

THE FORTNIGHTLY



JULY TO DECEMBER 1942
VOL. CLII NEW SERIES
(VOL. CLVIII OLD SERIES)

Verified

EDITORIAL OFFICES:
13 BUCKINGHAM STREET, STRAND, W.C.2.

PUBLISHING AGENTS:
LONDON:
HORACE MARSHALL & SON, LTD.
TEMPLE HOUSE, TALLIS STREET, E.C.4

UNITED STATES:
FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW OFFICES
13 BUCKINGHAM STREET, LONDON, W.C.2

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CONTENTS

AUTHOR.	TITLE.	PAGE
ADDISON, Lord	The Treatment of Post-War Problems	177
BAERLEIN, Henry	Scots in Poland	277
BANYARD, Herbert T.	Points of View : IV. The Civil Defence Worker	413
BARKER, Ernest	Educational Aims	236
BARTON, Sir William P.	The Viceroy's Council and Indian Politics	109
BATISTA I ROCA, J. M.	The Spanish Pendulum	31
BLUNDEN, Edmund	October Comes— <i>A Poem</i>	340
BROGAN, D. W.	The Case for French	334
CALOSSO, Umberto	The Monarchy in Italy	318
CHARLTON, Air-Comm. L. E. O.	Air Power and Sea Power	52
CHURCH, Richard	From "Twentieth Century Psalter"— <i>Poems</i>	263
CLIVE, Sir Robert H.	Japan : Dishonourable Anniversary	365
COLE, G. D. H.	The New "New Atlantis"	293
CORRESPONDENT IN INDIA, A.	Indian Freedom	301
"DANUBIAN"	Democracy on the Danube	24
DELAFIELD, E. M.	Mr. Fairchild ?	193
DENT, H. C.	Education for Democracy	91
DUNSANY, Lord	Sime	129
F/Lt.	The Bombing Offensive	229
FILIPOWICZ, Tytus	When Victory Comes	243
FORBES, Rosita	Bridge of Asia	373
FRANZERO, C. M.	What Future for Italy ?	97
GERARD, S. H.	Germany Between West and East	255
GILLETT, Eric	Modern Prose Forms : V. Fiction	197
GOODHART, A. L.	Modern Prose Forms : VI. The Drama	341
GWYNN, Maj.-Gen. Sir Charles	The American Elections	382
	Opening Moves	49
	Air Policy	116
	Germany's Next Step	184
	Japan's Strategic Position	274
	German Defensive Prospects	330
	The Battle of Egypt	394
GWYNN, Stephen	Ebb and Flow— <i>A Book Commentary</i>	61, 132, 205, 281, 353, 419
HAGGARD, Stephen	The Unproud Flame— <i>A Poem</i>	41
HAILEY, Lord	"A Colonial Charter"	1
HAMILTON, G. Rostrevor	Corley : 1902— <i>A Poem</i>	410
HEYMANN, Hans	Absorbing the Post-War Shock	308
HINKSON, Pamela	Ireland 1941-1942	153
HUXLEY, Julian S.	The War : Two Jobs, Not One	221
JEFFERY, Gordon	Points of View : III. The Shipyard Worker	43
LASKI, Harold J.	The King's Secretary	145
LUDWIG, Emil	Bismarck and Hitler	105
MACDONALD, N. P.	Germany and Portugal	37
MARRIOTT, Sir J. A. R.	England and Russia : a Retrospect	
MURRAY, Gilbert	The Classics	

32
70 M67
M67-152

69646

THE FORTNIGHTLY

JULY, 1942

'A COLONIAL CHARTER'

BY LORD HAILEY

It is undeniable that in our colonies there has been a great change during the last generation in the position regarding what may be termed generally the exploitation of natives. Perhaps the best evidence of this change is to be found in a study of the matters in regard to which the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society has in recent years found it necessary to exercise its vigilance. It must be admitted that there are in the Colonial Empire a considerable number of people who are condemned to live in what has generally been described as a state of serfdom. I am not here concerned with the precision of this term, but the circumstances to which it has been applied are sufficiently clear. They arise sometimes from the control still exercised by superior over inferior tribes; the Masarwa in Bechuanaland are a typical instance. At other times, it arises from the application of local economic usage, under which persons who have for any reason become indebted to others are held in more or less permanent bondage to their creditors. There are many instances of such practices in West Africa. In other areas, again, it arises from social custom, under which children pass by some form of adoption or the like from the control of their own families into that of others, and this is at times liable—as under the Mui Tsai practice in Hong Kong or Malaya—to take the more sinister form in which children so obtained may be subjected to prostitution. The hardship or disability actually involved is therefore of very varying degree. In no case can we look with any equanimity on the continuance of such relationships; in their worst form they call urgently for remedy. But it may be said of all of them, that the disabilities created are not the result of exploitation by Europeans or the abuse of administrative authority. In many cases, administrative action has already been taken to remedy them, though perhaps not always as readily, or in as complete a form as many could have desired. But their remedy is only partly to be found in administrative action, and the final solution must depend on the results of a general social and material advance.

But the greater proportion of the cases to which the more recent records of the Society refer do not lie in this direction. They refer

to matters in which racial discrimination has been shown in legislation, or where insufficient regard has been paid to protecting the conditions of labour, or where social services—and in particular health services—are inadequate. That list is not, of course, exhaustive, but it illustrates sufficiently the tendency to which I have referred. More and more, it would seem, the issues which provoke concern tend to be those of racial equality and of social and economic development, rather than those arising from the more crude forms of exploitation or of the abuse of authority. I have been struck by the analogy in this respect between the position of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society and that of the Commission for the Protection of Natives in the Congo, the independent body instituted by the Charter under which the Belgian Government took over the administration of the Free State, whose more recent records show the same development. But the development is itself a natural one, and reflects the change which has gradually taken place in the relations between the colonial administrations, or the European societies in the colonies, and the native populations. The change is part of that process which has produced throughout the world the growth of a more active and effective consciousness of the obligations which civilization at large owes to the more backward peoples. As Dr. Gilbert Murray has remarked, its most significant evidence is to be found in the international acceptance of the principles embodied in the mandatory system, and of a machinery by which breaches of those principles can be referred to the judgment of world opinion. But with all this, we cannot justly claim that the relations between the administrations of the colonies and their populations are yet such that the former no longer need the stimulus or the corrective which the activity of organizations interested in the cause of the natives of the Colonies can supply. Our own colonial system differs from most others in the facilities it offers, through the institution of legislative and other bodies, for the expression of local opinion or the ventilation of grievances. It is far more tolerant than most others of the expression of opinion in a local press. The time will come when we may be able to regard these agencies as adequate for voicing the interests or exposing the troubles of the more backward of our colonial peoples. But that time has not yet arrived.

It is characteristic of the changed outlook of which I have spoken, that the organizations which for many years have interested themselves in work of this character can now rely on assistance derived from a number of other sources. I was looking lately at an article written by the late Sir John Harris in 1939, which has been reprinted under the title "Native Labour: Success after 30 years."

It would, I think, have been difficult to have secured so general an agreement regarding the principles which should regulate the use of forced labour without the influence exercised by the International Labour Office, which has taken concrete shape in the Geneva Labour Conventions. The direct influence of the International Labour Office has, again, been seen in the rapid expansion of the labour inspectorate throughout our colonies, and in the passing of a very considerable body of legislation of the nature of Workmen's Compensation Acts, or Acts regulating the development of the Trade Union System, and the like. There are now also a considerable number of other organizations—some of them attached to the executive committees of important political sections in this country—which devote themselves specifically to the study of colonial problems. Indeed, those whose task it is to examine these questions have become very conscious of the volume of literature devoted either to examining the character of our colonial policy, or to planning for the future of the peoples of the dependencies. I am not at the moment on the point whether the public itself has reacted to the interest shown in colonial questions by these organizations. It has often been remarked that the attitude of the British public to colonial affairs is one of considerable apathy, and that it requires the shock of some untoward incident or some local scandal in order to remind it of its responsibilities towards the backward people dependent on us. In a general sense that is true, and we have lately received fresh proof of it in the outburst of popular feeling produced by our military disasters in the Far East, though indeed in this particular case a great deal of the criticism has been emotional, and based on false analogies. But I am concerned here, not so much with the attitude of the public at large, as with the activity of the organizations or the better informed groups whose function is to canalize the issues of public policy and to assist in determining the course it shall take.

It is relevant to ask, therefore, what is the most fruitful course to which effort on behalf of the more backward peoples can now be directed? I have made it clear that I am far from suggesting that the humanitarian impulse is no longer needed in order to provide a stimulus or a corrective in the direction of colonial affairs. But there are some of us who have begun to feel that our responsibilities towards the colonial people might be discharged far more effectively if we were inspired by a more definite view of the objective of colonial policy. Let me explain this point more fully. I will not attempt here to deal with the views put forward by the earlier school of critics which saw in the history of colonial acquisition nothing more than the expression of a crude spirit of

Imperialism, or the later school, inspired largely by Marxian theories, which saw at every turn the hidden hand of the capitalist and the monopolist. Whether these views square with historical fact or not, they are liable to lead those who hold them along a somewhat barren path. We no longer need to be admonished against the moral hazards to ourselves, the injustice to the native peoples, or the peril of discord in our relations with other nations, which would follow from giving way to the spirit of acquisitive Imperialism. Protagonists of these schools of thought are apt to be so engrossed in the relatively easy task of questioning the motives of a past generation, that they can afford little attention to the far more exacting study required for providing guidance in the solution of the concrete and very complex problems of the present.

Yet if we turn on the other side to the official or accepted conception of colonial policy, can it be said to be very explicit in the guidance which it affords? All declarations on the subject rely mainly on the affirmation of two principles, the fulfilment of the obligations of trusteeship, and the determination to pursue our traditional policy of assisting the dependent units of the Empire to attain self-government. So far as this goes, no one can quarrel with these principles. The conception of trusteeship was, as I have already said, largely built up on the teaching of that humanitarian school with which the early Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Societies were so closely associated. There can be no question of the genuine character of that sentiment among the more enlightened representatives of public opinion nor of the influence which it has exerted on the course of colonial administration. Again and again it has been invoked to prevent or correct action which seemed to threaten the vital interests of natives. It still holds the field to-day as the embodiment of the spirit of the mandatory system. But there is this also to be said about it as a guide in practical affairs. It is liable to a great variety of interpretation; its concrete expression must indeed differ widely, according to the philosophy of rule preferred by a colonial Power. The standards it applies are moral, and though this may suffice when the problems of policy can be stated in terms of moral issues, it gives no guidance in the wide range of administrative problems which have no such implication. It indicates the pitfalls we should avoid, rather than the path we should pursue, and to that extent, is apt to prove of negative rather than of constructive value. It has finally a connotation which causes its use to be resented by more educated and advanced people in the colonies, as it has been also in India.

It has been pointed out, in more than one quarter, that with the

progress of events our relations to the dependencies are now coming under the influence of a conception which if it should not be considered as replacing that of trusteeship, at all events embodies a more constructive interpretation of it. It is the conception of the State not merely as an agency for maintaining justice and equal rights, or for preventing abuse, as it was held to be in earlier political theory, but as the most active agency for promoting social welfare and improving the general standard of living. That is a conception which increasingly dominates our domestic policy, and it is forcing its way from domestic into colonial policy. Its implications on our relations to the colonies are far-reaching, and have already been seen in the wide recognition given to the principles underlying the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. Not the least of its benefits is derived from the fact that it brings colonial policy within the range of things with which the general public can claim some familiarity from its own domestic experiences.

But let me turn to the second of the principles which I have described as making up the sum of our declared colonial policy—the affirmation of the determination to assist the colonies to attain self-government. That is an ideal of which all those who are imbued with the traditions of British rule must be ready to assist in the fulfilment. But in the form in which it is commonly embodied in statements of public policy, it seems to say either too much or too little. If it encourages the hope that a unit, small in population and resources can, standing by itself, expect to attain responsible self-government in the sense that the Dominions have attained it, then it is likely to prove illusory. Nor does this statement of policy declare anything of the course to be followed where the normal development of constitutional self-government would bring the interests of a settled European community into variance with those of a native people; it leaves it to be assumed that the decision is somewhere implicit in the doctrine of trusteeship. It says nothing of a possible choice between the forms under which self-government can be attained, leaving it to be assumed that development must inevitably follow the one course which we know ourselves, the achievement of the normal institutions of Parliamentary government. I could pursue the catalogue; but I will limit it to just one further point. There is some lack of consistency in the declarations we have made regarding our economic relations with the colonies. There was a time when the watchword was that contained in Mr. Chamberlain's declaration of 1896, that we develop our colonial territory as trustees of civilization for the commerce of the world, and thus maintain everywhere what has generally been known as the "open door" in tariff matters. We have of late years departed

from that principle in regard to the tariff arrangements of a number of colonial areas; whether or not its re-establishment would be for the economic benefit of the colonial people I will not discuss here, for it is a point still in debate; but I feel that it is a matter on which our intentions should at least be made more clear.

It is considerations of this nature which have made many of us feel that the time has come when the essentials of our colonial policy should be restated. There are at the same time others who have demanded a new statement of policy, but from a different angle. They claim that recent events have shown that we need to show a new vision in our colonial rule. In their view we must show that we have a conception of common citizenship and common ideals, which will inspire the people of the colonial Empire as well as ourselves. If it serves that end, it may also serve to justify our position as a Colonial Power to the outside world, and to mitigate some of the suspicion which now attaches to it. That new conception should, in their view, be expressed as a Colonial Charter and should form a supplement to the Atlantic Charter.

In one particular, this proposal presents a special difficulty. The demand made in some of the colonies for the issue of a Colonial Charter—for instance in Ceylon—was explicitly directed, as it had been also in the case of India and Burma, to obtain a declaration of the time and manner in which we intended to concede responsible government to the communities concerned. That is a matter on which it would be out of place to enlarge here. I am more concerned to ask whether we do indeed need a new conception of our relations to the Colonial people. I do not overlook the inspiration of a new ideal. I would myself do nothing to discourage the efforts of those who feel that they can frame that ideal in terms which will give it the dynamic force which they seek for it, and will secure a fuller loyalty and stronger spirit of co-operation from the people of the colonies. But I have been much struck by the words used by *The Times* in the article on Imperial policy issued on last Empire Day. "It is in the Colonies," it says, "that must be worked out one of the greatest problems of the twentieth century, the problem how best the politically advanced nations can assist the less experienced on the path towards full liberty, political and economic The war has offered its secular challenge to British Colonial policy. It has exposed latent weaknesses or deficiencies and it brings with it as well the demands of a new age. The system must once again look, as it looked in an earlier day of adversity, for new life and strength in a ruthlessly realistic acceptance of its lessons." It is to these last words that I attach particular importance. I am convinced that any statement we may make now should in truth be realistic. I am

anxious lest the attempt to offer a new vision of the future should lead us into statements so general that they will not convey conviction, or so optimistic that they will only produce disappointment and a charge of bad faith when we have to recognize that circumstances will impede the early fulfilment of the promises which the ideal holds out.

The solution I myself venture to commend cannot, I admit, claim the character of a new vision. It may indeed be somewhat prosaic, and if it has any virtue, it is only that which can be derived from a clearer and more constructive statement of policy. I should, in the first place, prefer to see our relations restated, not as those of trustees and wards, but as those of senior and junior partners, on terms which recognize that the latter must as of right acquire an increasing share in the control of our common undertaking. I would prefer, again, to see our obligations to the colonial peoples stated not as those of trustees, but as those incumbent on the modern state in regard to the improvement of the social services and the standards of living in its own domestic backward areas. I think we should make it clear that, while holding whole-heartedly to the principle of self-government, we feel that the immediate step towards it should be taken in the more rapid development of fully powered local institutions and the fuller participation of the people of the country in their own administrative services. We should show, again, that it is our object rather to build as firmly as possible on the basis of existing institutions, in order to assist the evolution of forms of self-government best suited to the tradition and circumstances of the people, than to foster the artificial development of political forms of the model to which we are accustomed. I should wish, were it possible to do so, to show also what we are prepared to do to meet what is now the cardinal problem of most of the colonies, as it is that of most tropical or Eastern areas—the need for bringing the economic conditions of populations producing raw materials more nearly to the level of those of the industrialized countries. But that is not a problem merely for us; it is one which the civilized world as a whole must solve. It may have to make sacrifices to secure its solution, but it will not ensure the contentment or perhaps even the peace of the world until it has solved it. But we must at all events commit ourselves to give our good will and all the assistance of which we are capable in dealing with it.

(This article is the substance of an address delivered by Lord Hailey to the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society.)

PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

BY BERTRAND RUSSELL

AT present education, everywhere, is controlled by national States, and is used to promote a degree of nationalism which is scarcely compatible with any system of international government. In the totalitarian countries, especially in Germany and Japan, education has been, and is, just as much part of the preparation for war as the manufacture of munitions. Important virtues and excellences, such as courage, physical toughness, industry, and devotion to impersonal ideals, are successfully instilled, but are rendered harmful to mankind by the narrowness of the aims which are set before the young. No one can doubt that the young men who carried out the raid on Pearl Harbour felt themselves to be doing something noble; without this belief they would have been lacking in the necessary courage and discipline. This false belief is the result of bad education, and shows that, in certain respects, national education will have to be subject to international control if the world is to be safe from such disasters as it is now enduring.

Assuming some form of international authority established (I use this vague phrase because what I have to say is compatible with any of the suggested schemes) it must, if it is to be stable, forbid, and if necessary punish, not only actual rebellion, but the ideological preparation for rebellion by means of miseducation in recalcitrant national States. But this negative aspect—forcible prevention and punishment—is less important than the positive aspect. There must be an educational system promoted by the international authority, designed to give instruction free from national bias, to produce text-books and works of research calculated to encourage a universal human loyalty rather than a sectional devotion to some part of the human race even at the cost of war, and to train teachers with a well-informed belief in the principles upon which any supernational authority must rest. Let us consider how such a system can be built after the present war.

The central institution required will be an international

university. This should be in some neutral territory, analogous to the District of Columbia. It should be frankly designed to serve two purposes, one the purely academic, the other that of creating and diffusing an outlook calculated to prevent war and to promote loyalty to international ideals. The purely academic side of the university must, if the institution is to serve its purpose, be at least as good as is to be found in any existing university, and should, before long, be considerably better. It will be financed by the international authority, which should make generous appropriations. The laboratories, libraries, and other equipment should be the best possible. The architecture should be modern and utilitarian, but at the same time spacious and splendid.

The university must have a Charter, embodying a Bill of Rights. Both as regards teachers and students, it must be open to all races, all religions, all political opinions except such as reject the idea of an international government. It is obvious that, if it failed in this respect, it would not be truly international. Men and women who are academically qualified must not be rejected because they are yellow or brown or black, nor because they are Jews or Buddhists or Mohammedans or Hindus, nor yet because they do not subscribe to the dogmas of any sect or creed.

The selection of the initial teaching staff is a matter of great importance and some delicacy. The international authority would not itself have the necessary competence in academic matters to choose among younger men for subordinate posts, but it should be able to ascertain, without much difficulty, who were considered the most eminent among older men in various departments. I suggest that it should, in the first place, select three representatives of each large department of learning, all three to be of different nationalities. In doing so it should take account of international rather than purely national fame, for many of the men best qualified would be unpopular in their own countries; Einstein may serve as the most widely known instance, but a large proportion of academically eminent Germans are in the same position. The three men selected by the international authority, in each department, should become its directing committee, with power to co-opt; they should themselves be professors, and should select the rest of the staff of their department, subject to budgetary limitations, and rules precluding the preponderance of any one nationality within a department. All persons accepting a post in the university

10 PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

should be required to sign a declaration stating that they favoured international government and the legal settlement of all disputes between nations.

The government of the university (except as regards finance) should be in the hands of a body consisting of the above three representatives of each department, together with a certain number of men chosen by the international authority on account of their administrative ability, or to secure adequate representation of the various nations. After the first ten years or so, less difficult methods could be adopted for appointments to posts falling vacant or to newly created posts. The most natural plan, and probably the best, would be recommendation by all the teachers in the department concerned, with a power of veto by the international authority, to be exercised in the interests of international impartiality and for the furtherance of the aims of the university.

The student body should be entirely post graduate. It would not therefore compete with existing universities; but it is to be hoped that it would become customary for students who hoped to achieve eminence to go on from their *alma mater* to a post graduate course at the international university. In addition, advanced temporary fellowships should be offered to older men, both in the universities and in different professions, to enable them to keep abreast of recent work in their special fields, to meet their foreign colleagues, and generally to refresh their minds. Moreover, to supplement the permanent teaching staff of the university, funds should be set aside to provide for visiting lecturers. The university should hold summer schools for those who could not otherwise enjoy its advantages. By these means it would soon become a flourishing intellectual centre. All students should be required to know English and at least one other of the dominant languages of the world, and as many as possible of the lectures should be given in these majority languages. But where necessary the university should provide interpreters to make lectures in special subjects available to as many students as possible. The mixture of nationalities, though it would present some difficulties, would tend to diminish national bias, both among students and teachers, and would make impossible the kind of teaching which ignores fact in order to flatter the nations to which professor and students alike belong. The Japanese teach that Japan was created sooner than other parts of the world; in an institution where many nations meet as equals,

PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 11

such doctrines, even if a teacher holds them privately, cannot be avowed without covering him with ridicule.

Science, naturally, would be emphasized in the curriculum, and still more in the expenditure, of the university. Public-spirited and humane men of science would be relieved of a weight upon their consciences which, in the world as it is now, grievously oppresses very many of them. They know that their discoveries and inventions, whatever their intention, are likely to be used to make war more terrible, and there is nothing that they can do to prevent this result. Employed by the international authority they would not be troubled in this way. Whatever strengthens the central government from a military point of view makes rebellion less likely, just as at the end of the middle ages gunpowder and artillery put an end to the anarchy of feudal barons. Very soon, if people come to feel peace secure, the possible warlike uses of science will sink into the background, and it will again become an almost wholly beneficent activity, as it was before the days of Archimedes, the first scientific militarist.

Among academic studies, perhaps the one that affords the clearest illustration of what a world university could achieve is history. At present, history is usually written, and almost always taught, with a nationalistic bias; facts are distorted, or, if not actually falsified, are unfairly selected; many of the men who are held up to most admiration are not those who have benefited all mankind, but those who have led one particular nation to victor in war. What is even more important is the national bias exhibited in the history of science. The law which the English call Boyle's law is in France attributed to Mariette; English writers sometimes suggest that Priestley discovered oxygen, which is an injustice to Lavoisier; German mathematicians are apt to claim Gauss as the originator of non-Euclidean geometry, whereas this honour belongs to the Russian Lobatchevsky. The invention of the steamboat is quite a different affair in English and American books. The most famous of such controversies was the dispute between Newton and Leibniz about the invention of the calculus, which prevented George I. from bringing Leibniz with him to England, and ruined English mathematics for more than a century.

All large countries falsify history in a greater or less degree. The accounts of the Indian mutiny that are taught to English children are grossly one-sided. In the world university, the Indian account of this event must be given exactly as much

weight as the English account. Similarly, the Spanish-American war of 1898 must be treated from a point of view which is neutral as between Spain and the United States. While these evils are nowhere wholly absent, they are much worse in Germany, Italy and Japan than in any other large countries. The Italian government emphasized the glories of ancient Rome, and tried to make its subjects believe that these glories could be revived. The Japanese government "revived" the ancient Shinto religion, which had been almost completely displaced by Buddhism. But the new Shinto was very different from the old. It was a State religion, designed to instil the belief that the Japanese are radically superior to all other nations. Such a belief, while it retains its present force, makes it impossible to incorporate Japan in any genuine attempt at international co-operation; Japan's membership of the League of Nations carried always a large measure of hypocrisy.

The history of German chauvinism is even more relevant to our theme, since it began among university professors: Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* in 1807 inaugurated the process, and emphasized the importance of education. "The new education," he said, "must consist essentially in this: that it completely destroys freedom of the will in the soil which it undertakes to cultivate, and produces on the contrary strict necessity in the decisions of the will, the opposite being impossible. Such a will can henceforth be relied upon with confidence and certainty." He concludes that "to have character and to be German undoubtedly mean the same." Hegel, somewhat more urbanely, developed a similar doctrine in his *Philosophy of History*. Spirit, which governs the course of great events, embodies itself now in one nation, now in another. Truly great men, whom it chooses as its instruments, are above the moral law; Alexander and Cæsar are given as instances. In our age, it is the Germans whom Spirit has selected as its champions.

After these philosophers, the historians took up the task. Mommsen's *History of Rome* is throughout a glorification of aristocratic imperialism, culminating in a monstrous overestimate of Cæsar. Rome and Carthage are regarded as prototypes of Germany and England, and there is a clear suggested hope that some future Punic Wars may have a similar outcome. Treitschke, in his *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century*, preached German nationalism with

any pedantic regard for accuracy. These learned men and their lesser coadjutors prepared public opinion in Germany for Bismarck, William II, and Hitler. They show what university professors can achieve, and what, in an opposite direction, may be achieved by a world university.

As regards text-books: the international university should appoint a licensing board to select text-books from those already written, or, if necessary, to commission the writing of new ones. Every author of a text-book would have to seek the *imprimatur* of the international university before his book could be used in schools. Any State which persistently rejected the internationally authorized text-books in its national education would thereby afford *prima facie* evidence of its disloyalty, and would be penalized by the international authority. This arrangement would not be intended to prevent students from encountering different points of view. On the contrary, both university students and children of all ages should be allowed and encouraged to read partizan statements and nationalistic literature of all countries; but the "set books" prescribed by their teachers should have the certificate of the international committee. They would thus be sure of their facts, and could read the propaganda of all sides without being misled. Inspectors appointed by the committee would visit all schools to make sure that the approved text-books were being used; and it would of course be necessary for national governments, on pain of deprivation of federal privileges, to allow such inspectors all necessary facilities and guarantee their authority.

The international university cannot impose its ideals on the different nations of the world from without; it will need responsive movements from within. In countries other than those of the Axis such movements should not be difficult to promote. Everyone who hopes for international co-operation at the end of the war can do much, while the war still continues, to substitute the international motive for the purely national. It is not enough to fight for our respective countries, or for the preservation of the American or the English or the Chinese or the Russian "way of life." These countries have the same interest in victory, but they cannot be said wholeheartedly to wish for the preservation of each other's "way of life." Their common aim is to put an end to national aggression and to substitute the rule of law in international affairs.

14 PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

In the Axis countries, which are the most important field for internationalism in education, it may be difficult to find a suitable method of reform. It is impossible to discuss the problems that arise except on the basis of some hypothesis as to the nature of the peace. The peace treaty must, obviously, leave undetermined the period during which ex-enemy countries will be disarmed and subjected to military occupation; the length of the period must depend on their good behaviour. I suggest that their educational policy should be one of the things taken account of in determining the period when the occupying forces could be withdrawn. An ex-enemy country which hopes to get them withdrawn will have to satisfy the Federation that it has adequately reformed education, and in order to do so will have to afford every facility for inquiry by agents of the Federation.

The provisions in regard to text-books, already discussed, can be applied without change to the ex-enemy countries. Free access to schools for inspectors appointed by the international authority should be a condition for withdrawal of the garrison. Such inspectors would, no doubt, pay special attention to teachers' training colleges. It would be to the interest of the ex-enemy State to win their approval, and it would therefore presumably facilitate their work; but if bitterness led to obstruction, that would be evidence that the garrison was still necessary. The inspectors would be invited by the ex-enemy State concerned, not imposed from without; all that is imposed is disarmament and a foreign garrison.

During the probationary period, students could not be admitted to the international university from ex-enemy countries, except in the case of individuals specially approved by the international authorities. If ordinary students were admitted, they might be spies or saboteurs; they would probably, at first, associate only with their compatriots, and fail entirely to acquire any tincture of internationalism. It would be better if, as a step towards removal of the foreign garrison, the State concerned were to invite to its universities visiting professors from the international university, who could act as missionaries.

It is to be hoped that the international university would influence teachers especially, both directly and indirectly. As regards university teaching, the prestige of the international university should lead to the appointment, in other universities, of a large percentage of teachers who have profited by

PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 15

its education. The international authority might encourage this by paying a percentage of the salary of any professor or instructor, at any university, who had been a satisfactory student at the international university. But as regards schools something different will be required. Here what is most important is the training of teachers. It would be desirable for all instructors in training colleges to have been trained at the world university; its influence would then percolate first to the teachers and then to the students.

Some purists may object to all that has been said on the ground that it involves an illegitimate use of education for the purpose of instilling certain political opinions. This objection will be urged, on the one hand, by those who wish other political opinions to be instilled, namely those of a narrow nationalism; on the other hand, by those who hold that education, and especially university education, should have no ulterior motive, but should be concerned solely to equip students with certain kinds of knowledge and skill.

The objectors of the first of these two kinds are really objectors to something which is essential to international government, and are carrying over a point of view which the creation of any international authority is designed to render out of date. In a world of wholly independent States, any one of which might at any moment attack any other, it was felt that the only safety lay in readiness for self-defence, and that such readiness had to be secured, not only by armaments, but by the creation of a strong national feeling. The internal stability of the national governments of all large countries has been secured by prolonged educational propaganda, dating back, in England, France, Spain, and Russia, to the middle ages; in the United States, to 1776; in Germany and Italy, to the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is only through such propaganda that national interests have superseded local interests in public opinion.

The present war is being fought by an Alliance, which requires mutual understanding and respect for its smooth working. Victory would be endangered if the Allies were to compete in each lauding their own merits at the expense of the others. What is necessary among the Allies during the war will be necessary on a more extensive scale after the peace if a Federation sufficiently powerful to prevent future world wars is to be established. Such a federation will need a new outlook, in the establishment of which the world university must

16 PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

play a leading part. But the outlook required will not need, as nationalist education does, the support of untruthful or misleading propaganda. The educational work required to insure the stability of the international authority will consist entirely in emphasizing truths which national governments are apt to suppress, and in exposing falsehoods which national governments are prone to disseminate. When I speak, in this connection, of "truths" and "falsehoods," I am not thinking of something metaphysical; I should, for this purpose, define "truth" as what is accepted as truth by a well-informed person who is not a party to the controversy.

National propaganda has been successful largely because it has been felt to be in line with national interests. The new international outlook must also be presented as in line with national interests. This should be an easy task. At the end of the present war, assuming the Axis Powers defeated, there should be a very general realization that wars are a misfortune to all parties, and that it is to the interest of all to find a way of preventing them. It should be easy, given the establishment of an international authority, to persuade all the politically conscious portion of the human race that the only way to prevent war is to substitute law, enforced by a centralized armed force, for the present anarchic system in which each national government has its own forces and is the sole judge as to how and when to employ them.

Finally: in a world so full of chaotic evil, any man who combines intelligence with humane feeling must be, in a greater or less degree, a missionary. A new world is needed, and the battle of the democracies must be inspired by the hope of creating it. Our battle must not be purely defensive: it must be inspired by a new hope and a new vision. No hope has much chance of realization, in our technically unified but politically divided planet, unless through the creation of an international authority, strong enough and resolute enough to prevent the recurrence of world wars. The creation of such an authority, for the first time in human history, is now a practical possibility. When once it exists, the men who serve it will see new opportunities of progress. Philosophers, historians, economists, men of science, will be liberated from the nightmare oppressions that have impeded their creativeness. Our times of darkness may be succeeded by a great age, in which a new productiveness will be generated by new hopes and wider loyalties.

BRITISH INDUSTRIES LOOK AHEAD

BY VISCOUNT SANKEY

THE Reconstruction Report by the Federation of British Industries issued in May, 1942, is a remarkable document which ought to be read and studied by all those who by deed or word can make any contribution, however small, towards the future welfare and happiness of Great Britain. Its origin shows the weight which is to be attached to it.

Although the term "industrialist" appears to be used throughout as referring to the employing side of the industry, in the present article the word is used as referring to all those employed in it, both the master and the man, the worker and the manufacturer. Industrialists will win the war together and their object must be to hammer out a system which will be the greatest advantage to the country in peace. A joint effort will be required, and success will not be attained unless British industry is conducted by all employed in it with the greatest amount of efficiency and the least amount of friction.

It is perhaps not an unnatural occurrence that just about the same time the Labour Party were preparing a Report, and they issued it under the title of "The Old World and the New Society" for debate at their Annual Conference in May.

It is just as well to hear both sides of the case, and it is extremely useful to read both these Reports together at the same time, but the present article deals with the Federation Report, although a reference is made from time to time to the Labour Party's Report. Both Reports, however, wisely say that their effort is not a final consideration of the problem. The Federation state that their document must be considered as a preliminary one; the Labour Party state that it proposes only the basis upon which the nation could begin forthwith to build.

The Federation Report, at the very beginning and at the very end sets out the real nature of the problem. It asks "What is the main object served by industry in this country?" Put briefly it is to maintain a population of 46 million people in these islands, and to provide them with the maximum means of employment and with subsistence at as high a degree as the community can achieve. The

Labour Report, which is more political and more rhetorical, is in essential agreement with this when it says: "The basis of our democracy must be planned production for community use."

The Federation Report in the last paragraph says that it does not deal with labour questions and the relations between employers and employed; that these are dealt with by the British Employers' Federation, but that it is clear that the two sets of problems, namely, economic and business considerations on the one hand, and labour and social questions on the other, interact upon each other, which is no doubt a profound truth.

A condition precedent to all the suggestions of the Federation rightly calls for security and the maintenance of peace. Their first submission is that whatever the future form of co-operation in policing the world against aggression may be, it is essential that the democracies and other peace-loving nations of the world should take a continuing and permanent interest in ensuring the maintenance of a sufficient force to curb aggression, and that they should be prepared to use that force without hesitation or delay should the necessities arise. Otherwise any post-war economic structure will be founded on a quicksand.

With this the Labour Party are in entire agreement. They say the peace which follows victory must have two objectives—to make it impossible for the aggressor nations to be able to use war as an instrument of national policy, and to build the ground plan of an enduring peace. They add that aggressor nations must be disarmed and kept disarmed.

The Federation Report is then divided into three main parts—

1. The International Problem
2. World Purchasing Power
3. National Questions.

As to the International Problem the most important submission probably is that a common policy between the United Kingdom and the Empire and the U.S.A. is essential, although the difficulties are fully realized, and that a system of consultation with the Dominions, including India, should be devised to permit of a common Empire policy being formulated for discussion with the U.S.A. at the appropriate moment, and that any British Empire/U.S.A. Group that may be formed must maintain close touch with Russia and China with a view to economic co-operation.

It is urged as part of the general suggestions that to carry out the task of reconstruction continuing international co-operation will be needed. This is of first importance. No doubt after the war much hatred and bitter memories will continue, but the sooner the wheels of international trade and commerce begin to revolve

again the better, the sooner international barriers are broken down, the sooner a real peace will be established.

Free trade in the old days prevented many causes of friction between the nations. A great historian, Mr. Trevelyan, in his *History of England* has reminded us that taken in its largest aspect the free trade policy of Great Britain and the refusal any longer to keep trade with our Colonies and Possessions as the reserve of our own, removed many sources of friction with other nations which would not willingly have seen themselves shut out from trade with so large a portion of the world as claimed to be included in the second British Empire.

Viscount Samuel in a recent Debate in the House of Lords (June 4, 1942) pointed out that it is now universally recognized that

to abolish every form of restriction and control in international trade and to establish universal freedom of trade is impossible in the existing state of the world. The classic economics assumed that free competition would be universal and that every individual manufacturer or merchant within his own country and in turn trade with all other countries But we have been for some years now very far from that situation, not only on account of the existence of tariffs but on account of the growing existence of cartels, of systems of trade such as practised by Germany, with political and military direction, and the Russian system in which the whole national commerce is in effect in one hand.

This no doubt is correct, but it is to be hoped that although it may be impossible to have free trade between individuals, we shall not find ourselves confronted by a system of international blocs composed of nations in economic warfare against one another.

While therefore it seems wise that we should co-operate with the U.S.A., with Russia, and with China, it will be regrettable if we forget that Great Britain is a member of the European group of nations. There is, however, one rather disquieting suggestion in the Federation Report dealing with the smaller nations. It states that one of the outstanding economic results of the last war was the creation of a large number of small national units, each with a separate economic life, and it may be assumed that there will be after the war a tendency towards the formation of larger economic units, whatever the political relationship may be between the parties forming some large economic groupings. This gives one furiously to think. Does it mean that we have reached a period where the small nation and the small man must both disappear, and our life and our fate must be entrusted to big combinations at home and big world national combinations?

May not we envisage still a free existence both for little nations and little men. Besides, it seems to be forgotten that Belgium, although a small European nation, has huge African interests, and

Holland, although a small European nation, has huge Far Eastern interests. Are they to be deprived of these in any future world order? Cultural independence is a poor substitute for national sovereignty and individual freedom.

As to World Purchasing Power the Federation lays it down that—an essential element of reconstruction is the creation of a political system which will ensure peace and an economic system which will create the machinery for a world exchange of commodities and services. One who has spent his life in hearing evidence and trying to come to a just conclusion feels it difficult to offer an original opinion upon this subject, which is really the domain of those with world-wide experience of trade. It seems to some, however, not only that modern inventions have destroyed isolation, but that the course of trade has made all nations more and more dependent upon one another. Each nation has reached the position of being unable to continue its normal existence without the co-operation of the other. It is true, as the Report says, that a policy of artificial scarcity of essential raw materials and foodstuffs does not seem a sound basis on which to build a more prosperous world.

It is a trite observation that some countries are throwing into the sea or burning foodstuffs which another nation is longing to possess. The Federation suggests that serious attention should be given both nationally and internationally to the problem of how far it is possible to facilitate development of the more undeveloped areas of the world, such as the Colonial Empires of the various countries and China, not so much from the point of view of their being providers of primary products for world use, as from that of encouraging domestic developments likely to improve the standard of life and give them the urge to do so.

One of the root difficulties is the question of wages. It is wages which create purchasing power. A very low wage paying country may, till education has raised the standard of living and of wage earning, compete quite easily against a high wage-earning country.

The Report truly says that a very small rise in the individual standard of life would have a profound effect upon world economy, and it refers to the Colonial Possessions of the British Empire and other countries.

"The objective should be to raise the power of the world to purchase, and to envisage a future in which there will be an expanding world economy, and for this a positive and not a negative policy is needed."

This is admirable advice, but there are great initial difficulties. How far it is possible to raise the standard of life and to increase wages in our West Indian Colonies is very doubtful. Those who have studied the Report made by Major Orde Browne on labour

conditions in the West Indies, 1939, Cmd. 6070, will realize the intricacies of the problem.

But it is not only wages which create a difficulty. There are also political questions like that of the colour bar in some of our African Possessions. The Labour Party's Report states that on imperial questions the Labour Party is absolutely opposed to the colour bar in every shape and form. Modern views of the doctrine of Colonial Trusteeship urge the state not only to develop Colonial production but to provide for it an outlet and a satisfactory market.

There are some, however, who are beginning to think the end of the so-called economic man is nearing. At the best he was only an abstraction divorced from the realities of life. Is it not possible to look forward rather to a change in the direction of our civilization than to try and alleviate particular hardships? A system which provides a wider choice of food and amusements is not worth having, if it entails recurrent periods of unemployment. Men will prefer a way of life which ensures definite and continuous work at a reasonable wage.

As to National Questions, which are most important for those of us who actually live in Great Britain, they are summed up under several headings, such as Finance, Government Control, Agriculture, Demobilization, Organization and The Home Market.

With regard to the question of agriculture, the Report sets an example when it says that the Federation are not in a position to advise on the technical agricultural problems involved, but they can appreciate the broad principles which have to be taken into account. Agriculture is one of the most difficult of questions and we shall probably all agree that we are not making the best of our British countryside. Some people are very good at building castles in the air, but you want land to grow crops, and the land question will be a difficult one. Another problem will be the question of collection and distribution of the produce of farms and small holdings.

With regard to the other headings, everyone will agree that the most careful consideration should be given to the problem of orderly demobilization, in order to avoid people being thrown on the labour market before it is ready to absorb them.

This leads to the most important heading, and that is the question of the Government control of industry. The Report says

the war has rendered it necessary for the Government to assume wide powers of control over industry and increasingly to concern itself with its operations Such measure of control is necessary in wartime, but should not be perpetuated as a permanent principle of our economic system.

There will probably be general agreement that control cannot be

removed for some time after the war. The Labour Party are of opinion that as a necessary prerequisite to the organization of society the main wartime controls in industry and agriculture should be maintained to avoid the scramble for profits which followed the last war. In addition to that one would like to add that some controls may have to remain a long time, not only to avoid the scramble for profits but because by such control the happiness and welfare of the nation as a whole will be best achieved. No one would desire universal control of everything and everybody. There is general agreement that whatever form of control is adopted, the technique of Bureaucracy and its dangers must be avoided.

Then again there are different means of controlling. You may have entire nationalization. You may have that form of control which has been worked out by several British experiments in public ownership, as for example the Central Electricity Board, the B.B.C. The London Passenger Transport. You may have a certain amount of control for the supply of capital and credit for productions, for the control of land for industrial and agricultural use, the control of import and export trade, and the control of transport, and the supply of fuel and power. These are referred to in a recent pamphlet *A Word on the Future* issued by the Fabian Society, also in the month of May last, where they point out that general nationalization is unnecessary.

Again it must be said that the compass of a short article prevents detailed discussion of these matters, but perhaps the writer may be permitted to make a few general observations in conclusion. It seems to him that the tendency in the future will be to have more control. The Federation contend that decisions on the matter should not be based on political theories of government but on reasons of economic welfare. This is undoubtedly true to some extent, but it is the experience of great nations that from time to time in their history changes take place in their customs, habits and outlook on life, and it seems that the general current of opinion in the country is setting towards a change in our way of life.

Some years ago Mr. J. M. Keynes wrote an interesting pamphlet on *The End of Laissez Faire*, where he pointed out that

many people who are objecting to capitalism as a way of life argue as if they were objecting to it on the ground of its inefficiency in attaining its objects A time may be coming when we shall get clearer than at present as to when we are talking about capitalism as an efficient or inefficient technique and when we are talking about it as desirable or objectionable in itself.

Capitalism as a way of life is like a creed. You have convictions for or against it, not depending perhaps on logical argument. It is not a question of capitalism pure and simple, but in whose hands capital shall be, whether in individual hands or in the hands of the State, and possibly also with regard to an individual capitalist as to how he has made his money and what use he makes of it. There seems to be a growing volume of opinion against large sums of capital in the hands of individuals or limited companies, and many object to such a system as the best way of life for a country. Probably the result of the war too will quicken the growth of this opinion. Further it may be said that, thanks to the help of Russia we were able to win the war, and whether that is true or not, people will be tempted to think that therefore the Russian system and the Russian way of life is the best. Great care must be taken before arriving at a just conclusion in this matter. Nor must it be forgotten that Russia has rather receded in the last three or four years from the absolutely non-capitalistic state.

In examining the question, therefore, from the point of view of a way of life it depends a good deal upon the convictions and feeling of the individual. There are those who think that a modern industrial democratic society with an oligarchically governed industry is a house divided against itself, and you cannot preach the advantages of a democratic system without conceding something to those who desire to see those principles expanded, not only generally in the State but to the industries which live within it. More people than ever are reaching the conclusion that the workers must be given an opportunity to develop their capacities and to share in the making of the rules under which they work, which is the second of the axioms of the planned democracy referred to in the Labour pamphlet.

It was said as far back as 1919 that half a century of education has produced in the workers in the coalfields far more than a desire for the material advantages of higher wages and shorter hours. They have now, in many cases, and to an ever-increasing extent a higher ambition of taking their due share and interest in the direction of the industry to the success of which they too are contributing.

In spite of the heat and conflict of political and economic controversy, the writer of this article has no misgivings for the future, and he is convinced that in due time these problems will be satisfactorily solved in the British way by which such questions always have been solved, and not by the excessive and violent methods which some Continental nations have found necessary to carry out social changes.

DEMOCRACY ON THE DANUBE

BY "DANUBIAN"

INCREASINGLY, public opinion favours a federation of the Danubian countries after this War. Official recognition of this movement has recently come from the *émigré* governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia. An Agreement which they concluded early this year provides the blueprint for a future federation of their countries. Among the nationalities which formed part of the former Austro-Hungarian empire, none had fought more ardently for their full national sovereignty than Czechs and Poles. Their new Agreement is an implicit, yet significant, admission that complete independence was another case of "*Que la République était belle—sous l'Empire.*"

Reluctantly and belatedly, even the most uncompromising among the Danubian nationalists are realizing the good features of the defunct Empire: its greater security in defence; its success as an economic unit; its achievements in the cultural sphere. Even its failure on the political side is perhaps no longer seen as an insuperable argument against its rebirth in some improved shape. A correct analysis of the causes of this failure may be of considerable importance in framing future policy on the Danube.

Among the more obvious factors which, in the end, led to the collapse of the Habsburg empire, the following seem to stand out:

- (1) Insufficiencies in dynastic leadership;
- (2) Excessive inequality in social and economic development as between the various parts of the Empire;
- (3) Obsolete, hence artificial, hegemony in Austria of the Austro-German, in Hungary of the Magyar, elements;
- (4) Weaknesses in the educational system.

The political history of Austria-Hungary since 1790 (death of Joseph II, Maria-Theresa's son) cannot be written without showing the numerous deficiencies, both moral and intellectual, the unfailing mediocrity, of the last five Habsburgs. Even at the beginning of the 19th Century, their conception of government—a means for the maintenance, welfare and further glorification of the dynasty—was growing obsolete. When the last Habsburg proposed the federation of his peoples on the basis of full equality, it merited the most outstanding case of "too little, too late" of the first World War.

Had all its latest rulers been blessed with political genius, the task of steering the Habsburg empire through the last seventy years of its existence

would still have been colossal. The Metternich police régime—a pale ancestor of the Gestapo—had been successful in postponing to 1848 the full impact of the ideas of 1789. Abruptly, this time lag had to be made up from the early fifties onwards. Such political, social and economic development as was witnessed in Austria-Hungary from 1848 to 1918 had started in France well before 1789 and in England probably as far back as the early decades of the 18th Century. As a result, at the outbreak of the first World War, Austria-Hungary had not nearly had time to achieve equilibrium. Highly developed, progressive, industrial districts in Lower Austria, Bohemia and Moravia co-existed with the backward, illiterate feudalism of the Hungarian plain, Slovakia and the Polish provinces where serfdom, legally abolished in 1848, continued in economic disguise. Such inequalities would have been difficult to adjust among a single and united nation, let alone a country of eleven nationalities with as many languages.

History had favoured two of these, the Austro-Germans and the Magyars. They had gained and maintained supremacy over a little more than two centuries. The rebirth of the subject nationalities in the 19th Century quickly turned their hegemony into a strongly resented anachronism. As national and economic grievances overlapped, open antagonism developed. The subject nationalities realized that political hegemony was tantamount to economic spoliation. The main industries, the big estates, the banks, the most influential and best remunerated posts in the diplomatic, civil and fighting services were in the hands of unyielding vested interests doubly hateful to the newcomers as they shared neither their language nor their cultural background. Whether, in details of social refinement at least, the ruling nationalities still retained a measure of superiority, is a moot point. Be that as it may, they were politically most unwise to treat the "minorities" as parvenus. For, taken collectively, these minorities both in Austria and in Hungary were in fact the majority (64 per cent. of the total population in Austria; 52 per cent. in Hungary, both according to the official 1910 census). Their successful coalition to throw off the political yoke was merely a question of time and opportunity. Quite apart from which parvenus, however disagreeable otherwise, have by essence more push and are more alert.

Existing antagonism was further aggravated by a system of education closely modelled on the German pattern if superior to it in some respects. That meant a system imparting a comparatively vast sum of knowledge without correspondingly developing character and will-power. Obedient subjects were considered more useful and certainly more convenient than thinking citizens. The spirit of Metternich's *Polizeistaat* was not yet dead either in the public mind in general or in the public services in particular. Nor did the very wide influence of the Roman Church on educational matters favour independent lines of thought. The whole system endorsed the famous "He thinks too much. Such men are dangerous."

All this accounts for the slow development of conscious democratic thought

and action. In Austria, the first franchise based on a general, equal and secret ballot was applied in 1907 while in Hungary, no secret elections were held until after the first World War. Hungarian elections had become proverbial in Europe to designate "rigged" ballots. In 1914, under § 14 of the Austrian Constitution—the emergency paragraph constitutional liberties were voided and Parliament went into a vacation which was to last until 1917. In Hungary, Parliament remained in session but, under the existing franchise, it neither reflected prevailing class divisions nor did it allow for adequate representation of national minorities. Without a glance at this—still very recent—historical past, future chances of democracy in the Danubian area cannot be seen in proper perspective.

II.

Sober examination of the existing situation shows that these chances are likely to continue poor, even after the inevitable collapse of Hitler's "New Order." The pessimism of this appraisal results largely from the experiences of the Successor States during the period 1918/1938. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, none of them was able to maintain democratic forms of government for more than a few years. Even in Czechoslovakia, the normal functioning of democracy was, during the last few years of her independence, gradually and systematically sapped by an increasing section of the population: by the majority of the Sudeten Germans, for nationalist reasons; by influential Czech agrarian and Czech fascist elements, for class reasons.

The closer the examination, the more the conviction grows on the observer that none of the Successor States was ripe for democracy. With slight variations, their breakdown had the same causes as twenty years earlier the collapse of the Dual monarchy. But to the factors previously enumerated, another must now be added: the comparatively low standard of wealth in all these countries. This last factor was strongly adverse to the maintenance of democracy. Regrettable though it may be, democracy is still a social luxury. It requires not only a certain minimum of civic education, but also a certain minimum of national wealth. One without the other provides an insufficient basis. That much is clear from the case of Germany prior to 1914 where the standard of civic education was deficient. *A fortiori*, democracy failed in the Danubian area where neither of these standards was reached.

Czechoslovakia is generally considered the one exception. Thus, such outstanding authority on the Slavonic nations as Professor Pares, of London University, writes in his excellent *Penguin Russia* (p. 213):

In their treatment of their inevitable minorities—in language, schools, representation in parliament—they (the Czechs) stood out above all other States on the Continent. Democracy for them was a faith for which their own generation had had to fight.

This judgment, representative of many similar pronouncements, some of

them by less qualified observers, is nevertheless an overstatement and therefore inaccurate.

The touchstone of democracy in any country is the treatment accorded to minority opinion; in the Danubian countries in particular, the treatment of minorities *tout court*. The award made by Professor Pares completely overlooks the examples provided both by Switzerland and by France (in Alsace). To be accurate, his sentence quoted above should read "... stood out above all other Successor States." Thus restricted, Czechoslovakia's claim to supremacy would not mean much in view of the notoriously unsatisfactory position of the minorities in the other Successor States.

Moreover, comparison with the minority situation in former Austria shows that the difference was *one of degree, not of kind*. It would be unfair to blame the Czechs for failing to solve their minority problems within the short period of twenty years, a mere split second in the reckoning of history. Had that failure been confined to their dealings with Germans and Magyars, it might indeed have been explained by the political fanaticism and the mulish intellectual outlook of both these minorities. Yet, as events were to show, the Czechs were hardly more successful with their nearest Slav kin, the Slovaks, a people whose language is almost as near to Czech as Danish is to Norwegian. Somehow, therefore, the spirit in which they dealt with their minorities must have lacked that element which, alone, could have created a national conscience in a country of six nationalities and as many languages. The first condition for the shaping of a national conscience in a young and nationally divided country is full equality of languages not only in private, but also in public life. In theory, the Czechoslovakian Constitution provided for such equality. In practice, notably in Court procedure and in dealings between citizens and public services, equality of languages was considerably restricted by a percentage qualification in respect of the minority population resident in a given administrative or judicial district (20 per cent.) Arbitrary delimitation of these districts and a tendency to interpret language regulations *strictissimo sensu* were the grievances most frequently encountered. During the first years of the Republic, the tendency to make Czech the *Staatssprache* was hardly less marked than at one time a similar tendency towards making German the *Staatssprache* in Austria. For many years, no posters in the minority language were permitted in Prague, the capital. Jingos caused frequent scenes in public places when minority languages were used in public. Rightly or wrongly, the minorities suspected such manifestations, however unimportant in themselves, to be more characteristic of the official attitude than the theoretical provisions of the Law. A visible tendency to sidetrack these and other, more serious, grievances—except belatedly, under outside political pressure—did little to remove these suspicions. Compare this with the Swiss and French examples. There is no record of the Berne city fathers ever prohibiting posters in French or Italian or the French objecting to the use of the Alsatian patois or, for that matter, German, in public. These facts,

insignificant though they may appear at the outset, show a basically different approach to minority problems. It is the difference between nations which history has taught to see in language a mere means of human intercourse and communication; and nations afflicted by a cultural inferiority complex under whose influence language becomes a weapon of political and economic supremacy. These facts must be stated, but, in justice to the Czech case, it must also be added that not even the most scrupulously fair treatment of her minorities would have prevented the disruption of Czechoslovakia from the outside.

III.

Czechoslovakia's case has been dwelt upon in some detail. Indeed, if it is admitted that her standard of minority treatment was the highest among the Successor States, one might legitimately conclude *Ab une disce omnes*. It thus becomes clear why the reconstruction of the Danubian area and its possible federation bristles with innumerable difficulties. Past history shows that no such reconstruction is possible on lines of national hegemony. Democratic equality alone can make it a success. But it is also evident that for such a solution, the spiritual background is at present lacking. A federation of Danubian democracies cannot be stronger than its weakest link.

IV.

Three factors, in particular, make reconstruction even more difficult to-day than it was after the first World War.

The first is the spirit of vengeance which is bound to have developed from the depredations of Hitler's "New Order." If the misery of this régime had helped the Danubian nations to realize their past mistakes, *à quelque chose, malheur eût été bon*. After the war, evidence of such tendencies will probably be found. But the New Order is more likely to have stimulated negative movements. Hate against the German oppressor and his satellites, the Magyar and the Oustachi Croat, has no doubt accumulated to such an extent as to forebode violent explosions. It is at least doubtful whether solemn resolutions by *émigré* governments about legal retribution will prevent the use of telegraph poles for speedier forms of process.

The break-up of the old economic unity after 1918 has completely upset the former balance between agricultural and industrial production in the Danubian basin. This is the second great obstacle to reconstruction. The new industries developed in each of the Successor States have, for the most part, only military justification. Neither the new Hungarian textile industry nor the new Czechoslovakian motor car industry could live without tariff walls. And if there was some justification for the building of new hydro-electric plants in Austria, to the detriment of coal imports from Poland and Czechoslovakia, it would probably have been by far more economic had Austria continued to import beet sugar from Czechoslovakia rather than develop

the cultivation of sugar beet and build her own refineries. The wastefulness of the whole process is perhaps best illustrated in the motor car industry where a single Austrian plant could have covered the whole requirements of the Successor States and would still have had a balance left for export. Whether the New Order has removed some of the new Customs barriers and levelled out costs of production is at present unknown. Otherwise, there will be new vested interests ready to fight for tariffs tooth and nail.

The greatest difficulty lies, however, on the spiritual side. No federation without a federal spirit. Where is it to come from? That it existed in fair measure in the Holy Roman Empire cannot be doubted. *Unius linguae uniusque moris regnum imbecile et fragile est*, is a saying ascribed to St. Stephen, patron-saint of Hungary (A.D. 1000). That spirit had time to vanish during the 19th Century. To revive it in the face of intense nationalism, hosts of conflicting interests and against a background of economic and moral ruin would require the coming of a Danubian Simon Bolivar. In their present condition the Danubian countries are unlikely to produce their liberator from the yoke of nationalism. They will require outside help, outside intervention and outside control once the Nazi locusts have departed and the ground is clear for reconstruction.

This implies a number of prerequisites without which these labours are doomed in advance. The first is a land reform both in Hungary and in Poland. If the feudal landowners are left in control in Hungary, democracy on the Danube will be still-born, the new Europe is left with a nucleus of future dictatorships and no peaceful settlement of minority problems is possible. If this same class is left untouched in Poland, reconciliation with Russia will be short-lived as will be Polish democracy. Democracy in these countries requires the broad basis of a numerous and prosperous peasantry. Under present conditions of landed property, there is room only for a ragged, starved, alcoholic and illiterate rural proletariat.

The second prerequisite of reconstruction is a charter of minority rights and obligations. To be effective, it must be coupled, during a prolonged period of development, with a refusal of full sovereignty to the new Danubian confederation. As things are at present, democracy will have to be enforced from the outside against its internal enemies. This implies the establishment of a political guardianship. There are guardians for every ward in Chancery. There should be guardians for countries politically not of age.

The minority problem is, however, an even more decisive reason for this denial of full sovereignty. Minority problems will continue to play an important rôle until national and social cleavages are bridged by better education and a greater average measure of prosperity. This is obviously a long-term affair. Meanwhile, a judicature will have to be provided for the settlement of minority disputes, easier of approach than the Council of the League of Nations and endowed with positive weapons of execution for the enforce-

ment of its decisions. Such weapons could never be provided if the new federation were given full sovereignty.

A third prerequisite, negative in nature, can only be mentioned in passing. Agitation for the return of the Habsburgs should be opposed. Their return to power in any part of the Danubian area—even with promises of limited aspirations, of doubtful value—is the safest means of ruining any attempt at unification from the very outset. As opposed to a few, mostly sentimental, arguments in their favour many more could be mustered against them, space permitting. But a numerical argument really disposes of the whole question. The Slavonic nations in their entirety are opposed to their return. They constitute the vast majority. Were we most generously to assume that Austro-Germans and Magyars were just as unanimously in favour of their return—which is far from being the case—that would still represent no more than about 18 per cent. of the whole Danubian population. Even Hungary, where Habsburg partisans are numerically strongest, has been quite content to maintain for over twenty years the legal fiction of a kingdom without king. There is no objection to the continuance of this fiction. It weighs little against the danger which the Habsburg agitation represents for future unification.

Even now, it is possible to enumerate the various opponents to the views here expressed and the main reasons for their opposition:

- (1) The future confederates, because it is hard to admit one's own immaturity;
- (2) Conservative opinion all over the world, because all proposals of land reform smack of revolution;
- (3) Misguided democrats—although they would not refrain from educating their children in the name of self-determination, they will oppose education to democracy in the name of that same principle;
- (4) Incurable isolationists—because they would like to creep back into their shells, having neither learned nor forgotten anything.

The prevalence of this opposition would be disastrous. Only full co-operation of all politically mature powers can achieve European reconstruction in general and Danubian reconstruction in particular. There is, however, one factor which seems to outweigh all possible opposition. That factor is Russia. Either the United Nations will co-operate in reconstruction or the Soviets will reorganize the Danubian area without them. Peace on her Western frontiers will be one of Russia's most cogent interests so that she may proceed with her own reconstruction. It is unlikely, then, that she will allow nonsense to continue on her strategic approaches, notwithstanding any opportunistic Order of the Day signed Stalin. In those circumstances, even champions of isolationism may not like to remain out in the cold. But whichever way the decision goes, after this war, the Danubian area stands some chance of emerging from its Wellsian "era of confusion."

THE SPANISH PENDULUM

By J. M. BATISTA I ROCA

ANY non-Spaniard trying to understand the political development of the Spanish peoples has my fullest sympathy. He will probably see only a jumble of actions and reactions, spectacular changes, and a bewildering succession of events. Hence he is tempted to fall back upon ready-made formulas to explain the inexplicable: Spanish pride and sense of honour, xenophobia, "a country of paradoxes," and so on. Such phrases are sometimes used correctly, but they alone do not imply any real knowledge of the country. Its political development obeys certain more fundamental historical laws. Such laws, unlike those of physics or mathematics, are only tendencies, but they show a certain periodicity in the great crises of the Spanish State. For instance it is a remarkable fact of modern Spanish history that almost always in the early part of the century there has been a great crisis. We have just witnessed the last of these in the civil war (1936-39).

In the 19th century we had the Peninsular War (1808-14). It caused a deep internal cleavage: the royal family and some of the upper classes took sides with the French Emperor and left the country, while each nation and region of the State organized itself independently and thus carried on the struggle. There was foreign intervention—a French army, which rallied to it most of the upper orders generally, and a British expeditionary force, led by Wellington, which had the support of the people. Then, as in the late civil war, there was a clash of ideologies in Europe—the liberal ideas born of the French Revolution against the principle of absolute monarchy—which went on in fact throughout the 19th century.

In the 18th century the crisis was the War of the Spanish Succession (1704-14). The Austrian dynasty in Spain having died out, two groups of European powers were competing for power in Spain: the French King Louis XIV was trying to place a Bourbon (his nephew the Duke of Anjou) on the Spanish throne, while Austria and her allies put forward the Austrian Archduke Charles. Bolingbroke, following the traditional English policy of keeping the balance of power, sided with the Austrians, until the Austrian Emperor Joseph I died, and it seemed as if the crowns of Spain and Austria were to be united on the head of the Archduke Charles, which led the English to accept the Peace of Utrecht and recognize the Bourbon Philip V as King of Spain. In this war the Peninsular nationalities fought against each other,

the Portuguese and the Catalans siding with the Austrians and the British, the Castilians with the French. Foreign armies fought in the Peninsula, and Peterborough and the Earl of Stanhope won their laurels there. This war also was the expression of a clash of political ideas, and the victory of the Bourbons introduced into Spain Louis XIV's concept of the identity of king and State, and a centralized form of government as opposed to the principles of self-government upheld by the Archduke Charles.

The 17th century was something of an exception to this historical law. Spain was then a powerful empire, able to prevent European wars from invading her territory. On the contrary, Spanish or rather Castilian armies fought in Italy, France and the Low Countries, and came near invading England. There was however plenty of internal strife between the Peninsular nationalities. Portugal, which for a short period had been united with Spain, rose against her (1640) and recovered independence. Simultaneously the Catalans rose against Philip IV and waged a war of separation for 12 years. They had help from the French, and Cromwell made a pact pledging Louis XIII support in his campaign in Catalonia, but the Catalans nevertheless failed to cut the bonds with Castile.

The first illustration of this law occurs at the beginning of the 16th century, when Charles V founded the Austrian dynasty in Spain and became the first king of all the Spanish kingdoms. His importations of German ideas and Flemish advisers provoked the townspeople of Castile to rebellion and there was a nationalist war. Charles's commitments as German Emperor involved Spain in the great European conflict of the day, the Reformation against the Counter-Reformation.

Thus every century we find Spain shaken by a great crisis. And in each crisis we may see three sets of factors in action: internal political forces, the conflicting views of the Peninsular nationalities, and the great currents of European thought shaping the history of the Peninsula—that country which sometimes seems to be cut off from Europe, but where most of the great European conflicts have found a battleground.

This historical law shows the late civil war in a new light. It was the fifth of the periodical crises in Spain since the 16th century, but it was not a purely Spanish crisis. It was a European conflict fought on Spanish soil, or in other words, external forces made use of the Peninsular national elements against each other.


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Within the frame of these regular upheavals every century, Spanish internal life has undergone many minor convulsions during the last 130 years. These can also be shown to follow a law of their own. The 19th century presents an intricate tissue of revolutions, civil wars, *coups d'état* and changes of government. It gave birth to a typical Spanish phenomenon, the

pronunciamiento, which has no equivalent elsewhere, to describe how a military leader makes a political pronouncement and gets his men to fight for it. Nevertheless there is method in the tragic madness of Spanish politics. Modern Spanish political history begins with the democratic Constitution drawn up to the Cortes in Cadiz during the Peninsular War, and completed in 1812. Between then and now three periods may be distinguished: 1812 to the restoration of the monarchy in 1876, from then to the military *coup d'état* of Primo de Rivera in 1923, and 1923 to the present day.

The driving force of the whole epoch was the struggle of the Spanish peoples towards democracy, and it was one long ding-dong battle between progress and reaction. The issue was particularly clear-cut in the first period, when the main object was the attainment of a democratic constitution to be drawn up by the Cortes and accepted by the Sovereign, as a weapon against the forces in favour of absolute monarchy. After all, this was no extreme demand. It was bound in the end to be satisfied, and it seems such a sad waste of time and energy that it was opposed at the cost of such bitterness and so many lives.

The first period (1812-76) falls into two phases, one 1812-56, in which attempts to establish a democratic constitution were always followed by a lapse to absolute monarchy, and a second phase, in which they were more successful and even at times produced more advanced forms of government. A table will show the swings of the pendulum more clearly.



The second phase showed the following changes, none of which was reactionary:

- 1856-68: 12 years democratic constitution.
- 1868-71: 2 years 6 months provisional government of the progressive type.
- 1871-73: 2 years 1 month democratic constitution.
- 1873-76: 3 years 11 months republic.

The second period in modern Spanish history, that of the constitutional

monarchy (1876-1923) was less troublous. But this cannot be attributed to the excellencies of the monarchy as a régime, for there was a king or a queen almost throughout the previous period, one of unexampled turmoil as we have seen. One reason for the comparative peace was sheer exhaustion. Moreover all Western Europe was enjoying a period of peace and progress. France had internal peace under the Third Republic from 1871 to its recent collapse. Italy after the *risorgimento* enjoyed a peaceful democratic régime up to the Fascist march on Rome in 1922. And Great Britain was moving towards the heyday of peace and prosperity of the late-Victorian age. But quiet waters run deep, and internal forces were at work among the Spanish people which were to show violent results later.

There were three important developments in this period. One was the loss of the last remnants of the Spanish Empire—Cuba and the Philippine Islands (1898). The interests of Spain became again more or less bounded by the Peninsula. With this regression to the mediæval boundaries we find a revival of the peripheral nationalities, just as in the Middle Ages—which seems to be part of a still wider cycle in the life of the Peninsular peoples. Already apparent in the earlier part of the 19th century, the revival of the nationalities, particularly of Catalonia and the Basque Country, coincided with the industrialization of these countries and their participation in the great social and political changes taking place in Western Europe, while broadly speaking the south and the central uplands of the Peninsula clung to their old agrarian organization. The third important development, the only echo of an imperial past, was the renewal of the Moroccan adventure. With the development of an army which laid the foundations of a dangerous militarism and became the weapon of the reactionary elements.

All these forces, which germinated during the period of quietness under the monarchy, were to play a vital part in the more recent upheavals in Spain. To the Progressives, the loss of the colonies and the revival of the nationalities pointed the way unmistakably to concentration upon the essential tasks of popular education, the development of internal resources and the establishment of a régime based upon friendly co-operation between Spaniards, Basques and Catalans. On the other hand, the response of the Reactionaries to these signs of the times was to seek to impose Castilian uniformity upon the peripheral nationalities, and to indulge in making wild schemes for the revival of the Spanish Empire.

A few incidents marked phases in the political evolution of the period. Thus there was violent popular opposition to the Moroccan war, and in July, 1909, churches were burned and there was some street fighting as a protest against the calling-up of certain reservists for Africa. Eight years later there appeared other important symptoms of uneasiness over the corruption that was slowly permeating the entire administration. In summer 1917, because the Government had refused to summon the *Cortes*, the Members of

the two Houses (the Congress and the Senate) met on their own initiative in Barcelona and Madrid. The army officers had organized *Juntas de Defensa* to uphold their interests as against the Government. And the Socialists led a general strike in Madrid.

The third period (1923 to the present day) begins with King Alfonso XIII plotting with his generals to set up a military dictatorship. He thus opened Pandora's box and, suppressing the Constitution, loosed every kind of force which could play havoc in the political arena. The pendulum was set going again, after 47 years. The military dictatorship lasted up to April 14, 1931, when the pendulum swung to the Left, and the Second Republic was set up. The factors which we have mentioned as being engendered and growing up during the constitutional monarchy now came to the surface. Chief among them were the agrarian problems in southern Spain, the progressive forces struggling against reaction, and the revival of the nationalities—Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia—which set foot firmly on the road to autonomy.

The civil war, breaking out in July, 1936, started as another violent swing of the pendulum to the Right, and the present *Falangist* régime came into being.

* * * * *

The political evolution of the three periods outlined above forms the background of innumerable explosions, revolutions, *pronunciamientos* and wars, which are tabulated below, so as to show the parts played by the forces of progress and reaction:

(P—Progressive. R—Reactionary).		1812-56		1856-76		1923-39		Totals		Sum Total
		P	R	P	R	P	R	P	R	
Army revolts (<i>pronunciamientos</i>)	Successful	5	2	2	2	2	2	9	6	15
	Unsuccessful	3	1	1	2	—	2	4	5	9
Popular revolts	...	9	5	3	1	2	—	14	6	20
Civil Wars	...	—	2†	—	1‡	—	1\$	—	4*	4
		17	10	6	6	4	5	27	21	48

† 6 months, and 5 years 11 months.
‡ 3 years 10 months.

\$ 2 years 9 months.
* 13 years.

These figures point to certain general trends. The ratio between the numbers of progressive and reactionary coups changed in the past period, the reactionary becoming comparatively more frequent. In the struggle against the absolute monarchy of the first period, there were many popular revolts and unsuccessful *pronunciamientos*, but after democratic forms of government were obtained they, of course, became less frequent. While the coups on the progressive side were short-and-sharp explosions, the reactionary forces had a technique of their own: they waged civil wars, which totalled a period of 13 years. These wars, provoked by the Conservative elements, not only have caused more damage to the material wealth of the country than all the

popular revolts, but have helped to split the community into two widely separated camps.

In the first of these wars, which was not exactly a civil war, Ferdinand VII obtained help from the Holy Alliance, and a French army, "the 100,000 sons of St. Louis," came to fight against the Constitutionalists and restore him to absolute power. Here we have foreign intervention on the side of reaction, which repeats itself in the last civil war. As for the duration of the oscillations, short ones of 2-3 years only mean, to use another metaphor, "stormy, changeable" on the political barometer. The real swings are longer—9, 11 or 12 years—and each, of whatever length, has always been followed by a swing in the opposite direction of similar duration. Thus there is some regularity in the length of the oscillations. In the 44½ years of the first phase there were 7, and their mean duration is 6 years 4 months. In the second phase, covering 20 years 3 months, there were four oscillations, with a mean duration of 5 years 1 month, which is not widely different from the average in the first phase. Now in the third period the oscillations between political crises lasted 8, 6, 8 and 5 years, giving an average of 6 years 9 months, which is not very different from that of the previous periods. This coincidence is so remarkable that it indicates a historical law governing the length of the oscillations of the political pendulum in Spain.

Will the present régime obey this law? It began in July, 1936, and now even many of its supporters in Spain realize that it has failed. It is kept going simply by the fact of the world war, which provides General Franco's Government with support from various quarters abroad, and makes many elements in the opposition chary of seizing the responsibility of government. Nevertheless according to the precedents of Spanish political history, the present régime is nearing its end. More important, let those who come after heed the warning of the pendulum. Let them set up a stable democratic organization capable of keeping it in equilibrium.

THE CLASSICS

BY GILBERT MURRAY

MY belief in the value of classical education rests mainly, so far as I can judge, on two articles of faith: one, that there are degrees of quality in literature, as in all forms of art, and that it is worth while to take great trouble in order to reach the best; the other, that the common tradition of European civilization, as a uniting and stabilizing influence among shattered and distracted nations, is a most precious possession to maintain and keep alive.

As to the first of these, the great principle of democracy gone rotten, that all men are equal and therefore a bad man is just as good as a good man, has been very widely extended to literature. As taste becomes enfeebled or deteriorates, people judge literature and art by irrelevant standards, and almost cease to ask whether things are good or bad. A book is sought out because it is "new," or because there has been "talk about it in the papers," or of course because it requires no effort to read and appeals to the lowest intelligence. In the film industry, a new art with special temptations but also special ideals of its own, this dominion of vulgarity has led to protests and reactions. It was felt to be intolerable that rubbish which either appealed to Hollywood taste or was believed by Hollywood to appeal to the taste of its most multitudinous and least scrupulous public should almost drive the better efforts of the new art off the stage.

These are commonplaces; but I have actually met with intelligent and influential people who maintained that, owing to the general march of human progress, the works of O'Neill and Noel Coward must be superior to those of Shakespeare or Aeschylus, and others who held that all "pre-war" writers, such as Barrie and Stevenson, were difficult and out of date. We are all familiar with the movements for democratizing literature by such devices as re-writing the Old Testament in modern colloquial English or substituting for a Shakespearean tragedy a précis of the plot with a few specially famous quotations. We seem afraid to say to our fellow men or even to our pupils: "This is the work of a mind greater than yours and mine: let us work hard to understand it."

The classical view is that there is such a thing as quality, that the highest quality is a thing of almost priceless value and worth taking trouble about, Swinburne considered that the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus represented "probably the greatest achievement of the mind of man." Macaulay said in a note that

there was perhaps nothing in literature so wonderful as the *Bacchae*, "not even the Seventh Book of Thucydides." Sir Henry Maine in an often quoted sentence remarks that in our present civilization "there is nothing that moves that is not Greek." Goethe, Shelley, Anatole France and others have gone even further in their expressions of admiration, some for the great Greeks, some for such Romans as Vergil, Horace and Lucretius. No need to labour the point. When due allowance is made for convention, for intellectual snobbishness and the like, it is clear that two thousand years after the great Greek classics were composed men of the highest intellect still read them with living enthusiasm. If we take a more popular test, is it not extraordinary that in quite recent times publishers have thought it worth while to bring out five separate translations into English of Plato's *Republic*? That means that people still want to read it, hard reading as it is. Is not this amazing vitality? And does not such vitality imply some very remarkable value?

The question is whether these books of extraordinary value should be kept alive or allowed to die?

If I may repeat an argument used by me in an old address to the Classical Association, literature, that is the writing down of things said or thought, is a practical way of saying to the passing moment of life, in the words of Faust, *Verweile doch, Du bist so schön*. (Stay longer, thou art so beautiful). Very, very few of those moments have been found of such permanent charm and interest to mankind that they have remained alive and vivid for over two thousand years, but those few form our classical literary record. Of course the record is redundant. It contains masses of matter that is now dead. Of course, also it is incomplete. There lived brave men before Agamemnon. There have been saints, sages, heroes, lovers, inspired poets in multitudes and multitudes, whose thoughts for one reason or another were never enshrined in the record, or if recorded were soon obliterated. The treasures man has wasted must be infinitely greater than those he has saved. But, such as it is, with all its imperfections, the record he has kept is the record of the triumph of the human soul—the Triumph or, in Aristotle's sense of the word, the Tragedy.

It is there. That is my present argument. The soul of man, comprising the forces that have made progress and those that have achieved in themselves the end of progress, the moments of living to which he has said that they are too beautiful to be allowed to pass; the soul of man stands at the door and knocks. It is for each one of us to open or not to open.

For we must not forget the extraordinary frailty of the tenure on which these past moments of glory hold their potential immortality. They only live in so far as we can reach them; and we can only reach them by some labour, some skill, some imaginative effort and some sacrifice. They cannot compel us, and if we do not open to them they die.

My next reason is historical. The two classical literatures, but *her* particularly the Roman, form the common tradition on which Europea

civilization has been formed. At the League of Nations a quotation from Vergil or Cicero appeals to almost the whole Assembly; a quotation from Shakespeare or Dante to only a few benches. Politically speaking, all the nations of western and central Europe are descended from the Roman Empire. We are at this moment of time engaged in trying to recapture that unity of *Civitas*, or citizenship, which Rome achieved. We are announcing Charters of common life. We are thinking of "armies of occupation" which would be engaged, just as the Legions were, not in making war but in keeping the peace and rebuilding the shattered prosperity of provinces. Intellectually speaking, of course, the Greek influence is more important than the Roman. But a separation of the two is difficult and often unreal. It is the Græco-Roman civilization as a whole from which our modern Christian civilization has sprung and in which our various modern nations find their bond of unity. If we look only at their present day activities and national movements, we see discord and rivalry; if we look further back, we find a great heritage which belongs equally to all.

This heritage is in part political and legal; it gives us certain common principles of law and public right, from the fundamental *pacta sunt servanda* upward, principles which can be recognized by the general instinctive shock felt by civilized opinion when they are violated. It is by violating them that the Nazis show most clearly their rebellion against the common tradition. It is partly æsthetic: all the sculptors of Europe have sat at the feet of Phidias; all the poets are disciples of the Greek poets; all the philosophers are disciples of Greek philosophers. To realize the full meaning of this, one has only to look at the other great well-spring of art and poetry and philosophy known to mankind, that of China. It is non-Greek. We can enjoy it, admire it and learn from it; but it is not that which has made us what we are. It is not there that we find our common brotherhood.

Above all, I am disposed to think, this common heritage is ethical. It is what we call loosely the Christian tradition, though many of its particular points of sensitiveness are not specifically dependent on the Church. Parts come direct from Greek philosophy; parts—and perhaps most intensely felt—consist of points of honour, which are probably aristocratic and chivalrous in origin. Parts again come from the great humanitarian movements of the nineteenth century. All are inspired and shaped by the doctrines of Christianity, but the solid base on which these higher or more refined ideals stand is the experience of our spiritual ancestors from the dawn of history. Not all mankind have understood or even cared to understand; and not all have grasped the idea of a society "formed that man may live, and continuing that he may live well." But the Greeks and Romans, or more specifically the Romans as taught by the Greeks, essentially did, and thus produced both the body and the soul of civilization. The body is there in Roman Law, in Cicero's *De Republica* and *De Finibus*; the soul in Augustine and the Stoics and the Greek poets, and still more significantly perhaps in

those maxims of the common man's wisdom, incredibly ancient, which form a sort of background to the speculations of poets, statesmen and philosophers. The rules of "Nothing too much," or "Know thyself"; the hatred of *Hubris*, the necessity of *Kosmos*, (order) and *τὸ μέτριον* (moderation); the eternal quest of *τὸ δίκαιον* (justice or righteousness) which runs through all serious Greek and Roman literature, express steadily and without false pretension both the ascertained rules and the unfulfilled aspirations of civilization.

And surely it is civilization that is now in danger. It is *κόσμος* and *το μέτριον* that the world has lost, and must regain if Man is to maintain any standard of a "good life." Seldom in the course of history can there have been a period in which the need of such a standard was greater than it is now. There have doubtless been many times of revolution; but seldom has there been revolution so wide-reaching as now or so much determined by the brute force of circumstance rather than conscious effort to achieve a desired end. The frightful overthrow of the Christian tradition in Europe has been due to wars, defeats, famines, intolerable cruelties and sufferings, much more than to conscious purpose. To a contented and peaceful Europe Lenin and Hitler would have preached in vain. But the social and moral disorder due to war and the sequelæ of war have had an effect upon our whole psychology. To define it would need lengthened study, but one element in the disorder which seems clear is a lack of continuity. All our post-war art seems to see things too much in patches, in sudden gleams or thrills, not in continuity, very much as our young men often find it hard to take continuous views of a life from which they may be snatched next week as cannon fodder.

People say: "It is a time of revolution; let us be revolutionary." Surely the very opposite of the true conclusion. When so much is dissolving it is time to cling firmly to such higher standards as we can preserve.

Of course the tradition is not the absolute truth. Its standards are no perfect. They are there to be criticized, reformed, at times to be rebelled against. But at least they are there. We know what the civilized world has held to be right or good; and have something with which to compare our momentary fashions. Without them, the momentary fashion is absolute. It is true of all art, the art of living among the rest, that from time to time *faut se retremper dans la nature*. In the same spirit those who seek after "good life for man" should look reverently at the ways, however difficult, by which man for many thousand years has best succeeded in reaching it.

THE UNPROUD FLAME

BY STEPHEN HAGGARD

THESE are times when the body yearns
And the mind must say 'Be still,
There is no fulfilment.'

When each swift, soft word
Burns in the memory, when the touch
Of each lovely movement remembered turns
Cold will into flame,
And the mind must repeat 'Be still,
There is no fulfilment.'

There have been mornings breaking on the foreland
In scattered pearl, each one its own fulfilment,
When the gorse
Has swept like a yellow sea-wind across the moorland,
White sun white clouds shadowing,
And the horses,
Whinnying pleasure in the dappled morning, stepped
Like poised birds along the cliff edge,
Carrying gods between the wheeling warnings
Of the seagulls soaring in and out of their high follies
And the gay markets pitched
By daffodils far down in the wet valleys.

There have been cradled afternoons
Of sunlight rocking upon water,
Of willows swinging in a wide slow arc
Their lazy hands across the summer clear—
Of swallows mocking—
Kissing and mocking at their shadows on the water—
Of women singing
Their longing for the nightfall, knowing
That darkness like an eager river flowing
Brings them fulfilment.

THE UNPROUD FLAME

There have been nights
 Of moonlight dreaming on pale beaches,
 Of black rocks sleeping
 Like caverns in the memory of the sun,
 Of little inquisitive winds that waken, filling
 The secret shadows of embracing limbs
 And spilling
 Wet silver from the heavy awnings.
 On nights like these the scurry and search of **wind**
 The shuttle of the water weaving
 Its **slow** history in the luminous sand,
 Being also love's speeches
 Secret as touch and intimate as breathing,
 Like the touch and search of a beloved hand
 Have brought fulfilment.

Why do you remember
 Those nights and the long afternoons
 And the vivid mornings
 If now the body fears and the will insists
 There must be no fulfilment?
 Why do you torment
 The shadows sleeping in the quiet awnings,
 Despising the unproud flame, self-deceiving,
 Mocking the slow shuttle weaving, the blind
 Strong search of the body, the night's fulfilling?

There will come a time
 When the flame will awaken, defying,
 When the memory spilling
 From pools of inquisitive touch and the burning
 Of lips in the shuttered mind
 Will insist too much.

POINTS OF VIEW

III. THE SHIPYARD WORKER

BY GORDON JEFFERY

IT would be pretentious for me to claim to speak for the **mass** of the shipyard workers all over Britain; but I can write with confidence of the point of view of some of them in the particular Southern dockyard in which I work and I daresay I shall represent, indirectly, the opinions of the workers in other dockyards. For the rest I must rely upon the doubtful veracity of statements of men returning from short trips to other ports and upon letters received from workers there. In the dockyards, it is plain, a unanimity of view exists: a view, moreover, which was developed over years and which, it will be difficult but very necessary, to dispel.

The scandalous position of British shipping in the years before the war is well-known to all but, worse than the actual sparsity of the shipbuilding programmes, worse than the shortage both of warships and merchant vessels, was the lack of trained mechanics. At the end of the last war thousands and thousands of shipyard workers were sacked immediately they completed their apprenticeship and they had no opportunity to practise the trade they had barely learned: almost they may as well have never been apprenticed. At the same time, in yards where previously a hundred and twenty shipwright apprentices were taken on every year, for example, it was seldom if ten boys were apprenticed in a year.

Depression and gloom hung over the shipyards and the dockyards: the best of the men shook the dust of the yards behind them and went into other industries such as airplane construction, carpentering on house-building, and so on. Those that were left drifted from port to port and district to district, where occasionally some spurt of activity would develop. But there was no hope in these men, only frustration and despair and a deep sense of disillusionment. Yet, all the time, they had in their hands and brain the skill and the ability to be building the ships which to-day we so sorely need.

After 1935 when our naval shipbuilding programme began to expand a little the drift was steadily southwards into the naval dockyards. This drift continued until the outbreak of war when an extremely large percentage of the men in these yards were not the theoretically, as well as practically, equipped dockyard ex-apprentices but North Country mechanics not wholly suited to the work and, moreover, men hardened and embittered, made cynical

by their experiences during and after the last war. 'Plenty of work now,' they said, 'but what'll it be when this lot's over? Same as last time I reckon! Out on yer back!' This was the common attitude expressed at the time war broke out and not until Dunkirk and the beginning of the bombing raids which, at last, brought the reality of war close to the shipyard workers, did it show any appreciable signs of being dispelled. Even now it persists amongst a number of men.

But they worked just the same. They worked long hours and they worked hard. In the yard where I am, a battle-cruiser was nearing completion after a complete refit at the time war was declared. The men leapt into the job and got her ready for sea at the earliest possible moment. But then, after the first rush of activity, after the nearly-repaired and commissioned ships had been sent out to sea, something strange began to happen in the dockyards. There was actually little or no work to do. We could understand that to a degree, realizing that the ships which normally would have been coming in for repairs of a general nature were now being kept at sea. Our work had taken on a new form. No longer would we be required to give a ship a complete refit: now it would be a gaping hole in the ship's side which needed to be mended, and mended quickly so that she could be out to sea again. That much we could understand but we could not understand why it was that . . . XYZ . . ., the fast, modern light cruiser we had commenced building a few months before, should still be perched ridiculously on the building slip without a man working on her! An unfinished ship lying derelict on a slip was the symbol of the depression: not of a country at war! Neither could we understand why work was being proceeded with so leisurely on board a battle-cruiser which was being stripped down before being modernized.

This was the period when the German and the Allied armies faced one another from behind the Siegfried and Maginot lines, the period when we complacently sung 'We're going to hang out our washing on the Siegfried Line,' while the Germans consolidated their position in Poland and trained and trained for their 'blitz' warfare. It was also the period when the British factories stumbled on at barely pre-war output and the German factories and shipyards worked at top pressure building tanks and ships.

The shipyard workers were completely unable to understand this. In the first winter of the war they were on overtime, working until 7 or 8 o'clock every night, yet for the mass of them it was impossible to do anything after five owing to the blackout conditions. But, in the main, there was very little work for them to do in any case. Yet if they wanted a period off overtime they were looked upon as slackers and constantly reminded by the officials: 'There's a war on, you know!' But they had no reason to know that there was a war on! The war to them was completely unreal and it ceased to be the topic of conversation over their morning 'scran' except occasionally when some ship or another was sunk. The months dragged by until the

spring of 1940. The . . . XYZ . . . remained on the slip! The Trade Unions spasmodically made efforts to get work started on her again. Experience had already proved—what the average shipyard worker, but apparently not the Admiralty experts, already knew—that fast cruisers were more valuable than the cumbersome, slow moving battleships. Yet the same excuse for the failure to get on with the building of the . . . XYZ . . . was monotonously put forward: 'Shortage of materials!' And the men murmured: 'All the work's going to the private firms!' But letters from the lads who had gone back north again said: 'We haven't really got a lot of work. They've given it all to the Yanks to do!'

But, at length, just a little before Dunkirk, work was started again and, as with the workers everywhere, with the fall of France a new spirit swept over the dockyards. It seemed as if for the first time the men were aware of the danger of Nazi aggression. There were a few, but a very few, who were defeatists and expected the Germans to be overrunning Britain in a few months. But the most leapt into their job even if, still, there was not a lot to do. Work on the new cruiser was however progressing and also on the refitting of the battle cruiser. But the strength and the vast numerical superiority of the *Luftwaffe* was making the passage of British warships in the Channel almost impossible and there seemed no prospect of much work coming in except for damaged destroyers, corvettes and small craft. The Trade Unions advocated the making of tanks as a temporary measure. The arguments in favour were sound. It seemed incredible that the skill of the men and the industrial plant needed to build a battleship could not be successfully employed in the manufacture of tanks. But nothing came of the proposals. Instead, by night, the dockyard workers endured (night after night as distinct from an occasional heavy raid) bombing raids: sometimes there were only casual bombs dropped at random as 'planes returned from other targets; often the raids were very heavy. And, by day, the men drifted in the yards: the initial desire they may have felt to hit back at the enemy stifled by the lack of any large amount of work. The . . . XYZ . . . had, at last, been launched in the middle of a period when heavy daylight raids were common but there was no sense of urgency about getting on with the job of completing her. The prevalent idea, not fostered by the Admiralty yet not dispelled by them, which hung over the yards was almost that of defeat! 'We're finished as a dockyard,' the men said. 'They'll be packing us all off up north soon!' Some even said we would all be going to America. Soon after the first daylight raid which had damaged the yard an eminent member of the Admiralty had come to inspect the personnel. In an interview he had instructed the men to hang on for a few months when we would have mastered the enemy bombers. Seven months later when we were being ruthlessly bombed night after night the men remembered this and were not encouraged to accept Ministerial promises any more.

And finally 'they' decided to move the battle cruiser which was being

refitted to a northern yard to be completed. At the time only about six weeks' work remained to be done. To the men it amounted to an admission by the Government that we were defeated: that our yard really was finished, a negative factor in our war effort. The final disillusionment of the dockyard workers was at hand. They accepted it in the same dull way as before they had accepted the slump after the last war: only they could not understand how it had happened in the middle of a war.

But it was not, after all, the end. Much that has directly affected the dockyards and the shipyards has happened in the last twelve months. In the first place the R.A.F., and particularly the night fighters, and better A.A. defences have to an extent defeated the *Luftwaffe*: the Soviet Union are in the war and the Nazis unable to spare the 'planes for the British ports to the same degree as previously: and, finally, Japan's entry into the war has revealed again the still critical state of British naval strength. Ships are for the first time in the war the prior necessity of Britain: before it was 'planes and then tanks: now it is ships.

Britain needs ships of every description to-day as she has never needed them before. But are the shipyard workers, are the dockyard workers ready to respond to the tremendous call that will be, and is being, asked of them?

Frankly they do not appear to be aware of the extreme urgency of the position. (In this, however, it appears that they are not alone amongst the British people). But I feel that there are many and various reasons for this and that these reasons must be carefully assessed and something done to remove the doubts in the minds of the workers and also to improve their material position. The bottom, I feel sure, of the problem of mobilizing full power behind our shipbuilding drive is the necessity to offer something concrete for the future which will do a little at least to overcome the conflict and the doubts which have developed in the minds of the shipyard workers over a long period of time. The reason for this conflict and doubting I have tried to illustrate and I cannot help appreciating the grim reality of their arguments. The shipyard workers have been shabbily treated over a very long period and, moreover, find it impossible to believe any promises for the future while they continue to be shabbily treated.

A great deal of nonsense is frequently spoken and written about the fabulous wages of war workers. I am not dealing now with workers in factories but as far as the shipyard workers are concerned few of them are any better off financially than before the war! The weekly wage to-day of a skilled mechanic in a shipyard is about 84s. Piece work and job price contract do not appear to be in any way generally worked so that the only extra earnings are from overtime. (Never a particularly 'easy' method of earning more money as the critics appear to believe!) In the light summer evenings work may be carried on until 8 o'clock with one day off a week and an earlier night once a week. Such a week would give the skilled journeyman a pay packet of about £5 15s. 0d.! Then in the winter for many long months no overtime is

possible owing to the blackout, and out of a small pay packet the income tax based upon the larger summer earnings is deducted. At the same time as the wage packet has slightly increased through overtime, not only has the cost of living increased but, more than any other section of the people, the shipyard workers living in the blitzed sea-ports have, in a very great many cases, been forced to live outside of the district in which they work and have to pay anything up to 12s. a week for travelling! For some of the most highly skilled workers in the country to-day, these wages are scandalously low. The men, not unnaturally, compare them with the wages of labourers and unskilled men in other trades.

But this disgruntled feeling about their low wages is only a small matter compared with other conflicting actions which have been imposed upon the shipyard workers. For instance they have seen their trade swamped with dilutee labour whilst there has been scarcely enough work to occupy the skilled men: the shipwrights have seen their fifth-year apprentices being called up for the navy whilst carpenters and joiners of much the same age have been entered into the yards as shipwrights and, similarly, the fitters have seen their boys go into the Forces where their skilled value will be doubtfully used whilst men of twenty-one have entered the yard as fitters from Government training camps. Is it not understandable that the workers argue—'Isn't an apprentice who has already served four years of his training actually on the ships, of more value than someone coming straight from six months in a Government Training Camp?'

Yet, believing it to be of importance to the war effort, the Trade Unions have allowed wholesale dilution to take place in the shipyards. But, to-day, they are beginning to ask: is this dilution being intelligently and fairly used? There will be no opposition to dilution, by the Trade Unions or by the men, if it can once be proved to be necessary. But that has still to be done. Yet the need of the moment remains an urgent one. Britain must have every possible ship and the full and complete co-operation of the shipyard workers. How can this be done?

In the first place the looseness of planning which has seemingly always characterized the shipyards must disappear and be replaced by a production plan which can best be compiled by the co-operation of the various employers, the Admiralty and the Trade Unions. Along with this co-operation for present production can go the beginning of planning for the future which will help to rid the worker of his fear of unemployment immediately 'this lot's over.' Secondly the conservative outlook regarding shipbuilding which is so deeply embedded in shipowner and worker alike must be swept aside. Ships can and must be mass-produced. The mould which serves for the plates of one ship must serve for six of a similar design. Provided that the work is there for them to do, any lingering opposition which may exist towards dilutees must go and, moreover, the skilled worker must be prepared to assist the dilutees. Women workers, too, are now making their appear-

ance in the shipyards. It is tough, very tough, work for them and they must be used intelligently particularly on light work which can easily be adapted to a series of processes, easily learned.

But, the biggest job of all is best illustrated by a reference to the very long and controversial correspondence which took place in the open page of the local paper here following Sir Roger Keyes allegations about dockyard workers. From all the many letters written to the paper by workers one fact burns clear—'Give us the work to do and we will do the job.' There are, as I hope I have indicated, reservations to this but, basically, that is the big problem—to plan our shipbuilding programme in such a way that every shipyard worker can be fully employed. Develop that plan and the ships will roll continuously, joyously, off the slipways! Moreover, far more important than the fact that they have got the work to do will be the realization to the workers that at last the Admiralty do mean business! And the men who have built the finest warships and liners that the world has ever known will not fail.

OPENING MOVES

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

SINCE I wrote last month much has happened. The opening moves of the summer campaign in Russia have been made; the R.A.F. has shown what Germany has to expect; Rommel has now plainly exposed his hand; Japan has suffered a second and more serious reverse in her attempt to extend her control of sea communication in the Pacific and has been compelled to start operations in China to forestall the establishment of American air bases from which her cities could be bombed.

Timoshenko's Kharkov offensive, although launched a few days after the German attack on the Kerch peninsula had begun, had probably been long prepared and was evidently designed to forestall a major offensive directed against Caucasia, for which the capture of Kerch was an isolated preliminary operation. It is probable that the timing of Timoshenko's attack was not influenced by the situation in the Crimea, but by his knowledge of the progress of German preparations and his own state of readiness.

What Timoshenko hoped to achieve is a matter of speculation, but we may accept confidently that he was not aiming at any far-reaching re-conquest of territory, or even the capture of Kharkov itself. No doubt he hoped to break through the weaker portions of the German defensive zone, capture quantities of material, and extend the Russian salient south of Kharkov so as to still further threaten the flank of any drive the Germans might make towards Caucasia. He must have expected and probably welcomed German counter-attacks which would entail the expenditure of reserves. Naturally he intended to exploit initial success but he must have appreciated that this could safely be done within limits only in view of the great forces the enemy had available for a counter-stroke. He appears to have kept a happy balance between boldness and caution. His initial attack evidently took the Germans by surprise; it made remarkable progress considering that it was delivered against organized defences, and penetration was deep enough to involve the capture of much material. As was to be expected from their defensive theories the Germans promptly used their local reserves in counter-attacks; whether successful or not these slowed down or halted the Russian advance, but not before it had become a serious danger to German communications in the south. This was a threat that could not be tolerated and Timoshenko's army, in a pronounced salient with its communications running through the bottle-necks of the bridges over the Donetz River invited one of those major counter-strokes the German Staff can organize rapidly. From

the Izyum region von Bock struck northwards against Timoshenko's left flank, threatening to envelope it and to cut his communications. The attack at first made progress and a certain degree of envelopment was achieved. There were critical days, but Timoshenko had evidently taken precautions and his troops fought with great gallantry and stubbornness; the infantry meeting the German tanks with their new anti-tank rifles and their artillery again showing its efficiency. Time was gained which enabled Timoshenko to bring up fresh reserves and to counter-attack in his turn. Eventually after both sides had incurred heavy losses, the situation stabilized, leaving Timoshenko in possession of most of the ground he had won, and therefore remaining a menace to any German Caucasian attempt. On the whole main front there followed a comparative lull of some weeks marked only by local engagements, but in the Crimea the Germans renewed their attacks on Sebastopol, evidently intending at all costs to take it this time.

It is evident that the Germans have no intention of abandoning their Caucasian project, although von Bock was compelled to expend in his Izyum counter-attacks troops intended to take an important part in it and to suspend his preparations. The immense efforts being made to take Sebastopol is one indication of adherence to the plan, and another is given by the new offensive opened in the Kharkov region. It is apparently also of a preparatory character with the object of driving Timoshenko from his menacing and somewhat exposed position before the main offensive further south opens.

On the Moscow front and further north there is yet no definite indication of major operations by either side, but it would not be surprising if the Russians had forestalling operations in view. The ground in the north, however, still appears to be very wet in consequence of heavy rain following the thaw, and that may have delayed major enterprises.

* * * * *

Rommel's offensive in Libya came as no surprise, but it was long uncertain what it aimed at achieving. Although he had been heavily reinforced while Malta was under intensive attack, he can hardly have considered himself strong enough to undertake a far-reaching invasion of Egypt unless he relied on an airborne attack from Crete co-operating in the final stages of his advance. For, even if he defeated the Eighth Army, Auchinleck would still have reserves with which to oppose him, and he would have great distances to cover with an exposed line of communications. Unless, therefore, some co-operative operation was planned it seems probable that his objective was the destruction of Ritchie's army, the re-capture of Tobruk and Bardia, and the re-establishment of his position at Halfaya pending the results of the Russian campaign. His offensive can have had no direct effect on the Russian situation, although the moral effect of the fall of Tobruk has been considerable. Possibly it was in a sense a forestalling operation to eliminate the danger of an allied offensive which might have necessitated the diversion of German resources from the main theatre at a critical time. And it may have

been thought that if he could achieve success it would be safe again to make Libya solely an Italian responsibility.

It is impossible to estimate at this time (June 23) the extent of General Rommel's achievement. As I write his forces are approaching our positions on the Egyptian frontier.

In the Far East the defeat of the Japanese enterprises which brought about the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway Island has left the situation more than ever one for naval and air forces to deal with. Land fighting for some time to come is likely to be confined to China where it is not easy to follow what is happening, so much of the fighting being of a guerrilla character.

Both in Russia and Libya it is clear that, with improved armament and experience, infantry supported by anti-tank guns and field artillery has acquired new power of repelling tank attacks. In Russia especially operations are therefore likely to take a form very different from those of last year, and deep penetrations by Panzer thrusts may seldom be attempted, at any rate in the initial phases of offensives. The growing efficiency of air attack on armoured vehicles may also tend to cause greater reliance on infantry and artillery action, with a consequent slowing down of operations.

AIR POWER AND SEA POWER

I.

BY AIR-COMMODORE L. E. O. CHARLTON

A BOOK is shortly to be published in this country which has already attracted the liveliest attention in America. It is called *Victory Through Air Power* and its author is a Major Alexander Seversky who distinguished himself in the 1914-18 War as a pilot in the Russian naval air service, and who, since then, has become an authority on the design and performance of United States aircraft. Major Seversky belongs to the sky-blue school of aviation, and a study of his work through the medium of copious extracts in the *Daily Telegraph* shows him to be a writer of incisive thought, acute perception and prophetic instinct. This is not a review article, the intention being rather to relate the Seversky tenets and conclusions to the tendencies of our own air strategy to-day. It must suffice, therefore, to sketch the doctrine which this book unfolds in barest outline. Here are some axioms confidently stated by the author.

No land or sea operations can be successfully concluded without control of the local air. Navies can no longer act strategically on the offensive. Blockade has largely become a function of air power. Only air power can defeat air power. Land-based aircraft must always be superior to ship-borne aviation. In aerial warfare quality is relatively superior to quantity. Destruction of national morale from the air can only be accomplished by precision bombing. The principle of unity of command applies no less to the air than to the forces by land and sea. Air power must have its own transport and be fully self-contained. Aircraft types must meet a specific tactical situation as well as being fitted to the general strategy. And lastly, the striking radius of air power must be equal to the maximum dimensions of the whole theatre of operations.

These are bare bones on which to build a fresh conception of air warfare, but if well pondered they will be seen to frame some fleshy arguments. It is not to be denied that the Seversky school of thinking, taken to a logical conclusion, would look on an army and a navy as mere appendages to air power, and the author, by implication, does not shrink from that determination. It is implicit, also, in his axiom that the whole theatre of a war must be within the striking radius of aircraft. For this infers, so world-wide have modern wars become, a power of transoceanic flight which is neither more nor less than the girdling of the earth. Aircraft range, he observes, is

extending with such rapidity that in three years at the outside neither the Atlantic, nor the Pacific, Ocean will be looked upon as any sort of obstacle to flight. It is a modest enough claim, and his further protestation that a round-the-world range of 25,000 miles will inevitably follow shortly after need not take our breath away. Such aircraft will be, of course, of monstrous size, equipped with engines developing 48,000 horse-power. If this should come about navies will indeed be out-classed, for how could surface ships compare, in speed, in range, or in weight of metal thrown, with an air armada of such leviathans which might rise at dawn in Tokyo and bomb Seattle before the setting of the sun. But all this is for the future, although at the present rate of aviation's progress it is not so far away. In several other of its conceptions the Seversky doctrine touches us more nearly.

The book, for instance, is specially illuminating on the subject of a properly organized attack by bombers, and here it is in favour of the planned production of aircraft types for a major task in hand. It is pointed out that the Heinkels and Dorniers used in the Battle of Britain were just bombers, with no peculiar aptitude for the job to which they were put. They were, in fact, all-purpose machines, fast for that period of the day, but with a speed procured at the cost of range, bomb-carrying capacity, armour and armament. This, to commence with, was a wrong idea, for since bombers cannot get away from fighters anyhow it was foolish to sacrifice protective armour and defensive fire power for the sake of a few additional miles an hour. The destruction of London from the air was so important to the Germans that they lost some 2,300 aircraft in the attempt. Quite obviously it would have been cheaper to build especially for such a vital task instead of employing aircraft maids-of-all-work. If a fleet had been so prepared in fulfilment of a long-projected plan of strategy, well-armoured and strongly protected by machine-guns against stern attack, there might have been another tale to tell. The truth, as the author sees it, is that the *Luftwaffe* was built up, and trained, as an adjunct to the army, to which it rendered brilliant service on the battlefields of Europe. It failed, however, when called upon to act as an air power weapon alone and unassisted, which serves to show that Goering and his advisers had not gone to the roots of the matter, choosing rather a tactical line of development than that of air strategy in a full connotation of the term.

The above, of course, refers to aviation of bombardment, and not to the Stuka or to aircraft of pursuit. If there is real soundness in it, then British design and development shine in a comparison. We did protect our bombers, we did not sacrifice capacity for speed, and we always had in sight the probability of long-range flights on bombing missions. We have constantly preached the doctrine of air bombardment, and made due preparation. The Germans arrogantly thought they could take London in their stride, and neglected to differentiate their air equipment. In spite of huge destruction

they did not impair our national morale, or will to war. It remains to see if we are not destroying theirs.

Our recent large-scale air attacks over Rhineland and the Ruhr, with an assembly on each occasion of a thousand pairs of wings, are in the true tradition. Even during the locust years before the War our metropolitan air force was being slowly built up on the concept of strategical attack. We have been indoctrinated with it ever since the Armistice, when a fleet of super-Handley Pages, each capable of dropping a bomb-load of three and a half tons, was being got ready to bomb Berlin from the Norfolk coast. Our most experienced Air Officers have consistently maintained that the proper use of air power lay in hammer-blows directed at the enemy's centres of war industry and production. And that is what we have now begun to do, waiting until this rather late day for the means to do it with.

Formerly, let us say in the pre-Rostock period, grave doubt was justifiable about our bombing policy. It was widely distributed, costly, and seldom in great force. Moreover the Admiralty were insatiable in their demands that diversionary targets, indirectly to do with the enemy's submarine and air blockade, should be substituted for those intimately connected with the industrial end of the Nazi war machine. Fitful weather, again, and sometimes prolonged periods of adverse flying conditions, saved objectives from a repetition of attack, thus spreading out our bombing thinly, robbing it of the knock-out effect of a follow-up and frequently disarming it completely for weeks on end.

In spite of the consistency with which our bombers flew out to Germany, and notwithstanding the hardihood displayed in their assaults, it is unlikely that, in the aggregate, our efforts amounted to more than a mild peppering of the enemy's industrial totality. But now that mass attacks have become the fashion, and now that we have means at hand for such a method of assault, neither a diversion of our aim, nor bouts of foulest weather, need henceforth serve to deprive us of a full achievement. In plain words once ought to be enough. When, on May 30th, we sent out over a thousand heavy aircraft to bomb Cologne it was the 107th occasion on which the city had been attacked. It is highly doubtful if it will require further attention for the duration of the war.

On this, and on successive similar occasions we have subjected the whole city, as well as its industrial environs, to bombardment from the air, and unblushingly announced the fact. An area of Cologne five times greater than that of London's City was obliterated on that night. Such widespread destruction is inevitable in the circumstances of a mass attack, and neither should it give us any feeling of remorse. The whole object of the attack was to remove Cologne from the Nazi list of actively producing centres of war output, and this appears to have been well accomplished. The policy will continue, and to refrain from employing our powerful air armada in the

manner best calculated to achieve the sought result, to subject it to unnecessary stress in a vain endeavour to spare war-workers' lives, would be to blunt the finest-tempered instrument of war the world has ever seen. We set out to release an obliterating flood of bombs, and deluges do not discriminate.

There is, however, another aspect of the matter, and here connection is again established with the Seversky doctrine. Germany has openly professed that in total war civilians and the military are indistinguishable, and her leaders have not failed to act up to that pretence. We, for our part, talk glibly of the cracking-up of Germany from inside, meaning that the combined effects of privation, hardship and disillusionment will eventually bring about a weakening of the Nazi will to war. But in either case it is enemy morale that is intended, and by the reiterated use of that evasive term we, in this country, though perhaps not as yet outspokenly, are legitimizing the civic element as an objective for attack. The fact is that bombing cannot be done without endangering civilian life, and the heart of Cologne is now a desert because we have at last cast aside all pretence that it can be otherwise. Previous experience has shown beyond all doubt that, if anything, national morale is heightened by the pure effect of air attack, and that neither deaths nor injuries conduce to lower it. But it is a different story when life's essentials are destroyed, when food, shelter, water, light, sanitation and all the other amenities of existence are unprocurable in a satisfying quantity. And these latter effects are the more devastating in the case of a thickly industrialized area in which the workers have a time schedule to maintain and little opportunity for self-adjustment to the rigour of the new conditions so suddenly presented. That is what Major Seversky means by precision bombing as opposed to random bombing, and that is what our rain of bombs meant also when it descended on those Ruhr and Rhineland cities. To destroy the factories of war production is well and good, but to prevent them from ever being rehabilitated is yet better. The one is a nibbling system; the other a devouring process.

AIR POWER AND SEA POWER

II.

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

THE controversy concerning the respective merits of what are called "Air Power" and "Sea Power" has been stimulated by Major Alexander Seversky. So far as his theories are directed towards war at sea his contentions are vitiated by an obvious lack of understanding of the nature of sea warfare and by a failure to appreciate the true nature and aim of sea power. As an example of his conceptions of the conduct of war at sea he shows that "navies have lost their function of strategic offensive." This "function" he assumes to be the battering of the coasts of an enemy. "The days when battlefleets steamed boldly within striking distance of enemy shores and proceeded to pound them into submission are now relegated to history." Unhappily for the Major's theories these days have never existed and are not to be found in history. Though there have been occasions when battle fleets bombarded second-rate land fortifications, or like Farragut, ran through the fire of shore defences, the attack upon land defences by ships has never been regarded, either in the days of steam or sail, to be a proper employment of a naval force.

Major Seversky lays stress on the need for unity of command of all air forces, wherever engaged and upon whatever task. "Military experts know," he says "that diversion of force spells disaster." Yet it is precisely diversion of force and of command that he recommends for a navy. Why, one asks, if unity of command is of such importance, is this principle inapplicable to sea warfare? Why should it be regarded as unnecessary for the command of forces engaged in the operation of sea warfare to be unified? One might have imagined that the grim experience of the last two and a half years would have removed that false interpretation of strategy: for if one thing has been demonstrated beyond all shadow of doubt it is that a fleet or squadron or flotilla is as incomplete in its constitution if it is without an air component as it is without its other auxiliaries—cruisers, destroyers, mine-sweepers: and that those air units need to be under the command and direction of the naval commander, who must be able to count upon their presence, their acquaintance with sea warfare, and the fitness of their equipment for the tasks they are called on to perform. The campaigns in Norway, the Cretan and Greek campaigns, the events of the passages of convoys

through the Sicilian Channel, the operations off the coast of Libya and in the Arctic, on the Murmansk route, to say nothing of those in the Indian Ocean and China Seas, all bear the most incontrovertible testimony to the truth of this. They all tell the same monotonous tale of failure in co-operation, the tale that the Navy, throughout this war, has never been provided with the aerial component of its needs either in adequate strength or of adequate training. It is with perfect truth that Major Seversky says that "not all their anti-aircraft defences could save the British naval forces in the Battle of Crete from overhead punishment"; and that the *Illustrious* was put out of action by 'planes. The reason for this was that these forces were denied their essential aircraft. If the statements are meant to prove that surface ships are of no use, they fail to take account of the fact that the convoy which was accompanied by the *Illustrious* and other surface craft could never have reached Malta without that surface protection, and that the naval forces off Crete prevented a single transport vessel from landing its troops on the shores of that island. The loss of the *Illustrious* and of the naval craft in Cretan waters was due to the total lack of air support: in other words, to the divided command. No seaman would dream of sending a battlefleet into waters infested with submarines without a destroyer screen: and destroyer flotillas are integral parts of the battlefleet in its offensive against an enemy force. Yet for some reason it is supposed that there is no need for providing the corresponding aerial unit, for defence or offence, essential as all the experience of the last two years has shown it to be. The Admiral who cannot count upon the presence of his aerial components is in exactly the same position as one who cannot be sure that his surface flotilla will be with him throughout his operation. And this in the name of "unity of command"! A more preposterous cry has never been raised in the annals of strategical discussion. An Admiral who should be ordered to undertake an operation in the conditions of those round Crete and the coast of Greece without his proper assignment of aircraft would be as fully justified in refusing to do so as he would be to insist upon a proper assignment of the other types of flotilla craft.

The distinction which the school of thought, of which Major Seversky is one mouthpiece, draws between "Air Power" and "Sea Power" appears to be based upon the assumption that "Sea Power" is something resulting from the possession of fighting ships and their bases; and that the words relate to, and are confined to, those fighting forces which, under the name of "navies" operate on the surface and under the surface. That it has been, until the most recent developments, through the possession and use of such forms of fighting ships, and their bases, that sea power has been assisted is true enough, with the addition, it should be remembered, of the third element of sea power, a numerous merchant navy and a healthy ship building industry. The exercise of sea power throughout the history of the world, back to the most remote ages, has been through the medium of the various types of craft

capable of fighting at sea which the inventiveness and skill of man have brought into existence. Those types, as everyone surely knows, have varied. At one time sea power is exercised by the oared galley, single banked, double banked or treble banked: at another, by the broadside sailing ships of different sizes at others by the turret ironclad, by the modern battleship with her numerous auxiliaries—cruisers and flotilla craft. New instruments, in other words have been continuously brought into being down the ages and incorporated into the navies. The latest of these instruments is the aircraft. But *her* incorporation into the navy of this country is refused. Objection is made to it on the preposterous assumption that all aircraft must be in a single organization, irrespective altogether of the functions that have to be performed. By a new process of reasoning, foreign to every principle of strategy, it is asserted that these principles which have governed the use of every other instrument of war that has ever been evolved are inapplicable to this new instrument. On one occasion when I expressed the view that the "war books" and Field Service Regulations of the three services should each contain, in their introductory chapter, the accepted definition of the principles of war in identical forms, I was brusquely contradicted by the high aerial authority present at the meeting with the remark that those principles did not apply to the air.

Sea Power is that form of national strength which enables a nation to use the pathways of the sea for the passage of its own commerce and armies and to prevent the enemy from so doing. Sea power enables "control of the sea" to be exercised: and the value of this control in war lies in the several results that follow therefrom. The financial benefits of trade, the material benefits of the supply of goods needed for the national life and the military operations of all kinds, the movement of armies to theatres where their services are needed, are all of far reaching importance in the great struggles between nations. That, surely, needs no discussion. Whatever, then, may be the fighting instrument capable of taking part in the operation at sea designed to establish command, and to exercise the control that results from command, is an instrument of sea power. The development of flying has not, as is erroneously assumed, created a new "power". It has, in respect of sea warfare, merely introduced a new arm to the forces of sea power. When the torpedo was introduced we did not talk of "torpedo power": nor of "submarine power" when the submarine became an effective type of vessel.

It is because these simple facts have either been disregarded or not reasoned, because eyes have been focussed upon the instrument instead of the purpose of the instrument, that we have suffered most serious losses in this war. False theories of war are more damaging than tactical errors. It is because of this false theory that the Navy have been unprovided with the air flotilla of its needs, in number, in type, and in training, that thousands of our seamen and our troops have been lost, that our colonies have been overrun, that India and Australia are now threatened.

only cause. There are also the criminally insane reductions in our cruiser and destroyer forces by the agreements of 1930 and 1931, and the shortsighted abandonment of the Irish bases.

Nor is this all. Singleness of purpose is one of the essentials of war as it is of every other form of human activity. We have not pursued singleness of purpose, but duality. Duality has been imposed upon us by the belief that air forces can, and may, wage a separate war of their own, and are able to bring about the defeat of the enemy by their unaided efforts. So, while our shipping was suffering from want of unity of command of the the sea and air forces operating in the Atlantic, while the enemy was attacking Crete, and that most important position was being lost, while our convoys through the Mediterranean were not having the road brushed clear for their passage by air craft, those air craft which might have turned the scale were employed otherwise. No doubt considerable damage was being done to the internal communications of Germany by the bombing of Duisburg and the marshalling yards of Hamm: perhaps some reductions were enforced in the production of guns and other military material, and this was of assistance to our Russian ally when she came into the war. But these injuries did not prevent the overrunning of Russia, the crippling of her armies, nor the sending of supplies to the enemy armies in Libya. They have not prevented us from losing the command of the sea in the Mediterranean whereby we are unable to use the short route to the East, but must make, at a great expenditure of tonnage and time, the voyage round the Cape.

What is the alternative? It is to adopt a first and principal object and concentrate to the utmost our upon its attainment. The command of the sea is the starting point from which all other things must flow, the foundation without which all other operations and our own existence are insecure.

Objection is expressed in Major Seversky's writings, and in those of others, to what appears to be considered the invidious position of an air force when acting as an "auxiliary" to another service—to the army or the navy. It must be independent, must be able to pursue its own policy, select its own object, conduct its own campaign. This is a complete contradiction of that fundamental principle, the liaison of arms. It dismisses all the lessons of the past upon which principles of war are built. The British army in the great war with France, according to Colonel G. F. R. Henderson in his *Science of War*, took more battleships than colours and almost as many attacks on land fortresses, in fulfilment of what that deep thinker called "the great maxim" that the naval strength of the enemy should be the first objective of the forces of the maritime power both by sea and land. In his eyes there was nothing invidious to the land forces in thus aiding the sea forces.

This principle of British strategy is not rendered obsolete by the fact that certain weapon carriers are now able to fly, and by the possibilities which the flight opens up for attack from the air. The "great maxim" remains the

same, with a mere addition of the words "and air"—"both by sea, land and air".

Lord Trenchard does not agree. Though he recognizes that the destruction of the instrument is a matter of the first importance, he believes that "air power should not be employed primarily in chasing the submarine but in striking direct at the enemy's industrial power which produces the submarine". The most economical course, he tells us, is to attack the centre of production. If air attack were able to destroy the centre of production there would be much to be said for this course: but there is no centre: production is spread over the widest possible area in many centres. The most concentrated one, probably the building yards: and those have been heavily attacked but submarine construction has not been stopped thereby. The modest number of some three score submarines with which the enemy started the war has expanded, despite bombing, to some hundreds; and it continues to expand. Even, however, if it did not, if it were checked or reduced, the problem would not be solved by this policy. It is not the German submarine only that causes us our losses at sea and hampers our military operations on land. What the exact percentage of our losses due to the submarine is I do not know: it varies and, at the moment is, I should imagine, high. But there are other causes of losses, for surface vessels from battle-cruisers to "E" boats, mines and aircraft have all been engaged in the campaign at sea, and their combined contribution has certainly been as high as 40 or 50 per cent. at times. The attacks on the "centre of production" of submarines in Germany will not remove *those* sources of injury, nor will it affect in the smallest degree the losses at sea and on land in the Indian Ocean, the China Sea and the Pacific, where Japanese cruisers, submarines and aircraft, acting as a naval force, have done us the most serious injuries and deprived us of materials of the first importance. Japanese naval forces are only to be beaten in their own seas, and, if any further evidence of the plain fact that aircraft are integral units of navies is needed, it is to be found, by all but those who refuse to see, in the two sea battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. It was possible for the American Navy to inflict the injuries it inflicted on the Japanese forces because the Americans have been wise enough to link the air arm to the Navy, make it an integral part, and supply it in adequate numbers, and train it in service at sea. The British Navy, starved as it has been, would not have been in a condition to conduct a similar action.

Let us then have the unity of command which Major Seversky recognizes as being necessary for fighting forces: but let that unity be governed not by the instrument or the medium in which it moves, but by the purposes it has to fulfil.

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EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

A STUDY of the Prime Minister may claim priority; Mr. R. H. Kiernan's *Churchill* (Harrap, 5s.) is not less valuable for being short and simple; and he has, at least to my mind, one clear advantage. Brought up in the traditions of an Irish Nationalist, such as they were under Redmond's leadership, he understands the workings of British politics without being attached to any party. For thousands of Englishmen the primary fact about Mr. Churchill used to be that, having begun as a Conservative, under the most distinguished auspices, he changed to the Liberal side, when Conservatism was becoming unpopular, and ultimately changed back again—once more in accordance with the turn of popular favour. That in itself to many English politicians seemed damning. I must look at it from my own point of view, which in many ways is Mr. Kiernan's, but governed by the fact that I watched Mr. Churchill at close quarters in the House of Commons from 1906 to 1918—while he was officially a Liberal. In reality, to my mind, he never was anything else; of the same school as another born aristocrat, Grey of Fallodon. It is rather staggering that Mr. Kiernan, who is by profession a teacher of history, should think it necessary to explain what Liberalism meant in the days when Winston Churchill was a Liberal. After all, Mr. Lloyd George is far from dead yet and he is the politician with whom Mr. Churchill was closely associated. It was a mighty pleasant game to speculate which of the two would come to the top—for it was evident that these two men—young men by the standards of Westminster—had the quality of leadership beyond their fellows. Oddly enough, the Tory recruit showed more of the traditional Liberal doctrine; he came in as a champion of Free Trade, while the Welsh man was much more concerned to redress social inequalities, by Old Age Pensions and such like machinery. To judge by my own recollection, we lookers-on did not realize how completely Winston Churchill's training had been that of a soldier: Mr. Kiernan brings out well the amazing adventurousness of his career. But still less did it enter our minds that the test of fitness for leadership would be furnished by war, deadlier and more savage than we had ever dreamt of; least of all was it even guessed at that not one but both of the two would answer the demand, and would rise to such a pitch of glory as Mr. Churchill has reached now, and as his colleague and comrade attained a full generation earlier. After all, those who have lived through these years have lived uncomfortably and even painfully; but we have seen things. We have seen men. Mr. Kiernan who wrote already about Mr. Lloyd George, has surely not lacked inspiring subjects.

It is characteristic of Great Britain at its best that each of these two, after hard fighting in domestic politics, should have been able to rally for a national

emergency the makings of a great coalition. But it is also characteristic that each of them, even when by general admission the nation as a whole needed him, should still have been pursued by party rancour. While Mr. Churchill was a vital part of the earlier coalition, his enemies were hot on his heels when a chance offered, after the failure at Gallipoli. With Lloyd George it was different; those who wanted his scalp at any price were those to whom he had been opposed from the first—who thought of him as the robber of their henroosts. But the Prime Minister of to-day has always had his most irreconcilable opponents in those who hated him as a deserter. There is one great difference between the two men; Lloyd George has a genius for persuasion; Mr. Balfour in particular never could quite resist sweet reasonableness which succeeded best with the most intelligent. Mr. Churchill can always state his case impressively and cogently; but persuasiveness was never his strong point.

* * * * *

There was one section of British political opinion on which arguments from him acted always as a powerful irritant—those of whom Lord Randolph Churchill had said a generation earlier—"Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right." Mr. Hugh Shearman in *Not an Inch* (Faber & Faber, 6s.), a study of Northern Ireland and Lord Craigavon, describes the career of the man who did most to see that Ireland should be armed, and ready for fighting. He has perhaps not made it clear how successful Sir James Craig was in getting support from the professional British army. There were always influential officers who accepted his view of the situation, and felt at liberty to act as partizans. But Mr. Shearman is unexpectedly fair; the qualities which he praises in Lord Craigavon he recognizes and approves in Mr. de Valera. A quotation is necessary:

Captain Craig, estimating the situation with the eye of a soldier decided on the method by which he would conduct the fight. He had studied his opponents, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Birrell, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Mr. Redmond, very clever men, men who dared not look on blood if they themselves were to do the shedding of it.

Now, seriously Mr. Lloyd George cannot be regarded as wanting in courage to face bloodshed; Mr. Shearman will remember that he took something of a part in the last war. In that same war, Redmond of his own initiative committed Nationalist Ireland to take a full part, choosing this alternative as a means of avoiding the danger which unquestionably he dreaded—civil war; whether in the wider field of these islands, or the narrower one of Ireland itself. Neither Captain Craig nor Mr. de Valera shrank from civil war, and if that be a proof of strength, they have it. Lord Craigavon did more than any one man to put Mr. de Valera where he is; and those who made the rising of 1916 were the people who really defeated Redmond's attempt to get round Ulster's attitude of "Not an Inch". There were at least the beginnings of fraternization in trenches; as to Ireland's attitude to the rising, when the news reached us in France, man after man in the ranks of Irish Catholics among whom I was serving, said to me, "Why won't they send us home to deal with it?" In fact, the troops who did deal with it in Dublin were mainly Irish. It is true that sympathy soon changed: a man of great repute for the wisdom most valued in Ireland (what horse is likeliest to win the next race) said to me: "The fools: it was the first time a rebellion had the

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country against it, and they turned it round in a week." "They" were the English Government and Mr. Shearman indicates how they did it.

I cannot pretend to admiration either for Lord Craigavon or for Mr. de Valera but it is true that both men showed a remarkable quality of leadership—though not, in my opinion, to the advantage of their common country. And Mr. Shearman's comments, for instance, on the Irish Convention of 1917-18 seem to me foolish. What destroyed the Convention's chances was the Government's refusal to make any important concessions. I was sent over to say that control of military power was not asked for, nor control of foreign policy, but that complete control of Irish finance seemed necessary. It was refused. Three years later, when enough policemen had been shot, the same British Government threw up their hats because Ireland had accepted something nominally short of a republic. The men who were not afraid of civil war had won. However Mr. Shearman tells us some pleasant things about Lord Craigavon's policy in a difficult post for even where Protestant enterprise has established large industries, Catholic working men tend to become a voting majority, and Derry, even more fully identified that Belfast with the cry of "No Surrender", returned a Home Ruler. But Ulster will never be what Ulster should be till its Protestant majority ceases to regard themselves as a *Herrenvolk*—entitled to lord it over inferiors. In the Irish Convention every intelligent man knew that the best and ablest member of it was Cardinal O'Donnell, son of a small farmer somewhere in Donegal—not fifty miles from Derry.

* * * * *

Mr. Robert Sencourt is another author who may be said to specialize in political biography and he adds now to his gallery a study of Alfonso XIII. who from the moment of his birth in 1886 till 1931 when he resigned in obedience to organized clamour was King of Spain (Faber, 12s. 6d.). Simplicity is not one of Mr. Sencourt's virtues as a writer and the story which he has to tell abounds in complications of every kind. Yet, broadly speaking, while he is narrating, the outline evolves itself, vivid, easily followed and interesting; his reader's difficulties only begin when the book passes to political commentary. Mr. Sencourt, who distrusts democracy everywhere, thinks if fated to failure in any of the Latin countries—if only because the assassins will never give it a fair chance. King Alfonso grew up strongly attracted to the English way of life, chiefly through his friendship with two England-loving sportsmen, the Dukes of Penaranda and of Alva; he went to England to look for a queen and Londonderry House helped him to find her. But when Princess Ena of Battenberg, Queen Victoria's granddaughter, came to Madrid to be married, Spain had a dreadful surprise for that wedding day; this book tells with real power how, as the procession passed from the church through crowded streets, a great bouquet of flowers was thrown from a window and the bomb it hid made a dozen corpses all about the royal carriage. Neither King nor Queen was actually hurt but it was a sinister beginning. Yet it never for a moment shook the nerve of one who was first and last a very valiant gentleman—deserving a more satisfactory employment than that to which he was born. Continental monarchs in Latin countries are not enviable—though indeed while he was king, and even when he dropped to the status

King Alfonso and
Democracy

of *roi en exil*, Don Alfonso showed an admirable talent for enjoying life. How far this book helps us to understand what happened in the Iberian countries before the present world war, and during it, must be a matter of opinion; it may be my fault but on the whole nothing seems clear, except that in Mr. Sencourt's view Portugal showed more light and leading than its bigger and even more famous neighbour. I should call it a tantalizing book, because it constantly stimulates interest without giving the sense of intellectual satisfaction.

* * * * *

Somebody has called Shakespeare "many-minded"; and the book on *Shakespeare's Country*, which Mr. John Russell publishes in Batsford's Half Guinea Library at least indicates the richness on which that amazing invention could draw. Mr. Russell's knowledge also is of a surprising richness. It seems to have been

Where the
Avon flows

built up round a passionate study of architecture, but everywhere the art of building is considered as closely linked to the social conditions out of which it develops and which it helps to create. All that I have to say in criticism is that Mr. Russell gives too much, except for the specially educated. But even those who may quarrel with his text for over-elaboration must succumb to the illustrations. Here is wealth indeed; here is England, indoor and outdoor, lay and ecclesiastical, gentle and simple—just as in Shakespeare. There are more than 150 of them, some prints, with a few in colour; but upon my word, the camera has it in such things as No. 130, a view of the Southern Malverns, or 132, Twining Ferry on the Avon.

"Shakespeare's Country," says Mr. Russell, "is a large irregular fertile watery plain including Warwickshire, Worcestershire and contiguous parts of Herefordshire and Gloucestershire. It is bounded by the Cotswolds, the Malverns and the industrial massif to the North." As to the subjects which come in, there is no limit; I note a casual page on those famous beauties, the Gummings; I note that the town of Upton-on-Severn is identified as that "in which Tom Jones fell out with a publican." But listen to this on Birmingham, which he describes as

essentially an armoury, and has been one since Benedict the Cutler set up there under Edward VI. This, almost alone among human trades has known no fluctuation more serious than the restriction of individual fancy imposed by the army regulation of 1850. Other trades were dependent on fashion or seasonal needs. William III. for instance introduced the buckle trade and the sudden substitution in 1791 of shoe-strings for buckles proved the ruin of twenty thousand persons.

And so on. But think how Shakespeare might have used a fund of miscellaneous knowledge, such as Mr. Russell possesses. Or rather, think how he did use it.

* * * * *

In last month's *EBB AND FLOW*, Lord Davies' book *Facing the Future*, published by Staples, was priced at 8s. 6d. This should have been 3s. 6d.

WRITERS IN FREEDOM, edited by Hermon Ould. *Hutchinson*. 8s. 6d.

FREEDOM: ITS MEANING, edited by Ruth N. Anshen. *Allen & Unwin*. 16s.

THE STRATEGY OF FREEDOM, by H. J. Laski. *Allen & Unwin*. 5s.

The world's writers, in P.E.N. International assembled, have made their statements of faith, here published in *Writers in Freedom*. One is left with the feeling that they have been brought in to think on issues not native to them. Mr. Priestley takes himself very seriously and explains that 'the public' is looking to 'writers' for guidance. I have the uncomfortable feeling that the newspaper editors would just as lief have the views of Mr. Coward or Mr. Oliver, if they could get them, in order to sell their papers. I find little or no coherence of view between Miss Storm Jameson, Miss Rebecca West, Miss Phyllis Bentley and Mr. Ifor Evans, who wisely reminded the Conference that propaganda is almost necessarily a dirty job and politics (as much as novel writing) is a whole time business. The most impressive contribution is that by Mr. Arthur Koestler, a good humanist, who told his listeners that "conscious propaganda means the artist's abdication . . . his mission is not to solve but to expose . . . his is the duty not to accept." The brutal truth is that the influence of novelists, popular journalists and amateurs as guides in domestic politics is, not too small but far too great. Profitable reference can here be made to Plato.

The philosophers show more coherence than the writers. In the galaxy gathered together by Dr. Ruth Anshen, in the symposium *Freedom: its Meaning*, one feels that

they have light to contribute and not chiefly heat. I confess that I was prejudiced against the book by coming first, after Professor Beard's historical survey, on a contribution by that eminent grandfather of fascism, M. Bergson. It is true that, like many grandparents, he vigorously repudiates his own authentic offspring; but they rise to salute him none the less. Here is he again preaching the Nazi and essentially atheistic doctrine that our morality is what our tribe tells us we ought to do. The comparison with the social ant, who is nearer to 'nature' than we, reappears. M. Bergson forgets that this is what the führers teach to their followers but, antipodally, do not believe themselves. One turns with some alarm from this wicked anti-Hellenic Moloch-worship to Professor Macmurray's contribution and is greeted with a delightful and wise little essay (he having turned away from similar heresies) in which the lawful, right and Platonic conclusion is reached that the core of spiritual freedom lies in sharing in the 'community of pleasures and pains.' My only criticism of this doctrine, which connects with Huxley and Heard, is that either we end in a self-admiring clique or are carried away in a 'movement' which soon proceeds to over-ride with intolerant enthusiasm the freedom of others. May it not be that communities are held together by some vision or idea of which the archetype, giving perfect freedom, is the *visio Dei*?

The point of this is that this view of liberty happens to be the right one—that only the individual, and not the State, can have this vision. Bergson and the Germans, Russians and all worshippers of anti-Christ overlook the truth in Reinhold Niebuhr's phrase about 'moral man and immoral society.' The quintessence of a sound doctrine

of freedom, expressed by Professor Macmurray and M. Maritain, lies in recognizing that it cannot be achieved in solely political terms or by any juggling with the mechanics of power. Neither, however, recognizes the connection between political liberty (which after all does matter) and belief in *experiment*, social and scientific, as the route to truth and safeguard of secular progress. Professor Bertrand Russell's article also fails to make this point, which it might so well have been expected to make, since here is to be found the philosophic nexus between liberty, toleration and democracy; but it is indicated by definition by Mr. Ginstain and in an interesting contribution by Vice-President Henry Wallace, who is scientist, philosopher and politician. Dr. Anshen is to be congratulated on this valuable symposium. In an age when all writers seem to agree that we are plunging back into authoritarianism, experiment is the guarantee that we do not confound the good with the socially approved.

Professor Harold Laski in his *Strategy of Freedom*, writes a popular pamphlet designed to persuade the American student (before the U.S. declaration of war) of the case for belligerency. It is characterized by that genius which touches almost everything Professor Laski writes. He rather surprisingly asserts that none of Lenin's conditions of revolution are likely to develop in Britain, save as a consequence of overwhelming defeat. In some ways I am more impressed by the reprint of a 1932 article of Laski's, entitled 'Nationalism or the Future of Civilization,' in Dr. Anshen's *Freedom*. Here he renews his classic argument that "the abrogation of national sovereignty is the condition upon which peace is safe in a world of democratic states." Indeed, since the only distinction

between League-ism and Federal Unionism is that the League interferes to the minimum with sovereignty ("it remains a League of Sovereign-States," says Professor Laski), I am unable to see why, in his latest revision, he does not enumerate the principle of Union, instead of writing academically about *maxima civitas*. The idea is not so obscene that one must talk about it in Latin. He does here, by obscurity, a disservice to his own great cause. And the labourers are few.

GEORGE CATLIN.

TO CHRISTIAN ENGLAND, by John Armitage. *Longmans*. 5s.

When I accepted the invitation to review this book, written by the Editor of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, I did so with the pleasure which comes from seeing the published work of a friend. Now that I have read it I write with a sense of great responsibility because I feel deeply that I want the greatest possible number of people to read this book, and I fear lest my words about it shall be an unworthy commendation.

It is an essay on the commandment "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." There have been countless essays on this text but I at least claim for this one that it is essentially relevant to the moment in history at which it appears. By its title the book is intended for a very wide public. The largest mass of our people are on the whole upright in their lives, desirous of doing the right thing, believers, however vaguely, in God, and given at times at least, to saying their prayers. To these would-be Christians our religion seems remote from their daily lives, and they have a sense of frustration because, in Mr. Armitage's words, "a great gulf has been fixed between Christian teaching and Christian

action." To these as well as to those who profess and call themselves Christians this book comes as a challenge and a call to action in which all can and must share.

The first five chapters set out in vivid terms the situation in which we are living. The world is as it is because men have failed to see that "our trouble is not political but spiritual." We have preferred security to the Cross. Through the "twenty years of darkness" between the wars, economic aims dominated the scene and money was the yardstick of success. (Personally I do not think that the twenty years were unrelievedly dark. I suggest that much of the present spirit of concern for a better order of things has sprung out of almost unnoticed movements during that period). A chapter in amplification of this theme is devoted to the domination of the profit motive.

The misuse of advertisement, the commercial traveller, the canvasser, displayed goods, automatic machines and hire purchase are called in evidence to the fact that in modern methods of trade the question "Am I my brother's keeper?" is consistently answered in the negative. The way out is

not by dictatorship or increased control by bureaucracy, but by spiritual education which will inform man that there is much more to live for than a competitive struggle for personal success, and by a return to the "natural order."

Mr. Armitage sums up his forcible reminder of the responsibility of Christians for the circumstances of the lives of other by an admirable paraphrase of the clause in the Lord's Prayer "Forgive us our trespasses." He is chiefly concerned to drive home a sense of corporate responsibility and therefore of corporate sin, and he rightly assails the ignorance, sometimes wilful, which exists among the more fortunate

sections of the population of the conditions of life of other sections. One of the values of the book is the clear cut little pictures which it gives: The overworked mother, the old age pensioner, the unemployed, the illegitimate child, are set before us with the sympathy and skill of one who himself loves widely.

When we come to the author's suggestions for action he has valuable things to say regarding the relation of legislation to the public conscience. The main aims which govern his proposals are two: namely, the uplifting and preservation of the Family and the Home: and the development of the sense of community. He suggests the establishment in every locality of "Family Houses": and organized research both centrally and locally on the part of Christians. The chapter on the Family House should be studied carefully. It offers a practical way of deepening our sense of community, and also of overcoming here and now the worst evils suffered by the over-burdened and under-privileged. It is no substitute for happy, healthy homes for each family but it should supply under one roof health services, advice, fellowship, recreation, and a sense of being wanted.

The method of Christian Research is based on the truth that no action can be taken which is not founded on knowledge. Mr. Armitage envisages a Central Research Station with local ones—the business of Christians. Here every possible fact relating to the way people live should be collected and the greatest publicity for the facts obtained. Out of these must come action backed by an informed public opinion.

The author is clear as to the difference between the attitude and aim of the Christian and the non-Christian in their zeal for social

reform. His message is summed up in the last sentence of the book:

We must think as Christians and act as Christians and we must never allow other considerations, political or financial, to sway our determination to find out, and then do, what is right in the sight of God.

K. C. H. WARNER.

THE CHINESE, by Winifred Galbraith. *Penguin Books*. 6d.

ETCHING OF A TORMENTED AGE, by Hsiao Chi'en. *George Allen & Unwin*. 2s.

CHINA, by P. M. Roxby. *Oxford Pamphlets*. 4d.

What is the secret of the unrivalled toughness of the Chinese, of the uniform continuity of their civilization through thousands of years, and of their undismayed resistance, despite every conceivable disadvantage, to Japan? To these questions the three books under review supply answers for a world that was never so curious about China as now.

Miss Galbraith is one who knows her China through and through both by personal contact and by study of the Chinese classics. And it is only through some knowledge of the latter that one can appreciate what the Chinese are. Briefly, the whole teaching of Chinese philosophy may be summed up in the magic word *jên*. No exact translation is possible, but Miss Galbraith describes it well as "a strongly developed consciousness of deep-seated human relationship which is the basis of all social being." That the Chinese may not always be true to this principle is beside the point that through the working of *jên* one finds the explanation of so many permanent characteristics of Chinese society in all ages, from their instinct for democracy to "face," which is only consideration for another person's self-respect. Miss Galbraith

found that, in spite of their sufferings from Japan, the Chinese people showed little bitterness towards the Japanese people, whom they seem to see, "as they have so often felt themselves, powerless in the hands of their rulers." That is *jên*. Miss Galbraith gives an excellent sketch of the successive dynasties, reminding us that the principle of "guns for butter" was invented by the Chins over 2,100 years ago. But China would have none of it and the dynasty did not last 20 years. There are also some charming chapters on China's painting and poetry, with several dainty translations of typical lyrics. The past 100 years have wrought violent changes in China, especially in the demand for action so incessantly stressed by General Chiang. But one can share Miss Galbraith's faith that the old essential virtues of China afford the surest guarantee of her future.

Mr. Hsiao Chi'en deals with some of these changes as they have affected Chinese literature, producing (as in art) a revolt against the "ivory tower" exquisiteness of the past and a flood of young writers without equal (at least in volume) in any country. "Our finest literary harvest in modern times is that of fiction," says Mr. Hsiao. Many writers are too introspective and self-centred and the influence upon them of Western authors has not always been beneficial. The war has been a blessing in disguise, bringing to Chinese writers solid experience of life and compelling them to use simple language "understood of the people." But novelists, essayists and dramatists alike, they are all propagandists for the righting of the evils they see and a better China—in fact, once again, *jên*. Altogether Mr. Hsiao has given us a most inspiring little book.

Professor Roxby has tackled the enormous task of compressing into 31 pages the whole of Chinese geography, history and national temperament. Such a survey necessarily leaves much to fill in, but the salient features are well presented and should inspire readers to push their enquiries further into the nature of a people whom Professor Roxby well describes as "potentially one of the greatest of the world's democracies." O. M. GREEN.

THE KEYS OF THE KINGDOM,
by A. J. Cronin. Gollancz. 9s.

THE SAMPLER, by Richard Church. Dent. 7s. 6d.

Integrity in conflict with ambition was the theme of *The Citadel*. Integrity in contrast to ambition is the theme of *The Keys of the Kingdom*. Mr. Cronin has simplified his problem by externalizing the two combatants. It is no longer the doctor who lives for his work at war in one mind and heart with the doctor who lives for its rewards, but the priest who lives for the love of God and Man side by side with the priest who lives for success in the Church. The result is a simple narrative of a brave, devoted and unselfish man in whom nearly all conflict has been resolved below the surface, while in the background, only catching the light at intervals, is the man whose real religion is getting on, and who naturally achieves his Bishopric, so that he is in a position to patronize and rebuke his old friend, back from thirty-five years in the mission fields of China, battered, inconsiderable, a little odd, and suspect for a toleration which extends to both Protestants and Confucians.

I think that if Mr. Cronin wanted to grow as a writer, he would probably have done better to stick to the more difficult path and work out the problem which evidently pre-

occupies him in one human being. A writer who does not grow is not really interesting, but taken on its own merits this is a readable story of a noble life, and would make an excellent Sunday School prize for any young person of the Catholic faith. The accounts of the fight against the plague, of the foundation of the orphanage, and of the dangers from famine and local war are vivid and exciting.

The sampler, worked by the half crippled Mary Woodman, had four corners, blue sky, young tree, grass foreground, and turbulent water. In the centre was the woman of Samaria coming to the well with her pitcher. The sampler provides the framework for Mr. Church's novel, in which he collects four people whose lives are separately touched in under these headings, and brings them to a Bloomsbury Hotel on a night during the London *blitz*. A bomb drops on the hotel, two of the four are trapped with others of the party in a cellar, the other two dig through the night to get them out. The incident appears to be unnoticed by the Civil Defence, no police or wardens come to the help of Sam and Roger, nobody reports to Control, or sends for ambulances or for the Rescue Party, which turns up out of the blue in the early morning. It is inevitable that *blitz* novels of this kind should spring up as thick as daisies. To get together a small group of people who have no connection with one another, bomb them and allow the bombing to change their lives is a war time bonus to the novelist in search of a plot, but it is too easy a device for a writer of Mr. Church's experience. It is perhaps because he has allowed himself to use a form which was hackneyed before it started that this novel, though of course competently put together, is short of vitality and real conviction. LETTICE COOPER.

THE OLD CHURCHES OF LONDON, by Gerald Cobb. Batsford. 15s.

The appearance of a new book on London's old churches inevitably raises the question as to whether there is anything original left to be said about them. This book differs from its predecessors in one particular at least. Coming as it does after the air raid destruction of 1940 there is poignancy in its illustrations and descriptions of buildings for ever vanished from the London scene. It took the damage to make many Londoners "old church minded" and for them this book should be bitter sweet indeed. For those who knew and loved the City and its alleyways and can never tire of the story of its rebuilding after the Great Fire the author has here collected facts from many sources.

Mr. Cobb's handling of the architecture and monuments of his subject is richly illumined by the introduction of Professor Geoffrey Webb. He contrasts the varying styles of architecture involved, their relation to and evolution from each other and the turbulent periods of Church history, with their differing effects on the buildings. He is an admirer of the genius and ingenuity of Wren but is not blind to the merits of such men as Gibbs and Hawksmoor and their work is outlined and illustrated with due importance. A careful reading of this introduction will lay for the average reader a firm foundation on which he may raise his own little edifice of knowledge and enjoyment.

The book proper is divided into six chapters and covers the period pre-Fire to the early XIXth century. The first, which deals with Churches generally and pre-Fire fabrics in particular, is disappointing. The author simply cannot be adequate in the space allowed. A more generous survey follows of the problems that

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beset the anxious congregations in their desire to forestall amalgamations by rebuilding immediately. The details of the accounts for this rebuilding make rare reading. Judged by our standards they are fantastically modest, while in view of the importance we attach to their handiwork to-day architect and work seem incredibly underpaid. A dinner to Wren and a present to his lady is often an item in the churchwardens' books usually, let it be said, as a subtle attempt to speed up the job.

The exteriors, interiors, furniture and fittings are dealt with in the next chapters and here Mr. Cobb is at his best. With knowledge and sympathy he selects and groups for his readers those characteristics of the master Wren which so invite special attention and sets before us the pattern of the work in all its perfection.

Towards the end of the book he moves nearer to its title for, leaving the city, he links together buildings far distant from each other and provides us with much interesting information about the larger parish churches of London. However, before the chapter finishes we find him discussing the formidable problem of the pulling down of the City churches and the transference of their wealth and influence to the crowded suburbs. The recent air raid destruction has made the subject less urgent but Mr. Cobb boldly enters the lists against any further demolition.

It is becoming a commonplace to say that we expect from Messrs. Batsford good and copious illustrations. Expectation is amply fulfilled on this occasion while Professor R. Schwabe's jacket panorama of spires adds considerably to the value of the book.

HERBERT BANYARD.

F S P, by Sergt. A. Gwynn-Browne. *Chatto & Windus. 6s.*

Very occasionally a new author will write a book which is as original in style and as important in matter as his publishers claim it to be. This book is one of them. The story of Dunkirk has already been told more than once, but Sergeant Gwynn-Browne's book is not only about Dunkirk; yet, even if it were, it would still rank as a vivid contribution to history for its ability to tell not what happened but what men felt.

That is the greatness of this book. It tells what men felt. It is full of humour and the humour is part of the whole but it is not the humour that matters. It has a wealth of incident but the incident has a more important task to perform than to entertain the casual reader, though entertain him it will. And at times the author will philosophize; but the philosophy of Sergeant Gwynn-Browne is important.

What the reader will have when he has finished this book will be a great deal more understanding than he had before. Even if some or many of his experiences have been the same he will still have more understanding of them. For Sergeant Gwynn-Browne charts experience. There is the small matter of army training, so very amusing but still more illuminating than it is amusing. There is the big matter of the state of public opinion in France, of the ordinary people, what they felt. There is penetrating insight into the state of being a refugee and, on arrival in England, the state of not being a refugee. And there is Dunkirk.

Finally let no man allow the style to be too much for him. It is odd. It is effective.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

AUGUST, 1942

BOMBING AND ECONOMIC WAR

BY HUGH QUIGLEY

THE war has reached a stage in its development when it is difficult to see where the next decisive action can take place, at least on the field of battle. Both Japan and Germany have gained a series of brilliant victories and occupied more and more territory, both on land and sea, but so far they have not been able to fight a really decisive action.

It seems to be characteristic of the present war that, despite the revolutionary changes in the means of waging war, in transport and in the planning of major engagements, the possibility of any one force being able to destroy the other seems to become more and more remote. The war has shown that it is virtually impossible, short of the most concentrated air attack, to stop the determined onrush of an armoured division, whether that division be German or British. It has also shown that there is a serious limit to the territorial expansion of any one power. At one time it seemed as if Japan, after having conquered the whole of the South-Western Pacific, Burma and part of India, could continue with a drive forward into India and link up with Germany. The decisive battle areas in the Far East were not so much the Dutch East Indies as the Aleutians in the North Pacific and the Maldivé Islands in the Indian Ocean. Once Japan had control of both groups of Islands, it could really attempt a linking-up operation with Germany through the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, and at the same time hold back the United States. This plan has been ruined by two of the most important battles of this war, fought between the American and Japanese fleets in the Coral Sea and in the vicinity of Midway Island. In both those engagements the American forces showed intelligent and imaginative leadership and a sure knowledge of modern weapons, with the result that it is doubtful whether Japan will be able to retain her hold in the South-Western Pacific and, as a major factor in the war against Germany, may be ruled out. The Midway Island engagement will probably be regarded as one of the decisive battles of the world, and it may be followed by a further engagement near the Kurile Islands.

In Libya, despite lack of initiative and tactical ability on the field, the scene of battle may have shifted somewhat closer to the

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Suez Canal, but the possibility of Germany bringing the war to an end through any further success in this area must remain somewhat doubtful. The last remaining possibility, through sheer territorial advance, lies in an attack through Turkey, but the inability of Japan to close the Indian Ocean has probably affected adversely even this scheme.

In Russia there is no indication of any serious collapse of the Russian armies, and as long as those armies remain intact, any further advance into the Caucasus must be extremely dangerous.

The position then is that as far as actual fighting is concerned, no further serious change may be expected for some time. If that is the case, emphasis shifts to other methods of waging warfare than the actual conduct of hostilities. For the first time, therefore, some real advantage may be obtained from an intelligent understanding of the rôle that economic warfare can play in the destruction of the enemy. It has been the misfortune of the Ministry appointed for this purpose that it should have lacked that type of determined and imaginative leadership which would have made it into one of the most potent weapons of destruction in the possession of the Allies. From being potentially a powerful weapon, it has become merely a fact finding and information organization, timidly exploring the obvious, and through its lack of clear principles, firmly enunciated, it has never had any real control or, for that matter, any influence over the activities of the fighting forces, where those activities might have been employed specifically for purposes of economic warfare.

The three methods of carrying out warfare, largely inherited from the last war, are propaganda, sea blockade and bombing. The control of propaganda, scattered through the Foreign Office, the War Office, the Navy, the Ministry of Information, the B.B.C. and the Ministry of Economic Warfare, has become so diffuse and so chaotic in its operation that propaganda, instead of being an asset, threatens to become a rather serious liability. There is no lack of material for propaganda purposes, but there is a constant danger of repetition *ad nauseam* of old political clichés which shed all meaning and significance as long ago as the last war.

The second method, namely blockade, was destined to failure right at the beginning. It is amusing and somewhat pathetic at this time to read the special studies, books and pamphlets on the terrific superiority of the Allies in economic resources compared with the Axis which appeared in the first year of the war. It was conveniently forgotten that the blockade as such, under the immensely more favourable conditions ruling then, made only a small contribution to the success of the last war, while its effects on the possi-

bility of immediate recovery in Europe were almost disastrous. In this war it was also forgotten by the theorists that the modern army, largely through its mechanized equipment and through the terrific speed it can develop, can live off the country almost as completely as the Napoleonic armies did; and as long as Hitler could, through sheer weight of numbers, conquer one country after another and seize the economic resources of one country after another, he could continue the war indefinitely. In a war of survival, neither Germany nor Italy nor Japan for that matter could be regarded as vulnerable to sea power. They are no more vulnerable to sea power than Napoleon for exactly the same reason. In control of the greater part of the land surface and the main land communications of two continents, they do not require to use the sea at all for the transport of troops, and we know that in the Libyan campaign the greater part of the forces employed by Rommel were actually transported by air.

The blockade by sea, as a consequence, was ineffective right from the beginning and became more and more ineffective as time went on, until in the last stages it resolved itself into an attack on occasional German-Italian convoys in the Mediterranean and German ships passing down Norwegian, Danish and Dutch coasts. The policy of the Foreign Office in treating France as a neutral and allowing French communications with North Africa to continue almost uninterrupted by sea, made even the use of the submarine in the Mediterranean ineffective. On the other hand, the German blockade of this country, combined with Japanese control of the Far Eastern waters, which fortunately may come to an end fairly soon, has been so complete as to tax the ship-building resources of both Great Britain and the United States, and it will probably be found that lack of imaginative leadership again on our side has contributed in no small degree to the success of those hostile operations.

We are left consequently with only the third weapon, and any further weapon we can devise from now onwards. On our intelligent and effective use of this weapon depends our capacity to paralyze German war production. So far, that weapon has not been used either effectively or intelligently, and this may be attributed not to lack of knowledge of objectives in Germany and in occupied countries, but to lack of co-ordination and lack of proper timing in the claims made by the Army and the Navy and by the Air Force itself on our bombing equipment.

A strong case has been made for independence of the Royal Air Force, but it is not only on the field of battle or at sea that this single command has proved its disadvantages. At no time during

this or any other war can the air weapon be operated independently because it does not contain in itself all the components which make for a decisive victory. It is similar in character to any other war weapon, such as artillery and torpedoes, and from that point of view it has no more right to an independent existence than the gun turrets of a battleship or the heavy ordnance behind an army. The case for handing over to the Army and Navy sufficient aircraft for their requirements and subject entirely to their control has an added strength through the very circumstance that Army and Navy claims may actually weaken the efficiency of those sections of the Royal Air Force which are employed in economic warfare. If the claims of the Army and Navy to influence the choice of objectives are admitted, and those claims are in conflict with the proper objectives in economic warfare, then the strength of the Royal Air Force becomes dissipated.

That has been largely the case hitherto in almost every country in which the Bomber Command has been operating, and it is to this that one must attribute the fact that almost three years of bombing in Germany have not affected seriously German war production. Yet the objectives are comparatively simple in number and extremely well defined. They are, in order of importance:—

- (1) The heavy basic industries which, through their very nature, are not free to change their location easily; industries such as iron and steel and shipbuilding.
- (2) Essential public utilities and services which have also only a limited power of migration but are essential to the preservation of the life of the community.
- (3) Transport and communications, where such transport is vulnerable as in bridges, viaducts, rail intersections, rail collecting centres and joint transport control centres.
- (4) Light metal and alloy industries attached to electric power plants.
- (5) The chemical industries, where they do not already come under the first category.
- (6) The engineering industries.

One would have thought that our bombing policy would have been based on this order of priority and would have carried out a policy of concentration of effort, but a careful examination of what has been achieved and attempted reveals a fairly studied inconsistency and an extraordinarily useless diversity of effort. To take only one example, why should it have been deemed necessary to send a thousand aeroplanes to bomb Cologne, one of the most beautiful cities in Germany? Not a single industry within the first five categories is to be found in the vicinity of Cologne, with the

possible exception of one or two power stations. Even the heavy air-raid on Essen was inconclusive and certainly incomplete. Why were heavy attacks not made on the following centres, which are fundamental for German war production—Hamborn, Oberhausen, Dortmund, Rheinhausen and Dusseldorf? If those centres had been wiped out, the production of iron and steel in Germany would have been halved. Why have the new Göring works in the vicinity of Braunschweig been omitted? Why have the great chemical works at Mannheim not been conclusively destroyed or the ball-bearing works at Frankfurt? Why have the magneto works round Stuttgart been omitted?

Again, no real interruption has been made in the public utilities and services. In the case of power stations, any policy which did not destroy at one and the same time at least a dozen central generating stations, would be ineffective, because the growth of interconnection and high tension transmission has increased the immunity of the individual station but increased the danger to groups of stations. The same observation applies to gas works, and to some extent also to water works. It may be possible to destroy thousands of houses without affecting seriously the morale of the people if the public services are still available, and the vulnerability of an electrical distribution system in any German town is less than in this country owing to the extensive employment of overhead distribution. It might be perfectly possible for the whole of Cologne to be destroyed, for example, and leave the electric service functioning after a short period of repairs. Now, a community with neither light nor water nor sewage disposal nor gas cannot exist. It can do at a pinch without shelter, without food and without transport, but a civilized community cannot escape disease and death if it has not got the other public services. An air attack which took the services for an entire area and destroyed them in detail, even if it meant destroying surrounding buildings in the process, would be infinitely more valuable than the destruction of a town like Münster.

Strangely enough, it is only in the attacks on Paris and Northern France that something like system has developed, but here again, one may ask, why the great iron and steel works of Valenciennes, Denain and Anzin and the great engineering works in the vicinity of Lille, mainly devoted to railway transport, should not have suffered the same fate as the Renault works in Paris? Why, again, should industrial Belgium, particularly the works in the vicinity of Liège, be entirely exempt? We know that all those works are actually employed as German works in providing munitions of war. With long range bombers such as the Air Force has at its disposal,

the paralysis of the great Italian industries round Turin and Milan and even in Central and South-Eastern Europe is possible, but the tragedy of our policy has been the refusal to link it up with any comprehensive and far-sighted scheme of economic warfare. The bombing has been desultory in the extreme, and quite obviously it has not been carried out according to plan, because no intelligently conceived plan would allow for such diversity without real force behind it. If, for example, the steel industries of the Ruhr had been really destroyed by concentrated attack, then the German tank, submarine and even ordnance production would have suffered. To send bombers to a distant centre like Augsburg to destroy a factory making Diesel engines, where the principal product can be sub-divided and sub-contracted to an extraordinary degree, shows not only ignorance of modern engineering practice, but a lack of appreciation of the necessities and realities of economic warfare. Even the complete destruction of the works at Augsburg would not weaken German Diesel engine production for more than a few weeks, or at worst a few months. Our experience in this country as a result of German bombing should be conclusive in that respect.

It is quite clear that, as far as industrial objectives are concerned, our bombing policy requires drastic revision. It may be argued of course that the bombing would be much more effective if it were devoted to means of communication, including docks, harbours and railways centres, and that it could paralyze the German war effort by making it impossible for Germany or Italy to send equipment and troops to the North of Africa or along the coast into Norway, but facts give an answer to that argument. Despite our superiority in the air, we have not prevented serious attacks by German aeroplanes and ships on our northern convoys to Murmansk. We have obviously not made the German ports unusable, because ships are still using them, and it is doubtful whether interruptions in supply to Rommel's army in Africa have been less serious than the interruptions in supplies to the British army in the same area. It may be of course that in those cases dispersion of effort without any definite plan behind it has had the same unfortunate results as in the Far East, or it may be that we have not the resources to carry out a really sufficient interference plan in the Mediterranean and the North Sea at the same time. In view of the contrast that always arises between our promises and our performances, there may not actually be enough heavy or medium bombers to carry out a comprehensive scheme of destruction, but that argument, in view of the increasing American production, should have very little validity after a few months, and the decision has got to be made whether it is our definite national policy to destroy the industrial

production of Germany at the source, or merely go through the motions of doing so.

We can destroy German industry at the source only by terrific concentration on the heavy, geographically limited, basic industries, particularly iron and steel and chemicals, and on the public utility services. We know exactly where they are located, and have probably a plan of each single plant. It should be a simple matter to destroy them in detail, even if it means a terrific wastage of bombs owing to the comparative smallness of the target. It is doubtful, however, in view of the improved bomb sights that are now available, whether even a comparatively small iron and steel plant could escape an intensive raid.

Quite apart from the aesthetic side, and this is important when towns of the quality of Lübeck, Münster and Cologne are involved, we should reconsider very seriously the advisability of attacking German towns as such. The value of destroying at one and the same time the Siemens works in Berlin and the town adjacent to them, built by this firm to house its workers, cannot be doubted, any more than the destruction of the Thyssen works at Hamborn with the housing colonies located beside the works, or the Central German brown coal power stations with their housing colonies. In other words, the policy of the limited objective should be adopted again, but it should include not only the industrial factory, but all the residential areas in the vicinity of the factory. Not a single German citizen with any intelligence or culture would lament the passing of Hamborn, but he would take as a serious crime the sacking of the older part of Lübeck. A continuation of this policy is the most certain way to solidify German opinion in active hatred of this country.

Largely as a result of our ineffectiveness in Germany and France, we have not been able to use our influence in preventing the diversion of Swiss and Swedish production to Germany. A very considerable proportion of the water power produced in Switzerland is being exported into Germany for munitions production, and there is scheduled and under active construction an immense extension of the water power equipment of Sweden, practically none of which will be devoted to home consumption. It is true of course that both Sweden and Switzerland are nominally neutral, but if they persist in devoting blatantly their production to the war purposes of Germany, they are no more neutral than if, like Finland, they were to send an army into the field beside the Germans. We have no more justification for allowing those plants to go on functioning without active British supervision, than we would have in tolerating similar activities in France. Again, in France, no

attempt has been made to interfere with the production of the new French power plants on the Rhine and on the Rhone, the construction of which has been accelerated by Germany in order to increase the German power potential.

Those are all phases of the economic war which cannot be ignored by this country, but, owing to our real lack of success in Germany, we have not been able to exert enough political pressure to ensure that such diversion of resources will cease. There is consequently a clear case, not only for a drastic remodelling of our bombing policy, but also for a much closer co-ordination between the three elements which go to form that policy, namely our interpretation of the rights of neutrals, where those rights are such as to help very considerably the enemy, our interpretation of the principles and practices of effective economic warfare, and our handling of the bombing and other resources at our disposal for the destruction of enemy war production. Admittedly, Germany will carry out reprisals, but our main source of supply, namely the U.S.A., is beyond any such policy, and even if, as a result of this internecine industrial European war, both German and British war production should be paralysed, there would still be the reality of American production. For the first time since the beginning of the war, the situation is favourable to the successful realization of a determined and imaginative economic warfare policy, but if that opportunity is not seized, we shall not be able to prevent Germany and Japan from gathering together new industrial strength.

AN ESSAY ON POPULATION

BY MARGERY SPRING RICE

TO judge by the wide divergency in the forecasts by professional prophets, the pattern of population is wrought of subtle imponderables baffling the most skilled investigators. It would be presumptuous therefore for the writer of the present article who is neither a statistician nor a scientist to attempt to paint yet another picture of the future. I shall try only to state the essence of the known facts, to suggest some of their implications and their causes, and to hazard a few possible remedies in so far as these may be considered necessary. But at the outset let me emphatically protest that any assumptions based on present trends or on those of the last twenty-eight years are highly suppositional in a world so shaken and unstable as this has been during that period. Quite apart from the spiritual, social and economic effects of two major wars, many of our social customs and values have been in liquidation for the past couple of generations, and no one can tell what the final settlement may be. We can but take stock, and initiate such measures as our intelligence can devise to counter the possible bankruptcy which seems to loom out of the future.

Admittedly the data for a really well-informed assessment of the existing position and therefore of the probable future are missing. With our habitual conservatism and complacency we have never thought it necessary or even desirable to analyze, far less to formulate a policy about a matter which, *a priori*, seems as simple and inevitable as the greenness and growth of grass; in consequence we have lagged more than a century behind some other countries in demanding essential information on the subject. The Population Bill of 1937 was passed only after a drastic whittling down to placate those people who were shocked that mothers should be asked such indelicate questions as their age at the birth of their respective children! Even registration of births and deaths was not introduced into this country till 1837 (Scotland 1857) and not made compulsory till 1874; so that about four million people are still living, at the time of whose birth no accurate figures were available.* It is easier to reconstruct the skeleton of the

* In Sweden accurate data about births and deaths and other vital facts still not known in England, were ascertained in 1774.

ichthyosaurus who has been extinct since the Quantocks ceased to be islands in a vast dead inland sea, than to measure or assess the human life of those same English counties a century ago!

Nevertheless certain basic facts are known, and although their accuracy can only be vouched for since 1875, that period is long enough to determine the *present* general direction of vital population movements. The birth-rate, that is the number of births for every 1,000 persons living, for England and Wales in 1875 was over 35; in 1938 it was 15.1; in 1939, 14.9 and in 1940, 14.6.*

The present birth-rate yields a reproduction rate of only .75 of unity. That is to say that every hundred women of reproductive age (married and unmarried) in this generation, are producing only enough girl babies to yield 75 potential mothers for the next generation. If the same reproduction rate continues, the number of mothers will decrease with every generation; and it is clear that when a population is not maintaining itself at source, it must at some point begin to decrease.† This need not happen immediately the reproduction rate falls below unity, because other agents may be at work to abate the *waste* of life (chiefly the premature death-rate) which in the past was very high. This has in fact been happening, for concurrently with the almost unbroken decline of the birth-rate, which began about 1879, there has been a rapid fall in the death-rate, which began well over a hundred years before that. It has been calculated that the population of Great Britain started to increase about 1750, owing to the death-rate falling (as far as is known, for the first time), below the birth-rate.‡ By 1875 when accurate figures were first obtained, the death-rate was already very much lower (22 per 1,000) than the birth-rate, which had remained at the high figure of 35 per 1,000 during the whole time that the death-rate had been falling. So that when fertility began to decline there was a large margin of safety, before it could conceivably overtake the *still-falling* death-rate. Moreover it is

* A regional analysis of vital statistics, such as was made by Mr. R. H. Titmuss in *Poverty and Population* (1938) reveals the fact that both the birth- and death-rates vary enormously in different parts of the country. This is of vast importance in an investigation of differential fertility (without a knowledge of which an analysis of the whole problem is obviously incomplete) and as a cure for complacency about the fall in the national death-rate during the last 100 years. Figures for the national rates are therefore very misleading. Mr. Titmuss says, "if the same infant mortality rates that existed in 1936 in many towns of a depressed nature . . . had obtained throughout the whole country, the nation would have lost in that one year approximately 25,000 more infants" (op. cit. p. 78).

† Space does not allow any analysis of the influence of migration, which is anyhow very small, and is quite unpredictable after the war.

‡ The reproduction rate fell below unity in the period 1921-31. In 1875 the average number of girl babies born, for each woman (married or unmarried) of reproductive age was 2.32.

clear that the effect of a high birth-rate in one generation will be reflected in the total number of births in the next, for the simple reason that there will by then be a larger number of potential mothers. In spite therefore of a fall in the fertility-rate, the total number of births may continue to rise for some years. In fact the actual annual number of births rose rapidly from about 700,000 in 1875 to over a million, and the rise continued till 1914 (with a bumper year in 1903, when 1,082,000 births were registered). Since 1914 the annual number has fallen steadily till in 1938 it was again about 700,000 (in 1939 about 695,000, and 1940 about 685,000).*

The population therefore, has continued to increase at least up to the outbreak of the present war. But the increase is progressively less rapid and may soon cease altogether. The number of women now at the most fecund years of life is abnormally large (because at the end of the last century and the beginning of this, births were about 60 per cent. in excess of those from which the youngest and oldest sections of the community are sprung); but this exceptionally numerous generation are working through their productive years and are becoming the elder section of the population. With the successive decrease in the annual number of births since 1914, the average age of the population will rise continuously until the people born in the most prolific years have died. Now an older population necessarily dies sooner than a young one, and so it is likely that there may within the next few years be a *rise*, rather than a further fall, in the mortality rates; and whatever the improvements in the death-rate at earlier stages of the journey, it seems inevitable that unless the supply of babies as well as the means to save them receives a fresh and powerful impetus, the population must suffer a serious and rapid decline until the abnormal elements in it have passed away. Ultimately of course the stream of life cannot lose more than it takes in, so that eventually, apart from violent upheavals in the shape of war or pestilence, there must be some sort of stabilization between the birth-rate and the death-rate. The serious question is whether we might not before that point is reached, have lost so heavily in numbers and in vigour as to be incapable of national survival.

Before speculating on the possibility of a turn in the falling tide, let us examine the chances of still further preventing the waste of the life we have, by reducing to the absolute minimum the risk of premature death. The reduction in the death-rate which has in fact taken place, and which is to be hoped for in the future, consists not in prolonging life for old people but in eliminating the chances of death before the most productive years have been completed. It

* These figures are in round numbers and are for Great Britain.

may even be argued that humanitarianism and science have gone too far already in protracting the normal journey from the cradle to the grave, and particularly in burdening the caravan with passengers who cannot pull their weight. Be this as it may, the scope for future improvement lies not at this end, but in the early and middle years of life.

The infant mortality-rate of this country is very much higher than that of several others, and the different rates obtaining in different parts of the country are witness both of what can be done and of what remains to be done. Between 1900 and 1939 the *national* rate fell from 150 per 1,000 live births to 50. In New Zealand and Holland (pre-war rates) it was 32 and 36 respectively. In Oslo (Norway) and Coulsdon and Purley (Surrey) it was 30. In the North of England as a whole it was 76, and in Jarrow 114. Comment seems almost unnecessary. If our national rate is shamed by that of a small European country almost as densely populated as our own, the varying rates inside this country dishonour us still more.

What, too, of the older children? Science has taught that death from such diseases as measles, diphtheria, whooping cough, tuberculosis and heart disease can be almost eliminated among children. In certain areas these diseases are much rarer than in others, and when they occur, they seldom kill. But in the North the deaths are two or three times higher than the *national* average. And even when, in Jarrow and Glasgow for example, the young escape the death which lurks for them round every corner of their squalid streets and in every cranny of their insanitary homes, in what state of health and for how long do they survive? Are they assured of any of the conditions in youth which are necessary for development into healthy, responsible and stable citizens? Is it not a fact that a great deal of the preventable disease in the years of greatest potential productiveness, is the result of neglect in childhood.* And finally, what of the four children a day who were killed on the roads of Great Britain during April of this year?

The remedy for these scandals does not depend on the advance of scientific knowledge, but on common humanity and public demand, of which every citizen can make what use he will. It may

* Rickets in early childhood is recognized as one of the chief causes of maternal mortality. The M.M. rate in the industrial areas of Wales is 145 per cent. in excess of those for Greater London, and 500 per cent. in excess for those of Kensington. The Army rejections (pre-war) amongst men, approximately 15-24 years of age, are 32 per cent. in the Home Counties, 58 per cent. in E. Lancashire, and 47 per cent. in Wales as a whole. Similar comparisons can be made in these regions for almost every disease and in every measurement or estimate of morbidity. The only cause of death which shows a higher rate in the south than in the north is "violence" for children under 15; there are fewer motor cars in the industrial towns of the north than in London!

well be asked whether we have the right to bewail a falling birth-rate, when by default and not through ignorance we condone from year to year a state of existence for the children of the largest families which makes moonshine of health, security and happiness. Until we remedy these evils, are we not morally bound to teach those parents from whom the population is mainly recruited, the means of drastic family limitation?

Some people will argue that a decrease in the population is highly desirable, and that it would be unwise to try to stimulate the birth-rate, especially if and when life is no longer impaired or endangered by poverty, disease and war. Although they would like to see an end to differential fertility, they wish it to be by means of smaller families at one end of the scale rather than of larger families at the other. They fear that otherwise the population will grow to such a size as to necessitate a falling off in the economic standard of life and a weakening rather than a strengthening of our national vigour. While admitting the evil of a situation in which babies and the conditions which insure their healthy growth are distributed inversely throughout the country, I feel that the aim should be to enable everyone to rear a family of at least four or five children, not necessarily in luxury and to some purely snobbish standard of education, but in health and economic security and with equal opportunities for intellectual development. I should like to see the socially differential birth-rate levelled by a more acute sense of social responsibility among both rich and poor; for the one class it would mean a sacrifice of some of the artificial values and luxuries which are now considered indispensable to happiness; and for the other class, scientific instruction in birth control which would result—given conditions of stability—in parenthood being regarded as a privilege and not as a punishment.

The question is one not only of the size of the population, but of its quality; particularly of intelligence and character. As to its size, there is undoubtedly an overwhelming opinion that it would be a pity, not to say a disaster if the English nation gradually faded away; and that although a slight fall in our numbers may be viewed with equanimity, we must do something to check the falling tide, and do it soon, for the time is getting short in which recovery or even stability will be within human power. Economists no longer hold the view that the population is too large for us to support, or that the world is not still capable of producing infinitely more than it is already doing. On the contrary, economists of the standing of Sir William Beveridge and Lord Keynes view with alarm the effect on the social-economic structure of a declining and ageing population; unemployment is likely to increase with a shrinking

home (and foreign*) market, and with the difficulties of the change over from a large to a small population and from the demands of youth to those of age. Moreover it is probable that the general standard of life would, for a long time, be at a lower level than at present.

I do not know what, if any, verdict history has given about the effect of a decadent population on its character and intelligence. It has certainly frequently been suggested that the elder children are seldom the healthiest or most successful in a family. The reasons for this may be physiological or emotional or both. The comparative ignorance of the parents with their first-born, and the absence of the more stable emotional environment of younger children who from their birth are in a group, may be contributory causes. It is clear that if there is any scientific foundation for these suppositions, national intelligence would suffer if the population were maintained by means of the smallest possible birth-rate combined with the smallest possible death-rate. This theory is not invalidated by the recognition that malnutrition, high mortality and morbidity, bad housing and all the environmental influences of poverty adversely affect the mental and moral power of children; and that in those families seriously impoverished by a large number of children, the risk of unstable, backward and even delinquent children, is very great. I would hazard the opinion that in the interest of the children's stability, character and mental power, it were better that two mothers should have four or five children each, and three women none at all, than that the same number of children should be as evenly distributed as possible between the five families.

Assuming therefore that we wish to maintain the population, it is obvious that at some point the reproduction-rate must rise to unity. The Registrar General tells us that with a constant annual supply of 700,000 births, the population could be stabilized permanently at about 3 per cent. larger than it is now, if the mortality rate continues to fall as may be expected; or at about 7 per cent. smaller if the death-rate remains what it is now. He adds, "that this (700,000 births per annum) could only be realized by a gradual rise in fertility over the next two or three decades, sufficient to counteract the serious fall in the number of reproductive women which is bound to take place over that period."[†]

Here, it seems to me, is the crux of the whole matter. How are parents to be persuaded to have more children? Do we yet know why they now have so few? It is fairly obvious that the decline in

* All European countries except Russia have a reproduction rate below unity.

† The Current Trend of Population; White Paper Cmd 6358. May, 1942. pp. 4 and 5.

the birth-rate is voluntary and is achieved by the use of birth-control methods, but this is no explanation of why people do not want to have more than one or two children. Various reasons have been suggested. Dr. Grace Leybourne in an exhaustive study of the past and present costs of education, makes out a strong case for regarding the chief reason of family limitation as economic.* The increasing cost of education, and the increasing value set by a number of people on education, either from merely snobbish motives, or from those of enlightened self-interest, have made it impossible to bring up more than one or two children to the standard desired by the modern middle-class parent. Where the economics of the problem are not concerned with education, they are with rent, domestic labour and general social amenities.

Undoubtedly this is part of the picture, and consequently some of the necessary stimulus would be provided by family allowances (though I find it hard to believe that among those classes most responsible for the falling birth-rate, a 5s. weekly allowance per child is going to make very much difference) and by free or cheap secondary education for all, the extension of university scholarships, the state ownership of land and a control of rents, and the provision of adequate houses for large families at rents in inverse ratio to the size of the family. But I venture to think that, much as these and many reforms on the same lines are needed on every ground, they will not solve the problem under consideration. It is a more subtle disease than will yield to these remedies; it is social rather than economic, and spiritual above all; moreover I believe it to be a disease of women rather than of men.

In the last sixty or seventy years remarkable changes have taken place in the social environment and habits of certain classes of women. In 1875 there were very few careers open to women except that of motherhood and domesticity. They were uneducated and could not earn their living, even if they would. There was no demand for them except as mothers and wives, and all their creative impulses had to find satisfaction within the four walls of the home. But some women had already begun to push open the doors which led to the outer world, and to fight for the same opportunities for themselves as had been given to men—a good education, the right to earn their own living, and the right to take part in the government and social work of their country. The pioneers were few and were for the most part women of remarkable balance and character, as pioneers generally are. But the freedom that they demanded was not for themselves alone, and when thousands of their fellows took up the cry it became a fashion rather to

* Education and the Birth-rate, by Grace Leybourne and Kenneth White. Cape, 1940.

despise the old career for which no special education or training had ever been, nor indeed now is, considered necessary. Any woman, it was felt, could bring up a family; but honour, independence, fame and, above all, excitement awaited those who entered the lists of the great world. Every year the number of women seeking an independent livelihood before marriage was growing; marriage was postponed, and more women remained unmarried. Those who married resolved that they would not get caught up in the old slavery of domestic ties, and that their other activities should not in any way be restricted. Emancipation, though of a different sort, spread from the serious-minded to the frivolous women, of whom there has always been a plentiful supply even when they were perforce the mothers of large families. They, too, had new opportunities because the fashion was changing. They could go about without escort—travel, dance, possess and spend their own money, and account to no one for their movements, their thoughts or their society. One or two children might be a pleasant foil for their charms, but the family must not be allowed in any way to become a brake to the real business of life—pleasure.

There have been many other conspicuous characteristics of this newly acquired freedom, all tending to undermine the stability of the home and therefore of those conditions which stimulate the production of a large family. Divorces have increased beyond all comparison with those of the last half of the 19th century, and are practically no longer stigmatized by social disapproval. Pre-marital and extra-marital alliances are now, if not universal, at least an ordinary occurrence, among *all* classes, and again are not widely censured by "enlightened" people.*

All this freedom of activity, thought and "morality" has been absolutely inevitable and necessary in woman's struggle to deliver herself from the shackles of ignorance and subjection. She could not stay inside her prison and merely shout for freedom, nor, coming out to fight for it, could she give time and thought to the demands made upon her behind the bars. Our concern should be, not that a certain number have found their freedom, have perhaps even abused it, and have certainly sometimes failed in judgment when revaluing the elementary functions of life—but that so many have been passed by and forgotten, and are left in their old slough

* The Registrar-General's statistical review for 1938 (not published, but commented upon in *The Times*) contains the first analysis of the new information about the fertility of women, obtained under the Population Act (1938). It reveals that about 40 per cent. of women who married before 20 years of age were pregnant before marriage; the proportion was 30 per cent. for those who married at 20; 20 per cent. for those who married at 21. The married fertility-rate has risen considerably at ages under 20, and marriages are tending to take place earlier. The combination of these three facts all point to a high incidence of pre-marital alliances.

of bondage and degradation. It is no satisfaction that these are counteracting the fall in the birth-rate for which the more fortunate of their sex are responsible, for to recruit the population from mothers so enslaved, so poor and so ignorant is a far greater danger than even a fall in numbers. Let us do what we can to emancipate them too, in the interests of themselves and of their country. *Fiat justitia, ruat coelum.*

In any case, there are unmistakable signs that the pendulum is swinging back. So many doors are now open to women that there is no longer so great a necessity to push against them, and—such is human nature—no longer such a thrill in walking out of them. Women have gained in knowledge and skill and public spirit. They have learnt that the proof of their equality with men does not lie in beating him at his own game, but in playing theirs (which incidentally is entirely beyond his powers) with the skill and energy it deserves. They are learning that emancipation is of the spirit and the mind, and can be won and retained as satisfactorily on the domestic hearth as in the office or workshop. And they are learning, in a world where all values and all standards have been shaken to their bases, that there is a permanency of achievement and of happiness in the production and raising of a family which is offered by no other career.

This however does not mean that the clock is going to tick in the way it did before 1875. We are not going back to the habits of mind or of life of our grandmothers. If the career of family-making is once again to claim the attention of women, it must be acknowledged as a skilled profession, demanding as high a degree of training as any other. For unless they can put their intellect and newly-acquired knowledge of life into it, as well as their emotions and physical strength, mothers will again begin to feel the old rub and the insistency of the call to other spheres of usefulness for which their education has fitted them. The fundamental conflict which I fear is incapable of an entirely happy solution, must somehow be weighted on the side of the family demands.

What then can we do in this direction? Let us first of all give our young girls a first-class education, cultivating all those intellectual attainments which encourage dependence on their own resources and not on distraction or entertainment by others. (I am convinced that the scrubbing of a floor is less arduous to someone who can hum Mozart to herself, or recite from memory and with delight a sonnet of Shakespeare's, than it is to the empty-headed elementary school-girl who can only think of getting off to the "pictures.") Their education should include a training in citizenship and an emphasis on those arts and sciences which add

colour and value to the making of a home and the up-bringing of children. Everything should be done to make the mother feel that she is doing a job of value to the community, and with which the community is helping her. There should be nursery schools for the youngest children of every class, giving the mother the chance of continuing the occupations of her earlier days as far as possible. As far as possible girls should be directed into professions which will prove useful to them in marriage, and which therefore they may be able to practise for the public benefit as well as their own, after marriage (though perhaps not then for financial profit). This would result in the termination of an uneconomic and anti-social state of affairs in which girls do not take their early careers seriously, thus lowering the status of the profession, perpetuating the system of unequal pay for men and women, and undermining their own morality about work.

The instinctive biological urge upon which some people base their optimism for the future has been overlaid and refined by civilization in the same way that hunger has by fine food. Both appetencies are still there, but they gain in flavour and in honour when skill is used in satisfying them, and when public veneration is paid to them. So let us hope that when Peace comes, it will this time, instead of disillusionment and despair, bring confidence, courage and renewed strength. Then can we "learn the Sciences that should become our country," for if War can teach us ~~nothing~~ else, it has burnt into our hearts that there is no ~~wealth~~ but Life.

EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

By H. C. DENT

"WE cannot work Democracy, because we are not educated." That, so Mr. Stephen Spender tells us,* is the plaint constantly to be heard from thoughtful men in the National Fire Service. How tragically true the diagnosis is—and, of course, not only of firemen; it is applicable to the great majority of us in this country. We are simply not capable of working democracy in any full or real sense: not because we lack the ability to do so, but because our native ability—which is great—has never been developed, and such education as we have received has been neither adequate nor fitting for the democratic way of life. Unless we set ourselves seriously, and at once, to remedy this state of affairs, we need look for no democratic order in England after the war.

This assertion will doubtless seem unduly pessimistic to many people. They will protest that England is already a most democratic country, and that it has been so for a very long time. I shall be told that our democratic tradition is the oldest (I may even be told it is the best) in the world; that we enjoy very *real*, substantial democratic freedoms, that most of our institutions of society (surely no one will dare to say all?) are thoroughly democratic, and that the stability of our national life offers convincing evidence that the system is working, if *not* indeed superlatively well, at least fairly satisfactory.

So it is—for the few. For the many, No. They cannot enjoy the democratic freedoms, and the democratic institutions are beyond their ken, because they have never been educated up to them. This is evident in every aspect of our national life. If, as Lincoln declared, democracy means "government of the people, by the people, for the people," the facts suggest that we are far from realizing anything approaching even a political democracy. True, we have universal adult suffrage; and in theory we have absolute freedom to elect whom we please to represent us—or to be ourselves elected—on any body set up for the purposes of national or local government. But what use is this freedom to most of us? How many can exercise it in a considered and responsible way? We have not the knowledge, the background or the judgment. As a result government is actually carried on by a very small minority drawn largely from the ranks of those who have received an exclusive and privileged form of education denied to the majority.

* In "Morale and Short Term Education." THE FORTNIGHTLY. June, 1942.

The mass of the people remained, until war stimulated them to an *ad hoc* interest, not so much uninterested in as completely outside politics. Many never troubled to vote even in Parliamentary elections, and many more voted quite irresponsibly, while in municipal contests it was always difficult to drag a sufficient number to the polling booths to prevent the elections being a farce. As for considering themselves as potential representatives of their fellows, or even as having any personal responsibility for the government of the country or the locality—the idea simply never entered the heads of the majority of people. Government was the business of “they,” and never of “we.” It is still thus regarded.

The reason commonly alleged for this is apathy; but apathy is not a native attribute of the English people. For them to exhibit it there must be a cause, and a powerful one. That cause is inadequate and defective education.

I do not for one moment suggest that the education of those who hold the reins of government is perfect. The reverse is the case. It is woefully evident to-day that the expensive education given in the schools of the privileged must be gravely defective. Having as its conscious aim the production of leaders, it has disastrously failed to produce them. Whether this be due primarily to the content of the education given in these schools or to the low calibre of those who pass through them, or to a combination of these two factors, I am not prepared to discuss at the moment. My interest lies with the schools for the many, where the issue is as much clearer as it is more important. Here the root defect is patent. An education which is considered ended at the age of 14 cannot in any way fit citizens for democratic living. It cannot be considered an education at all. It is at best the merest beginning of an education. Yet this is all most people get.

The results are as evident in other aspects of our national life as in politics. Among our most jealously prized democratic freedoms is liberty to worship God according to the dictates of our own conscience. But most of us can enjoy this freedom only in the negative sense of feeling free not to partake in any form of religious observance. If those who make no positive use of this freedom did so because they had attained to a reasoned philosophy of life which enabled them to dispense with religion, one might perhaps not feel so concerned. But it is obvious—and it is a root cause of the present almost universal sense of bewilderment and frustration—that far from having a reasoned they have not even a conscious philosophy. How can they have? How can one arrive at a philosophy of life when one is plunged, immature and untrained, into full-time employment at 14, to discover that life is a continuous—and frequently hopeless—struggle to maintain oneself at or just above subsistence level? There is much talk to-day about the freedom of thought and speech which exists in England. In fact, for the vast majority of us this means no more than freedom not to think, and liberty to talk a great deal of nonsense. Our education has made us literate, in the sense that we can understand print: it has not taught us to value or to use

our minds. Even the freedom not to think is by no means so absolute as would superficially appear. Our uncritical minds are completely at the mercy of the powerful commercialized interests which prey upon us, and our so-called thoughts consist largely of crude and half-digested opinions culled from the mass of perniciously pretentious literature poured out for our alleged benefit.

To derive the economic insecurity which is the constant nightmare of most of us from lack of education may seem to some an impertinence. Yet the relationship is direct, and twofold. It is a deplorable fact that in this country economic privilege spells educational advantage, and educational advantage economic privilege spells economic privilege. The speaker is used openly, even blatantly, to purchase economic privilege. The greatest at a public meeting who described the public school system as the greatest freemasonry in the world for getting its members good jobs was not too far from the truth. Nor is the vice confined to the public schools: the state secondary school has been perverted into an instrument for getting the able boy or girl of the poorer classes, if not a good job, at least a safe and clean one; and the greater the poverty of the home the less chance there is of getting to the secondary school—there is, of course, none at all of getting to the public school. The prevalence of economic insecurity is, of course, primarily due to an outmoded and ill-balanced economic system, but that this persists in spite of its patent noxiousness is due to the fact that we have not a sufficiency of able minds trained for and devoted to its reform. We have not these because, first, the public schools, and the universities which until recently were almost entirely filled by the public schools, have never been interested in nor understood the principles of economics. There was no *a priori* reason why they should be interested; economic pressure and insecurity as the poor understand them never came their way. There was no urge to understand. Second, we have not these brains because of the fantastic obstacles which still stand in the way of ability born in poor surroundings and prevent it from rising to a position where it may be properly used. A facet of this problem has been vividly illuminated by the war. In England economic security has been concentrated in the professional and office employments. Naturally, almost every able mind has made a beeline for one of these safe occupations, with the result that all forms of manual labour fell more and more into disrepute, until the onset of war found us with a shortage of skilled craftsmen so desperate as almost to have a decisive influence on the course of the war.

The war has revealed other grave defects in our educational system. It is not merely that the provision is inadequate; what is taught in the schools is largely irrelevant to the present day problems of society. Take, for example, the neglect of the fundamental questions of personal and communal hygiene, including nutrition. In a genuinely democratic community every citizen would be trained to accept the obligation of maintaining himself and those dependent upon him at the highest possible standard of positive health.

There has, it is true, been built in this country during the present century a considerable if still inadequate network of public health services. But this has been done in spite of rather than because of public opinion, which is still quite reluctant to make anything like full use of such services as exist. In 1935 63 per cent. of recruits failed to reach the not very exacting Army standard of physique and health. Before the war 96 per cent. of Navy and 98 per cent. of Army recruits were found in need of dental treatment, while recruits to the R.A.F. required on an average 5.1 fillings. Honorary dental surgeons attached to an Air Training Corps Wing of less than 5,000 cadets were in 1941 doing 2,000 extractions a month—and these from boys who only two or three years previously were still in the care of the School Medical Service. During the war it has been stated over and over again that if 75 per cent. of the children under 15 were immunized against diphtheria this disease would virtually cease to be a killing one. Yet by mid-1942, in spite of energetic publicity campaigns by many local authorities, with free immunization everywhere available, only 33 per cent. of children had been immunized.

It would be as cruel as untrue to suggest that parents do not care about the health of their children, or even that people generally are indifferent to the state of their own health. The truth is that precautions are not taken because dangers are not realized, and preventive health measures are looked upon with suspicion because they carry with them the irrational fear of the unknown. At the Peckham Health Centre 66 per cent. of people examined were unaware that they had anything wrong with them. This is typical: and the fault lies with the grossly defective education they have received. There is but one remedy: to create a system of universal and comprehensive education adequate to meet the needs of all.

It is clear that if we as a people mean to have a genuinely democratic order in this country we must forthwith set about the task of educating ourselves up to the task of creating it and maintaining it when created. A first necessity is that we shall clear our minds of all preconceived notions of the aim, scope, and content of education; the solution of our problem is not to be found in terms of prevailing modes of thought. To begin with, we must cease to think of education in terms merely of children and schools, or even of teachers and classes. It will include those elements, but it must go far beyond them. Education is a lifelong process, and our scheme of education for the future must embrace the adolescent and the adult as completely—though naturally in a different way—as it now does the child. It is a universal process, so it must embrace the entire community; it must be the prerogative and the privilege of all. It must be “of the community, for the community, by the community,” a grand co-operative effort in which all share, as teachers as well as taught. Most important of all, the educational process must have emerged from the desires of the people; there must not be an arbitrary system imposed from above. I suggest that this war is making it possible—

for the first time in our history—to build an educational system based upon the desires and ministering to the needs of all. It is giving us an idea of the true aim, scope, and purpose of education in and for a democratic community. In the realm of the education of the young, the glaring need of greatly increased care of the child under five years of age (so inadequately met as yet by the Ministry of Health war-time nurseries) should revolutionize our provision for the early years of life. The rapid development of the milk and meals in school schemes, and the almost unbelievably beneficial results—both for health and in social habits—which are already accruing should drive home once and for all the truth that health and education can in no way be divorced. The wide variety of tasks which school children are undertaking to aid the war effort is throwing a profoundly illuminating light upon the content of the curriculum, and should, if we are wise, put an end for ever to the academic conception of a sedentary schooling aimed at preservation of an effete and obsolete culture, which has so long afflicted us. The institution of a Service of Youth to care for the neglected years between 14 and 18, and more recently the registration of young people between 16 and 18, have brought us right up against the crucial problem of the relationship between education and industry, and should kill stone dead the preposterous notion that education must not concern itself with vocation, but only with culture. What culture is possible without vocation?

In the realm of adult education—previously left almost entirely to voluntary effort, and in particular to that devoted body, the Workers' Educational Association, which for so long has done such magnificent work—the development has been equally startling and even more significant. Hundreds of thousands of men and women who before the war would never have dreamed of any necessity for self-education are to-day voluntarily and gladly—one had almost said greedily—engaging in it in the widest variety of ways. Civil defence volunteers, firemen, Home Guard, A.T.S. and other services are submitting themselves to rigorous and arduous training. Women in thousands take course after course of lectures to qualify themselves as nurses, rest centre and communal restaurant workers. Countless thousands of men and women are learning new trades and skilled occupations. Nor is this new found passion for education in any way limited to vocational pursuits. Evening institutes catering for leisure-time occupations are crowded as never before; and the demand for lectures and talks on current affairs, philosophy, psychology, for lessons in foreign languages, history, geography, the elements of science, and religious knowledge has risen to an unprecedented pitch. The Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts—a wartime creation—is carrying good music, good drama and good art to places which have never known them before, and is being everywhere received with wildest enthusiasm. A.B.C.A.—the Army Bureau of Current Affairs—is achieving a popularity probably undreamed of even by its authors while the larger scheme for adult education in H.M. Forces, after an uncertain start, is making sub-

stantial if unspectacular progress. The Central Council of Recreative Physical Training is spreading the gospel of good health and healthy living throughout the country, and is perpetually embarrassed to meet a huge and constantly rising demand for its services. The W.V.S., the Women's Institutes, the Townswomen's Guilds and comparable bodies are daily experimenting with new forms of popular adult education, and daily discovering that they are pioneering in an almost virgin field of unknown extent. The amazing spread of the "Brains Trust" technique, and the innumerable, spontaneously formed and self-led discussion groups that spring up everywhere are other revealing but not isolated instances of what, if properly estimated, is in effect a mass movement of the most profound social significance.

"There is struggling to birth," wrote Dr. J. H. Oldham recently * "a broader and richer conception of education which takes account of other educative influences besides the organized and segregated life of the school." No words could be more true. We have to-day an opportunity unique in our history. We must weave together all these potentially rich and fruitful beginnings into a comprehensive and ordered scheme, avoiding any hint of bureaucratic domination, but avoiding equally wasteful overlapping and haphazard provision. If we do so, we shall really evolve an education for democracy, and be enabled to march forward to a more glorious and beneficent era than we have yet known. But if we lose this opportunity, the alternative is all too clear; we shall sink to the level of a tenth rate nation, and live miserably, torn by sectional interests and dominated by authoritarian leadership.

(Mr. Dent is the Editor of The Times Educational Supplement.)

WHAT FUTURE FOR ITALY?

BY C. M. FRANZERO

NOW and again we hear a different forecast of what the future of Italy may be after the defeat of the Axis and the disappearance of the Fascist régime. The first element for such a discussion should be to know what treatment Great Britain and the U.S.A. are reserving for a defeated Italy. But let us assume—and in me this assumption is as strong as a religion—that Great Britain, the U.S.A. and the Allied Nations will, apart from the general principles of the Atlantic Charter, distinguish between the Italian people and the Fascist régime and recognize that Italy entered the War against the people's will and has been reduced by the Axis to the unhappy position of an occupied country. It follows, therefore, that Italy will, after the War, be preserved as a nation and, according to the Atlantic Charter, allowed to choose her own free government. Upon this point there appears to be a general consensus of opinion. What, however, causes many Italians deep concern is to see how many wrong ideas and misconceptions there exist in Britain on the subject of a future free Italy.

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One basic point in the conception of a future Europe is that the peaceful existence of Britain and the security of democracy as represented by the British Empire and the U.S.A. must be founded upon a Europe in which Great Britain will be able to impress the stamp of her political, social and economic system, which is one of the broadest the modern world has seen; and this will be possible only if Britain is secure in the Mediterranean as well as in the Atlantic; a security which cannot be achieved without a full and complete collaboration between Britain and the Mediterranean countries of which Italy is geographically the central one. I submit that such collaboration can have a value only if the potentiality represented by Italy in the council of Europe is kept alive, and to do this it is necessary to preserve in Italy a social and political stability which can be maintained only by considering the Monarchy as a rallying point.

We often hear this kind of reasoning: "The Royal House, which has identified itself so closely with Mussolini and the régime, is suffering the same gradual eclipse of popularity. Democracy in Italy is discredited no less than Fascism; and therefore there seems to be no other solution but a government of Extreme Left." This way of thinking is mostly inspired by a misappre-

* Christian News Letter. June 3, 1942.

hension and it is founded on an imperfect knowledge of the factors upon which a new Italy can be rebuilt.

In the first place, it is an error of the first magnitude to presuppose that the misrule of Fascism has had the primary effect of pushing the Italian people towards the Extreme Left. That is not so, and for several reasons, the fundamental one being that the Italians are not extremists by nature nor are they intensely politically-minded; and a conception of popular government in the socialist-communist sense would imply deep political convictions within the masses, unless we contemplate it as an imposed form of government which would be tantamount to another form of dictatorship. The second reason is that modern Italy—that is to say, the Italy that has evolved between the '70s and the present day, is not and never was a nation of proletarians: in fact, Italy is, to a degree almost higher than France, a nation of small middle-class people, and the small privately-owned business still represents the bulk of social and economic life all over Italy. The third reason is that the industrial classes are not, as in other countries, represented by capital invested by the general public, but the industries are mostly the development of old family-concerns, congregated almost entirely in the North; and the attitude of the industrialists would prove an important factor in any subversive attempts, as happened in the troubled years between 1919 and 1922.

Another point that it is necessary to state bluntly (with complete disregard of the wishful programmes nurtured by some *émigrés* who have lost touch with things in Italy and remain rigidly fixed to conceptions that in Italy have, in the course of the last twenty years, lost all meaning) is that a word which frightens the Italians no less than Fascism is Communism. It was the scarecrow of Communism that afforded to Mussolini, in the years after the other war, the popular appeal for his political doctrine. It is true that the "Fascist Revolution" was merely a literary invention devised for self-exaltation after the access to power, as it is true that when Fascism went to power at the end of 1922 the social disturbances of 1920 and '21 had already petered out; but it is equally true that there never was in Italy a serious danger of a Communist uprising, and the occupation of the factories by the workers during September, 1920, were sporadic and localized episodes, which exhausted their energies in their very failure. In fact, the primary cause of the failure of those Communist attempts was that among the Italian people there existed no sympathy whatsoever for Communist rule. The Italian is, by instinct, a born individualist with an intense degree of egotism. The most ordinary Italian is, subconsciously if not deliberately, as self-centred as the heroes of D'Annunzio's books. It is this instinctive individualism and egotism of the average Italian that made possible Mussolini's ascent to power, because every class of the Italian people and every individual of each class was seeing in Fascism a system and a conception whereby his own individual existence and personal life would benefit thereby. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Italians, in their deepest heart have always treated the doctrine

of the Fascist State merely as the rhetorical trappings of a journalistic-dictator. As long as Mussolini redeemed marshes, excavated ancient Rome, built roads and conquered African territories cheaply, the Italians would have cheerfully remained Fascist. What the Italian people frowned at was a war in Spain and the increasing shadow of a European conflict.

Having made this clear, it can be taken as axiomatic that if Italy, at the end of the War or after a separate armistice, is to be spared as a nation and allowed to play her part in a future Europe, it is necessary to preserve in Italy a social and political stability in order to maintain the unity of the country. This, I say again, can be achieved only by considering the Monarchy as a rallying point.

Upon this point there are some people in Britain who believe that the Crown is discredited because the present King was instrumental in placing Mussolini in power and causing the Fascist régime to secure a grip on the country. Let us, for the sake of argument, admit this responsibility of the King, although there are many Italians who firmly believe that when King Victor Emmanuel, in 1922, invited Mussolini to power, he was inspired by the higher desire to give a new man a chance of setting the country in order, and was not merely prompted by the advantage of securing the new Party's support for his crown which was in no danger. But even so, it does not necessarily follow that by condemning the present King we must condemn the Monarchy as a principle. To confuse the present King with the principles embodied in the Crown is deliberately to forget that a Constitutional Monarchy not only symbolizes the concept of a unified Italy, but it may be extremely dangerous for that very unity to sweep away the Crown and set up a republican form of government. This might indeed prove for Italy a most fatal experiment. Italy is composed of a variety of peoples who, although belonging to the same racial group of Latins or what we should better call the Mediterraneans, differ in a high degree from North to South. The economic composition of the country itself and the unequal distribution of natural and industrial resources may provide an opportunity for a dismemberment of Italy once the ideal of national unity vested in the Crown has disappeared. Moreover, the republican idea has never been very widespread among the Italian people, and the few experiments of republican governments recorded in the modern history of the Peninsula were all of a transient and rather unsatisfactory nature. The Italians of all classes feel towards the Crown in the same way as the people of all classes in Britain felt at the time of the Abdication; and it can be said that if the Italians are not perhaps deeply monarchically-minded, they are certainly even less republican-minded, and the very sense of self-protective individualism would always make them prefer the safe abstraction of a sovereign to the danger of the petty tyrant that would lurk behind every Italian competing for the job of republican president!

Then, there is another factor which cannot be overlooked in Italy, and that is the Church. Italy is, by millenarian tradition, the seat of the Roman

Catholic Church; we may almost say that Rome is, spiritually, the centre of Christianity. Can we really believe that the Vatican would contemplate with indifference in Italy such a change-over from the monarchy to a republic? By the experience of the last seventy years the Vatican knows that the disappearance of monarchies in Latin countries and the advent of a republican rule has always been accompanied by a form of irreligious government, at times with a distinctly anti-clerical attitude. It happened in France with the Third Republic; it has happened again in Spain in recent years. The last thing that the Vatican may wish is to face the risk of seeing Italy, the very country where the Roman Catholic Church has its seat, going anti-clerical.

I say this not merely out of personal belief, but because I possess most definite evidence that the Vatican is entirely in favour of a continuation of the Monarchy in Italy. During recent months I have had the opportunity of discussing, in private and therefore very frank conversations, this very problem with a Vatican diplomat who was in a position to have first-hand knowledge of the Vatican's views on the subject; and although discretion prevents me from divulging the name of this personage, I will quote his words from my diaries:

I have discussed again with Monsignor X. the problem of the future of Italy. Monsignor X. foresees a democratic rule, depending inevitably upon the winning countries, that is to say upon Britain and America. In Italy, the working classes will have to be recognized and placed in the forefront, perhaps through the Syndicalist Unions. But political unity and order must be preserved, even with a full freedom of thought and of Parties; and unity and order can be preserved only through the Monarchy. Upon this last point Monsignor X. was most emphatic. The Church will exercise a moderating influence, and will support the Monarchy, especially a Monarchy with Humbert as King. It would be in fact fortunate, he said, if Humbert's father should live till the régime is overthrown, thus avoiding the risk that the Fascist Grand Council shall exercise its right of veto to the succession; and then, with the disappearance of the régime, the old King can retire in favour of his son. Of course, Monsignor X. went on, there will be a transitional period of military dictatorship, and the Crown must make full use of this military dictatorship to maintain both unity and order. Monsignor X. added that the views held by some people in Britain about the Duke of Aosta were fundamentally wrong, as Aosta had no chance, firstly because he allowed himself to be identified for too long with the Fascist régime, and secondly because he committed the mistake of accepting a responsible military position and failed.

We can be sure that the Vatican, in holding such views, knows that it can count on the backing of popular sentiment in Italy. In point of fact, it is an error to confuse the present King with his son the Crown Prince. Prince Humbert has remained a popular Heir to the Throne, notwithstanding the scurrilous rumours spread by the Fascist Party concerning the Prince's private life. It has always been well known in Italy that Prince Humbert was intolerant of the régime, and even better known that he "could not bear" the Germans. Furthermore, Prince Humbert has been wise enough never to accept any active command in this war; and the fact that he holds the position of Commander of half the Metropolitan Army must be appreciated as being

the usual nominal appointment of a member of the Royal Family and in particular of the Heir to the Throne. The death of the Duke of Aosta has cleared the air of the dynastic intrigues of Mussolini and simplified therefore the problem of the Crown. Suffice it to say that the Duke of Aosta had for too many years permitted the Fascist Party to make use of his name as a figurehead held in storage in opposition to the Crown Prince. The right of veto to the succession, which was vested in the Fascist Grand Council in December, 1928, meant indeed that should the Crown prove not amenable, the Fascist Grand Council would bring forward its own puppet-king in the person of the Duke of Aosta. Why the young Duke—who was a fine Prince and a gallant soldier—lent himself to such an intrigue is difficult to say: perhaps the Duke succumbed to the influence of his mother, the Dowager Duchess of Aosta, born Orléans of France, who had always nursed most ambitious ideas and never made a secret of her dislike of the present Queen, whom she used to call *ma cousine la bergère*. And it was not wise for Aosta to accept command of the war in Italian East Africa, a war that has ended with total loss of the Italian territories and the Duke's personal capitulation as a prisoner of war.

Those who say that the King and the Royal Family should be condemned because they do not show any inclination to take a stand against the régime, are overlooking the fact that the Fascists would ask nothing better than to be given the opportunity of one single gesture from the King or the Crown Prince so as to have at long last the chance they have been waiting for—of overthrowing the Crown. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the present inaction of the Royal Family is not so much a sign of cowardice as one of wisdom: and Kings are, by their very august position, bound to be the Great Silent Ones. Equally it would be foolish to underestimate the influence of the Vatican in Italy. From the religious point of view the Italians are by far the most homogeneous people in Europe: more than 99.5 per cent. of the population are members of the Catholic Church. The Church, and the influence of the Church, can never be made to disappear from Italy because the Church is part of the people; and a government that would try to destroy it or "to put the Church in its place" or pursue fancy religious programmes would soon discover its shortcomings. No one was more religious at heart than Mussolini himself, whose anti-clericalism was so notorious that even his apologists have found necessary to explain it away with unctuous assurances that "the miracle" of his conversion is rendered all the greater thereby. But nevertheless Mussolini has never underrated the exceptional position of the Vatican and the immense strength of the Church in Italy, and the Lateran Treaty of 1928, which reconciled the Italian State and the Vatican, showed that Mussolini was too supple a politician to disregard the fact that the Italian people would never countenance an open break with the Church, no more than he, Mussolini, could disregard the more cogent argument that the Church in Italy can break any government or régime who would take an irreligious

stand. Moreover, the Vatican looks at the Democratic Powers to live up to their profession of being engaged in a struggle for the survival of Christian civilization: the independence of the Holy See is a matter of world-wide significance for the survival of Christian civilization; and any form of violent change in Italy, bringing with it social, spiritual and religious upheavals, would only make the Italian people pass from one form of tyranny to another.

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Yet, the extremist programmes of which we hear from time to time—and which are unhappily flavoured with a spirit of vengeance and reactionarism—are plainly intended to appeal to a certain section of public opinion in Britain—to what may be called the clubs' armchair revolutionaries who are always ready to affirm the need of a revolution anywhere except in Britain. And is it in the interest of Britain and of democracy to start the life of a new Europe with social and economic revolutions in any of the unhappy nations of the Continent?

The last thing that the Italian people want is to be presented with revolutionary methods which would make straight for confusion and anarchy. The Italian people do not want an empirical or doctrinaire peace. They want a peace of realities. Peace is irreconcilable with the rule of men who are already announcing the fire of a new "revolution" to cure Italy of the evils of the old one. The Italian people do not believe in the joy of suppression of private property. In a country of small middle-class people, a country where the crafts are still mainly in the hands of individual artisans, the ownership of one's shop or business is the proud right of man to the fruit of his labour. Not even Fascism, for all its hectic and often quixotical reforms, has made the mistake of suppressing the right of the citizen to retain what is his own.

On the other hand, the existence of the Labour Party will be indispensable. The policy of a new Italy will be, and shall be, a policy of social renewal; but a renewal which will express and recognize the reciprocal understanding and needs of all classes; and the excesses of any one side will be tempered by the moderating influence of the others. To those who are galloping after cut and-dried (and perhaps also stale) programmes, I would point out the social system in Britain: it may have its faults and it may be capable of improvement, but Italy would be happy enough if only she could reach that level!

Many people in this country have failed to appreciate the deep changes that for good or bad have come over the Italian people in the course of the last twenty years. The future of Italy cannot consist in a return to a past which is dead and buried and has long been forgotten; but the future must be the happy fusion of all the experiences gained through the past and recent errors. If anything can be done by propaganda it should be not to tell the people in Italy: "We will soon come and bring you a suit-case full of doctrines," but to convince the Italians in Italy that democracy is not a bogey but the most liberal and human conception of Christian ideals, and promise them that the

democratic countries will help Italy to strengthen its free government and rebuild the life of the nation. All other talk is mere rhetoric. Socialism pure and simple and the political parties it represents have lost all values in the eyes of the Italian people. Socialism can only mean the basis of a future conception of the great organization of the working masses—a conception in which employment of labour shall be treated not as buying a commodity but as the capital contributed by the worker. But a Socialism that means a dictatorship of the proletariat, with all the evils of any dictatorship not excluding a proletarian one; a socialism which means class-war and the bogey of bourgeoisie in the same way that Fascism made a bogey of Socialism and Democracy, will never again set foot in Italy. The men who will evolve the new conception are men who to-day are choking with revulsion under the misrule of Fascism; and they will never stand again for a class-war that will only mean a gratification of hate and revenge, and under a pseudo-ethical cloak of social justice will bring again adventure, pillage, personal power and profitable offices.

Of the political structure of the State, one may venture to say that although the régime will disappear, several of the institutions evolved by Fascism are bound to stay. What will disappear *in toto* will be the régime as a Party State, with all the gangrenous paraphernalia of nepotism and monopoly of rule and brass-sounding trappings. But it is natural to foresee that many institutions, such as the labour and professional Syndicates, are bound to remain. One can foresee, as an instance, the survival of a Press Ministry as a Ministry of Information, with a Press free from control and yet aptly guided and helped with information; and the survival of the excellent reference department of the Press Ministry which, in the absence in Rome of anything comparable to Chatham House, was most helpful to political writers. There is, again, something that all journalists in Italy will want to remain, and that is the National Contract which did not leave the professional journalist to the mercy of a callous and unscrupulous newspaper proprietor. And there are other things, which only a rabid spirit of vindictive destructiveness may wish to efface; things that, under a Fascist name, are merely a counterpart of what in democratic countries are called Social Services, and which in Italy had been evolved to a high degree. The Chamber of Corporations will have to revert to the normality of a Parliament elected by the people; and here too it is to be hoped that the desire for a return to freedom will not produce pure and simple hot air.

But what will certainly disappear from the political life of the nation is the spirit of militarism with its bogey of imperialism. Fascism had tried to inspire the Italians with an imperialistic ardour on two premises, and both were false. One was the theory of national determinism: that the policy of nations is dictated by needs, which is entirely false, because the policy of nations, and particularly of nations ruled by dictators, is dictated by greed and, in the case of Fascism, by a misplaced pride. The other was to speak of

WHAT FUTURE FOR ITALY?

imperialism in the name of an Italian race, when the Italians know perfectly well that there is no such thing as an Italian race; and to "revive" the imperial spirit of the Italian race was a ridiculous attempt to revive what was not there. The problem of Italy was and is purely an economic one: a condition of poverty arising out of the injustice of nature when she scattered the Pandora Box of natural riches; and such a condition of poverty might be altered only by a different conception of the economy of the world.

Infinite causes and circumstances which cannot be foreseen will contribute to give shape to the right and final form of government of future Italy. But there is, however, one comfort; and that is the certainty that the future government of Italy will be an entirely liberal government; and I am using the term "liberal" in the true Italian sense which is the equivalent of "democratic" in English: that liberalism of the mind that means the freedom of the individual, that vast sense of tolerance which makes it possible for the individual citizen to feel safe and free; and I say that the Italian people have remained "liberal" in their heart and mind notwithstanding twenty years of Fascist schooling.

(Mr. Franzero is the author of "Inside Italy." Hodder & Stoughton (1941).)

GERMANY AND PORTUGAL

By N. P. MACDONALD

THE major part of Western Europe is already occupied by Germany. Only Spain and Portugal remain, at present, outside Hitler's so-called "New Order." Yet neither Iberian state has been spared the intensive German political and economic penetration so often the prelude to future military operations. To-day, despite their preoccupations in Russia, Hitler's military theorists may well be coldly calculating the advantages of German occupation of the Peninsula, and especially of Portugal, with her strategically valuable coastline.

It is in Spain, therefore, and particularly in Portugal, that any German action to forestall an Allied offensive in Europe may take place. Only recently Mr. Sumner Welles intimated that a German drive against Portugal was by no means beyond the realm of immediate possibility.

Berlin has spared no effort to prepare the Iberian Peninsula for an important part in Hitler's military plans. German penetration in Spain has been more widely publicized, but its parallel development in Portugal has had no less sinister intent.

Intervention by the *Reich* in Portugal actually began long before Hitler came to power. Since 1924 Germany has taken care to cultivate Portugal and her people. Portuguese-speaking Germans were brought from the former German colonies in East and South-West Africa to settle in Portugal, while immigrants direct from Germany readily adapted themselves to Portuguese conditions, and mixed easily with the people. Thus the number of German nationals resident in Portugal increased from 454 in 1920 to 1,885 in 1936. These Germans naturally provided an admirable basis for the redoubled political and economic penetration of Portugal begun by Germany as soon as Hitler became Chancellor.

That penetration had already made great progress under the guidance of Herr Burbach, the German Consul in Lisbon. In 1932 he had reported to Berlin:

I have attached great value to influencing the press . . . the official organ of the Portuguese Government is in my hands. I gave the President of Portugal and other gentlemen to understand that the future Germany will have a good memory, and that every article in which we are attacked will be carefully preserved in the competent quarters, and will not be forgotten.

In furtherance of this policy of "influencing" the press, Portuguese editors were, until the outbreak of war, frequently offered free trips to Germany. In 1939 one such group of journalists from Portugal were forced to listen to

a number of lectures by Goebbels and his subordinates, the burden of which was that "Portugal should be the fulcrum of the lever by which the British Empire would be overturned."

As elsewhere, the Nazis made much of the "cultural" links alleged by them to exist between Portugal and Germany. German cultural centres were established at Lisbon and Coimbra, German teachers visited Portuguese schools, while a German-Portuguese club in Lisbon provided a free information service and organized lectures, concerts and film demonstrations. Missions of study, including university professors, students and workers, were invited to Germany, where aeroplanes were placed at their disposal, and everything was done to impress them with German military might.

To ensure that German propaganda in Portugal did not appear one-sided, centres of Portuguese culture were established at Hamburg, Cologne and Berlin. In 1937 Portuguese was placed on the same level as French as an optional language in German schools, and scholarships at German universities were awarded annually to 15 Portuguese students.

Trade relations between Germany and Portugal were simultaneously intensified, a development facilitated by the settlement of Germany's War Debt to Portugal in 1936. Mutual trade treaties were signed, and Portugal placed in Germany large contracts for machinery and armaments. By 1937 Portuguese imports from Germany had risen to £3,200,000, compared with £2,500,000 in 1936. An armaments clearing agreement was subsequently signed, resulting in Portugal bartering turpentine and oil seed for further supplies of arms.

Against this background it is not surprising that, since the beginning of the war, German propaganda in Portugal has become more blatant. It has attempted to stir up unrest among the poor classes, in the army, and in monarchist circles. It has not even spared Dr. Salazar, the Portuguese Prime Minister.

Latterly, however, this propaganda has had little effect. German attempts to show that Hitler sincerely wishes peace, and that Britain and the United States are alone responsible for the continuation of the war, are looked at for the most part askance. The Portuguese people have long memories. They remember that Napoleon made peace in 1802, and renewed—18 months later—a war that eventually engulfed their own country. They are by no means sure that Portugal will remain uninvolved in the present conflict, and they are not willing to support any German feelers after a peace which, they fear, would have no more permanence than that which followed the Treaty of Amiens.

Thus German propaganda in Portugal can hardly be regarded as having attained that degree of success envisaged by Berlin. But propaganda has not been the only instrument by which Hitler has sought to bring Portugal to heel. Since the Nationalist victory in Spain, Germany has done everything possible to encourage Spanish extremists to bring about an Iberia

Federation of Spain and Portugal. None other than the General Secretary of the Spanish Ministry of War recently advocated such a policy. In a lecture to army officers in Madrid, he praised General Franco for overcoming Basque and Catalan separatism, and suggested that he should next seek to bring Portugal under Spanish rule.

The reason why Germany supports any idea of union between Spain and Portugal was clearly outlined by the late Field-Marshal von Reichenau. As long ago as 1938 he declared, in a private lecture in Berlin:

Portugal's attitude to Franco Spain is to our advantage. . . . The two Iberian nations have drawn very close to one another, so that the conditions appear to-day to be more favourable to a federation than they have ever been before. That means that the British alliance would lose all value for Portugal, and that our friendly relations with that country would have to be intensified. It seems that German's best chance lies in the support of the Pan-Iberian movement. . . . We can secure *points d'appui* in the Portuguese army; the activities of these cells must sooner or later turn to our advantage. If necessary, the powerful army that General Franco will have at his disposal after winning the war in Spain can be thrown into the scales; that army would be able, a trifle more efficiently than by diplomatic means, to instal in Portugal a régime acceptable to us.

That Portugal had been referred to in such terms by a German military leader soon became known in Lisbon; whereupon a formal denial that von Reichenau had given any such lecture was handed by the German Chargé d'Affaires in the Portuguese capital to Dr. Salazar. A few weeks later, on July 10, 1938, the official newspaper *Diário da Manhã*, published an article which described as completely inconsistent reports that Germany was using pressure to induce Portugal to modify her alliance with Britain. It was asserted that Germany would never be guilty of such ingenuousness, because an exclusive friendship on the part of Portugal for Germany would interest Germany only as a potential reinforcement in the event of an Anglo-German conflict.

Ignoring the fact that the Portuguese have never forgotten, or forgiven, the Spanish occupation of Portugal from 1580 to 1640, and that Spain and Portugal signed a pact on non-aggression in 1939, German agents in Spain have intensified their pressure on Falangist exponents of an Iberian Federation. Berlin encourages the idea that such a federation is an essential precondition for the reconstruction of the Spanish Empire. The provincial newspapers of the Falangists speak of that empire as including French Morocco, Gibraltar and Portugal.

In Portugal, prominent families have latterly been made the especial targets for Nazi propaganda in favour of union with Spain. They have been warned of the possibility that a Red Spain might arise, with the prospect of a Communist Portugal, and that an acceptance by the Portuguese of General Franco would be preferable. Every opportunity is seized to detract from the British war effort, with emphasis on the difficulty Britain would supposedly experience in coming to the aid of Portugal if she were attacked.

Thus, it is clear that, either through the agency of Spain or directly, Germany intends to secure control of Portugal. The strategic advantages of the

country have already been emphasized by German military leaders. In May, 1938, the *Deutsche Wehr* official organ of the German Ministry of War, published an article by Major D. O. Welsch referring to Portugal's "incomparable position on the Atlantic, with all its strategic advantages." The article went on to say: "This peninsula, stretching far to the south-west into the ocean from Europe should be looked upon as a springboard for all-embracing world-power on land and sea."

In the lecture already quoted, the late Field-Marshal von Reichenau said: "The most important of sea, and latterly also of air, routes lead along the Portuguese coast, and can be either defended or attacked from it. Portugal's bridgelike position towards Africa is obvious."

In recent months Germany has made fewer references to Portugal. But the Portuguese people are no less apprehensive on that account. They and their Government are well aware that, long before the outbreak of war, Hitler was planning to annex not merely Portugal, but also her overseas possessions. Nevertheless, Portugal has attempted to remain officially and genuinely neutral.

Yet neutrality did not save the other small countries of Western Europe; like them Portugal will remain neutral, not as long as her own people choose but only as long as Hitler chooses. She is in no position to resist any German aggression. History has proved her vulnerability to attack at several points on her land frontier of 600 odd miles. The Portuguese army is too small to defend it; and is not equipped to meet German *blitzkrieg* methods. In any case the army—much to the disgust of many of its officers—depends on arms and munitions of German manufacture.

The only factor hitherto standing between either Portugal or Spain and German attack has been the usefulness of both countries as a means of communication with the Americas, and for the passage to German-occupied Europe of food and raw materials. But that usefulness waned as the United States intensified their aid to Britain, and now that they are in the war it has disappeared.

Instead, both countries—and more especially Portugal—may well have other uses for Germany. Any German military move against Portugal would inevitably delay, if it did not change, plans for an Allied offensive in Europe. It would also have a vital influence on the whole Mediterranean, the more so if it were coupled with an attempt by Hitler to close the Straits of Gibraltar. A Portugal under German control would add to the already long list of targets facing the R.A.F. By providing bases for U-boats, it would increase the already great strain on the shipping resources of the Allies; it would render the importation of copper from Spain, and of wolfram from Portugal, impossible. To Germany the proposition may well appear to be worthwhile; a military occupation of Portugal would not require great numbers of troops, while the many advantages that would accrue to them would be of the highest military importance.

THE VICEROY'S COUNCIL AND INDIAN POLITICS

BY SIR WILLIAM P. BARTON

THE increase to fifteen of the members of the Council of the Viceroy of India, the reconstitution of the Council and the nomination of Indian members to the Imperial War Cabinet in London closes a vivid chapter in the history of Indian politics. To what extent is the Council as now constituted likely to appeal to the popular imagination; how will the Congress party re-act to the new experiment, are questions of the hour in India: the fate of the country may depend on whether the India Government, as reinforced by a strong body of the ablest statesmen in India, can attract support generally in a supreme effort to mobilize to the full the military resources of the country against the common enemy.

At the outset let us briefly examine the composition and status of the Viceroy's Council. The three new portfolios comprise Defence, War Transport, Posts and Air. The question of placing Defence in Indian hands was, it will be remembered, raised during the negotiations carried out by Sir Stafford Cripps. An effort was then made to meet the Congress demand that the war department should be handed over to an Indian minister, by proposing a Defence Ministry, the Commander-in-Chief to retain a seat in the Council as War Minister with full control over the armed forces. The proposal was not accepted by Congress; in point of fact the offer was described in contemptuous terms as conferring on the Minister little more than responsibility for providing military canteens and lavatories. The criticism was unfair; in any case it is now disarmed by the wide range of responsibilities entrusted to the Defence Member in the present scheme. The Member should in fact play an important part in military policy, in which he would have the support of his Indian colleagues who form the majority—11 out of 15—of the Council. Another point to be noted in this connection is that Indian representatives on the War Cabinet in London will have a voice in the general conduct of the war, and especially as regards Indian participation. That the British government should have some influence on military administration in India during the war has at least some justification in the fact that Britain is providing several hundred millions sterling to finance India's war effort.

The choice as Defence Member of Sir Feroz Khan Noon will be generally approved. He acquired a reputation for statesmanship as a member of the Punjab cabinet; he was for several years High Commissioner for India in London; he is related to the present Prime Minister of the Punjab, Sir Sikandar Hayat. The two belong to a famous clan of fighting Punjabi

Musalmans; they are however noted for the moderation of their political views: both stand for Indian home rule; Sir Sikander has indeed recently endeavoured to bring about a Hindu-Muslim entente with a view to the acceptance of the Cripps offer.

Dr. Ambedkar, champion of the outcast community, who view with concern the possibility of the withdrawal of British influence from India, becomes Labour Member. His appointment will be a great encouragement to the 60 million outcasts. It will be recalled that by virtue of the communal award of 1932 during the Round Table Conference the outcasts were given appreciable representation in the scheme of responsible government it was proposed to set up, which would have given them a strong position in parliamentary life. They lost this valuable privilege as a result of Gandhi's fast to death in 1932, undertaken in order to force the outcast leaders into agreeing to forego separate, for joint representation, with the Hindus. The result was, as was only to be expected, that outcast nominees of Congress won the elections in almost every case. And not unnaturally two years of Congress government brought no advantage to the outcasts: their leaders now claim the restoration of their original privilege.

The Sikhs who, next to the Muslims, are the strongest element in the Indian army, resented the non-inclusion of a Sikh member in the Viceroy's Council when it was reformed and enlarged for the first time last July. Their resentment was increased by the privilege conceded to the Muslims in the Cripps offer of staying outside the Indian Union, which the Sikhs thought might subject them for all time to Muslim domination in the Punjab, without giving them a chance of forming an enclave of their own. The appointment of a prominent member of the Sikh community, Sir Jogendra Singh, to the Council should do much to remove any sense of grievance that may still be felt.

Sir Ramaswami Aiyar, who takes over the Ministry of Information is one of the ablest and most dynamic of Indian statesmen. He is an ex-Congressman and has served both on the Madras Council and on the Council of the Viceroy; he has for several years past been Prime Minister of Travancore, one of the most important Indian States.

As regards responsibility the position of the Council remains unchanged. It is not responsible to the Central Legislative Assembly, though subject to its criticism; the Assembly retains its powers of legislation, it passes the budget subject to the Viceroy's power of certification. Through the Assembly and by reason of the contacts of the Members themselves with the political life of the country, the Government of India will be more closely in touch with public opinion than it has ever been. And as regards the transfer of power and questions of policy there can be little doubt that the views of the Council would inevitably prevail unless obviously to the disadvantage of the Allied cause and so of India itself.

As regards public opinion one may note that the great party of orthodox

Hinduism, the Mahasabha, does not support the non-violent policy of Congress and is ready to co-operate with Government in developing the war potential of India. It is particularly anxious to encourage the enlistment of Hindus in the army, not only for the defence of India but because it feels that the weakness of Hindu influence in the army might otherwise be an obstacle to its policy of parliamentary democracy when faced with the military predominance of the Muslims.

The bulk of organized Labour under the leadership of the ex-Communist and ex-Congressman, M. N. Roy, with Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Jamna Das Mehta as his colleagues is in favour of giving full support to Government in the production of munitions and in the war effort generally.

As to the Muslims, although the League is not officially represented on the Viceroy's Council, it will welcome the appointment of Sir Feroz Khan Noon as Defence Member, and Muslims generally are prepared to give their best in the defence of their country. It is particularly reassuring that Sir Sikandar Hayat has publicly asserted that the Punjab, the sword arm of India, stands firmly with the Government. Now the Punjab Government is a coalition ministry and includes Sikh and Hindu leaders; the Sikhs and the Hindu peasant tribes together with the Muslims form the majority of the army; they provided 60 per cent. of the combatant forces recruited in the last war; there can be no doubt that in the case of the Punjab the Muslim premier of a responsible minister can speak for both Muslim and Hindu. The attitude of the Punjab is a factor of immense importance in India's hour of danger.

Another vital factor in the political situation is the Indian Princes. Whatever view their critics may take of their position in the Indian body politic the fact remains that they speak for 90 million people; with their people and their resources they are solidly behind the Government. Their representatives did not take a prominent part in the Delhi negotiations. They are nevertheless prepared to support a scheme for Indian Home Rule that would not place them at the mercy of a political caucus.

The foregoing review suggests that in the absence of anti-British agitation the Indian Government might rely on adequate support from the people of India in the prosecution of the war. At the moment the only party in opposition is Congress, the party that claims to speak for India and in its name demands complete control of the government as a condition precedent to participation in the war effort. Will it remain quiescent while the rest of India is rallying to the support of Government in order to meet the Japanese menace?

Congress psychology can only be understood in the light of its record. Till 1920 it was content to work for political independence on constitutional lines. In that year Tilak, its great leader, died. Gandhi, who had returned from South Africa with the prestige of a leader, flushed with the success of his technique of non-violence against the South African Government, felt that he could, with the same weapon, wrest Home Rule for India from the British

Government. For this purpose an organized party was essential. Congress wanted a new leader, especially a leader who could appeal to the masses. Gandhi seized the opportunity; in the words of Mr. Rajgopalachari, late premier of Madras, he took the Congress by storm, forced it from the sterile path of constitutionalism into the broad road of revolution, gave it a new energy and new self-respect. Congress accepted the Gandhian political tactics and policy.

A challenge to the Government was followed by two intensive campaigns of civil disobedience with the object of paralyzing authority. Favoured by the slump in the world market for agricultural products of the early thirties Gandhi harnessed the discontent and misery of the peasantry to the chariot of Hindu financiers and mill-owners who were providing Congress with the funds it needed, for their own selfish purposes. By such methods the way was prepared for the Congress victories in 1937 in the elections for the new responsible parliaments. Congress had in the process lost many of its best men who did not believe in non-violence nor in the religious exploitation of the masses for political ends, a prejudice which Pandit Jawahir Lal Nehru shares.

Congress rule in the greater part of India till October 1939 was practically a dictatorship. The High Command under Gandhi's orders appointed and dismissed ministries, laid down policy. No effort was made to conciliate the Muslims; in fact the anti-Muslim tendencies of the Congress ministries nearly led to a Muslim revolt; in the opinion of competent observers the country was, towards the close of Congress domination, in a state of suppressed civil war, an explosion being prevented by the Police and the British military system.

Congress has never believed in non-violence; it accepted it as a policy, not as a creed, as the only condition on which it could have Gandhi's leadership and domination of the Hindu masses, a policy that made the resignation of Congress ministries inevitable on the outbreak of the war. They could not remain in office and refuse support to the Central Government in its warlike preparations. Only their loyalty to Gandhi induced the majority of Congress leaders to acquiesce in the fantastic *satyagraha* or preaching against participation in the war either by serving in the armies or working in ordnance factories, initiated by their leader in the Autumn of 1940 in order to keep Congress in the public gaze.

With the Japanese invader almost at the gates of India public criticism of their anti-war policy compelled Congress leaders to reconsider their position. Ultimately in January of this year they decided to renounce non-violence. Gandhi retired from the leadership of the party. His mantle fell on his principal lieutenant, Jawahir Lal Nehru.

Congress leaders were still not prepared to commit themselves to participation in the war except on their own terms which require the handing over of complete control of the administration to Indian hands.

The War Cabinet offer through Sir Stafford Cripps placed them in a difficult position. Gandhi and the Congress High Command had made it clear long before that only with independence could they settle the Hindu-Muslim dispute; here was independence within their grasp, combined with an opportunity of adding their full weight to the war effort by working in a national government with the British. Nehru admits the negotiations got within 75 per cent. of success. Why did Congress refuse in the end? Obviously the demand for immediate independence was an afterthought.

Congress was in fact on the horns of a dilemma. Without Gandhi their influence with the masses would be of no account. How indeed without risking the eclipse of the party could they go into the villages and towns and tell the people that their adored Mahatma, the avatar of Sri Krishna, had been wrong, that they had thrown him over and instead of the golden age he had promised they could only offer them blood and tears and toil and sweat in a desperate effort to defeat a terrible enemy? Where was the leader with the courage to play such a part?

Another difficulty was the internal dissensions in the party: only the leadership of Gandhi, as Nehru himself admits, could keep the jarring elements together, socialists, communists, rightists, leftists, the Forward Bloc. Another disturbing factor was a movement led by Mr. Rajgopalachari, ex-premier of Madras and a prominent Congress leader, with the object of bringing about a Hindu-Muslim entente and so of making the acceptance of the Cripps offer possible.

Gandhi has repeatedly said that *swaraj* or Home Rule is an impossibility until Hindus and Muslims come together. Yet Congress supporters defend their rejection of the Cripps offer mainly on the ground that his Majesty's Government was not ready to hand over power to a national ministry, in other words to Congress. They are not candid enough to admit that the result would have been civil war and a consequent Japanese victory.

Another point in the indictment against the sincerity of the offer is that the new constitution under the 1935 Act was immediately annulled on the outbreak of the war by the Defence of India Act. Was it? Is it not a fact that the Punjab, Bengal, and Sind Governments have continued to function normally, also a coalition government in Assam till quite recently, while a new popular government has been formed in Orissa. It is believed that none of these five governments has found itself inconvenienced by the Act in question.

The assertion sometimes made that all political parties and organizations except the Muslim League supported the Congress in the stand it took towards Britain is simply not true. The Depressed Classes (the outcasts) repudiate Congress; the all-India Peasant League while declaring for independence supports the war effort; the same is true of the majority of the Trades Unions under the leadership of M. N. Roy and Jamna Das Mehta. The argument conveniently overlooks the attitude of the Mahasabha; that

its policy, already referred to, of encouraging recruitment of Hindus from among the classes not hitherto interested in a military career is being successful, is proved by the latest recruitment figures.

Another criticism advanced by Congress supporters regards the concession to Muslim opinion of the right to secede. But the provision is not absolute; it is more than likely that the Muslims would not be able to take Bengal out of the Union; the concession is indeed mainly a bargaining point in favour of the Muslims; if the Hindus meet the Muslims halfway the latter would probably forego the claim to a separate country.

The autocratic nature of Congress rule from '37 to '39 has already been noted. On the admission of Congressmen themselves Congress has developed a drift towards totalitarianism which weakens still further its moral right to challenge the association of princely autocracy with Indian political development. One can hardly expect Congress to be generous enough to impute to righteousness the fact that most of the leading States have gone a long way towards giving responsive if not responsible government to their people, some States like Mysore, Travancore, Baroda, Cochin having progressed so far as to appoint responsible ministers.

Indecision, as will be seen from the foregoing sketch of its political career, is characteristic of Congress mentality. Without Gandhi it lacks dynamic leadership. Pandit Nehru is obviously not the inspired leader. For one thing he is frequently out of sympathy with important elements in the party. He does not believe in non-violence; he is contemptuous of the narrow and selfish interests of the bourgeois group which he thinks inclines to fascism; his theories and policies do not appeal to many of his colleagues; his socialism alarms the capitalist or rightist element. He recognizes clearly enough that Congress has no mind of its own; Gandhi, he says, is Congress. And unquestionably it was Gandhi who made up its mind for it when rejecting the Cripps offer. Once again it has fallen under the hypnotic influence of the political mystic. Escape is difficult. "Its supreme need" in the opinion of the Lahore Tribune, a Congress newspaper of some standing, financially independent of Congress, "is rescue from the paralyzing grip of the octopus of non-violence which threatens its very life." But who is to rescue it? Is it possible that a strong element of the party might rally to the support of Mr. Rajgopalachari with the object of establishing a *modus vivendi* with the Muslims? If this could be achieved the remnants of the party would probably dissolve.

The Congress attitude has compromised it with American opinion, once inclined to be critical of what it thought to be British reluctance to give Indian democracy fair play. Congress resents American criticism, but there is little doubt that the unfavourable reaction of its attitude on American opinion was responsible in some degree for the shifting of their ground by Gandhi and Nehru. Even the Congress Press criticized Gandhi's policy of

demanding the immediate withdrawal of British and American troops from the country.

So far neither Congress nor its leaders have found any effective retort to the re-organized Government. The Council, comprising as it does some of India's ablest statesmen, all known to be desirous of promoting the political independence of India, is hardly exposed to criticism; it is no longer possible to deride the inadequacy of the Defence portfolio. The growing volume of recruitment—over 120,000 young men offered themselves for recruitment voluntarily in May—is clear proof that the hold of Congress and its non-violent policy on the country is weakening. Gandhi may feel that any attempt on his part to recede from his pledge not to embarrass the Indian Government in its war measures would damage his reputation in India and abroad and that the risk is not worth taking. He may seek to avoid the impasse by courting arrest; he may think it wiser to adopt delaying tactics in the hope that sentimentalists and other supporters of Congress in Britain may induce the Government to make a fresh offer. In fact it is more than likely that Congress leaders will expect the British Government to help them out of the blind alley in which they have landed themselves.

Whether such a move would improve the Government position is doubtful. To leave Congress to its own devices would appear at the moment to be the best policy. One point is however worth considering. The fact that in seven of the provinces which Congress once ruled British Governors have no unofficial advisers has been much criticized; public opinion would welcome the appointment of two or three unofficial Indians in that capacity in each province while the administration would unquestionably benefit from the closer contact with the people of the provinces such an arrangement would ensure.

AIR POLICY

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

MR. PETER MASEFIELD'S "Answer to Critics of our Air Strategy" in the *Sunday Times* of June 5, and Lord Hankey's article on "British Air Power" which appeared in the same paper the following week deserve close study by all who feel concerned about Air Ministry policy.

Lord Hankey describes the position with his usual moderation and clarity. He points out that although in theory the responsibilities of the Air Ministry have not altered materially since 1918, yet, owing to the course the war has taken, they have increased immeasurably. By implication he draws a distinction between the essential tasks of the R.A.F. and those which, however great the results which may be hoped for from them, are of an experimental nature. Of the essential tasks defence against air attack and invasion stands first, for from the circumstances of the war air power is called on to provide our first and most important line of defence, both at home and in certain parts of the Empire, notably Australia.

Co-operation with the Navy and Army to ensure the maximum results from their individual and combined war effort is also an essential responsibility. The Navy in particular must receive all possible assistance in the vital task of maintaining sea communications, both by offensive and defensive measures. The Army not only requires protection from air attack but also maximum air co-operation in its offensive action, especially in case of the establishment of a second front.

On the other hand the long range bombing of Germany, as regards the extent of the results to be expected, is definitely experimental. That it will achieve great results is undoubted, but Lord Hankey warns us that it would be unwise to count on its achieving early and decisive effects. He hopes that with American assistance the policy may justify sanguine expectations, but he draws attention to some of the uncertain factors which have to be taken into account. The policy in any case has been long accepted and prepared and the experiment must be tried out to the full. Nevertheless advantage must be taken of American assistance to make good without delay the deficiencies in the essential co-operative services of the R.A.F. which undoubtedly still exist, whether they have arisen from a lack of appreciation of their necessity or from over concentration on the great experiment.

Mr. Masefield's defence of our air strategy, if it represents the views of the Air Ministry, suggests that an inadequate recognition of the vital import-

ance of co-operation and of the functions of the other Services was at the root of the trouble. He asserts that 10 per cent. only of our total air effort is employed on bombing Germany. The figure can hardly be accepted without knowing what is included in air effort, and what is the length of the period to which the figure applies. Does air effort, for instance, include the man hours required for the production of heavy bombers and the mental efforts spent by designers and those responsible for framing and carrying out air policy? At any rate the figure is almost impossible for critics to test. The indications Mr. Masefield gives of views held on air co-operation and on the functions of the other Services are more important and surprising. He writes: "The situation demands that the three Services must act in unison."—That we all agree if it means not only acting harmoniously but in active co-operation—but I can conceive nothing more calculated to produce discord than his next sentence in which he asserts: "We come down to the basic fact that to-day the Air is the striking force, the Army the holding force, the Navy the carrying force—and each is essential to the other." If the Army held that view it might be accused of Maginot mindedness and of lack of air mindedness; and I doubt if the Navy would be satisfied that it represents an adequate definition of its functions. In his last paragraph Mr. Masefield does not improve matters when he says: "Air power is the dominant factor in making victory possible." That is true in so far as air power is essential to the full development of the potentialities of the other Services; and it may possibly become true in the sense that it will be the decisive factor in destroying German will and power to continue the struggle should the experiment of our bombing policy yield the results hoped for. But to achieve victory it is necessary to avoid defeat, and for the present the dominant factors are the power of the Navy, including its air component and the mercantile marine, to maintain sea communications and the power of the allied armies and air forces to defeat the enemy in battle. Mr. Masefield suggests that the public is apt to see only "the tactical end and forget the strategic aspects," but is he not himself inclined to ignore the facts that strategic conceptions require tactical fulfilment and that the enemy also has strategic plans.

Mr. Masefield points out (I will not say he complains) that the Admiralty's requirements for heavy bombers in the Coastal Command makes Bomber Command's job in attacking Germany itself more difficult. Others have even complained that the Admiralty's wish to have ports where U-boats are constructed bombed, causes dispersion of Bomber Command effort. Surely it must be recognized that German war effort follows two lines, that directed against the allied armies and that directed against our sea communications, and that the latter is if anything the more dangerous because it directly affects our own war effort, as well as entailing the possibility of defeat by starvation. In dealing with the various calls on the R.A.F. which hinder its maximum concentration on bombing Germany, Mr. Masefield makes a surprising

admission which goes far to justify the criticism that the long range bombing policy of the Air Ministry has been carried too far at the expense of the other Services. It suggests that till recently there was more justification for saying that the Air Ministry lacked army mindedness than that the War Office had not learnt to be air minded. He writes: "Air support for land and sea forces is *now beginning* (my italics) to take on a new complexion. Formerly its function was to protect them from air attack and from reconnaissance and to undertake strategic bombing. To-day the aeroplane is expected to destroy the tank with bombs and the battleship with torpedoes." It is surely evident that these demands are not unreasonable in view of the development of the war from its outset, and it certainly has needed a good deal of pressure to bring about a somewhat belated recognition of changed conditions. As a matter of fact the view that the air function in respect to the Army should be mainly protective, was an Air Ministry conception, always somewhat grudgingly accepted by the Army which had little voice in the matter. Long before the Polish campaign had illustrated the dangers of air attack the Army had expected that modern developments would make the danger acute, and had taken its own precautionary measures. It had, however, practically no control over offensive air action and air opinion tended to discount its importance in the actual land battle; chiefly, I suggest, because it too readily accepted the theory that the Army had mainly a defensive rôle. The Army itself had never accepted that theory, though it may have been slow to realize the form which offensive action might take until it had gained practical experience in Norway and France.

The controversy on the dive bomber question is somewhat a side issue. The air attitude towards it suggests the idea of sour grapes, but the Army, I think, will be quite satisfied if the fox can find a bunch that is really ripe; either in the form of the fighter-bomber or some new type of aircraft which can do all and more than a Stuka does. Meanwhile the Stuka has perhaps more to its credit than air authority is willing to admit. Granted that it may be vulnerable to fighter attack, and, as in the case of all day bombers, that it needs fighter protection. But surely it is easier to ensure that it should have fighter protection than to ensure that it should always be intercepted by fighters. For example, in the El Alamein battle six escorted Stuka attacks were made one day, but it was only claimed that two had been intercepted and turned back. Moreover, in the resulting dog fights it was the enemy's escorting fighters and not his bombers that were shot down. The view that dive bombing has generally little lethal effect on personnel, able to take cover, is borne out by much experience from Norway onwards; but there can be no denying its neutralizing effect. The mere facts that troops are compelled to take cover and are stunned by the noise and shock effects of bombs, temporarily make them incapable of using their weapons efficiently. The creeping artillery barrage, invented in the last war, produces the same results. It has com-

paratively little lethal effect, but it forces the defence to take cover, thus enabling attacking troops who follow the barrage closely to close with the enemy. So far as can be gathered from reports Rommel exploited the neutralizing effects of his dive bombers in his assault on Tobruk, as well as that of his artillery. Airmen and gunners, however, naturally tend to emphasize and develop the destructive effect of their weapons.

Putting controversy aside the main thing now is to get on with the job. Bombing of Germany will it is to be hoped go on with increasing intensity, air co-operation with the Army obviously must be developed as it has been in Egypt, not only to give the Army protection, but in order to add to its offensive power; and of course the requirements of the Navy must be met. It is better that mistakes where they have been made should be frankly admitted rather than be made the subject of acrimonious post-mortem discussions. We certainly cannot afford to be too proud to learn from the enemy's methods and experience when his theories and practice differ from our own; though obviously mere imitation would always leave us some distance behind his lead.

SEA POWER

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

THE debates in Parliament on July 1 and 2 on the central direction of the war were marked by one most singular omission; an omission that goes far to explain the real cause of our many and costly disasters on land, at sea and in our over sea possessions—the omission on the part of so large a number of members to recognize that the loss of command of the sea was the fundamental reason for these defeats. The bulk of the criticisms of the central direction were directed towards the insufficiency and unsuitability of the material with which our armies and air forces are provided, —tanks, dive-bombers, guns—the personality of the Prime Minister and the source from which some members imagine our fighting forces are officered. The fact that criticism was almost confined to these aspects of the direction implies that members have not yet grasped the nature of the problem, and realized that these victories of our enemies in the Far East and in Libya have been achieved by armies which had to cross the sea to reach Malaya, the islands and North Africa; and were only able to do so because we did not possess the necessary forces at sea to stop them; or, to put it otherwise, that we had not made the gaining of the command of the sea the first and primary object of our strategy. In our past wars we gained our successes in the oversea theatres, for there it was possible for us to assemble land forces superior to those of the enemy and he was unable to send adequate reinforcements to his own. This is the merest ABC of British military history and the essence of common sense. Yet in those recent debates, out of forty-eight or so speeches, nine only made any reference to the part of our disasters that has been played by our failure to establish command of the sea. One of the few who referred to it was Colonel Walter Elliot (Hansard No. 84, p. 547) who called it “extraordinary” that no reference in this debate had been made to the need for command of the sea. “That the House of Commons should debate a war for two days without mention of sea power is wrong. Sea power remains, as always, decisive for our people.” The Mediterranean position, he went on to say, began to worsen in Libya when Rommel was able to cross the sea.

It is indeed extraordinary: but it is only a continuation of the Parliamentary apathy of the last twenty years towards the maintenance of British sea power, some examples of which I mentioned in the July issue of THE FORT-NIGHTLY. Another is to be found in the attitude towards the Washington

Treaty. That treaty prevented this country from making the natural reply of armoured cruisers to the heavy armoured cruisers built by Germany, mis-called “pocket battleships”; the reply which we had made when similar commerce destroying autonomous ships were built by Russia and France in the 80's and 90's of the last century with the definite intention of conducting a *guerre de course*. This we could not do without reducing our capital ship force to numbers insufficient to meet a threat from Europe and/or Japan. The total neglect of our shipping and the shipbuilding industry, that most important third factor (the others being our bases and fighting units) in our sea power, is another. While the foreigner, making use of subsidies, commercial combines and other means whereby to drive our flag off the trade routes, built lavishly, the British industries were left to fend for themselves, the tonnage disappeared, shipyards were closed down, and skilled men in the trade sought employment in other work or went abroad. So it came about that owing to this apathy on the part of our representatives in Parliament we began this war short of fighting ships of the cruiser and destroyer classes, without bases to the westward, and with a depleted merchant navy, while the merchant navies of the pirate states of Germany, Italy and Japan increased.

These patent facts appear not to have got home in Westminster, judging by this debate. Every week brings evidence of the pressing need for a new outlook if we are to survive the dangers that encompass us. The command of the Mediterranean, except for a limited stretch of water in the neighbourhood of Alexandria, is in the hands of the enemy: that is to say he can reinforce his armies, as he has done and is still doing, and we cannot use the Mediterranean route, greatly as it is needed to send troops and supplies to the Middle and Far East. It is becoming questionable whether we can revictual, and replenish the munitions of Malta. Two convoys, one from Gibraltar and one from Alexandria, were despatched simultaneously last month to take relief to the island. The former got through, though not without loss of some of the ships and with a loss of one cruiser, four destroyers and two escort vessels that were part of its defence: the latter, under the protection, it appears, of light cruisers and flotilla craft, had to turn back, threatened by a squadron of battleships of the Italian fleet. Since Tobruk fell into the enemy's hands supplies of men and stores have been able to reach that port from Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese, carried in small craft.

In the Barentz Sea our convoys have suffered badly, according to German reports; and lying though we know those reports have often been, it is not possible to dismiss the claims as though there were no truth in them. We have lost escorting ships also, and our cruiser forces—those forces cut down by the insane Treaty of London—are being grievously depleted without any corresponding depletion of the forces of the enemy. The *Tirpitz* with a backing of some cruisers, put out to intercept one of these convoys but fortunately did not succeed. A Russian submarine sighted her and her consorts and claimed to have hit her with two torpedoes. We may hope that this

claim is correct but we cannot count on it; for the evidence of the torpedoes striking is confined to hearing the explosions and these may have been on one or another of the other vessels. We have in any case to be prepared for further surface ship co-operation from the four strongly defended naval bases the Germans have created at Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik and Tromsø; and to endeavour to use air forces to diminish the enemy's powers.

In the Far East, the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway Island have afforded striking testimony of the influence of sea power, just as the losses of Malaya and Burma furnish testimony of the effects of lack of it. "All the improvement in the position of Australia, New Zealand and India," said the Prime Minister with perfect truth, "has been effected in the main by the brilliant victories gained by the United States Navy and Air Force over the Japanese in the Coral Sea and at Midway Island." The only fault to find in that statement is the allusion to a separate American Air Force. There is no such a distinction in the American Navy. Aircraft form, as they should in our own, an integral part of the Navy. What however is extraordinary is that it should be possible to discern this patent fact concerning sea power and yet to fail to apply the obvious lesson to our own problems in the European theatre, and to take immediate steps to make use of our growing air power to crush the resistance of the enemy at sea: for this is vital to our existence.

To return to the debate. It was pertinently asked by some of those few speakers who mentioned sea power, why, when our bombers were ice-, fog-, and frost-bound from month to month and could do nothing against Cologne and the other targets in Germany, their mobility, which is quoted so often as one of the prime attributes of air forces, was not made use of to transfer bombers to the Mediterranean where their help would have been of such great value; and why, in 1941, no steps were taken to dispose of the Italian fleet when it would not have been very difficult to do so, and the result of which would have been felt outside the inner sea; for heavy ships could then have been set free for the Eastern waters where, it was abundantly plain, the storm clouds were gathering. "If half the bombs dropped in Germany," said Major Milner, "had been concentrated on the Middle-East, on naval establishments and the Italian fleet and German airfields, we should not be in our present difficulty." In the course of the war we have lost over 1,700 bombers in these enterprises. There is thus good reason to agree with this estimate, and also with that of Mr. Hore-Belisha when he said that the best service we could have rendered to Greece would have been the smashing of the Italian Empire; the first steps towards which must be obtaining the command of the sea in the Mediterranean. The only way by which that most desirable end could be attained is by a concentrated effort of the sea and air forces against those of the Axis. While it is not to be doubted that the 98 attacks which our brave bombing squadrons have made upon Bremen, and the almost equal number upon Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Emden, and other ports where submarines are put together, will have made a contribution towards reducing

the number of submarines that are being produced, it is also clear that they have not prevented the great development of German sea power, its various forms of surface ships, submarines and aircraft, to a strength which has inflicted, and continues to inflict, deep and dangerous injuries to the power at sea of the allies; nor has it reduced the strength of the other two enemies, Japan and Italy, neither of whom is affected by it. The results of bombing, moreover, are temporary, not permanent. Factories damaged are rapidly reconstructed, as our own experience in certain bombed areas has shown. What is needed *immediately* is the destruction of the several forms of fighting instruments of our enemies that are *now* at sea. Bombing is a long term policy. We require *immediate* results if we are to throw Rommel out of Africa, the Japanese out of the Pacific, or to procure the safe delivery of munitions to Russia via the Arctic and the Persian Gulf. It is of little help to burn down the stud farm where Derby winners are bred in order to win this year's Derby. The horse that is taking part in the race has to be beaten. Action at sea by all the types of fighting craft capable of taking part in operations at sea is what is now wanted, and the sooner we begin to concentrate our forces upon this single and immediate object the better. A time may come when we shall have more aircraft than we need for this purpose. If that time comes we can then spare the surplus for the long term policy of bombing the interior of Germany and the centres—of which there are many—of production.

DIARY-KEEPING AND MISS WEETON

BY KATE O'BRIEN

DIARIES are almost always sure-fire entertainment—other people's diaries. Even bad and idiotic ones manage to contain authenticity in one form or another—often an authenticity by no means intended in the writing. And sometimes those resolute, dull diaries which children keep:—'Got up. V.G. for algebra. Walked with Mademoiselle. There was mutton and roly-poly for dinner,'—re-create life with a deadly accuracy which blows the average novel sky-high.

'*Se confier, c'est s'exposer et se livrer: mais ce courage touche les coeurs magnanimes*,' said Amiel. Yet magnanimity is not, I think, severely strained in readers of the *Journal Intime*, for it would be the sheerest dullness to withhold patience or concern for him from a diarist whose close pages of introspection and self-searching carry in themselves such a rich, pervasive seam of magnanimity. Who gives so much makes it easy indeed for his debtors to give a little back.

Amiel, as hopes left him and disappointments grew, found the desperate courage needed to make a close life-work and vocation of his journal, which became the centre of his existence, '*ma principale idole*'; he clearly was not naturally courageous, whereas he was, by habit of mind, by intellectual and moral pre-occupation, magnanimous. The same is true of André Gide, whose close-packed journals, running from 1890 to 1938, overflow with luminous, irresistible magnanimity, but wherein the courage necessary to face self squarely, coldly, for exact comment and deduction, is only present by a rigid assault—comparable to Amiel's—on the diarist's sensibility.

These two men, and Gide particularly, represent diary-keeping at its most satisfactory and moving. They project a whole man, a whole life—at a high emotional, intellectual and spiritual level. They present a moral being, in relation to universal principles and in struggle too with the ordinary and humiliating issues of everyday life. From a nature as rich, varied and intellectually honourable as Gide's, '*s'exposer et se livrer*' is in fact, even if accidentally, a great gesture of magnanimity. *Le journal nous remet en équilibre*' says Amiel—which is very much what a great journal, such as his or Gide's, must also do for its readers. '*Le journal n'est que le recueillement plume en main.*'

Miss Weeton, who knew no French and before whose aggressive and hearty personality Amiel might certainly have recoiled, would have assented to these two observations. '*S'exposer et se livrer*' was the major business of her obscure but lively life, and it must be said that she managed it effectively, and in spite of a curious violence both of her nature and of her vicissitudes, did attain perhaps, by writing herself down, something like the *équilibre* of Amiel's promise. Certainly she was a *dévoté* of '*le recueillement plume en main*'—and a most eccentric one, sprung up in unlikely ground. That she was courageous and ranging in thought as well as in deed is evident from her literary remains, but I do not think it is possible to call her magnanimous, in the highest or most instructive sense. She was capable indeed of considerable generosity of behaviour and of opinion in ordinary affairs; but her voluminous writings about herself cannot by the nature of her close limitations of knowledge and experience, approach at all to intellectual magnanimity. When she leaves the self and its local habitation and doings she becomes, very necessarily, timid, and takes refuge in *clichés* and unproved pieties. But she is, for all that limitation, a remarkably good diarist—because, willy-nilly and take her or leave her, she gives us the whole of her unusual personality, vehemently alive and sometimes kicking. But her necessity as a diarist was very much more self-justification than self-examination; she had few doubts about herself, though a normal plenty about her neighbours. She had many grievances, natural and strong; also great zest, and much observational and pedagogic power. She was a brainy, original woman cramped by lack of books and cultural background; she was an affectionate, trusting woman whose heart was outraged by a caddish brother and a brutally unkind husband; and she was a woman of great energies, who never found a satisfactory externalization of her vitality.

So her Journal, her Retrospect and her books of her own long, vivid letters are, first and last, a *protest*. They are in no sense tentative or exploratory. They present Miss Weeton whole and sound as she understood herself to be; they offer, declamatorily, a story which in its facts appears to have been much more tragic than the vigorous personality of its enactor allows us to believe it could emotionally have been; they give a detailed, realistic picture of middle and lower-middle-class life in Lancashire between 1807 and 1825; and above all, they re-create an English eccentric of the first water, rampaging, self-righteous, generous, coarse, pious, amusing and alarming; a boss and, were one not in the mood, no doubt in the flesh very often a bore, a domineering and too articulate bore. Quite likely there were those who, seeing Miss Weeton coming their way along the street in Upholland, would turn aside into the baker's or the milliner's to escape her; for her grievances, though real, were constant, and her letters make it clear that she aired them in conversation hardly less than in '*le recueillement plume en main.*' But at least it was easy to see her coming; she had a distinguished appearance:

I am taller and thinner than most women, and very plain-featured—yet, I think, not so ugly as to attract passers-by—perhaps I am; few of us know how we appear in the eyes of others. Many of the country people I meet on the road bow or curtsy to me, as if I were of some rank or respectability of appearance . . .

She was, though of humble birth, the sort of oddity that the English upper classes have often run to, and with distinction, in their women. She was of well-varied possibilities—a bluestocking *manquée*, or a rake outside the rakish class perhaps, or a traveller, explorer, preacher or social reformer born out of place. Lady Hester Stanhope, Miss Harriet Martineau, Miss Florence Nightingale, Miss Gertrude Bell—Miss Weeton suggests some affinity of ability and temperament with each, I think; but all she became was a governess. About twenty years earlier than the Brontës, on the edge of Windermere and afterwards in Yorkshire, she practised their profession, better paid than they and better able to stand up for herself, and vigorously and often wittily observant of the lives she was associated with and her relation to them. She was no Brontë, but had she directed her energy away from incessant copying of her own letters, she might have become a very good novelist of a quite other order.

Few people seem to know Miss Weeton. I fell in with her only a few months ago, in the house of one of her keen admirers, Miss E. M. Delafield. Yet she was published by the Oxford University Press in two fine volumes—the first of these appearing in 1936 and the second in 1939. And she is meticulously edited by her discoverer, Mr. Edward Hall, who, having fallen on such a prize, not unnaturally fell in love with it; indeed excessively in love. For he protests too much, and as Miss Weeton herself was no mean protestor, between them they weaken their case—rousing scepticism and—alas for our unaccountableness!—sometimes smiles when they solicit tears.

She was hardly used by life, in some things very cruelly indeed. But she was of unusually tough fibre, and so gloriously self-confident and vigorous-minded that it is impossible to accept her as tragic. Indeed, she was not. She rode her one real tragedy, in middle age—her wretched marriage and subsequent enforced separation from her only child—with an admirable gusto, landing up in the fifties triumphantly respectable and respected, a chapel-goer and a 'good works' committee woman, housed in Wigan with her daughter; a tough, healthy creature who thought nothing of walking twenty-five miles one day and eighteen or twenty the next, and who had in fact not long before climbed Snowdon alone and unaided, between breakfast and supper. *Hinc illae lacrimae*, Mr. Hall! As an instance of his curious *attendrissage*, I refer possible readers to the pleasure with which they will read of Miss Weeton's holiday in Wales in 1825, when she was forty-eight—one of the best parts of her journal, wherein she appears at her most attractive, observant, extrovert and zestful, performing prodigies of walking and sight-seeing, eccentric and independent, at the top of her form—and then to Mr. Hall's reference to this outing: 'How long she continued to tolerate the mockery of a "holiday" in

Wales, a stranger in a strange land . . . ' This is sheer nonsense. It is clear from her own words that she enjoyed herself thoroughly on that trip—the occasional references in the holiday journal to her trials and misfortunes being in fact a part of her method of heightening her own self-appreciation and enjoyment.

She was in some ways a very lucky woman, for her day and situation. White-haired and gaunt, at forty-seven, she went alone by coach to visit London, and spent ten weeks there. At the end of eight of these she calculated that, marching about to sight-see, she had walked 538½ miles. An average of 9½ miles a day! She gives a very good tourist's impression of London, as also of the pleasures and annoyances of coaching. On both journeys she rode *outside* the coach, and on the way home was incommoded, but far from downed, by some rowdy Irish pig-drivers who sat beside her, annoyed her and jammed her against the iron hand-rail. 'The women in Ireland must have a dreadful time with such fellows,' she says.

But mountaineering and coach tours were autumn pleasures, when her battles were mostly over. In her early governing days, before she was inveigled by her wretched brother into marrying Mr. Stock, she had to hack her way through strange and varied experiences—with the mad Pedder household on Windermere, and against the petty *bourgeois* tyrannies and irritations inflicted by Mrs. Armitage in Yorkshire. But the journal and letters which record these events are the work of an extremely temperamental, variable and obstinate woman,—that is clear on every page—and it is curious that her editor is unable to take any of her drama with even a little salt. It seems to me that Miss Weeton is someone to be appreciated, warts and all—but neither to be beatified nor excessively pitied. Millions of unrecorded lives are far more packed with frustration and sorrow than she ever dreamt of allowing hers to be—having talents, audacity and arrogance with which to meet whatever came. To say nothing of excellent health.

Her life with the Pedders was vivid and grotesque, and she makes it vibrate again in her accounts of it. She fell in love there, but briefly and to no effect; she saw her unhappy epileptic pupil die a frightful death; she was buffer, adviser and general all-in umpire and intervener in the crazy and violent marital life of her employers. But also she went on splendid picnics, she climbed mountains, she observed peasant life, and enjoyed friendships among her neighbours. And she attended two regattas, at one of which some of the competitors were guilty of indecent exposure, creating a state of dilemma which the diarist records with humorous gusto, adding that 'the ladies, disgusted, every one left the ground.'

Miss Weeton had a Flemish taste in vulgarity, a *Tyl Eulenspiegel* appreciativeness of the more humiliating human functions; she is quite startlingly free, especially in letters to her brother, with scatological humour. And once she is downright filthy, deliberately and at some length. This outburst, with some lesser ones—considering the high moral tone she takes as a rule,

and the absolute shindy she raises when an old aunt spreads a false rumour that she has gone off on a trip with a man—explains, or at least suggests, a good deal about her temperament; but it is an oddity which with many others she carries off by the sheer force of essential sanity and self-confidence.

The Napoleonic wars were on during her earlier years, and the upheaval of Peterloo shook all her region—but though she occasionally makes slanting reference to public affairs, her eye is fixed on personal life—her own and her friends'. A shrewd eye, with a somewhat masculine and orthodox vision; not introspectively turned nor lensed by sensibility over much. She can suffer and analyse—indeed she can! but with reference to broad principles, and specific acts and issues. There is nothing of the '*Ich weiss nicht was soll es bedeuten*' in her nature. She always knows what she is about, and why she is upset.

She was remarkable, and left a remarkable record—of simple life lived gustily for its own sake through complicated times. Her relations were saddlers, mercers, butchers; her father was captain of a merchantman; her mother, widowed young, had a little school, which she inherited and conducted for a time. She stormed along, too big for her setting, but too untrained and perhaps too cocksure to stride very much beyond it. It is a pity that when she lived with the Pedders at Dove's Nest she never met the Wordsworths, so near her at Rydal Mount. It is difficult to guess what comments on William and Dorothy would have been penned to Wigan and Upholland, and copied into the letterbooks. But comment there would have been, for she was an unsparing observer and pronouncer of judgments.

She fatigues, she bludgeons, she touches the heart, she gets the reader worried and she makes him laugh outright; she is a character, a card and a bit of a freak. But while one follows her one follows life, caught on its rush, unstemmed by any disaster, personal or public.

If, finally unmoved by her to that magnanimity which Amiel expects to have accorded to confessional courage, we withhold from Miss Weeton the epithet 'magnanimous' which we concede to the unhappy Genevan—we do so with regret. For she would have resented such a negative judgment, and would have written passionate pages to refute it. And she had, be it repeated, a rough, unreliable kind of greatheartedness. And no one could deny that she had the courage to '*s'exposer et se livrer*.' The courage—and the need. In the latter word really lies the secret of her journal's singing life; she kept it because she *had* to. And therein we find her sole resemblance to Amiel. He was frustrated by his own nature, she by intractable circumstances—and each escaped by the same road from ultimate frustration. He to an especial kind of greatness; she to smaller things, eccentricity, freedom and personal satisfaction. But each could have said: '*Le Journal nous remet en équilibre.*'

SIME

BY LORD DUNSANY

WE have lost, in a time of losses, when loss is nothing out of the ordinary, a genius whose stupendous imagination has passed across our time little more noticed by most people than the shadow of a bird passing over a lawn would be noticed by most of a tennis party. The shadow of some dark bird, going silently, particularly suggests itself, because there was in his pictures a sombre grandeur showing all the majesty of night, or the mystery of dark forests, or the hair-raising power of spells which won your credulity; and because his life passed so silently through its span, with no fuss and no complaint and little fame. This genius was S. H. Sime; and if I attempt to give any description of the kind of work he did, for those who may not know it, it must be borne in mind that, whatever comparisons I may make, that work was unlike anything that has ever been before, anywhere else in the world. He was primarily a black-and-white artist; and, if you took all that was nasty away from the pictures of Aubrey Beardsley (and there was often something nasty in corners of some of those pictures), you would have in what was left a picture that you might hang in the same room with Sime's without either jarring too much upon the other. But that is only mere outline and tells you nothing. Some of Beardsley's figures might have walked in Sime's pictures, but they would have been ill at ease there, terrified by the tremendous atmosphere, like thunder about to break on extinct volcanic mountains where Japanese gods were plotting against the race of man; or against one wayfarer, benighted by storm that tattered his cloak, and dogged by steps of something too dark to see, but whose echoes are only too audible, as you tell by the traveller's whole attitude. Such a picture the reader already perhaps thinks somewhat unreal. But no, for through the wildest forests, of trees that only grew in remote days of geology, and past tremendous gods, there will go through one of Sime's pictures somebody swinging a bucket with such determination, and carrying with so much purpose a scrubbing brush, that the familiar figure, forcing itself on our attention by its sheer energy, somehow assures us that all those wonders are commonplace. As Dante was led through the wonders of all his hells by Virgil, or as Virgil gave Aeneas a sybil for guide through the underworld, so Sime gives us for guide through lands as strange as anything Dante saw, some well-accustomed figure, such as a charwoman; so that some stairway of the gods, going up past the flight of far planets, will not seem too unconcerned with

our mortal affairs, because one corner of its colossal marble is probably being scrubbed by some such figure, whose scrubbing-brush is so intensely true to life that we instantly accept its reality, and this acceptance somehow flows all along the stairs and slops over among the stars. Soapsuds slopping upon the eternal, or a common scrubbing-brush amongst the severely classical, would be enough to shatter most pictures, or to send their fragments crashing amongst absurdity; but they are the passports to Sime's pictures, the charms that open the gates to his strange worlds, which without them would be too remote for us. Cliffs too vast for our world I have seen made terrestrial in one of his pictures by a little iron clamp and a couple of screws fastened over a crack in the cliff, so that, just as our fumbling imagination was about to fall back from the splendid precipice, unable to hold it, this very human bit of iron made it somehow feel at home. Houses of his in cliffs, and even in trees, fill the world with a new wonder for us, but one which we should not be quite able to enjoy, finding it too far outside our experience, were it not for a stovepipe coming out of the cliff or the tree, a stovepipe so common in its design that not one of us can possibly complain this is too far-fetched. Nobody lost in that wonderland can say that the stovepipe is highbrow: it is earthly and even vulgar. As our imagination comes out of the wood and sees that stovepipe, we learn that we are not so far from home as we thought: earth must be somewhere near. Of course all painters know that, since storytelling is a literary art, its natural place is not in pictures; but they know also that no rules bind an artist, and Frith, for instance, was not bound by any rule that precludes the story. In Sime's pictures the literary art comes peering here and there through crevices of the canvas; but he is strangely unlike Frith. There is no wonder in Frith: if a story excites our curiosity for a moment in any part of one of his pictures, a single glance at its obvious *dénouement* immediately abates wonder. In Sime's pictures the figures are as clearly drawn as in Frith's; their purposeful march and set faces show as clearly as Frith's figures that there is something afoot, a story in progress; but what that story can be is another matter. Beyond any doubt three men with spades, one of whom carries a sack, are going by night into a forest in order to bury a corpse: a hand sticking out of the sack indicates that much. But why are they going? And what is following them? Something, or the last man would not look round as he does; but what it is you must guess from the look on his face. And then, where are they? In Frith's pictures you can so easily discern Paddington station or Epsom; but in what country is Sime's forest, or on what planet? Look closer and you may see, if you chance to have studied geology, that the forest is such as used to grow in the coal-measures before the downs were formed. But it is not all pure geology in this wood, for sniffing round one of the trees you see the nose of a dragon. It is not the business of a picture to tell a story, and the story remains untold. All one can be certain of is that the three men are doomed; that is certain from the laughter on the face of the Old Woman

Who Lived In A Shoe, who, happening to have strayed on the scene, has seen everything where she hides at the edge of the forest and is indeed the only person who knows what is going on, and it is from her face that the onlooker must make out whatever he can of the story. This is not the description of any picture that Sime actually drew; but it is the sort of picture he would draw. Lampblack was his principal medium, worked with a brush and a sponge, and very rarely a speck of Chinese white; and Indian ink, with which he used to draw his figures, for which he used a pen. By these means he would make sunny landscapes, or forests lit by shafts of intensely bright moonlight. The figures were vividly drawn, so vividly and realistically that you felt the tale must be true, if only you could find out what it was; and Sime's pictures gripped one's imagination and kept it wondering, trying to find out where his figures hurried so earnestly, or what doom was about to overtake them. For a doom seems often to haunt the glades of his forests, and sometimes seems to spread over the whole landscape, like a curse laid for a joke by a god whom nobody worships. A doom laid on a land for a joke by an unknown god is particularly the kind of landscape you would look for in Sime, for the sombre shadows of lampblack and Indian ink are always lit by the rays of his merry humour, so that his pictures give us the feeling that, however terrible things may seem in this world or among the asteroids, they are really rather a joke. One warning I would give those who may look at Sime's pictures: let them be chary of saying, "I like a certain amount of imagination, but a wood like this, with a beast like that in it, is really too utterly remote from earth to have any interest for us." Let them rather go home and look on some spring morning at the nearest patch of moss to their own doorsteps; let them look carefully, and use a microscope, and they may see that very beast. For, when Sime's imagination could get no further, he sometimes deserted it and turned back to Mother Earth, and there with the aid of his microscope saw some of the most fantastic monsters that are to be found in his pictures. One cannot therefore be sure that anything that Sime drew was not perfectly true to life, till one has thoroughly searched moss.

And now that vast imagination has left us, having enriched our age with dreams that we have not entirely deserved.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

MISS Olive Lodge says that "the Serbian refugees of the Great War (in Corsica) communicated to her the spirit of their story." How she came to be in Corsica—which after all is not just so handy as the Isle of Wight—she does not trouble to mention, nor how she managed to communicate with these people who had kept their customs, their feasts and all the rest, including certainly their language. But she is not one to let difficulties deter her and after a long period of enforced waiting she made her way to the country of these folk and spent six years there,

travelling as the peasants travelled, on horses or mules, sometimes even astride a donkey, in springless two-horse-carts, more rarely in an ox wagon; or, like everyone else, hired a single place in a motor car, or sat in the new auto-buses; many a time also footing it from village to village, *apostoliki*, like the Apostles, as the Serbs say.

So she qualified herself to write the book on *Peasant Life in Yugoslavia* which Seeley Service publish, copiously illustrated, for a guinea. In a charming story, *Illyrian Spring* (several times reprinted several years ago), Dalmatia, "a place which no one had ever heard of and where nobody ever went," made an admirable background for that idyll of a painter's escape from family embarrassments. Miss Ann Bridge develops even more fully than Miss Lodge the attraction of fields full of flowers that we only see in gardens: yet she neither knows nor pretends to know the country itself, which, as Miss Lodge emphasizes a score of times, is a peasant country, of cottages and villages where most of what is used must be home-made and hand-made. What shopkeepers, speaking German and Italian and occasionally even English in places like Spalato and Ragusa, offered to tourists when the cruising steamers called was made originally for peasant homes—some of which might be well to do. Kara Djordj, who founded the Karageorgewich clan, became leader of Serbian revolt at the beginning of the last century—"a tall, dark fierce peasant" who could neither read nor write; but bred pigs on his farm until the need came—and then organized not only war but a national system of education. His end was defeat and assassination, but his work lasted. Miss Lodge, who has gleaned her Serbian history from the folk themselves, only reinforced by books, makes her readers feel that the national life may be even strengthened by the resistance to disaster. She dedicates her book "To the Spirit of Kossovo," yet makes it plain that Kossovo, fought in 1389 against the Turks was a bloody defeat for the Serbs, though the Sultan as well as their King fell there.

But her main concern is with customs rather than with history, except in so far as history affects the way of life. It is a strange country surely where you can tell a Muslim from a Christian by the shape of his plough (always home-made). The cap is "even more distinctive. In some villages peasants have said they would kill anybody who used a cap to which he was not born."

This would be thought excessive here, even for one who should masquerade in someone's else's old school tie. In Ireland it is not uncommon to hear a person described (with varying implications) as "Protestant-looking." In Yugoslavia there are three possibilities for such description—Orthodox, Roman Catholic or Muslim. But Muslims on occasion will go to the shrines of orthodox saints hoping for a cure, just as Protestants have for instance been known to bring away water from the Holy Well of Doon in county Donegal. Architecture offers a charming variety "where each creed impresses its outward stamp on buildings," though to Miss Lodge's regret, "uniformity is invading the village and houses rise up like houses anywhere." Yet such a country must keep its charm, for although wolves and eagles are a menace to its farm yards, they have real sunshine and the grape; they can grow the most fragrant tobacco in the world from which "Turkish" cigarettes are (or used to be) made. But in reality the essence of this book is to make us realize the spirit of the people, which is maintained in part by the Orthodox church but above all by the wandering minstrels. Their songs which she gives—never before given, she says, in English—have the authentic ring.

* * * * *

In *Russian Boy*, an unnamed author gives us vivid insight into a country even less known than Yugoslavia to most English readers. The publishers,

A Gallant Small Boy

King & Staples (who issue it at 6s.) say that the author brought in his manuscript, telling them that it faithfully recorded his early history. He was the son of a Russian cavalry officer who was killed fighting the Germans. His elder brother entered the cadet school, but the mother kept this younger one and his sisters with her. Restless in Petersburg she went from city to city, even to Kazan where the Tartar people spoke a different tongue and wore strange clothes. Then they turned back, but the Bolshevik revolution made food hard to get, so they travelled again, to Troitsk on the border of Siberia. The boy was eight years old now, and just as authentically a boy as Tom Brown or any of his schoolfellows, yet living through the most startling experiences—as for instance when he was allowed to ride a wild Cossack colt down to the water. He went to school, among the Tartar peasant boys, and presently Troitsk was attacked by the Bolsheviks. The Cossacks drove them off; a later attack succeeded; but then it was the other way round. The boy with his Tartar friends had the chance to look on at all these changes. But "Mum-mie" had sold nearly all her belongings and the boy must go to the Cadet school away in the far east at Irkutsk. He was ten now, but a fighter, and needed to be, for bullying was at its worst there; but evidently it did not break his spirits. When the Revolution reached Irkutsk, he and one of his fellow cadets saw a troop of soldiers led by an officer of the Citizen Army with three prisoners—all officers—who were tied up against a fence. The first died quietly with his eyes bandaged; the second screamed; but the third, Kolchak, commander-in-chief of the White Armies, tore the bandage from his eyes, saluted as if at an inspection and gave the word—"Fire!" The Soviet troops showed their respect by acting on his order.

Life was hard at Irkutsk in semi-arctic conditions and the mother decided to head west when it grew warm enough to travel. But in Petrograd all had been starving since the Revolution. Still there was school and football at school, and homework and reading "helped the boy to forget that he did not

have a meal." But it was a rough time and the elder brother had run away to join a gang of criminals. At last, in 1933, there came an invitation for him and his two sisters to join relations in Germany; and there he stayed, so the publisher tells us, with his father's brother till 1935, when he was six-and-twenty. But he cuts short his story at fourteen having given us, incidentally, vivid glimpses of the vast Russia, but, above all, having shown how in the most tragic adventures a courageous boy remains both unshakeably and incorrigibly boyish.

* * * * *

Almost fantastically different from this study of boyhood, illustrated by Russian experience, is Miss St. Clare Byrne's reconstruction of an English girlhood from its earliest remembered moments. She calls it *Common or Garden Child: A Not Unfaithful Record* and the Fabers let us have it in a nice volume for 7s. 6d. Between them they make me feel thankless and unappreciative for the thing is well done and in normal times would be enjoyable for anyone. There are those who can detach themselves from present realities and are glad of what helps them to do so: and such a person might welcome this account of a child who paraded from the first her longing to be a boy. A very young father who seems to have spoilt her a little enchanted his daughter by the gift of a real cricket bat; she loved the feel of it and the texture of the wood which she devoutly oiled. She was teased by him, though, and can recall the teasing; as also she remembers trying out for herself the attractions of sliding downstairs on a teatray. Later of course there were competing interests—and a gifted friend called Helen, who could write poetry and do real dancing; and there were the influences of domestics who had "gentlemen friends." Then came sudden passionate attachments—and disloyalties—involving Helen; and finally, at fourteen, revolt. "There is nothing more for me to learn here in my home, on my holidays, or at my school." And so comes transfer to a High School, with a train journey twice each day, but with "a real sixth form, real Prefects' Room, real teams that play real interschool matches," and she will now "learn Greek as a matter of course." Is it really like that in many girlhoods? The book rings true: but the reviewer must regret that it did not reach him when his response could have been more welcoming.

* * * * *

It is a real distress to feel the same lack of sympathy about another book from the same excellent publishers; for it is Messrs. Faber who bring out at 10s. 6d. Mr. Wilson Knight's *Chariot of Wrath* which a subtitle describes as "The Message of John Milton to Democracy at War." But here is no question of unlucky timing; if one does not like the book, it is unhappily because one does not like Milton, or at least that aspect of Milton which Mr. Wilson Knight forces on his reader. I say "forces," because his methods of "critical interpretation" leave me doubtful. Great literature, he writes, "is itself a power, and the harmonizing of virility and goodness its ultimate purpose. In the *Iliad* Achilles, vengeful and sadistic, is balanced against Hector, upholder of family and chivalrous qualities and the good man. Yet when at last they meet Hector flies in

mortal terror; for the power-man is as it were a superhuman force." Now, I happen to have re-read the *Iliad* pretty recently and cannot believe that Homer was conscious of any such "ultimate purpose." Whoever wrote the *Iliad* was for all his genius a simple-minded man, whose chief purpose was to tell the story in such a way as to bring out its beauty and force. Mr. Wilson Knight it seems has interpreted Shakespeare's message also. We have surprisingly little detail about Shakespeare, but one thing we know absolutely; he was not self-righteous. About Milton we know a mass of facts; as a whole, tragically moving; yet in the last resort Milton is not lovable—and Shakespeare is. Of the two writers, Milton is the impeccable artist; whether in prose or verse you could scarcely find in him a piece of bad writing; in Shakespeare (as Goldsmith did not hesitate to say) there is plenty. And yet, beyond all doubt or dispute Shakespeare after all this time still comes home to men's business and their bosoms; Milton estranges, and estranges most when he is most himself. We know the poems of his youth, *Lycidas* and the *Allegro* and *Penseroso* almost as if they were Shakespeare; but about the things which he wrote when blindness had shut him in on his own soul, that simply is not true. However, we may readily believe that this great writer, so ferociously an Englishman, had purposes beyond those which are natural to every serious poet when he planned and carried out *Paradise Lost*, *Paradise Regained* and *Samson Agonistes*. The thought of England's destiny could never be far from the mind that had so fiercely championed England's king-killing; and his poetry would be shaped by an instinctive symbolism. Mr. Wilson Knight writes, like Milton, with passionate sincerity but, like Milton also, without a touch of humour. He finds no difficulty in speaking of Britain as "a Messiah-nation." Still one must admit that he allows us to perceive "a certain affinity" between Hitler and Milton's chosen hero Cromwell, both being men "who ruthlessly override ethical objections in obedience to an all-demanding intention." If, which is unthinkable, Mr. Wilson Knight entered at all into the Irish point of view he would realize that England directed by Cromwell dealt with Ireland as Germany directed by Hitler is dealing with Poland, and went far to establish here a *Herrenvolk*. That is no doubt part of the reason why I, as an Irishman, find the book uncongenial. But I prefer to put it in this way. Mr. Knight quotes noble words of Milton's addressed to Cromwell.

After having endured so many sufferings and encountered so many perils for the sake of liberty, do not suffer it, now it is obtained, either to be violated by yourself or, in any one instance impaired by others.

When Great Britain declared war on Germany because of Germany's aggression on Polish liberty, the action conformed to that high vision which Milton had of his country's destiny. If in taking that action Britain got no support from Ireland, the cause lies in that Irish policy which Cromwell with Milton's approbation so firmly established that "the curse of Cromwell on you" is still the bitterest word of execration known to Irish lips.

STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT, by G. P. Gooch.
Longmans, Green & Co. 12s. 6d.

In one way or another, two thirds of Dr. Gooch's somewhat forbiddingly entitled volume deal with the origins of the first World War. As editor, with Professor Temperley, of the "British Documents on the Origins of the World War," he possesses unrivalled command over the vast mass of documents and memoirs in which the diplomatic history of the period 1871 to 1914 lies buried. The précis form of most of the essays and the shortness of the bibliography at the end of the first essay on "Franco-German relations 1871-1914" modestly cloak the author's vast reading. As a careful digest of an enormous literature which few people, however interested, would find time to study in detail, the value of the present volume would already be considerable. It is further enhanced by the author's broad outlook, his moderation and evident striving for impartiality.

Pursuit of impartiality is carried to such lengths that at times it seems to lead to an excessive exculpation of Germany. Conversely, a corresponding censure of French politics is implied, if not expressed, in much that is said about the Morocco crises. This is not everybody's reading of pre-war history, but it is one in keeping with the atmosphere of the pre-Locarno and Locarno periods. With an eye to his successors, Prince Bülow quotes in his Memoirs the words of one of his friends: "*Quand on fait des crasses, il faut qu'elles réussissent.*" It is Germany's systematic repetition of "*crasses*," one successful, the second unsuccessful, the third as yet undecided, which leads one to doubt Dr. Gooch's views on the origins of the first World War. He

sums them up thus, in a conversation with von Jagow, of 1929: "The European system was the main cause of the war. Germany was dragged in by Austria, England and France by Russia. It was an East European quarrel." Jagow concurred, and no doubt with relief.

The longest essay in the book deals with "British Foreign Policy 1919-1939." As a summary of the diplomatic history of the past two decades, it is highly instructive. But it omits completely any reference to the influence of class bias in foreign policy and thus excludes one of the most important factors in British, and, for that matter, French foreign policy, during that period.

The portraits of Prince Bülow and Kiderlen-Wachter make attractive reading. In comparison, Kiderlen, though less dazzling, comes out an easy winner. Incidentally, his favourite maxim: "If a man says in advance he will not fight, he will achieve nothing in politics," affords the clue to the disasters of British and French foreign policy during the Long Armistice of 1919-39.

The last four essays of the book are more philosophical in character. "Political Autobiography" is an extended review of apologias of rulers and statesmen as a form of historical literature, from the 16th Century to the present time. "It covers such little read material as Sully's *Oeconomies royales*, Frederick the Great's *Histoire de mon Temps* and the memoirs of Metternich, Guizot, Beust and Emile Ollivier about which little has been written in this country. From the literary viewpoint, it counts however among the less attractive chapters of the book.

"Politics and Morals" is a review of Machiavelli's philosophy of statecraft, and the essay on "Hobbes" deals with another, comparatively neglected, founder of the totalitarian

conception of the State. It speaks for Dr. Gooch's high idealism that his long familiarity with politics of the Great Powers has failed to convince him of any immanent divorce of politics and morals.

"French Revolution as a World Force" dates a little. It was written in 1920. The chances are, an essay written to-day would examine more closely the internal opposition to the ideas of 1789 (never completely suppressed and which showed itself with unexpected vigour in June, 1940), rather than its permanent, but now somewhat eclipsed influence in France and elsewhere.

One may not always agree with Dr. Gooch's views or his distribution of light and shadow. But as a stimulating book for thinking readers, one would have to look far for anything better among recent publications.

R. P. SCHWARZ.

IN RUSSIA NOW, by Sir Walter Citrine. Robert Hale. 3s. 6d.

WE MADE A MISTAKE, by Lucien Zacharoff. The Bodley Head. 6s.

RUSSIAN NEWSREEL, by Charlotte Haldane. Secker & Warburg. 10s. 6d.

Of books about Soviet Russia there is now no end. Whatever else the entrance of Russia into the war has done, it has certainly pulled down the shutters of prejudice, opened the eyes of the blind and unstopped the ears of a multitude who were deaf, even to news from the Soviet Union.

Here are three books which will help to meet the clamouring demand for information. Sir Walter Citrine, of course, is not a journalist. He is a trade union official who, especially when journeying abroad, keeps a diary. His book suffers somewhat because of these things. He went to Russia on a special and important

mission, namely, to further the cause of Anglo-Russian trade union unity in the prosecution of the war. But the book is not about this mission. It simply intrudes itself along with a peculiarly laboured effort to explain the difference between associating and collaborating with the communists of Russia and Britain. This rather spoils a carefully told story of his journey and his new impressions of Soviet Russia. Here again he is too anxious to prove his consistency and his discriminating attitude to things Soviet. This rather deadens what otherwise is a straightforward account of what he saw and heard and well worth reading.

Russian Newsreel, covering a lot of the same ground, is a much livelier told story. Mrs. Haldane is a journalist who has done more than keep a diary. She has given us here a vivid picture of the Russian people at war. The Red Army soldiers are described not as so many units firing guns, but as many human beings who are characteristically Russian. The account of her journeyings is exhilarating and inspires confidence in Soviet Russia's fighting strength without hiding the difficulties to be overcome or the backwardness of some things which so many people expect to be entirely other than they are.

In the Russia of to-day all the centuries seem to meet. The new generation of industrial workers and the Red Army emerge as the vanguards of a vast multitude of people in varying stages of development, from the middle ages to our own times and beyond. Any visitor can see in Soviet Russia just what he wishes to see. If he wants the most up-to-date developments he can see them. If he expects backwardness he can see it. He will be a wise visitor however who carries with him, to such a country especially, a

sense of history in order to see things in their proper perspective. *Russian Newsreel* has this quality and is good reporting.

We Made a Mistake is a book of another kind. Lucien Zacharoff, a Ukrainian, has taken for the title to his book a quotation from one of Hitler's speeches. Hitler confesses that he and his colleagues did not know of the gigantic war preparations of Soviet Russia. The author seeks to prove how great was this blunder by telling the story of Russia's war strength.

Unfortunately he has not produced new, unpublished evidence. The chapters really consist of a series of articles based upon data collected from Russian and other printed sources. He is obviously an ardent admirer of all things Soviet, and he tends to tell his story in such a gushing manner that the book loses force.

It would have been a far more powerful commentary on Hitler's miscalculations, and British miscalculations too, had the author really given us a carefully prepared account of the structure, strengths and methods of the Red Army and the industries upon which it depends. Nevertheless it will serve a useful purpose in countering the fantastically defeatist notions which some people in our country hold even to-day.

One theme runs through all of these books—Soviet Russia is unconquerable. And they are right.

J. T. MURPHY.

REMEMBRANCE, by H. J. Massingham. *Batsford*. 10s. 6d.

A man does not pause to write his life story when he is little more than a newcomer to middle age but Mr. H. J. Massingham has ample and unhappy justification. If more than an unfortunate accident were

needed, by way of explanation, it may be found in the fact that his book is concerned with thought rather than action. Harsh happenings and physical disablement have driven him from a field of pleasant activity, from the easy contemplation of England's immortal beauty, from the joy of movement free. He has accepted the trial as a brave man would and added the consolation of religion to his armoury. In the first instance his book must be a reminder of the flight of time to those of us who worked for the *Daily Chronicle* under his father, H. W. Massingham, in the early nineties, when all the world was young. In those days the youthful Massingham was getting his first glimpse of literature from John Sargeant at Westminster School; he was less happy when, at Queen's College, where the late Canon Streeter was Dean, he proclaimed himself an atheist. Had he sat at the Canon's feet his life must have been greatly enriched.

It is no small fortune for a man who devotes himself to letters to have had a sound class master and to be a son of H. W. Massingham—naturally enough, doors opened. In years when he was meeting John Squire, Orage, Vernon Rendall and other distinguished writers, he learned to love the countryside, one of the easiest of his life tasks, and to hate the industrial and machine age which has so nearly destroyed the craftsman. Perhaps he overstates the case against industrialism. For all the latter-day limitations and enforced reliance upon the factories the countryman has a better time to-day than he enjoyed when the earth was the landlord's and the fullness thereof, when the farm worker lived and died in picturesque insanitary cottages and knew unending labour through all the hours of light. Yet Mr. Massingham is justified in

saying that the village community, happy after its own fashion, was destroyed from without.

There is little of the ordinary biography in this readable book but there is an absorbing story of spiritual growth and, on a lower plane of interest, an excellent guide to the Cotswolds with archaeology, architecture and bird-watching prominent throughout. Pages are lit by flashes of deep insight. Here are a few: "The curse of Victorian ethics was their sincerity." "I began to realize God from seeing what the world was like without Him." "The modern economic system is rejected of the Earth because it is false." "The law of Nature, if truly interpreted, expounds the Divine Law."

The final chapter, devoted to consideration of the exploitation of Mother Earth by our economic system, will evoke much sympathetic response but it is odd to find that while praising Sir Albert Howard's great composting system, Mr. Massingham ignores the researches in the same field of Dr. Rudolf Steiner.

From his father he has inherited a hatred of injustice, the instinct of a crusader and the gift of style; I do not remember that a love of the country scene was part of the make-up of the redoubtable H.W.M. He has also inherited one failing from his father; he lacks, or at least he fails to display, any sense of humour.

Mr. Massingham leans heavily on his pen at times; the craftsman's delight in the well-chosen word does not always take count of the need for easy reading. When not dealing with industrialism and economics he delights in what Swinburne called the noble pleasure of praising; his publisher, his editor, his colleagues all pass before us in their gala dress.

These are but slight blemishes to record, if indeed blemish be not too

harsh a term, for *Remembrance* is a brave book. Those of us who have enjoyed the author's love for what is best in the country scene will wish him long years of quiet happiness. He has been forced to renounce many things but as the Bhagavad Gita has said "Near to renunciation, very near, dwelleth eternal peace."

S. L. BENSUSAN.

VICTORIAN DOCTOR: The Life of Sir William Wilde, by T. G. Wilson. *Methuen*. 15s.

"He was currently reported to have a family in every farmhouse," as Mr. Shaw put it. He was the principal figure in a law court scandal. These two items constitute the popular legend of Sir William Wilde. Father, mother, and son have been the victims of unceasing attentions aimed at proving them worth no attention at all: among other choice examples, Dr. Wilson quotes a particularly unpleasant display of spleen by Harry Furniss. But unlike Oscar, Sir William has lacked champions—not least against the wild assertions about him commonly loosed by those endeavouring to champion Oscar: and, though incomprehension as to wherein Oscar's claim to greatness lies is shown by Dr. Wilson's statement that he is not sure "that when the final judgment is made, Sir William will not be pronounced the greater man of the two," an important service to history is performed by setting forth the facts about him.

Dr. Wilson remarks that Sir William had but two faults: "his bad temper and his mistresses." (The usual charge of intemperance is dismissed as baseless). To set against them, he was not only an outstandingly brilliant aurist and oculist (Dr. Wilson does not mention

Wilde's extraction, when a student, of a needle from the eye of a fisherman, without an anæsthetic, of course: and saving the sight), and one of Ireland's most notable archæologists; but a man of great physical audacity, who climbed over slippery casing to the top of the Second Pyramid, and of keen social conscience, for he set aside much time from a private practice of unlimited success, to found and attend constantly St. Mark's Ophthalmic Hospital for the poor of all Ireland. "Why," asked a contemporary, 'should it not be called Wilde's Hospital?'" Wilde was a man of great penetration and many civilized interests.

Moll Travers, who sued Lady Wilde ("Speranza") for telling her father, Dr. Travers of Trinity, that his daughter had had an intrigue with Wilde (Miss Travers's own story was that Wilde had seduced her when she was under chloroform), was not only, as Dr. Wilson says, "a half-crazy monomaniac," whose activities were very similar to those of Oscar's persecutor, but also a drug addict. Though Lady Wilde lost the case socially by not putting the essential witness (her husband) in the box—the identical mistake which later lost Oscar everything, Miss Travers's virtue was surprising but accurately assessed by the jury at the traditional farthing. But the harm was done; and Wilde's decline was rapid.

Speranza, much abused and ridiculed by the ignoble, seems in reality to have been, though an indifferent poetess, the model wife: stimulating and interested in the world, without being in the very least a Public Woman; and, rarest of all, quite without jealousy in the most trying circumstances. She was duly rewarded by retaining the love and affection of her husband to the end.

Dr. Wilson, who enjoys all the versatility of his subject, and whose writing has a pleasant amateur quality, in the best sense, touches many subjects: nineteenth century medicine; Irish topography; Egyptology; the "hungry forties," of which he gives some gruesome glimpses, and where he well illustrates the immemorial and unlovely Irish political consciousness. Large quantities of maize were supplied by the English, "including many of the much-abused landlords," to feed the Irish reduced to famine by the successive failures of the potato crop. "The politicians referred to it as 'Peel's brimstone,' and the belief was fostered that it would turn those who ate it black"

There are interesting notes on the much under-estimated writer, J. S. Le Fanu; and a quotation from "Pitcher" of the 'Pink 'Un' illuminating that unsatisfactory ghost, Willie Wilde, Oscar's brother.

The background of a delightful book is Dublin in sad and unnecessary decline; the victim of English industrialism, with its evil centripetency, and of Irish political ineptitude. No city better than Dublin illustrates the curious poverty which follows the modern way of living; and the pernicious anæmia of society which follows too much concern with politics.

Dr. Wilson is as opposed to hustle as is Mr. Norman Douglas. Like George Moore, he is also a foe of photography. His book is illustrated by many charming little drawings by the author, one of them, at least, actually copied from a photograph. There can be only one complaint: Dr. Wilson's drawing pen is still unfair to Speranza

ROBERT FORDYCE AICKIN

THE DEATH OF THE MOTH, by Virginia Woolf. Hogarth Press. 9s.

Mr. Leonard Woolf has selected from his wife's papers a few essays, written between 1917 and 1940. There remain many others still to publish, and I hope he will publish them, disregarding for once the memory of Virginia Woolf's natural fastidiousness, and his recollection of her agonies over revision. For it is to be suspected upon the evidence of her work that this writer was of so pronounced a personality that even in her most somnolent, uncreative moods, the least effort of self-expression was likely to be an original expression.

Curiously enough, the trend of mood in these essays emphasizes that fact and even crystallizes it into an attitude of mind. In one of the essays, an unpublished letter to the *New Statesman* drawing the editor's "attention to the fact that in a review of a book by me your reviewer omitted to use the word Highbrow," Virginia Woolf proclaims her status, and that of all artists, as a member of the aristocracy of mind. In effect, she says that this aristocracy consists of the true highbrows, just as the aristocracy of body and energy consists of the true lowbrow. She claims an alliance between the two, an easy affinity broken only by the mischief and meddling of a third party, the middlebrow. In this last hateful category (and how, in her playfulness, she shows the deadly seriousness of her hatred!) she includes all pseudo people, the people with ulterior motives, who use art, religion, life itself, in order to 'better' themselves and their own kind and kin. She attacks once more the 'remote and ineffectual dons,' only she finds them far from remote, and devastatingly effectual in ruining the freedom of art and life, in dragooning

the gypsy artist, in explaining the poet, and in feathering their own nests.

Of course it is all playful, and she did not publish the letter. But how true it is, in spite of the confusion of terms which tends to categorize these three kinds of human beings according to social grades. The despised middle-class, living in its despised suburb, nevertheless outbreeds at times both highbrow and lowbrow; while in Bloomsbury one can find as many pretentious bores and intellectual snobs as one can in Grantchester or on Boars Hill. And what makes the nomenclature more difficult, the three kinds of brow can play concertina tricks, so that the same person, at different times, shows the stigmata of high, middle or low.

Out of all this emerges another characteristic of Virginia Woolf. It is her revulsion from scholasticism. Born and bred amidst heavy learning, she has risen to the surface somewhat dazed, her sensitivity heightened, her mind sharp. Only her nerves have had to pay the penalty. But she sees herself as the rebel, the artist, demanding an amoral freedom which is cleaner and sweeter than anything produced by pedantry. She refuses to be dragooned any more, and asks "is the true self neither this nor that, neither here nor there, but something so varied and wandering that it is only when we give the rein to its wishes and let it take its way unimpeded that we are indeed ourselves?" And she repudiates what she calls "the good citizen," at least so long as she feels the need for that vagary in which alone she can write. In one essay called *Why*, and in a lecture here printed, on *Professions for Women*, she goes to the enemy camp and says what she thinks about the culture racket, and she asks why "learn about English literature at

universities when you can learn it for yourselves in books?" Never was so eloquent a plea made for the necessary abolition of the English Literature Faculty in universities, and all its incidental and dreadful uplift, so solemn and Germanic.

Her nature is revealed in all its intensity of apprehension. "It is always an adventure to enter a new room," she says, "for the lives and characters of its owners have distilled their atmosphere into it, and directly we enter it we breast some new wave of emotion." That is a key to her ability, and the ever-fresh beauty and lucidity of her writing, qualities which became more marked as she grew more mature in her art. On the first page of this book she writes that she is looking through the window of her room (that 'room of her own') and "such vigour came rolling in from the fields . . . that it was difficult to keep the eyes strictly turned upon the book." Yes, indeed, and so it always was with her, until the 'vigour' overwhelmed her.

RICHARD CHURCH.

NEWSPAPER DAYS, by H. L. Mencken. *Kegan Paul*. 16s. 6d.
HERE'S RICHNESS! by James Agate. *Harrap*. 10s. 6d.

The gently satirical philosophy in the first pages of *Newspaper Days* makes them read as though they should be Chapter XXI. of Mr. Mencken's last book. But as this one progresses the impression of continuity with *Happy Days* recedes. It is not that there is any dullness in the record, that Baltimore adventures were few or meagre in quality, or that American journalism in the first years of this century lacked a *gauche* charm conspicuously absent in its descendant. It is perhaps that an innate lack of enthusiasm for newspaper jobs "which involved the control of other men's work, or any

responsibility for it" extends to writing about them. He seems to imply relief that only a decade of his existence has been spent reporting and editing. Fortunately, after deducting the *Happy Days* period thirty-odd years' experience still waits to prove in further instalments that he is the magnificent free lance—journalist and scholar too—nature intended him to be. This book has a very valuable place as a stepping stone, therefore, although the inclusion of Mencken's Law:

Whenever *A* annoys or injures *B* on the pretense of saving or improving *X*,
A is a scoundrel

alone justifies it. Meanwhile, there is eager anticipation of the next one to be going on with and, for those unfortunates who are unacquainted with *Happy Days*, there is the seeking out of that altogether delectable book.

Perhaps the only chapter in *Newspaper Days* which sometimes verges on the not quite so sparkling is the one called "Scent of the Theatre." Mr. Mencken confesses:

My general view of the theatre, in truth, was always somewhat skeptical and this brings us naturally to Mr. James Agate's anthology of and by him. The jacket of *Here's Richness!* proclaims—autobiography, biography, drama, essay, fiction, history, sport—a seven-decker sandwich the chief ingredient of which is of course the theatre. But the "trimmings" are solid too, piquant, appetizing and sufficient to the last crumb. As Mr. Mencken wrote of a Mayor of Baltimore, Mr. Agate is a "rambunctious fellow . . . good stories radiated from him like quills from a porcupine." (!) His book is essentially one to be dipped into and wherever it opens acute, caustic observation and analysis, decorated with prides and prejudices, leap out. In an extremely discerning Foreword Mr. Osbert Sitwell says his wit

which permeates these pages, often makes the reader forget how fine, as apart from how trenchant, a writer he can be; hundreds of sentences in this book go to prove him an author, too, with the admirable and serviceable quality of being easy to memorize and to quote.

Mr. Sitwell cites a description of New York and it can be testified that there are many passages, particularly when Mr. Agate is in *Provence*, which might well go into other anthologies under some such too smug heading as Best English Prose.

Of course it is when he comes to the theatre, and Mr. Agate is never far from it even in such diversions as boxing, horses, cricket and golf, that we forget his prejudices and remember only his prides. He could never join Mr. Mencken in being skeptical (or even sceptical) about the sacred theme. And is there anyone to excel his gift for painting an actor's portrait with a few strokes? Not only features good or bad and character vicious or virtuous, but the emphasis imparted by a lifted hand, the inflections which run the gamut from mirth to tragedy, are plain to see. Above all, and this must be one of his rewards as a critic, he makes us literally ache because Rachel, Sarah Bernhardt, Ellen Terry and the others came too soon. His essay on the first conveys his own sense of loss in missing her, and his readers who were in time for the rest must surely be grateful for those emotions remembered, though not at all in tranquillity. In the section which he calls "Gallimaufry" he moves more or less in the contemporary theatre and from such titles as "Filming Gilbert and Sullivan," "Elmer Rice Pudding," "Tallulah Gautier," "Really, Miss Tempest!" we know what to expect and proceed to enjoy every morsel. Richness indeed, Mr. Squeers! GEA MORRIS.

DAFYDD AP GWILYM. FIFTY POEMS. Translated, with Introductory Essays by H. Idris Bell and David Bell. *The Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion*. 15s.

NEW POEMS BY HARTLEY COLERIDGE, Including a Selection from his Published Poetry. Edited by Earl Leslie Griggs. *Oxford University Press*. 10s. 6d.

SONGS OF THE HEART, by The Rt. Hon. Godfrey Locker Lampson. *John Murray*. 3s. 6d.

WORK IN HAND.—Alan Hodge, Norman Cameron, Robert Graves. The New Hogarth Library. Vol. VI. *The Hogarth Press*. 2s. 6d.

POETS OF TOMORROW, Third Selection. *The Hogarth Press*. 6s.

It is legitimate at times to turn gladly from the songs of modern speech and to hear, if not the surge and thunder of Homer, the authoritative voice of a past age speaking to the present. Since so much of a great Welsh literature remains untranslated, we should be very grateful to H. Idris Bell and David Bell for giving us these fifty unfading lyrics of Ap Gwilym which enshrine the bardic tradition of Wales. How refreshing in a disordered day to plunge into the Troubadour atmosphere of this National poet who, though an older contemporary of Chaucer, has been not without effect upon present fashions! While faithful to the complicated bardic tradition, as an admirable introductory essay shows, Ap Gwilym was also an innovator and through his influence upon Gerard Manley Hopkins has undoubtedly helped to fertilize the verse forms of to-day. Ostensibly "the laureate of ladies' love," one cannot help agreeing with Borrow that what really interested this poet was Nature.

She shone in my arms like candleshine. It is fanciful, pretty, without a trace of passion. But in the nature poems

describing skylark, tit or seagull, in *May and January*, *The Poet Finds Help From The Stars*, *A Snowy Day*, with their tumbling of image upon image, he is at his most fertile and exciting. Unfortunately the best passages are too lengthy for quotation, depending on the rapid accumulation in the mind of conceit and image. Of the stars he writes:

Proudly they show and swiftly, bright
Cherries on the tree of night, . . .

This book is most warmly to be commended.

Another debt of gratitude is owed to the researches of Professor Griggs, constant to the Coleridge family. The value of his book lies principally in the selection made from some 300 hitherto unpublished poems which belong by right to the Romantic Movement and swell a tributary that reveals a singularly sweet temperament. "Li'l Hartley," as the Lake Country dalesmen affectionately called him, is perhaps also at his best in descriptions of nature, but this time straightforward descriptions.

Light the birdie leaps,
Shaking translucent gems from every
spray.

Here is delicacy, charm, quaintness from this "waif of nature" whose gentle, pious sentiments are often imbedded in sonnets of good workmanship in spite of the fact that the poet sometimes mixes the Shakespearean and Petrarchan forms.

Yet there is something in my heart that
would

Become a witness to eternal good.

The shades of Wordsworth and Coleridge *père* preside at this homely meal whose drink is pure spring water. We partake among ghosts.

Mr. Godfrey Locker Lampson

continues his romantic song to his "Goddess of the shining locks," and his note has deepened. He has taken a stride forward. As well as elegance and beauty here is passion. He looks to the past, to the tradition of love poetry in any age, so that in *If You Were Maimed* I was reminded of Catullus, and the Greek Anthology is never far away. However, his delight in nature is more modern. I liked particularly *Atlantic Rollers*, *With Sightless Stare*, *O What a Lovely Thing a Blush* and *The Days Are Growing Longer*. His book may be recommended to those who like poetry that is not ashamed to be poetical.

I confess to a sense of disappointment after reading *Work In Hand* by Robert Graves, Norman Cameron and Alan Hodge. How flat and unprofitable many of these poems seem in these momentous times! Only Robert Graves speaks with the authority of a true poet.

Stirring suddenly from long hibernation
I knew myself once more a poet
Guarded by timeless principalities
Against the worm of death, this hillside
haunting.

And he is apt to be peevish.

The *Poets of Tomorrow* offered in this third selection did not strike me as being so promising as those in the previous volume. Adam Drinan, a Scot, is interestingly traditional, but somewhat remote. David Gascoign writes competently in *A War-time Dawn* and *Chambre d'Hotel*, and I liked Arthur Harvey's *The Final Loss*. But surely, surely these young men should be able to find something better to write about today?

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

SEPTEMBER, 1942

BISMARCK AND HITLER

BY EMIL LUDWIG

THE Germans have had hundreds of dictators, their kings and emperors. Really, they have never been governed otherwise. They are the only people without a revolution in their history. For the German character prefers discipline to freedom and is afraid of independence. Because of their passion for obedience, the Germans have not had usurpers; no one cared to revolt against legitimate power. There have been only a few ministers of importance who have had power over their kings and who took the liberty of governing in their names. Bismarck was the strongest of these exceptions—and the last one. Up to our days, the Germans never have had a leader of the people; neither a political nor an intellectual.

Hitler is the first man risen from the people, who has governed the Germans. Hitler's power is much greater than Bismarck's ever was, for the latter was to a certain extent dependent on his emperor and the *Reichstag*; he was only half a dictator. A comparison of these two men is useful, because it will show us the development of the German character in the short period that lies between them.

When Hitler was born, Bismarck was still the almighty chancellor. At Bismarck's death, Hitler, as a nine years old boy, could experience the mixed feelings of joy and grief that came over the people. In his home-country Bohemia, Bismarck was hated by most Austrians. But his father and his friends belonged to the minority who adored him. Between Bismarck's death and the formation of the Nazi party there lay only 22 years—also, however, a war and a defeat.

The two characters are great contrasts. This is only partly due to the different surroundings of their youth. Bismarck, as the son of a Junker, who grew up on the debt-ridden estate of his forefathers, was as lazy as Hitler in his twenties. Both of them failed to pass their examinations. Bismarck quit his career as a lawyer without a degree, and as an officer he did not finish his training. Hitler left school at the age of 14.

But the one lived the elegant life of the privileged class knowing that his name guaranteed him a good position and, perhaps a rich

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wife. He could depend also on his physical appearance; he was a giant, and a fine rider, hunter and swimmer. If he inherited his physique from his aristocratic forbears, officers and landowners who had never excelled at anything, he was fortunate in inheriting the intelligence of his mother. She came of a middle class family of gifted jurists who had risen to high positions in government.

As the years went by the aristocratic trend of Bismarck's character grew stronger and stronger. His self assurance was so great from the very beginning, that he did not need to have it acknowledged by the world. This was the secret of his inner poise. When, as a young lieutenant, he was introduced to the King of Prussia, he did not feel the least bit flattered, as can be seen from his letters. His loyalty to monarchy was a thing of tradition to him, or, as he later said, of religion.

Hitler spent the formative years of his life in constant need, in the never ending necessity of asking strangers for money and shelter. He held himself to be an unappreciated artist. When in the last war he failed to become an officer as many of his comrades had, humiliation deepened to resentment, and strongly influenced his character. He has never quite got over his low birth. That is why he hates inborn nobility and inherited wealth.

That is why the fundamental impulse of his ever dissatisfied character is hate and jealousy. He cannot bear to have anyone stand next to or over him, and he wants no nation on a level with the Germans. Most of his actions are dictated by feelings of vengeance against the Jews, because for years he lived in their charity asylums, against the French, because their country is richer, against the English because he believes they have stolen the world from the Germans who merit it. Above all he hates the Americans because they are always smiling in their pictures which proves to him they are feeling fine. It seems, Hitler is not as much bent on making the Germans feel rich and happy, as he is bent on letting nobody else be rich and happy! His speeches are brim-full of negations, and the more insults he puts into them, the more he is applauded.

This man, and with him a majority of the Germans, is morbidly dependent on what the world thinks of them. All his activities are directed to getting what he calls his "honour" acknowledged by the world. It is because he has no love for anyone that he makes so strong an impression on the Germans who prefer to have a gloomy boss to give them orders. Their kings were supposed to drive through the streets with sinister faces, otherwise they were not recognized as kings. Men who like subordination want a serious master, and not a familiar one.

Bismarck also did not have a great love for men, as a species. H

ad his wife, children, his dog, two friends, both foreigners and one of them an American. But he was much too proud to brood on having his revenge on those who were higher born than he, for instance his king. He once said: "My honour cannot be taken from me by anyone. It depends only on my own self assurance."

Hitler had to reach his starting point with infinite exertion, with many years of humiliation. Like Shakespeare's Coriolanus, in the beginning he had to win every single vote for the making of his party. Then, he had to fight for many years with his followers to gain the leadership, as well as making concessions to people he despised, in order to collect the money for his party. There are letters of his—published by his own party—which Bismarck never would have stooped to write.

Bismarck and Hitler both are anti-democrats, but Bismarck despised the mob as an aristocrat, whereas Hitler, having lived amongst it, always felt the impulse to rise above it. Bismarck lived as a patriarch: his relations with his forester and gardener were of the same kind as those of his king. He paid for an expert and saw to it that he was well treated but was glad to belong to a higher class. The Empress who hated Bismarck because he was indispensable, talked of him as a wealthy lady talks of her butler or of her house-doctor.

Bismarck and Hitler did not care for the people, but like all dictators, were very well aware of the necessity to please them. In the past century, ministers preferred to stick to their kings rather than to the people, because power was then given only by the kings. It is therefore astonishing that Bismarck the *Junker*, nevertheless introduced social reforms. In the 'Eighties he was the first to make insurance laws in Germany that, half a century later, are called revolutionary by Roosevelt's opponents in America. Bismarck's laws for Old-Age and Sick-Pensions are still exemplary; but he did not give them to Germany for love of the people, only because he wanted socialists to have less cause for complaint.

Hitler has the advantage that he can, in these times of mass consciousness, play the part of the man in the street, or of the Unknown Soldier as he likes to call himself. Thus he has to-day the same advantage of his low birth, as Bismarck had of his position.

A born demagogue, Hitler has a single talent not given to Bismarck: he is a very good popular orator. This is one of the chief reasons of his success. Hitler without a voice would be a Rafael without arms. He intoxicates the Germans, or rather, they get intoxicated by his words, and the more so, the more commonplace they are. The hysterical cries he likes to work up to, corres-

pond to the nervous character of a man who is always trying to get even with his youth, and with his enemies.

He is the first political orator the Germans have had since Lassalle. He has literally come to power by speaking. Bismarck, on the other hand, was no orator, he did not cultivate it, did not want it and was too proud to try and convince people. He never spoke to the people directly before he was eighty and out of power. In parliament, his speeches, spoken in a high-pitched voice, made no great impression, and were generally outdone by those of his opponents. But when read they impress every reader by their virile and original language, and their vivid colouring. Hitler impresses his audience by dramatic cries and menaces. But if you read what he said his speeches are poor. One man in America, praising Hitler's concentrated phrasing, was quite taken aback when I told him that what he was admiring was a merit of American journalism. The translation was much better than the German original with its bombastic and often comic style.

There are two other reasons for the great difference between these two orators. Bismarck's personality was noted for his good education and his naturalness. His speeches and letters are contrived in a fine language, rich in scenes from nature, from country-life, from history, embellished with quotations from Goethe, Schiller and Shakespeare. His memoirs have become a textbook of modern German style. Hitler's book *Mein Kampf*, in six hundred pages does not contain one single original picture from the life of the peasants or the citizens, no proverb, no quotations from German classics, and when he does quote history, he is generally wrong.

But both men have one thing in common, their love of money. Bismarck accepted donations of millions from the government, in the form of land and forests, and even then he tried to cheat the State of his taxes! Hitler is the chief-shareholder of the biggest German publishing house which he founded with a fellow-Nazi to publish his own book and a party-paper. He earns millions through the book and the paper his party is obliged to buy.

The two men's attitude towards war is also conditioned by the difference in their characters. Bismarck was the man without fear who fought duels when he was forty and never felt better than on a bear hunt in Russia. Hitler is the man who, in November, 1923, ran away from his own *putsch* and left the hero's death to seven of his comrades for whom later on he erected a memorial. Bismarck was too much of a *Junker* to be a pacifist; on the contrary, he started two wars. But he did not like war, and said,

in his later years: "That seventy-thousand men were killed in my wars, is a thing for which I am responsible to God alone." The shock, when his son had been wounded in battle, was tremendous, but he himself, as a minister, in a crisis, offered immediately to go to the front as a soldier. Bismarck feared God but not Death. Hitler fears Death but not God. Whereas Hitler praises war as a bath of steel for the nation, declaring it vital for the health of his race, Bismarck ended his wars as soon as he had reached his well-defined goal. Hitler wants unlimited might for the Germans, Bismarck wanted nothing but their unification.

And this is the decisive difference! That Bismarck was the founder of German Imperialism is a fairy tale. The contrary can easily be proved. In a century that brought about the national states, it was only natural that the German tribes too had to unite. That this could not be achieved without war, had been demonstrated by the failure of the Frankfurt-Parliament. At that time it was absolutely true that Germany's unification could be achieved only through blood and iron. This Bismarck said and made it come true, but he never said: Might goes before right. That is the distortion of a word from one of his speeches where he said that there have always been moments in history when might was stronger than right. False too is the notorious story of the Ems-telegram that he is supposed to have falsified in order to start the war. Bismarck, it is true, wanted war with France, but France provoked and declared it.

The basic difference between Bismarck's and Hitler's philosophy of power is nowhere more evident than in their ways of peacemaking. Bismarck too started a war against Austria, but not in order to subjugate her. When, after the battle of Sadowa, June, 1866, the victorious king wanted to conquer Vienna lying within his reach and unprotected, Bismarck, in a famous interview, contradicted the king passionately. He fought the princes and generals, and only by threatening to ask for his dismissal did he succeed in securing a peace that made the vanquished enemy an ally. Later on, after the fall of Paris, he stopped the parade of the victorious German troops at the Arc de Triomphe. Those five billions that France had to pay were a sum consistent with her wealth, and were paid after a few years without doing any harm to French business and finances. Bismarck also for a long time rejected the idea of annexing Lorraine, an idea which in the beginning he derided as "a professor's idea." But at that time he was not strong enough to stand up against a victorious emperor and a thrice victorious General Staff who, being soldiers, wanted to conquer. This big mistake he much regretted in his later days.

We only have to compare the treatment which, before our very eyes, seven conquered countries have received at Hitler's hands—and forever we shall be cured of comparisons in Hitler's favour.

About the race-ideal that Hitler preaches Bismarck made some caustic jokes, and recommended marriage between Jews and Gentiles saying that a teutonic stallion and a Jewish mare would be a good match! Later, he married his eldest son to a Bohemian countess, the grandchild of an American Jew. His grandson, the present Prince Bismarck, has thus in his veins German, Bohemian and Jewish blood.

Bismarck's dream never was Teutonic world-domination, but of a strong Germany in a pacified Europe. At that time, when the world felt scared because of the terrible strength of the new Germany, Bismarck never allowed himself to yield to the temptation of annihilating France. It would have been as easy for him in 1875 as it was for Hitler in 1940. On the contrary; immediately after his victory, he was seeking France's friendship, as he had sought Austria's before, and he never humiliated the French people by acts comparable even remotely to those carried out in France by Hitler. The pan-Germanic arrogance, born in those times, tried in vain to tempt Bismarck.

He thereby revealed his genius as a statesman, for Bismarck became master of Europe only after his wars. He knew about Germany's dangerous geographical situation, had always declared her to be a continental power, and therefore asked for the strongest army, but not for a navy. For twenty years he managed to be on good terms with England and Russia; he wanted an alliance with England and had renewed again and again the one with Russia. But at the same time he made the Triple-alliance with Austria and Italy. Never before nor after had Germany a master like him at the helm, for Bismarck's brilliance was not to be found in his wars, which lasted in all under one year, but in the twenty years of his peaceful work.

By governing for twenty years the *Reich* that he himself had built, and keeping it always well armed and prepared, but never challenging, Bismarck was the last bulwark against German Imperialism which started only with Wilhelm II. Because Bismarck strongly opposed Wilhelm's arrogance and boastful speeches, he had to go. The crisis started literally three days after Bismarck's dismissal, when the young Kaiser, finally delivered from his chancellor, failed to renew the treaty with Russia that had guaranteed the security of the *Reich*. The World War and the fall of the Kaiser were the direct consequences.

Bismarck showed his genius as a statesman not only by the peace with Austria, but by creating after his two victories the two German parliaments. Nobody forced him to do that, neither the people nor his king and nothing but his historical clear-sightedness told him that the time was ripe. Too long has the world known the image of a Bismarck, as the man of blood and iron. Like Mussolini, he could have reigned as dictator, making a puppet of his king. Instead he created his own opponent with the *Reichstag*. In national affairs the *Reichstag* had important rights. When Bismarck was eighty it refused to send him congratulations. Hitler, on the other hand, who faced a really functioning *Reichstag*, the Congress of a Republic, destroyed it in the first weeks after he came to power. To-day in that institution six hundred of his party comrades sit. All the qualifications they need is some instruction in athletics and singing. Like robots they have to raise their right arm and must know how to sing the hymn. There have been no debates in parliament in the eight years under Hitler and no voting. Only two commands are given: Hands up! and Sing! For this each of the delegates get several thousand marks a year.

The most amazing difference between the two men is that Bismarck was hated by most of the Germans, while Hitler is loved. There were, of course, Germans who admired Bismarck in the days of his power, but it was only when, after having reigned for 28 years, he was discharged in so brusque a manner, that the sympathies of the German people were on his side. But then he had held power for too long a time! Only a sovereign born like Queen Victoria can be forgiven a long reign. In Bismarck's later years his victories had already been forgotten and the next generation accepted the *Reich* as a matter of course. Inside it, the half-freedom that Bismarck had given the Germans with his Constitution, seemed too great to the *Sunkers*, and too small to the citizens. Frankly, nobody was satisfied with him.

But Hitler conquered all hearts at once because, after 14 years of civil liberties, he was the first who again dared to command the Germans. The German is always ready to die for his Fatherland, but not to think for it. For this, there is a profound reason as I have shown in my recent book. Hitler's success is based partly on his good fortune that he did not rise to power immediately after the last war but only when a worse decade was over. He was the successor to men who had the best intentions but no authority. Nobody who has studied the German character can hope for a revolt against a régime for which millions have voted three or four times, in days when it had no successes to show at all. To-day, in

the midst of great victories, there are only a few who sense Hitler's weakness, and the few are silent, in the face of authority.

This one word 'authority' is the link between Bismarck and Hitler, a great statesman and a bold adventurer. Both appeared as gloomy men to the German people, exactly as they like their leaders to be. The Germans being in love, for mystical reasons, with tragedy, only appreciate men who behave coldly towards them. Their soldierly past, the ideal that the uniform represents for them, has made the German adore the man who commands. To him, the State is not a community of equal citizens but a pyramid, on the steps of which they wish to stand as high as possible.

It is the same in the realm of the mind. Schiller, cool and ambitious, is more popular than the human Goethe; the cold-blooded Frederick the Great appeals more than the romantic King Ludwig of Bavaria.

Bismarck never sought fame, at times he even despised it. Once, when the others were talking about it, he listened for a while and then said: "This bottle of Bordeaux is more to me than all your fame." Hitler is obsessed by the idea of fame, and would like to outdo Napoleon and Cæsar! And yet Bismarck's personality and work will outlast those of Hitler. His work was even stronger than he himself foresaw.

Hitler's dream to unite Europe under German sovereignty could only be of short realization. As he is aiming at the impossible, he may attain nothing. Bismarck, keeping in the realm of the possible, created a unity that even endured the crash of 1918, because it was as natural a structure as that of other nationalities.

If Bismarck said: Prussia will now be integrated in Germany, Hitler's followers about 1950 will say: Germany will now be integrated in Europe! For the Unity of Europe will be as natural tomorrow as Germany's and Italy's unity were seventy years ago. But this unity is only possible under equals and will never come to life under any supremacy, be it German, English or Russian. Thus, Hitler's conquests will evaporate like clouds—but Bismarck's creation will remain as a natural part of a greater community. This new unity, born out of the present war, can only be the United States of Europe.

IRELAND

1941—1942

BY PAMELA HINKSON

THERE is a great difference between Ireland's words and Ireland's actions, as between her official face and her real feelings, what she pretends to believe and what she knows in her heart. These always existing tendencies, now intensified by precarious neutrality and rigorous censorship, make public opinion more difficult to assess there than elsewhere. Nevertheless the visitors to Ireland who record that the majority of the people are united on neutrality and that there have been recent converts to the policy from the ranks of those originally opposed to it, including some surprising ones from among the Anglo-Irish, speak correctly. But these outside observers of the neutrality mind have not watched it grow progressively to its present state of a fixed idea and a national ideal, nor have they discerned the signs of ill-health that have been an inevitable part of the development of this plant, forced in the dark house of Censorship suppression.

The majority desire to remain neutral at the beginning of the war, which Mr. de Valera represented truthfully, was a reasonable one for a small, poor, underpopulated country which had not yet built up its own new house of freedom, and was still exhausted by the struggle with Britain and the following Civil War. This was more an exhaustion of mind than of actual loss of life for the total casualties in Ireland during the whole troubled time can only have been a fraction of those caused by a short period of fighting on the Western Front. But the inward turning Irish mind—this intensified by education and by the Sinn Féin policy of Mr. de Valera's rule—as it believes that Ireland alone was persecuted in the past, has exaggerated her recent sufferings also and forgotten that the suffering of most of the rest of Europe was far greater during those years. 50,000 Irish volunteers had been killed in the last war out of a total of 250,000 recruited from the whole of Ireland.

The war came at least ten years too soon for Ireland in two important respects. Too soon for the people to take their stand beside—and under the command of—an army that they had so recently fought. And the accompanying powers of Censorship came before Ireland had emerged from the state of tutelage effected by alternately oppressive and comparatively benevolent British Governments, to an adult state of mind, now again stopped in its growth by such a control of thought as no British Government ever achieved.

The later change over of some of the previous anti-neutrals was due mainly

to the conviction that with the state of Eire's air defences and the inadequacy of money and means to provide these, it was now too late for her to be as much help as she would be liability. But there is a surprising factor in the—still isolated—cases of educated Anglo-Irishmen who profess to accept the equation of the belligerents.

The Censorship, established at the outbreak of war, ostensibly to protect neutrality, was accepted by the Opposition, with the provision that free speech should be permitted in the Dail. But the debates are censored and only what Mr. de Valera's Government permits reaches the press and the public. The original powers have been steadily extended, until now they cover any subject, external or internal, at the Government's will. Criticism of Mr. de Valera's statements or actions, or those of his Ministers and even an important correcting answer to a statement made by Mr. de Valera, sent to the press by a prominent Deputy, have been banned. So the Irish Premier—for he is the Government—rules as complete Dictator, and he has taken full advantage of this opportunity of making the mind of Eire his own; with, it must be admitted, the majority consent of that mind, for there is little support for the principle of free speech in Ireland—rather an always existing intolerance of opposing views. This tendency which accounts for much of the lack of moral courage that is our greatest national weakness (although that is usually ascribed, by those acknowledging it, to past British oppression alone with an ignoring of any contributing factor of internal tyranny) has now been given full rein for one political party. The same inclination that has made this suppression of thought possible, makes it also a more dangerous weapon in Ireland than elsewhere.

The sanctity of neutrality—Eire's first independent and most Separatist act—was Mr. de Valera's creation. It was the interpretation of neutrality which emanated from the Irish Premier's own inhuman public exterior—those who have seen him privately report that he has shown then the feeling that in public he has suppressed for himself and others—with its curious mental identification of neutrality with indifference, that has produced the most distressing aspect of the deterioration of national spirit, thought and feeling during this time. Paradoxically the suppression of feeling which would appear from a study of the Government newspaper and other official influences to have been a deliberate policy, suggests the knowledge that that feeling, if permitted expression, was not likely to burst in equal neutral sympathy for both the belligerents but mainly for one—the British—side; as the lengths to which Censorship has been carried, prove that only by these unlimited powers could the untenable principle of Neutrality Thought—demanding the impossible equation of the belligerents, both morally and as the war issue affects Ireland—be sustained.

Eire, by this carefully cultivated indifference and the consequent withering of unused mind and heart, lost the greatest opportunity that ever came to her of proving herself a living Christian force in the world. She might have

maintained her neutrality, making no excuses for it, in view of the example of other neutrals, great and small, who had not entered the war until attacked, and otherwise followed the example of Switzerland, in a much more dangerous geographical position than Eire's, yet with a free press and a unique record in Red Cross work. Much has been done, both by the Irish Red Cross, a young and comparatively poor organization and by individual effort. The Red Cross in addition to the care of the survivors of sunken ships brought to the Irish shore and the succour of refugees from bombed cities—notably those of Belfast—has sent subscriptions of £500 in each case to China, Turkey, Greece and for Polish refugees; £1,000 for French refugees and £1,000 to the British Red Cross during the Air Raid on Britain. Lately, with the ready co-operation of the Irish Department of Agriculture the Society has been sending a monthly gift of 2,000 eggs to a London hospital where the patients, many of them suffering from jaw injuries as a result of air crashes, have special need of liquid diet. The private efforts and donations great and small are too many to list. But among them a house was taken and equipped to receive British babies from bombed areas, the moving spirits and considerable financial backers of the scheme being prominent Nationalists. This, like the evacuation scheme for British women and children, which was Mr. de Valera's striking departure from his usual inhuman attitude, was not utilized from the British side as the situation altered in Britain. A prominent Catholic ecclesiastic expressed to me the regret that many others felt also that these efforts had come to nothing, because of what they might have meant both in making Ireland happier and in the relations between the two peoples. "The children especially would have done so much," he said.

But these efforts were not given sufficient prominence inside Ireland to fill somewhat for the people the void left by the intensely egotistical interpretation of neutrality, while politically any public question of neutrality was banned. Mr. James Dillon's dramatic speech of July, 1941, in which he advocated the loan of the Ports to Great Britain and America for the prosecution of the war, which he declared to be one in defence of religion and freedom, was permitted publication on the grounds that the news of it could not be kept from the public, but a subsequent order forbade further press reference to it. That speech caused Mr. Dillon's departure from Mr. Cosgrave's Party of which he had been Vice-Chairman, and in the following debate Mr. Cosgrave revealed himself as a convinced neutral.

II.

The Nazi persecution of religion might have proved decisive in directing public opinion on the war but for the most remarkable—and in its influence, the most effective aspect of Mr. de Valera's Dictatorship—his domination of the Catholic Church in Ireland. Not only have Vatican statements on the persecution of the Church in Germany and Osservatore Romano and Vatican Radio pronouncements and statements from Cardinal Hinsley been banned

from the press, and authoritative Catholic books on the persecution of the Church under the Third *Reich* and in German-Occupied Poland been excluded from Eire; but Pastorals and statements from Irish Catholic Bishops—one of these at least speaking clearly on the moral issue of the war—have also been forbidden publication. These suppressions, combined with the prominent press publicity given to those Irish ecclesiastical statements which have accepted the untenable equation of the belligerents, have naturally been a most potent factor in confusing the minds of the people, and have created the impression inside and outside Ireland that the Catholic Church of the country is united in turning a blind eye both on the moral issues of the war and on the fact that Ireland's fate depends on the outcome of it.

But in his Lenten Pastoral of 1941 the Most Rev. Dr. Morrisroe, Bishop of Achonry, made the following statement to his people:

We know what the Poles are suffering and we know how the Dictator has treated the Church in Germany. Can we look with indifference on God dethroned from His rightful place in the Universe? Can Catholics view with easy minds the possibility of a victory which would give brute force the power to control Europe and decide the fate of small nations? . . . Such an attitude of indifference to the religious outlook of the future is treason to our faith. This mentality is caused by the persuasion that anything that injures a hereditary enemy is good for us. Even if true, political expediency should not weigh in the balance against Christianity.

This portion of the Bishop's Pastoral—read in the pulpits of his Diocese—was banned from the press. Later another Catholic Bishop of Eire denounced the German bombing of Eire. This denunciation was also suppressed. So Mr. de Valera has used his censorship powers to smooth out the disagreeing lines in the face of the Irish Church—of which the majority of the leaders have conformed to the mind of the Government—as he has used it elsewhere to present the face of a United Eire, even if perhaps he has postponed indefinitely the prospect of a United Ireland.

III.

Meanwhile the war effort of Southern Ireland continues to be amazing. Thousands of young Irishmen have joined the British Forces, filling the Honours Lists and the Casualty Lists. Ireland now has five V.C.'s. for this war, in addition to the many other decorations won by her sons. Commander Eugene Esmonde who led the Swordfish attack on the German battleships in the Channel fight came of a family of great Nationalist and Catholic traditions. While London and the Commonwealth pay tribute to the late Wing Commander "Paddy" Finucane, no public tribute is permitted in his native Ireland; but Ireland is talking of him. No one who has witnessed the reception of a young airman arriving on leave at an Irish country station, could doubt the popular sympathy and admiration that lie behind the suppression. Reference to Irishmen in the British Forces, naming them as Irish, is forbidden in the Irish newspapers and their countrymen denied national

pride in them. A similar policy was followed with regard to the gallant acts of civilian workers, notably nurses, during Britain's Air War, and the decorations awarded for them. This was a curious interpretation of neutrality which later permitted certain Irish papers to fill their columns with accounts of the moral dangers awaiting (and by implication, quickly affecting) the Irish workers gone recently to war industries in Great Britain. It would appear to be more unneutral to work in a munition factory than to perform a woman's most noble act of healing. But the effect on the people who are not allowed to know that a girl from their district has brought glory to Ireland's womanhood while they are told, in effect, that they are not strong enough to preserve their faith and morals outside the safe shelter of Ireland—a fantastic theory to those acquainted alike with the best of the Irish population in England and with the great domestic virtues and family love that are English characteristics—has been one of many contributions to the depreciation of national confidence increasingly evident during this time.

The concentration through the war period on the narrow Nationalism which is Mr. de Valera's conception of patriotism—and which is in such strange contrast to his appearance as a world citizen when he was President of the League of Nations—has been a further contribution to the isolationist neutrality mind. This was illustrated in the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1916 Rebellion and its accompanying programme. For Mr. de Valera, Eire was born in 1916 and, creating the new name, he broke with many of the old traditions of Ireland.

In the insistence to the people that they should not forget this first successful Irish revolutionary movement it has been made the achievement of the Government Party although many now opposed to them took part in it. This policy has involved a frequent raising of the old issue with England which, according to reason—since no one doubts Mr. de Valera's war sympathies or his fear of Germany—should at least have been buried for the duration. The people received the presentation of 1916 as a military victory and have forgotten that they were once told by General Mulcahy, a leader of the movement—who is now openly pro-British if not interventionist, in the Dail—that there had been no military victory. They miss the fact, with its important implications, that the Irish Free State was won largely from the British conscience.

The hard face of indifference broke down before any actual touch with war suffering—as with the Air Raids on Belfast when the city sent a call to the South for help and the South answered. Those days when the Dublin Fire Brigade roared North through the night and refugees poured South and were succoured in Dublin, proved the wide meeting ground that awaits the two peoples, outside politics. Even Mr. de Valera spoke some of his rarely human words: "They are our own people and their sorrows in the present instance are our sorrows."

IV.

The Sinn Fein ship has come on the rocks of the supply and economic problem. The crisis broke on Eire more suddenly because of the natural racial improvidence with regard to tomorrow and the Censorship, covering the mention in an increasing list of supplies running short, ostensibly to prevent panic, emphasized further the people's tutelage. Now without coal and with oil and petrol almost non-existent the whole machinery of transport, industry and agricultural production is threatened with complete breakdown. The gathering of the harvest is problematical. If trains cease to run, even home-grown food and turf, the only fuel, cannot be brought to the towns. There is consequent sudden and serious unemployment as well as dearth. The building trade involving 90,000 men is the latest casualty.

Yet these events have not shaken the neutrality mind, now so firmly established as a national ideal that any suffering is accepted as an offering on its altar. It is an important fact that material hardships mean less to the Irish—a race always singularly indifferent to the bodily comfort of which they have known little—than to other peoples, and on this Britain miscalculated when she answered the withholding of the Land Annuities with the Economic War.

Mr. de Valera has been saved somewhat in his difficult hour by a factor that is also in opposition to his self-sufficiency policy—the large emigration of Irish labour to British war industries. These emigrants have eased the home food situation and they send back good wages to their families. The Irish Premier who has spoken most against emigration in the past, brought a sad note of reality into his speech on the subject made in July, 1942, saying that he would do anything in his power to enable men to live at home but that he saw no solution without a complete change of the social system.

Since the supply crisis, criticism of the Government's internal policy and censorship of internal affairs has increased, notably from the Labour Party.

V.

The supply situation has been intensified by America's belligerency, adding to the uneasiness which that event in its political aspects has brought to the earlier complacency. Previously Mr. de Valera's broadcasts to America spoke mainly of Eire's material needs. His 1941 Christmas broadcast revealed the embarrassment of his new position. Something has happened now that may alter Ireland's future history. She can no longer look confidently to America, either for material aid or for the sympathy that so often proved her trump card in her struggle with Britain. Old friends with a claim formed by long and serving friendship are less patient than old enemies now acknowledging their past sins and seeking forgiveness with friendship, and the contrast between British patience and understanding of the difficulties which Ireland has created for her in the hour of her greatest peril and the attitude of America, with different memories of her Irish association, has already been

proved strikingly. Feeling the cold wave of disapproval replacing what was previously the warm wind from the West, Eire has withdrawn further behind her wall, while across the Border Ulster is garrisoned by American troops.

But this new situation may in the end be the saving of Ireland, who has lived for years on the sympathy of the world—particularly of America. Through this period of the agony of other nations she showed officially a cold and mainly pitiless face to this suffering and turned inward to brood on her own past wrongs. This national egoism which was an always existing tendency and the absence of generosity of mind which has grown to an extreme point during the war period—making a more jarring note because of its world background—is the stranger for contrast with the natural Irish generosity with regard to material things. Now Eire has forfeited her claim to world sympathy, which must be reciprocal, and in the post-war world she must stand alone as she chose to stand when the world was shaking and she had a contribution to make to the saving of it and refused that contribution. It may be that standing alone and forced at last to rid herself of the destructive influences of self-pity and hatred for past wrongs—for self-pity must have a sympathizer and the post-war world will have enough tortured nations to absorb its sympathy and aid—Ireland will live again, bringing to her forced independence the qualities that made her greater in the past than she has been as Eire, and so take her place among the nations that must rebuild the world. Perhaps that will be the beginning of her true freedom and independence.

For Eire now is neither free nor happy.

There was a unique moment of national unity during the invasion scare of 1940, but that immense opportunity was lost in the confusion of Mr. de Valera's narrow and dividing conception of patriotism and his impossible equation of the belligerents, which failed to provide the necessary clear purpose for the spirit of a sustained national effort.

Certain things need to be stated in view of questions I have been asked in England. Ireland is not "full of Germans." The total number is something like 300, the majority refugees. A number of prominent Germans, believed to be of Nazi views and activity, left at the request of the Irish Government at the outbreak of war. Mr. de Valera is not "pro-German." He stands in constant danger, both from open German attack and from the intrigues fostered by Germany among the extreme I.R.A., with the first object of destroying the Irish Government as a pathway to Civil War and embarrassment of England.

The presence of the Axis representatives in a country where so many families are personally involved in the war, is the most fantastic aspect of a fantastic situation. But visitors to the German Legation are few and the propaganda done by this hospitality is reputed to concentrate on those of Fascist leanings, leaving the extreme I.R.A. to be cultivated from another quarter. The success of German propaganda is hard to assess. There is no

natural Irish-German sympathy. But German Youth Movements and similar organizations have a certain appeal for unsatisfied minds and bodies seeking an escape from the dullness of Irish rural life and the general lack of stimulus.

Assuming that neutrality can be preserved, there will be internal problems before Eire in the post-war period when the Irish workers must return from Britain unemployed and the educated young men of Eire for whom there is not sufficient employment at home, may find themselves cut off from opportunity in the Commonwealth and perhaps America, since naturally in the difficult reconstruction period the men who have won the war will be given first preference. The dangers of this period are likely to be increased by certain tendencies—the educational policy which has directed thought towards political violence as an ideal of patriotism rather than to the safer outlet of constructive citizenship; the denial to these young men of Eire—with their consent—of the other outlet, of a concern, even if it were only one of mind, for world problems and reconstruction.

Considering the effect of Mr. de Valera's successful enforcement of his own mind on the majority of the people, one point stands out strikingly. That where once the men of free mind and spirit who were prepared to sacrifice popularity, comfort and life if need be, for that ideal of freedom, were those who fought the British in Ireland, these stand now on the British side. It is an inevitable reversal. The inheritors of Irish traditions of idealism could hardly remain indifferent before Poland, Greece and the rest of that chapter. Once it was the way of comfort to walk beside the British; now that way may be uncomfortable for the body but is more satisfying to the soul than the way of Neutrality Thought.

Leaving Eire for the belligerent world has been another reversal of the old association. It used to be a spiritual adventure to go to Ireland—an escape from the machine age and the destructive importance of material things, to a land of spiritual values. Now it is leaving Ireland for England that makes the spiritual adventure. One has left a country that is stifling under suppression of mind and feeling and uneasily aware of it, for a land where men are free to think and feel and where every man, woman and child has faced fear and cast it out, as only a thing known and faced may be cast away.

Great Britain has seen her cities destroyed and gained something of the spirit. That—won through agony—is implicit in the faces of the people that are happier than the faces I left in Ireland. Eire has disowned the flower of her youth who have died to save her freedom with that of the rest of the world. She suffers in solitude without the compensations of national pride and comradeship which alone make war endurable and her material deprivations are not the greatest of her troubles. She has kept her towns all but intact, but by her interpretation of neutrality, more than by the act, she has lost something for which Ireland once stood to the world.

EDUCATION IN INDIA

BY CECIL NORTHCOTT

IT is easy enough to decry the British achievement in education in India during the last one hundred and ten years, and at moments of tension—like the present—the failures are etched in strong relief. Britain, so it is said, has failed to offer India a real Indian education; the number of illiterates is gigantic, and there has been only a nibbling at “education for life” for the villages and rural communities; the British plan for education in India has been too academic and the best has been offered only to those who can pay for it.

There is much truth in all this. A peevish hesitancy seems to have blighted many of the bold plans for education in India. Even when a leader of zeal and earnestness like Lord Curzon was in power the distrust with which he was regarded frustrated progress.

But this is not the whole story as a glance at the history of western education in India will show:

It shall be lawful for the Governor-General in Council to direct that . . . a sum of not less than one lakh of rupees in each year shall be set apart and applied to the revival and improvement of literature and the encouragement of the learned natives of India, and for the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories in India.

Such was the paragraph which Parliament inserted into the East India Company's charter in 1813. It was Britain's first declaration of interest in the education of India. In the same year Macaulay glowingly furnished the British Parliament with appropriate rhetoric in support of that ideal:

It may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system until it has outgrown that system; that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government; that having become instructed in European knowledge, they may in some future age demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not. But never will I attempt to avert it or to retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history. To have found a great people sunk in the lowest depth of slavery and superstition, to have so ruled them as to have made them desirous and capable of all the privileges of citizens would indeed be a title to glory all our own . . .

But events moved slowly until 1835 when the Governor-General's Education Committee, probably under Macaulay's inspiration, decided that the government grant for education should be used for English education alone and that the medium should be the English language. That was the great turning point. From that decision flowed the long train of development which led

to the India Act of 1935. It also meant the building of over two hundred thousand schools and colleges and the enrolment of some thirteen million pupils.

In the same year as the Mutiny the first University was incorporated, but it was not until 1882 that the first comprehensive Education Commission (under Sir William Hunter) reported on the state of education in India. In its report are to be found all the factors which have since dogged the educationist in India—the increase in population outstripping the school enrolment; the too exclusive literary character of the curricula; the indifference of the masses; the meagreness of educational grants; the hunger for technical education, and the realization by the “upper classes” that only a higher education would provide a safe job in one of the Services.

Then came Lord Curzon and his vigorous battle for the reform of the universities which might have issued in more ample results had Lord Curzon been other than he was! But his resolution did impart new life to all the higher and technical branches of Indian education, especially in medicine, agriculture, forestry and engineering. This was felt, too, further down the scale in the village schools where the schoolmaster—almost illiterate himself—struggled on against indifference and undisciplined attendances. Altogether this was an invigorating period, and, although Lord Curzon was probably not aware of it, helped to prepare political India for the constitutional changes of 1921 and the domination of Congress in Indian politics!

Numbers now leaped ahead. Between 1922 and 1927 college students rose from 58,000 to 83,000; secondary school pupils from 650,000 to 868,000; and primary pupils from 6,897,000 to 9,247,000. In the nine years 1927-1936 the corresponding figures (the latest available) were 113,000, 1,456,000 and 11,276,000. Small numbers compared with the rapid increase of the population, but not out of proportion when it is remembered that compulsory attendance, while inscribed on most provincial statute books by 1927, has never been seriously applied.

Educationists in India have always been divided about compulsion. Some hold it impossible ever to apply, even to boys, in India. Others believe it ought to be enforced in order to bring discipline and regularity into the primary schools. But compulsion in the village life of rural India has very little place and when it is associated with the education of his children the Indian peasant begins seriously to question the need for education. The child is usually of more value in the fields than spending his time in the school learning the accomplishments of reading and writing which are of no practical use. School attendance too is expensive in time, which means money, and in the provision of a cloth garment which means an actual cash outlay. The village school in India must be its own attraction in order to overcome both the inertia of the parent and the initial unwillingness of the child.

It is calculated that to give the 53 million children, between the ages of six and fifteen in India, compulsory elementary education on the same basis and cost as in England and Wales would need £900,000,000 annually. It would no doubt be cheaper than that, but still remain an impossible charge on the revenues of India. Bengal one of the most developed provinces of India with a population of 51 millions has a total revenue of only £9,000,000 out of which all the public services, including education, have to be met. The sheer poverty of India is a telling fact when universal primary education is considered.

Alongside the state directed education in India has grown up the notable education system of the Christian churches through the missionary societies. Missions were pioneers in almost every branch of Indian education and to-day (with government aid) they are providing a large portion of education in India, including twenty-three colleges at, or approaching, university standards with nearly eight thousand students, mainly non-Christian, in them. At the primary stage there are over 13,000 schools with 600,000 pupils, and over 300 high schools with 67,000 pupils. It is estimated that one quarter of the primary education of India is being done by Christian missions. The literacy figures too of the Christian community are particularly striking—nearly 30 per cent. as compared with the general 8 per cent. for India as a whole.

This general review of the educational position in India shows that the task has only really just begun! Much more might have been done in a hundred years of British rule and what has been done is largely the result of patient dogged work in face of indifference and inertia. To report that there are eighteen universities, headed by the vast Calcutta University with 30,000 odd students in its various sections, a million and a half pupils in the secondary schools and ten million odd primary pupils looks impressive. But when viewed against the back-ground of India this achievement is dwarfed by the overwhelming facts of a population now approaching 400 million and a potential primary school population of 60 million of children in British India alone. Add to this the bewilderment of 225 spoken languages, and the fact that under ten per cent. of the population is literate in any one of them and you obtain some measure of the size of the task confronting India now that she is on the eve of self-government.

Can she complete the task of education alone? Undoubtedly the task of educating India must be accomplished by India. She must discover the indigenous element in Indian education which will provide an infectious enthusiasm for education in the villages and amongst the peasantry. Something like that happened amongst the literate classes when they discovered that English and English education were passports to secure jobs. To appeal to her villagers India needs to discover an education which speaks to the hand as well as the head which is of the soil as well as the city. In other words it has to be education closely linked with actual life in village India.

When a group of Indian village teachers were asked some time ago to

give their views about the purpose of the village school their replies showed much confusion about the purpose of education. Here are some of the replies: "To teach the children to read," "To teach children to read and write," "To educate the people so they will not be cheated by the money-lenders," "To prepare for admission to higher schools," "To get Government Grant-in-Aid," "To prepare young people for good jobs," "To develop character," "To free children from superstition," "To improve village life." Parents showed greater confusion: "To teach children to read and write," "To teach children," "So that boys may learn to count," "So that boys can get jobs," "To teach according to the rules."

The lack of understanding of the true place of education is, however, not confined to India! Indeed India has the great asset of providing large areas of virgin territory for the true educationist to get busy in.

Much pioneering has been done in providing an "Indian education" for India especially by Christian missions. There is a notable example at Erode in South India of a community school which has made a widespread educational impression of the right kind on its neighbourhood. Erode is the centre of a large group of villages of the depressed class type—thatched huts, dirty, unmade roads, filthy wells and unkempt people. Most of the people are agricultural labourers, but only one quarter have any land of their own. Scanty and uncertain rainfall make farming a continual risk. Even at the best of times a good crop will only give food and work for five months of the year. So other occupations are needed if the families are to subsist at all. This situation might be matched in many other parts of India and it is a situation to which educationists must design their methods. In this case a leader of genius, Mr. H. A. Popley, saw that if these villages were to be new places and the community truly educated he must train leaders who would be content to live in the village and make it their home and "lift up the whole village life, both in the material and spiritual sphere, to a higher level."

So for many years the Community School at Erode has been providing "educated men" who go back to their villages as tradesmen enlivened with the vision of a new village India; and also trained teachers who go out to lead village life as well as to teach the "three R's." During their two years' course they learn how to organize and run a village co-operative society, how to prevent epidemics, and what to do when they do occur. They start village *panchayats* (the village councils of India), organize health weeks, persuade the women to stop washing their clothes in the drinking well, and generally translate their "school ideals" into practice. Of course there are many breakdowns. The best of the teachers look longingly at the higher rates of pay to be got in the towns, and the worst of them sink slowly beneath the inertia and sloth of village life. But much has been accomplished over thirty years in the Erode district by the steady integration of this "Indian education" into life.

The Community School itself in Erode is a living fellowship in which boys grow as they learn. And most of their learning avoids the "literary" by the project method. This system ejects the school at frequent intervals into the life of a stagnant village, and the boys descend on it not only to "clean it up" but to refurbish the machinery of community life. A *panchayat* is often one of the first organs of local life to be re-established and in one instance it immediately got busy about the dreadful state of the village roads. In six months a mass of sticky clay with a series of deep pot-holes became a decent motor road. In another village an ordinary hut was cleansed and re-modelled and all the village began to copy it. Going out like this in large, laughing gangs the boys are an excellent advertisement for the school and its methods, and so gradually a remote village begins to see the glimmerings of education within its own youngsters to the school. True education is always closely allied to true propaganda, and India understands this sort and responds to it. The multiplication of this kind of community school would do a great deal for Indian education.

Another immediate task for the first national government of India will be a bold facing of the problem of literacy. Mr. Gandhi told the American literacy expert, Dr. Laubach, that the economic problem is far more pressing than the teaching of illiterates. "Education may do more harm than good," he said. "It often puts men in contact with bad literature, and for many minds reading has become a substitute for thinking." That is a shrewd observation. But Mr. Gandhi cannot have it every way. It is idle to talk of democracy in India when 90 per cent. of its people cannot read or understand a simple political problem. Ten years ago the Lindsay Commission reported, "Democracy will be an illusory ideal in India until there is an educated electorate, until at least there is a leaven in the general population who have the knowledge to administer all those forms of local government and democratic organization which must exist between the people and the government."

As far back as 1903 the late Mr. G. K. Gokhale tried to stir his countrymen to the real need of universal education:

It is obvious (he said) that an ignorant and illiterate nation can never make any solid progress and must fall back in the race of life. What we therefore want, and want most urgently, is first of all a wide-spread diffusion of elementary education, an effective and comprehensive system of primary schools for the masses; and the longer this work is delayed, the more insuperable will be our difficulties in gaining for ourselves a recognized place among the nations of the world.

Dr. Laubach's methods of teaching adult illiterate people to read in a short time have proved very successful in India. They have been mainly tried in connection with the missionary societies. What is needed now is a planned campaign on a national scale adapting some of the methods which have been used in Russia and China. But it is not enough to have a literacy

campaign on its own. Mr. Gandhi has pointed out the error of that. To go with a literacy campaign there must be plans for the "literacy of the whole person" so that the peasant becomes a better farmer too and more intelligent about his daily life.

Dr. Laubach reporting on his literacy campaign says:

An obstacle to progress in India is the fact that among illiterates, life is static. It is considered dangerous and almost wicked to do new things. If a method has been used for a thousand years, that is convincing proof that it is best. The "zest and quest for better and best" has not yet taken hold of the masses of India at all. There are, to be sure, millions who have caught the spirit of progress and who are battling against the sleep of ages. While they do not yet constitute one in ten of the population, their influence is far greater than their numbers.

Another reason for India's slow educational progress is that so many school children lapse into illiteracy again after they have left school. They return to almost wholly illiterate villages and having nothing to read or write, forget almost all they knew. In many villages it would be impossible to find a post-office, and difficult to find a book or newspaper. Unless a student continues to make use of the knowledge he has gained in four or five years of schooling, he will forget it all—even as you and I have forgotten our Latin and Greek, unless we have used it since leaving college.

If parents are literate, their children never lapse into illiteracy because they find books and papers in their homes, and because their parents realize the value of education.

How far English should still be used in Indian education is one of the great debatable issues which the growth of Indian nationalism has sharpened. As a foreign language it is a real handicap to Indian educational progress. It leads to mechanical learning, and much of the "stiffness" of education in India may be traced to this source. The student flounders to express himself and his ideas are throttled before he can make himself clear. One educational officer says, "that facility with the language which does not dam the current of ideas is the attainment of only a few of our best students, and, far from progress being evident, the unfortunate experience both of others and myself is, to put it in an Irish way, that progress is backward."

But without English it is difficult to see how India could have communicated with India in the wider ranges of her life. It has been a notable cultural bond, and not a few Indians are masters of a graceful English thought and style which have placed them in the realms of English literature. English too has been the gateway of science and medicine, and most thoughtful Indians would agree that without it India's march of progress during the last hundred years would have been at a much lower rate.

Nationalism, however, has given a great impetus to the study of the vernacular, and in a number of provinces the final stages of the high school courses have been arranged in the vernacular on the ground that the pupils would think more alertly in their mother tongue and express themselves more concisely. This movement will grow in the new India and with it will grow a richer and more variegated provincial life which will compel a more adequate supply of literature in the vernacular. English will then be

seen in its rightful place as the great common tongue of India for intercourse within India and with the outside world.

Another field of great educational opportunity for the new India to face will be the education of women. If it had not been for the steady persistency of Christian missions during the last hundred years it is almost safe to assume that nothing would have been done in India about women's education. "For many years," says Mr. Arthur Mayhew, "the Government of India gave them no support. It was men not women that they wanted for the professions and the public services; and they feared resentment in orthodox circles if the privacy of home life and the sanctity of the social structure was exposed to the radical influence of Western education." Even to-day there are in India only 5,000 women studying for university degrees and the annual output of graduates is hardly five hundred. Hindu girls are now crowding into the medical and teacher training schools to train for the three main careers open to Indian women—teaching, medicine and nursing. But the Christian community in India (numbering less than seven millions) still provides over half the number of women students and it has still much pioneering to do in encouraging women to launch out on new careers. For instance in 1937, 49 out of 53 women students in agricultural schools came from the Christian community.

Under the inspiration of Mr. Gandhi the Nationalist movement, in the years following the last war, made a striking appeal to Indian women to enter public life, and Congress has since had a woman president, and there have been women ministers of provincial governments. But this has caused a certain hardening of orthodox Hindu belief that a woman's place is entirely in the home. Only the continued education of ordinary Indian women who stick to home life and their families can show that a generation of educated mothers will be a mighty contribution to her general welfare.

"Though Indian women freely criticize the idle and parasitic life of some western women, as they see them in India or London, (says Mrs. H. Gray in *Modern India and the West*) they praise and envy the West's army of enfranchised and trained women who devote their lives to public service. India admires their thoroughness, their unrewarded devotion to those in need, their freedom of movement, their organizing ability and wide experience. For this reason, for instance, they emphasize the importance of sending social workers to train in England or America, though the funds spent on such training could be used to equip a larger number in their own surroundings. In the training for social service it is India that insists on the broadening effect in the West, while English social workers advocate training under Indian conditions."

Britain has brought India thus far along the road of education. The way has often been magnificently muddled and unplanned in true British fashion. The faults in the system are glaring—the fearful gap between the educated

and the illiterate; the limiting facts of English as a medium of instruction; the blindness to the need for vocational training (it was 50 years after the first university that the first institute of agricultural research was founded and then by an American!) the completely secular character of all government education, responsible so its critics say for much of the unrest and indiscipline amongst Indian young men.

On the other hand education broke the mental isolation of India and opened fertilizing streams of knowledge all over the country. It provided those schools and colleges which have been the birthplaces of Indian nationalism. It gave India ideas of independence, self-sacrifice and national service. The very use of English has kept India abreast of world thought and given her a place amongst the nations. Even if the British method of education in India has produced an "army of clerks" (thousands of them unemployed!) it has also produced the leaders of India upon whom will now devolve the leadership in the great uncompleted task of educating a quarter of the world's peoples.

(The Rev. Cecil Northcott is Home Secretary of the London Missionary Society.)

THE TYRANNY OF FRENCH

BY E. ALLISON PIERCE

IN August, 1916, when Great Britain had been at war with Germany for just two years, the then Prime Minister appointed a Committee to enquire into the position of Modern Language studies in our schools and universities, from the standpoint of the requirements, not only of a liberal education, but of commerce and of public service.

The present War has run nearly three years of its course and few informed and thinking persons would maintain that the position of Modern Language studies, in relation to our now vastly increased needs and responsibilities, is more satisfactory to-day than it was then. Yet, amid the multiplicity of articles, speeches and letters to the Press on the subject of post-War reforms, no suggestions are being made for dispelling our national inertia towards language-learning, for broadening our conception of Modern Studies or for putting an end to the ineffectiveness of our actual instruction. All these things, none the less, are of the first importance. Without a far deeper and more widespread knowledge of foreign tongues and foreign cultures than we have at present, we cannot hope either to make the recoveries and advances that we so sorely need in international trade or to advance any great distance along the path of international understanding.

In particular, a fresh enquiry into the position of Modern Language studies is required, chiefly because the last enquiry was held under conditions quite different from those of to-day. This is the contention to be advanced in the present article.

The report of the Government Committee of 1916 was issued shortly before the Armistice and by the end of 1918 was on sale as a pamphlet of some 300 pages, in a small and handy format, with the significant title, not of "Modern Language Teaching," but of "Modern Studies." It was a most important document, which for generations to come will mark the point at which a narrow cart-track began to widen into a first-class thoroughfare. The members of the Committee were in the main educationists or administrators noted for breadth of outlook or business men whose devotion to the humanities and to liberal ideals of education was unquestioned. They began by interpreting "Modern Studies" as "all those studies . . . which are directly approached through modern foreign languages"—that is, not merely linguistic and literary studies (which was the popular current interpretation of the term) but historical and economic as well—"the study of modern peoples in any and every aspect of their national life, of which the languages are an instrument."

They laid down a truth, too often forgotten, that "the study of languages is, except for the philologist, always a means and never an end in itself." They declared that no part of our national education had been so backward as that "concerned with foreign countries and foreign peoples of the present day." They drew attention to the value of languages then little studied in Britain, such as Italian, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish. They deprecated certain practices which an earlier age had accepted without question—compulsory Latin and Greek at the Universities; the beginning of two foreign languages at school simultaneously; the division of schools, below the First Certificate stage, into Classical and Modern; time-tables as full and classes as large for modern language teachers as for teachers of other subjects. They laid down as sound principles what had formerly been considered heresies: non-linguistic pupils should be allowed in certain circumstances to abandon foreign-language-study; if only one foreign tongue was to be learned, it should be a modern one; the direction of Modern Studies in Universities should be in the hands of British, not foreign, scholars; language teachers in schools should be encouraged to qualify for posts in Universities. They recommended that the history of all countries whose languages were taught should be given greater attention. University Modern Language departments, they asserted, were undermanned and their staffs underpaid; while "in no University and for no country is there any adequate provision for Modern Studies in the history and economics of great national areas." They set the seal of their approval upon a number of progressive movements which were meeting with opposition or failing to evoke appreciation in high places: the principles of the "Direct Method"; the systematic use of phonetics; better pay and a more practical training for Modern Language teachers; closer contact between learners and the foreign country at every stage of instruction. All this, ambitious and far-reaching as it sounded—and as it was—embodied only a small proportion of the Committee's fifty-five conclusions and fifty-three recommendations. Small wonder that for years afterwards teachers of Modern Studies were given to referring to the document as "Our Charter."

In many of the directions indicated progress has been made, and in many where it has not it still might be: indeed, one of the first tasks of a fresh Committee might well be to examine the conclusions and recommendations of its predecessor with relation to current practice. But this alone will not suffice, for so much has happened since 1918 that the whole matter needs re-opening.

Let us take two illustrations of the changes that have occurred, one from each end of the educational ladder. It appeared, in 1916-18, "not desirable to introduce modern languages into the great majority of Elementary Schools, though in special schools of this class, keeping their pupils beyond the age of fourteen, good work can be and has been done." It is doubtful if it would appear so undesirable to-day. Experiments have shown that boys and girls,

coming from poor homes, and with no background of culture, can excel in Modern Language study; and many people think that every child in the country capable of learning a foreign tongue, provided it be a suitable one, should be given the opportunity to do so. The imminent raising of the school age, the creation of many new schools and new types of school and the projected developments in part-time education all point to the urgent need for exploration in that field.

Again, in University study, the picture presented by the Committee, all too accurate then, is now quite out of date. At the beginning of the last War, neither Oxford nor Cambridge had a Professor of French—omissions which were made good soon after its close. There was not a Professor of Italian in the whole of Great Britain—but very shortly after the report was issued there were four. There were only two Professorships of Spanish—there are now five. On the other hand, the Committee recommended the creation, within ten years from the conclusion of the War, of fifty-five new Chairs (fifteen of French and ten each of German, Italian, Russian and Spanish) and double that number of lectureships. A few of these have in fact been created but nothing approaching that number. Why not? Have our ideals fallen since 1918? Or was the recommendation a mistaken one?

But there is one matter standing out high above all others into which a full, searching and unprejudiced enquiry ought to be made without delay—the position of French in our educational institutions compared with that of the other chief foreign languages. These, for convenience, we may agree with the 1916 Committee in defining as German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, though something might also be said about Portuguese, Dutch and the languages of Scandinavia. And, though the claims of the four "secondary" languages were dealt with to some extent by the report, the Committee was so heavily weighed down by pro-French evidence that the strength of those claims was never made clear—probably, indeed, was never realized.

That this bias should have existed in 1916 was natural, if not inevitable. For a number of reasons, into which it would take too long to enquire, French had been almost exclusively the modern language taught in our schools since the time when, against tremendous opposition, Modern Language study first fought its way into the curriculum. Practically every modern language school-teacher, that is to say, whose opinion the Committee could possibly ask, was a teacher of French; a few also taught German; none of them taught, and very few were even acquainted with, any other modern language whatsoever.

Further, the atmosphere of the time was one of *entente cordiale*. For two years, the French had been fighting beside the British, tenaciously and magnificently, against the German invader. Actual contacts across the Channel were possible and were daily being made. Even in the hectic atmosphere of war, plans were being outlined for increased Franco-British collaboration once the war that was to end wars should be over and peace

established in perpetuity. In such an atmosphere, what chance was there that the strangle-hold of French over our linguistic education should be loosened? It says a great deal for the conscientiousness with which the report was drawn up that any other language should have been given a place in it at all.

Consider the Committee's witnesses. Of all the bodies which sent official representatives, only one had a foreign title and that one was French. Of the ten witnesses representing the Modern Language Association, eight were teachers of French. The list of "individual witnesses" is thick with the names of teachers of French and other persons known as specialists in French: so far as I can see, only five out of the sixty-two of them were connected with any other language. Of a group of "thirty-one University Professors and Readers" who sent the Committee a long memorandum, no less than twenty-two were teachers of French, or of "Romance languages," or of "Modern languages," which in those days meant French with a dash of German. And, as if the bias were not already strong enough, the Committee invited two distinguished Frenchmen to come to England and address it: the "Chief Inspector of Living Languages for the French Ministry of Public Instruction and . . . (the) Professor of English Language and Literature at the Sorbonne, were good enough to cross the Channel to give the Committee the great benefit of their experience and advice." So French interests, it is clear, dominated all the Committee's forty-nine meetings: indeed, unless it had itself crossed the Channel and held its meetings in Paris, it is difficult to see how they could have been represented more strongly.

Fortified by all this experience and advice, the Committee betrayed on almost every page of its report its failure to realize that, more than any other single cause, it is the dominance of French which is holding back this country from progress in Modern Studies as a whole. Because French is either the first, or the only, modern language taught in schools where a modern language is taught at all, every child in such a school has to learn it, whether it be the language most suited to him, and the language he most needs, or not. The experiences of a few progressive schools which have been bold enough to experiment with other languages suggest that he would often do better if he were to learn something else, but in most places this cannot be done, simply because it never has been. Again, practically every person aspiring to become a teacher of modern languages takes an Honours degree in French, not necessarily because he wants to but because he has little chance of making a living if he takes any other. Because single-language Honour Schools are now in fashion, it is rarely that a teacher of French knows (or apparently cares to learn) any other modern language. The Headmaster of a large public school with a staff of forty recently told me that the position of Spanish there was precarious, because only one man on his staff knew any. Presumably they were all incapable of learning: what a commentary on our linguistic education!

We may suppose, however, that such thoughts as these did not disturb the 1916 Committee. Its members took the predominance of French for granted and would have been as shocked at the suggestion that Italian (a far easier and more attractive language) should be substituted for it as a "first language" as their Classically-trained grandfathers were when the suggestion was made that any modern language should be taught in schools at all. The sixth chapter of the Report, on Elementary Schools, is particularly illuminating. It assumes throughout that if a modern language is learned in such a school that language will be French. It discusses (and rejects) the possibility "that there are spare hours which should be given to *French*"—and does not use the phrase "to a modern language." No other modern language, in fact, is mentioned. If in a not distant future, as may quite conceivably happen, Spanish or Italian is taught to every Elementary School child capable of learning it, this chapter will come to be read as an interesting survival from the Dark Ages.

There were others like it, but we must now pass to the pages in which the Committee reviewed the claims of French compared with those of other languages. First, let us remark upon the method of that review. The Committee did not say: "We have now to decide which languages should be taught in our schools, and in what order of importance. Let us consider (i) what qualities such a language requires; (ii) how far each of the five claimants possesses each of such qualities." It employed rather what may be described as the method of Comparative Eulogy. First came a panegyric of French—some of it fully merited, some disputable and some irrelevant—beginning with one dogmatic assertion: "French is by far the most important language in the history of modern civilization," and ending with another: "From every point of view French is, for us above all, the most important of living tongues." Then, in a much lower key, it entered upon a defence of German. As that language was decidedly unpopular, this was really rather brave of it, but the most patriotic could hardly have described the claims put forward as too strong. Before the War, said the Report, German had been the first language "from the point of view of information." It had advanced "somewhat rapidly" and its rise had been largely due to German "industry and competence," "skilfully fostered by the admirably organized German book trade"; the value of German literature and culture the Committee preferred not to discuss: "the time is hardly propitious for their dispassionate consideration." Such was the mood of 1916-18. Yet without a discussion of so fundamental a point it is surely impossible to arrive at a conclusion of any value. No doubt realizing this, the Committee decided to give German the benefit of the doubt: its position, after the war, "should be improved"—just that, without amplification.

Before entering upon its unequal eulogies of Italian, Spanish and Russian, the Committee remarked that the place of German in schools and Universities, before the War, had been "unduly superior" to that of these three languages.

Considering that German had long been established in the schools while hardly a single full-time day-school in Great Britain taught Italian or Russian, and a mere dozen or so taught Spanish, and considering that on the Committee's own figures, those three languages had only three University Chairs between them as against eleven in German and two in French-with-German, this must be considered a notable example of under-statement. It was followed by an entirely inadequate estimate of Spanish, which was treated as predominantly a "commercial" language: its "striking and romantic history" and "fine literature" were dismissed in exactly eleven words. No passage in the entire report makes one realize better how far we have progressed since then. On Italian culture, on the other hand, the report has an almost lyrical passage to which the only possible rejoinder is: "Why, then, is French taught everywhere and Italian almost nowhere?" In treating Russian at such a time the Committee naturally walked very warily, and ended by giving it a somewhat tentative testimonial, for use in Universities only.

So far as one can judge, the Committee's general attitude seems to have been this: French must, at all costs, maintain, and even strengthen, its grip on British education; German should be taught more, but must remain for all time a bad second to French; the other three languages may be taught here and there, provided they never seriously interfere with French or German. This is, in any case, just what has happened. The term "modern languages" still means little more than "French"; and, despite longer hours, better qualified teachers, improvements in method and closer contacts with France, the results produced by the teaching of French are anything but satisfactory. Speak in French to any group of schoolboys who have been learning it for five or six years and see if you can evoke more than a few stammering sentences by way of answer. Ask any Frenchman to discourse in French for ten minutes on current affairs to an audience of University teachers, most of whom will have done from eight to ten years' French at school, and some several years more at the University, and see how much readiness they will show to discuss his speech in the same language or what other indications they will give of having understood it.

It is both for this very practical reason, and also because I believe that the claims on our educational system of German, Italian, Russian and Spanish have never had a full and unbiassed consideration by authority, that I venture to suggest that we need a new Government Committee on Modern Studies, with a reference empowering it, among other things, to enquire into the relative importance of the principal European and non-European languages and to determine the extent and degree to which each can and should be taught in different types of school, and in the Universities of the country.

If such a Committee, carefully and without prejudice, studies Paragraph 60 of the 1918 Report—that is, the panegyric of French upon which it presumably bases its attitude to that language—it will hardly fail to be struck by the

weakness of the arguments set forward. "France," the Report tells us, "was ahead of Italy in the mediæval revival of learning"; but this seems no reason for teaching French, rather than Italian, to English children to-day; and, if it were, one might reply that French literature, for centuries, lagged some way behind Italian. "The University of Paris was the chief source of light to Europe"—but there were also the Universities of Oxford, Bologna and Salamanca. "In literature alone among the arts has she an equal or a superior in England": effectively though our educational system has prevented children from learning other modern languages, there are many who would not hesitate to place either Spanish or Italian literature above French. "In the lucidity and logical consistency of her interpretation of life she has no rival"—no, it may be added, nor in inflexibility and rigidity of mind. Great France undoubtedly is, and none would wish to deny the fact; but give her rivals an opportunity to state their case with the same fullness and she will be hard pressed to maintain her superiority.

For "practical purposes" also, states the Report, the "great majority of our witnesses give French the first place": being themselves products of the system and representing in the sum many French interests, they were almost bound to do so. But the arguments which follow, however valid then, sound pitifully feeble to-day.

(i) French is "the language of diplomatic intercourse."—True, it has been; but can it conceivably continue to be after the present war?

(ii) "In countries where English has not established itself French is found most commonly useful as an intermediary between any two persons of different nationality."—This I believe to be largely a legend. Most tourist hotels in Switzerland and Italy will understand French (even a Briton's French); but anyone who tries that language in the streets of Spain or Portugal, Turkey or Greece, Norway or Sweden, will soon betake himself to English in desperation. Business houses usually have clerks who can write or read French; but they can generally also deal with English. "It would not be the slightest use," remarked Sir Malcolm Robertson recently, "to write or speak French in . . . the capital cities of any country in South America. I wonder what Mr. X, of Birmingham, Leeds or Gloucester, or anywhere else in this country, would say if you started to address him in French. Yet, if we think of a foreign language at all, we imagine that all foreigners must talk French. In point of fact, they do not."

(iii) "Physical propinquity also gives French a special value for Englishmen."—It was useful, no doubt, for school travel-parties and penniless undergraduates, but how many people ever travelled in France *from choice* compared with those who went to Switzerland and Italy? Shall we all flock to France after the War or otherwise take advantage of our physical propinquity? In any case, will not the rapid development of cheap air travel soon make this argument meaningless?

(iv) "In mere matter of language . . . the two nations seem destined to

serve as complementary one to the other"—Wishful seeming, it is to be feared; for English is equally "complementary," in one respect, to Italian or Spanish, and in another to German.

(v) "Our careless articulation may be corrected by the precise and studied utterance of the French"—But much more so by the precise and studied utterance of the Spaniard, who not only, like the unfortunate British school-boy, finds the French language hopelessly unphonetic, but looks on it as positively slovenly in articulation by comparison with his own.

(vi) "Our modes of written expression might gain much" from French.—But they would gain just as much if we studied the flexibility of German word-order, or wrestled with the immense wealth of Spanish synonyms, while the child who studies no Latin would gain far more from German than from any language relatively weak in inflection.

Such are the main arguments used by the 1916-18 Committee. There is, of course, much more to be said on both sides, and this article, far from pretending to summarize the whole of the case against the ubiquity of French, is no more than a plea that the matter should be given an impartial re-examination. But one thing more must be said in conclusion. Behind the dominance of French, giving it added power at the very time when the importance of other modern languages was beginning to be recognized, was the Grey Eminence of the *Entente Cordiale*—a phrase, which, it is to be hoped, will soon be used exclusively in its English form, and of the relations between the great world-powers of the future which are to be looked for among the British Commonwealth of Nations and the twenty-one republics of America. "Recent calamities confronted and endured together," says the 1918 Report, "should create an eternal bond of sympathy" between Britain and France. Eternity is a long day; the bond of sympathy with our former Allies has, despite the courage and tenacity of a handful of Free French, become irreparably loosened; the British boy and girl, for a long time to come, will think of the French as the people who believed we were about to have our necks wrung like chickens. I do not for a moment suggest that this is in itself a reason for dropping or curtailing French studies but I do claim that the "French everywhere" school is not justified in using such arguments as that the soul of martyred France is sound and that its heart is still beating with Britain.

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THE TREATMENT OF POST-WAR PROBLEMS

BY LORD ADDISON

POST-WAR aims have not yet obtained their right place in our National thought and purpose. Certainly the Government has not provided definite leadership. Perhaps because it does not think it necessary to aim at any degree of definiteness at present, but more likely because, as a Government, it simply has not had the time. The Members of the Cabinet and the heads of the great Departments must be occupied all the hours they have in dealing with the urgent war aims that crowd upon them every day.

Nevertheless even in the interest of the more energetic prosecution of the war itself a much more inspiring and constructive definition of what we mean to attain is urgently required. There are abundant reasons for this statement, apart altogether from the undeniable fact that unless careful and adequate preparation is made beforehand we shall be in danger, when the war ends, notwithstanding our abundance of good intentions, of a confusion that, from lack of considered leadership and prepared arrangements, may be as desolating as the war itself.

We have before us the guidance of the Atlantic Charter and the knowledge that it has received the adherence of our great allies, Russia and China, together with many of the allied nations. As a statement of great purposes it is splendid, and the recent anniversary message of President Roosevelt to Mr. Churchill describing it as a "Great Union of Humanity" dedicated to the realization of these noble aims, is a glorious addition to it. But the message does reveal that it is a year since the Charter was drawn up and its applications in the lives and opportunities of people all over the world remain to be given form and an expression of reality that will inspire their hopes and strengthen their resolution. In this connection American leaders have so far been much in advance of our own. Mr. Eden, I believe, provides the only example of a British Minister who has sought to interpret the provisions of the Charter in terms that appeal to the people.

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The formulation of war aims, in such terms of definitely planned intention as may be possible, must necessarily vary in its appeal amongst the different nations—amongst our own people at home—in the conquered countries and in Germany itself to those whose discontent with what Nazism is bringing them is expressed in increasing misery. These last two groups are specially involved with the prosecution and duration of the war itself and may appropriately be referred to first.

So far as the people in the subjugated countries are concerned German rule varies in its ferocity and cruelty, but surely never in history has there been so vast a dissemination of hate. It must be a loathing indescribable. The longing of the people in these countries for deliverance must be past imagining. But what could fortify them more—what could do more to intensify the ingenuity and resolution of their resistance than the spread amongst them of confident statements by the United Nations of the relief and help they will be able to bring them in the hour of victory? The more these are accompanied by sufficiently clear indications of the ways and means whereby that assistance will be made available the more forcible they will be.

First of all how invigorating will be the assurance that food will be brought to them quickly wherever they are, and that it will be there without bargaining, on generous Lease Lend principles—a pledge of the new world spirit. The absolute necessity of this help for the scattered, homeless, penniless millions stares us in the face; and, equally so, the fact that it must be continued until their homeland industries can be re-started.

Similar considerations apply to the definite promises of help in transport back to their homelands of those who have been exiled. They will want to return to their own places even if they have been half destroyed. Equally so would be the encouragement derived from the knowledge that international help will be forthcoming in rebuilding their houses and in re-starting industries.

These things and many more will certainly have to be done if famine and anarchy are to be averted and the more the knowledge that they are being prepared for with resolution is spread amongst the conquered peoples, the more their faith and spirit will be upheld and the day of their deliverance brought nearer by their more dogged resistance to their oppressors.

As to Germany, independent testimony is telling us more and more that masses of the people, apart from the armies and the specially cared-for Hitler Youth, are enduring the war more because of the fear of the vengeance that defeat may bring upon them than because their hearts are in the war itself. It is true indeed that no nation ever had more terrible warrant for its dread but the multitudes of those who are sick at heart over what the war is bringing them undoubtedly increased after the Russian campaign began and increased much more during the winter. If it were not so why should the Gestapo be creating a special army of its own with hundreds of arsenals, machine gun posts and the rest scattered throughout the towns of Germany? This growing multitude of dissatisfied Germans should not be lost sight of. The assurance of the Atlantic Charter and of Premier Stalin as to what victory of the United Nations means for the world should be brought home to them. The more they realize that the determination of the United Nations utterly to destroy Naziism and the military machine and to punish criminals is something separate from the consequences to the masses of the people,

the more potent, as a dividing factor, becomes the knowledge that that victory means a better opportunity for a decent life everywhere, including in Germany itself.

A striking book recently issued by Mr. Howard K. Smith who was one of the last American journalists to get away from Berlin before the declaration of War between Germany and the United States, makes this point with remarkable force.* It reveals too that the more this propaganda has a basis of reality in the definiteness of declared intention, the more effective it will be.

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There is no doubt as to the spirit of our own fellow countrymen. They are united—miraculously united—in their determination to fight until Hitlerism is utterly destroyed as well as those forces that, from one generation to another, plunge the world in war. Moreover this determination does not flag with reverses. It defies disappointment and is in the very bones of the people. They see and understand what German tyranny means, and they will endure until success against it has been obtained. Their discontents—will endure until success against it has been obtained. Their discontents—and they have many—are focussed most of all upon what they feel are setbacks due to bad management or insufficient foresight in the conduct of the war—not on the necessity of fighting it.

Alongside this however they want to know more and more what sort of arrangements can be made to prevent the recurrence of war, and to ensure peaceful progress. They know, from bitter experience, that these things cannot be left to improvisation when the fighting is ended; that, apart from details, understandings must have been reached by the United Nations as to the main line of action, and by our own Government also in respect of home restoration. They know that the United Nations will be strong enough to lay the foundations of a system that will really enable people to live "free from fear and want," but they want to know that this wonderful opportunity of a great "Union of Humanity" for world restoration is really being planned for with courage and decision, and will not be lost in a catastrophe of disputes because of failure to make use of the immense goodwill and community of purpose that now possesses the nations.

The fact that the Members of the Government themselves are necessarily taken up with war problems is the greatest of all reasons why others should openly be mobilized and set to work under their direction upon these tasks. Equally the work needs to be participated in by the leaders of all those conquered nations who are in our midst or in the United States, as well, of course, by our other great allies.

There is this also. People realize more and more that poverty, unemployment and economic discontent provide ready material at all times for war-mongers and that there can be no safety so long as there is no united effort to remove them. One of the most eloquent indications of this widespread

* *Last Train from Berlin*, The Cresset Press.

conviction is the multitude of people and the number of organizations that issue pamphlets and memoranda on different aspects of these post-war problems. I want in particular to refer to two of them, as striking examples not only of the direction of thought but of emphatically expressed desire.

The first, is a pamphlet entitled *War of Ideas* which has been prepared by a number of men in the City who are highly experienced in financial and in large-scale trade and industrial enterprises. It has not been issued for general circulation but I have received permission to quote from it. The other is a small recent book by Sir John Orr entitled *Fighting for What*.*

There is nothing timid or faint-hearted about either of these, as there is no need to be.

Nearly at the outset the *War of Ideas* make this declaration:

Men and Women in our own country who are working to destroy Naziism and Fascism, intend to have something better than poverty, slums, unemployment and frustration which survive two generations of active Social Reform.

There is one other statement of fundamental importance to be mentioned at the outset; and I pray God that our great leaders of finance and industry in the City will adhere to it after the war. It is this (referring to the Community)

We are rich enough to assure to every member the elementary material conditions of civilized life.

This is undoubtedly true if we think in terms of what our real wealth is, but not in terms of gold buried in cellars and not in terms of piles of money that cannot find a use in production whilst millions of men cannot find work in the production of things that people want at home and abroad and which we are well able to produce. As Sir John Orr says, this second world war in a generation marks the breakdown of a system and we have to find a new and better one if civilization is to be saved. As he puts it: "A system which is forced for its own preservation to prevent the production and distribution of commodities which the majority of mankind urgently need, is incompatible with human progress." It certainly is. But we have to think out a better one. Not I think by separate Committees of different political parties aiming at producing different plans with an appeal to the electors in mind.

There is a great deal of this activity going on at present, and all honour to those engaged in it so far as the common good is their objective. It is the only way they can work under present conditions. But the subject is too vast and world-wide in its consequences to be successfully dealt with in this way.

We must have a financial system under which money will be found for restoration and for the production of what the people need and *that will enable them to buy the things they want*. If ever there was a subject that called for united effort inspired by the Government it is this. It cannot be

* Macmillan, London, 1942.

limited to this country alone; for not only will the pre-war system of regarding national wealth and expenditure not apply after the war, but the treatment of international debts simply cannot be dealt with on pre-war lines. If they were, for example, in regard to the many thousands of millions of debts incurred under Lease-Lend, we could not buy the imports our industries must have, let alone the balance of food we may need over our own production. Most of what we could make for export would be mortgaged in advance in the service of debts. Happily for the world President Roosevelt like some of his colleagues has given a great lead in this fundamental issue.

In a recent debate in the House of Lords* Viscount Simon quoted some extracts from President Roosevelt's fifth Report to Congress on Lease-Lend operations for the period ending June 11. It is worth while making two quotations:—

The real costs of the war cannot be measured, nor compared, nor paid for in money. They must and are being met in blood and toil. But the financial costs of the war can and should be met in a way which will serve the needs of lasting peace and mutual economic well-being.

... And although the nations richest in resources are able to make larger contributions, the claim of war against each is relatively the same. Such a distribution of the financial costs of war means that no nation will grow rich from the war effort of its Allies. The money costs of the war will fall according to the rule of equality in sacrifice, as in effort.

This means, thank God, that Recovery is not to be crippled by astronomical debts and that pre-war methods will not apply. I resist, however, the temptation to expand this theme because I want to return to our homeland side of the case.

When the war is over we shall have lost much precious life and the equipment of many of our industries—happily not agriculture—will have suffered deterioration and there will have been enormous destruction of houses and other buildings. But our immense productive capacity will still be here; there will be even more workers skilled in production processes than ever before. Our wealth of management experience and direction will still be with us—it will I believe be greater than ever; our land will be in much better heart although even then we shall be far, very far, from having developed its full productivity. Indeed the realities of our national wealth will still remain. The, so-called, National Debt will, after all, largely consist of money that has changed hands and even if it amounts to twenty thousand millions, the service of the Debt at, say, 3 per cent. would represent only a small proportion of the national income—and even that would mostly come back into the pockets of the citizens.

Sir John Orr's bold programme for the post-war years contemplates feeding all the people properly; utilizing land still further; temporary, and then, permanent housing; national works of improvement of many kinds; the equipment of industries and many more wealth-producing labour-providing

* July 22, 1942.

182 THE TREATMENT OF POST-WAR PROBLEMS

activities, all of which, as he rightly claims, are undeniably needed and would provide profitable work for many years. He takes for granted our National ability to pay for them and leaves that side of it to the financier.

It is this last aspect of the case that calls aloud for a new method of approach. It calls for the subordination of many preconceived obstructive prejudices and, above all, for united thought charged by the State with the duty of devising ways and means whereby national restoration can be provided for. There is no matter wherein agreement is more vitally necessary than this. I am one of those who consistently strives to promote inter-party agreement on agricultural policy but this question of finance is at the root of all the rest.

Unless an agreed national policy can be arrived at on this fundamental matter it is an absolute certainty that the glorious opportunity of real restoration in the post-war years will be lost in acrimonious party wrangles. There is no time to lose in starting upon it. But it cannot be achieved by different groups of individuals, however experienced and well meaning. *It must be inspired by the Government.* There is not the least possible doubt that the undertaking of it would be acclaimed by the people with infinite relief.

As the authors of the *War of Ideas* say in the forefront of their pamphlet

- (a) We have learnt that it is false economy to curtail public capital expenditure when private expenditure falls off in a depression.
- (b) After this war we must not allow our people to drift into unemployment and stagnation as they did after the last war.

True—abundantly true. But it will happen, all the same, unless agreement has been reached beforehand on the financial policy involved.

I cannot forget the bitterness and falsity of the so-called Economy Campaign of 1931 wherein, by elaborate propaganda, millions of people were persuaded that a debt of a little over a hundred millions on the Unemployment Fund foreboded national bankruptcy. Many thousands of poor fellows who were unemployed were led to believe that the safety of the country was dependent upon their accepting a reduction of a few pence per week in their meagre allowances, and, for patriotic reasons, they voted accordingly. Nothing more utterly shameful has ever disgraced our national political life. But there are multitudes of people, now silent, who would be glad enough after the war to resurrect a similar agitation.

These people seem to be intellectually incapable of grasping the elementary fact that *work and production depend upon the ability of people to buy*; that it is upon the ability of the millions of purchasers all over the world to buy that productive industry must depend. They said in 1931, and persuaded the people, that, by some strange necromancy they would be better off if they had less money to spend. A repetition of anything of that kind would precipitate us into disaster.

In connection with this aspect of the case let me add a further note on this important matter of purchasing power.

THE TREATMENT OF POST-WAR PROBLEMS 183

The ability of people to buy food, clothes, houses or anything else depends upon the wages they receive, and future progress and the security of employment depend therefore upon raising the standard of life of hundreds of millions of people. Some years ago the League of Nations published a report upon the economic conditions of the world's primary producers. It was an appalling document. If only international action in that "Great Union of Humanity" that President Roosevelt speaks of in his anniversary message to Mr. Churchill, can lift the level of life—the ability to buy—of the multitudes of India, China and other countries, it will have struck at the root of unemployment all over the world. It is only international action that can do it.

But there is a battle to be fought over this matter. There are lots of people in our midst who worship cheapness; whose chief concern is to get the things they buy at as low a price as possible without thought for the standard of life of those who produce them. It is this that perpetuates the payment of wages at "the coolie level" in many parts of the world. We must contemplate *control of the prices* of primary products by international agreement; and I cannot imagine any more righteous basis than that the price to be paid should be such as will assure to the producer a decent standard of life in return for his labour.

People will render lip-service to this kind of thing readily enough; but behind President Roosevelt's courageous statements there is clearly the recognition of the fact that only by united action of the nations can this be done.

May I end this article by quoting some words of my own in the Debate in the House of Lords on July 22 when referring to the desire of securing freedom from want as expressed in the sixth article of the Atlantic Charter—

No more glorious task than that embodied in the Sixth principle of the Atlantic Charter has been vouchsafed to any generation. We should pray that the opportunity of benefaction will not be frittered away in petty rivalries. When the conquest of the enemies of freedom is accomplished there is a new and greater conquest awaiting the leaders of Nations. The conquest of Want.

GERMANY'S NEXT STEP

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

GERMANY, in spite of the immense success of her main operations, has so far not inflicted a decisive defeat on the Russian armies. She has of course compelled Timoshenko to retreat and to abandon territory of the utmost value. But even that part of Timoshenko's army that has retreated has not been completely disrupted, though it must have suffered great losses of men and material. Zhukov's armies and the reserves which Stalin presumably retains under his own control, so far as can be judged, have not yet been seriously committed; though no doubt reserves have been sent as reinforcements both to the Voronezh and Stalingrad fronts. This failure to secure annihilating victories would normally be an encouraging fact, but the question is whether this year the German General Staff deliberately abandoned attempts to destroy the Russian Army and instead merely aimed at destroying its offensive capacity. Writing in the February number of *THE FORTNIGHTLY* I suggested that would be the main strategic object of a German offensive and that the most obvious way of attaining that object would be by depriving the Red Army of its main sources of oil supply. The attacks towards Stalingrad have clearly indicated that that is now an objective within sight, and is being pursued with the utmost vigour. What we have to consider is, if that objective is attained how will the Germans turn its attainment to account?

I have suggested above that this year the Germans have not aimed at securing annihilating victories, but rather at depriving Russia of her resources by territorial conquests. Last year German grand tactics had most certainly the former object. Every phase of the offensive took the form of encircling attacks designed to isolate and destroy opposing armies. The claims made to have achieved this object left no doubt as to the tactical intention. This year there is little sign that similar tactics have been adopted, if one excepts the German counter-attack from Izyum which evidently aimed at cutting off the retreat of Timoshenko's force in the salient his forestalling offensive had formed south of Kharkov. That, however, was an opportunity that obviously had to be seized. But when the main German offensive was launched it was at once noted that German tactics had altered. Panzer thrusts took a new form. They were no longer deep encircling drives but short stabs to break up the Russian defensive positions, more effective in compelling retreat than in achieving annihilation. Possibly a change in Russian tactics may have

accounted for the change in German methods, though I think it was the other way about. Last year the Russians when threatened with envelopment by Panzer thrusts, appear often to have ignored the danger and held their ground in an attempt to prevent the main German forces supporting the Panzer penetrations. In doing so they certainly on occasions made sacrifices. This year they may have sought to avoid heavy sacrifices by timely retreat when their defensive positions were broken into by short Panzer drives powerfully supported by artillery and dive bombers. Once the Russians were in full retreat and rearguards only had to be dealt with German tactics again changed, and Panzer Divisions made deep thrusts. Their aim, however, was not encirclement; they were pursuing intent on seizing important points before resistance could be fully organized; while of course seizing every opportunity to destroy opposing forces, since that would facilitate the advance of the main army. As a result of what I suggest is a changed German policy the Russian Army would seem to have suffered less heavily than last year. Timoshenko's army, especially its left wing in Caucasia, has been badly mauled, but taken as a whole the Red Army is as capable of defensive action as ever. That it will be capable of sustained offensive action should the Germans by reaching the Volga cut it off from its main oil supplies must, however, be more than doubtful.

The Germans have always admitted that owing to great distances, inadequate communications and man-power resources, the total destruction of the Russian Army presents an almost insoluble problem, and that the most that could be hoped for is to render it impotent. In 1917 the revolution solved the problem for them and last year they attempted to solve it by *blitzkrieg* methods employed on an enormous front and in three main directions. This year they have attacked in one direction and with the object of rendering the Red Army impotent by robbing it of its oil supplies. If they succeed in that will they exploit their success by attempting its complete destruction? If only because of the approach of winter I think it is probable they will make no such attempt, at any rate this year.

What is the alternative? Obviously is it not to stand on the defensive in Russia and to turn their energies against Britain? Should the second front materialize the course of action would be simple, it would manifestly be of first importance to crush invasion before it became a serious menace. There is a sufficient nucleus of German troops in the occupied countries to render a sensationally rapid development of the second front improbable, and whatever the potential resources of Britain and America may be they cannot be deployed as rapidly as German troops can be transferred from the eastern to the western front, to say nothing of such reserves as are still retained in Germany itself.

While the threat of the second front exists I cannot believe that Germany will commit herself to an attempt to attack British positions in Iraq and Iran, involving as it would the occupation of Trans-Caucasia, an immensely long

line of indifferent communications and at the best results not immediately decisive. An attempt to reach Egypt through Syria and Palestine is hardly more inviting, for it would mean either an attack on Turkey or air invasion of Syria. At this stage of the war Germany is unlikely to add Turkey to the number of her enemies, particularly if it would involve a winter campaign. An invasion of Syria mainly dependent on air action would make heavy demands on the *Luftwaffe* already insufficiently strong to meet all the tasks required of it. Invasion mainly dependent on airborne troops at best would be a risky experiment.

Iran, Iraq and Syria as things are have their strategic value to Germany, since clearly they must be adequately protected on a scale which implies considerable dispersion of British resources.

It would seem more probable that any attempt against Egypt would be made from the west associated possibly with airborne attacks from Crete and the Dodecanese, for which Rommel could provide some degree of fighter protection. Whether an all out attempt to invade Egypt were made or not it is certain that Rommel will be reinforced strongly, if only to ensure that he will maintain the threat and interference with allied sea communications which make heavy demands on allied resources, particularly of shipping and air power.

The conclusions I come to are that in the first instance Germany will devote all her energies to depriving Russia of offensive power by securing control of the Lower Volga and such part of the Caspian coast line as would enable her to interfere seriously with allied munition supplies reaching Russia through Iran. The occupation of Trans-Caucasia would not seem to be essential but may be attempted mainly in order to deprive the Black Sea Fleet of its last possible bases. Not much Russian oil, even from the Maikop and Grozny fields can be exported to Germany, unless the elimination of the Black Sea Fleet made sea transport safe. Russian railways, congested with military traffic could not transport oil in quantities nor heavy plant required to restore scorched fields. Caucasian oil is probably not essential to Germany for military purposes, though it would obviously be welcome to improve the transport and general economic situation in Germany and in the occupied countries. The invasion of Trans-Caucasia in any case is of secondary importance to securing control of the lower Volga. It would probably imply a very serious military effort, particularly if the left wing of Timoshenko's army is not hopelessly broken up north of the Caucasus. The fact that allied munitions can reach Trans-Caucasia is obviously an important factor in the situation.

Whether the second front materializes or not it seems improbable that the Germans will launch an offensive against the northern or central Russian armies this year. It certainly could not be opened for some time for it would mean major troop movements and the employment of troops and material which have deteriorated from exertions in the southern campaign. The

danger of again becoming involved in a winter offensive would be almost prohibitive. An attack towards Moscow at a late season of the year is not likely to be repeated, and the arguments for postponing it to the spring are even stronger than in last year. The siege of Leningrad would naturally be maintained and if it cannot be relieved it is hard to believe it could hold out through another winter.

Assuming therefore that the Germans will succeed in securing control of the lower Volga I should expect them to be content to consolidate their gains and stand in the main on the defensive, undertaking only such minor operations as would improve their positions and tend to exhaust Russian resources. Already two-thirds of the Russian front is held defensively and must be well organized to stand winter conditions; newly gained ground would not have that advantage. Winter has on every occasion proved invaluable to the Germans as a time for recuperation and reorganization and there seems every reason why they should again prefer to take full advantage of it in preference to embarking on doubtful and exhausting enterprises. Even last winter when the *Reichswehr* suffered so greatly in Russia it was possible to expand and reorganize the Panzer force which has proved so formidable, and to a considerable extent this also applies to the *Luftwaffe* which cannot be used to the full under winter conditions in Russia.

There is another consideration which is bound to affect German plans. Anglo-American air attacks on Germany cannot indefinitely be left unanswered, and it seems obvious that at the earliest possible moment the weight of the *Luftwaffe* will be released from Russia to provide an answer. Clearly it cannot be released while the *Reichswehr* is engaged in major operations. This surely implies the closing down of offensive operations as soon as essential objectives have been gained and makes it improbable that new enterprises, such as the invasion of Egypt on a scale which would make heavy demands on the *Luftwaffe*, would be undertaken. It is not merely that German morale must be supported by reprisals but that every measure to diminish the weight of the attack would require to be taken. Flak and night fighters would not be enough, bombing attacks fiercer than any yet experienced would be necessary, particularly on aerodromes. This is not a pleasant picture, but of course the hypothesis on which my argument is based has not yet been established and never may be. The Volga route has not yet been interrupted, and the Red Army may have reserves sufficient at least to give it offensive power for a considerable period. The great fight it has made at Voronezh and to cover Stalingrad shows that its fighting spirit is unbroken. Last year when it seemed that the Germans must achieve their object, Russian resistance proved too strong and it may again. Germany has staked everything on one offensive thrust, and if that were brought to a standstill without having undermined Russian offensive power a very different picture might be painted.

THE AIR ARM AT SEA IN 1941-42

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

ON September 3 we complete the third year of the war. Apart from the great events of the entry of Japan and the United States into the struggle, one particular element stands out in our experience of this year at sea, and that is the growth of the importance of the air arm in the sea warfare, and, with that, the growing realization of the fact that the air arm is, as President Roosevelt said two years ago, an integral unit of a modern navy. The words of his broadcast on May 26, 1940, deserve repeating to-day. "In sea operations, the airplane is just as much an integral part of the unity of operations as the submarine, the destroyer and the battleship." Adequate naval defence, he had said on an earlier occasion, could not be had without ships—"ships that sail on the surface of the ocean, ships that move under the surface and ships that move through the air." All of these need to be developed, trained, used and commanded in unison with the object of perfecting them in co-operation with the other two types of fighting ships, as limbs, in fact, of a single body. Whether we look at the events in the light of either strategy or tactics we see the truth of that doctrine.

Two great battles have been fought during this year—the first "great" battles at sea, important as those were off the River Plate, in the Sicilian Channel, off Matapan and in the Arctic: the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway Island. In each of these, large masses of ships were present, battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers, but in neither of them did the surface ships come in contact with each other. They were long range battles; battles of advanced forces if the matter is looked on as a whole, in which the aircraft of each fleet attacked the opposing surface ships and those of the United States fleet inflicted such injuries on the Japanese fighting ships and the transports that they were carrying towards their objective that the attempt they had in view had to be abandoned. Neither battle was decisive in the sense that the enemy's fighting forces were greatly reduced and the balance of strength at sea materially altered; but in each the enemy was deprived of the command he had enjoyed, undisputed till then, of the waters in the southern and eastern Pacific. Indecisive battles have on more occasions than one had far reaching results. Malaga (1704) was indecisive, but it settled the contest for command and secured our position at Gibraltar for the time. Ushant (1775) was indecisive, but it enabled the French fleets to operate in the American theatre and thereby to determine the course of the

campaign. Graves's action with de Grasse was indecisive, but it was the primary cause of the fall of Yorktown. These two last battles in the eastern seas were, as Admiral King has said, defensive in purpose. In the first, the object was to frustrate the very considerable expedition which the enemy was directing against either Australia or some territory contiguous to Australia; in the second, it was to defeat the expedition, or expeditions—for there were two separate Japanese fleets—proceeding against Midway Island and, probably, Honolulu. The great size of the Japanese forces suggest that both of these were intended. The battles were unquestioned victories in that heavy losses were inflicted on the Japanese and their purposes were defeated in each case: it was unfortunate that the decision between the outposts took place so far from the main body that the wounded enemy was able to withdraw his fleet without being brought to close and decisive action.

Both battles, and the Midway battle in particular, emphasize the point to which reference has so often been made in these pages and which the American and Japanese decisions regarding the air arm and the surface support—that the British decisions in the matter of the air forces and naval forces were wrong. It was wrong to deprive the navy of its air component. It was wrong, when restitution was made, to confine that restitution to those aircraft which are shipborne. Shore-based aircraft played an important and possibly decisive part in the second battle. Some of the shore-based craft were it is true, army machines, but these, under the order of last March, came under the naval command. Thus the Admiral could count upon their being available to reinforce his fleet if the battle should be joined within striking range of the shore base. A British Admiral, as matters now stand, has no such assurance. Yet it is indispensable that he should be as sure of being reinforced in this arm when he has to operate within an area in which he is exposed to attack from the air as his remote predecessor of sailing days could be sure of being reinforced by battleships when passing through a zone of enemy battleship strength, or as his more recent predecessor of the last war was of being reinforced by destroyers when passing through a zone of submarine strength.

Observe the analogies. In the old wars the great convoys were protected by comparatively small forces of ships while in the open ocean, where only small scale attacks were to be expected. But until they cleared the Soundings when outward bound, or when they were about to enter them homeward bound, they were given either close or distant cover by the Channel fleet: in other words, they were then reinforced by the appropriate form of strength in the appropriate manner. Similarly on approaching the West Indies outward bound they were met by the West Indies squadron, and when homeward bound were escorted by that squadron through the danger area in which they were liable to attack by enemy squadrons and numerous privateers, operating from the French bases in the Caribbean. The same principle applied when submarines were the danger in the Soundings: the ocean convoys were re-

inforced by destroyer flotillas—the type most appropriate to the form of attack. There is of course no mystery in this. It is the merest commonsense. The only mystery is that the same principles have not been applied to the situations in the present day. In both of those instances the necessary dispositions could be made in the *certainly* that the additional and essential strength would be at the right place, in adequate strength, at the right time. That certainty has been lacking in the navy with regard to the danger from the air, and there is no question that we have suffered from the lack. Thus, the whole burden of the defence of the convoy escorted by the *Illustrious* and *Southampton*, when passing through the danger zone in the Sicilian channel fell upon the few aircraft of the carrier and the guns of the fighting ships and merchantmen. These had to meet the attack of the numerous aircraft coming out from the shore bases in Sicily. The *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, which, as a matter of course, had their destroyer escorts to guard them against submarines, were without their equally essential air auxiliaries. The *Cornwall* and *Dorsetshire* were without air support when they were attacked and sunk in the Indian Ocean.

The need for air components is no less plain in the Northern convoy service. The convoys on their way to Murmansk have had to pass through a zone of even greater danger than that in the Mediterranean, for there in place of the inefficient Italian navy there are the German ships of all classes—battleships, cruisers, destroyers, motor torpedo boats and shore-based aircraft. The enemy's possession of the Norwegian ports, which he has developed and defended strongly, enables him to bring all these craft into use, and, while his shore ranged torpedo craft, both surface and aerial, can be used, in the large numbers which make their attack particularly dangerous, we, operating from more distant bases, can bring none of the appropriate type of surface craft—the motor gunboats which constitute the true reply to the motor torpedo boats—into play, and only such numbers of fighter aircraft as the carriers can provide; a number far below that which can be launched from the shore bases of the enemy. The effects of this local superiority of the enemy are only too plain. Unless therefore a means can be developed by which adequate shore-based aircraft can reinforce the escort in the danger zone in the Arctic the supplies to Russia by that route will cease. So we find ourselves once again faced with the truth of the doctrine that the first object of our strategy must be to obtain command of the sea. Without it we cannot give our ally the aid she so greatly needs.

In the Mediterranean the influence of the air forces has steadily increased with the growth of the German air strength there. It is their appearance that has altered the situation—the contrast between them and the Italians is striking. Since their arrival the extent of our command and use of the Mediterranean has shrunk and is apparently now limited to a comparatively small area in the eastern basin. Of two convoys intended for Malta, one from Gibraltar and one from Alexandria, the former only got through with the

loss of a cruiser—the *Hermione*—five destroyers and two escort vessels; and the latter was forced to turn back to Egypt. The Axis forces were both sea and air units, among them some Italian battleships which returned when threatened by the British aircraft; the damage, so far as can be gathered from the official report in the Press, was effected mainly by the aircraft and submarines. Since that attack the situation has hardened. Another convoy battle has just taken place of which only preliminary Admiralty reports are available at the time of writing (August 15). Heavy claims are made by the enemy, claims which, if they are in any way approximate to the truth, must indicate that our means of defence are not adequate; in other words that we have not been able to reinforce our defence sufficiently in the danger zone with the types of craft needed: and these are principally aircraft and light craft—according to the Italian report motor torpedo boats and torpedo boats of the larger type of which Italy has a considerable number, took part in the battle. One thing is as plain as it can be: the need for greater air strength in the Mediterranean. Thousand bomber raids on Cologne and lesser ones on Mainz may do great damage to the factories in those cities, but they do not enable us to do that which we need most urgently to do at this present moment—regain the command of the Mediterranean without which we shall lose Malta and not improbably Egypt into the bargain.

Though the work in the Atlantic has been less spectacular than these great battles in the Pacific, the Arctic and the Mediterranean, the air arm has affected the course of operations. At one moment the Focke Wulfs were threatening to equal the submarine as instruments of destruction, but by adding catapult-launched aircraft to the defensive armaments of the convoys this danger seems to have been reduced. The need for unified command of the forces on and above the surface was recognized, after some delay, both in this country and the United States. The strength of the attack on the Atlantic routes seems to have moved from the western approaches to the American coast and the region off the northern French African colonies. German eyes were set upon Dakar long ago and there is unhappily small doubt that use of the French ports has been allowed by the Vichy Government. It may be assumed with some confidence that the Germans will openly establish themselves at Dakar whenever it suits them to do so. When they do, a more serious situation will have to be met. It does not need much perspicuity to discern the true strategical reply.

Thus in every one of the great theatres at sea—the Eastern Seas, the Mediterranean, the Arctic and the Atlantic—the pressing need is that of the command of the sea, and for the fullest employment of that growing air strength, of which we hear such glowing accounts, at sea. The growing part which air forces have played in every one of these areas must surely be plain, and also the dependence of those craft on bases. No navy has ever been able to operate without bases, and the modern navy of all arms needs them even more than its sailing and steam predecessors. The shore base is an

aircraft carrier that is both unsinkable and of far greater capacity than the ship. The capture or disablement of those positions from which the enemy does us such great injuries and endangers our whole position is therefore of the first importance. This the Japanese have recognized from the beginning. The primary object of their strategy was to obtain command of the sea; the course of action adopted was the disablement of the sea forces of the United States and the seizure of every position which would serve the needs of the navy. The first set back in that career was the successful defence of Ceylon, and it is not unlikely that that set-back was due to the arrival, only a short time before, of a force of Spitfires. The forestalling of the Japanese in Madagascar was a welcome sign of life; how much remains to be done there is not known. The other great set-backs were the two actions in the Pacific in each of which aircraft played the primary rôle. The next phase in which the allies pass from the defensive to the offensive is now begun with the attack on the Solomons. On the outcome of that expedition very much depends, and that outcome itself depends largely on the air. What is called for now is the adoption of a single-minded strategy, a strategy which has one primary object in view and that object the command of the sea. To the attainment of that object we need to direct all the means, of all arms, both in the major strategy and in the tactics. The strength of the air forces capable of contributing to this end needs increasing, the convoy movements need co-ordination with shore-based air squadrons exactly as those of the old and recent convoys were co-ordinated with the battle fleets and destroyer flotillas. We need every possible aircraft at sea if we are to preserve the flow of supplies to Russia and re-open the Mediterranean.

MR. FAIRCHILD?

By E. M. DELAFIELD

IN June of the year 1790, a young English boy of thirteen left the Merchant Taylors' School in order to live with his father, sister and stepmother in France.

It was a curious, uncomfortable family. The brother and sister were legatees under the will of their father's father, although, being still under age, the money was administered by their father. This responsibility he took very lightly, occasionally handing the boy some money, and giving none at all to the girl, between whom and her stepmother existed a deadly feud. Neither child received any education after the age of thirteen.

The boy, Henry, some six years later wrote an account of this singular childhood.

I did just as the whim took me, ate what I could get when I was hungry, made my own bed, and went where I liked. My sister did pretty much the same as I. Our stepmother rarely admitted either my sister or myself into her presence. My father scarcely ever spoke to me: I was my own master in every way.

Henry grew "very tired with this way of life" and somehow contrived to find himself on board a brig, under a French captain, setting sail for Marseilles.

The French Revolution had begun, and on reaching Marseilles the pilot who came aboard the brig gave an account of the massacres in Paris and the wholesale arresting of the aristocrats.

Henry—aged fourteen—went, with others, ashore, and writes as follows:

On returning, whilst walking about the streets I fell in with a mob dragging with them certain unfortunate persons whom they were going to hang "à la lanterne." The mob were singing and dancing and I found myself surrounded and held by the arm and was afraid to attempt getting away. They hung another of their prisoners by the feet and afterwards cut him down, opened his body and dragged him by the feet round the city, singing all the way. As soon as I could I got away and fled to the ship. On my way I saw several bodies hanging to the lamp ropes.

At Marseilles, Henry also saw the guillotine: it was carried about the streets in procession, whilst the populace sang the new hymn: *La Marseillaise*.

It was February, 1793, before Henry got back to his home at St. Valery, and by that time the Revolution was in full swing and France was also at war with England. No more money came from overseas, creditors became disagreeable and finally violent. Henry's father grew alarmed and fled, with his wife and her children, to a village near Amiens.

Henry matter-of-factly relates of this: "I was not asked to go, neither was

I forbidden. I was very much like a dog belonging to the family. There was a poor old washerwoman who had only a wretched hut who offered to take me in, in hopes of remuneration. So I remained at St. Valery. My sister remained with another old servant."

By the end of September all English people were considered suspect and both these children were put under arrest and, "as there was no proper prison at St. Valery," they, and two young Englishwomen in the town, were ordered to march to Abbeville—about twelve miles away. They had no food, excepting a piece of bread that a soldier gave to the little girl. It took them four hours to cover half the distance, and then "a horse was sent" to meet them.

The prison was the Hôtel St. Blimont, and contained about fifty English people and, segregated upstairs, one hundred nuns. Bread was difficult to get, scarcely anyone had any money, and all slept upon straw. Clothes began to fall to pieces and shoes and stockings failed. Henry, however, remained more than merely philosophical.

I was very happy, even though I went barefoot. There was always one of our guards who would scrape a fiddle for us in return for our saving a little bread for him: and we danced away in our guard-room and kept ourselves warm. Some of the young ladies joined us. It must have been a trying situation for the young creatures "(could they have been any younger than the diarist?)"—yet I have every reason to believe that they all conducted themselves with great propriety. As for me, I chose one as my idol and was, as far as possible under the circumstances, in love. She, too, fell in love with me; but I never saw her after I left the prison.

Henry was discharged from the prison, on the indisputable grounds that "reason required that he, at his age, should not be held responsible for the crimes of his country."

The poor boy protested that liberty was of no use without bread, and that he had no means of returning to England. The ruler of the prison replied kindly: "Take your liberty, at all events, and if you find nothing better you can return to prison."

This, in fact, was what the boy did eventually.

His sister returned to her old quarters at St. Valery, where she earned a living "by embroidering regimentals." Henry, and one or two older prisoners, tried to get to Boulogne, hoping to reach England eventually. But the party broke up for lack of food and leadership and Henry went back to the Hôtel St. Blimont.

After a while, the prisoners were all moved to the old College of Abbeville, and found it much more comfortable than Blimont, and Henry improved himself by reading the books in the College Library.

Robespierre was ordering massacres right and left: in the Nantes prison, it was said, two English families had been murdered, even to a two-month-old baby.

Henry was seriously thinking of escape—penniless as he was—when, for

the first time, he heard from his father, to whom he had several times written. One day, this incalculable parent actually appeared in person at Abbeville and announced that he now had friends in Paris through whose interest he hoped to get passports for England. "He proposed my joining him," writes Henry laconically.

The proposal was accepted, and father and son returned to St. Valery, where it is fair to add that the old washerwoman was liberally paid for her kindness to Henry.

A meeting took place with Henry's sister, and presumably an offer was made to her to join the expedition to England—but "my father showed so much eccentricity, not even telling her where he was going, that she declined to accompany him, on which he turned round and walked out of the house. I lingered behind . . . but he called out that I must follow him immediately or he would disown me as his son. He was in a state of great excitement." Father and son reached Paris and, says Henry temperately,

Paris did not appear to advantage: famine raged, the horrors of the Revolution were by no means over—the very day we arrived deputies had been arrested—and we could not get a bit of bread for the three days we were there.

An extraordinary and exhausting journey followed: Conducted by the head of the family, who was literally penniless, since no money could be got from England, Henry, his stepmother and five young children, trailed from Paris to Auxerre, Geneva, Frankfort, and Cassel. They were helped by occasional good-natured officials, charitable individuals, and—on one occasion—the stepmother and the five little children all cried so much in the presence of the Governor of Fribourg that he gave them ten shillings, and his wife gave them a *louis d'or* and a crown.

English Consuls in various places did something for them, but very little, for there were innumerable distressed *émigrés* and foreigners on the move everywhere.

It was Henry—aged about fifteen—who eventually saved the situation, by making acquaintance with an English dragoon, called Thornton, whose father kept the Swan Inn at Birmingham. Thornton had a friend, a sergeant, who was in charge of some stores that were to be returned to England—and between the sergeant and Thornton, the hapless family was taken aboard the vessel, bound for Hull, with the sergeant and the stores. The good sergeant made himself responsible for all the passage-money.

At Hull, they did in fact find money awaiting them, and paid their debts. Instructions, presumably from the executors of the Will that was to provide for Henry's education, were also awaiting, directing him to go to Coventry, to his aunt.

And now the force of habit showed itself. I was afraid that the money would not last, so I bought no clothes, but took leave of my stepmother and the children, in order to proceed by coach. My father was going to London and left me next morning.

Henry was, actually, feeling very ill and had, not very surprisingly, con-

tracted scarlet fever in the course of his travels. It need scarcely be said that this made no difference to his father's plans.

By impossibly slow stages, with coaches that never ran more frequently than every other day, Henry went through Lincoln, Nottingham, Newark, Leicester and Hinckley. The landlord of the White Hart at Lincoln was kind to him and wanted to keep him till he got better, at Newark he got a gargle from an apothecary who would accept no payment, in the Nottingham coach he was seized with a shivering fit and a gentleman covered him with his coat. The Leicester coach was full inside and Henry got outside. A storm came on, and he was wet through.

It was a Sunday when he reached Coventry, "dressed like a beggar, in a foraging cap, my old, dusty black coat with only one shirt, no stockings and a pair of Provençal pantaloons." He sought admission at a small public house, but "all the waiters and guests were in their Sunday clothes and they would not receive me." He fainted on the doorstep, was taken in and given warm brandy and water, and next morning proceeded on foot to his aunt's house, which was about ten miles away.

Some years before he had visited his aunt, and as her house was a large one with great iron gates, he remembered it well and knocked at the door. A servant who had been long with the family opened it but failed to recognize Henry in his rags and tatters.

"Go to the Mayor! Go!" she cried, thinking him a beggar

This prototype of the as yet uncreated David Copperfield said piteously: "I am Henry Sherwood."

He was admitted, put to bed, and the surgeon called, and at his aunt's house he remained for some time.

* * * * *

As soon as he was of age, Henry came into his share of his grandfather's money and procured himself a commission in the 53rd Regiment. He also fell in love with, and subsequently married, his cousin Martha Butt.

She was destined to become the author of that immortal record of a Calvinistic household: *The Fairchild Family*. Luckily for Henry, her more rigid views on right and wrong—especially wrong—did not overtake her until middle life, when she seems to have become very like the firm, kind, but unalterably censorious mother of her own Fairchilds.

But it is difficult to see the indomitable and adventurous Henry ever becoming Mr. Fairchild.

MODERN PROSE FORMS

V. FICTION

BY ERIC GILLET

IT is a curious fact that the most widely read and popular of prose forms, the novel, has been declining steadily in accomplishment ever since the last war. Efficiency and competence are qualities which numerous novelists possess in a high degree but inspiration, vision, superb character creation, have almost vanished. The reading public seems ready to accept size for intrinsic worth, and many long-winded novels which plod on through hundreds of pages of small type achieve an immense momentary success which has no relation to their merit. This popularity is a tribute to the readers' anxiety to find an escape from the unpleasant realities of the world of to-day. People feel that they must "get away" from the War and they prefer indifferent fiction to no fiction at all. At the same time it is instructive to note how rarely one hears critical readers nowadays express whole-hearted satisfaction with a new novel. No doubt when Dickens and Thackeray were rattling off masterpieces year by year, there was much criticism of the comparative value of their novels with keen and sometimes acrimonious partisanship. It is not easy to imagine a full blooded controversy developing to-day between the adherents of Virginia Woolf and those of Mr. J. B. Priestley or Mr. Charles Morgan. Contemporary fiction is accepted and mildly liked or disliked. There is next to no enthusiasm in the discussion of it.

Mr. Frank Swinnerton, who has been consistently underrated as a critic of his contemporaries wrote an article on "The Decay of the Novel"* in which he made various observations which were both true and wise. His remarks should be assimilated and pondered, especially by those high-brows who are least likely to read them. His concluding paragraph must be given here:

We need a new generation of novelists, whose idea of tragedy is not that of the gutter newspapers, whose idea of comedy is not that of the films, whose idea of technique is that it should fit the book and not be its sole pretext. We need a generation which shall exult in the hurly-burly of contemporary noise and passion and mechanics. Above all, we need a generation in which the creative faculty—composed of engrossed interest in the human species, imaginative sympathy with every type of individual, and a fearless invention by which these qualities are given colour and drama—has escaped from both sentimental ineptitude and priggish self-display.

* *The Spectator*, July 10, 1942.

Mr. Swinnerton cites Darwin and, later, Freud, as the destroyers of the English novel. He emphasizes the divorce between literature approved as "first-class" by the priests of culture and literature appealing to the humane.

Fiction and writers of fiction are unfortunate to-day because there are no outstanding critics who are prepared to state not once, but day after day and week after week, that literature is an integral part of life, dealing with its ardours and endurances, its passionate pleasures and terrible griefs. Almost all modern fiction, whatever its size and scope, seems to be written, like contemporary music, in a minor key. Immense technical skill and research go to its making and the result is generally speaking, a puny and inconsiderable achievement.

"If you are determined not to be taken in by life," Mr. Priestley wrote in *The English Novel*, "as these younger writers so obviously are, you may be many things, but it is not likely that you will be a novelist of any importance. The major novelist succeeds because, for the purpose of his art at least, he is taken in at every turn by life, by the hopes and fears, the joy and sorrow, of all manner of his fellow-creatures."

There is no doubt that the idols which have received most attention from the intellectuals since the last war are never deceived for an instant by the rich experiences of life. They are so busy analysing them that they have no time to enjoy them or to sorrow at them, and the result is that their readers may admire what they write but can never identify themselves with the people in the novels. They are never swept away into that "willing suspension of disbelief" which is assuredly an integral part of the novelist's job.

It would obviously be impossible here to review in any detail the work of English novelists since the last war. All that can be attempted is a consideration of some of the most admired and discussed writers of fiction, and a glance at the trend of the novel to-day. For this purpose it will be necessary to ignore almost entirely any of the writers who were in full production before 1919.

In the famous article on the novelists of the day which Henry James contributed to *The Times Literary Supplement*, four 'junior' novelists were mentioned. They were Compton Mackenzie, Gilbert Cannan, Hugh Walpole, and D. H. Lawrence. Only one of them—D. H. Lawrence—became in the Twenties the object of almost hysterical admiration, and it is not unprofitable to trace the reason for so much inordinate applause for a writer whose best fiction had been written long before he became the object of a cult. Lawrence's best novel is one of his earliest, *Sons and Lovers*. It was mainly autobiographical and it proved that the author had the soul of a poet and the ability to recapture his own early life with beauty and force. He wrote with great power, which even so early, showed a tendency to degenerate into hysteria. As time went on the form of the novel seems to have made an ever-diminishing appeal to Lawrence. He became increasingly interested in ethics and manifestations of the sexual impulse. He felt that the language

of polite society was inadequate to his needs and his experiment in what he, no doubt, considered to be mere honest frankness of expression. *Lady Chatterley's Lover* only revealed the weakness of his method and the unsoundness of his intention. Of his honesty there is no doubt whatever. His descriptive powers are rich and strange. Their brilliant dark intensity has not been equalled, and the remarkable cadences and rhythms which he fashioned from English prose are an individual contribution to its harmonies.

A feature of the literature of the last twenty-three years has been the gradual separation between intellectual criticism and fiction in the great tradition. With some of these pundits to be popular is to be bad. To be a best seller is to be damned beyond all hope of redemption. The form or the approach must be new to win their approval. Honest work within the recognized conventions of the novel does not suit them at all. This is a mistaken outlook, because though there are many ways of telling an imaginary story, these methods were just as practicable when the Bible was written as they are to-day. It is the artist not sure that he can make an impression with a straightforward story who decides on a fantastic or unorthodox approach, which will, he hopes, earn him some attention from the crowd. This outlook is not widely different from that of the unbalanced gentleman who parades the streets of a great town with texts plastered all over his clothes and a miniature windmill twirling away on his hat. He succeeds in making his impression but it is not the kind of effect which he most wants to produce. This type of literary mountebank, sane or otherwise, is not to be confused with the serious writer, who feels, quite mistakenly, of course, that a new fashion or mode of storytelling is a necessity for him. He may add something to the literary technique of his period.

The enthusiastic disciples of Lawrence who wrote so many books about his life and writing never seemed to be perfectly certain wherein his greatness lay. Like everyone else who met him they were convinced that he was a great man. It never occurred to any of them that Lawrence could be a great man without being a great artist. As a writer he had elements of greatness in him but a variety of circumstances prevented him from expressing himself fully and satisfactorily in literature or art. He had not a rich vein of material from which he could draw sustenance for his books. He was not a creative artist primarily but a critic of life and society who never recovered from the circumstances of his childhood, which were considerably better than those of many of his contemporaries. Indifferent health handicapped him throughout his life and unconsciously coloured his outlook. He never realized to the full the promise of the early work which had brought him to the notice of Henry James, and few such resounding reputations have been achieved on the strength of such a modest talent.

Compton Mackenzie, whose work must be mentioned here, was by far the most promising of James's selected young men at the outset of his career. A brilliant tour-de-force, *The Passionate Elopement* was followed by *Carnival*

a highly coloured story of the stage, which was written in a lively, accomplished style with a large vocabulary. It took a steep dip into melodrama at the close but it is a noteworthy accomplishment for a young novelist. Unlike some of his contemporaries, Mackenzie waited to write his autobiographical novel, *Sinister Street* until he had won a sensible mastery over his craft. *Sinister Street* is a masterly picture of Victorian-Edwardian childhood and adolescence. It has caught and preserved an entire phase of life in its pages. It has some excellent, if not especially subtle characterization, and Mr. Mackenzie was not afraid to fling unusual words about on his pages with all the fine confidence of youth. To-day *Sinister Street* seems to be under a cloud. Young readers do not enjoy it and it is easy to understand why. Most of them are jealous of the privileges and the pleasant, unshadowed life of Michael Fane and his friends. To them it is almost an insult that people of their own ages should have enjoyed such carefree happiness. They find Michael's preoccupation with all manner of aesthetic and religious problems affected and, as they would probably call it 'pansy.' They do not realize that youth will always find new problems for itself whether it happens to be young now or in the time of the Pharaohs.

Mr. Mackenzie is able and versatile, but except in *Guy and Pauline* he has never again reached so high a standard of achievement. The uncompleted *Four Winds of Love*, now in course of publication, appears laboured and verbose when contrasted with *Sinister Street*, and yet, while it remains unfinished Mr. Mackenzie can throw off, apparently without effort, a little masterpiece of farcical and satirical humour, *The Red Tape Worm*, which ought to be read and pondered, by every politician and person in the Civil Service. It is as yet too early to estimate the full measure of this author's possibilities.

Illness unfortunately compelled Mr. Gilbert Cannan to give up his literary career many years ago, and Mr. Frank Swinnerton, after writing *Nocturne*, a completely satisfying short novel has been unable to recapture the taut precision which marks its composition.

Sir Hugh Walpole had a true gift for story-telling. Arnold Bennett once told me that Walpole had sent him a copy of one of his novels with the inscription "Written with blood and tears." Bennett was not impressed, though he was sincerely fond of Walpole. He commented drily that Walpole had never been able to guard effectively against an excessive facility in this medium. Walpole was obviously influenced by his literary idols, James, Trollope, and Conrad among them but he was an honest craftsman and he gave, and no doubt will give pleasure to thousands of readers. In *Mr. Perrin and Mr. Traill*, *The Dark Forest*, *The Green Mirror*, and in the *Herries* stories with their vivid historical background, Walpole wrote with ease and competence, and sometimes with a sinister intensity. There was a macabre element which persisted in intruding into his work. He once told

me that he was unable to account for it, but it may have been due to the cruelty he suffered when he was a very small boy at a preparatory school.

Mr. E. M. Forster, who, with James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, and Mr. Aldous Huxley, form the group which has excited a great deal of fulsome adulation from the intellectual critics most completely divorced from the traditional outlook upon fiction, is a precise and fastidious writer, whose creative impulse is not a very strong one. He is apparently more interested in life and letters than in the writing of fiction, and it is curious that he should have reached his present pinnacle of fame on the strength of his actual performance. Unquestionably he has great qualities as a character creator, within rather narrow limits. His cultured spinsters, undergraduates, and Anglo-Indians are extremely well done. When he attempts action in his stories he usually achieves rather crude melodrama, but as a subtle and rather mischievous commentator on a relatively small cross-section of life, he is outstanding. In my opinion *Abinger Harvest*, a fascinating collection of literary essays, is better than *Howards End*, *A Room with a View*, *A Passage to India*, or any of his fiction.

Like Mr. Swinnerton, Mr. Oliver Onions has written one outstanding short novel, *In Accordance with the Evidence*. This hinges on a successful and ingenious murder. His other novels do not approach its standard. A more considerable talent is that of Mr. Francis Brett Young. Possessed of most of the qualities required by a good novelist, except humour, he has written at least two spacious, leisurely, and satisfying tales, which do not date and which portray the varied Midland scene with colour and fidelity. These two are *Portrait of Clare*, and *My Brother Jonathan*, the story of a doctor, which is a companion piece to Mr. Somerset Maugham's *Of Human Bondage*. Mr. Maugham's style is so precise, so lucid, that it blinds the critic to a certain lifelessness and lack of true creative joyousness in his fiction. These are his principal defects, though he managed to conceal them to a great extent by choosing picturesque and exotic settings for his stories. *The Narrow Corner*, a tale of the Malayan Archipelago, is, perhaps, the best of them.

Virginia Woolf, a daughter of Sir Leslie Stephen, the critic and essayist, was a subtle and consistent experimenter in the impressionistic form, more discriminating and selective in her approach than Miss Dorothy Richardson has been. Her work has been likened by Mr. Priestley to "rapid coloured films that have occasional moments of great poignancy," and the reader can have no doubt of her considerable intellectual ability. She began her career as a novelist with a flying start. Her prowess as a thinker and talker were already acknowledged. There were critics ready to acclaim her first novel almost before they had read it. Her two first novels, *The Voyage Out* and *Night and Day* achieve a defined pattern, but in her later fiction impressionism clearly won the day at the expense of coherence. In *Orlando* the principal character experiences a change of sex in the course of the narrative. It would

be impossible to classify this book as a novel. It is a fascinating experiment which refuses to conform to any recognized type.

The creative power, the ability to present characters, was never strong in this writer. When Mrs. Woolf allowed the strongly subjective side of her genius to take full charge, she was in her element, and for that reason her best book is *A Room of One's Own*, a really delightful plea for woman's economic independence, made in the academic atmosphere which was so congenial to her. Her books will continue to be read by a number of readers, not for her merits as a novelist but because she had a rare and subtle mind capable of catching and conveying delicate impressions in beautiful prose. Miss Rose Macaulay has a mind more nimble and perhaps a little less subtle than Virginia Woolf's. She is both wise and witty, a poet with a very critical outlook on all human manifestations. She uses her great gift for satire with energy and verve. It is not her fault that, on putting down one of her excellent entertainments, the reader feels that he has been allowed to inspect a collection of diverting oddities. It is the writer's habit of mind which seizes on the ludicrous and mocks it with a fine perception of what human values ought to be and most emphatically are not. If Miss Macaulay were ever to abandon her aloof attitude to novel writing and to concentrate her several talents within the framework of a single book, it might well be a memorable and enduring piece of literature.

It seems unlikely that James Joyce will continue to enjoy the adulation which was showered upon him by critics who were obviously anxious to be regarded as heralds of the new dawn of fiction when *Ulysses* appeared. Joyce was a musician. He had a remarkable sense of prose rhythm. He had read widely. He had an extensive and peculiar knowledge of certain aspects of Dublin life. He was very much a literary artist and experimenter. Unfortunately he ignored one vital fact. A writer must conform to contemporary standards of intelligibility and comprehension. Joyce chose to disregard them. *Ulysses* deals with one day in the life of an Irish Jew who left his wife in the morning and returned to her at night, thus providing some small justification for the title. This brief summary gives no idea of the book's scope and contents. The "stream of consciousness" flows here in full and chaotic spate. Extraordinary outrages are perpetrated at the expense of the English tongue. It has been noted by a critic that Joyce tried to do "in printed prose what might be done by a combination of motion-picture and programme-music." No one can deny that there are flashes of genius in *Ulysses* and in the still more incomprehensible *Finnegan's Wake*. Unfortunately, judged by normal standards they are both impossible to read.

It is a relief to turn to the work of a novelist who is content to use traditional forms. Mr. J. B. Priestley's most resounding triumph was won by the cheerful, happy story, *The Good Companions*. At the time of its publication, 1929, the English novel was in the doldrums. Adventures in

morbid psychology and laborious translations from the German were the fashion and Mr. Priestley set himself deliberately to break down a vicious convention, and went about his work with notable enthusiasm. He assembles a small company of people, turns them into a concert party, and lets them loose over half England. It was an excellent device for his purpose. Humour, high spirits, and the belief that without courage and perseverance it is impossible to cope with life, animate every page of this compelling novel. Here and there the characterization is exaggerated, coincidence plays too large a part, and the author is too resolutely high-spirited. These are small blemishes in a first-rate piece of work, which is rich in well-observed incidental humours and oddities.

Angel Pavement, its successor, a more serious and ambitious book, is the author's most satisfying novel up to date. His future is full of possibilities, and his reputation will probably grow for the work that he has done already. He would be a better novelist if he were not interested in many different literary forms, but he is in tune with the aspirations and dreams of his fellow men, and although he is constantly experimenting, he has the good sense to understand in achieving subtlety it is positively unnecessary to become unintelligible, an attitude which our less percipient intellectuals are entirely unable to comprehend.

Exactly contemporary with Mr. Priestley, Mr. Aldous Huxley seems to survey the contemporary scene with some of the distaste and detachment shown by Miss Macaulay. He also enjoys collecting oddities in his pages, and his early fiction, up to and including *Crome Yellow* shows clear evidence of the influence of Peacock. An intellectual, very much alone in an uncongenial world, Huxley is an entertaining and provocative writer. He gives the impression of being uninterested in ordinary people. His two best novels, *Point Counterpoint* and *Those Barren Leaves* are full of brilliant conversation and stimulating opinions. Both of them are "menagerie" novels, exhibiting strange and remarkable fauna. Huxley is primarily a subjective writer, who does not seem to be greatly interested in the mechanics of fiction. As in the novels of Virginia Woolf the creative impulse does not seem to be strong, and Mr. Huxley's books are read principally for their author's thoughtful comments on men and things, expressed with a maximum of brilliance and wit. Still comparatively young, his future development is a matter of considerable importance to English letters.

The last decade has witnessed a sad decline in the fortunes of the novel. Perhaps circumstances have made us less humorous than we used to be. Certainly we have shown a tendency to appreciate the portentous and the trivial, at the expense of the honest, the sane, and the normal. It is as though we had lost our literary sense of proportion, and the novels published during the period are, on the whole, a reflection of the public taste. There are, of course, some striking exceptions to this widespread mediocrity of

accomplishment. Among the women writers, Miss Clemence Dane, whose *Regiment of Women* fluttered the doves years ago, wrote *The Moon is Feminine*, probably her best novel. Helen Simpson died before she reached her prime. Stella Gibbons, whose *Cold Comfort Farm* is one of the funniest and best parody-satires ever written has not attempted a successor in that genre. Miss E. M. Delafield, whose sense of humour is no less keen than Stella Gibbons' has invented in her *Provincial Lady* a character which gives her endless opportunities for poking fun at different aspects of life. Miss Elizabeth Bowen seems fated to take Virginia Woolf's place in the esteem of the intellectuals. She is a more considerable novelist and she has a real talent for delicate prose writing and a vein of nostalgic evocation which serves her well. The abrupt staccato realities of I. Compton-Burnett mask the virtues of a novelist who delights in depicting the interplay of character, which she draws as convincingly as any of her contemporaries.

Among the men the explosive entertainments of Mr. Evelyn Waugh provide a brilliant contrast to the subfusc patterns which seem to please most of those who are writing now. Mr. Forrest Reid continues to tread delicately his lonely path. The Poet Laureate shows, at intervals, that he can tell as good a story of sea adventure as any man living. The sensitive prose of Mr. Graham Greene serves to clothe some acute psychological studies. After writing one perfect long-short story, *Lady Into Fox*, Mr. David Garnett has seemed unable to blend matter and manner satisfactorily. Mr. Osbert Sitwell continues to write stories which are beautifully polished and delightfully malicious. Loudly applauded by the intelligentsia Mr. Christopher Isherwood seems to be most at ease when he is writing of the degenerate demi-monde of Berlin in the years which followed the last war. Mr. Norris Hughes' *Changes Trains*, the best of his novels, reveals the author's fascinated preoccupation with abnormal types. It is too soon yet to tell whether he will merge as a full-fledged novelist.

Unfortunately there is not space to mention various other able writers whose works do not especially call for comment. It is my opinion that the present decline in the standard of fiction is purely temporary and that it will not be long before one of the novelists already before the public, or some author as yet unknown will add gloriously to the many fine novels which are so cherished a part of our national library.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By STEPHEN GWYNN

Wilderness Sings is announced as "printed for the author," Mr. J. Lyle Donaghy, by the Wood Printing Press, Dublin, 6s. This means that no publisher has thought it likely to be a profitable investment; it means also that Mr. Donaghy has faith in the lasting importance of his work; and in my judgment his faith may be justified. He is already known as a poet, and for the last twenty years or so has been among the group whose headquarters is Dublin—all of them very much in the modern movement, to which my sympathy does not easily go out. Mr. Donaghy does not give me at once the pleasure of poetry; he is too difficult and dispenses with many allurements, rhyme for instance, and he has not the spontaneity of song. Nevertheless, he has made me feel that his poetry matters; there is in it the reality of poetic thought and poetic feeling, and an observation as keen as any painter's. It is the contemplation of nature through a mind steeped in modern geology, natural history and the rest, but steeped no less in the legends and literature handed down from Greece. He has drunk also what Ireland offers in the same kind; but Herakles means more to him than Cuchulain. Of the English poets Shelley (the "sun-treader" as he calls him) is probably his special master—none the less because he quotes Tolstoi as a teacher. But let us hear himself. He hopes that his work may outlive him:

Because the naked world
Became a storm of beauty in my brain
And all the heavens were lightened by the truth.

That puts the claim high, but after reading these poems I recognize that he has experienced ecstatic contemplation which he can in some measure transmit. Take the first of his "Symphonies":

The river goes out of the valley
the farer through gorge and gap
And into the black-sided inlet
sometimes the sea-birds come
As long before man they came there
travelling the river upward
deep in folds of the hills.

By the river, by lake or valley, in its trees, in its hills, nature to him is beauty, but man is an intruder, "a spore-cap of disease over the earth." With exultation the poet foresees a time

when frost has burned away
Even the memoryless traces of man,

and he praises the excellence of fate

that with such white word mute
shall close the obscene debate.

But if man is no delight to him, other living creatures are; he sees how

hare with startled ear
and twitching nostril stares from scrubby form;
he can show you the dragonfly:

Oh, monstrous jowl, great eyes and whole body
beautiful beyond compare
tingling in metallic movement, of acute transitions
exquisite king,
organic jewellery.

At least, however, human interest is admitted in a poem about his father, and another "In Memory," clearly of his mother, who gave him her own human love for the Dublin hills. Though the style is to my mind disfigured by recurring intrusions of words borrowed from the jargon of science, "saprophytic," "glumaceous," and so on, I admit that he almost reconciles me to verse without rhyme or fixed metre; and even though more than a few of the poems are incoherent, I recognize in what he writes, for instance of the life of trees, true and informed insight. Four "Philosophical poems" with which the book closes have the sincerity of articulate thought. Nature, as he holds, continually repeats itself but never exactly.

No crystal is absolutely perfect in shape, or perfectly pure!
From these perpetual approximations
proceed partly enrichment of change, variety; personality,
perhaps individual will—

But Mr. Donaghy must say the rest for himself. Beyond question to me, he gives us real poetry; and it may be that in another fifty years it will be said, he gave us great poetry.

* * * * *

Mr. Richard Hillary's book *The Last Enemy** is another with which later generations may probably concern themselves, but for its value as a document, rather than as literature. Yet to have given it that value is a considerable literary achievement; it interprets the prevailing mood in which elaborate young men went from Oxford and Cambridge into the Air Force—changing their preoccupation with athletics and with "dilettante browsing" for a way of life that offered "a concentration of amusement, fear and exaltation, impossible to experience in any other form of existence." Not that they were all so "egocentric" as he (the word is of his choosing, not mine); some were "willing to co-operate to the full"; but Mr. Hillary and others, known as "the long haired boys," did not make things easy for their instructors. More specially they were quite clear in their "dislike of organized emotion and patriotism" and wanted no more than a chance to prove "that undisciplined though we might be, we were a match for Hitler's dogma-fed youth." There was, however, one intimate, from Cambridge, not from Oxford, who had less fear of lapsing into "copy-book talk." This was a Pease who, when driven into a confession of faith, admitted that Christianity seemed to him "the only way of life worth fighting for." In reality Mr. Hillary gives us the story of his own conversion—not to Christianity in a theological sense but to humanity which is not egocentric. Incidentally of course he gives us the adventures of a "long haired boy" who survives his comrades, Peter Pease among them, but pays for it with disfigurement—almost with loss of sight. In the record of his fighting

* Macmillan. 7s. 6d.

experiences during the "battle of Britain" he lets us know that "the losing of friends was extremely impersonal—they simply weren't there, sufficient unto the day was the emotion thereof." Finally came his crash into the North Sea, described in the book's first pages—and after it the hospital experience, new eyelids to be provided, and lips also. In hospital, he saw in a vision the death of his friend Peter. Yet he remained egocentric when news came that left himself "the last of the long haired boys"; and not much different when one of his friends who had been a conscientious objector announced change of heart—and the intention to join up. What finished conversion was the experience of an ordinary London raid and the call to take a hand in getting out a woman whose child had been killed beside her, and who died too, as they reached her. He realized then what Peter Pease had told him, that it was necessary to feel deeply the deaths of others because in that way a value was conferred on life. Altogether, the book certainly carries conviction; it asserts itself as a document.

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Even the longest established reviewer cannot have read everything and I own up this month to approaching as new acquaintances two much admired authors. Yet what Messrs. Faber publish (at 8s. 6d.) as *Best Stories of Walter de la Mare* may be called their author's favourite pickings out of no less than four earlier collections. How did it happen that none of them ever came my way? Mr. de la Mare's verse I have known, of course, but not his prose—which is so typically a poet's. If anyone chooses to construe this into meaning that the prose is only his second-best, I make no protest—so long as you admit that even Mr. de la Mare's second-best is very good indeed. There are poets, Kipling is one example, whose prose is definitely better than their verse; but then Kipling's verse, though a most vivid and vital way of expression, is not quite what one means by poetry. And again Stevenson, in various ways the finest master of English prose who worked during my lifetime, means more to us by his essays and by his narrative than ever by his verse—even than when he wrote "Hail and farewell, I must arise." But I cannot feel that these stories, in spite of their exquisite finish, give me the essential Mr. de la Mare. Just before entering on them I had been re-reading Anatole France's *Le Livre de Mon Ami*—and *M. Bergeret à Paris*. There is much in the opening of Mr. de la Mare's collection to remind me of the Frenchman; it is a study of grown-up jealousies and loves seen through the eyes of a too intelligent small boy; yet, to say truth, if I were to look for something from Mr. de la Mare that could stand beside that French masterpiece, I should have to pick it from the poems.

* * * * *

On the other hand, on reading *My Remarkable Uncle and Other Sketches* by Stephen Leacock (Lane 7s. 6d.) I find myself telling myself how Anatole would have enjoyed the observation of this other professor on "The Passing of the Kitchen." There is a wealth of curious knowledge which would have appealed to M. Bergeret, united to an observant philosophy not at all unlike M. Bergeret's own. It is excellently illustrated in this essay, which traces the evolution of human habitations from the need to protect that central soul of existence which is the kitchen fire. The modern housewife, or he for whom she makes provision,

Humorous
Philosophy

will find here succulent detail about Edward IV's dinner at the consecration of an archbishop—a thousand sheep, three hundred calves, as many of hogs, with geese and capons to match, and a matter of thirteen thousand lesser birds. She will find also full appreciation of the modern appliances which enable her daintily to achieve something infinitely better than ever came from Cardinal Wolsey's famous kitchen at Christ Church where you could roast an ox whole over one of the fires.

I am not always so pleased with this Canadian humorist; for instance when he writes on "Cricket for Americans." Personally, I never played cricket seriously since I left school; but I was brought up with reverence for the game; and indeed I and a distinguished soldier whose name is familiar to readers of *THE FORTNIGHTLY* for long knew it as our chief distinction that we were related to our younger brothers—whose achievements were remarkable. Professor Leacock seems to lack a sense of true fitness—as also when he writes of angling, though then he does see something real behind the "piscatorial urge." But for the very model of an essay that will do good to any reader, and make him enjoy being done good to, take Professor Leacock on "The British Soldier." That lights up the history of the past three generations. He proceeds, on the next page, to joke statistically, which one could not easily forgive were it not so easily forgotten, or, still better, skipped. But his envoi, "A Salutation across the Sea" from Canada to the British is a thing for which to thank heartily this Anatolian professor—is it of Economics?

THE NEW LEVIATHAN, by R. G. Collingwood. Oxford Clarendon Press. 21s.

"Leviathan was burned at Oxford in 1683, but it proved impossible to put out the flame." So said Dr. G. P. Gooch lecturing for the British Academy in 1939. He was assuredly right. Signs multiply that the vogue of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury is greater to-day than at any moment since *Leviathan* was published in 1651.

"It is only now" says Dr. Collingwood in the Preface to the work under review "that men here and there are for the first time becoming able to appreciate Hobbes's *Leviathan* at its true worth as the world's greatest store of political wisdom." Dr. Gooch described Hobbes's work as "one of the great books of the world." And here we have one of the most brilliant of Oxford philosophers attempting to bring "the *Leviathan* up-to-date,

in the light of the advance made since it was written, in history, psychology, and anthropology."

Dr. Collingwood follows closely the original scheme. Hobbes divided his work into four parts. The first dealt with 'man,' his characteristics and capacities, his virtues and defects. The Second Part 'Of Commonwealth' dealt with the State and contained Hobbes famous exposition of the origin of Civil Society in a "Social Contract" and an exposition which has been generally taken to be an apology for absolute sovereignty. Part III. is entitled "Of a Christian Commonwealth," and was bitterly resented by Hobbes's friend Lord Clarendon and all the "Anglican" party in the English Church. "Of the Kingdom of Darkness" was the subject of Part IV.

Dr. Collingwood's scheme differs from Hobbes's only in terminology, and therein but slightly, "Man," "Society," "Civilization" and "Bar-

barism" are the themes on which he dilates. Part I. exhibits the author as the moral and metaphysical philosopher; the rest of the book deals, of course, in the scientific sense with Politics.

Hobbes's reputation in the eighteenth century suffered from the political ascendancy of the Whigs who found in John Locke a philosophical apologist for the 'limited monarchy' to which England was committed after the accession of the Hanoverian sovereigns. In the nineteenth the most formidable critics of Hobbes were the anthropologists who revealed the unit of primitive society to be not the haunted and hunted individual but the family or group. As a fact much of the criticism of the anthropology was, as far as Hobbes was concerned beside the point, since Hobbes's account of the origin of society was not historical but purely philosophical.

No similar target for mis-directed critics will be found in *The New Leviathan* written in the full light of modern research and with a firm grasp both of Economics and Politics. That the Clarendon Press should publish an important book without an index seems, on the face of it rather surprising. But I half-suspect that the omission is (on the author's part) deliberate. An "index" would almost certainly send the more casual reader to the words 'Germans and Germany.' Nor (it is proper to add) would he be disappointed.

Little as the author of *The New Leviathan* may like it, he may take it as certain that the portion of his work on which the ordinary reader will fasten with most avidity, will that dealing with the evolution of the modern German spirit (ch. xxxiii), and the gradual development of German "Barbarism."

Nor will they be disposed to quar-

rel with his conclusion that "barbarists in the end have always been beaten." (p. 386). This conclusion he reaches as Dr. Collingwood says "by the induction study of cases." The cases are the devastation of North Africa by the Saracens—"the psychological substitute for the uncompleted conquest of the world"; the persecution of the "Albigensian heretics"; the barbarities inflicted by the Ottoman Turks, and lastly by the Germans whose barbarism, Dr. Collingwood thinks, may be "dated not too inaccurately to the age of Bismarck," though he is careful to add that this does "not mean that it had never exhibited itself before that time, or that by that time it was fully formed." (p. 374).

Dr. Collingwood adopts a very curious form of writing; each chapter consists of some 90 numbered paragraphs, all short and many of them consisting of only one or two sentences. To many people I fear this form will be, as it is to myself, awkward if not actually repellent, though the latter's method undoubtedly makes for precision and lucidity.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

A COMBINE OF AGGRESSION, by Karl Otten. Translated by Eden Paul and F. M. Field. George Allen & Unwin. 15s.

EUROPE AGAINST AMERICA, by R. H. M. Worsley. Jonathan Cape. 8s. 6d.

Although these two books deal with different subjects they belong decidedly together. The German author, Mr. Karl Otten, analyses the psychological premises which enabled Hitler to get hold of the amorphous masses of the German people, whereas the Englishman, Mr. R. H. M. Worsley, exposes the economic war aims of National Socialism. The connection is clear. Had not

the huge masses of the Germans blindly followed Hitler, the *élite* would never have been able to start on their road to world conquest.

Karl Otten, well known in Germany and Switzerland, is not for nothing the disciple of the famous German sociologist, Max Weber. His work is a profound analysis of the psychology of the German masses and explains how these masses who formerly for the most part had made up the ranks of international Socialism and Communism, could be filled with such demonic hostility against democratic civilization. After giving a historical review of the events after the first world war, Otten comes by methodical philosophical and sociological deductions to the conclusion that it was despair at the non-acceptance of their social ideas which drove them into the arms of the prophets of Naziism. They allowed themselves to be mesmerized by the ideology of the "talked socialism," by such slogans as "New Order," "Right of Labour," "Racial Supremacy," "Right based on Might and Conquest" and so on in grandiloquent sequence. It is easy to understand that these masses, without a will of their own, became the instruments for the aggressive plans of a combined group of General Staff officers and leaders of economics who, in order to make the deception of the masses complete, chose as the personification of their power a man of these same masses. This basis of modern evolution exists in all mechanized capitalist and state-capitalist states; in Germany and Italy however as well as in Japan the ruling *élite* knew how to turn this "a priori" revolutionary will of the mechanized masses into the fanatical readiness to start the modern blitzkrieg. Mr. Otten is able to prophesy that the day will come when the pathological struc-

ture of the totalitarian state will prove inferior to the cool calculations of the Anglo-Saxons whose peoples and resources have yet to be organized to the full.

Mr. R. H. M. Worsley, the English author, provides the economic completion to Mr. Otten's psychological deductions. He presents the first fundamental analysis of the economic war machine as the German General Staff had prepared it long before. The thorough minded Prussian *Junkers* in the proud uniform of the General Staff learned the lessons of the first world war. Examining the reasons for the breakdown of the home front which led to the breakdown of the fighting front, they recognized the failure of organizing supply properly as one of the principal reasons. They demanded after Hitler's arrival to power, the total command of economic policy. Hitler knowing that he could not win his wars with the party, but only with the army, sacrificed his most loyal collaborator, Ernst Roehm, and granted the army what it wanted. The "Inspectorate of war economy," a most important department of the war ministry which had been in full activity long before Hitler made himself Lord of the German Reich, now became supreme master of all economic bodies, such as the "Labour Front," the "State Organization of Industry," the "Chambers of Commerce," etc. Strategy replaced economy.

The result of this grand war strategy is that to-day the whole of the European continent is working for Hitler who disposes of no less than 37.5 per cent. of the total world trade. Trust him to make the best use of this state of affairs in his fight against the Anglo-Saxons. To become undisputed master of the world he has to break the economic as well as the political

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ERNST KLEIN.

THE DEMOCRATIC ADVANCE, by Edward Mousley. *Dakers*. 6s.

PEACE BY POWER, by Lionel Gelber. *Oxford University Press*. 3s.

SOCIALISM—NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL? by Franz Borkenau. *Routledge*. 5s.

Viewed in retrospect the cardinal sin of the nineteenth-century liberalism, surely, was its obscuring of the factor of power in human society. This arose, on the one hand, from the current obsession with money and money values, which is reflected still in the economic text-books. On the other hand, since it was *British* capitalism which made the running, there was the additional element of innocence—a genuine unconsciousness of the underlying power structure, which has characterized Anglo-Saxon thought on international matters ever since the Navy established our island security.

Only in the past few years has this unawareness of power begun to yield to the harsh realities. Now the books defining and elucidating the power-problem are tumbling off the presses. Mr. Edward Mousley has already given us an admirable, if rather elaborate, exposition of the theme in his *Man or Leviathan*. In this little postscript, dedicated to the boys and girls of Britain, he is concerned to hammer home two truths: (1) that "superior power is no less essential to maintain the victory than to win the victory," and (2) that, by an essential law of human evolution, "the eternal extension of the radius of order over human society is based on power." The democratic advance has reached a point, he argues, when nothing less than the establishment of an international polity, however rudimentary, will restore the light of civilization to a Europe that "has passed under almost total Nazi eclipse."

Mr. Lionel Gelber's book points the same moral, with special reference to the rôle of the United States. Written over a year ago, however, before Americans had become conscious that they must sink or swim with the British—and before the Russian factor came into the picture—it has little relevance to the present, and, moreover, is so evidently addressed to the 'Western Hemisphere' that its publication over here at this time seems rather a mistake.

Mr. Borkenau, as usual, provides solid good sense, though his book is not easy reading. He is concerned to refute the traditional view that Socialism is an international movement. It is actually so, only from the *ideological* angle, as all experience shows, not least the attitude of labour in Britain on the refugee question! We can all agree that "labour internationalism has proved to be one of the most futile ideologies ever cherished."

what Mr. Borkenau writes is indeed trite—outside the Labour movement, at any rate. But in his last two chapters he says some home truths on Labour's "ostrichism" about the League and sentimental cant with regard to federal union which badly needed saying. His main point is that the post-war world and its international planning will require emphatically a "central authority having power to override all individual interests" but that this is not practicable on a basis of equality of all participants. A joint Anglo-American leadership alone will provide the way forward. The author foresees ultimately a development parallel with that of Rome.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

PARENTS REVOLT, by Richard and Kathleen Titmuss. *Secker & Warburg*. 3s. 6d.

The value of the short book, of which the war has so far brought us several outstanding examples, is that it sets itself a limited objective and having determined on a line of approach advances rapidly and logically to its conclusions without so much as a glance at the many and varied byways that abound on either side. The authors of this book have not been so wise in their conception, nor so fortunate in execution. They select as their sub-title, "A Study of the Declining Birth-Rate in Acquisitive Societies," a large field of enquiry demanding in itself a fat volume. Even so they are only half content and dealing with opinions as well as study give the reader the impression that they ache constantly to provide more than the allotted space permits.

Yet no subject is really more important than population and Richard and Kathleen Titmuss have a valuable store of information on which to draw. The phenomenon of the

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declining birth-rate will increasingly attract attention and whether it is approached historically, sociologically, or merely nationally, it teems with debatable points which will engage research for many years. The fact that there are now in England and Wales 2,000,000 fewer children under 14 than there were in 1914 and at the same time 2,500,000 more men and women over 60 years of age, is in itself a staggering consideration. As the authors put it this means that whereas there are less children to care for there are more old people to provide for, a state of affairs which if allowed to continue will place an intolerable strain on the actual working population.

The authors conclude:

A revolution in reproduction such as we have witnessed amongst the white peoples during the last sixty years cannot be met and solved by alleviating social distress and by measures of social reform. The economic liability of children is one factor in declining fertility; a factor which must be solved but it is not, we believe, the deciding factor.

So far I am in complete agreement. It was a weakness of Wing-Commander Wright's argument in moving the question of family allowances in the House of Commons last June that he placed too much emphasis on the effect these allowances would have on the birth-rate. Judging from what has happened so far the necessary raising of many people's standard of living would not increase the birth-rate but diminish it. The authors continue:

So long as men, twisting, turning, fighting and rotting in an economic society, in which they are saturated with class thinking, are forced to compete one with another so long will they refuse to reproduce themselves.

The connection is not clear and is, in any case, highly questionable. The authors themselves show how the birth-rate remained high

through the greater part of the 19th century, a period of intense competition and bitter class distinction, under the unbridled system of *laissez faire*. That parents have revolted against these conditions I do not doubt and in so far as they do so they contribute their mite to the world revolt, the many eruptions of which we now witness and endure. But it is too speculative, I think, to argue that the competitive society and class division are the causes of the declining birth-rate. Rather is the declining birth-rate a further illustration of the spiritual distemper of our times.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

THE BOOK OF REVELATION IS HISTORY, by H. S. Bellamy. Faber & Faber. 8s. 6d.

Someone who, like myself, is not much more than an occasional guest in the house of the commentators upon the mysterious book with which the Bible ends, can bring to judgment only a very ordinary supply of critical commonsense. Mr. Bellamy himself has been an inmate of that house for years—though not quite a member of the family—and he knows intimately all work which his predecessors have done. He is, in addition, as his *Moons, Myths and Man* shows, extremely well versed in the whole range of mythological science and lore; and it is this rather uncommon store of knowledge which he brings to the interpretation of the Apocalypse.

Mere critical commonsense is therefore well out of its depth from the start, and so it remains to the end. But none the less it rings the warning bell. For example, Mr. Bellamy propounds a theory of the linguistic problem: probably his theory is right—I wouldn't know. But he adds rather truculently, "Henceforth this will be the only

possible point of view to be taken by critics and commentators of the Book of Revelation." Well, it may be so, but the author of the theory should not pronounce it quite so confidently. Again, he separates the mythological from the religious material, and says of the latter that it "cannot interest us here. This religious material has therefore been eliminated altogether in this treatise." But what sort of a treatise is it which takes a book written with a fundamental religious purpose, and whose author plainly thought that the mythological part was germane to that purpose, and calmly disregards the whole of the directly religious sections? It is rather as though somebody who disliked the central element of the Cross in the Gospel were to write a commentary on St. Mark from which every reference to Calvary had been excised. The result would not be very lucid but might still be extremely interesting, and that is exactly true of Mr. Bellamy's book. His interpretation of the apocalyptic myths is certainly interesting, and even enthralling. He believes that they reflect, and bind together many ancient traditions and written accounts of two supreme disasters which happened to the world in "prehistoric" days, when the vagaries of spatial gravity and the interruption in the normal courses of planets brought a virtually complete destruction of the sum total of human achievement, and almost of human life, at the end of the Tertiary Age. This is Mr. Bellamy's key of interpretation, and it is in this sense that he claims that the "Book of Revelation is History."

ROGER LLOYD.

RETROSPECT OF AN UNIMPORTANT LIFE. Vol. I. 1863-1920, by H. Hensley Henson. Oxford University Press. 16s.

Since the Bishop chooses to refer back to his own life as "unimportant," the reader must summon up the considerable mental reservations demanded of his silent acquiescence; but he remains free to proclaim the life as of great interest in itself and of considerable significance in the context of its times. The life was that of a liberal, in the best sense of that term; the times were hardening towards a more rigid partizanship in all human activities. Through them went Hensley Henson, a man of exceptional intelligence and an unusual capacity for hard work and conflict in defence of convictions deeply held.

A humble and devout belief in God and, under God, in his own ministerial calling; an outlook which remained more lay than clerical throughout long years in the highest ecclesiastical circles; a great desire to work out in the Church what he believed to be her characteristically English and re-united destiny, based on the Restoration Settlement; a dislike of all extremes, whether of Ritualism or of "obscurantist Bibliolatry" in Church or of party, privilege or class in the State; a sturdy and plain-spoken individualism combined with a firm belief in the broad flow of national tradition and an almost reverential respect for Law—it would indeed be hard to find anyone more characteristically English than this clergyman.

Even in the heresy-hunt which preceded his election to the See of Hereford, a vitriolic and sustained attack which obviously caused him, usually so heedless of wounds, acute distress, his "heresy" was very, very English. He believed that only a special intervention of Providence,

working through ways perhaps unknowable to man, could account for the Birth and Life of Jesus, and that since the Ascension the triumphant Christ has reigned in glory and power; but he also maintained that this belief need not necessarily be accepted only in literal and material terms of parthenogenesis and of levitation.

From a middle-class home and a local day-school "of no great merit" Hensley Henson, desperately pressed for money and time went to Oxford in 1881 for three years of Non-Collegiate obscurity, to emerge in 1884 at the age of 21 with a First in History, and an immediate Fellowship of All Souls, a distinction destined to remain his chief joy and refreshment throughout life. His earliest years in Orders seem to have been mismanaged by well-meaning friends: to appoint a raw Deacon as Head of the Oxford House in Bethnal Green and thence to send him on as Vicar of the ancient and important parish of Barking six months before his twenty-fifth birthday showed a sad lack of discrimination between a high opinion of Hensley Henson and the real needs of an untrained beginner. He duly got the trouble his friends asked for him; he soon left the Oxford House where he had been an obvious misfit, and five years later he resigned Barking with health impaired by premature responsibilities. A largely nominal Chaplaincy of St. Mary's Hospital, Ilford, gave him opportunity to develop his real gifts of study and preaching and by 1900 he was ripe for the Abbey and St. Margaret's.

The next dozen years were obviously the happiest and most fruitful of all those described in this volume and saw Hensley Henson at his very best and in his true *métier* as a preacher and as a real power over public opinion in both Church and

State. His subsequent six years at Durham Deanery, though laborious as ever and not unhappy were necessarily clouded by the first world war; and the immediate post-war years brought him not only the general controversies of those fevered times but also the bitter opposition of the "Neo-Tractarians" to his nomination to Hereford. But in this he had the last, English, word when he took early opportunity to promote a recent opponent to a Prebendal stall. This volume ends with his impending return to an eagerly welcoming Durham; and the reader will await Volume II. no less eagerly.

JOHN HALET.

FROM THE LAND OF SILENT PEOPLE, by Robert St. John. Harrap. 8s. 6d.

This book would certainly have met with the approval of that great and beloved war-correspondent, Henry Nevinson, for in spite of all the terrible experiences through which the author and his handful of colleagues had to make their way from bombed Belgrade, through Bosnia, Montenegro, the Adriatic and Greece they never forgot their duty to editors and public.

We begin at Belgrade when those who had bowed to the demands of Hitler were swept aside in a wave of popular frenzy and the consequences were not for a moment weighed; when they were it was to feel that British soldiers and 'planes would come in vast numbers to the help of their ally. Alas, it was only in Greece that they appeared and then it was too late.

Mr. St. John, says:

We met a Yugoslav officer who had just come from the boy King's palace in Dedinje, on the edge of Belgrade. He told us all about being in the palace when bombs were landing on the gardens and close to the royal home. His

job had been to get Peter out of Belgrade. First, the boy didn't want to go at all. Then he agreed on the condition that he should be allowed to drive the car himself. They had come over the same winding road we had taken. Only by that time the German 'planes were working on the refugees, swooping down and riddling almost every car that tried to leave Belgrade, as well as pouring lead into the thin black ribbon of foot-loose people. But Peter refused to take any easy way out. He drove straight down the lead-sprinkled road at sixty miles an hour. Some lucky star apparently was looking over him, the officer said, because the bullets came close, yet never hit the car.

For Mr. St. John the destruction of Belgrade had not been without compensation, for when the Ministry of Press and Propaganda shared the fate of other government offices and became a charred shell an expulsion order against himself, on account of what he had written about those who would have tied this gallant people to the Axis as Roumania and Bulgaria have been tied, was destroyed.

One of the most thrilling parts of the book is that devoted to the voyage from a tiny Montenegrin port in a boat that none of the travellers knew how to manipulate, for the three American journalists and Terence Atherton of the *Daily Mail*—Mr. St. John does not mention that he used to edit that interesting paper *The Balkan Herald*—were as ignorant of navigation as was Mike, the elderly Yugoslav fisherman whom they took with them. "He was the proudest little man I ever saw," says Mr. St. John. "He was the hero of Petrovac na Mare. This was the one big moment of his life . . . Of course he didn't know then that he was sailing off to his death. And a miserable death at that. But neither did we. If we had known it we shouldn't have taken him." By night these adventurers guided themselves by the stars, forgetting that stars are not

stationary. They had to avoid the inshore mines, the submarines, the Italian and Albanian coasts and various other things. At last they reached Corfu, where their reception was not what they had bargained for. They had to prove that they were not parachutists, that the typewriters to which they clung were not radio sets, and Atherton had torn his passport into bits and thrown it into the Adriatic when it looked as if they would be captured—America was still officially neutral. It cannot be said that the British Consul in Corfu city was very helpful; most irregular, most irregular, said he when Atherton suggested he should issue him a temporary passport.

If one had space it would be given to many acts of heroism, such as that of the young Australian soldier in Greece who refused to leave an oldish New Zealander who could only live a few hours; we would describe the delightful encounter between the private who was a Russian prince and the major, something of a Blimp, at Cairo. There is much in this book that the squeamish will dislike; it is a man's book and should on no account be missed.

HENRY BAERLEIN.

POEMS OF THIS WAR. Edited by Patrica Ledward and Colin Strang, with an Introduction by Edmund Blunden. Cambridge. 5s.

THE VAN POOL, and other Poems, by Keidrych Rhys.

WOUNDED THAMMUZ, by John Heath-Stubbs.

SOLDIERS, THIS SOLITUDE, by Alan Rook.

THE IRON LAUREL, by Sidney Keyes.

Routledge's New Poets. 2s. 6d. net.

The best of the younger school of Norwegian poets, Nordahl Grieg,

nowadays devotes much time to reading his poems to Norwegian sailors and airmen. His work, which is classical in form and direct in expression, is said to arouse his compatriots to enthusiasm. Polish fighting men stationed in this country appear to occupy their leisure by reading and listening to poetry, and Polish poets who had to be content with small editions in pre-war Poland, find themselves best-sellers in Britain. I have not heard that poetry-readings are organized for the men in our own Forces; but if such an unexpected phenomenon is taking place, it is unlikely that Messrs. Routledge's new "Young Poets" are given pride of place. English poetry appears to be determined to remain recondite, or so personal that only the author has the key to its meaning. None of the four poets in the new series could expect to emulate Nordahl Grieg, and it is improbable that any of them would wish to. The divorce between English poets and the English people seems to have been made absolute.

In the five volumes of poetry under review there is abundant evidence of unusual perception and of considerable erudition; most of the poems—if one may generalize—disclose eager intelligence, if not profundity; quick emotional reactions, rather than deep feelings. But rarely does the poet set out to give the reader the freedom of his mind and heart, expressed in a form that could appeal to the ordinary cultured lover of poetry. Browning, accused of obscurity, contended that he always did his best to make his meaning clear. Our young contemporaries would make no such claim. Too often, since Mr. Eliot pointed the way, they conceal their thoughts behind barricades of recondite allusions and technical oddities, as if to ward off intimacy. Gram-

matical and typographical devices developed over the centuries are often thrown to the dogs, and punctuation is sometimes discarded altogether lest it should assist understanding. There is no consistency of treatment. Mr. Rhys, for instance, sometimes grants the conventional initial capitals, sometimes he doesn't; sometimes he will even hand out a colon or a semi-colon; but more often he lays his work before us in this way:

pleasures are known emotions on parade
the regional way of life
uppermost in Vale of Towy!
the remover's van furniture
thank-you letters posted off on a
Sunday
2 Chalk dogs

In spite of this, certainly not because of it, Mr. Rhys is able to create little homely scenes, revealed in flashes, as through the mind of a rather angry and bitter, but witty and self-assured young man in delirium; and he even sometimes achieves poetry.

Far removed from Mr. Rhys's deliberate angularity is the luscious tapestry-like texture of the long sustained poem "Wounded Thammuz" by John Heath-Stubbs. Milton's "Thammuz . . .

Whose annual wound, in Lebanon,
allured
Syrian damsels to lament his fate,
In amorous ditties, all a summer's
day . . ."

is the immediate source of Mr. Heath-Stubbs' inspiration, and his achievement is not unworthy of its origin. This poet has an unusually opulent vocabulary and an acute feeling for the evocative power of sounds. Although he is clearly in the modern swim, and even indulges in the modern habit of incorporating others' words without indicating that they are quotations ("The pearls which were your eyes" and "But in that sleep of death What dreams may come?"), Mr. Heath-Stubbs goes his own way, and is

truer to the Milton-Shelley-Swinburne tradition than to Eliot and post-Eliot. Some day Mr. Keidrych Rhys may ("oh how this next phenomena saddens me!" to quote him) give up poetry for prose, but Mr. Heath-Stubbs never.

There is high seriousness in the works of Mr. Alan Rook and Mr. Sidney Keyes which all their obscurities and perversities cannot conceal. Mr. Keyes' most sustained poem, "The Foreign Gate," for all its private symbolism and arbitrary and not always significant epithets, does communicate its theme and throw light on the workings of the modern mind in its relations to war:

Once men, then moving figures on a map,
Patiently giving time and strength and
vision
Even identity
Into the future's keeping . . .

He is able, too, to crystallize sensations and personalities in pregnant phrases—as in "Schiller Dying" where he evokes a mood not unlike that created by Thomas Mann's *Die Schwere Stunde*.

Mr. Alan Rook's poems show intellectual grasp, sincere feeling, and an active social conscience, as well as an instinct for the revealing word. For the present reviewer his method relies too much on the conversational cadence of the English language and not enough on strict form. It is not enough to divide up your sentences so that they make a pretty pattern on the page, if the divisions are arbitrary and have no relation either to sense, sound, or phrasing. The following verse, which is a summary of a faith supported by many other poems in the book, is typical of his method:

I see. I accept. In these three, in love,
the long
dream of beauty to be held and treasured,
and the wise relevant
fulfilment of the individual promise

(and continued over to the next verse)
is freedom.

These four books, together with the interesting and varied collection of "Poems of this War," provide substantial evidence that the claim that there is a "stirring of the poetic imagination" taking place in this country is not without foundation.

HERMON OULD.

THE POLLOCK-HOLMES LETTERS, edited by M. D. Howe. Cambridge University Press, 2 vols. 36s.

This is a good dog for those who like this kind of dog. There will be many who do. A correspondence extending over 60 years, "twisting the tail of my fellow monkey," between two men of such eminence removed from each other by a hemisphere, must surely be unique. The letters, naturally of the highest interest to any lawyer at a time when an even more intimate legal reciprocity between the lands of 'Our Lady, the Common Law' is under discussion, are also full of erudite *curiosa*, of informed comment on passing events and of reflections on the *comédie des mœurs* such as will reward the perambulant layman. There are of course pages in these Holmes-Pollock letters—I know no reason in alphabet or dignity why the title of the American edition should have been reversed—of which one may use Mr. Justice Holmes' "blasphemous" confession about Jane Austen: "Sometimes I find her a bore." Then—if the reader has not prematurely decided, as did Pollock on the *Recherche du temps perdu* that, as for this "time," he prefers not to lose it and that "life is really too short to do more than dip into" the matter—he will come across some such rewarding saying as Holmes'

dictum:—"age begins with 80;" or "Bergson is churning the void to make cheese;" or "civilization is the process of reducing the infinite to the finite" (? reducing mass to form).

The temptation is irresistible to look into the index and to see how one's acquaintances are faring. By 1932 Dr. C. E. M. Joad had not risen above the horizon of the higher consciousness nor had other more self-important people. Miss Anita Loos and Mr. Walter Lippmann each receive five references—the latter highly favourable. It requires the superior perspicacity of Holmes to perceive the importance of Professor Laski. In general the judgments of Pollock (politically a Liberal) are at once the more conventional in substance and the more peppery, if not arrogant, in style. Mr. Wells and Mr. Shaw are dismissed as "clever impostors"; Ramsay Macdonald is "a shifty knave," Mr. Lloyd George is "without knowledge or principle," Woodrow Wilson a "damned schoolmaster doctrinaire," Mussolini is "a man at any rate," and of Mr. Winston Churchill (three references) "his genius is too flighty." On the other hand Holmes refers to Dicey with the comment "what a dear, naïf, ingenuous creature he was," and to "my friend Nevinson in whom I delight."

No one was less pompous than Holmes, although his character was shot through by many a thread of soldierly pride. I recall being told in Washington how he had declined to have on his tombstone his legal dignities but only the inscription, "Captain, Massachusetts Infantry." Those of us who have seen the living man would believe this to be in character. In some ways there was,

in Holmes, an odd resemblance to Lord Cecil. He had the reputation among conservatives for radicalism because he belonged to a conservatism of an earlier vintage than theirs. Just as Lord Cecil permits an illusion of modernism because he is an internationalist, but really of the pre-Metternichian type, so Holmes believed in freedom of speech and the rights of man, not because he sympathized with the revolutionary Gitlow—of the once famous case, *Gitlow v. New York*—but because his outlook was still that of Jefferson and Adams. For Captain Holmes, and for Mr. Justice Holmes, liberty was that of the *liber homo*, the free fighting man. His liberalism, of which the implications were for thirty years to be developed in opinions in the U.S. Supreme Court, was founded on no Rousseau-ite optimism but upon a disbelief in the infallibility alike of majorities and of systems. For Holmes the best philosophy was the pragmatic; the best approach to life for him, as for Nevinson, was the humour of the soldier; and the best guide in his profession was faith in the common cause of the Common Law. Many over-wise wights to-day spend their time explaining how different are the English and American peoples. This correspondence, lasting for two generations, may serve to demonstrate to the perspicuous how similar the rulers and judges of the two halves of the English-speaking world have been, alike in their preferences and in their prejudices. *τερπύωνος ἀντίφρ.* The phrase here rings true. Holmes may not have been 'a representative American,' but surely he was a great American and typical in the sense that the great ever displays a type and makes it by example.

GEORGE CATLIN.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

OCTOBER, 1942

THE WAR: TWO JOBS, NOT ONE

BY JULIAN S. HUXLEY

I WAS once in Texas when Ma Ferguson was campaigning for Governor of that great State. One of the things I remember about that campaign is a huge poster of Mrs. Ferguson with her husband behind, looking over her shoulder; and underneath the slogan, "Two Governors for the Price of One."

To-day we have the possibility—indeed the necessity of doing two jobs—two enormous world-jobs—at the price of one. So far, most of us have only bothered about one of the jobs—getting on with the war. But over the shoulder of the war something else is looming up.

That something is no less than a world transformation. And by a world transformation I mean a process of drastic change, when history is being made much more quickly than usual, and the whole framework of the ideas and institutions by which and in which we live is being entirely re-shaped into a quite new form.

During the course of history, humanity has been through a number of these drastic transformations. One of the most familiar to us is the period of the Renaissance and Reformation, while another is that of the Industrial Revolution. During the Renaissance and the Reformation the Middle Ages were transformed into a more modern kind of world, where individual freedom of enterprise in exploration and business and politics, and individual freedom of judgment and enquiry in religion and philosophy and science, became substituted for the rigid framework of feudalism and the equally rigid framework of orthodox religious philosophy. During the Industrial Revolution (with which the American and French and Latin-American revolutions are linked) the pre-scientific world gave place to a world where individual enterprise found new frontiers opened to it by technology, where competitive economic enterprise was freed from innumerable restrictions, nationalism became the main driving force in world politics, and natural science at last began to play an important part in shaping the background of thought. It is this world brought into being by the Industrial Revolution which is now destined to disappear and be remodelled in the new transformation through which we ourselves are living to-day.

OLII

Do you doubt it? It is perfectly possible to do so, possible to live in the middle of a world transformation and yet not realize the fact of its existence. It is easy to concentrate on single symptoms—the war, or the depression, or the unrest in India, or the New Deal—rather than on the giant process as a whole. But it is the whole which counts. Unless we first recognize the existence of the world transformation, then do our best to understand it, and, finally, embark on it of set purpose in order to make it happen the way we want, we shall never release all the forces of democracy. Too many of those forces are still latent: that is why Hitler was able to sneer at us as sluggish and decadent “pluto-democracies.” But if we can mobilize their full potential, democracy could become more dynamic than Fascism or Communism or any other-ism or ideology.

If we look back at the last quarter of a century, we find country after country adopting new methods to compensate for the breakdown of the old. Sometimes the old system is rejected entire, and a wholly new one deliberately set up. The transformation then becomes a true revolution. Since 1917 there have been revolutions in Russia, in Italy, in Turkey, in China, in Germany, in Spain, in Portugal, in a pale sort of way in Vichy France, and in other countries. In all these cases, the revolution has been wholly or mainly totalitarian, though in Spain, Portugal and Russia it began by being democratic; in China its totalitarianism has been a matter of military necessity and political expediency, and it contains a good deal of actual and a great deal of potential democracy.

However, countries can suffer radical transformation without passing through a revolution. Japan, for instance, has always been totalitarian. It has transformed itself from a tribal and feudal to a modern technological totalitarianism. It anticipated Hitler in calling for the complete subordination of the individual to the State, and in ideas of a “New Order.”

Finally, you can have a transformation which is non-revolutionary and also democratic. So far, this particular kind of transformation has nowhere been completed; but it has gone quite a way in a number of countries. In the Scandinavian nations it revealed itself in the form of sweeping measures of social security. The British Dominions, most notably perhaps New Zealand, moved independently along a closely parallel course. The same trends, though in many ways not so sweeping, were followed by Britain between the two wars, and have become accentuated during the present war. In the United States the New Deal represented a partial but very sudden instalment of the transformation.

Internationally, things were happening too. The League of

Nations, the first attempt at world-wide international organization, came into being. Its failure merely served to underline the urgent need for *some* international political organization. Hitler's vision of this is the New Order, through which he has already gone a long way towards making Europe a unit. Japan's vision is the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The United Nations have their vision of such an organization, though it is as yet much vaguer. On the other hand, they have already undertaken various concrete pieces of international organization during the war which could readily continue in modified form after it is over—Lease-Lend, the leasing and sharing of strategic bases, unified committees for supply and other functions, the Czech-Polish Agreement, the Anglo-American Economic Agreement, and so on. The most fundamental change, however, is that the world has recognized the fact that it has become a unit.

Another international aspect of the transformation has been the greater concern over backward areas and peoples. Sometimes this has revealed itself merely in a desire to exploit material resources. Sometimes it is focussed on political advance, as with the United States' guidance of the Filipinos along the road to independence, sometimes on social and economic welfare, as in the West Indies. Sometimes it is thinking of all-round development, as in the increased sums of money made available during the war by Britain for her colonies. Sometimes it is concerned with backward regions inside the nation, as with the Depressed Areas in Britain, or the Tennessee Valley Authority in the U.S.A. Sometimes action is being forced by the demand of the dependent peoples, as in India. Sometimes even, as in Europe since the spring of 1940, the more powerful nation has forcibly driven others into backwardness, the better to be able to exploit their resources. There has also been the establishment of the Mandate system, which, for all its unreality in certain respects, did establish the principle that some backward areas at least were not possessions of a single Power, but the responsibility of the world at large.

At first sight, this jumble of events and tendencies may seem to reveal no common characteristics. Sudden revolution and slow evolution as processes; democracy and dictatorship as methods; exploitation and emancipation for backward peoples; social welfare and military aggression as national aims—what elements can these have in common? However, when we look more closely, we find that all over the world the transformation pursues certain broad trends which are everywhere similar in direction, while the differences are in their form. There is a trend away from *laissez-faire* towards planning; there is a tendency for the Government to

take a more positive hand in an increasing number of the activities of life; there is a trend to put non-economic motives and aims into first place; there is an increasing concern with the material and human resources of backward regions; and there is a growing realization of the necessity for some strong and thorough-going international organization.

Those are the common elements in the transformation, and they seem to be inescapable tendencies of the times, as inescapable as were the trends, a century and a half ago, towards mechanized private enterprise and the other main features of the Industrial Revolution. In some form or another they will accomplish themselves. But the form itself is not inescapable: there are alternatives. For one thing, the transformation may be got through faster or slower, with more friction or with less. That depends on whether we co-operate with the inevitable tendencies or whether we resist them. The people who talk, or have talked, about "the Wave of the Future" have seen this. But they have seen it crooked; they have not perceived the second cross-roads in the route. And this second alternative is more important than the first. The first was a choice of quantity—whether the transformation should go faster or slower. The second is a choice as to its quality: shall it be peaceful, co-operative, democratic, or shall it be militarist, totalitarian, brutal?

The believers in the Wave of the Future said, correctly enough, that a transformation had taken place in Nazi Germany, and that Germany had thereby become more efficient, more unified, more disciplined, more willing to make sacrifices, more proudly conscious of itself and its destiny; it no longer suffered from the hesitations and cross-purposes of the democracies, their lack of aim, their lack of a sense of satisfying purpose in life. They therefore concluded not merely that the democracies also ought deliberately to undertake their own transformation, but that this should follow the German model.

The first part of their conclusion was correct, but the second was not. They were wrong in concluding that there was only one kind of Wave of the Future, namely, the totalitarian Fascist model. There is also a democratic model. Or, rather, a democratic model is possible. Their mistake was in a way pardonable, for already some time before the war Germany and various other totalitarian countries had got through their transformation fairly completely, while nowhere had a transformation of democratic type gone more than part way towards completion, and nowhere had it been deliberately undertaken.

One of the reasons that no complete model of a democratic trans-

formation as yet exists is the slowness of our democracies. Another reason is that it is more difficult to get through this particular transformation in a democratic way than in a totalitarian way. Totalitarianism, in fact, provides a political short-cut towards stability and unity. Whether it ever actually gets there is another matter: but for the time being it certainly can achieve a good deal of unity and stability very quickly, just because it is totalitarian.

The problem before a democracy is much harder. It may realize that more planning and more government control are inevitable, that the automatic operation of economic motives is not enough to produce a satisfying life, that greater unification and a more conscious sense of unity are necessary, that international organization is urgently required. But how is democracy to achieve this and yet stay democratic? Planning, for instance—there are plenty of people who genuinely believe that planning is the thin end of the totalitarian wedge. Then there is the feeling of unity. How is it possible to achieve this without substituting propaganda for freedom of the press and untrammelled expression of opinion, without forcibly muzzling those with minority views? And, finally, how can you make nations join an international organization without doing violence to the democratic principles of national freedom and self-determination?

Once more, the answer is that it is difficult, but it can be done. Planning can be democratic. The Tennessee Valley Authority, for instance, in everything except its direct executive job of building dams and power plants, does not forcibly impose its plans on the region. It improves agriculture and checks erosion by persuading the farmers. It does not even distribute the electricity it generates; it persuades towns and rural areas to create their own distribution organizations. It does not force new methods on people; but it has designed a number of agricultural and electric appliances suitable for small farmers and rural consumers, which it then makes available (via license through private firms) at low cost. It does not insist on town-planning schemes; but it puts its research facilities and its expert advisers at the disposal of any town that wants to plan itself. It does not impose a plan forcibly from above; it helps local communities to plan for themselves. It tries to get a general sense of participation on the part of the people of the region through the voluntary collaboration of the educational authorities. Far from crushing private enterprise, planning here has aided it.

In general, within the framework of a plan, plenty of room can be left for individual initiative, and certain sectors of life can deliberately be left unplanned.

As regards motive, war is the clearest demonstration of how economic incentives can be made to take second place. But it would be equally possible to make patriotism the chief motive in peace-time, a patriotism which takes pride in the achievements of the whole nation. A people can be proud of having the lowest infant mortality in the world, of abolishing malnutrition and slums, of possessing beautiful cities and fine orchestras. In Russia, there is immense pride in new scientific discoveries, or in the success of a difficult expedition, and as much interest in them as the English-speaking peoples evince in sport. Anyhow, sport is another non-economic outlet. Besides, there are the powerful motives of service and sacrifice, of self-development and adventure. If outlets can be organized for these, we can be sure that full advantage will be taken of them by human nature.

Unity, too, is not impossible of democratic solution. Unity may be achieved through uniformity; but it does not have to be, and unity in and through diversity is fuller and richer. One aid to unity is to have a truly national culture—music, films, writing, radio, art, architecture—which reflects all the diverse facets of national life and makes a people conscious of itself and its corporate existence, its destiny and its ideals.

A high level of universal education can also make both for unification and for the sense of unity; so can the provision of large-scale organizations for service—youth service, military service (as in Switzerland), civilian service, workers' voluntary service, and so on. Finally, the putting of non-economic motives in first place, above economic motive, can help to produce unity. Purely economic motives on the whole tend to rivalry and disunity; so do certain non-economic motives such as the craving for power for its own sake. But patriotic motives, whether the patriotism of war or the patriotism of peace, make for collective pride and unified purpose. And motives that transcend even the nation, as can be the case with science, with religion, with art, with the relief of suffering, may equally make for unity and co-operation.

Finally, there is the difficulty of making international organization democratic. But is this really so great? The United States itself came into existence by organizing originally independent sovereign units into a greater whole. England and Scotland, once separate and often hostile, are now united to form Britain, and that too is a democratic co-operative union. The joint supply and military measures of the United Nations, including drastic restrictions of national sovereignty, like the leasing and pooling of bases, are all on a voluntary, co-operative basis, and so are the arrangements, already well advanced, for bringing food and medical

relief into the enemy-occupied countries as soon as the war is won.

The need for getting on with the transformation quickly and of set purpose is also of importance for the war itself. It is a fact of observation that those nations which have got through the transformation more completely have, in general, shown greater military efficiency. In the language of the statistician, the two facts show a marked positive correlation, and the degree of transformation undoubtedly helps to produce the military efficiency. It is not merely that the totalitarian nations have been preparing longer for war: it is that the totalitarian nations are also the more completely transformed.

In the democratic countries, the changes which have been found necessary, some by bitter experience, to increase military efficiency, are all changes towards more central planning and control, towards the subordination of the profit motive and all ideas of "business as usual" to the non-economic motives of success in war, towards greater unity, and towards more thorough-going international arrangements—four main trends of the world transformation.

Thus the next step must be to make sure that our transformation, when we go right through with it after the war, is a democratic one, and that we are not taking the easy short cuts that lead to totalitarianism.

There seems to be only one universal principle of democracy, applicable in any and every phase of history. It is that human individuals are the democratic yardstick. The satisfaction of the needs of individual human beings is one side of the picture; and the other is their free and active participation in the life of the society to which they belong. Satisfaction of needs means a basic platform of health and welfare, security and freedom for all, together with equal opportunity for further individual development, through education, recreation, adventure, service and self-expression. Participation means that the individual feels himself to be a part of a greater whole, that he co-operates in the general affairs of his community and nation, and that he is given the opportunity of sharing in as many activities of society as possible.

In addition, there are certain principles that will be applicable in the new phase in which we are entering. The chief characteristic of that new stage is that the world, though still consisting of distinct nations, has become a unit, so that the nations and their affairs are becoming much more "mixed up." The consequence of this is the inescapable trend already mentioned towards some form of international organization for both economic and political security.

What is the democratic way of building up such an organization? The first essential is that it should be based on freedom, equality of

opportunity, and co-operation, instead of on one-sided domination, inequality and force. The pooling of strategic bases for common use is an example of equal co-operation in the military sphere: in the economic sphere, an example is the joint control of certain key raw materials to prevent booms and depressions, and to increase consumption. The second is that the authority which has to take decisions on international matters should, as far as possible, represent peoples and not national governments. This is another way of saying that individual participation is needed in the international as well as the national sphere, though perhaps the participation of peoples in the new World Order will at the outset be confined to making the decision to unite for certain purposes.

Free and equal co-operation applies to peoples which are sufficiently advanced to stand on their own feet as distinct nations. But what about those others, forming nearly a third of the world's population, which are still so backward that they must be administered as dependent colonies, or those which are nominally independent but still require a certain amount of tutelage or guidance? The answer is, I think, not in doubt. If they cannot be treated as actual equals, they must be treated as potential equals. That means helping their peoples to achieve self-government as quickly as possible, and developing their material resources not by one-sided exploitation but as part of a co-operative scheme.

There remains one final question. How are we to enter upon the transformation consciously, formally, and with the greatest possible energy? The answer is clear—by proclaiming war aims which include the achieving of the transformation. Once more, this can be done in a totalitarian way or in a democratic way. Both Hitler and the Japanese have proclaimed their war aims. They are comprehensive, and boldly envisage the achieving of the world transformation, not as a hostile process to be resisted, not as a necessity to be tolerated, but as an opportunity to be seized, a mission to be embarked upon. Just because this is so, they have enlisted much of the emotional forces of their peoples.

There is no reason why the United Nations should not do the same—the same, only different, because in a democratic way; the same, only more potent, because the democratic idea is in the long run more powerful in its appeal. But this will not happen unless we first become aware of the world transformation, learn to understand it, and treat it as an opportunity to be embraced by democracy.

THE BOMBING OFFENSIVE

By F/Lt.

A NUMBER of responsible commentators have recently given it as their opinion that the war may well reach a position of military stalemate during the coming months. They feel that a stabilization of the German front in Russia may arise, and that a similar balance may be struck in the Middle East. Similarly they suppose that the American naval successes in the Pacific have set bounds to Japan's conquering onset to the West and South-West. They are apt to draw the moral from these speculations that economic and political warfare will become of increasing importance. For while they discern these boundaries to the enemy's progress, they are by no means optimistic as to our capacity to drive back the enemy's armies, fleets and air fleets in the immediate future. Some of these writers go on to suggest that Germany is, on this occasion, far less vulnerable to naval blockade than she was during the last war. Therefore, they conclude, if we wish to sap her economic power, we have left to us above all the weapon of strategic bombing.

For my part I am inclined to be sceptical of this prospect of stalemate on the main military, naval and air fronts. I am inclined to think that the military equilibrium is, in this war, a much more unstable one than it was in the last war. We may at any time see major changes, either favourable or unfavourable, on the main fronts; great areas of the world may yet be lost to the United Nations, while on the other hand the tide of enemy aggression may be turned back earlier than now seems probable. But with the main conclusion of these commentators, namely that the strategic bombing of the heart and centre of our main antagonists must assume, as the war goes on, a very great part in the general pressure which the United Nations must exercise on their antagonists, I am in strongest agreement.

The history of the use of bomber aircraft for the strategical pounding of the centres of production of the enemy, has been a curious one. This use of bomber aircraft was not part of the German High Command's conception of how this war should be waged. Yet, because of their incomparably greater resources in the first years of the war, and because this was the one way in which they could get at their remaining antagonist, Great Britain, it was the Germans who first resorted to the mass bombing of their enemy's centres of production. They used, to the limit, their full resources to bomb, first by day, and when that proved too expensive, by night, the towns and industries of

this country from August, 1940, to May, 1941. This was the first major example which history affords of this use of aircraft.

The attempt failed. Great Britain survived as a fully operational fighting force. This failure has made many critics—many naval and military critics in particular, perhaps—conclude that their preconceived opinion that bombing of this type could never become a decisive weapon, was well founded. Careful students of air warfare may have reached a more cautious conclusion, however. For several important factors, which may not be present in future, fully account for the German failure to reach a decision by bombing in the first and second years of this war. In respect of the initial attempt by means of day bombing, the German Air Force was never able to secure a sufficient degree of air supremacy over their targets to enable them to bomb them effectively without prohibitive losses. It proved, as every responsible air officer knew it would, that bombing aircraft could not live in daylight within range of an undefeated fighter force. Had it been possible for the German Air Force to destroy Fighter Command, there is not the slightest doubt that they could have ended the war-making ability of this country within a few months, by means of concentrated daylight bombing.

But what of their second and more sustained attempt, when they turned from day to night bombing? Why, if bombing is capable of producing decisive results, were our enemies unable to produce them then? It is, of course, known that the German Air Force was on the whole ill-equipped for night bombing. Their aircraft were not of the right type. They could not carry the really heavy loads necessary to get results from this method. Again the scale of their effort had been fatally reduced by the losses they had sustained while they were still persisting in their day attacks. Had they used their whole undiminished force for night attacks from the start our position would have been far more serious.

Again the actual missiles used were of a primitive nature compared to what are available (to both sides!) to-day. The incendiaries dropped were almost toylike objects compared to the deadly fire-raising agents which are used to-day. The greater part of the high explosive bombs were far too small to do their job. Even the relatively undeveloped passive and active defence systems which we possessed at that time were able to cope with attacks of this character. It was not until the very end of the period, in the Spring of 1941, that the enemy began to use improved methods, that he began to concentrate his attacks, to use greatly improved incendiaries and to rely mainly on one and two ton high explosive bombs.

When all this has been said, however, the fact should not, I think, be lost sight of, that in spite of everything, very considerable damage was done to us. It is always impossible, in the case of bombing attacks, to separate moral from material damage. The two are intertwined, subtly and inextricably. The primary object of a bombing attack is material destruction. But there is always an additional effect on morale. For example, it is a great mistake

to suppose that morale is damaged only by the great blitzes on whole cities, such as the great fire-raising raid in the first few days of 1941 on the city of London, or the major blitz on Liverpool in the late spring of 1941. On the contrary, successful precision bombing, which does not destroy a single dwelling house, can have an immense effect on morale. Bombers may succeed, for example, in destroying a key factory which turns out an important proportion of some indispensable part of war production. Its destruction may necessitate the closing down, partly or completely, of a whole series of war factories. In this case an immense moral effect will be produced. The wave of (precisely) "alarm and despondency" which will spread through the country from such an event will be an important adjunct to the actual curtailment of production itself.

Now that we have surmounted our first great period of trial we naturally look back upon it as a national triumph. And so it was; but it was a triumph over a very real emergency and one which it would be unwise of us to under-rate. It is, of course, impossible to say by how much the Germans would have had to multiply the tonnage of the bombs which they dropped on us (or alternatively their efficacy per ton) in order to have begun to produce decisive results. But it would be foolish for us to assert that there is no multiple which would have done the trick. Therefore those commentators on air warfare, who like the American writer Major Seversky for example, have concluded that the German failure to reduce Britain by bombing in the first two years of the war, is by no means conclusive evidence of the impossibility of this operation, have much evidence on their side.

In the same way, commentators in this country (as for instance, Mr. Hugh Quigley, in the August issue of this journal) who call for an intensified and improved bombing attack upon Germany, cannot be lightly dismissed. It may be, however, that some of these writers are not fully familiar with the tactical and operational problems which this new form of warfare involves. Mr. Quigley, for instance, in his natural impatience to see vital damage done to our enemy—an impatience which we all share—tells us that a decision must soon be made as to "whether it is our definite national policy to destroy the industrial life of Germany at the source, or merely to go through the motions of it." He goes on to write:

We can destroy German industry at the source only by terrific concentration on the heavy, geographically limited, basic industries, particularly iron and steel and chemicals, and on the public utility services. We know exactly where they are located, and have probably a plan of each single plant. It should be a simple matter to destroy them in detail, even if it means a terrific wastage of bombs owing to the comparative smallness of the target. It is doubtful, however, in view of the improved bomb sights that are now available, whether even a comparatively small iron and steel plant could escape an intensive raid.

All this sounds a little as if the Air Ministry, at any time within the past twelve months, could have been doing all this to Germany. It sounds as if the authorities, for some mysterious reason, had forbore to take this sure and simple way to the winning of the war. Unfortunately it is not quite so

easy as all this. Mr. Quigley contrasts the bombing of great works, such as he advocates, with some of our recent raids, on such cities as Lubeck, Mainz and Cologne, which he deplores because of the aesthetic value of these cities. Such raids will, he thinks, tend to "solidify the German nation in active hatred of this country."

But it is not, unfortunately, by any means "a simple matter" to destroy the major German industrial plants in detail. The real truth of the matter, which it is high time the public appreciated, is that, except on quite exceptional nights in the year, it is a matter of very great skill or very good fortune to find an individual plant by night. Night bombing by means of heavy concentration is, I am convinced, a most deadly weapon; but it is not a weapon of precision. The blunt truth is that the target for a great night-bombing raid over a well defended area can be little less than a section of a city. If that city is heavily enough bombed, the factories in it will be duly hit. No less than 250 separate factories were damaged by our great raid on Cologne on the night of May 31. But it is probably true to say that few of these factories could be seen clearly enough for precise aim. It was simply that a sufficient concentration of bombs was put down on the city as a whole to ensure that the factories in it would be hit.

No doubt it must seem strange to those who are unfamiliar with the condition of this novel form of warfare, that the Air Ministry, the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and the other responsible authorities, have not picked off the essential plants and factories of Germany one by one. I can assure my readers that it is not from any lack of desire to do so. On the contrary, the authorities are undoubtedly thinking of little else than the problem of how these vital key points can be struck. And it may be that the time will come when it will be possible to pick them off with precision. If for example, any method by which the day raiding of Germany becomes practicable, without prohibitive losses, can be developed, then, unquestionably the destruction of these economic key points will become possible. Until then we must wield the bludgeon (and it is no light one) of the mass night raids. Once or twice a week we put down four or five hundred tons of mixed h.e. and incendiaries, both of the very latest and most destructive type, on one great German city or another. We can see the results for ourselves in photographs, such as those which have been recently published, of the city of Mainz. In the most successful of recent raids we have been able to destroy sections of these cities with the factories, houses, public buildings and public services. But we shall delude ourselves if we suppose that it is a rapier and not a good, stout and most effective bludgeon that we are wielding.

Moreover, it would be the greatest injustice both to those who plan, and above all to those who execute the raids to suppose that it is an easy matter to attain these results. On the contrary, every raid is a struggle, a desperate contest of wits, and of nerve. It is only sometimes that we win complete successes. Just as we cannot expect our Army or our Navy to win every

engagement which they must fight, so we cannot expect our Air Force to be 100 per cent. successful every night which they go over Germany. If every raid was as successful as our best—if every raid was a Mainz, a Lubeck or a Cologne—it is safe to say that the German power to make war would already have been very greatly reduced. No doubt if the Germans had no defences every raid would be as successful as those were. But in fact, our aircrews encounter the most formidable defences every time that they attack.

It is this fact which accounts for the otherwise puzzling circumstance that we have never been able, hitherto, to destroy a German factory with the same thoroughness that we devastated the Renault works on March 3 last. Why, some writers have enquired, cannot we take the great German workshops and do to them what, as our photographs showed for all to see, we did to Renault? The answer is that the Germans are using the service of some one and a half million full time adult workers (about half of whom are uniformed and highly skilled members of the armed forces) in their systems of air raid defences. This has been a heavy burden, imposed by our bomber offensive, on the enemy's war effort. For this one and a half million figure takes no account of all the workers employed in producing the enemy's mass of searchlights, guns, detectors, night fighters and equipment of all kinds, with which the enemy must provide his defence workers. But it has enabled the enemy to prevent the swift and certain rubbing out of his great factories by means of the same simple and direct attack as we were able to inflict upon the almost undefended Renault Plant. Again this may not remain true; the balance of advantage between the defence and the attack in bombing is an ever shifting one; some new circumstances may suddenly enable us to overcome all these elaborate defences. (On the other hand, of course, a development may make it more difficult for us to penetrate them).

Very much is at stake here. If the advantage swings our way we may well be able to strike decisive body blows at our enemy. That is why many of us urge as vehemently as we are able that nothing should stand in the way of the maximum possible concentration of effort on our bombing attacks. Moreover, it is not merely that the possibility of victory itself arises from these attacks; the possibility of very grave injury to ourselves arises also, if we allow the enemy to get ahead of us in the concentration of effort upon strategical bombing.

If, unhappily, the German High Command is able to stabilize a front across the face of Russia this winter, and thus be enabled to disengage its main bombing air fleets from the Eastern Front, we must expect very heavy attacks upon our cities and our centres of production this winter. We should not believe for a moment the German story that they consider this form of attack obsolete. They are forced to depreciate the importance of strategical bombing to-day simply because they cannot undertake it, and will not be able to undertake it so long as the bulk of their resources are locked up upon the Eastern Battle Front.

We have hurt them seriously, though by no means mortally, this summer by our raids upon them. If they can free their hands in the East, and if we do not push home our assault in the West to the very limits of our resources, they will almost certainly seek a violent revenge upon us. It is true that our defences are now strong and that the enemy does not possess bombing aircraft capable of carrying the great loads regularly transported to Germany by our four-engined heavies. But these advantages are to a debatable extent offset by the fact that their air bases are some hundreds of miles nearer to their targets than are ours. If the next phase of the war does indeed prove to be in the nature of a bombing match the side which concentrates all its resources most effectively will win most important advantages.

We have just begun to receive the immense, and in the end inexhaustible, reinforcements of the U.S. Army Air Corps. No country will be able indefinitely to withstand the air offensive which the combined air forces of Britain and America will some day be able to launch. But this American reinforcement is only just beginning. For many months yet we must rely predominantly on our own resources. The task in hand may prove to be that of not merely inflicting grave injury on our enemy but also the task of keeping down, and out-matching his effort to inflict grave injury on us. To be adequate to that task we must set our faces like granite against avoidable diversions of efforts.

In this connection Mr. Hugh Quigley in the August number of *THE FORTNIGHTLY* was under a complete misapprehension when he suggested that it would actually assist our bomber effort to divide the bombing resources of the R.A.F. into three parts: to assign one of these parts to the Navy for exclusively naval work, one to the Army for exclusively army work, while the third part should engage exclusively on strategical, or economic, bombing. On the contrary such an arrangement would reduce our bomber effort by almost a third. It is a primary principle of our air warfare that the only economical use of a given number of aircraft is that they should be kept in one pool for all operational purposes. For then the same aircraft can be used for different purposes at different times. For example, when *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* laid in Brest Harbour it was indispensable to damage them sufficiently to prevent them from putting to sea again and creating the same havoc amongst our Atlantic convoys which they had created upon their one brief voyage. Accordingly an important proportion of Bomber Command's effort was diverted from Germany on to Brest. When the *S.* and *G.* left Brest and returned, heavily damaged (so heavily in the case of *Gneisenau* that in order to repair her, she has apparently had to be dismantled) to Germany the same aircraft could be, and were, put back on to the bombing of the Rhineland.

If these aircraft had been assigned to the operational control of the Admiralty, to be used exclusively for naval purposes, they would have had to stand in comparative idleness during all these months since last February.

If, on the other hand, they had been assigned to the exclusive task of Army Co-operation, they could have been used neither for the bombing of the *S.* and *G.* in Brest nor, before nor since the *S.* and *G.* were there, for the bombing of Germany. Finally, if they had been assigned to a bomber force reserved exclusively for the bombing of Germany, they would not have been available to meet the naval emergency which arose when the three warships went to Brest.

Many other similar examples could be given of the immense waste of effort which would result from the cutting up of the bomber force into three watertight compartments. No doubt if we had an unlimited supply of aircraft, there would be advantages in such a division. But we have not an unlimited supply of aircraft; nor will any country ever have an unlimited supply of aircraft. For the demand for aircraft in contemporary warfare is, by its nature, unlimited. No part of the war effort can ever have enough of them. The Navy would be, genuinely, short of aircraft if every one of our operational Bomber Squadrons were exclusively engaged on naval tasks. The Army would be short, if every bomber we had were employed exclusively for its needs. We should still have an inadequate number of squadrons bombing Germany if not a bomber had been diverted to naval and army uses. Therefore, the only possible arrangement is to keep the available bombers and other aircraft under one hat, in a concentrated formidable force, capable of being switched at need from this task to that.

Thus we may say that concentration is in a double sense the watchword of a modern Air Force. There must be *strategical* concentration so that every aircraft is in turn available for every task of which it is capable. There must be *tactical* concentration so that a few targets are attacked decisively, instead of many targets indecisively. If, but only if, we take this watchword of concentration to our hearts, we shall use our formidable air weapon to the best advantage.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS

BY ERNEST BARKER

THE Conservative Party's central committee on post-war reconstruction, which was set up less than a year ago, has just published the first interim report of its sub-committee on education. The terms of reference to that sub-committee put the question: "What should be the purpose of an efficient system of national education, both absolutely and in relation to post-war national requirements?" The sub-committee has sought to answer that question in a philosophic and highly stimulating pamphlet, of nearly forty pages, which bears the title of *Looking Ahead*, and the sub-title "Educational Aims." The gist and scope of the pamphlet may be gathered from the headings of its main sections. A section on 'The need for a bolder view of national purpose in education' is followed and balanced by a section on 'The development of the individual.' The great and central section (which occupies nearly the half of the whole pamphlet) on 'The religious factor in education' is similarly followed and balanced by a section on 'Secular moral training.' A last section, on 'Ability and leadership, with a note on specialization,' concludes the argument. It is an argument which stirs the mind and excites the thought of the reader.

There is comfort, and there is encouragement, in the hard thinking which is now being put into the problems of the future, and especially into the problem of education. To an old man, who remembers (and tried to take his share in) the thinking about reconstruction during the last war, it seems that the thinking of to-day has a greater value, and attains a higher level, than that of twenty-five years ago. It goes more to the roots: it rises higher above the 'idols' of party and prejudice. This pamphlet, for example, is published under Conservative auspices. But an old and impenitent Liberal (as the writer must confess himself to be) has little serious quarrel with its gist and its main contentions. It omits some things which he would emphasize—for instance the need for the further development of adult education, especially by a system of residential 'people's colleges': it emphasizes, again, some things which he would prefer to leave in a quiet silence—for instance the idea of the inculcation in schools of 'a national ideal—the ideal of the nation, as a leader among the nations—with which every child can identify his own future.' But on the whole, and in the main, the level of the argument attains a height at which we can all stand together, above the divisions of party.

This is a point which was brought clearly home to the writer when, on the

morning after reading the pamphlet, he read in *The Times* a report of the speech of Mr. George Chester, delivered at the Trades Union Congress, which dealt with the Memorandum of the General Council of the Congress on education after the war. There are differences, of course, between the spirit of Mr. Chester's speech and the spirit of this pamphlet. For one thing, Mr. Chester argued that 'the system of dual control must go, and the unification of the educational system be finally completed'; while the pamphlet, in an opposite sense, suggests that 'the State must be tender towards schools of religious origin and present character, to the point of enabling them, *if they are judged worthy of such help*, to reach the standards of secular teaching and accommodation required.' This is a serious difference; and there is another, not less serious. Mr. Chester suggested that 'private schools would be abolished, or brought within the control of local educational authorities (except for the genuine experimental school)'; while the pamphlet argues that the special contribution made by such schools "to the education of talent and the development of leadership is too valuable to be jeopardized" (as it would be "if they were to lose their independence and become a mere part of the State system"), and then proceeds to plead that the value of their special contribution should be increased by a widening of the social basis on which they rest. We must not burke these differences, which raise the fundamental question whether democracy means (1) variety, and room for the voluntary principle, or (2) uniformity, and the doing of all things by the democratic State. But when we have allowed for these differences, we can also note agreement—and agreement on two main points.

In the first place, the primary argument of the pamphlet is that education has a 'two-way character' or double aim—the aim of 'service to the individual pupil' and to the development of individuality, and the aim of 'service to the community' and to the development of a strong sense of national obligation. Mr. Chester uses almost identical words. He pleads for an education "in which the full achievement of personality and the principle of service to the community would replace the competitive motive as the main factor of school life." That is one point of identity. Another is even more obvious and more specifically practical. Mr. Chester argues that "education must be regarded as the central constructive service of society." The pamphlet similarly contends that the State must 'learn to treat education as its biggest long-term job.' Pressing the contention further, it argues that the President of the Board of Education must become the 'Minister of Education,' with his department recognized as a front-rank department, and that he must have 'continuity in the headship of this difficult and all-important office.' Mr. Chester, one may feel sure, and indeed all thinking men, would endorse this argument. The fleeting series of Presidents of the Board of Education is something of a national disgrace; and it is profoundly to be hoped that the present President, who has shown a high and energetic conception of his office, will be given the time to accomplish a long-time policy.

It may be that the writer, in the foregoing remarks, has exaggerated the unity of feeling and purpose in the nation in regard to the future of education. And yet—recognizing fully that there are differences to be frankly faced and frankly discussed—one cannot but feel that there is a unity of national feeling and purpose of which a wise statesmanship will hasten to take advantage. The authors of the pamphlet which we are considering have made a notable contribution to this unity. Making their appeal to 'the large central mass' or 'central core' of the people, they plead for a policy which will satisfy its central and cardinal aspirations. Arguing that "it must be a primary duty of national education to develop a strong sense of national obligation," they come to the conclusion that

the result must not be, and could not conceivably be, the teaching of party political views . . . it must be the teaching of a national purpose, transcending all party interests; and this teaching will be done by men and women teachers holding diverse political opinions.

A cynic, or a would-be realist, may object that in this argument Conservatism is once more assuming the mantle of a super-party patriotism, which was worn by Bolingbroke in his *Patriot King* and donned by Disraeli in his 'Young England' days. Such cynicism, or realism, would not be founded on reality. The argument of *Looking Ahead* is in no sense a party masquerade. It is a genuine and ardent national philosophy, commended for its own sake.

The first article in that philosophy is that which has just been mentioned—the awakening of a sense of national duty, or as Mazzini called it 'mission,' in the mind of teachers and taught in all our national schools. It is impossible not to sympathize with this article of belief; but it is difficult also not to feel doubts about the suggestion of policy in which it issues. It is true, and profoundly true, that we are called upon, as a nation, in the days which lie ahead, to discharge a duty and fulfil a mission in Europe. Duty is upon us; and it is an ineluctable duty. But the difficulty of teaching that duty in schools, and to school-children, is that you will be insensibly led, in its course, to magnify the nation and the national State which has that duty: you will proclaim 'the State's right to enlist the enthusiasm of the young' on behalf of its high vocation: and you will tend to fall into an educational *étatisme*. Now the fear of educational *étatisme* was just what delayed and hampered the coming of a national system of education in England for so long. As long ago as 1756 an English writer had argued, in a book called *British Education*, that "the principle by which the whole community is supported ought to be most strongly inculcated in the minds of every individual." This shocked contemporary opinion; and the general idea of inculcation of a national principle was so hotly repudiated that national education itself was repudiated along with it. A current of thought was set in motion, and lasted till the days of Herbert Spencer, which held (in the words of Godwin) that 'national education ought uniformly to be discouraged on account of its obvious alliance with national government.' Shall we be wise

if we revive that current of thought by reviving the idea of the inculcation of a national principle? Ought we not rather to trust the national principle to unfold itself, in silence, by its own operation, and without any attempt at a scholastic inculcation which might defeat itself and its object, causing the young to dislike the thing they were told to like? These are things which are best not preached on the housetops, or at any rate in the class-room. *Est et fidei tuta silentio merces*. The quiet working of a national ethos, silent but safe and sure, is our British strength. We may not see it ourselves; but it is there. Any foreign observer will tell you of its strength, and show you the pattern of life it weaves for you—a pattern which, without teaching, you instinctively observe. Self-consciousness, in such a matter, may be a vice. To inculcate consciousness of a national purpose may defeat the people's slow and silent fashioning of its own purpose. I trust the working of the national mind; and I would not set teachers to teach it its purpose. I would teach the child the history of our nation; but I would trust it to say *for itself*, when it had learned the record, "Here and here did England help me: how can I help England?" All in all, "the necessity of conscious national education in the training of our future citizens" is a necessity I do not see.

I have thus some qualms about the first article of the philosophy of *Looking Ahead*. But it would be singularly unjust to the general philosophy of the pamphlet if it were to be judged by its first article. A second article immediately succeeds the first; and this second article is a corollary, a complement, and a balance. It is entitled, 'The Development of the Individual.' Here the Hadow Report is criticized (to the gentle surprise of the writer of this article, who was one of the committee by which it was drafted), for its inadequate recognition of the right of the individual in the sphere of education; and here some fine and memorable things are said about the creative power and the proper privacy of the individual mind. Perhaps these things are said so incisively, and so well, because the authors of the pamphlet are anxious to balance the argument of the first article of their belief; but however that may be, they are well and truly said. One of the dangers of our times is the danger that educational authorities—particularly, perhaps, local educational authorities and their directors of education—should imagine themselves (in a high but misguided sense of responsibility) to be so many local providences, charged with the development of the citizen from the nursery school to the adult class, and even beyond. Local providences have to count with individuals—and not only so, but with groups of individuals, acting in our traditional British voluntary way. The individual, and the group of individuals united by their own action in voluntary societies of their own, come by their own in the argument of this pamphlet. (The nation, it is true, stands majestically in the background; but of that enough has already been said). Here are some of its notable sayings:

It must be foolish for any educational authority to try to determine what each individual shall be . . . Beyond anything that the educator knows or foresees is the obscure

source of power in the individual, which in the end sets the educator's own pace. Education must, therefore, never monopolize the pupil's whole life; and as it becomes more competent and more highly organized, it must become still more scrupulous in its respect for individual privacy.

The wise educator will always leave his pupils with their own secret garden; and there are some of us who can testify that they grew more in that garden than they grew in the ordered plot of the school.

This recognition of the value of individuality is accompanied by two natural and congruous corollaries. One is the corollary of variety. This corollary is not specifically stated under its own separate heading; but it runs through the whole of the argument. "We regard the existence of independent and relatively independent schools as a source of strength"—so the authors of the pamphlet say, even when they are proclaiming the need for a bolder view of national purpose. In the same sense, as we have already had reason to notice, they urge that the State should be tender to religious schools and should not prevent the establishment by private enterprise of new denominational schools; they plead that voluntary organizations could, and should, be assisted to play a much more important part in the sphere of the moral training of youth: they contend that "organic variety is a fecund, and administrative uniformity a sterile principle." (Those are words that deserve to be remembered—whatever may be our interpretation of democracy, and whether we think that it means 'the citizen's choice' or believe that it means a choice made by all for all). That is the first corollary—the corollary of variety. The second is the corollary of the free career for ability. This has its own separate heading, or rubric, of "Ability and leadership." Faced by a prevalent philosophy, which may be expressed in Browning's words,

Make no more giants, God,
But elevate the race at once,*

the authors of *Looking Ahead* urge that education has a task at least equally important—"to detect and bring to fruition exceptional qualities of mind and character, at all educable ages." However equalitarian we may be, and however much we may identify democracy with equality, we must acknowledge that any society needs an *élite*, and that a democratic society needs a freely recruited and carefully chosen *élite*. If we make that acknowledgment, we must agree with the suggestion that "children exhibiting signs of unusual ability should be watched with the utmost care and, if necessary, exempted from the customary requirements." One of the perils of schools to-day is that of doing things by whole forms, and, more especially, of making promotions by whole forms. The writer of this article, looking back to his school days at Manchester between 1887 and 1889, when he was watched and promoted by a wise High Master in a way that made him breathless, can see, more than fifty years afterwards, what was happening and why it was done—and he

* Browning wrote these words, in his *Paracelsus*, in 1835. They were apposite then. In 1942 we may well pray for a few more giants. We need them.

cannot but record his gratitude to one who is dead and gone, but will never be forgotten. (Will the reader pardon any impression of vanity which this last sentence may leave on his mind? The writer is only anxious to record what could be done for a poor lad, who showed some signs of ability, in the free air of a Northern school fifty-five years ago).

We have treated some of the main articles of the creed of *Looking Ahead*. There remains the last and the greatest—the *articulus stantis aut cadentis reipublicae*—the article which is concerned with 'The Religious Factor in Education.' This, as has already been noticed, occupies nearly half of the pamphlet. It would be idle to attempt to summarize, even in the briefest form, the essence of the argument of this article. It is not idle, and it is only bare justice, to say that it goes deep, and deserves the most careful study. It is based on a distinction between the spiritual and the ethical aspect of religion—or, as the authors of the pamphlet put the matter, between 'the ultimate religious field' (which concerns the relation between the individual and the divine purpose, and involves the 'sense of obedience to a divine society, transcending but by no means unrelated to the earthly society') and 'the moral discipline of religion' which is the outcome, but not the essence, of the ultimate religious field. It is in the exploration of the ultimate religious field, in the analysis of the state of religious feeling among us, and in the plea for a view of religion 'as a basic and vital element in the national life, to be deliberately fostered and encouraged' by the State, not in the form of religious knowledge, but in the form of religious feeling and the awakening of a religious sense—it is in these things, these ultimate things, that the pamphlet attains its greatest height. Particularly striking, and particularly just, is its analysis of the present state of religious feeling among us (and in other countries of Europe, and more especially Russia); and every reader of this article is advised, and indeed entreated, to read the pages (pages 17 to 25) in which this analysis is made. There is no complacency in the analysis: there is, on the contrary, a fearless analysis of what may be called 'the vacuum of neutralism' into which we have fallen: there is also a fearless facing of the possibilities—whether of aggressive rationalism, or of a secular social utilitarianism—which may rush into this vacuum if it is left unstirred and unheeded. It is not idly, but in the light of this probing analysis (which has the value of a tonic), that the authors of the pamphlet plead that

for the State, and in the field of religious education, the governing aim should be the awakening of emotional awareness . . . awareness by the individual of a purpose at once transcending and governing not only his own life but the whole contemporary and terrestrial scene . . . as an essential condition of all social excellence.

This is nobly said. But the nobility of general propositions must always 'condescend upon particulars'; and it has to be judged, in the last resort, by the acid test of the "practical" aims in which it issues. These are set out in detail, under that heading, in the pages which follow the general propositions. They involve, as we have already noticed, 'a tenderness of the State towards

schools of religious origin and character,' which goes to the length of helping such schools to reach the required standards of secular teaching and accommodation. They involve the acceptance, in State schools, of a system of religious teaching on the basis of an agreed syllabus of an undenominational character—a system which, we are told, in two frank and valuable paragraphs, the authors of the pamphlet began by rejecting, and ended by warmly accepting. They involve further consequences and corollaries; but these are the main contentions. The contentions may be disputed by many. Some of us would accept them, and endorse them with all our hearts. Those who dispute them are bound, at the least, to study the analysis on which they are based, and to ask themselves whether, in the light of that analysis, they are not logical and irrefragable consequences.

There are some things omitted in the general argument of the pamphlet which might well have been considered. Two may be mentioned. It is a little sad that the whole theme of adult education should only be mentioned once, in one brief clause at the end of the penultimate paragraph. Adult education is at least a half of education—and perhaps the greater half. Schools matter; but adult classes and adult colleges matter as much, or more. It is to be hoped that this sub-committee on education, as it continues its work, will turn its attention largely, and turn it closely, on the theme of adult education, and that it will remember the words of Mr. Chester, in his speech at the Trades Union Congress—"a life-long education, a preparation for citizenship no longer limited to a brief period of childhood, but extended to the threshold of adult life, with *every opportunity for its renewal in a voluntary adult educational movement arising out of social life and experience.*" That is one lacuna. The other is the absence of any mention of the family. Much is said of the State. Could not something be said of that other and intimate society, which is vitally concerned with education both in its own internal life and in its indispensable connection and co-operation with the school? We shall never make much of education until each family is also a school, a home of religious teaching (mothers matter in most men's lives), and a place of culture, in the good sense where parents and children read books and listen to music together. Is that an idle dream? Then life is an idle dream. For the essence of life is the family, and the handing on of the torch of life by fathers and mothers to sons and daughters. Build good homes for the family (for housing goes with education), and help the family to live a life of the mind in a good home. Endow your village, too, with a village hall, and your building estate with a community centre; and help your village and your building estate to gather together for a life of the mind in village hall and community centre. Those are sources of education—spontaneous, vital, intimate sources. And education has many sources, as our Father's house has many mansions. Not all is in the State—be it central or local. Least of all is all education in either.

WHEN VICTORY COMES

By TYTUS FILIPOWICZ

IS it idle to think about the conditions of peace while we are still in the middle of a very difficult war? My answer is—no! The morale of a soldier and of a civilian engaged in the war effort can be good only if they know what they are fighting for and if they feel sure that a costly victory will not be followed by a bungled peace. The morale of the occupied countries demands that their populations are hoping that peace would bring them liberty, the return of their property and the punishment of crimes; so it is advisable to repeat to them again and again that they do not hope in vain. In the first place future peace will be shaped by Allied military victories, but undoubtedly public opinion will influence its character and details. Hence the duty of those who are not solely engaged in war work is to visualize peace conditions such as will assure a durable peace. Victorious war—we know this now—demands years of preparation. Similarly a good peace demands forethought well ahead of the armistice.

The Atlantic Charter gives the skeleton of future peace arrangements. Some of the ideas of the Charter as to the conditions of security differ from the conceptions which formed the background of the Versailles Treaty. The Charter divides the nations sharply into those who were attacked and those who committed aggression. Those who were attacked will have the right to remain armed and to plan the organization of future security, while the aggressor states will be disarmed and kept disarmed. So the Charter is explicit about the general organization of the post-war world, but it does not enumerate practical measures of a political or military character. Within the framework set by the Charter it is permissible to plan detailed measures. This is only wishful thinking in so far as any engineer's blue print represents a practical expression of wishful thinking.

My suggestions are limited to Germany. If the Allies wish to assure for their children and grandchildren safety from German aggression, the following measures ought to be applied.

A. MILITARY ACTION.

1. After the armistice the Allied troops should occupy the whole territory of Germany. Within the general scheme of the location of the Allied troops a number of special zones would be created serving as aviation bases and the Allies *Place d'Armes*.

2. A general Allied Military Commission of Control would have executive powers based on the Army of Occupation. German fortresses, ports, aviation, airfield and war material would pass into the hands of the Military Commission.
3. For the duration of the occupation, Germany would not have any compulsory or voluntary military service, no army, navy, air force, no great General Staff, no military schools, no mobilization bureaux.
4. The German War Fleet would be surrendered to the Allies.
5. On the German shore of the North Sea and of the Baltic a number of zones would be created to serve as bases for the Allied Fleet, Air Force and Coastal Defence.
6. In order to ensure free passage to the Baltic, the Danish and Swedish part of Skaggerak and Kattegat as well as the Kiel Canal would be internationalized. Denmark would lease air bases to the Allies.

B. POLITICAL AND STRATEGICAL ACTION.

1. Immediately after the signing of the Armistice Germany would withdraw all her military forces as well as her civil personnel and German settlers from the territory of all states occupied by Germany after 1935.
2. Germany would be deprived of all territories which during her past aggressions served as military jumping off places for attack on her neighbours (the Rhineland, East Prussia and the German Corridor separating Poland from Czechoslovakia). The German population of these territories either ought to receive a large measure of autonomy or be repatriated.
3. Germany should become a decentralized federation, Prussia being divided into several state units. There is no ground to take such a scheme as equivalent to the dismemberment of Germany, as it forms only a precaution against the overwhelming influence of Prussia within Germany. Such a reform would be a return to the internal organization which Germany had before 1871.
4. After the Armistice Germany would become a member of the International Labour Bureau.
5. If an "International Association" (a New League of Nations) could be created, Germany would come under its jurisdiction although she would not at the same time become a member. Her admission as a member would be decided later on.

C. ECONOMIC ACTION.

1. Germany would return all machinery, goods, libraries, church utensils, museums, monuments, factories, laboratories and private property taken from occupied territories (or would deliver the equivalent of them).

2. Production by Germany of warships, 'planes, and all kinds of military material would be stopped.
3. Part of her mechanical and chemical factories would be transplanted into Allied Countries and the rest of her metallurgical industry would be brought under Allied management.
4. German big industry would be put under the control of The Allied Economic Commission. The production of iron and steel would be limited and the production of mechanical tools stopped.
5. Imports which could be used for the production of war materials would be controlled by the Allied Economic Commission.

D. SOCIAL MEASURES.

1. After the signing of the Armistice there would be no blockade of food-stuffs imported to Germany. The German population would participate in the food and medical relief which the Allies might organize for Europe.
2. Before the end of the war the Allies ought to create a Special Commission to plan how to deal with the unemployment caused in Germany by demobilization and the simultaneous reduction of German industries.
3. In order to diminish the influence of the *Junkers* on German life Prussia must carry out an agrarian reform to break up the big land estates.

E. EDUCATIONAL REFORMS.

1. All German agents, military or civil, who during the war or occupation committed atrocities in the occupied countries would be brought before Special Tribunals of the respective nations. The Juridical Commission of the Allied Nations would act as an advisory body to the national Special Tribunals.
2. The existing German educational system ought to be suspended. There should be created an International Body (with the participation of well-known German anti-Nazis) which would organize a new system of German education. This new system would have to cure the German mind of the beliefs that the state is an idol, that military aggression is the most noble industry and that lordship over the world is the mission of the German nation.
3. As it is doubtful whether the re-education of the Germans could be effected before the period of a generation, some form of military occupation of Germany by the Allied troops (or by an "International Force") ought to last until the re-education of the coming generation is finished.

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I am well aware that the above scheme is neither precise nor complete, that particular points lack juridical precision, etc., etc. But I make no pretensions to write the draft of the treaty. Any Peace Treaty represents the collective

result of the effort of hundreds of brains reacting on the impulse of the actual political situation existing at the moment of making the peace. At present such a situation does not exist. Many of the above proposals have already been stated by other people and discussed privately or publicly. I am simply trying to answer in a popular way a popular question: "What to do with Germany?" I give the gist of the most important and necessary measures which in my opinion would result in the political, strategical, economic and moral disarmament of Germany.

The reader, after having considered the above paragraphs may remark that a peace based on such conditions would not be a negotiated peace. He would be completely right. Only a power entirely beaten in the field would accept submission to a one-sided disarmament as foreseen in article 8 of the Atlantic Charter. I maintain that only a peace based on conditions similar to those sketched above can break Germany's capacity for aggression once for all. And this is what the world is entitled to receive.

The main cause of the inefficiency of the Treaty of Versailles was the disregard of the opinion of the military experts by the leading peace makers. The statesmen of 1919 did not wish to see that the problem of Europe is first of all a strategic and military problem. Let us hope that the statesmen who make the future peace will remember this primordial truth. After the horrible calamities brought upon mankind by Germany, certain sacrifices on her part cannot be considered too great, if only they serve to give Europe a long period of security and to do away with the fear of aggression.

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A part of British public opinion still believes that Germany would become harmless once Hitler and his Nazis were removed. If this state of mind should continue up to the moment of the peace settlement then it is probable that the political and economic foundations of Germany's aggressive power would be left unimpaired even if German military force had suffered complete defeat. For, at the moment of Allied victory, Germans would organize all over the world a propaganda of sympathy for the underdog, hoping that the result of it would be the same as after the last war. So, if a large part of British public opinion maintains its present attitude, the peace may be lost even if the war is won. And the lost peace may mean after a short time another and much more frightful war, the Third World War for German Supremacy. Some of the Allies are not blind to this danger. Will the British public see it in time? Will they realize that all the holocaust of two world wars would be in vain, if the defeat of Germany is not followed by a peace which will make her permanently unable to go to war again?

A critic may say that the measures suggested here to disarm Germany are going too far and that to carry them through would mean the exclusion of Germany from collaboration with the other nations. My answer is: The

conditions of peace outlined here are not vindictive and surely far less exacting than would be the conditions of peace dictated by Germany to Great Britain if Germany should be victorious. They are only just and take account of German ways of life and German psychology. German history for a thousand years represents an unbroken aggression mainly against the east and the branding with sword and fire of the territories conquered; in matters political Germany's pledged word never meant anything; "the good Germans" were always deftly used by other Germans as a blind to screen their political activities. The only form of collaboration from which Germany would be excluded until re-educated would be participation in the organization set up to assure security to every nation, great or small; in the meantime, until German re-education is accomplished, only force can keep them out of mischief. So the force ought to be applied. Every public-minded citizen of the United Nations ought to understand that this is the only solution of the problem, and ought to understand it before victory comes.

(M. Filipowicz was formerly Polish Ambassador in Washington.)

THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY

By W. T. WELLS

THE year 1942 has witnessed two events of outstanding importance in the history of the British Empire, or, as it was fashionable to call it in the years before the war, the British Commonwealth of Nations. In the Far East, control has been lost over territories whose extent, and commercial importance in the modern world, challenge comparison with the American colonies as constituted on the outbreak of the War of Independence. And, following on the U.S.A.'s formal entry into the war in December, 1941, the Empire is cementing its formal alliance with the States into an understanding more sincere than the *entente* with France was ever capable of being.

The connection between these events and the future position of Great Britain as a world power is of profound significance. The world leadership of the United States was long ago forecast by Lecky. There can be but little doubt that, after the war, it will be a self-evident fact. But, even were it possible for them to have it, the United States would have no wish for an exclusive hegemony such as haunts the dreams of Hitler or of Tojo. The Soviet Union, China, and ourselves will be essential partners in the establishment of the new world order. In spite of many differences, there is between ourselves and the United States a fundamental similarity of ideas and of social and economic systems which makes a strong Britain, in sympathy and whole-hearted partnership with themselves, one of the States' first interests. Great Britain and the United States are necessary to each other, if either power is to follow a way of life which makes life itself worth living. But co-operation between the two, if it is to be effectual, must be unstinted. A partnership of this type does not involve a fusion of identities; it does necessitate a continuous process of adjusting differences. To prevent those differences from being, or becoming difficulties, we must first analyse quite frankly what they are, and then work out a basis of agreement.

In view of American history, it is inevitable that the British Empire, in so far as it is based on imperial control over the colonies and dependencies and not on the free co-operation between the Mother Country and the Dominions, must be difficult of acceptance by the American people. It is true that, apart from the question of the freedom of the seas, which arose only in time of war, and Canadian frontier disputes, always susceptible of peaceful settlement, direct conflicts of interest have been few. It is further true that, influenced by Mahan, a certain number of educated and influential Americans had come

before 1914 to regard the British Navy, as the guarantor of world peace, the States' own first interest. But the events of 1914-1918, reinforced by the lessons of the present war, have shown them that the British Navy alone is not enough, and that the *Pax Britannica* cannot suffice to guarantee the *Pax Americana*. The vested interests of American capitalism will not in the future numb the pricks of the American conscience at allying itself with a political system which it disavowed as its first conscious political act.

It is one of the first interests of world peace that the British Empire should justify itself to the American mind. The fact must be faced by ourselves and our friends, as it has long been recognized by our enemies, that if we ceased to be an imperial power we should not be a power at all, but a third class state with a place in the world rather similar to that of Austria's position in Europe before the *Anschluss*. We should be in that event not an asset to the United States in forwarding their world policy, in creating that American century of the four freedoms of which Vice-President Wallace has spoken so eloquently, but a drag upon them: a well-meaning poor relation in the comity of nations.

It is perfectly evident that most Americans realize this close association of interests between themselves and our Empire. The more optimistic both of them and of us may be inclined to say that there is no real obstacle between the fulfilment of their ideals and the realization of our interests. Each war that has been fought by the Empire in this century has not weakened but strengthened the ties that bind us to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The last war and this have shown how solid is the relationship between ourselves and South Africa. This free association of free peoples, in equal partnership in politics and trade, knitted by the ties of blood and of common loyalty to the Throne and of affection to the Royal House, has been one of the major factors in the world politics of the twentieth century. There may have been friction at times; but it has been of no significance in comparison with the consciousness of the common way of life and the common interests. Is not this association of the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions, it may be asked, a pattern for the relations between them and the rest of the Empire? It certainly is. Will it not, in the end, be established as such? In any event cannot the British Empire survive as a world power, which most Americans firmly desire, without British rule extending over peoples not in equal partnership with Britain and the Dominions?

The last question is crucial. In the Atlantic Charter the two powers declared that: "They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." It is useless, and highly dangerous, to doubt the importance Americans attach to this declaration, or the literal interpretation they place upon it. It is most evident in their attitude on the Indian question. A few American writers, such as Miss Katherine Mayo, have cast doubts on the fitness of the Indians for self-government. But in these doubts there has always been implicit a further question, namely whether the British Government has been sufficiently active in promoting

those social reforms which are a necessary preliminary to self-government. By most Americans these doubts have not even been entertained. Congress professions of faith and statements of policy have, for the most part, been taken at their face value. The sanctity of Gandhi, the lucid intelligence of Nehru have, until recently at least, constituted them for Americans the political leaders of the Indian people. Moslem demands for Pakistan, the Depressed Classes' fears of domination by orthodox Hindus and greedy industrialists, the Indian States' treaty relations with the British Crown, have been factors complicating the situation but not affecting the main issue. The charge levelled against us by Nehru, among others, that we have deliberately fomented inter-communal strife for our own ends, on the principle of "divide and rule," has received widespread credence. Probably the most favourable view of British rule in India which can be considered typically American is that expressed in Mr. Basil Matthews' *India Reveals Her Face*, a view not fundamentally inconsistent with that underlying Garratt and Thompson's classical work, *The Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*. It is that Britain has done a great work in unifying India, but that now the best elements in that country are at one in demanding that it shall from henceforward be at liberty to work out its own salvation; and that any delay in granting that demand will merely prolong the existence of a moribund political system, retarding the growth to maturity of a system whose inherent vitality must ensure its ultimate ascendancy.

That picture is not an entirely true, certainly not a complete one, but all but a sprinkling of Americans have yet to be convinced of that fact. The Cripps mission, with its promise of full self-government after the war, was for the vast majority of politically-minded Americans the first indication that we were sincere in our attempts to prepare India for self-government. How easily that impression of sincerity could be effaced was clearly shown by American press and wireless reaction to our imprisonment of the Congress leaders. It is perhaps unfortunate that the friendly and sympathetic comments of the *New York Herald-Tribune* should have received such widespread publicity in this country. We have reason to be grateful for the understanding attitude of this great and influential newspaper, but the blunt question of one commentator, how British rule in India could be reconciled with the four freedoms and the Atlantic Charter, was more typical in its matter if not in its manner. There can be no distinction of principle between India and the Crown Colonies: it must be accepted that American opinion is now antipathetic to the continuance of our rule over them, and will be still more opposed when the immediate crisis affecting the two nations has been resolved.

Without the colonies, and probably without India, the British Empire cannot, in the predictable future, retain its vitality. They form a necessary complement, with their wealth of raw materials, to the predominantly industrial civilization of Great Britain and of all the Dominions except New Zealand.

They will be needed, it is clear, even more after the war than they were before it; unless the post-war Empire is an efficient economic entity—not of course an economically self-sufficing unit, which it is most undesirable that it should aim at becoming—London can never regain its position as a world financial centre, on which Great Britain and the Empire have relied for their economic stability at least since the dawn of the present century. With the sale of so many of her foreign investments, Britain must in the future, for a while at least, rely for her livelihood on industrial production rather than on financial services. Without receding from her traditional policy of the open door, from which even the qualified protectionism of the Ottawa Conference may prove to have been an undesirable deviation, India and the colonies play a most important part in maintaining the Empire's economic strength. The control over strategic ports and bases ensures the maintenance of stable communications; political influence not only opens administrative careers to the sons of the professional class but at least ensures an absence of economic discrimination against British merchants: in view of the economic policies prevalent in most of the world before the war a most necessary provision. To deny, or even to question, the importance to Britain's economic strength and political power of the control over oil, rubber, tin, tea, and the numberless materials which India and the Colonial Empire possess would be in the highest degree unrealistic, and certainly unworthy of the intelligence of American citizens, who regard the vast resources of North America as their birthright.

Criticism of this aspect of British imperial life is, nevertheless, at the very heart of American distrust of our institutions. The first British Empire, from which the U.S.A. broke away, was founded on mercantilism, the use of trade, including American trade, as a weapon in power politics. The second British Empire, they are apt to suspect, is founded on another, more subtle mercantile system; British control over capital for investment has been used to develop the production of raw materials and to stifle industrial enterprise and, with it, political freedom. This new mercantilism is the basis of our rule; such is the case we have to meet.

To answer it effectively we have to be utterly frank and free of cant. Trade, in the view of the 18th century mercantilist, followed the flag: and to his mind this explanation was a perfectly satisfactory justification for the existence of an overseas Empire. It was by no means an adequate formula to describe the historical processes by which that Empire arose, for in India, and elsewhere, the flag slowly, and indeed reluctantly, followed our trade. The proprietors of the East India Company were, like other commercial adventurers, concerned with questions of profits and dividends and with very little besides; they assumed the burdens of Empire as a necessary but none the less tedious consequence of their money-making enterprises. In either event, whether trade followed the flag or the flag followed trade, commerce was the basis of the 18th century Empire; and when the doctrine of free trade took the place of the doctrine of the protected market and the exclusive source

of raw materials, it was natural to assume that the Empire would dissolve into its component parts. These, for reasons of mutual interest, would continue to do business with each other as with the rest of the world.

In fact the Empire outlived the Manchester School. The ties of blood and of the London money market led what are now the self-governing Dominions to remain in association with the Mother Country. Considerations of strategy and of trade caused the latter to maintain interest in what are now the Crown Colonies. Material self-interest, it is necessary to emphasize, and no purpose of fulfilling a "civilizing mission" provided the mainspring of our early efforts.

To make this admission is not to cast any slur on the pioneers of the Empire. To make a living, or in a profit-seeking world to make a profit, is evidently a legitimate motive. Every other imperial power, Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, and Belgium, was similarly actuated by it, and in itself it deserves neither praise nor blame. The methods and results of its colonial administration, not the objects for which it entered the colonial field, are the criteria by which a colonial power must be judged. Did the British Empire on the whole bring poverty or plenty, oppression or order, darkness or enlightenment? There are dark chapters in our colonial history, for instance the slave trade and the opium trade. But if in truth, and on the whole, the British Empire brought poverty, oppression, and darkness to our colonies the latters' part in our war efforts of 1914-1918 and of to-day, quite voluntarily as they have been, require some little explanation. There may have been mistakes in handling the native populations of Malay and Burma, with the result that they did not act so effectually in defence of their territories as they might have done: we are too near the events to pass judgment upon them. The more remarkable fact is that, alike in India and the Colonies, so many of what our enemies would call the "subject races" have voluntarily answered the call to arms in defence of a supposedly alien Empire.*

The plain truth is that the Empire has been a healthy and liberalizing influence in human affairs. The *fin de siècle* political romanticism of Swinburne and Kipling is more dead than its poets. The guilt is off the imperial gingerbread; but the gingerbread itself is none the worse. Whether or no the Empire has been unduly slow to translate its principles into political practice, it has yet proclaimed and promoted the dignity and sanctity of the human life under its control.

There is no need to be very apologetic for our imperial past, nor shall we earn the respect of Americans, who like a man to stand up for himself, by being so. But the dead must bury their dead, and we must look to the future. Americans may contrast their voluntary withdrawal from the Philippines, which was to have been complete by 1946, with our own reluctant

* Far more Indian fighting men . . . were and are potentially available than can be provided with arms and equipment within measurable time. (*The Cripps Mission*. By F. Coupland. p.8).

ance, before the Cripps mission, to give India any promise of self-government within a specific period. They may compare their methods of economic imperialism—essentially the provision of financial and technical help in the development of the "colony"—with what they consider, not altogether justly, our mercantilist system. In the face of such comparisons we must find some constructive purpose to justify our imperialism to ourselves and to the world.

The need for such a purpose was most clearly revealed in two recent articles on "Britain in the Far East."* These articles vindicated our record in setting up a sound administration in Hong Kong and Malaya and in developing their material resources to the advantage of all concerned. "Both Malaya and Hong Kong," the writer argued, "had roads and drains, schools and hospitals, with which little fault could be found. The populations were free, prosperous, and reasonably happy. Yet something was missing from both Government and governed which prevented the fusion of the community into a living whole." "The spur lacking . . ." he continued, "was a long-term policy to give purpose and meaning to increasing material development. Where were the British colonies heading? . . . Programmes of public works and schemes for public health . . . are not in themselves enough to catch the imagination of a politically unrepresented community unless directly related to some larger purpose." The lack of such a purpose was, he thought, "a subtle malady spreading down through the civil service to the public and accounting for the atmosphere which some observers mistook for apathy."

It seems questionable whether the malady was really the lack of a larger purpose, or merely lack of consciousness of it; though philosophers may argue that an unconscious purpose is a contradiction in terms, the psychologist may come to our aid in confirming the possibility of a subconscious purpose. That many civil servants, doctors, and teachers served a wider purpose than they knew is the best explanation of the devotion of their lives; but that purpose cannot be achieved unless it is more widely understood. The British have tended to pride themselves on their gifts as colonizers. There has been a great deal of justification for their pride where they have had to live in strange surroundings but with fellow colonizers of their own race. Native populations they have been inclined either to regard from a strictly commercial standpoint, or to treat as children. The population at home, and consequently the administrators overseas recruited from it, have not felt and have not inspired that sense of common citizenship which, for example, it has been the object of the French administration to create in North Africa.

Because a man cherishes an aim there is no need for him to pretend that he has already achieved it. Nor if we aim at promoting a common sense of citizenship between ourselves and Australians on the one hand and native Africans and Malays on the other have we to pretend that we are all in the same state of development. The Englishman, however, while delightful with

* *The Times*, July 31 and August 1, 1942.

children, has an unfortunate faculty for treating the adolescent with condescension; and that is precisely what he often does to educate Indians and Africans whose background necessarily makes them politically rather immature. The result, too frequently, is that the very men who are most capable of being active and effective partners become bitter and irreconcilable enemies.

The imperial Englishman must mend his manners. Above all he must learn to think of the African and the Malay as his neighbours and to give effect to his thought in his policy: the machinery is there to hand, for instance in the Colonial Welfare and Development Act, and so are the men to work it. The public at home, and they alone, can give the lead in ensuring, by a sustained interest in imperial topics, that a sense of common citizenship inspires the whole Empire, and that the whole world is made aware of the fact. Nothing less will suffice. The Empire cannot survive widespread secessions; yet only a sense that life inside the Empire is richer, fuller, and freer than life outside it can prevent them.

A notable article entitled "An American Proposal" in the May edition of the American review *Fortune* examined the future of American relations with the Empire. Its two main theses were:—

1. America has a unique chance to redress the shortcomings of the British Empire while continuing its best and most liberal traditions.
2. America and Britain can be a source of new freedom and strength for the whole world.

It is important to remember that the shortcomings to be redressed are shortcomings only in the context of present world conditions; and we are entitled to demand that our friends shall not be so unhistorically minded as to suppose that universal suffrage and similar pieces of political machinery are conditions of conscious citizenship. Conscious citizenship, it would be truer to say, begets universal suffrage. Nor, in dealing with projected campaigns of civil disobedience, must they forget that at all times, but especially during war, it is the inescapable duty of a government to govern. This measure of understanding must be extended to us. Redressed the Empire's shortcomings must be, and we need American help, above all American sympathy, in redressing them. To carry out this task we do not need to repudiate our past, but only to be true to it, and to show that in adaptability and in practical idealism we are the worthy sons of worthy fathers.

GERMANY BETWEEN WEST AND EAST

By S. H. GERARD

IT is almost universally agreed that after a collapse of the Nazi régime Germany will be in a state of despair, exhaustion and demoralization. But there is also the immediate danger of civil war all over Germany. All signs point to the fact that the revolutionary events in a defeated post-war Germany will take on a much more violent character than the *coups d'Etat* of 1918 in Germany and of 1940 in France. The present régime will not only be terribly punished for all its crimes and the ruin, distress and humiliation it has brought down upon the whole world, including Germany, but also the country as a whole will probably be ravaged.

Further, any régime that might emerge, sooner or later, from such a revolution would not be able to stand for long without support from outside. A defeated Nazi-Germany can no longer stand between the East and the West. She will have to choose between them. Only the principles and values of either of these worlds can provide the political ethos for the future Germany. A non-communist and anti-Nazi régime in a post-war Germany could only be established if such a government could get from the beginning the help of the Anglo-Saxon countries in the same way as a communist Germany would get the help of the Soviet Union.

Most of the plans, projects and statements on the post-war situation have this in common that they only deal with the question of how Germany is to be treated after the collapse of the present régime and not with the question of what will probably happen in Germany after this event. This frame of mind would be quite natural if it were only the question of imposing upon, or of dictating to, the vanquished nation the peace which the conqueror devises. But this implies that all the victorious nations unequivocally pursue the same political line towards the vanquished.

But in face of this what are the facts? One is that in 1918 the Socialists prevented the Bolshevization of Germany and thus of Central Europe because the overwhelming bulk of the German workers were united in the liberal minded Socialist Party, that is the organization which in its whole structure corresponded to the English Labour Party. There was, for instance, not a single communist in the German National Assembly of 1919. Before the Nazis came to power, on the other hand, there were more than six million communists in Germany and about a hundred communist deputies in the *Reichstag*. After a Hitler defeat it must be assumed that in addition to these people further millions, especially those formerly liberal-minded workers and many

others of the disappointed and disillusioned strata of society, will express communist sympathies. Moreover, as a result of the collapse of the Nazi régime the upper classes which—as even Lord Vansittart admits—have not made but only “taken up” Hitler will be in a much more difficult position, socially and politically, than the working class people. And it is just those who above all would be prepared to support a new Western-minded régime in Germany.

The Russian leaders who are quite aware of this situation in the Germany of to-day have adapted their post-war policy to this situation. It is true, the Soviet Union has accepted the Atlantic Charter. She has just concluded a new treaty of Alliance, collaboration and mutual assistance with this country, not only for the purpose of the war but also to determine a common line of action for the allied countries in the post-war period. But even this treaty should not lead us to gloss over the ideological differences which still exist to-day between the West and the East, between liberal Democracies and Communism. In the long run a permanent co-operation in the international field will only be possible if at least to some extent the co-ordination of the Home policy of the countries concerned can be secured. For the old maxim that the internal régime of a state does not concern third states is no longer valid. The structure of a régime is no longer a matter of domestic policy; to-day the truth lies the other way round. In the 20th century foreign policy grows from the internal structure of a state. For instance, National Socialism and liberal Democracy cannot live side by side and if a state adopts a fascist or national socialist totalitarian policy it is the modern equivalent of a declaration of war on democracy. When, therefore, for instance, Mr. Eden stated after his visit to Russia at the beginning of this year: “What matters in foreign policy is not the form of the internal government of any nation but its international behaviour. The trouble with Hitler was that he would not stay at home,” we should reply that such a statement does not seem to be on firm ground any longer. The traditional non-intervention policy of liberal Democracy belongs, at bottom, to the old world. The foreign policy of liberal Democracy must, for good or evil, be adapted to the altered ideological situation.

This means, in our connection, that as long as the basic ideological differences between liberal Democracies and the Soviet Union are not reconciled in essential points it can hardly be said that the old antagonism between the countries has been fully overcome. Of course, the new treaty of Alliance may further such a reconciliation and it is strongly to be hoped that it will produce important modifications in the whole outlook of the two countries and lay the foundations for a new world. It may be that the Russia which emerges from the war will be quite different from the Russia that entered the war. It may be right that Russia cannot escape profound internal changes and will eventually be won back to the West. But it must also be said that such a fundamental change is not an implication of the Alliance; it cannot

be taken for granted. For it may be argued: Why should the presupposed winner of the war on the continent need to revise its political and ideological principles? Such a change would contradict to some extent historical experience which proves that it is the vanquished and not the conqueror who has to undergo sweeping reforms or even a shattering revolution.

In any case, up to now, the Soviet Union has pursued a post-war policy of her own which differs in some essential points from that of this country.

It was only a few months ago on the 24th anniversary of the Russian revolution (November, 1941) when the Soviets sent “greetings to the German people groaning under the yoke of Hitler’s blackguard bands” and in his speech on November 6, Stalin said: “Only Hitlerite fools do not understand that it is not only the European rear but also the German rear of the German fascist army which is a volcano, ready for eruption and ready to bury Hitler’s adventurers.” The same line is followed up in the Order of the Day issued on the 24th anniversary of the Red Army dated February 23, 1942, in which Stalin proclaimed:

It is a stupid lie and a senseless slander of the Red Army . . . to prattle to the effect that the Red Army’s aim is to exterminate the German people and to destroy the German nation. The Red army has not and cannot have such idiotic aims. The aim of the Red Army is to oust the Germans from our country and to liberate Soviet soil from the invaders It would be ridiculous to identify Hitler’s clique with the German people and the German state. The experience of history shows that Hitlers come and go whereas the German people and German nation remain.

It is true that according to Article III. paragraph 2 of the new Alliance the Soviet Union has the responsibility for preventing a renewed violation of the peace by an aggressive Germany. But this undertaking does not imply a policy of repression or national humiliation. It does not make it necessary to impose on the enemy moral disqualifications, effective controls over his territory or industry, or reparations. It does not suggest by implication an occupation of the enemy’s country and the establishment of a special Allied Governmental Body or unilateral disarmament. The Soviet leaders are much too good political realists not to know that a common faith and common standards and convictions are more important for the security of their country than schemes, blue prints and all the various safeguards based on force and power. They do not believe in the innate and irremediable wickedness of a nation. They know that the security of their own country against renewed attack by Germany is strengthened more by a communist Germany and a new international order based on the common feeling of the communist creed than by a policy of force which includes an occupation and a unilateral disarmament which cannot practically be maintained for ever and probably not even for one generation. From the Russian point of view, it is much more important to strengthen by all means that very strong trend of the German outlook which after a Nazi collapse will tend rather to the East than to the West. They know that—as things stand to-day—the dynamics of the politi-

cal situation in Germany will favour a development which may well lead the Germans to embrace Communism in some form. They have, therefore, no need to interfere in German internal affairs to bring about this event. They realize that they are not only geographically but also in their whole political and ideological conception of life nearer to the present Germany than the Anglo-Saxon countries are.

From a communist point of view, a communist régime once established in Germany will not entertain aggressive intentions in the sense of Article II. paragraph 2 of the new treaty of Alliance which forbids separate peace talks with any other German government that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions. And the question of what will happen if the Democracies hold another view on this matter is not settled in the Treaty.

At the same time such a development would open, from the communist standpoint, new perspectives for the rest of the Continent which would not be able to escape the same fate. How, for instance, can France evade communist implications granted a victorious Russia defeating a Nazi-Germany just becoming communist. A new France would be liberated to no small extent by the decisive support of communistically minded people. This development seems to be all the more inescapable if at the same time one bears in mind the automatic collapse of the Pétain government, the impossibility of returning to the *status quo ante* in France and the traditional French parliamentary system and the great strength of the communist movement in France even before her collapse. And we do not know whether such a general development could be successfully prevented by the Anglo-Saxon countries sending an army of occupation to a communist Germany or Europe.

This policy of the Soviet Union reveals a great realistic understanding of the German problem and it is not probable that the basic lines of this policy will be modified in some way or other in the future. If one remembers that the Soviet leaders have been able to maintain unwaveringly their political attitude towards Germany—although no belligerent country (apart from China) has had to bear such burdens and sacrifices as Russia—one must admit that this kind of political realism is amazing and at the same time an impressively statesmanlike achievement.

As to this country it is known that there are two schools in regard to Germany. There are those holding the same view as the Russians who state: "We have no quarrel with the German people as a whole but only with Hitler." They wish to destroy "Hitlerite Germany" and seek a peace on Christian-humanitarian and planned-co-operative lines hoping thus to rebuild the civilization of Europe. On the other hand, there are those who believe in innate German wickedness. They say that the ideology and practice of Naziism far from being original are based on specific German thought and constant and inherent traits of the German soul. According to them there is no difference between Germans and they allege that the Germans stand united behind Hitler and Nazi standards and methods. They think therefore

the United Nations must destroy Germany as a whole, that they must break up German unity and divide her into two or more separate states. We have not to deal here with the special question of the relation of National Socialism to the specific problem of Germany. At bottom, it seems this question cannot be satisfactorily answered without considering those currents which transcend to a certain degree all national boundaries, especially the deeper causes of the social and economic revolution which made the rise of Fascism in the modern world possible and the material and spiritual driving forces which in their destructive effects are not confined to Germany alone but have made the German problem a European problem of universal scope.

What is of special interest, in the connection before us, is that the dualism mentioned has found its expression also in the Atlantic Charter and in Political Warfare. The latter encourages the hope that the average German is not predisposed by specific Nazi qualities and that he can use his critical faculties—if only rightly influenced—in a reasonable way. It is this line of thought which, especially in the last few months, has caused various members of the British Government to appeal directly to the German people to take an active part in the overthrow of the Nazi régime. In accordance with this line of thought Article 6 of the Atlantic Charter proclaims as a condition for a new order the final destruction of Nazi tyranny and not that of the German nation as a whole. A general equality and collaboration between all nations in the economic field has been projected for the time after the war (Article 4). Unlike 1919 in which the peacemakers were not aware of the importance of the need for economic equality there will be no trade war in the post-war period. But, on the other hand, this kind of policy is in some way weakened by the disarmament clause of Article 8 which provides for the unilateral disarmament of the defeated aggressor nations, at least for a transitional stage and which as a matter of course, must strike in its practical effects the nations concerned as a whole. This Article is based on the conception that without the destruction of the German army that security which will safeguard the world from a repetition of the happenings of to-day cannot be obtained. One would perhaps be inclined to admit that the most shocking features of the Hitler régime—the persecution of innocent men on account of their race, faith or political conviction and gangster and jungle methods in national and international life—would disappear if the army replaced the party machine. But the thesis is that the German army is responsible for the doings of the national socialist régime as without the help of the army the régime could not have established itself. The spiritual equipment of the army ideology seems not basically different from the Nazi conception of life. The adoration of power and success worshipped for its own sake, the dynamic materialism and nihilism of Naziism would remain. Without having changed their temper and outlook the Germans would have made a "spurious revolution" to deceive the world a second time.

This dualism gains in weight by the fact that it is backed by certain views

which are widely spread to-day. Not only those who see in the present conflict an imperialist war and want to finish it by a policy of permanent coercion but also those who are opposed to such a policy and refuse to return to the old system of independent national units (with the old conceptions of unrestricted national sovereignty and national self-determination), hold largely the view to-day that after a collapse of the Nazi régime the whole of Germany should be occupied. It is widely urged that a kind of Allied Reconstruction Committee should be established with the explicit task of exercising governmental functions until a time arrives at which this Reconstruction Committee could be replaced by a trustworthy German government and even Professor E. H. Carr in his brilliant book *Conditions of Peace* advocates a military occupation of Germany for a limited time in order satisfactorily to solve the problem of security and to bridge the transition from the old order to the new.

If the liberal Democracies should follow up this line of policy the question arises whether the way of winning Germany back to the West will not be finally blocked. Even a defeated Nazi Germany can possibly make a decision of great political significance: it can accept the offer of the East and refuse that of the West. And it will probably act in this way if it cannot get the help of the West it urgently needs for its new Western-minded reconstruction or can get this help only under less favourable conditions than the Russians were prepared to offer to a communist Germany. To put it in another way, a defeated post-war Germany will choose as far as possible that régime which offers her immediate political gains, that is a better peace, and enables her to evade the worst national humiliation.

In this connection, the army as the only group of power which can take action against the régime will have to play a vital part. There is no doubt that the restoration of the liberal political, economic and cultural system in the sense of the Anglo-Saxon countries will not be possible in a post-war Germany. Order in Germany cannot be achieved by returning to the liberal *status quo*. For some time to come no régime there will be able to exist without a strong and effective authority in order to secure normal conditions of life. If such a régime is to have a non-communist character it needs the active support of the Western-minded oppositional forces in the army. And these groups cannot act unless they have reason to believe that there is at least a prospect of a more or less tolerable peace.

If such a chance does not exist then those other forces which advocate a close co-operation with the Soviet Union and are prepared to transform Germany into a communist state will gain the upper hand. These rather strong forces are also connected with the army and have only been driven underground and are probably even stronger to-day than they were before as a result of the various tendencies in the West to finish the present conflict in some way in terms of power policy. They lay stress on the common interests between Germany and Russia and openly aim at creating a great

transcontinental block consisting of Germany, Russia and Japan which should counterbalance the two great Anglo-Saxon countries. General Haushofer and his school were the first to express jubilant and triumphant sentiments on German-Russian collaboration in August, 1939, and on the defeat of Rosenberg. These Eastern-minded circles in the Army know that the Russians have a war machine comparable to that of Germany, that they have a military tradition and spirit and that the soldier is one of the three pillars on which the Soviet Union is based. If these forces come to terms with the Soviet Union the other strata of the population who look for liberation, salvation and guidance to the West would not be able to oppose such a development.

In order to appreciate rightly the function the army can exercise at the present time we must realize that in the highly industrialized states a purely military authoritarianism is no longer possible since it is incompatible with the whole structure of modern mass society. It is almost generally accepted that a planned society is inevitable in the twentieth century. And there is good reason for the belief that the Anglo-Saxon countries and especially this country might be able to produce a new and effective alternative to the modern secular totalitarianism of to-day by creating a new type of modern planned society which—unlike Fascism and Communism—is based on Christianity and maintains freedom. From a sociological point of view, the army is to-day irrevocably placed in the position of a servant and not of a master. The happenings in Russia, Germany and Italy confirm this. In all these states the army is at the disposal of totalitarian leaders. Where the attempt has been made to interfere with the political claims of the totalitarian régime it has met with complete disaster as is shown by the fate of the German Generals von Schleicher, von Bredow and Fritzsche. The only excuse the German army can make for its subservience to the originally detested Nazi régime is the fact that there was actually behind the specific military ideology no political, social and spiritual conception of life which could attract the minds of the masses and permeate them with a new spirit. At bottom, the army of to-day is only a gigantic technical instrument. In so far, it is true, its significance is eminent and its power immense. But the point is, it cannot of itself provide the basis for a new order of a planned society. It has no longer a spiritual or political driving power of its own.

Therefore, if the liberal Democracies do not want to face a communist Germany, with a communist continental Europe, it is not enough to appeal to the Germans to overcome the present régime. At the same time the ends and the purposes of the projected action must be made clear. A politically realistic and tolerable alternative is necessary which gives those forces in Germany which still look to the West at least a chance of choosing a post-war régime in harmony with Western principles and values. These Western-minded forces in Germany should be treated practically in the same way as Russia would treat a communist Germany and given

help in re-establishing order and preventing anarchy and mob-rule. The question of a military occupation could perhaps be raised, in this connection, as a means of helping to establish a new order in compliance with Western standards and principles. And as to the question of the disarmament of the aggressor nations one should bear in mind that a defeated Nazi Germany which has gone through a shattering revolution will only be too willing to disarm—even if only to prove her good will and completely changed attitude. But just for this reason it should be considered whether the whole question should not perhaps be put in a wider programme which in the course of time would to a certain extent give security to all nations. As we know, in the long run, a permanent unilateral disarmament will never reconcile the nations with each other. The question of disarmament can only be satisfactorily settled if—as the Pope said, “a mutually agreed, organic and progressive disarmament, spiritual as well as material” can be secured in future.

In any case, as long as a defeated Nazi Germany is in a position by becoming communist largely to evade the application of the traditional means of power politics this kind of policy has no real chance of being carried out. To put it in another way: under the present circumstances, the old policy of force and power in whatever form and intention it may be recommended is more illusory and utopian than its adherents think. It is perhaps, therefore, no chance that many of those who to-day so strongly advocate this kind of “realistic” policy belonged in former times to those politicians who pleaded in a no less energetic way for an appeasement policy towards an aggressive Germany. We come, therefore, to the conclusion that the treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and the Soviet Union does not relieve the liberal Democracies from the task and the responsibility of pursuing a constructive policy towards a defeated post-war Anti-Nazi Germany. It depends on the general political lines of the Anglo-Saxon countries and not alone on Germany, whose actions are at least calculable, whether after the complete destruction of “Hitlerite Germany” she herself will be won back to the West or whether Communism will dominate the mind of the European Continent.

FROM “TWENTIETH CENTURY PSALTER”

BY RICHARD CHURCH

26TH DAY. MORNING

WAKENED by the summer moon
 Pouring her magic on my lidded eyes,
 I stared upon the silver, and heard
 The small sounds of night. Distant cries
 Of hunted things, and hunter, beast and bird
 Half distinguishable, none
 More real than a dream when it is ended,
 Floated before me, and I smelled
 The living garden, forest, field,
 Their separate odours drawn and blended
 Into one, the very joy of my heart.

Yet I shuddered in my joy, and shuddering,
 Heard the distant sirens start
 Some town or village to the alert.
 Faint, and coldly on my fear, the murdering
 Gunfire, and feather-touch of bombs
 Felt along with indifferent fingers,
 Crumbling the edge of night,
 Of earth, of human life,
 Like the assassin with his knife
 Cloaked in fantasy, and creeping
 Dope-drugged, lost to all sensation.

I shrank, pleaded with myself, half weeping,
 ‘I am small, and of no reputation,
 These things are not in my keeping.’
 But still the iron of guilt entered
 My soul, corroded my senses, rusted
 The sweet evidence which I had trusted.

The moon, in whom my wakefulness was centred,
 Moved on. Once more her path
 Passed beyond the miniature wrath
 My mind reflected to her from the earth
 Along with owl-shriek, foxbark, cries
 Of death at midnight under perfumed skies.
 I saw her as she was, ample
 In time, and under heaven’s span
 Sufficient comment on the deeds of man,
 A light and understanding unto the simple.

27TH DAY. MORNING

In this century of salesmanship,
Easy analysis of mind and matter,
It is not simple to proclaim a faith.
There is no way, by singing of society,
Of men in crowds, of men at war and work,
To shun the responsibility of solitude.

A boy with metal wings has been the match
Of the material past, of the scornful reproof
Of the wealthy. With time and space, he has plumbed
The deep waters of the proud. He has broken belief
In things that the moth and the bomb corrupt. He has cracked
A whip of explosives on the steps of the Stock Exchange.
His word has dropped from the sky, and shattered the churches.

But gods and airmen, winging above the world,
See all and nothing. They have eagles' blood:
Their bones are nervous and of fragile stuff.
The glooms and caverns of our human story,
Changing as mountains change, have made them rebels,
And they have filled the century with their cry,
'The snare! The snare is broken, and we are delivered!'

The echo of that challenge is despair.
They have no comfort, the divine destroyers.
See what they lose; the stillness and the silence,
The secret of an individual joy,
The momentary anarchism of love
That mirrors love alone, and has no aim.
Losing that soliloquy, they lose
The quiet communion of faith, the sight
And primal substance that Spinoza plotted,
That Pascal and the clod-foot peasant knew,
The contradiction that has made me sing
Though death and cynicism in my brain
Deride the music, mock the rising joy.

Now, for my brethren and companions' sakes,
I beat that critic down, and dare proclaim
Something of God, that twentieth century science
Still lags to prove, for lack of solitude.

YOUTH WORK

BY MERVYN STOCKWOOD

A FEW days ago I listened to a magistrate passing sentence upon and admonishing a young man who had been guilty of a serious stealing offence. Most of those present in Court would probably have agreed with what the magistrate said—it was deplorable that anyone should take advantage of fire-watching duties to the extent of robbing his employer; it was deplorable that a boy of 18 should be so lacking in moral perception that he appeared incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in the most elementary instance. What concerns me most is not the boy's lack of moral perception, but the causes responsible for it. The magistrate saw the incident in the terms of taking something which is the property of another; I see it in the terms of a social system, which is so constructed that it prejudices the educational, mental and ethical faculties of so many of its younger citizens. I know the background of that boy intimately—the foul hovel in which he has grown up; the filthy bed which he has shared with other members of the family; his fourteenth birthday when, not even half educated, he left school to help the family exchequer, only to find himself frustrated in no less than seven successive dead end jobs; the attempts which I made through clubs, games, religion, to point him to a different way of living and to an existence in which he would have the opportunity to live a full and useful life and to enjoy those finer things which had been denied him by the cruel circumstances of his social environment. I mention this because I want to make it clear that in writing of youth work and of religion I am seeing those things not as isolated but as integral parts of a social system; and that if we are dissatisfied with the progress we are making in educational experiments, the fault must be sought, not necessarily in the experiment as such, but in the system in which the experiment is made.

This applies equally when dealing with youth at other levels of society. As a schoolmaster, as one who since his ordination has been closely associated with a public school, as an elementary school visitor, as a lecturer at a secondary school and as a club leader I realize that all boys and girls are to some extent the victims of our present social system—in fact I do not know which is the more worthy of pity, the boy who leaves his elementary school at fourteen almost uneducated, or the public school boy whose educational opportunities are too often devoted to turning him into a presentable and successful member of the privileged class.

Unlike some critics, I do not believe that the solution of our difficulties is to be sought by a blind imitation of foreign social systems and youth organizations, though only a very foolish man would ignore altogether the experiments in the U.S.S.R. But generally speaking their methods are not our

methods, and in any case the measure of its success has yet to be fully proved. Instead, I would urge that it is incumbent upon us who realize the nature of the problem to strive for a solution in our own way and by methods which are in keeping with the tradition of this country. Perhaps the most important point is that we should be agreed as to the aim of our youth work—too often we have been deficient in this respect. I have met some club leaders who appear to imagine that our task is completed if we have inculcated a sense of comradeship and a desire for team games in their boys and girls, while at the other extreme I have known some of my fellow clergy to judge the success or failure of a particular club by the regularity of the members at Holy Communion, with the result that games and club features are looked upon as little more than decoys for bringing the outsider to Church services.

I would approach it from the other end. I believe that God has a plan and a purpose for this world, and that this plan and purpose can be realized only through an integrated community—that is to say, through a comradeship of men and women who are living a full and useful life, developed in body, mind and spirit. By this criterion all else must be judged; a particular piece of youth work, for example, is valuable in so far as it makes this end. If, for instance, the playing of ping-pong is going to create a sense of community, it is a good thing; if, however, it is a mere negative antidote to the running of the streets, then its value is at least suspect, if not definitely harmful.

It is at this point that we can put our finger on so much of the weakness in our youth movements. Boys and girls are collected together into clubs with no apparent end in view beyond the desire to keep them out of mischief—to an extent we succeed because of the psychological reactions of the adolescent who is passing through a team or gang phase; then the phase passes and the club sees them no more. I am an uncompromising opponent to club services in the sense that when Sunday arrives it is presumed that the club will worship by itself as a club. While I do not deny that such services can sometimes be of great value, yet I am quite sure that we ordinarily defeat our purpose if we suggest to our young people that there is one type of religion for youth and another type of religion for the grown-up; for though it may provide the spiritual stimulus for an excessive and false sense of community among the club members themselves, it will certainly not help them to realize their membership in the fuller community outside. But in giving an illustration from the spiritual affairs of youth work, I do not want to appear to isolate religion, because my thesis depends upon the integration of all human activities. I refuse to differentiate between things spiritual and things secular, for everything can have a religious significance—even the throwing of darts, if it makes for that integration and sense of community which is according to God's plan.

If we are to succeed in making this world what we believe God intends it to be then it necessitates that we who are to work for it shall be as far as

possible sound in body. I have never been a worshipper of athletics—I suffered from an overdose at school—but I do believe that the opportunities which athletics offer for the development of character and of community sense are tremendous; and what concerns me is that at the moment these opportunities are not available to the vast majority of our younger citizens in any adequate way, and I would suggest that the attempt to remedy this defect is a religious duty. Certainly as a parish priest I have no hesitation whatever in saying that the remedying of them would obviate many of the more specifically spiritual problems with which I have to deal. There are other things besides athletics which make for physical fitness, in particular adequate health services and proper instruction in medical and sexual knowledge. I would stress two things:

1. It is to be hoped that after the war the state will realize its responsibility in seeing that all its citizens have at their disposal the fullest and best medical attention and knowledge; if for no other reason than that it is ultimately in the interests of the state to ensure that its members are as physically fit as possible. It is inconceivable that sickness shall continue to be regarded as a means whereby the medical practitioner reaps to himself private profit.

2. The attitude which the average Education Committee adopts towards sex education is not merely stupid but it is also criminally wicked. Few things make more for disintegration and for the breaking up of community than a disordered sex life—and few things are more responsible for a disordered sex life than the lack of adequate and scientific sex knowledge.

Then to pass to mental development. A social worker who passed some nights with me among the people who have been compelled to live in shelters remarked in despair that it would be difficult to do anything for the betterment of England until we had increased our educational opportunities. This criticism will I know meet with the approval of the elementary school teacher and of the club leader; the former loses the child just as it is beginning to be mentally appreciative, while the latter knows the almost impossible task of stimulating intellectual interests. Here we need a bold lead from the state. To achieve our objective we need to have the same concern for education and mental development as the Greek City State had in the days of Pericles. To cram facts in a person's head as a preparation for examinations is, I suppose, a necessity; but it will achieve very little unless at the same time such intellectual discipline is preparing the person to play a full and useful part in the life of the city. At my own church I do what I can to stimulate interest in music, painting, politics and civics, and quite often I hold discussions and recitals in the church building after Service time—I do so on the ground that God's purpose for this world cannot be accomplished through a nation of nit-wits, no matter how pious, but through a community which is intellectually alert, and in the fullest sense of the word cultured.

The present state of affairs is quite deplorable. Recently travelling with some officers to Scotland I noticed that the railway carriage aspired to nothing higher than the *Daily Mirror* and *Picture Post*, while in my own parish I live among people most of whom read in normal times little more than racing results and obituary notices. Whatever may be the final solution to this problem, it certainly involves the most drastic and revolutionary overhaul of our whole educational system, and above all it demands from the State that attitude of mind which will treat as a sacred trust the culture of its citizens—that each, no matter what his origins, may have the opportunity to benefit according to his ability. In the meantime, we who are concerned with Youth work must continue to scratch at the problem in our different ways—but I would like to suggest that perhaps one of the most valuable things we can do at this juncture is to interest our young people in civics and social reconstruction.

Then spiritual development. No one will quarrel with the dictum of Karl Marx: "From each man according to his ability, to each man according to his need." With that as a basis, an integrated community becomes a possibility. Unfortunately Marx does not show us how we can overcome the difficulty which confronts us in that while most men are prepared to take according to their needs, few of them are ready to give according to their ability. The Christian deals with the problem by asserting that man can only begin to live for the benefit of his fellows and for the realization of the Divine Plan when his spirit is knit with the Spirit of God. The Gospel makes no bones about its estimate of human nature; it is in fact the most bitter opponent to Liberal Humanism—man's nature is prone to evil, to disharmony, to disintegration—hence what man needs is not moral uplift but a radical conversion, a shattering of his sinful nature as catastrophic as the experience of birth itself.

Compare that with the sort of religious instruction which is provided in some of our State schools. I am not criticizing the efforts of individual head teachers, the thoroughness of whose methods are often beyond praise, but the shackles placed upon them by the higher authorities—to know the 23rd psalm by heart; to repeat the beatitudes without understanding the first thing about them, may be sufficient for a scripture examination, but it certainly has nothing to do with God's purpose for the world, nor with the turning out of fully developed citizens. Similarly in our clubs the lust singing of "He who would valiant be," a breezy talk on the club spirit, may have a certain emotional appeal, but I am sceptical as to their permanent value.

In particular I would stress two things. Just as in physical education it is essential that the child shall be taught the nature of his body and the method whereby it needs to be developed, so in the matters appertaining to the spirit it is essential that the child should receive a reasonable presentation of the nature of man and God. It is for instance quite useless to tell the club boy that

that is required of him is that he should love God, unless there is pointed out to him the character of the God whom he is supposed to love. Even when we have done that it is useless to urge him to love this God—and just to leave it at that—when he realizes with St. Paul that he is prevented from giving this love on account of a deep inner frustration—"The things I would do, those I fail to do; the things I would not do, those I do." It is just here that we can account for so much of our failure, for instead of basing our spiritual education on a grimly realistic foundation, we have ignored the facts and instead have substituted a misleading humanism. The remedy is to be sought primarily in a complete overhaul of the methods whereby religion is taught—something can be done in clubs and in churches, but the root of the problem lies in the schools.

Then secondly, we shall fail if spiritual development is presented in isolation, or as something which concerns only the individual. As I stated at the outset, the purpose of all education is to equip men so thoroughly that they will be able to live a full and useful life as members of a community which has a purpose to achieve. Hence, whatever our views may be about the Church and Denominationalism, the fact remains that there is little point in spiritual education unless it is going to prepare the child to take his place in the religious community.

This I know opens up all sorts of problems—not least the problem of the Church itself, and I am aware of the fact that to most young people the Church appears as a dull, irrelevant, reactionary and supine body. With many of their criticisms I find myself in agreement, but even so I am convinced that unless we can help them to take their places in organized Church life (and I use the word "Church" to cover all denominations), we have largely failed in our task. If the Church is to capture the loyalty of our young folk the sooner we can free ourselves from the old parochial outlook the better. The Church will only commend itself to them if it manifests itself as a creative community in both agricultural and industrial environments, as dynamic cells of committed Christians in factories and farmsteads, sharing a common purpose and living a common life. For in that context the phrases spiritual maturity and the Kingdom of God become comprehensible realities.

So to conclude. My purpose has been to suggest a common aim; the necessity to realize in this country an ordering of society which will approximate more nearly to the will of God than that which we have hitherto known—a society in which each man will have the opportunity to live life to the full as a useful member of the community. The problem of education is the problem of preparing youth to take its place in such a community. It is primarily a spiritual problem, because it can only be solved by men who have grasped the truth that a radical change in outward circumstances is dependent upon a radical change within the being of man—it is those two changes which must dominate our thinking as we approach the youth of this country.

COMMAND AND CO-OPERATION AT SEA

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

IN his speech on September 8 the Prime Minister observed that "we must regard the struggle at sea as the foundation of all the efforts of the United Nations." This realization of the dependence of the Allied Cause upon sea communications is indeed long overdue, and this tardiness in discerning what our primary object should be, and of acting accordingly, is itself in a measure—and no small measure—due to an unduly restricted outlook upon, and interpretation of, the term "command of the sea." That term has been interpreted in the language of material in place of the purpose which it fulfils in war. The purpose of command in the present war is, as it always has been in wars of the past, to exercise control of all kinds of communication between territories affected by or affecting the conduct of the war and separated from each other by an intervening space of water. Whether the vehicles by which these communications are carried on and controlled are "ships" in the air or "ships" on the sea is not the fundamental point. What is fundamental is that the allies shall be able to carry men and materials across the water-spaces that lie between armies in the metropolitan area and the territories they need to conquer or defend, and between countries and the sources of those raw and finished materials which, being unable to produce them within their own borders or those of the countries they have occupied, they must import across the sea.

It is most unfortunate that the expression "command of the sea" should have become associated solely with ships of war and the word "sea power" identified with material power in the form of naval strength alone. Naval strength is one of the means by which sea power is exerted, but sea power, rightly understood, is not something material: it is the power, or capacity, to fulfil a particular aim, and that particular aim is the control of the lines of communication of every kind across the sea whether those lines are served in the air, on the surface or under the surface of the sea. It is not perhaps unnatural that there should be this association of command of the sea with the number of ships, in particular those of the largest types, for these have been so long the sole instruments by which command was obtained; and minds are not quick in shaking off old conceptions. Fleets met fleets in large masses, battles ensued, and the result of a decisive victory in such a battle was that "command" passed into the hands of the navy which had effectively destroyed the material or the morale, or both, of the enemy. A decisive battle was one of which the result was so to reduce the number of heavy ships of the oppos-

ing navy as to establish, or markedly to increase, the degree of superiority of the victor. With that superiority he could so distribute his forces at sea as to enable him to oppose the enemy with a superior fighting force wherever he might attempt any movement across the sea. Movements of troops or of trade were possible only when adequate protection could be given to them, and the enemy, weakened by losses in battle, was unable to provide that protection.

An old writer once called the battleships of the navy the "infantry" of the sea. They constituted the "mass" corresponding to the massed infantry with which a decisive battle was fought on land. Except in certain narrow waters in which numbers of heavily armed gunboats could attack them under favourable conditions no other vessel, from frigate to brig, could challenge the battleship. To-day all that is changed. The destruction or disablement of the battleships of a navy is not necessarily followed by command of the sea. Thus the Italian battlefleet has been disabled for the last two years, partly by loss of material, partly by loss of morale; but the command of the Mediterranean has not passed thereby into the hands of the allies who now command only a restricted area in the vicinities of the ports of Gibraltar and Alexandria. The passage of the centre of the sea across which Rommel's supplies reach him is "commanded" by the enemy to the extent that he is not deterred by such losses as he suffers from continuing to send men and munitions to Africa and at the same time is able to deny us the passage through the Mediterranean, except at such heavy sacrifices as we have witnessed in the convoy battles of recent months. Nor is the command of the Arctic Sea in our hands in spite of our possession of a greatly superior battleship force in the North Sea. We need that command badly in order to send Russia the munitions she so greatly lacks. In the Atlantic, though we possess the power to prevent the enemy from sending armies and goods across it, the command is partial only so long as the allied communications in all parts of that ocean continue to suffer the heavy losses of the last six months.

In the Atlantic, in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean the instruments which have principally worked this change are the submarine and aircraft. What is now indispensable for the allied cause is to overcome those two agencies of destruction. Though the United States and ourselves are able to produce munitions in vast quantities, that which reaches the scenes of battle in Russia, in Africa, and the East, is substantially reduced by those losses and delayed in transit to its destinations. Those losses and that delay must be overcome, and until they are overcome we can neither deliver to Russia the tanks, guns and ammunition and transport vehicles she requires nor make effective military diversions in favour of her armies; while as to what is called, for some strange reason, a "second front" (for we already have at least half a dozen "fronts") it is idle to think of it in the present state of our shipping tonnage.

In the Far East, command is no less the preliminary to the recovery of our

positions and securing the Dominions in the South Pacific; but whereas in the European and American seas the principal obstacles to be overcome are the aircraft and submarines—for the great ships of the Italian navy have throughout been an almost negligible influence except for “containing” a certain number of our own which we could have used advantageously elsewhere—the allies in the Far Eastern theatre have to meet and beat a powerful and efficient navy of all arms, with bases in the hands of numerous and well trained troops. Till command is established little can be done towards ejecting the intruders from the islands and the mainland colonies they now occupy; but when it shall have been obtained, the scattered Japanese forces, isolated, will be in much the same position as our own were when they were cut off from reinforcements and attacked by superior forces. At the same time, the flow of munitions moving without the present losses across the seas, will be sufficient to open up a new line of attack on Japan from China by way of the air.

Because there is this new element, aircraft in sea warfare, both in the form of fighting units and transport, we need to broaden our interpretation of the term “command of the sea.” It was correct to think in terms of ships on the surface when all communications took place on the water and—except in certain narrow waters commanded by shore artillery—could be interrupted only by ships on the water. The command we need to-day is command of the water and the skies above it from which communications are subjected to attack. But for the fact that the word is an awkward one one might call it “transmarine command.” It is necessary only to adjust our minds to the new conditions, and to realize that what we need is command of the space between coastlines across which armies and goods require to move. That is the real meaning of “command of the sea” to-day and it is no more necessary to talk of “airpower” and “sea power” as two distinct things than it would be to talk of “surface-ship power” and “submarine power.” And not only is such a distinction unnecessary; it is incorrect.

If the Prime Minister’s words are to take a practical shape and not remain a mere platonic phrase all the efforts of the combined strategy of the allies should now have as the primary object command of the sea. The German successes have been won by observation of the old and sound principle of “one thing at a time.” They departed from that rule when they attacked Russia, and that departure is undoubtedly costing them dearly to-day. Our failures have been due to loss of command of the sea and that loss, in turn, has been due, in a large degree, to dissipating our efforts upon more than one object at a time; forces which were initially insufficient for a single purpose. An illustration of this is the neglect to secure the essential position of Crete which the criminal attack upon Greece by Mussolini put into our hands. Major Seversky in his very remarkable book makes the observation that from the time when the Italians invaded Greece the British had more than six months in which to entrench their aircraft in Crete and build an aviation centre, but failed entirely to do so. He attributes this most singular

omission to our naval mindedness and our belief that the island could be protected by the guns of the fleet alone. In my opinion the cause lies elsewhere. It lies in the absence of a single object. We were told that the needs of Crete could not be met because of demands in other parts. The efforts which, if command of the sea had been adopted as the primary object of British strategy, would have been thrown into making Crete secure with an adequate force of aircraft and artillery, were expended otherwise. Dissipation of effort, not concentration upon a single object, was the keynote of the loss of Crete, Crete and Tripoli, two objectives of the very highest strategical importance, fell into, or remained in, the enemy’s hands through not making a correct analysis of our principal object and acting upon that analysis. The result has been that the command of the sea, that foundation of every operation we may wish to undertake, passed into the enemy’s possession in the Mediterranean. We learnt recently that the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean fleet had stated that a new organization had lately been set up to improve the sea and air co-operation in that theatre. It appears from that that it has taken two years of active warfare, two years in which the whole position in the Mediterranean has been dominated by the need for command of the sea, to bring home the necessity for the two arms to act in the fullest combination. This indicates a singular lack of vision and understanding, and it is justifiable to attribute this lack in the main to a failure to realize that command of the sea is the first and principal need, and that the supposed distinction between it and “command of the air” is a false distinction, as false as the distinction between ships on the water and ships in the air.

Mr. Churchill referred in the same speech to the “continued efforts being made by us and our allies to unify and concert the command and action of the united nations.” Although unification of command and action appears to be the most elementary commonsense it needs to be realized that in practice it is always very difficult to attain, and that we must not be unduly impatient or censorious if it does not materialize immediately. Long experience tells us a tale of failures due to a variety of causes—differences in the national outlooks (Mr. Churchill observed that we and the Americans are sea animals and the Russians land animals) the tendency to think of what will be most immediately favourable to one’s self, or of the future possession of territory (as the Russians opposed action by the Greeks at Constantinople and the French action in Syria in the last war), a narrow national view like that expressed in the Italian “*sacro egoismo*” to which they adhered throughout and which made the command in the Adriatic a most imperfect arrangement as well as wasteful of strength. It is well worth reading General Maurice’s *Lessons of Allied Co-operation** at this moment, for there the difficulties and the reasons for want of allied co-operation are set out and explained. To appreciate that there are difficulties and in what they consist is the first step towards overcoming them.

* Oxford University Press. 10s. 6d.

JAPAN'S STRATEGIC POSITION

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

CAN one form any conclusions as to the probable future developments of Japan's strategy? Must we assume that its object will be to support a policy of further aggressive expansion, or is it more probable, particularly in view of the more recent events of the war, that it will aim primarily at providing for the security of her home bases and of her newly acquired possessions? It will help us, I think, if we try to differentiate between Japan's purely acquisitive actions and the defensive measures she took to ward off their consequences. There can be little doubt that Japan's primary aggressive purpose was to secure for herself the resources of Indonesia and Malaya. If she had ambitions to extend her conquests to Australia and India they must have been more vague and have taken definite shape only when she became drunk with her own success. For it is clear that she had made no complete plans to exploit success immediately when she dominated the arena, and her opponents were weak and staggering from the effect of her blows. The defensive side of her strategy had been fully elaborated, and it of course entailed offensive action. It included securing immediate command of the sea in the northern Pacific by temporarily incapacitating her opponents' navies, already greatly weakened by their commitments in other waters, but she had also to provide against an ultimate recovery of their strength by securing the naval bases which they would require for counter-offensive action. The capture of the Philippines, Hong-Kong, Singapore, and the footing obtained in New Guinea and Polynesia were to a large extent defensive measures to buttress her aggressive policy. They extended her pre-war defensive position, already very strong in home waters owing to the great distances of the bases from which hostile fleets could operate. Essentially the defensive side of Japanese strategy provided for exploiting the advantages held by a fleet operating in waters within easy reach of its bases, and with shore based air protection. The crippling of the American Pacific Fleet, which could only be temporary in view of America's immense resources, gained time for the establishment of the defensive position. In the event the time gained proved insufficient, and the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway Island took place before defensive measures could be completed. The functions of Japan's army, both in pursuing her purely acquisitive policy and in consolidating defence, were of course of vital importance, but they did not entail the employment of a high proportion of her available land power. The great dispersion of the part that

was used proved that Japan looked on it as a secondary though necessary instrument in her strategy, mainly required for acquisitive action. How incapable it is, owing to dispersion, of providing adequately for defence the recapture of the Solomon Islands has shown. That action has also revealed that Japan's naval defensive position, though still very strong, is not complete.

Japan has to the utmost of her resources used air power, both in pursuance of her aggressive strategy and in consolidating her naval position, but it is in the air that her defensive position is weakest; and it is only by the use of her army that her defensive position in that respect can be improved. Her navy can do little to remove the weakness which so far has not been seriously tested. Yet danger of air attack both from China and Siberia may develop. Air attacks from either or both of these directions, though they could not be expected to produce decisive results, might go far to cripple her war industries and her navy, on which she must mainly rely for defence. Japan's anxiety to close the Burma road and her offensive launched to secure the airfields in Chekiang prove that she fully realizes the danger that threatens her from China. Equally the retention of a large part of her army in Manchuria indicates her preparedness to undertake offensive operations with a defensive object in Siberia, should her pact of friendship with Russia prove an inadequate defensive precaution. Japan's whole course of action has, I think, shown that in spite of her aggressive policy she was fully alive to the necessity of defence. The question is can she carry her aggressive policy further and at the same time extend her defensive position? Is it conceivable that she seriously contemplates a large scale invasion of Australia or India, or is it her object to maintain the threat, hoping to induce her opponents to concentrate on defensive measures while she exploits the material resources of her newly gained territories in order to strengthen her previously weak economic position?

Such offensive enterprises as Japan can now undertake must, I think, have a definitely defensive purpose. Those she has carried out or attempted since her occupation of Malaya and the Dutch Islands would appear to be of that nature. The conquest of Burma gave her possession of Burmese resources, but in any case it was a necessary defensive measure to prevent Burma and China becoming a base for counter-offensive operations. The attempt that failed at Midway Island must certainly have had a defensive object, and that which was defeated in the Coral Sea, though its purpose is not quite clear, was probably intended to secure a base for the interruption of communications between the U.S.A. and Australia and not for a major invasion of Australia.

Apart from these indications of Japanese strategy it is obvious that to attempt an invasion of India or Australia under existing conditions would imply the employment of a very much larger army than those used by her up to date. It would be necessary in the case of Australia, and probably also in the case of India, to transport it by sea—invasion of India through the difficult country of northern Burma and Assam could hardly be more than a

subsidiary operation. Has Japan sufficient shipping to transport adequate forces? And even if she has could she have any hope of carrying through a large scale amphibious operation successfully in view of the naval and air strength which the Allies have now developed; to say nothing of the increased strength of their land forces? The operation would have to be conducted outside the zone in which convoys and their escort would have efficient shore based air protection; and they would have to pass through waters within operational range of allied naval bases and covered by shore based aircraft. If Japan had been able to exploit her original successes at once while the Allies were at their weakest there is no telling what might have happened. But has not the opportunity passed, leaving the security of her acquisitions her chief concern? Her attack on Port Moresby is surely designed to strengthen her defensive position by enabling her to command the Torres Straits. It might if successful lead to an attempt to obtain a footing in northern Australia in order to strengthen her position, but the possession of New Guinea or a footing in northern Australia offer her no great economic prizes.

If Japan's strategy is now mainly defensive it would seem that her attention must be turned to China and Siberia. So long as she can keep China almost completely isolated by retaining her hold on Burma and the approaches to the Burma road, she has little to fear from that direction. For with sea communication open she should be able to reinforce her army sufficiently to retain her hold on Chekiang and other parts of China from which danger might threaten. The fact that she has allowed herself to be driven back by Chiang Kai Shek's armies in Chekiang would seem to indicate that she is reserving her armies to deal with more serious dangers elsewhere. In China Japan still holds the area from which danger might develop, in Siberia she does not. The urge to secure possession of that danger area while Russia is so fully engaged in the west must therefore be great. Does she intend to strike, or is she hesitating knowing that Russia still holds formidable forces in the east and that if attacked some degree of American assistance could be given her? Does she hope that Germany may yet gain such decisive successes as to render danger from Russia negligible, and that she may in consequence be left free to use all her resources to meet the counter-offensive of the other Allies? The events of the next few weeks in Russia may determine Japan's course of action, but I suggest that failure of the German offensive in Russia would be more likely to precipitate Japan's action against Siberia than its success. Should Russia survive as a great military power Japan might never again have so good an opportunity of strengthening her defensive position as at present. It seems clear that in any case Japan's decision will not be influenced either by a desire to help her ally or by land hunger, but simply to eliminate danger which the development of air power has brought to an insular nation which previously could rely on sea power for protection.

SCOTS IN POLAND

By HENRY BAERLEIN

IT is no secret that large numbers of Polish soldiers are at present stationed in Scotland; but it is not generally known that some centuries ago the Scots who migrated from their native land very often travelled to the Polish kingdom. According to William Lithgow, the rather bombastic Lanarkshire author of a book of travels which was first published in 1614, Poland was then 'a large and mighty Kingdom, powerful in horsemen and populous of strangers,' with a soil 'wonderful fruitful of corn' and 'a proud nobility, a familiar and ruvidous vulgarity'; in fact the only feature he, a strong Protestant, deplored was 'the hissing of snakish papists.' He tells us of the 'abundance of gallant rich merchants, my countrymen' who were 'wonderful glad' of his arrival there. It was, indeed, a period in which large numbers of Scots emigrated to Poland and lived there for some time or permanently exercised commercial business or crafts.

The reasons for this emigration were various, the most important of them being that Scotland's resources were insufficient for its population; another reason came with the persecution of the Catholics and of the Presbyterians. The relations of the Scots with England prior to the Union were hostile, France had a considerable trading class of its own, many Scots were already settled in Holland, while Poland with its commerce somewhat undeveloped and with a good harbour—as far back as between 1474 and 1476 no less than twenty-four Scottish ships entered the port of Danzig—Poland offered many advantages to the enterprising and the persevering.

The emigrants were chiefly of the class of small lairds or townfolk, and their most popular profession in Poland was that of pedlars. Sir John Skene, a learned Scot, clerk of the King's Register, Counsel and Rolls, in his book *De verborum significatione* (published in 1597), has a detailed paragraph on "pedders" and his main examples are 'Scotsmen of the realm of Polonia,' on whom he adds the interesting remark: 'Quhairof I saw an great multitude in the towne of Cracovia anno Dom. 1569.' Here we may mention that one of Cracow's most hallowed customs, prohibited by the Germans during their occupation, is being kept alive in a certain Scottish town, where at noon every day from a lofty tower one hears the notes of a Polish trumpet which breaks off in the midst of a passage. In Cracow from the magnificent tower of St. Mary's church it was heard every hour until the German invasion, in memory of that brave man who, six hundred years ago, was warning his fellow-citizens of the approach of the Tartars until an arrow struck him in the throat.

In the year 1606, when the idea of union between Scotland and England was discussed in London in the House of Commons, and Bacon moved that the Scots might be naturalized by an Act of Parliament, the party opposing retorted that if the Scots were admitted into English liberties they would overrun the country and 'the multiplicities of the Scots in Polonia' was given as an argument. After the events of 1649 Charles II. sent to Poland his agent, Sir John Cochrane, in order to raise money for the support of his cause from among the Polish Scots, all of whom were by no means pedlars. Little of the money which Cochrane collected came into Charles's hands, so that he disowned this envoy and dispatched other emissaries with the same purpose. But the Scots in Poland, having been robbed by Cochrane, gave them a cold welcome and one of them, John Denham, reported in verse on the unsuccess of his mission. The stubbornness of his countrymen, he says, was such that they would not even hear him,

Nor answer would send
To our letter so well penned,
Nor assist our affairs
With their monies, nor their wares,
As their answer now declares,
But only with their prayers.

The legal position of the Scots in Poland differed according to whether they were settled in towns or carried on an itinerant trade. There was no pressure on the part of the State to naturalize them and for quite a long period large numbers of them considered themselves subject to the King of Scotland. The wandering hucksters were on the whole allowed to exercise their commerce freely on payment of a tax, which however gradually rose. First a special supplement was added for any horse they used in transporting their goods; later on it was not only a poll-tax and a horse-tax that were levied, but also a charge on wares or on baskets in which they were carried. Of course they met with difficulties from merchant guilds; they were forbidden to set up their stalls in certain places. They had, moreover, to face the hostility of their own privileged compatriots, eight of whom were appointed by King Stephen Batory as purveyors to the court, who were allowed to follow the King in his travels over the country and to be immune from all jurisdiction save that of the Royal Marshal. These privileged Scots could not bear the illegal competition of their own people; they denounced them and the King ordered Abraham Young, a Scottish officer in his service, to study the laws by which his countrymen were governed. He was appointed for life Director over all the Scots in the realm, of many of whom it was said that they 'live licentiously and do not recognize any judges or law-courts.' To remedy this every Scot had thenceforward to belong to some brotherhood and swear to observe its rules.

A Scot who met with some successes and saw larger possibilities of gain would bring over to Poland his brothers and the more distant members of

his family. They married in the first generation almost exclusively among themselves; as the girls were not numerous the widowers were besieged with offers as soon as their mourning was over. All the family festivities were accompanied by almsgiving to the Scottish poor, about whom they were always anxious. They were seldom involved in criminal cases; but the smooth surface of their life was occasionally disturbed by the further immigration of their fellow-countrymen. For instance in 1592 a letter was addressed to the municipality of Danzig by ten Scots citizens of that town, in the name of 'the whole Scottish nation dwelling there' to complain of the new arrivals who practised 'interloping and forestalling trade,' that is to say, sat with their baskets on the bridges, looked for customers in courtyards and were assisted by 'lazy women and loose servants.' Another document, five years later, gives the views of fourteen new arrivals who complain to the municipality that their settled compatriots refuse to receive them in their homes, John Kinfauns excusing himself on the ground that he is a widower and one Gelletlie on the plea of pressure of business. In 1625 King James issued a proclamation warning the young against lightminded expeditions; masters of ships were forbidden to take on board young people of either sex unless they could produce letters from their families living abroad and summoning them, or prove that they were provided with means of subsistence for at least one year.

Even those Scots who were established in Poland for good maintained connections with their native country; thus in 1651 when the buildings of Marischal College, Aberdeen, became dilapidated many members of the Polish brotherhoods answered the appeal for help, twenty-one of them from Warsaw alone, while the Danzig merchant John Turner subscribed £600. Many of these Scots deserved equally well of the country of their adoption, as for instance Robert Porteous who became not only the richest merchant of Krosno, a Carpathian town, but almost a monopolist of the wine trade between Poland and Hungary. His Hungarian suppliers once sent him as a bribe a cask filled with gold instead of wine. He went with it to a court of justice and distributed the money among the poor. A Catholic convert, he rebuilt the parish church after a fire, and among his numerous bequests was one to the organist of 600 florins 'on condition of his taking his degree at the Academy of Cracow, and I impose upon him the duty of singing the Litany *Omnium Sanctorum* with the school-children after Vespers on Wednesdays.' As a further proof of his loyalty to the King, John Casimir, he left him the sum of 10,000 florins and an altar of pure gold.

For centuries Scotland had been the recruiting-ground of mercenaries for all nations. In 1577, when Danzig revolted, King Stephen Batory brought 600-700 Scottish soldiers down to the city under the command of Colonel William Stuart and we are told that the fighting was hard and obstinate. Of the many other Scots who fought in Poland we will only mention two of the clan Gordon: Lord Henry Gordon whose horse was killed under him

at the battle of Czudnów in 1660 and Patrick Gordon, nicknamed 'Steelhand,' who in the same year, as a captain of Polish cavalry, was wounded by the Cossacks.

Another Patrick Gordon, usually called Auchleuchries, after the humble place of his origin in Aberdeenshire, had perhaps the most adventurous career, which he depicts quite sincerely for us in a diary whose only fault is that Gordon, like Fynes Morison before him, notes the prices of everything he ever bought. Coming to Poland as a young man he was befriended after a time by a magnate, Opalinski, in whose suite he travelled to Hamburg. Left there without employment he enlisted in a detachment of mercenaries with whom the Swedes proposed to attack Poland. Taken prisoner by the Poles, Gordon entered the dragoons and, being quartered in the house of a country gentleman, he was sought in marriage—throughout his life he remained exceedingly handsome—by his host's daughter. Avoiding this he practised a little blackmail on some peasants who had taken refuge with all their goods and cattle on an island in the Vistula; he undertook to protect them for a definite weekly payment. When Warsaw was taken by the Swedes he entered their service again and when after three years he was captured by the Poles he might have fared ill if another woman had not come to his rescue. Subsequently he was offered a post by Jan Sobiński, the future King, whom Gordon found 'courteous, but a hard bargainer,' a rare compliment from the pen of a Scot. Field-Marshal Lubomirski appointed him Quartermaster, and refusing several other offers of marriage he stayed with the Poles for a while and then entered the service of Peter the Great under whom in a short time he reached great advancement.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By STEPHEN GWYNN

ANYBODY who wishes to know about Ireland would do well to get hold of Mr. T. J. Campbell's *Fifty Years of Ulster*, published in Belfast by *The Irish News* at 10s. 6d. Mr. Campbell is a member of the Northern Ireland Parliament and a Benchman of the Dublin and Belfast Bars; he began to write for Ulster's Nationalist organs some fifty years ago. But

**Devlin's
Friend**

I think that the proudest of his titles is to have been Joseph Devlin's friend and successor. That little Belfast orator—"Wee Joe," as they called him—had a singular gift for inspiring devotion; and loyalties are strong in Belfast. Whoever knows even the first thing about Ulster will know that a Catholic politician like Mr. Campbell must have many painful things to record—some of them even shocking. For instance I read that Sir Basil Brooke said to an audience at Newtownbutler: "Many of the audience employ Catholics, but I have not one about my place." A kinsman of Sir Basil's was second-in-command of the Connaught Ranger Battalion with which I served in France; and he would have liked no better than I do this attitude towards the religion of ninety per cent. among our men. Mr. Campbell gives figures which show that Sir Basil's principles are widespread in Ulster; Catholics are forty-two per cent. of the population in County Derry and get less than four per cent. of the salaries and wages, and, unhappily, this is not an extreme case. It is well that such facts should be published, for publicity is the only way to effect a change.

But if that were all Mr. Campbell were to tell the readers of his book I should be slow in commending it. Its character is better given by his observation that the Ulster Bar Mess is always ready to hear and applaud either the "The Ould Orange Flute" or "The Croppy Boy." But what was he thinking of when he wrote: "Ulster Unionism has produced no verse which is worthy to rank as literature"? He praises Moira O'Neill's "Songs of the Glens of Antrim" which are indeed about Irish country people who may be Catholic as likely as not; but "Corrymeela" and all those other verses came out of a typical Protestant Ulster house. So for that matter did Miss Helen Waddell's astonishing talent—and I do not know that two more gifted women writers could be found anywhere in Ireland. One would have liked this Catholic Ulsterman to accumulate evidences of Protestant sympathy. Does he know, I wonder, that when the new Catholic Cathedral at Armagh was opened, Archbishop Alexander, then Primate of the Church of Ireland, put his carriage at the disposal of Cardinal Logue's guests? Or that when the Cardinal died, the Government of Northern Ireland sent a Guard of Honour to the funeral. However he records this observation from the editor of *The Belfast Newsletter*, most Orange of prints, "You fellows think we do not care for Ireland. Man, we would die for Ireland!" But in truth the Irish Bar, North or South, has a fine tradition of comradeship, and its atmosphere

is felt all through these pages. The bar has also an amazing repertory of good stories and Mr. Campbell draws freely on them in what, if truth must be told, is rather a scrap book than an organized piece of literature. But when all is said, we are faced with the deplorable fact that this able and likeable man represents a minority in a part of the British Commonwealth where the minority feels that it doesn't get fair play, and where the principle of a *Herrenvolk* is crudely asserted. This is all the worse because Mr. Campbell produces emphatic testimony from the Protestant minority in Eire that its citizens, and above all its schools, get generous treatment under Mr. de Valera's régime.

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The chances of reading have sent me to a book, published before the war had actually begun, but when causes of battle were emerging. I do not know that we can be said to be fighting for decent treatment of the Jewish race; but at all events Professor H. B. Charlton feared in 1938 that one of the essays in his book "Shakespearean Comedy" (Methuen 10s. 6d.) might seem to have been suggested by Hitler's proceedings. However he assures us that what he has to say about "Shakespeare's Jew" was planned several years before it was issued in the John Rylands Bulletin to the students of Manchester University. And in truth it is plain-enough that Hitler did not originate Europe's attitude to the Jew. So far back as about 1594, "public sentiment in England," says Professor Charlton, "was roused to an outbreak of traditional Jew-baiting; for good and evil Shakespeare the man was like his fellows. He planned 'A Merchant of Venice,' to let the Jew dog have it and thereby to gratify his own patriotic pride of race." Hitler or any German might have done just the same, but it would not have worked out in the same way. "However one reads the play, it is certain," says Professor Charlton, "that the intentions of the author were in many ways defeated." In so far as it was a piece of propaganda the dramatist botched his job; no German would have been so clumsy as to generate sympathy for Shylock. "Shylock the ogre becomes Shylock the hero," because Shakespeare the artist has been seduced into humanizing what was meant to be a monster. What we know chiefly about Shylock when the play is done is the extent of his suffering. What is more, as Professor Charlton makes us perceive, Shylock's famous bond was not a long planned snare; when the bond is made, there is no reasonable expectation that Antonio's flesh will become forfeit. Shylock turns to his revenge only when revenge is thrust into his power at the very moment when his own house has betrayed him, his daughter and his servant are deserters, and his ducats are gone with them. Then, against all probabilities, there is offered to him this fantastic revenge. And next what Shakespeare has to do is to show Christian justice taking from the Jew what Christians had bargained to give him. At the back of the English heart there is a revolt against injustice, and Shakespeare in spite of himself, against all the prejudices of his age gives the Jew human comprehension. It is right, it is in the nature of things that Shakespeare's people to-day should be in the very front of the forces which resist what Professor Charlton calls "the Traditional Jew-baiting." Wherever Germany rules, that tradition is now raised into a first principle of policy; wherever the English genius is felt the tradition daily loses credit and authority. Shakespeare's opinions were of his time; his genius was capable of transcending them by the noblest of all inconsistencies, when a man attempting a meanness finds his own self rise up against it.

**Shylock's
Suffering**

A distinguished soldier who has been also through his long life a student sent me to the work of Captain Vincent Swicz. *Poland Still Unknown*, which can be had for half-a-crown from *The Standard*, Duke Street, Kilmarnock, is a private venture in national propaganda worth backing. The book's title is only too well justified; to say truth, our minds instinctively turn away from some of the most painful chapters in recent history. But Poles will not let themselves be forgotten; only the other day in the severely neutral country where I write these lines, a fight raged over two or three counties barely higher than the tree-tops; and when the attacking Spitfire was finally brought down, its pilot, still living, proved to be a Polish airman. He had given his life, but not for nothing; the five Germans with their bomber crashed a little further on; and all the sympathy and admiration of County Meath went out to the single-handed champion. Captain Swicz does not court the same risks; none the less, it is adventurous for one not by profession a writer to force his way into print through the medium of a foreign tongue. If in many respects, he is short of equipment, one thing alone would compensate for much graver deficiencies; he is admirable in temper when he reviews Poland's relations with Russia or with the lesser States on which her interests and her territory touch only too closely. Probably he would not claim that he could give us adequate instruction; but nobody could read his pages without feeling that Poland offers one of the international questions on which we are bound to form a judgment. The Poles are there—geographically ill-defined, nationally almost as persistent as the Jews, to so many millions of whom their tolerant Christianity has offered a home. Undoubtedly Poland offers a problem. Germany's answer was very simple; root them out, scatter where you cannot kill. What we have all come to realize is that questions cannot be solved in that manner without destroying all that Europe stands for. Captain Swicz does not underrate the difficulty of creating a structure of central Europe which will give room for growth for several peoples side-by-side; indeed he reaches the conclusion that the English commonwealth must take on itself the duty of seeing fair play. But one thing is clear; the Poles do not lack the will to help themselves. In the British air force, they are piling up from week to week such a record of skilled valour that when the war is over it will be strange indeed if Polish interests have not ardent supporters among British fighting men. With regard to the most urgent of all Poland's necessities, her outlet to the sea, seamen surely will not forget that the traditions of British seamanship were never so magnificently interpreted as by Joseph Conrad, the Pole.

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Still there is always need for honest and well-informed writing, and I think the more and not the less of Captain Swicz's book after reading Mr. Ivor Thomas's highly accomplished professional treatise on propaganda—published in the Penguin Series with the title, *Warfare by Words*. The Member for Keighley became a journalist when he finished a brilliant career at Oxford; service on *The Times* and on the *News Chronicle* gave him training to which the war added very different experience; then came the Ministry of Information. I note that to him "the fundamental lesson is sincerity"—which he exemplifies in the success of Mr. Churchill whom, to his mind, "no other propagandist can hope to emulate." I may add that it is sincerity which gives special value to my

**Allied
Aims**

Polish volunteer. According to Mr. Thomas, we cannot as yet press for a definition of Allied war aims; "none was attempted in the last war until military victory was in sight." All the more reason to welcome what we find in *Poland Still Unknown*, an outline of what the peoples of central Europe hope for. It is not only true that the Polish, Czech, Yugoslav and Greek Governments, operating as they can and where they can, have, as Mr. Thomas points out, framed a joint policy for the future of their countries after the Axis has been broken. Poland and Russia also have reached an agreement of the strength of which a Polish army is now being formed on Russian soil. In short we may learn from Mr. Thomas what objects can be aimed at here and now by British propaganda. Captain Swicz, working independently gives a very reasonable outline of what the Poles feel themselves entitled to ask, and of the International arrangements by which such a settlement might be secured not for Poland alone but for the whole region in which Europe has shown itself most vulnerable.

THIS EXPANDING WAR, by Liddell Hart. *Faber & Faber.* 12s. 6d.

THE WAR MOVES EAST, by Strategicus. *Faber & Faber.* 10s. 6d.

In this, his latest book Captain Liddell Hart, than whom there is no more expert writer on military affairs, offers us a mixed dish the most part of which consists of old material served up anew, and is frankly avowed as such. It is in three parts, and the first of these, which takes up more than half the volume, would appear to be a bold conception even for a writer of his acknowledged fame. The period it comprises is from the early spring of 1941 to the same time of year in 1942, and in the eleven chapters of Part I. he leads us, though in rather jerky fashion, through the series of World War events that started with the Graziani rout in Libya and ended with the fall of Singapore. An explanatory curtain-raiser is followed by the re-printing of a contemporaneous article, originally written for the *Daily Mail*, and the remainder of each chapter is devoted to a commentary, based on the later outcome of events, which shows the

reader how prophetic the writer was. The result, as might be expected, tends largely to become an instrument of self-advertisement.

It cannot be gainsaid, however that the prediction embodied in the article has usually been borne out for it is uttered by a great authority on military matters who writes supremely well. It is, in that sense a disturbing book, for the article's lecture notes and memoranda, which comprise Parts II and III, call for remodelling of our forces in the light of up-to-date experience, coupled with a new conception of our future conduct of the War, which must inevitably take years to bring about. In a final chapter the chance of final victory is discussed with a candid appreciation of the odds against us. The re-creation of a Western Front is presented as very nearly a hopeless undertaking, firmer reliance being placed on a psychological break-through which should be prepared by a home-made antidote to Hitler's 'New Order,' convincing alike to our people and to those of Europe, both enslaved and free. In the conclusions which he draws the author is either very right or very wrong, with no room for adjustment in between the two extremes.

In contrast to the work above-mentioned the book of Strategicus is placid and refreshing. This writer is already known to a great many readers for his published articles in *The Spectator*, and has always maintained a high reputation for calm appraisement, coupled with an obviously studied insight as regards the sequence of events. In this book the ground he covers is the same as that above, but it is a plain relation of the unrolling panorama of the War, with some explanatory matter intermixed. It will be very helpful to those whose memory is overcrowded by the swiftly moving tides of battle, which now lap every continental shore, or to those, particularly, who glean their information daily from the press and now wish to brush-up on the earlier events. These latter, indeed, will be grateful for such an informative compilation, for many points of nicety are missed when the eager eye too hastily devours the column from a special correspondent in an effort to know the best, or worst, in one fell swoop. Strategicus writes simply, though most informingly, and with a power of narration that is both concise and clear. He makes intelligible the confused situations on the Russian Front, and clarifies for us the mournful succession of withdrawals in Malaya which ended with the most abject surrender in British history. On that point he does allow himself the right of criticism, and has much fault to find. Most remarkable of all he actually succeeds in reducing to some sort of order the chaos of our second Libyan Campaign, making of the jumbled fight at Sidi Rezegh, in particular, a reasonable picture of desert give and take. A close study of this little book will be well repaid, and it will afford a salutary lesson also of the difference between events when contemporan-

eously reported, and those same occasions seen with the eye of retrospect.

L. E. O. CHARLTON.

CAN WE WIN THE PEACE? by Paul Einzig. *Macmillan.* 8s. 6d.

The controversy on how to treat Germany after the war is perceptibly influenced by concern for internal morale in Britain. Protagonists of what is often called the Vansittart point of view fear that unless Germany's grim record of aggression is constantly stressed humanitarian or Christian considerations may lead the British nation to overlook the need for deterring the aggressor by a drastic peace settlement. Others may have an equal horror of appeasement but believe that British fighting spirit is upheld in wartime quite as much by guarantees of equitable post-war conditions in Britain as by hatred of the aggressor and they may feel that opportunities for Germans willing to collaborate in European reconstruction may help to make economic security in Britain possible.

Dr. Einzig shares the Vansittart point of view but is not content simply to hammer away at the danger of appeasement which received adequate notice in his previous book on that subject. He goes some way to meet the other point of view by urging "a scheme which, while unacceptable to undefeated Germany would nevertheless give a fair deal to the German people after it has been defeated and has adopted a less bellicose régime."

The provision in the Atlantic Charter—it is a pity that the clauses were not cited in an appendix to this book for the convenience of the reader—for post-war economic opportunities for the German people might, in Dr. Einzig's view, contain the germ of appeasement, unless

safeguards are provided. The Charter, he declares, would fail in one of its main objects, to shorten the war, if the German people were allowed to take it for granted that they can claim these benefits even if they should continue to fight on for years, inflicting savage reprisals by extermination of the population of occupied territories or even by gas warfare. Dr. Einzig insists that stipulations must be attached to the Charter making clear that conditions do not hold good indefinitely. "Unless the German people choose to overthrow the present criminal régime before their resistance is finally crushed by Allied forces on German territory, it is impossible for the Government to give any undertaking to safeguard the defeated nation"—against the oppressed peoples thirsting for revenge after long sufferings. That is Dr. Einzig's conclusion. In the earlier chapter he outlines a scheme for ensuring the industrial disarmament of Germany by the dismantling of her machine-tool industry and by the imposition of an inverted "New Order" whereby access to raw materials overseas would be assured but transformation of neighbour countries into agricultural depositories dependent on Germany for industrial products would be arrested.

There is no space to comment on Dr. Einzig's proposals as a whole. It will be clear that they are, in the true sense of that phrase, "thought-provoking" and this much may be said. Every nation necessarily bears responsibility for its rulers' actions but that does not apply to Germany alone. A responsibility lies on Britain, in the light of her past record, to disregard no opportunity that may occur for utilizing elements in the *Reich* which, while fearing national extinction in the event of defeat, dread the consequences of a National Socialist victory. There

may be wisdom in withholding overt proclamations of peace aims until they can coincide with a turn of the tide towards Allied victory but plans must be completed for such an eventuality if Britain is not to be found pleading the uncertain fortunes of war as an excuse for unpreparedness.

BERNARD CAUSTON.

MONKEY, by Wu Ch'êng-ên.
Translated from the Chinese by
Arthur Waley. *Allen & Unwin*.
12s. 6d.

In the 7th century the monk Hsüan Tsang was sent by the great T'ang Emperor Tai Tsang to bring back the Buddhist Scriptures from India. Nine centuries later a Chinese author, not otherwise distinguished, wove this historical fact into the perfectly delightful romance which Mr. Arthur Waley has now given us in English. It is, as Mr. Waley says "unique in its combination of beauty with absurdity, of profundity with nonsense," told with the richness of imaginative detail which one finds in the infinite decoration of Chinese porcelain and architecture.

The main characters are as vividly real as any to be found in literature. Hsüan Tsang, otherwise Tripitaka, is rather a poor creature, continually dissolving in tears at the slightest difficulty, evidently recommended to the Emperor by Kuan-yin for the mission to India in order that through the perils of the journey he may add strength to his piety. But the real hero is, of course, Monkey, brave, resourceful, impudent, mischievous, scolding his master Tripitaka for his poor-spiritedness, but serving him faithfully and bringing him triumphantly through all dangers.

Monkey was born of a stone egg produced by a rock which "since

the creation of the world had been worked upon by the pure essences of Heaven and the fine savours of Earth, the vigour of sunshine and the grace of moonlight till at last it became magically pregnant." Such a creature was certainly bound to have unusual qualities. Monkey studied under a Sage for twenty years and learnt the secret of the seventy-two transformations, of immortality, and how to project himself in an instant for thousands of leagues through the sky. Called to Heaven to answer to the Jade Emperor for his pranks on earth, Monkey remains as mischievous as before. Buddha himself has to be involved to restrain him and imprisons him for 500 years under a mountain until Kuan-yin releases him to accompany Tripitaka to India.

Other assistants are picked up on the journey, all of them deities condemned for various faults and now released by Kuan-yin on condition of serving Tripitaka—a dragon horse (the dragon in China is nearly always a beneficent monster); Piggy, another admirable creation with his long snout and inordinate appetite; and Sandy, an ogre of the River of Flowing Sands, who occasionally gives Tripitaka some sound advice but is otherwise rather invisible. Monkey's trial of strength with the three Taoist Immortals, who have captured the land of Cart Slow and reduced all the local Buddhist priests to be mere hewers of wood and drawers of water, is particularly rich in humour.

The Chinese take a very matter-of-fact attitude on religion—seating the Rain God's image on the parched fields, for instance, when there is a drought to give him a practical proof of the inconvenience due to his laziness—and "Monkey" is typically Chinese in this respect. The Jade Emperor's heavenly court is a satire

on the stuffy ways of bureaucracy. Monkey himself could have been an emperor any time, he says, "but I have got used to being a priest and leading a lazy comfortable existence." Even in Buddha's Heavenly Mountain Ananda and Krasypa, when told to give Tripitaka the Scriptures, try to cheat him with waste paper because he has no present for them. Kuan-yin, always China's favourite goddess, has her human weaknesses.

"I shouldn't like to hurry you" said Monkey kneeling (when Kuan-yin is setting out to help Tripitaka). "But wouldn't you like to finish dressing first?" "I can't be bothered," she said, "I'm going just as I am."

Innumerable touches like this add to the charm of the book. All ends happily. The Scriptures are brought back to China, Tripitaka and Monkey are both made Buddhas and Piggy, Sandy and the dragon horse all suitably promoted in a closing scene of gorgeous imagery. One hopes Mr. Waley will give us some more of his beautiful translations. China abounds in folklore and romances quite unknown to the West.

O. M. GREEN.

AUDEN AND AFTER. The Liberation of Poetry. 1930-41. By Francis Scarfe. *Routledge*. 8s. 6d.

A good critic is as rare as the good poets upon which he feeds, for it is just as difficult to be original and clear-minded about literature as it is about life. Mr. Scarfe already has that clarity, if experience has not yet enabled him to have the originality. At present, he tends to make exciting discoveries, particularly about the personal problems of poetry, which proved exciting to Wordsworth and Hazlitt, and even to Aristotle. But it needs to be pointed out that Mr. Scarfe is one of that still young generation which

has been held in fetters during the febrile decade that preceded the outbreak of war; the fetters of political subscription, the arid doctrine of Grigson's 'New Verse' coterie, the surrealist experiment, and other such outbreaks against the coming doom.

In consequence, an older critic or practitioner of verse, in reading this book, will be impressed rather by Mr. Scarfe's manipulation of his material and the principles he draws from it, than by the material itself. Frankly, I find much of it mediocre, pedestrian, and lacking in the authority of a personal emphasis. For me, the general effect of this book is a recollection of sound, lucid argument by a most attractive and honest thinker, illustrated by examples of verse that are seldom exciting. The result is that Mr. Scarfe appears to be making the best of an indifferent job; mountains out of molehills; nightingales out of sparrows.

But such a dubious recommendation fails utterly to convey the excitement which I have found in this book. Its author is a critic controlled by a profound discipline. He has gone far enough in scholarship and in living (he includes an autobiographical essay) to have found a humility of spirit that releases him from mannerism and partizanship. Indeed, the purpose of this book is to trace that progress, an experience of over ten years of mental and emotional growth, out of the fashionableness of those annoyingly arrogant literary groups of the 1930's, to the danger and solitude and reality of to-day. And by reality, I mean in the Gnostic sense; for an obvious word such as that cannot be applied to Mr. Scarfe without reorientating it. He is a quick intuitional being, and he does not use ideas lightly. He lives them first.

Mr. Scarfe's adventure amongst

the poets is always controlled by ideas, although he is a rebel against intellectualism, and happily (as I see it) has thrown over the dreary, boy scout objectivity (a dangerous Fascist sprouting which came to nothing) of the "New Verse" group, with Grigson as its drill-sergeant. Mr. Scarfe has a definition, 'poetry is a music of ideas' whose value is immediately apparent to the fastidious person. He gives his reader a sense of confidence, a conviction that he will never inflate his values, and never go outside his own claim that "the most a critic can do to-day, as at any other time, is to use his own judgment, while drawing his background as much as possible from contemporary thought in its many fields."

That is excellently put: but it also explains the somewhat restricted proportions of his material about which I have already complained. I would like to suggest that in an effort to a larger self-discovery, Mr. Scarfe should leave 'contemporary thought' and write an essay on Dante's or Milton's egoism.

As for the material in *Auden and After*, Mr. Scarfe has succeeded in making much obscurity plain. I have not before read so useful an analysis of the poetry of Dylan Thomas, the most outstandingly 'personal' work of any since de la Mare and Davies. It has fascinated me, without my being able to comprehend it. I have found it sometimes apocalyptic, sometimes mere urinal-writing. Mr. Scarfe gets down to it in a practical way, as one would to a fire-bomb.

This detailed analysis of each poet's technique and fabric gives the body that makes the book so satisfying. From Auden and Day Lewis (the latter surely a poet with staying power and emotional depth) to the youngest poets tumbled from the universities into the fighting

forces, Mr. Scarfe traces his way towards the discovery that the poet must no longer be exclusive and negative, but must celebrate "a belief in the sanctity of the human body and the inviolability of the mind, a belief in the liberation from humbug and hypocrisy of spontaneous human feeling."

RICHARD CHURCH.

THE AMERICAN NATION by John Gloag. Cassell. 7s. 6d.

THE AMERICAN VENTURE, by R. B. Mowat. Andrew Dakers. 12s 6d.

ROOSEVELT, WORLD STATESMAN, by Basil Woon. Peter Davies. 10s. 6d.

It is said that

A little bit of burglarizing
A little murder here and there
Won't earn the hate of fellow-men
As much as being patronizing.

Much in the attitude of the European mother-countries towards their young American offspring has long evidenced something of that patronizing air. The right to patronize and to criticize was taken for granted. Had the Americans not themselves taken to criticizing us, possibly with more justification, they might have dismissed our attitude by a phrase applied originally, I believe, to the émigrés returning after the French revolution: "*Il s'prennent leurs souvenirs pour des droits.*"

Condescension cannot, however, be held against either Mr. John Gloag's *The American Nation* or against the late Professor Mowat's *The American Venture*. Both are short and wholly sympathetic accounts of the rise of American civilization. The authors, both British, are unafflicted by academic style. Their books are thus clear and readable. Professor Mowat's book is perhaps more philosophic and goes deeper in tracing the trends and cur-

rents underlying the development of the United States. As a book of reference, Mr. Gloag's volume is, however, handier. It is, moreover, wider in scope. Professor Mowat opens his story with the War of Independence. Mr. Gloag also gives a brief summary of the pre-Columbian explorations and the early history of the settlers. There is also a brief history of each of the 48 states composing the Union with a full list of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the U.S. to date; a chapter on the "Political Parties, the Presidents and Representation"; an excellent section on "Education in America"; another on "The National Flag and National Holidays." Some of the information given will not be found elsewhere in the same immediately available form (see the list of American Ministers and Ambassadors to Great Britain). Finally, Mr. Gloag has a better index and provides some maps. These maps, although unfortunately not orographic and somewhat crude, are better than no maps at all. Both books lack a proper bibliography. Mr. Gloag's is exceedingly short, Professor Mowat's consists of a few foot-notes. Both books could be usefully supplemented by a full reprint of the American Constitution and its first ten Amendments (the "Bill of Rights.") The lack of maps occasionally handicaps Professor Mowat's story, as for instance in the whole narrative of the Civil War campaign. But his *exposé* of American history during the first four decades of this Century rivals in lucidity and interest F. L. Allen's *Only Yesterday*.

Both authors see the meaning of American history in an ever-closer approach to the tenets of the Declaration of Independence. In their opinion, with all its faults, the United States has honestly striven to realize for its citizens those

"unalienable Rights" among which are "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" through a democracy without snobbery.

Mr. Basil Woon's short biography of F. D. Roosevelt epitomizes these efforts in the life of its only thrice-elected President. I started reading *Roosevelt, World Statesman* with distrust. Too frequently, authors try to exploit a boom, political, historical or otherwise, by dumping their seasonal goods on to a rising market. But Mr. Woon's books reads well and while he has a tendency to over-admire his hero's political oratory, he is not altogether uncritical. As a newspaperman who has spent many years in the States, he has full command of the background. His account of the New Deal is one of the best I have come across anywhere, his sidelights on the mentality of the Roosevelt opposition (pages 140-141) are illuminating and wholly true. British readers will be particularly interested in Mr. Woon's last chapter "Looking to Peace" with its remarks on the difference between the Roosevelt and the Churchill outlooks on peace and the forces behind both (page 183). Mr. Woon, incidentally, is himself British.

R. P. SCHWARZ.

THE CLASSICS AND THE MAN OF LETTERS, by T. S. Eliot. Oxford University Press. 8d.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE GREEK AND OTHER ESSAYS, by T. R. Glover. Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.

In his Presidential address to the Classical Association Mr. Eliot regretting a decline in classical studies appears as their defender from the point of view of the man of letters; a title deliberately chosen to include not only the great scholar and great writer but those of a lower rank.

His contention is that "the maintenance of classical education is essential to the maintenance of the continuity of English literature" and that some knowledge of Greece and Rome, their history and their literature, must be spread among many more people than at present possess it. Let this be done in translation so that those who do not know the languages may have it too.

Most of those who have been brought up on Latin and Greek have asked themselves what they have learned from them and in these days there are still very many who are disposed to think they have not learned very much: there are very many more who have not been so brought up who do not feel they have missed anything. So the classics have perhaps been losing their place in education, as Dr. Glover suggests "because we have forgotten the real aim and purpose of classical study and the real significance of the classics." It is, I think, his aim in this book of essays not only to insist that there should be a distinct purpose in classical studies (the theme of his Presidential address to the Classical Association included in this volume) but to inspire you to pursue that purpose, to read and enjoy the great classical authors.

And though we may admit that the classics have lost ground in education it would not be untrue to say that there are many who, knowing neither Latin nor Greek, feel that Greece has contributed something to the world which has lived these many centuries and always will live. Perhaps no age has been so akin to Ancient Greece in spirit as our own and in attempting to understand the age and its literature the ordinary man has been much helped by the writings of such scholars as Sir Richard Livingstone, Professor Gilbert Murray and Dr. Glover.

You do not need to know Latin

or Greek to enjoy Dr. Glover's writing, though you may enjoy it more if you do. You will in either case want to break off in every chapter and read or re-read some great literature, so that it will be a long time before you will have finished the volume if you get the best out of it. And there are other books and authors you will want to look at again besides the Greeks and the Romans.

Although the book includes articles on Vergil and Erasmus (and very delightful articles too), it is to Greece that we are directed in the main: in these days perhaps more than ever we need freedom—"freedom of mind and heart, freedom to be the men and women God meant us to be; . . ." he says "and of all disciples to set the mind free and to set it growing, there is none known to me (nor, I think, known to anybody else) like living with the great souls of Greece."

The author, with a scholarship that is never obtrusive, has the gift of making the spirit of the past live: the Greeks are shown as a living real people meeting the problems that confront men at all times; problems of feeding a city, of the forest, of farming, of trade and commerce. There is an essay that suggests that the principal difference between British Empire and Greek city is our capacity for sinking ourselves in a team; and then some delicious pages on the *Gastronomers* of Athenaeus. Indeed a very mixed bag, all steeped in literature and learning.

'Homer and his Readers' is the title of one of the most important of these essays and it is as a philosopher wakening a profounder philosophy even than Lucretius that Homer here appears: training the Greeks' moral sense shaping their thinking, "their outlook on life, their sensitiveness to beauty and right and pain and to moral grandeur." Yet

"People stare if you speak of the philosophy of Homer" wrote a Cambridge critic recently. Dr. Glover would not stare.

J. F. BURNET.

H. R. L. SHEPPARD: Life and Letters. By R. Ellis Roberts. Murray. 15s.

It is difficult to write a full and frank biography of a contemporary for obvious reasons. Mr. Roberts felt that a proper understanding of Dick Sheppard could not be attained without laying bare a domestic tragedy which he suffered in the last years of his life. He was himself the kindest of men and he would have been distressed beyond measure that the publication of his biography should bring suffering to one whom he loved. It is surprising that this thought did not occur to Mr. Roberts who has in other respects written a readable and well constructed Life of one of the most fascinating personalities of the century.

It is the fashion nowadays to select some striking incident in a man's childhood, and then to deduce from it the subsequent shaping of his career. Sheppard feared and disliked his grandfather. He was made miserable by a sadistic schoolmaster and began to run away from school. Dissatisfied with this plan he made another which he thought was more likely to succeed. Night after night, when the boys in his dormitory were asleep, he seized his water-jug and drenched the bedclothes. Then he lay down again hoping that he would become desperately ill. He did. After a second attack of pneumonia by which both his lungs were affected he was taken away from Marlborough, and after a year or two at a coach's, went to Cambridge, where he found, as so many have done be-

fore and since his day, that the more elastic standards of university life give far more opportunity to the unusual boy with character and personality than the public schools do.

Sheppard had the knack in an extraordinary degree of being able to enlist the sympathy and interest not only of a vast assembly but of every man and woman in it. The overflowing love for his fellows which he possessed was permanently at the disposal of every one of them. If there had been a hundred Dick Sheppard's instead of only one, they would not have been able to do the work which Dick attempted with his single frail, asthmatic body.

To begin with Sheppard was not sure of his vocation. His tremendous success as the Head of Oxford House, where he whipped up a large personal following in a few months, was followed by his ordination, and here, let it be said, that one of the most delightful features of this biography is the series of wise and kindly letters addressed by Archbishop Lord Lang to his young friend. For some time Sheppard was his secretary. The young Bishop of Stepney, as Lord Lang then was, realized at once his unique talents. He gently restrained his impetuosity and the more extravagant elements in his nature. All through his life Sheppard went to him for counsel and the Archbishop never failed him though he must often have been sorely tried by his ex-secretary's impatience and doubts, and he certainly rejoiced in Sheppard's unqualified success when he converted St. Martin-in-the-Fields from being a church almost

without significance into the parish church of the British Empire.

It was during this triumphal period to which Mr. Roberts allots less than seventy pages that Sheppard's health began to fail him. There was a miserable spell of suffering before he went to Canterbury as Dean. Here again his work promised great things. The Chapter were loathe to let him go but his doctors ordered him to resign and he had to do so. Another tremendous chance seemed to loom in the distance, the Directorship of the B.B.C. Department of Religion. It is impossible but fascinating to speculate what Sheppard would have done at Broadcasting House. He would not have suffered its departmentalism gladly, and he found the conservatism of the Chapter of St. Paul's where he accepted a canonry when his health recovered a little, galling to a degree, though he found a new friend in the present Dean.

In the last, difficult days of his work there when he was also organizing the Peace Pledge Union he continued to give himself to those who needed him as freely as ever. One might disagree with his opinions. It was impossible to doubt his sincerity, or his true Christianity. His death removed a source of inspiration which is without parallel in the recent history of the Church. Memory of his personal magnetism and of his unbounded kindness will linger long after those who knew him are dead. And, in the meantime, the work which he inaugurated at St. Martin-in-the-Fields goes steadily forward.

ERIC GILLET.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

NOVEMBER, 1942

THE NEW "NEW ATLANTIS"

By G. D. H. COLE

ANY author who sets out to write a new Utopia ought to be well assured in his own mind of what he is trying to do. Is he, for example, meaning to be plausible, in the sense of setting down what could come about, were men but sensible enough to act on his advice? Or is he frankly giving rein to fancy, as do those Utopia-makers who provide men with impossible angel-wings, or an impossible longevity, or any other attribute plainly inconsistent with the essential characteristics of mankind? Is he trying to write prophetic history, or an instructive fable, or a frank statement of his own likes and dislikes, irrespective of the probability of the world's tastes coinciding with his own? To a certain extent, every Utopia-maker is bound to be a propagandist; but there is a vast difference between the writer whose main aim is to persuade men to action and the writer who sets out primarily to make them think or to record his own likes and dislikes.

The first question that has to be settled is where Utopia is to be. The Utopia-writer whose aim is to stimulate direct action will most probably set the scene of his Utopia in his own country at some future point in time. He will try to show his own countrymen living differently and better, as they might live, in his opinion, if they would but show more commonsense and greater courage. Such a writer has to ponder carefully what liberties he is free to take with the future course of scientific discovery. It is one of the dangers that beset him that his Utopia may become too much an inventory of new gadgets and assumed developments of man's productive powers. It is obviously easiest to sweep aside the problems of riches and poverty by assuming at the outset so great a power to create wealth that all questions relating to its distribution become irrelevant. But the effect of such an assumption is to beg the question; for assuredly no single country—and much less mankind as a whole—is yet within even distant sight of so great a victory over nature. An alternative is to stress the simplification of human wants which would accompany a more intelligent way of living; but in all the cases I can call to mind G. K. Chesterton's objection forcibly applies. The visions of the simple life displayed

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to us by the Utopia-makers have many attractions, but cheapness is not one of them—cheapness, I mean, in relation to the actual standards of real expenditure which prevail among quite 'well-to-do' sections of the peoples of advanced countries to-day. The simple-life Utopians have usually very pleasant villa-residences, with trim and well-stocked gardens, good furniture and furnishings, food, books, and in short all the amenities (except in some cases drink and tobacco) which an intelligent but not rapacious or greedy middle-class household can reasonably want. The Simple Life, alas, is not an answer to the problem of poverty; and the Utopia-maker who recognizes this, and wants all his Utopians to live absolutely *comme il faut*, is easily driven to assume that science, once set free to give of its best to mankind, will speedily settle all the difficulties, and make everyone rich with only so much labour as will suffice to keep humanity in trim.

The *practical* Utopia-maker who relies neither on the simplification of manners nor on scientific discoveries that have not yet been made has a hard task, and is in danger, when he has done his best, of being accused of failure to produce anything that is worth putting forward as an ideal. Therefore, most practical Utopia-makers (we are not now considering the cynics or satirists, who belong to a different category) do take liberties, usually by making out, to themselves as well as to their readers, that science has got a good deal further than it actually has, and that better organization of men's productive powers would increase output a great deal more and faster than it actually would. Those very practical Utopia-makers, the Russians, have not found that, in truth, the problem of production has been solved, and only that of distribution remains. Far from it: they are still wrestling, most manfully but still at an early stage, with the intractable problem of primary poverty and man's limited productive power.

To say this is not to assert that we are *not* on the threshold of an age of immensely rapid development in productive power. On the contrary, I hope and believe that we are. But I cannot think that the greatest practicable advance will speedily bring us to a point at which all the inhabitants of Great Britain, or even of the United States—much less of India, or China, or Africa—will be able to enjoy all the things they really need in order to live as intelligently and comfortably and satisfyingly as the most intelligent persons of to-day wish to be living. Utopia is expensive, if it is realistic—ally projected, even for a single advanced country. For the world as a whole, it is still an immense distance beyond the present growth of man's power over the forces of nature.

A largely different set of considerations applies when Utopias

are not meant to be realistic, in a material sense. The Utopia-maker of this class usually places his vision not in his own country, but as More and Bacon did, and as Lord Samuel has done in the volume* which has provoked me to these remarks, in some imaginary island or continent, preferably shut off from the rest of the world. Lord Samuel's Utopia, for example, is in form a continuation of the theme of Bacon's *New Atlantis*, based on the report of a visitor who found his way thither some three hundred years later. This removal of Utopia to an imaginary country manifestly enlarges the liberty of the author's fancy. He can, with much less violence to his readers' feelings, endow his Utopians with faculties beyond those of known men and with any material equipment of living he may please to devise for them. If he can steer clear of utter impossibilities, so much the better; but not even these are ruled wholly out of court. The main theme of such Utopias, when they are Utopias and not mere stories of marvels without a moral, is mental rather than material: they aim at presenting rather a state of mental perfection than one of material opulence—though it is to be observed that most Utopia-makers seem to postulate a considerable opulence as necessary soil for the fullest growth of the human spirit.

Lord Samuel's Utopia, though it has mixed characteristics, including some touches of satire, belongs mainly to the category of mental dreamlands. The author has indeed shown an excess of care to prevent his readers from taking him as encouraging them to set about building any practical Utopia based upon his vision. He has moralized for them in his later pages about the extreme dangers of any sort of revolutionary action; and he has stressed again and again the gradualness, spread over centuries, with which his Isle of the Blest was brought to its happy state. Nor has he been content with these admonitions: he has woven his caution into the very fabric of his tale by making the advanced condition of his 'Bensals' depend on a surgical discovery which enables them to add several inches to the size of the human head and brain. Nay, he has gone further by expelling from his Utopia all persons who had not profited by this simple little operation, and condemning them to inhabit in isolation from his 'Bensals' certain neighbouring islands, at greatly inferior levels of culture and virtue.

Indeed, so much hangs on this surgical operation as to protect Lord Samuel completely from any inconvenient morals that might otherwise be drawn from the character of his imagined Utopia. The society which he depicts in 'Bensalem' is entirely classless, dispenses with all material incentives to labour or enterprise, and

* *An Unknown Land*. Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.

with all buying and selling, and appears to be, in the very fullest sense of the term, a society of equals. There is no suggestion anywhere that there survives in it a single person inferior in mental capacity, possessing abnormal or criminal propensities, or even slightly ill-tempered. (Nor, it may be noted in passing, is there any sign that Lord Samuel's traveller to Bensalem suffered from any sense of mental inferiority, though he had not enjoyed the advantage of having his brain enlarged. His fellow-travellers did suffer in this way, and reacted strongly against a superiority in which they could not share. But not he! Oh, dear, no!).

What is Lord Samuel's meaning? Does he, in sending off all his men and women of normal brain-stature to continue living under non-utopian conditions somewhere else, and in reserving his Utopia to be inhabited exclusively by a race of supermen who have brought applied science to a point far beyond any known in the real world, mean to imply that the means of good and sensible living are not within the grasp of men as they are, or only of such very superior men as his own traveller, who could stare at this mental sun without blinking? If that is what he means—and I fancy it is, whether he be fully conscious of it or not—surely the interest is bound to evaporate; for can we take a very keen interest in a Utopia which is not designed to accommodate men like to ourselves? There is much in Bensalem that has, for one reader at any rate, a powerful appeal, provided that it can be regarded as having some application to human beings of a common sort. But if these good things are reserved for supermen, who care as little as Lord Samuel's Bensals for what happens to anyone outside their superior island, I am not interested at all, being neither a superman nor a candidate for that status nor much of a lover of highly superior persons, wherever found.

Among the attractive features are the division of occupations into primary and secondary—the primary representing the individual's limited quota of 'national service' and the secondary his spontaneous creativeness over and above this primary demand. In Bensalem primary labour is said to call for but nine hours a week, thanks largely to the elimination of all superfluous activities; but the division is not dependent for its value on so great a reduction in the primary demands on labour. It could be introduced into a society as soon as the hours of normal labour could be brought down to a point which would clearly leave any normal person with considerable surplus energy unconsumed. Similarly, I like very much Lord Samuel's insistence on the need for ready facilities for changing jobs, not only when a wrong initial choice has been made, but also to avoid staleness and boredom, even when the initial choice

has been wise. I like too the high place given by the Bensals to scientific research; and I am naturally attracted whenever Lord Samuel attributes to them a predilection of his own which I happen to share, and antagonized when his prejudices and mine happen to diverge. He is plainly much more sensitive to noise than I am—though I reckon myself sensitive in comparison with most people I meet. He is also much more hostile to speed, which I confess that, within limits, I enjoy; and I am repelled by the sedateness of pace to which traffic is restricted on the roads of Bensalem. Moreover, I certainly want wine, and probably tobacco (though that, I recognize, is more a matter of habit) in my Utopia; whereas Lord Samuel austere banishes both. On the other hand, Lord Samuel wants certain things that my Utopia would be devoid of—notably a very, very attenuated constitutional monarchy and a very, very refined form of theology, which is really more of a philosophy than a theology when you come to examine it, but retains a sort of a something that dubs it theology all the same.

I grant, Lord Samuel's monarchy is as innocuous as any monarchy of which I am able to conceive the idea; for, being set in an otherwise classless society, it is a monarchy without a court. We are not told whether the monarch's brothers and sisters, cousins and aunts, in fact behaved in an entirely unsnobbish manner, or were treated in an entirely unsnobbish fashion by everybody else. The Crown's relatives are, in truth, not mentioned; but we are left to infer that, if they existed, nobody took any notice of them. To treat the matter in this way, however, is to evade the real difficulty. The final argument against constitutional monarchy is not the monarch, but the monarch's relatives and hangers-on. Even with the near approach to harmlessness of the Swedish monarchy in view, I am not convinced of the possibility of so dovelike a monarchy as Lord Samuel depicts. Certainly not in Great Britain!

The religious, or theological, issue is much more difficult. Lord Samuel plainly likes speculating about ultimate things. Indeed, he has written books about them before now. I don't. Such things bore me stiff, and have done ever since, thirty years ago, I heard myself lecturing about them professionally, observed that I was talking nonsense, and resigned my job in favour of something less pretentious. It is my humble conviction that high philosophy is all rubbish—failure to answer questions which are unanswerable because they are not real questions at all. I find Lord Samuel's philosophy a good deal less rubbishy than many; but that did not prevent me from being bored by the good many pages of it that occupy the middle of his book.

Nor did I like Lord Samuel's idea of God. Confronted with the

agelong problem of evil, Lord Samuel emerges with the solution of a God who refuses to pull men's chestnuts out of the fire for them for fear of weakening their character and causing them to look perpetually for supernatural help. This seems to me the feeblest of arguments; but it is given the place of honour in Lord Samuel's account of the religious celebrations of Bensalem.

At quite another point, I suppose I might have been expected to be annoyed by Lord Samuel's contemptuous references to historical materialism and to the Soviet Union—in which country he admits a recent improvement, but imputes it to an abandonment of Marxist principles. I was not annoyed, because it was abundantly plain that Lord Samuel never applied his acute intelligence to an attempt to understand historic materialism, and was therefore attacking a mere Aunt Sally. How often is it necessary to repeat that historical materialists do not believe that man's history is determined for him apart from the action of man's own mind, but on the contrary lay the greatest stress on the influence of mind on the evolution of the forces of production, of which mind is the active part? I say this, not as a professed Marxist—for I do not label myself as any one man's follower—but as a mere matter of accuracy. Lord Samuel may be right in preferring to explain reality in dualistic terms as a dualism of mind and matter, instead of trying to subsume either under the other. As far as I have any view on the question, I incline to his. But that does not make the historical materialists into crude materialists who deny the rôle of mind. They are only one of the many schools of thinkers who cannot be happy till they have resolved everything nominally into unity, even if the real character of their thought is dualistic, as Marx's was. Personally, I prefer a pluralistic universe, if I have to consider such matters at all. But in the main I am just not interested.

No apology, I think, is needed for thus diverging into a recital of my personal motives and predilections. As William Morris wrote a long time ago in reviewing Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, a Utopia has to be looked at as the expression of its author's personal vision, or it is not worth looking at at all. Now, looking at another man's Utopia in this way necessarily leads to comparison's with one's own standards of value. Looking at Lord Samuel's, what I feel most of all is that he is an intellectual snob, whereas I believe that I am on the side of the common man. In matters of personal taste, I naturally find much in common with Lord Samuel. I dislike crowds, vulgar noises, unchastity, greed, intemperance and a great many other things which he dislikes; and I like books, music, intelligent conversation, pleasantly planned homes and towns, family life, a beautiful countryside, and many

things, more which are valued by any intelligent and educated person who is not also a fool or a knave. But I want these good things for everybody, and not merely for an *élite*; and I would sooner have some of them for more people than a great deal of them for a few.

Indeed, unless that is the line we take, we are back in the old argument of the aristocrats against democracy—the argument that a leisure class is needed to sustain the higher culture. Lord Samuel, it is true, has very conveniently so arranged his State that his leisure class does not need a subject class to do its dirty work. *Qui videra le pot de chambre?* is no problem for the Bensals. But that does not really settle the problem; for it is no solution for the intelligent aristocrats to bundle the inferior people out of sight and out of mind, and merely to refrain from living on the produce of their labour. Lord Samuel's solution is an unascetic monasticism and not a democracy. He had no right so cavalierly to push aside the inferior persons who did not enjoy the blessing of swollen heads.

In truth, the problem of Utopia is to educate the many to live well, not only in a narrowly material, but also in a spiritual sense. Lord Samuel's only contribution, in this book, to that problem is to express his belief that we have been making slow progress towards human betterment, and may expect to go on making slow progress, as long as we are very, very careful to avoid doing anything at all revolutionary, anything that would cause a break in the continuous tradition of our society. If he is right in that, the good things in Bensalem may be good to dream about, but we are forbidden to try for them—we, or our children, or our children's children's children—for fear of breaking the tradition. Utopia becomes not a prophecy, but a pipe dream—or would, if Lord Samuel did not so much dislike tobacco.

I do not feel so dolorous, even in so disconcerting a world as we live in to-day. That there is no Utopia just round the corner for us I am very well aware. But surely, if men have but hope in their hearts, they can move, with modern science to help them, a great deal faster than Lord Samuel seems to believe. What they cannot do is to move fast without making a revolution. I do not mean by that that they can move only by violence; for I do not know how violent the revolution I speak of need be. What I do know is that men, in order to advance with hope, must break the narrow bounds of an economic system that is dominated by the fear of plenty and the hope of scarcity as a means to profit. In Bensalem, men worked under no such crushing limitation; and Lord Samuel himself can find no place for it in Utopia. But surely freedom to expand the powers of production and to apply the fruits of scientific

research is not something we should seek circumspectly and with the utmost care to avoid any break with tradition. It is not so, any more than, as Cobbett once said in answering the advocates of 'moderate Reform,' a man should be expected to rest content with "moderate chastity in a wife." I do not like this Tantalus presentation of a Utopia which Lord Samuel first dangles before his readers and then snatches away, lest they attempt to bring it to life. If I ever dream of Utopia, it will be of one that I mean to try for as hard as I can, not merely of something laid up as a remote island for the contemplation of a few wise men. Lord Samuel himself expresses the fear that his readers may regard life in Bensalem as dull. That is not my trouble about it: my feeling, quite simply, is that a monastic seclusion of superior persons is not my notion of Utopia. I do not want to hide away from the world, but to convert it to a belief in what I hold to be good.

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INDIAN FREEDOM

By A CORRESPONDENT IN INDIA

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS has come and returned, empty-handed, and it becomes necessary to take stock of the new situation which his visit has created. Members of Congress differ on the cause of the breakdown which sent Sir Stafford Cripps back to England. It is, perhaps, a not unreasonable inference that if it had not been one thing it would have been another, and that there was no real intention to agree—a conclusion justified by the abuse of the proposals and of Sir Stafford Cripps himself with which in ever-increasing volume the columns of the Congress Press have been filled since the breakdown occurred. If the reason was an unwillingness to assume responsibility, the difficulties of the situation are greatly increased.

It seems generally correct to say, however, that it was to the interim period and the reconstituted Viceroy's Council that the attention of Congress was mainly directed. If there had been an agreement on this, no doubt the Muslim League would have come in; though they would certainly not have come in on the basis of the rejected Congress demands. But it was in the terms of the post-war settlement outlined in the Cripps proposals that the Muslim League were mainly interested, and it was on these that they based their final rejection, adding that the circumstances, it was unnecessary for them to say anything about the interim proposals. The deadlock was thus complete.

In retrospect the Cripps proposals for the interim period seem now to have been the more important politically, though this was probably not realized, and certainly not by His Majesty's Government, at the time they were made. It is clear beyond doubt that even if defence remained the responsibility of His Majesty's Government, a national government in Delhi, if they were genuinely in earnest about the prosecution of the war, would have been in a position to exercise a legitimate and growing influence on all matters affecting the conduct of the war, not excluding matters of an essentially military character. Yet Sir Stafford Cripps' proposals have been described by Mr. Gandhi as "naked imperialism" and by another leading Indian public man as an insult to India; and a well-known Indian publicist has committed himself to the view that, if there were dangers in rejecting them, the dangers of accepting them were infinitely greater. Such extravagances seem to postulate this dilemma, that either the nature of the proposals was never understood by those who rejected them, in which case the claim of the latter to govern their fellow countrymen must be regarded as resting on singularly

flimsy foundations; or that, being understood, they were rejected because no one was prepared to take the responsibility of carrying them out.

In these circumstances it is difficult to find any justification for the allegation that His Majesty's Government are unwilling to part with power in India. But since statements to that effect are still being made, it is necessary to ask this question: to whom is the transfer to be made? There are a number of possibilities: a national government, more or less on the lines of the Cripps proposal, to carry on for the period of the war and thereafter to invent or supervise the machinery for constructing a new Constitution; a body born of the labours of a constituent assembly and taking over the whole machinery of government, no matter how ignorant or inexperienced its members may be; or, lastly, discussions between small delegations of the various communities and interests, for the purpose of working out details of a new Constitution, which might possibly result in an agreed instrument and in a new government which would be generally acceptable and have the good will of all. This, if it came about, would be the best augury for the future.

Indian politicians when they talk of the transfer of power are thinking, for the most part, in terms of domestic politics. Of the domestic or municipal functions of a government the function of maintaining law and order by far transcends in importance all the rest. People in India have lived so long under a system which has guaranteed not only public order (the Moghul Empire had done this in a fashion over a great part of the country), but also the rule of law, a very different thing, that they tend to forget the horrors and miseries of a régime which is able to guarantee neither. Yet there have been notorious examples in more parts of the world than one during the past twenty years, of which perhaps China is the most significant. To preserve public order in India has never been an easy, and has often been a disagreeable, task; and it is not likely to become easier when there is no longer a third party, whose impartiality is not suspect, to intervene effectively in communal riots and disturbances. These are problems, however, which any Indian government will have to face, if it is to discharge its duty; and the measure of its success in counteracting centrifugal and disruptive forces will determine whether the unity of India is a real or an artificial thing, whether it is one nation or a number of peoples held together by the strong hand. The question is one of immense importance to India herself—that goes without saying—but it is of no less importance to her neighbours. A distracted India, the prey to disorder, even if not to organized civil war, would always be a temptation to marauding powers in that part of the globe. One effect of the theory of totalitarian war is that both war and peace are indivisible throughout the world; and, since there could be no greater provocation to war than the absence of an orderly government in a country as vast and populous as the Indian sub-continent, the domestic and internal peace of India is a matter from which other countries, and not only her neighbours, cannot disinterest themselves.

A new Indian government has, however, to face other problems of no less importance than the preservation of law and order at home. There is the question of the defence of her land frontiers and of her naval defence; and there is the peculiar problem of the Indian States. The defence of the land frontiers of India is bound up with questions of foreign policy. For many generations past it has been the policy of the Government of India, with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government at home, to maintain friendly relations with a number of States lying along the borders of India, and to take such steps for strengthening their independence and giving them no cause for attributing designs against themselves to the Government of India as the circumstances of each case seemed to require. There have been aberrations from this policy in the past, invariably followed by disaster; but for many years now peace and amity have reigned on all the frontiers. It is, however, to be observed that these States, of which the most important are Afghanistan and Nepal, are in diplomatic relations with the Crown and not with the Government of India; and it is to the Court of St. James's and not to New Delhi that their Ministers are accredited. There is reason to believe that they would not regard their present treaties as any longer binding on them, if the control of British Indian foreign policy passed into Indian hands; and it may well be that a new Indian government might find itself in the early and most critical days of its existence faced with a demand for the revision of these treaties, before its material and moral resources were adequately organized. Nor would it be wise to disregard the natural contacts and affinities which exist between the Muslim bloc in the north-west of India and the nations that lie on the other side of the frontier, since these might become a very vital element in the problem, if conflicts with a communal basis should break out in any part of northern India. Of Nepal it need only be said that her friendship will always be as valuable as her enmity would be dangerous. She, probably, does not forget that she once ruled over adjacent parts of British India; and though the affinities of her people are with Hindus rather than Muslims, she remains apart and aloof from both. Nepalese authorities still forbid the employment of any Indian Officer in a Gurkha battalion of the Indian Army.

Of India's other neighbours beyond her land frontiers it is idle to speak at the present time, since no one can foretell as yet the geographical consequences of the Peace. But it is plain that India's relations with China, and probably also with Russia, will be closer than they have been hitherto. The end of the present war may usher in a period of universal peace, not only in Europe but in Asia and in the Pacific also; but it may still be unwise to pay no attention of any kind to problems of defence. It seems improbable in any event that India will be able to dispense with armed forces, even if only for purposes of internal security; and the problem of the creation of a national army is not the least of the problems with which an Indian Government will have to grapple. This is no doubt a domestic problem for India herself. She

may or she may not find herself able to solve it; but any suggestion of insecurity upon her frontiers, whatever be the reason for it, must preoccupy other nations besides India. It may be that the peace settlement will produce some effective arrangement for the international guarantee and protection of frontiers, by which India will benefit and in the responsibilities of which she will share. But these matters are not to be settled in a day, and there may be an interim period full of danger. Certainly these matters are not to be settled by a country in the state of anarchy and chaos which Mr. Gandhi predicates as an essential consequence of his policy; and it is perhaps significant that the recent discussions on the constitutional issue refrained, whether deliberately or otherwise, from referring to questions relating to the future defence of India.

The question of naval defence is intimately connected with the political status of the new India, whether it is to be within or without the British Commonwealth of Nations. Few, if any, Indians appear to have any conception of the expense of a naval establishment; but since a single modern battleship costs something like ten or twelve *crores* to build, to say nothing of its annual maintenance, it will be seen that even a small fleet is an expensive luxury. The complaint that India has never been permitted by the British to have a navy of her own has even less foundation than other complaints of the same kind; and in fact India has had for over two hundred years the protection of the Royal Navy without more than a token payment. If India remains within the circle of the British Commonwealth, she can expect the assistance of the Royal Navy in times of difficulty, no less than South Africa and Australia; nor should there be any difficulty in making arrangements with regard to the use of Indian ports and dockyards similar to those made with regard to Simonstown. It is not to be supposed, after all that has been said, that India will be content to receive British naval protection without giving anything in return; but these are matters for future arrangement. If however India becomes wholly independent, then the question of her naval defence becomes of prime importance. It is plain that she will not herself be able to afford a navy adequate for the purpose, and she will therefore have to rely, whether she likes it or not, on assistance from others. This assistance may be forthcoming from the United Kingdom or from the United States or from some form of international organization, if any such is set up after all. But here again the interim period, before sufficient arrangements are made, may be one of great difficulty and danger, and the whole subject requires the most careful consideration.

Lastly, there is the question of the relation of British India to the Indian States. The craving of some of Their Highnesses for an extension of territory is well-known, and it seems not improbable that in certain circumstances the history of the 18th and early 19th centuries in India would be repeated. British Indian politicians are apt to assume that, in relation to the States, the new Indian government will be the legal successor to, and will step into

the shoes of the old. The States are known to take a very different view of the law, and are in any event not likely to pay great attention to the legal aspect of the question. Their weakness vis-à-vis British India is their apparent inability to combine with one another for any length of time; but if by any chance, under the pressure of circumstances or competent leadership, they were able to achieve some general or local union, they might provide a very formidable competitor for any new government. Hence the very great importance of a reasonable settlement with the States; and this is another of the questions which were touched upon only too lightly in the course of the Cripps negotiations.

Here then are four questions, all of immense though varying importance, for which satisfactory solutions must be found if any future government in India is to function with a hope of success. The question of domestic law and order comes first, and postulates a reasonably strong central government, that is to say, a government commanding the general allegiance of the communities and peoples of India—unless, indeed, its place were filled by a military dictatorship, which would no doubt be able to guarantee law and order of a sort, but which could scarcely be described as an example of peaceful or democratic government. Of a government of this kind it must be confessed that there is no sign as yet, though Mr. Gandhi has convinced himself that it will emerge by some kind of magic as soon as the British are gone, even though a period of anarchy and chaos may precede it. There are many politicians, no doubt, who would be willing to exercise power if the United Kingdom continued to have all the responsibility of government; but there are limits to the patience of the British people, however much they may be prepared to do to establish a united and self-governing India upon a firm basis. They are conscious, and indeed proud, of a great work done in India; but they recognize that the task which they have undertaken is almost complete, and are only too willing to hand over the reins of government, if they can find any government willing and able to receive them. They have not the slightest wish, whatever the politicians and newspapers in India may say, to continue in India a moment longer than they are obliged; but they are, naturally enough, unwilling to act in such a way as to endanger all the constructive work which they have done for the country and to throw it into that state of disorder of which Mr. Gandhi so lightly speaks. If they were to withdraw before any organization had come into existence which could take over the government, that is what must inevitably happen, and it needs no argument to prove it. It is said that, being the present rulers of the country, an obligation rests on them to bring this new organization into existence; and up to a certain point the British people to recognize that that is true; but with their long experience of political liberty and self-government behind them, they are not prepared to admit that a country which seeks to govern itself is under no corresponding obligation. Indeed to an Englishman it is of the essence of self-government that a people are able and willing to settle

all these domestic problems for themselves, without any external help whatsoever; and he resents accusations of insincerity from men of the two great political parties in India who, at a crisis in their history, were prepared to negotiate with a representative of the British Government, but never thought to communicate with or approach each other.

His Majesty's Government have done their best to bring about an agreement between the Indian parties and will continue their efforts, but they cannot go on indefinitely; and the British people, unwilling to incur any further liabilities or to be made a scapegoat for the futility or intransigence of others, may exclaim: "A plague on both your houses," and follow Mr. Gandhi's advice, though not, it may well be believed, in the sense in which he intends it. That is the real danger, and an attempt has been made above to sketch the consequences which must follow. It is easy to say that the United Kingdom is under an obligation "to give India her freedom," as the common phrase is, but there can be no freedom if there is no one willing to assume with general assent the responsibility of protecting and maintaining it. And if freedom can be neither protected nor maintained, nor law and order guaranteed, the substance has surely been thrown away for the shadow; and India becomes, instead of an example of a self-governing country, a plague spot and a running sore—a standing invitation to every warlike and acquisitive power in Asia.

Strong efforts are again being made to saddle His Majesty's Government and the Government of India with the sole responsibility for the present impasse; and many well-meaning persons, after a few weeks' stay in the country (including a visit to Wardha), are demanding that steps should at once be taken to concede all the demands of Congress, both because only thus can India be "given her freedom" and because only thus can the people of India be induced to co-operate wholeheartedly in the war. This demand is coupled with an intense propaganda which cannot be without its effect; and since practically all the more important newspapers in India are owned by Congress adherents or sympathizers, the other side of the picture is never seen. The assumption continues that all the present difficulties are the fault exclusively of the Government of India, with the corollary that no party and no person in India is to blame for anything at all. As proof of the sincerity of His Majesty's Government in their efforts to make India self-governing (an expression to be preferred to the *ad captandum* phrase "giving India her freedom") the facts must be left to speak for themselves; but it is desirable to add that His Majesty's Government cannot compel the peoples and parties of India to agree with one another, and that the promise that India is one nation is denied by a minority of nearly 100,000,000 Muslims. These circumstances are not mentioned as a reason or excuse why the British should seek to continue their rule in India a moment longer, but because they are hard and very relevant facts which cannot be disregarded by anyone who seeks to solve this intractable problem. They are neither the cause nor the result

of the British people, but are inherent in the political situation of India; and although the British people are willing to do all they can to remove the difficulties which those circumstances create, they are powerless to remove them without Indian co-operation.

The necessity for some organization not only willing but able to take over the existing government and maintain law and order throughout British India surely needs no proof. But such an organization can only issue from an agreement among Indians themselves; and that agreement must be a real and not fictitious agreement. The British people can help to bring it into existence, but its establishment must be in the main an Indian responsibility. Civil war is a dreadful thing and not lightly to be contemplated; and it is plain that those who babble of it can have no conception what it means. If India were the real unity which it is asserted to be, civil war would be no more than a bogey to frighten children with; but no public man in India has denied that it must be the inevitable consequence of a transfer of power here and now with no organized government to exercise it with general assent; even though some assert that it will be a non-violent civil war (as if such a thing could exist), and Mr. Gandhi has undertaken to settle it in a fortnight. It is a grave responsibility to withhold self-government for a moment longer than is necessary, and no Englishman will be found to assert the contrary; but it is a responsibility no less grave to remove all props of law and order before anything has been found to take their place. To gamble thus frivolously with the lives and fortunes of so many millions of souls is not the moral obligation which it is claimed to be, but the bankruptcy of responsibility and of statesmanship.

It may be that this problem is beyond the power of a single nation to solve. Let other nations then assist in its solution. Let them help to remove difficulties; but the least effective way of doing this is to deny that the difficulties exist. The British people do not claim a monopoly of political wisdom, but they have had a very long experience of self-government and the obstacles which have to be removed before it can be achieved and enjoyed. They and the Dominions which have sprung from them have only achieved it after long and sometimes bitter struggles; but in each case it has been achieved without external help or pressure. To be able to do this is to them the hallmark of a capacity for self-government; and if they have been able to achieve it in this way by themselves adjusting their own domestic differences they see no reason why others should shrink from assuming a like responsibility. In this way, and in no other, is the reality of national unity made manifest; and India cannot expect that her path to the desired goal will be easier to tread than others have found it.

ABSORBING THE POST-WAR SHOCK

BY HANS HEYMANN

ANY national concept of our 20th century organization must be viewed in a broad universal perspective or it is inorganic and will not live. Managerial policy, or control, or planning cannot be avoided, but it must be conceived in a joint national *and* international "dynamic" form. The attitude of abstention (negative isolationism) is as rotten as imperialism in its many modern manifestations.

To the degree to which nations and governments will agree to participate in an international or supernational political economic organization, to that extent a return to free enterprise within nations may be made possible. To that degree (in the transition period), a "controlled *decontrol*," (as Condliffe terms it), may be attainable.

Governments may have to cover or to enter fields that private finance cannot assume without endangering "other people's money." There are credit and other risks that only governments can bear. But a true renaissance of social-minded and socially conscious private initiative and enterprise can come about only if we create the supernational centrifugal pump and accumulator of wealth as well as the generator-distributor of material and human energies, supported by national power stations and their over-land and air nets of power distribution to bring the wealth of our earth to the needy classes and peoples.

Vice-President Henry A. Wallace calls the 20th Century "the Century of the common man." In the following sentences he admirably summarizes before the Free World Association the main points essential to common welfare:

No nation will have the God-given right to exploit other nations. Older nations will have the privilege to help younger nations get started on the path to industrialization, but there must be neither military nor economic imperialism. The methods of the nineteenth century will not work in the people's century which is now about to begin. India, China, and Latin America have a tremendous stake in the people's century. As their masses learn to read and write, and as they become productive mechanics, their standard of living will double and treble. Modern science, when devoted whole-heartedly to the general welfare, has in it potentialities of which we do not yet dream.

And modern science must be released from German slavery. International cartels that serve American greed and the German will to power must go. Cartels in the peace to come must be subjected to international control for the common man, as well as being under adequate control by the respective home governments. In this way, we can prevent the Germans from again building a war machine while we sleep. With inter-

national monopoly pools under control, it will be possible for inventions to serve all the people instead of only the few.

Yes, and when the time of peace comes, the citizen will again have a duty, the supreme duty of sacrificing the lesser interest for the greater interest of the general welfare. Those who write the peace must think of the whole world. There can be no privileged peoples. We ourselves in the United States are no more a master race than the Nazis. And we cannot perpetuate economic warfare without planting the seeds of military warfare. We must use our power at the peace table to build an economic peace that is just, charitable and enduring.

We realize that during war, power relations are shaped by battles. But after democracy has survived the free and liberated peoples of the world must reconcile the geo-dynamic laws of our globe with the democratic principles within and above nations. Regional power groups, emerging from the war, must be integrated into a just geo-political world order. Only an organically functioning world can apply a post-war shock absorber effectively.

Recently Mr. Milo Perkins, Director of the American Board of Economic Warfare, said in an address that should be read by every world citizen:

Within your life-time and mine, men have entered an era dominated by the machine and the test tube. If we take all that can be produced at the end of this war and divide it among the people who will then be alive to share it, we shall be within reach of a very good standard of living for the first time in all history. That will be the most important material thing that's happened to the human race since the discovery of fire and the invention of the wheel The job of the future will be to build up a mass consumption great enough to use this mass production. That will require a bold and daring use of long-term credits by every enlightened government of the world.

Mr. Perkins has hit the nail on the head. A bold and daring use of long-term credits will produce the shock absorber. But what form will it take?

If we apply all our intellectual honesty and sincerity to the task of positively winning and preserving the peace, we must truthfully admit that any programme of war production is unproductive in the economic sense. It may be true that wars sometimes purify a rotten situation, that they put inventive genius to work to create progressive methods of production and war efficiency which otherwise would not have been created at all. It may be true, that a part of these war achievements can be usefully employed after the war. Still, we must honestly admit that by far the greatest part of war efforts and investments are unproductive and completely lost; a burden which is hard to bear by the generations which follow.

II.

It is, therefore, a vital question that during the war extraordinary measures are taken to preserve a certain amount of economic strength until after it. The vain hope of obtaining adequate reparation payments after a destructive world war, the danger of famines, epidemics and economic disturbances, the necessity of transforming armament production into civilian production, impose grave hardships upon victors and vanquished alike.

And in the transition period, our problem is not one of a short boom to fill our empty supply basins and consumption needs, but one of counteracting a lasting post-war depression, that grows worse and worse after every year. Even the Nazis have recognized that during the war extraordinary measures must be taken to make up for the losses. Their ruthless policy of mass exploitation and shifting of industries and workmen all over the Continent cannot be successful unless it meets with voluntary co-operation on the part of the people. Subjugated, hungry and desperate peoples do not think of constructive effort; they have only one thought in mind, to become free again. But, in taking extraordinary measures now, we must be realistic. We must not indulge in an unlimited post-war spending spree. We must build a bridge between public and private investment within and among nations. Mr. John T. Flynn and others have now begun to warn America that post-war federal debt must not expand without limit; that if capitalist groups want to save a sound amount of free private enterprise, they must reform and revive the dynamic element in it. And that element they consider to be private investment. That must be repaired and put into operation again.

All this admitted, we must not forget that the success of national budgets, national investment, and national credit expansion, in the post-war era will depend entirely upon international credit reforming, managing and expanding. Our considerations for post-war national budgeting cannot and must not be restricted to national boundaries alone. The national budget must become part and parcel of the world budget.

The American programme must be concerned with

- (1) co-operative unity of action, comprising most of the Western Hemisphere and the United Nations
- (2) the supplementation of America's armament programme with one of genuine production, distribution and consumption, which in turn depends upon
- (3) her programme of active economic foreign peace policy.

In addition to all-out war measures much can be done to prepare for these principle endeavours. While, during the war America's national income keeps rising to 120 billion dollars or more, she must prepare to balance gradually the unproductive (pure war) part of her production by a constructive programme for the Western Hemisphere and the outer world. We know that priorities and allocation of war supplies do not permit a non-war-essential programme for the duration.

But that programme can be anticipated by wise statesmanship now. This can be done, first, through negative measures, such as the curb of inflation by means of price ceilings, organization of supply, useful and economical allocation of goods and labour not required for war purposes, forced saving, etc. But this must also be undertaken with positive measures such as increases in crops and in the production of vital foodstuffs and raw materials, the production of new machinery, ships and non-luxury goods of all kinds,

setting up of inflation reserves against exhaustion of plants and machinery as protection against economic shocks. With stabilization of credit and reform and expansion of investment the war effort must be bolstered.

The stronger the country is materially, when the war is over, the less it will be haunted by inflation and a consequential increase in the price level; the stronger it is physically, morally and psychically, the better it will stand the post-war strains and trials.

First of all, America must get rid of the static concept of national economy. She must overcome the idea of an "American frontier" as a terminus to her capitalist system. Even the Nazis, the "national socialists" so called are not thinking in such limited terms. They are striving to impose their "national" socialism upon the world from above.

If America is to live on in the spirit of her forefathers and to uphold their ideals of liberty and justice for all, if America is to find her soul, she must replace the idea of an "American frontier" with the ideal objective of a unified sphere of the entire globe. She must think in terms of a world community, of a brotherhood of men.

But in order to reconcile ideals with practical action America must find and establish a universal mechanism that will function so exactly and justly, that **she will never again lose her balance.** She can only arrive at a just equilibrium between mind and body, between moral law and practical application, if the greatest human ideals, individual liberty and equality under the law, are safeguarded by the universal mechanism of collective security. Such universal collective security must be economic as well as political. The fathers of the constitution did not exclude economic justice from their Bill of Rights; but they did not foresee that America would ever arrive at a situation where economic injustice could become an insult to the moral law.

A world-wide Bill of Rights is necessary to do away with economic injustice. Liberty and justice are expensive indeed. And, in the words of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, "we must pay the price, whatever it will be." The present American generation will have to write that precious document. There can be no human rights without the obligation of living up to them. Liberty can only be had at the price of discipline. And in order that that discipline is not abused for human ambitions of power America must anchor it in the best attainable super-national machinery. This planning, organizing, controlling, managing supra-national apparatus will make Americans feel free not in spite of, but because of a certain degree of discipline. It will help them carry the burden of social emancipation and civilization, and will make them free to devote themselves to art, culture, religion, science, friendship, and all the beauties of life. Once the social needs and wants of humanity are justly cared for and safeguarded on a universal scale, the spiritual man will be reborn and the contradictions between ideals and conduct eradicated.

III.

The international programme as Mr. Milo Perkins has lucidly recognized is one of a bold and daring use of credits.

In my book, *Plan for Permanent Peace*,* the reform of world credit, currency and finance has been sketched with all its technicalities. I should like to mention only the main functions of this vast credit mechanism.

First, however, the question arises, who shall be the executor of the mechanism of the future free democratic world order? From the just economic viewpoint, it would be ideal if all nations or groups emerging from the present struggle could participate in that world-wide organization right at the start.

However, the Nazi march of conquest, the Japanese blow against Australasia and the pincers movement to embrace the "heartland" of the world (Eurasia) have caused the great powers of the United Nations, China, Great Britain, Soviet Russia and the United States of America to strike a counter-blow by uniting their war efficiencies and economies under the lend-lease and other emergency agreements, which are being extended to the other United Nations. Soviet Russia has signed a twenty year Treaty with Great Britain, to police the world after the war with regard to German aggression, and the United States is expected to share in that responsibility. No one would doubt the wisdom of such an alliance as far as co-operation is concerned at the present time and in the future as well.

Since China and Russia have been included in America's lend-lease agreements with England, a true partnership of these four supporting pillars of the future democratic world organization has come into effect. Mr. Walter Lippmann is right in saying "that in a war of survival the realities of international affairs are infinitely stronger than theories, ideologies, sentiment and prejudice." And for the peace to come there is no combination that could more effectively contribute to the reconstruction of the world, than this quadruple alliance. America's alliance with China forms the bridge over the Pacific and the open door to East Asia. It is the best reassurance against a possible war between the yellow race and the white. And the alliance with the U.S.S.R., the greatest land power on earth and the wealthiest in man power and resources, can keep Europe and Asia in check and will be indeed indispensable in building up the world in a truly social spirit. But these pillars must have their capital and their cupola to form the dome of the entire free world order. They must select and elect their dominant authority. It will be their responsibility to build the world's superstructure.

Twenty years is a long time. Sooner or later the time will come when the police force of four must be expanded to a police force of all, by all, for all, indiscriminately. The omission of such action would again invite counter-

pressure and countermoves of the policed group or groups, termed "war" in our society.

At the present time, therefore, there appear to be three methods of procedure: (1) The mechanism may be organized by the four Allied powers. (2) It may be undertaken by the Western Hemisphere powers. (3) The mechanism may be prepared by the United Nations' group as a whole.

There can be no doubt but that the best social system rather than military might will finally win the moral struggle now being fought. If the democratic countries are to win, they must create that system. They must give the lie to the Nazi charge that the democracies are plutocratic parasites. This must be the answer to the "new order"—Nazi style.

There have been valuable statements on what the general democratic philosophy of this system should be. There has been, however, a dearth of actual practicable measures to carry out these ideals.

IV.

In my experience the most practical plan would be the creation of a Bank of Nations as the functional approach to economic spheres of interest. This economic centre must co-operate with a Federal World Authority entrusted with greater sovereignties—the political sphere of the plan—and a reformed, enlarged and more powerful International Labour Organization—the social sphere.

The Bank of Nations must be given the ultimate task of unifying and co-ordinating the economic functions of the world community. The plan envisages the Bank of Nations co-ordinating the activities of a Western Hemisphere Bank, a Europa Bank and an Oriental Bank. Each country in turn is affiliated with its hemisphere bank.

Among other functions the Bank of Nations is given the power to issue an international currency; to grant short-term credits to trade; and to issue serial notes for long-term credit purposes. The power of credit, and the part that it can play in solving the enormous problems of production, distribution and consumption, is greatly under-estimated. Credit is the electro-motive force in the dynamics of economic activity. It establishes the contact between the energies emanating from the subjects and objects of our planet. From the creation of purchasing power to the exchange of just purchasing power parities between nations, there is nothing that credit cannot accomplish. At a time when the destruction of the world necessitates incalculable works of reconstruction and construction, credit is the only instrument capable of anticipating future earnings of long-life capital wealth and placing it at the disposal of the present generation. Credit and investment are the most powerful instruments in counteracting business cycles and making post-war reconstruction continuously prosperous. They are in fact the great shock-absorbers of our time.

* George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1942.

If we want to win Mr. Cordell Hull's courageous fight for a freer flow of goods throughout the world we must supply currency-feeble countries with a sound currency of the Bank of Nations. At the same time world-wide distribution of newly produced products would be set in motion through the new credit system, if it were only possible to limit to the absolute minimum the inhibitions of trade, such as import and export restrictions, customs walls, etc. The fecundity of freer trade would be immediately realized by the member nations of the Bank. Any country persisting in imprisoning itself behind insurmountable trade barriers would soon enough discover the disadvantages.

It is indeed a vain hope of American financiers that they may again grant dollar credits at high interest rates to weakening countries without driving them to bankruptcy. The lend-lease method, lately extended to China and Soviet Russia gives rise to the hope that low interest or interest-free international credits will prevail in the post-war era and that the *après nous le déluge* attitude of orthodox capitalists will not be suffered again by the peoples of the world.

The proposed long-term credit system provides the creation of promissory notes (serial notes) for long-term investment purposes. These notes are issued in series and amortized during the life of the capital objects, structures, and utilities of all kinds created by the Bank and its branches.

The Bank's activities are paralleled by regional branch banks, with credit and issuing departments. Furthermore, the Bank would have to deal with special problems, such as international labour migration, unemployment, insurance and social security in general, crop insurance, raw material clearing, reserving and transporting, gold and index questions and many other international problems. There are a number of functional subsidiaries which would co-operate with the Bank of Nations.

The Western Hemisphere Bank of a United Nations' Bank may well represent the first step towards the ideal Bank of Nations. If this Inter-American or Union-Bank would handle the currency and credit problems adequately and in such a way that future unified world solution is by no means impeded, we might as well now take the first steps.

Or are we again to let the opportunity pass by and sow the seeds for another war? The danger that this might be done is very grave. Ambitious, hyper-nationalist or imperialist statesmen are always at work and eager to grab individual and national advantages for themselves. America has a heavy burden of responsibility in this struggle for justice against the forces of evil. Our best men are none too good to struggle with this situation and to fight the real war, the war for social justice on earth.

The merging of the incentives to progress embraced by the classical social philosophers can be accomplished by the new system I have termed "Social Capitalism." We visualize this system applied within, between and above nations. We must show first how it can be made to function internationally

and nationally and how it ultimately will lead our chaotic society into the socially advanced United States of the World in which regional groups, federations and individual nations may finally be integrated. This is the economic, social and political basis for the democratic world of tomorrow.

It is my greatest desire to find understanding and co-operation for the new credit system in Great Britain. England, the classical country of enlightened political economy, the country of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Lord Keynes, will, I hope, be among the first to lead the world in introducing the social credit of solidarity. England will not fail to recognize the vital necessity for a central supernational institution for the revival of world trade and world production.

In this war of wars England will have learned that only through the co-operation of all nations in the spirit of justice can a financial world catastrophe be avoided. The lend-lease agreements among the United Nations are dynamic trail-blazers for the credit of solidarity among nations. The people of the world must choose between the end of civilization and "the wealth of (all) nations." The low interest credit or even an interest-free credit of world solidarity is the alternative to post-war chaos and the absorber of the post-war economic shock.

I have hope and confidence in that great city in which "The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street" keeps smiling and struggling valiantly in the face of a political economy which is going to rack and ruin; but will rise from its ashes to unprecedented social pride and glory.

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THE MONARCHY IN ITALY

BY UMBERTO CALOSSO

IN 1922, the year of the "March on Rome," a play was given there, in the course of which a king with a little crown on his head entered, saying, "By tendency, I am a Republican." The author of the comedy was Arturo Rossato who had been Mussolini's right-hand man for a number of years and chief political columnist in the *Popolo d'Italia*, the Fascist newspaper founded by Mussolini. All Italy enjoyed the joke. For it referred to a very recent political incident. The fact was that when Mussolini, immediately after the war, founded the National Fascist Party with an extremist political programme, he avoided the question of the monarchy. It did not seem sufficiently important. There were much more acute and popular questions which worried the men who had come back from the war. But when, in 1921, Mussolini foresaw that he might sooner or later be called by the King of Italy to form a Government, he quickly added a point to his programme: that of being *tendentially republican*. For a month or two the Fascist Party was in an uproar about the new formula. This was clearly what Mussolini wanted. Only a tiny minority objected to the republican tendency and left the Party.

In using this formula, Mussolini was obeying an unwritten tradition according to which leaders who rise from the people and want to reach power in Italy must always be republican and make anti-monarchist declarations. Mussolini's formula was as good as saying to the King and to Giolitti's old governing class: "I might be prepared to accept the reins of Government and to alter the more extremist parts of my programme. It is a question of give and take."

Mussolini is not a statesman of the highest order, and he is a ridiculous military leader, but he is very gifted as a Party man, and in earlier times he might have become a great brigand chief. His very name resembles that of the last Italian brigand, Musolino, who lived less than forty years ago: in fact not a few old peasants in 1922 believed it was the same man back in the news again. The well-known Italian brigands: Fra Diavolo, Mammone, Tiburzi, Maino, the Passator Cortese and others, all had their picturesquely rebel sides to please the people and the peasants from whom they have usually sprung, but they were also usually able to come to some agreement with the large landowners and the police. Mussolini was admirably tactful in transferring these methods from the field of brigandage to that of politics.

"Tendentially republican" was a clever formula. Etymologically it was (like so many of Mussolini's phrases) of Marxist origin. There is Marx's

theory of "the tendential decline in profit margins": profits tend to become less but the process is delayed by temporary factors which make it possible for Capitalism to continue to exist, even for a long time. So, inversely, the Republic, according to Mussolini, is an irresistible tendency, but one whose achievement may be temporarily delayed by certain factors, for instance by Mussolini himself being called by the King to assume power.

Mussolini's move will not be clear to a foreigner, unless the whole Italian background is understood. The Italian State was born less than a century ago, during the *Risorgimento*, at the time of Mazzini and Garibaldi, and founded upon an ideal that was substantially republican. "Young Italy," the secret republican society founded by Mazzini represented a religious faith rather than a political party. The national songs which rouse the Italian people and which have even now an official status, Garibaldi's hymn and Mameli's hymn, are republican in spirit. (The Royal March has no words and it was composed by a corporal at the King's behest). The Italian unity was a great compromise by which the House of Savoy managed to survive by stepping forward as the exponent of an essentially republican revolution, and by putting its small white cross on the revolutionary tricolour. For a time Garibaldi fell in with the Savoy monarchy so that he might, with its aid, strike at the monarchy of the Two Sicilies, but he died a republican, having always been one, at heart.

One of the earliest Prime Ministers of the new Italy, the Marquess Massimo d'Azeglio said: "Every one is a republican at twenty." Crispi, a later Prime Minister, had been a fervent republican. It would be difficult to count the number of ex-republican Ministers who were accepted by the Crown without being asked to give any very convincing proof of their conversion. Even Giovanni Ansaldo, who is the most intelligent of the Fascist leaders and propagandists, is the author of a vulgar skit against the person of the King. There is no Italian Monarchical Myth, and too much zeal on behalf of the monarchy is usually disastrous. The King's private friends, men like General Capello and the Socialist deputy Zaniboni have been in prison for years, without the King having been able to move a finger to help them.

It is evident that the Monarchy in Italy is not one of the nation's essential traditions. The old Italian tradition is found in the aristocratic Republics of St. Mark, of Genoa, of Florence, whose memory is still present and whose *gesta*, even now, are the stuff out of which Italian patriotism is woven. Every schoolboy's heart in Italy is still moved by the memory of the Death's Company round the *Carroccio* drawn by six pairs of oxen, which defeated the German emperor Frederic Barbarossa and left him as good as dead on the battlefield; by the memory of the Genoese boy called Balilla who threw a stone at the soldiers of the Kings of Austria and Savoy in his city; by the memory of Ferruccio, a general of the Florentine Republic, who died in the religious war of the Republic against the Medici, the Spaniards and the Pope.

An analysis of the monarchist problem in Italian history was made several

years ago by an Italian writer, Mario Missiroli, in a book entitled *Socialist Monarchy*. It is an important book for students of Italian affairs because many of the typical political and cultural post-war groups in Italy drew inspiration from some of the theses in the book, and especially Gobetti's "Liberal Revolution" movement among whom was the Giovanni Ansaldo mentioned above. (Gobetti died at the age of 26 as a result of Fascist beatings. Ansaldo, after a term of imprisonment betrayed us essentially by his deep-seated disbelief in the capacities of the Italian people).

According to Missiroli's thesis Italy, not having had her Reformation, ceased to be a modern state. With the fall of the Florentine Republic and of Savonarola's party in 1530, after a long religious war against the coalition of the Pope, the Emperor Charles V. and the Medici, the last bulwark of Italian freedom had collapsed. A long period of decadence began, which assumed the characteristics common to Italian periods of historical failure: it was a period of exaggeration, melodrama, brigandage, illiteracy, processions, mobs, Pulcinellas, masques, and scepticism. The Italian citizen lost his pre-eminence as a man of culture and Shakespearian energy and began to be portrayed as a gesticulating, funny figure. The whole of this degeneration runs parallel to the fall of the Republics and the triumphs of foreign monarchs in the two key points of the peninsula: in Milan and in Naples. For generations the idea of the monarchy came to be associated with the Germanic and the Spanish intruders.

When Italy began to feel her unity in the XIXth century, it was inevitable that republican programmes should reappear. Mazzini's "Young Italy" drew its inspiration from the ancient liberties of the republics and from the spirit of Savonarola: but "Young Italy" was far more than a mere republican political programme. It was an attempt at a modern spiritual revolution that reached out beyond Catholicism and Protestantism. Not a few English people grasped its essential character during Mazzini's thirty years in exile in Chelsea. It was an heroic attempt, but the handiwork of a very few, and it did not reach the working masses. The Savoy dynasty was able to provide an assurance of political success to Italian unity, but it smothered its spirit, and so remained as the symbol of a compromise.

The only traditional monarchists are we poor Piedmontese up in a corner of the Alps. Piedmont is geographically and historically on the borderline of Italy. It had not come under the influence either of the great springtide of the Italian Renaissance nor the decadence which followed. While the rest of Italy fell to foreign intruders, Piedmont remained the only armed state, loyal to the patriarchal House of Savoy, defending the Alpine passes in all the great European conflicts and pursuing a slow policy of extension towards Lombardy, dreaming one day of creating a Kingdom of Northern Italy. Suddenly this ancient dream became a living possibility. Two conditions however would have to be fulfilled and these had not been foreseen. A Kingdom of all Italy and not only of Northern Italy had to be formed, and

—the cause of the Italian revolution would have to be espoused. Be it said, to the honour of the House of Savoy, that it bravely fulfilled both conditions and not without much private misgiving. But in the process it lost its historical roots. When Italy placed herself under our monarchy, the Kingdom of Piedmont was far too small to provide the whole country with a governing class. Our army, our old aristocracy and our slow and honest civil service could not absorb the ruling classes elsewhere in Italy and give them that political tradition which they lacked. Our governing classes ended by being absorbed by them. Giolitti, a Piedmontese who was the Prime Minister on and off for thirty years till 1921, represented the last attempt at a compromise between the Piedmontese political tradition and the Mafia (local rule by gangs) of the South, a compromise which was always opposed by the upper classes of Lombardy, economically the strongest and most modern element in Italy, but with shallow political roots. Giolitti actually tried, at the last minute, to ally himself with the Fascist gang, thinking to outwit them, but they outwitted him and marched past the Royal Palace with their republican banners in a peaceful procession, while Mussolini was called upon to form a Government.

All this is not really the King's personal responsibility (he was a Giolittian, even without Giolitti); it is an historical situation which has ended by making a character. The ancient Crusader Counts, turned into the *rois fainéants*. Very slowly, political ability turned into a mere technique; compromise became an end in itself and the very conception of feudal honour became only a memory. The process was accelerated by the anarchist shot which killed King Humbert 42 years ago. The present King, who succeeded Humbert, was aware, both by education and by his own nature, that the monarchy could henceforth initiate nothing. He was "Socialist" during the socialist agitations in the Val Padana; "Fascist" when agitation and the republican tendency passed over to the fascists.

One royal and traditional virtue has remained with the House of Savoy: simplicity of manners, which is in marked contrast to the rhetorical outpourings of the fascists. The use of the Piedmontese dialect which is still partly current at court, in itself precludes excessive flights of oratory. But that is all: neither King Victor Emmanuel's use of understatement nor the Crown Prince's smile have ever reached even to the outskirts of humour.

That there should still be people outside Italy in certain circles who believe they can play the Monarchy card in Italy as though it were trumps, is a matter for astonishment, more especially so in England where the old aristocracy was once renowned in Europe for the ease with which it could carry republican sentiments. For twenty years now we exiles have been meeting politicians who tell us, in a whisper, that they have heard from secret and sure sources that the Crown Prince, Umberto, is a personal enemy of Mussolini. I had the experience recently in Egypt of talking to people who thought that an

Anti-Fascist legion might well have been entrusted to the command of the Duke of Aosta—and that was *before* he had been forced into surrender.

What can one say of such dreams, which, in this epoch of religious wars, seem to be quite peculiar to politicians? The "circles" which are referred to by those who appeal to the anti-Fascism and to the anti-Germanism of the House of Savoy, nearly always consist of "retired neutral diplomats," "a Roman Prince," or quite simply Sherlock Holmes, a useful but generally over-rated fellow. An elementary appreciation of the real camps at open war in Italy and on the whole continent reduces all this talk about monarchical influence to its proper place. In Austria and Germany (countries with a deep monarchical tradition) the monarchy collapsed after one defeat. Is it going to withstand two wars in Italy? The weakness of such a thesis is evident, and the matter is not without importance in British foreign policy, in so far as Italy after the war will be in such a state of exhaustion that any prop given to a dead institution will only serve to complicate the organic way out and hasten the danger of anarchy.

In the last century, the English governing class was by far the most expert and specialized political class in the world, unaffected by the *morbus artificum* so frequently associated with too much specialization. These Englishmen avoided taking up a purely political and diplomatic attitude about the Italian question. By Whig tradition and Tory temperament, averse to showing sympathy for Italian reactionaries, they were able, with very little adjustment, to preserve a real interest in the Italian revolution. This "strategic alliance" between a policy and a revolution, between a diplomacy and a religion, which as we know, Bismarck at a certain moment tried to sketch out with Mazzini, was somehow achieved by the governing class in England. An English Cabinet Minister did not hesitate to call the Monarchy of the Two Sicilies, "the negation of God," despite the fact that this monarchy had been an English ally for twenty years during the Napoleonic wars.

It is significant moreover, that on the European continent from Portugal to Hungary, all the totalitarian régimes to-day, although they are not republican, have not restored their monarchies, which goes to show that the monarchy as an institution is no longer a rallying point. A contrary process has occurred in England, where the monarchy has seen the disappearance of certain gentlemanly semi-republican sympathies and of the indifference to royalty which was still common in the days of the younger Pitt. With Disraeli and Queen Victoria's jubilee the English monarchy seemed to be endowed with a great and increasing popularity. It is un-English to speculate on abstract ideas and the Savoy dynasty is fundamentally an abstract idea on the continent as it is to-day. Moreover in Italy, monarchist propaganda is the surest way of driving the King further into the arms of Fascism and of its war: this is a "secret of technique" which should by now be well known to the diplomacy of both hemispheres.

We may well ask then, should the Republic stand foremost in the Italian

question? No, that would be an error. Monarchy or Republic are to-day simply *fórmulæ*, which hardly interest the younger generation of Italy. The Italian monarchy is practically non-existent and an Italian republic seems inevitable but uninteresting. Other problems take precedence among the younger generations, and to insist on the republic simply displays an antiquated mind, hidebound by the political interests of pre-Fascist days and unable to free itself from the antitheses of those days. It is clear that to-day in Europe none of the different types of Fascist Governments in power can be called either monarchical or republican. Questions of this kind are simply alien to them. The truth is that the Fascist and National-Socialist revolutions have raised new problems, new devils which they can no longer command, and the new generations look beyond Fascism, not back to pre-Fascist times.

The Republican position is considered superfluous in Italy in the *Comitati d'Azione*, those groups of active men from all parties and without party who do clandestine work against the German war. It is only among exiles that some men lay so much emphasis on the word republican, and sometimes they do it because, having found it to be respectable in America, they think it will be useful in Italy. British policy on the subject is not known, but it seems as though there is in England a definite tendency not to become involved in this problem or imprisoned in it and not to change the old slogan: "Hang the Kaiser" to the new one "long live King Victor Emanuel" which is even worse; and that is the right attitude. As to Soviet Russia it is a fact that although she is ultra-republican, she uses no republican arguments in her Italian policy, and that is because, at the moment, she is far more concerned with Russia than with Communism and she does not want to prejudice even the mere chance of an anti-fascist intervention by the Italian Generals in favour of a separate peace.

The idea that some general or other may be able to save the House of Savoy after a defeat comes out of a dream-world in Europe as it is to-day. Not even Hindenburg succeeded in doing that with the Hohenzollerns. But the possibility that a sort of General Monk might take action *during the war*, at a critical moment, to overthrow Mussolini and so cause a crack in the German-Fascist edifice, though extremely unlikely to happen, cannot be excluded *a priori*. Nor is the Italian Army very monarchist, although its discipline provides it with a monarchist exterior. Off duty, even the generals tell the usual funny stories about the King and recall the republican patriotic legends of Italy with some feeling, but when they wear uniform they temporarily become somewhat monarchist. However, armies are far too important in the modern world to be lightly neglected, and the aim of good policy must be to try to separate the army of Italy from Fascism, the Regulars from the Blackshirts, the generals from the operatic generalissimo Mussolini, and to concentrate on Enemy No. 1 which is Fascism.

BISMARCK, HITLER AND—EMIL LUDWIG

By R. P. SCHWARZ

IN the September issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, Dr. Emil Ludwig contrasts the founder of the Second, with the founder of the Third, German *Reich*. In doing so, he sets forth some unusual views on German history, recent and less recent. In particular, his statements on Bismarck's rôle are very dubious, so much so, indeed, that from Dr. Ludwig's interpretation of the facts, nobody would suspect Bismarck of being one in a line of German imperialists. He writes on page 149:

And this is the decisive difference! (that is between Bismarck and Hitler). That Bismarck was the founder of German Imperialism is a fairy tale. The contrary could easily be proved. In a century that brought about the national states, it was only natural that the German tribes too had to unite. That this could not be achieved without war had been demonstrated by the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament. At that time it was absolutely true that Germany's unification could be achieved only through blood and iron. This Bismarck said and made it come true, but he never said "Might goes before right." That is the distortion of a word from one of his speeches where he said that there have always been moments in history when might was stronger than right. False, too, is the notorious story of the Ems telegram that he is supposed to have falsified in order to start the war. Bismarck, it is true, wanted war with France, but France provoked and declared it.

Le pauvre agneau si tendre et innocent. . . . It would indeed be quite untrue to say that Bismarck was the founder of German, read Prussian, imperialism. Nobody with any knowledge of German history ever said so, for that historical phenomenon can be traced much further back. But we are not concerned with words. Bismarck was most certainly the most ardent, ruthless, logical, cunning and successful exponent of Prussian imperialism after Frederick II. And that alone matters.

One might also question that "in a century that brought about national states, it was only natural that the German tribes too had to unite." So little natural was this indeed that Professor F. W. Foerster, a German, nay a Prussian, has devoted a considerable part of his remarkable and deep-probing book *Europe and the German Question** to show how contrary this development was to the historical traditions and to the true interests of Germany—though not of Prussia. In my opinion, his analysis of German history is far more consistent and much better supported by facts than Dr. Ludwig's superficial appraisal. I say superficial because it fails to perceive the continuity that leads from Frederick II. and possibly earlier Prussian

* English edition, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1941. The English edition is more complete than either the German original or the French translation thereof.

imperialists—Professor Foerster goes back to the Order of the Teutonic Knights—via Bismarck to Hitler. Any view that disregards this continuity is superficial. Unpalatable though the fact may be to Dr. Ludwig, there is only a difference in degree, not in kind, between Bismarck and Hitler. Bismarck was more cautious and, having lived abroad, as distinct from Hitler, had a better appreciation of the forces active in foreign politics. Besides, he had a good command of foreign languages—again as distinct from Hitler who does not even know his native German.

"At that time," writes Dr. Ludwig, "it was absolutely true that Germany's unification could be achieved only by blood and iron." Was it? Only, of course, if the so-called *kleindeutsche Loesung* (the Little-German solution excluding Austria from the German Confederation) was adopted. The other alternative, the *grossdeutsche Loesung* (the Greater-German solution including Austria and allowing for her non-German elements) would have excluded Prussian leadership and Prussia would not in this case have been able to secure hegemony. That the Greater-German solution would have been far more in accord with Germany's historic traditions has, I believe, been conclusively shown by Professor Foerster. Moreover, were one to plead the principle of nationalities, this alternative would also have brought about a much wider unity, both ethnically and culturally, of the German element. That the Habsburg dynasty was spiritually too bankrupt and materially too weak to achieve it is another chapter.

There seems to be no need to argue with Dr. Ludwig on whether Bismarck spoke the famous sentence: "Might goes before right." Even if he did not, he always acted on that principle. If indeed, he said that "there were always moments in history when might was stronger than right," he certainly did his best to plan these moments well in advance and to see that might was on his side. As Bismarck's biographer, Dr. Ludwig should know the following letter written by his hero to Baron Blixen, Danish Prime Minister, in 1863:

If you undertake to forge Scandinavia into one *Reich*, I will then unite Germany. We will make a Scandinavian-German League and will be strong enough to dominate the whole world. We have religion and culture in common, nor are the languages very dissimilar. But tell your countrymen that if they are not prepared to enter into my plans, I may be obliged to cripple them so that I do not have any enemy in my rear when I have to attack on other points.

As to the famous Ems telegram the falsification of which Dr. Ludwig denies, all depends on what one understands by the word "falsification." One may quibble over the word, but the charge, in substance, remains true as will be evident from the texts that follow. Before quoting these texts, it is, however, necessary to outline the historical background.

The Franco-German war of 1870/71 arose over the candidature of a Hohenzollern prince to the throne of Spain. This was the pretext, not the cause. In France, this candidature was recognized as a potential danger in the rear. Before the Munich appeasers, French opinion had never been

divided on the necessity of furthering friendly or, at least, genuinely neutral governments in Spain. Whatever may have been the defects of Napoleon III's personal régime—and it had many—no French government conscious of the interests of their country, could have been indifferent to the danger involved in a German prince ascending the Spanish throne. France's mistake lay not in opposing the Hohenzollern candidature, but in the diplomatic methods used for the purpose. Instead of remaining content with the withdrawal of that candidature, the French government tried to secure from the king of Prussia, as head of the House of Hohenzollern, a declaration of principle disapproving in advance any future similar candidature. This declaration of principle the king refused to give to the French Ambassador, Count Benedetti, when he received him in audience at Ems. There lies the origin of the famous Ems telegram which was sent to Bismarck by a high official, Counsellor Abeken, on the king's instructions after the latter had decided not to receive the French Ambassador a second time. The Ambassador had wished to repeat his first *démarche*. The king gave Bismarck full latitude to publish Abeken's telegram.

What does Bismarck himself say on this subject? From Bismarck's own narrative* it is quite clear that the text was "doctored" and that it was given a deliberate twist to such purpose that war could not be avoided. Here is a full translation of the relevant passages:

... and I reduced in the presence of my two guests† the telegram by deletions (*Streichungen*) without adding or altering a word, to the following text. (Follows the full text of the telegram as published).

Bismarck continues:

The difference in the effect of the shortened text of the Ems telegram compared with that of which the original would have produced, was not the result of stronger language, but of the formula which made this manifestation appear as final while Abeken's wording would only have had the appearance of a fragment (*Bruchstueck*) of a negotiation pending and to be continued in Berlin.

In plain English, Bismarck, with his version of the telegram, deliberately closed the door to further negotiations. How conscious he was of this fact becomes quite clear from the continuation of his narrative:

Having read to both guests the condensed (*konzentrierte*) version, Moltke remarked: "In this manner, it sounds quite different. Before, it sounded like a *chamade*, now it sounds like a fanfare in answer to a challenge." I explained: if I convey this text which contains no additions to, or alterations of, the telegram, in execution of the orders of the Allhighest, not only to the newspapers but also to all our legations, it will be known in Paris before midnight and will make the impression of the red rag on the Gallic bull not only on account of its contents, but also on account of the way it is diffused. We must hit (*schlagen*) if we do not want to assume the rôle of one who has been beaten without a fight. Success depends, however, materially on the impressions at home and abroad (*bei anderen*) as to the origin of the war; it is important that we be the attacked, and

* I quote from *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* Reflections and Reminiscences), popular edition in German, Cotta, Stuttgart, 1921, Vol. II, pages 108/9 and 111 ff.

† Moltke and Roon, the Chief of Staff and Minister of War respectively.

Gallic bearing (*Ueberhebung*) and irritability (*Reizbarkeit*) will give us that rôle (*wird uns dasu machen*) if we announce to the European public, to the extent this is possible without the mouthpiece of the *Reichstag*, that we face France's threats without fear.

In fact, Bismarck's insistence on "no additions, no alterations" deliberately avoids the issue. One can twist, doctor or even falsify a text by a mere omission or, as he did in this case his protests notwithstanding, by stronger language. For Abeken had telegraphed to Bismarck that "the king had decided not to receive Count Benedetti again, but merely to convey to him through his aide-de-camp that he had. . . . received the confirmation of the message Benedetti had already had from Paris* and had nothing else to say to the Ambassador." In Bismarck's version, the decision not to receive the French Ambassador a second time becomes the *refused* to receive Count Benedetti: "His Majesty then *refused* to receive the French Ambassador a second time (*nochmals*)"—a considerable and deliberate aggravation further enhanced by the way in which the refusal was communicated to the world.

After that, Dr. Ludwig may well say that France provoked the war, but I do not think he will find many believers. No doubt the tendencies inherent in the Napoleonic régime made for war. But the texts already quoted show clearly that *this* war at least could have been avoided had Bismarck not pushed at the wheel with all his energy.

Elsewhere, Dr. Ludwig writes: "The pan-Germanic arrogance born in those times, tried in vain to tempt Bismarck." Really, Dr. Ludwig? This is what Bismarck said to a deputation from Styria, then an Austrian province, visiting him at Friedrichsruhe on April 15, 1895:

... and that is what I would like to say to you: when you are doing business with your Slav rivals, even at moments of the most violent anger and in the most critical situations, always retain the profound conviction, the most profound but secret conviction, that you are fundamentally their superiors and that you always will be so.

There are many more features in Dr. Ludwig's picture of Bismarck which are drawn completely out of line. To say that Bismarck gave his Social Laws (Old Age and Pension Insurance) to Germany "because he wanted socialists to have less cause for complaint" is one. In reality, this legislation was passed to attenuate a political mistake that Bismarck had committed by outlawing the Socialist party—which for this very reason could no longer complain—and thereby driving their organization underground. That mistake was finally corrected by the complete repeal of his anti-Socialist legislation. But it never occurred to Bismarck to spare the feelings of his political opponents.

Of Hitler, Dr. Ludwig says that he "was the successor of men who had the best intentions, but no authority." Apart from the fact that one might legitimately ask why they failed to secure authority, Dr. Ludwig could conveniently verify the good intentions of these men under the Weimar Republic

* Renunciation by the Hohenzollern prince of his Spanish candidature.

by reading again General Groener's deposition as a witness at the famous *Dolchstoß* ("Stab-in-the-Back") trial in Munich, October-November, 1925.* It shows the most obvious collusion between the Social Democratic party leaders (Ebert, Noske) and the Army, a collusion which was faithfully continued under Noske's successor, Dr. Gessler. The truth, now all too patent, is that Germany never disarmed nor even intended to.

I must mention finally some minor inaccuracies and questionable assertions. In the very first page of his article Dr. Ludwig writes: "In his (Hitler's) home country, Bohemia, Bismarck was hated by most Austrians." "Bohemia" might be a slip of the pen for "Austria." In any case, it may be worth mentioning for the benefit of the innocent reader that Hitler, so far as is known, was born at Braunau-am-Inn, a town situated on the Austrian side of the river Inn at almost exactly the point where that river leaves Bavaria to enter into Austrian territory. This is about 100 kilometers as the crow flies from the nearest point on Bohemian territory. There is, to my knowledge, no evidence of Hitler having been born on Bohemian territory. If there were any, the point would be of psychological significance, as the Germans of Bohemia have long counted in their midst the most fanatical and narrow-minded Pan-German *têtes carrées*. Not less questionable is Dr. Ludwig's attempt to explain Hitler's anti-Semitism by the use he is supposed to have made, during his Vienna period, of Jewish institutions of charity. This explanation by ingratitude looks like an over-simplification. Konrad Heiden's biography of Hitler—the most authoritative, but certainly not the friendliest of its kind, written as it is by an anti-Nazi—is silent on this point.† In his chapter "Early on the Rocks" (p. 14 of the English edition), Heiden merely says that Hitler lived for three years in a men's hostel at Brigittenau, a Vienna suburb East of the Danube. It is difficult to imagine that Heiden would have missed this easy score had there been any reliable evidence. Not that I hold a brief for Adolf Hitler, but facts are facts and suppositions—suppositions.

Whether "Bismarck's creation will remain as a natural part of a greater community"—the future United States of Europe—as Dr. Ludwig asserts, only time will show. Some people feel that at the end of this war there may be "*Kein Reich, kein Volk, kein Fuehrer*."

* Recently published in English in *Gollancz in German Wonderland*, by Curt Geyer and Walter Loeb, Hutchinson, London, 1942, which throws further light on these well-intentioned men.

† Hitler. A Biography. By Konrad Heiden. Second Impression. Constable & Co., London, 1936. I was unable to consult the German original.

THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

THE importance attached to the Solomon Islands both by the Japanese and by the Allies is evidenced by the scale and pertinacity of the campaign for the possession of those islands. In the recent attack in mid-October the enemy have brought some of their heavy ships into that area in spite of the risk they run in the neighbourhood of shore based aircraft and submarines. The reason for this is plain. Japanese strategy has been founded on the principle of securing positions for their naval forces and advancing from one position to another step by step with each foothold well secured. By that means, consistently pursued, the line of communications from Japan to the outermost zones of the theatre in which their ambitions lie is secured by bases at short intervals apart, and this has a particular importance in enabling the short ranged fighter aircraft to reach whatever point in the theatre their services may be required.

The whole matter had been thought out with all that meticulous attention both to the main course of strategy and to the details which the Japanese apply to all their plans for war. Their active preparations began over a year before they openly threw their lot in with the Axis and made their attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbour. With expansion to the southward and the ultimate conquest of Australia as their settled policy they began by making sure of the use of Indo-China as an advanced base. The fall of France and the complete submission of Laval and the Vichy gang to Berlin afforded the opportunity to establish themselves in that country without the need of firing a shot and to put some 70,000 troops and their whole equipment into Indo-China as well as to collect the shipping which would be needed for a continuation of the movement against Malaya. All the possible dangers and delays which would have been experienced if they had to move from their previous most advanced position, Formosa, were thus overcome—all but one: the intervention of the American fleet. That intervention was, as we saw guarded against by the combined use of diplomacy, employed to cover the attack by a pretence that the difficulties and differences were open to solution by the honourable means of discussion, and the attack itself without warning or declaration of war. Thus secured against the great danger of a powerful enemy sea force they could safely move their armies across the short spaces of water. Malaya fell from want of sea power upon which the whole system of its defence had depended, and from Singapore the armies passed in safety along the chain of islands reaching New Guinea and New Ireland, where they established themselves in the old German base at Rabaul which had always been a bugbear to Australia as the New Hebrides had been fifty years ago

when the French were actively getting a footing in those islands. If Australia was to be conquered or if, less than conquest, she was to be prevented from being the departure point of a counter-attack with the recovery of the conquered islands as its object, she must be cut off from the support of the United States. The precise objective of the Japanese in that movement which was halted by the defeat of their expedition in the battle of the Coral Sea (May 5-9) is not yet clear; it may have been the Australian mainland or, more probably, New Caledonia, but it is clear that if they were effectively to interrupt the communications between Australia and the United States which are vital to the whole Pacific situation they must extend their chain of bases further eastward. The essential stepping stones needed for this were the Solomon Islands, the New Hebrides and New Caledonia.

If this was clear to the Japanese it was no less clear to the United States. This resumption of the drive to the east must be halted at all costs, and the bold and hazardous step was taken of sending an expeditionary force to recapture the Solomons and secure for the Allies the admirable position at Guadalcanar where anchorage for ships and aerodromes for their aircraft were to be had. The American squadron had a task of the greatest difficulty to perform. It must preserve secrecy up to the latest possible moment and when that secrecy was broken at the beaches it must protect the large body of transport ships against attack from the sea and the air. There is no position in which a naval commander less likes to find himself than that in which he has at the same time to fight a fleet engagement and protect a body of shipping carrying troops. In such a position he is at a marked tactical disadvantage; but this was unavoidable in the pressing circumstances of the strategical situation. Time could not be lost. The surprise was effected but a powerful Japanese squadron, of what strength we do not as yet know, swept down from the north and a night action followed. A night action is very much a matter of luck and the attacker is at a great advantage. Though the troops were successfully landed the squadron suffered the severe losses the full tale of which has only been revealed by the Navy Department during the last few days. Three heavy American cruisers were sunk and, as we had already heard, the Australian heavy cruiser *Canberra*. It was a bad blow—there is no concealing that. It threatened the security of the troops that had been landed. Their powers of holding their own, let alone their prospects of ejecting the Japanese from the island, were badly compromised, for those depend upon whether supplies and reinforcements can reach them in time and on whether the enemy can be prevented from reinforcing and supplying his own land forces. Several attempts by the enemy to land more men were interrupted and some, it appears, definitely defeated; but with so great a choice as the stretch of coast affords of landing places it could not be possible, without a command of the sea, to prevent landings being effected. At the time of writing it is reported that another considerable Japanese force has been put ashore and that the fighting is intensely severe.

Though the Japanese have suffered the loss of several ships of the cruiser and destroyer classes and the disablement of more their position at sea is very strong. The weakest point is in the lines of supply, and their supply, like our own, depends in the long run upon shipping. The American submarines are reported to be taking a respectable toll of the Japanese shipping and there is no reason to suppose that they will not be as successful in this branch of the war at sea as the Axis have been against ourselves. Success in these operations in the Pacific would have the double effect of reducing the shipping available for the transport of troops and supplies and of forcing the Japanese to allocate to its defence, as we have had to allocate to ours a large number of small craft, among them destroyers, which are important units of the fighting squadrons in the island campaign. Replacement is a more difficult business for the enemy, who do not possess either the raw materials or the ship-building facilities of the Allies. Japan has a numerous flotilla but it is not unlimited. The Japanese have shown a high capability in co-ordinating all the arms of their navy—cruisers, destroyers and aircraft; they have enjoyed the benefits of an undivided navy as they did not commit the error into which we were driven of separating their air forces from their navy, and they owe much of their success to the correctness of their judgment in this matter as well as to our own mistake.

One might summarize Japan's grand strategy with fair accuracy in these terms: her diplomacy paved the way in the period of preparation, enabling her to acquire without expenditure of even a rifle shot, the advanced positions she needed in Indo-China and, following that in deceiving the now united nations by her pretences of a will to negotiate; and under the cover of the conversations in Washington delivering her attack without warning or a declaration of war. The function of the army was then to assist the navy to establish the command at sea, by securing for it the bases it required. The control of the lines of passage of the army was undisputed, or opposed only by the weak forces available in those waters. So the army moved, in security and undelayed, from position to position until it met its first serious check in the Coral Sea. Now it falls to the navy to enable the army in the Solomons to eject the American forces. Its object is to ensure the landing of reinforcements and supplies and intercepting those of the enemy.

The battle for the Solomons is, beyond doubt, of first-rate importance. The loss of that position by the Allies would expose the New Hebrides, where they have a base at Espiritu Santo, New Caledonia and Fiji to attack and the loss of those positions would prejudice the line of communications by which the needs of Australia are provided. Its retention is essential for the opening of the offensive against the long chain of enemy bases and the sea and land forces they support. The campaign of reconquest and of driving back the Japanese to the place from which they came is thus bound up with the battle that is now being fought.

GERMAN DEFENSIVE PROSPECTS

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

LAST month I advanced the view that Japan is now strategically on the defensive, and that her main concern is to retain and exploit the territories she has occupied, while at the same time taking all necessary measures to assure the security of her home base. Is not Germany approaching, if she has not already reached, the same position? Has she now any hope of inflicting a decisive defeat on the Allies? She has failed again to defeat Russia decisively, and though Russian offensive potentiality is undoubtedly reduced it still remains formidable while the strength of Britain and America not only is unimpaired but is steadily growing. Should Germany decide to adhere to an offensive policy, are there any courses open to her which would not entail the risk of disastrous defeat, or, at least accelerate the attrition of her resources and try her to the point of exhaustion. She might renew her attempts to knock Russia out of the ring, but the results of this year's campaign, successful as, up to a point, it has been, are not reassuring. The price paid has been very high. America remains out of her reach. Invasion of Britain, rearmed and reinforced by American troops, must be more than ever impracticable as a decisive operation. U-boat operations, though they have had great successes, seem less than ever likely to bring about a decision now that ship replacement is fairly in its stride. The U-boat is becoming a defensive instrument counter-attacking to limit the mobility of the allies and thereby reducing their offensive power. An attack on the allied position in the Middle East has become increasingly difficult. From the west, owing to the nature of the country and the difficulties on the lines of communication, an attack must necessarily be limited in strength, and it would be met by a defence which has become stronger and could be further reinforced. An attack from the east, even if delivered simultaneously with one from the west, would encounter equal or even greater difficulties. The risk of disaster to a force advancing from that direction and depending on an immensely long and inadequate line of communication would be great. For in case of failure, air power, formidable in attack and pursuit, could give little support to a retreating army. At the best a successful attack on the Allies in the Middle East would not mean their decisive defeat. There remains the possibility of delivering an air attack on Britain on a maximum scale. Experience up to date gives little cause to believe that it would be decisive, though its destructive effects would certainly be great. In any case it could probably be delivered in greatest strength and under the most favourable conditions of concentration if it were combined with a defensive policy on land.

Continuance of an offensive policy with the view to obtaining a clear-cut victory certainly would seem to offer few prospects of success to Germany. How would she stand if she adopted a defensive attitude, facing the dangers of a prolonged war in the hopes of securing an inconclusive peace which would not involve the renunciation of her conquests?

It must, I think be admitted that her position is undoubtedly strong, though with elements of weakness. Both require consideration, and it would be certainly unwise to assume that because German mentality has a predilection for offensive action the German General Staff has not studied the problems of defence in all their aspects. German armies, we have learnt, can fight as courageously, and as well organized in defence as in attack.

The great strategic advantage for defence that Germany possesses is of course her central position, with good communications by which her forces can be moved to threatened points; and her forces, though numerically inferior to those of her enemy, are sufficiently large to meet many calls. The Allies, with the exception of Russia, on the other hand depend on sea communications, and even with adequate supplies of shipping can only deploy their armies slowly and at a limited number of points, assuming that they could overcome the resistance of Germany's outer defences. They thereby lose much of the advantage numerically superior forces acting on exterior lines normally possess if they maintain steady unrelenting pressure at a number of points. The exception of Russia is of course of immense importance, for as long as Russia retains offensive power a large proportion of Germany's resources would be permanently tied to the eastern front; though by no means as great a proportion as was required for offensive purposes. Furthermore, a large part of that front has already been organized for defence which would greatly facilitate a rapid change of strategic policy.

As regards her western front, where seaborne attack alone is possible, Germany's position is undoubtedly strong. Although the front is of great length it has been strongly fortified, and the points at which attack in strength could be made are not numerous. Its liability to be raided by small forces necessitates the employment of considerable numbers in the fortified outpost line on the coast, but its real strength lies in the facilities for concentrating reserves to meet any serious attack—including air reserves, which it must be assumed would be much stronger than at present if Germany were everywhere on the defensive. The allied air arm might cause some interference with the movement of reserves, but so far in this war the inability of air attack to check large troop movements has been surprising.

On the whole it cannot be denied that on the western front Germany has a strong defensive position so far as land operations are concerned, and could probably allot adequate numbers to hold it effectively. For air defence or air counter-attack she is geographically favoured, although the invader could exploit numerical superiority, up to a limited range, infinitely more rapidly than in the case of land forces. Since any Allied invasion of Western Europe

must be seaborne Germany's power of defence must depend largely on her ability to interfere with the Allies' sea communications, and that obviously is so great that it constitutes the most important advantage she possesses. U-boat and long-range air attack have we know taken a heavy toll on shipping, the effects of which have been all the more felt owing to the demands made on shipping by the Japanese war and other distant commitments of the Allies. But even if that form of counter-attack were brought under control and the Navy could guarantee the passage of transports against underwater or surface attack, there would still remain the danger of air attack and the fire of coastal batteries. In the prolonged operations of landing large forces, their supplies and equipment, losses of vessels and the stores they carried would be bound to reach startling figures and add greatly to the time needed to deploy an invading army, and to the difficulty of maintaining it when deployed. One must, I think, conclude that, if Germany could disentangle herself from her offensive operations in Russia and adopt a defensive attitude there, the prospects of opening a second front in Western Europe would not be encouraging—obviously nothing like so good as while Germany has to concentrate the bulk of her armies and air power for offensive operations in the east.

If that were all Germany might be justified in boasting of her ability to avoid defeat and to hold what she has conquered for an indefinite period. But is her position really so secure? Have conquests enabled her to withstand the effects of blockade in a defensive war of long duration, or is it necessary for her to extend her conquests still further to make her economic position more secure? So far, by drawing on accumulated reserves and on the loot of conquered territory, she has, though she has had to tighten her belt and to reduce the conquered peoples to the verge of starvation, been able to meet the wastage of offensive campaigns, but obviously these must be failing sources of supply; and there are limits to which she can allow starvation of the conquered peoples to go, if the productivity of their territory is to be maintained. Even with the economies that might be effected in a defensive war she must develop the resources of the conquered territories if she is to resist the pressure of the blockade—particularly the great areas of Russia that she occupies must be made to produce. Can that be done without the machinery and oil and the population which it needs? Rumanian, synthetic and looted oil have so far kept the German war machine going, but will they suffice to meet as well economic needs? Will it not therefore be necessary for Germany to obtain possession of Trans-Caucasian oil before she can make her economic defence against blockade anything like complete? And that would be one factor compelling her to continue offensive operations in the east.

Apart from that have Germany's victories in Russia been sufficiently decisive to enable her to adopt a defensive attitude there? It is evident that she has not reduced the offensive capacity of the Red Army and Air Force to

anything like the extent she had hoped. By effecting an immense concentration of the *Luftwaffe* she achieved local superiority in the air for her offensive campaign, but only by sacrificing her air position in the west. But if she transferred the bulk of the *Luftwaffe* to the west for defensive purposes and reprisal counter-attacks Russia, with the assistance of the Allies, could soon attain a dominating position in the air to an extent that, with the recuperation of the Red Army, might make her defensive position precarious. Only by continuing successful offensive operation could she hope to prevent a rapid recuperation of Russia's offensive power, especially in the air, and that would imply a weakening of her western front and continued acceptance there of inferiority in air.

To sum up:—Should Germany attempt to adopt a defensive policy, strong as her position in many respects would be, she would have to face a long war under the pressure of blockade, with her reserve resources depleted and with many difficulties limiting the development of the resources of the conquered countries. She might escape the danger of war on two fronts on land, but could not escape war on two fronts in the air. She could not without offensive operations prevent the recuperation of Russia's offensive strength.

Added to that there would almost certainly be a loss of morale in her army during long periods of inactivity, especially among troops holding down occupied territories. Although by adopting a defensive attitude economies might be effected which would to some extent compensate for destruction caused by air attacks, the morale of the civil population, suffering from bombing and other hardships and without the encouragement of sensational victories, would certainly deteriorate. The general lowering of morale might in fact become the most serious consequence of a defensive policy.

Germany, taking warning from Ludendorff's fate, may fall back on the defensive in preference to attempting a gambler's coup, but certainly she cannot conduct a passive defence.

THE CASE FOR FRENCH

BY D. W. BROGAN

IN the September FORTNIGHTLY Professor Allison Peers, under the title *The Tyranny of French*, attacked the quasi-monopoly which that language now has in our school system. He raised other questions too; he complained, with justice, of the inadequate provision for the teaching of modern languages in our universities and of the neglect of the scientific study of modern societies, a study naturally, though not inevitably, associated with linguistic studies.

The position of French in the English secondary system is due, first of all, to its replacing Greek and later, and not so completely, Latin in the standard curriculum. It has become the standard second language as Greek used to be. And its position is now endangered because of the very mixed reasons why a knowledge of French became in the late seventeenth century what a knowledge of Latin had long been, a mark of the educated man. Some of those reasons are now obsolete; some are not.

French, in the two centuries between the Peace of Ryswick and the first Battle of Sedan, was the language of what was thought to be, and, for long was in fact, the most powerful European state. More educated people, more people in the movement of the age, spoke French as a native language than spoke German or Russian and many more spoke French than spoke English, Spanish or Italian. In French, the great conflicts of the flesh and the spirit were carried on. It was the second language of Frederick the Great, Catherine the Great, Gibbon, Grimm, Alfieri. It would be hard to name an eminent Englishman of the eighteenth century who could not read French and some, like Charles James Fox, spoke it admirably. French was then a necessity. But it was also a luxury. Paris was the centre of more than intellectual fashions and this left its trace on the language of diplomacy, war, cookery and fashion as early Italian pre-eminence in music left its trace in the language of that art. We still write *hors d'oeuvres* for the same kind of reason that we write *andante cantabile*.

The political, economic and numerical reasons for the pre-eminence of French are gone. France is a conquered country and may never be a great world power again; France is relatively a poor country; and French is spoken by far fewer people than speak any of the great European languages, except Italian. French may preserve and, probably, will preserve for a time, the kind of snob appeal that pleases head waiters and smart dressmakers, but the kind of French that astonishes the waiter or impresses the mannequin

can be acquired in ten easy lessons. There is no reason for wasting school time in such frivolities. So far, the case against its old predominance can be considered made. But the real case for French remains and it is the same as the original case for Greek in the fifteenth century. French is a language whose acquisition immensely broadens the cultural outlook of the English boy and girl. Other languages could do this too, but not so well or so easily. And French is taught in schools mainly in order that our educated classes should learn to read one foreign language.

Professor Peers would contest this thesis for several weighty reasons, but he has also taken time to advance some reasons that are so frivolous that one is tempted, at first, to mutter a tag from one of his preferred romance languages and content oneself with a *non ragionam di lor*. There is for instance, the strangely unworldly assertion that few "ever travelled in France from choice compared with those who went to Switzerland and Italy." Professor Peers conjures up a vision of a tourist industry in France dependent on "school-parties and penniless undergraduates," on whose meagre surplus, the inn-keepers of Juan les Pins and of Le Touquet eked out a narrow livelihood, while the rich, the cultured, the sophisticated, crowded Sienna and Lucerne. In fact, in the last twenty years, the tourist attractions of France have been far more widely appreciated than ever before in history and the Lido and Saint Mark's both fought vain battles against the equally potent but snob appeals of French plagues and French Gothic and Romanesque cathedrals. As for Switzerland, who that could afford it ever visited that once fashionable country except belated Victorians, winter sports addicts, mountaineers, tuberculous patients or pilgrims to Geneva? And only the last class needed any linguistic equipment and, in their case, the best equipment was French! Another argument tells against teaching modern languages at all. If with all the prestige of French, with all the advantages of experienced teachers, preponderance of university chairs and other academic advantages, so bad a job is made of teaching French as Professor Peers asserts, why should we expect better results from the teaching of languages like Italian, Russian, Spanish for whose study such inadequate provision is now made? It may be that a speaking smattering of German is more easily acquired than a speaking smattering of French, but a competent reading knowledge of German is less easily acquired. So unless we assume that the aim of linguistic teaching in schools is a speaking knowledge of the language, we are back where we were. Boys and girls will learn to speak a foreign tongue if they are made to aim at that seriously. And it may be that more attention should be paid to spoken French or spoken German, but that is another story. Before we abandon French on these grounds, we should have to have proof that by some miracle, the stout English refusal to make a fool of oneself speaking a foreign tongue is going to be changed into a German or Polish willingness to learn by speaking, merely by making the victim language Italian or Russian.

That the old predominance of French is gone and that it is no longer a

lingua franca must be admitted. But it has to a great and probably increasing degree been replaced in that rôle by English (or American) and a little attention to clear enunciation, some elementary grounding in phonetics, would be a better investment of the time of the mythical strayed reveller in Stockholm, Shanghai or even Buenos Aires than any other European language other than that of the country concerned.

The argument with which Professor Peers concludes his article is of a kind that it would be a *meiosis* to describe as "tactless." If it was silly of the educationist of the last war to base the claims of French on the great rôle of the French in the alliance against Germany, it is surely rash of a champion of Italian, German and Spanish to stress the fact that many Frenchmen in the summer of 1940 (like many Americans, Russians and others) thought that the British chicken's neck was about to be wrung. For the Italian and German Governments were the self-appointed wringers and the Spanish Government a benevolent onlooker while the operation was attempted. I do not forget that nations are not always fairly represented by their governments, but Professor Peers seems to have done so. This acrid partisanship is his contribution to the debate, not mine, and if it has any value it pleads for Russian, Chinese, Modern Greek and, above all, English, the language of the chicken.

With another of Professor Peers's reforms I am in great sympathy. We do need, and need badly, more thorough, objective and understanding studies of contemporary societies and cultures. But, as Professor Peers would probably agree, it is not the job of modern language schools in the universities *as their duties are at present interpreted*, to train such students or to promote such studies. Time spent on Marie de France or Walther von der Vogelweide is, of course, not time wasted from a general cultural point of view. But it is not an immediate help to the student of contemporary France or Germany. It is not, I think, accidental that the most profound French student of modern English society, Elie Halévy, was a philosopher by professional training. It is, at any rate, worth noting that although French is much less widely and thoroughly taught in American schools than in English Schools, serious academic study of modern French history and political and economic organization is much further advanced in America than it is here. We should have more and better understanding of our neighbours if modern language schools made it one of their primary jobs to study the contemporary life of the culture which they are also studying from a linguistic and literary point of view. And if the production of such experts is a primary university job, (as it is) the most important societies to study and languages to master, are Russian and American. Spanish and Portuguese are runners-up but at a great distance and their importance is due to the existence of Latin America, not to the intrinsic importance of Spain or Portugal.

I shall try to give reasons, later on, why the quasi-monopoly of French is, in fact, a good thing in itself, but even were this not so, the fact that nearly

all the "educated classes" in Britain have been taught the same foreign language (although some have been taught others as well) is a matter for rejoicing. It would be a matter for rejoicing even had the language been German or Italian. For such a monopoly has the happy result of giving our educated classes a *common* foreign culture or the minimum linguistic means of attaining it. Thus after reflection, I find that only one of my friends and acquaintances who can read any foreign tongue cannot read French. Even were a knowledge of French less intrinsically rewarding, this unity in our educational system would be a good thing. It was a weakness of the French educational system that it did not, in fact, provide that common background so that, lycées on the eastern side of the country studied German, lycées in the central part studied English and on the south-east and south-west, there was a tendency to study Italian or Spanish. The gains that come from a knowledge of the current discussions of problems in another tongue are greatly increased if the whole of the educated classes have a reading knowledge of the same foreign tongue, provided that language is rich enough in its current production to cover adequately most aspects of contemporary life. We have got this desirable unity; why should we throw it away, however much we may encourage the study of more than one foreign language?

For all that we can do for the school-boy or school-girl is to give him one or more linguistic tool with whose aid he can enrich his own native culture. The study of language as such is to be commended. But that is an argument for a little instruction in the character of really different languages like Chinese, Hebrew or Turkish, not for stress on more or less inflection, more or less elaborate systems of Aryan verbs. There will be, in every thousand school-boys, a few natural linguists as there will be a few natural mathematicians. But the natural linguist like the natural mathematician will look after himself. The average boy will be content—and should be content—if he is taught to read one or more foreign languages well and so has been given access to a culture different from his own *and* intrinsically interesting and valuable. A reading knowledge of any of the great European tongues will serve this end but not all serve it equally well and none serves it as well as French does. The most serious rival to French is, in fact, German. But German has never really caught on as more than a useful tool, because German literature is more voluminous than interesting. I base this view on the candid admissions of friends of mine whose German is excellent and who very seldom read any German except for immediately utilitarian purposes. The prestige of German literature is lower to-day (with no blame imputable to Hitler) than it was a century ago. Only Rilke has won the serious attention of our own critics and poets. In any case, Professor Peers's real case is not for more German, but for some Spanish and Italian in the schools.

Professor Peers asserts that "there are many who would not hesitate to place either Spanish or Italian literature above French." It would be more impressive to have the names of the many and to find among them scholars,

poets, critics, who are neither Italians nor Spaniards nor teachers of those languages. For it is not the bias of the Board of Education that accounts for the demand for *translations* of French books and not translations of the French equivalents of Ibanez or Feuchtwanger, but a complete war-time edition of Proust. It is not the memory of what subjects they took for school certificate that caused so many readers of the *New Statesman* to badger Mr. Raymond Mortimer for a glimpse of the new poems of M. Louis Aragon or leads thousands to pay real money for *La France Libre* or a review like *Sur* to publish *Lettres Françaises* in Buenos Aires. It is genuine interest in French literature which is a tribute to the skill with which Professor Peers's villains, the teachers of French in our schools, have done their job. And it is an even greater tribute to the variety and attractiveness of French literature which has not, for three hundred years, known any of those long periods of occultation that mark the literary history of Spain, Italy and Germany. I cannot speak for Spain, but the translation-filled bookshops of Italy were not only a tribute to Italian broadmindedness but to the comparative meagreness of Italian literary output. And what is true of literature is still more true of knowledge. In what branch of learning is it more important or as important to know Spanish or Italian as it is to know French? Perhaps an economist would be better employed in learning Italian, but he would be still better employed in learning Swedish. And, as we do not know what a schoolboy is going to find professionally useful, we must choose his language for him on general cultural grounds. That is why we should choose French. It is a key to French literature, but it is also a key to French culture and a more complete key than most languages are to the cultures of the peoples who speak them.

In one sense, the culture of a nation or a society is all the manifestations of its power of expressing its personality or adapting its natural resources to its needs. But here culture is taken more narrowly, as covering the conscious arts; this culture is a key, often the only key, to the wider culture or civilization of which it is the artistic or intellectual expression.

Inside a national culture of this narrower type, one art or skill may be predominant, either by influencing all the other arts or skills or simply by being the thing that the nation and its neighbours agree is done best or is best worth doing. And it is sometimes easy enough to determine what is the main contribution of a nation to the civilization of the world, or to determine that there is more than one such major contribution.

It is especially easy to do this in the case of France. France, like England and unlike Germany and Italy, is a country whose culture is predominantly literary. In the Middle Ages her greatest contribution to medieval culture was architecture; and it would be argued by some (but not by me) that her greatest nineteenth and twentieth century contribution has been painting. But like English, French culture is a literary culture. Italy is for most people more a home of the fine arts than of poets; Germany more the home of music

and philosophy than of prose writers. But France is the country of many books. The approach to French civilization from the literary side is imposed by the literary character of the culture itself. And it comes easily to the English boy or girl, because his culture is predominantly literary too. Indeed, it is in a way more literary than is the French culture. For what English Victorian age musicians or artists compare in interest or eminence (each in its own kind) with Debussy, Gounod or Bizet, with Delacroix, and Cézanne? Something is lost in studying French life purely from the literary side, more than is lost than in studying English life from that side, but far less than is lost in studying German culture and omitting Beethoven, Brahms, Wagner, Hegel, or in studying Leopardi, Carducci, D'Annunzio, Pirandello and neglecting Rossini, Verdi and Puccini.

A knowledge of French is not only a better instrument for the understanding of French culture than is a knowledge of German or Italian, but for an immediate political need of British society, it is as valuable as English (or American) and Russian. In the great debate which must follow the end of Hitlerism, much of the most valuable discussion will be carried on in French. This is not only because the French language is and has been for centuries, a model language of discussion, nor because in most departments of life, except perhaps in pure economics, the richness of the content of French discussion is worthy of the merits of the language. But in the reconstruction of Europe, the rôle of France as the greatest and most typical victim of Hitler, will make French discussions and French solutions, objects of passionate interest to the other victims. German, for obvious psychological reasons, will not be to the taste of the victims of Germany. And, more important, the German internal problem will absorb the energies of the German people. Their examination of conscience and, we must hope, repentance, will be of the greatest importance to Europe, but the German problem is a thing apart. Nor can we expect Europe to use Italian for its common tongue. Europe is, in fact, as likely to use English (in its American version) as any language. But even if this is so, there are enough experiences common to all the invaded countries and not shared by us or by the Americans, to make the Dutch or the Norwegians watch, with a sympathetic understanding, the French experiments. In the general and (apart from oral command of the language) efficient teaching of French in this country, we have an admirable common instrument of education, of great immediate political value and of permanent cultural value. To disrupt this existing, efficient and valuable educational system will be easy. But it will be much easier to lower the standard of French than to replace it by other modern languages, taught as well and, in themselves, as rewarding.

OCTOBER COMES

By EDMUND BLUNDEN

I HEARD the graybird bathing in the rill,
And fluttering his wings dry within thorn boughs
That all embowered the rill; with tiny bill
The robin on red-berried spray bade rouse
One whom I could not see, a field away;
I heard the passing girl to her young man say,
"O look, there's a buttercup"; for Autumn brought them still.

Upon my hand the fly so small that sight
Hardly could shape him settled, quested, flew;
Above me crowns of cloud and worlds of light
Moved with the minutes, and the season's blue,
Autumn's soft raiment, veiled some forms of dream
That I yet reverence; once more to my stream
The clear forget-me-not drew my eyes; the vole watched too.

He watched, and ate his chosen leaf; well-furred,
Well-fed he felt for water, winter, all.
Whoever else came by, midge, moth or bird,
The time was easy, nor did one leaf fall
From willow or elm that hour, though many glowed
With such wild flame as evening shot abroad
To warn that even this calm was not perpetual.

CONTEMPORARY PROSE FORMS

VI. THE DRAMA

By ERIC GILLET

MR. SHAW, like Ibsen, used the drama as a medium for ventilating all manner of topics which preoccupied his fertile and versatile mind. He wrote quick and lively dialogue. His prose is admirable, clear, striking and forthright. If he had thought as clearly as he wrote, Shaw might well have been the second English dramatist. Unfortunately, there is a vein of irresponsibility in him which sometimes finds expression in the memorable phrase. Often enough this is exceedingly effective but the impression has been created at the expense of truth and accuracy. No one will quarrel with Mr. Shaw for his habit of shocking apathetic English audiences into attention with paradox and quip, or with his determination to take a serious or important matter and use it as material for a play. His powers are so great that he can make, and has made, the most unlikely subjects productive of good entertainment. It might be said that all his characters seem to belong to some vast debating society and that they do not possess an independent life of their own when the session is over. He cannot submerge his personality in that of a character. It is always Shaw who speaks, and for the most part the Shavian characters are the puppets animated by one able showman, who imitates all their voices as well. As he grew older he became less interested in the construction of his plays and more concerned with the dissemination of his ideas. The talk flowed on and at times degenerated into garrulity so that audiences of his later plays have often prayed for a little action after an act of unrelieved debate.

When the first book of his plays was published in 1898, it was seen that the new dramatist, with his lengthy prefaces and picturesque and detailed stage directions, was the founder of a new school of dramatic literature. His approach to his medium was made with entire artistic reverence and tremendous gaiety and high spirits. Nothing was too difficult for him to attempt. Social problems, history, philosophy, fantasy, all came within his range, and all the time he was striving to get at the roots of things, to expose the causes of human failure and of human evils. He soon proved himself to be a master of satire.

In the later plays Mr. Shaw became increasingly preoccupied with what he wanted to discuss and not with what his characters were to do and say when they were on the stage. The stage became his forum or a debating

platform for the diversity of his ideas. As time went on, the Shaw plays had less to do with the theatre and more with the display of the author's amazing ingenuous dialectics. They became animated tracts.

It would be ungracious and ungrateful to end on this note. It is impossible to say yet how much the English stage and, indeed, the world's stage, owes to this writer. He blew away the Victorian cobwebs. He modernized the traffic of the theatre. He set men's minds to work on new lines. Apart from the tendency to wordiness which has been noted, Shaw's influence on the theatre has been all to the good.

Mr. Laurence Housman has earned fame for his play, *Victoria Regina*, which was fashioned from a series of short plays dealing with the life of the queen. Mr. Housman is at his best in the short episodic piece which has a religious or historical setting. He is at his happiest when his characters are real personages. Within these limits his achievement is notable, and he always writes with true literary distinction. His most important works are *Victoria Regina* (1934), *The Golden Sovereign* (1937), *Angels and Ministers* (1921), *Gracious Majesty* (1941) and *Little Plays of St. Francis* (1922; second series, 1931). The charming pierrot fantasy, *Prunella*, of 1906, written in collaboration with Granville Barker, has been persistently successful on the stage.

At the beginning of the century it looked as though Granville Barker would become the leading figure in the English theatre. His early plays, *The Voysey Inheritance* and *Waste*, which was banned, treated considerable social problems worthily. Some years afterwards he retired from the theatre and only his valuable *Prefaces to Shakespeare* (1928 and later) and some translations from the Spanish show that he has retained some of his interest in it.

It was in 1906 that *The Silver Box*, the first of John Galsworthy's many plays, saw the light. It made the point that there was one law for the rich, another for the poor. Galsworthy always had a sympathy for the underdog. He never tired of calling attention to abuses which needed abolishing or to conditions of life which called for radical alteration. To see or read *Strife* or *Justice* to-day is to recall with surprise that when they first appeared they were considered to be strictly impartial statements of the cases which the author presented in them. Galsworthy's later plays, such as *The Skin Game* and *Loyalties* both of which achieved immense popular successes, were written with considerable knowledge of the theatre and with less of a desire to be a protagonist.

There is no doubt that Galsworthy always wrote with a fine sincerity. It is equally certain that he often deceived himself and was a victim of that sentimentality which was perceptible in the earlier plays and often took charge of the writer in his later ones. Galsworthy had no remedies for the troubles of life in the twentieth century except understanding, patience and mercy. All human institutions, he felt, are the better for an infusion of the personal element. He had no sympathy for the complex mechanism of civilization unless it functioned with sympathy and tact so that the least of human

creatures should not be wounded or crushed by it. He maintained that men and women in the mass are usually cruel and stupid. In effect, all Galsworthy's plays are a plea for greater gentleness and for the making of allowances. He would always give the benefit of the doubt but, as he showed in *The Pigeon*, one can make any amount of concessions to people who are unworthy of them and the poor, misguided creatures will snatch any advantage they can. And who can blame them, he seems to add, when things are so utterly hopeless for them? Galsworthy was the mouthpiece of the world's unfortunates but neither he nor they seem able to explain how they are to be made happier.

J. M. Barrie, who, like Galsworthy, was a member of the Order of Merit, was in his way as original a dramatic writer as Mr. Shaw. A Scottish peasant by birth, he won his way to a university education at Edinburgh and passed by way of journalism in Nottingham and Fleet Street to his full career as a playwright and novelist. He satisfied a certain demand, which he did much to create, in the theatre of his day. The surface of his plays was garnished with a wistful humour, sometimes pawky, which lifted life right out of its normal colouring and made it rainbow-hued. As Mr. Denis Mackail showed in his *Story of J.M.B.* there was far more in Barrie than the escapist and wishful thinker, though it was largely through these qualities that he became so widely popular. There was a vein of hardness, almost of cruelty, which found expression in a few of his least-known plays. This was as much a part of the man as was the more attractive side of his genius. *Quality Street* an early 19th-century comedy, sentimental in the manner of *Cranford*, and tinged with great charm and humour, shows the author's remarkable knowledge of stage technique. *The Admiral Crichton* is one of Barrie's very best plays. The theme is treated with supreme tact and a mastery of presentation which does not fail until the last act. Two first-class one-act plays, *The Twelve-Pound Look* and *Rosalind* showed Barrie's mastery in this form and gave full play to the exquisite talent for light comedy of Dame Irene Vanbrugh. *Dear Brutus* is a sentimental but beautifully imagined story of lost opportunities. The last play, *The Boy David*, a version of the Biblical story, is uneven, but in places very moving. It was not successful. Barrie's greatest stage triumph is unquestionably *Peter Pan*. In this piece Barrie achieved the extraordinary feat of adding a character to fairy mythology in the twentieth century. *Peter Pan* is a real play for children, to whom the central figure is now as familiar a friend as Lewis Carroll's "Alice".

It is too early to say yet how far Barrie's work is lasting. At the moment there is a reaction against whimsical humour and so his plays are temporarily under a cloud, always with the exception of *Peter Pan*, and in some nurseries he may be regarded as too delicate a creation for tough contemporary youth. Barrie's achievement rebels against classification, but it has made its mark in the theatre and, with the possible exception of Mr. A. A. Milne, no author who has attempted to imitate Barrie has emerged unscathed from the ordeal.

To turn from Barrie to Mr. William Somerset Maugham is to drop from

the realm of fantasy to the hard earth. A highly successful and accomplished commercial playwright with a great talent for writing effective dialogue which is both witty and satirical, Mr. Maugham has written three plays which have both literary and dramatic merit. They have also affinities with Restoration comedy, displaying a glittering façade and an almost entire lack of feeling. These plays are *Our Betters*, *The Constant Wife* and *The Circle*, and they are his most convincing work.

Mention must be made of the dramatists who worked for Miss Horniman during her eventful tenancy of the Gaiety Theatre, Manchester. It lasted from 1908 to 1921. The greatest publicity for Miss Horniman's work was obtained when a young Manchester man, Stanley Houghton, wrote *Hindle Wakes* in 1912. This attracted attention because it dealt with the unusual situation of a mill-girl who refused marriage with a prosperous man, because she thought that as a partner for life he would be thoroughly unsatisfactory, though he might pass muster as her companion during a holiday week at Blackpool. Magnificently acted by a cast which made the most of the Lancashire dialect, it created a stir out of all proportion to its merits. Two other Lancashire plays, *The Younger Generation* and *The Dear Departed*, were also freshly written and unconventional for their period. Houghton's untimely death robbed literature of an interesting figure who undoubtedly possessed unrealized possibilities.

Harold Brighouse knew the Lancashire scene and people as well as Houghton did, but after writing *Hobson's Choice*, an entertaining play, he seemed to lose interest in the theatre, and turned his attention to other literary forms. Probably the most considerable of Miss Horniman's dramatists was Allan Monkhouse. Beginning life in a Manchester warehouse, he was taken on the staff of the *Manchester Guardian* as a commercial expert. In due course his flair for honest and discriminating literary criticism became widely recognized, and later he made a small reputation as novelist and playwright. He was prevented from obtaining wider recognition because of the austerity and over-economy of expression which characterized all his work. Of his plays the three best are *Mary Broome*, *The Education of Mr. Surrage* and *The Conquering Hero*.

Among the pieces which were given admirable performance by Miss Horniman's company, Mr. John Masefield's *Tragedy of Nan* takes a high place. It is less popular now when a deliberately poetical treatment of a theme is out of fashion. Written in prose, with a poetical purpose evident in every line of it, the *Tragedy of Nan* clothes a sordid story of the Severnside with a literary importance which the theme is hardly strong enough or suitable for carrying. *The Tragedy of Pompey the Great*, also written in prose, is a worthy treatment of one of the great events of history, which suffers a little from the author's delight in the short, direct sentence. In itself this is an obvious virtue, but Masefield has indulged in it so freely that the general effect of the play is mannered. It deserves revival. Masefield's later plays are

experiments which have often only received private performance. He deserves well of the theatre because his contributions to it are always characterized by a thoughtful sincerity to which is added a tireless desire for sane experiment and sensible innovation. Numerous very young and very serious writers for the theatre would benefit by a study of Masefield's dramatic work. Its accomplishment and versatility deserve praise and notice.

Another poet, John Drinkwater, made an outstanding success with his chronicle piece, *Abraham Lincoln*, which probably attracted such international interest because it is a play about a great American written by an Englishman. Drinkwater treated his subject soberly and competently. He was a man of the theatre and he avoided all the dangerous pitfalls, except in the rather platitudinous verses which were spoken by the chorus. *Abraham Lincoln* is an honest piece of homespun and no other play by Drinkwater met with similar success. A short war play in verse, *X—O*, has real beauty and is effective on the stage.

Drinkwater was closely allied with Sir Barry Jackson in his excellent work at the Birmingham Repertory Theatre, but no Midland school of dramatists sprang up round it, and Arnold Bennett never brought the Staffordshire people of his novels on to the stage.

As a dramatist, Mr. J. B. Priestley won tremendous popularity with the stage version of *The Good Companions*, with which he was helped by Mr. Knoblock. Immediately afterwards he wrote his first play unassisted, *Dangerous Corner* in 1932, which is technically fascinating and flawless as a completely satisfying dramatic experiment. It has something in common with the "second chance" of Barrie's *Dear Brutus*, but the author's handling is entirely his own and the characterization is very able. *Eden End* has a North-country setting and some effective examples of dramatic portraiture. Flirting with J. W. Dunne's theories, Mr. Priestley has written several plays inspired by "time" themes. The best of these is *I Have Been Here Before*. His most ambitious play, *Johnson Over Jordan*, a modern pilgrim's progress, overweighted the writer, but it is deeply moving and has moments of true beauty. In it Mr. Priestley showed that he has the mind of a poet, without a poet's powers of expression.

Mr. Noel Coward has an all-round talent for the theatre without compare and he is also an indefatigable experimentalist. After his immensely promising and amusing play, *The Young Idea*, he wrote nothing of literary importance for some years. His deeply felt war play, *Post Mortem* has never been performed. *Cavalcade* is a remarkable panorama of English life in the first twenty years of the century. *Blithe Spirit* is a brilliant farce, which is by far the most polished piece of work he has done. Dealing with death and spiritualism, he manages to do so with such adroitness that he gives no offence and contrives situations at times so richly comic that they will stand comparison with those in *The Importance of Being Earnest*. The disciplined powers that he shows in this play may well foretell a richly fruitful phrase

of his maturity. Of his other light pieces, *Hay Fever* is the most satisfactory.

Until very recently, the intellectuals have not bothered themselves with the theatre. Mr. Aldous Huxley wrote one promising play, *The World of Light* in 1931, but since then he has not ventured into dramatic composition. It remained for Mr. T. S. Eliot to win a public for his *Murder in the Cathedral* in 1935. Written for performance at the Canterbury Festival, this play, which Mr. George Sampson has rightly called a "modern exercise in the medieval manner," strangely lacks passion and deep feeling. The verse is arid but sincere. The story of Thomas à Becket had appealed to Tennyson, and it was found to have lost none of its compelling power when Eliot dressed it once again. Eliot's other plays, which, like his poems, seem to be exercises in proving to the author's satisfaction that almost any theme or blend of themes could be made to suit his poetico-dramatic approach, have not succeeded in proving this to the critics or the public. Some of the young writers who are his disciples have worked on the same lines, and two of them, Messrs. W. H. Auden and Christopher Isherwood, working as collaborators, have written in *The Ascent of F.6*, a play in verse and prose which is a real achievement, a highly satirical survey of bogus modern values and the abuse of publicity. It comes to grief completely in the last act, where the authors seem to have lost their sense of direction, but they may yet do great things for the theatre, if only they will discard obscure symbolism and wilful eccentricity.

In a short survey it is clearly impossible to mention the numerous accomplished authors who have had plays produced during the present century, but mention must be made of some of the more important of them. Before the last war, Cicely Hamilton wrote on feminist questions with authority and some success. Later Mr. R. C. Sherriff in *Journey's End* and Mr. J. R. Ackerley in *Prisoners of War* gave us the two most effective war plays. "Clemence Dane" (Miss Winifred Ashton) showed in her powerful and able *A Bill of Divorcement* the misery that can be caused by lunacy in married life and the law was subsequently altered. Clifford Bax has written several historical plays of which the best are *Socrates* and *The Rose Without a Thorn*. There is more of permanence in these two dramas than in most of the work done by contemporary writers. They have beauty, poise and distinction in the writing. Rudolf Besier's *The Barretts of Wimpole Street* discussed the love affairs of the Brownings with dignity and sustained interest. Sutton Vanes *Outward Bound* handles death symbolically and with competent dramatic technique. In *French Without Tears* a very young writer, Terence Rattigan, showed that he could take a purely farcical situation and treat it with real dramatic accomplishment and gracious high spirits. Other dramatists who have done good work include Ashley Dukes, James Bridie, Reginald Berkeley, C. K. Munro, Halcott Glover, H. F. Rubinstein, Gordon Daviot, Ronald Mackenzie, John van Druten and Emyln Williams. The last two have shown in such plays as *Young Woodley* and *The Corn is Green* that they have an important contribution to make to the contemporary theatre and as both are

comparatively young men much more is to be hoped from them. James Bridie is an able and irritating writer, whose *Tobias and the Angel* is his one wholly satisfying play. With great powers of characterization and the ability to write effective dialogue, Bridie's most obvious weakness lies in his failure to develop a theme satisfactorily throughout a play.

It is too soon as yet to say much about a new kind of dramatic writing which has come to stay. Radio drama makes its appeal only to the ears. It is not always easy to distinguish between plays and "feature" programmes which often have a large element of drama in them. The three ablest exponents so far are Mr. Priestley, "Clemence Dane" and Mr. Louis MacNeice, and there are others who have memorable and moving work to their credit.

It seems inevitable that a war shall slow up the production of serious and important plays, but although no one would claim that we are living in one of the great periods of the theatre, the present era is full of hope and promise. There are able writers alive to-day who realize the essential demands which this form of writing makes, and who are not afraid to experiment freely and sensibly within it. The English theatre has been dying for a remarkably long time, according to the pessimists, and it is true that there are millions of young people who are cinema addicts and have never been inside a theatre. This competition is not in the least unhealthy. So far from discouraging managers, producers, writers and actors, it may well spur them on to fresh and more considerable efforts, and in those efforts lies the possibility of the future prosperity of English drama.

A VOYAGE TO NORTH UIST

BY RICHARD PERRY

THE *Loch Mor* lay silent and sleeping on this calm beautiful dawn, when we rowed out from the Isle of Skye and boarded her. Herring gulls standing on her stern-rail were the only waking passengers. We leant over the bows, drinking in the perfect peace of this anchorage in its mountain cradle; but just as the sun rose from behind the hills the ship's engines began to thud, and we cast off from the mainland of Scotland.

The wooded green bluffs of Skye faded into the morning mist. This was the fourth time that I had left her, and I was still bewitched by the music of her hills and glens. As we battled with the strong currents racing through the fifty-yard cut between the outlying skerries of Ramsay and South Rona, the clear piping cries of guillemot and razorbill chicks, carrying far over the calm waters of the Sound, brought nostalgic memories of the Isle of Puffins—four hundred miles to the south. And then for more than three hours we were steaming up the fantastic, god-hewn coast of Trotternish with its mighty columnar cliffs, whose vivid green headlands are crowned by the black rectangular sgrurs of the Quiraing. Towards the north of the Island a fulmar petrel planed athwart our bows, and groups of puffins came whirring and bounding over the waves. Away to the north-east the dim bluffs of Sutherland were merging into the horizon, to be replaced by the queer succession of humped skerries forming the Shiant Isles—home of a myriad puffins—which diminished in size in line astern as they receded towards Lewis of the "Long Island"—of Lewis and Harris, Boreray, North Uist, Benbecula and South Uist, Barra and Mingulay.

All this while the softly rounded hills of Harris—the unknown land—were looming nearer, and as we steamed closer I saw that they could in no wise be mistaken for those of Skye, for they were fashioned out of the bare, shiny, protruberant gneiss, which had not the luxuriant herbage of the Skye mountains nor yet their black sgrurs and fanged crowns. Holding to our course implacably, we steamed on and on, right up against this mountain barrier of naked cliffs. Suddenly we were through and in the hidden port of Tarbert: a spacious anchorage studded with skerries of the same bare rock, and landlocked by shelving bare grey and green hills, which fell to the sea in bold concave sweeps. And here was a new and unique land culture, for the rocky braes were blistered with long bright-green wales. Here, still flourishing, were the workings of that ancient civilization, whose relicts I had mused upon so often in the glens and on the banks above the shores of Skye: for

the green wales were "lazy-beds" of oats, and in some instances darker-green beds of potatoes, thrown up by the spade on boggy banks between the boulders, which littered the braes from hilltop to beach. This was a phenomenal toil, hacking a living from the very mountains. I had not seen before so grim and barren a land, with its white crofts and reed-thatched borhacs dotted about the hill-side in little oases of verdant lazy-beds. This was the poor township of Scarpay. From its wooden pier a thin rough track wound up into the hills. The crofters' coarsely bred Blackfaced sheep were tethered on the close-cropped grass edging the track, but we saw no birds on these shelterless, gale-swept hills.

Half an hour's steaming among the puffins and razorbills to the other end of the anchorage brought us alongside a rather bigger wooden stage and township: Tarbert, the capital of Harris. We went ashore here for twenty minutes and wandered up the rough road between the crofts, which were dumped down in odd corners among boulders and bogs, with the inevitable sheep tethered about them. The only birds in evidence were those remarkable emigrants from the biggest cities, the house sparrows.

Towards noon we steamed out through the cleft in the barrier cliff and bore away south down the rocky coast of Harris. Seldom more than a score or two of yards off the cliffs, we were always in sight of oystercatchers and terns and sometimes curlew; while black guillemots, dropping down off the rocks, whirled over the waves with flickering black and white wings. Throughout the two-hour voyage from Skye gulls, apparently the same individuals, circled around the ship, often alighting on davits and masts. It seemed very possible that these fine fellows were making the three-day voyage round the Hebrides and back to Mallaig, where they had joined the ship.

Harris' rocky coast was cut here and there by narrow sea-lochs. We steamed up two or three of these and lay off in the anchorage, what time boats pulled off to us with various human and material freights from the little townships. At one a huge black and scarlet "wherry" pulled out with long sweeps from a pleasant cradle of green hills—with a "Norman-towered" church on top of one of them—and delivered through the iron door of the steamer's hold a number of fat wool-bags and a black garbed minister, still sweating from his kindly ministration at one of the enormous sweeps. This green and pastoral combe might have been in sunny England, and the contrast with the neolithicism of Tarbert was startling.

In the late afternoon we began to bear west towards an illimitable panorama of low hills and skerries backing away from the mountains of Harris and South Uist to the Atlantic. And the end of it was that we drew up alongside another wooden landing-stage, packed with the usual jabbering swarm of Islanders awaiting the *Loch Mor's* arrival at Lochmaddy, capital of North Uist.

Escaping from the throng, we drove slowly past a green littered with cattle awaiting shipment to the mainland, and through the slovenly grey "Irish" township out on to the moors and peat bogs of a Dartmoor or Macleods Maidens in the Isle of Skye, had it not been that they were intersected by numberless lochs and lochans—on one of which a black-throated diver was swimming. Moreover, there were many more peat stacks and cuttings than anywhere in Skye.

We had come on the last day of the horse and cattle sales, and along the undulating moorland road straggled strings of horses and ponies, roped up tail and head, of all colours and sizes and degrees of emaciation—bought by the dealers from the North Uist crofters. Drove of shaggy cattle of every imaginable crofter cross and unkemptness followed the horses, herded by plus-foured drovers and hard-bitten buyers, with their innumerable collies and lurchers. Ragged tinkers, squatting in round cabins pitched on the heather at the edge of the road, set the seal to an immemorial scene. In our first half-hour we had delved deep into the ancient life of Uist.

For ten or a dozen miles we struggled through drove after drove of cattle or horses, and as we made over to the Atlantic coast of the Island on this glorious eve, so the brown moors, with their marauding "hooded" crows, gave place to rolling green downs, straddled by gulls and full of the flickering wings of plover, with pale crops of oats, barley, and silver rye on their western slopes. Wire fencing, alive with white-rumped wheatears, began to replace the crumbling grey stone dykes of the low downs, accentuating the spaciousness of this Atlantic Isle. From the crofters' strips of wild white clover came the *pank-pank* of pastoral corncrakes; a fat corn bunting "jingled" from every lazy-bed of oats. To a belt of brine-scorched sycamores around one grey farm stooped roosting flight after flight of starlings, and there was a cheery babel of chattering, gurgling and muted mimicries of redshank and curlew. Luxurious pasturages of red and white clover, the wonderful *machar* flats, stretched away for miles, like Fens, to white sands and a sparkling silver sea, where eight or ten miles out the great blocks of the Monach Isles sheered up. We seemed to have come into an open prairie-land of light and sun and song, after the grey weeks of mountain rain in Skye.

Widely scattered along the road and half hidden in folds of the moors were unbelievably ancient borhacs, or "black-houses," whose undressed stone and rounded mossy thatch were as natural growths of the country as the tumbled boulders, the "beehives" of stacked peats, and the grassy mounds and ruinous grey walls of forgotten townships, that once straggled along the pleasant margins of the sea-lochs. Cracked and crooked chimneys staggered skywards at one end of the borhacs, whose blankets of thatch swept down over the walls on to the very turf of the banks and braes from which they projected. Grasses and flowers sprouted from the thatch, and the Uist ponies, conveniently placed on grassy dyke-banks, munched the herbage off the roofs. Fowls

roosted in the deep embrasures of tiny windows, sunken one or two feet into the thick stone walls; horses, cows, calves, ewes and lambs were tethered about the crofts, which were sometimes encircled by stunted plantings of willow and the ubiquitous elder—in this otherwise tree-less island. Wrinkled old *cailleachs*, with black shawls over their heads, shuffled along the road from croft to croft, greeting us with the Gaelic.

Dusk began to gloom the moors as we clip-clopped on and on along the narrow metalled road, wrapping ourselves up in oilskins, rugs and deer-stalkers against the cool night. On our right-hand were heather moors, with brown lochans and long black peat cuttings, climbing away to the rounded thousand-foot hills of Uist: on our left hand, two miles across wide sands, a long low island. Highland cattle on a green hill were silhouetted against the darkling sunset over the sea; lapwings and yellow plover whistled wildly over the banks; we saw kilted Highland cut-throats peering over every heather brae. This clip-clopping in the silent dark was a traditional sound, and in little more than an hour's trotting we travelled through centuries' experience of that great heritage, the Land of Britain: for it was a tranquil dreamy night on the moors, full of the bewitching spirit that lives in *Puck o'Pook's Hill*—until we woke to the fresh cool wind of the Fords, the sharp cries of the wading birds I love, and the softened clop-clop of the horse's hooves on the firm sands—firmer than those of Lindisfarne. As we drew over the ford towards the Island, we could make out the gaunt lines of a baronial house and a square farm on a little hill, and two crofts at the edge of the sands.

On the morrow we strolled out over this tiny island on the fretted edge of the Old World. A Sahara of big marram-clad sand-dunes at the east end swept down to a grassy hill and meadows watered by a reedy lochan—home of the rare red-necked phalarope. At the base of the dunes there was a beautifully built little stone *fank*, or walled enclosure, which was still used as a burial ground by certain Uist crofters, who carried their deceased across the fords in carts: but the mounds and headstones were almost buried under a dense growth of burdock. Westwards, the rabbit-nibbled pastures merged into sandy banks, growing luxuriant crops of oats, barley, rye, potatoes, and the wild hay, or *machar*, with its wonderful bottom of clover, vetch and a hundred other flowers and grasses.

The green pastures swarmed with starlings, gulls and lapwings. In the huge craters of the sandhills, which were composed of that staring white sand peculiar to all the Long Island, were ravens and hooded crows, wheatears and rock-doves. The latter were continually flying to and from the shore and the crops of corn on the banks above, which were alive with "shivering" corn buntings. The bunting was the bird of the Island. All day he "jingled his keys" incessantly, ruffling up the feathers of his fat head and body, and hastening alone, or with his mate, over the wide strips of rye and barley,

which flourished in all sorts of unsuspected hollows and flats in the splendid white sand and rabbit warrens of the low dunes. There, too, were the retreats of many corncrakes, who also skulked in the thick matted bottom of the *machar*. At every meal from breakfast to supper we ate to an unique duet from corncrakes and corn buntings in the hayfield outside the farm-window.

At both east and west ends the pounding Atlantic breakers had breached the rocky shore. At high water the sea surged up these mile-wide channels between the Island and North Uist more swiftly than in any other place I know, sweeping over the six square miles of fords that stretched away to the hills of the mainland. Sea-trout came up with the tide into pools on the flats; not infrequently we saw the huge tail-flukes of a basking shark, that inoffensive and harmless giant; families of eiders and their ducklings steered a mazy course in and out of the brown skerries, where packs of curlew "quavered" and oystercatchers piped; dazzling white gannets, plunging headlong in magnificent corkscrew dives, crashed into the exquisite blue waters, down through the limpid deep-green depths, to the sterile white sand with its patches of orange-brown tangle.

When the sea went back again it left the white sands of the fords a curious shade of grey or pale bistre; just as on the Atlantic shore there were a number of beautiful little white coves, where the sea had eaten widely into the brown rock, and sandy *machar*. Shelduck and oystercatchers, knots, turnstones and other wading birds frequented these coves; cormorants stretched their wings on the skerries; and big grey Atlantic seals popped up their anvil-shaped heads, and moaned out on the reefs that reached out towards the rocky stacks of the Haskeirs. Forty miles beyond them, over the dark steel-blue Atlantic my blood stirred to see the smooth grey outline of St. Kilda's misty hump—my *ultima thule*—with its queer jaws to the south and the toothed stack of Boreray to the North. When night came down there were the lovely "bubbling" cries of curlew over the worm-cast ebb flats, and the soft call of little flights of dotterel. Gossamer pools of evening mist—the "duncan dale" of Lindisfarne—lay in the hollows of the banks and smoked above the crops, while a soaking dew drenched the thick tangle of the *machar*. We slept to the ceaseless pounding of the rollers on the bar, for night and day the Atlantic strove to overwhelm this most westerly outpost of the Old World, where men and women lived as their ancestors had lived for a thousand years; the woman suckling her babe before the glowing peats, Himself stretched out on the settle; the woman stooping to lay out the peats that Himself cut with the iron; she stooping to bind the corn he layed with his scythe; she lifting the potatoes he dug with the greip; she raking up the hay, while he fashioned the cock; she forking up the sheaves of corn to him in the cart; she milking the cows and setting food before her lord and master.

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EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By STEPHEN GWYNN

WHEN Captain Robinson decided to call his autobiography *A Modern De Quincey* (Harrap, 8s.6d.) I wonder if he did not overestimate the number of people who have read or even heard of a book once widely famous. *The Confessions of an Opium-Eater* were valued more as a masterpiece of style than for the interest of what they told; and taste has changed in a direction which leads away from appreciation of De Quincey as a stylist. However the title does not matter. Captain Robinson, if not specially notable as a writer, has the gift of holding his reader's attention; and the life story which he has to tell is incomparably more dramatic than that of the earlier addict. A very skilful romancer might have invented its climax. Evidently the love of the East was strong on him and after the war (during which he served in Mesopotamia) he got a transfer to the Burman military police. This meant living far out from European society and using almost entirely native tongues. It seems clear that, in spite of two very serious lapses, he was an excellent officer and his account of life and death among these people, their feats of strength and of magic, all make very good reading. He went down to spend a few weeks in Mandalay and there, visiting a Chinese eating house, he came accidentally upon an inner room where for the first time he saw a man smoking opium. Instantly his curiosity was stirred and asking for leave to try, he was conducted to a regular establishment, the House of the Deer. Here he met with a Burman of extraordinary charm. "At school," he says, "there had been boys whose faces had been a source of perpetual disquiet to me, but never have I met a man whose fascination could compare with that of Ba Ohn." After some months Captain Robinson made a journey from Mandalay, taking Ba Ohn with him. Then he saw for the first time the plight of an opium addict who cannot get a smoke, and deciding that he must shake free, he formed the singular plan of entering a Buddhist monastery. After a period of training, the novice under his Burmese name went abroad daily with his begging bowl which the Burmese friends, who had been his sponsors, gladly filled. But one evening, after coming at the hour when opium dens grew crowded, restlessness recurred, and the superior monk who was acting as his spiritual director advised a change into the country where associations might be less strong. It was tried, but resulted only in the complete admission of failure; and the Englishman was back again to where Ba Ohn welcomed him—without surprise.

From that time forward Captain Robinson gave himself unreservedly to the drug. He saw plague come to Mandalay but was little disturbed by what he saw. Yet, during a night spent in the jungle, he thought hard and

decided to make at least one more journey to England, in the hope to raise capital for gold prospecting. This journey, by the arbitrary action of a ship's doctor, was made a purgatory, till mitigated by the surreptitious purchase of some opium at Port Said. This was lost in England, but he was already heading back Eastward. Then began the final stage, in which everything he possessed went to buy what was now his life. At last police came to arrest him on suspicion of being about to run away from his debts; and knowing what opium addicts suffered in prison, he put a revolver to his temple, but only blew his eyes out, not his brains. The violent physical shock effected what neither religion nor advice had availed to do; he was rid of the obsession, and, living in blindness, he has written this book—which certainly is of manifold interest. It is charged with all that makes certain Europeans worshippers of the East's beauty; but more specially he dwells on the special charm of the Burmans, their courtesy and their kindness.

* * * * *

We can all of us who have reached so far as forty remember the period which lay between two wars—the great and the greater; yet we are too near to see it as posterity will—that is, as a period. Anybody who cares to get a singularly variegated view of it, and to test fidelity (or faithlessness) of memory can accomplish this very agreeably by reading Mr. Edward Stirling's *Something to Declare* (Muller, 12s. 6d.). The book records his experiences as director of a theatrical company which acted in English plays in thirty-two countries in the seventeen years 1922-39. During that period the company's centre of operations was Paris, which Mr. Stirling adored and adores. "Nothing can weaken its hold on the imagination of the world." Yet what he has to tell us about France and the French is of much less interest than the impression given of growing menace and disquiet in Germany. His company were the first British actors to play there after the war in 1928 when the British army was still in occupation. Between that date and the final shut door in 1939 they appeared in forty-eight German towns, and were everywhere welcomed. Theatrical visitors have a special position; they bring entertainment and easily make contact with the life of a country—often with most distinguished individuals. Naturally much depends on their power to profit by their chances but Mr. Stirling has been not only a great traveller but a good one; inconveniences have been all part of the adventure even when they were hardships or actual dangers. One of the perceptions which emerge from reading him is the growth of travel possibilities during this period—even in the Balkans or in South America, to which he and his party turned when Europe was growing too nerve-racking. Even beyond the wide range of his business he was carried by curiosity, as when he went up from Palestine to play for the R.A.F. stationed at Annan in Transjordan.

About people of the period he has many significant notes—as for instance about the Yugoslav sculptor, Mestrovic, of whom he found Zagreb so proud. Balkan royalties gave distinction to audiences in many cities—but specially Queen Marie of Rumania. Bucharest appealed to them by its gaiety and they got a great welcome as the first English actors to play there. What they played we are (for once) not told; but probably Shaw—"the one certain attraction, with Shakespeare as a good second." Out of fifty towns visited in their tours thirty-five were giving Shaw in their own language. "In fact,

Shakespeare and Shaw (in that order) were not only the most popular British authors, but the most acted playwrights of any language." Yet, says Mr. Stirling, "there is no doubt that the majority of English people care less for the theatre than any other Europeans. On the continent I can count literally hundreds of towns in which the theatre is a vital part of the community's social life and I regret what we miss in England." Polish example is notable: the theatre has been for the Poles during periods of subjugation "a platform where the Polish word has been spoken (and well spoken and jealously preserved) and where the plays of the great national poets prophetically brought hope of their country's resurrection."

This book has what it needed, a good index, and Mr. Stirling's readers will be able to turn back at any time to what he has to say about such people as the Guitrys or the Pitoëffs—or about almost any country in Europe, except Russia during this strange interlude of so-called peace.

* * * * *

Mr. Eric Baume in *I've Lived Another Year* (Harrap, 8s. 6d.) also gives aid to memory, about matters which, though only too recent, are confused by the sheer brutality of impact. How many of us realize that only fifteen months ago people in London were expecting Russia to join Germany in the attack on Egypt? Opinion was not settled till June 22nd, when the German march into Russia became a fact. This New Zealander, working for the Australian press, found it hard to understand why so many English folk talked of "filthy Bolsheviks" and refused to regard them as "any kind of ally." "The most dangerous enemy Britain has is herself," he writes. "Certain sections of the upper classes think that because they are English everything is on their side." But that does not represent his general view of England, where "there are more deep friendships to be made than I should say in any other country in the world. It may be, if you like, a complacent people, content for so long to trust and to believe in those who may have made mistakes. But it is a nation and a country so grateful for the Empire effort that a description of that gratitude must be included in any description of this war." And he lets himself go about English hospitality—the Sunday dinner with an Englishman and his family for colonials. And a very nice story he tells about "Jimmy Ward," a New Zealand V.C. and two proper colonels who found themselves in a first-class compartment with this sergeant and Mr. Baume, whom Ward had accompanied to a recruiting meeting. The colonels scowled, until the sergeant dropped his book and they saw the V.C. ribbon. Like one man they rose to their feet, naming their names and asking leave to shake hands with him. After which the Anzac sergeant-pilot discoursed to them of "unwritten Maori music and harmony." I liked also Mr. Baume's tribute to the House of Commons atmosphere, "the general feeling of friendship and good temper in the lobbies and at coffee. There is none of that continued political hatred which is a bad thing"—and from which Australia to his mind is not free. Altogether this is a very pleasant volume and I do not wonder that its writer succeeds as a lecturer and speaker on the wireless.

* * * * *

General Sir George Barrow has written in *The Fire of Life* (Hutchinson, 18s.) a book which, if I may be allowed to say so, has a special appeal to me. We were born in the same year; the regiment which he joined on getting his commission was the Connaught Rangers—where I also had my first lesson of soldiering; at least one of his Ranger friends was a good friend of mine thirty years later.

**A Cultured
Soldier**

But General Barrow only used the Rangers as a stepping-stone to his ambition; and a cavalry man he became as soon as he could get a transfer. His book conveys admirably a picture of the old India—Kipling's India—and of the old army which was so much a family party, at all events for those who had talents and energy sufficient to attain to staff posts. In 1884, when General Barrow got his commission, Roberts (then Sir Frederick) was commander in chief in India. At home, Wolseley was in the ascendant, and, when after six radiant years of a subaltern's life, Barrow got his first leave home, he was recalled to become "personal assistant" to Sir Henry Brackenbury, Military member of Council. He had seen in Waziristan one of the frontier campaigns before he went home to read for the Staff College, worked ten solid hours daily for six months and so got one of the two vacancies open to officers of the India army. At Camberley he was fellow-student with a batch that included Haig and Allenby, as well as a dozen others who became only well less well-known than they; and his chances of service brought him into friendly contact with Lord Wolseley and Sir Evelyn Wood—another celebrated field marshal. Since he is a very likeable human being (no small merit in a writer), men as men interest him keenly and there is a deal of comment, shrewd but generous, on these personalities.

On the whole Sir George Barrow has remained an Eastern. He missed the Boer war; though Roberts asked for him, Lord Curzon refused to let more Indian officers go; but soon there was compensation when the Boxer rising in China blazed out and the Legation was besieged in Peking. He got his chance now, being set to the job of policing one of the three "cities" into which Peking is divided—that one which is Peking's "East End." We become aware that our author, in addition to his feeling for history, has a keen sense of beauty in nature and in art, and is a lover of poetry; indeed some verses, attributed to "Anon" strikes me as very like what the author of the accompanying prose may have written.

Of course the book covers a vast range of events. He served in France, on the Staff, and in command of cavalry, which could only be sparingly used in those conditions. But it was his great good fortune to command a mounted division in what he considers to have been perhaps the last major action in which such forces could ever take part; and the ground on which it took place appealed powerfully to his imagination. His Mounted Yeomanry had to take part in the capture of Palestine and fight under Allenby where Joshua had fought and Saul and David and the Crusaders—and Napoleon. They had passed through Damascus and were in Baalbek when news of Germany's surrender reached them. That was November, 1918. It was 1928 before Sir George Barrow closed his forty-six years of soldiering as G.O.C. of the Indian Eastern Command. Of many pleasant things in a big book perhaps the pleasantest have to do with his memories of Indian soldiers, in all ranks. To-day, it seems, he is a full private in the Home Guard—far enough from India. More power to him, wherever he is.

**THE CONSTITUTION UNDER
STRAIN**, by A. Berriedale Keith.
Stevens & Sons. 2s. 6d.

The true line of demarcation between "constitutional" and "political" history has long been debated in academic circles. The debate will not be closed by Professor Berriedale Keith's latest little book. The title would lead one to expect something different from the pabulum actually provided. How has the British Constitution—described by a brilliant French philosopher as "non-existent"—stood up to the strain of the war? How have the various organs of Government, the Cabinet, Parliament, the Judiciary, the Civil Service actually functioned during these latter days? Wherever the line be drawn between "political" and "constitutional" history, there can be no doubt at least half Dr. Keith's treatise is concerned less with the functioning of Institutions than with the conduct and personality of politicians.

Take the Civil Service. One page only is devoted to this vital subject and much of that (p. 55-6) is devoted to the question of making up the pay of those Civil Servants who were withdrawn from their ordinary work for military service.

This, though important in view of public finance is much less Constitutionally important than the vast increase of bureaucratic powers—a point almost ignored by Dr. Keith.

Of the six sections into which this booklet is divided the first three deal respectively with: "The International Crisis of September, 1938"; "The Advance into War"; and "The Aid derived from the British Commonwealth."

The first is purely political, dealing with the sequence of events in April and September, 1939. Dr. Keith makes it clear that with the policy of "appeasement" pursued by Mr.

Chamberlain and Lord Halifax he has little sympathy. Subsequent events have, of course, proved that it was hopeless. The only relevant question is whether the authors of the policy had any reasonable expectation that it might avert war. On the question of policy Dr. Keith ought, I submit, to have gone back farther at least to March, 1936, when Hitler was permitted, without protest from either Great Britain or France to violate the Locarno Pact and march into the de-militarized Rhineland. Once he had got away with that, all else followed in natural if not inevitable sequence.

Incidentally, I am curious to learn what authority Dr. Keith has for reporting the "suggestion" (he does not endorse it) that the British fleet was deliberately "absent" (p. 9) when Italy overthrew the Kingdom of Albania? The "suggestion" if groundless is peculiarly sinister, and Dr. Keith, so careful, as a rule, in giving references to authorities, omits in this case to do so. And what has the question of "Peace Terms" (whether German or anti-Axis) pp. 22-23 got to do with the British Constitution in War-time?

More definitely Constitutional are some of the points raised (pp. 27-32) by the co-operation of the Dominions and the neutrality of Southern Ireland, and with the sections on the War Cabinet and the Legislature I have no quarrel, save that in both there is more about persons and less about principles than I had hoped for. Still more is that true (but less unjustifiably) in the short section dealing with Political Parties.

There are a number of expressions scattered about this little book about which, did space permit, I should be tempted to comment. I should like to know for instance what exactly the people who wanted a pledge from Mr. Churchill meant

(p. 64) by a "people's peace"? Again while there is no evidence that Dr. Keith would wish to wipe out "*rentier* people" I am always curious to know how far the principle would be extended and in particular what treatment would be accorded to people who have preferred to invest their hard-earned savings, and so to promote industry and employment instead of purchasing (say) a deferred annuity? and what (p. 16) does Dr. Keith mean by the "*defection*" of the Greek forces? "Partly as a result of France" (p. 13), and could Germany (or anyone else "persuade a revolt" (p. 20)?

We may be grateful to Dr. Keith for his untiring industry as a constitutional commentator though, in the present instance it has, perhaps, been rather prematurely applied.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

THE SPEECHES OF ADOLF HITLER: April, 1922 - August, 1939. Edited by Norman H. Baynes. *Oxford University Press.* 2 Volumes. 50s.

It is with reluctance that the English people have come to recognize the political genius of Hitler. Even now, after victories unparalleled in modern times, they contrast him unfavourably with Napoleon, while hinting darkly that he himself is a puppet for the power and machinations of others.

Such an estimate will in future years seem merely foolish and part and parcel of a general myopia which affected many more than those dwelling in the British Isles. Certainly Hitler has every appearance of a comic character and his ranting is of a type that sounds unintelligible as well as rasping to English ears tuned in to a loud speaker. Yet Hitler talks a great deal of sense in a mass of verbiage and he possesses, what every great

leader must have, a fanatical belief in his own pernicious doctrine. Here he is, way back in 1922, defining that necessity for himself and his followers:

And then sixthly we grasped the fact that power in the last resort is possible only where there is strength, and that strength lies not in the dead weight of numbers but solely in energy. Even the smallest minority can achieve a mighty result if it is inspired by the most fiery, the most passionate will to act. World-history has always been made by minorities. And lastly, if one has realized a truth, that truth is valueless so long as there is lacking the indomitable will to turn this realization into action!

That his words inspire no one can doubt. Eye-witnesses have testified to the mesmeric state of his audiences while the sounds he evoked from them have been likened to the sighs and howls of savages as they watched spell-bound the prancings of the witch doctor. That Hitler is mad I have no doubt if genius, that concentration of human energy and intellect in one direction, is accounted madness. Hitler is the living embodiment of his beliefs. He neither spares himself nor anyone who crosses his path. ("We may be inhumane, but if we rescue Germany we have achieved the greatest deed in the world!") There is that much, at least, to learn from him. We cannot, as some seem to think, conduct a revolution in our spare time. It demands all.

Much will be owed by every student of Hitlerism and World History to the splendid work Professor Norman Baynes has done in editing these two volumes of Hitler's speeches, which are issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The speeches could not be published in entirety and in historical sequence, nor will anyone think that they should have been. As they are now presented in subject form, with the whole of the second volume devoted to Foreign

Policy, they avoid endless repetition and yet lose nothing of Hitler's method of turning again and again to say the same thing in variations of the same words. That is part of Hitler's spell, the constant hammer, hammer on the same theme.

In his preface Lord Astor draws particular attention to the deceptions practised by Hitler, deceptions achieved with such mastery and sleight of hand that they seemed at times to deceive even the deceiver. Certainly the explanation of Hitler's oratorical success, that he believes everything he says at the moment of saying it, is most convincing even from a reading of the speeches, but that hardly explains why so many of us failed utterly to recognize the menace of his programme until it was very nearly too late.

The purblindness of our political leaders may be put down to a variety of causes. At first the very magnitude of Hitler's self-appointed task seemed altogether too ambitious to be taken seriously, particularly when the consensus of opinion, even in his own country, was that he was a mountebank and a man hardly to be accounted a serious candidate for power. But some circumstances favoured him, not least in England where many feared Bolshevism as a 20th century plague and others looked with so much favour on Hitler's social legislation that they failed to grasp the implications of the full Nazi doctrine. As for the cruelties he practised, the phlegmatic Englishman regarded them with his usual lack of imagination and perhaps with a passing reference to the belief that no revolution could be accomplished without a little suffering.

So it was in 1939 that, unprepared in armament and in mind, we faced not Hitler but Germany. It is perhaps little less than a miracle that we have been able in our weakened

state to stand up to the blows rained upon us in the last three years.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

THE NEW FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, by W. Arnold Forster. *Methuen.* 6s.

Mr. Arnold Forster begins by tracing the development of the rules of sea warfare and the origins of the doctrines of "Free Ships, Free Goods" and of immunity of so-called "private property" at sea. All this has a certain historical interest, but all of it has equally become obsolete since Germany threw over every canon of international behaviour. Mr. Arnold Forster recognizes that the old kind of Freedom of the Seas in war time was simply "a policy for amending the conventions of international duelling in the interest of neutrals" and that "no convention of sea war-

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concerns questions which touch everyday human life very closely such as: Can we have any knowledge of the world outside us, other than that we gain by methods of science, observation and experiment? Is the world ultimately spiritual and mental, or material, in its ultimate essence? Is it more correct to compare it to a thought or to a machine? Are we humans endowed with free-will, or are we mere cogs in a vast machine, which must follow its predestined course until it finally runs down?

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fare, however drafted, would abate the violence of a Germany which had resolved to fight with eyes shut to every rule and almost every scruple" even if this involved bringing the United States against her.

So he demands what he calls a New Freedom of the Seas. He favours President Wilson's proposals but he sees that the basis on which they rested, collective action for the preservation of peace and the international boycott, became impossible when the United States withdrew from the League of Nations and that the League itself, even if she had remained in it, was a toothless instrument, incapable of effective armed action if an aggressor should arise. And aggressors did arise: first Japan, then Italy, then Germany; and in the war that resulted from these rascals' ambitions and lack of scruple every vestige of law has been relegated to the dustbin.

Mr. Arnold Forster appears to attribute the war to a great extent to what he calls the inequitable distribution of shipping, and his policy of freedom demands the adoption of measures to secure an equitable distribution of the world shipping resources. He desires to see a World Shipping Board whose functions include the allocation of the shipping services and their control, even going to the possible further length of ownership. Apart from the questionable premiss in this assumption the proposal appears to be framed upon a want of knowledge of the processes of shipping. The great organization of British shipping, built up by generations of experienced men and serving the needs of this country with conspicuous success, is to be scrapped and the shipping of the world confided to the care of an international bureaucratic body who will administer to the needs of this nation, a

nation dependent as no other nation is upon the sea. The failure of state shipping, wherever it has been tried, is one of the commonplaces of Leadenhall Street. What the condition of this people would be if that system were carried to the further lengths of international control is easily to be imagined.

HERBERT RICHMOND.

THE TWILIGHT OF FRANCE, by Alexander Werth. *Hamish Hamilton*. 12s. 6d.

THE GOVERNMENT OF VICHY, by Pierre Tissier. *Harrop*. 15s.

CHARLES DE GAULLE, by Philippe Barrès. *Hutchinson*. 9s. 6d.

FRANCE STILL LIVES, by "Michael." *Lindsay Drummond*. 10s. 6d. 6s. paper.

I WORKED WITH LAVAL, by Pierre Tissier. *Harrop*. 5s.

DEATH AND TO-MORROW, by Peter de Polnay. *Secker & Warburg*. 12s. 6d.

The political history of the period dating from the "sixth of February" (1934) is necessarily a record of things that besmirch the fair name of France. Let it be said at once that the books listed here make no attempt to gloss over the sordid facts of the 'decline of the French State.' Yet one cannot help feeling that something more might have been said of those other attributes of French life, outside the political sphere, which set up a standard of civilization for Europe and which are certainly not dead. Of those other features, equally important for any representation of the true face of France, only the grim story of life in the French capital in the first few months after the capitulation by the Hungarian-born novelist, Peter de Polnay, gives us any inkling. It is because of the persistence of those

private virtues, however, besides public disgrace, that the French nation, as a whole, has survived its shame and tribulation.

Professor Brogan, I may say, in his introduction to *The Twilight of France* makes this point:

that the political life of a nation does not often illustrate its virtues and achievements at their best... and in the France of the last twenty years the difference between the achievements of the French nation and the French state was even more striking than usual.

But Mr. Werth's book, which he rightly describes as "the most valuable contemporary record of the last years of the parliamentary republic," is essentially a political chronicle and as such makes depressing reading. What we have here is an omnibus volume compiled as a labour of love from the three well-known Werth books appearing at two-yearly intervals—*The Destiny of France*, *France and Munich* and the Epilogue of *The Last Days of Paris*, all stocks of the two earlier books having been destroyed in the London blitz. I need hardly say that this record of those years of weakness is indispensable to an understanding of what followed.

For the aftermath the weighty volume by Lt.-Col. Pierre Tissier, Comptroller to the Fighting French forces, is no less indispensable. The book is a dispassionate and detailed analysis of the reforms in the internal structure of the country either projected or carried out by the Vichy régime. The author gives a useful account of the steps that led up to the Labour Charter—now, of course, thrown overboard in the attempt to satisfy Hitler's manpower demands. He describes in some detail the treatment of agriculture, the rationing methods and procedure, the ideas for dealing with unemployment, the banking system, State insurance, etc. In all this field of social policy there is much that is an improvement on the

practice of the Third Republic. But the judicial system—and here Col. Tissier as a *maitre des requêtes au Conseil d'Etat* speaks with authority—is more than ever corrupt and now cluttered up with special political and military courts, while the task of political renovation has been utterly neglected. The weakness of the "national revolution" is fundamental, as the author suggests, since no reform can be made that will endure if it is associated with subjection to the German conquerors. And the fact remains that Pétain and Co., on the most charitable explanation, took political power in order to cover proven military incapacity.

This point, frequently obscured by political skirmishing, is well brought out by Philippe Barrès' little book on General de Gaulle and the Free French movement. Though described as "the first complete and authoritative account" of that movement it is in fact rather superficial and scrappy—and, unfortunately, appears here not in readable English but in an execrable American idiom. But it throws light on certain aspects of the capitulation that have been perhaps forgotten: as for instance that the great majority of the two million Frenchmen taken prisoner were captured after Pétain had announced on the wireless (June 17) that France was seeking an armistice—when there was a general belief that the war was over for France. Much of what happened in the first year or so after the surrender, moreover, is explained by the fact that the Armistice Agreements of 1940 never seem to have been properly published in the French press.

The companion volume by Michael, which relies in the main on material supplied by the de Gaulle organization, also underlines this deliberate attempt to keep the French public in ignorance of the national

abasement. The author, an Englishman who has lived most of his life in France, gives a good picture of the nation's calvary and of the earlier phases of 'resistance.' But he spoils it all by painting in his shadows too dark in the first chapter, "The Racket," in which he confuses the political "ramp" with moral disintegration.

Colonel Tissier's other little book is a chatty personal document which certainly gives us a peep behind the scenes of French public life but, of course, only shows us the seamy side. His exposure of the parliamentary system as it had become in France is complete and scathing, but the conclusion reached is that in twilight days of the Third Republic "nothing of democracy survived beyond an empty shell," not that democracy itself is discredited. And he agrees that "the French were not morally degenerate"—that is a fable encouraged by Pétain and his time-servers.

The real trouble was the vacuum of authority. France went to war this time, as Mr. de Polnay says, "not as a nation but as political partisans." He gives us a delightful picture of Montmartre in the summer and autumn of 1940. As a Hungarian he was able to talk freely with the German visitors. With his truly Magyar-aristocrat enthusiasm for England, however, he could not stomach "collaboration" and made up his mind to get to England. It took him fourteen months and the most harrowing adventures to get here—the underworld of Marseilles and the inside of French prisons are described with humour and feeling: and, when he did come, so the present reviewer understands, a grateful country could find no better use for him than the Pioneer Corps!

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

CHRISTIANITY AND CIVILIZATION, by H. G. Wood. *Cambridge University Press.* 3s. 6d.

A DIALOGUE IN THE DESERT, by Gerald Heard. *Cassell.* 1s. 6d.

These two short books, both of unusual distinction, are studies of the mind of Christ in its relationship to a world gone wrong. Mr. Heard penetrates the more deeply of the two, perhaps because there is a timeless quality about his approach which leads him to view all evil as a unity and delivers him from the need of overmuch analysis of the particular forms which militant evil takes in the twentieth century. But there is always need for such an analysis, yes, even though it has been done twenty thousand times already, provided it is fresh and arresting, and these are precisely the qualities which distinguish Professor Wood's essay. In his hands the seam is new even though there can be hardly another which so many have been working. His method is to take such modern idols as scientific humanism and Marxism, such ambitions as the perfectly civilized society and a true international order, to delineate them with the mind of liberalism at its very best, and to examine the result from the uncompromisingly Christian point of view of Jesus in the Gospels. In the process even those who have for years been close students both of modern politics and of the Gospel will discover that they are not merely reading the book to find out what Professor Wood has to say, but that they are making their own quite a number of things they had not fully realized before. The facts on which this book builds are all perfectly familiar: hardly one of them will be unknown to any likely reader. But they seem to be held together in a new synthesis which makes their relationship more intelligible and their real meaning more clear. Per-

haps this is because a Liberal and a Christian of the classical school is doing the writing, for the liberal is the prince of expositors, and the discipline of classical education and biblical study does undoubtedly induce a sense of timeless values. It also confers an extremely apt instinct for the right quotation. This book is one of the "Current Problem" Series: most people would agree that it is one of the best of them. Not the least of the debts which we owe to it is the really glorious suggestion of the right lesson to read in church on the occasion of the armistice after this war. It is II Chronicles XXVIII, 8-15.

Mr. Heard hardly ever mentions modern times. He has expanded the Gospel story of the Temptation of Jesus in the wilderness in the form of a dialogue. There are three speakers, but one of them, the Zealot who speaks with the accent of a modern communist, comes in only at the end to offer the third temptation, all the kingdoms of this world and the glory of them. The other tempter is "the dark echo of—and reaction from—Jesus's own authentic inspiration." Mr. Heard will not have him called the devil after the simplicity of the Gospels. It is hard to see why there has to be this over-refinement, especially when it is remembered that every classic portrait of the devil concentrates on his subtlety and his most remarkable intelligence. In his imaginative expansion of the temptations, Mr. Heard has triumphantly caught that note of subtle intelligence. Just so, it is plain, would the devil have argued with such a One as Jesus. Make the stones bread for their sakes, not for yours; and not merely to fill their bellies but to win their hearts for the freedom you can offer them, and you only. And the answer comes at once, "A day may come when God

will answer their greedy cry: give them power to make the desert a cornfield—the rock bread—when they will have such plenty that they will burn wheat and pour whole harvests into the barren sea. Will His Kingdom have come then?" Just so is the dialect of subtle temptation, nicely attuned to the strength of a character, not its weakness, and just so is the answer that is final. This book is in fact something of a treasure. It might be a very valuable theme for meditation to compare Mr. Heard's Satan with Mr. C. S. Lewis's Screwtape; and probably no one should preach or teach any more about temptation until he has read and digested both books.

ROGER LLOYD.

OCTAVIA HILL, by E. Moberley Bell. *Constable*. 15s.

Octavia Hill's name could not be omitted from any list of the great Victorians. When she died in 1912 and the Dean and Chapter suggested an Abbey funeral they represented the public opinion of their day. Her work has gone on without interruption from her death, and has continued to spread beyond the reach of her hopes, though not of her foresight. Yet her name is known today within comparatively narrow circles. To the widest public it is hardly known at all.

This is as she would have wished it. Octavia Hill shrank from publicity. Rather she repudiated it. It became a religion to her family and friends to press down the soft pedal on the intimacies of her life. A very full, but very carefully-selected, body of her letters was published after her death by her brother-in-law, Charles Edmund Maurice. The rest, including much that was thought too personal for the public eye, was destroyed.

Yet what a story her life was! A young woman grappling alone

with the horrors of fetid courts, where the police dare not enter and where the landlord had sometimes been an undertaker boasting of his double profits; the creation of a pioneer London garden for her tenants under a shower of brickbats; the making of friendships among the squalid and the despairing; the attack on filthy dwellings court by court; the beginnings of cleanliness and independence among those who had known neither; then the starting of clubs and music and a wide-ranging social life—until Octavia was invited to take over great areas of bad property in South London and Westminster by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, and at her death had created a band of workers and an organization which has never ceased to grow.

Her housing work receives most attention in this book, and with some reason, since all the rest developed from it. Nevertheless another adventure as gallant in the face of obstacle broke as new ground and bids fair to have as permanent results. For to her we owe the open space movement and the beginning of clubs and military training for poor boys, complemented by the association with them of the public schools, in games, in camp, and in settlements: in fact the germ of all that we now call the Youth Movement.

The National Trust, of which she was co-founder with Sir Robert Hunter and Canon Rawnsley, was the culmination of years of individual struggle for open spaces big and small—from Hampstead Heath to the "Postmen's Park" in Aldersgate. All the time she dreamed of wider, freer spaces, of moors and hills and cliffs and woods, mountains and streams and fells and lakes: mile on mile of unfettered tramping for everybody. Let nobody

take these gifts for granted. "Who will look after my open spaces?" (she wrote when compelled to surrender her work for a time) for nobody knows there are any." Octavia "hiked" half-a-century before the term was invented. She made her dreams come true. How many of the visitors to National Trust possessions know that these exist only by reason of her vision and pertinacity?

Miss Moberley Bell has written of Octavia's work with sympathy and understanding. Nothing could be better than her description of the housing work, from its modest beginning to its immense development, and the lesson it carries, however different the circumstances, for present-day housing reformers.

Behind all her work was a personality of great strength, ardent faith, and extreme sensitiveness. This book gives publicity for the first time to her engagement to Edward Bond, a barrister and co-worker who failed her in the crucial matter. He was afraid of his mother, and "came to her apologetic, hesitant, counselling delay." This was not the marriage she had believed him to be and she put an end to their brief engagement. But it left a permanent scar and brought about a serious and prolonged breakdown.

There are many other personal sides to her story, and that of Ruskin's quarrel with her—not hers with him—comes into it of necessity. His behaviour was in his worst and most petulant vein. But this must be read in the biography. Miss Bell has done less than justice to Ruskin's powers (or it may be follows a habit of the moment not likely to prove lasting) but she records with appreciation Octavia's warm and magnanimous tribute.

W. THOMSON HILL

ADVERTISEMENT AND BUSINESS OFFICES: 13 Buckingham Street, LONDON, W.C.2
PUBLISHED FOR THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, LTD., BY HORACE MARSHALL & SON,
LTD., Publishing Department, Temple House, Tallis Street, E.C.4
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GERRINGS OF ASHFORD, LTD., 80, HIGH STREET, ASHFORD, KENT
PUBLISHED IN NEWCASTLE

THE FORTNIGHTLY

DECEMBER, 1942

JAPAN: DISHONOURABLE ANNIVERSARY

BY SIR ROBERT H. CLIVE

ON December 8 Japan will have been at war with the United Nations for a year and with the world for over eleven, for ever since she tore up the Washington Treaties, invaded Manchuria and defied world public opinion, Japan has been in a state of war, ruled by the military hierarchy. Parliamentary Government has been swept away, the Press is but the echo of the military spokesman and we have the word of General Tojo, the Premier, that Japan is prepared to go on fighting indefinitely. Greatly aided by the perfidy of our former ally in Indo-China, Japan has gained victories which a year ago would have seemed fantastic. To-day she dominates the whole of South-Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific excepting Australia, New Zealand and a few of the most westerly groups of islands, but as General Wavell has said, like a boa constrictor that has swallowed a goat she needs time to digest the meal. The United Nations are doing their best to interrupt the process of digestion.

War in the Eastern hemisphere is so remote from these shores that many people are apt, if not to ignore it, at least to underestimate its importance. They do not envisage the possibility of war continuing in Eastern Asia once it has been brought to an end in Western Europe. They do not realize that total war must be followed by total peace before we can hope to resume a normal way of life, and they vaguely imagine that Japan will have to throw her hand in if the Germans collapse. It is of interest then to consider the views of a Scottish missionary recently repatriated is quoted in *The Scotsman* as saying:—

I have gathered the impression that people at home are inclined to take the Japanese too cheaply. There seems to be a general feeling that as soon as Germany is finished the Japanese will collapse. Japan is not dependent on Germany. She has gathered everything she wants by her conquests in the Pacific. The Japanese are digging themselves in and it seemed to be their calculation that by the time the United Nations were finished with Germany they would be too fed up with fighting to set about digging out the Japanese. The latter might even offer compromise terms that would enable them to hold on to the conquests they prized most. They were strong in man power and materials and would carry on alone for a good

LONG

mercial interests were slowly but surely being driven out wherever the Japanese established themselves. The flag of the Rising Sun was not merely the symbol of Japanese power, it served to wave away the foreign merchant. The open door was only for the Japanese. Enlightenment at length began to dawn after the seizure of Manchuria in 1931. And just as the door has been shut, barred and bolted against the foreigners in Korea and Manchuria so will it be in the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch Indies and the Pacific Islands unless the Japanese are ejected neck and crop from all these territories. For there is no question of blockading them. They have obtained from their conquests more than all the tin, oil, iron ore and rubber they are likely to need for this and many more campaigns and economically are in an almost impregnable position. Australian wool, American cotton and German machine tools would no doubt be welcome but the Japanese will not be very seriously inconvenienced by the lack of them.

And so on the anniversary of Japan's entry into the war against us various questions arise to which it would be useful to know the answers:—

1. Did Japan ever seriously intend to attack Australia and does she intend to do so now?
2. Does she intend to attack India?
3. Can China be conquered?
4. What are the prospects now or later of war between Japan and the U.S.S.R.?
5. How can Japan be defeated?

With great diffidence I will attempt to suggest answers to these questions.

(1) I have always felt very doubtful whether Japan ever seriously contemplated the invasion of Australia. To sever the lines of communication between N. America and Australia was sufficient for her immediate purpose. The attacks so far made on Australian ports have been little more than nuisance raids, but she hoped no doubt by holding New Guinea and the Solomon Islands to make it possible to land sufficient forces to take Port Darwin and thereby control the Torres Straits. Now that large forces of Americans with adequate air support are installed in Australia Japan lacks the troops and transport necessary to stage a full scale attack on a huge country thousands of miles away from the homeland and she is far too cautious to attempt anything she is not confident of being able to achieve. But she has not given up hope of extending her activities to the New Hebrides and New Caledonia in order to cut the American lines of communication, and it is on this account that such determined counter attacks are being made on Guadalcanal,

for strategically the control of the Solomon Islands is vital to her purpose.

But even supposing the Japanese are eventually forced to withdraw altogether from the Solomon Islands and New Guinea, they will have delayed by so many months an allied attempt to recover any of the Dutch Indies or the Philippines and given themselves time to consolidate their position and strengthen the defences in those islands. Japanese strategy is not a day to day affair but like the German meticulously worked out in advance with this difference that, whereas Hitler occasionally insists on politics overriding strategy, there is no danger of this happening in Japan so long as the sway of the military remains supreme.

(2) *Does Japan intend to attack India?* The answer to this question would appear to be veiled in the secret of sea-power. Without adequate sea-power and transport India cannot be invaded with any hope of success from the East. We have the word of General Wavell that if the opportunity arose an attack on Burma would be made, and it is obvious that the ejection of the Japanese from Burma is of the very first importance, for that would mean the re-opening of the Burma road and all that it implies in the way of bringing aid to China—in fact one might go so far as to say that unless the Japanese are driven out of Burma they cannot be beaten. The Japanese know this as well as we do and, as the fighting season in Burma is limited by the monsoon, they may as a diversion attack Indian aerodromes, or the coast of India in order to upset or at least delay our plans for the recovery of Burma. But I hesitate to believe that a large scale attack on India is to-day an integral part of the Japanese strategic plan any more than a large scale invasion of the Australian continent.

(3) *Can China be conquered?* The Archbishop of Canterbury recently recorded a conversation with a Chinese priest in which the priest said, "These things will soon be over." "How long will it be then before stability is restored?" queried the Archbishop. "I think in about eight years" was the reply. This reminded me of a conversation I had in 1923 before leaving China, with the Foreign Minister, W. W. Yen, on whom I had called to say good-bye. I expressed the hope that the civil war which had been raging for the past three years would soon be over. "But what are a few years of civil war in the life of China?" he said. "Fifty years, a hundred years are nothing. Civil war won't last for ever." Here in England we have been mesmerized by that comforting but dangerous slogan "Time is on our side." But in the East things are different. Time has not the same meaning there and time is always on the side of the Chinese. Fifty years, a hundred years are

nothing in the life of China, but in the life of Japan, that land of aggressive go-getters fifty years are still a long time. I am not suggesting that Japan will weary of the struggle or ever plead for peace, but in spite of General Tojo's defiant boast that Japan will fight on indefinitely, a few years of peace in order to recuperate and build up her industry before renewing the struggle would be welcome even to the Generals. But we must have no more illusions about Japan's aggressiveness. To the Japanese as to the Germans "Peace is but the interlude between two wars." Japan's determination to dominate Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific is irrevocable, and when peace eventually comes we may be sure that before the ink is dry on the treaty the General Staff will already be planning a new war of aggression. It would be very rash therefore for the Chinese to disband their armies or for the British and Americans to reduce their fleets or air force in the Far East. On the contrary—reactionary as this may seem—the Chinese will be forced to maintain large efficient and up-to-date fighting forces in order to survive and the United Nations will for many years have to keep adequate forces in their Far Eastern possessions if the door is not to be closed. For the Japanese only respect force, and we must be prepared for a long drawn war in the Far East. China is the pivot and for the United Nations the continued resistance of China is vital. If for no other reason it is absolutely essential to give all aid to China in order to wear down Japan and make it possible to attack her directly by the heaviest bombing raids.

In a recently published book by a Japanese, *How Japan plans to win*,* it is claimed that the latest Japanese planes are far superior to American, that a U.S. raid on Tokyo is nothing to be feared, but that if Soviet planes attack from Vladivostok, it will be a genuine menace to Japan. This was written in 1941 before Japan came into the war, and before flying fortresses and liberator bombers had been heard of. It is probable that to-day the author would somewhat modify his views, but the fact remains that so long as the Russian neutrality pact is observed Japan can only be bombed successfully from the neighbourhood of the China coast. This renders it all the more essential to obtain the control of landing grounds in Eastern China and to do that the Japanese must first be expelled from Burma. It will be seen then how vital to the allied cause is continued Chinese resistance. In any case I feel sure that Japanese aggression for 5½ years is not going to be conquered in this war. Far from it, and I like to think of her recovering Formosa and the Liu Kiu Islands as T. V. Soong has hopefully predicted.

*By Kinoaki Matsuo. Harrap. 8s. 6d.

(4) *What is the prospect of war between Japan and the U.S.S.R.?* Russia is Japan's hereditary enemy, the one country she has always feared since the Russian Empire first penetrated to the Eastern seas. One day she is determined to challenge the menace, and drive the Russians back to the plains of Siberia beyond Lake Baikal. But the day is not yet, it seems. Matsuoka's neutrality pact signed in April, 1941, does not expire till 1946 and for the moment it is not in the interest of either country to break that pact—in fact both have an advantage in keeping it. Apart from the fear of being bombed from Vladivostok Japan is pretty fully extended in having to maintain a million men in China and large forces in Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Dutch Indies and the Pacific Islands. Though she keeps half a million troops in Manchuria ready to take the field she would be hard put to it to find adequate reserves and transport if in addition to the fighting that may be expected in other theatres she had to take on the Russian far eastern army at the same time. "It is a divine rule," says the author of *How Japan plans to win* "that when a country launches invasion towards the north she will never win the final victory. Therefore Japan must plan defence in the north and attack in the south." It seems unlikely then that Japan will take the initiative just yet in starting a war with Russia.

(5) *Finally How can Japan be defeated?* It need hardly be said that such a possibility has never entered the head of any Japanese, for not only does Japan claim never in history to have been defeated, but it is inculcated into every Japanese soldier that once the Japanese have taken a position they can never be ejected. It was inevitable therefore that the loss of the important aerodrome on Guadalcanal would be followed by a large scale attack on the island. It was not merely the loss of the aerodrome but loss of face that was involved.

It is certainly going to be an exceedingly tough proposition to defeat the Japanese, for until they are expelled from Burma, New Guinea and the neighbouring islands their strategic position is immensely strong—it might almost be called impregnable. It is idle to contemplate internal revolution; little help can be expected from the Malays, Javanese and Filipinos and there is no question of blockade. Mr. Grew, the late American Ambassador, said on his return to his country: "The Japanese must be physically ejected yard by yard before the war can be won" and this can only be done when the United Nations are able to muster overwhelming forces. He warned his listeners against foolish optimism and complacent self-confidence. "To the Japanese," he said, "their imperial realm is security, patriotism and religion at the same time." They will

not bend, they will fight until they can do it no longer. We cannot fight partially, tentatively or dubiously against men who are fighting body and soul under a frenzy of fanaticism exploited by dictatorship." There is no doubt about it: in the fight to maintain a hold on the Solomon Islands and New Guinea as elsewhere the Japanese will never admit defeat and may be expected to contest every yard of the ground.

It is not a cheerful outlook. We are paying for years of indifference to the defence of our Colonies, for grossly underestimating Japan's strength and for the policy of trying to appease a militant and aggressive nation that has always mistaken conciliation for weakness.

Let us find encouragement however in the words of Field Marshal Smuts:

For Japan just as surely as for Hitler the writing is on the wall. All that will remain of their spectacular success will be Japan for the Japanese. For Japan has infallibly sealed her own doom. Pearl Harbour was at once a challenge to America, to Western Europe and to the principles of good faith on which it is basically founded. In the long run Japan will not be good enough as an associate even for Germany.

But don't let us ever be lulled into a feeling of false security where the Japanese are concerned. They have in full measure the fanaticism, tenacity and brutality of the Germans and one of the great illusions shattered by recent events in the Far East is that the Japanese are a chivalrous race. Their behaviour at Hongkong, their treatment of prisoners, their savagery towards many missionaries of all nations give the lie to this. Until the boundless ambition of the Japanese is finally checked, no world peace is possible. But in the end they will be beaten. It has been proved in North Africa that no army, not even the German, is invincible, and when at length the Americans and ourselves are in a position to challenge the Japanese with overwhelming naval and air superiority, they will be driven back to their own islands. Japan for the Japanese—there is no desire to challenge that.

BRIDGE OF ASIA

BY ROSITA FORBES

"THE Power which holds the oil of Central Asia, holds also the next thousand years of history." For such dominion the armies of von Bock and Rommel fought. Their purposes were the same. Their operations coincided. In effect they held two ends of one front and that the most important in the world. Asian oil is contained under the great limestone dome stretching from Northern Iraq and the Kirkuk fields through Khuzistan in Persia to the Caspian Provinces and the Caucasus. Within this geographical circle, roughly 400 miles in diameter, is contained the largest fuel reservoir in the world. Most of the material is still unexploited. Russia gets from her own fields some 32 million tons of oil annually for her war effort. Persian wells supply the Allies with approximately ten million tons. Iraq provides another four to five. But this is only a fraction of what Central Asia could produce. And within the same area there is three quarters of the world supply of manganese—used for hardening steel, invaluable for heavy artillery—a considerable proportion of its copper, the huge synthetic rubber plant at Erivan, the cotton of Soviet Armenia and Iraq, the linseed, sesame and barley, the unlimited date food which Japan offered to buy from Baghdad. For a triple purpose the Nazi armies fight. And it is as important that we should hold Egypt or at very least, Arabia, as that Marshal Timoshenko should maintain his grip on Caucasia and the Volga. Hitler's Eastern plan is comprehensive. (1) He wants the oil and minerals of Central Asia. Still more important than getting them himself is to prevent the Allies making use of them. (2) He wants to break Russia's life-line from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf and put an end to all British supplies except through the sub-Arctic. (3) He wants to join the Japanese operating from the Indian Ocean. He might do this either by means of an existing front, that is—through the Caucasus and Persia, or through Egypt and down the Red Sea. Alternatively he might try to accomplish it by means of a third offensive across Arabia. This last would link the Russian and Egyptian campaigns, transforming them into the flanks of a mighty drive through Palestine or Syria into Iraq. Damascus is only thirty-six hours by motor from Baghdad. The track made by the Nairn brothers after the last war, is now a desert highway. In two days' and two nights' hard going, a Panzer division might thrust from Mediterranean to the Shatt el Arab. If—simultaneously—the Japanese navy could reach the Persian Gulf the Axis would join forces. The raw material

captured with Malaya and Burma would go to feed the factories of occupied Europe and the *Reich*. If this happens, some economists claim that twenty years would be added to the war. It would become a cosmic struggle to be judged in terms of science rather than military effort! To achieve this, Germany must seize and hold the narrow 'Bridge of Asia.' To prevent this, a mighty allied battle front is being reinforced from Central Asia to Central Africa.

General Smuts, returning from his meeting with Mr. Churchill in Cairo rightly emphasized the vital importance of the Mediterranean war. A successful Front there is far more useful to Russia than any we could establish in Europe. For the Middle East provides a possible re-entry to Europe through the Balkans. It is the back door to Turkey by means of the Baghdad-Aleppo-Ankara railway, and to the Soviet Union through the Dardanelles, or by the new British built railway across Persia, to Tiflis or Baku. It is the main road to India, either by way of Arabia, Persia and Baluchistan, or directly across Africa from Allied bases on the West coast to the Sudan and Eritrea.

If ever we lose the Middle East, with it goes our chance of attacking Germany in the rear and also our position in the Moslem world. Our shipments to the Soviet would be limited to the extreme Northern route where in summer, convoys have to fight through unending daylight. The Allied plane and motorized transport services newly established across Central Africa would be jeopardized. And this enterprising exploit has doubled in value since Brazil's entry into the war, for her important strategic position at the American end of the shortest South Atlantic crossing facilitates quick and effective conveying to West Africa. The loss of the Middle East would mean that we should have to depend entirely on American and West Indian petrol, while Germany would acquire immeasurable quantities of oil, minerals, cotton, fruit, cereals and a good deal of gold. She could receive all the raw materials which Japan has captured in Malaya to feed the industries of the *Reich* and of occupied Europe. The whole of Asia would be closed to us and our part in the war would be reduced—temporarily—to defending Britain and keeping open the Atlantic ways.

All this Hitler knows. For years his plans in Arabia have been carefully laid. *To-day, he holds the position which we exploited in the last war.* For in the very words we used to raise the Arabs against the Turks, Nazi propagandists promise a "free and united Arabia" as the reward of a breach with Britain. "Allah in heaven and Hitler on earth!" is the message of Dr. Goebbels to Islam. Egyptian Fellaheen and Arab Bedouin are told that Hitler is a descendant of their Prophet Mohammed and the Protector of the Moslem peoples. The "Free Arabia" radio operating from Athens or Bari insists that Nazi Germany will destroy the British and the Jews. Berlin will bring the day of Liberation.

This same was promised by Lord Curzon in his famous speech "While the sun rises and sets, the Arab flag shall fly over the four cities of Hama, Homs,

Damascus and Aleppo." But it was not implemented at the Treaty of Versailles, owing to France's demand for the Syrian mandate, and it was rendered impossible by even the partial fulfilment of Lord Balfour's promise to the Jews of a National Home in Palestine.

Where Britain used the ambitions of the Sherif, afterwards King Hussein, and the vision of his son, Feisul, later King of Iraq, Dr. Goebbels (distorting the part of our Arab Bureau in 1917) employs the shrewd political talent and the possibly genuine nationalism of Jerusalem's Grand Mufti. This man, Haj Amin el Hussaini with his ally, Rashid Ali el Gailani, late Prime Minister of Iraq and supporter of the pro-German 'Golden Square' which led opposition to the British last year, is now on the move between Rome and Berlin. Their organization in Arabia is admirable and perhaps under-rated, except by such expert and traditional opponents of Von Papen (German Ambassador in Turkey) as Colonel Stirling and Major Blunt, representing in this war as they did in the last, 'intelligent anticipation' on the part of Britain in the Middle East. But the Mufti also is experienced and he can draw on twenty-three years of comparatively justifiable discontent. For Palestine has been split by ten centuries of history—the gap between primitive Arab and civilized modern Zionist, their spiritual roots respectively in the Ka-aba at Mecca and in the free-thinking, scientific universities of modern Europe—as much as by the conflicting promises of Curzon and Balfour.

Jew and Arab each believe that the land sacred to three great religions, but to only one nation (Zion) is his alone. Each race has been severely disillusioned by Whitehall, where, with patient courage, British officials attempted the impossible without the slightest hope of success.

There is of course no sympathy with Nazi Germany among the Jewish traders and expert agriculturalists who have brought prosperity to their highly developed Palestinian zones. And many Arabs still have a sentimental leaning towards the British with whom they fought under the Emir Feisul in the last war, and among whom they found such devoted and self-sacrificing friends as the late Sir Gilbert Clayton and Gertrude Bell, St. John Philby in Nejd, Peake Pasha still in Trans-Jordan, Colonel Joyce who did much to create the Iraq army, Colonel Stirling, familiar from Albania to Egypt, and Sir Kinahan Cornwallis for fourteen years King Feisul's closest friend, now British Ambassador in Baghdad.

But Palestinian Arabs have lost too much of their land. The generous price paid by Zionist purchasers has given them nothing in return. For money is of no use to the Moslem peasant accustomed to patriarchal life on a communal family inheritance. With his land, he disposed of his sustenance and having wasted the purchase money in a year or two, he joined the growing number of malcontents and ended, as likely as not, in a prison camp.

Syria has been in worse case, for since the end of the last war, her history has been a succession of hopeless rebellions punctuated by alternate reprisals and concessions on the part of France, the Mandatory Power.

Independence has always been the firebrand of Middle Eastern politics. But "national freedom" is interpreted in many different ways. To civilized Lebanon it means autonomy with an elective parliamentary system and a treaty with France according to which Syria shall be financed and protected in return for flying the *Tricolore* in as few places as possible! To Damascan Moslems it means a kingdom or republic including absolute dominion over the Christian seaboard and the Druses of the Hauran who are Arab only by generic name and hardly Moslem at all. It is probable that to Armenians, Assyrians, Chaldaeans and such strange survivals as the Devil worshippers—peaceful farmers in Jebel Sinjar—and the devotees of the moon, the fish, water or the colour blue, scattered over Syria, the most consoling definition of freedom would be incorporation in a French colony.

Unfortunately—for High Commissioners attempting to administer their Mandate for the mutual benefit of all races concerned—Syria is a continent in miniature. Among its most important elements are the two sharply divided Moslem parties, Sunnites and Shias, each over 150,000 strong and a third as many worshippers of the symbolic Golden Calf in Jebel Druse. Syrians, Greeks and Armenians are split into Orthodox and Catholic factions. Maronites and Metouelis carry on persistent feuds with the Bedouin who are still in the days of Abraham and with the Chaldaeans whose spiritual home is still Babylon. Jews, Ottoman and Osmanli Turks, Latin and Balkan merchants add to the confusion of centuries. How can a Western power cope with 4,000 years of mediæval history? Syria has had too much of everything—too much government and too much taxation, too many races and religions, too many promises and ministries and nationalists and officials.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement of twenty years ago, its protagonists an adventurous English imperialist and a French Consul shrewd to the point of brilliance, gave as Southern frontier to Syria the Ras na Kura heights which command Haifa. So our vital harbour and the terminus of the pipeline from Baghdad might—at any moment—have been within range of Axis guns if we had not occupied this Vichy held territory last year, subsequently handing it over to local rule with a certain amount of Free French direction. The latter element varies in popularity according to the religion, cultural station, political aspirations and local affairs of those concerned.

It is immensely important that the Allies should hold Syria. For a hostile force there, above all Axis planes operating from Rayak or other aerodromes, could cut off our supplies from Iraq and the East.

If Egypt ever has to be evacuated and the Suez Canal blocked, our highroad for food and munitions must come overland from the Persian Gulf. Turkey's backdoor is in the same direction. For she has completed an important strategic railway linking Ankara with Mosul and Baghdad. While she holds this line she does not need entry into Europe. She could lose Constantinople and still be safe where the genius of her first President, Mustapha Kemal enthroned her among the Anatolian hills. But she must have command of

her Eastern railway and for ten miles this all-important line runs through Syria. In view of the British-Turkish trade pact with India and the Dominions, this loop of railway to Aleppo, which town logically belongs to the port of Alexandretta, now a Turkish *sanjak*, becomes immensely significant.

Syria is still the key with which Germany hopes to unlock the Middle Eastern gates. An airborne invasion from Greece and Crete, supported by the Italian navy, would place Turkey between the pincers of two German armies. Simultaneously, the Mufti's organization would be expected to achieve effective rebellion in Palestine, while Rashid Ali's nationalists, directed—and misled—by Germany's 'Free Arab' wireless, would rouse German-armed tribesmen from Kurdistan to the borders of Nejd in support of whatever discontented elements remain in Iraq's army.

Palestine may prove too hard-shelled a nut for German guile to crack. For the Jews, representing intellectual Central Europe, farming Russia or the shepherds of Central Asia—so diverse have been the immigrants of two decades—should be solidly with the Democracies.

In September, 1939, there was a lull in racial and political strife. Arabs and Zionists simultaneously offered their services. Jewish volunteers amounted to 86,000 men (71 per cent. eligible for front line activities) and 50,000 women. Simultaneously, with trade relations growing between Arab Jaffa and Zionist Tel Aviv, the Jewish Agency offered to raise a Hebrew fighting force from Palestine and Israel's Diaspora. But the British Government decided on combined Jewish-Arab units, at first for the Auxiliary Forces and subsequently as combatants. By 1941, over 6,000 Jews and half as many Arabs were serving in the Middle East. In addition 1,500 Jews were with the R.A.F. in Arabia, and many more, in the front line abroad.

Unfortunately, the land transfer regulations, embodied in Mr. Macdonald's 1939 White Paper and coming into force a year later, threatened the truce between Jew and Arab by emphasizing the difference in their political aims. To preserve a portion of Palestinian soil in Arab possession, the country was divided into three zones. In (1) 6,615 square miles, mostly in the hills, land-transfer from Arabs to Jews was forbidden. In (2) 3,295 square miles, such transfer was restricted. In (3) 319 square miles, including a fertile coastal plain, transfer remained free. The Government explained that these regulations were necessary owing to the increase of the Arab population, their inability to make a living except on the land and the low standard of their agriculture. The Jewish Agency protested. Strikes followed. The war-time truce between Zion and Islam, between two nationalisms equally emotional, was broken.

Other difficulties arose over the immigration quota. Sixteen thousand Jews, largely refugees from occupied countries, reached Palestine during the first war year. Many entered the country illegally. Late in 1940, the Government announced that unauthorized immigrants would be deported to

a British colony for the duration of the war, after which it was hoped they could be repatriated. Nearly 2,000 were put on board SS. *Patria* at Haifa. There was an explosion and the ship sank. This protest cost a hundred and seventy Jewish lives. The survivors were allowed—as an exceptional favour—to remain in Palestine. But since then, 1,600 immigrants have been sent to Mauritius.

Palestine may not at present support a bigger population although the presence of our large Middle Eastern army has given a certain amount of employment and a stimulus to such production as does not need imported raw material and machine tools. But Jewish Palestine had hoped that the solution of land and immigration problems would be left till after the war. Effective Government action has disillusioned keen Zionist politicians. And the same action is stigmatized by the Mufti's followers as a repetitive threat to interests based on Arab domination of an Arab country. So the Germans profit. For the Mufti's organization, which will become extremely important if the *Reich* invades the Arabian peninsula, has its agents from Akaba to Teheran. Last year it was known that Haj Amin el Hussaini had received £10,000 sterling from the Italian Legation in Baghdad in return for an agreement to raise revolt in Palestine—at a suitable moment and an annual cost of approximately quarter of a million sterling. The Mufti had previously received gifts from Egypt, Nejd and Baghdad. The Iraq secret service at one time contributed a thousand dinars monthly to his foreign relations committee responsible for intrigue and propaganda. This was in addition to the parliamentary vote of 18,000 Iraq dinars. With so much money at his disposal, the Mufti had no difficulty in establishing cells throughout the more literate countries of Arabia. Nationalist organizations receiving German funds—after the fall of Poland, through Italian diplomatic sources—backed his campaign. During Rashid Ali's premiership in Baghdad (1940) the Mufti's power was at its height. Probably he had a good deal to do with the murder of Rustum Haider, Finance Minister, which caused the resignation of the patriotic P. M. Nuri es Said Pasha. It is said that he had arranged to have this pro-Allied statesman killed by German agents on his way to visit Ibn Saud in S. Arabia. Nuri Pasha learned of the plot and cancelled his journey.

When the British occupied Iraq after considerable opposition encouraged by the Mufti through varied enterprises, Nuri Pasha was re-established as Prime Minister. Yunis es Sab'awi, founder of the German-modelled Youth Movement, disappeared from the scene. Several key members of the Nazi influenced "Golden Square" were executed. Sheikh Ali Mahmud, ex-Minister of Justice, with the Chief of the General Staff, General Amin Zaki Suleiman, were imprisoned.

The Mufti and Rashid Ali escaped—to direct from Axis Europe a movement which would still be dangerous in case of German invasion. Throughout the Middle East, there exists the skeleton mechanism for organizing Arab revolt and maintaining a state of guerrilla war. There are cogs within the local

fighting forces and civil services. The driving-wheel is in the German Embassy at Ankara and the motive force is supplied by von Papen's subsidiaries. Orders are received by secret channels across Turkey and Syria. Nomad tribes, notably the Kochis or Suleiman Kheil—gypsies who wander with their camel caravans from Soviet Central Asia through Afghanistan and Persia to the Indian Ocean—act as Germany's telephone and banking system. Axis-controlled radio in Italy, Greece and the Balkans broadcasts direction. The German General Staff leave nothing to chance.

When the June, 1940, armistice released German subjects from internment in Syria, Dr. Goebbels got his chance throughout the Middle East. For these one-time political prisoners filtered back into the business and private life of the Mediterranean seaboard. One, Roland Eilender, Syrian-born but a German, was appointed leader of his compatriots in the Levant—Gauleiter in a Nazi future. Rudolph Roser, commercial agent, returned to Beirut—from Berlin—and until the Allied occupation of Syria last year, conducted widespread activities from a Lebanon hotel. By January, 1941, Germany's key expert for the Middle East was in Beyrout. This von Hentig, with experience of Central Asia acquired in the last war, was entrusted by von Papen, the friend and nominee of Ribbentrop, to prepare bases for Levantine rebellion in case of a German drive, air-borne across the Eastern Mediterranean, with Crete and Cyprus as its advance posts. The Rashid Ali movement in Iraq was one of his successes. It was cut short by successful British operations, military and political. With the Allied occupation of Syria, overt Nazi organization disappeared. But the Eastern Department of the German Embassy in Turkey has been stretched to enormous proportions. This controls—under Herr Chapeaurouge—preparations for front line activities, if the Nazi front now narrowed between the Caucasus and Egypt could be reinforced by invasion of Arabia. A new German Vice-Consulate works very hard at Iskenderun, a stone's throw from the Syrian border. The ubiquitous—and well-informed—Herr Roser is in charge. He is assisted by one of the Wilhelmstrasse's best women agents, Fraulein Koch, whose activities in Beyrout were once extremely effective. The Germans use disaffected tribesmen to whom they smuggle rifles and machine guns, genuine patriots to whom they promise a free and united Arabia after the defeat of Britain, refugees with Nazi tastes still in contact with their own countries, anyone with a grudge or an ambition who can be beguiled by German lies.

In the Middle East, there are nearly always several claimants to a throne or an inheritance. Every minority looks upon revolution as a practical and justifiable means of attaining power. So there is inevitably a discontented candidate who can be used by the enemy. Thus the Druse Chieftain, el Arslan, rival of the great Sultan el Atrash who fought French rule and led his fugitive people into the grim salt desert between Azraq and Nejd, became the German approved leader of his fellow-countrymen in the Lebanon.

Nazi agents meet constantly under the aegis of von Papen. They journey

between Turkey in Europe and Central Asia. The German Consulate in Adana furnishes funds and directions. Commercial travellers go as far as Erzeroum and Trebizond. Pilgrims go to Mecca. Gypsies bring carpets from Persia and take back tobacco from Greece and Macedonia. Berlin despatches constant material to Arabia, through local sympathizers who have seen von Bock's and Rommel's armies advancing and who believe they are ensuring the freedom for which they have struggled since 1917. In return, the D.N.B. office in Stamboul, its Eastern department run by Fraulein Krüss with the help of Arab, Persian and Indian assistants, receives much information to be collated and trimmed for propaganda broadcasts. The secret "Arab Nation" station pours out an insidious collection of misstatements, disparaging British prospects as well as British administration. Japan joins in with broader exaggerations. Athens and Bari combine false reports with tales, humorous and adventurous, such as Arabia has loved for two thousand years. Berlin employs an eloquent Baghdadi called Yunis Bahri, whose original Chaldaean blood stimulates his imagination, and a particularly appealing Persian Parsee called Shahra, whose father was a political irredentist. Right across Arabia, couched in many dialects and suited to all forms of intelligence, flows the oil and honey of Nazi propaganda, making smooth the way of eventual invasion.

Britain replies in practical fashion—by establishing good relations with local leaders, by increasing military and political strength, by building new roads and railways to facilitate war transport. America is storing supplies. Her forces multiply. Her Air Power grows. Month by month, if the Caucasus and Egypt hold, Germany's chances of an Arabian invasion—backed by local revolt—should decrease.

Meanwhile, Ibn Saoud, ruler of Central Arabia with some five million Moslem Puritans, the Wahabis, scattered over 700,000 square miles, cannot be ignored. Britain has not yet made the full measure of concessions necessary to consolidate majority Arab opinion in favour of the Allies, whereas German promises are as expansive as the myth which represents Hitler a miraculously born descendant of Mohammed, the Prophetic green girdle about his middle!

The King of Iraq is a child. The Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan is the least ambitious of Hussein, King of Mecca's sons. Without the charm and the pathetic vision of Feisul who lost two thrones and his life because of diverse and perhaps incompatible loyalties—to his ally Britain and to the Arabs—he is an engaging character, but not a driving force. Ibn Saoud, mighty in stature, shrewd in brain, is therefore the strongest personality in Arabia. The Germans know it. And any "federation" of Arab states for the greater convenience of Allied policy would repeat the primary mistake of Colonel Lawrence and the errors of the Turkish Empire, if it ignored the power of Riyadh's ruler.

Saudi Arabia is the vital factor within the huge peninsula to-day. Its King

will accept no authority but his own. He has many links with and considerable influence in neighbouring Moslem lands. The exiled Druses were befriended by him. In Nejd, those mighty fighters could have found new homes. If it is ever possible to generalize about Arabia—"continental" in diversity of interests—it can perhaps be said that the best, although certainly not the most sophisticated, elements between Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Mediterranean would be influenced by Ibn Saoud.

This desert Lord has never particularly loved the British, but his support has been unfailing and his advice to neighbouring states has always been in favour of co-operation with the Allies. Ibn Saoud is far too clever to have been bewitched by Berlin. He is entirely Arab and Moslem with some of Mr. Stalin's qualities of patience and foresight, cold, detached realism, enduring enmity or friendship, caution backed by intelligent suspicion—shrewd and diverse resource, urbanity when necessary, unexpectedly abrupt decisions on occasions. Neither Germany, America or Britain can afford to ignore Ibn Saoud. For Wahabi interest, the King of Nejd will make alliances and accept policies he may not wholly approve, but he despises most Arab leaders as impious and venial. Neither the Mufti nor Rashid Ali could hope for confidence from Ibn Saoud. But only with this ruler's help can an effective Arabia emerge from the chaos of the last twenty years and the dissident interests of to-day.

A "second front" second to none in importance has long been in existence from Persia through Egypt and East Africa to Madagascar. It has now been extended to cover most of North and North West Africa. From this allied Front, with the new Nigeria-Sudan airline as a supplementary supply system, the back doors to Axis Europe can eventually be forced. Italy can be crushed, the Caucasus relieved and the oil of Central Asia held—or retrieved if Hitler achieves a supreme gamble. For with the American-British drive succeeding in the Mediterranean, the German High Command may yet attempt either a diversionary thrust from Greece into the Arabian peninsula or invasion on a sufficiently big scale to disturb the Allied operations in North Africa. If so, the Ninth Army under General Wilson would share with the victorious Eighth the guardianship of those "next thousand years of history." For Hitler cannot be sure of the wells and mines threatened by Von Bock's advances to the Volga and the Caucasus, unless he can seize the Bridge of Asia. To hold it, with the indomitable Marshal Timoshenko undefeated on the northern flank and the American-British forces gathering strength on the southern would be the task of an earlier Alexander.

THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS

BY A. L. GOODHART

THE American elections which were held on November 3 are perhaps the oddest in the history of the United States. This is due to the fact that they will be of little or no importance so far as the immediate conduct of the war is concerned, but they may have a decisive effect in 1944 when the next Presidential election takes place. Moreover they may be influential in determining the American post-war international policy.

The *Stars and Stripes*, a daily newspaper published in London for the United States Forces in Europe, in commenting on the elections, quoted the remark of a soldier on leave: "We gotta fight a war right now. To hell with the election." The editor added that this "appeared to be the general attitude" of the American troops stationed in Great Britain. This same feeling of indifference seems to have existed throughout the United States, for the pre-election newspapers show that the campaign was rarely "front page" news. It was the war which interested the reader, and what the various candidates said could be relegated to the inside pages. This lack of interest was proved by the extraordinary falling-off in the number of voters as compared with those who had taken part in the 1940 election. It is true that the latter was a Presidential year, but even that does not explain such a radical change. In 1940 a little over 50,000,000 votes were cast, while in 1942 the total, when finally recorded, will probably amount to less than 26,000,000. This cannot be explained by the fact that only a small proportion of the 5,000,000 men in the army and navy took advantage of the complicated system which had been devised to enable them to vote, or that the shift in the working-class population to new war factories had prevented many of them from registering. This can account for only a minority of the non-voters. The dominant reason was that many of the people did not care what happened at the election because they did not think that it was important. They concurred in President Roosevelt's statement that he was too busy with the war to bother about politics. Unfortunately, as I shall point out later, the election may have a greater influence on the post-war world than some people have realized.

The election was, in a sense, a sham battle because there was no major issue which divided the Democrats and the Republicans. It was held because the United States Constitution provides that the whole House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate must come up for election every two years. There is no provision by which this can be postponed, war or no war: thus both in

1864 during the Civil War when General George B. McClellan ran on the Democratic ticket against President Lincoln, and in 1918 when President Wilson made the unfortunate mistake of asking that a Democratic Congress should be returned to support his war policies, elections were held and were fought with far more bitterness than has been manifested this time. It is unlikely that the Constitution will ever be amended on this point because on the whole these elections do less harm than might be expected. It is true that a certain amount of time is wasted during the political campaign, and that the prospect of facing their constituents makes Congressmen unusually cautious in the pre-election months, but on the other hand the occasion allows people to blow off steam. The political opponents, having abused each other during six weeks, will probably work together more amicably after the contest has been decided.

But although there was no major issue in this campaign, there were a number of minor ones which were of interest, and which the political commentators have been trying to analyse as a guide for the future. At one time it looked as if the election would result in the defeat of most of the former isolationists, both Republican and Democratic, there having been a certain number of the latter who had opposed the President's foreign policy. This would undoubtedly have happened if the elections had been held six months ago, shortly after Pearl Harbour, but in the intervening period public opinion had veered round on this point. The American voter, like his English brother, is essentially good-natured, and he does not like to blame a man for an honest mistake, especially if it was one which he was inclined to make himself. Therefore he felt that there was no reason to vote against a candidate merely because the latter had been an isolationist in the past. Pre-war isolationism, it was felt, did not mean that the war to-day must not be fought without the utmost vigour.

It was this demand for more progress in the conduct of the war which probably influenced many of the voters. It was on this ground that Mr. Wendell Willkie, who had been the Republican candidate for the Presidency two years ago, asked that his party's representatives should be elected. He spoke of the Administration's "lack of courageous leadership," and described the American war effort as "confused and in many respects inefficient." His demand for a "Second Front in Europe" was echoed by many people who felt that enough was not being done, and that the President should be prodded. They did not realize that their intended prod might turn into what would have been almost a knock-down blow if it had been just a little harder. A close analogy can be found in the British feeling last summer when a number of independent candidates were returned to Parliament. It must be gall and wormwood to those Democratic Congressmen who were defeated on November 3 to realize that if the elections had been held a week later they would probably have been elected, for North Africa has given the answer to Mr. Willkie's accusation that the Administration was "viewing the problems of

which has been frequently criticized, these chairmen are chosen strictly according to seniority, and if the Republicans had had a majority Hamilton Fish, the most violent isolationist in Congress, would automatically have become chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee of the House. Fortunately this did not happen for he would have been able to cause difficulties.

So far as war legislation is concerned the Republican gain of 45 seats will probably have little or no effect because both parties were pledged to the fullest support of the war effort. On this point ex-President Hoover, one of the leaders of the Republican party has said: "Our enemies can get no comfort from this election because the platform of every single candidate—Republican, Democrat and Labour—was vigorous and efficient prosecution of the war." Similarly Senator Vandenberg, a former isolationist, announced that the Republicans were anxious to take their full share of responsibility for the conduct of the war. Apparently Dr. Goebbels has understood this, for the German wireless has made no attempt to make propaganda out of the American elections. Since Pearl Harbour there has been no division between the parties on any of the major issues, and Congress has voted without any hesitation all the money for which the President has asked. The tax bill was delayed for many months, but this was due to the fact that the Congressmen, entirely apart from any question of party, could not decide what taxes would least hurt their chances of re-election. The only serious dispute in Congress has been concerning price regulation, but the division here was along regional rather than along party lines. It was the Farm Bloc, made up of both Republicans and Democrats, which opposed the price control of agricultural products. The election may, however, have some effect on legislation concerning the control of labour. There will be stronger support for the compulsory registration and drafting of all available man-power, a course to which the unions have so far offered strong opposition. The new House is likely to give the President full support if he decides that, owing to the shortage of labour, it is necessary for the Administration to take this step. On the other hand any attempt to give more powers to the unions would be certain to be defeated, but there is no reason to suppose that any extension of the New Deal legislation is contemplated at present. It can be said therefore that although the elections to the House of Representatives constitute a set-back to the Democratic party, they are not of major importance and will in no way affect the conduct of the war.

The Senate elections were less dramatic than were those of the House because only a third of the seats were being contested, but the result may prove to be of far greater importance. Before the election the Democrats held 66 seats, the Republicans 28 and the independents 2. The figures now are Democrats 57, Republicans 38 and independents 1. The important point to notice is that the Democrats no longer hold a two-thirds majority. As everyone knows since the unhappy fate of the Treaty of Versailles, it requires a two-thirds majority of the Senators voting to ratify a treaty, so that the

issue may hang on one or two votes. Thus President Wilson had a majority of the Senate in his favour in 1919, but he was defeated by a small group of "wilful men." As a Senator is elected for a term of six years it is probable that most of those chosen this year will still be in office when the various peace treaties come to be made. The gain of the ten seats by the Republicans in this election may therefore prove to be of the greatest practical importance then. If at that time a Democrat is still President it is highly probable that he will attempt to obtain Republican support by appointing a Republican Senator as a delegate to the Peace Conference, thus avoiding the fatal error made by President Wilson, but the present election may nevertheless act as a brake on increased American intervention in foreign affairs. The Republicans are, on the whole, more inclined to be isolationist than are the Democrats, and it is in the Senate that this influence will be most marked.

Apart from the Congressional elections, there have also been the elections of 34 State Governors and Legislatures. These are chiefly of local interest, but they may have a direct effect on the 1944 Presidential election. Here again the Republicans made notable gains, especially in winning the four key States of California, Connecticut, Michigan and New York which the Democrats had previously held, and in re-electing Governor Bricker of Ohio for a third term. The importance of these elections from the national standpoint is that the party which is in power in a State can strengthen its position by the use of political patronage. Moreover, an able Governor can build up the reputation of his party, so that the voters will be more likely to support it in a national election. This happened in New York where the twenty years during which Al Smith, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Herbert H. Lehman held the governorship did much to strengthen the Democratic party there. It was in that State that the most dramatic election of the present year was held, and one which will certainly be of importance in 1944. The Republican candidate, former District-Attorney Thomas Dewey, who had made a reputation as a "racket-buster" in New York City, won a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate Attorney-General John Bennett. This automatically makes him the leading candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency in 1944. He almost won this in 1940, but at the last moment Mr. Wendell Willkie defeated him. Now the tables are turned, because Mr. Dewey's election has materially weakened Mr. Willkie's influence. The latter appealed to the more progressive wing of the Republican party, while the former is more popular with the regular conservatives. It is generally thought that Mr. Dewey has isolationist tendencies, although he has been careful not to commit himself one way or the other. Therefore if Mr. Dewey should succeed President Roosevelt in the White House it is probable that the United States would play a less active part in world affairs. Strange to say, if Mr. Bennett, the Democratic candidate, had been elected this would have had an even more important, although a less direct, effect in 1944. He was the candidate supported by the famous Jim Farley who was President Roosevelt's

campaign manager in 1932 and 1936, but who resigned in 1940 as he hoped to get the nomination for himself. Since then no love has been lost between them, but the first open break did not come until this September when President Roosevelt tried to get the nomination for his supporter Senator Mead. Mr. Farley succeeded however in winning it for Mr. Bennett as he had lined up all the regular party politicians, who have no affection for the President, behind him. If he had succeeded in electing his candidate to the Governorship it would have greatly increased his reputation for political acumen, and it would have given him firm control of the Democratic party in New York State. As this is by far the largest and most important State, control of its delegation to the Democratic convention in 1944 would have given Mr. Farley a deciding voice in the choice of the Democratic candidate, and as he is a professional politician, who has never been a whole-hearted supporter of the President's policies, it is probable that this would have fallen on an anti-progressive Democrat. The defeat of Mr. Farley has placed the control of the Democratic party more firmly in President Roosevelt's hands, for it is now clear that without the President the Democratic party is like Hamlet without the Prince. The Democratic nomination in 1944 will therefore be determined by the White House, and will probably be given to Vice-President Wallace. His belief in international co-operation and his faith in the common man have been stated recently in speeches which have attracted the attention of the world.

This summary of the Congressional and State elections may have left the reader without any clear picture of what the results have proved, but the answer is that there can be no clear picture where so many conflicting tendencies have to be considered. Three points of importance stand out, however; first, the elections will in no way impede the war effort, secondly, the conservative elements in opposition to the New Deal and to increased international co-operation have been strengthened both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, while thirdly, the influence of President Roosevelt is more powerful than ever. It is this third result which will, perhaps, prove to be the most important.

THE KING'S SECRETARY

BY HAROLD J. LASKI

LITTLE by little our knowledge accumulates of the complicated metaphysics of limited monarchy. We have travelled far from the scene that Bagehot invited us to survey in the famous chapter of the *English Constitution* when the tree of our liberties was 'watered by the tears shed over the mausoleum at Frogmore.' It is not too much to say that the general burden of all the material goes to show that what the Monarch has lost in power, he has gained in influence. If it is probably an exaggeration to say, with Professor Keith, that the Crown is the reserve power of the Constitution, it is not beyond the mark to insist that no Prime Minister, however popular, could afford to neglect the goodwill the Crown can mobilize on his side. We are still a people deferential enough to look with awe upon the 'dignified' part of our political system. We take it for granted that our monarchs are a race set apart; and it is only the specialist who will enquire into the machinery which keeps the masses so able, in Burke's phrase, 'to venerate where they are not able presently to comprehend.'

Lord Ponsonby's life of his father,* Sir Henry Ponsonby, who was private secretary to Queen Victoria, is both an interesting and a valuable addition to our knowledge of this machinery. So far he had been known to us as a discreet figure in the background of the Court, who passed across the pages of the great political biographies of the Victorian period without our being able to know with any precision either what kind of a man he was, or just how he performed his delicate functions. We knew that he had been a brave soldier, that, although a man of liberal views, he yet commended himself no less to Disraeli than to Gladstone, and that his tact and discretion earned him the gratitude of a royal mistress who was never notable for generosity. Lord Ponsonby, with a skill that is beyond praise has turned a ghost into a man. It can never be easy for a son to be the biographer of his father; and it is particularly difficult for a son to write of a father whose life is passed in that *arcane imperii* which it is part of our system to conceal from the public view. Yet Lord Ponsonby has succeeded in giving us a biography in which the historian never yields to the courtier. He makes us understand the functions of the Monarch's secretary from within; and he lifts the mask with which he must, mostly, obscure his features, so that every so often we can see the smile flit across them or watch him suppress the shade of angry annoyance as

* *Sir Henry Ponsonby*, by Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede. Macmillan. 21s.

he steps into the royal room. Obviously, the book is, as it were, no more than a footnote to history; but it is a footnote of enough value for those who want to know how the actors in the drama are dressed to play their part on the stage.

In many ways, no doubt, the main result of the book is to give further emphasis to things we already knew. The Queen's strong political prejudices; her remarkable will-power which, at times, degenerated into obstinacy; the curious combination of a narrow mind with a high sense of obligation; the tenacity with which she defended her prerogatives; her curious absence of any affection for her children; her inability to see any point of view intellectually save her own; yet, with all these explosive qualities, an almost instinctive capacity for knowing when, in the final resort, she must give way; all these things are admirably illustrated afresh in Lord Ponsonby's pages. It is clear, I think, that her power came from the way in which she impressed all her Ministers with the depth of her devotion to duty, and, after a time, from the sheer weight of the experience she accumulated. She owed a great deal to her Ministers, above all to Gladstone; for only men of extraordinary generosity would have given the time and energy she so ruthlessly exacted from them, when, her own favourites apart, she was herself so little capable of magnanimity. It says much for their loyalty, that the public learned so little of the grumblings, denunciations, evasions to which they were continually subjected; and that the more when, after the epoch of Melbourne, few of them had ever the luxury of dealing with her on equal terms.

But, if her debt to her Ministers is great, that to her private secretary is almost immeasurable. The position, in Sir Henry Ponsonby's case, may well be called a dignified slavery. He must be at her beck and call; even the claims of family affection must be sacrificed to a mistress who brooks no rival to her power. He must know all that is going on; he must be ready to advise upon all. But he must never so advise that he seems to influence the decision taken by the Queen in terms of the premisses of his own thought. He is the confidant of all Ministers, but he must never leave the impression that he is anybody's man. He must intrude without ever seeming to intrude. He must learn how to deflect the lightning from others. He must be able to carry the burden of her mistakes. He must not know the meaning of fatigue. He must take correction without being provoked to the humanity of remonstrance. He must accept condescension as a favour, and he must know when to be deaf and blind. He must have the art of translating attitudes into the gestures which make the royal relations possible. Receiving a thousand secrets, he must discriminate between what may emerge and what shall remain obscure. And he has to steer his way through the complicated labyrinth of anxious politicians, jealous courtiers, the mass of continental royalties, each of whom is on the watch lest a right be withheld or a claim denied.

It is a life passed amid circumstances in which the most trifling incident may lead to major disaster. It is a life, too, which affords the maximum

opportunity for the mischief-maker. The royal secretary walks on a tight-rope below which he is never unaware that an abyss is yawning. If the Monarch is lazy, like Edward VII, his very presence may almost become an error of judgment. If the Monarch is hard-working, like Queen Victoria, all his tact and discretion are required to keep firmly drawn the possible lines of working relations in a constitutional system. He has to be himself, since his sincerity is the crux of his position; but he must never be so insistently himself that Ministers are disturbed by his influence. It is vital that he be a judge of character; he has to thread his way through a host of influences the effective measurement of which is essential to the Monarch's position. He has to translate the obvious decisions of common sense into the elaborate formulæ which the etiquette of the system requires. He must accept its pomps and ceremonies without fatigue; and he must be able to make the elegant minuet he is constantly performing capable of adaptation to a world which is constantly changing. Half of him must be in a real sense a statesman, and the other half must be prepared, if the occasion arise, to be something it is not very easy to distinguish from a lacquey. No one who studies Lord Ponsonby's pages with attention will doubt that Sir Henry Ponsonby is one of those half-observed figures in the Victorian age to whom the monarchy owes more than the Monarch will ever know, much less seek to repay.

For he has to put aside his personal views; a private secretary to the Monarch who pushed his ideas might easily precipitate a crisis. He must be pretty nearly selfless; once private ambition begins to colour his horizons, his usefulness is over. He must move serenely amid all the events which move other men to passionate statement; he must seem, therefore, never to feel while he never appears to be without the power of sympathetic response. The secretary to the Monarch, in short, occupies to the Crown much the same position that the Crown itself in our system occupies to the Government; he must advise and encourage and warn. But whereas the Monarch can speak his mind—as we know from the royal letters of the last hundred years—the private secretary has no such luxury. He interprets as best he can a tradition which is never quite the same from one Monarch to another, never, indeed, quite the same from one Prime Minister to another with the same Monarch. We may be pretty sure that Sir Henry's burden was a very different one when Mr. Gladstone was in office from what it was when Mr. Disraeli was Prime Minister; just as his function was in many ways different from that performed either by Sir William Knighton or by Sir Herbert Taylor.

It is very difficult to exaggerate the importance of the post, not least perhaps, when there is on the throne a woman with the strong prejudices and iron will of Queen Victoria. I do not think it is beyond the mark to say that a bad private secretary, one who was rash, or indiscreet, or untrustworthy, might easily make the system of constitutional monarchy unworkable unless the Monarch himself was a person of extraordinary wisdom. This is so because the system is built on compromises, accommodations, a process of

half-measures, in which an attempt, on either side, to dominate might rapidly produce an explosive atmosphere. The Monarch, with us, has grown in influence as he has surrendered power and the very fact of that growth means that those who are playing for power will seek to capture his influence. To keep the Monarch nicely balanced in the delicate position he occupies is likely to call for a diplomatic talent of the first order. For, first, it is not very likely that the Monarch himself will be a really able man; we have only had two Kings of real ability upon the throne since the Restoration. And, second, it is still less likely that the Monarch will be a person of large or generous views; the problem of a royal education which evokes this outlook seems to remain insoluble. The need, therefore, of this diplomatic talent is central to our system; there can hardly be a compensation for its absence.

That will be obvious to anyone who reflects on the great political crises of recent years, not least upon the dynamite which might so easily have exploded at the time of Edward VIII's abdication. Bad advice when Mr. Bonar Law resigned, an indiscretion at the time when the first Labour Government took office, or in 1931, might have provoked a political conflict of the first magnitude. The Crown, so to say, in our system may be heard but must not be seen and no one has so large a part to play in organizing its discretion as the private secretary to the King. The one thing he must seek to prevent is the emergence of a situation where the Crown becomes the arbiter of the national destiny. That was why, it may be noted, the Labour Party so rightly refused to oppose Lord Baldwin and his cabinet over the abdication; for had that momentous event resulted in the dismissal of the Government, the restoration of active power to the Crown would have altered in a dangerous way the whole balance and direction of our Constitution. Probably the most important service Lord Esher ever rendered to that Crown to which he was so devoted was when he insisted, despite the great authority of Professor Dicey and Sir William Anson, that the King must in every circumstance act upon the advice of his Ministers. No function of the private secretary can ever be more important than the task of preserving this tradition. For upon its preservation the very life of constitutional monarchy depends.

And the task may well prove more important in the next generation than it has been in the last. Sir Henry Ponsonby had some difficult problems to solve; none that he faced was as delicate or as dangerous as those by which Lord Stamfordham was confronted; and I venture to doubt whether Lord Stamfordham ever met an issue so full of difficulty as that confronted by Lord Wigram in 1931. It is, indeed, at least possible that the theory which underlay the decision of 1931 may come to prove a vital precedent in our future history. It is, broadly speaking, the theory which Professor Keith has evolved into the argument that the King is the 'guardian of the constitution,' that there are, therefore, rare, but decisive, moments, in the national life when the King must exchange the duty of influence for the exercise of power.

I believe this theory is a dangerous one, since a monarch whose exercise of

power was not approved by the nation would have made his position an impossible one. The private secretary, therefore, must bend all his energies to the task, first of preventing, if he can, the rise of a situation in which the King decides to act, and, second, if the situation looms, of making political parties understand the dangers implicit in its emergence. To keep the Crown a dignified emollient, to confine its acts to ceremonial, to maintain the ultimate faith of parties in its neutrality, these are the terms upon which the metaphysics of constitutional monarchy can continue to be accepted. Because our generation is entering upon a period in which, as in the seventeenth century, we shall be compelled to re-examine the foundations of our society, the post of the King's secretary is likely to be a post of quite outstanding importance. He will 'shape the whisper of the Throne' in a way and in a degree that may well be decisive of its future. The Crown will be fortunate indeed if the secretaries of the next generation have the qualities of mind and heart which made Sir Henry Ponsonby the ideal holder of the office.

THE BATTLE OF EGYPT

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

IN order to compare the problems of the opposing commanders and their methods of solving them it is, I think, well to look on the battle of Egypt as having begun with Rommel's offensive in early September. The interval between his and Alexander's offensive was of course so long that the latter had practically none of the advantages of a counter-attack on an exhausted enemy. This makes comparison all the more straightforward, and enables us to appreciate fully Alexander's great achievement. The main problem presented to both commanders was the destruction of the opposing army, strongly entrenched in a position which had no open flanks. Decisive results and not merely the gaining of ground was the aim.

When Rommel attacked he had certain definite advantages. His troops were flushed with victory, and if not numerically superior possessed in some respects superior armament. His opponent was also bound to hold his ground, for there was no equally favourable position in rear covering Alexandria. Moreover, if he could break through the defences he would enter a terrain in which he would have room to exploit manoeuvre.

The 8th Army position was not held in uniform strength but consisted of a pivot position strongly held by artillery and less mobile troops, with a flank thrown back covering its lines of communication in such a way as to require a long movement to turn it. The rest of the front was lightly held by mobile detachments, but covered by minefields which would delay any attempt to break through. Behind this part of the front armour provided elastic defence. Rommel might penetrate here, but he was not given the opportunity he had at Gazalá of isolating portions of the defensive line, and the solid block of the position provided a base for counter-attack on his communication if he attempted an enveloping movement, or tried to bring Montgomery's armour to decisive action. This, it will be remembered was the course Rommel adopted, attempting to achieve his object by a decisive thrust towards Montgomery's communications without making any serious frontal attack on his main position; repeating the tactics he employed in the Gazala battle, but without having the opportunity of isolating defensive groups. He was compelled eventually to attack with his armour, Montgomery's strong thrown back flank, was repulsed with heavy loss and forced to retreat, lacking the support of his main infantry force to protect the communications of his forward thrust. Possibly owing to lack of confidence in Italian troops Rommel, in

fact, made singularly little use of his infantry, except those of his mobile divisions. Nor does he appear to have made much use of artillery except in support of his armour, nor of the *Luftwaffe*. That possibly may have been due to the difficulty of maintaining adequate supplies of ammunition and petrol by his long and precarious line of communications. Nevertheless he appears to have been obsessed with the idea of rapid and decisive envelopment without preparatory wearing down action. In Montgomery's disposition and conduct of the battle there are obvious indications of a governing tactical idea based on the actual situation and on a correct anticipation of his opponents methods, rather than adherence to stereotyped defensive theory.

Rommel's offensive may have been forced on him by the knowledge that heavy reinforcements were on the way to Montgomery, and that, in view of his own reinforcement difficulties, no better opportunity of defeating the 8th Army was likely to arise. The same factors obviously made it inadvisable for Montgomery to attempt a major counter-attack when his opponent retired. It could hardly have had more than limited success, and could not have been exploited to the full.

To turn now to the second phase of the battle. Rommel, after his offensive failed, fell back to his previous defensive position, and for nearly two months devoted his energies to strengthening it. He must have been well aware that Alexander, when fully reinforced and fully prepared, would attack; and he must have been conscious, that if he failed in defence, his position, with a long and tenuous line of communication, would be precarious. But his position was quite as strong as the one Montgomery had successfully held. It was organized in accordance with defensive doctrines elaborated by the German General Staff on the experiences of the last war, and it embodied recent developments of anti-tank defence—multiplication of anti-tank weapons of power and mobility, minefields and obstacles. The doctrine taught that defensive action should in the main be mobile and in the open—counter-attacks, immediate and deliberate, delivered against the attacking troops when exhausted and disorganized. Artillery fire and the static resistance of mutually supporting strong points disposed in depth would tend to disorganize the attack, but artillery positions were sited especially to cover counter-attacking action. Temporary loss of forward areas was accepted as preferable to the risk of large numbers being overwhelmed in the first onset of the attack.

There was much to be said for this doctrine which provided for active and elastic defence in depth. It seemed especially designed to meet attempts to break through the position in an initial major onslaught, such as in most instances marked the opening of offensives in the last war. It had, however, points of weakness. It demanded great initiative from subordinate commanders, and a very high standard of training and courage for effective counter-attack. It postulated an amount of disorganization and exhaustion in the attack which might not occur if the attack was delivered in carefully designed stages with limited objectives, and by well-trained troops not easily

thrown back by counter-attack. Nor, I think, did it allow sufficiently for the advances made in artillery technique and for air attack, both of which tend to make counter-attacks very expensive. The great extension of wireless communications also favours the attacker, reducing confusion and enabling support to be given without delay. Prompt and vigorous counter-attack is of course still an essential feature in the conduct of defence, but if recklessly employed may lead to rapid attrition of reserves. In the last war our troops, insufficiently trained were perhaps unduly sensitive to counter-attack, but even then the Germans had to give warnings against their wasteful and indiscriminate employment.

Information is still lacking* on which to form definite conclusions, but it would seem that Montgomery played on the weaknesses in the German theory. He did not launch the offensive with an all out attempt to break through. The depth of Rommel's positions and his great system of mine-fields must have made such attempt in any case impracticable. His initial attacks were well controlled and had limited objectives. They drew counter-attacks which were met by well trained infantry, and were in many cases broken up by artillery and bombing. Apparently, in an attempt to make immediate counter-attacks more effective, Rommel was induced to employ German troops and armour from his main reserves which he had intended to use in a decisive counter-attack against any premature break-through attempt. The disposition of his reserves was also affected by the weight of Montgomery's initial attacks being in the north. They were therefore wrongly placed to meet the final break through in the north centre. It is, therefore, evident that Montgomery began his attack with a deliberate policy of tactical attrition; for which the initiative, offensive spirit and high training of his infantry provided a powerful instrument, capable of making steady progress in a series of minor attacks, generally at night. Intense artillery and air action was also employed to wear down the morale of the defence, and to break up counter-attacks. Not until this process had formed a gap in the enemy's defences was the final break-through attack launched, carried out by two armoured divisions and the motorized New Zealand divisions, fresh and well under control. Rommel's depleted armoured reserves were incapable of stopping it, and the decisive victory had been won. The remainder of the story is too well known to need comment. The Allied air-force, which, as I pointed out last month is never more formidable than in pursuit, quickly turned Rommel's attempt at an orderly retreat into a rout, despite his sacrifice of his Italian allies to facilitate escape.

It is interesting to compare Montgomery's tactics with those adopted generally in the last war. He began with attrition and reserved his break-through effort till attrition had done his work. Haig, on the other hand, although he had at an early stage adopted a strategic policy of attrition, in

his earlier offensives began with an all out attempt to effect a tactical breakthrough, and only fell back on tactical attrition when the initial blow had exhausted itself and been brought to a standstill. French and German commanders followed much the same policy. Foch and Haig in the final phases of the war did, however, resort to tactical attrition on a grand scale, but at a stage when it could not be followed by a break-through. Conditions were of course widely different in the last war. The possibilities of defence in depth were only gradually developed, but all the same Plumer in the final stages of the Battle of Passchendael showed how tactical attrition of defences in depth could be effected by a series of well controlled limited attacks.

Many factors of course contributed to the success of Alexander's offensive in addition to Montgomery's skilful tactics. Naval and air attacks on Rommel's supply lines almost certainly left him short of petrol and other essentials—this may especially have contributed to the very ineffective part played by the *Luftwaffe*. The superiority established by the R.A.F. made an immense contribution to the success of the main battle, and was of decisive importance in the pursuit. Artillery again came into its own, and evidently was as effective as bombing in wearing down the enemy's morale, and, within its range, was perhaps even more destructive. Nothing can, however, minimize the credit due to the infantry and sappers who opened the way for the decisive thrust, and who bore the most continuous and prolonged strain. The infantry has proved that well trained and properly equipped it is still an attacking arm, capable of much more than merely following a barrage to occupy and defend ground gained by artillery and armoured action. In this battle in fact it was required to open the way for tanks, not vice versa.

The question obviously arises, should Rommel have accepted the battle he must have foreseen, or should and could he have retired to a less dangerous position when his own offensive had failed? Was he over-confident in German defensive theories hoping to be able to deliver a crushing counter-attack with his armour? One can well believe that he may have been unwilling to admit that Montgomery could be any more successful in breaking through a well organized defensive position than he himself had been, and, at the worst, relied on his counter-attacking ability. Was it in fact a case of underrating the enemy, or was it that he could not, with his precarious line of communications, afford to sacrifice reserves of material he had accumulated in his position? Their withdrawal without heavy loss would hardly have been practicable.

On the whole we may suspect that Rommel's capacity was over-rated, and that his previous successes were in fact due very largely to superior armament. But in defence he certainly applied recognized German methods and theories and his Italian troops appear to have fought quite well. It is possible therefore that, when the time comes, the defensive wall Hitler relies on will not prove as invulnerable as he claims?

* Written before General Alexander gave his illuminating account of the methods employed in the 8th Army attack.

THE MEDITERRANEAN CAMPAIGNS

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

THE words "second front" have been much in prominence in recent months, and no one doubts that the final defeat of Germany will not be achieved without bringing the war into the heart of Hitler's country. Before, however, that can be done two things are necessary: the superiority essential for decisive victory, on land and in the air, must be available and a strategical situation created which will impose the greatest difficulties and disadvantages on the enemy; and, not least, the shipping situation must be such as to render possible the maintenance of the very large forces which will have to be maintained across the wide spaces the supplies for those forces must be carried.

The phase through which the allied nations is now passing is that of building up that situation. It is still largely defensive—we are on the defensive on the ocean routes, in the Eastern Seas, in India and the Indian and Pacific Oceans. We are beginning the offensive in the Mediterranean with the operations which will, it is to be hoped, open the way to the control of that sea which is the essential preliminary to the decisive action. When the "command" of the Mediterranean shall have been gained the Allies will be established in positions along its southern shore which will confer on them the initiative and the power of taking the offensive which, as every writer on war has said, is an eternal advantage, he who possesses it knowing where he is going to strike needing to be strong at that point only while his opponent, in the suspense of his ignorance, must be strong everywhere; and everywhere is a wide term when the possibilities of attack stretch from the north of Norway to the extreme east of the Levant.

While that situation is being laboriously created the Allies are engaged on no less than six fronts—"second front" is indeed somewhat of a misnomer so far as we are concerned; we who have had a 2,000 mile front on land and sea between Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, a front stretching from the Straits of Bab el Mandeb to the islands in the South Pacific, a front at home in the Channel, the North Sea and the Arctic, another on land in the frontiers of India, another in the Middle East and, finally, one other vast front on the many routes of shipping across the Atlantic. A major disaster on any one of these fronts would undermine the position on all the others: the Russian front would at once feel the repercussion of the loss of command in the Atlantic or the northern route to Murmansk.

Of all those fronts one in particular is now commanding our profound attention—the Mediterranean. Since the launching of the attack by the army of the Nile on October 23 a transformation has taken place in the general situation which, if it proceeds as it has begun, will affect all the others. The German military staff has shown great skill in mounting so-called "pincers movements"—movements in which two separate bodies, whose places of concentration and objectives are as much concealed as possible, combine to fall upon the flanks of, and to surround, a portion of the enemy forces. This time it has been the Allies who have devised and carried to a successful opening such a "pincers" operation in the co-ordinated attacks of the Army of the Nile on Rommel's Axis forces in Egypt and of the sea borne expedition from the United States and Britain on Morocco and Algeria. It is the greatest of all conjunct operations that have ever been undertaken; it greatly exceeds in magnitude those of the Japanese, important and extensive as they were, in the Russo-Japanese and the present wars. In its preparation and its execution it has achieved one of the greatest aims of the strategist—secrecy and surprise. It is very far from easy to conceal the preparations for a movement on such a scale—to assemble shipping without the assemblage being observed, to move the large bodies of troops to the places of embarkation, to embark the immense quantities of warlike stores, to cross the ocean over miles of water and to arrive, undetected and unexpected, at the many points of disembarkation with the punctuality of a Scottish express. While concealment was one of the means by which this surprise was effected it appears proper to assume that the "passive" form of secrecy was not the only one but that the active one of misleading the enemy as to the allied intentions also played a part. We witnessed, during the last few months, an intensive effort on the part of the enemy to fortify the northern coasts of Norway, to terrorize the Norwegian people, to strengthen the land, sea and air forces in the northern districts. All these were signs that the enemy expected, and feared, an invasion there; and, considering the advantages to be gained by the ejection of his sea and air forces from those positions flanking the route to Murmansk, it is natural that he should fear such an attempt. We may not unreasonably, also, associate those fears with his knowledge that there were military forces in the northern parts of this island, provided with landing craft and practicing the operations of disembarkation; forces which had been used in "commando" attacks on the Lofoten Islands and elsewhere, thus obtaining the required training and experience in preparation for a larger operation. And, while a feeling of insecurity was being thus engendered in the extreme north, tying down, as we may fairly believe, a certain amount of land and air and submarine force in that part, we saw an American combined expedition landing in Liberia with the asserted object of countering any Axis activities in the Republic in favour of the U-boat campaign. No belligerent announces the real intention of his acts, none is so foolish as to inform the enemy of why he is taking a particular action. The interpretation to be put upon that

movement must therefore be something else, and what else could it be but an attack upon Dakar? So again measures to strengthen the defences and the garrison of that base must be taken. The two spots, Liberia and the North Cape, lie at the extremities of the western sea front, at the greatest distance from the actual objective in the entrance to the Mediterranean and on the Moroccan coast. Thus, attention was drawn from the true objective to places as remote as possible from it; a very satisfactory feint, if this reading of the situation is correct.

The landing was made, as we have seen, with complete success. Up to the time of writing—mid-November—things have gone well both in Libya and French Africa and the prospects that the Axis armies will be thrown out of Africa appear good, dangerous as it is to prophesy in this uncertain game of war in which the unexpected has so often befallen both ourselves and the enemy. It is, however, too much to assume that this, if done, will give us, as some seem to think, "command" of the Mediterranean. It is not from the African bases that the main attacks by U-boats and aircraft have been made, but from Sicily and Sardinia—some aircraft did approach the convoy that was so fiercely attacked in June last from the direction of Tunis, but the bulk of the attack was from the two islands to the north. But the possession of the bases, both for naval and air forces, on the north African coast will most materially strengthen the powers of defence. We saw, in the escapes of the battlecruisers from Brest, the strength of a defence against aerial attack. Fighter aircraft, in spite of the limited time which they can keep in the air, could be thrown out in relays as the three ships moved up Channel and so give them a continuous protection from the sky. With airfields on the African coast a similar continuous protection should be possible, a protection far greater than the limited resources of an aircraft carrier can possibly provide. So, too, in the attack on the Mediterranean convoy we saw that enemy motor torpedo boats were among the attacking forces; the cruiser *Manchester* was torpedoed by one of them and lost. The true defence against these small swift and almost invisible craft is the motor gunboat, the type which we have been hearing of in the Channel and North Sea where they have done some excellent work. But so long as we have had no bases from which these comparatively short ranging craft can work they could not accompany a convoy throughout the long stretch of the 1,000 mile route between Gibraltar and Malta. Now, with a string of useful bases, they, like the fighters should be able to afford protection throughout the danger area.

Finally, though we must assuredly expect a concentration of Axis submarines in the western basin and mid-Mediterranean—report indeed has it that boats have been hastened in from the Atlantic—the possession of the north African coast will enable a combined defence of air craft and light craft to be organized and conducted. It is in working these two types in combination that the greatest efficiency of both is developed; it is hardly too much to say that the effects of each are doubled.

There will still remain the surface forces of the Italian navy. The allied light craft operating against submarines offensively, or engaged in the defence of convoys need cover against superior forces of surface craft. Bombers and torpedo carrying aircraft constitute, as we have seen in the Pacific and the Mediterranean, a very considerable threat and deterrent to these larger vessels, particularly within comparatively limited areas, though not there only as the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway showed. The battleship herself, for all her armour, her underwater protection and her size, is by no means a safe conveyance. Nevertheless, if further operations are to be undertaken, as we hope they will be, it will be necessary to ensure that no interruption from these larger vessels is possible. The most effective way of preventing it is to disable or destroy those ships and, though the Italian navy has shown itself singularly unenterprising and ineffective, it would be sound policy to get rid of it once and for all, and thus set free our own cruisers and heavy ships for work in the Indian Ocean where they will in good time be needed. Lying at Naples the bigger ships have been out of range of the heavy bombers from Britain, and though increases in the aircraft accommodation at Malta have recently been made a greater force could be operated from the more extensive bases in Africa.

There have been moments when it seemed possible and even likely that a German move through Spain might be made, of which one object would be to neutralize Gibraltar as a naval base, the effect of which would have been serious both to the operations in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Now, with a number of alternative bases stretching from Mogador to Tunis, the neutralization of Gibraltar would be of a far lesser moment—its capture may be dismissed altogether. For this Spain may well feel grateful. The prospect of a German move through Spain, on the customary pretext of the altruistic intention to protect the country against an imminent attack by Britain, will no longer exist; for the move would lead nowhere. It could not carry German armies into Africa and even if it could bring the harbour of Gibraltar under fire from guns or bombardment from the air, the results would not be worth the candle.

The effects of the North African victories have been recognized in Russia and have produced a welcome alteration in some of the public utterances there. It is however to be regretted that the second front is still harped upon in language that conveys the impression that there has been a reluctance on the part of this country to send help in this form to the hard pressed Russian armies. The Mediterranean campaigns are now actively preparing the way for an offensive. To undertake an offensive before the way is prepared is to play into the hands of the enemy.

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA: A RETROSPECT

BY SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT

A JOLT, physical, moral, or intellectual, is at the best, an uncomfortable sensation. It may even be painful. At the worst it may be fatal. For many political jolts to England Russia has been responsible. Few thoughtful Englishmen can have read without discomfort Mr. Joseph Davies's recent work *Mission to Moscow*. It suggested a good many questions. Has England been wrong about Russia all the way through—or at any rate between 1833 and 1907? Since 1917, or at least since 1924? More definitely since 1934? These dates are not selected haphazard; but though suggestive to the historian, they are not self-explanatory.

The explanation, though it involves an historical retrospect, need not be lengthy. Relations between Russia and England are of relatively recent origin. They date only from the last decades of the eighteenth century. Until the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725) Russia had been absorbed in the task of internal consolidation—a task long drawn out, and not until a much later date more than partially achieved.

During this process contact was rarely made between England and Muscovy, and when made did not endure. There was one partial exception. In 1553 some London merchants, stimulated by the profitable enterprises of the Portuguese and the Spaniards, formed a Company with a capital of £6,000 and fitted out three ships "for the discovery of regions, dominions, islands and places unknown." The expedition, under the command of a famous seaman Sir Hugh Willoughby, reached Lapland. But the crews of two of his ships perished with Willoughby himself in the rigours of the Russian winter. The crew of the third, under the command of Richard Chancellor reached Archangel, and made their way to Moscow where Ivan received them hospitably and sent back by Chancellor a cordial invitation to Edward VI to open up trade with Russia. That invitation led to the establishment of the "Muscovy Company" of which Sebastian Cabot was the first Governor and under its auspices industries were established in Russia for making ropes, boiling tar, and burning potash. For some years the English Company successfully exploited its initial advantages but succumbed to Dutch competition.

The reign of Peter the Great opened a new phase in Russian history. Peter was determined not only to Westernize Russia itself, but by "opening windows" on the Baltic and the Black Sea to give his country a place in the European System. The foundation of Petersburg brought the Tzar into conflict with Sweden then the dominant Power in Northern Europe. The attempt to establish a port on the Black Sea meant the opening of the age-long conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire which had but lately passed the zenith of its power.

The Russian capture of Azov (1696) initiated a new development in an immemorial problem—"that shifting, intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests, rival peoples and antagonistic faiths that is veiled," as John Morley once said, "under the easy name of the Eastern Question." Hitherto the Black Sea had been a Turkish lake. Azov, indeed, had to be surrendered temporarily in 1711, but by the Treaty of Belgrade (1739) it was recovered by the Russians though only on condition that its fortifications were destroyed. Nor were they allowed to sail the Black Sea except in Turkish ships. Not until the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774) did Russia obtain a firm grip upon the Black Sea and begin seriously to threaten the ascendancy of the Turk in the Near East. From that time until the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1920 the rivalry between the Muscovite and the Turk increased.

How did Great Britain regard this development? The younger Pitt was the first English Statesman to give any heed to it, and it was not until Lord Palmerston's day that Englishmen at large manifested any real jealousy of the progress of Russia towards Constantinople. Until 1780 England had, indeed, cordially welcomed Russia's entrance upon the stage of European diplomacy;—politically as a counterpoise to the dangerous pre-eminence of France; commercially as an exporter of the raw material required for naval construction and as a considerable importer of English goods and of colonial produce carrier to Russian ports in English bottoms. The elder Pitt was a consistent advocate of an alliance with Russia, then under the highly competent rule of Catherine II. Convinced that we should never be friendly with the Turks Lord Chatham wrote to Lord Shelburne in 1773: "Your Lordship knows I am quite a Russ. I trust the Ottoman will pull down the Bourbon in his fall." In regard to Russia, Fox inherited the views of Chatham.

Nor was the Tzarina Catherine unfriendly to England. On the contrary she concluded in 1762 a commercial treaty with us, and in the earlier days of our war against the American Colonies Russia, like the other Northern Powers, leant towards the English side. Yet it was Catherine who gave the first jolt to Anglo-Russian relations. After the intervention of France in the American War of Independence the great French diplomat Vergennes, invited Catherine (1778) to place herself at the head of a League to protest against the English Maritime Code which then, as afterwards, caused great irritation to neutrals. Anxious not to annoy England Catherine contented herself by begging England to use "a little more circumspection in the mode of proceeding against the ships of neutral States." But her protest proved unavailing and in 1780 she headed the League formed by the Northern Powers (*The Armed Neutrality*) in protest against the policy pursued by England against neutral shipping. The League was renewed by her successor Paul I at the height of the struggle between England and Napoleon (December, 1800).

Meanwhile, the younger Pitt had come into conflict with Catherine's ambitious scheming in the Near East. Assured of the cordial support of the Emperor Joseph II, Catherine not only annexed and fortified the Crimea

(1783), but resolved to expel the Ottoman Turks from Europe, and to re-establish the Greek Empire in favour of her second grandson Constantine. Her first step was the conquest of the great fortress of Oczakov. This aroused Pitt's suspicions and Catherine accused him of inciting Gustavus III to attack Russia in the Baltic and so diverting its attention from the Black Sea. "As Mr. Pitt," said the Tzarina, "wishes to chase me from St. Petersburg, I hope he will allow me to take refuge at Constantinople." Though the insinuation was groundless, the intervention of Sweden undeniably served Pitt's purpose. In 1790 Pitt was moved to assume a firmer attitude towards Russia; he demanded that Catherine should surrender Oczakov, urging that "the interests which this country had in not suffering the Russians to make conquests on the coasts of the Black Sea were of the utmost importance." That, as far as I know, is the first reference to "British interests" in the Near East. The significant thing is, however, that Pitt's suspicions evoked no response whatever either in Parliament or in the country at large; he was compelled, therefore, to effect a rather humiliating retreat, and Catherine had her way about Oczakov without interference by England.

During the Napoleonic Wars Russia pursued a somewhat tortuous policy. She joined the second and third Coalitions (1798 and 1805) formed by Pitt against Napoleon, but in 1807 the young Tzar Alexander I came to terms with Napoleon, and by the Treaty of Tilsit agreed to join in an attack upon England and to divide the world between himself and the Emperor of the French.

That was the second jolt administered to Anglo-Russian relations. The Franco-Russian alliance could not, however, stand the strain of the Continental blockade, and to the final defeat of Napoleon the Tzar Alexander made an important contribution.

Still more important was the part he played in the Peace Settlement of 1814-5 and in the subsequent attempts to repress revolutionary outbreaks in post-war Europe. There also Russia found herself opposed to the liberal policy of Castlereagh and Canning. But it was not until Palmerston's accession to the Foreign Office (1830) that there was open conflict between the two countries.

By the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833) Russia established a virtual Protectorate over Turkey. Palmerston, whose mistrust of Russian policy was from first to last profound, was determined that at the first opportunity this Treaty should be torn up, and an end be put to Russian predominance at Constantinople. Torn up it was by the Treaties of London of 1840 and 1841. Turkey was rescued thereby from the open hostility of Mehemet Ali of Egypt and from the interested friendship of the Tzar Nicholas; Russia was not to be allowed to regard the Near Eastern Question as her exclusive concern, nor to convert the Black Sea into a Russian lake; and France, no less than Russia was made to understand that England was vitally interested in the fate of Constantinople and that in the ultimate settlement of the Eastern Question her wishes and interests must be considered.

The next jolt to the Anglo-Russian relations was given by the Crimean War (1854-6). In the interval since the Treaties of London Nicholas I had made a sincere attempt to come to terms with England. His proposals were, however, based on the assumption that the Ottoman Empire was smitten with mortal sickness, and that the interests of European Peace would be served by the division of the estate between Russia and England. Roughly, Russia was to have Constantinople and the Balkans; England was to take Egypt together with Cyprus and perhaps Crete also. The Crimean War was partly caused by England's refusal to consider this cold-blooded, if perspicuous solution of the problem.

A distinguished diplomatist, Sir Robert Morier once described the Crimean War as "the only perfectly useless modern war that has been fought." Most historians have accepted Morier's verdict. I prefer Lord Cromer's. The latter held that "had it not been for the Crimean War and the policy subsequently adopted by Lord Beaconsfield's Government, the independence of the Balkan States would never have been achieved . . ." Precisely; and that is a point generally ignored by the critics of Lord Beaconsfield's policy in the Near East. Far more truly than Mr. Gladstone must Lord Beaconsfield be recognized as the liberator of the Balkans from the yoke of Turkey.

Lord Beaconsfield had been the victim of another jolt from Russia. The broad result of the Crimean War was to strengthen the position taken up by Lord Palmerston in 1840-1, to repudiate the claims of Russia to an exclusive Protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Port and to arrest her progress in the Black Sea and towards the narrow Straits. Moreover, that war gave the Sultan a chance to effect reforms from within. Of that chance he characteristically neglected to avail himself. The result was constant unrest in the Balkans followed by the outbreaks of 1875-7. Those outbreaks, though mainly due to Turkish misgovernment were partly caused by Pan-Slavist agitation encouraged from St. Petersburg. Had it not been for the firm action of Lord Beaconsfield Unkiar-Skelessi would have been repeated, with results even more inimical to English interests in the Near East as well as to the ultimate independence of the Balkan nations.

But if the Congress of Berlin (1878) registered a triumph for Lord Beaconsfield it was a landmark also in the diplomacy of Bismarck. Bismarck's diplomacy may be summarized in a sentence: bind your friends to you more closely; sow discord between potential enemies and rivals. Keep France apart from Italy by encouraging French ambitions in Tunis; keep England and France apart by encouraging England to stay in Egypt; and embitter the relations between England and Russia by fostering the enterprise of Russia in Central Asia.

As a result the next jolt to Anglo-Russian relations arose from what was known at the time (1884-5) as the "Penjdar Incident." For many years past the Russians had been fishing in the troubled waters of Central Asian politics, and more particularly in Afghanistan. Their activities caused great un-

easiness both at Calcutta and in London. When in 1844 the Tzar Nicholas I visited England, he undertook to refrain from those activities and to leave the Khanates of Turkestan as a neutral zone in order to keep the British and Russian possessions in Asia from "dangerous contact." The Tzar's advance repeated in 1852, were repelled. Consequently, having been simultaneously headed off by England both from Constantinople and from Afghanistan Russia renewed her activities in Central Asia. Early in 1884 Russia, taking advantage of England's preoccupation in the Sudan, occupied Merv and Sarak thus coming within 200 miles of Herat. Negotiations ensued, but while they were pending the Russians suddenly seized Panjdeh, a village belonging to our protected ally Abdur Rahman, the Amir of Afghanistan. Mr. Gladstone aroused to bitter indignation by the treacherous action of Russia, promptly called out the Reserves and obtained a large vote of credit. His prompt action averted war, but only in 1887 was an agreement reached between the two Powers; a definite check was then put upon Russian advance toward Herat and the frontier was settled up to the line of the Oxus. The same year witnessed the annexation to India of the Quetta district under the designation of British Baluchistan.

Checked on the western frontier of Afghanistan the Russians continue their advance northwards and eastwards and in 1895 annexed the Pamirs. But further negotiations resulted in yet another Anglo-Russian Convention the result of which was thus described by Sir Alfred Lyall:—"The boundary pillars now set up . . . on the Hindu Kush and by the Oxus record the first deliberate and practical attempts made by the two European Powers to stave off the contact of their incessantly expanding Asiatic Empire."

Not, however, until 1907 was a complete understanding reached between the two Empires. France and Russia had been allies for more than a decade. In 1904 France and England had settled all the questions which for many years past had kept them apart. France was naturally anxious that the long standing estrangement between her two friends should be composed, and that the peace of Europe should be secured by an equilibrium between the Triple Alliance and a Triple *Entente*. The foundations of an Anglo-Russian *Entente* had been laid at the Algiers Conference (1906), and after long months of negotiation the patient labours of Sir Edward Grey were crowned by the conclusion of a comprehensive Anglo-Russian Agreement (August 31 1907).

The agreement covered all the outstanding questions which affected the relations of the two Powers in Central Asia, and dealt in particular with Afghanistan, which Russia recognized as "outside the Russian sphere of influence" and with Persia which was mapped out into three spheres of influence. The Russian sphere involved the north and centre, including Teheran. The British sphere included the coastal district of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean to the frontiers of Baluchistan. Between them was a neutral zone in which both Powers could obtain political or commercial con-

cessions. The Agreement was sharply criticized, notably by Lord Curzon of Kedleston. Not unnaturally. As John Morley wrote: "Russia had for most of a century been the disturber of peace in Central Asia, and a menace to the external security of our Indian power. There was therefore nothing to surprise us in the frowns of incredulity, suspicion, and dislike, with which the idea of an Anglo-Russian agreement dealing with Afghanistan, Persia and Thibet was greeted at Simla." (*Recollections*. II. p. 151).

The Anglo-Russian Agreement did not stand alone. The Tzar Nicholas II endeavoured to anticipate revolution by constitutional reform. His efforts were too limited in scope to effect their avowed purpose, but combined with the Tzar's genuine enthusiasm in the cause of international arbitration they did something to allay the suspicions aroused among English democrats when in 1914 Great Britain found herself involved in a European war as the ally of the Russian autocrat. But the jolt thus given to British susceptibilities was as nothing compared with that felt when in 1917 the Bolsheviks carried through a revolution in Russia, and concluded a separate peace at Brest-Litovsk.

Between 1918 and 1921 the British people (with a few shameful exceptions) were not less horrified by the excesses and cruelties of the Russian Bolsheviks than their ancestors had been by those of the French Jacobins. The Russian Revolutionists had followed, albeit at quickened pace, the course taken in 1789-1794 by the French. A "constitutional" movement with Prince Llov as Prime Minister and not inconsistent with a "limited" monarchy, was quickly superseded by the Government of the "Cadets." The latter were mostly moderate and parliamentary republicans led by Kerensky, a distinguished lawyer, a great orator and, a skilful organizer, and Professor Paul Milyukov, much the ablest of the Cadets who, though a convinced Monarchist, took office as Foreign Secretary under Kerensky. The Cadets were in favour of continuing the war but were soon swept aside by the soldiers and workers of Petrograd who set up a communist triumvirate, Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin. These were the men who at once made peace with Germany and, like the French republicans before them, declared war on every established Government in Europe.

"This evil in the heart of Europe must be extirpated from that centre, or no part of the circumference can be free from the mischief which radiates from it." So Burke had exhorted England and Europe to undertake a Crusade against Jacobin France. Similar exhortations were not wanting in 1919. But the effort to extirpate Bolshevism by foreign aid was no more successful than that of the monarchical coalition against republican France. And it was much more half-hearted. Nor was it "official." No foreign Government committed itself to the anti-Bolshevik crusade. In Trotsky Soviet Russia discovered a Carnot and by 1921 was triumphant alike against foreign and domestic enemies. The Tzar, the Tzarina and their children had been murdered in July, 1918; their murderers were masters in Russia.

But though Bolshevism triumphed politically, its communistic policy was a failure. In 1921 Lenin was courageous enough to recognize the fact, and initiated a new economic policy (N.E.P.) which was a curious combination of State Socialism, economic nationalism and private enterprise. In 1924 Lenin died and Mr. Stalin, after a brief but decisive struggle against Trotsky, Zinoviev, and other leaders of the Third International, succeeded Lenin as Secretary of the Communist Party and thus became the real ruler of Russia.

Between 1924 and 1935 Mr. Stalin, aided by the brilliant diplomatic talents of M. Litvinov, his Foreign Minister, made great efforts to win the confidence of Europe. An important Treaty had been concluded with republican Germany in 1922, and in the same year the U.S.S.R. was recognized *de jure* by Poland, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. It was recognized in 1924 by the socialist Government in Great Britain, who gave a lead to Italy, Austria, Hungary, Greece and the three Scandinavian Kingdoms. Not, however, until 1933 did the U.S.A. follow the example of Europe, though in 1928 Russia had adhered to the Briand-Kellog pact. In 1934 the Soviet Union was admitted to the League of Nations. Unwisely, however, Russia was not invited to join England, France and Italy when in April, 1935, they established the "Stresa Front" against Germany, though a month later France did conclude a defensive alliance—an "Eastern Locarno"—with Russia.

In the course of the next three years Russia repeatedly attempted to form an anti-Nazi bloc in Europe. Great Britain, however, consistently declined the advances. As late as March, 1938, Litvinov proposed a Conference of "Peace" Powers. We refused to confer. In view of subsequent events that was unfortunate. But it was not unintelligible. A few exceptionally well-informed Englishmen, like Sir Bernard Pares, knew that if the rulers of Russia had not undergone a change of heart they had radically revised, if not renounced, their policy. But mistrust of Soviet Russia was deep-rooted if not ineradicable. For some years after 1919 the Third International—not easily distinguishable from the Soviet Government—had done its best to stir up sedition in England. As Sir Bernard Pares himself says:—"Kamenev was active on our Black Friday. Trotsky had a hand in the General Strike. Zinoviev's chief job was to work for revolution in England." Mr. Stalin had, indeed, cleared all these mischief-makers out, but how completely he had repudiated the policy they represented was imperfectly realized in England. The British Labour Party would have nothing to do with British Communists; The British Government kept Stalin and Litvinov at arm's length.

To this prejudice against Russia Czechoslovakia was sacrificed. On March 17, 1938, Litvinov said in view of the danger to European peace from German aggression the Soviets would be glad to participate in collective discussion either within the League or outside it, to avert war. On March 24 Mr. Chamberlain declined the invitation. In September, 1938, Litvinov renewed at Geneva the pledge of the Soviet Union to defend Czechoslovakia provided France was prepared to do the same. But French policy followed in the wake

of England's. The Chamberlain Government was still bent on "appeasement" and Russia was consequently not invited to take part in the negotiations at Munich. After Munich Hitler quickly threw off his mask. On March 5, 1939, he marched into Prague, and a week later occupied Memel. On the 1st we gave our historic pledge to Poland: France associated herself with us and on April 28 both Powers gave similar pledges to Rumania and Greece.

Hitler estimated these pledges at their true value: they did not deflect his course by a hairsbreadth. So did Mr. Stalin. Throughout the spring and early summer of 1939 the Kremlin was playing with Whitehall and the Poles by their natural suspicions of Moscow helped the game. On August 23 Anglo-Russian relations received the worst jolt to which they had ever been subjected. On that day, while an Anglo-French military mission was actually in Moscow, Russia and Germany signed their famous non-aggression Pact. Any humiliation we had recently imposed on Russia was repaid with interest.

On September 1 Germany invaded Poland: on the 3rd France and England declared war. On the 17th the Russians marched into Poland. The Poles had no chance, and again saw their country partitioned between Germany and Russia.

The story of the relations between Hitler and Mr. Stalin from August, 1939, to June, 1941, cannot be told because they are not known. On June 22 Hitler suddenly attacked his ally, and Mr. Churchill at once announced that a Power attacked by Germany became *ipso facto* the ally of the British Empire.

That the alliance so suddenly effected has been devoid of friction it would be affectation to affirm. That we have done everything in our power to assist Russia in her superbly courageous effort to withstand the onslaught of Germany can be denied only by those who in ignorance or malevolence misrepresent the facts. Mr. Morrison's speech at Cardiff on November 1 ought finally to dispel any doubt on this vital point. Nevertheless it is plain that Mr. Stalin thinks that we could and ought to have done more. But the mischief makers who suggest that the British effort has been frustrated by "sinister influence in high places" are not only base calumniators of their fellow countrymen, but "defeatists" in the worst sense. Mr. Churchill has wisely insisted on the difficulty that the elephant must always have in understanding the manoeuvres of the whale: a great part of the tremendous effort made by Great Britain in the common cause must necessarily be hidden from friends as well as foes. Mr. Morrison therefore did well to remind Mr. Stalin that when tanks and aircraft go from us to Russia they have to fight their way over a distance equal to the 2,000 miles of the Russian front, and five times the length of that front when they have to go round the Cape to the Middle East. The superb defence of Stalingrad is evidently more spectacular than the daily miracle performed by the "silent service" of Great Britain, by our Navy, our merchant seamen, and our mine-sweepers. It is not more essential to the common victory.

CORLEY: 1902

By G. ROSTREVOR HAMILTON

I SWIM, a living ghost, against the stream,
 Change this real nightmare for a waking dream;
 Swim, swim against the glistening stream-line
 Charioted for nineteen-thirty-nine,
 Time in a head-on crash; still struggling swim
 Back till the fragments of to-day grow dim;
 Swim struggling back till, forty years behind
 This nineteen-forty-two, I wake and find
 Childhood and sunny water; then again
 No water, but a green and sunny lane.

For this is *Corley Lane*. I know by heart
 That bend, that slope, driving the governess-cart,
 And Gipsy, stubborn pony, knows them too,
 In each unchanging house I know who's who;
 Here at her gate good kindly Mrs. Wall
 With the twisted smile will answer if I call;
 Here wizened Pettifer lives, and Steele there,
 Silent, important man, the carrier,
 Who from his high-wheeled cart looks grimly down
 On the slow-motion road, full five miles long, to town.

To town? His plodding mare and rumbling tyres
 Roll on to *Coventry*, city of spires,
 Ribbons and bicycles, where Peeping Tom*
 Hopes the white shade Godiva still may come.
 But we, we Rectory children, jog between
 High-towering elms and hedge-topped walls of green,
 Where only eyebright from the grassy steep
 And cuckoo-flower and straggling stitchwort peep,
 And no romances out of yesterday
 But only White Leghorns unghostly stray.
 They, the daft birds, too dignified to shun
 Approaching wheels, at the last moment run,
 Swerving now left, now right, wings trailed before us
 All helter-skelter in an outraged chorus,
 While mocking them along safe hedges flit
 The chaffinch and the sideways-peering tit.
 Now the lane opens; sudden on the right
 Rich-sanded *Corley Rocks* come into sight,
 Red Indian paradise for feet to scramble
 Through lacing palisades of fern and bramble

His effigy, looking from a window.

To spots enchanted where the kettle sings
 On Saturdays, and people sit in rings—
 Haven of picnic, where soiled paper bags
 Still hang mid hawthorn-twigs their tell-tale flags.

Soon we are heading for home at a brisker pace,
 Stable and tea-time calling. On we race
 As Gipsy breaks to a canter, and the rein
 Her lolloping ardour scarcely can restrain;
 Down hill we swing, and up again we lurch
 The last lap home, past the high-shouldered church,
 To a standstill by the long brick stable. There
 Old Fletcher waits us with a quizzing leer,
 "You've brought her home then? Or did she bring you?"
 We know him far too well to argue who—
 So kind a man, we humour him with ease,
 And only kinder, if we let him tease
 And laugh at his quick wit. We wave, and run
 Through kitchen-garden preening in the sun,
 By apple-orchard and by springy moss
 Edging the velvet croquet-lawn, across
 To the grey Rectory, whose brooding wings
 Swallow and hide us, till our racketings
 Ripple through corridors to fall subdued,
 Mere murmurs, on the grown-up solitude.
 Tea in the nursery: ravening we cram
 The duty butter and rewarding jam,
 Then soon as done, are off with quick-said grace,
 Feet fidgeting for any other place.

And many places lure us in the bound,
 So wide a pleasance, of the Rectory ground.
 The drive, pale pebbly river, swirls between
 A shaggy hayfield and the fresh-cut green,
 Banded with silver, of trim lawns that ride
 Down to a hidden curve. On that smooth side
 Prodigious rhododendron-clumps their bold
 Bonnets of crimson from dark mounds unfold,
 And fir-like, small, uncandled Christmas-trees
 Stiffen in glaucous sprays. How unlike these—
 Disdaining by such uniform to please—
 The busy deserts of the hayfield spread!
 Here dragon-flies their thin bright needles thread
 Zigzagging; here, through breathless afternoon
 Flicker the Blues, and float the Whites, and swoon
 The flopping Meadow Browns; here to the skies
 Two single trees in turbaned grandeur rise,
 High sovereigns, each recognizing each,
 Cool tulip-tree and dark-bright copper beech—
 Pride of the village, set within whose frame
 A *Warwick* landscape turns midsummer flame
 To catlike drowsiness.

And still between
 The shaggy hayfield and the shaven green
 Blinking in heat the gravel drive descends
 Till shadow-chilled under tall trees it bends.
 Trees overhang the highroad. Outward swing
 Trees in a portly round enveloping
 Garden and orchard, trees that nod and talk
 Above the path nicknamed *The Lovers Walk*,
 Where on a moonlit night behind you creep
 The clammy-fingered ghosts that cannot sleep.
 Yet there, when night and whisperings are gone,
 In friendly daylight you may walk alone,
 Or in the shine of dew, as bird-songs wake,
 With feet unfollowed through the circle break
 And cross by open fields to *Corley Wood*:
 A name by some for foxes understood,
 By some for bluebells, but much more by one
 For Orange Underwings that in the sun—
 He droops his net, the chase not yet begun—
 Fly among catkins high above the cool
 Rim of a private, cloud-reflecting pool.

But that was April morning; now 'tis June,
 And after tea-time. Hark! the ringing tune,
 Again, of Father's axe! And Mother stands
 To watch him in his shirt-sleeves with gloved hands
 Chop the low trailing boughs, to make a new
 Tunnel through leaves, an open-window view
 To *Coventry*. Ah! there, this very minute,
 The thinning space falls clear and, sharpened in it,
 Three pencil spires in the showering light
 Salute us, rising level with our sight;
 While, strange to think, three hundred feet below
 Invisible but large as life there go
 Hiscock the chemist, Moore of the *King's Head*,
 Laxton and Blythe. Among the trams they tread,
 Between the houses that lie safe and snug
 As any rich man tucked up in a rug,
 The centre round which all of England lies
 And drinks in peace from wide, unpeopled skies.

POINTS OF VIEW

IV. THE CIVIL DEFENCE WORKER

By HERBERT T. BANYARD

A.R.P. came to full birth in a world just recovering from the hysteria of Munich. The Government was still expressing belief in permanent peace when it started re-armament and decided to recruit a voluntary force of men and women to act as wardens in the event of air attack. The mass of the population was as usual indifferent and the vocal minority, suspecting any plan of Chamberlain origin, saw at once in the formation of this new body the first step to a British Gestapo. The wardens, envisaged by the authorities as the trusted friends of the people in their areas, were branded by many of these same people as grand inquisitors who would report to the proper quarter any case of political instability.

For the next twelve months these men and women laboured with a minimum of equipment to learn the elements of their new tasks. Unlike other industries A.R.P. had no history from which lessons could be adduced and comparisons made. It had no wealth of descriptive literature built up through the years to illumine the disappointments and satisfactions of those engaged in it. (Apart from some highly coloured works describing 'blitz' conditions Civil Defence—to use the modern title—has still no historian). Almost a new vocabulary was required for the job: 'incident,' a blessed understatement devised by the official mind to describe bomb damage, 'sector,' which meant the smallest area in A.R.P. sub-divisions, 'D.A.' for delayed action bomb, 'H.E.' for high explosive, are some of the terms which have passed into the language. To this day many civil defence workers have never really mastered the 24 hour clock and still do mental arithmetic when reporting for duty at 0.7 hours or being relieved at 19 hours. They learnt something of what was to be expected from aerial attack and prepared themselves by means of first aid courses to be of use should the emergency arise. It did—and in September, 1939, the recruitment of a large number of men and women for full-time A.R.P. began. This task was thrown on the shoulders of the local authorities, already overburdened with problems of child and adult evacuation, food, fuel and personal registration in premises not suitable and with staffs not specially trained.

Thus A.R.P. as a separate force emerged and for the first twelve months of the war extemporization was its watchword. Local authorities were given

autonomy under Home Office control and differences in training and equipment were but reflections of the mental qualities of the permanent officials of local councils. Mercifully the outbreak of war was followed by the absence of air attack in this country for nearly the whole of this year.

I volunteered as a part-time ambulance driver in the service of a London suburban borough with a population of some 200,000 and an area of 4,500 acres mostly residential but with a large share of industrial targets. Our lodging place was and is still a big elementary school whose play-ground was our garage and in whose assembly hall and class rooms we went to school again to learn the rudiments of our craft. It was a mixed group of men and women who attended these classes. Into the rows of too small desks were crowded on the one hand men who had given up good civilian jobs to volunteer and on the other, musicians, taxi drivers, commercial travellers, in fact all sorts of people who were displaced by the upheaval of war. Shop assistants, hairdressers, mannequins, cashiers, gave some indication of the diversity of callings that provided our female staff and these were stiffened by a solid contingent of the wives of serving men. The hours were onerous and the pay inadequate—£3 5s. for a 72 hour week with one free meal each day for the men; £2 and no meals for a 48 hour week for the women. The tradesmen who formed the backbone of the rescue squads were paid their usual trade rates. They were plumbers, carpenters, bricklayers, gas fitters, etc., and the stretcher bearers, wardens and ambulance drivers were not regarded as skilled workers and so received only the minimum wages.

From this assorted material ambulance teams, stretcher parties and rescue squads were trained and equipped while the report and control centres, with a fair sprinkling of ambulance attendants, and the canteens provided the women with their sphere of work. To the prevailing spirit of "doing one's bit" was added the inspiration of being a member of the first civilian army trained to protect the actual homes of England from a peril the dangers or extent of which it was impossible to estimate. Morale was thus running high and the men and women strove to be a real credit to the new force.

But the expected did not come and the "it can't happen here" general public began to grumble at the creation of the new leisured class. The apparent absence of work was noted during the periods of standing by and the fact that these people in the summer of 1940 seemed to be having a holiday at the taxpayers' expense was indignantly proclaimed. No heed was given to the sacrifice that many of the men and women had made, no gratitude was expressed for the solid achievement of training and no pity was felt for those who suffered long hours of boredom. The Government listened attentively to the howls of resentment and submissively undertook the first purge of A.R.P. personnel just four months before the blitz started. It was hoped in official circles that many more part-time volunteers would fill the gaps caused by the retrenchment, but the actual figures of these were much below expectations.

The partially depleted force was soon to be tested in the Battle of Britain which begun in August, 1940. These men and women, not very timid and not unduly brave, learned as a matter of course to forget their own safety. There were orders to obey, objective functions took decision out of their own hands and the demoralizing condition of dodging personal risk vanished in the sense of a larger duty to the community. The autumn with its ceaseless daylight attacks seemed to take a long time to pass into winter and, baulked by the R.A.F. of victory, the Germans resorted to night bombing to achieve the purpose. That civilian morale did not crack during that winter of raiding was due in no small measure to the reassuring presence of the steel-helmeted civil defence personnel who succoured the trapped, the wounded and the bereaved. Impossible risks were taken and the incredible achieved when families were rescued in utter darkness from houses which were due to collapse at any moment. The public learnt a new respect for the men and women who drove cars and ambulances through streets pitted with bomb craters. But the outsider could know little of the devotion of rescue squads who after tunnelling all night refused to be relieved until they had found the victims. Working for eighteen hours and more together, after a few hours' sleep they would return to the same blitz conditions each succeeding night.

The public, and especially those members of it who had envisaged the wardens as sinister busybodies, discovered that these were the lynch pin of the whole civil defence organization. They were the apex of an inverted triangle on which was balanced the efficiency of all the service. Alone and frightened, without the comfort of working in a team, the sickening swish and crash of bombs would send them out from the protection of their posts to assess the damage and decide what services were needed.

Thus the winter passed and the cries of rage changed into paeans of praise for the heroes and heroines of this new civilian army. Civil defence workers were not impressed however and a note of criticism was heard because so little apparent attempt had been made by the Government to clothe the personnel properly. Gaberdine overalls were poor protection for hours spent in winter conditions. The wear and tear on the clothing underneath these and especially on boots and shoes was substantial and a demand was put forward for more effective coverings before another winter should come. Also, it seemed to have escaped the attention of our rulers that men and women exposed for long periods to acute mental and physical strain needed something more than the tea and cakes which were provided by the many voluntary organizations, admirable as these organizations were.

So the arrival of spring and the cessation of bombing enabled civil defence workers to take stock of their conditions and many felt that some form of representation was necessary to formulate their demands and present them effectively to the proper authorities. The tradesmen were in the main already organized in their craft unions and the Transport and General Workers' Union opened its doors to the unskilled workers. Remembering

the diversity of callings from which such workers originated, it was hardly to be expected that the advantages of a collective bargaining spirit would be apparent to them. As a result of this apathy the National Association of Civil Defence Workers which was formed to cater for their needs, found the organizing of them very difficult and the response half-hearted. Therefore, none of these Unions can claim to speak for anything like the majority of civil defence workers.

But of course meetings were held and these gradually increased in frequency and in the size of the audiences. The lessons and experiences of the last winter were shared and apparently it was common opinion that the local councils were too parochial in outlook to continue the control of civil defence. It seemed undesirable to entrust any longer the working of a national body to men who by training and tradition were used to dealing with small compact groups. There was a feeling that far too many of the younger permanent officials of the councils were being placed in positions of authority and were thus being exposed to a divided loyalty. This was not surprising in view of the fact that the senior controllers of the service were often the senior officials of the councils and these younger men with one eye on the future were apt to become "yes men" and therefore failed to serve civil defence to the fullest extent of their abilities. It also appeared that the more junior of the appointed officials tended to support in and out of season the official viewpoint and thus claims put forward for local amelioration of some of the more onerous of the conditions of service met with petty obstruction. It was felt that if these officers in the final instance were responsible to a national rather than to a local authority a more consistently liberal viewpoint would prevail.

Civil defence workers usually do twenty-four hours on and twenty-four hours off duty alternately, but differing conditions of service prevail in neighbouring boroughs which tend to produce envy, hatred and malice. For example, one borough allows its personnel two hours off duty (to be spent within easy call of its depots) every working time of twenty-four hours while another, with the exception of leave which is granted for swimming as physical training, confines its people for twenty-four hours together within the walls of its depots. The older men, deprived of their daily pint, fail to regard the swimming (from which they are debarred) as any compensation. Possibly it is not to be wondered at that these depots are sometimes described as "bloody concentration camps."

Suitable uniforms and boots arrived in due course. There is, however, some feeling, especially among the women, at the compulsory surrender each quarter of some of their clothing coupons to provide for replacements. Uniforms may only be worn on, or proceeding to, or from duty and thus more than half a woman's life is spent in civilian clothes and she feels at some disadvantage compared with her civilian sister. The surrender of the coupons operates unfairly between the careful and the careless and it might

well be possible to institute a system of coupon surrender only when the uniforms need replacing and therefore put a premium on their care by the personnel.

There seems to have been no imagination employed to deal with the problem of the enforced leisure of the standby period. One such attempt to fill these empty hours with war work outside the depot was doomed to failure when it was discovered that while the tradesmen, already receiving higher pay, were to receive additional allowances no provision was to be made to increase the wages of the unskilled workers. As the pressure for man power increased, owing to munition and service demands, men under thirty-five years old were drafted into industry while awaiting calling-up notices. By a system of linking districts with regions in a pool of mutual assistance it was hoped that adequate protection would be afforded to the civilian population. There is, however, a real feeling of concern lest the cuts in personnel have been too drastic and the staff now inadequate for the speedy rescue services that the public have expected and received in the past. It is obvious in total war that the available man power must be balanced against the prospective demands of industry and the services, but an ageing civil defence staff with the younger men withdrawn and the influx of physically frailer women, is incapable of rendering hard and continuous service should a return to severe 'blitz' conditions be experienced.

Meanwhile, the endless boredom of empty days ought to be tackled. The financial position of civil defence workers provides a constant source of irritated conversation. For a married man with children £3 14s. is obviously not sufficient to cope with the rising standard of living, even if this sum does include uniform, a free meal during each twenty-four hours of duty and a post-war credit of 6d. per day. This credit might be made considerably more attractive if a certificate were issued say every six months showing the steadily mounting total. As it is, the men are sceptical and, anyway, the exchange of opinions of such subjects is extremely limited. There is much unorganized and often uninformed discussion about the future. There is a lot of speculation as to whether jobs will be waiting for them after the war and what sort they will be. There is some doubt about the possibility of a new world—this from men who fought with distinction in the Great War and suffered too much disillusion in the days of peace. The W.E.A. and similar organizations might undertake the formation of discussion groups to give form and direction to random thoughts. There is scope for the imaginative borough librarian to present in enticing form the treasures of the bookshelves in his charge. The local employers and residents might be invited to subscribe to a prize fund in order that public inter-depot and borough competitions in first aid, rescue work, speed of turn-out, etc. might be arranged and thus healthy rivalry and extra efficiency maintained under attractive conditions. Incidentally, informing the public might be one of the objects of these contests. It is doubtful whether the outsider can have anything but

the sketchiest of ideas concerning what happens in civil defence from the time the warning goes until the last rescue squads leave. Something like 'real sympathy between public and workers might be engendered, something more enduring than the hysterical adulation of "heroes."

Is there any future for the civil defence organization? Certainly not in its present form. The reason for its existence will sooner or later be but a scar in the memory and not a tear will be shed when the time comes to disband it. Then, if public spirit is larger and stronger than self interest, the rebuilding of well-planned cities will be bound to emerge, and this urgent task will obviously be beyond the power of private enterprise. Civil defence with its staff of craftsmen, drivers and labourers might well form the nucleus of the builders of our new towns. After instruction the wardens, with their experience of handling humanity both individually and in the mass, might provide from their ranks the housing estate managers of these new communities. If these objectives are not either feasible or desirable nevertheless the unskilled personnel who face the future with foreboding should be given training *now* to make them useful members of post war society.

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EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By STEPHEN GWYNN

NOTHING could be more important for an intending politician than the choice of a father; but since that is not feasible, nothing is more significant than the way in which a man reacts to his luck when he comes of distinguished parentage. The help to a start may be enormous; but a father whose fame you cannot live up to, takes a deal of living down. The Cecils never succeeded in making us forget that they were the sons of Lord Salisbury; that always seemed to me the most significant fact about them; and yet better men than Lord Robert or Lord Hugh, in their wholly different ways, did not sit with them in the House of Commons. What the Chamberlains inherited was not all gain; there was the memory of bitter feuds and blazing indiscretions. Friends of mine whose opinion counted thought Austen Chamberlain among the most lovable of human beings, yet whenever things went wrong with him, people in Ireland, and out of Ireland, were glad for his father's sake. Doubtless that was also true of his brother Neville. The one and only man who has completely emerged from the shadow of his father is Mr. Churchill; and it was no light achievement to make Lord Randolph forgotten. Not exactly forgotten—but nobody thinks first of the Prime Minister as his father's son.

These reflections arise out of a book which invites us to see the essential "Man of Tomorrow" in Sir Stafford Cripps—son of a father who certainly attained to eminence. Yet my mind has always been biassed by a sense that nobody could ever be as benevolent and benign as Lord Parmoor looked, and I never could take Sir Stafford seriously as a rebel despite all appearances. But as Mr. Froome Tyler makes plain in *Cripps: a Portrait and a Prospect* (Harrap. 6s.), rebel he certainly was against party discipline in English politics; in revolt against nearly all that his father's long life had stood for; and yet, as Mr. Tyler makes us feel, without any collision even of ideas between father and son. For when war came in 1914 it found the veteran Unionist lawyer a champion of conscientious objectors; then an ardent apostle of the League of Nations, and finally Lord President of the Council in the first Socialist Government, under Ramsay MacDonald. He held that post again between 1929 and 1931 when his son became Solicitor-General and Member for Bristol East;—a Labour Candidate, whose professional income at the Bar had run into five figures. But when the Labour Government went into coalition and became "National," the Solicitor-General resigned; he said violently that this was not the way to Socialism. Back at the Bar, he was earning more money than ever, and in Parliament was attacking the official representatives of Labour—who retaliated. At the General Election in 1935

a National Labour candidate was sent down to oppose him; but East Bristol stuck to their man—now an extremist of the left wing. Early in 1937, when Europe began to feel war coming, Sir Stafford told the British workers that they had the chance of their lives. "Refuse to make munitions, refuse to make armament; they will have to hand over the control of the country to you." Up till 1939 he was for getting the Government out at any price "to ensure democratic freedom." Then came the war; he turned down all his briefs and offered his services in any capacity—to the Government. No notice was taken of the offer, and as a private enterprise he went to India meeting the leaders there; then to China, meeting General Chiang Kai Shek there; and finally, for a brief visit, to Moscow. In May, 1940, Mr. Chamberlain was replaced by Mr. Churchill—one of whose earliest acts was to send the hitherto unwanted Socialist as Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Moscow. Relations between the two countries were bad; Russia had a non-aggression pact with Germany. No one trusted that pledge; but Germany's attack on Russia did not come till June, 1941. Then the year's work of Sir Stafford bore fruit, when he signed for Britain a full alliance against Hitlerite Germany. The new alliance was not at once popular in England; but Lord Beaverbrook same to act as Minister of Supply and make collaboration closer. Sir Stafford Cripps was still in Russia when Premier Stalin's counter-offensive turned back the German onrush from Moscow. By the spring of 1942 his mission was held to be completed, and back in England he joined the War Cabinet as Lord Privy Seal and leader of the House of Commons. Then a new task was found and he departed for India.

Mr. Tyler outlines all this in the manner of an accomplished journalist, and in the same style he sketches the Indian situation and what happened on this mission. Yet I cannot feel that he brings us close to the real subject. Either Sir Stafford has not the gift of utterance which conveys not only a man's meaning but his personality, or Mr. Tyler has not made good use of quotation. He lets us know that he expects great things after the war of this singularly able rich man who is a Socialist; but he does not make me at least feel that I know the inwardness of the man.

* * * * *

That is true also of the book which Mr. A. Hingston Quiggin has written about *Haddon the Head Hunter* (Cambridge Press, 7s. 6d.). A most unusual proportion of the pages (50 out of 150) are given to his education, and when all is done we only know that he first got a chair of Zoology at Dublin, and finally, almost by instinct, drifted into anthropology, then the "Cinderella of the Sciences." He was only able to give up the Dublin post, which limited his freedom, when Christ's gave him a Senior Fellowship. In short, there is a lot to be learnt here about the steps by which anthropology's importance grew in educational programmes—as for instance when Wingate, then Governor General of the Sudan, asked that probationers for Colonial Service should be given a course of such studies; but the book leaves me quite unclear as to what chiefly this very likable man added to human knowledge. Part of it I personally, have read with delight for it revives the memory of "Fisheries Green"—the most singular type of a Church of Ireland parson known to any of us. When Haddon came to Dublin, as professor of Zoology in the Royal College of Science, W. S. Green was Rector of Carrigaline in county Cork, a tall, untidy,

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bearded man with a passion for all sports, but especially for sea fishing; and in 1885 when a Dredging Expedition was planned to investigate the life of the deep sea bottoms, Green was put in charge of all the operations in Bantry Bay. In 1886 he was again in charge of the *Lord Bandon* paddle steamer when they found a pink sea anemone new to science and named it after him. In 1890 they were off the west coast and had a look at Achill and Aran as well as at the dredge hauls. Other Dubliners were with them as well as Green, and one of them Francis Dixon, today a venerable professor, helped Haddon to annex some skulls which were lying heaped in a derelict church. I remember Green's vivid talk of their various adventures, and it seems to me now clear that Ireland owes Green's transference from a parish to the post of Chief Inspector of Fisheries to Haddon. Arthur Balfour was Chief Secretary in those days, and Haddon had been at Cambridge closely in touch with his brother, M. M. Balfour, the entomologist. If Haddon made the necessary link, he did a good day's work for Ireland, and for Green and for Green's friends. Of his later work as an anthropologist in and about Torres Straits, I cannot speak; but curious it is, reading of his peaceful investigations to come on names like Thursday Island—now so much in the news of Japanese war.

* * * * *

Minora canamus; here are three little books whose purpose is simply to entertain, and they do it. One is in a manner technical, for Mr. Eric Parker in *The Shooting Week-End Book* (Seeley Service, 10s.) gives a deal of detailed advice concerning equipment, training of dogs, prevention of diseases in game, and so forth. But I—who never was a properly equipped sportsman (except perhaps on a river)—am concerned with this charming writer's natural history of game birds and his discussion of the characteristics of birds of prey as well as with the lore about appropriate bird names. What he tells us about the mating of partridges has almost a romantic interest; and again who would not wish to know that you should speak of a "bevy of quail"? I note one omission in his local names; we always in Ireland call the grey crow a scalcrow (pronounced as in 'scald'). At all events we did in Donegal, and the word must therefore be usual in Scotland. In Donegal, shooting meant a tramp after snipe with possible chances of woodcock, duck, golden or green plover; all the elaborations which Mr. Parker discusses were outside our ken. But the tone of the book is delightful and the natural history allows for all points of view—as in the discussion whether rooks should or should not be tolerated. He knows the fatal attraction which, alas, green peas have for jays—a lesson I had to learn in Berkshire. Only one thing I miss in his treatise—a consideration of what birds one may shoot sitting without loss of respect. My own usage extended to wood pigeons, plover—using a second barrel when they rose—and duck with the same consideration. Pheasants were not in my range, but of course one would have as soon potted a barn-door fowl. Still I know that it would have been to me sinful to fire at grouse, partridges, snipe or cock before they rose. It is true one hardly ever had the temptation. But was it unsportsmanlike to secure a golden plover—or possibly two—before they got up? Mr. Parker, by the way, puts them very high for difficulty as a shot on the wing.

* * * * *

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craving by *Travels without a Passport* of which Frederick Muller publishes the Second Series at 8s. 6d. These journeys and adventures—some evidently authentic, some imaginary—open in Mexico, but the rest are either in Europe or places so fully Europeanized as Rhodes or Tunis. Not on any beaten track in Europe; Mr. Baerlein seemingly knows most languages—and knows a good deal else; as for instance all the detail not only about Elba but about Napoleon's going there. I like his attitude to history; he loves those personal touches which humanize the abstract record and bring it within touch of man's natural way of recalling events—in short, with gossip. There are many glimpses here of the various Balkan States and of Poland: his dislike of Germans has been fed from many sources. The book concludes with a series called "Echoes of War" which dramatize Europe's various reactions towards Naziism—ending up with a story of what happened in Norway when nothing was left of an historic carriage but "Some Pieces of Wood." These a museum treasures for the sake of Sivert, who headed his pony over a precipice, carrying with them the German officer who had been brutal to him and to the pony.

* * * * *

Mr. de Vere Stacpoole is another author who can look back over a long career in print, and he puts his retrospect in the form of a very informal autobiography. *Men and Mice* (Hutchinson, 10s.) begins (if it does anything so definite as to begin), in 1871-2, and begins in Ireland. At that time the central figure is Mr. Stacpoole's mother who had come from Canada, not unadventurously. Mr. Stacpoole's first adventure was running away from Portarlinton School—and it certainly was no place for a youngster of nine. Then they moved to England and his mother, who in Ireland had met Charles Lever and Dan O'Connell, made friends with Oscar Wilde and his brother Willie, a great talker. And so through "Random notes of People and Happenings," Mr. Stacpoole, irrepressibly readable, builds up a picture of the late 'seventies, 'eighties and 'nineties—chiefly concerned with literature. But he was being trained for medicine, and was practising in one place or another, so that other subjects came in. There is emphasis on the fact that they lived two doors from Browning in Warwick Crescent—and on the fact that it was an adventure when Mrs. Stacpoole, unaccompanied, went on the top of a bus. Just as Haddon when he got to Torres Straits realized that humanity was changing fast and offered pictures which must be recorded at once or never (whereas sea anemones and such could wait), so Mr. Stacpoole shows himself a social anthropologist. Not only in England; he travelled; Mr. Baerlein, whose talent he praises, took him off on a visit to Czechoslovakia; and he writes amusingly about Iceland. But what stands out to me is his recognition of the importance of two publishers—Fisher Unwin and John Lane. They mattered more than the heads of much greater firms because they had a missionary ardour for their job. Lane really was a considerable person because he was so much in love with books. Alas! his little partner, Elkin Mathews, with whom he quarrelled so bitterly, has been forgotten, even by Mr. Stacpoole. But why go on talking? Here is a real revival of the world before motorcars—with pictures of so many people; Queen Victoria in her open carriage, rosy-faced and laughing at something that John Brown was saying to her from the rumble; and Davy Stephens, the Dublin newspaper seller who always met the mail boats—and had, it seems, a personal history which Mr. Stacpoole appreciated—as he has appreciated so many things.

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Since the miracle of China's resistance to Japan has gradually dawned on Western consciousness, a strong desire has grown up to know more about the Chinese and, in the common phrase, "how they have done it." These two books, therefore, should have a wide welcome. In the "Everyman" Mr. Hughes has given us typical extracts from the writings of some thirty leaders of thought in the "classical period" (between the 7th century B.C. and the end of the 1st century A.D.); while *The Mean-in-Action* (the "nothing in excess" of the Wise Men of ancient Greece) and *The Great Learning*, the text-book which every educated Chinese knows by heart, contain the very core of Confucius's wisdom, though there is no knowing how much he wrote of them or indeed who did write them.

It is particularly interesting in both books to compare the style and thought of Confucius with that of later scholars who enlarged upon, argued about, or branched off from him. They were more elaborate; they tackled questions which do not seem ever to have presented themselves to him. But there is a clarity and directness about Confucius's apothegms which, the more one studies them, become hardly less appealing to Western readers than they have ever been to Chinese. And through him one can see the Chinese people and that "spiritual strength" (to quote Mme. Chiang Kai-shek) which enabled them to triumph over the Mongol and

Manchu invasions and now sustains them against Japan.

The foundation of that strength is *jên*, which Mr. Hughes translates as "human heartedness," that is an intense consciousness of the importance of mutual relations between man and man. However much they may fall away from this principle in daily practice, the Chinese never lose sight of it. Mr. Hughes gives prominence to the curious episode of the Chin dynasty, founded by the so-called "Napoleon of China," Shih Huang-ti, and the Legalists, who 2,100 years ago tried to force upon China a totalitarian state with "guns for butter." It died with the death of Shih in fifteen years. China would have none of it. Her ideal politically was the sage-kings of the mythical past, ceaselessly working for their subjects; and, in private life, the *chun tzu* (which Mr. Hughes translates "man of breeding"); Liang Chi-chao, the great scholar of the turn of this century, suggested "gentleman" in its best English sense as being most appropriate) perfectly equipped for every vicissitude of life and for all his dealings with his fellows.

The chapter on filial piety is particularly instructive: one realizes why Matteo Ricci, the father of Roman Catholicism in China, took so lenient a view of ancestor worship. So too, is the account of the enormous importance that Confucius attached to ritual—the right way of doing a thing. But this became a snare in later times. Chinese etiquette is said to contain 300 rules of conduct for major matters and 3,000 for the minor, all of which the *chun tzu* must know. Inevitably the shell of Confucianism frequently became more important than the kernel. There is also much of interest about the mystical religion of Taoism. In its insistence on moral virtue (as opposed to written laws,

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for which the Chinese do not much care) it chimes with Confucianism; but it is too transcendental for general daily use. The Chinese are always an extremely practical people.

Mr. Hughes has done his work in a manner to suit all readers, with admirable explanatory notes and life records of the men whom he quotes. One wishes he would have given us more of his beautiful translations of those poignant Odes from the dark days of the Chou dynasty. *The Great Learning* is prefaced by a brilliant essay, sketching the history of Chinese philosophy and its marked influence on Western thinkers of the 18th century. Depending then for its information about China on the Roman Catholic Fathers, scholars and mathematicians, such as Ricci, Schall and Verbiest, who mixed as equals with the best minds in China, Europe knew far more about the Chinese than it did in later decades. That is what we have now to correct for China is undoubtedly going to be one of the greatest world influences; and Mr. Hughes ably helps us to do so.

O. M. GREEN.

A SHORT HISTORY OF FRANCE,
by Sir J. A. R. Marriott. Methuen.
15s.

The jacket tells us that this book is primarily for "University and other adult students" and their needs are admirably met. But there was, we are told, a widespread demand for a "comprehensive history of France." That demand, too, has been met though not quite so successfully, for the common reader will probably expect something more comprehensive in content than he gets here. Sir John Marriott is, fortunately, free from the sentimental superstition that regards war and politics as unworthy of the historian or which condemns the

historian to speculation about the People, instead of investigating the more manageable problem of what the rulers did and thought. *Politique d'abord* is no bad motto for an historian in these days, if only as a reaction against that neglect of political and military history that led us so far astray in the muddled twenties. Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that economic, cultural and, in the main, institutional history is here cut down to a minimum. Sir John Marriott makes a number of useful comparisons with English political practice, but in many ways, a more fruitful ground of comparison would have been with the continental states that went the way of France towards absolute monarchy. Frederick the Great casts more light on the problems of Louis XIV than does any modern English monarch.

The first and most striking merit of this book is its clarity. It is often possible to disagree with Sir John Marriott but very seldom, indeed, possible to misunderstand him. There is an almost Gallic lucidity here which is very welcome. There is also a high standard of accuracy (apart from mere misprints). Although there is none of the jargon of "geo-politics," there is always present in this book an appreciation of the basic rôle of geography. The menace to French unity of the great fiefs which lay around the royal domain; the importance of the acquisition of great bastions like Metz or the line of the Alps; these are basic problems for the historian of France, as they were for the rulers of France. French "security" does not appear here as a pathological obsession, as it appeared to many of our most eminent shallow-minded intellectuals between the two wars, but as a basic necessity of French life. The lesson hardly needs driving home to-day. And Sir John is too good a European

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SOCIAL STRUCTURE, by H. W. Mess. *Allen & Unwin*. 6s.

CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY, by Ranyard West. *Methuen*. 15s.

Sociologists are dangerous people, always discovering new and inconvenient facts. They have been such from the days of Thomas Hobbes, the theorist, down to the present; and it is not strange that Hobbes complains that they were persecuted. Dr. Mess is no exception. By chapter one, in this brief manual, he is discovering that people's moral opinions are determined by virtue of birth and not of rational choice. "Our practice of waging warfare seems to some of the primitive peoples," who would think it quite right to abandon their aged parents, "so horrible as to be almost incredible." By chapter two Dr. Mess has pointed out that there are racial differences between peoples; that what matters is stock; and that no improvement of environment can improve what is obtained from it. Here is dynamite for the United Nations. He goes further and believes that we are breeding disproportionately from inferior stocks. However, it is not to be expected that much will be done about the matter. We are the victims of the stereotypes of our society's cast of thought as well as of heredity. Indeed, this book might be called 'Destiny and Dr. Mess.' He does allude, without sanguine expectation, to "some power of choice."

Dr. Ranyard West is even more guilty of misbehaviour. As a doctor of medicine and a psychologist, he reviews the human race and its

political imbroglios. He follows the theories of Suttie rather than of Freud, and disagrees with Freud's belief that the native sadism of all human beings, intolerably repressed by the morality of civilization, has periodically to explode in acts of hate or war. On the contrary—and here he is definitely in line with anthropologists such as Malinowski—he holds that human beings are naturally peaceable animals enough, but can be stimulated into a disproportionate aggressiveness by errors in education, which makes them sensitive to suggestion of attack. Such writers as Lord Vansittart and Mr. Voigt (who has been called 'Vansittart with the lid off') are, in Dr. West's view, to the scientific eye just plain wrong, ignorant and dangerous, doubtless due to some *malaise* of infancy. Dr. West wants, not to damn the human race with Calvin and Freud, but, with Hume and Holbach, to hang the politicians. He notes it is as odd that almost all Russians think Stalin right because Marxist Communism is best; almost all Germans think Stalin devilish and Marxist Communism evil; while many of us here in the West think Stalin certainly right but capitalism perhaps right too. This argues again, not rational morals, but choice by place of birth and in terms of its stereotypes, unrelated to ethics, since were choice rational the mathematical odds in favour of this local unanimity would be negligible. Dr. West continues:

National warfare is always seen by the participants as 'the only way left' to correct some great error, to save a culture, or to establish a 'good.' To a few 'leaders' a war may be a gamble justified by ambition or fear. To the mass of men who support it and suffer by it, its cause is always 'right.' And since two opposites cannot both be right, and human nature is the same in these matters wherever we turn, it follows that this 'rightness' is always a figment... Ten years after this present war has ceased it will no more

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matter who 'caused' or who 'won' it, than it did ten years after the last one. Politically, mankind will be crushed and burdened by the problems of an aftermath.

Dr. West writes rather as Lenin might have done about an 'imperialist war.' He believes that men suffer, not from lack of conscience, but of understanding; and sets out to confute Mr. G. B. Shaw's dictum that there is no wisdom in wartime, only force and rhetoric. He appears to be a conditional pacifist as the result of his researches, or more precisely, a believer in an international authority founded on a negotiated peace and the belief that the enemy must contribute to this authority. It would be more cautious to demand, on the example of the successful Congress of Vienna, a German Talleyrand or to support the London Trades Council in its demand for post-war German collaboration. Dr. West has not solved the problem of pacifism, with its Augustinian belief that this whole world is irredeemably wicked and no one worthy of power, nor the straight problem of world authority, 'who shall rule whom?' He has, however, turned the rays of science on to his victims with effects that may scorch them and even himself.

GEORGE CATLIN.

THE CHILD AND THE MAGISTRATE,

by John A. F. Watson. Cape. 10s. 6d.

GIRLS GROWING UP, by A. P. Jephcott. Faber & Faber. 6s.

YOUNG OFFENDERS, by A. M. Carr-Saunders, Hermann Mannheim, and E. C. Rhodes. Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d.

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Only if we dig deep shall we expose these basic factors and from them alone shall we learn that what matters is not the conduct of the child, but his social and mental background: poverty and slums; disease and drink; immorality; indifference to religion; each of them conducing to that most tragic of all a child's afflictions—a broken home. These are the roots of evil.

Mr. Watson writes with such clarity and human understanding that his book will appeal to many who have had hitherto little knowledge or interest in his subject. Primarily, however, *The Child and the Magistrate*, must be regarded as a manual for those connected in any way with the working of a Juvenile Court. As such it succeeds to perfection, stressing the importance of alertness and attention to detail, and outlining the work and procedure of all concerned. Nearly half the book is directed towards a discussion of possible forms of treatment and in each case the reader is given an illuminating and carefully balanced picture.

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The Lord Chief Justice, who writes an Introduction to Mr. Watson's book, notes that the illustrations from the author's own experiences are so good that the reader may be pardoned for wishing for more of them. This is not a criticism he could have made about Miss Jephcott's book, which deals not with delinquency but with the whole story of working girls' adolescence. "They treat you like kids at school," says the young office girl; 'at jobs we have to act grown-up—it comes as a shock.'"

Miss Jephcott's method is to draw liberally from written statements by girls she has known in clubs and from snatches of their conversation. It sounds a bold venture but in practice is brilliantly successful and the reader puts this book down in the firm conviction that he has been privileged to see into the minds of others. Miss Jephcott emphasizes the hardness of the struggle, the harsh break between school and work, the lack of beauty in the adolescents' daily life, the limited variety of possible employment to meet their varied talents, the effect of long hours and the overwhelming importance to the family of a good monetary reward at an early age.

All Miss Jephcott's statements are supported by ample evidence. She touches the girl's life at every point and indeed astounds one by her intimate understanding, which includes a thorough reading of the more popular—and sensational—girls' papers. *Girls Growing Up* ends with a strong plea for more and more clubs of all kinds, under better organization and in much better buildings. Miss Jephcott sees these clubs satisfying every demand and serving a constructive purpose in giving boys and girls together a practical experience of a co-operative society, instead of a negative aim of keeping young people off the streets and away from temptation.

Young Offenders, which is a book dealing with the findings of a careful and scientific enquiry into Juvenile Delinquency, does not suggest that membership of a club is quite so beneficial as a preventive to crime as some would have us suppose. It does find, however, among its valuable conclusions, that the belief that the 'broken home' predisposes children towards delinquency is proved. The chief lesson of this book is that one must tread warily when generalizing about causes of delinquencies. All that one can say with safety is that the machine age, with its consequent urbanization, has served no one more ill than the youth of the nation. How to protect and guide it is the problem for which many are seeking the solution.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

THE WEALD OF YOUTH, by Siegfried Sassoon. *Faber & Faber.* 8s. 6d.

This new instalment of Mr. Sassoon's reminiscences is another example of the precision and care with which he chooses the fruits of his garden of youth. This book offers no crowd of events, and little number or variety of characters. In spite of further recollections of the hunting field (which can be rather dull to readers who have no liking for the foxy world and its leather-mouthed snobberies) *The Weald of Youth* contrives to be a record of loneliness, and of ineffectualities brought to an end only by the rough clap on the back which the war-god gave to the author in August, 1914.

Now the loneliness of youth is an awkward theme, and in clumsy or sentimental hands it can be nauseating. But Mr. Sassoon contrives to make it exquisite, removing himself to a cool contemplation of it from an objective position well above the familiar foggy nostalgia. For the

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trouble about the young is that they are so much alike, lacking the variety of character which age and experience bring. If only children could have the foresight and the skill to write about their old age, how original such records would be.

Such is Mr. Sassoon's artistry that he almost achieves that *vice versa*. This book, in spite of its paucity of events, and its vague geography, tells of a distinctive and interesting youth in a setting which, compared with the lot of everyman, was paradisaical. Here was a young fellow in those golden days, who did not have to worry about earning a living. He kept three hunters, and could afford to spend a season with a fashionable midland hunt, and to follow it up by taking a set of chambers in Gray's Inn, found for him by Sir Edward Marsh, his first serious mentor in what at that time was a secondary ambition—to become a poet.

The book opens with that ambition being stimulated by a first appearance in print. T. W. H. Crosland had printed a sonnet by him in the *Academy*, a copy of which lay beside him on the seat of the dogcart as he drove his high-hearted self home from Tunbridge Wells to Brenchley along one of the most beautiful hill-ridges in the world. Once again that scene is evoked, with the cultured home life, the music, the painting. The young hunting man stands at the parting of the ways, and he wonders with some bewilderment why they have to part. Later in the book he wonders "why it was so impossible to amalgamate my contrasted worlds of Literature and Sport. Why must I always be adapting my manners—and even my style of speaking—to different sets of people? Was it really necessary to exclude one world in order to find diversity in the other? . . . There were moments when I felt that I was an indecisive intruder who had no genuine foothold in either of

these apparently incompatible spheres of activity." The problem is one of our English social history, and larger than his personal one. But he was not to know that at the time, and his bewilderment remained, a cloud over an otherwise sunny world.

Sunny indeed! Looking back, with Mr. Sassoon, on the scene whose centre is that ridge of upland gradations amid the weald, with the lovely villages of Brenchley, Goudhurst, Lamberhurst, Cranbrook, Sissinghurst (already immortalized by a true poet), one sees that world as a lost Eden—except that in fact, it is not lost. It has absorbed the Battle of Britain, most of which took place over it, and it remains its own lovely self. Other poets have written of it, two of them, Blunden and Kendon, being born amid those villages I have named. Frank Kendon's prose book *The Small Years*, tells of a fabulous land of childhood only some five miles from the scene of Mr. Sassoon's youthful uncertainties. Both have a quality in common. It is the golden glow of the Weald.

But there are complications in the vision of Mr. Sassoon. Behind his slightly ironic air of simplicity about himself, and his apparently candid revelations of the ignorance and naivety of his younger self of twenty-five years ago, lies a deadly skill in presenting other characters. He is urbane, indeed reverent, in his presentation of Edmund Gosse and Rupert Brooke; but somehow the portraits emerge a little nearer to satire than Mr. Sassoon may have intended. Nor does he spare himself. He shows the reader a creature blundering about, fettered to a prolonged adolescence. It is astonishing to learn that a man of over twenty with literary ambition knew nothing about punctuation. "I had never thought about it at all, and had no notion that it made any dif-

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ference in the art of writing." And as in writing, so it was with his acquaintance with the other arts, especially of opera and ballet. His initiation is told with grave humour, that almost persuades us to believe him as he paints a portrait of a clumsy, slightly oafish fox-hunting self fumbling at the door of the house of art, where it stands (for him) in a garden reminiscent of those described so dewily by Mrs. Earle and Dean Hole. But then the afterthought comes. Could it be possible that from such a belated and left-handed apprenticeship, the present graceful artistry, a fine flower of fastidiousness, could emerge?

RICHARD CHURCH.

THE HOUSE OF MRS. CAROLINE, by C. M. Franzero. *Hodder & Stoughton*. 8s. 6d.

THANKLESS CHILD, by Frank Swinnerton. *Hutchinson*. 9s. 6d.

Both these books are about the inevitable clash between generations which never become wise enough to avert it. *The House of Mrs. Caroline* is a background to the history of Italy during the first thirty years of this century and *Thankless Child* deals solely with the tyranny of parental love. The one has thus too little psychological import and the other alas too much.

The story of a family is bound to reflect in large measure the story of a country and as the first is subordinate to the second in Mr. Franzero's book it is not surprising that the characterization is slight. It is an account of the rise and fall of a Piedmont family whose fortunes were founded on banking and the silk worm industry, the Andrades being linked to the Ferreros by grandmother Caroline. Possibly the author had early experiences in Italy and in London journalism later to draw upon. But many of the hap-

penings are improbable, particularly when Serge arrives in London with three shillings in his pocket and after staying seventeen days in a first-class hotel leaves without paying his bill. Also, and more serious, it is not clear why he ever became the family wastrel. Such unsolved problems are irritating and one can not escape the conclusion that only when the author is being autobiographical is he convincing. The tall rings only too true when Mr. Caroline gives up her home to her son and sees it vulgarized, beautiful panelling being stripped off the wall and silly pastoral scenes painted on the ceilings. And Selva puts well the helplessness of the common people swimming against the tide of Fascism. It is for touches such as these that one wishes the book had been a straightforward history of modern Italy. But this should not be taken too seriously: it comes from one who would always prefer to read history than novels about history and one, moreover, who has already enjoyed Mr. Franzero's *Inside Italy*. There obviously more to come and as on the early stages of Mussolini's régime have been reached it will be interesting to see what the author makes of the decline and fall of Fascism in his lovely country lovable but misguided people. The book does not appear to be translated from the Italian. Mr. Franzero is to be congratulated on his command of English. He, in turn, probably congratulated himself and Mr. J. Morton Sale on the latter's dust jacket. This is of a sort that one removes and puts away carefully until the book is read. *Thankless Child* centres so entirely on the love of Mordred (how name suits him!) for his daughter Frankie that one gets impatient. Yet, morbid and maudlin as he often is, he rings true throughout. The attraction of Frankie, too, is

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understood by the reader but her intelligence is not so obvious. Everyone surely has known that blinding moment when a parent was first discovered to be fallible but everyone surely knew it at a much younger age than twenty. Agger-ness struggles through a sister's trials and emerges a not unlikable aunt. The subsidiary characters are disappointing, such as the fantastic Scoble of the two lives and especially the hysterical Harold Sniggs. Cursed by a small income and a mere wish to write, he never once arouses sympathy and this much attention is paid to him only because his suicide is the cause of the one flaw in the portrayal of Lovat Kyle. It is hard to believe that the self-contained and blank-
less Scotsman could have been

thrown into such a fury of remorse. Nevertheless, Mr. Swinnerton has drawn no one better than this artist, quite recognizable as a certain type from over the border, whose genius it is easy to believe in. Absolutely sure of himself and of where he is going, the arrogance that comes of such certainty is balanced by the essential kindness and modesty of the man. The picture is so authentic that his creator must have been sure of him too. It is a relief to find a book in which war is not even mentioned. The period is apparently the 'thirties and Mr. Swinnerton tells the story so well that he can completely ignore those uneasy years without imparting a sense of unreality.

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GERRINGS OF ASHFORD, LTD., 80, HIGH STREET, ASHFORD, KENT
PUBLISHED IN ENGLAND