


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JANUARY, 1942

THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY

By JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

IS it in a kind of revulsion from the felt insufficiency of our most familiar political conception that so much is spoken nowadays of the need for a Christian social order? There is, undoubtedly, a vague but widespread feeling that Democracy is not quite on the same level as its manifest opponents, Fascism and Communism. For good or evil these political systems seem to have a positive dynamic that Democracy no longer possesses. As ideas and as systems they evoke a loyalty which Democracy does not; they command and receive from their followers an almost religious enthusiasm. There was a time, a hundred years ago, when Democracy was the object of a similar enthusiasm. But the time is past. The goddess who looked so fair in the days of first love and courtship has become a humdrum wife, without the glory and the gleam. She finds it hard to compete with the new glamour-girls of political ideology.

We cast about, therefore, for some conception of a future society which shall embody our opposition to Fascism and Communism, and yet be something more than a mere defence of the *status quo*. It must have a potentiality of religious enthusiasm about it, which can prevail against the religious enthusiasm evoked by the totalitarian creeds. The only conception which seems capable of filling the bill is that of a Christian society. We turn towards it, half-instinctively.

The instinct may be right—I myself believe it is—but unfortunately nobody knows what a Christian society is. That is the reason why so many people are now engaged in trying to establish what it is. The heads of the Churches in Britain a year ago formulated five "standards" for a new society. True, they did not go so far as to say that they were standards for a Christian society; but the plain implication was that a society which satisfied those standards would be a more Christian one than this is, anyway. Here are the standards:

- (1) Extreme inequality in wealth and possessions should be abolished.
- (2) Every child, regardless of race or class, should have equal opportunities of education, suitable for the development of his peculiar capacities.

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- (3) The family as a social unit must be safeguarded.
- (4) The sense of a divine vocation must be restored to man's daily work.
- (5) The resources of the earth should be used as God's gifts to the whole human race, and used with due consideration for the needs of present and future generations.

They may be criticized for their vagueness (what is *extreme* inequality?) or for their obscurity (how is a divine vocation for machine-minding to be recognized?); the fact remains that a world-society, or a national society which satisfied these criteria would be a good deal better than the one we have. But the awkward thing is that a Communist or a National-Socialist society might make the claim that it came nearer to satisfying these criteria than a society like our own.

Can they make their claim good?

We may leave aside point 5 as applicable only to an international society which shows no sign of existence. In point 1 they certainly pass the examination better than the democracies. In point 2 they pass better in one respect, but not in another. There is much greater equality of educational opportunity in Russia and Germany than in Britain; but it is not regardless of class in the former or of race in the latter. The Jew in one, the kulak in the other is excluded. In point 3 Britain passes better than they: for although in Russia the attempt to break up the family has been abandoned, in both Russia and Germany children are taught that it is their duty to the State to inform against their parents for political heresy. In point 4, if we leave aside the knotty question of when a vocation becomes divine, they certainly surpass us. There is a widespread sense of vocation in the daily work of both countries which is infrequent among ourselves. Although it has been customary to represent them both as tyrannies, it is pretty well established by now that the average worker has a real sense of serving the social whole. Possibly, the sense is stronger in Russia than in Germany, probably, it is more justifiable there; but the evidence cannot be gainsaid that it is stronger in either than it is with us. Nor does the cause, or part of it, seem far to seek. In either country the worker is secure, on however modest a basis. He is not haunted by the spectre of unemployment, and he knows that, however tyrannical the state may be, it is at least a tyranny that makes his security in work its first care. The society the workers are compelled to serve is a society that cares for them, and does not leave them as pariahs in a social and economic no man's land, in which if

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they can keep their bodies alive, they cannot keep their souls.

Yet in one point which the heads of the Churches do not mention the totalitarian societies completely fail. And it is surely a point of cardinal importance in judging what is, or what is not, a Christian society. Probably the heads of the Churches take it for granted: for it is the practice of toleration. The missing 6th point should read somewhat as follows: "Every citizen should be secured in the right to express his opinions freely, so long as they do not offend against the law of the land." Yet the moment one tries to formulate the principle of toleration, the difficulties become obvious. For toleration cannot extend to the expression of *all* opinions; yet if it is limited to those which do not conflict with the law of the land, we need some security as to what the law will forbid. Stretch the law of treason a little, have a police busily engaged in ferreting it out, and you legalize most of the activities of OGPU or a Gestapo. Indeed, at the present moment in Britain, under the excuse of war-emergency, the law empowers the Home Secretary indefinitely to imprison any suspect without recourse to law. If this is the consequence of emergency in law-abiding Britain, it is less surprising that countries which exist in a perpetual condition of revolutionary emergency should intolerably extend the use of arbitrary power.

Since laws that may not be overridden in an emergency by a legislative body are scarcely conceivable, there seems to be no security for toleration except in the habit of mind of the people. Toleration is secure only in a society which has learned to be tolerant. That is why it disappears in the stress of revolution. For revolution (strictly so called) is always violent; and violent revolution is impossible in a tolerant society. Violence begins where toleration ends. And although representative democracy may fairly claim to be the political form naturally taken by a tolerant society, it is to put the cart before the horse to imagine that representative democracy is a guarantee of toleration. Much rather is toleration a guarantee of representative democracy. It is the condition without which representative democracy cannot work. Sooner or later in an intolerant society, or a society which has become intolerant through intolerable conditions, representative democracy destroys itself, as German democracy did when it voted Hitler into power, or as Russian democracy did when it submitted to the dissolution of its Constituent Assembly.

Though toleration is manifestly a Christian virtue, and

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therefore a necessary attribute of a Christian social order, it is a very modern Christian virtue. From the time Christianity was embraced by the Roman State till the end of the Wars of Religion in the 17th century—that is, for thirteen hundred years—the Christian Church, Western or Eastern, was professedly intolerant. It had no doubt about its right to extirpate the heretic. Now, it protests, with indubitable sincerity, when the totalitarian states insist upon extirpating their heretics; it denounces the practice as a barbaric retrogression. It is; but it is revision to the age-old practice of the Christian Church. And the cynic might suggest that that is the reason why toleration finds no place among the ecclesiastical criteria of a Christian social order. That would be unjust. Almost certainly the signatories took toleration for granted: they are themselves an embodied toleration—the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, and the Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council.

Nevertheless, it remains curious that they did not consciously insist upon it, for the survival of toleration is the crucial issue in this transitional and chaotic modern world. When Britain claims that she is fighting for liberty, it is for the practice of toleration that she is fighting. Her moral case against Hitlerism is that it is an intolerant and oppressive social system; it is, of course, equally the moral case against Stalinism. In so far as we are defending a Christian value, it is toleration that we are defending. And assuredly Britons and Americans have a right to assert that toleration is a Christian value in their history, whatever may be its status in the history of the Christian Church as a whole. For toleration was established in Britain and America by the struggle of the Protestant sects among themselves. Some were originally just as intolerant as the Church against which they rebelled; others were tolerant as a matter of self-evident Christian principle. But eventually they agreed to live and let live. Gradually the circle was widened to embrace Catholics (still intolerant by theory) and Atheists. Every citizen was then entitled to the freedom of his own opinion and the right to express it, and to suffer no civic disability for doing so.

It is not the old religious intolerance that we have to fear to-day, but the new quasi-religious intolerance of the deified State. There is a religious element in it. There is a religious fervour in the new totalitarian political ideologies: all alike conceive the secular State as the instrument of a divine mission

—to secure the triumph of the messianic proletariat, the mystical Third *Reich*, or the inspirations of the God-Emperor Meiji. The great totalitarian states somehow combine in one the different divinities of the medieval Church and the medieval Empire. Unless the totalitarian state has this absolute power to suppress heretics, its leaders say, it will be unable to fulfil its divine and historical mission, whatever that may be. Nor can it be denied that the leaders and the people as a whole are inspired by a sense of mission.

The sense of mission in European totalitarianism derives from two main sources. First, it is important to remember the truth on which Peter Drucker has insisted: that Naziism is a post-Marxist creed. Russian Communism is avowedly Marxist. Historically, Naziism came into being largely as the antithesis to Communism, but not, as many people in Britain vainly imagined, as a conservative antithesis to it. Much rather as an equally revolutionary alternative to it: a new combination of Nationalism and Marxism, devised by a demonic genius who had, by first-hand experience in the underworld of Vienna, understood both the dynamic insufficiency of international Marxism and the immediate needs of the proletariat. Communism and Naziism alike are steeped in the Hegelian philosophy of history; from Hegel at first, second or third hand, both derive the conviction that the State is beyond morality, the vehicle for the realization of the divine Idea. Second, both are based on some sort of understanding that a machine-society is generically different from all previous societies. The demands of the machine have to be met. Production has to be maximized at all costs. The ensuing liberation of machine industry into full production (whether of armaments or the commodities of peace) by ruthlessly smashing all impediments to full production, though the impediments happen to be human beings, is the immediate source of the sense of throbbing energy with which the totalitarian societies are animated. It is as though in a great organism the blood that ran sluggishly had suddenly began to circulate freely.

This, I believe, is the reality of the quasi-religious experience which distinguishes the totalitarian societies. Obviously, it transcends the individual, but not at all in the same way as traditional religious experience does. It does not unite the individual with a transcendent God, but with the new, pulsing life of the social organism. What is so difficult for us of the Western tradition to understand is that this new life of the

social organism really is new. The liberation of the machine within a national society brings a new experience to its members. The experience is akin, no doubt, to the familiar sensation of closer community in war. Nevertheless, it is generically different. The familiar unity of patriotism is an emotional unity; the new totalitarian unity is a socio-physiological unity; and though it is assimilated to the emotional unity of patriotism, the new combination is generically different. And it is capable of new achievements.

The point to be emphasized is that this new and portentous materialistic religion is real in the actual experience of the men who participate in it. It is not a theory, not a frenzy induced by the modern technique of mass-propaganda (though this is freely used) but something that has physical reality in the mechanical nexus of the totalitarian society. Just as there is physical reality in the nexus which binds together the members of a crowd in the grip of mass emotion, so on a deeper, subtler plane, there is physical reality in the nexus of a society in which the machines are allowed to go "all out" in complete disregard of all traditional human impediment, of law, custom and property-rights. The creative energy developed in such a society permeates all its members.

The question—the radical and perturbing question—is how a society of toleration can maintain itself against this new concentration of energy in a national society, taking conscious form in a conviction of historical mission. Both Germany and Russia conceive it to be their historical mission to change the world; and both have the power to do it. Perhaps it is by divine providence that they are engaged in attempting this against one another. Perhaps the significance of that titanic struggle is that it gives us of the Anglo-Saxon or tolerant tradition a breathing space—a respite in which we may become conscious of our own mission.

That mission must be to maintain in being a society of toleration. But that is a problem of a new kind, of which the elements and urgency are ignored when we speak of it as "the defence of liberty." The real problem is to reconcile the practice of toleration and liberty with such a liberation of the machine as will enable us to develop a physical energy comparable with that of the totalitarian societies. That is the physical problem. There is a corresponding spiritual problem: to determine the purpose for which our energy, if it can be released, shall be employed—to decide whether we also wish to change the world, and into what we wish to change it.

Probably, we should all agree that we would like to change the world into a world of ordered peace. But that is far too vague. What that really means is a world-society of toleration. Since the dynamic at present belongs to the intolerant societies, it is probably impossible to create such a society. And anyhow the chance of imposing toleration upon the world would depend upon the achievement of world-power: and in the effort to achieve so vast an aim, calling for such a titanic organization and expenditure of energy, it is practically certain that toleration itself would be destroyed.

So it seems that the problem narrows down to the problem whether the Anglo-Saxon societies can, without sacrifice of their internal principle of toleration, so liberate the productive capacity of the machine that they can develop energy enough to maintain their defence against the intolerant societies, which have used intolerance to release the machine. This conception of the Anglo-Saxon mission has manifest and immediate corollaries for the strategy of the war. It seems to point directly to a reliance on sea-power, and a deliberate rejection of all strategies which require a vast development of land-power: if only because we need to restrict the demands on the Anglo-Saxon energies to the minimum compatible with the defence of our tolerant societies. That minimum is prodigious enough, in all conscience; it will tax all our moral energies to provide it without doing fatal injury to the practice and the principle of internal toleration. And over and above this simple consideration is the fact that it is behind the shelter of sea-power that the liberties and toleration of the Anglo-Saxon societies have historically developed. The privilege of sea-power has enabled us to avoid the curse of permanent military organization, and the constant threat to free institutions which such organization involves. If we blindly sacrifice that privileged position in the pursuit of policies which, even if successful, will create a situation in which the maintenance of our own free and tolerant society is no longer possible, we shall annihilate our own significance for the world. We shall be meeting the challenge to our own potentiality of creative response to what is perhaps the greatest crisis in the history of man like irrational animals, not like creatures endowed with godlike reason.

For the problem is not, as many people take it to be, to maintain the machinery of political democracy in war; that is preserved by running it at a good deal less than half-speed. The problem is to ensure a situation after the war in which

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political democracy can function; or at least to avoid a situation in which it cannot function—a situation in which violence is the only visible remedy. Such a situation seems to be inevitable at the end of the road we are now blindly travelling; for that must end in a situation wherein our export trade has shrunk to a shadow, our shipping is decimated, and our foreign investments are down to zero. Into such a ghostly fabric of British economy millions of men in the army will be clamouring to enter. The word peace means something emotionally, however little it may describe the brute fact of the post-war situation. The primitive urge of millions of conscripted men to enjoy the freedom they have been fighting for will be disastrous to a political system incapable of satisfying them; whose representatives have neither taken thought how to satisfy them, nor warned them that they cannot be satisfied.

After all, this democracy of ours, this society of toleration and freedom, is the most civilized polity the modern world has produced. It is, as we have contended, at least the necessary foundation of a Christian society. If this cannot be preserved, we may put out of our minds any advance towards a more Christian society for generations to come. Yet, unless it undergoes a creative change, and permits a liberation of the machine, it cannot achieve a dynamic comparable to that of the totalitarian societies. Abstractly, the line of advance is a liberation of the machine by genuine consent: and some imagine that that is actually being enforced upon us by the war. But in reality it is not so at all. Partly by a colossal draft on the future production of the country, partly in reliance on extraordinary aid from America—which is a kindlier version of the same process—we are simply postponing the day of reckoning with the machine, and accumulating intolerable tensions for the future.

It sounds extravagant, and it is unfortunately discordant with the ethos of Britain; nevertheless the truth is that if we wish to retain a society of freedom and toleration after the war, we have to plan for its retention deliberately and resolutely now. Perhaps the task is, even objectively, too great; but without a conscious awareness that the task exists and is urgent, it is subjectively quite impossible of achievement. Yet, if the task is not deliberately formulated and attempted, the condition of disillusion that will follow the war will be fierce indeed—so fierce that any conceivable new ordering of the world which depends upon our participation and support will collapse immediately, because the support will not be there.

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The water of the spring of world-renewal will disappear in the cleft of revolution; only the dry and barren rock will remain.

The task is not the planning of a more Christian society than we have; it is planning how to retain those elements of a Christian society which we have already achieved, and which by common consent, we are now engaged in defending. Nevertheless, it is true that if we are really to set about the task on which we are all agreed, we should find ourselves compelled to create a more Christian society than the one we have—a society which at least fulfilled the standards of the Christian leaders. The root of our trouble is that it occurs only to a tiny minority that to defend democracy, as a society of toleration and freedom, is now become a definite, specific and most difficult task. It is almost universally taken for granted that it will have been successfully defended if only we can beat Hitler; if we can destroy Hitlerism, by the very fact our society of toleration will have been successfully defended. No illusion is more widespread, and none more dangerous. It is entirely the other way about. If we can ensure the continuance of a free and tolerant society, by conscious and creative action, we may eventually destroy Hitlerism. Hitlerism is only a particular variety of totalitarianism. To beat Hitler only to discover that there is no remedy for our ensuing plight but totalitarianism would destroy our influence in the world for a century. We should have sunk "beneath the level of history."

To be honest about ourselves, we have been dragged at the chariot-wheels of history for at least a dozen years. No decisive or creative act has come from us, no symbolic or significant initiative. Whether or not the round world believes that we shall win, it certainly does not believe that we shall know what to do if we do win. Its scepticism is most justified: for what we shall do depends upon what we shall be; and we show no sign of taking serious thought about that. Parliament is engrossed with the fight for survival. True, but the issue is the survival of Parliament. The Church is engrossed with the defeat of Anti-Christ. True, but the issue is the survival of the Church. For the Church in the world of to-day is a minority group. Its freedom depends, not on its own sanctity, but on the existence of a civil society of freedom and toleration. It should strive to bridge the gap between its abstract principles and the concrete present by pondering the conditions of its own existence as something more august than a persecuted remnant.

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Perhaps Christianity is incapable of a counter-dynamic to the totalitarian. It is lamentably true that the tolerant society was established less by positive Christianity than by negative, less by the will to love than by deprivation of the opportunity to hate. Possibly, it takes the tolerant society for granted, because it did so little positively to achieve it. It will rue the loss of it none the less. So that it should be deeply concerned to discover and release a counter-dynamic, if one can be found. The clamour for the revival of religious education is beside the mark unless it means an entirely new kind of religious education. The dynamic of totalitarianism is not so much mental, as socio-physiological. The only kind of Christian education that is relevant is an education into the reality of a modern industrial society, into the necessity of releasing the machines from the impediment of individualism. Unless that release is planned by an act of creative and discriminating imagination, it will come automatically, as a convulsive reaction to a situation produced by inertia; and the machine will triumph not over individualism merely—that is probably its mission—but over the individual as well.

'CAPTIVE' FRANCE

BY W. HORSFALL CARTER

BRITISH diplomatic gentility, the persistent underestimating of the enemy in the military sphere, above all the easy optimism of the general public since Russia came into the war on our side—these are obvious shortcomings of the national war effort. What is less obvious perhaps, and more serious in the long run, is the blind spot in the Englishman's imagination that frequently screens from him the far-reaching effects of a particular train of action: our Achilles heel, indeed, I would suggest, is a congenital inability to enter into the mental processes of "foreigners," to see ourselves as others see us. Have we ever stopped to realize, for instance, what it means that, with the exception of outlying Turkey and Portugal, there is not one country on the Continent to-day where Britain and the cause for which she stands can be freely championed? (Sweden and Switzerland, though not under the yoke, suffer from the inhibitions of "neutrality.") Everywhere press and radio play—and in many cases have played for some 18 months—one unceasing record, their master's voice. Against this chronic barrage of tendentious news and unfriendly comment our only reply consists in the much-jammed foreign language bulletins of the B.B.C. (now at last available on the long-wave)—with Colonel Bramble metamorphosed into Colonel Britton—and, in France or Belgium, for example, the clandestine press. It is essential that we British should ponder upon the long-range effect of this smothering of democracy's voice in Europe. The consequences are only too visible here and now in the policy and behaviour of the ruling elements in Vichy France.

Six months ago in a statement to the press of occupied France,*Admiral Darlan attacked Britain and British policy in terms so abusive and challenging as to foreshadow an immediate participation of Vichy France in German plans to seal the Western Mediterranean and wreak havoc in our Atlantic approaches. That statement, which included the charge that

*See also an interview given to Henri Beraud in *Gringoire*, May 27, 1941.

Britain's only aim was to destroy the sea-power of France and to separate the Motherland from her colonial empire, should be recalled to-day as the most explicit motivation of the policy now being pursued by the Pétain Government. After giving a long list of "British acts of piracy against France" culminating in the bombing of Sfax (Tunisia) by the R.A.F. the Admiral declared:

I am more than ever determined to secure respect for France's right to dispose freely of her ports and her lines of communication . . .

Nothing happened, however, at the time. The impetuous Gascon had anticipated his cue. Germany's "Constructive Plan for a New Order in Europe" was nowhere near ready, and her Japanese ally was still busy weaving her strategic web. France herself, that is to say the French people, required further doses of chloroform. Hitler and Mussolini were meeting the same day (June 2), as it happened, to make the final arrangements for the onslaught on Russia; and it did not yet suit Hitler to elbow his Italian confederate aside. For all these reasons, and, too, perhaps, because President Roosevelt's "fireside talk" of May 27 revealed an American policy much more forthright and positive than he had bargained for, Hitler decided that his African plans must wait.

But do we realize now what we are up against? Because in the early months of 1941 the intensified attacks on British shipping had failed to "starve us out" there was a tendency over here to sit back and assume, complacently, that once again sea power had shown up the inadequacy of a mere "Continental system." We comforted ourselves with the thought that, so long as Britain rules the seas, the conqueror of Europe is at the same time its prisoner. Those who—before Norway—had talked of the "cornered maniac" began to raise their voices again. But this was seriously to underrate the range and dimensions of the German challenge. Nazi strategy has all along been conceived in terms of world and not merely European domination: "world mastery or we go under" was no mere figure of speech. The German attitude is expressed in these words from a recent editorial in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*:

Even though we in Germany may have no desire to control the seven seas, we are determined, in spite of Roosevelt, to obtain in the course of this war sufficient command of the seas to ensure the gradual weakening, and eventual eclipse, of British naval power. Meanwhile the military position of the Axis Powers on land will become more and more unassailable. Anglo-Saxon sea-power will be crippled by our

Continental block, and our influence will extend far enough from our coasts to settle in our favour the vexed question of "Sea-power versus Continental power."

The plan reflects the theories of Professor Haushofer and his "geo-politics" school in Munich of a huge land-mass covering Europe and a considerable tract of Asia, the Eurasian heart-land, self-supporting in all but tropical products, the latter being procured from the African extension of Europe—with enough sea and air power to ward off any intruders. Consequently the attack on Russia was never an *alternative* to invasion of the British Isles, it was central to the whole grandiose scheme. And, coming when it did, it was designed to bring substantial psychological advantages, to foster the *mystique* of a Europe united by Germany against the common danger of what Hitler in his hysterical rhetoric now calls the "mongol hordes." His instinct for Europe did not deceive him. As Catholic writers in *The Tablet* and elsewhere do well to remind us, the feeling about Russia and Communism on the Continent is far more deeply ingrained than in the easy-going "Anglo-Saxon" countries. It is a potent weapon, for instance, in the harnessing of Pétain's France to the German war-machine.

The campaign in Russia has certainly not gone according to plan. Nevertheless, the strategic purpose in the narrow sense will have been achieved if Russia is pinned down, if her power to take the offensive is crippled. Hitler counts on the threat from Japan to immobilize the enemy on the Eastern front, while he resumes the preparations of six months ago for the Battle of Africa. Before enforcing his demands on Spain and Portugal, however, essential pawns in the Atlantic offensive, he must first make sure that the French in Africa have provided free passage. And so the spotlight shifts to the battle for France. It is not just a question of whether Hitler is going to get the necessary facilities for transporting supplies to Tunisia in time to foil the British attempt to secure mastery in Libya. So much will probably have been achieved before this article appears. What is at stake is the whole question of Anglo-American sea control in the South Atlantic—and the indispensable air route for supplies to the Middle East from Bathurst (in British Gambia) and Lagos. For, granted the necessary naval support from France, the Germans can work untold mischief in Africa,* at the same time bringing pressure

*cf. *Watch over Africa*, by Denis Saurat (Dent) and an article by the same author, "Germany and Africa," in the *Sunday Times*, July 20, 1941.

to bear on South America and the United States' Atlantic defences, to coincide with the Japanese onslaught in the Pacific. It is an appalling prospect, but it is a prospect that must be faced because such a purpose is implicit in the German ambition of world conquest. Against this background the policy of paltering with Vichy France, to which London and Washington have been committed, just looks silly; and the negligence of local commanders in failing to give adequate support to the de Gaulle expedition at Dakar in September, 1940, stands revealed as one of the biggest blunders of the war.

"Geography ordains," M. André Labarthe, the brilliant young editor of *La France Libre*, has reminded us, "that in a world conflict like the present France should occupy a pivotal position in the war strategy; all lines of communication . . . pass through some part or other of the French Empire." The lesson has been driven home by events in Indo-China and in Syria. Yet, on the most charitable view, the men in charge of French destinies since the capitulation have seemed unaware of the fatal logic of their own craven actions. Atrophied by defeat and defeatism they spurned the suggestion that France should maintain a self-respecting independence through a Government operating from North Africa; fortunately General Gaulle and his followers have provided not merely a rallying-point but have, through their occupation of the Chad and other territories in Central Africa, fastened on the jugular vein of the whole African Continent. Obsessed by the manpower shortage and diminishing birth-rate of European France by the side of mighty Germany, thinking in purely Continental terms, these "little minds" clung to the idea—I quote from M. Labarthe—"that France could recover from defeat and the consequences of defeat by withdrawal from the world in order to preserve a reduced patrimony." Intent on their anti-democratic "revolution" whose object would be to rebuild a Catholic and rural civilization damming the "Communist" floods released by industrialism, they did not see, apparently, that in the process they were emptying the baby out with the bath water, indeed by way of sacrificing the soul of France itself. Events, in their fateful majesty, have shown up crystal-clear what M. Labarthe calls the "total and absolute error" of the arguments on which the men of Vichy based their surrender.

The initial assumption was, of course, that Britain would likewise be suing for peace in the summer or autumn of 1940. So little were *les chefs* alive to the world-wide nature of the

conflict, apparently, that it was not until September 4, 1940, that Marshal Pétain addressed any message to "France overseas." When the R.A.F. repelled the onslaught of the *Luftwaffe* and German hopes of finishing off the war quickly were dispelled, loyalty to the conquerors, in the words of M. Baudouin, had to give place to "collaboration." But in the meantime ordinary French men and women were recovering from the collective numbness that afflicted them following the military disasters of May and June and began to cherish hopes of liberation from the Axis yoke. It was necessary therefore to combine the positive aim of staking out the claims of France in a future German-controlled Europe with the negative object of maintaining a simulacrum of independence on the part of the unoccupied provinces and the French Empire. Above all, the fetish of Pétain, the man of peace, must be upheld: in contrast with that of Clemenceau the aged Marshal's watchword might well be—*je fais la paix*. This dualism of policy was in fact inevitable in the whole Vichy position; adopted in the first place for reasons of domestic policy it has, one fears, by its very ambiguity served Hitler's purpose admirably. The innocents at home and abroad were bulldozed into believing what they wished to believe, while the conquerors were given valuable time in which to bind "captive" France in chains and prepare for the conquest of Africa. Once again we have seen at work Hitler's technique, as expounded in *Mein Kampf*, of treating the victim to successive doses of humiliation which he would never stomach if he had to swallow them in one gulp. Laval first, then Darlan, Benoist-Mechin and the rest, tutored by M. Fernand de Brinon, French "ambassador" to Paris (the very title proclaims the shame of Vichy) have been the willing instruments of this treatment; the octogenarian Pétain needed only to be flattered and fed upon the illusion (which had inspired his whole pre-war attitude) that by abandoning Central and Eastern Europe to the *Reich* France would be allowed to maintain her ascendancy in the West, with leadership of the Catholic-Latin *bloc* dear to his heart. "European crusade against Bolshevism" was the trump card which the Germans were keeping up their sleeve.

The actual results of the Pétain-Göring conversations at Saint Florentin-Versigny have not been divulged when I write. But there is sufficient evidence in the reports to suggest that they have marked a further stage in the Vichy policy of all aid to the Axis short of war or, as M. Jean Luchaire terms it—"military neutrality tinged with Europeanism." The enemy

will have the use of naval and air bases in North Africa—and Darlan has presumably contrived to "square" Mussolini by lease-lending Bizerta to the Italians 'for the duration.' All available French tonnage in the Mediterranean has already been requisitioned for the transport of supplies to General Rommel's hard-pressed troops. It is thought that this will surely provoke Britain to hostile action which can be represented as aggression against the integrity of France and her empire—then and only then will Hitler make his bid for the French fleet. The suggestion that French West Africa shall be regarded for the present as "a zone of Franco-Spanish defence" chimes with the Marshal's own stipulation, voiced early last year, that any possible territorial adjustment in favour of Spain was a matter for negotiation between the French and Spanish Governments alone: and it might also have been conceived as a soporific for the Americans. Actually, Washington's reaction to the dismissal of Weygand suggests that the State Department has at last shed its illusions about Vichy; the only question is whether President Roosevelt has not left it too late to assert, with armed force, American interest in Dakar and the whole African bulge as an outpost of the national security. Japanese intervention in the war must be regarded as yet another instance of Hitler's perfect timing of his strokes.

To appreciate why we must expect the worst of France under her present rulers—and perhaps to dispel any lurking illusions in high places—one has only to consider the trajectory of Vichy's degradation since the beginning of 1941. The Germans had chosen well their man, the ambitious Darlan (who took over the Ministry of the Interior on January 3 and replaced Flandin as Foreign Minister and Minister for Economic Affairs on February 9) and an official announcement was made that the Montoire policy—of collaboration with Germany within the terms of the Armistice was to be given a "new reality." A fortnight later, after being forced to meet Laval and issue a statement that the "misunderstandings" that had led to his extrusion from the Cabinet had now been dissipated, Pétain declared in an interview for the American press that France—

intends to associate herself with the organization of the Continent and co-operate loyally in the hope of establishing a solid and durable peace in Europe . . .

Evidently the old man was 'coming along.' But at the same time the official spokesman in Vichy was deputed to affirm that "she will insist on full observance of the Armistice terms"

and that "it must be perfectly understood that we continue to assume the safety of the Empire overseas." On the face of it, and precisely because of the success of General Wavell's offensive in Libya, Vichy was in a better position to bargain than in the autumn. There was always the threat that German forces would extend their occupation to the whole of France—which would mean the end of Pétain's "national revolution" enterprise; and Hitler still had his hostages in the shape of the million and a half French prisoners-of-war. Six months of German occupation, however, had destroyed any shreds of good will among the population of the occupied zone, and the Germans did not want trouble, with the Balkans campaign on their hands and the roseate visions of the "new order" that were to be conjured up. French friendship, if it could be obtained, was likely to be worth much more to Hitler than, for example, the Italian alliance, which was rapidly becoming a distinct liability. So the watchword, on the German side, was still—conciliation. And German propaganda was switched on to encouraging the idea of a Latin bloc, so dear to Frenchmen of the Right: a common Mediterranean policy uniting France, Spain and Italy—under Germany's protection, needless to say—to destroy the last remnants of British power and influence on the Continent.

More particularly it chimed with the rooted conviction of Admiral Darlan and his naval colleagues that France's overseas destiny, her future as a Mediterranean Power, depended on the extrusion of Britain from the Middle Sea. 'Trafalgar must be avenged; only thus would France retain her due share in the European nations condominium over Africa.' (The tradition of the fleet in France, in the upper deck, is, of course, one of hostility and combat against Britain). This was the period, then, when the new policy of active participation in Germany's designs, of which we are witnessing the fruits to-day, was first signalled. Count Fernand de Brinon was put up to spread the idea:

If we believe that Britain has lost the war we should come to an agreement with Germany about collaboration in Africa. It would be to our advantage, at a time when British influence is collapsing, to associate in the minds of those peoples who are sensitive to force the old prestige of France and the prestige of victorious Germany.

Two months later (in May) he returned to the charge on the Paris radio with a specific reference—"North Africa is a prolongation of Europe. It has a vital part to play in Europe's reconstruction." Meanwhile the newspapers took up the

theme which was continually being played in the Spanish press that economic privations were all due to the British blockade—although actually, not least out of deference to United States wishes, our Ministry of Economic Warfare was dealing very leniently with French merchant shipping, especially the traffic with North Africa, which was in fact benefiting the Nazis substantially. And meanwhile Marshal Pétain was usefully disarming criticism by his reiterated declarations that "it is a matter of honour for us to do nothing against our former ally." To Admiral Leahy, U.S. Ambassador, who conveyed a warning message from President Roosevelt, he was reported, however, to have repeated his conviction that the war was lost for Britain and there was nothing to be done about it: it was the old refrain: "We French think in terms of continental policies, and the Germans are masters of the Continent." Comparing his position with that of the Belgian king he would hold out no hope of resistance to German demands; but that did not stop him instructing M. Henry-Haye in Washington to renew the pledge that France would not surrender her fleet or the colonial empire.

The outbursts by Admiral Darlan, to which I have alluded, told a different story. Negotiations for a 'peace agreement' superseding the Armistice were in full spate. Darlan broadcast from Paris on May 23 promising details but in fact giving no indication of what had been agreed. All that emerged was that economic bonds were being drawn tighter, collaboration being extended to the whole country and the North African territories developed in concert with the Axis Powers. Then, on June 4, a strict censorship was clamped down upon all press dispatches concerning Franco-German dealings. The outside world could only guess that some new grave step was contemplated from the resignation of French Embassy officials in Ankara "because Darlan had broken his promises and compromised the future of the French Empire . . . and was acting contrary to the wishes of the people"—and from the terms of a formal statement issued by Mr. Cordell Hull in Washington. The tragedy of Syria followed, and the French people, we should remember, were regaled all the time by Vichy with the German version of events. To a further admonition in a public statement by Mr. Sumner Welles, following the cession to Japan of bases in Indo-China, Vichy replied with the usual bland assurances, which were straightaway belied by Marshal Pétain himself in his big speech of August 12.

Whether in the meantime the fanfares of the Russian cam-

paign and the revival of the anti-Red fervour of his period as Ambassador in Spain had been too much for the old man and had overborne his surviving scruples we do not know. But now he was prepared publicly to announce that the Government wanted to pass on from the Armistice stage "to more stable bonds without which the European order cannot be built up again." "France must know how to orientate herself towards a larger horizon which a reconciled Continent can open up to her activities . . . she must change the régime of yesterday, taking heed of Spain's experience . . ." The appointment of Darlan as Minister of National and Empire Defence set the seal on the new, more positive policy.

Yes, that speech gave the game away. It was remarkable, too, for its admissions that the chief, indeed the only obstacle, was the resistance of the French people: the adversaries of collaboration, he said, must be "decimated," 'the "national revolution" had not yet become a fact.' From that moment the battle for France was joined.

In the material sense Vichy's record is certainly one of failure. After a year and more of "collaboration" France has secured nothing beyond the release of 100,000 of the prisoners-of-war and the reduction of the occupation costs from 400,000,000 to 300,000,000 francs a day. She is being bled white to feed German bellies and the German war-machine: every month she has to send to the *Reich* some 4,000 cattle, 14,900,000 bottles of champagne, 80 per cent. of her wine harvest and all her wine reserve, quantities of cheese, potatoes, sugar-beet, wheat and fruit. Spiritually the régime is bankrupt. For all its efforts and prating of "the Legion" the Government group has failed to secure any mass-support for the imitation-Fascism to which it is committed. The issue is now so patently 'for or against Germany' that the credit on which it could draw last year for promising to have done with rottenness and corruption of the *République des Camarades* has long since been exhausted; no new constitutional structure has in fact been established. Since August we have seen how the true spirit of France is asserting itself—in sabotage, assaults and a constant harrying of the oppressors. And the only reply this régime can make is to impose the severest police measures, to institute special courts—and blame it all on the "freemasons," "Communists," "de Gaulists," and, of course, British gold. But in a country like France punitive action on this scale defeats itself. With their profound sense of human dignity the French are the last

nation to put up with dragooning. If Frenchmen are going to be liable to penalties for the crime of being anti-German, Darlan's new police force will be arresting 90 per cent. of the population—all except "that small clique whose public careers depend upon a German victory," to use Mr. Churchill's words in his speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet.

The dismissal of General Weygand has brought things to a head. So far the only manifest result has been the decision of General Odic, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, to join up with the Free French, and the resignation of the Assistant Naval Attaché in Washington. The terms of the statement issued by the man who formerly held command over the air force in North Africa (under Weygand's direction), however, reflect what the majority of the French Army leaders are thinking. Even the Admirals are not all prepared to stand for Darlan's policy of subservience: at the beginning of September Admiral Le Luc, Chief of Naval Operations (and French Naval representative on the Armistice Commission) was removed from his post, presumably because he opposed the granting of facilities at Bizerta. And it is at least doubtful whether junior officers and the lower deck will be prepared to serve in a navy patently under German control. A firm stand by colonial officers and civil servants may yet baulk the best-laid schemes of Hitler's catspaws. And—in Kipling's pregnant words—the people "has not spoken yet."

One word of warning, however, is in place. The feeling in France is essentially anti-German; it is not pro-British. A constant stream of propaganda has had its effect: and indeed there was only too much truth in Darlan's charges* that:

From 1919 to 1936 Britain did everything to prevent France from benefiting by her victory. Through the League of Nations she always sought to weaken us militarily and upheld German claims. The principle of equality of rights was her battle-cry, but she took good care not to apply it when it came to naval affairs

and so on.

The beneficiary is—and will be—the de Gaulle movement, which has proved itself, and, since it is in fact doing the job that an independent French Government operating from Africa should have done from June, 1940, onwards, has come to be recognized as the symbol of liberation. (It was admitted by a certain M. Charles Guy broadcasting from Radio Paris on November 17 that for that very reason *une large section du public est de coeur avec eux*.) When, ultimately, the combined resources of the three genuinely world Powers—Britain,

U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. have achieved victory, Free France represented by de Gaulle will be there to safeguard French interests. Our business will be to remain as inconspicuous as possible, while taking our share in the joint guarantee of French security that we shirked last time, with such terrible results. Behind that shield France will have to work out her own political salvation, to build the bridges between *le rouge et le noir*, the Right and the Left, between the Catholic tradition of authority and the "revolutionary" tradition of liberty, for lack of which she has been brought to her present plight. It may take a long time, during which France's rôle in the new Europe will be a secondary one. But at least there is one consolation; she will be able to start from scratch. For the old parties of the inter-war period, each of which has contributed its quota of defeatists and traitors, still more the reactionaries and 'friends of Germany' and attendant time-servers—all these will have been utterly discredited, and the present period of purgatory will not have been in vain.

*Interview in *Gringoire*, mentioned above.

THE JAPANESE AND THEIR RULERS

BY O. M. GREEN

IT is significant and, as far as memory goes, without parallel, that Japan's declaration of war came, not from the Government, but from the High Military Command. We can be fairly sure that there are plenty of Japanese in high places (names could be mentioned if it were not actually dangerous for their owners to do so) who never wished for the war. But the Army has spoken, overriding all opposition and demonstrating its omnipotence to its own people as to the world by issuing the declaration in its own name.

In passing, it is clear that from the Army's point of view the outlook had become pretty desperate. If Great Britain and Russia backed by America won in Europe, all their dreams of a Greater East Asia full of docile serfs working for Japan were done for. There could be no more appearing to retreat in order to advance again at the favourable moment, as for instance at the Washington Conference when, under the weight of international displeasure, Japan returned to China the former German possessions in Shantung. All the plunder amassed in the past ten years she would be made to disgorge.

On the other hand, if Hitler came out on top, Japan had had enough experience of his perfidy to know that he would never allow her to monopolize all the riches of East Asia, with notices, "No foreigners admitted" on all the doors. The only course was to plunge into a mad gamble to win or lose everything at one stroke. And again and again the Japanese people were told that "Japan is at the cross-roads" and that she "is faced with the direst crisis in her history."

So far as General Tojo and his friends are concerned, "the 17th century-minded daimyos," the Black Dragon Society, the fire-eating "Young Officer" class and all the associations of fervent patriots that have sprung up in recent years, that is true enough. But the position of the Japanese people, the millions of farmers, shopkeepers, small industrialists and factory hands, is very different. For them it may well be that one arm of those cross-roads points to the dawn of a freedom such as they have never known.

It is no exaggeration to say that the present rulers of Japan are as much the enemies of the Japanese people as they are of every nation that stands in the way of their ambition.

Since the seizure of Manchuria nothing has been plainer than that the granting of a Constitution with Houses of Parliament and ballot boxes in 1889 changed nothing in Japan's political and social structure except the name. A feudalism Japan had been for over 2,000 years and a feudalism she remained, with the additional rigidity imparted by the powers of the new bureaucracy, the dominance over all trade, industry, banking and shipping of half-a-dozen huge syndicates and, worst of all, the unique privileges of the Army and Navy. The latter were partly constitutional, but solidified by Marshal Yamagata. The Army and Navy were made responsible to the Emperor alone, to whom they had access at all times (the Premier must ask for an audience; the chief Generals and Admirals walk in) and their right to appoint or withdraw the Minister of War and Navy as they please enables them to dictate the formation and policy of every Government.*

A potent instrument for strengthening the military grip on affairs has been the creed of the Emperor's divinity. In the reign of the great Meiji Emperor this legend was not specially prominent, certainly not in its present political bearing; and during the 1920's it became distinctly perfunctory. Those were the years when a wave of liberalism swept Japan, when commoner Premiers fought their way to the top as they do in western democracies; and when the Diet, backed for their own purposes by the big financial syndicates, seemed on the road to become a real power in the State. Part of the Army's motive in swooping on Manchuria in 1931 was to regain the mastery over a domestic movement which it both hated and feared.

Once again in the saddle the Army resuscitated the cult of Emperor-worship and drilled it into the nation with an intensity which in these days seems almost unbelievable. In every school is a safe containing a portrait of the Emperor before which the pupils daily abase themselves: the picture itself is only exhibited on great days. And visitors to Tokyo from the provinces must go first of all to the imperial palace to worship before its mystic walls. The Emperor himself is rarely seen, the Army posing before the nation as interpreter of the divine will, whereout "suck they no small advantage." Readers will remember a vivid description in the July, 1941, *FORTNIGHTLY* of the strictness of the Emperor's incarceration,

*For example, in January, 1937, General Ugaki was ordered by the Emperor to form a Government. The Army disliked his liberal ideas and refused to co-operate with him. After struggling for a week he had to go to the Emperor and ask permission to give up the attempt.

proof of which, if it were needed, may be found in the Imperial Rescript issued on the declaration of war. Here are a few typical sentences:—

It has been truly unavoidable and far from our wishes that our Empire has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain. More than four years have passed since China, failing to comprehend the true intentions of our Empire and recklessly courting trouble, disturbed the peace of Eastern Asia. . . .

Eager for the realization of their inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient, both America and Britain, in giving support to the Chungking régime, have aggravated the disturbances in Eastern Asia. Moreover, these two Powers, inducing other countries to follow suit, have increased military preparations on all sides of our Empire to challenge us. They have obstructed by every means our peaceful commerce, and finally have resorted to the direct severance of economic relations, menacing gravely the existence of our Empire.

Patiently have we waited and long have we endured in the hope that our Government might retrieve the situation in peace. But our adversaries, showing not the least spirit of conciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement, and in the meantime they have intensified economic and political pressure to compel our Empire to submission.

Almost word for word these terribly false and hypocritical sentences especially the parts italicized, are repetitions of speeches recently made by General Tojo and other Ministers. It is inconceivable that the Emperor would have fathered them, if he had had any true knowledge of all that has happened in the past ten years. But though we are told that he assiduously reads the papers, it must be remembered that the papers only publish what the Army allows.

Like their Emperor the Japanese people are prisoners. They have never known any freedom nor possessed any rights connoted by the word. Except during the 1920's, there has never been any trace of a democratic tendency in Japan. The old Chinese Imperial Edicts invariably ended with the words, "Tremble and obey." Yet in fact the Chinese people exercised a large measure of self-government; guilds in every calling protected them from the rapacity of officials; and when the Emperor ceased to devote himself to the people's welfare, on which his claim to exercise the "Mandate of Heaven" as ruler strictly depended, the people's constitutional right to rebel against him was as old as Mencius. No such safeguards of public liberty exist in Japan even in principle, still less in practice. From time immemorial the samurai has ever been top dog, and the people's duty only to do as they are told and to minister to the needs of their betters.

Readers will remember how in July, 1940, Mr. Melville Cox,

Reuter's correspondent in Tokyo, was arrested and so tortured by the police that in his frenzy he jumped out of the window and was killed. That, in fact, was nothing out of the way. Even members of the Diet are not safe from the tyranny of the police, which Germany itself cannot excel. Yet redress or reform are beyond attainment in spite of many protests.

Or take the case of the farmers who constitute 57 per cent. of the population. As far back as the eighth century one reads of reformers endeavouring to relieve them from the burden of unequal taxation, absentee landlordism, cheating middlemen and accumulating debt, but nothing has ever been done for them. It is from the farmers' families that the factories and brothels regularly draw their recruits, and both those industries are far too important to permit of reforms which might improve the farmer's lot and thus dry up the supply of female flesh.

It would be unfair and inaccurate not to recognize that there are many Japanese who deeply deplore the condition in which Japan finds herself, who hate the tyranny of the Army, looking back with sad regret on the hopes born in the 1920's of a new representation of the people's interests in the national administration, and who would never have agreed to Japan's challenging Great Britain and the United States if they had been able to stop it. But it would be equally deceptive to imagine that, being in the war, these men will not go through with it to the bitter end partly because of the intense Japanese clanishness, partly because there now appears no other way that offers any chance of securing Japan's future.

And in that word "securing" lies the basis of all Japanese policy for forty years past. Again and again as one looks back one finds this nervous grasping after security as the main motif in ministerial speeches. The Japanese are perpetually haunted by imaginary terrors. Not improbably this is the unconscious outcome of the volcanic nature of the soil they live on, which is annually shaken, on an average, by 1,800 earthquakes: there is a terrible legend that some day Japan will slip bodily down from the cliff-like edge of Asia—for the sea between her and the mainland is a comparatively shallow pond—into the depths of the Pacific. But Japanese imagination has never been wanting for material bogeys—Russia in 1904, China's growing prosperity in 1937, and recently the supposed designs of Great Britain and America to encircle and destroy.

A more tangible background for this craving for security and one on which, if her rulers had not been what they are,

Japan would have been entitled to sympathy, is her dependence on other nations for raw materials. She is the only great industrial Power which has to import practically all the materials needed by her industries. Her own reserves of iron ore are but little more than what the United States mines in a single year. There are more copious fields of ore in Manchuria, but the content of iron is very low, in general not more than 35 to 40 per cent. Similar deposits in America are not thought worth working. There are better deposits in Chahar, Inner Mongolia, which is now held by Japan, and in the central Yangtze Valley; but in both directions the activities of Chinese guerrillas considerably hamper production and transportation. For the same reason Japan has been disappointed of the quantities of coal and cotton which she expected to get from China. Her own deposits of coal are better than those of iron, furnishing some nine-tenths of her needs. But she is very short of coking coal necessary for the production of steel and iron, though China is well provided. In respect of cotton the rapid decline in China's production since the war began has been the subject of anxious discussions by the Osaka manufacturers. But the success of the Chinese guerrillas in persuading farmers to grow grain instead of cotton and in uprooting cotton fields where they are found still causes the output to decline. In any case, Japan grows no cotton herself, and for the best of her supply has depended on America and India. The wool with which in recent years she had built up a lucrative industry she obtained entirely from Australia and the Cape. Great efforts have been made by the Japanese to develop the production of wool in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, but the results have been very poor.

Of non-ferrous metals Japan is best off in copper, although even thus she has to import about a fifth of what she needs. Of tin, lead, zinc and manganese she only produces from a tenth to at best a half of her consumption. For aluminium, antimony and nickle she depends entirely on the outside world. Her mountain streams and waterfalls provide her with an abundance of hydro-electric power, but that will not drive ships and aeroplanes. And of the oil she uses, what she obtains from shale in Manchuria and from the wells in Southern Saghalien* do not amount to a third of her annual requirements.

*The northern half of this island belongs to Russia, and Japan's eager desire to prospect in it for oil is one of the old never settled "questions" between Japan and Russia.

The list of things that Japan must have and can only get from abroad might be continued indefinitely—wheat, sugar, rice, rubber, materials for the chemical fertilizer so urgently necessary for her intensified agriculture, hides, wood pulp for the rayon industry, and machine tools. This article is not concerned with the effects of the freezing of Japanese credits by America, ourselves and the Dutch on Japan's exports—with the consequent total cessation of her 400,000,000 yen sales of cotton goods to the British Empire and 500,000,000 worth of silk sold to America for instance—except to indicate, in conjunction with her dependence on imports, how terrible a weapon blockade is against Japan. Some commodities she will be getting from Indo-China and Thailand, rice and rubber, some iron and zinc, but there will still be a long list to fill up, especially oil.

It is to be remembered that the freezing of credits has only been in force since the end of last July, and closely as Japan tries to keep her secrets there is plenty of reliable information as to the severity with which it is already pressing upon her. The bulk of Japan's industry is performed by little firms employing under ten workers each: the big syndicates supply them with raw materials and undertake the marketing of their manufactures. The reason for this is that the Japanese factory law regulating hours and conditions of labour does not apply to firms that employ under ten hands. Consequently little firms can and do work their employees for intolerably long hours under the worst conditions of pay and surroundings. This was the explanation of Japan's ability to sell her exports so cheaply, but it is also the source of so large a "C.3 class" that some 40 per cent. of men called to the colours have to be rejected. Under the stress of enforced work and lowered standards of living since the war with China began the increase of tuberculosis and of accidents in factories have called for a special Government enquiry and the inauguration of an "anti-tuberculosis campaign," which is not likely to have much success so long as the one essential ingredient—peace and a better livelihood for the people—is withheld.

There is much evidence from Britons and Americans recently evacuated from Japan that the severe restrictions on all sides of life, the food reductions below the subsistence level, crushing taxation and on top of all the economic blockade, which has thrown hundreds of thousands of small manufacturers and their employees out of work, have already bred deep discontent among the Japanese masses. Even a year ago there

were trustworthy reports to the same effect. Yet in imposing new taxation last November calculated to bring in another 2,000 million yen, Mr. Kaya, the Finance Minister, said that the Government's aim was still further to cut down the standard of living so that people should have more to put into national loans.

It is believed and may well be true that General Tojo and his fellow-extremists have rushed Japan into the world war precisely because of the rising tide of popular anger at the misfortunes they have brought on Japan in the last four-and-a-half years. Let it not be forgotten that by conservative estimates the Japanese dead in China amount to fully a million and still the daily drain on life goes on. Behind the fanaticism of the Young Officers dreaming of Japanese glory, there is in the High Military Command a cool calculating brain far more concerned about its own position in the nation. Hence the tyrant's old device of war, with the hope of snatching some glittering prize which will silence the critics of his own misdeeds.

We come back to what was said above, namely that the present controllers of Japanese destinies are as much the enemies of their own people as of others. Obviously they must be smashed in the interests of both; but that, however effected, whether by external conquest or internal revolution, leaves the questions glanced at in this article still unsolved. All Japanese alike, whether they were against the war or for it, are imbued with a deep sense of grievance intensified by the rejection of their request at the Paris Conference that the principle of racial equality should be embodied in the League Covenant, that Japan is one of the "have nots" deliberately kept in poverty by the "haves." The absurdity of this delusion as one looks back on Japan's enormous commercial growth in pre-war years does not alter its influence on the Japanese, a virile, active people who breed like rabbits. We shall, presumably, put an army of occupation into Germany after the war until the poison of Hitlerism and Prussianism is eliminated and the Germans have thoroughly learnt that brigandage does not pay. But Japan is too far away for such measures to be expected in her case and unless something can be done to mollify her grievances, there will be more "17th century-minded daimyos," more Tojos and Matsuokas and Young Officers within fifty years.

Unfortunately the above-named gentry have done everything they possibly can to baulk a solution of this question.

Before the seizure of Manchuria, even before the beginning of the present war, Japan was in a fair way to dominate trade and industry in China, in which respect geography gave her indisputable advantages over every other nation. Her mills at Tsingtao (destroyed by the Chinese before they got out in December, 1937) represented £12,000,000. The best of the factories at Shanghai and Tientsin were her's, and her ships were at every Chinese port. If she had not made war on China, the latter would have been very unlikely to interfere seriously with this situation. But now the barbarism of Japanese armies has bred such hatred of the very name of Japan among the Chinese that their appetite for trading with her is likely to be small for many coming years. Incidentally, if all accounts are true, no Chinese more thoroughly detest the Japanese than those who have tried to work with them in their puppet governments. Among the Koreans, though they are militarily impotent, irredentism burns as hotly as ever. How effectually India is roused against Japan is shown by the recent memorable admission of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru himself that the forces of progress are represented by Great Britain, America, Russia and China, and that isolated nationalism for India is dead. Indo-China and Thailand have had to submit to Japan, but we can be sure that they hate her cordially. Wherever the Japanese go, even as colonists, they have a unique faculty for getting themselves disliked.

Primarily Japan is a question for the Asiatic peoples, among whom the tide of nationalism set in motion by the last war will be enormously accelerated by this one. But whether their own resulting problems will leave them much time or sympathy to assist Japan in hers, is doubtful. It may be that defeat will work what revivalists used to call a "change of heart" in the Japanese, enabling them to live in their islands dealing peaceably with their neighbours on normal terms of buying and selling. But to expect that is to look for a miracle undoing all the training and traditions of the past 300 years. One of the greatest obstacles in dealing with the Japanese is that they are literally incapable of seeing any point of view but their own. Among all the problems awaiting the world when peace returns, by no means the smallest will be that of the Japanese and their rulers.

THE YUGOSLAV REVOLT

By C. F. MELVILLE

AFTER suffering what seemed at the time to be a defeat both crushing and final, Yugoslavia has risen against its invaders with such force and purpose that it is now well on the way to creating a potential "third front" for the Allies against the Axis. The revival of her resistance, and the conflicting interests and ambitions of the occupying Powers, have between them created a situation in which Hitler's New Balkan Order is fast disintegrating into the New Balkan Disorder.

Hitler and Mussolini are behaving in the Balkans like two gangsters who, while they war together on Society, nevertheless regard each other with the most acute suspicion. This applies also to their satellites, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Quisling régimes of Pavelitch in Croatia, and of Neditch in Serbia. The conflict of interests between Germany and Italy is demonstrated by the fact that whereas the former wants to leave the territorial situation fluid, the latter wants to have it definitely fixed. This is clearly shewn by the maps of dismembered Yugoslavia which have been produced recently in Berlin and Rome. The German maps show the carved up provinces of Yugoslavia as "occupied territories." The Italian maps show them as "annexed territories." Hitler prefers to regard the new frontiers and divisions as being of a provisional nature, which he may change whenever it suits his purpose. By these means he is able to keep both the subjugated peoples and his own allies in a perpetual state of uncertainty, and it gives him the opportunity to play off one against the other to his own advantage. It is the time-honoured technique of "divide and rule." Mussolini, on the other hand, being aware of his partner's technique, and fearing, not without reason, that at any moment he may find himself double-crossed by Hitler, is anxious to give the present territorial settlement as permanent a status as possible. Otherwise Hitler might take away Yugoslav territories at present in Italian occupation, or under the rule of Italy's puppets, and attach them to Germany,

or otherwise dispose of them to suit Germany's own interests.

An example of the Hitlerian method is afforded by his attitude towards the Quisling régimes in Croatia and Serbia. To Pavelitch, in Zagreb, he says, in effect: "Do as I tell you, and perhaps I will reward you by taking away some more territory from Serbia and attaching it to Croatia." And to Neditch in Belgrade, he offers as the bribe for future services to be rendered, promises to take away territory from Croatia and incorporate it in Serbia. Recently he has been known to say to Neditch, in so many words: "Crush the Serbian patriotic revolt, and I will reward you by detaching Bosnia from Croatia and rejoining it to Serbia." This policy serves a number of purposes. It keeps Mussolini guessing. It increases the German hold on both Croatia and Serbia. At the same time it is calculated to sow the seeds of hatred between the Serbs and Croats with a view to preventing them from coming together again to make common cause against the Axis.

Balkan territorial divisions also figure in the bargaining which takes place from time to time between Hitler and Mussolini in regard to the Russian front. Hitler frequently admonishes Mussolini because the quota of Italian troops sent to participate in the Eastern campaign falls below the agreed figure. Whenever Mussolini is thus confronted with Hitler's demands for more Italian divisions to be sent to Russia, he invariably tries to make a Balkan bargain demanding an extension of the Italian sphere of interest in Yugoslavia in return for augmenting the Italian army in Russia.

Further evidence of conflicting Italo-German interests in Yugoslavia is to be found both in Croatia and Slovenia. Croatia is nominally under Italian protection. The Pavelitch régime is composed of Mussolini's hirelings, and the Italian army is in occupation of Croatia, under the guise of the "co-operation" of the Italian and Croatian armies. But although the Italian troops occupy the towns, the Germans maintain control of key-points such as aerodromes, waterworks and other public utilities of military value. Croatia has been converted into a "kingdom," and the Italian Duke of Spoleto has been made "king" under the title of "King Aymone." The "king," however, has as yet shewn no disposition to enter into his "kingdom." He is still in Italy. He is said to be waiting until the reconstruction of Croatia has been completed. As conditions in Croatia are becoming more and more chaotic, he is likely to have to wait a long time. Moreover, he is known to be opposed to assuming the Croatian crown so long as the

real masters of the country are the Germans. The situation in Croatia is chaotic because the "independent" Croatian state is a purely artificial creation which depends for its existence upon German and Italian bayonets, the Gestapo and the "Ustacha" (the murder organization headed by Pavelitch and his associates in the Croatian government). More than ninety per cent. of the Croatian people are opposed to Pavelitch and his Axis masters. They remain faithful to Dr. Matchek and the other leaders of the Peasant Party. Dr. Matchek and his colleagues are at present languishing in concentration camps, where they were incarcerated by the Nazis because Hitler feared their authority over the mass of the Croatian people. Their imprisonment, however, has had an effect exactly the opposite to that intended; for, if anything, it has increased the veneration in which they are held by the peasantry. And their last messages to their following were exhortations to remain faithful to the ideal of a united Yugoslavia.

The Pavelitch régime has the support, amongst the Croats, only of the *Ustacha*, a few careerists in the towns, and a handful of ideologues amongst the *Frankovtsi*. Many of the last named, formerly pro-Habsburgists, who jumped on to Hitler's band wagon in the fantastic hope that this might in some way or other lead to a return of the old *kaiserlich und königlich* dispensation, must already be undeceived and bitterly disappointed. The out-and-out supporters of Pavelitch, therefore, must by now be confined to the *Ustacha* gunmen, whose ranks have recently been augmented by Croatian *émigrés* from the U.S.A., hardened criminals who have been "wanted" by the American police for their part in gangster activities in Chicago and New York. Pavelitch and his *Ustacha* storm troopers persecute all those Croats who show resistance to the régime. Even more savage is the persecution of the Serbs in Croatia. Those who have not been murdered have been subject to mass expulsions to Serbia.

In Slovenia the situation is even more tragic. This province has not been given the outward trappings of autonomy. It has been carved up between Germany and Italy; the Germans having taken the northern part, with Maribor (now renamed Marburg) as the capital, and the Italians having taken the southern part, with Ljubliana as the capital. The part annexed by the Germans has been incorporated into the one-time Austrian Styria. But even in the territory taken by the Italians, the Germans have a finger in the pie. Italian troops may parade through the streets of Ljubliana, but the Germans

control the waterworks and other key points. The Slovene territory in German hands is being subjected to a process of the most intensive and brutal Germanization. The German aim seems to be the obliteration of the Slovene people. This is being done by a combination of mass murders and mass expulsions. Slovene culture, including the Slovene language, is being crushed out of existence. The schools are being closed and books in the language burned. A particularly savage campaign is being conducted against the priesthood, both on anti-Christian and on anti-Slovene grounds. In the Diocese of Maribor, twenty-three priests remain out of the original number of four hundred and seventy four. In the Diocese of Ljubliana, only seventeen remain out of two hundred and thirty five.

Twenty-six thousand Slovenes have been forcibly expelled to Serbia, and some eleven thousand have been driven into Croatia. In both places Germans have been settled. Twelve thousand have taken refuge in the Italian part of Slovenia. Ten thousand boys and girls have been sent to Germany to undergo forced labour. Another sixteen thousand have been sent to a living death in Poland. In the Ljubliana district alone, two hundred and fifty-one people have been shot as hostages. And not less than two hundred and fifteen girls have been placed in military brothels in Germany, their arms branded with the letters "F.M.M." (*Frei Militar Mädchen*).

In the Italian part of Slovenia the oppression is on the whole less brutal, although the recent faked trial at Trieste shows that the Fascists can, on occasion, be as cruel as their Nazi mentors. Cultural institutions have for the most part been left untouched, and the Slovene language is permitted. This, however, does not mean that Mussolini is being moved by humanitarian considerations. Political oppression is just as strong in the Italian as in the German occupied territories. The milder régime as regards the local culture is due to political considerations. The Italians are not certain about their future in the Balkans. Therefore they think that if they institute a milder régime than the Germans have done, they may perhaps be able to win over the Slovenes in the event of further territorial changes in the Balkans.

Both in Croatia and Slovenia there is resistance to the occupying Powers. The Nazis try to make out that this resistance is confined to the Communists. The Communists are certainly active in sabotage. But equally strong resistance comes from the Catholic organizations. In Slovenia, for

instance, there is a very strong Catholic youth organization which is heroically resisting the invaders. In the German part of Slovenia this movement numbers some two thousand. In the Italian part as much as seven thousand. In Serbia the resistance is taking the form of organized guerrilla warfare, carried out by the *Chetnics* under the command of Colonel Draja Mikhailovitch. The *Chetnics* have cleared the occupying forces out of large tracks of country in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia, and have organized extensive sabotage not only in Serbia but also in parts of Croatia and Slovenia. In districts where the *Chetnics* are active, the Italian army hardly dares to show its face and the Germans have been obliged to send entire army corps against them. But neither by these military means, nor by wholesale shootings of hostages have the Germans succeeded in putting down their resistance. Even such brutal acts as the obliteration of towns and villages by dive-bombing planes and by artillery have failed to shake the resolution of the Serbian patriots.

Germany's attempts to use political methods have also come to nothing. Hitler installed the Quisling government of General Milan Neditch in Belgrade in the hope that appeals from Serbs to Serbs might succeed where German force had failed. But the only result was the intensification of the *Chetnic* activity, which moreover, added the name of Neditch to its list of "traitors condemned to death."

General Neditch is in a different category of Quislingism from that of Pavelitch. The latter might be described as a "professional" traitor. The former is more a Serbian edition of Pétainism. In ordinary circumstances he would not elect to play his present rôle. He does so now because he thinks that Germany's ultimate victory is inevitable and that therefore the best thing to do is to co-operate in the hope of gaining concessions. Again like Pétain, he has been bitten by the anti-Bolshevist bug. He is not representative of Serbian feeling or Serbian tradition. He is completely out of touch with reality, and he presents the pitiful and shameful picture of a one-time distinguished soldier dancing like a marionette on the conqueror's strings.

In Serbia the number of people butchered as hostages is higher than in the other provinces of Yugoslavia. This is because the degree of active, physical resistance is stronger in Serbia than elsewhere. For Serbia has become a battleground.

In Yugoslav Macedonia (South Serbia), nominally handed over to Bulgaria, the real governance is in the hand of Mihailov

and the I.M.R.O. (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization). The I.M.R.O. are the terrorists and Komitadjis who for years embittered Serbo-Bulgarian relations; who, together with the Croatian *Ustacha*, were responsible, under the orders of Mussolini, for the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia at Marseilles; and who for a decade or more conducted a murder campaign not only against the Yugoslavs but also against those politicians in Bulgaria who sought to restrain them. Hitler put Mihailov and the I.M.R.O. in charge in Yugoslav Macedonia in furtherance of his policy of divide and rule. He knows that there are no natural grounds for mutual hatred between the Serbs and Bulgars. He is aware that in the past Serbo-Bulgarian hostility was mainly the outcome of the ambitions of reactionary and revisionist Bulgarian politicians and military chiefs working in close liaison with the I.M.R.O., and that Mihailov and his fellow terrorists were always one of the most potent influences for evil in Bulgarian politics. Therefore the I.M.R.O. have been given a free hand to practice brutalities against the Serbs in Macedonia, in order to perpetuate hatred and keep the two South Slav peoples divided. For Hitler fears, and not without reason, that left to themselves the Serbian and Bulgarian masses might make a *rapprochement* under Russian inspiration.

The I.M.R.O. also has its use for Hitler in holding down opposition inside Bulgaria, and in acting as a sort of "ginger group" on the Government in Sofia. Hence Mikhailov is now known as the "Uncrowned King of Macedonia." He has the worst record for brutal assassinations, burnings, tortures and rapings even in the blood stained annals of the I.M.R.O.

Much brutality has also been in evidence in territories taken over by the Hungarians. The Magyars needed little encouragement from the Germans to apply the usual methods of mass murders and mass expulsions to the Serbs. But Hitler was not satisfied with this. He also induced the Hungarians to make encroachments upon the territory of Germany's Croatian ally. The result of this—as Hitler accurately calculated would be the case—was to make the Quisling government in Zagreb more dependent than ever upon Berlin. Pavelitch was obliged to appeal to the Führer to restrain the territorial appetite of the Hungarians. Hitler, of course, was willing to oblige, but on terms.

Thus one sees in the case of Hitler's manipulation of Hungarian-Croatian relations, as in the case of Serbo-Bulgarian, Serbo-Croat, and Slovene-Croat relations, the eternal technique

of divide and rule. With even further cynicism he has applied this method to Italo-Croat relations. He encouraged Mussolini to take over the Dalmatian coast of Croatia. This caused even Mussolini's own hirelings in Zagreb to protest. And it revived the centuries old Croatian hatred for Italy.

It is clear that this is a situation which can last only so long as Hitler is able to avoid defeat on any of the major battlefields of the war. As soon as he suffers a definite and large-scale military reverse, his grip upon the Balkans will slip, and the whole artificial structure of his New Balkan Order will collapse like a house of cards. It will collapse either as the result of successful internal revolt or because of that revolt leading to the creation of a third Allied front in the Balkans.

The question now imposes itself: what of the future? This is a very serious question and one which, I submit, requires due attention on the part of Britain. Our neglect of the Balkans in the past was largely the reason for the collapse of the Allied cause in the Balkans during the war. We should not repeat that mistake. Two things, I think, emerge very clearly. One is that the future lies with the federative idea, not only in regard to the internal structure of a reconstituted and united Yugoslavia but also in regard to the relations with one another of all the Danubian states. This would provide the best guarantee of these states being able to resist external attack and internal disintegration in the future. The other is that there must be the closest political and military co-operation between Britain and Yugoslavia after the war. To neglect this would not only be to betray a very gallant ally. It would also be contrary to our own political and military interests in the Near and Middle East and in the Eastern Mediterranean, which are bound up with Anglo-Yugoslav collaboration.

Some solution must be found, I am convinced, along the lines of regional federation in South Eastern Europe within the wider framework of an Anglo-Russian understanding in regard to Europe as a whole. The alternatives could but be that this part of the world would again fall under the domination of predatory Great Powers, and again become the victim of the policy of divide and rule. The alternatives are so fraught with danger that surely they must be avoided.

With regard to the Yugoslavs themselves, it may be stated without fear of contradiction that the Croats, as represented by Dr. Matchek, no less than the Serbs and Slovenes regard the restoration of Yugoslav union as an absolute necessity. Even the most ardent Croatian federalist is agreed upon this

fundamental. After the allied victory the Serbs will naturally set about chasing Pavelitch and his *Ustacha* gang out of Croatia. But I am sure that the Croats themselves will be equally enthusiastic in the chase.

The Slovenes will not only demand that their dismembered country should be re-united within the Yugoslav union, but they will also insist that the Slovene territories taken away and handed to Italy and Austria after the last war should be restored to them.

The Serbs, having borne the brunt of the physical revolt against the Axis invaders, and having provided the main basis for building up anew the military strength of Yugoslavia, will not unnaturally take the lead in driving out the enemy and reconstituting the united Yugoslav state.

All these questions of internal and external structures are necessarily fraught with a number of delicate problems, but there is no reason why they should not be satisfactorily solved within the solution of the wider problems which will face the peacemakers after the Allied victory. In the meantime there is much we can do, in the realms both of political and military warfare, to help the Yugoslav revolt, and thereby not only hasten the creation of the Allied Third Front in the Balkans during the war, but secure also the basis for Anglo-Yugoslav co-operation during the peace. We could assist them now by devising ways and means for supplying the *Chetnics* with arms and ammunition. And we could give them assurances of our future friendship by means of the right kind of propaganda. Not only would this be a human gesture which Yugoslavia has merited by her loyalty and bravery during martyrdom, it would also be very practical politics on our part.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON CRIME IN WAR-TIME

BY HERMANN MANNHEIM

THE effect of war on crime and its treatment is a problem which may interest various categories of people for different reasons and in different ways. In time of war, the statesman and the social reformer can be expected to pay close attention to the movement of crime because mass violations of the criminal law may reveal hidden danger-spots which no community can afford to neglect in a period of external crisis. Professional students of crime will take advantage of the opportunity offered by sudden and profound changes in the social structure as can be caused only by war or revolution in order to check the validity of their theories, and practical penologists and penal reformers strive hard to save the badly knocked about penal system from complete shipwreck and to plan the outlines of its future reconstruction.

By now it has become a commonplace to say that this is a problem which can be successfully tackled only for each particular war separately, whereas comparatively little can be gained by theorizing about it on general lines. Though certain patterns of thought and of action seem to be inseparably connected with war as such, criminal behaviour in war-time must be understood less as a by-product of the international conflict itself than of the social and psychological conditions which it produces. As long as the latter remain in existence no improvement in the crime position is likely to take place even after the end of the actual fighting. There are hardly more than perhaps half a dozen criminological reports of apparently general validity on the effect of war on crime and for the very reason of their universal applicability none of them is particularly informative. For instance, we know that the total amount of crime, after declining during the initial stages of a war, usually increases towards the middle or the end; that the extent of the final deterioration mainly depends upon the course which the war has taken; that the increase is heaviest and begins almost at once among those categories of the population which remain outside the fighting services; that it is not so much, as is frequently assumed, crime against the person but economic crime that becomes more frequent; and, finally, that the penal system tends to deteriorate under

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the strain of war. All this, it must be admitted, is not very illuminating. As soon as we attempt, however, to supplement these general statements by more detailed observations for specific wars we find ourselves handicapped by the extreme dearth of the material available. There is some reason to hope that for the present war, at least in this country, the information which is being collected will be somewhat more comprehensive and systematic than for the war of 1914-18. Statistical investigations into the incident of crime, it is true, are becoming more difficult than ever on account of the tremendous war-time changes in the local and occupational distribution of the population. Evacuation, the calling up of men and women and the shifting of industries have profoundly altered the population structure of the country. While this affects the total amount of crime only in so far as offences by members of the Forces are frequently dealt with by military courts and thereby excluded from ordinary Criminal Statistics, it renders almost impossible any comparison between pre-war and war-time figures for individual localities. To make matters worse, no Criminal Statistics for the whole country have as yet been published for the period after 1938, whereas during the last war the annual blue-books came out much as usual, though on a greatly reduced scale. Such local figures as have so far been quoted in public seem to justify the conclusion that the total amount of "Crime known to the Police" has undergone no considerable changes since the outbreak of the war, the increase in some Reception Areas being balanced by the decline in a few Evacuation Areas. For London, by the way, the published figures of indictable offences show a reduction which is obviously less substantial than the decline in population would have justified (1938: 95,280; 1939: 94,852; 1940: 93,869). On the other hand, we know from official publications that juvenile delinquency increased by approximately forty-one per cent, during the first twelve months of the war,* and there are certain indications that delinquency among women is also, though less markedly, on the upgrade. The conclusion is therefore that there must have been less crime among men over the age of 17. As the amount of "Crime known to the Police" remains unaffected by the calling up and the numbers of men serving overseas cannot be very large, this may indicate a real improvement. Nobody is likely to over-estimate the value of such statistical considerations. Changes in Police

*See the Memorandum on Juvenile Offences, published jointly by the Home Office and the Board of Education, June, 1941, His Majesty's Stationery Office. 3d.

activities, the creation of new offences, and many other factors may invalidate any conclusion based upon figures alone. There is in particular one aspect which seems to be of the greatest importance for the study of war-time crime and to which so far but little attention has been paid, that is, the extent of habitual criminality and of recidivism.

Surely, neither to society at large nor to the practical penologist can it be indifferent whether 100,000 offences "known to the Police" have been committed by 100,000 first offenders or by a small group of perhaps 2,000 habitual lawbreakers of whom each has been responsible for an average of fifty offences. Whereas for the masses of first offenders social (including family) conditions are the principal causes of crime, the habitual criminal is more likely to be the product of his psychological maladjustment or abnormality or of the faulty treatment he receives from state and society. In periods of war, the latter, absorbed as they are in their fight against the external enemy, are likely to become more indulgent in their attitude towards the criminal and are willing to give him a chance. On the other hand, the growing complexity of every day life infects many more hitherto blameless individuals with the bacillus of lawlessness. Consequently, and this may be regarded as a further experience of universal validity, recidivism and habitual criminality tend to decline in time of war, and more newcomers begin to appear before the criminal courts, a development which may profoundly alter the practical problems involved. No large scale and systematic statistical information on the whole question of recidivism is available even for pre-war years, let alone for the present. The existing material, however, would largely seem to confirm our thesis, that is, the proportion of first offenders appears indeed to have increased at least among adults in general and among juveniles in reception areas, whereas the opposite tendency makes itself felt among juveniles in certain evacuation areas. In support of this view the following facts may be mentioned.

According to press reports analysed by the author, out of a sample of 424 persons charged with looting 387—90 per cent. had no previous convictions recorded against them, which reveals an abnormally high proportion of first offenders. Of the remaining 37 only nine had more than three previous convictions and might therefore have been habitual offenders. In spite of the smallness of this sample there is no special reason to doubt its representative character. That habitual crim-

inals are less easily caught is a truth that operates not only in war-time and can therefore hardly be stressed in this connection. Moreover, the same impression has been gained by many other observers, though it has not found expression in statistical figures. For other war-time offences such as violations of the Food Control regulations, profiteering, lighting offences similar results are likely to emerge. The specific reasons for the prevalence of first offenders may be different for the different categories. Lighting offences are, as a rule, unintentional actions committed for no reason of financial gain, both factors characteristic of non-professional crime. Looting and the various types of profiteering are nothing but somewhat more pronounced forms of general patterns of anti-social behaviour which remain unpunished in times of peace, and their perpetrators, though public nuisances, do not therefore rank as professional lawbreakers. In other words, the juvenile looter may represent only a further stage in the normal development of the slum child who is used to picking up things lying about on the pavement, and the war profiteer is only the somewhat more unscrupulous war edition of the smart business man who, under normal conditions, manages to keep on the right side of the law.

For the criminologist and the student of social psychology and ethics no other recent mass phenomenon can have been more interesting than the outbreak of looting in the winter of 1940-41. Several thousand criminal proceedings for looting (there were 4,584 cases of this kind alone before Metropolitan courts during 1940) and the heated discussion which accompanied them may have proved, among other points, that legislative action and increased penalties in themselves are unable to eradicate certain deep-rooted conceptions. In the popular mind, the idea of property cannot be altogether divorced from that of possession and of actual use, and in cases where this visible link between owner and property has been cut by temporary elimination of the former no threat or punishment can make up for it. Robbing automatic machines and stealing by finding are the models which, better than anything else, can help to explain the background of looting. "It is a thousand pities," a London magistrate was recently reported to have said, "that the public does not always understand that stealing by finding is almost as bad as stealing in any other way." When Professor T. H. Pear and Mr. E. C. Gates, J.P., Manchester, made an interesting attempt, on a small scale, to ascertain the attitude of young people to property they dis-

covered that out of fifty adolescent boys thirty-one decided that they would keep a sum of 10/- found in the street, and many others were not at all sure what to do.* Among the excuses offered in court by looters in the writer's collection of cuttings are not only the common "everybody is doing it" or "it was a pity that the goods should be lying about unused," but also "I didn't know that I was doing any harm, as I was told the lady was dead," whereas in another case the argument goes in the opposite direction: "This is not looting—it would be different if he had taken it from the dead." Such examples, which could easily be multiplied, indicate utter bewilderment and perplexity rather than moral wickedness, and the best cure for first offenders of this type will be education and guidance rather than severe punishment and stigmatization.

While looting and other war-time offences have widened the extent of criminality, the position of many men with pre-war criminal records has improved. Employers can no longer insist upon a spotless character and, as a consequence, not only manual labourers but even black-coated workers and professional men, in pre-war days the most difficult charges of After-Care organizations, have become easy to place. Their response seems, on the whole, to have been highly satisfactory, and they are said to be giving much less trouble than many young men with previously good characters. The Home Secretary's statement that there are in the Civil Defence Services "a number of people whose records are open to question, many even with criminal records, who have done a first-class job in civil defence," seems to be fully borne out by the facts. Thus the experience of the last war is repeating itself that even men with many previous sentences of penal servitude or imprisonment are likely to keep straight if they can obtain jobs with living wages and are not under a cloud of suspicion. It is to be hoped that this will not be forgotten when, after the war, work may again become less plentiful.

On the other hand, it will be asked why the present abundance of highly paid work so frequently fails to prevent young boys and even some mature men with hitherto unblemished characters from falling into crime. Recent discussions in the press and elsewhere have shown that, while most experts are inclined to regard the inflated earnings of to-day as direct incentives to delinquency, some others find it difficult to reconcile this interpretation with the traditional view that crime is

largely due to poverty and should therefore disappear when economic conditions are improved. To this one might reply, the same event can affect different types of people in a different way, and if other factors change, it may even affect individuals of the same type in a different manner. Although poverty and unemployment rank very high as crime producing elements one should never forget that, in most cases, they can become effective only in co-operation with other unfavourable factors or may be neutralized by favourable ones. Likewise, events which, as a rule, have a crime preventing effect may lose this character under special circumstances. And, finally, nothing is more dangerous than a sudden change in man's fortunes and even the most propitious happenings may require a long process of education and training before they are properly digested. These are platitudes, but their practical implications are sometimes overlooked. To shower inflated wages upon an adolescent entirely unaccustomed to them may easily upset his mental and moral balance, give him an equally inflated sense of his own importance and impair his relations with his family. It may well be true that, as has been stressed, these boys have to work very hard or that they are not the only ones who earn more than they deserve. To meet the latter objection it might be said that factors which are conducive to delinquency among adolescents are not less harmful because of the existence of others which render possible profiteering and similar forms of "white collar criminality," to use a term popular with American criminologists. Nor is it the business of the theoretical criminologist to suggest any specific measures of an economic or social character, whether it may be compulsory saving or reduction of wages. All he can do is to sift the evidence, to interpret the working of the social and psychological mechanisms involved, and perhaps to recall certain analogous experiences made in most belligerent countries during the last war and after. In this country, the warnings of war-time prophets* seem to have been fully confirmed during the years after 1918 by observations of prison and Borstal governors and social workers. The case may be quoted of a boy who, having earned £6 to £7 as a fitter's mate during the war, took to house and shopbreaking when his earnings fell to less than £4. After his discharge from Borstal he was offered a job at thirty shillings which could hardly have been to his liking.

*See, for instance, *The Nineteenth Century and After*, October, 1918, p. 707.

*See *Social Welfare*, July, 1941.

For children of school age, as already indicated, the situation seems to have developed on different lines in evacuation districts and in reception areas, the former having had a larger share of persistent offenders, the latter more newcomers. At first, all those social and psychological factors which make for juvenile delinquency could easily be found assembled in reception areas, and it is therefore not surprising to find that many children had to appear before the juvenile courts who would normally not have become delinquent. After two years of practical experience many difficulties have been overcome by better organization and understanding. In particular, the sudden change from city to country life and the resulting "culture conflict," which were responsible for many initial lapses, have in the long run frequently proved beneficial, and there is evidence from many quarters that the delinquency rates among evacuees are now lower than among local children. Although during the first year of the war court figures of juvenile delinquency and especially of recidivism may in some districts have been artificially reduced by the practice of sending offenders back to their homes, the present improvement seems to be genuine.

In evacuation areas a selective process of an altogether different character is likely to have taken place. In the first instance, the proportion of bad homes and inefficient and neglectful parents was almost certainly higher for those children who remained in bombed districts, and the proportion of children with delinquent tendencies who were sent back as "unbilletable" after a brief absence must also have been large. Conditions in such districts have, generally speaking, not been conducive to good behaviour, although the re-opening of many schools and clubs during the year 1941 has proved beneficial. In contrast to many reception areas there is but little to compensate non-evacuated children for the losses they have suffered. The consequences have become apparent in many juvenile courts, least of all perhaps in London, where the war-time increase in delinquency, according to the latest calculations of the L.C.C., appears almost negligible. It is only in conformity with the general picture that in some evacuation areas (noted in an interesting report by the Bristol Child Guidance Clinic issued in the summer of 1941) attention has been drawn to the alarming increase in delinquency and recidivism among feeble-minded and very dull children. Although the Bristol figures are too small to warrant any general conclusions, it is noticeable that 69 per cent. of the

children examined had been delinquent before and that 49 per cent. of those who had previously been charged belonged to the very dull type (I.Q. 70-85) which represented only 31 per cent. of the total. It is, of course, not a new experience that recidivism is particularly frequent among feeble-minded and psychopathic offenders, but it is equally clear that conditions of life in bombed cities and lack of suitable facilities for treatment make it almost impossible for them to reform.

Summing up the present crime situation one may be justified in saying that, in spite of the considerable proportion of first offenders who are coming before the courts, no signs of a truly alarming deterioration have so far become visible. Moreover, those observers who might feel inclined to deplore the absence of certain striking improvements which occurred during the last war should bear in mind that there was much less scope for them in 1939 than in 1914. To take but one example. Compared with the spectacular decline of drunkenness convictions from 183,000 in 1914 to 84,000 in 1916 and to 29,000 in 1918 the present improvement which may be no more than 12 per cent. of the pre-war total of 50-55,000 is bound to appear less satisfactory than it actually is. It would seem essential, however, that the future development of the whole crime situation should be closely watched and that statistical material should be collected which might render possible, among other points, a more accurate estimate of much of war-time crime that is due to the activities of a small group of recidivists or to great masses of newcomers respectively.

There can be little doubt that the growing strain on the penal system will, as time goes on, result in a general increase of recidivism, especially among young people. While space forbids to deal in detail with the manifold problems of treatment, it may be pertinent briefly to analyse certain general trends. Is it simply a picture of wholesale deterioration that here meets the eye, or are there also visible certain changes for the better which might perhaps prepare the ground for a future reconstruction of the penal system? It is not only the crisis of this system itself that has to be considered but, first of all, the difficult position which confronts the criminal courts, including juvenile courts, in their sentencing policy. Even in peacetime criminal courts cannot perform their duties regardless of the general requirements of society at large. In time of war, these claims will grow in intensity and, within reasonable limits, it may become more important, for instance, to free man-power for essential war-work than to send offenders to

prison. Special attention has to be paid to the changes in character and capacity which penal institutions and methods undergo in war-time. It is useless to commit juvenile delinquents to already overcrowded Remand Homes or Approved Schools. Probation Orders, appropriate as long as the offender remains in his usual surroundings, may become harmful when the probationer becomes an evacuee and has to live in a rural district with strangers who may regard a child on probation as an habitual criminal. Or, with the ordinary local prison in many respects thrown "back to 1922" (Howard Journal, 1941, p.7), a prison sentence to-day may mean something different from what it was in 1938. Moreover, the old experience has to be faced that in war-time the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive is altered in favour of the latter. It is not only in the case of Regulation 18b that this becomes apparent. When prisoners have to be transferred *en bloc* to Borstal Institutions or inmates of penal institutions are discharged much sooner than could be expected by the judges, the latter may well complain that their sentences are no longer carried out. But is this state of affairs not the logical conclusion of a process which, for good or evil, has been going on for a period much longer than these few years of war, a process which in the U.S.A. has culminated in a movement to take the power of sentencing, at least for adolescent offenders, altogether out of the hands of the judges and to entrust it to an administrative body, the "Treatment Tribunal"?

With regard to the treatment of prisoners one of the most important experiences is that men transferred under the strain of war-time necessities to less oppressive conditions have responded well. The lesson to be learned is, as Mr. Alexander Paterson indicated some time ago,* that oppressive conditions are, as a rule, unnecessary and should be replaced by a more constructive system of observation, classification and treatment. If such facilities as observation centres, hostels, clinics for psychological treatment, and the like had been available on a sufficiently large scale at the beginning of the war, the overcrowding in penal institutions might have been avoided. That the present penal system is in need of greater differentiation on scientific lines rather than of mere expansion seems to be the chief lesson of war-time experience for the penal reformer.

WINTER ON THE SALTINGS

BY RICHARD PERRY

THE evening was calm, though stormy-looking, after days of sleet-showers and hard white frosts: frosts so hard that the fieldfares had been driven out of the frozen fields to the softer tussocks of the saltmarsh. Below the cloud-pall of gun-metal grey and turbulent blue the gloom-light was lowering and yellow. Tens of thousands of gulls streamed down Eden into the dun twilight, as the last sun-illuminated clouds tarnished the cold oxidized river: silent pack after pack careening out to their huge nightly roosts on the illimitable sandbanks of the Firth. Later, the grey duck, the wild mallard of the Solway, hurried down to a night's guzzling in swampy depressions on the salting. I knew them only by the swift regular swishing of unseen wings.

It snowed hard all the next two days, and the flushes and pools of fresh and tidal water on the salting bore thin filaments of brown ice. The grey duck abandoned the frozen loughs on the fells, where they were wont to sleep and preen away the hours of daylight, and bobbed in packs all day on Esk and Eden and out on the Firth. Snipe, always the first wading birds to feel hard weather, began to stand about under the mudbanks of creeks and drains.

At midnight on the second day a huge copper-yellow moon hung low over the western edge of the salting, flooding with radiance its two thousand acres of wiry grass. To listen, from beneath the brow-edge of some winding creek, to the contented humming of wild grey geese, feeding forward in the moon's light, is always an uncannily beautiful experience, and the silken rustling of their grazing bills is a soothing, happy sound. I was sorely tempted to plod down-river to the salt-ings: but the spirit was weak, after long hours of writing, and I stumbled upstairs to bed—and lay awake regretting my decision.

At the darkening on the fourth evening the pale blue wash of the western sky, above a fiery orange sunset, was pencilled as delicately as a Chinese etching, with tenuous black lines

*Howard Journal, 1941, pp. 12 et seq.

and chevrons of duck and geese fighting over the Firth. The frozen corrugated sand-flats about the salting were white with tiny flowered splinters of ice, with here and there tide-drifts of broken ice-floes, which gave out a hollow bell-iron sound. When I walked round the salting at moonrise, my water-boots sank deep in to a yielding carpet of thick tussocks, soft with hoar-frost; flushes and creeks were frozen. From all around me came the deep grunting *ugh-ugh* of the grey geese steps and the *ga-a-ag* of their geese. There had been three thousand of them on the salting during the day.

When they moved away, the night was as still as I have known it to be in the mountains. The intense frost of this Sabbath night hushed the far away roar of traffic on the great highway between Carlisle and the North. Drifts of snow walled off Gretna from the West. Standing listening in the moonlight, straining tensely to locate the murmurous humming of the geese, I caught the soft clangour of swans beating up-river—that wonderful wing-music that has come to me, like the silver chiming of sleigh-bells, over lonely moors of the Hebrides, crescendoing to a great melody of sound, when a wedge of swans, dazzlingly white against a frosty blue sky, forges in from sea with rhythmic clangour of beating wings. Long after they have passed their wing-music echoes in my ears

Later that night and all the next morning snow fell heavily, banking up twelve-foot drifts on the passes over the hills. The snipe, stabbing their inordinately long bills up to their hilts in the ooze of the creeks, paced slipperily over frozen patches, pointing the swollen tips of their tweezer-like mandibles delicately at the ice, pausing from time to time to look steadily at me with their rather small black eyes. Silent peewits stood rigid, breast-deep in the snow, heads to the north wind, never stirring at my crunching passage down along the river-bank. Nor even did the shy goldeneye duck lift from their river pool of open water. To this pool in the late afternoon drifted downstream unending thousands of gulls, congregating to bathe before sailing on to their roosting sand-banks. When, two or three hours later, I returned up-Eden, after twice sinking to the waist in snow-filled creeks on the salting, the peewits were still rigid in the snow: a little deeper set. Unwisely deserting inland pastures for the salting, they would be the first of their kind to die.

By the end of the week the pall of snow was hard frozen, and the sand-flats and salting were an Arctic waste. Broad

inlets to marsh creeks were piled high with bulging boiler-plates of buckled ice-floes, and huge hummocks of ice littered the flats. In the low afternoon sun a lovely ultra-violet glow played over the white scene: contrasting with the cold blue-white of the ice-sheets which coated the smooth brown banks of the creeks, and with the purple strips of thawed mud between two such ice-sheets. A lone curlew quavering long and often, set the beauty of the scene.

Inevitably, on one of the coldest days of the century, a wren, hardiest of all small birds, crept about the snow-drifts in a creek well in on the salting, among two thousand pink-footed geese and a score or two of grey lags, grazing where the salt tide had thawed the brow-edges of the marsh. Some hundred of cushats also came down to the narrow strip of grass freed from the frost. Packs of ducks plashed in the pools opened by the tide, and at ebb-tide two hundred gulls a minute floated down-river through the channel smashed by the bore. Up-river, at the darkening, the strident *kee-kee-kee* of a kestrel cut the frosty silence like glass, below the high red cliffs.

After ten days of frost it was said to be the coldest weather for forty-five years. Redwing thrushes, with yellow plumes over their eyes, and song thrushes scattered the dead leaves furiously in their hunger, and the peewits joined them on the wooded slopes of Eden. The foreshore and banks of the river, after a high tide, were lumbered with small ice-bergs and thick floes of frosted ice piled up one upon another for miles upstream. But although the flooded edges of the salting were also sheeted with ice, the grey duck continued to flight in good numbers at dusk, and two goldeneye, sheltering under the river bank, cawed harshly like duck widgeon, when I went down to the marsh a second time that night at ten o'clock. At that hour the new flood-water in the creeks already bore a thin film of ice.

The bore of the next morning's spring tide, after another intense frost during the night, carried with it a swift flow of pack-ice, which filled Eden from bank to bank, an hundred yards across. On this the hardest day of all, a wren poured forth his cascade of song! Curlew and waterhens companioned the thrushes and peewits under the trees, and redshanks trailed their cerise stilts over the dazzling snow. When the bore flowed over the river's banks, sudden snipe and woodcock came down to the open water of flooded drains and runnels.

On the twelfth day, however, the moon waned, the spring tides fell back, and with incredible swiftness it thawed: so that the salting was flooded with huge flushes of ice-water, over which dipped white packs of gulls—hard times were over! . . . Curlew swarmed smokily over the tide far out on the Firth; great black-backed gulls, young and old, prowled over the marsh with heavy lazy flight, throwing far shadows ahead of me when they crossed the sun in their passaging from Eden to Esk: others were lined up with dazzling silver breasts on the higher dryer brow-edges; grey geese were peacefully afloat on the flushes—hard times were over!

Little swallowtails of pintail duck cut across the marsh downwind at terrific speed, the long-tailed drakes as sharp as swords. Though so devastatingly swift of flight, they flew very delicately, and with their fast-beating wings and long necks looked not unlike mergansers. Shoveller duck flew fast and high out to the Firth, with those same breath-taking twirling stoops and abandoned slipping sideways of the pintail. With the narrow wings of widgeon set far back on the heavy bodies of mallard, their erratic lifting flight was superlatively dashing.

Terrific gales and rains followed the great frost. For weeks the winds blew from north and west, often for days and nights together without an hour's break, until sleep became a fevered mockery. Big tides were forced up the Firth again and the bore swept over all the salting, leaving huge depressions flooded, when it ran off into the creeks, which radiated from the core of the marsh out to the sand-flats.

I do not know that I particularly enjoy lying out on salting or mud-flat in heavy rain, against which even oilskins and sea-boots are not proof over long periods: but many the morn and eve I lay behind the grassy sea-wall at the back of the salting, watching the packs of duck, and sometimes geese, bobbing up and down on the tempest-tossed waves of the deep flood-water—just out of range of the man with the gun, but not of the watcher with keen eyes and a pair of binoculars. Because of the pleasure I got from studying these shy wild-fowl in what seemed to me their perfect environment, I often almost forgot the wind and rain. On that wild grey marsh sea the extravagantly plumaged mallard drakes were seen in their proper perspective. Wet olive-yellow bills, dark-green velvet heads that shone so glossily in the fleeting sun, purple-brown breasts and grey-lilac flanks, were in perfect harmony

against the grey back-ground. When the sun glimmered over the colourless ebb-tide sands, they gleamed almost as whitely as their companion sheld-duck. Few seemed to be British mallards, but nearly all the small Baltic winter visitors, sharp of heads and slender of white-ringed necks.

When the flood-water of a bore had partially drained off the marsh into the creeks, I would make shift to get myself out to the middle of the salting, by dint of much wading and detouring round brimful creeks. On two huge flushes out there swam fifteen thousand duck. Nearly all were widgeon, but among them were three or four thousand teal, a thousand-odd mallard, and a score or two of pintail and shoveller. To have three thousand teal streaming low over my head, with a rushing wind of green-glinting wings was too kaleidoscopic a phenomenon for me to record its swift changes in form and colour and sound: and so, too, five thousand widgeon in a cork-screw descent, flattening out over the flush in an endless column, those in the rear pouring over their fellows in the van, already glissading over the flood with braking webs flung forward. When I squelched out along the tussocky ridge dividing the two flushes, this stupendous flight of widgeon rose again from the water, slanted athwart me—a glimmering sheet of white bellies in the wintry sun—flattened out over the flood, lifted once more, and soared as a grey cloud, which was slashed by the white wing-bars of the drakes. What but a hyper-sensitive action-reaction tempo of each duck to its fellows could govern the spontaneous unanimity of flight-movement of this great body of duck, when the concourse stooped down on me with the mighty rushing of a sudden squall of wind—eight thousand pounds' weight of muscular duck tearing a jagged rent in the air with devastating velocity.

It was not easy to gain a long close study of the ten thousand duck still swimming on the flushes. The cold was intense and there was some physical discomfort in crawling through the long oozy grass and lying in nine inches of water: but the most insurmountable obstacle was the great size of the flushes. Though elsewhere laid flat by the winds, the luxuriant marsh grass stood high at the edges of the flushes, so that after one hundred yards of laborious 'worming,' I would in the end have to raise myself at least as high as my elbows, to obtain any sort of a field of vision. That was likely enough to disturb those duck nearest to me, who would rise and take with them all the other duck in the vicinity to the far side of the flush, two or three hundred yards distant. Mallard

always went, widgeon nearly always, but the little teal, after a momentary lifting of suspicious brown heads, would often resume feeding or preening without more ado. And their constant companions, the heavy shoveller, were always loath to go, especially if the morning was hot and sunny. Not only were shoveller always to be found feeding with the teal at the edges of the flushes, but they would also fly out with them to the flats, when the tide ebbed, to dredge and dibble in the slimy green weed of a little bay. Their method of feeding on the flushes was peculiar, for they dipped their heads deep into the water, straining down from their shoulders, while still swimming forward: unlike the long-necked pintails who would up-end for hours at a time in one patch of a few square yards of water. Sinister ducks, the old drake shovellers, their hard gold orbs gleaming from spatulate-billed black heads, sun-dusted with a green sheen.

My stalking was not always unsuccessful, and at the end of one long crawl I was rewarded by a nice little bundle of seventy-five widgeon grazing industriously in a slushy place only a few yards out from the wall of grass. Continually on the move, they might have been a flock of guinea-fowl, with their clean grey backs. On a pool a little beyond them other ducks and drakes were 'purring' around one another with vibrant pale-blue bills, drake diving at drake, and darting about the flush at lightning speed, with much splashing and threshing of wings. The old drakes, with marigold crests to their dark copper heads, ecstatically trilled their dynamic *wrr-ee-oo*, in answer to the harsh *chockawrr* of the ducks.

Two or three hundred tiny teal squatted at the edge of the flush or stood on hummocks in the shallows, preening with sudden glints of green speculums, or lazing with heads tucked back into their scapulars. The queer little duck teals appeared hardly bigger than redshanks. Others were continually up-ending with quick little shoots forward in the water and flashes of silver undersides; the golden wedges of their tail-coverts, gleaming in the sun, were reflected in the flush. Others, again, dabbled in the slushy grass with characteristic energy, continually piping and bleating. Once, their soft *pheep-pheep* spread from duck to duck and crescendoed to an urgent chorus, when all quitted the edges of the flush and swam out to open water. As I looked about, puzzled by their sudden excitement, a peregrine falcon swept low over my head. With the enemy's swift passing the outcry died down and the little ducks swam in to the marge, still unaware of my presence.

If I was unlucky, and all the duck took flight at the end of my stalk, I could either rise stiffly to my feet and try again at another flush; or I could lie still and wait for something to happen. Once, when all the duck had deserted a flush, but I had lain still, a lone duck widgeon shortly came in to the flush and alighted on the water a few yards from me. For all that I could see or hear of the world to which I normally belonged, I was alone on earth with one wild duck. *Our* world was a pool on a saltmarsh, which, from my field of vision, was as illimitable as the Universe to earth. Here, surely, was a chance to tear the veil and learn something of the nature of a wild bird. For an hour I lay watching her, what time she swam incessantly backwards and forwards over that part of the flush on which she had alighted, idly dabbling in the water with her dark bill. Her plumage was almost pink against the bright sky, with a dark-pink crest to her brown head.

From time to time she uttered an emphatic *gug-guggawrr* and once a *ch-ch-ch-ch-ch* when a drake swooped low over the flush. What had brought her alone to this pool on the salting? Was she self-conscious of her surroundings, self-controlled in her actions? Or was she only a live robot bandied about by forces emanating from sun and moon: ordered by the fundamental impulses of hunger and reproduction: inherently guided from one season to another by the 'magnetic' pull of winter feeding-territory and summer breeding-territory? I tried to project myself into her entity, to probe her sentient being: but she only swam and dabbled and cawed. The veil was impenetrable. She did not even lift from the pool when in the end I rose to go, and I knew no more of her nature, and understood her mechanism no better, than when she had first alighted: so I left her still swimming to and fro on the flush.

SCHILLER DYING

BY SIDNEY KEYES

WHEN there were rules to break, when I
 Was punished and rebelled; then one might build
 Castles and cities out of history, or walk
 In grassy countries; then perhaps might yoke
 Even the shy unbroken horse
 That grazes no known pasture, the hard-hooved
 Pegasus even—spur him from the fair
 Out of the clapping and the roaring lamps
 And freak-shows into windy ways of joy.
 Joy . . . that is important in a way
 I cannot tell, somewhere quite other than
 This drunken planet . . . there are choirs crying
 Joy in my head . . . It was, of course, disguise:
 Not joy, but something positive, the root
 Of love, the keynote. These high voices find
 The explanation I dared never seek
 Outside the words; now my joy is becoming
 Not joy, but ringing hoofbeats of the horse
 I stole to ride those mountains; singing
 Chainshot at Lützen . . . blood starts through my joy
 And Eger threatens. Listen to Wrangel, listen
 To Max the foreigner, the foxy prince
 Who never knew it; stand immovable
 Beside me, under Saturn stricken also—
 Save me from fear and Venus, guard my joy.
 But in the end they pulled you down, they struck
 Swords in your holy flesh, as now in mine
 Fear spreads like poison . . . once I was not afraid
 To hide my meaning, once I could assert
 "Joy is a spark from heaven," never thinking
 I lied: that joy was only the reverse
 Of my consumption, of the angry blades
 At Eger; or that pain's repeated
 All over the world's body, like a scar.

My nose is red. Perpetually climbs
 The sickness through my bones—a spiral fever
 Searching the marrow. Winter is too long . . .
 And joy has coarsened the great poet's face
 That challenged winter once; and silly women
 Who laughed at me, climb to his high-flown bed.
 Joy has devoured that man. My nose is dripping
 Just as he said it did; always a snivelling
 Poor Württemburger poet, while he rules
 A soft world's pleasure with his easy joy.
 There was another word . . . now I may speak
 More openly . . . there was a foreign girl
 Came to our winter valley, but she left us
 In spring without a word. Her name was never
 Joy—but I never knew her name at all.
 And I knew more than joy, the day I came
 Hopeful to Weimar, looking for a sun
 To warm my winter, with the Mannheim voices
 Forgotten and far off, beyond the hills.
 That was the moment, when the hard-shaved teachers
 And mouthing dukes lost hold of me; when Goethe
 Lifted me out of fear in his great hands.
 But now he's frightened too; and I am drifting
 Back to the cruel school, the uniform
 Of uncomplaining earth; back to the fair
 Unhorsed and haggard now, a clumsy ploughboy
 Forgetting how he harnessed the wild horse;
 Back to the theatre, to the open faces
 Of the untutored, unregenerate crowd . . .

Joy is waylaid and slain. It was my joy
 They murdered on the Rhenish roads, and left
 A wheezing red-nosed ghost to end the journey.
 My joy is murdered, tumbled in the ditch
 With Rousseau and Wallenstein, a black blood-welter.
 Joy, my Adonis, arise; now I can meet you
 Unmasked in all your violence, dry blood
 Hanging about your eyes, your beauty punished.
 You need not come disguised; I have learnt courage.
 Your face is like my own, too sensitive
 For its fulfilment, crossed with heavy weals
 And scored by time's derision. And your voice
 Is hoof and chainshot, choir and orchestra; the weeping
 King in his chamber; Eckermann and Goethe

SCHILLER DYING

Preparing fame over the hock-glasses;
 My own dry coughing . . . or it is the cranes'
 Accusing scream, the wild thin voices
 Of cranes denouncing my joy's murderers . . .
 The meaning is not joy. Joy died. The word
 Is freedom and the bleeding face is freedom.
 Goethe has lost it. I am only free
 Since my youth died. The cranes are crying
 Freedom and pain, freedom and fame . . . My fear
 Has left me. I am ready to set out.

MODERN PROSE FORMS

III. AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND REMINISCENCE

PART II.

By ERIC GILLET

ONE of the autobiographies published during the last decade which has had a profound influence on contemporary autobiographers is Dr. Axel Munthe's *Story of San Michele*. Almost every life story is more or less a travel book but it would not be unfair to call Dr. Munthe's book a picaresque autobiography. It is brilliantly episodic and it may be conjectured that its rapid narrative influenced another medical man, Doctor Halliday Sutherland when he wrote his *Arches of the Years*. This is extremely vivid and amusing, and the chapters which describe his war experiences on the south east coast ought not to be omitted from the corpus of literature dealing with the last war.

There has been a spate of medical autobiographies recently and they are almost invariably good reading. Doctors and priests see more of human nature with the veneer off than anyone else and it is astonishing that more good records of personal experience have not been written by doctors in the past. Probably strict professional etiquette exercises a restraining influence. If this is so, it is a discretion which has undoubtedly deprived readers of some very entertaining volumes.

There is no doubt that the best contemporary autobiographers are novelists or journalists. Mr. Compton Mackenzie's accounts of his last war experiences though overlong have humour and an agreeable shrewdness which informs them all. My own favourite among them is the first, *Gallipoli Memories*. This shows a welcome regard for perspective, and great competence in characterization. There is nothing particularly malicious about these portraits but it would obviously be unwise to fall foul of an author who realizes that the best remedy for pomposity, lack of initiative, and other

official short-comings is ridicule. He is content to allow people to reveal themselves in their own statements. One excellent old gentleman, who happened to be a general, found it very difficult to understand that a man could earn a living by the pen:

"You write, don't you?" a bland voice broke in "Do you really make a living by it?" "Yes." "By writing novels, I mean?" "Yes, yes." "Extraordinary!" he ejaculated in bewilderment. "But do you seriously mean to tell me that people buy enough of your books to support you?" "So far, they have, General."

"Well, it's the most extraordinary thing I ever heard. I couldn't believe it when somebody told me about you on the 'Arcadian.' I never had the least idea that people ever dreamed of buying books to that extent. Why, I never bought a book in my life! Ah, yes I may have bought a magazine occasionally You know, at some railway station perhaps on my way to Ireland to go fishing. But never a book. It's most interesting to learn that you can sell enough books to live on. Most interesting and most extraordinary! I would never have believed it if you hadn't told me yourself. How do you think of a book? Do you just sit down and think? I don't want to seem inquisitive but I've never come into contact with this kind of thing before."

A very different type of general, Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston, even in his life time an almost legendary figure is hit off to the life in a few sentences:

From the moment that General Hunter-Weston turned his hawk's countenance on me and spoke to the accompaniment of his own humming, "So you're coming back with us for a blow at Helles! Splendid! Capital! You'll enjoy yourself. Tra-la-lira-la," I knew I was in for a good time.

Another versatile writer Mr. Clifford Bax is more philosophical in his approach than is Mr. Mackenzie, but in my opinion *Inland Far* deserves a far wider popularity than it has yet enjoyed. It is a friendly, thoughtful, and at times an amusing book. It is a book which stimulates the reader's mind to speculation and conjecture. Most authors writing in 1925 would have noted the decline of favour towards the romantic view of life and would have attributed it to the disillusionment which the war or rather the results of the peace had brought. Mr. Bax approaches this subject from a different angle.

The discredit which has fallen of late upon the romantic view of life may be due in large part to the fact that romantic literature so often closes to the sound of wedding bells. Most comedies end where most tragedies begin. I think we begin to feel that both marriage and death are temporary 'curtains.' In the realm of fact, as we know well, the romantic person is peculiarly unlikely to achieve a lifelong

union. He or she has a strong will to happiness, and the mind to imagine it: is apt to develop indefinitely; denies that life must become prosaic: and refuses merely to 'rub along.' When two or three hundred years have passed, the world will be amazed that we ever expected two people to remain together always. The few that achieve such a lasting happiness will be envied of all men, but their luck will be considered no less extraordinary than the health of someone who has 'never had a day's illness in his life.' Nobody will pretend that such good fortune is, or could be, normal. To me it seems certain, rather, that people will acknowledge more and more definitely that life is in all respects a moving pattern, and that in consequence men and women should acquire a faculty of frequently readjusting themselves to its changes.

There is no space here unfortunately to comment on the delightful tour to Spain which Mr. Bax took with his brother, Sir Arnold Bax, Mr. Balfour Gardiner, and Gustav Holst. Mr. Bax records (or invents) conversation brilliantly and indefatigably. *Inland Far* and its successor are notable examples of perspective and proportion applied to autobiography a medium in which these qualities are usually rare.

These qualities are to be found in Mr. J. B. Priestley's two autobiographical studies, *Midnight on the Desert* and *Rain Upon Godshill*. There is no doubt in my mind that Mr. Priestley is at his best, not as novelist or dramatist, but when he is writing personally in his essays, in these two books, and in his travel book *English Journey* which I hope to consider in a later article. The author describes *Midnight on the Desert* and *Rain Upon Godshill* as "chapters in autobiography." They are not formal presentations of his life. Their form is more elastic. Beginning, in the first book, with a winter's night in a little hut on the Arizona desert he lets his mind play on people and things that have interested him or affected his life or his attitude of mind on a number of occasions taken apparently at random but in reality chosen with remarkable relevance and aptness. Mr. Priestley excels as a critic of life and literature because his standards are completely sincere. They are informed by his natural good taste. In *Midnight on the Desert* he lets his mind range from the American theatre to the time theories of Dunne and Ouspensky. There is a glimpse of Charlie Chaplin imitating old English music hall singers, of a degree ceremony at St. Andrew's University, of the Grand Canyon, of American women seen triumphantly trim and conscientiously beautified in railway breakfast cars. There is a most interesting estimate of America's efficiency on the material side of civilization:

America is definitely in front. She hardly knows she is leading us, but she is. Russia can turn the old political and economic system upside down, but no sooner has she done so than she takes a long look at America. One country after another follows suit. They may be ten years behind, but they are following on steadily. America does not know where she is going, but if she walks into some abyss of barbarism, she will walk alone.

There is a deceptive ease and familiarity about Mr. Priestley's personal writings. If you take him at his own surface valuation, he is an ordinary middle-aged chap from the North, who hates shams and pretence and 'La-di-da' of any kind and who likes his pipe and slippers and a quiet talk with no nonsense about it. You have only to read this book to realize that underneath this rather commonplace façade there lives another personality, sensitive, restless, possessed of really remarkable deductive and intuitive powers, with the mind of a poet but unfortunately without a poet's powers of expression. No one has ever written with more understanding about listening to fine music than Mr. Priestley. There is a remarkable passage in *Angel Pavement* and another in *Midnight on the Desert* which is worthy to be put beside it.

The sight of a symphony orchestra in those days (when he was twenty) filled me with the deepest satisfaction; I would count every man of them carefully, to see that no tricks were being played on me, and then when I was sure they were all there, I was happy, and blessed all those benefactors who had thought of adding another ingenuity of wood or metal, until this huge instrument of wizardry had been achieved; and then I would look about me at my fellow-townsmen sitting there, some of them—for we know about music in Yorkshire—already glancing at their scores, and my heart would warm to them as fellow-communicants; and then I would be lost in the magic landscapes of sound, would sail great seas and find lost cities in remotest forests, would stand on moonlit turret roofs with bewitching princesses, would romp hugely with drunken giants, would fling myself down in tears by the grave of the whole beautiful world; and then down the steps I would reel again, and the cold night air would sober me a little, but only so that I felt a noble youth, ready to dedicate his life to some equally noble but rather mysterious cause like the hero of an old and foolish romance.

That is how it seems to me now, twenty-odd years and a world away

Mr. Priestley has always the great capacity for whole-hearted enjoyment. He can commemorate his enthusiasms and communicate them to his readers with a gusto which is shared by few of his contemporaries. It used to be said of a famous writer of sensational novels: "You can't help being thrilled by Blank." It would be difficult for the middle-brow to avoid

being enthused by Mr. Priestley, and in *Rain Upon Godshill* he gives a further instalment of autobiography which is as good as its predecessor.

Earlier I commented on the very high standard of literary men's autobiographies published during the last decade. One of the best of these books came out only two years ago. It is small—one hundred and six pages. Its author is well known as a journalist and novelist but I believe that he is at his best as a descriptive writer, and when he is deeply moved he has few superiors among his contemporaries. Mr. Howard Spring's *Heaven Lies About Us* is the narrative of his early boyhood in Cardiff, where his father was a jobbing gardener with a large family. In *Midnight on the Desert* Mr. Priestley gives a most sympathetic picture of his own father. Mr. Spring is more detailed and as understanding. His father was a man to whom money meant nothing and to whom literature meant a very great deal. He would not allow his children (there were nine of them) to read trash. Although he earned only a pound a week throughout his married life, he would spare a few pence often enough to buy secondhand books for himself and his family. His own taste was for *Paradise Lost*, but for his children he would buy *Tom Jones* and *Swiss Family Robinson*. He was a silent man. He never told his wife anything about himself except that as a boy he ran away from his home in County Cork. Perhaps it was this reserve and a genuine but inarticulate kindness that left so great an impression on his son, so that the one occasion on which he showed emotion left an impression which had to be set down:

Because I knew so little of him, and because, even when I accompanied him, I was in no sense with him, I recall the more vividly a Sunday walk when the barrier came near to obliteration. We stood on the top of a hilly field with young spring woods greening on the right hand and the left. There were cowslips growing in the field and a stream at its foot where kingcups floated their golden saucers upon the water. The whole day was full of bird-song and the quavering cries of lambs. I remember how my father stood there on the top of the hilly field, bare-headed, holding my hand; and when I looked up into his face I saw with a shock that there were tears behind his eyes. Brusquely then he urged me down the field to where, at the bottom, a man was turning the handle of a turnip-cutting machine. He and my father talked of the weather and this and that, as strangers will, while I munched a long finger of turnip.

That is an unforgettable picture. It conjures up the reticence of the father and the quick observation of the son and it is most tenderly expressed. Contemporary autobiography is

peculiarly strong in the happy expression of small and highly significant incident. Most of the writers contrive to be forthright and remarkably frank. The two exceptions seem to me to be Mr. Noel Coward, whose *Present Indicative* managed to be consistently entertaining, like its author's plays, but to me it says little about the man who wrote them and G. K. Chesterton. Chesterton, who was ready to enter into controversy about anything which was dear to him and who was one of the most charming, courteous, and least alarming of literary men for a young admirer to meet, wrote an autobiography which was unsatisfactory for another reason. I believe it was his very real modesty which prevented him from writing intimately about himself.

Mr. H. G. Wells belies in almost every line of his *Experiment in Autobiography* the sub-title he has given to it: *Discoveries and Conclusions of a Very Ordinary Man*. He was an imaginative and highly strung boy, and when he was sent as an apprentice to a respectable firm of drapers in Windsor the only breaks in the drudgery of the work there were made by visits to his cousins at Surly Hall. They were not always without incident:

Like most undernourished growing boys I was cowardly and I found the last stretch from Clewer to the inn terrifyingly dark and lonely. It was black on the moonless nights and eerie by moonlight and often it was misty from the river. My imagination peopled the dark fields on either hand with crouching and pursuing foes. Chunks of badly trimmed hedge took on formidable shapes. Sometimes I took to my heels and ran. For a week or so that road was haunted by a rumour of an escaped panther—from Lady Florence Dixie's riverside home, the Fisheries. That phantom panther waited for me patiently; it followed me like a noiseless dog, biding its time. And one night on the other side of the hedge a sleeping horse sighed deeply, a gigantic sigh, and almost frightened me out of my wits.

This autobiography of Mr. Wells contains some arresting portraits, none of them, I think, more striking than those of Lord Northcliffe and Frank Harris. Mr. Wells has a theory of progress of the individual life as a pilgrimage from familiarity to loneliness which deserves attention. No subsequent association systems replace the confirmation and reassurance our families give us at the beginning of our lives. Generally speaking we do not break away from these ties, we are broken away from them.

We cling to friendships, social circles, cliques, clubs, movements, societies, parties, descendants: but for all our clinging we are forced towards the open. We lose the trick of easy clinging. In the long

run, if we live long enough, we find ourselves standing alone, grown up at last altogether, in the face of the universe and life—and what remains to us of death.

There is a fascinating thesis to be written on that theory. In effect nobody can be said to grow up until he or she has left the home circle of his childhood. Even people with potentially strong personalities can be not only suppressed but also harmfully repressed unless they are given the opportunity to realize themselves away from the overfond or overcritical eyes of their families.

In his most charming and amusing last book, *Final Edition*, which he called an *Informal Autobiography*, E. F. Benson tells how he tried to settle down with his mother and sister at Tremans, Mrs. Benson's delightful house after he came down from Cambridge, but this was not a successful experiment. Benson felt that he was "odd man out," and was relieved to discover that his mother was as conscious as he was that the experiment had failed. His friends will remember Benson as one of the best raconteurs of his day, and *Final Edition* more than any autobiography of the period bristles with good stories. Here is the skilled man of letters, the skilled amateur of many of the best things in life setting down opinions and experiences with a very fair and detached urbanity. I should not think that there has ever been a writer with a greater or more Puckish sense of the ludicrous than Benson. As I write recollections come flooding back. There is, for instance, an extraordinarily vivid and detailed account of his own funeral ceremony which involved, I remember, a kind of scenic railway which was to join his dining room in Brompton Square with the entrance to Holy Trinity Church just behind it. Benson commemorated Edwardian extravagance as no other has done. His pages on the eccentricities of the late Lord Battersea are extremely funny and also really revealing. They catch and preserve a type which has ceased to exist. This nobleman had a weakness for magnificence and an extraordinarily Catholic taste. The decorations of his house ranged from paintings by Rossetti to doorway curtains of split cane and glass beads. Nor was he more fastidious in his own dress. He might frequently be seen, under the frankly admiring gaze of his devoted wife, returning from an early morning bathe clad in a green tam-o-shanter, a vivid blazer, and a pink shirt.

"Does not dearest Cyril look too beautiful this morning?" Lady Battersea cried. "Dearest Cyril I was saying how beautiful you looked!" It was too much, as John Brown said when Queen Victoria

gave him a plated biscuit-tin on the Prince Consort's birthday. "Oh, Connie," he called, "how *can* you be so silly?" On his motor there was a horn which when the bulb was pressed, emitted gay bugling sounds. He loved to tear about the country at sixty miles an hour, and sitting beside the chauffeur, to press the bulb on coming to a corner or passing through a village. She inside, was divided between terror at this excessive pace and admiration of the music. "Are we going too fast!" she said to her companion, "and does not Cyril use the horn beautifully? He makes it sound just like a bugle . . .". One night at dinner—he dined in a ruby-coloured velvet suit—he referred appositely but with Rabelaisian frankness to an unsavoury divorce case that was in progress. "I call it *Love's Labour Lost*," he said. "Cyril, how can you?" exclaimed Lady Battersea in a shocked voice from the other end of the table, and put up her hand to hide her blushes. But she could not maintain a disapproving attitude and beamed at him. "Dearest Cyril, you are too brilliant!" she cried. "Love's Labour Lost! Is that not clever? Did you hear what dearest Cyril said, Mr. Balfour?" And when her admiration ceased to boil over, she asked Mr. Balfour if he was not very fond of reading.

Benson was never happy unless he had a book in hand. With all his interests, and they were many and various, and with his great love of games and skating and art and chess and music, not to mention his friendships, Benson felt that there was something missing in his day if he did not put in several hours on a book. He could be admirably self-critical. When he realized that he was losing some of the great popularity which had come to him with his first novel, *Dodo*, Benson took stock of his achievement. He read carefully the works of the admired novelists of the time. Some he found hard to follow. Others, he felt, had acquired lucidity by a blank disregard of euphony. They were full of jerks. Benson felt that the best told story in the world is the parable of the Prodigal Son. He disliked the tendencies of modern fiction which were wont, as he remarked, to make its studies of morality in the monkey house and to follow its heroines to the water-closet. Benson thought that his approach to fiction was out of fashion and so he turned to biography and reminiscence with very great success. In *As We Were, As We Are*, and in his careful and authoritative study of Charlotte Brontë he writes with his unflinching ease and shows his acute selective powers at their underestimated best. For some reason it is an English habit to undervalue writers who make us laugh. With the publication of *Dodo* Benson acquired a reputation for "brilliance," which somehow carried with it a hint of the meretricious. This was exceedingly unfair. In the biographies Benson put in a large amount of spade-work to get his facts right, and in the consistently entertaining and highly polished *Final Edition*

written when the author was in the grip of a mortal illness and finished only a week before he died, he wrote and rewrote until these very varied reminiscences were moulded to his satisfaction. In years to come Benson's personal writings will be read with sympathy and amusement by readers who will also treasure the work of William Hickey, Greevey, and Greville.

It is becoming a commonplace to deprecate the work of a man as soon as he is dead, and Sir Hugh Walpole's novels received rough handling last year, largely because of the remarkable fluency and facility with which he wrote. In time his books will probably recover a measure of popularity because he wrote easily and could tell a story. He developed very little as a novelist. Recently I read two of his books written at a distance of over thirty years and there was very little difference in style or method. Both had freshness and zest. These are qualities which you will find in *Roman Fountain* which is ostensibly the record of Walpole's experiences when he was in Rome for the Papal Ceremonies early in 1939. In fact the book is an interesting causerie. Walpole could be an excellent talker on occasion, and here he moves to and fro across the eventful experiences of different stages of his life with sane self-criticism and lively revelation. *Roman Fountain* provides an interesting contrast to *In The Mill*, Mr. Masfield's recent autobiographical volume.

It seems to me that with every prose book he writes the Poet Laureate tends to become more austere and economical in his method. He delights to confine himself to the statement of essentials. He has become averse to the flavouring which personal commentary can give to a narrative. It is a method which leaves facts to explain themselves, the very opposite to Walpole's practice. I do not think it is altogether imagination on my part that gives to Mr. Masfield's earlier works, *Gallipoli* and *The Old Front Line* a crispness and colour which his recent book on Dunkirk and *In The Mill* lack. I do not attribute this to flagging inventive powers or to any decline of interest in the writer's craft. It is probably owing to a too intense pre-occupation with the niceties of self-expression that the increased austerity of Mr. Masfield's prose style is due. And it is a good thing that the accredited representative of English letters should be as scrupulous in his approach to his chosen medium as his predecessor was.

It is doubtful whether any contemporary writer could write of himself with such excellent reticence as Mr. Masfield does.

in this book. There is nobility in it and a pervasive sympathy with the struggles of his fellow men:

In trying to set down the story of my time in the mill, I have found that for most of the time there was no story; all my life was lived outside the mill or deep within myself. The time ended nearly forty-four years ago, and much of it has dropped from memory. I was very young then, and youth is a time of unhappiness. I was very unhappy, from youth, exile, home-sickness the worry over a friend, and despair of being able to master the fates which offered and attracted. I was also unspeakably, radiantly and burningly happy. I had found my road. It was a deep time, such as one would not be without.

There are wisdom and poetry in this passage, and one is grateful for prose which can convey so much without fuss or the use of the loud pedal. It is fair to say that a number of recent autobiographical writers, including Mr. Somerset Maugham, Air Commodore Charlton, Mr. Forrest Reid, Mr. Christopher Isherwood, Mr. Arthur Waugh, and Rudyard Kipling have had the same great merit.

In ending this short and necessarily inadequate survey of one of the most prevalent and interesting literary forms of the day it is important to stress the fact that the inadequacy of my treatment of it is due to some extent to the very many who have attempted this kind of writing. It is hoped that some of them may be included in subsequent articles which will touch on the literature of travel and of war, but the standard is so high and the writers so many that I owe an apology to writers whose books almost clamour for inclusion and who have not even received a mention.

THE NEW STRATEGIC SITUATION

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

ONCE again the inherent advantages of offensive strategy have been illustrated—power to seize the initiative, to exploit surprise and to concentrate effort at selected points. Although Japan to a remarkable degree dispersed her forces, her numerical superiority in her theatre of war enabled her to effect concentrations at those points and in those operations where superior numbers were called for—in the Philippines, in the Malay peninsula and Thailand and at Hong Kong. At Pearl Harbour she relied purely on surprise.

The Allied forces are of course equally dispersed and have unfortunately to a large extent lost the power of reinforcing threatened points. This particularly applies to the Philippines, where the U.S.A. may pay a heavy price for unwillingness to employ conscript troops abroad if it is found that there are insufficient forces to meet attempts at invasion. Nevertheless the defence has now opportunities of displaying its undoubted tactical advantages, and it may be tested to the full, not only in the Philippines but in Malaya and elsewhere. At Singapore and in Malaya it is believed we have adequate numbers of first-class troops for defence and it should be possible to reinforce both our land and air forces. Here there has been no strategical surprise and the terrain lends itself to defence. Our weakness may be in the air, owing to the vulnerability of our air bases and other air targets. It is, however, understood that a number of new airfields have been constructed, and so long as these remain in our possession and in usable condition our air force should give a good account of itself. The weight of the advantages therefore would appear to lie with the defence, although undoubtedly the enemy may cause much damage by bombing attacks. Landings near our main centres of resistance should meet with fierce opposition, and from those that may be effected at greater distances long stretches of difficult country will have to be traversed. Hong Kong was a different matter. It suffered especially from lack of alternative airfields. How far Burma and the Burma road are threatened by land is difficult for the moment to estimate. That heavy air attacks from Thailand will develop may be looked on as certain, but the terrain presents many difficulties to an invading army.

It is of course the naval situation in the Pacific with its repercussion on the naval situation elsewhere that primarily matters, and that is not for me to discuss. Obviously neither land nor air-forces in the Pacific theatre have at present an independent offensive rôle, they must be subordinated to the protection of bases from which the Navy may ultimately regain control.

of sea communications. The closest co-ordination of the efforts of the three Services is more than ever essential with the Navy's interest predominant. Every soldier must realize how dependent in every theatre the Army is on the Navy, and must appreciate how magnificently the Royal and Merchant Navies have played their part under the most adverse circumstances.

The opening of a new theatre of war in the Far East tends to increase rather than to diminish the importance of the Libyan theatre. An early decisive success there would sensibly reduce the tasks of the Navy and the risks it is bound to accept in co-operating with the Army. After a promising opening of the campaign there was undoubtedly a disappointing sequel. An extremely efficient and hard fighting adversary was encountered who, even if he was to some extent surprised by the method of our attack, was well prepared and quite capable of adjusting himself to the situation and striking shrewd blows. Fortunately he does not seem to have been able seriously to disturb General Auchinleck's essential strategical conception, though its development required modification in consequence of tactical reverses. The situation is now developing in our favour, and now that Tobruk can be used as a supply base and when the main coastal road is cleared at Sollum, the tempo of General Auchinleck's operations may increase. In the meantime there is every indication that Rommel is suffering from lack of essential supplies. He had apparently accumulated large and well distributed reserves in the rear of his defensive frontier positions; whether with a view to taking the initiative or to conducting an active defensive policy is still uncertain. But those reserves have either been exhausted or captured and the operations of the Navy and R.A.F. have greatly reduced the flow of reinforcements of all sorts. That Rommel at the moment is short of supplies is proved by the abandonment of tanks and other weapons and by the condition of prisoners. It has yet to be seen whether he has sufficient reserves accumulated in western Cyrenaica and Tripolitania to enable him to re-equip his army, and to maintain his fighting powers for long. It seems at least that he has lost a large part of his armoured strength and it is improbable that he can replace his losses in that respect unless the Vichy Government gives him new facilities for landing material at Bizerta or elsewhere in French territory. General Auchinleck, on the other hand, should have ample reinforcements and replacements within call. The Russian recovery should justify him in drawing on them fully, and once Tobruk and the coastal road provide better communications he will be able to employ larger forces and move more confidently. Up to the present the circuitous route which his supply services have had to follow, one exposed moreover to enemy raids, must have imposed limitations on the size of his striking force. Rommel is now definitely in retreat under heavy and probably growing pressure. He is using his remaining armoured troops to delay pursuit by short counter thrusts. Delaying action is all the more necessary, for he must have large infantry bodies to get away; and if, as seems probable, he has lost large numbers of unarmoured vehicles it will

be difficult to accelerate infantry movement by motorization. Pursued by armoured formations and subject to air attack his task is likely to prove difficult, all the more because his line of retreat and communications with Tripolitania are threatened. He may of course decide to stop in the western part of Cyrenaica and fight it out on ground which is more defensible and offers less scope for armoured forces. Much, however, may depend on whether he has well stocked reserve depots there. If he has not he would seem to have no choice but to follow Graziani's example and attempt to withdraw to Tripolitania.

Shortly after I wrote last month the German offensive in Russia, which had been brought to a standstill by mud, was renewed when frost hardened the ground and snowfalls were still light. And very threatening for a time the offensive seemed to be. In the north Tikvin on the Leningrad-Vologda railway was captured; practically completing the isolation of Leningrad and opening up the possibility of a thrust to Vologda which would have interrupted communication from Archangel and Murmansk to Moscow. In the Moscow region the situation was even more serious. Violent attacks from the north, north-west and west made progress and, though penetrations effected were not deep, the defence was seriously shaken in a number of places. To the south of the city the situation was even more threatening, especially round Tula where not only was a footing gained on the Tula-Moscow road, but a thrust eastwards threatened to interrupt railway communications between Moscow and the south. Again in the south, in spite of Timoshenko's success in reorganizing defences Rostov was captured, and it seemed possible that further success there might lead to invasion of Caucasia in which the force at Kerch might take part. Sevastopol too was under heavy attack.

Then when the outlook was most critical came an amazing change in the situation, largely no doubt due to the arrival of the real Russian winter, but even more to the quality of Russian resistance and the capacity of Russian Generals, especially Timoshenko, to seize an opportunity. Timoshenko's counter-attack on von Kleist's over-confident thrust at Rostov was evidently well conceived and admirably executed. It may go down in history as the turning point in the war, but for the moment it can at least be reckoned as the first serious reverse the *Reichswehr* has suffered. Von Kleist was thrown out of Rostov and compelled to beat a hurried and disorganized retreat, hotly pursued. He had apparently no strong reserves in support and though his rearguards are still holding on to Taganrog the Russians appear to have by-passed the town and are harassing his retreat further west. Such counter-attacks as have been delivered appear to have been local efforts to check pursuit, and, so far, he does not seem to have been able to organize a counter-offensive movement on a scale which might retrieve the situation. The fact that Italian, Rumanian and other non-German troops form a considerable part of von Rundstedt's army must add to the difficulty of collecting reserves, for they cannot safely be left without a stiffening of German troops. It seems

probable too that von Rundstedt may have had to contribute some of his German reserve formations to the Moscow offensive. Timoshenko has now extended his counter-offensive further north in the Donetz region, which will tend to prevent dangerous concentrations against his pursuing force. On the Moscow and Leningrad fronts winter has probably played a great part in bringing the German offensive to a standstill. Berlin states that deep snow makes it impossible for armoured vehicles to operate, and that the men cannot use their weapons in the intense cold. All the same the Russians have made a number of successful counter-attacks, though with less sensational results than at Rostov. These counter-attacks have been particularly effective at points where Panzer Divisions had effected penetration; presumably because the infantry formations were unable to move to their support. The defeat of the forces that had made progress at Tula and of the force which had captured Tikvin east of Leningrad seem to be the most important results the counter-attacks have achieved.

Daily, however, the Russian counter-attacks are assuming more and more the character of a general offensive, and the German withdrawal that of a retreat. But German capacity for rapid re-organization must be recognized and a new retreat from Moscow cannot be expected. It is hardly conceivable that the Russians are yet in a position to undertake a far reaching counter offensive. Exploitations of their successes against German forces in exposed positions and recapture of ground which would give more elbow room round Moscow is probably as much as can be hoped for, provided that damage inflicted on the German army in the process is commensurate with ground regained.

It is at any rate safe to assume that no renewal of a German offensive against Moscow is now possible this winter unless the Russians by some ill-conceived policy exposed themselves to counter-attack. In the south Timoshenko may be able still further to exploit his victory, but in the north as active harassing policy would appear to be the best course for the Russians to adopt. That would compel the Germans to retain a large number of troops in exposed forward positions and would maintain the strain on *their lines* of communication. It obviously is undesirable to give the Germans a quiet winter in which to rest and refit their exhausted troops and to build up reserves of material. The Russian air-force, in spite of weather conditions, seem still to be able to operate most effectively, and if it can maintain its activity it might take a large share in harassing operations, especially on railway communications which in winter, when snow interferes with motorized movements, must become of increasing importance.

Naturally the Russians will also have much refitting and reorganization to do. Reserves of material must be accumulated and troops given rest. These conditions therefore would seem to prohibit far-reaching counter-offensive operations during the winter, especially if events in the Far East should entail new Russian commitments.

THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

THE broad lines of the Japanese plan for the attack on the United States and Great Britain are now clear. A smashing attack was to be delivered on the American fleet at Honolulu behind the screen of the continuance of diplomatic relations and a pretence of a willingness to discuss and settle the points at issue. Success in this attack would, at the best, deprive the United States of their superiority at sea in the Pacific, at the least prevent any interference by the American fleet with the movements of the Japanese armies before they had completed the first stage of their operations. To hinder the movements of any American forces which might not be involved in the hoped-for destruction the stepping stones on the cross-Pacific route, Guam, Midway and Wake islands, were to be simultaneously captured. Considerable military forces had been previously conveyed across the sea into Indo-China on various flimsy and false pretences and these had secured the possession of landing positions and large quantities of material of all kinds in that country besides overawing the feeble Government of Thailand. There was thus no difficulty of an opposed landing to be overcome.

While the combined air and submarine attack was thus providing the necessary cover for the movement of further forces, by the disablement of the United States fleet, other military bodies which had been assembled with their transport in the near neighbourhood of their objectives had the duty of capturing, as rapidly as possible, the two principal naval bases of the United States and Great Britain—Cavite in the Philippines and Singapore. If these could be seized before the American fleet could arrive in the China seas both it and any further British naval forces would be without any bases from which they could act effectively against the Japanese military communications with China, Indo-China, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and Thailand, all of which could then be reduced without difficulty by the vastly superior Japanese military forces that could be put into the field. These armies, crossing the northern provinces of Malaya and the isthmus of Thailand to the north of Malaya, would seize anchorages on the west coast, thus providing Japan with bases on the Bay of Bengal from which her cruisers and submarines and long distance bombers could conduct an intensive war upon the lines of supply of the naval and military forces in the eastern area, the trade of the Indian Ocean, and the supplies going to the British armies in Egypt, and the Russian armies via the Cape of Good Hope, the Red Sea and

the Persian Gulf. At the time of writing the useful position of port Victoria has already been occupied.

All of the movements of this far reaching scheme needed to be most accurately co-ordinated and timed so that the blows should fall simultaneously in Hawaii, on the mid-Pacific bases and on the coast of Malaya. The preliminary movements must have been made many weeks before, for whether the immediate point of departure of the forces aimed at Hawaii, Wake and Midway islands was a home base in Japan or one in the mandated islands, the aircraft carriers, submarines and whatever escorting vessels accompanied them had to start from the main Japanese islands. Thus the minimum distance that the force attacking Hawaii had to cover was some 3,400 miles and, if they sailed via the Mariana Islands, as is very probable, some extra hundreds of miles must be added. As submarines whose surface speed on such a voyage would be unlikely to exceed 12 knots—though probably that is too high a figure—were among the units in the attack on Pearl Harbour, the ships must have been set in motion at least twelve days earlier. When the time necessary for the assembly, storing and preparing the ships is taken into consideration, apart from any question of the making of the plans which we may assume were made long in advance, it would not be too much to assume that the decision to attack the United States and Britain was made, at the latest, a month beforehand and that the interval was used to maintain the pretence of a desire to continue negotiations with an intention to arrive at a settlement. An active "Fifth Column," we now learn, had been organized to prepare the way and dislocate the defence as its counterpart did in Norway and the Low Countries.

The completeness, no less than the spirit in which these plans were evolved, must even excite the envy and extort the admiration of the perpetrators of the treacheries in Norway, Holland, Belgium, Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. In that illuminating disclosure of German mentality *Thus spake Germany* an apposite quotation is given from the writings of the Munich Professor of Modern History, Albrecht Wirth:

When one is contemplating war it is best not to say a word about it, to envelop one's designs in profound mystery; then suddenly and unawares, one leaps like a thief in the dark, like the Japanese torpedo boats against Port Arthur, throwing all caution to the winds, like Frederick II. hurling himself on Silesia.

The method had succeeded in the countries attacked by Hitler and Mussolini; the precedent in 1904 had proved an incomplete success. It needed only to be interpreted in terms of the modern implements of war and such weaknesses as there were in it eliminated. For the torpedo boat of that day we have the aircraft and submarine, and the movable aerodrome, the carrier, was available to bring the aircraft within striking range of the American base.

Success as there was at Port Arthur—for though all that was aimed at was not achieved, some success was attained—was due to the total lack of precaution on the part of the Russian commander. It was with that in my

mind that, writing in mid November for *THE FORTNIGHTLY* I expressed the hope that it was "unlikely a similar unreadiness would exist in the allied fleet during a time of strained relations such as those of to-day." Unhappily it appears from the report of Colonel Knox there was unreadiness. The precautions that were lacking at Port Arthur were twofold. The fleet was not moved into the security of an enclosed and well protected harbour and no patrols were being maintained to seaward to give notice of an approach and break up the attack of an enemy force. While it is not possible to provide harbour defences which shall exclude aircraft, as booms, breakwaters and mines exclude surface and submarine torpedo craft, it is possible to meet those craft with fighters, provided warning is given in time for the fighters to get into the air. But such patrols must be well out to sea and there must be no doubt that they shall be so disposed as to ensure sighting the enemy. Useful and long-visioned as air craft are it is dangerous to place one's reliance on them alone—the failure of the German aircraft sent off the East Coast before Jutland to give notice of any move of the Grand Fleet is a case in point. Surface scouting forces are also required. The American air patrol, so Colonel Knox reports, gave no warning and the attack was a surprise. That it did not do more than it did is a tribute to the skill and resource of the fleet.

Though the desired surprise was unfortunately achieved the results must assuredly fall short of Japanese hopes. One battleship destroyed, one rendered unserviceable for a prolonged time and three destroyers sunk are certainly a serious diminution of the allied fleet in the Pacific. But that fleet is not disabled. It put to sea and went in search of the enemy with its battleships, cruisers, destroyers and aircraft carriers. Moral effects, too, have to be put in the scales of the balance against material effects and it may well prove that the welding together of discordant elements in the nation's body politic is a greater asset than the lost ships.

On the other side of the Pacific the Japanese armies were thrown simultaneously into the Philippines and Malaya and against Hong Kong; for the sea was open and safe for the passage of those invasionary bodies and no strong opposition could be organized at the numerous points at which landings were made on that long stretch of coast. Certainly there is some matter for surprise that landings in force should have been possible on the East coast in the North East monsoon. It was, it appears, to interrupt those landings that Admiral Phillips put to sea with his two battleships, accompanied by a destroyer screen for protection against submarine attack and in the expectation that shore based aircraft would come to his assistance if attacked by enemy aircraft, an expectation that was disappointed, for the aerodromes had fallen into the enemy's hands. In the absence of any information as to the situation or the forces available in Singapore it is impossible to comment on the decision taken. One can only say that normally the vessels most suitable for the destruction of transport vessels and craft are cruisers, flotilla vessels

and aircraft—numbers and ability to penetrate into shoal waters are needed, not size. The function of the heavy ships is to cover these vessels against heavy ships. It seems proper to assume that the cruisers and flotilla craft were not available and that it is to the limitation on those two classes of fighting ships that was so unwisely accepted by Parliament in the Treaty of London that we now owe, in part at least, the loss of two battleships, as we owe the loss of thousands of tons of shipping to the same cause.

In the meantime, what of the future? To predict what will happen is impossible, but the factors in the situation can be broadly indicated. Four outstanding sets of operations, two of them military and two naval, are in progress. The military operations are those concerned with the defence of Singapore and with the larger though not so immediately crucial business of driving the enemy's armies from Thailand and Indo-China—or any other territory into which he may succeed in penetrating in the meantime, including any positions he may have occupied on the west coast to serve as bases for attacks by sea upon the communications in the Indian Ocean. The naval operations are those concerning attack on the military and commercial communications of the enemy throughout the China seas and defence of the shipping in the Indian Ocean—the trade, the supplies of the army and the fleet in the Far East, the shipping taking munitions via the Cape of Good Hope to the army in Egypt, via the Red Sea, and those bound to the Persian Gulf for the Russian army. Every available submarine is now needed to attack the military communications of the large Japanese army which is now committed to an oversea campaign, and, in co-ordination with this offensive, another against the coastal communications which form an important element in Japan's distributive system. In the Indian Ocean we shall shortly see a *guerre de course* on an extensive scale. Japan has followed the German example of a "pocket battleship" policy, bettering it with more powerful ships, mounting 12in. guns in place of the German 11in. To guard the communications of the many kinds in the Eastern seas will call for the services of heavy ships, and therefore the sooner we can rid ourselves of the incubus of the remains of the Italian heavy ships the better. Inefficient and unenterprising though the Italian command has been for the last eighteen months its heavy ships are containing a body of British ships that are wanted elsewhere.

We are all familiar with the saying "The sea is all one." That saying has a wider interpretation to-day. Not the sea only but the air and land also are all one in this world war. Mr. Roosevelt did well in his fireside talk to remind his countrymen of this fundamental strategical fact. Every theatre of this war, all the land, sea and air forces are interconnected and interdependent. As he said, guerrillas in Serbia, a Russian offensive, a British victory on land or sea all have their repercussions in America; a Japanese success in the Pacific helps the Germans in Libya, a German success in the Caucasus is an aid to Japanese attack on the Dutch East Indies. So too he might have added

a Japanese success in Malaya affects the whole Russian front from Leningrad to the Black Sea as it prejudices the supply of tanks and many other munitions which Russia needs from the United States and Britain.

How the Japanese entry into the war will affect the Vichy Government's willingness to "co-operate" and in what form remains to be seen. One thing is certain. Hard blows will now be struck in the Mediterranean, and the pressure upon Vichy for the French African bases, both in the Mediterranean, and on the Atlantic, and for the assistance of the French navy, will be redoubled. At the beginning of the war the pernicious catchword was "Time is on our side." That delusion was swept away when France capitulated, but now a new and not less mistaken catchword is taking its place—"the allied resources outweigh those of the enemy." The importance of resources is unquestioned, but he wins who uses them with foresight, intelligence and vigour. So far there has been little of these in the direction of the war. Opportunities have been missed—Trondhjem, Dakar, Crete and, if Admiral Keyes is right, in the refusal to make any use of the picked and well equipped Commando forces. The bravery of the fighting men at sea, on land and in the air can do nothing if the hands which direct lack the qualities needed.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

LET us now praise men in their manliness. Henry Nevinston, whose life was an honour to British journalism, had a strongly marked individuality; yet he belonged to a well marked type of which I have been happy enough to know four examples: self-constituted knights errant, champions of the underdog, upholders of chivalry as a principle, devoted to the sanctity of freedom but no very devout respecters of any government—indeed, all having some dash of the rebel, not always latent. Two, I rejoice, to say are alive, and one needs no comment; the House of Commons has known Colonel Wedgwood for five and thirty years. The other survivor also saw Parliament from the inside, but mighty long ago; Captain Henry Harrison was a Balliol undergraduate when he got to grips with police who were evicting Donegal cottiers, and this led to his election for a Nationalist constituency. Parnell spoke of him as “a stripling”; but very soon “Parnell’s stripling” had to stand behind his chief in bitter times of the “split”—half a century ago. Since then, he has been unswerving in service to all that Parnell stood for; and in 1914 when Parnell’s successor called for an Irish brigade, Harrison turned out, and so, like Colonel Wedgwood, became knight errant in arms. I met him in France, well on in the forties and badly touched with deafness, none the less a scout-officer, prowling about in No Man’s Land, where he earned more than the good subaltern’s ordinary distinction; his Military Cross got a bar to it.

Another Irishman in my list is Roger Casement of tragic memory. Everybody remembers that he did his utmost to get German support for the Irish insurrection in 1916, and this has blotted out memory of his earlier work in Africa where one might almost say that single-handed he destroyed that abomination, the Congo Free State; no other of the four can show a comparable achievement. It was bitter to find this magnificent creature throwing in his lot against the Irish fighting men whom Captain Harrison represented. Yet in fact the movement which Casement supported won from English statesmen what was denied to us when we asked in the name of the Irish soldiery. Perhaps he saw clearer than the rest of us; at all events, he paid the uttermost price. His final actions will always need generous construction; and there never was a judge to whom I would sooner leave them than the great Englishman whom I have associated with this Irish felon. Nevinston’s pen was a weapon essentially of defence, though never for himself. Perhaps the needs of advocacy deprive us of a good deal which might have come from him; writing in *Time and Tide* Mr. Edward Thompson says

that the best of his work was in verse. He makes his case by quoting a lyric in which Nevinston carelessly dismissing his *animula, vagula, pallidula, nudula, frigidula*, cries out—

“But for my body, what shall come of it?
Dear host and comrade of the soul,”
I do deplore the destiny unfit—
That graveyard hole.

Glad one may well be to have known such a man; glad also that his later life gained the companionship of another fighting pacifist as chivalrous as himself when he married Evelyn Sharp.

* * * * *

A book has just been published which appeals strongly to all that Nevinston upheld; indeed Dr. Norman Leys tells us it was read in proof by Mr. Brailsford, perhaps Nevinston’s closest associate. To be plain-spoken, *The Colour Bar in East Africa** makes thoroughly uncomfortable reading, especially because of its studied care to avoid violent expression. The English people are under strong temptation to self-righteousness, above all in whatever concerns the guardianship of freedom; it is a shock to be told that in one great region they have hauled down to half-mast the standard which their ancestors a century ago set flying proudly. England in Wilberforce’s day decided on the simple and drastic remedy of making all the inhabitants in her colonies “equal before the law.” Yet “men who believe in and practise the policy of inequality, of discrimination, on the ground of race, are in practically unchallenged authority in half of British Africa.” Further Dr. Leys says that colour bars are “not found outside of British rule in Africa.” They do not exist in French, Portuguese or Belgian territory. “In British West Africa they hardly exist; in the West Indies the policy of equal rights has scarcely been encroached upon.” But in British East Africa, “the policy of the colour bar pervades all life” and the labourer’s daily income (allowing for the value of home-grown food) varies from 4d. to 9d., as against 9d. to 1s. in West Africa, and 2s. to 4s. in the West Indies. The white man in East Africa has established a monopoly of all gainful occupations and has confirmed it, positively by law, and negatively by withholding such education as would qualify the African for higher wages. Rulers there are zealous to protect natives from the evil of becoming “de-tribalized”; in a tribal state, it is held, they were happier, and pleasanter to deal with. But at the same time the protecting power makes it essential for every African in these countries to have money—which in tribal conditions was not a necessity. Taxes have to be paid and virtually can only be earned by working for some European employer. Money cannot be got out of the land, because about half of the really cultivable soil has been given to Europeans so that the African is restricted to a very small holding, and is forbidden by law to purchase land or lease land. This in his own country! Dr. Leys very justly observes that the English people would not tolerate such a law if they knew of its existence. He notes also that the constitution of Southern Rhodesia, framed in 1923, when Mr. Churchill was Colonial Secretary, “contained no trace of a colour bar and explicitly asserted the right of Africans to own land anywhere in the territory.” But “one of Mr. Churchill’s successors” allowed a change in the constitution by which Africans are barred from owning or leasing land in the more eligible and practically all the well-watered parts. They may live there only if they

* Hogarth Press. 7s. 6d.

are in European employment, and this is the position of the great majority. In a word East Africa is being run for the convenience of the small European element. Money is spent lavishly to provide schooling for European children; less lavishly for Indian children; penuriously for the Africans. British rule in East Africa does not aim at producing educated natives. These facts ought to be familiar to every member of the House of Commons, for Parliament has a direct responsibility. One Labour member, Mr. Creech Jones, apparently follows up this matter, and will no doubt find himself condemned as a crank, interfering where he has no knowledge. The best authority on Africa that I ever knew was Mary Kingsley, and she said that there was one sure guidance in dealing with Africans—to give them justice according to your strictest conception of what is fair between man and man, as justice will always be understood. Much of what Dr. Leys describes cannot be reconciled with any conception of decent trusteeship. He makes it plain that if the British Empire insists on enforcing equality of rights, irrespective of colour, the Empire may have to face the total secession of South Africa. Yet not even that should force Parliament to tolerate injustice where it is responsible.

* * * * *

Here at least France gives us what is pleasant to think of. Since the Revolution she has stood for the Roman conception of citizenship. Every Senegalese has thought of himself as a Frenchman and we know what the Senegalese infantry have been worth to France. But Professor Denis Saurat (Director of London's Institut Français) tells in his book *Watch on Africa** how powerfully the educated African also has helped France in her darkest hour. At the very centre of the continent in the Chad region a man "much blacker than any of his subjects in Equatorial Africa" was Governor-General. From the first Governor Eboué took his stand on the side of General de Gaulle, and M. Saurat translates an extract from the proclamation which he issued in January, 1941:

Since we have been able to unravel, and as a whole very simply, what was for so many others a very serious moral crisis, there must have been a spiritual fund in our nation to which we all could and did appeal. Soon we shall re-enter France, and it is only too likely that we shall find in France, together with the ruins heaped up by the enemy, subjects of profound internal discord . . . From to-day onwards let us liberate our souls from any narrow and aggressive mood so as to be able and worthy tomorrow to reconstruct France to the innermost of her soul.

Here the black man, West Indian born, governing black men African born, speaks as a Frenchman for France. This is a long way from that conception of what an African is and must be which underlies all the action of British administrators in Kenya or Rhodesia. Yet that example of what a black Frenchman may become is not unique. Some years back, the Prix Goncourt was awarded to a novel dealing with life in the Central African bush; its author was a native African who was employed there in some administrative post.

M. Saurat writes without professing any special knowledge of Africa, but, as a witty Frenchman who went out to visit key positions of Free France, he writes entertainingly and with fine insight, amongst other subjects, concerning General Larminat and Admiral Muselier. But I am specially grateful to him for the quotation from Governor Eboué—and for the photograph of this big solid French citizen in whom M. Saurat sees "a real negro king."

* Dent. 8s. 6d.

In a series devoted to "Current Problems," Dr. Routh (formerly Professor of English Literature and Institutions at the University of Athens) considers how best to promote *The Diffusion of English Culture*.*

A World Language

With intrepid assurance that after this war England will be the world's leading power, he assumes that a vast number of persons will desire to know English, not so much for their pleasure and enlightenment as for their convenience. None the less, well directed teaching may increase their understanding and appreciation of the English genius and of English institutions; it may lessen the unpopularity which he thinks is likely to spring from a sense of England's interfering dominance. Broadly, if I understand him rightly, he wishes that behind the teaching and with the teaching, should be a sense that English does not belong to England only, nor only to the English-speaking nations. It should be taught as a world language, in which all contemporary civilization has a right, as once all Europe had in Latin.

At present between six and seven hundred millions use English either as their native language or as the language of government and commerce . . . Our nearest competitor is China with a paltry four hundred and fifty million; the rest—nowhere.

These are awe-inspiring if not frightening figures; and obviously English may suffer a sea change into something stranger rather than richer. Yet Helen Waddell has made us all aware what vivid life the wandering scholars could put into Latin; and if Dr. Routh gets his way, the process of world-wide instruction will be directed from a central truly English institution through men as carefully selected and as well paid as Indian Civil servants. "Culture" is not to be given too humanistic an interpretation," he says; and of course the word is among the least definable. But one hopeful thought presents itself. If through the mercy of providence England is guided after victory by the man who dragged her out of defeat, the world will be at no loss to comprehend what is meant by English culture. So radiant an intelligence as Mr. Churchill's has not been put into any other man of our time; take as a trivial instance the swift image by which from the first he made us understand this Libyan battle of tanks in the desert by pointing out its analogy to a sea fight. All the professional military commentators could not by their combined efforts so illuminate. But there is more solid proof in a piece of prose now several years old. Lady Rhondda has had the inspiration to reproduce in the Christmas number of *Time and Tide* what Mr. Churchill wrote about Moses. Germany's accusation against England and against the United States is that they are in bondage to the Jews. Mr. Churchill would reply that the condemnation of Nazi doctrine is precisely found in that campaign of persecution which Christianity condemns, humanity condemns, and even humanism revolts against; for in truth German culture owes more to Heine than to almost all of its Aryans. Yet what Germans think, or are forced to think, about Jewry need not concern us; but when famous Frenchmen begin tentatively to approve the Jew-baiters, we may be thankful for a great Englishman who can translate into vivid modern terms the Saga of Moses whose essential historic truth events of the present time bring home to us. Here indeed is truly a step towards the diffusion of English culture. There is no better test of a nation's quality than the part which Jews play in it, and no nation can stand that test better than the one which to-day listens to every word that falls from Winston Churchill.

* Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLAND, from Augustus II. to Pilsudski (1697-1935). *Cambridge University Press*. 30s.

When the rulers of states consider themselves strong enough to annex a neighbour's territory, they usually give some high-sounding explanation. Seldom do they follow the example of Frederick the Great who, when he occupied western Poland in 1772, simply said that those provinces were necessary to round off the lands of Prussia. At that same time Catherine of Russia preferred to invoke her right to Polish territories which eight centuries earlier had formed the Grand Duchy of Saint Vladimir of Kieff. To-day we hear publicists of Dr. Goebbels' school demanding the incorporation of France into the German *lebensraum* on the ground that a thousand years ago France formed part of Charlemagne's Empire.

Strictly speaking this book is the second volume of the history of Poland; the first awaits completion in more favourable times. Thus the reader finds himself in the middle of an historical process and if he is without knowledge of the earlier stages he will meet some baffling problems. Poland's history is to a large extent a chronicle of clashes with her western and eastern neighbours over territory and her external problems of the 17th century are therefore given proportion by the editors' summaries describing previous happenings. Some of their generalizations demand an analysis which can only be complete when the first volume is published. It is to be regretted that the author of the two chapters on the partitions says that Russia might well incorporate the Poles' old Russian lands instead of calling them *Ruthenian* lands. The use of the former word may make the

reader think that Catherine's assertion as to the "Russian" character of Eastern Poland was something better than pure propaganda.

The Introductory note contains this passage:

The fundamental cause of Polish retrogression was undoubtedly the overwhelming preponderance of the squires in the Polish state. There were other nations in Europe where history had given the acres and the administration to the warrior class. Only in Poland, however, did that class monopolize the wealth, the power and the administration, secular and spiritual, social and political, of the whole countryside.

This conveys an opinion which is true not only of the earlier Poland but to a certain limited extent of the occupied Poland until about 1850. At the same time, however, the passage is apt to leave the impression that the state of things was mainly due to the conscious efforts of the landowning class to maintain its monopoly. Undoubtedly, such efforts were made; but similar behaviour on the part of the same class in England and France failed. Why did it succeed in Poland? Military events are one of the main factors in the distribution of wealth; Poland down to our own time suffered constant wars and invasions and in the 17th century she enjoyed but fifteen years of peace. The invaders left only the productive capacity of the land intact; as grain was almost the only source of income it was natural that the wealth of the country was concentrated in the hands of landowners. And, as usual, political and social power followed the wealth. So it was not so much the overgrown egoism of the landowning class which was the cause of Polish retrogression as the fact that wars on her territory were a sort of permanent institution which stifled every new form of existence. This explains many social phenomena of

the old Polish Republic as well as the economic underdevelopment of the new Poland reshaped by the Treaty of Versailles.

Nearly all histories of Poland written after 1772 try to establish the cause of her downfall. Some see it in the system of elective kings which, after giving Poland such rulers as Stefan Batory or Sobieski, introduced the Saxons who were no better than fifth columnists on the Polish throne. Some see it in the individualistic character of Poles; some in the intellectual and practical pacifism which made Poland reduce her army in the beginning of the 18th century, just when Russia, Prussia and Austria increased theirs. For the English speaking world there may be another approach to Polish history. For centuries Poland was ruled by her parliament; till the end of the 18th century England and Poland were the only two countries so ruled. How to explain the success of the one and the failure of the other? Is geographical situation or the character of the inhabitants a more important factor in shaping the destiny of nations? Here is a field unexplored for philosophical interpretation.

The Cambridge History of Poland is the most extensive and detailed account of Polish life ever published in this country. It maintains the tradition of "Cambridge Histories" in its selection of contributors and their knowledge and impartiality in presenting events. Let us hope that when the editors achieve publication of the first volume it will contain an ample account of early Poland's territorial problems as well as an analysis of her parliamentary system, which will be of special interest to British students of history and of comparative institutions.

TYTUS FILIPOWICZ.

HOUSMAN, 1897-1936, by Grant Richards. *Oxford University Press*. 21s.

What a genial and candid Barabbas Mr. Grant Richards proves to be in this book on his most distinguished author! The relationship between author and publisher is one about which no two debaters can agree, because it varies as subtly as that ordained by the marriage vow.

Housman, seeing that he was a poet, was fortunate in his publisher. Most publishers are interested in a poet only as a prospective novelist. Mr. Richards knew that his man would never exfoliate in that way, and indeed was likely not to blossom again. But this frost-bitten asset, becoming each year more and more a morose don, was tenderly guarded and watered with discreet publicity by Mr. Richards. His faithfulness was unshaken by his financial bankruptcy, and when he started afresh as a publisher, *A Shropshire Lad* marched at the head of his catalogue. It may be argued that this book happened to be a constant seller. I suspect, however, that its career has been urged forward with the utmost skill by its publisher's careful pricing and timing of edition after edition; and all this in spite of the author's affectation of indifference and curmudgeonly meticulousness over commas. It is true that Housman refused to take his royalties. But that must have made him only the more embarrassing a personality to handle.

The legends about Housman's personality were well aired during the few weeks after his death, when the obituaries were long and many. Extracts from them appear toward the end of this book, together with the detractions, the most notable of which was that by Mr. Connolly in *The New Statesman*. Such activi-

ties round about the work and personality of a poet are amusing. We can never ascertain how much effect they have. The hungry generations come, sample the work, accept or reject it. So the process goes on, immeasurable by critics.

But Mr. Richards has collected everything left uncollected by the poet's brother Laurence and by Mr. Gow, in their respective studies. The book is, in the author's own words

not a critical study. It is largely the story of my own business relation and my own friendship with Alfred Housman in the years that followed the first, almost abortive, publication of *A Shropshire Lad*, a friendship that lasted in spite of many trials, until his death.

I should not call that first publication abortive. In 1896 Housman produced the book, at his own expense, through Kegan Paul, in an edition of five hundred. I should rather agree with Sir William Rothenstein, who says that it had "an immediate success." Figures bear this out. Several important journals (Mr. Richards gives details) singled out the poems and hailed a poet of distinction. The whole of this edition was sold out in two years, and the author received his thirty pounds with a profit of £2/5/3. That is astonishing success for a book of verse by a new writer.

It was at this stage that Mr. Richards took over the book and put out a second edition, with another shilling on the price. Of that second edition of five hundred, 115 were sold in the first month! By the end of seven years, 1475 copies had been sold. With this proof of fame, Mr. Richards felt justified in putting his author on a pedestal, and from that time forward he treated him as one of the great. He even published the product of Housman's second personality; Housman the

pedant. After much minute care, with growlings from the scholar, the now famous edition of the Latin poet Manilius appeared, at the author's expense.

Such slender commerce between immortal and publisher was signally celebrated by a banquet. When Mr. Richards' first publishing venture went bankrupt in 1904, he invited the Housman brothers to a meal at the Carlton, and gave them an epicurean feast of hedgehog and snails, with the appropriate wines. Such a gesture, surely, was one of the most notable events in the history of British publishing. It appealed both to Housman's vanity and his fastidious palate. Of the skill and experience of that palate, Mr. Richards never wearies of writing. Of the vanity, he quotes a letter from the poet.

Vanity, not avarice, is my ruling passion; and so long as young men write to me from America saying that they would rather part with their hair than with their copy of my book, I do not feel the need of food and drink.

Nevertheless, he was particular about that food and drink. Together with his Manilius, they occupied his long life at Cambridge, protecting him from the legend which had gathered around his personality, and the fame which had surrounded his one book of poems. It is, to-day, a curious spectacle; the egoist, concerned with his bachelor luxury, damning the printer who misplaced a comma, and finding Cambridge "an asylum, in more senses than one." Perhaps his own irony, in that phrase so characteristic of him, had a second edge which even he did not perceive.

RICHARD CHURCH.

FOLIOS OF NEW WRITING,
Autumn, 1941. *The Hogarth Press.*
7s. 6d.

THE PENGUIN NEW WRITING,
No. 9. 6d.

Here is good provocation to debate. After the Franco-Prussian War, writes Walter Allen, "Flaubert visited Paris and saw the ruins of the Tuileries. 'This would never have happened,' he said, 'if only they had understood *Sentimental Education*.' Of course he was right—" (*Penguin*, page 120). Of the English writers of the thirties "nearly all," John Lehmann remarks, "had foreseen a great catastrophe just ahead of them, and had filled their poetry with warning and exhortation in the hope that it might be avoided" (*Folios*, 7). Other words of Allen, who reminds us that Flaubert disavowed all moral intentions, may come as a rejoinder—"The artists of the thirties . . . wanted to be the men who would change history. It is only now that we have re-discovered that

Art is not life, and cannot be
A midwife to society.

The period of political faith is over; whether we like it or not, 'absolute doubt,' it seems to me, is forced upon us once again." (*Penguin* 124-5). As against this, Rex Warner declares that the vital questions as to the form of the coming socialism "are decided in the long run by the thoughts and desires, conscious and unconscious, of the ordinary man and woman. Now it is here . . . that poets and writers generally are still the 'unacknowledged legislators of the world,' and it may be that at the present time we have more need of them than ever before" (*Folios* 188-9).

We may reverence anyone so detached and singly devoted to his art as Flaubert, yet thank heaven that not all the best writers conform to his inhuman ideal. For a world

in convulsion Flaubert is not enough; we need also poets and writers of burning purpose—religious, moral, social—who want to "change history." In the highest art such purpose will be subdued to the imagination, and may thereby be the more powerful in the world of action; but let us not be such pedants as to scorn the lesser and impure art in which purpose is too naked.

In another respect the great Flaubert is not enough: he "suffered from no idealistic delusions concerning human nature;—the only admirable characters in his novels are the stupid or the very poor" (*Penguin*, 120). Now these are not the only admirable characters in real life, even in a decaying society. A powerful disillusioned writer, whose form of delusion about human nature is that he cannot see the health for the corruption, is sometimes a most needed medicine. But if all writers were to conform, the result would be an overdose, a poison. We need writers who can see the good (as well as the bad, which is easier), and who are courageous enough, after past disillusionments, still to hope and risk being disillusioned again.

The writers of the thirties have been crudely attacked; yet, however great their excuse, there was too much disillusion in their excessive suspicion of the Government at the outbreak of war, and in their over-cautious attitude (see *Folios*, 6). There is too much in *England* (*Autumn*, 1938) by A. S. J. Tessimond, a poet of slight output always welcome for his exquisite sense of phrase (*Penguin*, 114). The partial justice of his summing-up is injustice in the whole. Look for anything to restore the balance, and you will hardly find it, though you will find Henry Green's allusion to "the

perennial hypocrisy in England" (*Folios*, 50).

Generally there is little positive sign of a continuing desire to "change history." There is plenty of social realism, also touched by disillusion, and some more purely imaginative work, neither being of a kind to influence "the thoughts and desires of the ordinary man and woman" towards the decision of vital questions. Rex Warner points to a need which *New Writing* does not here supply.

But there are things to be grateful for. Outstanding prose items are a queerly vivid piece by Dylan Thomas (*Folios*, 19), and perhaps next to it *Twenty Tons of Coal*, an impressive story of tragedy in a coal-mine by B. L. Coombes (*Penguin*, 39). Then there is a generous introduction by William Plomer to a group of New Zealand writers (*Folios*, 55), one of whom, Roderick Finlayson, follows it with a good story. Henry Green pays just tribute to Doughty (*Folios*, 44), but makes a bad slip in his turgid and self-conscious final paragraph. Lawrence did not in fact close the *Seven Pillars* with the phrases referred to. Mr. Green has been looking at the end of *Revolt in the Desert*, that abridgment in which Lawrence confessed that he had "purposely whittled" his book "into nonentity."

Last, there is some good verse, notably by Stephen Spender (but his moving *No Orpheus, No Eurydice* is marred by the bathos of a Bank Holiday image) and by David Gascoyne in *Folios*, and by Charles Brasch, a young New Zealander, in the *Penguin*. But we look for something to take the place of the old "warning and exhortation," for more hope and direction—offered perhaps with more humility—to the ordinary man.

G. ROSTREVOR HAMILTON.

THE LIFE OF SIR WILLIAM OSLER, by Harvey Cushing. Oxford University Press. 21s.

A first reaction on opening this book was to question whether any man is worth 1,400 pages of biography, especially after two years of total war. The query receives at least one sort of answer from the fact that the book has been in steady demand since it was first published in 1925. It has come to be regarded as one of the great medical biographies, and the publishers are to be congratulated on producing this one-volume edition. The dedication is "To Medical Students," and one can imagine no better gift for them.

But if the book were of interest only to medical men there would be no point in reviewing it in these pages. Osler, however, was more than a great doctor and an unusually inspiring teacher; he was a man with a very wide range of interests which brought him innumerable important contacts. Wherever one opens the book there is something to hold the attention, and gradually there is built up the picture of a man whom it would have been a privilege and an education to have known.

Osler was a "son of the manse," born in Canada in 1849. He was a teacher all his working life, at four universities, in three countries—Canada first inviting him to McGill, the United States successively to Philadelphia and Johns Hopkins, and England finally to Oxford as Regius Professor of Medicine. His life covered a period of intense activity in medicine and the allied sciences, and it is fascinating to watch the reactions of an acute and exceptionally informed mind to the historic discoveries of Lister, Pasteur, Koch, Ehrlich and others, as they were made, and sometimes too precipitately announced.

The question of the best type of medical education has been well to

the fore recently, even reaching the correspondence columns of *The Times*. Why should the normal doctor, the general practitioner, have to spend so much of his time as a student clogging his memory with an immense array of mere names, which he will promptly forget so soon as the relevant examination has been safely passed? The problem has been posed recently in the *B.M.J.* in these terms:

How shall the medical education of the future help to develop a breed of doctors better blessed with humanity and judgment, with simultaneous gain rather than loss to their scientific sense?

The words might almost have been written with Osler in mind. He himself embodied these ideals, and he fought for them all his life, to the increasing advantage of both the profession and the general public.

Whilst the years in Canada and the United States have their own special interest, the period at Oxford is naturally closest to English readers. H. A. L. Fisher recalls it in glowing terms:

Though Oxford is proverbially hospitable and generous, she does not easily capitulate to strangers, especially if their claim to distinction rests upon scientific rather than on literary grounds, but Osler left Oxford no choice, and from the first the surrender of the university was absolute and immediate. Of course his great reputation as a physician and medical writer had preceded him, but we immediately discovered that finished competence in his own art and science was but a small part of the man, that the new Regius Professor was the least professional of doctors and the least academic of professors, that he was amazingly devoid of vanity and pedantic inhibitions, that his spirit was free, alert, vivacious, and that there was apparently no end to the span of his interests or to the vivid life-giving energy which he was prepared to throw into any task which fell to him to discharge. Old and young alike acknowledged his mastery and never left his presence without feeling the magnetism of the man and that insatiable, but unobtrusive appetite for helpfulness which made him the prince of friends and benefactors.

Something of this man's magnetism has got into his biography.

H. E. A. CONDON.

CINNAMON AND ANGELICA, A Play, by John Middleton Murry. *Andrews Dakers*. 3s. 6d.

CREATIVE LOVE AND KIN-DRED POEMS, by Herbert Hyam. *Basil Blackwell*. 5s.

GROPING POET, by W. D. Dunckerley. *Basil Blackwell*. 5s.

EIGHT OXFORD POETS, Selected by Michael Meyer and Sidney Keyes. *George Routledge & Sons*. 2s. 6d.

After I had finished reading the four books listed above I wondered whether the reaction in poetry, perhaps overdue, was upon us. True, *Cinnamon and Angelica*, written at the close of the last war, was first published in 1920, but was not the fact that a new edition had been con-

RETRIBUTION

By GERALD ABRAHAM

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sidered timely significant? For this play with its deceptively fanciful names is of the very stuff of poetry. It will come as no surprise to anyone who has read that masterpiece of contemporary criticism, *Keats And Shakespeare*, that the author should be inhabited by those two poets. His diction is quite astonishingly Shakespearian, in sudden passages of breath-taking beauty Keatsian, but without plagiarism for the inspiration springs from deep sources. The plot enables Mr. Murry to reveal not so much a "country of the mind" as a country of the heart and soul and senses. It is as though he were playing on the instruments of the two major poets, but very softly, tenderly, against a background of love, regret, and aspiration.

You speak as though you heard the crack of doom,
The last trump blaring to the awestruck world.

The fable, of a war between the Cloves and the Peppercorns and of love between their rulers, allows of a delicate satire on war and of an incantation to the wonder of love.

Verily, I believe
The world is wayward and the wind, but
you
Are what God meant by woman.

It is difficult to quote from the packed vision of this play, but here is a little jewel of poetic drama of a much purer water than one or two verse plays produced fairly recently at the Westminster. It should be performed as Mr. Murry would like, directly opportunity offers.

Mr. Hyam writes also from faith wanted so long, with "a concord of sweet sound." This man has seen something. He has a uniform vision, or rather an all-embracing vision, pantheistic, of the immanence of God in manifestations of Beauty, so that there is a certain sameness, a monotony through the book. The "kindred" poems may almost be

considered as one poem, it does not much matter where you read. He is in places like a more passionate Gray who has written not an elegy but a pæan to God. He skips rather lightly over the imperfections of our mortal life, transcends them. At times he recalls Wordsworth:

I see thy light break through the ground
In all the lovely flowers of earth;
I see it in the starry sky;
In all the precious life thou brought'st to birth.

A man speaks out from the work of Lieutenant-Commander W. D. Dunkerley, R.N., who was lost on active service in August, 1940, while in command of a submarine. If there is too much sing-song in some of his ballad metres, he is original and can often write vividly:

These will endure when all the woods decay,
When star-toothed Arctic night devours the day.

He is witty in *Sunday Afternoon*, bitter in *Searchlights Over Valetta* and *Rhythm*, effectively lyrical in *Groping Poet* with its slight echo of Ralph Hodgson, romantic in his joy of living. In *Query to Moderns* he asks:

Why to so much abundance do you bring
Uncouth cheap forms which only complicate?

While Mr. Sidney Keyes in a brief Foreword to *Eight Oxford Poets* says that "we are all, with the possible exception of Shaw, *Romantic* writers" and "that we have, on the whole, little sympathy with the Audenian school of poets," I found, nevertheless, in the techniques of Mr. Roy Porter and Mr. Drummond Allison the influence of that school. There is in general in the work of these young men horror at the present situation, preoccupation with death, anxiety, a sense of frustration. They seem already "weary of heavy thinking." Among individual poems I liked especially *A Sea Change* by Gordon Swaine and

Leporello by John Heath-Stubbs. By far the most exciting poet is Mr. Sidney Keyes himself whose poems invariably sing, while most of the others seem baulked or constricted. In the richness and flexibility of his blank verse, in original phrase and striking metaphor, he soars free within the compass of a poet's love of the world.

Why should we wish to hide within the present
Hanging above infinity and waiting
For pain to move, a rabbit in the grass?
Unfocus rather the too-watchful eye
And wander singing in the golden haze
Behind the flock, and take with them
your pleasure
At random from each leaf or twig.
One awaits his development.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

THE CHURCH LOOKS AHEAD:
A Series of Broadcasts, edited by
E. L. Mascall. *Faber and Faber.*
3s. 6d.

THE DISCIPLE, by T. R. Glover.
Cambridge University Press.
2s. 6d.

THE GOSPEL FOR TOMORROW,
by the Bishop of Truro. *Penguin Books.* 6d.

Last of all in the series of religious broadcasts which were delivered last winter came Mr. T. S. Eliot. In a real sense he had set their tone and scope in his *Idea of a Christian Society*, for each broadcast might have been designed, as perhaps it was, as a comment on that very influential book; and in the end he came to the microphone to set the coping stone on the comments of his predecessors. He spoke on the theme of "Towards a Christian Britain." He gathered up the sum of what his colleagues, Dr. J. H. Oldham, Mr. Maurice Reckitt, Mr. Philip Mairet, Miss Dorothy L. Sayers, Father D'Arcy, and Mr. Demant had previously urged, and he set it all in a mould of imaginative force. His very title had that

FROM a bank
clerk's stool



TO the deck of
a destroyer



The tang of the sea instead of
the fogs of the city . . . He's one of
the people who may no longer need

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quality, and it was a needed quality, for all the others were necessarily much concerned with diagnosis and analysis. In this task they all went deep to the roots of the modern situation; and they made quite clear what hardly anyone now denies, that no Church can hope to redeem society, and to work for a Christian Britain which does not have its being far more in public and political places than has been customary for many years past.

But, of course, it cannot do anything at all in any sort of sphere unless it is all the time making fresh Christians of a high quality: the essential prerequisite of Christian policy is a sufficient supply of convinced Christians, and of course while Christian economics can do much to remove unnecessary stumbling blocks set before the Faith, in the end every soul has to come into the Kingdom one at a time, and loyalty to Christ is a personal choice as well as a communal life. This is why Dr. Glover's book is so excellent a companion to the broadcasts. He is concerned with the quality of individual discipleship, and he considers what it must be by listing the various New Testament titles of a Christian, and explaining them: Slave and Freeman, Soldier and King, Comrade and Singer, Ambassador and Thinker. Wise directors of souls often tell their penitents to use such titles as a vehicle of self-examination, and those who obey find it a searching test. Dr. Glover explains exactly what the New Testament means by each of these titles, and he does it in his own quite inimitable style.

Thus his book too has the essential quality of imaginative force, without which there can be no evangelism, for what phenomenon anywhere exists which has an imaginative force comparable with that of the perfectly dedicated soul?

The Man in the Street may probably not read either of the two books listed above, but he is likely to read the Bishop of Truro's Penguin just because it is a Penguin. That is one reason why it is specially urgent that only the very best Christian writing should be put into the Penguin series. Alas, it certainly isn't: with one exception, the religious Penguins have been distinctly second rate, and the Bishop of Truro's book is not, I'm afraid, the exception. "The Gospel for Tomorrow is the Gospel of Reasonableness." That quotation sets the key, and the colour of the whole is the grey of that rather arid intellectualism which in effect is always trying to devalue the essential mystery of Christianity, and attacking what it is pleased to call tendencies to superstition, mostly connected with the Eucharist, on every other page. The trouble about this "Gospel for Tomorrow" is that it is impossible to believe that any pagan would be seriously attracted, much less converted by it, so utterly does it lack colour and imaginative force. In the whole enterprise of making a Christian Britain, the Penguins can play a very big part, but they cannot do it until Christians have learned to write to that length and in that rather specialized way, and we have not learned it yet.

ROGER LLOYD.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

FEBRUARY, 1942

THE WAR AND THE YOUNG OFFENDER

BY JOHN A. F. WATSON

IF there is one guiding principle for magistrates and others who are concerned with delinquent children, it is this: that far more important than a child's offence are the conditions which give rise to it.

Two boys—let us call them Tom and Peter—are found guilty of stealing from the ruins of a bombed warehouse: a common enough offence at the present time. They are much the same to look at. They live in the same district. They are both fourteen. Neither boy has ever been in trouble before. Yet not infrequently the enquiries made by the juvenile court reveal an amazing contrast in their social and moral background.

Tom's home is in a slum court and consists of three rooms up a dark and evil-smelling staircase. There he lives with his parents, an elder sister of sixteen, and three small brothers under conditions of nauseating squalor. His father is a shiftless drunken creature who is rarely in work, but frequently in prison. During the intervals between one sentence and the next he spends most of his time and all the money he can lay hands on at the local pub. Minnie, the eldest girl, earns a large part of the family income in a munition factory. Their mother, an unkempt and slatternly woman, "minds" the home, the comfort and cleanliness of which she has long since ceased to care about. Tom himself is a van boy—his third job since leaving school last Easter. In the evenings, as he is not wanted indoors and belongs to no club, you will find him in the street. At night he sleeps on the kitchen sofa under a pile of old coats.

Now meet Peter. An only child, he comes from an excellent home. His father, a postman of many years' standing, has apprenticed him to a printer, and both he and his wife are horrified that their son should steal. For some time they have been worried about the kind of friends Peter has been making, especially since the evening institute was bombed and shut. They have already punished him severely and beg the court to give him another chance.

CLL

Could anything be more futile than to deal with these two boys in the same way—just because it happens that both have committed the same offence? For Peter, who is thoroughly ashamed of himself, a few plain words will meet the case, brought home to him perhaps by some minor penalty such as the payment of a few shillings out of his pocket money by way of “costs.” But for Tom, who confronts the court with an air of defiance and whose mother is voluble in her excuses on his behalf, more drastic treatment is called for. The court decides to transfer him from his present surroundings to lodgings or to a hostel, if not to an approved school, where they may yet succeed in making him a decent citizen. We are no longer content to “let the punishment fit the crime.” We are concerned with something vastly more important—to make the treatment fit the criminal.

Proof of the overwhelming influence of a child's surroundings upon his behaviour—if indeed proof were needed—is to be found in the juvenile courts at the present time. For under the abnormal conditions resulting from the war there has been a serious increase in juvenile crime, which is said to have risen by 30 per cent. as compared with the pre-war period. This deplorable happening is not due to any fundamental difference in the children themselves. Boys and girls in war-time are intrinsically no more wicked than in time of peace. It is simply that a variety of unusual factors, both social and psychological, are affecting their outlook and influencing their conduct: the disruption of homes by evacuation; the interference with such normal family life as remains by air raids; lack of parental control due to the absence of fathers on active service; the breakdown of the educational system; the excessive wages being paid to boys and girls in their 'teens; the closing of clubs and evening institutes; last, but not least, the very atmosphere of war itself, which stimulates that spirit of mischief which is inherent in young people.

Consider, first, the results of evacuation. Designed to spare our children the horrors of total warfare it was unquestionably justified, and by its means thousands of boys and girls have been saved from death or mutilation. But let no one think that this has been accomplished without an appalling list of casualties of another kind. I refer to the *mental* and *moral* casualties, from the effects of which the country will suffer for at least a generation. Some people hoped that this great exodus of Youth would herald a social revolution of considerable magnitude. In fact, it has resulted in considerable

chaos. But even if the responsible authorities had performed their duties so efficiently that the whole scheme had gone through without a hitch, there remains one fundamental difficulty which the most efficient organization would have been at pains to overcome. For to children there is one thing even more important than fresh air, or warm beds, or nourishing food. That is the peace of mind born of family life in a happy home.

Appearances are so often deceptive where children are concerned. Too frequently the child who seems happy enough in the foster-home, if at times a trifle home-sick, is in fact suffering an emotional strain which may have all kinds of serious consequences. It is not merely that he is concerned for his parents' safety—which is natural enough since he knows that they are still living in a place considered too dangerous for him. It is that so many evacuated children develop a deep-seated anxiety as to whether their parents, who agreed to their exile, still love them and want them back. Need I dwell on the close relationship between a child's happiness and his behaviour? Nowhere is this more strongly emphasized than in the juvenile court, where the vast majority of young offenders are found to come from broken and disrupted homes. Evacuation has broken up thousands of happily adjusted families and is thus the indirect cause of much delinquency.

Now consider the combined effect upon so many children of the emotional upheaval caused by evacuation, with the educational breakdown which followed in its wake. It is true that most of these who went to the country had some form of teaching, although generally on a half-time basis. But of those who stayed behind, or trickled back from the reception areas, many received no schooling at all. Then at the age of 14 they found that jobs were theirs for the asking, mostly in blind-alley occupations and all of them overpaid. Could anything be more demoralizing?

Albert, for example, was evacuated at the beginning of the war. He came from a decent working-class home in South East London, and although his father was dead he had a grown-up brother who kept him well in hand. His brother joined the R.A.F., his small sister was evacuated somewhere else with her school, his mother got a job on munitions. Thus the home was completely disrupted. Albert was unhappy in the country and behaved very badly. When on his fourteenth birthday in March, 1940, he returned to London, everyone was thankful to see the last of him.

He secured his first job without difficulty—as errand boy in a bootshop. He kept it exactly a fortnight. And when he appeared in the juvenile court in January, 1941, pleading guilty to the theft of a bicycle from a bombed garage, the court was supplied with a record of his employment:—

- (1) *Bootshop*: 2 weeks. Quarrelled with the other boy and walked out.
- (2) *Electric Light Co.*: 5 weeks. Left, because he tried to tell the manager what hours he intended to work. Also there was trouble over a shilling he was supposed to have been paid by a customer.
- (3) *Engineers*: 5½ weeks. Dismissed, because he was saucy and would not pay attention to his work.
- (4) *Grocers*: 2 weeks. Dismissed, because of doubt about his honesty.
- (5) *Cleaners*: 1 day. Left, because the cycle was too heavy.
- (6) *Tin Factory*: 3 weeks. Left, because he wanted more money.
- (7) *Laundry*: 5 weeks. Dismissed, because he was found to be unsuitable and played truant on Saturdays.
- (8) *Rag Merchants*: 2 weeks. Dismissed, because he was caught taking away some goods.
- (9) *Leather-shop*: 1 week. Left, because he did not like it.
- (10) *Furnishers*: 2 days. Left, because he did not like it.

It will be seen that during a period of approximately 39 weeks he was in employment for only 26. For a third of the time he was out of work and doing nothing. Yet Albert is not wholly a bad boy. On the contrary, he has much good in him. What he needs—and is now receiving in an approved school—are the discipline and training which, due to circumstances almost entirely arising from the war, were denied to him at a highly impressionable stage of his development.

Apart from the ease with which boys can find jobs in war-time, there is an additional evil in the excessive wages which they are paid as a result of the shortage of juvenile labour—especially in the contracting industry. To-day, boys in their early 'teens are often able to make £3, £4 or even £5 a week—in many cases more than their own fathers, now serving with the armed forces, have ever made in their lives. Indeed, a few months ago, I had to deal in my court with a boy of 14 who was receiving—I will not say earning—the preposterous wage of £6 5s. 0d. a week for fixing slates on shattered roofs.

It is not unnatural that boys who are apprenticed at a few shillings a week should throw up their training in favour of jobs where they can count the contents of their pay packets in pounds. It is happening every day, for the temptation is so great as to be almost irresistible. What is wrong is that the employers of labour—and behind them the biggest employer

of all, the State—should put such temptation in their way. What, one wonders, are the feelings of their fathers and their brothers who are fighting for their country, when they see these striplings gaining so huge a reward for so insignificant an effort? And of what value to an industrial nation will be a generation of unskilled labourers—unskilled because of this wholesale breaking of apprenticeships in favour of blind-alley occupations? On a boy's character the effect is disastrous. Few of them have anything to show for the wages they receive; for the most part they are squandered on gambling and on drink, in the cinema and the fun-fair, or lavished on girls of the most undesirable type. So high do they pitch their standard of living that when they lose their jobs—as frequently they do—they refuse every offer of employment which is less well-paid. In the meantime they steal.

This menace to the nation's youth is all the graver, coming as it does at a time when so many clubs and centres for young people have closed their doors. Some have been closed for lack of leaders; others have been closed because their premises have been requisitioned by some "competent" but singularly unimaginative authority; still others have been demolished by bombs. Thus in many districts, at a time when there is a vital need for some means of healthy recreation for young people in their spare time, no such counter-attraction exists. The recent provision for the compulsory registration of children aged from 16 to 18, in order to ensure that they are employing their spare time to the best advantage, is a step in the right direction. So is the agreement said to have been reached for the payment of youths in the building trade on a wage-for-age scale. But both are over-due and neither goes far enough. It is just as important, if not *more* important, to supervise the recreation of children at the impressionable age of 14 and 15 as of those who are older; and until some form of wage-control is applied in *all* industries where young people are employed—at least until normal conditions return—the harm will continue and the statistics of juvenile crime will go on rising.

So far I have written of boys. Alas, it is to be feared that girls too are finding their way into the juvenile courts in increasing numbers—although less commonly on a criminal charge than on the ground that they are beyond their parents' control, or "in need of care or protection" because they are in moral danger. Here again the blame lies less with the girls themselves, than with the unnatural social conditions which

are so deplorable a by-product of modern warfare. The adolescent girl is notoriously passing through a difficult phase. Sex plays a far more self-conscious part in her mental make-up than in that of the average boy. The general atmosphere of unrest, the laxity of parental control, and a superabundance of young soldiers of romantic disposition conspire with the black-out and the communal life of the air-raid shelter to put temptations in her way. What easier to-day than for Mary "in one of her moods," smarting perhaps under some parental rebuke, to assert her independence by running away from home?

The procession of such girls through the juvenile court is one of the saddest features of the war. Most of them come from respectable families and have never previously been in trouble. Yet they are frequently brought before the court after being missing not merely for days, but for weeks. Jobs can be had for the asking. So can boy friends with money to burn. There is always the public air-raid shelter—if nowhere better—in which to sleep. When found they are sometimes pregnant, and nearly all are infected with venereal disease. Weak and stupid as they are, thoughtless of all the misery they cause to their parents, yet one could scarcely describe them as wicked. For the most part they are just the pathetic victims of adverse circumstances. *Les enfants sont ce qu'on les fait.*

* * * * *

It is surely obvious that the treatment of these young people by the juvenile court *must* be constructive. It is not enough that it shall be merely punitive. And although deterrence may be an important factor in punishment, no order by the magistrates should contain any element of retribution—which is merely a polite word for revenge. Indeed their attitude should be that of wise parents, who punish their child in order to prevent a repetition of his offence—not "to get back on him" for the consequences of his misbehaviour. Magistrates are not appointed to enable Society to get back on the offender.

Of the total number of children who appear each year before the juvenile courts of England and Wales, roughly half are dealt with by being placed on probation. That is to say they are sent home, or required to live for a time in lodgings or a hostel, under the supervision of a probation officer attached to the court. Probation officers are in no way connected with the police. They are highly trained social workers and the servants of the court. It is customary for women officers to

deal with girls and all boys under 14, and for male officers to supervise the older boys. They are remarkable people, these probation officers, of whose work it is impossible to speak too highly. Especially in war-time, when the problems they have to solve are vastly more complex than in time of peace, theirs is a vocation which calls for all that is best in men and women.

In these days of excessive wages the fine has become a more effective instrument in the correction of the young offender than in the past. Moreover, the payment of costs or damages to the prosecutor, introducing the salutary principle of restitution, may be ordered in addition to a probation order or to some other form of treatment.

But what, it may be asked, is the remedy when these methods have failed? What is to be done with the child or young person who has been fined and placed on probation—perhaps been made to live in lodgings or in a hostel—and who still offends? The answer is that in such circumstances the court should have no hesitation whatever in ordering long-term treatment—in the case of a child under 10 by committing him to the local authority, which may assume responsibility for his maintenance with foster-parents until he is 18; in the case of a boy or girl who is older, by committal to an approved school.

Approved schools are the lineal descendants of the old industrial schools and reformatories. Although subject to inspection by the Home Office, they are owned and managed by local authorities or voluntary organizations. They are graded according to various age-groups and the schools for the older children are equipped for technical instruction in various trades. To the casual visitor an approved school much resembles an ordinary boarding school, but there is the important difference that the approved-school child remains there all the year round except for a fortnight's holiday in the summer. The length of his detention does not rest with the court. Subject to a certain maximum period, calculated according to his age on admission, the date of his release depends upon his own industry and conduct. Thus the school managers, on the advice of their headmaster or headmistress, have power to release him at any time after the expiration of twelve months.

Generally speaking these schools do excellent work and, having regard to the material they have to deal with, the proportion of their successes is remarkable. It is therefore all the more to be regretted that at the present time, when our troubles are so serious, the capacity of the schools should be insufficient to meet the demand. At the end of 1941, according

to a statement made in Parliament, there were no less than 1300 children, already committed, awaiting vacancies in remand homes up and down the country. This is deplorable. It is to be hoped that the Home Office will do everything in its power to expedite the opening of new schools; for remand homes, which are designed for temporary detention only, are quite unsuitable for long-term treatment.

There are three other methods of treatment to which I must refer briefly. The first is imprisonment, which, though never ordered in the case of offenders so young as 14, is still a legal punishment for children as soon as they have reached that age. Prison is in every sense a hopeless place for boys and girls. The provisions of the Criminal Justice Bill, which sought virtually to abolish imprisonment for offenders under 21 and was unfortunately dropped at the outbreak of war, are long overdue.

The second is Borstal. In no sense a prison, it is a system of re-education and training for more depraved offenders between 16 and 23. As however the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts ceases at the seventeenth birthday, the proportion of cases recommended by such courts for Borstal treatment is relatively small.

Lastly I come to the birch, the use of which as a means of treatment has been abandoned by all the more progressive and enlightened courts. I have no intention of entering here upon a discussion of so controversial a subject except to say this: that the decision of the Departmental Committee on Corporal Punishment was based, not on sentimentality, but on common sense. After hearing the whole of the evidence the Committee came to the unanimous conclusion that the *judicial* whipping of children, both as a reformatory factor and as a deterrent, had been proved to be ineffective and should therefore be abolished.

In these dark days when the youth of England is so beset with temptations, the responsibility of the juvenile court is indeed heavy. Thus I would end where I began, by repeating that the infliction of mere punishment according to the nature of the offence is not enough. The vital thing is the child's welfare. The task of the court is to find a remedy for his troubles.

(Mr. Watson is Chairman of a London Juvenile Court.)

AUSTRALIA'S POLITICAL TREND

BY ERIC BAUME

JOHN Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, to-day is the pivot on which Australian contemporary politics is balanced. The one-time secretary of the Victorian Timber Workers' Union, far from being hamstrung by a bare majority in the Australian House of Representatives, has more power, by public support and acclaim, than the Menzies administration, the Fadden "rump" or, for that matter, the Nationalist (now United Australia Party) Country Party coalition when the Rt. Hon. S. M. Bruce, P.C., M.C., C.H., and Sir Earle Page, G.C.M.G. (both to-day in London) were in office before that defeat in 1928 which brought Messrs. Scullin and E. G. Theodore into power with a previous Labour Government.

It is no over-statement to claim that Mr. Curtin in the past month has become the most significant public figure in the British Pacific. To assess the augmenting of his political stature as well as the growing public expressions of Australian sentiment in this war it is necessary to review shortly the events since 1939 which have led to what is, in the opinion of many observers, Mr. Curtin's decision to demand the implementing of the Statute of Westminster.

Until his now almost sensationally regarded speech of December, the Statute had been something symbolic of the Imperial spirit, of the English (as apart from the Empire) delight in a banner hanging above a stall; but it had never been implemented, prosaically, realistically. The Dominions Office had no need to tempt Providence. With High Commissioners' cars, beflagged, outside Downing Street offices, direct demands—or suggestions—came only through secret if conventional channels. No untoward remark in public, no embarrassing suggestion in the press until *after* a decision, was ever anticipated by Whitehall. No Prime Minister—not even the Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser or his predecessor the late Rt. Hon. Michael Joseph Savage, though their Finance Minister had been embarrassed by the City of London in pre-war days—would have ignored formal channels of Dominions representation.

But the Rt. Hon. John Curtin, skilled in harsh industrial disputes, decided on other, less traditional methods. By his recent action I for one am convinced he has forced, for the better, changes of British war plans as well as of British strategy and conception affecting what, for simplicity's sake, may be called the "Outer Empire." Added significance is given his decision by the wording of the Indian Congress message to Britain of January 4th. His policy of a direct and uncompromising "crisis approach" direct to the British Prime Minister will alter the concept of the Statute of Westminster as surely as the idealistic Atlantic Charter will one day become a rationalized document, retaining its beauty but adding to itself the means of physical accomplishment as well as virtuous expression.

Mr. Curtin's bluntness is a key to the internal politics of Australia. The Commonwealth is a country keenly, vehemently political in its Federal sphere at Canberra and its State legislative systems in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, West Australia and Tasmania. The almost gruff realism of Australian Labour, more vocal in foreign affairs than the equally forceful internal policy of New Zealand Labour, I believe will have an effect on the post-war Empire—the British Commonwealth of Nations—which official England so far cannot, perhaps will not understand.

That is why Mr. Curtin's recent speeches should be reviewed dispassionately. There has been too much "professional" political propaganda about them, both in Britain and in Australia. Asperity expressed must have been welcomed *mit grossem vergneugen* by Dr. Dietrich's Press-Bureau in Berlin. Even Mr. Menzies' effusion about Australian "loyalty" was in my opinion as gratuitously unnecessary as Sir Keith Murdoch's plea to Australians to "Trust Britain." Neither, fundamentally, was needed. Party politics must not be considered if Mr. Curtin's speeches are to be dissected for the Empire's sake—though to his political opponents in Australia and in Britain they have produced a violent political urticaria.

Before discussing Mr. Curtin's speeches and their implications, I am indebted to a London staff colleague, Mr. Charles Henry Bateson, formerly Principal Information Officer with the Australian Government, for a vivid pen-picture of the Prime Minister himself—a picture which will establish his character and enable people in Britain to assess from that character the importance or otherwise of his actions. Mr. Bateson writes:

Doubtless many people have pictured 'Jack' Curtin, since his recent pronouncement, as a big, broad-shouldered, truculent individual, loud-voiced and aggressive. Nothing could be further from the truth. Although his well-knit figure still bears the unmistakable traces of the former athlete, Curtin is slight, bespectacled, rather stooped, and his voice is quiet and subdued. At first glance you might pass him by as a nonentity, mentally classifying him as a retiring scholar or an undistinguished minor official. It is only later that you become aware of a curiously latent dynamic quality within him. It is impossible to appreciate Curtin's position in Australian politics, and now his position in Empire politics, without knowing and understanding the man himself; for Curtin's influence upon Australia and Australian politics, if less spectacular, has been as great as the influence of Churchill upon the British Empire, or Roosevelt upon the Americas. Until the tempering test of war revealed his peculiar gifts, Curtin had had a mediocre career. He was born in Victoria in 1885, and, educated at State schools, did not go to University. He was 26 when he became secretary of a timber workers' union, and 32 when he was appointed editor of a labour weekly in Western Australia. He retained that position until his entry into Federal politics in 1928, but was defeated at the general elections three years later. In 1934 he re-entered the Federal House of Representatives, and the following year succeeded the former Prime Minister, 'Jim' Scullin, as leader of the Australian Labour Party. Only by a narrow majority did he retain his seat at the latest general elections in September, 1940. He has always been recognized as a competent labour journalist, with a flair for news. He has written numerous booklets and pamphlets expounding Labour's principles and policy.

When war broke out there were many critics, particularly in the Labour movement, who contended that Curtin was an unsuitable and unsatisfactory wartime Labour leader. His qualities of sincerity, fearlessness and genuine kindness were admitted, and it was recognized that, on occasions, he was a powerful orator, one of the few outstanding speakers on either side of the Federal House. But the majority of Labour politicians and Labour supporters regarded this modest, rather shy man as being too weak and insufficiently aggressive, too interested in social reforms and social services, to lead the Labour Party successfully through the strains and stresses of war. He was, frankly and unashamedly a moderate, whereas a large section of the Labour movement was, just as frankly, more extreme. This militant industrial section, critical of Britain's political leadership under Baldwin and Chamberlain, had its headquarters in New South Wales, where Labour has always been more extremist in outlook than elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Perhaps that criticism was justified by events.

It is essential, for a proper appreciation of Curtin's qualities, and for a just assessment of subsequent events, that these facts should be noted. On the outbreak of war the Labour Party was opposed to the despatch of Australian troops abroad, at least until her home defences, particularly her air strength, had been built up to a stage at which she could regard herself as impregnable to invasion—prophetic view indeed. A considerable section of the movement, though here opinion was less unanimous, was sternly opposed to close and intimate

co-operation with the existing Government, and maintained that Labour could best serve the National interest by fulfilling the rôle of a critical opposition. Events, particularly Dunkirk and the fall of France, forced upon the Labour Party changes of major policy. Ultimately it withdrew its opposition to Australian volunteer forces serving abroad.

It was unquestionably Curtin's patience and quiet tact which enabled the Labour Party, without any loss of prestige and without any split within its own ranks, to weather these days of critical change. He ruled the caucus, the final arbiter in Labour politics, without seeming to rule it. A more violent, a more aggressive leader would have failed Curtin succeeded because all knew that he was sincere and honest, a man whose whole life had been devoted to the furtherance of Labour's aims and whose very soul was wrapped up in the Labour movement. He was trusted and respected, and it was this trust and respect, coupled with his sound political judgment and unflinching tact, which enabled him to induce his party to co-operate closely with the Government in its war measures through the War Advisory Council, while rejecting overtures for a National Government and remaining a still critical Opposition. But the measure of his achievement was not then recognized generally. The public regarded his leadership as weak and vacillating. This feeling was revealed significantly when he was almost defeated for the seat which he had held for seven years.

The Australian general elections multiplied Curtin's difficulties. Labour's forces, both in the House and in the Senate, were substantially increased, and many of the new members belonged to the militant New South Wales group. After each general election, the Labour Party's office-holders are elected by the caucus, and on the eve of its pre-session meeting there was talk of open revolt among many of its members, who demanded openly a new leader. But Curtin was elected to the leadership without opposition, and his supporters received the other executive posts. That he was still leader, not merely in name, but in actual fact, he showed again later, when at a long and stormy caucus meeting the militants demanded that the Labour Party should challenge the Government on the floor of the House and, with the support of certain independents, seize office. Curtin strenuously opposed that move. He carried the caucus with him, as he did again when the extremists essayed a second trial of strength. It was not that Curtin shirked the responsibilities of the Prime Ministership. He did not regard his party as being less fitted to govern than the coalition of the United Australia and Country Parties. But he did not deem the time ripe politically for Labour to seek office.

Where lies the quiet, determined strength of this man who has ruled Labour so ably during these months of storms and stresses and who to-day speaks to the Empire and the world fearlessly and bluntly? Perhaps the best answer is to be found in the experience of two American journalists, Messrs. Waymack and Binder, who visited Australia early last year. They talked with all Australia's political leaders and, in crisp, American style, put each through a rigorous cross-examination. Curtin they did not meet in person, since he was in West Australia at the time. But a special line was cleared so that they might interview him over the telephone. In rapid succession they asked him question after question, dealing with every conceiv-

able subject connected with Australia, her resources, her economic conditions, her industries, her policy in relation to the war; and, leaping nimbly from one subject to another, Curtin replied to each question informatively and intelligently. When the two Americans were leaving for home, they declared that no Australian had impressed them so favourably or had helped them so materially as Curtin, the one man they had not met in person.

Curtin is blunt, plain-speaking, essentially a realist; a man of infinite patience, keen political judgment, skilful and tactful in the handling of men; a man not brilliant, not scholarly, but well read and well informed, kindly and with a genuine sympathy for the "have-not." He lacks the magnetism and the breadth of vision of a Churchill or a Roosevelt. But he is sincere, honest, a hard, conscientious worker. And he is a journalist who knows unerringly how to arrest the attention of his listeners or his readers.

Thus concludes Mr. Bateson.

After Mr. Curtin's first speech, in which he intimated that Australia would deal direct with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Curtin was accused immediately of wishing to cut the painter between Australia and Britain. This, of course, was ludicrously untrue. There was little mention in England of two attacks upon Australia's methods and conduct of the war by *The Economist*, which were worded in such a way as to irritate not only the Prime Minister but many other Australians. These attacks may have been justifiable from *The Economist's* point of view, but the tone of them demanded a sharp answer from Australia, irrespective of politics. This answer was given. When Mr. Curtin said that Australia looked to America in the Pacific, he was anticipating by a week or so the Allied declaration arrived at by Messrs. Churchill and Roosevelt, as well as the other Allies fighting the Axis. He was not asserting that Australia should sever traditional ties with Britain. Nothing could have been further from his mind, or the mind of the Australian Labour Party, as a Government, or the minds of the Australian people.

What is not realized in England is that for many years there has been in Australia a strong society known as Anglo-American Co-operation, which has worked indefatigably to produce better relations and closer co-operation between the two Pacific countries. This is no different, nor has it been in concept, from organizations in this country, one notable being that of Professor George Catlin for Anglo-Saxon Fellowship. Neither group could be accused of having been organizations comparable with those instituted by the Nazis in Danzig, or in the Sudetenland. Australia is British; Mr. Curtin says:

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"More Empire-minded than the British War Cabinet." So it will remain.

A fiery reaction in certain quarters in Britain was fanned by well-meaning Australians. The *Daily Sketch* was the first to spring to the attack, and within a day Sir Keith Murdoch, a prominent Australian Newspaper proprietor, here on business, published in the *Daily Mail* an article appealing to Australia to "trust Britain." The fact that Australia did trust Britain and had trusted Britain for almost 160 years was not taken into account. The *Sydney Morning Herald* also attacked the Prime Minister for his choice of words, and within 48 hours the controversy had become, from the Australian point of view, parochially political, though many of the opposition supported Mr. Curtin. The moment it reached that stage it was obvious to observers who understood Australian politics that the Prime Minister's further statement of Australia's loyalty was made lest relations between Britain and Australia should deteriorate because of earnest, sincere, but at this particular stage rather thoughtless polemicists.

What Mr. Curtin had done, apart from the words complained of, was simple. As Prime Minister of a great Pacific country he felt himself entitled to express the opinion of his Ministers and of himself that the war in the Pacific was not a subsidiary portion of the war in the West. There may be in Britain considerable sections of opinion who would oppose this view, who would most sincerely say that should Britain go under, the Empire had gone. That view would find respect among Australians but it would not silence their expressions.

The later reverses in Malaya, leaving out of the question the primary blows to American possessions, continued to strengthen Mr. Curtin's hand and his viewpoint. Leading Australian newspapers backed him up more vehemently than he had expressed himself. The *Sydney Daily Telegraph*, the *Sydney Daily Mirror*, the *Sydney Sun*, the *Melbourne Herald* (Sir Keith Murdoch's own paper), the *Melbourne Argus*, all vehicles of balanced opinion, were unanimous in demanding that Australia's voice be heard more in the conduct of the war, which was even at that time only a few hundred miles from her shores, for Koepang, 550 miles across the Timor Sea, is the beginning of the Dutch East Indies, and if they fall the Australian continent is open for invasion by land, by air, by sea. Hence the Dutch-Australian occupation of Timor.

It was not Mr. Curtin who complained in so many words of delays and traditionalism in both the Foreign Office and the

Dominions Office, though he implied it. It was the Australian newspapers who claimed, rightly in the opinion of many Australians, that the views of Australia had often been neglected by the Dominions Office system, because no High Commissioner had either the status or the right to force an issue. It may be said with equal justification that the High Commissioners have powers, under instruction from their Governments, and that the Dominions Office system had worked well and adequately for many years.

I think one should consider the abnormality of the times rather than the routine. War had come to the Pacific. Australia, eager to help, felt and expressed itself through its Prime Minister that there had been bungling incompetency and inefficiency, in the East as well as in the West. Australia was prepared to accept responsibility, and to take blame, provided she had the right to join in making vital decisions. Surely then the words of her Prime Minister were to be taken, not from the viewpoint that he may have used, as one critic said, an unhappy phrase, but that his mission was to speed up co-ordination of the Pacific defences even though that speeding-up had to be achieved by unconventional means.

To carping critics who continue to suggest that Mr. Curtin as a "secessionist," the answer is clear. There is no "Secession from Britain" movement in Australia, nor has there ever been one. The vapourings of an infinitesimal number of cranks, of whom there are similar types in, say, the Scottish National movement, cannot be regarded in any way as the voice of the Nation. How could Australia secede from itself? Yet that is what would be the position should she break from the British Empire. The Empire to-day is no single unit. England realizes the truth of that statement, judging from the conversations I have had here during the past two and a half years.

Another criticism of Mr. Curtin has been that he leads a violently Red party, revolutionary, irreconcilable. One cannot describe thus the Australian Labour Party. In the worst days of the J. T. Lang régime in New South Wales, when Captain de Groot cut the ribbon of the Sydney Harbour Bridge, having trotted uninvited with a Cavalry Guard of Honour; when Captain Eric Campbell formed the neo-Fascist New Guard; when Lang himself and his vivid Government was preparing such an assault on private enterprise as no British country has ever imagined, there was no question about Australia's loyalty to the Crown, with which she was, as she is,

one and indivisible. She has ever the spirit and the tradition of her forefathers. It is to be remembered that she, above all other countries of the Empire, has the highest proportion of British stock since the days of the First Fleet in 1788.

The trend in Australian Labour politics has never moved towards separatism. In a world in which sensations and the man-biting-dog news item had so much effect on the public since the end of the last war, it was only to be expected that movements such as West Australian Secession, which planned to break away from the Commonwealth, should have had undue prominence. That was a political squib. Perhaps it had some slight justification for having flared, because even Loan Councils can appear unjust at times.

The Australian Labour Party, in control in Australia to-day, should be remembered in Britain as the first to refuse Communists the right of membership when they were attempting to sabotage, generally, industrial effort. The Labour Party knew them for what they were, without reference to the Soviets. They were the descendants of the I.W.W. and the "Red Feds" of New Zealand. As such they were pledged to a policy of anarchy and destruction, which the Labour Party in earlier days smashed. The Party Mr. Curtin controls to-day, as well as the Labour Governments in Queensland, New South Wales and Tasmania, is not as Left Wing as most sections of the rank and file of British Parliamentary Labour. Australia's Labour problems have been concerned mainly with social legislation, with industrial unionism, and with the maintenance, linked closely with fiscal policy, of a high standard of living which has become part and parcel of the Australian scheme and bids fair to become one of the models for all the world when this war ends.

The varied avocations of members of State Governments, as well as of the Federal Government, again show the sound basis of personnel, separated entirely from visionaries and revolutionaries, on which the Australian Labour Party stands. For example, the Premier of New South Wales, Mr. W. J. McKell, now a lawyer, was once a boilermaker. In a recent speech (November) he said he regarded the press and its freedom as one of the most democratic of institutions. From that statement it should not be difficult to realize in England that the frank expressions about Australia's position in the Pacific, made after Mr. Curtin's speech, are in line with the forthright attitude of Australian newspapers, far less conciliatory than here. The Federal Treasurer, Mr. J. B. Chifley, who gave his

war-time Budget in November, was a worker on the New South Wales railway. The Minister for Customs, Senator Keane, was General Secretary of the Australian Railways Union when he entered the Senate in 1938.

Prominent in the newspaper columns of Australia last month were such items as expressions of opinion by Labour politicians that wartime promises to service men should be made legal and binding; that employment guarantee to returned service men by their former employers must be permanent, and that full allowances of adequate size should be continued to wives and children of those who lost their lives and will lose their lives during the war. The *Sydney Daily Mirror* recently (in a Trades Unionist country!) praised General Blamey for his frank statement that the comparison between the pay of soldiers and munitions workers was an outrage and was "war on the cheap." This newspaper, apparently with the support of the Government on the point, said: "A tax ear-marked for soldiers' higher pay would be gladly met, no matter how many millions of pounds a year it involved."

Added to this is a feeling in Australia, with the Government as well as the people, that in order to bring the Empire more closely together, there should be an Empire Government and Cabinet drawn from the whole Empire and acting for the Empire as a whole. There is no particular anxiety to have this brought about in full during a war. But Mr. Curtin's insistence on close discussion before war decisions are made from London, is regarded generally by Australians as reasonable, and as an earnest of Australia's determination to assist in every possible way to bring down for ever the Nazi terror in Europe.

Another quotation from a Sydney evening paper of November 12 fits both Mr. Curtin's speeches and the present situation: "Between Britain's war and Hitler's war there has long been this apparent difference—that the Nazis framed programme and plan more decisively than did the British." In that paragraph also is seen the reasons actuating the Australian Government in its request for closer co-operation. Australian politics are not British politics. I think if we take that as the basis for thought about Australian moves there will be no more misunderstanding. It is no more reasonable for English opinion to demand from Australia a National Government when Australian politics do not run that way, than it would be for Australian people to demand that the present Parliamentary truce in England be ended forthwith.

It is no use for Mr. Menzies, for British consumption, to urge a National Government, though he has a right so to do. He cannot alter, out of office, the will of Australian politics, any more than he could when he was in office.

Australia's political trend, as I see it, will be towards a harsher waging of war, strict national discipline, and the maintenance of unbounded faith and affection for its ties with Britain. And although prophecy is a foolish thing, I will prophesy that the extreme Left Wing, as it is known here, will not dominate the affairs of the Australian people. The Australian Labour Party is too strong for such incursions. Mr. Curtin, I believe, if he lives, will be Prime Minister at the Peace. The general impression is that he, with his government, will lead the Australian people wisely and well. But you will find that the Australian Government will insist on stronger representation in Britain, on the basis that it becomes so easy for an Australian after years of residence to adopt an English outlook that special care must be taken to ensure that Australia's voice in London will be the real voice of Australia—harsh on occasions though it may sound to Whitehall ears. And it may speak with full Ministerial status.

One final point to remember—the Australian Labour Party to-day is, in all respects, identical with Australia's first Government, the Watson Labour Government, which laid the foundations of the Commonwealth after the federation of the States.

(Mr. Baume is the European Editor of TRUTH Newspapers Australia and New Zealand and of THE SYDNEY DAILY MIRROR.)

THE OUTLOOK FOR JAPAN

BY SIR JOHN PRATT

FROM the moment that Japan emerged into the modern world in the middle of the 19th century she has aspired to be the dominant power in the Far East. The idea might well have seemed an idle dream for it was at this moment that the nations of the West, exulting in the overwhelming power placed in their hands by their conquest over the forces of nature, were extending their activities to Eastern Asia and, by a strange combination of circumstances, the Japanese, a virile, competent and warlike people, found themselves armed only with bows and arrows. Japan, however, has an invincible faith in the capacity of her people, in her destiny and in the divine mission of the Yamato race and, with a steady spirit of calculation, that would be admirable if it were not consistently devoted to material ends, she prepared and armed for the trial of strength that lay ahead. The measures that she took seemed to be obvious precautions to make herself secure against any possible aggression and it was not apparent to the world at large that she cherished in secret the mystical idea that it was the mission of the Japanese race to spread their rule over the neighbouring peoples of Asia. She was thus able to take the first steps towards carrying out this mission without exciting undue suspicion or alarm because they seemed to have been taken merely in self defence. The rapid advance of Russia to the Pacific was a real menace and Japan accordingly drove China out of Korea in order to deprive Russia of a possible base for attack. Similarly the war with Russia in 1904-5, though it opened like the present war with a sudden attack by Japanese naval forces, was regarded as resistance to aggression. After the defeat of Russia, however, the Japanese army was with difficulty restrained from annexing South Manchuria and the soldiers never understood the political reasons that made annexation at that time inadvisable and never forgave the politicians for their caution. It was not till the Great War in 1914 that the mask was pulled aside and the Western Powers learned with some astonishment that Japan proposed to seize

the golden opportunity to turn the whole of China into a vassal state. A little later the Russian Empire fell to pieces in the Bolshevik revolution and Japan made a determined effort to establish her dominion over Eastern Siberia as well as North Manchuria. She had, however, miscalculated the strength of the forces, spiritual rather than material, that were arrayed against her. These aggressive enterprises failed disastrously, the army was discredited and out of favour and Japan accordingly was willing to come to the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and subscribe to the Anglo-American plan for stabilizing peace in the Far East. The effect of the various measures agreed to at the Conference was to place Japan in an impregnable position in the Western Pacific and in return for the complete security thus assured to her Japan pledged her honour to abandon aggression against China and to join with Britain, America and other interested Powers in international collaboration for the political and economic reconstruction of China. Ten years later, in 1931, she broke this pledge, seized Manchuria and embarked upon the course of aggression which has culminated in open war on China, the plan to establish a Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere and the treacherous attack upon Pearl Harbour, and the British Empire in the Far East on December 7, 1941.

The stage Japan had reached, about the year 1930, just before she embarked upon her present course, may serve as a convenient standpoint from which to "look before and after" and obtain a general view of the Far Eastern Scene in which this drama is being enacted. The population of Japan doubled in the 50 years prior to 1930 and is still rapidly increasing. Living conditions in the urban and industrial centres that have grown up since Japan became a manufacturing country do not favour large families. There are fewer marriages, the marriage age is later and new conceptions of marriage and family life are spreading among the people; but an abnormally large proportion of the population consists of persons of child bearing age and this makes it certain that between 1930 and 1960 there will be an addition of 15 to 20 millions to the population of Japan. Only one sixth of the area of Japan is cultivated and pressure of population has already led to excessive fragmentation of farm land. The land tenure system is essentially a system of small holders and two-thirds of the farmers occupy farms of less than $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres in extent.

Rice is the staple crop and by immense and painstaking industry and an intensive system of agriculture Japan succeeds

in growing all but 5 per cent. of the food that she eats. Since the first decade of the 20th century there has been a notable rise in the standard of living but it is the urban classes who have reaped the benefit rather than the farmers and peasants. Japanese rice is produced at too high a cost, the law of diminishing returns has begun to operate and agricultural depression is endemic. The farmer has however been saved by silk. The production of raw silk in Japan trebled in volume between the years 1913 and 1928 and in the latter year Japan accounted for two-thirds of the world exports of silk. One half of Japan's total exports consisted of raw silk and nine-tenths of the Japanese exports of silk were sent to a single country, the United States of America. The value of the raw silk sent to America, £70 millions sterling, almost exactly balanced the value of the raw cotton imported from that country, and it was this sale of raw silk to America that enabled the Japanese farmer to eke out a living on his tiny holding.

Silk and cotton have always been the two chief mainstays of Japan's economy and it was this narrow basis of her foreign trade that was the greatest menace to the Japanese standard of living in 1930. Seventy per cent. of her total exports consisted of two commodities, silk and cotton, and seventy per cent. of her exports were sent to two countries, America and China. The American tariff of 60 to 90 per cent. on silk piece goods was an effective bar to the development of silk manufactures in Japan while the raw silk trade was at the mercy of vagaries of fashion. Similarly the cotton trade was at the mercy of gusts of political passion that might give rise to a boycott or a hostile tariff in China, and the progress of industrialization in other countries, particularly China and India, might at any moment threaten the Japanese industry. The diversification of Japanese industry was thus an urgent necessity, and in order to provide a basis for this diversification and for a wider range of foreign exports the essential first step was to build up heavy industries. Heavy industries are also the foundation of military and political power and the greatest obstacle to the realization of Japan's dream of the hegemony of Eastern Asia is her lack of the fuel and metal resources required for the establishment of heavy industries. This is the explanation of Japan's interest in Manchuria.

When Japan defeated Russia in 1905 she acquired by treaties with Russia and China the special position in South Manchuria that is so vividly described in the Report of the League of Nations Commission of 1932 commonly known as the Lytton

Report. The measure of control that she thus acquired in that region afforded a valuable outlet for the economic and industrial activities of her people. The country was developed by railways built with Japanese capital. The soya bean was introduced and by 1930 seven million acres were devoted to its cultivation and the imports of soya bean and bean cake played almost as important a part in Japan's economy as rice itself. It is however the supplies of Manchurian fuel and metal which Japan regards as indispensable. Even before 1931 her plan was to establish the heavy industries that she required not in Japan but in Manchuria, and that is the main reason why Japanese have always loudly proclaimed that Manchuria was their life line and why, up to 1931, the maintenance and extension of the privileges enjoyed by virtue of her special position was the corner stone of Japan's foreign policy. Manchuria is considered to be for them a national interest as vital as the interests of Great Britain in the approaches to India.

Japan emerged from the Great War in a very strong financial position. She had built up a gold reserve of 700 million yen and her foreign balances and loans amounted to nearly 2,000 million yen. There were however grave distortions in her economic structure, the great earthquake of 1923 was a shattering blow and the history of the decade after the war is largely a tale of how these resources were used up in a series of desperate struggles to cope with financial and economic difficulties. In 1929 Japan returned to the gold standard. The policy was sound but its inception coincided with the onset of the world economic crisis. This aggravated her difficulties and in particular intensified the privations suffered by the farmers and peasants in the rural districts. It coincided also with the triumph of the Kuomintang—the Chinese Nationalist Party—both in China and Manchuria. In 1928 the walls of Jericho collapsed at the blast of the Kuomintang trumpet; the old War Lord government in Peking, which had eked out for some years a moribund existence, faded away and the capital of the new, young and vigorous China was established at Nanking. The ruler of Manchuria—the young Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang—declared allegiance to Nanking and hoisted the Kuomintang flag. Manchuria was thus opened to Kuomintang propaganda and a vigorous rights recovery movement was quickly under way. An attempt was made to oust Russian control and seize the Chinese Eastern Railway but Soviet troops and bombing planes promptly invaded North Manchuria and the Chinese gave way. There was no cessation

however in the campaign to circumscribe Japanese treaty rights.

Opinion in the group conveniently described as the Military Party was formed largely by the young officers who mostly came from rural districts and were acutely conscious of the distress that the great depression had brought to the homes of their friends and relatives. Young officers as a class are not remarkable for political insight or maturity of judgment. They attributed all these ills—difficulties with Nationalist China, economic disturbances and agricultural distress—to the policy which Great Britain and America—in their own selfish interests as they believed—had forced upon Japan at the Washington Conference. The military party—discredited by the collapse of their idol, Germany, and by the failure of their own aggressions—had unwillingly accepted this policy in 1921, but by 1930 the young officers had good grounds for believing that public opinion was ready for a change. During the winter of 1930-31 500,000 persons were in receipt of relief in Tokyo alone and at this moment its silk market in America collapsed. The price of silk fell from 1,400 yen per picul in April, 1929, to 573 yen in September, 1931. On the 18th September, 1931, the Army in Manchuria staged the military coup which resulted in the seizure of the whole of Manchuria. This was the first step in a policy, the ultimate goal of which is the expulsion of all western influence from Eastern Asia and the establishment of Japan as the dominant state in this vast region surrounded by a ring of satellite states serving her needs. This policy is supported by the people of Japan and differences of opinion exist only as regards the timing and methods of each step. Moreover economic considerations, though an important factor, are relevant only in so far as wealth, prosperity and economic strength are the indispensable foundation of military and political power. This is clear from the course of events between the attack on Manchuria in 1931 and the attack on China in 1937.

The heavy military expenditure in Manchuria made it impossible for Japan to maintain the gold standard or a policy of balanced budgets. The Government that came into power in December, 1931, embarked upon a new policy of stimulating industry and agriculture by means of large Government expenditure financed by borrowing and currency expansion. The Finance Minister, Mr. Takahashi, calculated that after 4 years of reflation economic health would be restored and Japan could then return to normal sound finance. His policy was extra-

ordinarily successful. During the years of depression Japanese industry had made great efforts to reduce costs, improve efficiency and weed out its weak members. The Government controls then established were rapidly extended and adapted for the purposes of the new policy. New industries fostered by Government expenditure grew up and during the decade prior to 1936 there was an astonishing advance to a higher level of technical efficiency and organization and a remarkable improvement in the skill of the workmen. The diversification thus achieved relieved Japanese industry from its dangerous dependence on two commodities and two countries. But when in 1936 the Government desired to bring the period of deflation to an end their proposals met with violent opposition. In 1932 the direction taken by the new Government expenditure had been determined by the demands of the Military Party who had insisted on the adoption of a "quasi war time" economy and the fostering only of those industries that contributed to Japan's military power. By 1936 the military party had already launched a fresh aggression on China in the form of a disreputable so-called "autonomy movement" in the five northern Provinces. They wished to see the controls established under the "quasi war time" economy made permanent and the Government's proposal to return to normal methods provoked in consequence a military revolt in the course of which Mr. Takahashi was murdered. His successor was obliged to carry out the wishes of the army and when war broke out with China in July, 1937, there was a vast increase in expenditure and a great and progressive extension and tightening up of the controls already established over trade and industry. Intricate and elaborate measures were devised with the general aim of ensuring that no commodities should be imported except munitions and the raw materials required by the export trades, and that none of the imports or manufactures should be diverted to the home market. The hardships and difficulties involved were very great but up to, at any rate, last December Japan had not become a completely totalitarian state. The influence of those groups who still looked forward to the restoration of a free economy was sufficiently powerful to resist the more extreme measures pressed by those whose conception of an ideal State was one in which complete control was exercised over every economic activity. The latter groups were represented in the main by those who pressed the policy of the Southward advance regardless of the risk of war with Great Britain or America

or with both. The former group was led by Prince Konoye who believed that Japan's position of leadership could only be assured if the door were kept open for a return to normal political and commercial relations with America and the British Empire. If Prince Konoye had remained in office war would have been averted but he made the miscalculation that America might be persuaded to condone a Japanese conquest of China.

The Tojo Togo group, have also made an even more fatal miscalculation. It seems likely that the decision to attack both Great Britain and America was made on purely military grounds and the Japanese carry their passion for secrecy to such efficient lengths that it is probable that only the military members of the Government knew what was impending. The Japanese have always been extremely shrewd and skilful in estimating the material factors in a situation and shaping their course accordingly, but they have no gifts for reading the minds or forecasting the reactions of other men. From the military point of view the surprise attack upon Hawaii, for all its treachery, was a marvellous stroke and the initial advantage thus gained will carry Japan a long way. But this will not compensate for the failure to realize the shattering effect upon American opinion. America has come into the world war without a dissentient voice, grimly determined to throw the whole of her resources into the struggle without delay. The doubts and hesitations that have weakened Anglo-American action in the past have disappeared. There is complete frankness and confidence on both sides without any trace of the jealousies that usually paralyse the joint operation of allies. Unity of command has been established from the beginning and American officers are serving under British and British under Americans. Two months ago it would have seemed a fantastic dream that such a state of things could come about so soon. The Japanese have solved President Roosevelt's most intractable problem and in solving it have rendered their own ultimate defeat a certainty. Japan may overrun the whole of the territories that she hopes to include within her co-prosperity sphere but she cannot hold them after America has recovered command of the sea. It would however be folly to under-estimate the formidable nature of the task ahead. In the short period—less than a hundred years—since Japan emerged into the modern world she has shown, not once but several times, a capacity for making astonishing progress in a brief space of time and for accomplishing feats that were

thought to be impossible. The decade prior to 1937 was one such period of progress and there may well have been another since. Most of her activities have been shrouded in complete secrecy and it would be wise to be ready for more surprises.

The Japanese are united and homogeneous to a degree unknown in other countries and the differences of opinion that divide political factions are not wide. The extremists now in control believe that they can seize and hold the whole of East and South East Asia and defeat any attack upon them. They contemplate placing Japanese economy permanently upon a totalitarian basis and, so far as the vast region they aspire to control is not self sufficing, they propose to conduct such foreign trade as may be necessary upon a totalitarian basis. They do not fear the retaliations that a totalitarian system of trading may provoke because their control of this enormously wealthy region with its indispensable supplies of tin and rubber will place them in a position to dictate terms to other states however powerful or wealthy. When this extremist faction suffers defeat it seems probable that the history of 1914-1921 will repeat itself. Extremist doctrines will be discredited and a more moderate faction represented by Prince Konoye may come into power anxious to abolish totalitarian controls, restore a free economy and come to terms with Great Britain and America. It is too early yet to speculate on the conditions that may be produced among a highly emotional people like the Japanese by crushing defeat for the first time in their history. It is evident, however, that peace can only be assured in the Pacific if the Japanese people have the means of maintaining a reasonable standard of living without resort to the expedient of establishing political control over the territories where raw materials and potential markets are to be found. This can only be effected by a return to freer international trade in the world as a whole. Here again it is too early to attempt any assessment of probabilities but it is of course obvious that much will depend on the attitude that America will be ready to adopt.

NO MORE NONSENSE

BY AN AUSTRIAN

*Judex ergo cum sedebit
Quidquid latet apparebit
Nil inultum remanebit.*

THERE are those of us who fight Nazi Germany, and those who fight—Germany.

The first hold that the German nation can be divided into good and bad Germans. Their quarrel is with the latter only. The second exclude such a distinction. In their view, no separation is possible between the various elements of that vast compound. To them, the German nation is indivisible and in the words of an appropriate German proverb, it is a case of *Mitgefangen, mitgehungen*—caught together, hung together.

Each side has briefed eloquent counsel. To quote only the most outstanding names, there is Lord Vansittart with his *Black Record* and a series of articles in the *Sunday Times*; there is *The New Statesman and Nation*, over the signature of Mr. Kingsley Martin. Diametrically opposed though the two viewpoints may be, they have, however, one common, if negative, denominator. Neither expresses a positive post-war policy to be applied to Germany. There is no positive statement of policy in phrases such as "preventing Germany ever to use force again"—one of the few points on which both sides agree. Such generalities are not implemented by concrete proposals.*

Provided this war is won, what policy should be followed to deal with the German problem? There are principles and there are facts. What practical means have we, this time, to achieve the "Never again" slogan? The accent is on "practical." Principles, it would seem, are irrelevant if they lead to a new World war every twenty years or so. If anywhere, it is here that the end justifies the means—any means in fact to prevent a repetition of periodic tragedy. This is no

*In fairness to Lord Vansittart, mention should be made of a letter of his published in the *Sunday Times* of September 27, 1941. From that letter, it is clear that he has deliberately abstained so far from stating any peace aims.

attempt to write the next peace treaty at this early hour. Rather is it designed as a preliminary effort to define certain minimum aims considered essential if lasting peace is to be achieved.

Among the variety of views held, there seems to be a consensus of opinion on three or four tenets at least, sufficiently large to allow for a definition of minimum aims. Once these have been clearly circumscribed, the problem of ways and means should be much easier to tackle.

(i) There is consensus on the continued predominance of the military caste in Germany and of its old ally, heavy industry and "big business";

(ii) On the necessity of disarming Germany and, for the time being at least, of disarming her unilaterally;

(iii) On the need for an incisive reform of the German educational system;

(iv) Finally, though to a lesser degree, there is consensus on the necessity of re-organizing the Danubian states, both politically and economically, for their own good as well as in relation to the German problem in Europe.

Few people will dispute the predominance of the military caste in Germany. Its importance has grown, practically without interruption, ever since the early part of the 18th century. In former years, its members were chiefly drawn from among the landed proprietors, notably in East-Elbian Prussia. While the relative importance of the Junkers may have diminished in recent years, they still constitute the backbone of the fighting services.

With Germany's gradual industrialization during the second half of the 19th century, the industrialists have gained in relative importance what the Junkers may have lost. Socially, they are to-day their equals. This is true notably of the heavy industry in the Rhineland and in Upper Silesia. Its leaders share with the big landowners the same ways of living, they are tied to them by marriage, they belong very much to the same, if not to a higher, income bracket. Hence, there is similarity of views on the problems of leadership and on the all-important problem of distribution of wealth.

The power of these allied classes was only once in danger—and that to a very limited degree—during the chaotic years of 1918-21. When the excessive egoism of their economic and financial policy might have cost them their leading position during the final years of the Weimar Republic, they concluded an alliance, so far unbroken, with the National Socialist move-

ment. In so doing, they neutralized the only dynamic element among a compound of otherwise static forces. It so happened that it was also the only political movement capable of ensuring for them the support of a sufficiently wide section of the masses.

This is not the view generally held as to the equilibrium of forces in this new alliance. Many observers seem to think that the deal went all in favour of the Nazis. In a few years' time, a less provisional appraisal may become possible. No doubt, both the Junkers and industrialists had to make wide concessions to their new partners. But there are no marionettes without wirepullers. In this respect, neither the Junkers nor big business seem to have been much affected by the new deal.

If this appraisal of existing forces be in the main correct, the first peace aim must be to break, deliberately and systematically, the political power of the wirepullers. True enough, the Nazis share their power. Yet they do so only by delegation, in the persons of their leaders and only for such time as these leaders can carry popular support. Failing such support, their comparatively small political, economic and social importance will become apparent to all. When the day of the great spring cleaning arrives, the new leaders will vanish. But Junkers and industrialists will remain and with them their very tangible sources of power: their estates, their factories, their mines, their hold on the Army, the Civil Service and the Judicature. Hence, the paramount importance of removing them from the helm, for good.

How? By a well-designed land reform for the Junkers; by a tariff reform for the industrialists.

Such a policy has not yet been tried. On the contrary, it would not be difficult to show that after Versailles, the Allied statesmen themselves, consciously or unconsciously, did a lot to put the men of the old régime back into the saddle. And it would be interesting to investigate to what extent class affinities prevailed over an impartial judgment of events.

In the case of the landowners, their great estates East of the river Elbe have always been the main source of their influence, notwithstanding the fact that most of them are mortgaged to the last brick. But Germany is the country which first demonstrated to an astonished world the advantages of being "in the red"—thanks to the opportunities the debtor has for blackmail; provided of course he be sufficiently unscrupulous. It would be giving too much credit to Dr.

Schacht to believe he invented the method. He did nothing of the sort, he is no more than a pantograph. He merely applied the Junkers' carefully developed methods of economic blackmail in the field of international finance.

The influence of the Junkers can be broken by a suitable land reform. In other words, a distribution of their latifundia. Such distribution would (a) reduce their financial status, hence their social and political influence; (b) would create a rural middle class whose holdings would produce much smaller individual revenue. The new landowners, are unlikely either from their origin, their education or their tradition, to form a State within the State. At the same time, this would affect the Junkers' allies and satellites in the Civil Service. This applies to the Diplomatic Service, the Army (and notably, its General Staff) and, to a lesser degree, to the Judicature.

For the industrialists, a tariff reform is needed. Ever since the 1840's, when Friedrich List came out in favour of protectionism, Germany has more and more raised her tariff walls. It would be difficult to say whether that development ensued from general tendencies already geared on expansion, or whether protective tariffs led to expansionist tendencies. Judging from the whole trend of German history during modern times, the first is the more likely explanation. Be that as it may, tariffs, at first moderately protectionist, were gradually raised and finally turned into a weapon of economic warfare. This much is clear in any case: assuming Germany's whole foreign policy was concentrated on expansion during that period, no more logical complement could be found for it on the economic side than high tariffs. These trends of tariff policy were already quite patent in Wilhelmian days. The climax came with Hitler's drive for economic self-sufficiency. No economic self-sufficiency has any other but military justification. It then becomes a weapon just as much as tanks or aeroplanes.

This tariff policy had disastrous consequences for the rest of the world. A wide and strongly protected domestic market ensured to German industry the profits necessary to conduct a policy of dumping on foreign markets. And little did it matter to its leaders whether such exports, made for the sake of prestige or to further foreign policy, were paid for to a large extent by ransoming the German consumer. In later years, international marketing agreements and cartels further facilitated this policy, by even rendering exports profitable. In due course of time, other countries were forced to adopt a

protectionist policy in self-defence. It is unlikely that they would have done so of their own choice, for their aims were not exclusively directed towards expansion. Germany was thus placed in a position of building up huge industries many of which were not naturally competitive in the world market. Germany's industrialization was not only far-reaching, it was over-reaching and justifiable only if at the same time, the idea of war was taken for granted. Internally, its development was associated with lack of social equilibrium; externally, with political havoc. It could not have been maintained without artificial measures such as dumping, ever-rising tariff walls, exchange control and, in the last resort, armaments. A close analysis of Germany's economic structure leads to the conclusion that her "de-industrialization" would prove much more logical than a similar policy at present applied by her to France—apart from being considerably more salutary for restoring lasting peace on the Continent.

Without reversing this evolution by force, a lot could be done to restore normalcy by means of tariffs. A tariff reform would eliminate the more sinister aspects of German "big business." To achieve that, it would not even be necessary to apply unilateral measures. A general return to free trade, a simultaneous reduction of tariffs *taking into account differences in cost of production*, would deprive Germany of a position in world trade, frequently conquered by dubious means, at the expense of competitors either more scrupulous or less aggressive. The Atlantic Charter provides that the future Germany shall not be worse off, economically speaking, than her present opponents. It does *not* provide that she is to remain better off at their expense. It is not proposed to ruin Germany economically. That would help nobody. It is proposed to restore equality of competition. That is why a proviso is made regarding costs of production. Such a "saving clause" would play against her when her competitive position is unduly favourable; it would play in her favour when the opposite is the case.

We must disarm Germany. We must disarm her unilaterally, at the beginning of the process. That is the second point on which agreement seems general. But how?

The first attempt at controlled disarmament, after Versailles, proved a failure. In retrospect, it seems pretty clear that such failure was due not to technical, but to political difficulties between the controlling powers. Granted that many an industry may serve with equal facility peacetime and

wartime objects, yet even the most sceptical is likely to agree that a solid front, political and military, of the victors could have put the brakes on German re-armament, and in some respects might have foiled it completely. It is difficult to see any practical way of ensuring Germany's disarmament other than international control. But since such control proved abortive on its first application, perhaps some lessons could be learned from this failure, particularly on two points. Additional guarantees are necessary against any attempt by Germany to manufacture arms abroad and additional powers are required for the controlling organs.

To achieve these additional guarantees, an international treaty would have to be entered into between all countries interested in Germany's disarmament. That means the near-totality of the civilized world. Its application, in turn, requires international control. Additional powers to the men in control of Germany's disarmament cannot be effective without a sufficiently prolonged and territorially extensive occupation of the *Reich*. Without such occupation, the members of the disarmament commission will prove as powerless against sabotage as did their predecessors after Versailles. Moreover, no better means than occupation has as yet been devised of bringing home to the whole German nation the meaning of war and the signification of defeat. Its psychological impact is a necessary mental medicine which, as distinct from the previous Treaty, should not be confined to homœopathic doses.

The control commission must have effective powers. That means that it should not be a mere consultative body whose every action would have to be sanctioned by the governments at home. Such a Commission would be still-born. It must have both legislative and executive powers—the latter backed up by the presence of an army of occupation. If its decision were to be subject to appeal to the controlling governments or to an International Court, the commission should at least be able to enforce a stay of execution *lite pendente*. Whatever the formula chosen, no commission deprived of armed forces to back up its decisions is likely to succeed in a country such as Germany. Do we again want to see the growth of "sports" clubs and clandestine arms depôts? Many objections will be forthcoming. Are we to start Versailles all over again? In fact, would this not be Versailles *en pire*? The reply is that Versailles has sinned not by severity, but by leniency—leniency at least in its actual application.

Germany's permanent disarmament implies the spiritual demilitarization of the German nation, joint or several. That entails the end of her army of conscripts, the dissolution of its General Staff—and this time, a disbandment not only on paper. In actual practice, it is difficult to see how this object could be achieved without depriving at least three generations of Germans of any military training whatsoever. That means a period of between 60 and 75 years. Must we maintain measures of coercion during the full length of that period? In principle, the answer is positive although circumstances may influence their enforcement in practice. German military tradition and notably, the tradition of its General Staff must be blotted out to vanishing point. This proposal one might expect to provoke another outcry of those who prefer justice for Germany to justice for their own countries. Do you want to maintain actual occupation for 75 years if necessary? Again, the answer is positive in principle. And who will pay the cost of that occupation? That, one should say, remains to be seen. But supposing the worst, namely, that we had to pay for it, that would still be a very cheap war risk insurance premium to pay, compared with the cost of a world war every 25 years. Besides, why should not Germany be able to pay for that cost? If there are to be reparations in some shape or form—and the case against economic reparations is strong—this would surely be the very minimum. Rather should we forego other economic and financial reparations whose moral justification is crystal-clear, but whose practical enforcement may do more harm than good.

There is, of course, one immediate objection to the views here expressed. By unilateral disarmament, Germany would secure an enormous relief of her financial burdens and would, moreover, increase the economic productivity of her population. The rejoinder is that there is no real objection to such an increase in economic productivity provided we ensure, by other means, a pacific outlet for this increase. Moreover, it is comparatively easy to compensate this alleviation in Germany's financial charges by an equalization tax to be levied by the controlling powers as long as they have to maintain active arms control on German territory. Such a tax involves, of course, the problem of transfers. The objections are well-known and not to be overlooked. But it may be pointed out that Germany has always succeeded in transferring considerable amounts when it was a matter of putting aside reserves of foreign exchange for the purpose first of financing rearma-

ment and later of financing the war itself. It was only when she had to pay reparations that Germany could not, or would not, find the foreign exchange required to discharge her obligations. Subject to a careful investigation of actual figures, it might be found sufficient to limit the yearly amount of equalization tax to the sums which Germany transferred annually on average between the years 1931 and 1939. After a period effective control of disarmament may, this time, enable the controlling powers to cut their own military expenses. Such a natural counter-part of Germany's disarmament should bring about a gradual and proportionate reduction in the equalization tax.

Thirdly, the German educational system requires a radical and incisive reform. This does not refer merely to such pseudo-sciences as *Rassenkunde* and similar pseudo-scientific teaching. These absurdities will die even before their inventors. It applies with even more reason to pre-Hitlerian teaching and, in particular, to the educational staff. Germany has always found among her teachers the scientists to provide her with the instruments for her aggression; the jurists to justify these aggressions; the philosophers at last to build them into a system of ethics—German ethics of course. A Hanoverian king, finding himself in conflict with seven professors of Goettingen University on points of constitutional liberty in the early forties of the last century, dismissed them summarily with the remark that "professors and prostitutes could always be had for money"—a hard judgment on these seven men among whom were the brothers Grimm, the philologists. Yet, the king knew his Germany.

A century later, German university teachers warrant this royal judgment even more. You will not find these days anyone among them to raise points of constitutional liberty. Secondary teaching merely follows the example set by the universities, minus some measure of discretion. Only teachers of primary schools—very likely owing to their social origins—made an exception during the first years of the Weimar Republic. Since then, there has been time for a change. To place the German educational system back to a level compatible with the general standards reached by European civilization, it would no doubt be necessary to dismiss 95 per cent. of the educational staff, the balance to be retained only after careful individual examination. Independent and genuinely liberal spirits have disappeared from the teaching profession since the exclusion of all adversaries of the present régime.

Their elimination has proceeded with unerring judgment. A judgment truly admirable in its infallibility were it not so evidently based on Gestapo spying.

No practical solution of this important problem seems anywhere within sight. Without a total collapse of the German structure, no sufficiently radical and durable revolution is likely to occur in the German conscience. Nor may we ever expect to hear a *nostra culpa*. In this province, a complete change of heart would have to take place such as is unknown to history since the birth of Christianity. Importation of teachers from abroad would meet with great obstacles, the problem of numbers alone being insuperable. These difficulties notwithstanding, measures of coercion may become necessary, here as elsewhere, should there be no spontaneous clean-up from within.

Unification of the Danubian countries is the fourth point on which there is at least a marked measure of agreement. Pending the enactment of collective security by a League of Nations or any other more practical method, the necessity of establishing a demographic, military and economic counterweight to Germany cannot be dismissed. But clearly, this object cannot be achieved by maintaining the past split-up of the Danubian territories into antagonistic national States none of which, individually, has a chance of survival. This subject requires separate examination and is only mentioned here in passing.

These are, in brief, the essential aims which any future peace settlement with Germany will have to achieve if it is to have some chances of permanency. Such a programme is bound to encounter resistance from many quarters. For instance, the conservative elements in all countries, the U.S.S.R. excepted, will oppose a "planned" diminution of their social "opposite numbers" in Germany. The cloudier type of pacifists upheld by the ministers of the various established churches are likely to invoke anew those Christian principles which are so conspicuously absent from our present world. These circles will not see that in the absence of any spontaneous change of heart—unlikely to arise—measures of coercion will be unavoidable in the case of a nation which has deliberately rejected the principles they invoke. In the main, these peace aims will have to count on the support of the bombed-out.

Let us all remember the words of a German. "The Germans have had a Kant and a Goethe" wrote Schopenhauer," but the

nation in general suffers from a spirit completely obtuse and from absence of all judgment." In that, we may trust Schopenhauer whose spirit was neither obtuse nor devoid of judgment. Since the majority of the Germans will not or cannot think for themselves, we shall have to think for them and to act in consequence. Germany's internal affairs, her future régime and economic welfare are our concern. In a world which new means of communication have reduced to a fraction of its former size, no nation can claim any of her affairs to be wholly internal. In the name of "internal affairs," we have had to watch the destruction of the whole of Europe. Meanwhile, we have been concluding treaties and gentlemen's agreements with its destroyers. Let there be no more agreements for which we supply the gentlemen and they—the agreement. No more nonsense, please.

TOWARDS A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

BY HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON

THE words 'Christian Democracy' have the merit of focussing an argument. To some, democracy appears as so obviously the political embodiment of Christian principles that the adjective is redundant. To others, the phrase is a startling contradiction in terms. The former regard democracy as society organized in such a way as to give expression to belief in brotherly love and the worth of each individual soul. The latter, accepting the Spenglerian analysis: 'In the form of democracy, money has won,' see in Christianity and Democracy the outward manifestations of those eternal opposites, God and Mammon. And so long as men attach mutually exclusive meanings to the same word, the present chaos of thought and action must continue. Men of good will find themselves, as 'democrats' and 'anti-democrats,' ranged as enemies whereas, if each defined his attitude instead of covering it with a catchword, they might discover themselves fighting side by side as friends.

These notes are an attempt to contribute to a resolution of the unnecessary quarrel; and as those who assume that democracy is the political embodiment of Christian principles probably far outnumber those who hold that democracy is (and by its nature must be) the negation of Christianity, it may be well to start with the more conventional view.

The essence of this view has been well expressed by Mr. Middleton Murry:

British democracy is not based on the principle that the voice of the people is the voice of God. Much more fundamental to it than a belief in the wisdom of a temporary electoral majority is the acknowledgment that the British citizen has certain basic rights, known as the liberties of the subject.

And in so far as this is the meaning attached to 'democracy,' it is incontrovertibly Christian; for Christian doctrine has always recognized the individual's need for free self-expression. Without this there can be no development of personality and thus—from both the natural and supernatural standpoint—no ultimate responsibility.

If the democrat were to go further and insist that the limitations on real freedom are more often economic than political, he could hardly find a better statement of his position than the following:

The immense number of proletarians on the one hand and the immense wealth of certain very rich people on the other are an unanswerable argument that the earthly goods so abundantly produced in this age of industrialism are far from rightly distributed and equitably shared among the various classes of men . . . In our days not only is wealth concentrated but immense power and economic domination are concentrated in the hands of a few, and those few frequently not the owners, but only the trustees and directors of invested funds.

This, however, is not an extract from a democratic manifesto, but the official attitude of the Catholic Church as defined in the great Encyclical of 1931, *Quadragesimo Anno*. And herein lies a clue to the cause of the confusion. The democrat would maintain that, in democracy, he has the means by which the wrongs can be righted. The anti-democrat, on the other hand, will retort that the state of affairs described in the Encyclical is democracy, and that justice and liberty can only be restored by the destruction of democracy. "But what you are calling 'democracy,'" says the democrat, "is really plutocracy, which, I would agree, has in all ages been condemned as the worst form of government." "That," replies the anti-democrat, "is precisely the point. 'Democracy' is the cloak which plutocracy assumes in order to deceive decent men." And it must be admitted that the facts favour the anti-democrat.

When President Roosevelt remarked that it was a disgrace for a country with the highest standard of living in the world that one out of every two Americans called up for military service should be below the normal physical or mental standard, he was voicing an indignation which every democrat would share. But every anti-democrat took it for granted and was only surprised that the proportion was not higher than 50 per cent. For he did not confuse the ideals which inspired good democrats with the facts of democracy in practice and he knew, from American statistics published in this country in the autumn of 1940, that, on the one hand:

Three families in the United States control a huge share of the nation's industrial wealth. They are the du Ponts, the Mellons and the Rockefellers. Together they own stock valued at £350,000,000 in 200 American industrial corporations. Thirteen families actually have stock holdings totalling £670,000,000;

and, on the other:

One in every three Americans is living below the 'safety line' of nutrition necessary to good health.

The question at issue thus resolves itself not so much into a debate about the facts—which are not, as far as they concern the two great democracies, pre-war Britain and present-day America, seriously in dispute—as to whether the conditions which are deplored by honest democrats and anti-democrats alike are accidental to or inherent in democracy. Is "Government of the people by the people for the people" the way of national salvation or the formula for national suicide? Are "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" the *open sesame* of a better world or the pointers to a new dark age? Are the three great wars which have decimated Europe in six generations the birth pangs of the Utopia announced in 1789 or the inevitable and retributive consequences of the fatal decision of 1789?

II.

That the outward form of democracy has not expressed the true spirit of democrats is to-day too obvious a point to labour. The idea that the 'will of the people' is synonymous with a majority of heads (not brains) counted once every five years has always been ridiculous and is at last being generally proclaimed as such by the apathy of the electorate. The idea that the interest of the people as a whole can be represented by an assembly composed of the obedient nominees of two rival caucuses, each fighting for the control of the money power that it may use it in its own sectional interest, has led to the use of 'politician' as a term of contemptuous abuse. 'Freedom of the Press' has come to mean merely that 'an editor is free to express as many of his proprietor's prejudices as his advertisers allow.' A party system based on a geographical franchise and the principle that the means of propaganda, whether cinema or newspaper, may be freely owned by anyone rich enough to buy them has not led to a democracy of which any democrat can be proud. The freedom of the free shark in the free lagoon was not what the libertarians meant.

This discrepancy is the more disturbing because it is hardly a case of a good idea being spoilt in execution, or of sound premises mysteriously leading to corrupt conclusions. The fault lies in the idea itself. It is the premise that is false.

'Government of the people by the people for the people' is—if "by the people" be equated with plebiscitary democracy—merely a piece of muddled thinking. For 'the essence of common democracy is quantity,' whereas 'Government for the people' implies quality of the rarest kind.

To submit every cause and question and taste to the arbitrament of the majority is to act on the assumption that 'there is a peculiar inspiration in the opinions of the ignorant.' If from this reckless appeal any standard survives, it can be only the standard of money and 'popularity': and those who interpret the scorching irony of *Vox populi, vox Dei* as statement instead of sarcasm should not be surprised if the majority prefers gods made in its own image.

In his essay, *Associating with Shakespeare*, Granville Barker wrote some years ago:

I find in an old notebook of mine something written by A. D. Darbishire, the biologist, who died on active service in the War. This is it: 'A flaw in the construction of an aeroplane may endanger the life of one man . . . but a flaw in our conception of life may endanger the whole of humanity and condemn it to an existence from which the sudden end of an airman would be a merciful deliverance.' We are all now speculating pretty grimly upon what the next hundred years may bring. One thing seems certain: they will put to a hard test democracy and its methods. Shall we or shall we not prove able to work this complicated machinery of civilization by constant appeal to the opinions of the mass of the people? And the answer may be: No, unless their conception of life can somehow be enriched. Here comes the claim of art to be of service. For art stimulates imagination. You cannot hope to make the whole mass of the people substantially knowledgeable in the thousand matters which now concern it. So sometimes imagination must be made to suffice; the cultivated sixth sense which will be alive to the difference between the false and the true . . . I would not prescribe a compulsory course of Shakespeare's tragedies to a mind debauched by the sillier sort of cinemas and the middle pages of the Yellow Press. All you can do is to set up your monuments of great art, like cathedrals raised above the sordid squalor around, as witness of your faith. And, if the faith is not a vain one, it will draw men to them.

In the ten years which have elapsed since the writing of that, the situation has become more grim and, though the diagnosis has been sufficiently confirmed, there is hardly the same attraction about the half-way gospel of 'the redemption of all things by Beauty everlasting and the message of Art.' The return must be to a sterner and more certain Gospel.

III.

"Love God," said Augustine, "and do as you like." Those

who are pleasurably attracted by the second part of the sentence are apt to ignore the first, on which it depends. The creed of 1789—a date which is useful as a symbol rather than exact as a definition—might not unfairly be described as an endorsement of the second and a repudiation of the first. Men were to do as they liked, but they were not to love God or even—unless they were eccentric reactionaries—to believe in Him. The order of the day was "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."

Yet, no less than Augustine's statement, these qualities are virtues only in so far as they radiate from the central Christian belief. Unless liberty is interpreted in the light of individual self-discipline in the sight of God, it becomes something worse than license. Men are certainly equal before God and no individual soul is of more value, at that Tribunal, than another. But they are not equal anywhere else. The one glaring fact of human life, in every department of it, is the inequality of man. ("Men are not born equal," writes J. B. S. Haldane and predicts that "the progress of biology in the next century will lead to a recognition of the innate inequality of man.") I quote this for the sake of those who place more reliance on the pronouncements of scientists than in the results of their own observation or belief in orthodox Christian teaching). As for 'Fraternity,' it is probably, divorced from its Christian context, the most dangerous concept of the three. One remembers Clemenceau's murmur: 'Ah, yes, Cain and Abel, Cain and Abel' when urged to allow the claims of 'brotherly love'; and one has seen 'fraternity' degenerate into that 'humanitarianism' which has been so aptly defined as 'sentimental self-indulgence in the filth and famine of others.' And it is persistently forgotten by those whose idea of religion is to quote uplifting texts out of their context that Christ's command, "Love one another," was addressed specifically to eleven men after He had deliberately by the prayer of Segregation ("Lord, I pray not for the world but for these Whom Thou hast given me") excluded everyone else.

'Fraternity,' in the Christian sense, does not mean and never has meant that a man should love all other men because they are his 'brothers.' It means that he should love all other men because they are God's sons.

Liberty, Equality, Fraternity have been defined as

Liberty meaning 'I can do as I like': Equality meaning 'You're no better than I am': and Fraternity meaning, 'what's yours is mine if I want it.'

This, which appears to those who still regard the words idealistically an unpleasant piece of cynicism, is in fact a correct description of the watchwords of a democracy which is not Christian. Cut off from the source of virtue, Virtue itself becomes Vice. And "lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds."

IV.

It would seem then that, if democracy is to fulfil the aspirations of those who have believed in it and even died for it, it must submit itself to be taught and tamed by the Christians. That there is an uneasy suspicion that something of the sort may be necessary is evidenced by the growing concern over Christian education; but unfortunately many of those who are most vocal in demanding that the Church should 'do something' are also of the opinion that what she should 'do' is to conform to the standards of 'democracy' instead of to demand that her own standards should be at last accepted. The Church must show 'tolerance'; she must 'come into line with modern thought'; she must 'align herself with the political demand for social justice'; she must 'use up-to-date methods.' In other words, she must adopt precisely the errors which have led the world into the catastrophic condition from which she is now asked to extricate it. Good men, who have forsaken dogmatic Christianity but retain a respect for its ethical content, ask the Church to come to the aid of the democratic state as a somewhat apologetic ally, whereas she can come only as an uncompromising teacher, demanding obedience. Which means that, finally, the initiative must lie with the Church herself.

As Christopher Dawson has put it:

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the whole trend of Western civilization was hostile to Catholicism. The absolutism and realism of Catholic philosophy was incomprehensible to an age which followed Rousseau and Kant, or Bentham and Herbert Spencer. When Pius IX denied that it was the duty of the Church to come to terms with Liberalism and Progress and Modern Civilization, his pronouncement was greeted with a chorus of execration from every country in Europe. It seemed as though the Papacy was pronouncing its own sentence of death, for the triumph of material progress seemed inevitable and no one could conceive the possibility of its failure. To-day all this is changed—Liberalism and Progress and Modern Civilization appear in a very different light from that of seventy years ago.

The Church, in her teaching, must reject the basic assumption of democracy—that man is naturally good and that

therefore the decision of the majority of men will be a wise decision—because the Truth, on which she is founded, is that man is naturally evil and that the majority decision will thus tend to intensify the evil. She will insist that Swinburne's "Glory to Man in the Highest, for Man is the master of things" is, quite simply and lucidly, blasphemy. At the same time, she will be even more emphatic that every man is not only potentially good but potentially a saint and that his business is to develop and practice sanctity. And within the tension of that paradox, all the aspirations of democracy will fall into their proper place.

There will be liberty, equality and fraternity; but not anarchy, 'averageness' and interference. There will be 'Government of the people by the people for the people,' but the emphasis will be on 'Government.' True to her fundamental mission, she will, as the representative of God, wage the unceasing war against Mammon. (She has always denounced usury and the failure to pay proper wages as sins). But at the same time she will insist that, though adequate bread is necessary and a right, man does not live by bread alone; and she will have no concern with the barren political warfare between 'left' and 'right' which is founded on self-interested materialism.

Oliver Cromwell once told parliament that the mind was the man; with an impure mind man was no better than a beast and a beast could not rule: the State must be controlled by the seeing eyes and the single hearts. "But to this conviction" comments one of his biographers, "he added another which made him a democrat of an extreme type in his ultimate ideals. His religion taught him the transcendent value of every immortal soul, even though dwelling in the humblest body. He dreamed of an aristocracy of quality where the best would govern, but all would be the best."

It is some such synthesis which, out of the present chaos, is again taking shape in the minds of well-intentioned men. At the moment, there is confusion because of the use of labels which divide instead of a Creed which unites. But 'Christian democracy,' if the Church can rise to the responsibility of the hour, may still be made a reality.

And, after all, if by reason of contradictory stresses it proves again unworkable, there is always Christianity *tout court*....

THE PROBLEM OF THE SMALL STATE

BY SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT

We shall never sheathe the sword . . . until the rights of smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation.

MR. ASQUITH'S words spoken early in the war of 1914 sound terribly ironical to-day. With Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Serbia, Greece, Rumania lying helpless in the grip of Germany the promise made by the British Prime Minister must seem sheer mockery. Yet Mr. Asquith was indisputably right—apart from the propaganda value of the recent violation of Belgian neutrality—putting the sanctity of the rights of small nations in the forefront of the war aims of the great nations then allied against Germany.

It may well be that in 1918 the principle was carried too far. For the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire the diplomatists of Versailles were not to blame. Bohemia, Austria, and Hungary had declared their independence before the Peace Conference met. Even if the fate of Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary, in 1940, could have been foreseen, even if the allied diplomatists had endeavoured to restore the Habsburg Empire, they would have been impotent in face of the determination on the part of the Slavs, Teutons and Magyars to break that Empire in pieces, and set up for themselves as sovereign powers.

The doctrine of nationality was in 1919 sacrosanct. The boundaries of States were to be made to correspond as precisely as might be with the demarcating lines of nationality. Moreover—apart from the idol of nationality—publicists were insistent on the value of the small State *per se*. Sir John Seeley, while deprecating the identification of bigness with greatness had in 1884 insisted that the future lay with great states—states of the type of the United States of America and Russia. It was on that ground that he urged that Great Britain should unite with its Colonies in an organic federation of self-

governing but closely associated communities. But by 1919 even the British Empire was in no mood for federal union.

Mr. E. A. Freeman had argued in his *History of Federal Government* (1863) that the multiplication of small states accentuated the possibilities and increased the probability of international wars. Nor can his argument be ignored, though perhaps it may be turned. But in 1919 politicians and historians were in a different mood. They were insistent upon the value, political, social and above all cultural of the small state. They pointed, with great effect, to Palestine, to the City-States of Athens, Florence, Geneva, to small communities like Elizabethan England and Weimar. What big state or great empire has ever in little more than a century produced or nurtured a Pheidias and a Praxitiles, a Sophocles, a Euripides, an Æschylus and an Aristophanes, or nurtured an Aristotle and a Plato? The modern world is never likely to see again the City-State which was a characteristic form of the ancient and medieval world. Are big states likely to produce a Dantè, a Shakespeare, or a Goethè? How great the debt which we in England owe to-day to the agricultural and educational experiments of a small state like Denmark. In 1914 Herbert Fisher argued that the debt of civilization to small states is incalculable. The City-State, he said,

besides serving as a school of patriotic virtue was not in the main of the blustering and thrasonical type, but refined and sublimated by every grace of instinct and reason. It further enabled the experiment of a free direct democratic Government to be made, with incalculable consequences for the political thinking of the world. Finally, it threw into a forced and fruitful communion minds of the most different temper, giving to them an elasticity and many-sidedness which might otherwise have been wanting or less conspicuous and stimulating, through the close mutual competition which it engendered, an intensity of intellectual and artistic passion which has been the wonder of all succeeding generations and such as can never be reached in great states organized for the vulgarity of aggressive war.

That is well said, though we may discern in Mr. Fisher's enthusiasm for small states a trace of the mid-Victorian Cobdenite assumption that while small states are necessarily pacific in temper and policy, big states are necessarily "organized for the vulgarity of aggressive war." That was doubtless true of the France of Louis XIV, exuberant in the consciousness of recently achieved national identity and unity. It is certainly true of modern Germany, permeated by the Prussian doctrine of the efficacy of "blood and iron." But it is not true of the United States nor of the British Empire.

Both are big states, yet neither is "organized for the vulgarity of aggressive war." Nor was the Third French Republic. Organized for war it was, but purely for defensive war—for the defence of its own frontiers or the protection—unhappily inadequate—of allies, unable to protect themselves against the might of Nazi Germany. The existence of big states which are as pacific in temper as any small community does not, however, in the least degree invalidate the argument in favour of the preservation of small states, which, though no longer reliable as buffers between their big neighbours, are invaluable as affording opportunity for a variety of experiments, social and political.

But how, in view of the prevailing tendency towards larger aggregations are the small nation-states—states with populations of anything between 3 and 13 millions, to be preserved? The tendency to aggregation, has, indeed, prevailed only in comparatively recent times. The great nation-states have become the prevalent form of polity only since the fifteenth century. (England, it is true, was exceptionally precocious in realizing its national unity, but not until the eighteenth century was well advanced did Great Britain become a big state). The middle ages were characterized not by diversity but by unity. France was a bundle of feudal principalities, Spain was a congeries of kingdoms. In Germany there were 360 sovereign states down to the end of the eighteenth century, and throughout almost the whole of the nineteenth century there were still 39. The Roman Empire, in its death agony, bequeathed to medieval Europe the idea of a World-State embodied in two institutions, the Holy Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire. There was a time as Lowes Dickinson said:

When the whole civilized world of the West lay at peace under a single ruler; when the idea of separate sovereign states always, at war or in armed peace, would have seemed as monstrous and absurd as it now seems inevitable.

Whether the medieval world was so peaceful as the *laudator temporis acti* suggests is doubtful, but it is undeniably true that the virtual dissolution of the medieval empire and the circumscription of the authority of the medieval church permitted the emergence of the modern states-system which, from the sixteenth century onwards, has formed the basis of European polity.

The apotheosis of the sovereign state has resulted, as we are all painfully aware, in international anarchy, accentuated by the periodical outbreak of international war. Nor can the

apologists of the small state deny that the formation they favour has not merely failed to provide buffers, but has actually tempted aggressively minded great states to further aggression against powerless neighbours.

The dilemma presented to the world to-day would seem then to be this: either we must acquiesce in the German ideal proclaimed in August, 1914, the ideal of universal peace sustained by the naked sword of Germany, or we must devise some system which will permit and, if possible, guarantee the survival of relatively small communities, sovereign if not self-sufficing.

Shortly before the outbreak of the present war Mr. Clarence Streit published in *Union Now* a very elaborate scheme for a Federal Union between the democratic states of the world. His proposals, clear cut and courageous, attracted wide attention and evoked criticism both constructive and destructive. War came. Mr. Streit has recently made a much more simple and less ambitious proposal for an *immediate* union between the United States of America and the nations of the British Commonwealth.* He was, seemingly, impelled to make the proposal by the impending fall of France, by the danger which in the summer of 1940 appeared imminent, that the British Empire would similarly succumb to the attack of the mechanized forces of Germany, and not least by the last minute proposal made by Mr. Churchill to the French for a political union between Great Britain and France. Of Mr. Streit's present proposal it can at least be said that it is far less fantastic than Mr. Churchill's despairing gesture to avert the surrender of France. Mr. Streit appears to imagine that the constitution of South Africa is federal (p. 210) though it is in fact (technically at least) unitary. He also says that Mr. Churchill's offer to France suggested a *Federal* Union, but that is not within my recollection. In order to meet the criticism that the British communities might decline to join a Federal Union in which the U.S.A. would be predominant Mr. Streit rather airily replies:

Let us invite them: If they refuse to do with us what they offered to do with the French, then the responsibility of destroying without a trial, the hope that Union gives for peace and freedom would be theirs alone. Surely they would not refuse.

Yet on the face of Mr. Streit's proposal it would appear that in Congress the U.S.A. could outvote the whole of the British Commonwealth (plus "Eire") by 131 to 72, a proportion

**Union Now with Britain*. Cape. 1941.

which, even if corrected to some extent by the composition of the Senate, looks, to Britons, more like absorption rather than Federalism.

For the moment I do not wish to pronounce either for or against Federal Union either in the original or the amended form suggested by Mr. Streit, and by Mr. Curtis and other enthusiasts in this country. What I do wish to emphasize is the importance—not ignored by the Federal Unionists—of avoiding the errors which *ab initio* wrecked the experiment of the League of Nations. That experiment was at once too ambitious in conception, too cumbrous in machinery and in executive action too timid.

Lacking a common purse and a common police force, requiring unanimity as a preliminary to action between great nations, whose responsibility was relative to their wealth and power, and small countries which risking little or nothing were reckless in council, the League though not ineffectual in regard to minor disputes and small states was impotent in dealing with Great Powers like Italy and Japan. But the root cause for the failure of the League was that like the Holy Alliance it was merely a League of Governments and not a Federation of Peoples, and above all that it was a creation and not the outcome of a gradual process of evolution. Only those Constitutions which have grown, which like Topsy were "never born," are destined to endure.

It may be objected that the Constitutions under which the people of the United States, of Canada and of Australia are living to-day are embodied in a single document. That is true; but only superficially. The Constitution which proceeded from the Philadelphia Congress embodied the results of a long process of evolution. The men who "made" the American Constitution were descended from ancestors who had brought with them from Great Britain the tradition of local self-government. There is not a single feature of the Federal Constitution which did not derive from one or other of the Constitutions of the Component Colonies. The Presidential Executive; the Senate and House of Representatives; the Supreme Court of Justice—all these characteristic features of the Federal Constitution have their prototypes either in the Constitutions originally devised for the British Colonies in North America or in the several revolutionary Constitutions of 1776-1780.*

*This point is emphasized by S. G. Fisher: *Evolution of the American Constitution* (1897) and more casually, in Marriott: *Mechanism of the Modern State*, vol. I.

Again it is true that the constitution of the Federal Dominion of Canada rests upon a single Act (with subsequent amendments) of the British Parliament. But the British North America Act of 1867 represents a long process of evolution, it embodies or discards the results of the experiments of 1791 and 1840. Similarly the several colonies which now form the Commonwealth of Australia had all gone through an evolutionary process from Crown Colonies to semi-self-governing Colonies and from the latter to complete Responsible Government. The fact that the British Parliament ultimately passed an Act for the Union of South Africa and for the Federation of Canada and Australia does not weaken the argument in favour of gradual evolution as opposed to 'creation.'

* * * * *

What is the relevance of this truth, or this contention, upon the problem immediately under discussion? Merely this: we can move on only step by step. I venture, with all apologies to reproduce words which I used while the League of Nations was in process of formation and which were intended as a warning against precipitancy.

It will be the task of prudent statesmanship gradually to transform a League into a Commonwealth; a temporary alliance into an organic polity, endowed with the organs appropriate to the higher stage of political development . . . But to attempt to include in such a Commonwealth States which are in very different stages of political growth is only to court the failure which inevitably overtook the League of Autocrats [of 1815] . . . Similar experiments will escape similar disaster only if membership in the League is, in the first instance, confined to States reasonably equal in power, not disparate in Governments inheriting similar traditions, and inspired by common ideals. To attempt more is to risk all.

Much more was attempted in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the result was the unfortunate failure of an experiment from which all men of goodwill had hoped much.

My practical suggestion, then, is that we should now proceed much more cautiously and modestly. The British Empire is, as Field-Marshal Smuts said during the last war, "the only successful experiment in international government that has ever been made." Let us start from that. The experiment of setting up an Empire War Cabinet in 1917 seemed, at the time, a step towards federalizing the political institutions of the British Empire. It was intended, as Mr. Lloyd George informed the House of Commons on May 17, 1917, that the Empire War Cabinet should become a permanent part of our

political machinery. That intention was not fulfilled. The Paris Peace Conference registered a definite reaction. Centrifugal forces reasserted themselves in the British Commonwealth. The spirit of nationalism in 1919 proved too strong for the centripetal forces which during the preceding war had brought into being the Imperial War Cabinet. During the present war we have, despite the superb contribution made by the Dominions and by India to the common effort, not repeated the experiment initiated by Mr. Lloyd George in 1917. Suggestions to that effect have frequently been made, but they have not, thus far, been accepted.

Is it that the Dominions fight shy of the renewal of the experiment of an Imperial Executive? If it be so, what are the prospects of a complete Federal Union even for the British Commonwealth? For a Federal Union would, on any hypothesis, necessitate a reduplication of all the organs of government—legislative and judicial as well as executive and administrative. But if we cannot even federate the British Commonwealth, the prospect of the Union advocated by Mr. Streit between the British Commonwealth and the U.S.A. would be hopeless and still more the prospect of the wider Federal Union to include all the "democratic" states of the world, or even of Europe, to which in his earlier essay Mr. Streit looked forward hopefully.

All this may savour of pessimism in regard to a solution of the problem of the small state. I am no pessimist. Assuming, as we must, the defeat of the Axis Powers, there will presumably be at least a period of respite for the small states now enslaved by Germany. And then? Then I would go slowly, but with the hoped-for solution ever in view. I should then hope to see a realization of the dream of a Federal Union between the several nations of the British Commonwealth. Next, I should hope to see it include all English-speaking peoples, and gradually extended to other nations willing, and able, to give the guarantees which must obviously be the condition of membership. *Ohne Hast, ohne Rast*, is a valuable precept in politics. Let us apply it, with hopefulness but without impatience to the solution of the problem of small states. Those states are, in my submission, essential to the progress of civilization. This is, I submit, the only possible means of securing their survival.

THE REFUGEE

BY LORD DUNSANY

IN England, on the downs,
Where wild things fly and creep
Far from the noise of towns
And summer seems to sleep
And bells from distant sheep
Tinkle through dreamy air,
Only last August there,
In a chalk valley deep
Where went past elm and willow
And haunt of fox and hare
By wandering ways a stream,
Flashing its little billow
And fading like a dream,
There in a garden lit
By rays enchanting it,
Level and gold and long,
Gilding the midges' throng,
Where tall delphiniums were
And hollyhocks grew strong,
I saw a spirit sit,
Singing a doleful song.
Around her where she sate
More bright was every hue
Of flowers and grass, more blue
Delphiniums were, and through
The leaves the level, late
Rays shone more bright and all
Near her was magical.
Behind her a dark yew
Rose up. She was as tall.
I spoke and asked her who
Tended that plot so small,
Where she had come to wait,
So hidden from great things,
For she seemed something great,

One who might speak with Fate
 Or mend the ways of kings.
 And at my questionings
 She turned and said that she,
 Now poor, was Liberty
 And once had wide estate
 And that her eastern gate
 Was of old far away,
 But, of her lands bereft,
 This English garden, deft
 With little paths that stray,
 Was all that she had left.
 Far through that garden lay,
 Like some enormous oak
 Felled by a lightning-stroke,
 And left where weeds' decay
 Cover it like a cloak,
 A long mound on the clay,
 Through which there flashed a ray
 Which weeds could not conceal,
 As though a thing of steel
 Were hidden from the day,
 Something akin, for wonder,
 To hurricane and thunder.
 And now the sun dipped under
 The old down that I knew
 And dim the spirit grew.
 (The bees had ceased their plunder
 And small birds homewards flew)
 The spell was going too
 That lately had enchanted
 This spot the spirit haunted,
 Where flowers of mauve and blue
 And white and pink were planted
 And, dazzling, dancing through,
 The evening rays had slanted.
 Now dim as though I dreamed
 The fading spirit seemed
 While flashes no more gleamed
 From the half-hidden thing.
 "Spirit," I quickly said
 As she was vanishing
 "What is in that long mound
 Which weeds are burying?"

She spoke with scarce a sound,
 But silence hung so dead
 And heavy that I heard,
 For now no more a bird
 Or insect, even, stirred
 And in that hush profound
 She said "In English ground
 Here I have hid my sword.
 But I will go abroad,
 To France, to France again,
 And once more be adored.
 Once more shall rise my star
 Where the great clusters are
 And I will travel far
 With millions in my train."
 She vanished, and the heap
 Where the great sword had lain
 Seemed nothing but a steep
 Long bank where ivies creep.
 The hush resumed its reign,
 And over down and plain
 All nature seemed to sleep.

RUDYARD KIPLING: ENTHUSIAST

BY JOSEPH BRADDOCK

ELIOT on Kipling—I admit that I was surprised!* Temperamentally, these two very considerable literary figures seemed to me to be in almost fatal opposition. I thought of the Kipling whose gusto I had cherished as a boy, whose writings have given the whole world pleasure, a born writer with his enthusiasm for the hurly-burly of life, the “common muck of the world,” with his magnificent objective vision. And then I thought of the precise, ascetic figure of Mr. Eliot, sophisticated, “twitchingly sensitive,” not for the masses; the high priest of literature beside the part-entertainer, the esoteric opposed to the popular, the cult against the craze. But then I remembered that Mr. Eliot is also a distinguished critic, as well as a poet, and I began to read his thirty-page essay to his own selection of Kipling’s verse. I was reassured.

Into the vitiated literary air of the nineties Kipling’s early stories and poems must have come like a breath of ozone. He had allowed glimpses of the Seven Seas and the Five Continents to penetrate into an artificial hot-house, and stood revealed first and foremost as a writer of action. As book followed book and the scope of his work unfolded, the range, strength and originality of this new writer were apparent; his vision of action, tonic, astringent, calling to adventure, appealed to the everlasting boy in the entire Anglo-Saxon world, and soon his vogue was as great, or greater, than that of Dickens in a previous era. Moreover, he had a vocation—he was sure of himself. What he had to tell was alluring. His gusto was unmistakable, springing as Arnold Bennett would have had it from his passionate sense of “the interestingness of life” so that for a time he was read to the farthest confines of Empire, and in America, everywhere and by everybody, often by those who did not normally read much at all.

When with the advance of the new century the tide of taste had turned against Kipling the change was alleged to have been due partly to his now discredited appeal to Imperialism and also to his over fondness for explicit or implicit preaching. After the disillusion of four years’ slaughter the twenties were understandably in the mood for

* *A Choice of Kipling’s Verse*. Made by T. S. Eliot, with an essay on Rudyard Kipling. Faber and Faber. 8s. 6d.

neither. About this time I remember Mr. Desmond MacCarthy observing apropos the works of Kipling that what kept the then younger generation from appreciation was the same barrier which prevented their elders from enjoying the latest novel by Aldous Huxley—objection in each case to the moral tone of the author! Well, let us admit Kipling’s faults from the outset in order to come back more quickly to an examination, with the help of Mr. T. S. Eliot, of his many and splendid virtues. The faults are, I suppose, stridency, too easy moralizing, and a kind of cocky knowingness that irritates the reader. Yet all great writers have the defects of their qualities (though hasty objections often spring from imperfect knowledge), and who would forego the experience of Wordsworth because he often wrote feeble doggerel: of Proust because his sentences are sometimes boring and interminable, of Shakespeare because passages in the plays are padded with fustian or rhetoric? Kipling’s opulent gifts far outshine his defects.

Mr. Eliot’s essay is profound, packed with suggestiveness and full of “meat.” He sidles round his subject with something of the detachment and cunning of the Cat that walked by himself, and by the time we come to the end we find that we have been helped to appreciate Kipling on a deeper level, that our ideas have been changed. Our enthusiasm has been stimulated to examine the prose and verse with a fresh mind. Kipling is not only a great writer; he is, it seems, an extremely intricate one, and has been ably defended “against the charge of excessive lucidity.” After tracing the starting point of Kipling’s verse to the motive of the ballad-maker and indicating the debt to Swinburne and Browning (*McAndrew’s Hymn* and *The ‘Mary Gloster’* are dramatic monologues, though metrically and intrinsically ballads) Mr. Eliot praises his technical virtuosity and invention, his “consummate gift of word, phrase, and rhythm,” and answers the question as to whether Kipling wrote poetry with the remark that, while Kipling’s verse sometimes rises to the intensity of poetry, Kipling was not trying to write poetry at all. To have done so would have interfered with his intention.

Unless they please they are not heard at all.

This does not “imply a value judgment” on Mr. Eliot’s part, it is simply that Kipling’s poems are intended to *act* rather than to *be* and that they therefore lack “a musical pattern of emotional overtones.” So Mr. Eliot solves this problem by making the claim that Kipling wrote “*great verse*,” though unfortunately what great verse *is* is never exactly defined.

Mr. Eliot’s second important point is that Kipling’s “prose and verse are inseparable; that we must finally judge him, not separately as a poet and as a writer of prose fiction, but as the inventor of a mixed form.” Here, I agree—the later Sussex books bear it out where in *Puck of Pook’s Hill* and *Rewards and Fairies* the “unit is a poem and a story together

or a story and two poems." I would only ask if this main contention does not apply to other writers as well, to D. H. Lawrence for example? I have always felt Lawrence's work as one.

More aspects of Kipling's content are touched upon in this admirable critical essay than I have space to deal with in my article, but Mr. Eliot helps to clear away some popular misconceptions. There has been, and still is, a tendency in certain modern quarters to label Kipling Fascist, or at least as a forerunner of Fascism. This is not only unfair, it is untrue, for "no-one was farther than he from interest in men in the mass, or the manipulation of men in the mass: his symbol was always a particular individual." Again, with regard to Kipling's Imperialism Mr. Eliot writes: "I cannot find any justification for the charge that he held a doctrine of race superiority. He believed that the British have a greater aptitude for ruling than other people, and that they include a greater number of kindly, incorruptible and unselfseeking men capable of administration." His reflections on the Boer War "are more admonitory than laudatory."

By a curious paradox perhaps a phenomenon which operates against a whole-hearted acceptance of Kipling is his almost invariable artistic success. He achieves brilliantly whatever he sets out to do. Again and again in the animal stories, the soldier stories, the horror stories, and the historical-fairy stories (and their equivalent poems) one is forced to applaud at the end with "brilliant!" But Mr. Eliot has noted the element of *tour de force* "which makes some readers uncomfortable." The writer is almost too clever. His detachment is as that "of a visitor from another planet," with something of the hard, bright beauty of de Maupassant. And yet "Kipling knew something of the things which are underneath, and of the things which are beyond the frontier." But Kipling's first purpose, "his aim, and his gift, is to make people see—for the first condition of right thought is right sensation—the first condition of understanding a foreign country is to smell it, as you smell India in *Kim*," his greatest book.

Then the night fell, changing the touch of the air, drawing a low, even haze, like a gossamer veil of blue, across the face of the country, and bringing out, keen and distinct, the smell of the wood-smoke and cattle, and the good scent of wheaten cakes cooked on ashes.

When we come to the verse itself—and Mr. Eliot here gives us 123 poems—we admire the strength and the accomplishment, as also the range of subject-matter, although in general Kipling's voice will be too loud for some tastes. But it is often the cheerful din of the brass band, sometimes of the music-hall. The familiar things are here, *Mandalay*, *The Song of the Banjo*, unforgettable when you have once read them, the admirable 'Bobs,' and many others. The British soldier is drawn true and not sentimentalized. Mr. Eliot picks out *Danny Deeever* for special

scrutiny and praise, drawing attention to the effectiveness of the recurrence of the same end-words and the use of half-rhyme in building up an atmosphere of horror.

'What's that that whimpers over'ead?' said Files-on-Parade,

'It's Danny's soul that's passin' now,' the Colour-Sergeant said.

He comments, perhaps significantly, on the word *whimpers*. This is the way the world ends. He goes on to call Kipling a great hymn writer on the strength of *Recessional*, indicating that Kipling could have done more in this vein. He points out too that a gift for prophecy appears with authority in *Recessional*, as well as in that remarkable poem, *The Storm Cone* written as late as 1932.

This is the midnight—let no star
Delude us—dawn is very far.
This is the tempest long foretold—
Slow to make head but sure to hold.

Stand by! The lull 'twixt blast and blast
Signals the storm is near, not past;
And worse than present jeopardy
May our forlorn to-morrow be.

Finally, Mr. Eliot draws attention to Kipling's gift for epigram. The *Epitaphs of the War* are many of them fine and repay close study. The reader who enjoys quieter poetry will do well to examine the poems belonging to Kipling's final Sussex period when "imperial imagination changed to historical imagination." Indeed, in this group of poems the nature lover will most probably find some pleasant surprises, lines like "I've buried my heart in a ferny hill," phrases such as "Spring's full-faced primroses." I confess to a surprise when poems like *The Way through the Woods* and *The Run of the Downs* brought Edward Thomas to my mind, though of course Kipling's muse is less shy and his music far less subtle. Other excellent poems in the book are *Cities and Thrones and Powers*, *Mine Sweepers*, 1914-18, and *Song of the Galley-Slaves* from *The Finest Story in the World*.

I return to my original conception of Kipling as a born writer and enthusiast, and will let him speak for himself.

It is enough that, through Thy Grace,
I saw nought common on Thy Earth.

If Mr. Eliot in *A Choice of Kipling's Verse* should have given the reading public the stimulus to re-examine the whole work of this extraordinary, able, and varied writer, he will have done us a good service. His essay is of the best type of criticism. And Kipling has made a substantial contribution to our heritage.

WHAT ARE GERMANY'S PLANS?

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

SO much depends on tactical results during the next few days and weeks that comments on the current situation would almost certainly be out-dated before they could be published. Current events, however, make it tempting to look further ahead and speculate as regards possible developments of the Axis' plans, especially those of Germany.

It may be presumed that Germany's immediate object is now to stabilize the front in Russia with the least possible expenditure of men and material, and it seems improbable that she will attempt to open a new offensive front until the spring, not only on account of climatic conditions, but in order to gain time to reorganize and to make good the immense wastage that the Russian campaign, and to a lesser extent the war in Libya, has cost her.

Will she, however, renew a major offensive in Russia as soon as weather conditions are favourable, or is it conceivable that she will stand on the defensive there and undertake a major campaign elsewhere? Ready as the German General Staff always seems to be to modify their plans and to switch from one immediate objective to another provided that it is an enterprise with a bearing on the main object, it is difficult to believe that they can afford an indefinite postponement of a fresh attempt in Russia.

For one thing to stand on the defensive on so wide a front against an opponent so active and with such an extraordinary power of recovery would not mean an economical use of Germany's resources. It is certain that it would lock up a large proportion of her air force and armoured formations. For in modern mechanized warfare the defence must possess strong and highly mobile reserves. The numbers of her armies of occupation would also materially reduce the forces which would be available for a major campaign elsewhere, and with the growing strength of the Allies it would not be easy to find a theatre where they could be attacked in superior force. Spain and North-West Africa, with the connivance of Pétain and Franco, is of course a possible outlet where a force of moderate size might be employed, but the entry of the U.S.A. fully into the war must make Spain increasingly an unattractive theatre; for even if the U.S.A. took no active part in operations American reinforcements sent to Britain would release strong forces now retained there by the threat of invasion. General Auchinleck's recovery of Cyrenaica, even should he go no further, reduces the prospect of Tripoli and Tunis becoming a base for an offensive campaign. A major campaign in

Turkey with Iraq and the Canal zone as its ultimate objective presents more difficulties than ever, now that Turkey could receive help both from Russia and Britain. The mere fact that Turkey was not attacked when in a much weaker position is an indication that the German High Command realized that to force a passage through Asia Minor would be no easy undertaking. The ingenious plot by which Turkey would have been by-passed and the Iraq oilfields together with the pipe-line through Syria would probably have been acquired intact, cannot now be repeated. The Iraq oilfields have in fact ceased to be an objective of immediate value, for even if captured their products would not become available till both the wells and pipe-line had been restored. Yet the capture of oil supplies must more than ever be of importance to Germany after the demands made on her oil reserves by the Russian campaign, and in view of the demands it will continue to make, whether the campaign is conducted offensively or defensively. Since the Caucasian oilfields are the only source from which Germany could hope to get increased supplies within a reasonable time it may be concluded that their capture will be a governing factor in German plans. Everything in fact points to a renewal of the offensive in Russia as the main German commitment this year, with the capture of Caucasia dictating its main direction. Quite apart from the consideration that to remain on the defensive in Russia would be a shattering admission of failure, the fact that so great a part of the *Reichswehr* would in any case be engaged there suggests the simplest course would be to reinforce it for offensive action. The occupation of Caucasia would obviously be a main objective since in addition to providing Germany with new sources of oil supply it would have a disastrously crippling effect on the Russian war effort.

The question is, what subsidiary enterprise is Germany likely to undertake? If Russia is to remain the chief offensive theatre it may be expected that she would, in the first instance, look for a field where direct influence on the issue in Russia could be brought to bear. What would appear best to fulfil that condition would be an attack on Turkey with the limited objective of securing control of the Dardanelles zone.

That would give her a conveniently placed theatre to which she is in undisputed control of lines of communication—one in close proximity to Rumanian oil supplies and within easy range of many established aerodromes. Moreover, as it would not entail a long advance and as, presumably, Bulgarian and Italian assistance could be counted on, it would not entail any wasteful diversion of resources from the Russian theatre. If the Straits were opened to the passage of the Italian Fleet and German U-boats, the assistance which could be given to a German drive towards Caucasia is obvious. The Russian Black Sea Fleet could no longer play the important part it has taken hitherto, both in transporting troops and in co-operation with coastal operations while, on the other hand, safe sea communications would be invaluable to the Germans in maintaining the supplies of their southern armies, and in offensive

amphibious operations. The persistence of the attack on Sebastopol at heavy cost, even after the port had become untenable as a base for the Black Sea Fleet, is a further indication of the German intention, not merely to cripple the Black Sea Fleet but to obtain a base for their own use. Preparations that the Germans have already made in Bulgaria and in the captured Greek islands clearly constitute a threat to Turkey. If the threat matures it would probably be in early spring for the weather would then be favourable and the Germans might hope to bring the operation to a successful conclusion before the drying up of spring mud permitted the main offensive in Russia to open.

There are of course other subsidiary enterprises the Germans might undertake which would have a direct bearing on the Russian campaign as well as on the general conduct of the war. One may be an attempt to capture Malta by an air invasion during the time when air operations in Russia are limited by winter conditions. If Malta fell, not only would reinforcement of the Axis Army in Libya become a less dangerous business, but it would affect British power to assist Turkey. It would become more difficult to supply and reinforce our Middle East forces and entail the retention of greater numbers in Libya, whether for offensive or defensive action. The heavier units of the Italian Navy have so far played but a small part in protecting communications with Libya, and with Malta in Axis hands their movement to the Black Sea would not appear materially to affect the risks convoys would still encounter.

If Russia is again to become the theatre for German offensive operations, would it necessarily entail the abandonment or postponement of a direct attack on Britain? I suggest that it must, for that would demand a major effort by the *Luftwaffe* probably just at the season when the great and growing Russian air power would demand a maximum concentration of the *Luftwaffe* to meet it.

The gist of my argument is that Germany is bound to make Russia her main theatre of war this year, and that she would naturally undertake only such subsidiary operations as would affect the main theatre. Russia has shown that she has an unexpected capacity for offensive action and purely as a defensive measure Germany must deprive her of that capacity; for Russia forms the only base from which the *Reichswehr* can be fully brought to action and defeated. It seems inconceivable that Germany should allow Russia's offensive power to grow unchecked and the most obvious way of checking it would be to deprive her of the main sources of her oil supply. Moreover, by attacking her she would tend to relieve Japan of her greatest immediate danger—an attack by Russia.

Can the most optimistic Germans now believe it is possible to achieve a crushing and decisive defeat of the Allies? Surely the best they can hope for is to attain a position of stalemate while retaining immense bargaining assets in their hands. That position cannot be reached while Russia retains her offensive potentialities and while she remains a base from which the other

allies can co-operate. Amazing as the Russian recovery has been it is hardly possible to believe that she can either fully develop her own offensive power or deprive Germany of hers during the next few months. Meantime the Japanese war must to some extent reduce the contribution the Allies can make towards expediting the full development of Russia's potential strength, and an early attack on Turkey would have a similar if lesser diversionary effect.

For all these reasons, unless the present Russian counter-offensive can achieve successes beyond all reasonable expectations, a renewal of the German offensive in the late spring or early summer may be expected, for it must not be forgotten that Germany has passed a number of obstacles, has advanced her starting line by hundreds of miles since last June and has now a well organized system of communication behind it. That the main offensive would be preceded in the early spring by an attempt to secure the Dardanelles zone seems probable, and a still earlier attempt to capture Malta is a possibility. Only in case the present Russian offensive achieved such success as to make a renewal of the German offensive out of the question does it seem likely that invasion of Britain as the last desperate course would be attempted; for the threat of invasion still serves its purpose, and failure would remove the threat in the course of a few days.

THE NAVAL AIR ARM

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

EVENTS in the Far East, in particular the losses of the American Fleet and the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, have corroborated to the full the opinions of those who, for many years before the war, pointed out that aircraft are integral units of a navy; as integral, in fact, as submarines and motor boats and every other type of fighting instrument which takes part in the operations of sea warfare. The failure to recognize this simple, and indeed elementary, fact at the time of the separation of the naval flying service from the rest of the navy was a most egregious blunder which has cost us dearly during the present war. Confused thinking was at the bottom of it, on the assumption that a new means of propulsion and action in a different medium were reasons for constituting a new service with the instruments so propelled and acting in the new medium.

The criterion by which the "Service" to which an instrument belongs should, in actual fact, be determined by the object of the operations which that service has to undertake. The operations of a navy have as their ultimate object the command and control of the sea. The immediate aim of the sea fighting forces is to destroy these forces of the enemy which, fighting at sea, oppose the establishment of command and the exercise of control, and to interrupt those communications by sea on which the enemy's efforts depend. All the "weapons" with which the warfare at sea is conducted are units of the sea forces; and they are indissolubly linked with each other. The greater surface ships need the protection of the destroyer against submarine attack, of aircraft against air attack; the destroyer needs the support of the air in air infested waters; the merchant ship which conducts the communications must be protected by battleships, if threatened by them, by cruisers against cruisers, by destroyers against smaller vessels, submarines and aircraft. The business of locating an enemy at sea is one in which, as the *Bismarck* chase illustrated, surface and aerial craft both play their parts. The repelling of a waterborne invasion is, in part, an affair of sinking the transports of the enemy in which surface vessels, submarines and aircraft are all concerned and between whom there must be the most intimate connection. In all of these, as well as in many another of the many operations of sea warfare, a complete co-ordination of the three arms, surface, sub-surface and super-surface is essential. A common doctrine must govern their strategy and tactics, the instruments themselves must be designed for the purposes they have to fulfil, the men

who use them must be trained to the work at sea. It is for the sea-commander to determine the objectives of his strategy, and he must possess both the means and the power to distribute them in the manner the circumstances demand.

It is necessary to recognize a clear distinction between the continuous operations of the struggle for command and control and those other special and temporary operations which are undertaken for a particular and specific purpose, and are of a conjunct nature—the capture of a base, a diversionary operation, an excentric attack from the sea or the expulsion of an enemy's forces from an area—in which land and sea forces have so often acted together. Given the necessary good understanding between the commanders and in all ranks—a condition that has not always existed, as all students of history are aware—effective co-operation between the services is possible for the execution of the particular enterprise: this, however, differs wholly from the continuous, unceasing struggle at sea for command and control, in which an unified command, which comprises and disposes of all the combatant forces engaged in it, is absolutely necessary; and even in those temporary operations the naval forces must be complete in all their units. The sea commander must be able to command the services of all the vessels and craft acting at sea, the minesweepers, surface flotilla craft and aircraft which act in combination in the offensive and defensive operations at sea: he must no more be dependent upon the good offices and inclinations of another command for his security from air attack than he is for his security against mines and torpedoes.

All of this is, one would have thought, very elementary. Nevertheless, it took many years to obtain recognition in the re-establishment of the Naval Air Arm, or, rather, its partial re-establishment. The return of some of the air forces which operate with the Navy was both tardy and incomplete; and it was made too short a time before the outbreak of the present war for a naval air flotilla to be built up with fit types, in adequate numbers and equipped and trained for service at sea. It is because of this delay and partial restitution that we have suffered some of the serious losses of the last two years.

Among the effects of the false assumption that there is a distinction between the forces acting in the air and those on and under the sea was the waste of effort in the first stages of the operations of the defence of shipping in the Western Approaches, where surface and air forces were engaged on the common task. While the surface forces worked upon one system of trade protection the air forces worked upon another. Long "reconnaissance" flights were made in the belief that enemy submarines, being thereby kept from coming to the surface, were rendered unable effectively to attack the merchantmen. It was a complete delusion. The results of these flights, in which a great number of aircraft took part and used many a gallon of petrol, were practically negligible. Very few submarines were sighted, a few more

tracks were seen, the number of attacks made could probably be counted on the fingers, and it is questionable whether a single submarine was sunk. The slogan "we keep them down" was, so far as it had any practical interpretation, a pure figment of the imagination; and hardly less was the belief that the rare occasions of sighting were of any practical assistance to what were called the "hunting flotillas." Indeed, hunting in open waters offers very small prospects of success, as the experience of the last war showed. The German submarine commander may have found it a nuisance to be sighted, but he can hardly have found that it interfered seriously with his operations. The ineffectiveness of this divided command was at length realized after seven months. In April, 1940, the air forces acting in defence of trade to the Westward were placed under the "operational" command of the navy, though the flying boats, essentially naval craft, were still for a time withheld. When the Fleet Air Arm was resurrected in 1937 the transfer was fettered by the utterly illogical compromise that only those aircraft which operate from ships should come under the Navy; those working from shore bases were to remain under the Air Force. This decision showed a complete want of clear military thinking. It made the point of departure of a particular type of fighting instrument a determinant of the service to which it belongs, ignoring the self-evident fact that all naval craft, of every type, make their departure from a harbour.

However good the liaison between the land and air forces may have been in the first Libyan campaign, that between the sea and the air was incomplete. While the military advance was prepared by a "strafing" of the enemy's airfields, no such a preparation preceded the movement of the highly important convoy during whose passage through the Sicilian Channel the aircraft carrier *Illustrious* was severely damaged and her services lost for many months, and the cruiser *Southampton* sunk (Jan. 10, 1941). The movement of an important convoy is a major operation of war—who does not remember that many of the great sea battles from the Dutch wars onward had their origin in the movement of a convoy, that Anson's and Hawke's battles in 1747, the first of June, even Trafalgar related to convoy movements; and that Gibraltar would have been taken by the enemy if the three convoys that brought relief during the great siege had been stopped? But in the movement of last January there was no attempt made to clear the way by previous or simultaneous attacks on those enemy aerodromes from which the aircraft proceeded which dealt us the serious blows to the two valuable ships. Air attacks were made on the Sicilian aerodromes *after* the event and considerable damage claimed; but how much better to have made them before!

Again, the attack on Taranto was made with a very small force of the older types of craft to which the navy was committed through having been fettered by the system of production. Contrast that attack, successful as it was, with the scale of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. The naval air arm of the

Japanese being wholly naval it was possible for the Japanese navy to develop it in the best manner; and it is to be noted that two-thirds of its units operate from shore bases. The Fleet Air Arm made that courageous attack with "a few six or seven year old 'Swordfish' biplanes, just capable of carrying one light torpedo at a speed of about 100 miles an hour" (Sir R. Keyes in *News Chronicle*, Dec. 18, 1941). Nor does the evidence of want of liaison stop here. Every schoolboy knows that tactical victory needs always to be consummated in a relentless pursuit, yet this victory was not followed up by the analogous operation of pursuit: that is to say, by attacks to complete the business by inflicting further damage, by crippling of the Dockyard at Taranto and the operations of repair, by bombing of the dockyard town and driving the workmen away. The naval air resources, limited as they have been by the preposterous policy, were insufficient to carry out this desirable strategy of pursuit and the Italian ships, or some of them, have since been repaired without interruption. The battleship crippled at Matapan regained port, but no attempt to complete her disablement has been reported. It is difficult to imagine that, if the navy were in possession of the air forces that it needs, this Hotham-like policy of inaction would have been followed. This is no time for saying, as that Admiral did: "We must be contented, we have done very well" but rather for following the Nelsonic principle: "Had we taken ten sail and had allowed the eleventh to escape, *when it had been possible to have got at her*, I could never have called it well done." Unless the navy possesses all the fighting craft which take part in its operations there is bound to be this failure to attain the results which opportunities offer in war.

It has recently been argued by a writer described as an Air Correspondent* that "the functions which are possible from a shore base are not at all the same as those that are possible from an aircraft carrier" since the short range of fighter aircraft prevents them from giving support to a fleet except when close to the shore. Support to a fleet from the shore must be given, the writer says, by long range fighters and these will always be inferior to short range fighters. This is a truly extraordinary line of reasoning. It ignores strategy; it ignores the ultimate object of the forces taking part in the operations of war at sea; it makes the range of a fighter the determining element in the service to which an instrument belongs—materialism pure and simple. The Japanese, as remarked earlier, have not been misled by such sophistries. If, as the action off the Malay coast appears to show, the Navy cannot depend upon enjoying the co-operation of the Air Force's long range fighters when engaged on a hazardous operation like that in which the two battleships were lost, and that other in the Sicilian Channel to which reference has been made—and there are others—the lesson is plain: it must possess its own, just as it must possess, and be able to distribute, according to the needs of the situation, the destroyers and other craft that complete its establishment. Is

*Daily Telegraph, January 2, 1942.

it possible to imagine the surface and submarine and mine sweeping forces as separate commands to which the Admiral of a battlefleet must make application on every occasion in which he needs their service, and even then cannot be sure that he will receive the support for which he asks? Of course it is unimaginable. It is indeed true that at the height of the submarine campaign in the last war a proposal was made by some submarine enthusiasts in France to constitute a separate and "independent" submarine navy; but the good sense of the French naval staff prevented the perpetration of the absurdity. Yet the relation of aircraft to sea warfare differs in no wise from that of the submarine of twenty years ago. At the risk of boring the reader with repetition it must again be said that aircraft, like submarines, are integral units of a navy and that this is not altered by the facts whether they fly from a ship or from the shore, or whether they are long or short ranged. Range is wholly immaterial in the matter—naval craft are both long and short ranged, from the motor torpedo boat to the ocean going cruiser.

The long separation of the control of the air forces engaged in naval work from naval control has had, I am convinced, much to do with such want of foresight as there has been of the potentialities of the air in sea warfare. If officers and men are to be fully trained in all the branches of the sea strategy, tactics and technique of the combined arms which constitute a fleet of to-day it is essential that there shall be the most complete interaction and confidence. The existence of a spirit in which one arm seeks to depreciate the powers of another, instead of seeking to discover the best methods of co-operation in strategy and tactics, is thoroughly harmful. No one who has followed the course which the controversy between the protagonists of the "battleship" and "bomber" took for some years, in which each did its utmost to prove the total uselessness of the other, can be unaware of the effects which this has had upon our preparedness to employ effectively our own conjunct forces and to master the efforts of our enemies. There was an almost analogous conflict before the last war between the "submarine" and "surface" schools of thought. Submarines were trained, and lived, in a watertight compartment, and it is not too much to say that the undefended condition of the naval bases at the beginning of the war in 1914 was in no small degree due to this isolation. The assumption had been made, some years previously, that the difficulties of navigation of the Firth of Forth and the Pentland Firth and channels leading into the Flow, were so great that no submarine could effect an entry; and when, about a year before the war, doubts were expressed as to whether this judgment, formed as it had been in the early days of submarines, still held good, it was indignantly denied that any need for a revision of the view was needed. The high officer who thus rejected the proposal to reconsider the question was out of touch with submarine developments and unaware of the fact that, in recent exercises, submarines had penetrated into the Firth. A proposal to make the submarine flotillas a part of the fleet was rejected on the grounds that it would check progress, and I have no doubt that the segre-

gation of submarines from the surface commands was a prime cause of want of acquaintance with the ways and powers of those vessels that led to a lack of precaution, both in harbour defence and in cruising at sea, which resulted in avoidable losses. It was the insecurity of Scapa Flow that caused the transfer of the fleet to another and less well situated base, and to the sinking of the *Audacious*. The segregation of the air from the sea has had, I am convinced, equally unfortunate results.

The writer previously mentioned claimed among other things that there is a particular advantage arising from the Coastal Command remaining under the Air Force, though engaged on naval operations. Its units, he said, need bomber and fighter support occasionally when so engaged, and are able, by virtue of their position, to call upon their sister commands for that help. A naval air arm could not make this call. The answer to this amazing statement is that if the naval air arm were properly constituted it would comprise both the bombers and fighters which are needed in the course of its *normal* operations. In operations on a larger scale, of an abnormal character, the co-operation of the services would come into play as it has always done when a conjunct naval and military operation of the type and object previously referred to was undertaken, precisely as the general in command in Libya can call upon the Air Forces in that theatre to combine their efforts with those of the land forces. If the navy cannot count upon receiving this assistance at these exceptional moments the only solution is that its own air forces should be strong enough to meet its needs. That, however, should not be necessary if a proper distinction is made between the different types of operations, the normal and the exceptional. The difficulty does not often arise, though it has arisen occasionally, in the combined use of the navy and the army, and there is no reason why it should arise in the case of the navy and the air service.

It is high time that we began to think objectively instead of subjectively and to recognize that a change has taken place in naval warfare as radical and far reaching as the changes from the oared to the sailing vessel, from the armed transport to the artillery carrier, from the sailing to the steam driven ship; and the tactical and strategical changes introduced by the invention of the torpedo which conferred "battle value" on the flotilla and imposed restrictions upon the movements of surface ships from blockade to the protection of commerce. Each new agent, whether a weapon or a weapon carrier, which is capable of taking an effective part in the operations of war at sea needs to be incorporated in the sea forces; and for all its novelty—if not indeed by reason of it—this rule applies as fully to this the air weapon as it did to its many revolutionary predecessors.

AIR POWER IN THE FAR EAST

BY AIR-COMMODORE L. E. O. CHARLTON

RECENT events in the Far East have been very largely hinged on air power, and there would appear to be a long road yet to travel before we, the Allies in that distant theatre, properly appreciate its uses and abuses when exerted over a field remote from metropolitan radii of action. As regards Pearl Harbour it is surely puerile to accuse the Japanese of treachery when they perpetrated their surprise attack. Does one expect an assassin manfully to declare that he is about to stab you in the back? Knowing the nature of the beast, and realizing that the times are out of joint, one walks about on guard and warily. The U.S.A. possesses flying boats of the Catalina order which have been contrived for the main, if not the only, purpose of carrying out long distance sea reconnaissance, and which have a noble range of flight. But we do not hear, nor are we permitted to infer, that the Pacific Ocean had been scoured in all directions, at the limits of their air endurance, by these winged leviathans, intent on the prevention of just what was allowed to happen and on proving that history, in that particular, could not repeat itself. Because of that sleepiness and lack of precaution, coupled with the fact that the U.S. Naval Intelligence was unaware that a considerable portion of the Japanese Fleet, including several aircraft-carriers, had put to sea, the enemy was able, treachery apart, to strike a master-blow, inflicting thereby serious loss, deranging the Pacific War Plan, carefully prepared to meet the eventuality of such a conflict, and jeopardizing the safety of the whole Far-Eastern situation, not excepting that of Singapore. All this, be it noted, was accomplished in little more than an hour by the clock, and at breakneck speed, by Japanese aircraft flying off the decks of the most vulnerable sea-going craft afloat, and within, comparatively, close range of their objectives. Could any campaign in a major war have more disastrously commenced? It was indeed a case of air power in the ascendant!

In the islands and archipelagos of the Western Pacific, which constitute the true Far East, the English-speaking Allies are everywhere feeling the pinch of enemy air superiority, an inevitable result of Japan's commanding situation as the Air Power on the spot. One of the most lamentable effects of the surprise air attack on the Philippine Islands, that fateful Sunday morning, was the damage thereby sustained from the bombing of the U.S. airfields, the equipment of which, owing to the huge distances involved and because the enemy fleet commands the neighbouring waters, is at present and for a long time will be irreplaceable. From this it followed naturally that the

Japanese were able to assert a local air mastery from the very first, freely introducing aircraft from the Chinese mainland and Formosa to occupy the captured airfields of Luzon, and assembling fleets of transports, under air and naval escort, to effect such landings, diversionary or in force, as their strategy demanded. The remnant of the U.S. air force responded gallantly, sinking the battleship Haruna and damaging another of the Kongo class, while life was in it, but waves of bombers persistently attacked the airfields, and soon succeeded in crushing all resistance from the air. As at Pearl Harbour, so in the Philippines, the efficacy of well-planned air surprise had proved itself again, the success of the invading forces being due, in more than all else besides, to the workings of the enemy in that element.

Hong Kong is another chapter in the same recital, although here surprise was lacking. The loss of the Colony, within the space of a few days at most, was a foregone conclusion owing to the setting of the board when Japan commenced hostilities. Both isolated and beyond all reach of succour, it was immediately deprived of any overhead protection as soon as British Kowloon, on which a solitary aerodrome was situated, had been overrun by the superior Japanese mainland forces. Thereafter it became a practice target for the aircraft of Japan in whatever force she cared to use against it, with no air resistance to encounter and able to maintain a perpetual assault by day and night. So assured was its fate in these circumstances that it seems a pity it had been so recently reinforced. The two Canadian units, at a late hour thus introduced, would have been invaluable at Khota Baru, in Northern Malay, when the enemy invaded the Peninsula on the same day that Hong Kong was attacked. They, and the remainder of the garrison, are now in captivity, and only our Imperial High Command know the purpose that was served by their brave, but Quixotic, resistance in a hopeless situation.

Turn we to Malay, and to that sea bastion in Far-Eastern waters Singapore. Here as well we are far outnumbered in the air, witness of that melancholy air procession overhead wherein the hostile aircraft come and go at their own sweet pleasure, and in privacy. The British public have derived much comfort from the periodical announcements that reinforcements have reached Singapore, which invariably included large-sized air detachments. They were further comforted by the knowledge that an Air Officer of vast experience, and wide repute, had been given the Command-in-Chief of that key position. All is well with Singapore, they said, knowing the immense importance of the place. And yet nowhere has the situation more deteriorated, taken as a whole, than in that particular portion of the globe. Our chain of air bases, constructed at great cost in order that fighters, and other short-range aircraft, might be flown from India to Malay, is now in enemy hands and available for a hostile purpose. Those few remaining to us are becoming scarcer as the enemy forces wriggle through the jungle and worm a way ever southwards towards Singapore. Such a development might not, excusably, have

been foreseen in the piping days of peace, nor even at the outbreak of the Western War. But Japan, in pursuance of her Nankai ("South Sea") policy, began to show her hand directly she put pressure on French Indo-China soon after Marshal Pétain, in June, 1940, sued Germany for an honourable peace. We have therefore been given eighteen months' notice of probable developments in the South China Sea and lands adjoining, a period of grace which we do not seem to have put to good advantage. As for Thailand, not much diplomatic acumen was required to be certain that the attitude of that modernized state would be determined by the circumstances in the event of the Nankai policy being implemented by Japan. Our air base chain from Burma southwards was put in peril directly the Vichy representative in Indo-China acceded to the Japanese demands. Eighteen months is a long time, in the midst of war, for new plans to be hatched, and a Commander-in-Chief, himself an Air Officer and notoriously air-minded, might surely have considered the practicability of fashioning an alternative chain, via the Andamans, the Nicobars, and Sumatra, in substitution for the one endangered. We might not thus be witnessing, once again, the sad spectacle of a Malayan air, empty of British aircraft, though crowded with the aircraft of Japan.

Hardly had we at home become aware of the worsening of our affairs in this respect, when news of the naval disaster assailed our ears, a direct consequence, it can only be inferred, of the deteriorated situation in the air. To dilate on that tragic happening, at the present stage of our information, would be both ill-timed and superfluous. The facts, as far as the general public is concerned, are plain and unadorned. The British Admiral was engaged on something very nearly approaching an inshore cruise; it appears that he had discounted R.A.F. assistance; he was hoping for a continuance of cloudy weather. But perhaps the most significant fact of all is that, having been detected by the enemy's reconnoitring aircraft, he had actually abandoned the design and was on his way back to Singapore when overtaken by disaster. Such is the impression in the public mind, which otherwise refuses to grapple further with the problem, content to think that everything will be satisfactorily explained when the Board of Admiralty sends its post-war linen to the wash.

The clouds are dark and lowering in the Far East. It may be that they will descend still further before they are dispersed. A militant nation has sprung into the arena suddenly in that portion of the globe, possessing the inestimable advantage of being the Air Power on the spot. To wrest that sore advantage from him is a first preliminary to the eventual victory on which we count. Could not a bomber force be spared from home? It might mean a lessening of pressure on the Nazi war machine. But would that matter?

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EBB AND FLOW—AN IRISH BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

IRELAND like every other neutral country offers a study in morbid psychology. In England where people accept many privations and at times even dangers, the average citizen is supported by pride; he or she likes to feel that "England can take it." In Ireland no such tonic is possible, though all minds are constantly preoccupied with the war and

ordinary talk reveals a curiously complicated mentality. There are no doubt some who regard immunity from war's hardships as fruits of a victory gained twenty years ago, and these may be said to be proud of their neutrality. Yet in this war, which is not Ireland's war, numbers of Irishmen have volunteered unasked; they are reckoned at 150,000. One man, well placed to know, told me that the sons of all who served in the last struggle have joined up to a man; and their own families are proud of them. But the generation too old to serve remains, even where sympathy with England is strongest, well content to be exempt. Dublin has been gay this Christmas. Some indeed suggest hopefully that "Ireland may be in the war before it is over," which of course means that in their opinion Ireland may be attacked. For the present however they accept Mr. de Valera's policy with approval but without ardour. Ardour is not a state of mind which neutrality can easily produce. There are none of those strong public emotions which accompany war-time in countries that have taken a side; and as one consequence, the books which come out of Ireland this winter are noticeably short of enthusiasm. Oliver Gogarty, one of our best writers whether in prose or in verse, gives us no more than an elaborate piece of fooling in his *Going Native** which in this case means playing at being an Englishman. But nothing could be less like England of to-day than what is shown in this picture of elaborate and lengthy week-end parties. The opening chapters are in a different vein; they sketch Yeats in his old age, and though we need not seriously believe that the poet counselled his admirer to get out of Ireland because it had been given over to "rude civil servants," one may very well believe that the movement which Yeats led had ended in a state of things which he regarded without pride. As for Mr. Gogarty, he seems to have lost his illusions about Ireland and failed to acquire any enthusiasm for the English.

* * * * *

Again Dublin has been vehemently discussing *A Lady's Child*† in which Miss Enid Starkey sketches a prominent Dublin family—(her own)—as she remembers it in the Edwardian period. The centre of that household was a famous Greek scholar, one of the greater gods in Trinity College before he became Commissioner for Education; but there is little trace in the book of the Irish literary movement

Dublin
Society

* Cape. 8s. 6d.

† Faber & Faber. 8s. 6d.

then at its height. Neither Yeats nor Synge nor the Abbey theatre seems to have affected the consciousness of these highly cultivated Dubliners whom, in the opinion of contemporary Dublin, Miss Starkey has presented with devastating frankness. Showing them as they were in the Edwardian period, she could not show their reaction to wars which had not yet taken place; but the Land War lay behind them and apparently it had never touched their minds. In fact the book is a curious proof that intelligent persons can live through a revolution without being aware that it is taking place. The landlord period of Irish history was dead and buried and seemingly forgotten before Miss Starkey began to be educated; the later revolution which put an Irish government in place of Dublin Castle cannot have much disturbed the social life of this typical well-to-do and cultured family group, or there would be some allusion to it, if only by anticipation. Society in Dublin has been and still is cut off from political currents as the equivalent groups in London or in Edinburgh could never be. Broadly speaking, the earlier revolutionary struggle was one between landlord and tenant, and persons in Society, whether they owned land or not, counted themselves on the side of the landowner. The struggle was fought out between government with its soldiery, police and law-courts, on one side, and a combination of peasants and shopkeepers on the other, led by what Society called 'rascally agitators.' When the active period of that struggle ended and the landlords were bought out, what remained was the fight to destroy the power of the English government with which social respectability identified itself. Literature to some extent in Ireland took the side of nationalism and was therefore not unnaturally suspect; Miss Starkey and her family were more concerned with the literature and art that came to Ireland across the sea than what was home grown. Her story does not touch the later time when the second wave of revolution swept away the English government, as the first had swept away the landlords, "England's faithful garrison." But if she had to describe Dublin society of the same grouping to-day, she would show it equally unconcerned with local politics—into which members of Dublin society are not encouraged to adventure.

* * * * *

There is however no lack of literature (using the word as it is used by propagandists) produced by those who accept the revolution with conscious delight. A typical example is *Rackrent Hall** by Mr. M. J. MacManus, literary editor of the *Irish Press*, the organ of Mr. de Valera's party. In a prefatory critical note he laments the "solemnity, tunelessness and obscurity" of much verse written to-day in Ireland conforming, as he says, to English models. Although as he puts it "Europe's sky is darkened by the wings of countless chickens coming home to roost," Ireland, he thinks, might produce "a swinging song of battle or a fierce resonant satire." But would Switzerland or Sweden or any other neutral country be a likely breeding ground for battle songs? You cannot have it both ways, nor cultivate at once martial music and a policy of judicious avoidance. And if fierce resonant satire began to deal with affairs at the moment, would the censor let it through? Mr. MacManus tries his hand at satire, but he goes back for subjects to an Ireland about which the censor need not trouble, and which he knows only by hearsay—the Ireland in which landlords had the power of eviction. I have the questionable advan-

* Talbot Press, Dublin. 2s. 6d.

tage of having grown up in it and have known and worked with the men who broke the landlord power—which at its worst was pretty bad. The Lord Leitrim of whom Mr. MacManus writes lived in my father's parish, and I remember well the messenger coming in with the news of his killing. But Mr. MacManus gives us the picturesque detail that he had a great library. It seems certain that there was a three-day sale of books at Mulroy House; yet I wonder if that was not after the death of a quite different Lord Leitrim. All I know is that an eminent Irish scholar thought seriously of going down because some works of special interest to him were included. Has Mr. MacManus any grounds for suggesting that the library contained a rare edition of Dante or a Crashaw or a Donne? However this is a side issue; what I want to point out is that Mr. MacManus and others like him who condemn Lover and Father Prout for "stage Irishism" run into stage Irishism of another kind. They give us the "stage landlord." This book has rhymes about a "Lady Louisa tall and fair," who first built a church for the Protestants and then

To Father Thady she gave a chapel
(Just like handing a child an apple)
Complete with bells and a slated steeple
That called to Mass all the country people.

But when famine came and the rents were not paid, Lady Louisa "sent out Peelers and crowbar brigade to pull down the roof-tree and quench the hearth fire." Now this retrospective rancour which snarls even at the gift of a chapel affects me unpleasantly and makes me uncertain of the rhyme's good faith. I don't believe in such a combination of qualities. My recollections of Donegal include not only Lord Leitrim but Lord George Hill, a white-bearded old gentleman with the most courtly manners, dressed in homespuns from his Gweedore estate, which he had bought deliberately because the people were dreadfully poor. He and his household were the only gentlefolk I knew who learned Irish so that they might have more friendliness with their Irish-speaking tenants; it used to be said that if Lord George's horses went lame, the tenants would pull his phaeton home those ten long Irish miles any day. Yet when the Land War came, Gweedore was drawn into the general strike against rents. I am not certain whether there were evictions there, but there was bitterness, and there was ingratitude. However, Mr. MacManus would probably think that to collect rents at all was an outrage. He writes triumphantly

Not all the King Harmans and all the King's men
Will bring back the gentry to Connaught again.

Well, till the other day Lady Gregory, Edward Martyn and W. B. Yeats were gentry resident in Connaught, and I do not think Connaught the richer for their absence. Nor do I think that the country people anywhere had any desire to see the gentry disappear—which is a quite different matter from the disappearance of the landlord power.

Again I have much sympathy with Mr. MacManus in his wish for gayer and more tuneful poetry, but his review of what Ireland can show in the way of light verse is singularly inadequate. He has forgotten Alfred Graves and C. L. Graves; he probably never heard of A. D. Godley. But apparently he accounts as Irish only those who write and publish within the shores of Ireland. Yet even so he might have found consolation on his own publishers' premises. Lynn Doyle's *Lilts and Lyrics** are just as "easy and unpretentious" as Mr. MacManus claims that his own verses are, and without putting

it too high they are just as good. I am for several reasons attracted by the piece called "The Worker in the Fields"; it has good sententious lines, such as

The lucky man is the man with the job worth doin' that does it with pride.
But better than this are lines that slash in a picture.

The turnip ground grows purple black with the drivin' sleet

The seeds fly far from my hand to nest in the readied ground

The ripe wheatfield curves an' shines like a horse's Back

Both these writers of verse lament the recent untimely death of one of Ireland's major poets, F. R. Higgins. Mr. MacManus stresses the fact that he was buried in his own county of Meath, at Laracor where Swift's memory lingers. I am glad that he accepts at least one of the Anglo-Irish writers as not wholly alien, for, having much sympathy with his stand for "melody and rhythm," I regret to find him setting up a most narrowing definition of what should be accounted "kindly Irish of the Irish."

* * * * *

Anybody who wishes to know how Ireland reached its present attitude—whether in Eire or in the Six Counties—cannot do better than study Mr.

The Irish Puzzle

Donal O'Sullivan's book on *The Irish Free State and its Senate*.† It is a pleasure to find subjects of the most bitter controversy treated with human generosity. Mr. O'Sullivan is a prominent Irish scholar, but I have found no one who speaks with more commonsense on the attempt to make Ireland into a Gaelic speaking country, or on the view that Irish nationality needs a separate language to distinguish it. As one of the official clerks to the Senate during its fifteen years of existence, he recognized the good-will of the Unionist minority towards the new Ireland. The Senate was indeed an attempt to make available for national purposes elements in the nation which the methods of elective democracy would have failed to bring in. Mr. O'Sullivan completes his work by a review of the last years in which Eire has been governed mainly on the single Chamber system. Inevitably he closes on a note of interrogation, seeing his country well within the area of a conflict "from the results of which Ireland cannot remain immune, and of which no man can yet see the end."

* Talbot Press. 2s. 6d.
† Faber & Faber. 25s.

GREY EMINENCE, by Aldous Huxley. *Chatto and Windus*. 15s.
TRAINING FOR THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT, by Gerald Heard. *Cassell*. 1s. 6d.

Mr. Huxley's essay in biography is perhaps the most remarkable of his many books, and one of the most remarkable books of this decade. It seems to me to be no exaggeration to say that Mr. Huxley is our leading political philosopher. This book is a psychological study of a Capuchin friar who was also a 'power politician,' a mystic who was also in effect foreign secretary of France and founder of the French Navy, a man who strove to serve at once God and the Cardinal, at once a Savonarola and a Metternich, Père Joseph du Tremblay, the 'Grey Eminence' who was *alter ego* of the Red Eminence, Armand de Richelieu. The book is full of admirable asides, as in the analysis of Milton, and of much typical Huxleiana, but it is also filled with a driving indignation and occupied with a precise vivisection.

Aldous Huxley has his own *Eminence Gris*, who has succeeded D. H. Lawrence in this post. It is Mr. Gerald Heard. *Grey Eminence* and *Training for the Life of the Spirit* should be read together. Heard's research shows in Huxley's study; Huxley's quotations reappear in Heard's brief manual. The two between them, fortified by great erudition and by genuine concern and sensitivity, are establishing a school of mystical religion and of the communal life of which I expect great things. Heard provides, in book after book, the positive message. Mr. Huxley in his more recent work, *Beyond Mexique Bay*, *After Many Summers* and the present book, provides a Swiftian critique of our present civilization, its vogues and pseudo-heroes. He shows where these deviate to their

own damnation from the Grand Tradition of righteous living handed down from Augustine and earlier. He damns them from the mouths of the saints and from the writings of the psychologists. Here the mischievous policy is relentlessly exposed of one of 'the founders of modern times,' the supreme 'power politician,' Richelieu, and also the devil's work of dividing Europe in order that France might unite herself, making Protestants the pawns of a secularized Cardinal in civil wars blasphemously called 'the Wars of Religion' and literally promoting cannibalism. The downfall of Richelieu's colleague, and the corruption of a saint by nationalist bigotry, is shown in the chapter on the virus of power called 'Nothing Fails like Success.' The Lord Buddha, by contrast, Mr. Huxley implies, was not interested in politics—not even as much as is Mr. Gandhi.

I have the temerity to say here that the mystic path, as traditionally followed, seems to me a raised path running beside the catholic and human highway. It is not a side-track. It is, however, only satisfactory when it is taken as *one way*, followed by men of a special function. Mr. Huxley unwittingly provides my reasons. They are, certainly, not that mysticism has only appealed to a few. So have the higher mathematics. They are not the Marxist argument that mysticism is "an escape." Achievement of a 'deeper reality' cannot be an escape, if indeed such reality is real. They are Huxley's own argument that philosophical questions are meaningless unless there are operational methods for their solution. Père Joseph did not solve this problem of living as, let us say, Confucius did. It is possible to be a considerable mystic, in love with God, and an evil man—that is what

emerges from this book. What one does become is a fanatic . . . A fanatic may be a great power, as Hitler is a great power and as is the Communist party. This does not remove the consideration that fanaticism is a moral deformity. Nor does great personal heroism cover the canvas or cover over this deformity. It mitigates the fault, but does not solve the issue. Where, among the mystics, a Père Joseph failed, there but for the grace of God might any other man. The mystic route does not seem to be the safeguard or to have the self-sufficiency that Mr. Heard supposes.

I will not go as far as Croce in saying that the transitory is the stuff of life or that the historic issues of here and now set the sole genuine problems of philosophy. But I will say that every problem of life fully solved must be solved becomingly—'elegantly'—and that the Quest of the Infinite only provides solutions at one level, although perhaps at the highest, that of the detached teacher, the total pacifist, the Buddha, to whom it matters not one straw what tyrant or commissar, Cæsar or Nero may reign, such being ordained of God. There are also problems of Power and Original Sin, Justice and the Secular Sword, which are also genuine problems; which can be solved elegantly; and which Père Joseph, the power politician (and all politicians whatsoever are power politicians, since politics are the relations of human power) happened to solve inelegantly. It is the grandeur of the Catholic Church that it has always tried to solve both orders of problem. Like the Pharaohs, it has held the crook and the flail—the crozier above the sword. Mr. Huxley's book is an attempt to argue the impropriety of this and his argument must conclude in Tolstoian anarchism. The State

exists by the Old Covenant—but the State, which is not mystical, exists, and rightly exists. It is the multiplicity of States, which Père Joseph did so much to confirm while uniting France, which wrongly exists. In the phrase of Dante: *Maxime unum est maxime bonum*. What was wrong with Père Joseph was not that he was a politician, or even a politician using force, but that, in the last resort, he was a bad politician *sub specie humanitatis*, even although he unified France.

There will, however be few readers of Mr. Huxley's curious and fascinating book who will not ask themselves, after reading it, whether most of our power politicians are not bad politicians or who will not find the question, although bitter in the mouth, salutary in the belly.

GEORGE CATLIN.

THE POWER BEHIND THE MICROPHONE, by P. P. Eckersley. Cape. 10s. 6d.

Mr. Eckersley's book is written with authority, because of his long and intimate connection with the B.B.C. as its Chief Engineer, and comes with the more authority, one feels, because of his wide general knowledge of the technical side of broadcasting. After all, broadcasting begins with the allocation of wireless wave-lengths; the scarcity of these was, as the writer very properly observes, first responsible for the monopoly enjoyed by the B.B.C., and against this monopoly, and its results, most of his criticisms are directed. This criticism is never merely destructive; indeed, few books on broadcasting have embodied so many positive and sensible ideas. Neither his likes nor his dislikes are confined to small points; he does not wish broadcasting to give more of this, or less of that;

he wants, rather, certain very radical reforms, and some completely new arrangements. His views are backed by his own very wide experience of broadcasting, both monopolistic and competitive, and as a critic he is positive, and, indeed, exuberant in explaining his ideas.

Mr. Eckersley's complaint is that the B.B.C. should have concentrated upon a cultural interpretation of its duties, instead of, as it has done, upon a policy which is subservient to the spirit of bureaucratic compromise which fathered it.

It has, in fact, not been "as independent in spirit as it was financially." Instead of being a "patron of the arts," it has patronized the artist. Mr. Eckersley is right, one feels, in tilting against the continual attitude of compromise brought about by the B.B.C.'s peculiar semi-controlled position, and against the complacency and smugness often shown by the Corporation. He feels that those most responsible for the conduct of affairs, are not sufficiently alive and creative; they are pre-occupied by administration, and they will not give latitude enough to the original or clever worker. Some of his criticisms of programmes are unfair; he lashes scornfully the Children's Hour, Schools' Broadcasting, and the Talks department, but seems to be upbraiding these features as they were, say, some years ago, and not as they are to-day. But in saying that poor programmes and unimaginative arrangement may largely be the result of safe monopoly, with no spur of competition, he is very near the truth.

His remedies are various. First, he was never satisfied with the use made of the Regional scheme, and would like the B.B.C., if it ever has Regions again after the war, to allow them almost complete freedom in putting on their own programmes, instead of largely, as be-

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fore the war, acting as a "double outlet" for material from headquarters. If the National were used for news, official announcements, and all sorts of short, necessary items, the Regions would be able to afford long periods of really good and independent stuff. His extension of this plan for uninterrupted programmes of good quality work to suit different tastes (classical music, light music, serious drama, frivolous features, and so on), is the most revolutionary of his ideas. "Wired wireless" would be substituted for the present broadcasting system; on a network of cables, a large number of programmes could be broadcast, and listeners would enjoy perfect reception. Instead of a "hotch-potch," they would get a steady flow of anything they wanted, to be turned on at will. If this system had been adopted before the war, we should never have been reduced to two programmes with bad or indifferent reception, for there would have been no "wireless waves" for enemy aircraft to pick up. Further, Mr. Eckersley would allow some commercial companies to broadcast also; the "wired wireless" system could carry these as well, and the stimulus would be good for the B.B.C. It is certainly amusing to think of the B.B.C. having to keep a careful eye on competitors, lest the listening public desert to the enemy, as it used to desert to "Radio Normandie" on Sundays. Vested interests, Mr. Eckersley says, have naturally opposed the prospects both of "wired wireless" and of commercial broadcasting; but if both these could be established, he thinks we should gain much in enjoyment and in "education" in the real sense. Whether the "mechanization" of entertainment, the feeding of the ears of the populace, has not already gone far enough, he does not con-

sider. Under his scheme, there would be still greater quantities of ready-made entertainment pouring from the tap. Perhaps his view is that, since "radio" has come to stay, it should be as copious and as good as possible. He is certainly sincere in wanting to improve what is good already, and to remove imperfections; his book is lively, and his criticism valuable.

MARY CROZIER.

CHARTIST PORTRAITS, by G. D. H. Cole. *Macmillan*. 15s.

LORD LIVERPOOL AND LIBERAL TORYISM, 1820-1827, by W. R. Brock. *Cambridge University Press*. 8s. 6d.

Mr. Cole's approach to the history of the 19th century is well known; a deep sympathy with the struggle of the working classes against "a hard generation, with the hardness of men utterly convinced of their own rightness, and of being on the side of economic progress"; a clear insight into the causes of their early failures and a strong belief in the gradual growth of the Labour Movement from the Industrial Revolution. Mr. Brock has other interests. His concern is with government and in this, his first book, he gives little indication that he cares one jot for the effect of government on the lives of the people. Although dealing with different decades of the same century the two books can profitably be read together.

Of the two Mr. Cole's book, a work of mature judgment, is naturally the more valuable. It is his object "to present something like a general picture of the rise and fall of the (Chartist) movement and of the widely differing elements that made it up." He achieves this by his choice of portraits demonstrating the appeal of Chartism to men

of vastly different character and attainments.

As Mr. Cole says, three forces were the mainspring of Chartism—"the factory reform movement, the ruthless campaign waged by employers, with Government backing, against the Trade Unions, and the New Poor Law." In fact the People's Charter contained nothing that was new. Nevertheless William Lovett, with his friends of the London Working Men's Association, redrafted the demands and aspirations of the common people at a vital time and for thousands the Charter became the symbol of liberty and justice.

The Charter's advocates divided not without bitterness over the use of physical force. Those who preached moral force were right in their assumption that threats were useless without weapons to implement them. But the cleavage was really much deeper than a question of arms between those who believed that a rational movement should use rational methods and those who agreed with Feargus O'Connor and those who went further than he did that such talk was moral 'humbug.' O'Connor himself proved, when the Monster Petition went to Parliament in three cabs, that the Government were not afraid of signatures; what the Government were afraid of was the mob.

Chartism was born to fail. At its worst it was reactionary; at its best it was the great awakening movement for those who were not yet ready to seize political power. For this reason it will always be a vital page of our history while the lives of those who gave their all to the Charter will continue to inspire. The Chartist Movement numbered many of the foolish in its ranks and foolishness was not the least characteristic of several of its leaders. Yet of how many can it be said that

there was nothing to admire? Even O'Connor with his mad Land Plan and his atrocious egotism, sacrificed his fortune and how great was John Fielden in human virtues or Ernest Jones in his almost senseless sacrifices for a lost cause?

Mr. Brock finds no difficulty in defending the repressive Six Acts of 1819 describing them as "measures which, with all their faults, were successful." By successful he means that in his opinion the country was thereby saved from revolution, an opinion shared undoubtedly by many of Liverpool's Government. But perhaps Mr. Brock is right to show in rather better light a Prime Minister who had charge of this country for no less than 15 years.

Historians have not dealt very kindly with Lord Liverpool, considering him a colourless personality

The men from JAVA

By JEAN MALAQUAIS

These men are not Javanese; they live in the South of France—but not the leisured pre-war South of France. Their home is a mining camp in the small Mediterranean town of Vaugelas. Their quarrels, their amours, their nostalgia provide M. Jean Malaquais with a wealth of material for his racy, intensely modern first novel, which won the Prix Renaudot.

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compared with his great foreign ministers Castlereagh and Canning, or with Huskisson at the Board of Trade and young Peel at the Home Office. Mr. Brock, however, claims considerable credit for Liverpool in selecting and backing the right political horse and in a negative way it does appear from Mr. Brock's narrative that the Prime Minister was held in good esteem by his peers.

Nevertheless, in an admittedly ticklish period, events controlled Liverpool rather than he the events. He remained to the end a singularly unlightened man for one who, as a young man, had been present at the storming of the Bastille. Fear of the mob played a dominant part in early 19th century politics and Liverpool was not the man to see beyond it.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

THE MODERN SHORT STORY, by H. E. Bates. Nelson. 7s. 6d.

The short story has been for some time now in a very precarious position. Threatened on the one hand by the plain fact that, on the whole, the public does not like it, and on the other by a literary reaction against the Tchechovian form which Mr. Bates has himself perfected; and now, like poetry, almost crushed out of existence by the paper shortage, its future would seem at least doubtful. Yet, as Mr. Bates points out, a kind of short-story Renaissance is in progress. Writers are groping for new directions, because

the new war inevitably walls off, as it were, the old era. The story of tranquil, reflective surface, in which the currents of emotions move out of sight, belongs to that era primarily... but the new era of terror and dislocation will—and is bound to—demand a change of form.

No writer as yet, has discovered that form; and the problem of its eventual nature is by far the most important one raised by this book.

Beginning with the origins of the modern short story in Gogol and Poe, Mr. Bates traces its development to the present day. The form took root in America, France and Russia rather than in England during the nineteenth century; mainly, as is made clear, because of the dangerous tendency of English prose writing towards diffuseness—to describe rather than to create. The short story must, like a poem, be sufficient in itself; it must be an emotional situation, not the blue print of one. It took nearly a hundred years for any European writer fully to grasp this essential fact; hence the sudden, almost unexpected flowering of the short story since Tchechov. He and Maupassant are accepted by Mr. Bates as the great masters; and the chapter on these two very different writers is one of the best in the book. After the turn of the century, the English story for the first time gained an importance and a distinctive style of its own, with the advent of Kipling and Wells; and later, of Katherine Mansfield and A. E. Coppard. Although admitting his importance as the first English writer to take the short story seriously, Mr. Bates' section on Kipling is little more than a passionate attack against a writer whose personality and work he obviously loathes ("... a writer whose outlook is one of harsh, confused, egotistical mysticism; a voice vulgar and cruel in its class intolerance"). Little attempt is made to prove this thesis, it is merely stated; and the result is not criticism, but abuse.

Throughout the early twenties of this century, a real renaissance of

the short story was taking place in America, its chief figures Sherwood Anderson and Hemingway. The effect of that movement has only comparatively recently reached England, and its results are hard to predict; but there is no doubt that we have a renaissance of our own, led mainly by such young Welsh writers as Dylan Thomas (whose story *The Tree* is one of the best in English) and Alun Lewis, author of the beautiful *The Wanderers*. Mr. Bates is wary of predicting what course the English story may take:

if the story of the last twenty years has been close to the lyric, the story of the next twenty years may move, or be forced to move, towards dramatic poetry

is all he will venture. But he has no doubt at all that the form is a living one, and that it has reached a crossroad rather than a dead end. His book is important because it gives evidence for such optimism; though it is sometimes spoilt by personal prejudice, and gives up too much space to painstaking analysis of single writers. And I, for one, wish Mr. Bates had overcome his modesty and applied the same process to his own work; without it, the chapters on contemporary writing have almost the vacancy of a princeless *Hamlet*.

SIDNEY KEYES.

HOW STRONG IS AMERICA?,
by Noel Barber. Harrap. 6s.
AMERICA IN WORLD AFFAIRS,
by Allan Nevins. Oxford University Press. 2s. 6d.
POLITICS AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, by D. W. Brogan. Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.

"Unforeseen events," as the advertisements of an American insurance company tirelessly assert,

"change the shape of men's affairs." The surprising thing, though, is how often they don't. Here are three books, all written before America's entry into the war, whose value is virtually unimpaired by that fact. In Mr. Barber's case, admittedly, credit must go to him for intelligent anticipation; "Who knows what may have happened," he asks when discussing Lend-Lease, "in the very brief time between the completion and publication of this book?" But Professors Brogan and Nevins, who are dealing rather with what is behind the hand that fires the gun, with foreign policy and domestic politics, retain their value because what the British public need to know about America is the fundamental principles of her behaviour just as much as—if not more than—the latest detailed information.

Similarly the worth of these little

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books is to be judged primarily not by the correctness of their detail so much as by the truth of their main picture. If that were not so one might cavil at Professor Nevins' description of the Springfield *Republican* as an "internationalist" newspaper or at his implication that there are only two Assistant-Secretaries at the State Department, and Mr. Barber could be taken to task for calling Mr. Rosenman a "judge of the Supreme Court," or for omitting to tell us that Mr. Stimson had been Secretary of State. But it is not by these notes that such sunbeams are to be measured; the test is a simpler one—do they make the dark places plain?

Mr. Barber emphatically does. He tells you what he's looking for, how he's found it and then in plain, clear words and diagrams what the answer is. Even the labyrinth of the U.S. defence organization, in which strong men have been known to lose their way, gets at any rate its principal outlines delineated in black and white for all to see. He disentangles appropriations from payments and orders from deliveries and if he doesn't know a defence figure he doesn't try to bluff it out. In Mr. Barber's statistics of 'planes and guns and tanks there are no numbers 'accruing,' in muddling-through phrase. You may differ from some of Mr. Barber's judgments—for example that the delay in using automobile plants for aeroplane production was due entirely to the practical difficulties of the switch-over—but you must admire a useful, clear, comprehensive piece of reporting, behind whose readability clearly lies a lot of hard work by author and assistants.

Professor Nevins has a harder task, to win the English common reader to both respect and understanding of American foreign policy. He brings to it, besides his

equipment as a scholar, an engaging willingness to admit what he feels to be his country's mistakes, and a clarifying frankness about the course he wants U.S. policy to pursue. An ardent internationalist, he yet speaks fairly for his isolationist fellow-countrymen, but he has his own interpretation of American policy, which sets the key in which his book is written:

The cardinal tradition or principle of the United States in ordering its foreign relations has been its predilection for the promotion of democracy throughout the world.

In what must be one of the best 'Current Problems' books, Professor Brogan analyses the structure of American politics, with particular attention to that element of rigidity which the legalistic basis of the constitution imparts to the whole machine. It is a rigidity which has more than once operated powerfully on America's conduct of her foreign relations, but Professor Brogan's concern is wider—parties, President, Congress, the Supreme Court all pass under his penetrating glance. The book, as he says "only illustrates its theme," without exhausting it. But it illustrates it with a learning, wit and wisdom that ought to attract every student of American affairs.

H. G. NICHOLAS.

ENGLISH CUSTOM AND USAGE,
by Christina Hole. *Batsford.*
10s. 6d.

ENGLISH NIGHT LIFE, by
Thomas Burke. *Batsford.* 10s. 6d.

Singularly appropriate is the publication of Miss Christina Hole's book at a time when, for reasons of security and rationing of food and clothing, many of the customs chronicled in it may have to be suspended 'for the duration.' It is excellently written, comprehensive in its survey and generous even by

peace-time standards in its illustrations—a welcome addition to the records of our national heritage. The author starts modestly with a wide acknowledgment of the help she has received from many quarters and quietly passes on to her own researches, the extent of which would seem to justify more detailed treatment.

The book is divided into thirteen chapters commencing with pagan custom survivals whose origins are lost in the mists of time and finishes with the many quaint gifts and bequests, descriptions of the distribution of which even now hold their place in the news items of our daily papers. It is not surprising that in the grim struggle for existence in primitive times special homage was paid to the gods in respect of such elemental forces as reproduction and fertility of crops. (One notes the discernment of later authorities in incorporating such festivals with the Christian calendar; crowded churches on Harvest Sunday are at least explained in part). Country folk will enjoy the accounts of their own fêtes and dances and for most town dwellers the book will be a revelation. Visitors to London and particularly Americans who have coveted the quill pen in the hand of the bust of John Stow will find the story refurbished here. The race for the Doggett's coat and badge, the King's swan-uppers in bright striped jerseys on their journey up-stream (I once heard a Londoner dismiss this in a gem of understatement as "a bargemen's outing no doubt")—these and many other customs quite as odd and enchanting find their place in these pages. In the wearisome uniformity of these days this book comes as a refreshing challenge that we who are the inheritors of such traditions should not let them pass out of our national life through our preoccupation or indifference.

From tapping
a typewriter



To driving
a tractor



Country air and exercise
instead of a stuffy office and
crowded 'buses . . .
*She's one of the people who may
no longer need*

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It is a book to suit all ages and its value is enhanced by the bibliography and index at its close.

Mr. Thomas Burke outlines the scope of the second volume with his subtitle: *From Norman Curfew to Present Black-out*, and with his customary diligence and attention to detail indicates the salient features of his subject. The emphasis on drinking, eating and gambling will I imagine provoke two reactions from his readers—regret that the good old days are gone beyond return and condemnation for such “goings-on.” Mr. Burke anticipates this second attitude in his preface when he remarks:

Both authors and artists of any particular period are apt to find their material in the more ebullient expressions of life. Quiet people going about their occasions do not afford very fruitful material for either pen or pencil.

He has cast his net wide and brought up for our interest and information much entertaining material. His stories are reinforced by a wealth of contemporary quotations and the book is raised above the ordinary by its prints and illustrations. These are quite outstanding and the photographs in the last section remind us of lights we hope soon to see again and of Tube shelterers we hope never to see again. I doubt if this volume will rank among the greatest of Mr. Burke's work chiefly because the limitations of the subject make for tedium which not even his descriptive powers can entirely overcome. The picture jacket would appear to be one of Messrs. Batsfords' best. It will be a duller day if ever paper restrictions put a veto on these.

HERBERT BANYARD.

CORRESPONDENCE

SOME REFLECTIONS ON CRIME IN WAR-TIME

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

May I make two corrections to my article which you published in the January issue?

(a) On page 38, line 12 of the second paragraph, the word “reports” should really be experiences. I was not referring to reports, that is, written statements, but to criminological experiences of a general character, scientific generalizations based upon a number of observations of actual facts. In the subsequent sentences several such general experiences are quoted by way of illustration.

(b) The last sentence of the second paragraph on page 45 should read:

It would seem essential, however, that the future development of the whole crime situation should be closely watched and that statistical material should be collected which might render possible among other points, a more accurate estimate of how much of wartime crime is due to the activities of a small group of recidivists or to great masses of newcomers respectively.

I should be very grateful if you would be kind enough to publish this letter in your February number.

Yours faithfully,

HERMANN MANNHEIM.

175, Hills Road,
Cambridge.

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MARCH, 1942

AFTER THE WAR—WHAT THEN?

BY VISCOUNT SAMUEL

THE work to be done after the war is in three spheres. There are international relations—World Planning. Within that there is the task of re-moulding each national society in the spirit of the times—Social Reconstruction. Within that again there is the reform of the physical environment—Town and Country Planning. Vast tasks indeed confront modern man.

As to the first, the Atlantic Charter sets the pattern. Endorsed by all the United Nations, the Charter gives the general outline. At this stage more than that is not possible. For a definite statement of specific Peace Aims it would not be enough for the leaders of two nations, even though the greatest, to meet together on a ship. Every allied State would expect to be consulted, and every British Dominion. All political parties in all of them would have to be allowed their say. Full parliamentary debates, and something in the nature of a preliminary Peace Conference would be necessary before an authoritative declaration could be made.

Are we to aim at a World Federation? Or a Federation among the Allies? Or a Federal Union between the British Commonwealth and the United States only? Federation means a combined State; with a central Parliament elected directly by all the federated peoples, and a joint Government acting, in specified matters, for them all. Unless that is meant the word Federation is the wrong word, introduces confusion and should not be used. We have to envisage, in any Federation, a unitary Government and Parliament, charged with sole control of Foreign Policy, Peace and War, Defence, and the finances needed for Defence. They must be empowered to decide those matters, if necessary by majority vote, and without the concurrence of the Governments and Parliaments of any of the member States. That is the essence of Federation. How many years—or months—would such a system last?

Or should we aim rather at Confederations?—that is to say permanent unions, for defined purposes, of two States or more; each retaining its own sovereignty, its own Government and

Parliament; drawing from them representatives or delegations to form a joint executive and a joint legislature. This is the plan now being worked out by the Governments concerned for a Polish-Czechoslovakian Confederation and for a Greek-Yugoslav Confederation: with the prospect of a union between the two, and of other adhesions later. Is that to be the model for Scandinavia, the Baltic States, Belgium and Holland; and above all for Britain and the United States—if the American people were prepared to accept so thorough an "entanglement"?

How is the great economic purpose proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter—the equal access of all countries to the trade of the world—to be achieved in practice? Is there to be a free uncontrolled movement of goods everywhere; and if so, how are vital national industries in the democratic countries to be saved from ruin by rival industries elsewhere, conducted by State or semi-State organizations, and fostered from national revenues held in the same hand?

All these difficult matters, and many more, will need to be considered before the definite peace aims of the United Nations can be officially proclaimed. Consideration involves consultation. Consultation cannot help giving rise to controversy. Controversy must certainly mean delay, and would very likely mean the break-up of present unity—unity between the nations, and within the nations. By all means let public opinion everywhere concern itself with these formidable issues. Let Associations and Leagues and Institutes and Party Conferences study them, and crystallize their views. But where Governments are concerned—bearing actual responsibility, seeking to avoid dissension and maintain a common front—at present broad general indications only are possible. For the time being we must be content with the Atlantic Charter.

* * * * *

Coming to the second sphere, Social Reconstruction, and limiting ourselves to our own country, we are faced, in the main, by nothing new. During the present century there has been a continuous effort for social progress. It has achieved great results. A marked rise in the standard of living of the people; better education, better health, a lower death-rate; the creation of a great system of social insurance; four million new houses, providing for a third of the population, built since the last war; an improvement in industrial relations—these are no small gains. But there have been failures and deficiencies also. Chronic unemployment, except under the

feverish stimulus of war, has been the most conspicuous. The deep poverty of a large fraction of the population; the hard, comfortless lives of many more; the luxury of the rich in striking contrast, and the injustice of the extreme inequality of incomes—these are grave defects in our social system. The standard of education, which seems high compared with fifty years ago, will seem low, we may be sure, when it is viewed from the standpoint of fifty years hence. There is still bad housing; still much avoidable sickness. The status of the workman in industry is still, for the most part, one of subordination and not of partnership.

The nation has long been aware of these things, and pressing for reforms. The greater sense of unity and the quickened tempo of the national life brought about by the war, has made that awareness more acute and has given fresh force to the movement. When the war is over this, it is easy to see, will form the main current in our public affairs.

The phrase "A Better Britain" is a good phrase. It expresses pithily a policy that is easily understood. The principle is simple; but the application must be complex. There is not one measure involved here, but a great variety. Those who think that the task can be entrusted to "a Minister of Reconstruction" misconceive the situation. The work cannot be accomplished, or even directed, by any one Department of Government. All the domestic Departments are concerned, and the direction can only come from the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Apart from Foreign and Imperial Affairs and Defence, here is the principal work for Governments and Parliaments in the coming years.

While the war is raging, and the attention of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet must obviously be given to the prosecution of the war—in priority to all else, and often to the exclusion of all else—the management of other affairs, including any necessary preparation for post-war activities, must be delegated to groups of Ministers. There is a Home Affairs Committee of the Cabinet, presided over by the Lord President of the Council or by the Lord Chancellor, which considers questions of legislation and administration not directly touching the conduct of the war.

For the time being this Committee on Reconstruction has been obliged to give a great part of its attention to questions that will be the most urgent of all when the war stops. It has to consider how to ensure supplies of food and raw materials for the half-starved countries of Europe; how to

restore transport by sea and land; how to enable the wheels of normal industry to be set going again. It is faced also with the situation at home that will follow from the demobilization of the forces and the stoppage of armament production—how to secure the speedy re-employment of several millions of people. Some preparation no doubt can be made, and should be made, for dealing afterwards with those other social and economic questions; specialists will be drawing up their proposals; the Government Departments concerned will be considering their post-war programmes. But definite action on any considerable scale is not possible at the moment, and it would be unreasonable to ask for it.

* * * * *

Thirdly, within the sphere of social progress and reconstruction in general, lies the special task of the improvement of the physical environment—the bettering of our towns, the preservation of our countryside.

Here again it is an error to think that nothing has been done. The nation has long realized that the industrial towns inherited from the nineteenth century are altogether unworthy. Ugly and grimy, monotonous and mean, usually planless and featureless, often congested and overcrowded, no one could claim that our British manufacturing cities are places of beauty and grace! Their tentacles push along the high-roads into the countryside. Patches of sporadic building here and there spoil great parts of a rural landscape which has possessed, and happily often possesses still, a charm that is unsurpassed. From an ashamed recognition of all this, and a resolve to cure it, has sprung the movement for Town and Country Planning.

Parliament passed the first law to establish some measure of control as long ago as 1909. There have been several more statutes since then. Many Local Authorities have done their best to make effective use of the powers conferred upon them, limited as they have been. Several voluntary bodies have been actively at work—The Garden Cities Association, which has now expanded its aims and adopted the title of Town and Country Planning Association; the Town Planning Institute; the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty; the Council for the Preservation of Rural England, and the Council for Scotland; many local societies with similar objects. Under their stimulus public opinion has become more and more alive to the needs of the case, and better instructed as to the measures for meeting them.

Since the war, the consciousness of the existing defects

having become more acute and the demand for a Better Britain more widespread and more vocal, the pressure of national opinion, exerted through Parliament, has led to definite Government action. Towards the end of 1940, the somewhat humble Office of Works was elevated into a "Ministry of Works and Buildings." An energetic Minister was appointed in Lord Reith. He was charged with the duty, not only of supervising the immense volume of Government building necessitated by the war, but also of preparing the ground for a comprehensive national policy for "the Physical Planning of Town and Country."

After prolonged delay, caused chiefly by inter-departmental controversies, a long step forward has now been announced by the Government in a statement made to Parliament on February 11. The Department is to be expanded again and to change its title once more: it will become the "Ministry of Works and Planning." The Planning powers under the existing statutes have been in the hands of the Ministry of Health; they are now to be transferred to the new Department. A Bill will be introduced at an early date somewhat enlarging those powers, and dealing with certain urgent matters—relating to the reconstruction of areas devastated by enemy action, and with the price of land needed for public purposes. More comprehensive legislation is to follow. Within the Department the control of Government building will be the charge of a special section—important, so long as the war lasts, but secondary to the organization of National Planning.

The fact is recognized that, wide as will be the task of this Ministry, the work of social reconstruction is much wider. Even apart from the questions of education, employment, the status of the workman, and the like, in matters of physical planning themselves the Minister cannot act independently and alone. The future development of the towns must largely depend upon the location of new and expanded industries. The Minister of Planning has not the knowledge to decide upon that. The Board of Trade is concerned there. Strategic considerations may enter also; the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry must be consulted. The programme of arterial roads is another important factor; this raises many issues which are within the sphere of the Ministry of Transport and must remain there. Agriculture is directly affected, when the question arises, as it constantly does, of farm lands being taken for building; it is affected also when the cities set out to surround themselves by broad Green Belts of rural land

and villages in order to save themselves from a corpulent growth of continuous building. On those matters the Ministry of Agriculture must be given a voice. Scotland presents special problems. The principle of Scottish self-government requires—and rightly—that National Planning in Scotland must be controlled in Edinburgh by Scotsmen, and not in London by an English Department (even though the head of it may at the moment be himself a Scot). Yet what is done there cannot be unrelated to the course pursued in the southern part of the island.

To meet this situation, the scheme of the Government provides that the Minister of Planning shall be assisted by an Advisory Committee, consisting of senior officials of all the Departments concerned. The business of this Committee will be, in the words of the statement, "to ensure that, as far as possible, the national policy of urban and rural development is carried out as a single and consistent whole." If a difference of opinion arises in this advisory body, the point will be referred to a Committee of Ministers concerned, under Mr. Greenwood's chairmanship. If further need should arise, there may be reference finally to the War Cabinet.

This general lay-out of the Government organization, this "Plan for Planning," is on the lines that have been advocated by the various Associations which have expressed their views, and by most, indeed almost all, of the active leaders of the national movement. It will be accepted, I believe, by public opinion throughout the country as ending the preliminary stage, and as a satisfactory starting-point for the next.

* * * * *

The reasons why, in spite of thirty years of effort, so little that is effective has been done to remedy the old evils and to stop the growth of new ones, are well known. In the first place there has been no driving force at the centre. The powers, such as they are, have been in the hands of the Ministry of Health, very busy with many other things. And the powers have been almost wholly negative—to watch the Local Authorities; to prevent their over-stepping their permitted functions; to act as a Revising Chamber for all their proposals. In the localities, again, the areas of the Authorities have usually been too small; the ancient boundaries, even with modern revisions, have not given adequate scope for comprehensive schemes. A wide enough area can only be dealt with by voluntary co-operation between two or more neighbouring Councils; and the nearest neighbours are not always the closest friends.

There have been formidable difficulties also, in obtaining control over the land, in spite of more and more drastic powers successively conferred by Acts of Parliament. The provision for assessing compensation for properties that are affected injuriously, and for claiming recoupment from owners that are benefited, are complicated and uncertain; they often involve the Councils in risk of financial burdens greater than many of them can afford to incur. All this, added to the bottle-neck at Whitehall, imposes intolerable delays. It is usually a matter of years before a scheme can be drafted, negotiated, considered and approved. Only a sustained zeal on the part of a Council and its officials can carry it through without a series of compromises and concessions that will rob it of much of its value; and that zeal is not always found. Furthermore, some questions are not local but national; in particular the preservation of large areas of the most beautiful parts of the country as National Parks—the Scottish Highlands, the English Lake District, the Snowdon country, Dartmoor and Exmoor, are the principal areas suggested; the preservation also of the amenities of the coast-line. For this there is no central authority empowered to act, and no fund available.

Now the Ministry of Planning is to be called into being, armed, let us hope, with full powers. One of its first tasks is to be the promotion of a Bill to control the rebuilding of the devastated areas; to prevent also a speculative rise in the price of land needed for re-planning. Other legislation is to follow. It will be necessary to constitute joint authorities in many districts from groups of neighbouring Councils. In order to avoid delays, there should be devolution also from the Ministry in London to local branches set up in the eleven Civil Defence Regions of England and Wales, or areas analogous to them. As soon as the expert Committee appointed early in 1941—the Uthwatt Committee—has finally reported, a far-reaching Bill will be needed, giving extensive powers to the local Planning Authorities to acquire, on just terms—just to the public as well as to the owners—all the land needed for the full execution of their schemes, or to secure adequate control over it. Stronger provisions are needed to prevent ribbon development along the highways; and the control of this matter, now vested, strangely enough, in the Ministry of Transport, should be transferred, to the Ministry of Planning. The building industry needs organization and expansion to enable it to cope with the vast tasks that await it; and

scientific research should be directed, more than hitherto, to the methods and the materials of building. Finally, a National Planning Fund should be put at the disposal of the new Ministry, with powers to create the National Parks and to preserve the coast-line for public use and enjoyment.

Here is a large programme. The preparations must be made well in advance. We cannot leave the matter till the end of the war. Then a vast problem of employment will suddenly arise, through the demobilization of millions of people from the armed forces and the discharge of millions more from munitions. At the same time there will be an insistent pressure for quick building in the destroyed towns; while the arrears of several years of normal building will have to be made good. The Local Authorities, therefore, must be ready with their plans. But they cannot be ready unless Parliament and the Ministry tell them in advance what their duties and their powers are to be. If the matter is left till the end of the war, there will be confusion, delay, a sense of frustration. The nation will be in an angry mood if months go by and millions are left unemployed and on the dole; if the Better Britain is found to have been no more than a phrase, not taken seriously by our governors.

I believe that public opinion will not permit this. But it is only by constant parliamentary pressure during the last two years that we have advanced as far as we have; and there can be no assurance that, if that pressure were relaxed, the further advance that is essential will be achieved.

But if it is, if the larger measures are taken, if provision is made with foresight, if the stores of willing assistance that are waiting throughout the country are fully utilized, then the movement for National Planning will attain its goal, and, with concurrent action in other spheres, even within a single generation, the Better Britain may take substance and form.

BRITAIN AND RUSSIA

BY SIR BERNARD PARES

OUR alliance with Russia came as a complete surprise to most of our politicians. It owed its genius, of course, to Hitler who knocked the heads of our two peoples together in one obvious common interest; its immediate achievement it owed to a brilliant improvisation of the statesmanship and commonsense of our Prime Minister.

There was nothing really odd about it. Mr. Eden had concluded in 1935 that there were no serious conflicts of interest between us. If we look back further, apart from the Intervention of 1919, we have only once fought Russia, when neither side gained anything by it. On the other hand, we have four times been allied with her—and each time in common defence against a great European aggression—which would suggest that the cause which we were defending together was that of peace.

If it were only a question between the British and Russian peoples, there ought to be no difficulty in the matter. There is no other people that gets on with us so naturally or shares more of our peculiar characteristics, and the points of difference are all matters in which each of us has much to give which the other might well be glad to take. This begins with a common understanding of values and a common instinct of friendship. My own study of Russia was undertaken precisely because of the complete contrast between politicians and press assuring us that Russia was our natural enemy and the practically unanimous report of our traders and others who had actually lived in Russia and assured us of the opposite. That is, so to speak, our secret, and in fact there is definitely a free-masonry between all of us who have lived long there. You will hear the same thing from those of us who have made intimate friendships with Russians in England.

But for the politicians it is a very different story, and many of them have found themselves sadly in need of a new orientation to satisfy the accomplished fact of the alliance. There were two possible dangers to this alliance—both of them.

political. Our left-winger might think he saw in it a party triumph. This would be a complete mistake, for if we had paid anything like the necessary attention to what has been happening in Russia in the period of Stalin, we should have seen that no gospel of world revolution was now to be expected of Russia, who had tried it and reverted completely from the international to the national. How was it possible to picture as a demon or angel about to sweep down on us a political experiment which was tried out completely and in its essential features was abandoned as unworkable in Russia as far back as 1917-21? "Communism" is now officially regarded in Russia as an ideal not yet attained, and the principle "to everyone according to his needs," though largely realized in social services, has in all practical matters given way to the ordinary understanding in other countries—"to everyone according to his work." If the left wingers had learnt Russian and made a serious study of the country, they would have added more to our knowledge; but they were far more interested in the theory of the new experiment. The issue of "continuous revolution," was exactly that on which Stalin fought and routed the bitterest of his enemies, Trotsky.

It is inevitable that the pressing of this obsolete view here should provoke a corresponding aberration on our other extreme. If Russia means world revolution on the model of 1917-21, then those on our right must be instinctively afraid of any contact with Russia. But nearly all the authors of that attempt have disappeared in Russia. A single passage in the history of a country, and such a poignant passage as that, is not a thing that can be repeated in the same form—especially if the main part of its work, the removal of a dead government and the equalization of rights and of classes has already been done. Russia is now busy with other and further tasks, above all the satisfaction of all material needs for the whole country, and in such a case, particularly in a world war, it is fatal for us to adhere obstinately to the perspective of twenty years ago.

All this can only be called by its proper name "ignorance," and let us see how it has arisen. In 1914 an aggressive Germany declared war on Russia, we came to her assistance and each side pledged itself not to make peace separately. Russia had no adequate heavy plant and could not make her own munitions. For this reason, as all the military records prove, her army was in substance destroyed three times over. She had to beg of us what we then sorely needed for ourselves, and our contribution only reached her in anything like adequate

volume when her regular army was no longer there to use it. The country was covered with cripples. The Russian government crashed, not primarily because it was autocratic but because it was the most inefficient government of its kind. It was replaced by chaos—by a huge gap. The revolution was far more important to Russia than the war itself. The helm was seized by a small group of internationalists, returned from their work of world revolution abroad. They saw indistinctly the new world order which they wished to create. Peace was a first necessity, and it was their promise of it that more than anything else brought them to power.

Russia slipped out of the picture, especially for the rulers of Russia, and its place was taken by world revolution. To cut their losses and retain a foothold for their new experiment, they sacrificed nearly all the territory gained since Peter the Great. Patriotic Russians challenged this and offered us their swords which we, still in the heat of war, accepted exactly as we accept those of the Free French to-day. Thus there was a civil war in Russia and a half-hearted foreign intervention which really helped the other side. Our partners were beaten and took refuge in western Europe where they remained our most accessible informants on Russia, and they continued to see her as she was at that poignant moment when they left her—that moment of twenty years ago which could not be repeated.

The Soviet Government of that time, irritated and angered, replied with a new intervention—one in its own speciality, that of world revolution. For three years there was practically no contact between the two countries, and the mutual boycott became for both sides almost an instinct and a habit. The Soviet censorship defeated even the most enterprising of foreign correspondents and they returned in despair and vexation: their editors saw little use in such a thin stream of sterilized news. We were left planted with the views of twenty years ago.

Meanwhile Russia was changing faster than any country in Europe. The young giant was rapidly outgrowing the measles of its childhood. From the humiliation of Brest-Litovsk let us trace this great revival, so triumphant to-day in the magnificent defence of one's own country.

For several years after the economic collapse of the wholesale communist experiment, the leaders held on obstinately in their hope of a general world revolution, in the ironical position of a government that had been radically defeated in

its original purposes at home. This was not illogical. The world revolution might come after all in one of those industrial countries for which it had been originally intended, among which agricultural Russia was not one of those primarily envisaged. But the passionate moment of 1917 had passed, and this hope received the almost annihilating answer of the peaceful failure of the General Strike in our own country in 1926.

This led straight to a new epoch in Russia. Furious disagreements broke out in the Communist Party which really ruled the country. On the one side were Trotsky and the Old Bolsheviks, trained abroad in a school of international conspiracy, with their doctrine of "continuous revolution." On the other were Stalin and the new generation in Russia, who alike had hardly ever been out of the country and had been cut off from Europe by the years of mutual boycott. Stalin had the enormous tactical advantage of being the General Secretary of the ruling Party, but he was engaged in slowly making Party and country identical. Slowly but surely, Stalin won outright. His triumph was absolute by 1928—thirteen years ago.

Now was the time for editors with vision to seek renewed contact with Russia, but the chance was not taken, and for the next few years Soviet suspicions made it difficult to take it. Stalin had formulated his new mottoes: "Socialism in one country," which means construction at home instead of international conspiracy abroad; "revolution is not for export"; "working relations with any foreign government, even capitalist which is friendly to the Soviet Union,"—that is, to Russia. But so far he was engaged in carrying through his new policy of construction against undoubted opposition and even "wrecking." Trotsky had certainly left behind him a network of conspiracy. No one will suggest that every victim of Soviet "purges" and "wreckers' trials" was guilty, and many innocent persons were swept into the net. But Stalin was indeed dealing with a real "Fifth Column." If he had not crushed it, he would have been defeated in a programme which had almost for its first object the rearming of the country and the rectification of that weakness which had led to the annihilation of the Russian army in the last war.

It was fortunate for Stalin that by ruthless severity, later varied by stimulation and encouragement, he was able to win through with his new construction just in time to face the national and international menace of Hitler's advent to power

in Germany. Not only in *Mein Kampf* but up to 1939 Hitler definitely aimed at the conquest of Russia which he is now attempting. "When we are talking of more ground and room in Europe we can in the first place only think of Russia" (*Mein Kampf* II. 742-3). "That Jewish sponge fungus" (Speech at Wilhelmshaven, April 11, 1939). Meanwhile, on Russia's eastern frontier, from 1927 onwards, had sprung up another national menace in the new policy of unlimited aggression in Japan, the future ally of Germany.

Stalin will go down to history as a patriot with a policy of socialist construction, but the foresight with which he dealt with the new danger puts him in the highest rank of contemporary statesmen. Both on his home and foreign fronts he dealt with it at once surely and resolutely. On the home front he sought immediately a synthesis between the new principles which he aimed to establish and the national instincts which he had to satisfy. This synthesis he achieved, in his broad revision of his programme of collective farming, his recognition of local initiative, his concessions to the instinct of property (especially in livestock), his encouragement of personal enterprise in industry, his re-establishment of the family, parental authority and the discipline of children, his "de-bunking" of undigested propaganda in the national system of education. All these drastic changes in the legislation of 1935-6 were published at the time in English, but practically obtained no recognition. We continued to talk of Russia in terms of 1917-21.

It was this special ignorance on our side that prevented our recognition of Stalin's new foreign policy. It was of a piece with his new home policy. To safeguard his new construction in Russia, he had absolute need of world peace. He therefore sought the co-operation of the democracies to prevent a new war by establishing a common front against aggression from Germany and Japan. Without delay he obtained the long missing recognition of the Soviet régime in America, brought Russia into the League of Nations, made a Pact and then an Alliance with France and also with Czechoslovakia, and sent Maisky to London to win the friendship of England. At Geneva Litvinov called insistently for firmness against aggression in Abyssinia, in Spain, in Czechoslovakia. In eastern Europe, Russia, with her instinct of nationality more virile than ever, remembered her losses of 1919 and her absence from the peace settlement, and called before everything for the

recognition of her return to her former rank as one of the world powers.

This was the new Russia, the Russia of the Russian people:— with its special care for the poor, the infirm, the crippled, the old and the young, and its long deferred emancipation of women; with its freedom of medical attendance for all, with its new modern state system of education on a basis of freedom, with its almost unique achievement of all-round literacy; with its equalization of all the 180 odd nationalities of the State in rights and duties; with its Red army united in "the defence of the Soviet homeland," at last adequately equipped and supplied, where the man behind the rifle, educated and alert, now regarded himself as a part-owner in the homeland for which he was ready to fight. This synthesis re-established the links with the past. The national past is now honoured in Russia; so are the great glories of Russian art and music; but it is a new Russia far stronger than ever before, full of virility and vigour.

In the light of this new discovery which has now been brought home to us in the stern school of battle, let us look back on some of our own doubts and hesitations. It is not difficult to trace some of their sources. To certain elements in the Russian emigration, in no way representative of the mass of it, but not without influence in their social connections, we can trace the now exploded theory that the Russian Army and especially the Russian General Staff, without their former leaders, would offer Hitler an easy walk-over, and that at the first reverses the country would rise against its new régime, Sir Stafford Cripps has declared that Stalin is now far stronger than at the beginning of the war.

Catholics are still justly incensed at the religious trials and sentences of Easter, 1923, which the Polish Catholic priests faced with such undaunted courage, and the Catholic cause always tends to blend with that of Poland. Indeed, in those provinces which have changed hands between Russia and Poland, peasants would even describe themselves to me rather as Catholic or Orthodox than as Poles or Russians. Poland after her long and brutal oppression by Tzarist Russia was able to make hay when the international aberration of 1917-21 had paralysed the national defence in Russia, and something like 14 million Russians then passed under Polish rule. This territory was recovered by the Soviet Government when the Polish army was defeated by Hitler, and otherwise it could only have passed to him. Clearly here are questions calling

for a careful settlement, and Mr. Eden has wisely lent his help in them. Fortunately there is a precedent for the British view on the question in the frontier line recommended to both parties by Lord Curzon in 1920.

Another obstacle to understanding is the attitude of those few English leftists who have not in the slightest realized that Trotsky and Stalin were deadly enemies and political opposites and sometimes talk as if they still want a world revolution on the old exploded lines.

At least equally dangerous are those political theorists among ourselves who have failed to understand that the commanding position of Britain in Eastern Europe, when both Germany and Russia were out of the picture, could only be temporary. On this basis sprang up a school of thought which set itself to reshape the frontiers of Eastern nationalities and to bring them all together under British leadership. If this has led at least to a better knowledge of that part of Europe and to a keener interest in it and therefore in the natural rights of the smaller nationalities, we can only be glad. But on this basis, with the temporary exclusion of Russia and Germany, was founded a hope of uniting all these little powers into something like a big power which would serve as a barrier to aggression. Events have shown in the most striking way that this hope is a delusion. They must have some real force behind them. No one can blame the rulers of the little states if each did everything to avoid invasion of his own country. And had we sufficiently studied their own jealousies and rivalries? As in the time of Napoleon, who also sought the conquest of Europe as an indirect way of breaking down the power of Britain, no solid resistance to the aggression of Hitler presented itself until he invaded Russia. This time, even France went down in the general crash.

We have no adequate equipment to undertake such a task alone. The weakest link in all our national armoury is our intelligence, and our ignorance of Eastern Europe and most especially of Russia is still almost abysmal. As to military power, we could not, for instance, send to Poland either a battleship or an army corps; least of all could we maintain a permanent army there to uphold British authority. The main lesson of this war is that a real peace has to rely on real strength. We can only rejoice that smaller states in their recognition of this lesson, are now wisely drawing together for mutual defence, but there can be no durable peace in Europe

without a real and solid understanding between Britain and Russia.

The same generation in Europe has twice had to suffer the horrors of a world war, and the lesson has to be read in the light of the countless sufferings and of the countless sacrifices of two generations. No prejudices of the past, least of all if they are based on misunderstandings, must be allowed to stand in the way of a firm and stable settlement. The people who defended Britain in 1940 have a right to demand this, and are sure to do so.

THE BALANCE IN THE FAR EAST

BY HUGH QUIGLEY

THE position in the Far East, as the result of the complete Japanese occupation of Malaya and their penetration towards Rangoon, has become more sharply defined, and it is possible to give a tentative definition of the balance of forces in that area. It is quite possible that some unforeseen circumstance may intervene even now to upset calculations, but Japanese strategy would appear to be just as firmly conceived as it is brilliantly executed.

One must be clear about the essentials, particularly the weaknesses of the British and American policy. It is difficult to apportion the blame for what has happened since the American plan of appeasement *à outrance* has transcended even that of Chamberlain at Munich with rather less justification, and the dismissal of a general and an admiral for dereliction of duty does not serve to cover up or excuse a worse dereliction of duty on the part of the American State Department. On the other hand, the sheer inability of Great Britain to understand the position in the Far East and the extraordinary weakness of our intelligence, particularly in Japan, led the public to expect that sufficient provision had been made, not merely to garrison the outlying naval and air bases adequately, but to ensure a constant and adequate stream of reinforcements in the event of an attack taking place. After all, it must have taken the Japanese forces not less than three weeks to get from Japan to Malaya, and yet there has been no indication either that the American or British were aware of the departure of Japanese convoys, or, if they were aware, that they understood the Japanese purpose. Singapore has played in the Far East almost exactly the same rôle as the Maginot Line in France, and the tactics adopted to reduce it bear a curious resemblance to those adopted by the Germans. They took it from the rear without any difficulty whatever.

Now, if there had been no Singapore, or if there had been a real understanding of the vulnerability of Singapore, the Allied strategy in the Far East would have been different, and while

the Japanese successes might have taken place just the same, they might have been delayed over a longer period of time. Quite apart from ignorance of the Japanese intentions and of the principles of modern strategy, the Allies had not really studied the economic strength of Japan, and in Japan I include Korea, Manchuria and Northern China. There is no reason why Great Britain and America should not have understood this, because British and American industrialists have made a very large contribution indeed to the industrialization of Manchuria, and even at the beginning of the war there were large orders in industrial establishments in this country being carried out on Japanese account.

The economic strength of Japan, including the Asiatic mainland, is certainly no less than that of Great Britain, and what is more important, is very much greater than that of the Eastern half of Russia and the Western half of the United States. Even if the whole of Great Britain's economic strength had been concentrated in the Pacific, it is doubtful whether Great Britain could, single handed, have resisted an attack by Japan. If, however, the real position is that an infinitesimal proportion of the fighting strength of Great Britain can be allocated to the Far East, the Eastern half of Russia remains neutral and the Western half of the United States is so completely unprepared as to be open to easy invasion from Japan, then of course the position of the Allies is impossible right at the beginning. To inform the British public that the Japanese attack could be easily countered by Great Britain and the United States was a criminal distortion of fact, for which those responsible should be called to account.

It is important to make a deliberate exception in the case of Australia and New Zealand, because it is already quite clear that the Australians had an acute appreciation of the situation. They repeatedly drew the attention of the British Government, long before the Japanese attack, to the extremely critical position in the Far East. They proposed certain measures which were not carried out, and even after the onset of Japanese attack the supply of reinforcements from Great Britain and from India was inadequate, and in any case the necessity to use the long Cape route in order to get reinforcements out to the Far East delayed them to a point where they could not arrive in time to affect the issues. In the race for time, the Japanese have hitherto won easily, but if the advice of Australia and New Zealand had been taken, this race might have ended otherwise. It is this very circumstance which

imposes on Australia and New Zealand a reconsideration of their economic and political position.

So far the war has shown—

- (1) The economic strength of Great Britain is barely sufficient to deal with developments in the Western theatre of the war, and the Libyan adventure is a fairly good indication of it.
- (2) The capacity of the United States to exercise any real influence on this course of events within an appreciable time is very severely limited. Even if the State Department had not been guilty of major errors of policy and had been entirely aware of the Japanese programme, American reinforcements could not have gone to the Far East in sufficient volume to decide the issue, because there was not enough man power enrolled in the American fighting services.
- (3) The only salvation for Australia, apart from Australia itself, lies in the terrific concentration of industrial production in India combined with the reasonably well trained military forces of China and the highly equipped and highly organized Eastern Army of Russia.
- (4) Events in the Mediterranean and elsewhere have shown that there are very real limits to British sea power, and that even if Britain and America between them had control of sea power in the Far East, they could not prevent the persistent and long drawn out Japanese attack on British, American, Dutch and Australian possessions. This war has shown that the strategical value of sea power has shrunk.

The only value that Allied resistance at the present time in the Far East may have had has been the diversion of Japanese forces away from Russia into the South-Western Pacific, and this diversion has probably given the Russian generals time in the West to force the Germans out of the tactically important sections of Russia and ensured the creation of a strongly held defence line for the German attack in the spring. It is doubtful of course whether Japan might have been successful in a direct attack on the Russian Far Eastern army, prior to its campaign against the Allies, but its action in beginning with the Allies has rather weakened its capacity to win a decisive campaign against either the Chinese or the Russians.

What is the significance of those developments for Australia and New Zealand? I believe it to be roughly this. The position must be contemplated where the Japanese will occupy the whole of the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Southern Burma, and even a part of India. At the moment it is not essential for Japanese economic plans that Australia and New Zealand, or for that matter New Guinea or the Philippines should be occupied.

The Japanese campaign can be seen in three stages. The first stage lies in the occupation of Indo-China, Siam, Burma and the contiguous part of India as well as the Dutch East Indies west of New Guinea. This part of the campaign may be completed at longest within the next three or four months. The second stage lies in the reduction of the Philippines, the occupation of the inhabited and inhabitable parts of New Guinea, Australia and New Zealand, and this second phase is probably the most important of the three, because the Japanese are fully aware of the resources of those areas and of the fact that they are capable of supporting an immensely increased population. This is not the case in the areas represented by the first phase of the campaign. The third phase lies in the direct attack on Russia or an attempted invasion of the West Coast of America, not with a view to occupying either Russia or America permanently, but with a view to drawing off Russian and American forces from Australia and New Zealand.

The question may be asked—has Japan got sufficient manpower to carry out this policy? The safe assumption is that she has. Any other assumption would be criminal folly. In order to carry out all phases of the campaign the Japanese would count on badly co-ordinated, badly organized and inadequate Allied resistance. She will have little reason to fear attack from Great Britain and the United States if all their air and sea bases in the South-Western Pacific are lost, and her position is not affected adversely by the continuous American occupation of part of the Philippines.

What then can the Australian and New Zealand Governments do? They can of course bow to the logic of events and make their peace with Japan, but it is no more feasible to make permanent peace with the rulers of Japan than it would be to make peace with Hitler. They can attempt to create a South-Western Pacific *bloc* which may in time serve to neutralize Japanese policy, and the first assumption in the formation of such a *bloc* must be that direct assistance from Great Britain and the United States will not, and cannot be available. This means that Australia and New Zealand have got to act as independent states fighting for their independent existence, and, in conjunction with China and Russia and what is left of the Dutch East Indies, work out an economic and political strategy which will ensure their continued existence as independent states. I have deliberately omitted consideration of the military strategy, because this must be determined by economic and political factors.

Australia and New Zealand, with Russia, China and the Dutch East Indies, must form a Pacific Executive Council which will take control over all resources available in that area, determine their effective use and work out the essentials of some plan of resistance to the Japanese campaign. Once that strategy has been evolved, it will be possible for this Pacific Council to insist that Great Britain and the United States should supply it with materials of war. The type of Pacific Council at present proposed, which is composed almost entirely of British and American representatives, with a small sprinkling of other countries, with centres of deliberation in Washington and London, is not the kind of Council which will be of the slightest use in the Far East, and if the Australian Government, or any other Government in the Far East, allows itself to believe that the solution of its troubles is to be found in such a Council, it has already lost the war in the Far East. The war must be confined, both in strategy and in fact, to the South-Western Pacific. At most such a Council can count on a respite of three or four months, since it will take Japan that period to round off the first phase of her operations, and during that period it must not only organize its forces capable of resistance, but also direct and control the flow of reinforcements from the United States and Great Britain. There is absolutely no time available for any further discussion of priorities or preferences or relative bargaining positions. The whole future of the British Empire is involved in the continued independence of Australia and New Zealand, but the preservation of that independence is no longer a matter for Great Britain or the combined British Empire, but for Australia and New Zealand alone. It will be difficult to prevent the Japanese from carrying out the second phase of their operations, and it will be impossible to prevent their ultimate success if the combined Russian, Chinese and Australian strategy is not worked out at once. The assumption must be made that the part played by Great Britain and the United States will be confined merely to the supply of munitions of war.

Assuming that the war either ends in a prolonged stalemate, which would be tantamount to Japanese defeat, or in a Japanese defeat, then there must be some consideration of the long term consequences of the change in the balance of Pacific powers. It is quite clear that the two dominant powers in the Far East, must be China and some form of Australian-New Zealand federation. This means that Australia must develop its economic resources to the absolute maximum, it must

accelerate the process of industrialization, and it must increase its population to several times the existing figure if it is to survive a second Far Eastern war. It has been shown since 1918 that it is impossible to keep down permanently any single great power such as Germany or Japan, and this means either that Japan should be brought into a full economic and political alliance with the other Pacific powers, or it should be neutralized by the increasing strength of the British and American section of those powers. Australia, with a highly organized population of thirty million is a different proposition for Japan from a semi-developed, largely disorganized country with a population of only seven million.

It is difficult in advance to work out the economic consequences of such a change. The intensive industrialization of Australia and the opening up of the Chinese market must mean a change in the agricultural configuration of the country. The part played by its exports of foodstuffs in determining its balance of trade will result in its becoming almost entirely independent of Great Britain and the United States. The war has shown that there are no serious difficulties in the provision of capital for development, if the country under development is in control of its own resources, and has not handed them over to private enterprise from other countries, and it follows that the political configuration of the country will also change, very possibly in the direction of more complete Government control of natural resources and the means by which such resources are converted into immediately available wealth.

Those considerations may not appear to have any importance at the present time, but they do determine in advance the strength and the direction of the resistance put up by Australia and New Zealand to the Japanese attack. Quite apart from the question of self-preservation, it will be difficult to keep the population of Australia, particularly, firm in its determination over a long period of time, if it believes that a return to the position ruling before the war will take place. If it is convinced that the outcome of this war will be a greater and more powerful Australia, in control of its own destiny and one of the most powerful constructive forces in the South-Western Pacific and in the world, then its opposition to Japan will increase instead of diminishing and its ultimate success will be all the more certain.

GERMANY IN SPAIN

BY SPECTATOR

GERMANY has long been interested in Spain, where her nationals have not been without influence in business circles; she is now demanding adequate recompense for services rendered to General Franco in the Civil War, and she insists that it must be made in political, and not only economic, coin. German intrigue in Spain is no new thing. During the last war her instruments were the 70,000 Germans and Austrians then in Spain, many of them from South America.

After the Great War, German interest in Spanish affairs decreased, and it was not until Hitler came to power in 1933 that it again became noticeable. Spain then became an early victim of the conception held by the *Reich* General Staff that foreign policy is always a struggle for possession of the best strategical positions. A state that cannot secure these positions for itself must win over suitable allies whose bases will be available for use. To Germany, then, the territory of Spain provides a whole series of naval and air bases of incalculable value in time of war.

Against this background it is not surprising that, from 1933 onwards, Germany spared no expense in the organization of a German Fifth Column in Spain. Before long the *Reich* was maintaining no fewer than 25 separate organizations in that country, the chief of them consisting of the foreign one of the National Socialist Party and the Spanish section of the German Labour Front, which extended over a network of more than 50 centres. Each of these organizations had at its disposal a special agent of the Gestapo and spies in the chief business and banking concerns.

German diplomatic and consular representatives in Spain were flooded with propaganda from Germany, chiefly from the *Fichte Bund* organization in Hamburg. In 1933 Dr. Goebbels had issued instructions that all German tourist offices abroad were to be used as propaganda centres, and thus, in Madrid, Herr Gustav Reder, Nazi Press Director and press consultant

to the German Embassy in Spain, became Propaganda Chief to the local *Reich* Railways agency. Herr Reder tampered ceaselessly with the freedom of the Spanish press, and soon reported that, in the month of September, 1933, alone the Spanish newspapers published 145 articles favourable to the Hitler régime. On the radio, propaganda talks on National Socialism encouraged listeners to begin a correspondence course which assisted the Germans to build up a valuable card index of "sympathizers"; political films disguised as "cultural," books and pamphlets, were all distributed by Herr Reder's office on a large scale.

Propaganda activities alone, however, did not satisfy the German Government. Germany had for many years occupied second place in Spain's foreign trade, and since 1931 had taken first place among the countries selling goods to her. The amount of German capital invested in Spain, although not large, was spread over important sections of the national economy, particularly iron-ore and the electrical and chemical industries. There were thus in Spain many German merchants, technicians and engineers well acquainted with the Spanish market.

These circumstances were at once seized upon by Berlin as a suitable background for a widespread system of espionage. In Spain, as in other countries, this system was organized under cover of the title "Harbour Service." There was hardly a German merchant, firm, or enterprise in Spain that had not something to do with shipping, and a German organization connected with shipping could not, therefore, have raised any objections from the Spanish authorities. In fact, the so-called Harbour Service was under the control of Herr Kurt Wremke, whose Berlin office became the headquarters of the Gestapo organization in Spain. Included in the ranks of the "Harbour Service" were employees of such firms as *Lufthansa* air services, and the Siemens electrical works.

Through the organization of the Harbour Service large scale efforts were made to capture Spanish trade. Most of the chief Nazi leaders in Spain were employed in local German firms, and this fact enabled the German Foreign Trade Office to build up detailed information useful for political as well as for economic purposes. As far back as July, 1935, for example, the Foreign Trade Office boasted in its secret information bulletin that it had nearly 3,500 firms registered on its card index.

This economic penetration was greatly facilitated by the

fact that before the Civil War the Spanish chemical industry and trade was wholly in the hands of the German Dye Trust, from a local branch of which the Catalonian textile industry was bound to procure all its chemicals and dyestuffs. Spain's pharmaceutical industry was in the hands of Schering-Kaulbaum, her industrial gas tied to the Gass Ververtungs-A.G., her electrical industry controlled by Siemens, her aviation in the hands of Heinkel, Junkers and the *Lufthansa*. With the exception of the British Rio Tinto mines, the Spanish mining industry was dominated by the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, and its equipment was bought from Orenstein and Krupp. In most of these cases the firms' titles were Spanish, as were their directors and shareholders. But their civil engineers, their managers, and the patents on which they depended for their operation were German.

Other German espionage organizations in Spain were masked in such disguises as the Academic Exchange Service (*Akademischer Austauschdienst*) which, under cover of scientific exchanges, conducted industrial espionage. Military espionage was undertaken by a firm known as *Windkräfte Centrale* (Aircraft Centre) which had branches and representatives all over the country. The Madrid offices of Siemens were used as a centre for the collection of aerial photographs later found very useful by the Germans during the Civil War.

Until 1936 all these German activities were under the control of the Hamburg Political Police. In that year, however, the Gestapo itself assumed the direction of all Nazi political and economic penetration in Spain. The subsequent power of the Gestapo in Spain was well reflected in the revelation by a special correspondent of the Paris newspaper *L'Ordre* in June, 1938, that the police official from whom he received his safe conduct to travel in Northern Spain knew no word of Spanish. Writing in *L'Europe Nouvelle* of August 27 of the same year, Senor Manuel Chaves Nogales, a Conservative Spanish journalist, said:

If one observes closely the 'real power' in Spain . . . what strikes one chiefly is the German influence and the undeniable activity of the Gestapo. From this point of view Spain can already be regarded as a German colony.

Although, by the outbreak of the Civil War, Spain was already honeycombed by German penetration, General Franco doubtless accepted German aid in the hope that it would be disinterested, that once a strong and stable government had been set up in Spain, the Germans would at once withdraw,

leaving the Spaniards to work out their own destiny. Yet, like many others who have trusted in the Third *Reich*, General Franco has found himself betrayed. He has realized that Hitler's words on February 10, 1933, that: "The first and most important item in my Government's programme is that we will not lie and that there shall be no deception," was the measure, not of Germany's honesty, but of the depth of her cunning.

Nor was it strategic naval and military bases in Spain that Germany alone coveted. The *Reich* needed Spain as an industrial unit, with all her economic resources of quicksilver, copper, and iron-ore. She intended that Spain should be not an independent country, but merely an economic appendage of the Axis.

In September, 1938, the German periodical *Wissen und Wehr* published an article by Dr. Hermann Gackenholtz which stated:

Mussolini has put Spain's new National Government under an obligation to him by his active support in the Civil War.

The implication was that Germany, too, had some claim on Spain for the aid she had rendered. Nor had she been slow in taking advantage of her position in Spain. As early as 1937 she was indulging in almost complete sequestration of raw materials in that country, quite oblivious of the needs of the local population. The Nazis divided that part of the country held by General Franco into sectors, and extracted all available commodities from each on the pretext that they were in payment for military aid.

No sooner was the Spanish war over than Germany sent an economic mission to Spain, led by Dr. Wohlthat, Field-Marshal Goering's chief economic adviser. The alleged purpose of this mission was to examine the possibilities of closer commercial relations between Spain and Germany. During the Civil War, General Franco had been unwilling to enter into close economic relations with the *Reich* for fear of causing Britain and France to abandon that policy of non-intervention so advantageous to his cause. Now Spain, withdrawn from world markets and striving for self-sufficiency, had closer economic relations with those nations whose systems were already adapted to trade on a basis of compensation.

The *Reich* was quick to take advantage of this change in Spain's economic outlook. The Nazis had always coveted, for the making of arms, the many raw materials that Spain could provide. One of the most important of these is wolfram, a commodity necessary in the process of hardening steel; both

Germany and Italy, having between them less than 10 per cent. of the amount needed for their war industries, wish to utilize Spanish supplies. No less attractive to Berlin is Spanish mercury. The mercury mines of Almaden account for 51 per cent. of the entire world supply. Figures published in the *Deutsche Volkswirt* in January, 1939, had already shown how German trade with Spain had expanded in the previous year. Increases in imports by Germany of raw materials from Spain were 700,000 tons of iron ore, 19,000 tons of copper ore, and 13,000 tons of zinc. Imports of oranges and olive oil, being unnecessary for the manufacture of armaments, show an equally significant decrease.

Such prospects were too favourable for Dr. Wohlthat to ignore. His mission at once evolved a plan for the more intensive exchange of Spanish raw materials for German manufactured goods. The agreement embodying this arrangement also provided for an increase in the activities of the German trading concern known as H.I.S.M.A., by the grant of mining concessions and commercial facilities to German firms in Spain, this despite the fact that a decree issued by General Franco in 1938 provided that at least 60 per cent. of the capital and shareholding of any new enterprise to exploit minerals in Spain must be Spanish-owned.

That this intensified German economic interest in Spain had an ulterior purpose quickly became evident. Herr Wohlthat proposed that Germany should be entirely responsible for the economic reconstruction of Spain. Spanish industry was to be rebuilt with nothing but German help, as were her railways and roads; following the publication by General Franco of a decree authorizing a new road system in Spain, Professor Speer, the Führer's architectural adviser, and the late Dr. Fritz Todt, builder of Germany's motor roads, and of the Siegfried Line, arranged to visit Spain. The inclusion in Herr Wohlthat's mission of several of the best-known Nazi constructional experts made it clear that Germany intended to get the major share in the large orders connected with the reconstruction of buildings in Spain.

These German economic activities have been followed by equally intensive political penetration, for Berlin has ignored no stratagem in her efforts to entice Spain into the war. German propaganda in Madrid is carefully organized. A big shop window has been rented by the Nazis and filled with maps, diagrams and photographs showing what steps have been taken by German industry to beat the blockade; they are

arranged so that even a child could understand them, and they attract crowds all day long. The only shops doing good trade in Madrid are German-owned, while the German Embassy has a staff of no less than 220. In the whole of Spain there are at least 80,000 Germans, 2,500 of them in Madrid, for whose presence there is no plausible explanation.

The Germans are more vigorous in their propaganda than the Italians. They bribe journalists, subsidize newspapers and publish periodicals advocating the introduction of National Socialist doctrines to Spain. The German press attaché in Madrid, Herr Lazard, boasts not merely that he has bought the Spanish press, but how little it cost him. In Barcelona, Spanish Nationalist war orphans were recently offered 20 free scholarships at the German School. It is hardly surprising that a French officer attached to General Franco's staff referring to Spain, stated to the Paris newspaper *Epoque* as long ago as 1939 that:

The Germans hold everything. They have the power stations and the telephone exchanges. The whole of the chemical industry is theirs.

The military purpose of German penetration in Spain is equally plain. The Germans have unobtrusively spread their organization and teaching to the army, in which almost all the junior and many of the senior officers are pro-Nazi. As long ago as 1937 German officers were teaching Spanish officers and men modern artillery and gas technique. They also founded a general instruction camp for the Spanish military where, by June, 1939, some 50,000 Spaniards had already taken courses. To-day the entire organizational work and training of the Spanish army is in the hands of German officers, German experts and German armament factories. German officers supervise the Spanish military technical schools and the technical corps of the army. The effect of this German control was seen on April 29, 1940, when General Fuentes Cervera, Spanish Under Secretary for War, in a lecture he gave in Madrid, went so far as to apply to Spain the geopolitical doctrines of Professor Karl Haushofer, which are the inspiration of the German General Staff.

In aerial matters Germany is equally well-established. In Southern Spain German engineers are constructing aerodromes—at Huelva and Cadiz, for example. Here and elsewhere in Spain, airfields have their full complement of German ground staff and supplies, and numbers of German aircraft are stored in their hangars. In the starving and immobilized Spanish countryside big German dumps of food and petrol

have been placed at strategic points. Spain is also to manufacture bombing aircraft under the supervision of German technicians. Not least, Spanish air lines, and especially those to Morocco and the Canary Islands, are under the control of the *Lufthansa*. It was not for nothing that even before the Spanish war the Germans, to ensure that only German machines should be chosen for service in Spain, sabotaged machines sent to Spain for tests by the United States and other countries.

The Spanish Navy, consisting of six cruisers, 19 destroyers, 24 torpedo boats, minelayers and gunboats, would be a useful addition to the German navy, which has not neglected to annex even Denmark's few small destroyers. On the outbreak of war, 200,000 tons of German shipping sought shelter in Spanish ports, there being 30 Nazi vessels anchored in Vigo Bay alone. Once armed, these ships would provide Germany with a formidable force of sea-raiders.

In June, 1938, the late General von Reichenau, one of the most pro-Nazi of the German military leaders, gave a private lecture to a gathering of *Reich* military and party leaders in which he said:

The conflict in Spain vitally affects the German people. That is the consideration which moved us in giving our moral and material assistance to Nationalist Spain . . . Germany has not become weaker through her intervention in Spain, but on the contrary, stronger, and her prospects have been bettered. Her military successes are of special importance, for they hold so many lessons of a decisive character that we may well speak of the Spanish War as of a Staff College. . . . The Spanish war experience of our picked dive bombers is a great asset to our reborn army. . . . The Spanish war has not only been a splendid school for war, but also a piece of excellent policy. For systematic and careful war preparation it is necessary to devise means long beforehand whereby one may get at the enemy, his commercial routes, his sea routes, his means of transport, his fixed and movable *potential de guerre*. . . . A state like ours, not being in a position to acquire the necessary *points d'appui* by direct action, must fill up the gap thanks to its alliances.

That admission of Germany's real objectives in Spain cannot be dismissed merely as the hypothetical application to Spain of German military theses by the Nazi student of war. Germany fully intends to utilize Spain in her plans of conquest no less in the New World than the Old.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIES

BY NORMAN BENTWICH

IN September, 1938, the month of Berchtesgaden, of Godesberg and Munich, the second British Commonwealth Relations Conference gathered at Sydney to discuss the common policy and the mutual relations of the British peoples. The first Conference had been held five years before in Canada, and there a sure common basis of policy had been found in the support of collective security through the League of Nations. The position in 1938 seemed much more obscure and confused. Great Britain had not stood steadfastly by the League in resisting the aggressor states, and the representatives of several of the Dominions were critical of her attitude. Lord Lothian was the chairman of the British delegation, which included Mr. Ernest Bevin, then just a Trade Union leader and not yet a Member of Parliament; and also Mr. Lionel Curtis, who was the father of the Institutes of International Relations. Delegations came from all the self-governing Dominions, including Ireland, and from India, which was regarded by anticipation as a member of the Commonwealth. While the delegates spoke with many voices, and the spirit of the Conference was summarized by Mr. Bevin at the concluding meeting as "on the other hand," there was one point of general agreement: The Commonwealth could not have a sufficient ideal and inspiration in preserving itself. It must find some larger purpose in a function to humanity. It could not be isolated from the rest of the world, but must help to lay the foundation for international peace and a better order for all. It owed a duty to mankind, to help in securing decent standards of life for everybody. The Commonwealth and Empire together embraced nearly one quarter of the world's surface and one quarter of the world's population. It was the greatest aggregation of peoples under a single rule, linked up with every continent, every race, every creed. Together with the other English-speaking peoples in the United States of America, it comprised one-third of the human race. In a new order it must take a pre-eminent position.

The Sydney Conference naturally devoted great attention to the question of the constitutional and economic links between the different parts of the Commonwealth. Again great divergence of opinion was manifested in the attitude of the different members of the Commonwealth. Australia, and less emphatically New Zealand, desired close union with Great Britain and regular consultation on matters of foreign policy and defence. The Canadian representatives, on the other hand, stood out for independence; and at that time, before the shadow of Munich had fallen, claimed that the Dominions must be independent in foreign policy and in questions of peace and war. Canada, no less than Australia, was a Pacific Power, but she felt herself linked as closely with the United States as with Great Britain. South Africa, for different reasons, claimed independence in foreign policy and defence. The same divergence of opinion has shown itself during the war in regard to the question of an Imperial War Cabinet. The Dominions in the Far East, though furthest from Great Britain, have pressed for such a Cabinet. Canada and South Africa have not felt the need.

The second world war has pointed still more emphatically than the first the significance of a world outlook on the part of the British peoples and, indeed, of the English-speaking peoples; and it has emphasized also the need for more thorough arrangements for common defence. The inner understanding between the British peoples may be so complete that the idea of Imperial federation, with a regular constitutional machinery of legislature, executive and judiciary, may be rejected. The bonds are stronger because they are less visible. On the other hand the forcible teaching of the war does indicate that some more definite union between the British peoples will be required in a new order. Mr. Lionel Curtis has recently set out in his pamphlet *Action* the minimum requirements of a defence union. While independent nationhood was the dominant outcome of the first World War in the feeling of the Dominions, international responsibility is likely to be the outcome of the second world war. The Commonwealth, if it is to hold, must be a dynamic growing body. And we must expect that after this war it will include self-governing Dominions not only of white men: besides the dominion of India, within a measurable future a Dominion of the peoples of East and West Africa. The Commonwealth will grow as the Empire diminishes. Two fundamental changes, indeed, will be required in the mind of the British

nations if they are to carry out within the Commonwealth the principles of the Atlantic Charter: to secure to all men the four freedoms. One is an external, the other an internal change. The internal change concerns the relations of the British peoples to the Indian, the African and other coloured peoples. The champions of a single humanity, must throw aside the colour prejudices and the colour barriers that, at present, stand in the way of equal treatment. The exclusion of British subjects from India and Africa in the British Dominions is a constant challenge to the principles which we proclaim.

The external change concerns the relation of the nations of the Commonwealth to outside peoples as regards economic policy and immigration. Canada and Australia are amongst the least populated parts of the world's surface. The policy of autarky in immigration, which has been maintained during the last generation, can hardly be squared with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The Dominions cannot fairly hope to reserve their territory for British peoples. They should make their contribution in providing a home for some part of the population of Europe that, after this war of devastation, will seek a home overseas; and they may be willing to open their doors also to some regulated immigration of the teeming peoples of the East. The Northern tropical regions of Australia, particularly, cannot be filled by white settlers; their defence to-day would be better assured if they were inhabited by loyal people from the Empire. There is no greater contrast as regards density of population than that between the Australian continent and the nearest islands of the Dutch Indies. In the continent the ratio of population is two persons to the square mile, while in Java it is nearly 1,000 to the square mile. The contrast with the United States, which has about the same area, is almost equally glaring: in one country 140 millions, in the other 7 millions.

The countries of the British Commonwealth, also have a big part to play in raising the standard of life throughout the world. Australia and New Zealand have attained a higher level of social and economic well-being than any other country, greater than that even of the United States. That is a signal achievement. In an order of which the guiding purpose is that the good things of the earth should be shared by all, economic policy everywhere must be framed in such a way as to secure a fairer distribution of the world's products. And the Dominions will be in a more independent position than at

the outset of the war, because they have already paid off the greater part of their former debt to the mother country. They will, therefore, be free to export their surplus produce to all countries, with the broad aim of sharing with other peoples the benefit of the kind of life which they have been fortunate to develop for their citizens during the past century. To make the world safe for democracy, as we know now, means not simply to spread political institutions which have been developed in the Western countries, but to help in spreading the better social and economic conditions which the English-speaking democracies have secured for their own citizens.

The British Commonwealth has a special responsibility for the peoples of the British Colonies. We have given up largely the use of the word "British Empire." Yet the peoples of the dependent Empire are British subjects no less than the citizens of Canada, Australia and South Africa. They number together sixty millions, and they inhabit vast territories. We are pledged to help them towards self-government and general well-being. We may be proud of their solidarity and their loyalty to us during this struggle. But we cannot be proud of our record in colonial administration during the last hundred years. The Colonies are, indeed, neglected estates, and their peoples, in spite in some cases of centuries of English administration, are sadly backward in economic, social and intellectual development. It is, too, a grave reflection that during the last century there has been an actual regression in our treatment of the native peoples of Africa. Whereas after the Napoleonic Wars the religious movement in England brought about a great popular agitation for the abolition of slavery throughout the British Realm, and the adoption of the principle of trusteeship by Great Britain for the native peoples, during the last half century the colour barriers have been raised in many of our Colonies, and the native has become in fact, if not in law, a serf.

It was claimed that the Mandate system of the League of Nations, which was introduced for the rule of territories in Africa and Polynesia that had been German colonies, was an application of English colonial ideas, since we had acted on the principle of being trustees for civilization. We flattered ourselves in that claim. The trusteeship which we proclaimed, but of which we did not have to give an account to any outside authority, was ill discharged for the peoples of the West Indies, West Africa and Kenya. Since we and the Dominions were granted the Mandates for the greater part of the German colonies, and have had to give an account of our administration

to the League of Nations, there has been a marked difference between the treatment of native peoples in the mandated territories and in the Colonies. Shortly before the outbreak of war, indeed, our conscience was aroused about the economic and labour conditions of the colonies under British rule. Royal Commissions had reported on the grossly low standard of life which was still the lot of the workers in the West Indies and Africa. In the early months of the war Parliament passed legislation by which the Colonial Development Fund, hitherto restricted to a maximum of £1,000,000 a year, should be raised to £5,000,000 a year. The increased sum, in the opinion of many, was still inadequate for the needs; and it is to be regretted that, so far, only a fraction of the larger amount has been actually voted for specific schemes in the Colonies.

During the years of the war we have been faced with the problems of the treatment of the native peoples in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and the South African Protectorates, which have long been felt to be a blot on our Imperial record. We have still to come to a fairer settlement with the self-governing Dominion of South Africa about those problems. It is a good augury that Field Marshal Smuts, the outstanding statesman of the Union of South Africa, and one of the most eminent statesmen of our time, has recently declared that at the end of the war a new relation must be sought between the white and coloured peoples of South Africa for the building up of a united and harmonious order. The common effort during the war of white man and black man to save Africa from Nazi domination, will help to a new outlook.

Generally, indeed, the English people during the struggle have manifested a growing recognition that colonial policy needs a radical change. Hitherto the dominant principle has been in the liberal tradition of *laissez faire*. The main business of the Government was to secure order and fair administration of justice, but to allow individual interests to direct economic development. That policy has meant the enrichment of members of the capitalist class of the ruling Power and a permanent impoverishment of the mass of the native peoples. We are coming to see that the conception of the social state, in which the Government is responsible for the economic well-being, the health, the education and the general advancement of the people must be applied in the Colonies no less than in the mother country. Lord Hailey, who has made a monumental survey of Africa, and Lord Moyne, the Secretary for the Colonies, have endorsed that conception. The other chief

colonial Powers, France and Holland, have been ahead of us in these respects. We may no longer lag behind. Our record about education is the least creditable. In great parts of Africa only a small minority of the native children receive any elementary education. The whole cost of Government help to the educational budget of the natives is derived from the taxation of the natives themselves, and the percentage of the revenue which is spent on education averages under two in East and West Africa. It is significant that in the Philippines the percentage is as high as 18 per cent. The health services and the agricultural services which we have established for the native peoples, if not as backward, are still altogether inadequate.

The Empire, as we have said, must be the responsibility not only of Great Britain but of the British Dominions. At present those Dominions are directly responsible only for the mandatory administration of territories in South West Africa and Polynesia, which were formerly German colonies. In the new order it is to be hoped that they will share with us the administration of all peoples in the British Empire not yet fit for self-government. It may be expected too that the U.S.A. which, during the war have entered into a treaty with us for common defence measures that affect immediately our Colonies in the American hemisphere, will take a fair part with us in the assistance not only of those Colonies, but of all the dependent peoples. Whatever may be the form of Government of such peoples, the experience since the last war suggests that the ruling Power should be definitely accountable for its trust to an international body. The two main purposes to which the administration must be directed are on the one hand the maintenance and advancement of the well-being of the native peoples, and on the other the education and preparation for self-government. They must be helped not only to political, but also to economic independence; and that will involve financial help in ample measure. The main cause of the permanent backwardness of the colonial peoples is their poverty. If they are to have freedom from want, it is the business of the advanced countries to come to their aid, not, as in the past, by investment for profit, which meant exploitation, but by co-operation and generous contribution.

It has been said that one of the foundations of the new order must be a Bill of duties and responsibilities of the governments parallel with a Bill of rights of the citizens; and the duties and responsibilities most obviously called for are to raise the con-

dition of the dependent peoples. The ugly phrase of the Japanese, which seems to us a mockery, the "co-prosperity sphere," should be translated in the British Empire into the reality of co-operation of white and coloured races for the well-being of the population. Then, indeed, the British Empire might become in the true sense of the word a British Commonwealth. That end clearly cannot be attained by the effort of Great Britain alone. We shall not have the substance or the men with which to carry out so vast a function. But the Dominions should be in a position to play an ever growing part in the development of the whole; and if the promise of the Atlantic Charter is sustained and the links between the British peoples and our English-speaking Allies are fortified, then America also, which has been critical of British imperialism, will be able to take her part in the common task. She and we together may give fulfilment to the ideal of her poet of democracy, Walt Whitman: "By God, I will accept nothing which all cannot have their counterpart of on the same terms."

CONSCRIPTION AND WOMEN

BY EDITH SUMMERSKILL, M.P.

IN December, 1941, a National Service Bill was introduced into the House of Commons which might in other days have created a Parliamentary storm of the first magnitude. It was unprecedented for it proposed to conscript the women of the country. And yet it passed all its stages in record time, and is now on the Statute Book.

Women view this new measure with mixed feelings. Many regard it as long overdue. Others feel it deals inequitably with spinsters while conferring favours on those able to produce a marriage certificate. The only organized protest in the lobby of the House came from women who demanded that in the event of conscription becoming law the Government should undertake to give to men and women equal pay for equal work and equal compensation for injuries received as the result of enemy action. In the House itself a few Members opposed the measure on the grounds that women should be afforded the maximum protection and that conscription would interfere with the sanctity of the home. These Members had also opposed the conscription of men, so that it was difficult to believe that their attitude arose solely from a desire to protect women.

Other interventions however struck a mid-Victorian note. There is a certain type of individual who is always ready to suspect the morals of women who indulge in activities outside the home and who is obsessed with the idea that a girl in uniform attracts certain undesirable characters. The girl may be a level headed, capable person, holding a responsible position in civilian life but apparently she loses all her graces immediately she enters the Services and becomes a sub-normal moral defective. She is unable to protect herself, even to the extent of screaming for help and must submit to the unwelcome attentions of any male who happens to cross her path. It is interesting to observe that there are still people who believe that the only serious harm that can threaten a woman is that of physical assault.

The periodic upheaval occasioned by war reveals that women have individualities of their own and are not merely adjuncts of men. They have aspirations and ambitions which become apparent in war time, because only then can they enjoy a real freedom to achieve at least some part of their heart's desire. But for the Crimean War Florence Nightingale would no doubt have continued to be the dutiful daughter of highly respectable parents. Her unwomanliness was deplored by her mother who believed that a lady should be satisfied with the shelter of her father's home until she exchanged his roof for that of her husband. It was scandalous that she should wish to nurse dirty soldiers. Women who did that were inviting trouble. And no doubt the grandfathers of those who whisper about the morals of the woman in the Services to-day opined that no respectable woman could become an army nurse and still preserve her chastity.

The great war of 1914-1918 provided a safety valve for the energies of hundreds of thousands of women. In the preceding years the suffragette movement had given evidence that women were showing signs of restlessness—that they were no longer willing to submit to a system in which certain privileges were enjoyed by one sex only. The fight for the suffrage was merely a symptom of the growing dissatisfaction with their place in the scheme of things and the war offered an opportunity to release them from a bondage which was growing irksome.

The 1919 Sex Disqualification Removal Act was the direct result of the war. Such a concession was surely not granted to women who were demoralized in the armament factories and in the auxiliary services. Four years of freedom to individuals who had hitherto led solitary, isolated lives, each securely shut up in her home, with very little opportunity of exchanging views other than with family and tradesmen must effect a profound change. The new woman who emerged had preserved her chastity, her morals were unsullied, but she had developed a mind of her own. She wanted to play her part in reconstruction. She hated war and sought to find a solution to the problems presented to the world. To express herself effectively she must have representation in Parliament, on local authorities and in the professions which had been barred to her on account of her sex. She demanded these things and got them.

Twenty years later she had to admit that her efforts to avert war had failed. The war drums were throbbing in the distance and once more she felt the call, not only to munition

work, to cooking, nursing or typing, but to the front line if necessary. The part which women are playing transcends anything which they accomplished in 1914. Yet this does not save them from the Jeremiahs who, ignoring the superb contribution which women are making to the war effort, can only see in this freedom the rapid moral and spiritual deterioration of our young womanhood. Those who fear for her morals should try to understand that the virtuous woman is not merely the one who lacks the opportunity to be otherwise. Also, though the uncertainty of life to-day is conducive to hasty marriages some of which are bound to fail, this is true of the relationships of men and women both in and out of the Services.

There are other individuals who fear that uniformed women will lose their femininity. One Eton crop combined with a long stride provides these people with a case from which to generalize. They forget or do not know that certain ductless glands determine the degree of femininity displayed by women and that it is scientifically impossible and quite unsound to suggest that a uniform, however severely cut, can influence the secretions of the hormones. The masculine type of woman will always be attracted to jobs generally performed by men. In peace time she will not be found in a chorus or a mannequin parade and in war time she gravitates towards some kind of mechanical work. As in civilian life, she is decidedly in the minority. A few members of the auxiliary services also apparently fear that the uniform may detract from their femininity, and no doubt that is the reason why they use cosmetics a little too freely. Those in authority have certainly not observed that the girls have ceased to be interested in their own physical charms, for instructions have been issued repeatedly that hair must be dressed neatly and not in the latest Hollywood style.

Women in uniform arrest the attention not because of any masculinity in their attire, but because they are abnormally uniform. We have been accustomed to see women exercising individuality—hundreds of them going to work, each wearing a different hat, whether it be in shape, colour or ornament. It did not need a war to teach the smart woman that a well-cut tailored ensemble would enhance her feminine charms, rather than detract from them. The pessimist who still believes that conscription and the consequent compulsory enrolment of a woman in the auxiliary services will produce an unsexed individual should take comfort in the knowledge that an

instructor—a doctor of philosophy—who has been appointed to plan recreation for the A.T.S. reports that the girls ask to learn dressmaking, child care and subjects which they may find useful in the future. This scarcely calls for explanation, for the urge to procreation sets normal men and women planning to have homes of their own.

It is regrettable that those who have persistently raised the question of the moral welfare of our young women, have not shown the same concern for their material well-being. Although a woman may be called upon to serve and perform the same duties as a man, her monetary value is assessed at four-fifths of that of her male colleague. If in the course of her work she is disabled and loses a limb or an eye, the loss again is reckoned as being worth only four-fifths of that of a man. The Government has never explained how a woman earning her living with her hands suffers less than a man through the loss of an arm. In fact her disability may mean the sacrifice of all her dreams of a home, husband and children, while a man may still find a wife who would be willing to care for him.

Service women find it difficult to make an organized protest in war time, but they keenly resent this differentiation. They find it difficult to reconcile the principles of democracy for which they are fighting with this inequitable treatment of their sex; equality of sacrifice, they feel, at least merits equality of pay. I am certain that the post-war woman will not tolerate this unfair discrimination in the labour market, and she will insist that she is worth five-fifths of a man if she performs the same work. With the introduction of a scheme of family allowances the opponents of equal pay will probably find themselves stripped of the hoary argument that a man has dependents and should therefore receive a higher salary.

Fears have been expressed that communal feeding and crèches herald the disintegration of family life after the war. Some of the worst features of home life are certainly threatened, to the dismay of the domestic Hitlers who revel in the petty dictatorships which they have established. The freedom which women are enjoying to-day will spell the doom of home life, as enjoyed by the male who is lord and master immediately he enters his own front door. I hope that communal feeding has convinced us of the stupid waste of fuel, food and labour entailed in millions of families each day cooking their meals on millions of separate gas stoves. It must at least have shown the housewife that she is not indispensable,

and that on occasions the family can feed well and cheaply, while she takes a day off to spend as she thinks fit. There is a curious belief which is shared by most men that women instinctively love cooking and washing up. A perfectly cooked meal is certainly an achievement and a woman may well experience considerable pleasure in producing a savoury and appetising dish. But I have never known ecstasy induced by washing up. Scraping, washing and drying dishes is a soul-destroying business and unfortunately takes twice as long as the eating of the meal; it is little wonder that a housewife complains that she has no time to call her own.

Marriage at the best for most people is rather a one-sided affair. While the husband has an opportunity of meeting people outside the home and exchanging ideas, the wife leads a rather isolated existence, which tends to make her more of an individualist, and keeps her comparatively uninformed on many subjects. This is in some measure due to the fact that the mother of young children has for the greater part of the day to try to assume the mental age of her youngest child. Crèches provide a release from this kind of nervous strain and consequent irritability and a well equipped day nursery, staffed by trained nurses, should be an indispensable part of our social services after the war. The post-war mother will demand this relief from the daily burden of trying to interpret and respond to the wishes of a youngster who needs the companionship of children of his own age. Communal feeding and crèches therefore will make some contribution towards improving the lives of housewives who, because of the nature of their work, are denied the enjoyment of certain cultural activities. A great deal of sentiment is talked about the position of the wife and mother in the home—she receives the love and respect of her family and what more can she wish?

This will not satisfy the post-war housewife who has tasted the joys of economic independence in the factories and the Services, and who will be critical of the status endured by her mother. She will argue, and quite rightly, that a woman in the home is making a contribution of inestimable value to the state and therefore that her rights should be safeguarded, together with those of other workers. She will probably ask awkward questions which will have to be answered. Why does legislation concerning the married woman lag behind legislation concerning other workers? Why is the housewife the only worker in the household denied the right of benefit under the National Health Insurance Acts, while she is often

the one most in need? Why do successive Governments disregard the anomalies in our unemployment regulations which concern the housewife? And why is she obliged to take the nationality of her husband, however ardently she wishes to retain her own? Why is a married woman who has devoted the whole of her single life to mastering a profession debarred from obtaining employment? Why is the work in the home not recognized as having a monetary value and a wife not legally entitled to one penny of the family income which she indirectly helps to earn? Why do Members of Parliament chiefly belong to one sex?

These questions will call for adequate answers. The woman toiling in this war has faced dangers and hardships and has accustomed herself to ugly sights and situations. She has learned to think and will not be put off by pretty speeches and promises. She will ask for no privileges, but she will demand her rights in no uncertain voice.

In short, the war will have given her a poise which was totally lacking before she had an opportunity of learning for herself that her alleged timidity, lack of balance, and absence of intellectual ability have no foundation in fact. If conscription should promote such an awakening in the women of Britain then it will be amply justified apart from its immediate effect on the war effort.

CHRISTIANITY AND RECONSTRUCTION

BY CANON F. A. COCKIN

NOT long ago a distinguished theological scholar, well known for his active interest in the bearing of Christian thought upon the problems of society, was discussing with a group of scientists in his own senior common room the universal question of post-war reconstruction. After a while he raised the question of the part which Christianity might be expected to play in this re-ordering of life—to be met with the blunt retort: "But you Christians won't have anything to do with this: this is going to be our concern!"

The incident is typical of an attitude which is widespread. In recent issues of *The Times Educational Supplement* there appeared three very stimulating articles by Professor Julian Huxley on the subject of "Education as a Social Function." In the first article, which dealt with modern trends in educational theory and practice, he noted as one of the most significant of these

an increased concern with the future, and with the possibility of approximating to ideal but scientific standards: and obversely a decreased concern with the past, and with the imposition of ideal but non-scientific (philosophical or religious) norms derived from the past

The implication is obvious. Religion, and with it philosophy, that dangerous branch of knowledge which suffers from the possession of an over-long ancestry, and which has more than once fallen from grace by showing itself the ally of religion, are to be discarded. They are to be replaced by a discipline which prides itself on its readiness to break with the past, and on its repudiation of the improper practice of "imposing" any norm of thought or conduct upon what should be man's free and unfettered "approximation to ideal but scientific standards."

Nor is such a point of view characteristic only of pure science. Economics, technology, psychology would all tell the same story. In the welter of discussion and planning by which we are surrounded, it is taken for granted that these and similar "techniques" will have a determining influence upon the future. They will in fact take over the task which Chris

tianity has attempted to discharge, in an amateurish and ineffective way, for the last fifteen centuries or so, and will set themselves by a thorough attention to what are described as "man's basic needs," to introduce an order of life in which the great enemies of human happiness, poverty, insecurity, ignorance, disease and the like will be "scientifically" tackled and disposed of.

One must avoid overstating the case. There are not a few among the scientific authorities themselves who recognize, as clearly as any Christian, the underlying need of a new motive, a new temper, if man is to be rescued from his present parlous situation. But they just do not believe that religion can any longer supply what is lacking. They fall back upon the hope that the removal of many of the material, and indeed intellectual, disabilities, which have for so long hampered man in his efforts to attain the good life, will somehow spontaneously engender a "new spirit" which will supply the incentive that religion has failed to provide.

No one but a fool would wish to deny or underestimate the truth which these views contain. It is painfully clear that the Christian Church has increasingly lost the power to convince more than a small minority that it possesses the clue to the new order of human society, or the secret of that moral dynamic which enables man to meet the demand for sacrifice of personal privilege and advantage which that new order will entail.

It is equally clear that the kind of reconstruction, national and international, for which we are looking, will involve the harnessing of the resources of scientific knowledge to the tasks of the common-wealth on an unprecedented scale; and the "imposition" (I do not think, *pace* Professor Huxley, there is any getting away from it) of a measure of disciplined planning such as we in this country have never known. But I am none the less convinced that some of the assumptions involved (and not always very clearly stated), in this demand for a life directed by science rather than by religion require a good deal more examination.

One wonders sometimes whether these confident prophets ever cast a glance over their shoulder at the history of the last two hundred, or even the last twenty, years. This prospect of a new earth—heaven of course can be disregarded—in which dwell prosperity, security and peace, seems somehow difficult to reconcile with the recurrence, most notably in the more recent period, of occasions on which very competent and

promising attempts to achieve it have suffered shipwreck on the rock of one strange but stubborn fact, that men did not seem to *want* the proffered millennium, or that if they did, they were unable to produce the "good will" necessary to its achievement.

The lessons of recent history are sufficiently plain. But they need to be reinforced by a more far reaching study of the nature of our European civilization, before we are really in a position to understand what is involved in this proposal to jettison Christian faith and philosophy.

Within the last eighteen months there have appeared two very remarkable books, Mr. C. N. Cochrane's *Christianity and Classical Culture*, and Professor R. G. Collingwood's *Essay on Metaphysics*. Working in different fields they both set out to maintain the same fundamental thesis, that the whole structure of European life is built upon a radically Christian foundation.

The purpose of Mr. Cochrane's work is to demonstrate the nature of the revolution effected by the great Christian thinkers from Athanasius to Augustine in the entire order of Graeco-Roman thought and life. He illustrates by copious reference to Greek and Latin literature the nature of the impasse at which poets, philosophers, historians and statesmen had arrived through the failure to discover a true "logos," a true principle or rationale of life, which alike in thought and action would enable man to make sense both of his universe and of his state. And he lays bare with penetrating insight the nature of the solution achieved by the introduction of the Christian "logos," with its substitution for the uneasy compromise between human capacity (*virtus*) and the incalculable element of circumstance (*fortuna*) of a new single comprehensive principle governing every event in nature and history, the will of God. The Greek *polis* and the Roman empire died for lack of a true metaphysic. Christianity—not without some false starts and wrong turnings—succeeded in salvaging the best of the life of both by providing it with a new metaphysic, the metaphysic of the Catholic faith. By so doing it reintegrated not only the ethic but the philosophy and the science of the ancient world.

Professor Collingwood develops the same theme in the field of pure metaphysics. He establishes the connection between the Christian philosophers and the main tradition of Greek philosophical thought as being not a mere syncretism, or a dilution of the main stream of Christian thought by the infiltration of Hellenistic elements, but a clear and deliberate

criticism and revaluation of Greek thought at certain specific points at which Hebrew-Christian monotheism corrected classical speculation whether idealistic or materialistic. His whole essay is a passionate plea for the recovery of that truly Christian metaphysical tradition which has been the root and the spring of European civilization.

The reintegration achieved in the 4th century lasted for something like a thousand years. Upon the question of how it broke up, and of what has happened to it since, opinions differ. The true nature of the Reformation is a subject which had perhaps better be left for discussion in those journals in which theologians wash their own particular brand of dirty linen. But on any view it is clear that the Reformation was an attempt to revivify the great tradition: and its astonishing effect in the outburst of theological life, in part healthy, in part morbid, showed that men recognized in the attempt something to which they instinctively responded. For good or ill it has left its mark upon the whole of subsequent European history. The Wesleyan movement and the Catholic revival are the two latest illustrations of the same truth. The civilization of Europe has been a religious civilization, a Christian civilization. If it seeks to remake itself now on another basis, it will cease to be European in the sense in which we have understood that word up to now.

But we can go deeper than the argument from history. Whatever the resources of scientific, economic and political knowledge which we bring to bear upon the problems of reconstruction, there is one fact from which we cannot escape. The reconstruction will be carried out—and still more important, it will have to be maintained—by man, *homo sapiens*. And the ultimate question which therefore confronts anyone who seeks to plan human life is the question: What is man? Indeed it is not the ultimate question: it is the first.

We have had a good many answers to the question during the past two or three hundred years. During that period we have attempted to build civilization upon assumptions which have claimed in turn to have discovered the essential truth of man's nature. He has been classified as the political man, the economic man, the scientific man, the psychological man, most recently as the mass man. Even when he has been regarded as "the bearer of rights and duties," these have too often been conceived in too abstract terms as purely legal and constitutional. In greater or less degree all these descriptions have ignored the essential truth about him, which is that he

is a spiritual being, a soul, with a destiny in this world and beyond it, and that his destiny in this world can be neither truly understood nor truly fulfilled if it is regarded as falling entirely within this world.

Because we have ignored this fact, we and our fathers have constructed theories and systems of society designed to reach the millennium, which could afford to dispense with God. We have achieved miracles of scientific, and in some respects of economic, progress. And now we have come to the end of that road. We have lost God—and we have not exactly found the millennium.

The contemporary mind witnesses to the truth of this. In recent years shrewd observers have marked the symptoms which indicated a condition of acute strain. There is the sense of confusion, aimlessness and futility—*The Waste Land* is sufficient illustration. There is the recrudescence of the resort to magic, the reappearance of that old pagan conception of *fortuna*, a sure sign of the collapse not only of healthy religion, but of healthy thought. There is, most significant, and rightly interpreted a source of encouragement, the feeling of dismay and shame at the collapse of so much in which we have trusted.

This is not, I need hardly say, the whole story. It would be untrue and ungenerous to ignore the signs of new life already springing amid the decay of the old.

First, and most obvious, especially to those who have had the good fortune to live in close contact with the mind of the young, there is the new passion for social justice. Often enough it takes crude forms. Denied, as it largely has been in this country, any effective outlet in a crusade for the removal of injustice, it has often spent itself in facile theorizing or in a rather pathetic imitation of foreign brands of revolutionary thought. It has not yet found any expression native to the genius of our people. Above all it has not yet found the religious motive, which would at once give it the passion of devotion to a cause, and save it from the barbarous extremes into which, as we know well, reforming zeal, not so directed, can run. But it is there, pent up just below the surface by the restraints of war. It will break out again, the moment they are relaxed: and woe betide this nation if we are not ready to meet it and give it an outlet in action.

In the second place there is the growing realization that this passion for justice must be an intelligent passion, trained, and equipped with knowledge. There are few more hopeful signs at the present moment than the growing demand not only for

a radical reshaping of our educational system, but also for a radical rethinking of our philosophy of education. It is dangerous of course: the air is full of ideas, some of them patently too idealistic to have a chance of fulfilment, others ominously indicative of what a "planned" education might turn out to be in the wrong hands. And again the only real safeguard is to go back to the fundamental question—What is man? What are the true needs of his nature? It is only in the light of the answer to that question that we can know what educating him means.

But deeper than either of these there lies a third demand, the demand implied in that significant phrase "design for living." Beneath all the diverse and sometimes bizarre suggestions for that design there lies the same insistent need, the need of a "logos," a principle, which will enable men to integrate, and so make sense of, the fragmentary incoherent moments of their experience. This is a need which touches the deepest levels of man's life, his relations within the family and in society, his sense of purposefulness in his work or profession, the very integrity of his own personal existence. Unless it is met he will be doomed to a continued frustration in which his superficial needs are increasingly supplied while his deepest nature remains starved and sterile.

If this analysis is anywhere near the truth one conclusion at least is obvious. The ultimate problem of reconstruction is not one which can be handled by the sciences. They have their contribution to make, a contribution without which no comprehensive solution can be found. But the root of the trouble lies in the soul of man, and that in no narrow individualistic sense. These demands which I have just touched on, for social justice, for an education which shall more truly fit each generation to take an intelligent and active part in the shaping of the common good, for an intelligible pattern of personal living, these are demands the satisfaction of which cannot be found merely by a more competent adjustment of material resources. They are demands for a new motive, a new quality, in our whole community life. They are demands of the human spirit.

The question is whether Christianity can meet them, and *on what terms*. I use this phrase deliberately since it expresses the real crux of the problem. It is obvious that increasing numbers of men and women are looking, not indeed very hopefully but as a last resource, to religion. It is equally clear that to most of them religion, as they see it embodied in the life of

the Churches, seems incapable of doing what they know it has done in the past, and what they would fain see it do again. They feel that it must radically reshape itself to meet the needs and requirements of a new age. In the second of those articles to which I referred previously Professor Huxley asks that the Churches should "recast their theologies in forms acceptable to the new phase of the Western world." It would be difficult to find a phrase in which truth and dangerous error are more subtly blended. It would not perhaps be unfair to ask to which particular new phases of the Western world the reformed theology is to be acceptable. But the issue is far too grave for making debating points. The whole thing turns of course on what is meant by "recasting" the Christian theology.

Certain things are clear enough. There is a crying need for Christianity to recover the capacity to formulate its ethical principles in a form which can give direction not only in the problems of personal life, but in the far more complex and difficult sphere of the large scale relationships of industry and politics. There is an equally urgent need for Christian theology to state its doctrine of God in language which, while it can never be in the strict sense of the word "scientific," conveys a conception of his relation to life which is at least intelligible to minds accustomed to thinking in terms of scientific discovery.

But to some at least it seems that the question needs to be stated the other way round. We are constantly told that there can be no going back, that it is hopeless to ask the modern mind to return to beliefs which it has discarded as antiquated and irrelevant. It is perhaps worth asking whether this is not the best course to follow when one finds that one has strayed off the track in difficult country with the mist coming down. There are times when it is wise to try to find the track again: and that may sometimes mean turning back to look for the point at which one lost it.

This is not a plea for a mere return to dogmatic antiquarianism. The task of finding the right track again is one which in itself will call for the combined output of all the ability, historical, philosophical, theological and scientific, which we can muster. For it was not yesterday that European thought took a wrong turning. And in that slow and painful process of getting our bearings again it will not, I venture to predict, be theology alone that has to undergo some "recasting."

CECIL RHODES AND EDUCATION TO-DAY

By LORD ELTON

WHEN Cecil Rhodes founded his Scholarships he was doing what we are doing to-day: he was looking for leaders. Or is it possible that we are not looking for leaders to-day? Certainly during the armistice between the two world wars—when most intellectual fashions were dictated by men who were in revolt against the war of 1914-18, against the men who had fought it and the virtues which had won it—it was not infrequently suggested that leadership was incompatible with democracy, and had somehow been tainted by the *fuehrer prinzip*. It seems doubtful however whether just now, *consule* Churchill, even Bloomsbury would maintain the thesis that leadership is a superfluous or alien quality (although there may be some distant kinship between this degenerate notion and the taste for Gallup polls and straw votes, which, with some at least, represents the instinct to replace the statesman and the expert by the collective wisdom of the irresponsible and the uninstructed). If, after a survey of the motley politicians from whom a successor to the present Prime Minister would have to be selected, we were to assert that few embryo Churchills obtrude themselves upon the inquiring and anxious gaze, would this not be an understatement of an almost breathtaking variety? Reforms of our educational system are a-planning: will they be reforms which will train us leaders? Hardly; for in that increased clambering which is intended upon the ladder of opportunity, the fortunate clamberers will have been picked by the examination system with which we are already familiar, by a series, that is, of intelligence tests, in which the successful will, in effect, be those best able to absorb and reproduce other peoples' ideas. A system, this, which is capable, at its worst, of passing a spineless bookworm up from scholarship to scholarship, until the final triumph forces an entry to Whitehall, and leaves him passing-to-you-please for the rest of his natural life. Our examination system seeks out intelligences only; and man does not live, or, for that matter, choose a new

pipe, by intelligence alone—how comparatively easy life would be, if he did! It hardly seems dangerous to hazard the guess that until our examinations themselves deliberately seek out all the qualities which go to make leaders, and not one only, our education itself, whatever else it finds for us, will not find sufficient leaders.

Which brings us back to Cecil Rhodes. For it makes a suitable starting point for a consideration of his scholarships to remind ourselves that Cecil Rhodes (who had a passion for education, and laboriously returned to Oxford from his African career to read for a degree) could never have won a scholarship. He never possessed, for one thing, the much over-rated gift of literary self-expression. Moreover he was so full of gigantic rough-hewn ideas of his own that all his life, and particularly in his boyhood, they served as a kind of non-conductor for the ideas of other people. Like Shakespeare, like Cromwell and Nelson, like Winston Churchill, maybe, himself, he would never have ascended the ladder of our present examination system. He wanted leaders, and yet he knew, none better, that tests in book-digestion alone could never be relied upon to pick them. He wanted leaders who would "esteem the performance of public duties their highest aim." He wanted leaders who would spread the civilization of the English-speaking races all over the globe. It was because he wished to spread civilization, and believed that the English-speaking races were the chosen instrument for spreading it, that he laboriously amassed his wealth. His original idea had been a secret society, on the model of the Jesuits, to serve the interests of the British Commonwealth. And then he hit upon the scholarships.

He wanted leaders: and he did not believe that book-learning and facility with the pen could be relied upon, by themselves, to provide them. How could he have believed this—for he possessed neither of these gifts himself, yet he cannot have doubted that he was a born leader? There is an amusing passage in his fifth will, the will which founded the scholarships, in which he speaks of the Oriel dons as living "secluded from the world and so live like children as to commercial matters." These were men after all who had climbed to the summit of the educational ladder of their day by the customary rungs and, for all he could see, they were not even to be trusted to use his legacy to their college with practical commonsense. And, although of this there is no trace in the will, the inarticulate young genius, so conscientiously return-

ing from his African adventures to read for his Pass degree at Oxford, must often have felt a sardonic amusement at the raw and condescending omniscience of some members of the undergraduate intelligentsia. The queer young "colonial" may even have experienced irritating slights from the College highbrows, and it would have been pardonable enough if, in a natural revulsion, he had provided that his scholarships should go to brawny he-men, hearty athletes, potential pioneers—anything rather than the ineffective intellectuals who sometimes emerged as laureates of the traditional scholarship system. Indeed Rhodes' scholarships have sometimes, quite mistakenly, been spoken of as if this had indeed been the Founder's purpose, and as if his scholars were customarily men of brawn rather than brain. Nothing could be further from the truth. Rhodes believed in all-round men. In his will he laid down almost meticulous instructions as to the qualities which those who would one day select his scholars were to look for; and though he included athletic prowess, it was at the bottom of the list. What his instructions amounted to can be briefly summarized. The Rhodes scholar should either possess exceptional intellect founded upon sound character, or exceptional character founded upon sound intellect.

All history, surely, is witness to the wisdom of this prescription. Can any great achievement be pointed to, to which there has not gone both remarkable intellect and remarkable character? A few, perhaps, a very few, in the field of pure literature, or of science, but none, I think, on the path of "public duties" with which Rhodes was specially concerned. The picking of potential leaders from young men between nineteen and twenty-five is naturally at best a tricky business—made no easier by the fact that a candidate's intellectual powers will already have been officially graded at school or college, while as to his character selectors will have to rely upon much less concrete estimates and impressions. In spite of which, selection committees, all over the British Commonwealth, have done their work, on the whole, with remarkable success. There are even statistics to show that, of recent years, a higher percentage of Rhodes Scholars, than of open Scholars or Exhibitioners from British Schools, chosen on a pure intelligence test, have obtained a First in the Oxford Final Honour Schools. And, although here no statistics are available, it seems very probable that a higher proportion of them have fulfilled the Founder's purpose by achieving distinction,

in later life, in the "performance of public duties." Norman Rogers, the Canadian War Minister, who perished so tragically in an air disaster not long ago, was but one particularly outstanding example of many former Rhodes Scholars who are playing leading parts both in the British Commonwealth and in the United States.

We need more leaders, and shall need them increasingly. The totalitarian states, with which we have to measure ourselves in the evolutionary struggle for survival, have hardly yet outgrown their revolutionary phase; which means that not only their three or four Biggest Shots, but all their administrative chiefs will be men who have forced and fought their way upwards through the lava of a Society in eruption. Such men will doubtless lack many of the Christian virtues, but they are likely to possess quick wits, resolution, drive, ruthlessness and fanaticism in abundance. Does a survey of our own system suggest that it can be relied upon to find for its high places the dynamic qualities needed to compete effectively with such opponents? We think of some polished, weary Under-Secretary, inheritor of the nineteenth century tradition that it is the first business of the Civil Service to point out difficulties; of some bellicose politician who went on urging us to spend our money on comfort, instead of arms, long after the Germans had given up butter for guns: it would be difficult to answer with a confident Yes. This is not, of course, by any means altogether the fault of our education. Our leaders are picked for us by a score of other agencies; by the Trade Unions, by big business, by Fleet Street, by Broadcasting House, by heredity, by nepotism, by their own powerful lungs, sometimes even by the Church.

British education, fortunately, is not anything like so one-sided as our examination system would suggest. For a hundred years the public schools, as they are somewhat absurdly called, have been setting an invaluable example of emphasis on the training of character. Life in one of these—"residential" schools would be a better label than "public"—involves an early and thorough training in citizenship. Like the trade unions they have been too inclined to serve the interests of a class, but like the trade unions they have made an invaluable training ground for leaders, and it was only natural that most of the publicists who preached decadence and defeatism between the two world wars should have assailed the public schools with special persistence and rancour. It is devoutly to be hoped that after the war, shorn of their excessive class

bias, they will extend their fertilizing tradition of character-training over wider areas than ever before. The non-residential secondary and primary schools, which, through State and Local Education Authority scholarships, nowadays supply so many of the rungs of the educational ladder of opportunity, have not yet developed quite the same emphasis on character-training. It is to them principally that the Master of Balliol's words apply—"to be trained from early youth to think about nothing but examinations is an experience which only the strongest mind can survive." Moreover one short-sighted practice in the public schools themselves in a roundabout way has done a good deal to discredit all qualities save intelligence in the successful examinee. Too many public schools have allowed the tradition to grow up that authority, in the great system of self-government which they inherited from Arnold, is best exercised by athletes. This perversion of the Arnold tradition (for Arnold made the Sixth form his oligarchy) overlooks the fact that though the hefty forward or the hawk-eyed batsman, whom the young so readily admire, may often enough lack brains, it does not by any means necessarily follow that they possess character. Meanwhile, excluded from early responsibility, the unmuscular but intelligent adolescent, half envious and half scornful of the somewhat bovine school aristocracy, is apt to grow up with a strong unconscious bias towards criticism and opposition, a tendency to over-value the quick wits which he possesses, and to undervalue the responsibility and experience which he has not been allowed to acquire. If later life does not supply a corrective, he may even grow into an incurable No man, and nurse through life a secret inferiority complex, for which Personages in general are but the prefects of his schooldays somewhat larger than life size, and evoke the old mixture of envy and contempt. It is this small minority of malcontent intellectuals which has been responsible for most of the sustained campaign against the public schools and their traditional emphasis on character.

Despite all, however, it is fair to say that, in general, even though the rungs of the educational ladder itself may consist merely of literary intelligence tests, the very nature of the British educational tradition ensures that a respectable proportion of candidates will have developed at school the qualities of character which are the indispensable complement of mere intelligence. Only, the would-be scholars are not tested in these. And as the University commoners, supported

by no public funds, become fewer and fewer, the influence of the public school tradition is bound to decrease.

An increased bias towards placing value on character in the examination system would soon impose analogous changes on education itself. In the examinations for the Civil Service, for Sandhurst, Woolwich and elsewhere, considerable weight is already given to the "interview." The same practice should be extended to every rung of the scholarship ladder. It would not be long before it had affected the whole school curriculum.

There is plenty of evidence that the schools themselves have for some while already been moving towards some such development. Indeed the residential schools have transformed themselves in a generation. I passed through both my "preparatory" and "public" schools, without spending an hour on any sort of handwork whatever; to my lasting loss, no drawing, no carpentry, no gardening, no engineering came my way. This meant an ill-balanced education, which would have mattered much less, but for the compulsory ball-games which filled the afternoons in which Tom Brown and his contemporaries fished, ferreted or birds-nested at their own sweet will. To-day, with its gardens, carpentry-shops, scout-troops and farm-contingents there is no boarding school which does not train its pupils to use their hands as well as their brains. Again, the so-called County Badge Scheme, already in operation in many parts of the country, forecasts in part the pattern of the education of the future. By this a boy is required not only to reach certain standards, in running, jumping, throwing or swimming, but to carry out an exploration, sail a boat at sea, make something with his own hands. I foresee the time when some such certificates of achievement as these—extended, and developed, all up the educational ladder, and dovetailed into the intelligence tests of the orthodox scholarship tradition—will be as indispensable to the ambitious young man as his First in Greats. When, in addition, every scholarship examination, from the earliest, involves an appraisal, modelled on the Rhodes tradition, of character as well as book-digestion, not only shall we have greatly widened the rungs of the competitive ladder, but we shall have laid the foundations of the education of the future, the complete education of complete men and women, an education fit to find us leadership for an age of Blitzkriegs.

LOST LEADERS

BY G. ROSTREVOR HAMILTON

From the poet-writer's standpoint all this prevalent talk about a New Order is sheer waste of time. There never will be a new order, and there never has been an old one . . . what I hope for and work for to-day is for a mess more favourable to artists than is the present one . . . A work of art . . . is the only material object in the universe which may possess internal harmony.

—E. M. FORSTER, in *The New Disorder*
(*Horizon*. December, 1941).

*sed nil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere
edita doctrina sapientum templa serena,
despicere unde queas*
Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* II, 7-9.

SUPPOSE a glory of arms, victory gained outright;
Then swift ignoble collapse, or tired gradual blight:
Suppose in loud *Te Deum* bells ringing again,
And candles of false peace lit over mounds of slain.

Then, Wise Ones, in late grief shall we congratulate
You who advise us now to hope no other fate?
“These”—shall we say?—“were the clear-eyed prophets, not
content
To be wise, like some poor fools, after the proved event.”

“These”—shall we say?—“had learned from history's
mottled page
No cosmos out of chaos comes, no golden age
From iron, nothing new beneath the visiting sun
But new disorder still, old discord new begun;

With, at the best, more ease for artist-souls serene
To gaze from guarded heights down on the stormy scene
Where crowds jostle and strive, and in seclusion make
Order, as only the artist can, for Art's own sake.”

So shall we speak, in praise? Or, “These men”—shall we
say?—

“Were disillusioned souls, lost leaders of their day;
Who, lightning-struck with Art's great order, could not see
In the common life of man the home-bred harmony,

Order of days and ways, sharing of warmth and food,
Family, friendship, love, working to brotherhood,
And order, less or more, but order truly named,
Even in parliaments and wider unions framed.

These were the gifted men, who sneered at statesmen's schemes
As rhetoric, will-o'-the-wisp, the will's deceiving dreams;
These, bitten once, were shy not only twice or thrice,
But sensed in each new plan a new fool's paradise,

And, when all strongest hopes were needed for success
And nothing on God's earth could fail like hopelessness,
On our light foolish heads their wisdom helped to draw,
By weakening our faith, the failure they foresaw.”

POINTS OF VIEW

I. THE MINER

BY B. L. COOMBES

I BELIEVE that few workers are more confused than miners in these days. They are exhorted to produce more, and are instructed in their behaviour by folk who show very clearly that they have no knowledge of what happens in the dark galleries below the surface of this land.

I have worked for many years as a miner but I try to value other points of view and to weigh them against the things which happen to us and influence our outlook. There is a shortage of coal and the usual inference is that miners are not doing their utmost when at work or are taking more time off than is allowed. The colliery companies are responsible for output as on that factor their profits depend; so they take care to see that the maximum is gained, and manage the workings in the way they consider best for that purpose.

The men do not always agree with the methods of working but their objections seem to have little effect, even in wartime. They may not understand all the administrative difficulties but many of them know the way to control roof and to handle the changes in the various seams better than the officials. During the last few years a change has come in the type of mine officials. A man is not now chosen for promotion because of his ability to do the hardest and most dangerous jobs. A little theory is now counted to outweigh years of experience so that many men are in charge who have never done the hard work of a miner; often it is that fact which has caused them to become officials. The miner feels a contempt for this type. If he has to be ordered to do a job he likes to feel that the instructor knows what he is talking about, especially in an industry where danger is ever at his elbow and the casualty list for ten years is far above a million and a half.

Often the workman knows a quicker and safer way of doing a job, but he must obey instructions. I have seen whole districts idle and hundreds of tons lost through the stupidity of

an under official but he will have first and most favoured hearing from the manager and very often the blame goes to the wrong man. This type of official has no use for the craftsmanship of the mines. He has not the experience to sense the need for a good job of roof repairing, for the neatly trimmed working place or the heading that runs straight and neat through the coal. He does not want men who know more than he does so he fosters younger men who have not matured to their job and are ready to "tear the coal up by the hair," as the saying goes, and are ready to run any risks for a few extra shillings. The resultant rush and scramble means irregular working and often falls which hinder the output—sometimes there are worse results.

In the early days the older workman might lose some output, but the roof he timbered would hold; his coal slips would be "shaped" so that his output would be sure and regular each day; and his straight and well laid roadway would carry the coal trams and give quick dispatch instead of the continual delays that come with slovenly laying. He would be at work every day and his output would come back as regularly as the evenings come to the valleys. That is the ideal which I feel should be aimed at—a reasonable output every day, rather than records one day and the transport all blocked and then a series of half outputs until the places are again got ready for the rush. Unless different methods are used all the highly skilled men will be driven from the mines. Their loss will hit the mining communities for the boys or young men brought up alongside a conveyor are not able to handle the difficult repairing jobs back on the roadways.

There was a time when miners took their sons to work with them, leading them carefully through the dangers of the mine and teaching them all the skill with hand and head that many years in the darkness had given to them. Nowadays no miner will let his son go underground if he can avoid it. "What has mining done for the likes of me?" They all ask the same question. "Given me nothing but slave driving and silicosis and likely enough the parish at the end. My boy shan't go through that. Let him get something safer and cleaner."

To many of us the complaint of coal shortage has a queer sound. We recall that not many months ago hundreds of miners from these areas where I live were ordered away to work. There were no coal orders we were told, and no possible prospect for the coal industry; so miners would be more patriotic if they left their homes and went to work on aero-

drome sites and other jobs. In bitter winter weather men who had always worked in hot seams were sent to outdoor work. Many suffered severely and I know of some deaths as a direct result. Then, when the warmer weather came and the men could work longer hours in better conditions the same people who forced them away discovered that they were urgently needed at the mines and so they must forsake their new jobs and homes to return. We feel that this fool changing may happen again at any time and when men hear of the need for coal they comment "Yes, I suppose. So that we can again be chucked on the road." Some had found good jobs away where the work was easier and much more pleasant. They found that the rewards were higher too and did not want to return. One mate told me that he had been sending more money each week to his wife while he was away than he had earned altogether since he had come back to his old job in the mine.

About this time the Labour Exchange did some queer things—nothing unusual in our experience of that service. I will give but one instance, typical of many. A close relative of my own was sent away from an ailing wife and four tiny children last spring. He had always worked in a warm mine and the change to outdoor work aggravated a bodily complaint that he had. He lost time through illness and more through the bad weather. But presently the weather and his health improved and he started to enjoy the outdoor work. Promptly came the command to return to the mines. He found that his old job was vacant and that the manager would like to have him back. Glad in the prospect of re-joining his family he journeyed home. His wife was so ill that the oldest boy of six had had to do all the shopping for the isolated household, and comfort the family when the raiders roared overhead. On his arrival the Labour Exchange informed him—and they saw no need to be civil—that his job was at a colliery in Nottingham. He explained about his old job being vacant and his home conditions. They were not interested, except to state that they would bring a man from away to do that job. Apparently they intended paying two lots of travelling expenses, two lodging allowances, breaking up two homes and forcing two miners to work in strange seams. To me their only excuse seemed that two jobs could be shown as having been found instead of one. In this case the miner had friends who could fight his case and they did so. Our Miners' Federation checked that bit of stupidity successfully.

Such happenings do not ease the bitterness left by decades of industrial warfare in these areas. I feel that most of the miners are thinking of the past and its happenings while the coalowners are very definitely looking to their own future. I am a miners' committee man and every week we have a pile of minor disputes to handle. I think these are more frequent now than before the war. Far more give and take is needed on both sides, but I have felt that efforts at co-operation have not been very successful. Sometimes when the men's side of the production committee urge a certain course they are asked: "Who's managing this colliery? You or us?" The result is that the committee loses its enthusiasm, yet they are in an ideal position to know the needs.

They know that a great waste of time and material is often hidden below the surface. Workmen are shifted back and fore from very warm places to others in which the air current is bitterly cold. Sometimes this happens more than once in the same shift and it can often be avoided. That way comes the loss of work through colds and weakened chests. I know of men who are away for months through these chills yet they have no claim for compensation. It is quite usual for a repairer to have to carry his heavy load of tools half a mile along the mine roadways, and very often he meets another of his mates carrying tools in the opposite direction to do the same kind of work. How many hours would be saved if this could be avoided? Also, during the daily rush, timber and steel arches are often sent to a part of the mine where they will not be needed for a while. The next repairing shift may want them badly, but in another section of the mine. Then comes the delay of loading again and bringing them back through all the intricate ways of the colliery—while repairers wait for their arrival. Short pieces of timber are often left about the sides and are a danger to transport. If these pieces were collected and sent to the saw mills they could be made into wedges for tightening posts. A little real thought and organization could save a deal of time and temper in these matters. There seems a desire always to save expense on the repairs of a colliery and it is usually the repairers who are stopped from working. I feel this to be doubtful policy as it is useless filling trams at the coal face unless they can be got back along the main roads.

In many collieries there is a surplus of officials and some of them could be put to coal cutting. Colliers are paid by the ton and the work of most day wage men is so arranged and inter-

woven that there is little chance of slacking. Apart from safety conditions there is little need to watch the men at work and I feel that many who are so doing would be much better employed at producing for this time of emergency. When you find an average of one official to every ten men or boys I feel sure that at least a quarter of the watchers are surplus. I know that a colliery manager has a difficult job to handle. He is deluged by regulations, worried by the lack of machinery and the belated arrival of supplies, and above all he must get coal out at a cheap rate. He must leave much of the underground control to the under officials and in this I feel that a swift change to more practical men is needed. The miner, always dreading a big explosion or other accident, is concerned about the type of man who will have his life in keeping if the disaster should come. I know there are mines where the choice of these men is not the manager's.

If coal is scarce why is so much thrown into the waste "gobs" and left for ever? This happens every working day and some men do little else. Quite recently I saw two men working without cease all through the night; they surely handled fifteen tons of coal but none of it will ever be seen in daylight. Every morning I pass a colliery which is well equipped for producing a large amount of coal and the seams are still only partly worked, yet not one ton has brightened the rails during the last twelve months. Why should modern machinery stand idle and why should the sixty or more coal trams that are outside be left rusting upon the rails? They are easily moved and could have carried many thousands of tons during that period. Recently I have seen coal being unloaded at the pit sidings so that the trucks could be filled again and the work kept going. Those who handle our transport problems blame the methods of the railways. I know well that miners from a distance who are entitled to cheap coal as part of their wages have great trouble in getting that coal delivered to them.

There is certainly absenteeism, some avoidable and some not. Often the man who is most keen to work may lose time because of an injury which he does not report—feeling he will be back at work in a day or two. His case might seem to be one of deliberate absenteeism. Then a foggy morning may defeat a man whose chest has been weakened by dust or on whom silicosis is starting its fatal grip. Many men are dubious about the new method of deducting income tax and I feel that time has been lost because of that. There are stand-

ing deductions of over four shillings weekly for insurances and other social services and many pay five or six shillings weekly in fares to work—and they are not allowed rebate on this. When several shillings again are taken off the docket for income tax the man begins to wonder what he is working for and the wife wants to know why there is such a gap between the £3 15s. or £4 that the average mine worker is shown to have earned and the amount which he has left to bring home.

The bulk of avoidable absenteeism is amongst the younger men who have no responsibilities and earn the highest wages. Many of these lose Saturday regularly and there can be no excuse for this. They should be checked, and I feel a good antidote would be better treatment of the married and older men who have more need of the money that is to be got in the best places. A proportion of these men earn high wages because they are lucky in their working places or have private arrangements with the officials. Possibly one-fourth would come under this heading but the remainder do not earn enough to take a day off even when ill, if they can crawl to work. I doubt, however, if it is profitable to man or State to work when unfit. Often a day or two resting might prevent a month in bed. A labourer underground getting a wage of about £3 13s. for a full week's work before any deductions are made cannot afford to be absent, neither can the hauliers, rope riders and other day workers whose wages are but little higher and who number, with the ordinary colliers, three-fourths of the workers underground. The better paid ones who absent themselves may be the cause of the lower paid being further penalized; for these may be sent back when not enough colliers are working.

In South Wales there has long been a system whereby the men on the afternoon or night shift lose a bonus turn if they are absent from work one day in the week—therefore they lose two days' pay by being once absent. No workman is going to suffer that loss if he can prevent it. There are, however, so many things that may happen; a train or bus may be missed; the alarm clock may not ring loud enough to waken an exhausted household; the wife or child may be very ill or the man may not be fit to face a heavy day; but that bonus shift is deducted without any mercy. Wartime food does not keep a man in the best condition for work and there are collieries where men have proved to have lost six pounds in weight during a shift. It is very true that many of my mates have come to work with little more than bread and often the slight

smear of margarine has been the wife's share. I work at a place which has that great boon—a pit head bath and canteen. Until recent weeks the canteen supplies have been chiefly a cup of tea with a promise of sugar and frequently no milk. Now we do get a number of meat pies. The men travel far from their homes and in some cases my mates have to ride quite twenty miles each way to work and have to pay the cost. Many of them have to leave their homes nearly two hours before they are due at the pit head. It often happens that the breakfast is a rushed meal as the housewife must get up before four o'clock to prepare it. After work is finished another two hours pass before the man or boy gets back to a fire and the chance of a warming meal. In such cases, and they number quite half the workers in this valley, there should surely be some method of giving a warm meal either before going in or before starting that long journey home—which is made even slower when winter makes the slopes difficult or an enemy plane drones overhead.

We know that the factories near us have good canteens and that they get cheap and ample meals. They work in pleasanter conditions than ours; surely we are worth at least the same consideration. At present we have to be grateful for the cakes and cigarettes they pass on to us when they board the buses which take us to and from work. It makes us think—and the conclusions are not pleasant.

SINGAPORE

I.

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

THOSE who designed the defences of Singapore have been accused of shutting their eyes to its real danger and of having spent immense sums on useless works and armament. Before coming to hasty conclusions it is well to recall the purpose for which the great naval base was constructed and the factors which affected its defence in circumstances which could be foreseen, and in those which have actually arisen. The purpose of the base was of course to provide for the heaviest units of our Navy an operational centre from which our sea communications in Eastern waters could be protected, and those of the enemy attacked. Singapore was in no sense a fortress intended to provide a pivot of manoeuvre in the defence of Malaya. The protection of the base itself, and, in fact, of all our Far Eastern possessions, depended ultimately on naval action, for no serious danger could arise unless Japan secured undisputed control of sea communications in the Far East. It was realized that war with Japan would imply the temporary interruption of much of our eastern trade, especially with China, but Hong Kong was the only one of our possessions that stood in serious danger so long as we could despatch strong naval forces to the East and maintain at Singapore a base from which they could operate.

The whole situation, however, depended on our ability to send an adequate force to the East since, for strategical and economic reasons, we were unable to maintain permanently in eastern waters a fleet comparable to that of Japan. The existence of the Singapore base, coupled with the possibility that in case of war with Japan the U.S.A. might make common cause with Britain, obviously exercised a deterrent influence on Japanese aggressive ambitions; but the fact that we did not normally maintain a powerful fleet in the East introduced a time element of exceptional importance in the scheme of defence. A naval bombardment and attack by carrier borne aircraft might have laid the installations of the Naval base in ruins before the arrival of the British Fleet; which would in consequence lose its operational power. That was the first danger to be guarded against, and it meant the installation of guns of a power and range to keep the heaviest naval units at a distance and air defences to deal with carrier borne aircraft. A small permanent land garrison was also required to deal with raiding parties which might be

landed in the close vicinity of the port. Landings on a greater scale on the Malayan coast out of range of the local defences had also to be considered; but the proximity of India made it practicable to reinforce the normal garrison of Singapore during a state of tension; and since the operation of landing a large force, and its advance to positions from which it could damage the base, would take a considerable time, the defence problem was one of delaying action until the Fleet on its arrival could interrupt the sea communications of the force landed. The time factor therefore tended to rule out the probability of landings in the northern stretches of the Malayan coast with the intention of attacking the island from the mainland. The chief danger was that a force landed might establish shore air bases from which Singapore could be attacked without risking carriers. Provision was therefore made for the rapid reinforcement of the air defences by the establishment of a chain of landing grounds, and it should be noted that in estimating requirements that it would have been the enemy who would have suffered from the lack of alternative aerodromes during the early stages of invasion.

How far has this conception of the defence of Singapore justified itself and what unforeseen factors have vitiated it? To a considerable extent certainly it has been justified. Singapore has not been subjected to bombardment by naval guns or to attacks by carrier borne aircraft. It was possible to reinforce the garrison and air defences during the period of tension as was anticipated. Landings in the close vicinity of the port were not attempted, and the advance of enemy troops landed in northern Malaya has been delayed for a period far in excess of the time required for the arrival of the Fleet. The *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales* found the base ready for them and secure, and if it had been possible to despatch further elements of the Fleet to the East after the outbreak of war they would still have found it intact.

What vitiated the conception was primarily the fact that we could spare no adequate naval force to despatch to the East, and the Pearl Harbour disaster went far to eliminate the time factor from the Japanese problem, so far as Singapore was concerned.

Secondly the connivance of Vichy and Thailand presented Japan with ports at which troops and heavy equipment could be disembarked rapidly and with impunity, with air bases, and with a good and secure line of communication up to the Malayan frontier. To meet an attack through Thailand nothing short of a field army and air force commensurate with those of the invader would have sufficed for it was a question of defeating not merely delaying the enemy. Mr. Churchill has explained that we had neither such a force strategically available nor could we have spared the ships to transport it. The size of the defending force would have had to be all the greater, in view of the danger of its being attacked by troops landed in its rear under cover of both air and naval support. Malaya is approximately the size of England, and when one considers the size of the armies necessary for Home defence

one can get some idea of what was required in Malaya, making of course due allowance for the nature of the country and its communications as limiting factors on the numbers that could be engaged by both sides. Malaya had, however, the special weakness that it could be attacked both by land and from the sea under favourable conditions of secure communications.

It must be realized that it would have been no solution to have prepared the defences of Singapore as those of a fortress capable of standing siege, for once the enemy was established in such proximity to the fortress as would have imposed limitations on the size of the defending airforce and the number of its operational bases the value of the naval base would have been immensely reduced, if not altogether destroyed. The case of Malta where the value of the naval base is greatly reduced by the proximity of the enemy's air bases is analogous. In the absence of a fleet capable of operating against Japan's sea communications with Indo-China and with landings in Malaya, the presence of a large field army was essential. The force that was available would probably have sufficed to deal with attempts at landings, but when in addition the enemy was able to invade by land and with secure communications, immensely greater strength was needed to stop him. All experience in this war shows that an air force alone cannot stop the advance of an army, though of course its value in co-operation with the Army of Defence is immense. Powerful air reinforcements would have enabled the troops in Malaya to have delayed the enemy's advance much longer, but it is certainly questionable whether it would have stopped it altogether.

On the other hand, the strengthening of the air defences of Singapore alone would probably not have stopped, though it might have delayed, the enemy's advance. The situation called for the defeat of the enemy's army. Strong fortification of the approaches to Singapore Island from the land side, either on the mainland or on the perimeter of the island, might possibly have checked the enemy's final advance, but after failure to hold him at a distance would not have fulfilled the purpose of protecting the naval base from bombardment nor have secured room for effective air defence. To have provided such works in the original scheme would have added immensely to its already great capital cost, and would have entailed maintenance charges and a garrison of a size which in peace we could ill afford. What was done and what might have been done to convert Singapore into a fortress capable of standing siege, after the collapse of France had added so immensely to our naval commitments, and when Japan established a footing in Indo-China, is a different matter and one on which it is impossible to express unforeseen circumstances ledge of all the local conditions. But under these unforeseen circumstances it is evident that the original project of providing a secure naval base entailed the employment of a strong field army and air force. Alexandria affords an analogous case; its security depends primarily on General Auchinleck's armies and associated air force, not on local fortification.

SINGAPORE

II.

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

SINGAPORE has fallen. It is the greatest disaster that we have suffered since the collapse of France, the most serious blow that has been struck not only at the British Empire but also at our allies, China and Russia. It paves the way to invasions of the British possessions in India and the Indian Seas. Australia and The Dutch Indies, the trade of India and the communications of the armies of the Empire, of Russia and of China, the supplies which pass through the Indian Ocean are threatened. The Burma Road can be cut as effectively at sea in the Bay of Bengal as in Burma or China. Japanese ambitions, now whetted with success, embrace the capture of every port in the Indian Ocean as far as Aden; and they will not stop there.

The immediate impulse in many minds is to find scapegoats for this grave disaster. The blame is variously thrown on the recent Commander-in-Chief; on the Administrations which, it is said, in the years before the war neglected to provide for an attack by land, their eyes being confined to the sea front; on those who rejected the advice of Lord Trenchard to confide the defence to the Air Force. Blame is thrown too on the present Ministers for failing to send reinforcements of land and air forces in adequate numbers, or to accompany the two battleships with aircraft. Australian critics complain that the Government in London, focussing its attention entirely on the security of Britain, has neglected the interests of the Empire in the South Pacific.

The Prime Minister has given his explanation of the reason why it was not considered possible to provide at the same time for the armies in Egypt, give Russia the aircraft and tanks and other munitions, of which she was in urgent need, and send reinforcements to Singapore. Whatever may be the right and the wrong in this matter, the real reason for the loss of Singapore lies further: and the persons and policy that are responsible for it are not far to seek. The persons are those Ministers who have directed the policy of our armaments for the last score of years; the Parliaments which have silently acquiesced in that policy; the Press which, with a few notable exceptions, has either supported the policy of reduction of British sea power or failed to point out the danger into which the folly and vanity of Ministers was leading the country; the successive Boards of Admiralty whose members, knowing (it must be presumed) the inadequacy of the provision that was being made,

and the erroneous strategical conceptions of the Ministers, kept silence and left the public to assume that their silence implied their concurrence. The public itself is not free from blame. Indifferent to the matter, and concerned with its own comforts and pleasures, it allowed the questions of national defence to be settled without enquiry. Nor are the Dominions without their share of censure. Ever since the first Colonial Conference in 1887, when the need for sharing the burden of the cost of Imperial defence was pointed out by Jan Hofmeyr, attention had been drawn to the need for the Dominions to take a proportionate share—proportionate either in terms of population, value of sea borne trade or some other criterion*—in the cost of the common defence, the maintenance of sea power which is the only possible form of security for our scattered Commonwealth of islands. The expenditure per head of population on the navy by the several Dominions and the United Kingdom was given by the late Lord Lothian (Round Table, November, 1910) for the financial year 1909-10 as follows:—United Kingdom 15s. 6d., Canada nil, Australia 1s. 6d., South Africa 1s. 6d., New Zealand 2s. 2½d., Newfoundland 3d. An increase in the Dominion contributions was agreed to in the Conference of 1909 but the disproportion still remained and has never been adjusted.

The fundamental reason for the loss of Singapore and the further losses that will follow is not the lack of local defence either in the present war or in the past preparations. Errors there may have been. It may well be—on this I can offer no opinion—that the defence could have been prolonged if the land and air defences had been differently arranged and in greater strength. But no fortress in the whole history of warfare that is isolated has ever survived. Unless there were sea power to bring relief, drive off the attacker at sea, and cut the communications of the forces he had landed for the siege, the place was bound to fall. The British and Dominion Governments which had failed to maintain a navy adequate to its responsibilities, which set aside the teachings of history and the eternal lesson that the security of such an Empire as ours depends on sea power, are the real authors of the disaster. Everyone knows the advice of the old Trimmer, Halifax, that the Englishman must look to his moat; the "moat" was the Channel and the North Sea; to-day it is all the Oceans. The first Lord Stanhope wisely advised in 1715 against trusting to other arms than our own for our security, well aware of the uncertainty of alliances. Burke reminded his countrymen of the danger of tampering with the Navy.

Of all the public services that of the Navy is the one in which tampering may be of the greatest danger, which can worst be supplied upon an emergency, and of which any failure draws after it the longest and heaviest train of consequences.†

What prophetic words!

There has indeed been no lack of writers to remind us of the fact that we stand or fall by sea power. "Keep the command of the sea," wrote Admiral

* cf. Lionel Curtis in *Action*. Oxford University Press. 9d.

† On the present state of the Nation, 1769.

Colomb in 1889, 'as you value your national life; without it you will speedily be blotted out from the list of great nations.' Nor, is it only by the maintenance of the navy at a proper strength that is necessary for salvation. The national strategy must first and foremost have as its object the attainment of command of the sea. So the great thinker Colonel G. F. R. Henderson enunciated the doctrine that the first duty of the British army is to assist the navy to obtain command of the sea.

These doctrines have been flouted, and it is because they have been flouted, not because the local defences of Singapore were inadequate in strength and unapt in type, that Singapore has been lost. Gibraltar was saved in its first siege in 1704-5 because sea power in the shape of Leake's fleet twice sailed into the Bay and dispersed the enemy fleet on which the investing army depended, and in its second long three-years siege by the three reliefs brought to it by Rodney, Darby and Howe.

Though the disablement of the American fleet is the immediate cause of the lack of allied command which has resulted in the loss of Singapore, the Philippines and the Dutch islands, it is idle to lay the blame on that event. This country, as Lord Stanhope had said, should rely upon itself alone for its security. It never could be foretold with that certainty that a question of this importance demands that the United States would either be attacked by Japan or would, if she was not attacked, come to the help of the Commonwealth to preserve its possessions and guard the Dominions in Australasia. To depend upon either of these events would be the height of folly, equalled only by the folly of not providing adequately for the command of the sea in a two-ocean war. For a two-ocean war was a possibility after Japan had set her feet upon a course of aggression and the twin dictators were beginning their careers of crime. No one could reasonably expect that if war should break out with Japan, it would be possible to send the whole fleet of Britain to the Far East: and less than the whole would not be enough. The temptation to our late enemies and the land-grabber of Rome to seize the opportunity to attack us in Europe if we had sent the whole fleet away was one to which no one could be blind: and, as the danger in Europe grew continually nearer with the rearmament of Germany, and the several acts of aggression by her and by Italy, Australia became anxious. England's difficulty would be Japan's opportunity, and Australian writers drew attention to the gravity of the situation that would then confront her.* The remedy that was suggested in Australia was local defence by submarines, destroyers, mines and aircraft. The utter inadequacy of local defence, the impossibility that it could replace a defence arising from the command of the sea, was not realized by these writers any more than the need for a two-ocean navy was realized by the successions of British Governments which tampered (to use Burke's expression) with the Navy.

* *Japan and the defence of Australia* by "Albatross"; *Australia and War to-day* by the Right Hon. W. M. Hughes, 1936.

Lord Jellicoe had seen clearly the need. When he made his world cruise with the object of discussing the problem of Imperial defence with the ministers of the several Dominions, he had recommended the creation of an Eastern Fleet of 16 capital ships with the proper proportion of cruisers and flotilla craft, and the building of a base at Singapore, the cost to be borne by the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in the proportions of 75, 20 and 5 per cent. respectively. The proposal expressed recognition of the true fundamental principles that the defence of the Empire depends on sea power and is the joint concern and responsibility of all its members. But it did not find support either in this country or in the Dominions except in so far as the building of the base was concerned, and that was undertaken at the cost of the United Kingdom. A base was a very necessary thing, but a base without a fleet is no more use than a sentry box without a sentry.

While it is this deplorable failure to maintain our sea power that is principally responsible for the tragic sacrifice and the consequent peril, two other causes have contributed to the present situation. One is, as remarked earlier, the destruction of the naval Air Arm which has deprived the Navy of an essential element of its flotilla strength, the other is the abandonment of that strategical principle expressed by Colonel Henderson. What Henderson said about the first duty of the army is applicable also to the Air Force. The first need of the Empire is the command of the sea. The doctrine of strategy widely preached in that arm has been that the hitherto accepted principles of war do not apply to the air, and that, whereas in the other two arms the primary object in grand strategy is to obtain command of the sea, and the course of action by which to attain it is the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy, the Air Force is an independent body which, operating on its own account, aims its blows directly at the two objectives of the will of the enemy people and the establishments of production supply and internal life in general. Engaged upon the activities in these directions there has been too little to spare for those operations overseas affecting the command of the sea. It may well be asked whether the bombs dropped, during the two months since Japan delivered her felon stroke on Pearl Harbour and began her invasions of the British, Dutch and American islands, have been as fruitfully used as they would have been if that flexibility which we are told is so important and invaluable a quality of the Air Arm had been exploited by the transfer of some of this bomb dropping force to the Far East to assist in maintaining the command of the sea and the defence of those possessions. Let us hope that it is still not too late to return to the old principles and employ our forces in co-operation with the object of regaining what the errors of policy in the past and strategy in the present have cost us and our allies; and that this will be done before injury can be inflicted on the communications of the allied armies in Egypt, Persia, Russia and China.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

IT seems agreed that book-buying is active at present; all the sadder for those to whom paper shortage denies the chance to profit by this unusual phenomenon. Probably the sight of a shop where unrestricted purchase is possible acts as a stimulus, and in certain cases the taste for reading may in this way be casually implanted. Lucky, if so, the implantee; books are the mind's best tonic for what all minds have now to face; they are also the happy diversion to other thoughts.

Five Little Books

I am glad to see that the Pen Club applies itself to meeting this need; a shower of little P.E.N. Books reaches me, all published by Allen & Unwin at the modest price of two shillings, and all under the general editorship of Mr. Herman Ould. Chief among the five is one in which the Club's President, Miss Storm Jameson, applies her vigorous talent to helping minds bogged in perplexity. Writing on *The End of this War*, she sets out by quoting the reported observation of a healthy fourteen-year old boy "that at least he had three more years before he would probably be killed in battle." There is a question implied; as she says, "the boy ought to be answered," and her answer, why this must be asked of him and others, is such that one could not ask it better given. Having known Czechoslovakia well, she knows what the New Order has meant to it; she knows and shows what it has meant in Poland. We must accept either war or the destruction of the civilization which many generations in many countries have built up under the central influence of Christianity. To the Pacifist who says: "Even so, war is not worth the cost," she nobly replies that "no one has the right to hand over unborn generations into slavery." But I differ from her in thinking it impossible to give the boy an answer which would satisfy him. She has allowed herself—like so many—to be talked into a belief that the word "war" always means the same thing. Up to a point it does; so does "man"; yet man and man differ considerably in quality. War is and always has been a characteristic human activity and by no means only or wholly an evil one.

It should be said to such a boy: "Yes, you may probably have to face your chance of being killed, but you have a more likely chance to survive with honour. In that case you will have gained experience that nothing else can give you; you will know yourself and other men—your own reactions and theirs in danger. You may have learnt what it is to command; you will almost certainly have learnt what it is to be well commanded. But, above all, you will have known comradeship as no ordinary way in life can give it you."

* * * * *

For my own part I should be prepared to say to such a boy—or to the

President of the P.E.N. Club—that after a life prolonged past the allotted span, in which there has been considerable variety of experience, no passage has enriched me more than the two years spent in military service. Edmund Blunden's *Undertones of War* (happily accessible in the 'Penguin' Series)

revived many memories for me; yet he, being of the normal age for company officers, as I was not, had far more than ever I had of this comradeship actually in trenches. That came to me later, in friendships made with men of my own age, when the casual tie was something different (fishing, generally), but the essential bond was our common experience of war; and no other friendships of all my life were so satisfying. Outside of these closer intimacies was the general bond with others who had served—how far-spreading! Add to this what Blunden's book gives admirably, the feeling, unlike anything else I have known, towards a battalion commander who has the power to inspire it. These are chances of experience which make the adventure worth while; and it is a great adventure. We have no right to tell a boy that he will be called to take his part in something disgraceful. On the contrary. It is a privilege to serve, and has been, even if death closes it.

There has been in this war, I think, nothing so disgusting and so wasteful of life as trench warfare was; and I am not sure but that the virtues acquired in the last war have reappeared throughout the whole people. At all events the Catholic Archbishop of Birmingham, who was once an army chaplain, holds that opinion; he is reported in the *Universe* of January 30, as saying:

The finest comradeship I have ever seen was that during the last war amongst the men who shared the hardships and dangers of the trenches. That sort of comradeship has during this war extended to hundreds of thousands of civilians. We become wonderfully kind to one another when each of us knows that it may be his or her turn next to suffer from the next bombing.

It has taken the common danger of a horrible war to produce this fine fellowship. But can't we manage to keep it after the war, even when the danger has passed? It is the real brotherhood of man, and it ought to exist in all man's activities especially in industry. There is no reason from the nature of things why only those who provide the capital should control an industry, and not share control with those who provide the labour.

Here, assuredly, Miss Jameson will agree—unless she is too violently committed against the whole principle of profit-making and profit-taking. Her anger with our society leads her to extravagantly denouncing "the England of doles, distressed areas and slums." "Dole" is a question-begging word. And I would ask her to remember that humanity has various gifts and one of them is the gift of profit-making—a special aptitude like the artist's, and not less creditable. Many of us are learning to be thankful for a shop-keeper who can give us good service in difficult conditions. To put it higher, I have known two men who had the gift and who made fortunes—one in the heart of London. He spent like one of the mediæval merchants; not only that, but found time to earn a name as one of the best writers of his time; I speak of that delightful essayist F. S. Oliver. The other lived in an old city not far removed from the mediæval type; but Martin McDonogh, the Galway merchant, owned much machinery, and bought always the best that could be had; just as he did when he bought cattle, or the racehorses that were his pride. A rough giant of a man, he had no graces of speech, but when he died, I heard again and again in the crowd at his funeral: "No one will ever know all the good that man did." All his dealings were personal, and

had that element of comradeship which exists between the good colonel and his men.

It may well be that our salvation lies in developing and preserving this virtue which war certainly can foster, at least I am sure that our failure after the last war was first and chiefly a failure in comradeship. The French, who had borne the worst of it, asked a joint guarantee for the future from the United States and Great Britain. America refused, and Britain, the older and closer comrade, refused to face the undertaking alone—not so much from “craven fear of being great,” as from lack of the impulse which bids comrades share all, to the last crust and the last cartridge. Who doubts now but it was a mistake, even in prudence?

* * * * *

At all events, Miss Storm Jameson, chosen head of the associated writers who group themselves in the P.E.N. Club, speaks her mind generously and with insight on the central preoccupations of this hour. Mr. Richard Church in *Plato's Mistake* devotes another of these volumes to considering his own particular anxiety. If after winning the war we create a New Order of our own (which Miss Jameson thinks necessary), how are the artists to be dealt with? And more particularly the poets? Speaking as one who is a poet and has been a civil servant, he is very much afraid that the Civil Service will be put in charge. The artist—and more particularly the poet—is prone to think for himself and make his own music; now, Plato in the *Republic*, says that any such person “who will not say what he says according to those models which are established by law at first” must be put (politely, but firmly) out of the city. The State may possibly and even probably find work for painters, sculptors and architects; it may even think it desirable to provide sustenance for musicians; but as to poets, if they want to go their own wild way, they must go it at their own expense; and Mr. Church does not believe that even the best of them will get a living by it. Nor does he share the general view that poetry is an occupation which can be well fitted in with some other; he quotes Yeats in support of his own view that it should be a whole-time job. Yet it was not so with Burns, who has a strong claim to be considered the most popular poet that ever lived, and the one who meant most to his native country (Shakespeare, being a dramatist, is in another category). Mr. Church does not reach any positive conclusion (except indeed that the Civil Service must be kept out of it); but then his purpose is to be provocative, or, as he says, a little impertinent. He allows that poets manage to get published—but only by publishers who hope that some day they may write a novel.

* * * * *

Henry Nevinson, in yet another of these volumes, writes of *Thomas Hardy*—a great storyteller (he disliked the name “novelist”) who valued himself chiefly as a poet, and would by choice have written nothing but verse. I am unable to regret that this wish was not granted. Yet after reading Nevinson's account of him, it is impossible not to sympathize in all ways with one whom the sketch presents as so lovable—and with such vividness. A phrase of old slang which I have not seen or heard for long years comes to my pen: Nevinson was (alas, for “was”) a great swell. I seem to remember Maurice Hewlett (who was a great swell too) using the expression when he wanted to convey achieve-

Post-War
Poets

Hardy and
Syngé

ments like those of the cricketer who makes a lot of runs and makes them with a style that has distinction in every stroke.

Mr. L. A. G. Strong writes of another genius, like Hardy's deeply seared with unhappiness, and, even more than Hardy's stamped with poetic character, though its finest work was in prose. *John Millington Synge* is the best appraisal of Ireland's best dramatist that I have ever seen; the kind of criticism which could only come from a poet, and yet has a mastery of critical technique which few poets ever acquire. It is curious how much literature at large owes to what was called the Gaelic revival but is now seen to have been a broadening of the domain possessed by poetry in the English tongue. Because that is seen, Synge and Yeats are less in favour than they were with all the Ireland that desires to think and speak of itself as Gaelic.

* * * * *

There is a singular difference between it and the other nation about which Mr. Wyn Griffith writes (still in the same series) his *Word from Wales*. If distinctness of language is the test of nationality, as Gaelic Leaguers hold, then Wales is far more a nation than Ireland; it has 800,000 Welsh speakers in a population of two million against an alleged 500,000 in Eire's three millions, and I do not myself believe that more than a quarter of a million in Ireland habitually use Irish. It would be impossible to find happening anywhere in Ireland what I met when I was brought down to speak on Home Rule in the district where Mr. Lloyd George grew up. Before I was called on, the local member, the local county councillors, all the leading Liberals of the neighbourhood, discussed Mr. Lloyd George's Insurance Act without a word of English, or a thought of using English. After an hour of this, it was only natural that, as a demonstration, I should start with a few sentences in Gaelic, which puzzled them; then they began to laugh, and I said we were even now—and went on in English. But my demonstration was only formal. I only knew one Irish Nationalist at Westminster who could have discussed technicalities in Irish, and it would not have come natural to him to do so. I doubt if there has been more than one man in the Dublin Dáil really qualified to pass such a test.

Naturally I have read with great interest the way in which Wales educated itself in the literate use of its own tongue; for of course the English authorities could not be expected to help. The spread of nonconformist religion helped the language and zeal for the language helped nonconformist religion. But Mr. Wyn Griffiths holds that the chapel is now “no longer the true centre of communal life,” and he calls on the Welsh writers to give a lead, free from the shackles of a constricted Puritanism. For Wales he believes that the Welsh language is an invaluable instrument of culture, of which English educational authorities should endeavour to promote the use. If they do, I should say from what I have seen in Ireland that one result will be to enrich English literature with a new strain; and a language so strong and vital need not fear competing attractions—which in any event must exist. The problem is to develop interaction and not repugnancy. Happily in Wales this is not made more difficult by inherited resentments.

THOMAS HARDY, by Edmund Blunden. English Men of Letters. Macmillan. 7s. 6d.

Membership in a series inevitably imposes limitations on any book, or at least supplies a standard skeletal structure, for the book must, to keep faith, satisfy the expectations which the series label excites. Searching my own experience for the time and state of mind when the English Men of Letters series was most useful, I concluded that the audience addressed was either the senior High School student or the general reader who wished to tread the realms of literature in the confidence provided by a well-informed guide. Occasionally the guide's exposition might be so brilliant as to illuminate thickets hitherto obscure, and it would then attract other guides; but it would be addressed primarily to the newcomer, and would aim at making him familiar with the main topographical features, so that he would not lose his way. Mr. Blunden's readers would expect to learn, that is, what tract of ground Hardy's work occupies, the kind of ground it is and its situation in respect to that of other contemporary writers and to English literature as a whole. Unfortunately none of these expectations seems to me to be adequately fulfilled by Mr. Blunden's work. A reader who knows not Hardy will gain a very odd notion of him from its curiously selected detail, may indeed wonder why Hardy is considered worthy of inclusion in the series at all, while those who know Hardy's work well will be exasperated by Mr. Blunden's omissions and misapprehensions, and enraged by his timid patronage of a great master. Is it really necessary, for instance, at this stage to state that one "cannot agree with Mr. Chesterton's attacks upon (Hardy) as one with a soured

and dangerous mind gloating over the bad"? "Almost any habitué of literature," Mr. Blunden tells us earlier, "could apparently lend (Hardy) a hand and improve the appeal of his genius by judicious retrenchments. Much might be done, but some caution would be required . . ." "Some" seems a trifle ungenerous in this connection.

The truth is that Mr. Blunden has laboured under two great difficulties. The first is that, a very great deal having already been written about Hardy, Mr. Blunden, perhaps from a mistaken view of his audience, has desired to avoid writing it again. Accordingly he both omits much that should have been said, and includes much that need not. He gives very little place to Hardy's regionalism, and never attempts to indicate the characteristic features of the Hardy plot structure; while most of Hardy's finest characters are never mentioned at all! No novice would have any notion of the content and quality of, for example, *The Return of the Native*, *The Woodlanders* and *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, after reading this book. On the other hand Mr. Blunden goes into tedious detail about Hardy's contributions to minor war charities, devotes ten pages to a scathing analysis of a minor novel like *A Pair of Blue Eyes*, and quotes endlessly—but *endlessly*—from minor Victorian reviewers.

The other great difficulty is that Mr. Blunden has not clarified, either for himself or his readers, Hardy's view of the universe. Hardy regards the First Cause, the Immanent Will, or whatever, as concerned solely to produce "eternal artistries in Circumstance"; to the human joy or sorrow produced by these artistries it is indifferent, because unconscious of them; and human attempts at individual choice or action, such as, for example, marry-

ing one person rather than another, leave it completely cold. Man's struggle to achieve individual wishes is therefore a piece of sublime foolishness, sublime because so foolish; it may succeed or it may not, the Will does not care either way. Once this fundamental idea is grasped, all Hardy's work is perceived to be a magnificent whole, linked by its philosophic content, to which he offers Wessex or Napoleonic illustrations. His fictions are continually, though doubtless at first unconsciously, founded upon the unlikelihood of feeling and incident working together favourably to any individual plan; *The Dynasts* reveals, on a huge scale, how the Will pushes men here and there without regard to their private longings; the poems often record the emotions of humanity in this parlous situation. Leaving this "figure in the carpet" of Hardy's works untraced, Mr. Blunden is apt to present their details as separate entities, when indeed, lacking the support of their context, their basic design, they appear distorted and meaningless.

There is one aspect of this study, however, for which every reader, novice or specialist, may be sincerely grateful. Mr. Blunden is a poet, and his every reference to Hardy's poetry shows the expert; there are no quotations here from other people's reviews, everything is fresh, sound and revealing. The analysis of Hardy's "restless, urgent, emphatic" beat and its cause, and the comparison with other Victorian prosodies, give particular pleasure.

No work by a writer of Mr. Blunden's quality can altogether lack beauties, but if I regard his study of Hardy as he regards Hardy's novels, namely as a mixture of "faded pages" and "elements of

achievement," it is because he himself has provided both the phrases and their relative emphasis.

PHYLLIS BENTLEY.

THE FUTURE OF NATIONS: Independence or Interdependence? by E. H. Carr. Kegan Paul. 1s.

DEMOCRACY—THE THREATENED FOUNDATIONS, by Reginald Lennard. Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.

THE FOUNDATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, by P. H. Winfield. Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.

HITLER'S REICH AND CHURCHILL'S BRITAIN, by Stephen Laird & Walter Graebner. Batsford. 6s.

No thinking person will contest the truth of Sir Stafford Cripps' assertion that, by comparison with the people of Soviet Russia, we who profess and call ourselves democrats are lacking in a sense of urgency about the war and that this relative apathy will endure and will continue to stultify our war effort until "the public knows what it is fighting for in a positive way." That is the justification of the outcrop of slim volumes since the war began, designed to limn the features of "the democratic order"—the title of the series edited by Francis Williams to which Professor Carr's little study belongs. Unfortunately the English public does not take kindly to ideas and "problems," so that this necessary education of democracy for democracy is an uphill task. A certain donnish quality characterizing the "Current Problems" offerings of the Cambridge University Press will, one fears, put most people off. However, these weaker vessels have the soft option of the Batsford book recording a straightforward conversation

by two American correspondents speaking from first-hand experience, from which they will get a certain amount of mental nourishment.

Mr. Lennard, actually, has done a useful job of clarification. His book as a whole lacks unity and reads more like a series of disconnected chapters, but he manages to explain the essence of what is meant when men speak of England as a democracy, despite the manifold superficial features of our society that would seem to deny it. Confining himself, perhaps wisely, to our island story he depicts the gradual growth of conventions and institutions which has produced a core of democratic faith accepted, consciously or unconsciously, by almost all of us; and in a final chapter he chides the impatient reformers with an array of facts and statistics showing the measure of social progress that has been effected even in one generation. A section discoursing on "the Temple of Moloch" provides the opportunity for an illuminating contrast with the totalitarian termite-State, and the author brings out well "the unique quality of the individual self-consciousness" from which alone springs the impulse to the good life.

Professor Winfield's book can hardly be said to contribute much in the way of light and leading. It is a wholly conventional primer of that most jejune of academic subjects—"International Law," pedestrian in manner and substance, contrasting unfavourably with that little masterpiece of compression on the same subject by Professor Brierley of Oxford. The author accepts uncritically, for instance, the meaningless gloss on the League of Nations Covenant which allowed the idea to grow up that economic "sanctions," divorced from military measures, could ever be an effective means of war-prevention.

Mr. Walter Graebner, correspondent for *Time* in London has been through our ordeal by bombing with us and evidently understands very well the "sort of people we are." Incidentally, he is sensible, and not merely adulatory, about Mr. Churchill, bringing out well his qualities and his limitations and mentioning the undertow of criticism of the Premier's relative neglect of domestic problems. But the main interest of the book is, of course, the picture of the *Reich* in wartime contributed by his colleague (who was in Berlin up till last June). Mr. Laird tells us little that is new to those who have read *Berlin Diary* or the recent book by Mr. Harsch. But we cannot be reminded too often that, whatever cause for grumbling they may have, the Germans have derived from Hitler and the Nazi régime a feeling of security such as they never knew before; that the nation is united behind Hitler in a negative sense—the Germans are "immensely afraid of losing the war" and

if they overthrow the régime they lose the war. If they win the war the Hitler régime can probably not be overthrown.

That seems to sum up the situation pretty well. He makes the point that Nazi domination of the world as conceived by Hitler (and the Army and industrialists who pull the strings) does not necessarily entail German rule everywhere but only a constellation of compliant "homespun fascisms in other countries" as a result of Axis military victories.

Professor Carr's little shilling-worth, though certainly a think-piece, is pure gold. He has a rare capacity for getting behind the labels of words to the essence of things. He shows us where the peacemakers of 1919 went wrong by their failure to distinguish between 'State' and 'nation,' so that "self-

determination," which indeed is implicit in the idea of democracy, was seen exclusively in the 19th century setting of political rights without due consideration of military and economic exigencies: men may "determine" themselves, after all, into larger as readily as into smaller units. Henceforth, for the sake of international order, we must not merely lay more stress on the obligations, as against the rights, of nations but also accept that the State-units, which form the political context of the nations' life, are required "to subordinate military and economic policy and resources to the needs of a wider community." This 'goes for' Great Powers as well as the small States. At the same time it is no use expecting a tidy international polity to be set up when this war is over; it will be a question of proceeding empirically "on the basis of the power available to make co-operation effective and of the will to use that power." No elaborate constitutional vestments but adaptation of the existing inter-allied military and economic war councils to the needs of peace.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

GERMANY'S FIRST EUROPEAN PROTECTORATE, by Eugene V. Erdely. *Robert Hale*. 12s. 6d.

BALKAN RACKET, by C. F. Melville. *Jarrols*. 2s. 6d.

UNDER THE IRON HEEL, by Lars Moen. *Robert Hale*. 12s. 6d.

Three different authors, three different books, but the subject is the same—and so is the conclusion. Dr. Erdely's most impressive *Germany's First European Protectorate* deals with the murder of the Czechoslovak Republic, "a democratic State in which legal security and public order protected the

citizens against any abuse of authority." On the basis of facts, figures and documentary evidence the author comes to the conclusion "that the actual losses in goods and money alone inflicted on the Czechs without waging war were much higher in proportion than those incurred by the Germans under the Versailles Treaty after four and a half years of war." This should be noted by those who regard Versailles as the root of all evil; and it is further worth recalling that the Treaty dictated by the Germans at Brest Litovsk was far more ruthless than the Treaty of Versailles. In order to make the German terror against the Czech people comprehensible, Dr. Erdely goes as far back as Tacitus, yet these crimes continue to defeat the human imagination, even though, as the author says, terrorism "occupies a prominent and honourable position in the armoury of German political weapons." Every crime committed by a German against a Czech is *a priori* excused by some paragraph of a German decree—which goes to confirm that the 7½ million Czechs are not citizens of a "Protectorate," but hostages of a savage enemy. The resistance of the Czech people is all the more wonderful. Dr. Erdely's book makes one painfully aware what a tragedy it is for the whole of humanity that the country that was once ruled by the voice of the great and noble philosopher Masaryk, should now be ruled by the voice of a creature of Himmler's. Mr. C. F. Melville in his book, *Balkan Racket*, displays a knowledge of Continental conditions for which even Continental journalists and historians might well envy him. He not only records facts, which he says is a journalist's job; he writes history. The fact that much of it is based on personal experience only adds to the interest of his book. The description of the political back-

ground of the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in 1934 reads like a thrilling novel. The portrait of the Regent, Prince Paul, is a masterpiece of psychological delineation. From the facts produced by Mr. Melville it is clear beyond all doubt that the real murderer of King Alexander was Mussolini, but it is also clear why the Hitler-Mussolini alliance was inevitable. Ignorance, or incorrect evaluation, of these facts rendered possible the marauding expedition to Abyssinia, led to the abandonment of Austria to Hitler and the destruction of Czechoslovakia and, finally, the present war. There is a straight line leading from the assassination of King Alexander to the outbreak of the present war.

Mr. Lars Moen, the author of *Under the Iron Heel*, travelled through occupied Belgium and Holland with open eyes and a receptive heart. He, like Dr. Erdely and Mr. Melville, gives only facts. In this connection he writes: "It seemed to me that the cruelty and cold barbarity of the truth made superfluous any embroidering of the facts." Coming from Mr. Moen, this conclusion has special weight, for he viewed everything with the objectivity of a scientist, which he is. His statement that the Belgians and Dutch would rather starve than allow Hitler to be strengthened through consignments of food to themselves, and his further statement that the excessive demand for goods on the part of the occupying troops is due to fear of a fresh inflation, are both worth noting. Our three authors—a Czechoslovak, a Briton and an American—all prove through facts the enormity of the German "New Order" in Europe. The brow of the German people is branded with the brand of Cain.

E. MULLER-STURMHEIM.

RECONSTRUCTION AND THE LAND, by Sir Daniel Hall Macmillan. 12s. 6d.

As a pioneer at the Rothamsted Experimental Station and author of *The Soil*, Sir Daniel Hall is known to all agriculturalists. In the book under review he has faced up to the formidable agrarian situation, stated it in broad and detailed terms, and advanced a solution.

The situation is roughly as follows. Farming has been declining in Great Britain for the last seventy years, a decline accelerating during the last twenty. The area under cultivation and the number of men employed has continuously shrunk. The condition of the land has declined, the equipment has not been kept up, the landlords have been unwilling or unable to spend enough capital on the land, with the result that the State has had to step in. It has been found necessary to assist agriculture by a system of subsidies and duties on imports which amount to a considerable burden on the taxpayer. These bounties do not call out reciprocal duties from farmers nor involve any fundamental reconstruction of the industry. It has become clear that the farming structure is out of date and requires a total reconstruction to meet the needs of the new farming with its enlarged powers and resources. And for this reconditioning of the whole fabric the landlords are not prepared. Hence the conclusion is reached that the state is the only agency that can carry out this necessary adaptation of the land to the new conditions. To do so and get repaid for its expenditure the State must become the owner of the land.

That conclusion reached, Sir Daniel Hall outlines how the State will take over—how purchase, how administer, how allocate larger and more economic units, and so on.

He does not fail to review in passing the various other schemes and the objections which have been put forward as against the solution he advances. In short, the reader will find here a very elaborate scheme of reconstruction.

It is a book which has already met with widespread approval and widespread dismay. The approval comes chiefly from the most powerful quarters, the industrialists, the financiers, the business economists. The dismay comes from those who regard farming as an integrated whole, whose viewpoint is not from the angle of cash and profit but of ultimate soil fertility and human well-being. This latter school of thought holds that the huge mechanical farms as opposed to the smaller units that can balance a good mixed production, will lead to the impoverishment of the soil, and that the very lands such as America, Australia, and the Argentine which show the lowest figures of returns per acre, are, by the Sir Daniel Hall scheme, to be copied instead of those which show the highest figures such as Holland and Belgium. And from the social and spiritual point of view it is felt that the scheme will make farms into factories.

The present reviewer does not feel himself as yet qualified to take sides in this enormously complicated matter. But it is clear that Sir Daniel Hall's frame of mind is that of Big Business, and that for him the Taxpayer and Consumer is a special kind of person and not to be found on the land, while Rent, Prices, and Money are things to which man must kow-tow. His attitude is unconsciously revealed in one remarkable sentence. In a very short and not too sympathetic account of the history of agriculture in this country he speaks of what he calls the heyday of British agriculture in the sixties of last century. "That was the golden age" he

writes, "to which men looked back when I was a young man, wheat at 50s. and wages at 12s. a week, a sack of wheat to pay two weeks wages." That is a very curious remark. It might pass at an unreported after-dinner speech to fellow businessmen, but it makes a strange appearance in a volume purporting to speak in the national interest.

JOHN STEWART COLLIS.

THE PRUSSIAN SPIRIT, by S. D. Stirr. Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d. TREITSCHKE'S ORIGINS OF PRUSSIANISM. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.

Mr. Stirr's survey of German literature and politics between 1914 and 1940 is, the author reminds us in his preface, intended as a "war-book" but in the sense of being "primarily concerned with ideas and with the broad battles of spiritual and intellectual forces." In other words while showing that Hitlerism is fundamentally a continuation of Prussianism, this book is not made-to-measure propaganda, providing easy ammunition for potting the fabulous Hun of the hasty leaderwriter's imagination. Yet it is a war book, for it surveys the portents of Weimar and Potsdam in the light of the menace to world peace of Prussian militarism.

The author sets himself out to assess the merits and demerits of Prussianism but he scouts the easy device of contrasting a brutal and Spartan Prussia with a supposedly peaceful other Germany. The Prussian spirit, in that sense, has been claimed by Germans with no lineal Prussian heritage. Even the most ardent devotees of the pre-Nazi Weimar Republic felt it hard to resist the call to discipline and self-sacrifice which—the author pertinently reminds us—means immolation before the State and suppression

of the liberties of other nations when it comes to the test of war.

That conflict of impulses was exemplified by Thomas Mann, despite the fact that he has been disowned by Nazi propagandists since he left the *Reich*. In *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* published towards the end of the last war he pictured with scorn the sort of Europe which would arise from the "pacifist, virtuous, republican, bourgeois demagoguery" of the French Revolution in other words, from the victory of Western democracy: "a little ridiculous, a little platitudinously humanitarian, trivial and demoralized, with a feminine elegance . . . a Europe of big business and pleasure, literary in the sense in which a Parisian prostitute is literary. . . ." Although in this is perceptible a shrill note of hysteria, testifying to the schizophrenic conflict within the German character, there is just a sufficient element of truth in the indictment to make us pause before asserting that all is well with Western democracy. Pertinent too, is Mr. Stirk's analysis of Oswald Spengler and his worship of Prussian Socialism. Spengler identified Pietism with Prussianism approvingly and asserted that Puritanism was its English antithesis. From Calvinism and the idea of predestination the English had derived their self-confidence and lack of conscience in action! Spengler's generalizations reveal a rankling sense of resentment at British success and an unconscious desire to emulate the ruthlessness with which he credits our imperialism. But, as the author reminds us, such fearless critics of Nazi abuses as the novelist Ernst Wiechert and the Protestant pastor Martin Niemöller, both now in concentration camps, are also Prussians.

Mr. Stirk, a Yorkshireman who studied at a German University and lived many years in the *Reich*, is

concerned not merely to indict Prussianism but to indicate what he calls "The Prussian dilemma" and how it may be utilized by Britain. He is not content to reply "Prussia is the culprit" to the usual question: "How is it possible that in the land of Goethe, Kant and Schopenhauer barbarism should again and again raise its head?" He traces the cult of the Prussian spirit via Frederick the Great, Moeller van den Bruck and Alfred Rosenberg and shows how the philosophic ideas of Fichte and Kant have been exploited to this end. Of particular interest is his account of the writings of Ernst Jünger, exponent of "Western Front Socialism." In Jünger one seems to detect distaste for the demagogic Hitler on the part of an admittedly militaristic but patrician mind. How far that Prussian contempt for the opportunist Nazi politician can be utilized is a problem of undoubted interest. A similar dislike of Nazi demagoguery could be discerned in Ernst Niekisch who long advocated Germano-Russian co-operation in opposition to the Versailles Treaty. Niekisch's periodical *Widerstand* which enjoyed a somewhat surreptitious vogue amongst young Left wing Nazis in the early years of the Régime was however suppressed and Niekisch himself was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment *pour encourager les autres!* Hitler, it appears, is aware of the "Prussian dilemma." Mr. Stirk's book, is, however, one which deserves attention at the present time.

Eden and Cedar Paul have produced an excellent translation of Heinrich von Treitschke's candid study of the colonization of Old Prussia by the Teutonic Knights, *Das deutsche Ordensland Preussen* written and published in 1862. Published for the first time in English, it provides a striking example of

the writer's early work and as a candid exposition of ideas glorified as the apotheosis of Prussianism it serves as a useful pendant to his better known book: *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century*.

BERNARD CAUSTON.

THE GERMAN NEW ORDER IN POLAND, published for the Polish Ministry of Information by Hutchinson. 10s. 6d.

RETRIBUTION, by Gerald Abrahams. Allen. 6s.

In the summer of 1918 some 6,000 Italian prisoners of war were at Knin in Dalmatia; dozens had died on the way, others while they were being got out of the station, for they had been bestially maltreated by the Magyars. They were nothing but skeletons, dressed almost exclusively in paper clothes; and when a doctor of my acquaintance reported their condition to General Wucherer of the Austro-Hungarian army, this general, a decent fellow, ordered the doctor to dictate the whole affair and said that if necessary he would take the matter direct to His Majesty the Emperor Charles. Then in the presence of his staff he exclaimed: '*Wir sind doch die grossten Schuftten!*' ('After all it is we who are the biggest scoundrels!') What would this humane man have said if he had lived to hear of the treatment accorded by his German allies to the population of Poland?

This book, with its horrifying illustrations, has opened the eyes of the world to the necessity of dealing with the Germans in no uncertain manner after this war. If it had not been for actual photographs of murdering and of the most ferocious proclamations no civilized person would have believed that a people calling itself human, let alone a *Herrenvolk*, could act in such a fashion. In the most methodical

From carrying trays



To carrying messages



Out in all weathers . . . tanned, healthy and enjoying life, instead of long, tiring, airless hours in a restaurant . . . She's one of the people who may no longer need

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Nerve-Tonic Food

manner it had been determined that the Polish nation was to be destroyed and a start was made with the intellectual class, so that there should be no leaders left. Of course the Germans have failed to work their evil will and when they have to face the new Polish armies which are being prepared on the Russian front they will indeed be wishing that they had behaved differently.

One scarcely knows where to begin in this catalogue of diabolical outrages against all that has been accepted for centuries between the nations of Europe, and, by the way, it demonstrates once and for all that no inch of African soil must be restored to a people so utterly incapable of ruling over another race. The most cherished customs of other people are precisely those which they take a delight in ignoring. What possible harm did it do them that the Polish Jews liked to wear beards? These were shaved off in the street, amid the jeering of German soldiers. And that was about the mildest treatment anyone received in their country. It was resolved that citizens should be evacuated, so that their comfortable houses should be placed at the disposal of Germans; this was done in the most inconsiderate manner possible, by awakening people in the middle of the night and ordering them, at the point of the bayonet, to leave instantly, whether dressed or not, and with no luggage beyond a small bag. Then they were driven perhaps into a field, no matter if it was deep in snow, no matter if some of the evicted were women about to bear children. Of the actual murders we cannot begin to speak, for they were innumerable; and, as these photographs show, the soldiers who carried them out en-

joyed them enormously. 'But, wrote a certain Herr Lemke in the *Warschauer Zeitung* of July 27, 1941, 'it would be a great mistake to think that after the notable successes of German policy and of the talented German High Command there has been any disillusionment or revision of view among the Polish population.' He blames the Polish intellectuals who, he says, have 'poisoned' the other classes of the population. Here, at any rate, is one German who recognizes that all the horrors his people perpetrated will recoil on their own heads.

A book such as *Retribution* is most opportune, especially when it is written with Mr. Abrahams's unanswerable logic and with all the difficulties taken into account. This time the victors will not allow the whine of the Germans to soften their hearts and from a recent pronouncement by Goebbels it appears that the more realistic of them do not expect it. One item, as Mr. Abrahams suggests, might well be the complete de-industrialization of a country which has planned that the rest of Europe shall merely supply her needs. It is all to the good that this time our sentimentalism will be forced to take into account the Russian programme for Germany, to say nothing of that on which so many peoples of Europe have every right to insist: 'We shall lose the effect of this war,' says Mr. Abrahams, who is a most competent and far-seeing lawyer, 'if we do not destroy Germany . . . to shrink from the task is simply bad surgery.' His book should be widely read and I hope he will be invited to be one of 'the boys in the back room' when the terms are delivered to the Germans.

HENRY BAERLEIN.

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BRITISH TRADE UNIONISM UNDER THE IMPACT OF WAR

By G. D. H. COLE

A TRADE Union delegation from Russia has been in this country recently, touring round the principal war factories and exhorting the workers in them to put the last ounce of energy into the tasks of war production; and these visitors have been everywhere received with a lively enthusiasm which proclaims a sense of solidarity between the working classes of the two countries. These Soviet Trade Unionists, in the course of their study of our war economy, must have been struck again and again by the contrast between the position of the Trade Unions here and in the Soviet Union. For, under Communism as practised in Russia, the Trade Union machine is for all intents and purposes a part of the machinery of government. Its main purpose is not the protection of wages and standards of employment against a body of employers who are often reluctant to recognize the right of the workers to combine, and of whom some entirely reject that right, but rather to serve as the auxiliary of the State in increasing production and improving its quality, in order to make possible an improvement in the general standards of living.

Of course, even in the Soviet Union the Trade Unions have protective functions and do undertake the representation of the workers' grievances and claims. But this function is secondary; for Russian Trade Unionism is based on the assumption that real wage-levels must depend, not on success in extracting, by means of collective bargaining, a higher proportion of the total value produced, but on raising the level of production. It is assumed that the Unions want to help the State planning authorities and the factory managements to raise output to the highest possible level, and that success in this will necessarily raise the standards of life. The theoretical foundation of the Soviet system being that the State represents the workers, an economic order in which the State is the principal employer and there is no capitalist class to contend with means that the Trade Union has to regard itself as the

State's agent for helping to ensure in the factories the success of the public production plan.

Under war conditions, something not wholly different from this develops in the practice of Trade Unionism in Great Britain. At any rate since the fall of France, and to some extent even before that, the British Trade Unions have interested themselves actively in increasing output, especially in the war trades. So far from resisting the 'dilution of labour,' which they would have fought with all their strength in normal times, they have for the most part actively encouraged it, and have been ready to play their full part in training new workers to eke out the deficient supply of skilled men, even when, in doing so, they have been consciously raising up competitors who may gravely endanger their bargaining strength in the future. The Unions have shown great readiness to co-operate with the Government and the employers in measures designed to raise output: indeed they, or the Trade Union shop stewards in particular factories, have often taken the lead in pressing such measures on reluctant or conservative managements. This has been especially often the case since the Nazis launched their attack on the Soviet Union; and there is no doubt that the Russian alliance has greatly strengthened the will of Trade Unionists in general to contribute ungrudgingly to the war effort.

But, while all this is true, British Trade Unionism remains essentially different from the Trade Unionism of Russia. There are still big firms in this country—even big firms engaged on important war contracts, which refuse to bargain with the Unions and as far as possible prevent their employees from belonging to them. There are millions of workers in the war trades, as well as in other occupations, who have not joined a Trade Union. Trade Union membership in most factories is still a purely voluntary matter, at any rate for the main body of less skilled workers; and the cases in which membership is in effect a condition of employment are still comparatively few, outside a narrow range of skilled trades. Moreover, the workman, even if he is in a factory which is engaged 100 per cent. on government contracts and is under full State control, remains the employee not of the State but of the particular firm to which the factory belongs, and continues to think of himself as working for a private capitalist concern, even if he is willing, while the war lasts, to go all out to increase production in the public interest.

The basic psychology of Trade Unionism in Great Britain

thus continues to be a psychology of opposition, even though the practical expression of this opposition is for the time being largely in suspense. Indeed, this cannot be otherwise in view of the economic conditions under which the war is being fought. There is, nowhere written down but tacitly understood, a treaty at present between the parties which together compose the Government. The terms of this treaty are, broadly, first that the basic structure of the industrial system is not to be so changed during the war as to prejudge the post-war issue between capitalism and socialism, and secondly that, as a corollary, when the State has to intervene to control industry, it shall use capitalist agents for the control of capital, and Labour agents for the control of labour. This is the rationale of the 'Controls' which exercise the State's functions in dealing with raw materials, machine tools, and other capital functions of production, and equally of Mr. Bevin's position at the Ministry of Labour and in the handling of the 'man-power' problem as a whole. This is why we cannot, for the present or for as long as the treaty holds, have a really unified Ministry of Production; for such a Ministry would have to control both Capital and Labour, and the terms of the treaty forbid putting either a capitalist or a Labour man at its head, and thereby in effect prevent it from existing at all. Under the treaty, Capital must discipline capital, so Mr. Bevin cannot be Minister of Production; and Labour must discipline labour, so Lord Beaverbrook, when he was made Minister of Production, could not be given the powers over labour without which neither he nor his successor can possibly co-ordinate the productive effort.

This dualism reacts on the position of the Trade Unions. It has meant that, as far as has been possible, the State has stood aside from interfering with the relations between Capital and Labour, and has left them, as much as it could to be settled by direct negotiation between the two parties. It has not, of course, been able to avoid a good deal of interference. For example, it has been necessary to limit, though not to abolish, the right to strike, and to provide means of adjusting wages by reference to publicly appointed tribunals of arbitration. But even this has been done in such a way as to provide for arbitration only when the efforts of the parties to reach a direct settlement have failed; and with this goes the fact that the alternative tribunals which have been set up act not as the agents of any clearly defined policy laid down by the State, but at their own discretion, and are under no obli-

gation to follow uniform principles in their findings. There is, in fact, no public wage policy; and when, last year, the Chancellor of the Exchequer half-heartedly attempted to lay one down and to press for the stabilization of wages at their existing levels, this policy was speedily brushed aside. It was, indeed, bound to be brushed aside, if only because the existing levels of wages were quite irrational from trade to trade, and even in many cases from factory to factory: so that no good defence could be put up for keeping them all where they were. It would have been a different matter if the State had been prepared, for the duration of the war, itself to prescribe suitable levels of remuneration for the various grades of workers. But that would have run directly counter to the *semi-laissez-faire* assumptions on which the war is being conducted on the economic front.

For my part, I regard the unwritten treaty of which I have been describing certain of the consequences as inconsistent with the thorough mobilization of our economic resources; and I believe that it will have to be very greatly modified before we can win through. But in this article I am not discussing that issue, but only raising it to the extent necessary to explain the working of Trade Unionism under war conditions. In certain special cases, the State has been compelled to go much further than it has in most in regulating labour conditions. It has been forced to concede to builders engaged on essential war contracts a 'guaranteed week' of 30 hours—that is, a guarantee of 30 hours' pay irrespective of interruptions of work due to bad weather or other causes. It has been forced to constitute mobile bodies of dock labourers, working under special guarantees, to handle the large amounts of traffic diverted from the usual ports of entry owing to war conditions. In the case of agricultural workers, the need to keep a sufficient labour force on the land in face of the highly competitive demand for constructional and other war work has compelled the State to acquiesce in the raising of the minimum wage to £3 a week; but, even so, care has been taken to preserve the form of a concession made by the Agricultural Wages Board, in preference to a direct grant of the higher wage by the State itself.

Apart from special cases of this order, the Trade Unions are still left to make the running with wage and other demands, and to argue matters out with the employers, even where it is perfectly clear that the State will be compelled to foot the bill or, alternatively, to pass it on to the consumers. Accordingly

the entire mechanism of collective bargaining remains in being, not much changed from what it was before the war, except that now reference to arbitration has become the normal sequel to a failure to agree. This, of course, tends to preserve the authority of Trade Union officials and executive committees and to make less likely the growth of unofficial 'rank-and-file' movements.

The dualism which I have noted pervades the entire machinery of the State for dealing with labour questions. The Government is advised by a general Committee and by a number of special Committees consisting of employers and Trade Union leaders in equal numbers; and in appointing area officers to handle such tasks as labour supply and inspection the attempt is made to balance every representative of Capital by a Trade Unionist, and *vice versa*, even when this is bound to interfere to some extent with choosing the best man for the job. Just as the Government itself rests on a balance of forces between Conservative and Labour Ministers, so must the organization of the labour factor in war production—or so the unwritten agreement seems to run.

It does not, of course, follow that the same principle is followed in the organization and control of Capital. No one has proposed that the 'Controls' at the Ministries of Supply and Aircraft Production shall be run by equal numbers of employers and Trade Unionists—or indeed that the Trade Unionists shall be allowed any look-in at all. That would be regarded as a violation of the term of the treaty which lays down that the structure of capitalism shall be left as far as possible intact; for Capital regards its exclusive control of industry, apart from the labour factor, as an inalienable prerogative. The claim of Labour to a share in control in this wider field does, however, come up in a different way; and it is at this point that the shop stewards' movement comes into the picture.

There is a marked difference in character and working between the shop stewards' movement which grew up between 1914 and 1918 and that which has developed during this war, chiefly since the fall of France and much more rapidly since the Soviet Union came into the conflict. The shop stewards' movement during the last war was mainly an organ of workers' defence and opposition, and identified itself only in a few places with the struggle for higher production. It was concerned, if not with preventing dilution, at any rate with imposing limiting conditions upon it and with guarding the economic inter-

ests of the workers who might be prejudiced by it. It engaged actively in the struggle for improved wages and conditions; and it fought hard battles against the repeated 'combing-out' of the munition factories for fresh batches of recruits to the armed forces. In practice, it became, as a movement, increasingly 'anti-war,' as the needs of the armies called for increasingly stringent measures to release men for the army and to make full use of substitute labour. It was thus in opposition, both economically and politically, to the Trade Union leaders who were supporting the war effort; and the hostility between the two forces was often acute.

The situation during the present war has been very different. Although many Trade Union leaders, mindful of past experience and fearful of a renewed challenge to their leadership, were for a long time—and some are still—disposed to look at the shop stewards' movement askance, there has been in its practical activities little or no warrant for their suspicions. The movement has made strides during this war mainly, not as a protector of working-class conditions, but rather as the advocate of a more intense productive effort. It has seconded, or gone beyond, the Trade Union leaders in positively advocating dilution of labour; and it has devoted a large part of its energies to pressing, workshop by workshop, for more effective measures designed to increase production by every possible means.

This is a remarkable fact, eloquent in itself of the keen sincerity with which the leaders of workshop opinion are behind the war effort, but at the same time raising certain acute problems which impinge directly on the unwritten treaty to which I have referred. The desire of the shop stewards, as representatives of the workers, to have a say in all workshop matters which affect the pace of war output involves a claim to intervene in many concerns which employers have always regarded as the exclusive prerogative of themselves or of the managers whom they appoint. The managers, acting as the appointees of capital, have for the most part taken the same view; and accordingly the attempts of shop stewards and workshop committees to tell managements how to run their works better have often been received with coldness or even resentment. Some managers have been prompt to realize the advantage of securing from the workers a co-operation in raising output which could never have been secured by them in time of peace. But many have been very hesitant about accepting this co-operation, and not a few positively hostile.

Employers, too, have been conscious that, if they once grant the claim of *their* workers to range over the entire field of management, it may not be easy to revoke so far-reaching a concession when the war is over, or to accept it without economic prejudice when the State is no longer waiting to buy everything they are ready to produce. Accordingly, the efforts of the shop stewards to help in increasing output are seldom received with unqualified thankfulness, and are often met with deliberate stone-walling, and sometimes with absolute repudiation.

The State itself, on account of the 'unwritten treaty,' is in a difficulty in dealing with these offers of help. Only now is the recognition of workshop machinery being made compulsory even in establishments which are directly owned and managed by the Government; and even now there is no compulsion—except in aircraft production, to which the system is just being extended—on firms which are working entirely on Government contracts to establish or recognize similar machinery. This may come, if the pressure for it is strongly enough sustained; but enforcement of such recognition would run counter to the general principle of letting the employer manage his labour relations in his own way, and would, even now, meet with extensive opposition.

Consequently, the position of the shop stewards' movement differs immensely from factory to factory, the governing factors being the personalities on the two sides. A strongly led shop stewards' organization can force the pace where one more weakly officered would fail; but even a strong movement may hit up against a manager who is radically opposed to any interference by the workers with 'managerial functions,' or against a board of directors which is strongly hostile to such interference, or even to Trade Unionism in any shape.

It has, of course, to be allowed for that, even if the shop stewards are devoting their main attention to measures which they regard as calculated to increase production, many of their leaders also hold strong views about the right of the workers to share in the 'control of industry,' and see in the war situation a chance of furthering their own economic objectives while helping on the war effort. It must also be admitted that in many factories the shop stewards form rather a self-constituted 'ginger group' than a leadership fully accepted by the whole body of the employees. The Communists, especially since the entry of Russia into the war, have strained every nerve to acquire positions of vantage in the local shop

stewards' organizations; and they have been pretty successful in many places. Being a shop steward is an unremunerative, and often a hard and thankless, task; and there is often little or no competition for the job. This means that the keen man can jump in with the acquiescence of the main body of his shop-mates, but often without their full support in a positive sense. There are wide variations in the degree of real representativeness of the shop stewards in different works and departments; and sometimes the movement stands rather for an energetic and politically minded minority than for the whole body of those whom it professes to represent. This enables reluctant managements or boards of directors to stand out against it more easily than they could if it were more broadly based; and the narrowness of its basis in some factories is often used as an argument against full recognition of it in others in which it rests on broader and firmer foundations.

These, however, are only qualifications of the general statement that in recent months the shop stewards' movement has been advancing very fast both in power and in popular support. It is undoubtedly the vital form in which the working-class demand for a share in the 'control of industry,' thwarted higher up by the influence of the 'unwritten treaty,' is making itself felt; and it seems clear that its influence is destined to grow as the 'man-power' shortage becomes yet more serious, and as the need for intense effort to raise production to the maximum becomes even more decisively recognized.

I feel no doubt that, on this occasion, the shop stewards' movement has come to stay. It was snuffed out with comparative ease after the last war, when shortage of labour turned into redundancy and it became a simple matter to sack anyone whom the management regarded as a nuisance. The office of shop steward then became so dangerous to hold that there were soon few candidates; and the institution died out, except in places where Trade Unionism was exceptionally strong and depression not too acute. The conditions of labour redundancy in the war trades may, of course, reproduce themselves after the present war; and, if they do, the shop stewards' movement will have a trying time. But it will be much harder to make an end of a movement which has associated itself closely with the promotion of workshop efficiency than it was to liquidate one which had been mainly concerned with politico-economic opposition, and with the defence of specific labour

interests, without showing any particular zeal for the improvement of the quality of productive organization.

To a very considerable extent, in the main factory industries, the future of Trade Unionism seems likely to depend on what happens to the shop stewards' movement. The Trade Unions largely established their present position, and consolidated their influence, by concentrating on a fairly narrow range of questions, among which by far the most important were the establishment by means of collective bargaining of standard rates of wages and overtime payments and of a standard working day and week. These are still immensely important issues; but the growth of mechanization and mass-production, accompanied by a great spread of piecework or other forms of 'payment by results,' has increased the relative importance of those conditions of employment which cannot be settled by collective bargains applying over whole districts, but must be adjusted factory by factory, or even workshop by workshop within a single establishment. This tendency means that, over and above the district and national bargaining machinery maintained by the Trade Unions in the past, there is increasing need in these days for distinct provision for the striking of workshop bargains, relating to the conditions which are peculiar to each individual factory. This need clearly calls for the recognition of Trade Unionism inside the workshop, as well as over a wider field; and it provides an obvious opportunity for the shop stewards' movement, having established itself under the favourable conditions of war, to consolidate its position in the post-war industrial system.

Such consolidation, however, implies a much closer relationship than exists at present between the shop stewards and the district and national machinery of the Trade Unions. The Unions, as we have seen, have commonly been reluctant hitherto to delegate any part of their authority to the shop stewards—beyond the mere duty of spreading Trade Union membership—because they have feared that the recognition of workshop machinery might undermine their own power. But it will be difficult to sustain this attitude if the shop stewards succeed during the war in consolidating their position as bodies closely concerned with the efficiency of factory management, and having a right to be consulted about it. At the end of the last war, the shop stewards were reluctantly granted, by way of a small representation on the district committees of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, for example, a sort of official

Trade Union recognition. But this principle was never carried at all far; and, as the shop stewards' movement disintegrated during the post-war years, it came to have less and less practical meaning. I feel sure that this recognition will have to be carried a great deal further in the future, if Trade Unionism is to have any chance of effectively representing the main bodies of less skilled workers in highly mechanized establishments, or indeed of holding its own in face of the changing technique of production and of the shift in the balance of employment between the old, basic industries and the newer, diversified industries which cater for modern consumers' needs.

Let me come back, in conclusion, to the point with which I began. Russian Trade Unionism is much less an engine of working-class defence than an instrument of State policy. This is because, in Russia, working-class defence has become a political objective of the State itself, and the main industries are administered under public auspices in pursuance of a public plan designed to raise production to the highest possible level. If conditions comparable with these exist in our own industries after the war, our Trade Union movement will doubtless undergo a transformation similar to that which the Russian movement has experienced; and in that event the war-time activities of the British shop stewards' movement will be found to have contributed largely to this process of transformation. But, in any event, I believe the changes in British Trade Unionism are likely to be considerable; for even on the assumption of a continuing capitalism, large changes are overdue. The adaptation of Trade Union machinery in this country has lagged a long way behind the alterations in the structure and processes of industry; and the movement needs to be organized, in view of these alterations, very much more on a workshop and factory basis, with much fuller provision for positive participation by the workers in the mechanisms of factory control. Very slowly, the need for this is being recognized in official Trade Union quarters; and war conditions are hastening this recognition, which has been further stimulated by the counsel of the Russian visitors, with their widely different experience and their habit of regarding the Trade Unions as the State's auxiliaries in promoting workshop efficiency.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOVIET-BRITISH COLLABORATION

BY H. FOSTER ANDERSON

A RECENT debate in the House of Commons on the policy of the Government produced what to many a foreign onlooker must have seemed another example of the illogical nature of the English. For while it was the Conservatives who supported the action of sending supplies to the U.S.S.R., it was the Labour and Liberal members who seemed to hold the view that the safety of the British Commonwealth should have been the first consideration. These speeches were followed in Moscow but it is doubtful whether they caused the Soviet Government to revise its opinion of the Left wing in British politics. In all probability they confirmed the view of the Russians that the form of the English outlook, which unconsciously moulds public opinion in every section of the community, is essentially imperialistic.

Moscow, however, has been empire-making equally as long if not longer than has England. At the time of Elizabeth Ivan the Terrible ruled over territory considerably larger than the original principality of Moscow. The Russian Empire has been a steady growth and not the spectacular but short-lived effort of consciously planned expansion. Where lies the cohesive force of its unifying action is difficult to discover. For since the outset of Moscow's contact with western civilization, ambassadors, visitors, Hanseatic merchants or trade delegations, have reported to their respective headquarters that the state of Muscovy was in such a condition of decomposition that its further survival would be a matter of a few years. Their observation of the facts may have been correct but their interpretation was wrong for in spite of misrule, waste, recurring invasions and defeat in war, the Russian Empire grew. And it has not stopped growing.

Thus the substitution of Soviet Russia for France at the post-war equivalent of the conferences in Paris will not be merely that of one country by another. It will mean the

appearance of an empire-making outlook distinct from that held by the other participants in the reconstruction of Europe. The Versailles Treaty was the work of men inspired by an ideal, called democracy. In reality it was the English empire-forming spirit, which in the past had united the different peoples of England, Wales and Scotland, had consolidated the various racial elements in the U.S.A., and had made co-operation possible between Afrikanders and British in South Africa. The representatives of this cohesive force dominated the conferences in Paris. They identified their common outlook with that of all men of goodwill. This, they believed, was not the outlook of the English speaking peoples. It was the human view of the nature and aim of political life.

Such an identification of one standard of values with the views of the whole of humanity, so that it implies the goal of universal assent, is an essential feature in an empire-forming spirit. And it is inherent in the Russian view of life. Neither they nor we regard nationality as the ultimate aim of political activity. Nothing less than some world-wide union will satisfy the aspirations of each. One result of this similarity of an aim of world unity is that the European is both mystified by and anxious about the Soviet-British rapprochement. He is mystified because the English seem to be blind to the real nature of Soviet Russia. He is anxious because for him nationality is something supreme in itself and he begins to suspect the English of not having at heart the same political ideals as he holds. Moreover the European knows that the English have a traditional aversion to commitments on the Continent so that if they do not believe in nationality, they may not be whole-heartedly against a supernational ideal other than their own superseding the national structure of Europe, provided, of course, that it does not get too near the Channel ports. Indeed in stating their ultimate aim of a world-wide unity both the Russians and the English rid it of any national origin for the one calls it the Communist International while the other declares it to be the rule of Democracy. Only to the European is this a piece of Machiavellian diplomacy. Both the Russians and the English are equally sincere in thinking that they have got past the narrow limits of a purely national outlook. Unconsciously each view identifies itself with that of the whole of humanity.

At first sight it may seem that Soviet Russia and the English speaking peoples are attempting in a hidden way the very

thing that they condemn in Hitler, namely, the ultimate conquest of the world. Yet this common condemnation is not because the National Socialists are trying to secure a world order. It is because the kind of order that Hitler would impose, would be a thing of evil. Whatever differences may ultimately exist between the Russian and the English views of life, each has one and the same basis assumption which unites them to destroy the attempted world domination by a spirit fundamentally opposed to each. This basis assumption can be expressed in what appears to be a mere tautology, "All men are men." That it is not a tautology becomes apparent when the German principle is stated, namely, 'Only Germans are entitled to the rights of man, the rest of the species is sub-human.' From this follows that a German world order would not be a super-national organization. On the contrary the world would shrink to being one nation in control of everything and everybody.

To destroy the power animated by the debasing view that the whole of humanity except the few are to be deprived of human rights, Soviet Russia and the English speaking peoples are at one in their efforts. But when this has been completed, further collaboration will depend on a clearer understanding between the two peoples. At present the only interest each has in the other is the purely practical one of the nature and extent of the help being rendered to defeat the Germans. We are thankful that a ruthlessly planned economy is giving Soviet Russia the means to sustain a great counter-attack and the Russians are more interested in the output of British factories than in the overthrow of a capitalist system. Even when the need for help in a common war effort has passed, the interest of each will in the main be of a practical nature. We shall want the Russians to help us to do something and they will want us to help them to do something. And this something will among other things be the post-war reconstruction of Europe. Thus there are three questions, what do we want of Europe, what does Soviet Russia want of Europe, and what does Europe want itself? To answer these questions involves an effort to grasp, if possible, the inner structure of the Russian empire-making spirit and the cohesive activity of the English attitude to life.

The Russian Empire started outside Europe. According to tradition the Christian faith was adopted not by missionaries converting the heathen but by a Tzar making a reasoned choice

from a number of religions offered. Church and State became fused into a unity and have remained so to this day. Uniformity for the Russian was and is a spiritual necessity since it is his conception of the structure of order. His fanatical hatred of anything in the nature of non-conformity explains that paradox in his character. He has more genuine love of his fellowman than has anyone else yet he is capable of acts of ruthlessness that can appal the outside world. Failure to realize the Russian's need for uniformity has given rise to the misinterpretation of his religious nature under the Tzars and a similar misinterpretation of the atheistic character of the U.S.S.R. Such judgments have been made by Europeans little realizing that they have taken for granted that the State and the Church are two distinct activities in the life of citizens. For this reason these judgments are false. The State and the Church being identical for the Russians under the Tzars, to have been irreligious was an act of treason. To overthrow the Tzarist régime the Bolsheviks were forced to attack religion and when they became the governing power to have been religious was, if not an act of treason, at least suspicious. Freedom of conscience is allowed in the U.S.S.R., but freedom to form a Church, that is, a great religious organization, is prohibited. This is not because the Communists are anti-religious in the European sense of the term. The Russians are simply incapable of understanding an order which is a union of dissimilars each having in some way its own particular sphere of human activity. For them ethics, mysticism, practical life and the state are fused into one complete unity.

Moscow started on its course of empire-making with this "complete" attitude to life where all the forces of man's nature are welded into one indiscriminate whole. Indiscriminate is the cardinal feature. There are no sharp distinctions or clearly opposed contradictions to be reconciled. As there is no division between rendering to Cæsar and rendering to God, so the line between "thine" and "mine" is blurred. Property is a function rather than a reality having rights in itself and individuality shares the same nature. While the European view of life demands freedom in order to reconcile the opposing duties as to State and Church, to self and others or to nation and humanity, the Russian limits duties to the whole which contains the total of man's varied nature.

But one has no right to call the Russian outlook totalitarian, Germany and Italy are totalitarian because, nurtured as they

have been by European civilization which is based on the constant struggle to reconcile the duties to Cæsar and to God, they declare that all, the total, must be rendered to Cæsar alone. Germany repudiates European civilization and attempts to destroy it. The true basis of totalitarianism must be held clearly in mind if we are not to fall victims of the new propaganda of Hitler, namely, that he is the defender of European civilization fighting the menace of the Russian non-European way of life. The sinister feature of this propaganda is that it is a half-truth which is always more dangerous than a complete falsehood. It is true that the Russian way of life is not European but it is false that Hitler represents European civilization. The totalitarianism of National Socialism is a denial of the basic structure of Europe. On the other hand though the Russian way of life is non-European it contains in its own peculiar way the same belief that ethics are essential to man's nature and that God as well as Cæsar is an aspect of social and political activity.

It is worth noting that Hitler has changed his ostensible aim from being a fight against Communism to being a fight against Russia. By doing so he has shown himself again to be a master of propaganda. In the minds of most the term Communism denotes the most radical form of socialism which in turn conjures up visions of state control and planned economy. But the stress of war and the vastness of post-war reconstruction has made it apparent to many that modern civilization demands in increasing measure a new economic structure in which planned economy will play a large part. Hitler is shrewd enough to sense the trend of affairs in the economic world. This does not mean that we are approaching the general rule of communism but any departure from liberal free trade carries with it the tinge of communism. So Hitler changes his ground from the economic to the political world for he knows that the opposition of Europe to Russia is no mere modern trend of history. It has several centuries behind it.

Of singular interest in this respect is the short-lived history of the Independent Baltic States. The Esthonians and the Letts had been serfs for centuries under the Baltic barons but from their masters they had received first the Catholic faith and then with the Reformation they became Lutherans. Whatever meagre training they had received, it was European in origin and tradition. When their chance of freedom came,

they had no memories of past glories as a nation like the Poles. They were very ordinary people who wanted to be free to conduct their affairs in their own manner. So they fought both the Germans and the Russians. They drove out Communism because, having lived for many generations under Tzarist rule, they recognized Communism for what it was, a Russian national movement. Since 1939 the Baltic States have lost their independence. If in the post-war reconstruction of Europe they are to be included in the U.S.S.R., the ultimate fate of Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians can be reasonably determined. The Russian view of life does not recognize any intrinsic rights in the individual or the nation. As it permits freedom of conscience but denies the right to organize a Church, so it permits the use of any language but suppresses any national organization. For these reasons Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians will be torn from their country and dispersed throughout the U.S.S.R. where each will have the right of any Soviet citizen to find the level to which his abilities entitle him. He may retain his native tongue but he will not be allowed to organize a native land.

The British Empire started in Europe and is based on European civilization. The long struggle between Emperor and Pope during the Middle Ages created with the Renaissance and the Reformation two specifically European conceptions, namely, the individual and the nation and these in turn carried on the traditional contest in the struggle to reconcile the claims of the one with the demands of the other. The whole essence of the European view of the structure of order is that it is an adjustment between opposing demands and nothing could be more intrinsically European than the view of the function of opposition in the House of Commons. The German *Weltanschauung* is decisively non-European and it has shown to the world the necessary consequences that follow from an initial total rendering to Cæsar. It is order achieved by elimination. First goes God, then opposition, then the rights of the individual and finally the nation is destroyed. Everything Europe has taken a thousand years to create is to be blotted out.

Moreover the European view of the structure of order as an adjustment of opposing demands implies that within the whole there are parts having some rights in themselves. The individual in some way is a reality in himself and so is the nation. Order is the reconciliation between the demands made by each.

And this type of order, as opposed to the Russian view of life as a fused whole, has produced its own special form of international order. It is the Commonwealth of free nations, each having rights in itself and each having to reconcile duty to nation with duty to other nations, thus carrying on the traditional European struggle which started between Emperor and Pope, became that between the individual and the nation and now goes forward to a new struggle to reconcile the demands of the nation and of the Commonwealth.

Collaboration between Soviet Russia and England is not only desirable but possible. Yet such collaboration can take place only when each clearly recognizes the difference in points of view and respects that of the other. Knowledge of the cause of disagreement can clear the way to the field of agreement in a common policy. Each has a fundamentally different conception of the structure of order. The Russians believe order to be that of an indeterminate whole fusing all the aspects of man's nature in one vague but powerful uniformity. The English believe order to be the adjustment between the claims of unique parts which make up the whole, and parts having certain rights in themselves such as the individual or the nation. And each type of order, the Russian and the English, has in it the possibility of gaining universal acceptance. Such universalism in all probability is a thing of the distant future. But post-war reconstruction may indicate which of the two has the greater power of expansion.

One thing seems to be certain. Russia will emerge from this war with its people proud of their strength, confident in their future and certain that their way of life is not only a blessing to themselves but would be to the whole world. But the Russian Empire is a thing of steady growth. For the time being those in charge of its destiny may decide on a period of repose to regain the strength so ceaselessly given by the people during the twelve years previous to the war and so courageously outpoured in the present struggle. The Russians have no need to be in a hurry. They are certain of themselves and of their future.

But have we the same confidence in our view of order, an order which believes in the rights of the individual and the freedom of nations? A view of life that aims at universal acceptance but makes no further effort in that direction admits that it is unfit for all. Is the Commonwealth of British Nations and the emergence of the Commonwealth of American nations

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the limit to the vitality of the English spirit as the vanguard of European political constructiveness? Or are the English speaking nations going to help the nations of Europe to create their own particular commonwealths? The test case will come when the frontier of Soviet Russia in the west will be decided. The Baltic States are symbolic. No people trained in the European traditions can accept the Russian way of life. To hand over any European population to the U.S.S.R. will mean their eventual liquidation as Europeans.

Such an emergency may not arise at the post-war conferences since it is more than doubtful whether Russia wants from Europe anything more than a set of conditions which will prevent Germany from making again a savage and powerful attack on her. For Germany to go Communist may deceive quite a number of people but it would not throw dust in the eyes of the Russians. It would be the old German trick of dividing Germans into good ones and bad ones to escape punishment. Moreover the Russians believe that the Communist system is the most efficient form for the modern state and the last thing they want is an efficient Germany. Russia does not want anything from Europe except that it will not be strong enough to attack her. She has plenty to do and enough resources of her own to do what she wants, namely, to give one hundred and sixty million people the highest standard of life in the world. Russia may accept help but she will not need it after the war.

But what do we want of Europe? Many of us would like to be in the position of Russia of being able to turn our backs to the Continent. Yet a small island supporting forty-five millions cannot afford to have an impoverished continent. We have to make up our minds what we want of Europe.

What does Europe want itself? In all probability no one united Europe will emerge from the war but regional and economic groupings; Latin, Balkan, European-Slav, and Scandinavian. Collaboration with Russia may come in the economic sphere since Russia will need the products of the secondary industries which she had not time to organize. Everything will turn on the atmosphere at the conferences. Russia will hold the leading cards. She needs the factory products of Europe but equally well she can do without them if she so decides. And more will be gained by trusting to her humanitarian streak than by commercial bargaining.

It is a Utopian idea to believe that after the war Russia will

disarm. Her very existence to-day depends on her clear realization in the past that defence is the first concern of a nation. Communism in Russia never suffered from that false assumption of socialism in the west that the total income of the country could be devoted to social services and a high standard of living. The English speaking nations will probably reduce their armaments to below safety level. In this case all Europe will sooner or later unite. For no country will wish to live by the grace of Russia.

(Since 1920 Mr. Foster Anderson has lived most of the time in the U.S.S.R. He was a representative of the Polish Relief Commission in Lithuania, and remained there, while the country was occupied by Russia, until February 1941, when he returned to England via Moscow and Vladivostok).

OUR CHINESE ALLY

BY SIR FREDERICK WHYTE

ON July 7 the war in China will enter its sixth year. It broke out on a large scale at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937, though it may truly be said to have begun in 1931 when Japan opened her Manchuria campaign with the bombing of Chang Tso-lin's train outside Mukden. Judged on either scale, and certainly in the operations since 1937, it was the first act in the drama of our own world war; and the resistance of China bids fair to have a powerful effect on the ultimate result.

China's power in war was rated low by friend and foe alike. The comparison between the war potential of the two combatants in the Far East, reckoned in material resources, in organization and in discipline seemed to leave no doubt that Japan must win with comparative ease. So axiomatic did this conclusion appear to be that the Japanese General Staff themselves failed to examine their strategic task and embarked on operations against China without defining their objective: or, it may be truer to say that their appreciation of their campaign made no allowance for those factors which have enabled the Chinese Armies to foil their opponents at every turn in the struggle. Relying on superior power, and operating with command of the sea, Japan reckoned on a short war. No one in Tokyo foresaw that the Japanese Army would be powerless to bring the Chinese to any decisive engagement; nor did any Japanese forecast accurately appraise the cost, either in time, or in actual expenditure or in casualties. In all three, the event has proved that Japan went to war against China in a confident mood in which she committed the strategist's cardinal sin of undertaking an unlimited liability and made the sin more heinous by underestimating the power of her opponent.

Doubtless the Japanese Staff have a good excuse. Who would have supposed that China would still be firm on her own feet, with her main armies in being and the spirit of her people undaunted, after she had lost her entire sea-coast, had seen her capital fall into the hands of the enemy, and with it all resources and wealth of the Yangtse Delta? Who indeed?

except those who knew China, who bore in mind the size of this unlimited field of war and understood the nature of the combatant terrain in the hinterland. Who again, except those who had realized the recreative power of the National Movement which had made China anew? In a word, who but the Chinese themselves? And they knew all these things. The whole world knows them now too; and if we are rightly surprised that the Japanese (of all people!) ignored them, may not the reason be that the root of Chinese survival lies in those moral factors which the Axis Powers have not yet learned to reckon at their supreme value. Japan, the sedulous and apt pupil of the Machine Age, believed that the power of her war machine must overwhelm the less mechanized Chinese; and, failing to understand both the physical and still more the moral limits beyond which the "machine" cannot overpower the "man," she is now ruefully driven to acknowledge that all her Chinese conquests do not spell victory, and that their cost has reduced her resources to a point where her power to sustain a long war on the new maritime and continental scale against the A.B.C.D. powers is not great enough.

Not great enough, that is, unless her Far Eastern successes contribute to the shortening of the whole war by enabling the Axis in Europe and Africa to win soon: *or*, unless they so materially replenish her own inadequate and partially consumed resources as to enable her to face a much longer struggle. We may surely say, without incurring the charge of a sanguine complacency, that the first alternative is not to be realized. However serious we must reckon this, the third crisis of the war, it does not portend the final defeat of the Allied arms; for the Axis Powers as a whole do not to-day enjoy the unchallenged control of the initiative (except in the Far East), and the reinforcement of the Allied Powers, both actual and potential, by American participation in the war ought to assure the final result. The second alternative, by which Japan would gain new resources from Malaya and the East Indies, is not so favourable as it may appear at first sight. If the Japanese victories in South East Asia had rewarded her with the possession of its material wealth intact, we should have to acknowledge that she had thereby repaired her chief weakness and enabled herself to confront the Pacific war with better assurance of success. May I refer the reader here to my own *Japan's Purpose in Asia** for an estimate (made five

*The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

months *before* Japan went to war against us) of her general capacity as a belligerent? Granted an inevitable margin of error, that estimate showed where Japan was weak and why she must regard a long war with apprehension. In her new position controlling Malaya and depriving the Allied Powers of the raw materials of South East Asia, she can claim to have made a considerable breach in *our* sources of supply. But, on the facts as known, it is very doubtful whether she has reaped any decisive gain for *herself* in respect of the sinews of war. The Dutch have put their oil fields out of action; and the supplies of tin, rubber and other commodities actually in Japanese hands, *and immediately usable*, are far less than she hoped to acquire. Therefore her material gains are moderate.

So much for these territories conceived as the reservoirs of a war-effort. It remains to estimate the effect on the defence of China of their now being in Japanese hands. Up to December 7, Japan had been deeply engaged in a continental war in China with no decisive result in sight. It must have been evident to the strategists in Tokyo that the assault on China could be pursued no farther along the lines followed since 1937. Chiang Kai-shek's Government was secure at Chungking behind a formidable barrier of mountains, and the attempt to force the passage of the Yangtse gorges could not be made. The alternative was to cut all the communications between Chungking and the outside world and thus to complete the isolation of China already partly achieved by the control of her sea-board. These communications had their sea termini on British territory and therefore could only be cut by war with the British Empire. This diversion of the direction of the Japanese attack from the frontal assault on an impregnable Chinese hinterland to Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies would serve the general strategy of the Axis far better than the continuation of the campaign in China. It would embarrass Britain by compelling her to divert part of her war effort to the defence of her Eastern possessions: it might also compel the United States to pay more attention to the Pacific than to the Atlantic. Thus we may assume that at the very moment when the Japanese General Staff were searching for a new way to break the expensive deadlock in their Chinese war, Hitler re-doubled his pressure on them to attack the Western Powers in the Pacific, with the results which are written in temporary Japanese characters all over the map of South-East Asia.

How much farther Japan will have carried her campaign against the Indian Empire before this article is published it is impossible to say, nor is any good purpose served by speculation on events to come. But since we are more concerned with the avenues by which supplies can reach China, we can make some estimate of the effect on them which Japan's advance has wrought. Normally China is supplied by sea, the main ports of entry being Tientsin, Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy and Canton. One by one these have been closed by Japan, leaving China to rely on points of entry on foreign territory such as Saigon and Rangoon. The former fell into Japanese hands after the defeat of France, and the latter is now also closed. This means that the Burma Road no longer serves Chungking, and China has to rely on the long overland route entering from the north-west for such material as the Soviet Union can spare. The only alternative route lies through North-Eastern Bengal and Assam: and when Chiang Kai-shek on his recent visit to India spoke of the "second string to his bow" which could be used if the Burma Road were cut, he must have been referring to this possibility. The ports of entry are Calcutta and Chittagong from which there is communication by rail almost to the border of British Indian territory up the valley of the Brahmaputra to Sibsagar and Dibrugarh. In normal times this route would never have been considered; and, when the war broke out, it did not exist at all. But these are not normal times, and when needs must, a way is found. The obstacles to road-making are even more formidable than those surmounted in the completion of the Chinese link of the Burma Road itself. The mountain chains stand athwart the road: there are few towns or villages which might make convenient stages for road traffic, and throughout the summer the rains are heavy, Dibrugarh having an average of about one hundred inches a year. But, since similar obstacles were overcome in completing the Burma Road, they can be overcome again. With coolies by the tens of thousands, and the devil of war to drive them, we may yet see this route at work. For all I know, the sinews of China's war effort may be passing along it already: by rail from the delta in southern Bengal, by road across the frontier, and thence by mountain path, river and road to Chungking! The western road-engineer may say that it couldn't be done; but China has her own ways of doing things that seem impossible, therefore the miracle may be performed.

The secret of this miracle, as of other feats executed by the Chinese, lies in the new spirit of the people. We know ourselves what stout-hearted men can do to defeat the utmost malice of the enemy; but we have in our hands a great wealth of material resources and a highly organized State to guide us, whereas the Chinese are worse off and were caught in the middle of their great national reorganization when Japan fell upon them. Their task of national defence was therefore all the greater, their equipment so much the less. Yet despite all handicaps, they survive and defeat all Japanese attempts to crush them. We have already noted certain features in the character of the battle field which operate in their favour. We have seen how the mechanized forces of Japan reached a point in the mountains where the wheels of her war machine could not revolve; we have read of the unrelenting warfare of the Chinese guerrillas which has inflicted daily casualties on the Japanese; we have watched the reorganization of the Chinese Government in Chungking after its successful retirement up the Yangtse from Nanking, and we have also seen how millions of refugees from occupied China have been transformed overnight from a burden into a productive asset in their new homes in Szechwan. That refugee movement alone is one of the epics of China; and when we remember that, despite the turmoil and disarray of such a human flood on the move, the people were able to take many of their tools and implements with them, the fact stands out as unique among human achievements. Workshops were packed bodily in junks, machinery was dismantled and borne in barges towed by those sturdy little Upper-River steam-craft that served the needs of Szechwan in times of peace. And thus much of the industrial equipment of the Wuhan cities—the Chicago of China—was shipped six hundred miles further west to work for China at war. The Yangtse Gorges are a sight to remember at any time; but never have they presented such a moving scene, set in the precipitous frame of their majestic cliffs, as during the time of this great migration.

Here was proof, if proof were needed, that the Chinese can look after themselves, which is only a homely way of saying that they have the fundamental capacity for self-government. This faculty they have always possessed, but only in our own time has it come into action in the field of national endeavour, as compared with local affairs. One of the most striking features in Chinese history is the contrast between the effective

power of unorganized self-government shown by the Chinese and their complete failure to demand a form of government which would give expression to public will in national affairs. Thus the Chinese, while successfully maintaining their local autonomy, always regarded "politics" as being the specialized occupation of a privileged class, commonly called the Mandarins, the public officials of the Empire. China's long history has shown many popular movements arising to overthrow the dynasty; but each of these successful revolutions was merely followed by the substitution of a new dynasty for the old. It was not till the opening years of the twentieth century that the Chinese conceived of a possible political alternative to the authority of the Throne; and therefore the national revolution of our own time is unique in Chinese history, not because it was a popular revolt, but because the people had found a new objective. This new aim, embodied in the programme of Modern Chinese Nationalism, was derived from the West, in about equal proportion from the French Revolution and from the European and American Liberal Movements of the nineteenth century.

The first contacts between China and the West were indeed made long before the nineteenth century opened: but at first they were confined to trade relations in the sea-ports and the first Europeans to settle in China were mainly engaged in commerce, and had little or no thought of a political purpose. None the less, as happened in India and elsewhere in Asia, the Western trader, whether he knew it or not, brought with him an indispensable cargo of ideas more important than the goods and products of Europe. These ideas and especially those of a political character, implanted themselves in the Chinese mind and led the educated Chinese to pursue them to their source by coming to Europe and to America for study. Thus it may be said that the birth-place of the Chinese Revolution was the universities and colleges of the Western world; and it is no accident that the spear-head of the national movement has been the young Chinese student. It was not till Sun Yat Sen assumed leadership of the movements that its real meaning became clear to the Chinese themselves; but it was already under way long before that, and Sir Robert Hart surveying the scene of the Boxer Rebellion from the British Legation in Peking described what he saw as "a movement new in Chinese history."

The Boxer Rebellion, like the greater Taiping Rebellion 50 years before was originally an anti-dynastic movement of the

usual Chinese kind. It was read by the Chinese themselves as a sign that the Mandate of Heaven was exhausted and that the Ching dynasty (commonly called by us the Manchu Dynasty) was near its end. The Boxer Rebellion in 1900 began as a movement against the Empress Dowager; but that skilful and shrewd old woman succeeded in diverting the attack from the dynasty to the foreign powers. And, as is well known, the Rebellion itself ended with the success of the Allied European Forces as the terms of a new settlement were dictated to the Imperial Government. The result of this was in the first instance to secure for foreign interests an even stronger position than ever; but its true consequence was to reveal to the Chinese themselves the weakness of their own government and to redouble their efforts to equip China with the instruments of modern power.

The Manchu Dynasty had revealed itself incapable; and by 1911 it had disappeared from the scene in the face of a revolutionary movement which originally broke out in Western China in that year. But as noted above, this new revolutionary movement was not merely concerned, like its historical predecessors in China, to teach the dynasty a lesson, but to find a new form of government altogether. Therefore the true significance of Sun Yat Sen was that he was the prophet of a new era, through which China is still passing.

Sun Yat Sen took "government of the people, by the people, for the people" as the watch-word of Chinese nationalism. His purpose was to establish a Chinese Republic. He embodied the purpose of the Republic in the three Principles of the People, the well-known *San Min Chu-I* which were (1) Nationalism, or the government of the people; (2) liberty, or the rights of the people; (3) livelihood, or the welfare of the people. Realizing that this could not be achieved over-night he designed the time-table of progress in three parts:—

- (1) *Militarism*: by which he meant that there must be a period of military conflict before the Republic could be established, in the course of which the Armed Forces of the Revolution would have to destroy the Imperial Power, the latter then surviving in the form of War Lords as the legacy of the defunct Empire;
- (2) The second part in the time table was described as *Tutelage*, in which Sun Yat Sen foresaw that it would be necessary for the party, the *Kuo Min Tang*, or the Chinese Peoples Party, to become the self-appointed Government of the country and to provide the first rudiments of public administration under the new order. This closely resembles the theory of Soviet Russian politics; and

it may be said that though Sun Yat Sen learned most of his political lessons in the West, he obtained many of his ideas from Moscow, and indeed at one period owed much to Russian assistance;

- (3) The third period was to be full self-government, by which time the Proletariat was assumed to have been trained in the period of tutelage for its democratic task.

The first two periods tended to run together. For the purpose of the Civil Wars, that is, the period of Militarism defined by Sun Yat Sen above, the Nationalist Party assumed from the first such national control as it was able to seize. The period from 1911 to 1923 was one of such confusion that, although the foreign powers continued to recognize the first of the national governments set up in Peking, political power was rapidly passing to more revolutionary armies in the south. Thus in fact it may be said that the story of the Nationalist Movement, as we have known it, really begins with the creation of Sun Yat Sen's administration in Canton in that year. At that time Sun Yat Sen himself hoped and believed that he would find in Britain and America the indispensable foreign assistance which his movement required. But his hopes were disappointed and he turned to Lenin and the Moscow Government. During the next three years Sun Yat Sen's Government in Canton was mainly engaged in consolidating itself and in preparing for the campaign northwards which filled the years from 1926 to 1928. Sun Yat Sen himself died in 1925 before this campaign ended; and on the date of his death it was universally recognized that the period of Civil War or Militarism had a long time to run before the Nationalist Party would be able to devote itself to the essential tasks of administrative reconstruction. During this Canton period, Borodin, General Galen and other Russian experts exercised great influence if not actual power. It was on Borodin's advice that Chiang Kai-shek, then a very young officer in the Nationalist Army, was made Commandant of the Whampoa Cadet School, which was the Officers' Training Corps of Sun Yat Sen's armies.

The choice of Chiang Kai-shek showed great shrewdness of judgment in Borodin, and has had incalculable consequences for China ever since. In the Chinese Civil War Chiang was to prove between the years 1926 and 1929 that he was first and the rest nowhere. He established his personal ascendancy in the Nationalist Movement by his outstanding quality as a military leader and then proved both in fighting and in diplomacy that he had no equal in China. One by one he defeated

all his rivals and thus laid the foundations of the supreme position in which he now stands.

If it be said, as it must be said, that in the present circumstances of China's fortune, the General is the incarnation of the people's will and purpose, the growth of the people themselves in national stature must be recognized as the outstanding factor in a decisive period. Traditionally careless of politics, thinking more of themselves as a Race, and not of China as a political entity capable of becoming a Great Power, the Chinese are now turning their unique qualifications to the task of making China a National State of the first order of importance. The outbreak of the present struggle with Japan caught them half-way in this process; and it is certain that one of the Japanese motives in launching the attack which began in 1931 and is not yet over, was to prevent China from organizing herself and her resources in such a manner as to become a possible menace to Japan herself. The Sino-Japanese struggle has therefore delayed the fruition of Chinese hopes; but whatever be the outcome of the struggle, the welding influence of danger from without has completed the process of patriotic unification already well advanced by the National Revolution itself.

The Chinese Nationalist Movement offers to British observers an interesting contrast with the Nationalist Movement of India. Both are derived from the same source. In each case the impact of Western civilization has provoked changes in Asiatic life, both in the economic and in the political habits of the people. India has reached an advanced stage in the growth of nationhood under the tutelage of Great Britain. China has achieved her half-fulfilled purpose mainly by her own efforts. These two interesting cases of Asiatic reaction to Western civilization are not easy to compare, they are in fact to be seen in contrast rather than in similarity. The national qualifications of China are very different from those of the Indian. The path by which each has reached the present stage is radically different from the other, but fundamentally they represent facets of the same twentieth century problem which will remain to be solved after the war is over. The rôles of East and West have hitherto been those of pupil and teacher in the political and economic field; but henceforth the strength of the National Movement in both countries will show that the temporary subordination of the East to the West is practically a thing of the past and that a partnership on more equal terms than anything hitherto prevailing is the goal of the future.

WOMAN IN NATIONAL SOCIALISM

BY ERNST KLEIN

WHEN the factors responsible for the triumph of National Socialism in Germany are examined in this country and in the United States, all sorts of points are raised—the national and religious disillusion of the German people, especially of its youth, the social conditions which found their most dangerous expression in the gigantic figure of more than six million unemployed, and the sentimental mysticism deeply rooted in the German soul. But one of the most important is never mentioned: the influence of the feminine element in the German upheaval. It may not have been ultimately decisive, but it is absolutely correct to state that Hitler could never have gained power against the opposition of the German women. In their devotion to him they were far more fanatical than the men.

Hitler-enthusiasm had got hold of the women in all social and cultural classes. His worshippers could be found in the drawing-rooms of the rich and the noble, the studios of the intelligentsia, in the country towns among the shopkeepers and in the villages among the peasants. In the upper classes, for the greater part thoroughly reactionary, there was hatred and contempt for the régime of the Weimar Republic. The ladies of the *Junkers*, of the officers, of the financial barons and industrial magnates resented the wives of the Socialist ministers being received in the homes of the foreign diplomats and driven around in cars. I was once in Danzig, just after Stresemann had become Chancellor. With a Swedish colleague I was invited to lunch in the house of the first Vice-Mayor of the city, Dr. Ziehm. Naturally the table conversation turned to politics and to Stresemann. The Vice-Mayor said contemptuously: "How can one have dealings with that man? He is married to a Jewess." Madam the Mayoress added: "How can the diplomatic circles in Berlin accept this woman as the representative of Germany! A Jewess!" In the words of her husband there were bitterness and contempt, but in hers envy and hatred.

It is a fact that the women of post-war Germany were more easily infected with the poison of anti-Semitism than the men. Perhaps the explanation for this can be found in the character of the German woman. It is hard and proud, strong and bellicose and not without a streak of brutality, even of cruelty. Far back in German mythology the character of the woman reveals itself in a peculiar hardness and harshness. Whereas the goddesses of Olympus were lovely, easy-going creatures, the deities of Valhalla presented themselves as females who could fight, ride and drink as hard as any man. The Germans adored that broadhipped, muscular Valkyrie Brunhild who could throw the heaviest javelin farther than any masculine athlete and could defeat every male adversary in wrestling matches.

The storm-whipped lands of the North Sea and their primeval forests produced a people who knew little of natural beauty, of sun and warmth of soul and body. In fighting the hardness and cruelty of their native country they became hard and cruel themselves. Whereas the Hellenes offered their gods flowers and danced before their altars, the Germans tried to win the goodwill of theirs by offering blood sacrifices, not only of horses, but of human beings. To honour their war loving gods, they organized athletic meetings and afterwards drank themselves under the tables with Meth, a bitter and strong brew made of barley. Olympus drank the golden wine Nektar. The difference between Nektar and Meth is the difference between the German world and the South.

When the first German tribes emerged from their dark and wild forests into the beauty of that Southern world, the Roman soldiers were even more frightened by the women whom the barbarians brought with them than by the men. Standing on their chariots, holding children in their arms, they drove their men with fanatical cries into battle and death. When the men were defeated or killed, the mothers slew the children and afterwards themselves lest they fell into the hands of the victors. Autocar, wireless, aeroplane, permanent wave and lipstick have not altered this original character very much. German women still belong to a nation which regards war as the sublime occupation of a race and believes in might as the basis of right.

It is true that hero-worship is not an idiosyncrasy of German women only. They share it with their sisters all over the world, because it forms an important part of feminine sexuality which is rooted deeply in the human soul.

The worship with which Germany's womanhood hailed Adolf Hitler comes beyond doubt out of the same mystic psychological underground as the adoration of Christ by the nuns of the Middle Ages. Hitler was the Messiah sent by Providence to lead the German people to glory and greatness. Women always take things personally and thus the German women hailed not the *message* of National-Socialism so much as the *person* of the Messiah who preached it. Hitler was "*Herzog Widukind* who on a white stallion rides through the German forest."

On the evening of January 30, 1933, thirty-thousand S.A. men marched with glaring torches along the Linden and through the Willhelmstrasse in triumphal homage to Hitler who had been appointed Chancellor on that very morning by the old Marshal. In the window of the President's Palace stood Hindenburg stone-faced and immobile like his own monument. In the window of the Chancellery, the building next to the Palace, stood Hitler, smiling and joyously returning the salutes of his people. Hundreds of thousands of them were in the streets, yelling like a people gone stark mad. Their enthusiasm however was not meant for the hero of Tannenberg, but for the *Führer*. The wildest of them all were the women. They had massed themselves under the windows of the Chancellery and indefatigably waved their Nazi flags and handkerchiefs. Many of them had brought their children with them. They lifted them high up and showed them the glorious figure of the *Führer*. "Look at him! Look at him!"

You could, if you felt like it, excuse them on the grounds of mass psychology. But then came the day on which Hitler's victory was celebrated in Potsdam, the stronghold of Prussian reaction, with all that splendour which Nazi propaganda knows how to display on prominent occasions. In the Garrison Church, the shrine of Prussianism, the *Reichstag* assembled, with all its ministers, its generals, with all the representatives of foreign countries. Hindenburg and Hitler laid wreaths at the tomb of King Friedrich II and the Austrian deserter afterwards made the dedication speech. In honour of the solemn moment he wore a frock coat, stiff collar, and striped trousers—probably for the first time in his life. One could see that he was uncomfortable. He looked ridiculous. Beside me sat an old lady, the widow of a lieutenant-general, as she informed me. Trembling with joyful emotion, she pointed out to me the military personalities presenting themselves in the glory of their war decorations. "Look there is

Mackensen! That is Hammerstein, Heye See how happy they all are! The Social democrats and the Jews have gone! The old glorious time has come back!" When Hitler mounted the pulpit and his harsh, rough proletarian voice filled the church, the Prussian *Junkers* held their breath to hear him. Stiff, with his usual impassive face, Hindenburg sat in his fauteuil. "Isn't he wonderful?" whispered my old lady. "Who? Hindenburg?" "Oh no! Hitler!"

A friend of mine, high up in the ministry, one day told me the following story: "One of my colleagues, Councillor Z., has a seventeen-year-old daughter who was going to celebrate her birthday. The parents asked her what she would like as a present. 'I can't tell you,' was the rather astonishing answer. The parents, disturbed by the strange behaviour of the child, persisted until the daughter revealed her birthday wish: 'A child by Hitler!'"

Certainly, there were millions of women in Germany who did not share this hysterical adoration of Hitler. There were many women with Jewish friends who not only refused to give them up but risked their own safety to help them. Also there were women who had the moral courage not to surrender their children to the Hitler Youth or the *Bund Deutscher Mädel*, who even refused to join the *Deutsche Frauenschaft* to be taught how to breed cannon fodder for the *Führer*. But these brave women were easily overwhelmed by the ruthless brutality with which the Nazis deliberately destroy family life in Germany. In the Hitler Youth the children were taught that it was their duty to the *Führer* to turn against their parents if they did not agree with the principles of National Socialism. Robbed of every means of defence these German mothers had their children taken away from them.

The Nazis knew how to deal with women who dared oppose them or refuse them their children. In 1938 the gaolers of women's concentration camps at Lichtenburg in Saxony, and at Ravensbrück in Mecklenburg turned hoses with ice-cold water on them. One of the most infamous cases of Nazi barbarism against women was that of Maria Janowska a former Municipal Councillor of Berlin who was dragged in the night from her home, taken to the Columbia House where Gestapo prisoners were being dealt with, stripped, thrown on a table and beaten to death with sticks.

The fact that the majority of German women so enthusiastically gave up to Adolf Hitler their children, their families, their freedom, even their religion is the less understandable as

Hitler's National Socialism from the beginning turned against them. They readily renounced all the material and political equality of rights which the Weimar Republic had granted to them. National Socialism boasted to be a man's movement. In 1930 when the last legal elections to the *Reichstag* took place, 37 female members were elected out of a total number of 577 deputies. No woman disgraced the *Reichstag* of Hitler's making. No woman was allowed to hold a public post. All women's organizations were dissolved and replaced by the *Deutsche Frauenschaft* under the leadership of Frau Gertrud Scholz-Klink, that ample-hipped Brünnhild whom the *Führer* himself had deigned to call the "ideal German woman."

In a speech to the Women's Congress of the Party rally on September 8, 1934, Hitler showed them their place by saying: "We do not consider it right that the Woman should intrude into the world of the Man. We consider it natural that the two worlds should remain separate . . . the contribution the Man makes to his nation's struggle, the Woman makes in maintaining the individual cells of the nation . . . Every child she brings into the world is a blow struck in her nation's struggle for existence."

But Hitler was preparing his wars. The more this work became intensified the more the Nazis found themselves in need of labour. They began conscripting women for work on the land as well as for industry. As far back as June 29, 1939, State Secretary, Dr. Syrup, of the Ministry of Labour had pointed out that the *Reich* possessed in its women a reserve of three and a half million workers who could be mobilized in case of necessity. Three months after this statement compulsory labour service for unmarried women between 16 and 50 was introduced and thus the legal basis for utilizing this reserve created. In the first place assurances were solemnly given that there was no intention of calling up woman power on a large scale, but very soon its mobilization turned into ruthless exploitation. It is true woman labour power is used to the limit in other countries too. Compulsory conscription has even been introduced, for instance in this country. Yet there is a fundamental difference between Germany and other countries in the basic principle of the question. Neither in Great Britain nor in any other civilized state where women have to do their part in war work, have they been submitted to such social and even cultural degradation as in Hitler's Germany. But now the war forced them to change their tune

and to-day it is the ideal of the "working woman" which is propagated.

Hitler has even had to allow college women to come into their own again. From the start National Socialism had tried to close the gates of University study to them. In 1932, before Hitler became lord of the destiny of the German nation, there were 19,600 women students in German universities. The next year this figure was diminished by 7,000. In 1938 it reached its lowest level with 8,995. But in July, 1941, it had mounted again to 18,300. Hitler needs educated women for all sorts of higher and even scientific work now, such as the direction of courses for wounded soldiers, for air-raid precautions, for service at the 'plane detectors. Women in England are used for the same work, but for them such occupations do not involve a change in social position. Never having been degraded they have not to be elevated again.

Slowly German women are allowed to retake their places in the social structure of their country. The questions arise: Have they forgiven the humiliation which was imposed upon them by National Socialism? Have they forgotten the contemptuous words of Hitler which he thundered years ago? The culminating question is: German women helped to bring Hitler to power; will they also become the instruments of his downfall?

One must not expect the German women to stand up in open revolt against Hitler. They did not do so against the Kaiser in whom they believed far less. He was never regarded as a Messiah, but Hitler is, and will be for a long time to come. Nobody outside Germany can estimate how fanatical that belief is which the German people, and especially the women have in Adolf Hitler. With him stands and falls National Socialism. There is another fundamental side of the character of the German women to be taken in account. They are no revolutionists. There are no *tricoteuses* or *petroleuses* in Germany. French women had the élan of the revolutionary spirit. The German women have not. There are no heights and no depths in their history and their character is as hard and proud as it ever was. Their patriotism is absolutely narrow-minded, without any understanding of foreign nations. Hitler with his devilish cleverness has succeeded only too well in filling German woman with hatred of all that is not German.

When I went to Berlin in 1919 I met women of all social and cultural classes and not one of them wanted to believe that the German armies had been defeated on the field. The Germans

felt themselves not only abandoned by their Emperor, but also betrayed by everybody else. The whole country was impoverished. It was incredible how spiteful and envious the German women were against the foreigners to whom they had to let their homes. It is true that they had to face the bitterest national disillusion and humiliation after four years of sacrifices and sufferings. It is furthermore true that the victors went back on their promises and did everything possible to deepen the hatred of the German people against them. One must not forget that these women of the first world war are the mothers of the German women of to-day. They are the mothers who surrendered their children to the Hitler-Youth.

There are more materialistic bonds which tie the German women so strongly to the fate of their Messiah and his political party. Hundreds of thousands of them have husbands who have well paid jobs in the organization of the Party and who were elevated to influence and wealth. The organization of the Nazi-party is so closely interwoven with the whole structure of social and even family life in Germany that it appears nearly impossible to throw it over. Yet will not the inexpressible sufferings of their husbands, sons and sweet-hearts have a sobering effect on their minds? Will not those ultimate sacrifices which Hitler is exacting from them open their eyes? Some time ago there were reports in the neutral press about demonstrations by outraged Austrian women who protested with the cry: "This we have to thank the *Führer* for!" against desolating food conditions. Another story came recently from Berlin where women are said to have thrown themselves on the rails at the Anhalter station in order to prevent two trains with reservists for Russia to leave. They refused to move and S.S. men fired machine-guns at the women.

Is this the beginning of the end? Certainly, there is unrest among the German people, but that does not yet mean that their morale is breaking down. News from neutral sources still proves that German women especially—although not so enthusiastically as before—willingly and obediently carry the heavy burden which their *Führer* has laid on their shoulders. Why not? Did he not so far fulfil his promise and make Germany master of Europe? Did not his victorious armies send home immeasurable booty? Of the atrocities committed by them against Polish and Czech women not one German woman has been heard to protest.

Now that news of overwhelming victories with booty is not

coming any more, now that instead of receiving fine fur coats from Russia German women must give up their own coats and even their last woollen stockings, they are told another National Socialist truth: Germany has to fight for her very existence. The whole world under the leadership of the Capitalists, the Jews and the Bolsheviks has united against her and her *Führer*. Therefore Germany has to stand by him to the very last. And—incredibly as it may appear—the German women believe that too.

That fanatical belief in Hitler and his mission must be shaken to its roots. How is this to be accomplished? The German women must be shown that he is not infallible; not the superman they believe him to be. Propaganda by the B.B.C.? Not enough. Bombardment of German towns? Of Berlin? Not enough. The German women must receive the most thorough object-lesson of the terrors of the totalitarian war which their *Führer* has been waging upon the world. They have not yet heard the roaring of the monster tanks. They have not yet seen their homes burnt down, their most cherished possessions looted. They have not had to flee in headlong panic into misery as the women of the other countries overrun by the German soldiers have had to do. They have not yet seen gallows erected in their towns.

A cruel and merciless medicine, but absolutely necessary if the belief of the German women in their Messiah is to be broken for good. Once this is done, his hypnotic power over the German people is broken. Once the women have lost their belief the men will follow them. The end will come. What shape it will take, nobody is able to tell. Perhaps Germany will become the scene of the bloodiest civil war the world has ever seen. Perhaps if the democratic powers occupy in time the most important cities of Germany it might be possible to avoid a chaos which would endanger the whole of the Continent.

But whatever happens afterwards Hitler has first to disappear. If the German women are to take their part in this overthrow, they must be convinced that their race is not a master race, destined to rule the world. They must not be allowed to go on believing in Messiahs who ride in armoured cars and preach hatred and robbery. Otherwise they will hail the next *Führer* whom the "Grace of Providence" sends to the German people as ecstatically as they hailed Adolf Hitler.

PARTNERSHIP WITH INDIA?

BY W. HORSFALL CARTER

IN less than four months Japan has toppled down the whole pyramid of power on which Britain's Imperial sway east of Suez has been based. Our relations with Australia-New Zealand, remotest element of the "far-flung" Empire, can never be the same again. But because, like Canada—for whom geography ordains a common destiny with the rest of the North American continent—the Pacific States will henceforth, from the point of view of strategy, be revolving within the orbit of the U.S.A., that does not necessarily mean a severance from the British realm.

India's future is more problematical. The relationship of this country with that vast sub-continent where the 'steel frame' of British administration has been imposed can likewise never be the same again. Incidentally, as with Canada, the economic basis of our mutual relations has shifted—by the end of 1942 India will have repaid all outstanding public debts. But here we are dealing with a far-reaching revulsion from alien rule, which alters the whole complexion of the problem. When we take pride in the development of the free association of the nations of the British Commonwealth we have to remember that our statesmen were dealing with primarily British communities—the people guiding the destinies of those overseas countries looked at life in much the same way as we ourselves. In the case of India, as with Ireland, there is the continual pother about British "imperialism"—there is no magic in the formula of 'Dominion Status,' and its constant incantation has too long masked a psychological conflict which is at the root of Britain's failure hitherto to satisfy Indian aspirations. Until we adjust our minds to the Indian approach, I suggest, nothing that the British Government can "offer" India in the way of political concessions will avail to stem the current that flows away from us.

*Mr. Edward Thompson observes in one of his writings—Someone in India once asked: "What is an imperialist war?" The answer was: "Any war in which Britain is engaged." Congress in its manifesto of September 14, 1939, talks of India as "the outstanding example of modern Imperialism."

The sending of a Special Envoy to India, with the War Cabinet's new plan, is an imaginative stroke which *may* prove as decisive as Mr. Churchill's great broadcast claiming Russia as ally on June 22. With Japan at the gates, as the Prime Minister says, the willing co-operation of Indians of all classes and creeds is the primary condition of the land's successful defence: that sentence from the dispatch of *The Times* and *Manchester Guardian* correspondent on Malaya—"The Government had no roots in the life of the people of the country" is ringing in all our ears. Not, of course, that any constitutional *settlement* can be sought now. What may be—must be—achieved is an interim working arrangement which takes account of the imponderables no less than the obvious material factors and thus gives promise of efficient collaboration between Indian leaders of the calibre of Jawaharlal Nehru and British official elements now and in the future. The repetition of past pledges, which is all that the Government has provided hitherto, is beside the point, as is also the sort of appeal "to forget domestic differences" which was made by the Viceroy at Calcutta on December 15. We make far too much of the Hindu-Moslem conflict as an excuse for standing pat. There is a previous question that demands an answer, and Mr. Churchill's statement in the House on March 11, was not altogether encouraging. To hark back to the Government statement of August, 1940, which met with a chorus of disapproval in India, at the same time placing the onus of agreement on the Indian political groups, alas! reflects the chronic blind spot in the British mental outlook, an apparent incapacity to distinguish between the things of Martha and the things of Mary.

British policy was well described by Sir Herbert Edwardes as long ago as 1861 as one of "first fitting India for freedom and then setting her free." There has never been any divergence of aim: the Morley-Minto reforms, the Montagu-Chelmsford recommendations, the Government of India Act of 1935—all indicate, in the words of the Declaration of 1917, "the progressive realization of responsible government." Lord Irwin when he was Viceroy in 1929 was more explicit in his affirmation that "the natural issue of India's progress is the attainment of Dominion Status." Latterly this pledge has been more than once elaborated as meaning—when Indians have settled their differences—"all powers of a self-governing State within the British Commonwealth." In the recent House

of Lords debate the Duke of Devonshire, speaking for the Government, re-affirmed that

the political issue in India to-day is not whether power shall or shall not be transferred from British to Indian hands—that was settled years ago. The issue is what Indian Government or Governments are to take over.

Two points should be noted, however: (1) Britain claims to retain the right in her wisdom to say *when* India is fit to be free; and (2) Britain takes for granted that a self-governing India will remain a member of the British Commonwealth—no longer a dependency but, nevertheless, subordinate in law, if not in fact to Parliament in London. It is a natural enough presumption on our part—but it begs the whole question. (The *right* to secede—cf. the Herzog attitude in South Africa in 1926—is regarded as the badge of freedom.)

Englishmen, that is to say, being essentially pragmatists, are thinking all the time in terms of practical government, of function; and, conscientious to a fault, they are mindful of their immense responsibilities towards the voiceless millions of India's peasantry, of the manifold internal differences that will have to be adjusted—of their treaty relationship with the rulers of the Native States and so forth. At the same time they betray an incorrigible *de haut en bas* attitude, a *Herrenvolk* "complex," so to speak, which comes out in many other ways besides the 'colour bar.' It is difficult for Indians to realize that the same sort of superior aloofness will be found frequently in the Englishman's relations with his fellow-Europeans (for example, any 'British colony' in a European capital!), but this seeming arrogance must be particularly galling since Indians of the educated classes, like the Chinese, in their secret hearts look upon Europeans, not merely the British, as of inferior culture to themselves.

The educated Indian, I suggest—be he Hindu, high-caste or low, Moslem or ruling Maharajah—is by nature fundamentally concerned with considerations of right, of *amour-propre*—that *izzat*, a combination of emotion, pride and self-esteem in which reason plays no part—for which there is no equivalent English word. Thus since first the flame of Indian "nationalism" was kindled by Japan's victory over Russia, and the emergence of the 'Union of South Africa,' the passionate urge behind the demand for home rule, for "independence" has been essentially a spiritual, non-political impulse—a perfectly natural desire on the part of Indians to run their own show. And the

point is that the politically conscious Indian postulates an *equality of status* which our politicians and administrators (and most of those who speak or write about 'the Indian question') with majestic insouciance consistently deny. Lord Irwin alone ever got near this fundamental Indian aspiration when he wrote in a State document of "an India rightly conscious of her self-respect." This preoccupation with status is primary, and until some British statesman has the imagination to appreciate the fact, there is nothing to be done about 'India' as a problem in practical politics. For that reason, of course, it was a Himalayan blunder for the Government, in Whitehall, in September, 1939, to declare India a belligerent without consultation, without supplying any opportunity for Indian opinion to express itself. Though enjoying separate representation in the League of Nations, though she has an Agent in Washington, who recently put India's signature to the declaration of purpose of the United Nations, India in her relations with London is made to feel that she is an object and not a subject of policy. India was omitted from the scope of the Balfour declaration of 1926, excluded from the provisions of the Statute of Westminster, while the Act establishing an all-India Federation was so hedged about with safeguards that the "grant" of responsible government was largely nullified.

It is quite remarkable how the declarations and murmurings of discontent that have been heard from India in recent months harp on this theme. First of all there was the appeal by the Indian Moderates and Liberals, including three members of His Majesty's Privy Council, sent to Mr. Churchill in Washington. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and his colleagues asked the Prime Minister

to realize the urgent necessity of transforming the entire spirit and outlook of the administration of India by making a declaration that India will no longer be treated as a dependency ruled from Whitehall and, after indicating four necessary measures to be introduced immediately, in the concluding passage returned to the charge with their emphasis on India being placed now "on a footing of absolute equality with the other anti-Axis Powers." On February 21, *The Times* quoted Mr. Rajagopalachari, the able ex-premier of Madras and a Congress leader, as saying:

India asks not for a constitution but for freedom. Other questions and what the constitution should be are subsidiary, and will be easily answered if Britain will give an answer on the main issue.

And he went on to express the hope that the forthcoming

declaration of future British policy would, above all, indicate that the British Government has specific plans for bringing Indians into equal partnership with the British people at the earliest possible date after the war. Then, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, Moslem premier of the Punjab, in an interview on March 5, hoped that the declaration will "make the status of India as a free and equal partner in the British Commonwealth . . . clear and beyond doubt." A similar statement was made to the *Manchester Guardian* by the Moslem premiers of Bengal and Sind, two provinces where the existing Constitution is functioning normally. Leading business men have endorsed the demand for equality of status now. Sir Chunilal Mehta, retiring president of the Indian Federation of Chambers of Commerce, declared in his speech at the annual meeting:

Without an early satisfactory settlement of the political deadlock the imagination of the common people could not be touched sufficiently to enable them to face the ordeals of totalitarian war. The most rigorous and efficient bureaucracy would hardly serve as a substitute for a genuine popular leadership.

The redoubtable Mr. Jinnah himself, on behalf of the Moslem League, has made it clear that he subscribes to the view that, in words used by the Calcutta correspondent of *The Times*, "Indians be allowed to feel it their own war by being brought right into the responsibilities of Government." The Moslem League, that is to say, is ready to work with Congress now within the framework of the present Constitution, without prejudice to the major political issues involved in the framing of the future constitution. Nehru himself, while contending that Britain's immediate step should be the formation of a provisional National Government, responsible to the Indian people, declares that "the question of minorities does not arise in the present crisis . . . This war is a vast revolution ushering in an order that will be entirely different."

That is clear enough. It is perfectly true, as these statements I have quoted show, that the obsession with status shades off easily enough into this or that political demand. Thus the clamour for "recognition of India's right to direct representation in the Imperial War Cabinet—if one is established—in all Allied War Councils and at the Peace Conference,"* to which Britain would appear to have bowed by Mr. Amery's announcement of February 12, is found on closer examination to carry with it a corollary that the appointment

*The words are those of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and his 12 co-signatories in the message from Allahabad.

of any such representative of "India" shall be made by a central Government "responsible to the Indian people"—and not by Viceroy and Council, still less the India Office. (One demand on which there is virtual unanimity, of course, is for the abolition of the "discredited"† India Office and the vesting of its present functions in the Government of India directly responsible to the Crown). But the point I am trying to bring out is that the only condition for maintenance of the British connection in the long run—and the only valid "safeguard"—is a solemn declaration by Britain now of "honourable and equal partnership" such as Mr. Gandhi, for instance, has for years been demanding. India may well be, as was wittily said once by William Gerhardt, rather like a young girl in the frame of mind that she feels she can neither live with nor without her mother. The family metaphor, however, which suits well enough the case of the transplanted 'Anglo-Saxon' communities, is dangerously misleading with regard to India. There is, it is true, seen from our angle, the identical process of emancipation, and, the conferring of "latchkey" status. But, actually, the relationship is far more complex, and the prospect of retaining India ultimately, under the British Crown far less certain. A device similar to the 'External Association' formula of Mr. de Valera, on the face of it would seem to be more likely of acceptance as a "just and final solution." We have the examples of Egypt and Iraq where satisfactory relations have been achieved by a treaty partnership.

It is time these things were said because even our most enlightened proconsuls go on talking in terms that miss the whole essence of the problem, putting the cart before the horse. Lord Lytton, for example, in a letter to *The Times* published on March 4, conceives "Dominion Status" purely and simply as a constitutional goal and as a boon or privilege, analogous to the grant of citizenship under the Roman Empire, to be conferred on an all-India Commonwealth *after* all the knotty political problems have been solved. As a statement of the strictly *political* task waiting to be done Lord Lytton's letter is admirable and deserves quotation at some length. He says truly:

... it is not merely a problem of reconciling the interests of Moslems and Hindus, but of combining the Indian States with the self-governing Provinces of British India. This fact is ignored in all the speeches and letters on the subject either here or in India. No Government

†Sapru in another statement.

which failed to secure the support of the Indian Princes and the fighting races, as well as that of the business community, could become responsible for the administration and defence of India as a whole . . . Only under a federal constitution can the whole of India be united, and it is for the separate Indian-governed units to agree upon the form and powers of the federal government at the centre which they will accept.

It is common ground that the particular Federal system which was evolved after laborious discussions at the Round Table Conferences has never come alive—though certain of its features were working satisfactorily before the Amending Act of 1939 pulled back into the Viceroy's hands the powers of self-government being exercised in eleven Provinces of British India. Why? Primarily, of course, because its British authors had not really reconciled themselves to the idea of equal partnership. The Imperial Power, through Parliament and the India Office, had retained a tight hand on the bearing rein: in these days one-fifth of the human race cannot be indefinitely coerced from a distance of thousands of miles away. Partly because Congress, obsessed with the "obsolete controversy" of Britain versus India—has not yet faced up to the essential part to be played in an all-India Federation by the Native States. Congress, imbued with the word-juice of nineteenth-century nationalism, with its continual gabbling of the shibboleths of democracy, has contributed not a little to the existing constitutional deadlock (cf. the clamour for "responsibility at the centre") by confusing what is really a spiritual ferment—the urge for India's self-expression and equality of status—with a political conception. And actually, of course, Hindu-Moslem differences have been accentuated and magnified out of all proportion by the mirage of *Swaraj*, each group seeking to manœuvre itself into the position where it may expect to derive the greatest benefit from the succession. Factional conflict is indeed largely a by-product of the chemistry of revolt against the British Raj. Inside the Native States, where the population is equally mixed, the communal issue, practically speaking, does not arise. But, fundamentally, I would suggest, the political malaise is due to a slavish insistence on the forms and pattern of Parliamentary democracy for Central and Provincial Government machinery among peoples to whom the tradition of Cabinet Government is an alien, imported tradition.

*Edward Thompson's phrase.

Without going into details let me enumerate certain stubborn realities which, I suggest, have too often been overlooked.

- (1) India is, *pace* her most vocal sons, not a nation in the European sense at all—though the physical and economic unity wrought by the British has endowed her with all the appearance and many of the forms of a nation. Here is a sub-continent, as large as Europe without Russia, composed of many different races in varying stages of development: a mosaic of autonomous States ruled by Maharajahs and the like and British-Indian Provinces that has been supported hitherto on the world's stage by the girders of the 'steel frame.' Sir Mohammad Iqbal, the Urdu poet of the Punjab, was not far wrong when he said in his presidential address to the All-India Moslem League in 1932 that "to base the constitution on the conception of a homogeneous India or to apply to India the principles dictated by British democratic sentiments is unwittingly to prepare her for civil war."
- (2) The problem of an all-Indian polity is how to devise some new political pattern which will take into account the existence of a number of federating units administered according to British ideas (the present British-Indian Provinces) side by side with 'quasi-sovereign' Indian states—who would be responsible still to the Crown as represented by a Governor-General (assuming, of course, that India retains the link with Britain). The Indian States, undoubtedly, are in the position of making a federal solution of the Indian problem possible. No democratic fervour can alter the *fact* of personal rule, the prevalence, in some cases, of quasi-feudal conditions in Indian India. But that is no obstacle to the achievement of a federal system—any more than the existence of several European States where Parliamentary democracy has never really worked was regarded as rendering impossible a European federal union, such as M. Briand and others advocated.
- (3) The only framework into which India's essential diversity can be appropriately fitted, I suggest, is precisely this popular nostrum of 'Federal Union'—impracticable in Europe because of the political nationalism of the units. It is not suggested for a moment that the great work of physical unification done by Britain should be undone. Thanks to our sheer administrative capacity the whole of this vast area has been gradually knit together into a single unit in respect of communications, coinage, defence, etc., in fact the essential federal services. Similarly the needs born of scientific progress and economic interdependence had endowed the world with a number of international administrative unions which carried on the world's business free from political passions long before there was ever such a thing as a League of Nations. The World Postal Union is the prototype. As for the institutions necessary for a federal system for the Commonwealth of India, I suggest many ideas could usefully be borrowed from the Geneva League of Nations—there was nothing wrong with the machinery established there. Council, Assembly,

Minorities Commission, etc. may all find their counterparts in the federal structure of an all-Indian Commonwealth.

Under some such federal scheme as the one I have outlined the present British-Indian Provinces would, of course, become independent units of statehood. And, since they were in their origin administrative units, there seems to be no bar to a well-considered re-adjustment of boundaries so as to obtain a closer approximation to racial and religious unity than exists at present. (Territorial modification of the Native States areas, "concentration" of Indian India in fact into thirty or forty effective units represented in a States' Chamber, is likewise a *sine qua non*). The Simon Commissioners, we may recall, who knew their India, perceived the necessity of breaking up the present unitary pattern and investing the at present subordinate provinces with the status of autonomy. This reform is in line with all the best thought on the subject—the speech by Lord Hailey in the recent House of Lords debate.

There is no suggestion that the 90-million strong Moslem element of India could be properly regarded as a "minority." Indeed, under such a federal scheme as I have advocated, there is no reason at all why something in the nature of the Pakistan scheme for a group of Moslem States should not take shape. Better that than a continuance of the separate electorate device which places a premium on communal rivalry. Lord Zetland has described 'Pakistan' as "not far short of a counsel of despair." But confronted by a peculiarly intractable problem of "two nations within a single State" in Lord Durham's words (though here, of course, the term 'nation' is misapplied) Britain has more than once in the past had to accept solutions that are anything but ideal: for instance, the Partition of Ireland, the Peel Commission's recommendations for Palestine—and the separation of Burma from India. In any case this matter is surely one for Indians to settle among themselves, not for us to decide.

I have always thought that the most satisfactory definition of Indian "nationalism" was that supplied by Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar in an address to the Indian Liberal Federation in 1930:

the vindication of India's right to grow into the larger life of the future in her own way and according to her own traditions and genius and to have the opportunity to arrange her own political furniture in her own house.

That "right" has hitherto not been granted to her, that

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"opportunity" has not been vouchsafed—because of British preoccupation with the manifest internal differences that would seem to endanger all prospect of continuing unity. The times are too serious for such a "craven fear of being great" to prevent us now doing the right thing by India. Sir Stafford Cripps' mission, in a nutshell, is to make it possible for Indians to feel that it really is "her own house."

Whether in the "larger life of the future" the Indian Commonwealth will be prepared to accept a status similar to that of the Dominions, with representation in London by a High Commissioner, it is too early to say. We cannot count on that. The most that a wise British statesmanship can achieve now is to ensure that this India—for whom geography and cultural affinities ordain the closest communion with China and a future group of Asiatic peoples,—shall not altogether lose the British connection. An independent India does not exclude British collaboration: for many years to come Englishmen—apart from the necessities of war—will be, presumably, giving the benefit of their experience to Indian administrators. But the relationship will have to be one of equal to equal. Events have written *finis* to all the dawdling and dallying. What men ask now is whether Britain has it in her to "enlist India for freedom."* Shall we deserve to retain India as ally and partner in whatever contribution this country still has to make to the world?

THE CENTENARY OF THE INCOME TAX

By H. E. A. CONDON

IN common with most years, 1942 will produce many important centenaries, but it is doubtful whether any of them will be celebrated by the ordinary citizen with a more complete lack of enthusiasm than that of Peel's introduction of the income tax in 1842. The subject touches him in too tender a spot. Moreover, the centenary comes in the middle of a great war which has already forced tax rates up to record levels and extended the area of charge to include some millions of people not previously liable. There is indeed a formidable accumulation of bias which has to be overcome in endeavouring to arrive at a fair judgment of the value of the tax, and yet there is every reason for regarding it as an indispensable tool of victory.

Although we talk of the centenary of the income tax, it is fairly well known that such a tax was first imposed in this country during the Napoleonic Wars. William Pitt was a keen student of Adam Smith, but there is some doubt whether the economist would have approved his pupil turning in his great need to a tax on income. War however applies new tests to established opinions, and so in 1799 Pitt introduced the first British income tax. It was dropped after the Peace of Amiens, reintroduced in 1803, and finally repealed in 1816, following a petition bearing the signatures of 22,000 merchants, bankers and traders of the City of London, and amid the acclamations of the taxpayers generally. The records of the hated tax were to be destroyed, and legend has it that the future Lord Chancellor Brougham himself helped to stoke the fires in Old Palace Yard, Westminster. But in spite of all their care, duplicate records escaped the flames. They remained lost for over a century and have only recently been discovered in the Public Record Office.

Peel had two ends in view when he resorted to an income tax in 1842. He naturally wanted to stop a series of annual deficits, but perhaps more important was his wish to reform the fiscal system so as to create conditions more favourable

*cf. The book with this title by Edward Thompson (Gollancz).

for industry and commerce. The tariff needed a thorough cleansing in the interests of that freer trade which was soon to be the national ideal. The price of this fiscal progress was an income tax at the rate of 7d. in the £, which everyone regarded as a temporary measure, to be dropped when the transitional period was over. The nation evinced no great love for the new tax, but soon there was a fairly general agreement that the fiscal changes as a whole had proved profitable to the community and had materially helped to swell the flowing tide of mid-Victorian prosperity. The first judgment on the income tax, therefore, even if conditional, must be accounted favourable.

The Crimean War postponed the prospect of an early repeal of the tax, but the hope was still there. The miraculous 60's, with Gladstone at the Treasury and trade increasing in leaps and bounds, saw the rate gradually reduced until by 1874 it was no more than 2d. in the £. Gladstone even went so far as to offer repeal if desired, believing that "money should be left to fructify in the pocket of the taxpayer," but the trend of events was against him. The cost of the new social programmes, which in varying degrees were now part of every Government's policy, and more particularly the wars—little wars at first, with bigger ones to follow—meant that no Chancellor could afford the sacrifice involved in the abolition of the income tax.

The subsequent history of the tax has shown that it has at least one merit, flexibility. The war in South Africa took the rate up to 1s. 3d., a young man named Winston Churchill remarking with concern in 1902 that this was "the extreme limit of practical peace-time taxation." The naval programme of 1908-9 was largely responsible for Mr. Lloyd George's famous 1909 budget, and so for the beginnings of the super tax. New records were made during the Great War of 1914-1918, which produced a maximum rate of 6s. plus a super tax of 4s. 6d. in the £. The present war scorns even these high levels and has already lifted the income tax rate to 10s. and the maximum surtax rate to 9s. 6d.

When a tax hits one's pocket so severely and so effectively as does the income tax it is extremely difficult to be impartial in judging its merits. Not everyone is capable of the detachment shown by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes when he replied to his secretary, who had been complaining of the mounting scale of taxes, "Young man, when I pay my taxes, I buy civi-

zation." But even its severest critics must admit that the tax has been exceptionally productive. Possibly that is the real cause of their criticism. It has been the sheet anchor of successive Chancellors of the Exchequer, and never has its value been more appreciated than at the outbreak of war.

The following table shows how the receipts from the income tax have grown during the century of its existence, and the potent effect of our wars.

	NET RECEIPTS		
	Income Tax	Surtax	Total
	£ (millions)	£ (millions)	£ (millions)
1842-43	.6		.6
1862-63	10.5		10.5
1882-83	12.2		12.2
1899-1900	18.9		18.9
1900-01	27.6		27.6
1901-02	35.4		35.4
1913-14	43.9	3.3	47.2
1914-15	59.4	10.1	69.5
1915-16	112.4	16.8	129.2
1916-17	186.5	19.1	205.7
1917-18	214.9	23.3	238.1
1918-19	257.7	35.6	293.3
1938-39	336.1	62.7	398.7
1939-40	391.6	69.2	460.8
1940-41	530.8	76.8	607.5
*1941-42	756.	80.	836.

* The figures for 1941-42 are the Budget estimates.

Important effects result from the way in which the rate now varies with personal circumstances and increases with the total income. At first the tax was a strictly proportionate one and the idea of graduation aroused horror. Even John Stuart Mill could remark that, apart from the exemption of necessities, a graduated income tax appeared to him to be "a graduated robbery." Graduation received an impetus when the super tax was imposed in 1910 at 6d. in the £. Current tax rates would have been incredible in 1910.

Discrimination and graduation are two aspects of a new, modern approach to fiscal problems. In earlier days the main

concern was to raise money with the least inconvenience to the authorities, which normally meant mainly by indirect taxation. But gradually "ability to pay" has come to be recognized as the fairest basis for levying taxes, and this is the justification for the form taken by the modern income tax. Naturally there has been a good deal of opposition, but the principle has made steady progress.

Although "ability to pay" may be more or less accepted in principle, there are quite a number of people who think they are asked to pay too much income tax and turn to possible methods of reducing it. Thus arise the twin subjects of "evasion" and "avoidance", increasing in importance as the rate of tax rises. The two practices shade one into the other at the margins, yet the distinction is reasonably clear. "Evasion" is the avoidance of tax by illegal means; "avoidance" is the evasion of tax without overstepping the limits of the law.

The degree to which evasion is practised is to some extent a matter of opinion, for in so far as it is successful it receives no publicity. The Inland Revenue Department, however, thinks it worth while to maintain an Enquiry Branch specially to investigate suspicious cases, and it has done much useful work. All sorts of tricks have been employed to defeat the law, from duplicate sets of books and false bill-heads to forged share certificates of well-known companies. From time to time a case comes into Court, but on the whole the problem is not an extensive one in normal times. Probably our standards are better than those of most other countries. Certainly I have yet to hear of a case like one which occurred in the East, where a man kept three sets of books—one for his own use, one to show his partner, and one for the Revenue officials. No doubt the Enquiry Branch pays its way, but it is hardly likely that Gladstone would hold to his dictum that an income tax makes "a nation of liars."

"Avoidance" is a more subtle issue. Lord Sumner said in 1928 in the case of *Levene v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue*:—

It is trite law that His Majesty's subjects are free, if they can, to make their own arrangements so that their cases may fall outside the scope of the taxing Acts. They incur no legal penalties and, strictly speaking, no moral censure, if, having considered the terms drawn by the Legislature for the imposition of taxes, they make it their business to walk outside them.

Many a taxpayer who can afford expert advice has adopted

this point of view and has had a good run for his money. Ingenious devices have been worked out in schemes sometimes so complicated that only another expert can follow their ramifications. The position indeed got so bad that the Chancellor had to step in, and about 20 years ago he started a campaign against avoidance. The legislation dealing with the subject is now extensive and some of it very complex. But there is no doubt of its substantial success. Here again the war is helping, for a sterner note can now be traced in judicial utterances. For instance, in a recent case the Master of the Rolls said:—

The Section is a penal one and its consequences, whatever they may be, are intended to be an effective deterrent which will put a stop to practices which the Legislature considers to be against the public interest. For years a battle of manœuvre has been waged between the Legislature and those who are minded to throw the burden of taxation off their own shoulders on to those of their fellow subjects. In that battle the Legislature has often been worsted by the skill, determination and resourcefulness of its opponents of whom the present Appellant has not been the least successful. It would not shock us in the least to find that the Legislature has determined to put an end to the struggle by imposing the severest of penalties. It scarcely lies in the mouth of the taxpayer who plays with fire to complain of burnt fingers.

The legal provisions dealing with avoidance raise in an acute form the general issue of the complexity of the law, and the allied difficulty of the language in which it is couched. These are easy game for the critics. Cannot the tax be simplified so that it can be more easily understood by the man in the street? What request could be more reasonable?

There are really two different questions here. A popular explanation of the tax is desirable for the ordinary citizen, and in fact constant efforts are made with that end in view, the latest being the "Income Tax Quiz" and the resort to broadcasting. It is reported that the United States has gone even further, Mr. Walt Disney's "Donald Duck" having been enlisted in order to explain to the many new taxpayers the correct way to fill up the forms. The law itself cannot be made really simple; the subject is necessarily complex. But we must remember Dr. C. E. M. Joad's distinction between the expression of obscurity and obscurity of expression. It would be a hardy individual who would assert that the text of the law could not be improved, for a tax which is the growth of a century necessarily carries a heritage from the past which in some respects is out of touch with the present. As long ago as 1927 the present Prime Minister, then Chancellor of the

Exchequer, appointed an expert committee to codify the income tax. The length of its labours, extending over some nine years, is an indication of the difficulty of its task; and no one would describe the draft Bill which it produced as simple. Simpler, yes; but not simple. And it has not yet proved possible to bring this Bill before Parliament for consideration. The problem remains, and should take a high place in the agenda for the early years of the peace.

I have already stressed the important part played by war in the origin and development of the income tax. In this, as in so many other fields, war seems almost unique in its power as a social cataclysm. It applies not only to the history of the income tax in this country but also to its extension throughout the world. Broadly it would be true to say that prior to the last war the tax was not an important feature in many countries. Money could be raised more conveniently in other ways. Even the United States did not have a federal income tax until 1913, although in her case it was the Constitution which stood in the way. The Great War of 1914-18 however speeded things up and more foreign countries and British dominions and colonies took to the tax. They did not follow our lead blindly, but introduced a number of novel ideas. Notably they have made freer use of the tax as an instrument of discrimination so as to influence the development of industry and to further particular social programmes. One interesting innovation is Sweden's combined Income and Capital Tax, under which the taxpayer's capital is computed and each year a given percentage thereof added to his income, a graduated tax being applied to the resulting total.

In the United States and some of the British Dominions we are confronted by a situation quite outside our own experience—the existence of a federal income tax side by side with state or provincial income taxes. Such a complicated relationship naturally brings its special difficulties, and here again the British income tax system has by comparison a measure of simplicity of which the taxpayer is largely ignorant. Canada has recently gone a long way towards side-tracking this dual system for the period of the war. The Australian Commonwealth wished to adopt a similar policy, but it was not possible to reach agreement between the different parties to the discussion. However, war is once again playing a dominating part and may thus make an agreed solution possible. It will be interesting to watch whether the pressure of war and the

colossal Budget appropriations it has already caused will lead to similar adjustments in the balance of taxing powers as between the Federal and State Governments in the United States.

Wherever we go in the world some income tax problems seem always to be present, the main one possibly being "avoidance", for its roots are deep in human nature. The United States has suffered a good deal in this respect and, as in this country, has had to pass much remedial legislation. "Incorporated yachts" and "incorporated talents" sound strangely to our ears as devices for avoiding tax, but behind these and other unfamiliar terms there is the all-too-familiar attitude of mind of the confirmed tax-dodger, to use the expressive description coined by the popular press. One prominent American authority stresses a further difficulty they have experienced in that an expert can make much more money working for the taxpayer who is trying to avoid his income tax than in working for the government attempting to collect it. He asserts that the influence of this fact, together with the effect of the spoils system, has meant that there have never been enough men of adequate experience at the top of the Revenue Department. In contrast to this state of affairs, he paints the British Revenue Administration in most flattering colours.

The present war has already had an enormous effect generally on income tax in the world. Rates have rocketed skywards, and more countries are finding that they cannot get on without the tax. This accentuates the difficult problem arising out of the double taxation of profits made in foreign trade. Which is the proper body to tax such profits, the country in which they are earned or the country where they are finally received? Both sides have naturally found convincing arguments, and neither wishes to give too much away. As things are the trader sometimes has to pay two or more income taxes on the same profits. It did not matter very much when rates were low, but the burden is now becoming a difficult one to bear. The League of Nations did excellent work in getting countries to work together towards a solution beneficial to all. Its expert Fiscal Committee drew up model agreements which formed the basis of Double Taxation Conventions between many countries. Whilst their scope was sometimes limited, they were a step in the right direction; but there is still a long way to go. Within the British Commonwealth it has been

possible to make much more progress, largely because of the family atmosphere prevailing, in which the British Government was prepared to make fiscal concessions in the general interest.

In spite of its blemishes, it would be difficult to find a responsible statesman who does not realize that the income tax has come to stay. If Pitt and Peel could revisit the scene of their labours they would be astonished at the extraordinary growth of their offspring, but it would not strike them as disproportionate to the general development of society. When they had got over their first shock I think that broadly they would approve. The income tax has served this country well, and never better than in its hour of greatest need. It serves the taxpayer well, even if he is normally blind to the fact. Perhaps some day more people will feel able to say with the late Sir Leo Chiozza Money that their taxation is the best expenditure they make and that they get most satisfaction for it.

THE FUTURE OF FARMING

BY H. J. MASSINGHAM

THE history of English farming reveals six basic figures who have remoulded the face of England from nature—the peasant, the yeoman, the craftsman, the labourer, the squire and the parson. They translate into human terms the siting and disposition of every authentic village into church-houses-fields, themselves a microcosm of God-Man-Earth. If you look at these figures to-day, you gather that what has happened to each one of them is the same thing that has happened to all. If the old term, *adscriptus glebae*, bound to the soil, be used in its simpler, non-technical sense, it will be seen that all these figures have in course of time ceased to become *adscriptus glebae*. The peasant was jockeyed out of his land by the Enclosures; the yeoman has ceased to have security in his land; the intimate association between land and craft has been broken; for a hundred years the labourer has been leaving the land; the squire and the parson lost the one his personal the other his spiritual responsibility for the village. All of them in different ways became uprooted. There were exceptions, and they were those who carried on the continuity of the tradition. Judging by its results, the term *adscriptus glebae* means something more than a social order which has been disrupted. The three primaries—God-Man-Earth—have been disintegrated and, however imperfectly, the village pattern reflected them. Thus, the term has spiritual and practical implications both; its meanings are æsthetic as well as functional. Good husbandry may be historically called the root of good literature, true piety and the art and craft of living. Peasant, yeoman, craftsman, labourer, squire and parson have been what may be called basic England, and all of them have been separated from the soil.

Consequently, the tradition is at its weakest to-day when a concerted attack is being made upon it. All that it has meant in the development of the authentic national character is not only threatened by a revolutionary movement in high places of

great power and energy, but its elimination is openly advocated. An alliance between the forces of agricultural technology and commercial interests with the bureaucracy as their rather Laodicean supporter has appeared whose professed object in its own words is "to overcome tradition" and be rid of "out-of-date customs which delay progress." The abolition of private ownership in land; the destruction of "nuisance" features in our countryside such as hedgerow timber, copses, hedges, lanes and the like; the abandonment of balanced farming for specialization in crop-production; the unlimited use of machinery and artificials; total nationalization accompanied by the profit motive as the sole stimulus to initiative in agriculture—these proposals are put forward not by irresponsible paper-ideologues but by men of weight and authority in national affairs.

Their advocacy of "larger economic units" represents the last stage, the final act of the 18th and 19th century Enclosures. This formidable body of opinion is flanked by the tenant farmers on the one hand, numbers of whom profess themselves as guided by the cash principle alone ("I don't go in for 'good farming' as some people know it. I just go in for profitable farming and the two are not by any means synonymous," is the way one of them puts it) and by the doctrinaire planners on the other. Their new orders, abstractly conceived from the top downwards, bear no relation to the needs of the countryman, have little or no knowledge of husbandry and look upon it as a mass-producing industry. Thus, the English tradition, as deeply a "part of an Englishman's constitution," as Crawford said of Shakespeare in *Mansfield Park*, is in danger of its death.

The main cause for all this activity against it is not so much the present interdependence between national safety and the production of home-grown food as the dawning realization that at the close of the present war it will not be possible, at any rate for an unforeseen number of years, to repeat the abandonment of our native agriculture at the close of the last. Our foreign investments having been "liquidated," our position will no longer be that of a creditor but of a debtor nation. The urban population will no longer be able to depend upon imported cheap foods as interest-payments upon non-existent foreign loans nor will foreign nations with their fully equipped industrial plant be willing to receive from us exported cheap manufactured goods which they will in future make for

themselves. The conclusion drawn is not a complete revision of an economic system which forced debtor countries into competition with one another for producing food and raw materials out of exploited soils as debt-charges paid off below the cost of production. That is not the end in view; it is the commercialization of our own countryside as a substitute for the loss of profitable fields of exploitation in distant lands, regardless of the examples in the spendthrift wastage of capital resources in soil-fertility, phosphates, timber and the like entailed by it.

The contempt expressed for any and every form of tradition shows quite clearly that it is not only the husbandman who is the object of attack but the whole English tradition, material and spiritual. The revolutionary not only regards the yeoman and the craftsman and the smallholder and the landlord as "obsolete" but English country and the English countryman as Marvell saw them and as, though fallen upon evil days, we see them:—

Oh thou, this dear and happy Isle,
The garden of the world erewhile,
Thou Paradise of the four seas
That Heaven planted us to please.

Is our native husbandry, on the busy stage of which the actors I have mentioned played parts of such lustre, really obsolete? The whole farming community is to-day almost agreed upon the necessity of the "standard price," fixed by the State for agricultural home-products as the only non-palliative measure to secure the farmer from his ruinous exposure to cut-price competition and alternating booms and slumps, as has been the history of agriculture since the 19th century. This is nothing more nor less than the "just price" of the mediæval guild and country workshop alike.

Many anti-revolutionary land-reformers like Sir George Stapledon and others have stressed decentralization as the first of all agricultural needs, and the nursing of regional centres and nuclei from a foundation of local practice, soil-conditions and human intercourse. Their reasons have been manifold. Locally raised fresh foods are a remedy for faked and sterilized ones and for the notorious malnutrition from which, according to Sir John Orr, twenty millions of our people suffer. The excess profits of dealer and distributor, sometimes five times those of the primary producer, are the effect of centralization and the transport over wide distances entailed

by it, so much so that one wonders whence arose the delusion that the food we eat is really "cheap." It has been costly enough from the points of view of health, security of living and a decent wage for agricultural workers. When the Ministry of Food can be publicly detected (see *The Times*, January 19, 1942) making no resistance to the removal of 95 per cent. of the wheat-germ from its "National Loaf" against the express recommendations of the Medical Research Council, the regional country mill is something more than a pious and "picturesque" aspiration. It is a much more practical proposition than reinforcing devitalized bread with a substitute for the virtue taken out of it. There are, of course many other reasons why regionalism would be of the greatest benefit to the nation—not least it would encourage the revival of a host of local crafts and industries, and so be a means of recharging the moribund village with life.

These are very different proposals from those of the "rational planners" to dump irrelevant industries upon villages and small towns and then urbanize them. But Mr. Trystan Edwards's *Hundred New Towns*, complete with factories and different centres of civic activity and depending on the surrounding countryside for fresh produce, could do nothing but good for the towns and good for the country. The interdependent balance between them is a true modernization of the English tradition, a fulfilment, not a destruction. It is needless to go further than the bare assertion that its husbandry has always been regional and never centralized except through the focal points of market towns.

Three other issues, deeply involving both the past and the future, are so closely intertwined as to make a composite unity. They are the balanced or mixed farm, the health and fertility of the soil and intensive production. That all are characteristics of our traditional husbandry calls for no exposition. The first and second interact for the obvious reason that the mixed farm of arable, pasture, livestock and woodland is the only one which can restore to the soil what it extracts from it, and recognizes the basic wholeness of nature by its own correlation of parts. Nature is the first of farmers; the mixed farm is the nearest to nature.

It is a very curious fact that, though the specialized and mechanized farm actually produces less yield of crops per acre than the mixed farm (large or small) and the small holding, yet output and again output is put forward as the reason for

supplanting the mixed farm by "large-scale economic units." The figures prove it beyond controversy. Recently a table has been published of the production per acre of wheat, barley, oats, potatoes and sugar beet between 1927 and 1936 in eleven countries. In every instance and by wide percentages, the list is headed by Denmark, Holland and Belgium, the type-examples of peasant and yeoman farming, and bottomed by Canada, Australia, the United States and the Argentine, the type-examples of large-scale mechanized farming for profit.

Peasant and yeoman farming is, of course, always intensive (when not crippled by finance and saddled with debt) partly by the stimulus of ownership and partly from that element of personal care and intimate knowledge which a farm run by machines and for profit alone necessarily lacks. It lacks something else as well. A fifty-acre holding properly cultivated and fed with humus has an internal surface equal to one of one hundred and fifty or even two hundred acres, so that throwing a number of small holdings into one large one is actually wastage of soil. Thus, in flouting the traditions of the past, the revolutionaries are mortgaging the welfare of the future, and from this conclusion there is no logical egress.

The assailants of the English tradition, nowadays so vocal and powerful, only refer to the question of values as one merely of "sentiment" and "nostalgia," and so presumably as out-of-date as private property in land, great or especially small. Yet the history of our peasant, our yeoman, our craftsman, squire and village parson have been pregnant with them, inseparable from them. The beauty of our landscapes and villages and little towns chimes with the inward beauty of those who have lived in and upon them, ranging the whole gamut from Shakespeare (who was of yeoman stock) to the ploughman's song. A competitive world riven into chaos and going up in flames would seem to stand in need of that co-operation the peasant expressed not for emergency but in normal usage. A humanity perilously near the automatism of the ant-heap has something to learn from the independence of the yeoman. Is the individual leadership of the squire to be despised (though it is to be admitted he has often been false to his responsibility for his tenants) in a world of State absolutism and government by committee? Are the Christian virtues of George Herbert, Charles Kingsley, William Barnes and Chaucer's "povre Persoun" outmoded by the chaos of their denial? Or, if we pass from the man to their work, is

not craftsmanship something of a true antidote to a humanity in bondage to machines?

I take it, then, that the English tradition of which our native husbandry is the base, being as it is true to the nature of the Englishman, is the concern of the future rather than a pleasant tale of the past. The qualities it produced are always in date and only out-of-date at the expense of the human living-power and the national well-being. Time may modify them to meet changes of circumstance but to destroy them is suicidal. We cannot imitate them by "putting the clock back" because we have lost the knowledge and the key to them. What we can do and what the times we live in will compel us to do, if we wish to save modern civilization from collapse, is to recreate the English tradition in a form compatible with certain modern developments which are real and salutary.

Since we have lost the art of self-help, the power of co-operative self-government, we have to call in the State. As this is in itself a confession of failure, it behoves us to invite the State not into the kitchen and the living-room, but to guard the front door against the financial wolves, rather than allow it to turn armed burglar itself, as is the habit of modern States. A very sharp distinction should be drawn between State control and nationalization. The extraordinary bungling of the urban bureaucracy in its dealings with agriculture during the present war and what would seem deliberate attempts to discourage and even suppress such healthy and productive activities as country milling, should warn all countrymen of what they are in for if they yield to the clamour for State ownership of the land. Granted that borrowed money be the worst of all landlords, the next worst is the State, for the simple reason that individual responsibility and so humanity are entirely lacking. It was when the squires became the State in the 18th and early 19th centuries that they acted like savages towards their tenants. Nietzsche called the State "the coldest of all cold monsters," and George Russell called Leviathan Apollyon, as indeed the German State has proved to be. The fact that we have to call it in, therefore, is the measure of what economic babes we have become, "for ever nuzzling at its nipples." To grow up we need some power to chain up the financial man-eater, and, until we do grow up, than the State there is no other power. How should that power be exercised?

The only genuine argument against self-help in feeding ourselves is that we prefer making money to healthy and happy.

human beings. But some imports there must be and it is the business of the State to regulate and adjust them to exports so that they shall not interfere with the home market. That implies a drastic revision of an economic system whose object has been to undersell competitors by "a favourable trade balance" of exports over imports that has fomented the diverse evils of economic warfare. Certainly the State would have enough to do without collectivizing husbandry. One of its duties is surely to put an end to land-speculation, especially in building sites, unless ribbon-development is to put out of production an even greater acreage than exists already. A State control that acquired the power of distinguishing between predatory and legitimate "enterprise" and made finance the servant instead of the master of nutrition and husbandry would thereby release them and the English tradition with them from an intolerable incubus upon both culture and cultivation. The provision of credit; the diversion of sewage from polluting the rivers to fertilizing the fields; fostering reclamation; facilitating land-purchase; the regulation of markets; the checking of dishonesty and adulteration in the handling of foods; the maintenance of security for the cultivator; a general supervision of our natural wealth which is our native land, the birthright of free men—these are functions like them but not beyond them are State business. This is no Utopianism nor New Order; it is the removal of obstructions from the right and duty of farmers to farm and the owner-occupier (be he landlord, yeoman or smallholder) to own. If they fail to fulfil that duty by their land, then forfeiture is the right and duty of the State. The function of the State is to encourage its nationals to do as far as is humanly possible without it, so that a vigorous and regional self-government is its true purpose, not a bureaucracy using revolutionary powers to paralyse it.

If the peasantry have been the foundation not only of rural stability but of civilization itself, as history shows it to be, both the labourer and the squire, the ground-floor and top-storey of the rural structure, are the means to its restoration. It certainly cannot be achieved by planning machinery from without. The labourer with his skill, his experience, his all-roundness and knowledge of how to do the right thing at the right time in the right place is the potential by virtue of being the post—or ex-peasant. But there are all too few of him to form the nucleus of a peasantry which, therefore, must be

recruited from the ranks of the younger and willing townspeople by means of an education with a strong rural bias, by dual occupation for the factory-worker, namely the allotment after the factory, and by the use of estates as miniature rural universities. Holiday and training camps on these estates are a means to that fellowship which the Danish Folk High Schools cultivated in its pupils by teaching them craftsmanship, history and literature, and without co-operative marketing in the actual profession of farming, it is impossible for the small man to hold his own. Such communal activities as the jam-making of the Women's Institutes point the same way towards the recovery of the much more than team-spirit of the peasant. And the manorial village farm might well be re-created in a new form by the estate grouped about by family farmers doing seasonal work upon it as a "dual occupation," just as the peasants did week-work and boon-work on the old demesnes. No peasantry can be re-created except on a co-operative basis, and the estate is the natural centre for co-operative labours.

Though nobody says it and everybody talks in the air about democracy, what we are really fighting for is the English tradition, based upon an extremely ancient rural democracy often violated but persisting up to the Enclosures. A recent writer has posed three possibilities before us at the conclusion of the war—the anarchy of the old *laissez faire* of competition for profit, a State despotism on the Communistic model or the Christian life. I should prefer to speak of the third possibility as the English tradition which is Christian and secular both, each irrigating the other. By "secular" I do not mean enclosure by legal compulsion which was both secular and revolutionary. I mean development from within growing up from organic life and those expressions of culture and husbandry which, though secular, were yet influenced by the polarity between the temporal and the eternal. This polarity is not difficult to understand because it was expressed in the English village and small town (church-secular buildings-fields), in themselves a bulwark against the evils of nationalism. Thus, so long as we fight for Christendom, we fight *with* the English tradition.

THE RUSSIAN OUTLOOK

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

FAR from having exhausted itself the Russian counter-offensive by all accounts, including German admissions, appears to be growing in intensity. Its progress has, however, slowed down since the German fortified zone has been reached, and a number of important objectives have still not been attained. Permanent communication with Leningrad has not yet been re-opened; lateral communication between the northern and central German armies has not yet been interrupted; the Rzhev, Vyasma, Smolensk salient still holds; Orel, Kursk and Kharkov remain as German strongholds; the vital railway running south from Dnepropetrovsk has not been cut and the Germans retain their footing in the Donetz basin about Stalin, on the shores of the Sea of Azov at Taganrog, and in the Crimea.

Yet at all these points the Germans have been subjected to relentless pressure and have been forced to fight desperately under conditions of extreme hardship. They have had to bring up numbers of divisions held in reserve, where they were re-organizing and resting preparatory to a renewal of the offensive in the spring. Even more important perhaps they have been compelled to use air transport to maintain the supplies of isolated or semi-isolated groups, and in doing so have had to expose their aircraft under unfavourable conditions to Russian attacks, expending material and suffering disproportionate losses. Although in the ground fighting they have so far been able to retain their hold on the majority of the key points, they have lost an immense number of subsidiary points with great sacrifice of life and material. It remains to be seen whether in the last phase of the winter war the Russians will succeed in liquidating any considerable number of the key points they closely threaten, and whether their cavalry masses and partizan forces will be able to maintain their attacks on German communication and outlying detachments when spring mud makes major operations impracticable.

While it must be admitted that the Russian counter-offensive has not so far disrupted the defensive front from which the Germans undoubtedly intend to launch a fresh offensive, it has achieved its main object in depriving the *Reichswehr* of a period for recuperation, re-organization and the building up of material reserves. The German infantry in particular has been exposed to immense strain and it must be doubted whether the troops which have fought the winter defensive battle will be in any condition either in morale or

physically to take part in a spring offensive. It is almost certain that a large proportion of them will have to be withdrawn for a considerable period of rest, and it is doubtful whether even that will restore their morale. It would seem that more than ever the Germans will have to rely on their *Panzer* Divisions if and when they renew the offensive, and it must be admitted that the winter has afforded opportunities of re-equipping and re-organizing these divisions to a greater extent than in the case of the infantry. It may be questionable, however, whether the *Panzer* Divisions retain all their former terrors. Their tactics are now well known and methods of meeting them have been perfected. Moreover, the Russian armoured forces which suffered so heavily in the retreat and in last year's battles have been reconstructed, and the Russian Air Force, which even in the most critical period was never driven from the sky, has made great advance both in numbers and the quality of its equipment. The Germans, on the other hand, in the air will be engaged in a two front war, and unless they can produce aircraft of greatly improved performance have little chance of achieving air superiority. To my mind the indications are that even more than last year results will depend on infantry and artillery action. *Panzer* thrusts will court disaster if unsupported by infantry advances, and it will be recalled that many *Panzer* thrusts last year had to halt failing that support, and only escaped complete failure owing to the lack of Russian armoured reserves for counter-attack. The strain that has been imposed on the German infantry this winter may therefore have far-reaching consequences, for there can be little probability that the Germans will be able to produce infantry divisions from their armies of occupation or the armies of their satellite allies of quality equal to those which took part in last year's offensive.

I do not wish to under-estimate the seriousness of the threat that a renewal of the German offensive would mean. German resources and German powers of organization are too well known to be discounted, and *Panzer* Divisions employed with initiative and determination must always be formidable. It must be realized, too, that the German starting line has been advanced and that the railway system behind it must by now be fully restored. Even if the heavy winter traffic may have told severely on rolling stock and have entailed the loss of great quantities of motor transport vehicles, the German supply organization will probably be even more efficient than it was last year, unless it is greatly affected by air action and guerrilla activities.

Obviously the German salient in the south is the most threatening part of the German front and presumably that is it that the intensification of Timoshenko's offensive aims at eliminating. Very heavy fighting is in progress there we know from German reports, but little has been disclosed by the Russians as to the nature and progress of the operations, and this equally applies to the Crimea. Elsewhere the most advanced German thrusts such as those that threatened the encirclement of Moscow and the thrust to Tikvin

which might have opened the way for a drive towards the Vologda-Archangel railway, have been dealt with; but the Vyasma-Rzhev salient though heavily threatened still remains, and should it hold out constitutes a threat not only to Moscow but also to the Russian thrusts outflanking it. For since the salient is strongly entrenched it provided a strong base from which to initiate an attack. The curiously irregular form which the front of contact has assumed confers in fact advantages on either side which is in a position to take offensive action, and in case of renewal of the German offensive the Russians may deem it advisable to straighten their front and withdraw from some of the areas where they have penetrated the German defences. It is always a mistake to attach excess importance to gain or loss of ground unless some definite strategic object is involved, and on the whole the greatest achievement of the Russian counter-offensive, should it not gain any further important strategic results, has been the damage it has inflicted on the *Reichswehr* in men and material, in loss of morale, and in depriving it of opportunities for recuperation. Territorial recovery has been much less significant, though of course it was of great importance to relieve Moscow of immediate threat and to deprive the Germans of their footholds at Tikvin in the north, and at Rostov and Kerche in the South.

Great as the Russian achievements have been it is impossible to believe they have been sufficient to compel the Germans permanently to adopt a defensive strategy. A renewal of the German offensive must be expected, but that may not involve a complete abandonment of the offensive by the Russians. It is quite conceivable that we may see each side taking the offensive in those parts of the front where conditions are favourable. The morale and offensive spirit of the Russians have reached such a high level that it is hard to imagine they would willingly revert to a purely defensive attitude, nor are they likely to be again forced everywhere on to the defensive by a surprise onslaught.

We may be certain that the Germans will fight with all their energy, though perhaps with a spirit of desperation rather than with their former confidence, but will the armies they have recruited from their satellite allies show the same spirit? They may prove a source of weakness. Possibly one of the achievements of the winter counter-offensive has been to upset German plans for utilizing services of these auxiliaries. If the Russians had remained inactive during the winter even troops in which little reliance could be placed would have sufficed to hold great stretches of the front, relieving German troops for rest. But evidently it has been German troops who have had to bear the brunt of the fighting and winter hardships. Will it be necessary therefore for the Germans to make more use than they had intended of their allies in the coming offensive? What, if so, will be their value?

Possibly the Germans are hoping for more assistance from their Japanese than from their European Allies. It is hard to believe that Japan will respect her pact with Russia when the German offensive re-opens. Her future is

now so closely linked with that of Germany and Russia that her direct intervention in the struggle seems inevitable; but has she left her intervention too late? A Japanese attack on Vladivostok last autumn when Russian fortunes were at their lowest might not only have proved a fatal stab in the back, but might have provided Japan with a much more secure base from which to launch her attack on the Allies in the Pacific. As it is should the German offensive fail that base will be desperately insecure.

Everything points to the coming struggle in Russia being decisive. Of that the Allied High Command is evidently convinced and fortunately they have on the whole the backing of popular opinion, particularly that of the great masses of munition workers if, possibly, on ideological rather than on strategical grounds. Black and depressing as the situation in the Far East is the Japanese onslaught may be remembered only as the devastating eruption of a volcano if Germany is defeated.

SQUANDERED SEA POWER

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

SINCE Singapore, Java, Rangoon and New Guinea, Australia is threatened with invasion and the trade of the Bay of Bengal and the communications of the allied armies through the Indian Ocean to Egypt, Persia, Russia and China are open to attack by the surface submarine and air forces of the Japanese Navy. Such, in brief, is the present result of the insensate policy of successive British Governments since 1919, abandoning the Two Power Standard of battleship strength, reducing the cruiser forces to the farcical figure of fifty ships and the destroyer flotilla to a bare third of what had proved necessary to avert defeat in 1917-18, depriving the Navy of its essential air flotilla and neglecting the Merchant Navy. The price we have had to pay for this deliberate rejection of all the lessons of long experience and the merest dictates of commonsense is heavy: and it is not yet fully paid. So far the Japanese have gained ports on the western coast of the Bay of Bengal from which to conduct the next stage of their campaign for the overlordship of Asia and the Eastern world; the allies have lost their strategical positions, their accumulated supplies of fuel and stores and munitions, their repairing establishments—except those minor ones in Calcutta, Colombo and Bombay—and their sources of those important raw materials, tin and rubber. The frontiers of the allied navies are now thrown back to Australia and Ceylon and the forces for attack on both are being marshalled.

The reason for this dangerous development is the loss of sea power. Command of the sea was the indispensable foundation of security in the East, as it is elsewhere for this maritime Empire, and command of the sea is acquired and held by sea power, which, in its turn, is an amalgam of three constituents—sea fighting forces, positions and shipping. The positions are held by land and air force and these are maintained and nourished by constant reinforcement and replacement by sea, requiring shipping to carry the men and materials and fighting ships to secure their safe passage. Superior sea power would have prevented the movements of those considerable military forces which have overrun Malaya, Burma and the islands of the Indies.

A massing of cruiser forces, Dutch, American and British, was attempted in order to stem the invasion of Java. The allied squadron met the enemy transport fleet, protected by a strong naval force. The result of that action was the loss of thirteen allied warships, including five cruisers. It is impossible to close our eyes to the fact that the Japanese won a notable victory, and

though the allied air forces took a toll of the transports it was insufficient to effect reductions in the landing forces which overwhelmed Java.

Victories at sea are—as they are elsewhere—the outcome of concentrations of superior force. The high purpose of the strategist is so to dispose his forces that there shall be superior force at the essential point at the required time. The enemy aims at forcing a dispersion of effort, and one of the familiar means is the use of comparatively small forces against the trade routes which constrain the opponent to devote far more numerous units for their defence. It is most profoundly to be hoped that the allies are not dispersing their forces or mistaking their true objects but it is not easy to understand why a larger force was not available in the Sea of Java to meet this invasion. The attack on Pearl Harbour caused heavy losses, but it can hardly have put out of action the whole of the fine cruiser fleet of the United States, a fleet numbering some thirty-seven vessels many of which were of a powerful type. The Japanese have spread their efforts very widely and have the communications of several armies to maintain—in Indo-China, Malaya, Java, Borneo and New Guinea. Their cruiser forces appear to consist of no more than twenty-five ships, though there is some uncertainty as to what may have been added after the severance from the League and the cessation of the transmission of information as to building. But the escorting squadrons of some of these expeditions do not appear to be large, except perhaps that of the invasion of Java, and it is disturbing to read of a small cruiser force bringing troops to Rabaul and landing them unopposed except by such aircraft as the Australian Air Force could throw against them.

There can be little doubt that an attack on the mainland of Australia is intended and will soon begin and that it will not be the only attack. The positions which the Japanese have acquired in Burma will enable them to employ heavy ships, submarines and aircraft in the Bay of Bengal. When we remember the effects upon the trade of Calcutta and Madras of the brief appearance of the *Emden*, a single small cruiser hunted continuously by superior British forces, we can readily imagine the effects that this situation will produce. The ocean trade of the ports of Calcutta, Madras and Vizagapatam, and the coastal trade which plays no small part in the distribution of goods along the Coromandel coast will now move in safety only if there is a sufficient naval force of all arms to protect it, and the protection will only be possible if that force retains its base, Trincomali. It is good to hear (*The Times*, March 13) that the reinforcement of the military and aerial defences of Ceylon had begun as early as last November and has been proceeding; but with the examples of Singapore and Java before us, and the knowledge of the numbers at the disposal of the enemy and his willingness to accept heavy losses, we cannot close our eyes to the need of meeting him at sea with an adequate combined naval force of all arms. The great object must be to prevent his obtaining a foothold and this is the essential business

of seafighting forces on the surface, under and above the surface. Japanese aircraft have already made their appearance over the Andaman Islands where the useful little harbour of Port Blair, defenceless against any attack in force, would be available as an advanced base both for military operations against Ceylon and sea operations against the trade of the Bay.

No position, in fact, is more vital at this moment than Ceylon, and in no position is the strongest possible sea and air force more needed. For the Japanese intentions reach across the Arabian Sea to Aden and the possession of the base in the centre of the Indian Ocean is indispensable. With that in their hands the attack so much desired by the Axis partners upon the supply lines of the Egyptian, Persian and Russian armies would be formidable, for there are many small island anchorages to the westward of India which would serve as supply positions for surface submarine and aerial forces operating off the coast of Africa. The Secretary of State for Air tells us that he still pins his faith upon the policy of bombing the industrial districts of Germany and the occupied countries, but we may reasonably ask which course will serve the allied cause best—the infliction of such injury as we have hitherto been able to cause to the output of warlike material for the German armies, or the establishment of command of the sea without which the armies of ourselves and our allies cannot fight and would be forced out of their positions in the Near East. Singleness of purpose is the one and only road to success in war and singleness of purpose demands the definition of an object. What should be the object of the maritime allies? Surely it should be that which has always been the object of the maritime coalitions and alliances of which this country has been a partner—to obtain, first and foremost, the command of the sea without which we ourselves cannot receive the very means of our existence or the materials of our war industry, without which we cannot send the munitions to our Russian and Chinese allies or maintain our armies in those positions that enable our fleets to act in distant waters, reinforce our allies or provide diversions of the enemy's strength. Command of the sea is the foundation stone on which our future efforts must be built and without which no future efforts are possible. If resources and forces that are capable of contributing to the acquisition and maintenance of command at sea are directed, while that purpose remains unfulfilled, to some other object, they are wrongly employed. The idea that one of the national arms should act independently, pursuing an object different from that of the others and of its own choice, attempting an offensive which does not contribute to the principal object, or does so in a minor measure only, is a strategical error of the first magnitude. The armies in Libya and the Middle East are contributing directly to the command of the sea, but it is very difficult to say that this is the outcome of much of the bombing of Germany. It is well within the bounds of possibility that a fraction of the efforts in that direction during the last three months might, if applied to the Eastern theatre, have

enabled Malaya and the Dutch islands to hold out for a longer period.

If dissipation of force upon a number of different objects is a strategic sin of the first order so too is squandering of either force, opportunity or time. There has been all too much squandering in the war at sea, both in its preparation and prosecution. What was it but sheer squandering, in the form of failure to take proper precautions to make Scapa Flow a secure anchorage for our fleet, that lost us the *Royal Oak*? Foolish people, at the time, belittled the loss, saying that we and our French ally were so vastly superior to the then enemy that the loss of that one battleship hardly affected the situation. We should give a good deal to have another battleship to-day. The pernicious glossing over of that loss was one of the many mistakes of the same order whereby the public has been encouraged to take things easily and been allowed to retain its confidence that all will be well without any exertions of its own. No less was it a squandering to send an inferior force into Narvik in the first attack upon the German flotilla in that port, a force unsupported by a heavy ship. It proved possible, in the second attack, to send a far stronger destroyer force with a battleship. How much better to have had the foresight to do this on the earlier occasion! It was squandering to send an aircraft carrier out to hunt submarines. Thereby the *Courageous* was lost in a most foolish form of employment—a form which has not been repeated; but must we learn all our lessons at the cost of hundreds of lives and of indispensable and valuable units of the fleet? So too it was squandering to send the other aircraft carrier the *Glorious*, into the North Sea with no other protection than a couple of destroyers at a time when there was nothing to prevent enemy heavy ships being at sea. So she and her escort were sent to the bottom with a grievous loss of life by the enemy's heavy cruisers for the want of an elementary amount of precaution.

The attack on the French battleships at Oran was another form of squandering. Unlike the capture of the Danish fleet at Copenhagen, to which it was compared, even at its utmost it promised no more than the removal of a port from the French battlefleet; it did not touch the cruiser, destroyer or submarine forces of France. In its final result it reduced the French Navy by one battleship and by 2,000 men, while on the other side of the balance sheet it caused a great revulsion of feeling against this country. Friendship was squandered, and the effects stretch far afield, to our detriment. At Dakar we squandered both force and opportunity. A recent American visitor to French West Africa writing in *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1942) has made these observations:

There seems a general agreement by most persons, the British included, that the action was a gigantic error. The intelligence work of the Free French must have been singularly inept and the judgment of the British most misguided. But the unpardonable sin was to fail to finish what was started. If the attempt to take Dakar was to be made at all, it should certainly have been carried through to completion regardless of loss.

One cannot dispute the criticism, one cannot fail to compare the whole proceeding with those of the Germans and the Japanese who begin by making ample preparation and then carry the operation through to a finish. For not only was the whole thing marked by a want of decision but even the elementary precautions of giving clear and categorical instructions to prevent reinforcements from reaching Dakar, and of sending an adequate force to enforce those instructions, were not taken.

Comparisons are certainly odious. We may compare the preparations of the Japanese for landing troops, with great numbers of properly equipped landing craft and men thoroughly trained in the operation, with our own complete neglect in the same direction, although amphibious operations have invariably been needed in our strategy. Nor had we any sufficient force of coast attack ships for the bombardment of coastal positions with high angle fire of heavy pieces of artillery. The old bomb ketch was always needed and the monitor was her modern successor; it has fallen to the battleships of the Mediterranean fleet to provide this form of support to the army and this they have done at a risk from submarines. Fortunately the Italian submarines failed to interfere seriously with the attacks, but with the coming of German submarines of a greater efficiency we have lost the *Barham*, a severe blow at a time when we need every possible heavy ship in the Eastern seas. We may compare too the extensive and careful preparations made by the Germans for the protection of the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Prinz Eugen* by aircraft on their run from Brest to the North Sea with the absence of any similar co-operation between the sea and air forces when the important convoy escorted by the *Illustrious* and *Southampton* had to run the gauntlet of the Sicilian Channel; whereby the aircraft carrier was so damaged as to be out of action for months and the cruiser was lost. Such want of foresight and preparation are no less forms of squandering than those cited earlier. If we are to pull through this struggle we cannot afford to squander the irretrievable assets of material, opportunity and time.

AFTER THE WAR—WHAT THEN? BY VISCOUNT SAMUEL

On page 175 of the March number the first sentence of the last paragraph should read:

We have the Committee of the Cabinet on Reconstruction which for the time being has been obliged to give a great part of its attention to questions that will be the most urgent of all when the war stops.

The confusion of this paragraph with the penultimate one was due to a last minute deletion made necessary by the Government changes announced after the article had gone to press.

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EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

AT such a time as we are living in, journalism seems to count almost more than book writing—and is of course something different—team work not individual effort. The best known newspapermen of this century (we know them by titles now) have either not been writers at all or only in a very secondary degree. Yet one or two journalists proper have earned for themselves a reputation which stood out definitely as a literary achievement. Mr. Wickham Steed is an instance, yet in his case it was the range of knowledge and insight that mattered rather than the writing; to my thinking only one political journalist of my generation has been conspicuous and influential to do that involved the forming and direction of a team. But I have known no other newspaper which depended so greatly on the writing of one man. To make the achievement fully individual, and stamped as much as any book with a personality, it was necessary that the writer in question should be also the editor.

For a matter of fifty years now work of mine has been appearing up and down the English press, but my feeling of strong personal attachment goes out chiefly to two journals, one of which was the *Spectator* in the days of Hutton and Townsend. There was never to my mind a better weekly, and St. Loe Strachey who ultimately succeeded to the two old associates helped to make it what it was. But it was in essence their paper, not his. The two men were completely unlike each other, yet somehow a composite personality evolved, and imposed itself even on outside contributors. Very little appeared in the *Spectator* that was not characteristic—but characteristic of the paper. I remember Sidney Colvin assuring me (and he valued himself on critical acumen) that an article which I had written was by old Townsend. And a very great compliment I thought it. But in the *Observer* during the years when I wrote for it weekly about Ireland, there was no possibility of mistaking the editor's own manner. He had indeed abandoned the whole conception of impersonal comment and signed his columns; yet there never was writing which less needed to be so labelled: it was personal to the point of extravagance, and its power was such that one seemed to assist at an athletic exhibition. Beyond all doubt the exhibition was popular and admired—as it deserved to be. It was the work of a writer who expressed himself explosively because he felt explosively and was never only half in earnest. If there was uncertainty in his mind, his first care was to let you know how uncertain was the possibility of reaching a sure conclusion. Yet a contributor whom he trusted got the freest of hands. When I had to write about the Black and Tans, and the Irish Republicans, and the numerous unpleasant happenings which marked that period, I cannot recall that he ever used the blue pencil or cautioned me.

His interest was always chiefly, but never exclusively, politics. Between 1897 and 1899 when he was only getting into his stride as a publicist, he con-

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tributed four articles to THE FORTNIGHTLY. Three of them had to do with Ireland, directly or indirectly; one was about Parnell's death, two about the New Unionism—in other words about Chamberlain. But the first of the four was a study of a poet to whom not many critics have given attention—Coventry Patmore. I have known few men whose opinion I should value more on any work considered purely as literature; especially if it were in verse. It is not surprising that the daughter who has been for years now closely associated with his editorial work should be primarily a poetess.

In the course of this century the Sunday papers have invaded what up to 1910 or thereabout was the domain of the weeklies: and if blame is the proper word, Mr. Garvin should be chiefly blamed for this. He made of the *Observer* something that gave us news on a day when there were no dailies, but gave also the sort of careful comment both on politics and on literature, for which we had turned to the *Spectator* and to the *Saturday* or the *Nation*. And certainly the paper as he made it had no less right to rank as literature than any of these famous weeklies. He has left the editorial chair after close on five-and-thirty years; but we are not done with Mr. Garvin. For that richly stored memory and athletic brain there is harvest to be brought in of a kind which cannot be gathered except by uninterrupted, undivided concentration. Team work is done with, and perhaps leadership, but there remains work that may be slower in effect, yet may last longer.

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Existing conditions and chiefly the paper shortage, tend to produce a type of book not unlike the old fashioned quarterly article. A single subject treated in a small separate volume has the chance to attract many more readers than any of the reviews command; and this weighs heavily when the purpose is propagandist. So, from various publishers, there comes to us this handful: *Polish-German Problems*, by Robert Machray (Allen and Unwin, 4s. 6d.); *The American Primer*, by Dorsha Hayes (Bodley Head, 4s. 6d.) and *Propaganda's Harvest*, by Kingsley Martin (Kegan Paul, 1s.). Mr. Machray gives us 56 pages (with a folding map); Miss Hayes, 119; Mr. Martin, 64; roughly, allowing for variety of type, the scope in all is the same. Mr. Machray should well repay careful reading for a serious student; but it has to be recorded that he is not easily read. On the other hand, nothing could be more brightly written than Miss Hayes's "Handbook on the American Way of Life." She buttonholes her readers, or rather, she gets on friendly conversational terms with her audience; for one has the impression of being part of a group addressed by a fully-qualified spell-binder. No undue strain is put on the intelligence of the public for which she writes—that is to say, the hundred and odd millions of her fellow citizens who accept, at least nominally, what is written in the American Declaration of Independence. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal." Well, without going further she has to admit that America's treatment of negroes does not square with that. Yet she does not bring together, as perhaps she might, this declaration and the facts of inequality to which she makes much too vague allusion. In short, she and Mr. Machray appear to have failed somewhat, but in different directions, when they approached the eternal problem of keeping a balance between generalities and detail. Either of them might with advantage consider how Mr. Kingsley Martin goes to work; his *Propaganda's Harvest* is a model of this kind of pamphleteering—if that is not a disparaging term to

War-time
Pamphleteering

apply to the series called "The Democratic Order" which Mr. Francis Williams edits. Mr. Martin, who may be placed as an editor in the same class with either Mr. Garvin or Hutton and Townsend, reviews the part which propaganda played in the last war and the last attempt at an international settlement, and he urges vehemently that in this war fuller powers should be given to the Minister charged with this department. In short he wants Mr. Bracken to decide, after hearing what the fighting services have to say, how much information should be given to the public, and how soon—even if his decision runs against the wish of army, navy or air force. Apart from such questions of detail, is the general strategy of the department and Mr. Martin insists that the way to shorten our path to victory is to let all Europe know what the Allies intend—carrying the already published outline of the Atlantic Charter so much further that even Germans may realize that Hitler's defeat may bring to them also a more reasonable world. His review of Lord Vansittart's contribution to this discussion is excellent in sense and in temper.

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The next book that lies before me is far removed from all thoughts of war-time pamphleteering or political journalism. Yet Dickens began as a journalist, and for that matter was more effective at propaganda than almost all other writers put together. What is more, it may be said that when Mrs. Lambert-ton Becker writes her *Introducing Charles Dickens* (published here by Harrap at 10s. 6d.) she is contributing to that work for "Anglo-American understanding" in which her daughter and fellow-worker, Mrs. Warde, is fully engaged. Proceeds of the American edition have already provided a Red Cross ambulance bearing the name of 'Charles Dickens'; royalties from this one will go (through the Dickens Fellowship) to the relief of small distressed Londoners. All this, I think, should be stated, in fairness to those who want to drag Dickens, from whatever region he now inhabits, to be an ally of generous purposes in this battle. He would have jumped at the chance; and nobody else ever made such surprising use of the least promising opportunities. But, for all that, it is amazingly difficult to relate the imaginary England which Dickens created to the England which is fighting this war. Trollope's people, Thackeray's people, Hardy's people—it is easy to see them in khaki: Mr. Pendennis and his friend George Warrington would have looked well as company or platoon commanders; but somehow all this array of character-parts which Dickens conjures up, though they are English enough, heaven knows (no other country could have produced them) are fitted so precisely to the circumstances in which and for which they were created that one can hardly separate them from a world which had the luck scarcely to guess what war might be. Certainly a regiment can have its characters, and as a rule has them; but uniform makes for uniformity; and I cannot see Sam Weller, or Sam's creator, in any sort of uniform, or of conformity. Mrs. Becker has a great yarn to tell and tells it with spirit; the facts about the life of Dickens beggar even his own invention. Some of them will be new probably to many readers—as for instance that Thackeray (not yet an author) proposed himself for the job of being illustrator, which went to "Phiz". She makes us feel that Dickens lived in the eye of the world like royalty—and consequently that intimate details of his life were regarded, specially by himself, as matter for public explanation. When the man who had written with such moving pathos about the magic of home, found it

necessary to separate from the wife who had borne him ten children, naturally there was talk; but Dickens felt it obligatory to issue a manifesto, and quarrelled definitively with the *Punch* owners because they would not publish this document. Yet there was nothing to reply to: Catherine Dickens made no protests. In the *Dictionary of National Biography* Carlye is quoted writing to Emerson: "No crime and no misdemeanour specifiable on either side; unhappy together, these two, good many years past, and they at length end it." "They" here is characteristic; it means, as Carlye would think it should mean, "he": Mrs. Dickens certainly did not contribute anything to the decision but some tears. Yet it does not appear that Dickens was influenced by a desire to commit either "crime" or "misdemeanour"; he simply found his wife's presence tedious—and therefore bad for his work. His home had to be a radiant centre, full (literally and metaphorically) of scarlet geraniums flourishing and well-tended. Mrs. Becker ingeniously raises Gadshill into a sort of emotional centre; the home towards which Dickens always aspired and which, after his usual fashion he attained and in which he died. He had just left his work to contemplate the new conservatory which he had added, to house his geraniums, when he dropped suddenly, and that was the end. And it seems that the tunnelled way which led from the dining room under the crowded Dover Road to his study in the garden is now "the best air-raid shelter in Kent." Yet Dickens is worth a deal more than that in wartime; his work must be for thousands the best shelter from the bombardment of formidably bad news.

THE POETRY OF MATTHEW ARNOLD. A Commentary by C. B. Tinker & H. F. Lowry. Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d.

This book rises to the category of useful works. Its interest is therefore curious and in detail. The authors' virtues are scientific, and the aim of the work is to leave the reader to deduce what aesthetic conclusions his intelligence and imagination may permit from the evidence offered by this commentary. The design of the work is set out in the preface.

We have prefixed no introductory essay dealing with the development and cessation of Arnold as a poet because that is, in effect, the unifying subject of the book, however fragmentary and disunited it may at first appear. A reading of our remarks on 'Resignation,' 'Rugby Chapel,' and 'Obermann once more', for example, will give a person who has not time or inclination for the perusal of the entire volume an adequate notion of what we conceive to be the relation between Arnold's poetry and his philosophy of life, as well as of

his inevitable transition from poetry to prose.

Let us do as they suggest, and examine their notes on the famous poem *Resignation*. First, they place it in its various appearances in his early volumes. Such bibliographical matter is important in an examination of Arnold's work, for the process throws much light on his self-criticism. We see, from his hesitancy, his temperamental changes of mind about the merits of his poems, his pluckings out and readmittances of certain poems in edition after edition, his alterations during the course of such parental fussing, how this is indicative of the shallow roots of his poetic and creative energy, and how something else forbade those roots to take a fundamental hold of his nature. What that something else is we will find out in a moment.

After that, the commentators collect all possible evidence of the sources of the poem. This, of

course, means going back over the poet's early reading, environment, friendships; in fact, everything that a conscientious biographer would collect before beginning to write a 'life.' We see how Lucretius (a dominant influence over Arnold's personality), Senancour, the *Bhagavad Gita* and Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* were influential in the making of this poem. The young man, still in his twenties, already finds Goethe's later work, the fruits of disillusion and experience, compatible.

Here, then, is the evidence neatly laid out by our commentators for a judgment upon Arnold's work and personality. And this specific instance in the matter of one poem is consonant with the impression which the whole book makes upon one's mind. We see Arnold, still a youth, admonishing his sister Jane (whom he calls Fausta) for being ruled by too impetuous a romanticism and yearning after excitement. He takes her for a walk in the Lake District, where they once went with a party ten years ago, in childhood. He recalls the meeting with some gypsies, and contrasts their free, spontaneous, irresponsible lives with the life of the poet, to find them antithetical. That in itself is odd enough in a young man, whom one might expect to be boiling with the witches' brew of adolescence and newly discovered literary ability. But no, Arnold is already obsessed with the fear of extravagance, of those flights of egoism which made Shelley an angel and Blake a prophet. Arnold, at this early stage, is already steeled to a more ascetic purpose. His father's iron discipline has been so successful that there is no way for the poet to throw off that moral armour and to throw up his arms to the skies in a gesture of freedom and rebellion. Instead,

The Poet, to whose mighty heart
Heaven doth a quicker pulse impart,
Subdues that energy to scan
Not his own course, but that of Man.

All this is very premature. The resignation is surely precocious. It is as though the young poet has lived through the seven ages of man within two decades, and is already settling into the grey scepticism and coldness of old age. He is already tired of life, and sees its vanities with that "sad lucidity of soul" to which he refers, in a characteristic phrase, later in the poem.

We know, too, that four years later, in the preface to his third volume, he proclaims his poetic creed. It is a dissertation on the text of seeing "life steadily and seeing it whole," a famous phrase which he had already coined. He asserts that what matters in a poem is the architecture and the subject matter, and not the expression and embellishment. That is profoundly true. But a young poet can discover that truth too soon. He needs first to sow his wild oats. And this Arnold never did. The result is that his flowers are perfect, but few. They grow on stony ground, a ground frozen beneath the shadow of his grim father's moral upbringing. We see Arnold with his notebook making deliberate plans for poems to be written as his timetable permits! It is a chilly sight. The cold creeps into the reader, as it crept into Arnold's maturing consciousness. Too late he discovered that though he had been *thinking* and *talking* poetry, he had been *living* prose.

These speculations arise from only one item in this gold mine of a book. You see how rich it is in material. A scholar and lover of poetry and the making of poetry should be duly grateful for it.

RICHARD CHURCH.

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL ORDER, by William Temple, Archbishop of York. *Penguin*. 6d.

THE MORAL BLITZ, by Bernard Causton. *Secker & Warburg*. 2s.

THINGS I LIVE BY, by The Bishop of Lichfield. *Cambridge University Press*. 6d.

The project of publishing small but important new books at the price of sixpence to bring them within the range and the notice of the railway bookstall public now receives triumphant and even spectacular vindication as a real public service. Dr. Temple's *Penguin* appears almost simultaneously with his appointment as Archbishop of Canterbury, and anybody can now discover the views of the new Primate for the modest price of sixpence. They are, he would say, not his own views so much as the inevitable social consequences of Christian doctrine. "I believe that every Christian ought to endorse the substance of what I have so far said," he writes on page 75. Up to that point he has said that the Church has a right to interfere in social policy; that, more, it has a positive duty to interfere; he has laid down in what this 'interference' consists, and still more in what it does not. It does not consist, he says, in the formation of any Christian political party, nor yet in the urging of particular techniques upon those responsible for framing policy. He has laid down most clearly what are the primary and the derivative Christian social principles, and their natural order and priority of application. Above all, he allows no reader to forget for one moment that human sin lies at the heart of the whole problem, and that therefore the art of government is the art of directing potential murderers, thieves, and tyrants, since all men are subject to original sin. Hence any form of Utopianism is

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Illustrated. 10/6

explicitly unchristian. Then at the end, he puts off the mitre of a bishop and writes as a private citizen his own proposals of what ought to be done:

At the end of the book I shall offer, in my capacity as a Christian citizen, certain proposals for definite action which would, in my private judgment, conduce to a more Christian ordering of society; but if any member of the Convocation of York should be so ill-advised as to table a resolution that these proposals be adopted as a political programme for the Church, I should in my capacity as Archbishop resist that proposal with all my force, and should probably, as President of the Convocation, rule it out of order.

His proposals are contained in an appendix of sixteen pages, but the matter in them is far too closely knit and argued for any summary of them to be fair. They are their own summary. In the meantime anyone who will spend sixpence to find out the mind of the new Archbishop ought to arise from his exploration full of hope. Never have the *Penguin* people laid us all more deeply in their debt.

Mr. Causton casts his net over a wider area. His field is world politics, and the key to their future in the inter-relationship of Britain and Germany. He knows Germany really well, and has many rather illuminating things to say about such matters as the real significance of Niemöller, in the course of which he destroys a number of legends. His affirmation is that this war is indeed a war about Christianity, but that we who defend it can only effectively do so by giving to the world an example of Christianity in action. "England can save Europe better by her example than by her precepts," he ends by declaring, and this, after all, is simply the best Johannine theology. But for action we must first understand the real issues of the conflict and the bearing of English speaking Christendom upon them, and it is here that Mr.

Causton has many helpful things to say.

The Bishop of Lichfield is one of the best of all religious broadcasters, and his six five-minute talks in the "Lift Up Your Heart" series will not easily be forgotten by those who heard them. Here they are in pamphlet form, and they certainly bear reading again.

ROGER LLOYD.

MEN AND POLITICS, by Louis Fischer. *Cape*. 18s.

It is futile to say that everyone should read this book. At the price of eighteen shillings they certainly will not. I challenge Mr. Allan Lane to put it in the *Penguins*. I will, however, say that it is the moral obligation of every journalist and publicist to read it.

Not that Mr. Fischer has so much that is new to say. On Russia, which he first visited in 1922, he merely confirms with even fuller documentation what we had already learned from the consensus of journalists who had been there for years, Chamberlin, Lyons, Cholerton; as well as from the Russians themselves who could escape to write, such as Souvanin, and from Koestler, Muggeridge, Van Paasen, Citrine and the rest. Against these have to be placed the Webbs, with their intimate knowledge of blue-book Russia, and tourists' impressions of working Russia, the Slavophil enthusiasm for Russia of Pares, the judgment of a briefed lawyer such as Pritt, and Strachey's mystical belief in the rightness of the people at all times. Mr. Louis Fischer is a life-long, tough American Left-winger of the militant and militaristic type, who fought in what he calls the Republic's Holy War in Spain. But he does not realize that propaganda is not reporting, but killing the enemy with lies—with


facts if that way is better, but with lies if necessary. The trouble with him is that he is honest even in his partizanship. He respects the evidence.

His opinion of the Rykov-Bukharin-Yagoda trial was that it was a "frame up." There are indeed three choices with these purges. Either the prosecution was right and the founders of the Bolshevik revolution were traitors and scoundrels; or the prosecution was lying and Stalin is a scoundrel; or Stalin regards it as unimportant whether he is a scoundrel or not, provided that the régime under Stalin goes on. The third choice is probably the correct one. It is also possible to hold that both Bukharin and Stalin thought that some kind of accommodation with the Germans would be militarily necessary; and that Stalin first put his opponents 'on the spot' and then adopted their policy.

What then, in Left-winger Mr. Fischer's opinion is the character of this régime for which so much shall be sacrificed?

Millions of Soviet citizens live lies every day to save their lives and their jobs. They make false confessions day in and day out. They write lies, speak lies. They lie to one another and know it. They lie to themselves and get accustomed to it. They lose their illusions and succumb to the sole cynical goal of self-preservation until a better day. The assassination of character and the annihilation of personality is the dictatorship's chief weapon which it never forgets. The further a Soviet citizen is from the centre of the régime the less he gets its blows. The peasants are least exposed to it. The workers more. The officials much more. And for the highest officials like Rykov, Yagoda and Krestinsky the destruction of personality and character took the intensified, telescoped form of trial and confession. The wonder of it is that so few confessed.

These men, isolated from comparisons save with the Tzarist



Still needing speed and accuracy and concentration, but working now in the fresh air instead of in a city office . . . She's one of the people who may no longer need

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régime, fought bravely against the invader and Hitler, as the Germans fought bravely for the opposite dictatorship—and the Moors fought most bravely of all. Mr. Fischer comments: "The more primitive the man, the less his fear of death"—shall we rather say "the less the worth whileness of life"?

And so, what? Here Mr. Fischer comes to a stop, becomes negative. Britain should have gone to war for Czechoslovakia, although "indeed Czechoslovakia itself was divided."

Neville Chamberlain was a sincere pacifist on general religious and humanitarian grounds but chiefly because he feared the effects of war on the British social system . . . Chamberlain feared the death of his England in a war.

Should one negotiate with Hess? Or, since the people wants the Stalin-Communist system through Europe, with all the one-party hierarchy that this involves, is it not best that this should come? It will be Caesarism: Julius came as a proletarian hero. So were most of the tyrants. But this system will probably improve the material condition of the common man. Spiritual liberty is independent of régimes. Only civil liberty is sacrificed. Ability will have as compensation what the neo-Marxist Webbs called 'the vocation of leadership.' If the *lumpen-proletariat* prefers it so, why not be content to lead? There is a systole and diastole in history, when men turn from liberty to authority. Not by words about liberty, but only in the bitter experience of tyranny, will men be brought to recognition of

their follies and to understanding of what liberty means. Meanwhile, in the antithesis of this dialectic, 'leadership' may have effected some revolutionary class changes for the world's good. Or shall we take neither of these routes, but let the crazy Europeans murder each other, not by our ritual but in their own ways? Shall we first gather together our own spiritual strength, find our own souls before we instruct others, and associate with us those like-minded for peace and freedom against the idolization, as superhuman, of subhuman violence and the cult of passion?

However, in all these ultimates Mr. Fischer, brilliant journalist though he is, gives no guide unless it be: 'let us, ~~test~~ but fight by his side against Fascism.' The remorseless, 'either-or' of politics he has not considered. "The martyred masses of Europe," he writes, "are not likely to display any eagerness for a Soviet dictatorship in place of the Nazi dictatorship." But, although we shall agree with the principle, there seems to me more hope than cutting edge to the conclusion:

The idea of a new practicable internationalism for peace and of a more civilized and more representative democracy in Britain would have an explosive effect on the European Continent.

Mr. Fischer is an individualist caught in the toils. He has not yet completed his philosophy. Perhaps the wisest remark is at the beginning of the book. "No one wins a war. Who won the San Francisco earthquake?"

GEORGE CATLIN.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

MAY, 1942

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS IN INDIA

BY SIR FREDERICK WHYTE

THE Cripps Mission to India was the outstanding political event of the early Spring of 1942. It owed its significance to the evidence thus given of Britain's determination to leave no stone unturned in the endeavour to bring about a settlement both of the problem of India's part in the war and of the ultimate political destiny of the country. Sir Stafford himself was a good choice, none better; and the manner in which he discharged his difficult task showed that, if he could not succeed, no living man could hope to do so.

Now, it has been the fashion to speak of the failure of his Mission. In the strict sense of the visible result achieved, it is doubtless true to say that he did not succeed. None the less, it is neither fair to him nor in accordance with the facts, to describe his endeavour as barren. Not only did he at a moment of critical deadlock in Anglo-Indian relations, transport the whole problem into a new climate of opinion, but he laid the foundation of a genuine settlement. It is not strictly true to describe either the unaccepted Declaration of His Majesty's Government, or the substance of British policy which it represents, as a radical departure from the main line of British purpose in India. The main Declaration was in its intention and in its terms the natural heir of the policy adopted by the British Government in its original Declaration of 1917, and in most of the political developments which have taken place in India since that date. The candid observer studying British policy both in the form of official Declarations made from time to time, and in the actual Statutes passed by Parliament, cannot escape the conclusion that the Cripps Mission, while a welcome novelty in manner and in the person of its performer, was actually an accelerated movement in a process of political evolution.

In what sense then can the situation be described as new? The Cripps Mission has now made explicit what was sometimes openly declared, but more often implicit in the statements of the British Government from time to time. But, more

OLD

pertinent and fertile than any exposition of policy is the fact that Sir Stafford himself created a new atmosphere. Since atmosphere and feeling are always more important than proposals and institutions (and nowhere is this truer than in India) it may be said that the chief novelty in Sir Stafford's achievement lies in the clearing of the skies and to some extent in the clearing of the ground as well. He has made plain, what was already known to those who have followed closely the course of British Indian policy in the past generation, that the real obstacle to further progress did not lie in the reluctance of the Government and people of Great Britain to recognize the political rights of India, but that it lay in conditions which are inherent in the Indian problem itself. It might almost be said that the result of his Mission has been to make the problem henceforth less one of Anglo-Indian controversy and more one which can only find its solution within the bounds of the Indian peninsula.

Let us look at the diary of events which led to the Cripps Mission. The war caught India in the middle of a difficult passage of Constitutional development. It provoked an old issue in a new and critical form. In law, India was at war when Britain was at war; and therefore constitutionally speaking no issue would arise. The enemy was at war with India and India was at war with the enemy; and from these inexorable facts there was no escape. None the less, much more could have been done, and should have been done, to give India the opportunity of going to war by a Constitutional act of her own, performed by and with the authority of her existing representatives. It would have been both feasible, tactical and wise to have provided the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State with an opportunity to declare by resolution the hostility of India to the Axis, the determination of peoples of India to cast in their lot with the Allies, and in the customary words of a Resolution by either House of the Indian Legislature, to "recommend to the Governor-General in Council that he do inform His Majesty of the purposes and desires of India thus expressed." Such action not having been taken, India, unlike the Dominions, automatically followed the United Kingdom into the war. Ordinances were passed giving wide powers to the Government of India over the Provincial Governments. These steps were taken without discussion in either the Central or the Provincial Legislatures as the Viceroy had sole power over Defence and Foreign

Affairs. On September 11, 1939, the Viceroy announced the suspension of the Act of 1935 owing to the war. The Congress Party were opposed to taking part in any war, save by the consent of the Indian people, and in August their members withdrew from the Assembly as a protest against the sending of Indian troops out of the country without the consent of the Legislature. On September 15 the Congress Working Committee issued a Manifesto protesting against India being declared a belligerent without her consent, and demanding the right of the Indian people to frame their own Constitution through a Constituent Assembly. On September 18 the Moslem League passed a resolution welcoming the suspension of the Federal part of the 1935 Act because its operation in the Provinces had resulted in the domination of Hindus over Moslems. On October 17 the Viceroy issued a White Paper giving the promise of ultimate Dominion Status for India and conveying the British Government's undertaking to consult with representative Indians at the end of the war with a view to modifying the 1935 Act. For the interim period the Government intended to set up a consultative group for "the association of public interest with the conduct of the war." As a protest against the shortcomings of the statement, the Congress Ministries resigned, while the Moslem League stressed the need for radical revision of the 1935 Act, in a sense congenial to the Moslem demand.

On January 10, 1940, the Viceroy again declared that "full Dominion Status in accordance with the Statute of Westminster" was the goal of British policy. To which the Congress Party riposted in March with the demand for nothing short of complete independence and the Moslem League by adopting the Pakistan Scheme. On March 12 the Chamber of Princes passed a resolution welcoming the promise of Dominion Status, but demanding the protection of their rights arising from any treaties, and safeguards for the autonomy of their States. On July 7 the Congress Working Committee again demanded complete independence and the establishment of a provisional National Government at the Centre. The Viceroy's "August Proposals" (August 8) invited representative Indians to serve on his Executive Council and proposed the establishment of a War Advisory Council, but both the Congress Party and Moslem League refused co-operation and a campaign of limited civil disobedience began.

On March 14, 1941, a Liberal Conference under Sir Tej

Bahadur Sapru submitted proposals for the immediate reconstruction of the Viceroy's Council to consist entirely of non-official Indians, and the transfer of the portfolios of Defence and Finance to Indians, and for an explicit declaration by the British Government of Dominion Status at the end of the war. In July the Viceroy created *three* new portfolios of Civil Defence, Information and Indians Overseas; and appointed *five* non-official, non-Party Indians to his Council. A War Advisory Council, including representatives from the Indian States but none from the Congress or Moslem Parties, was also set up. But these changes did not touch the heart of the situation; and on December 5 a direct appeal was cabled to Mr. Churchill (in Washington) from the Moderates urging him to act on their proposals of March, in view of "the gravity of the international situation."

So ended 1941. It was clear to all observers that a real deadlock had been reached. And while it might appear that the War Cabinet could release themselves from its grip by action designed to prove the *bona fides* of British policy in the sense of making the structure of the Government of India conform to the political demands of the Congress Party, such action would only resolve one deadlock by creating another, in the shape of the failure of the Congress Party and the Moslem League to accept a common solution.

At the same time a new element of mistrust entered the situation when the Atlantic Charter was described as "not applying to India." This statement was made, in perfect good faith, but without due regard to its reception by Indian Nationalists. It was made to seem as if the Charter were a boon denied to India, whereas it was evident that the Charter itself, except in the most general terms, did not declare its own application; nor was it primarily, if at all, designed to affect the circumstances of the United Nations including India. Doubt, if any legitimately arose, was due to the form of the Third of the Eight Points which declared that

the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom deem it right to make known that they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live

The right seemed to be addressed to India; but the phrase immediately following:

and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them

should have shown that the *whole* of the *Third Point* was conceived as part of a manifesto addressed to the victims of Axis aggression, and to no one else. None the less, India seized upon the words "the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live" as a new opening for a re-iterated demand; and it is probable that the Indian reaction to the interpretation of *Point Three* played some part in the decision to send Sir Stafford Cripps to India.

On March 11 Mr. Churchill told the House of Commons that Sir Stafford would fly to India forthwith bearing with him a draft Declaration by H.M. Government.

Now, we are still too near those eventful days in Delhi a month ago to be able to give a reliable account of what passed between the actors on the stage.* It is clear, however, from the Congress President's final letter to Sir Stafford Cripps (as also from the press reports of statements by Pandit Nehru and Mr. Rajagopalachariar) that there was doubt as to the essential point on which the breakdown occurred. No useful purpose is served by an attempt to apportion responsibility, especially since Sir Stafford has himself accepted it. This is an act of characteristic courage and generosity, but also a shrewd and wise one. Before this article appears in print, the public will know more, both from his lips and probably from a debate in Parliament; and until further light is thus thrown on the screen of moving events, comment must remain discreet and incomplete.

There are, however, three aspects of the Cripps Mission which stand out. The first is the reception of the Declaration itself, in which remarkably little was said about the essential manner in which His Majesty's Government proposed to meet the Indian demand after the war. This has created considerable surprise but it was due to the fact that, in the existing atmosphere of doubt about the *bona fides* of Great Britain, Indian nationalism attached greater importance to immediate action by which India would take her full part in the war, and by which the good faith of ultimate British intentions would be proved. The demand for immediate action apparently took the form of a proposal to appoint an entirely Indian Nationalist Ministry at the Centre—but how chosen, or how much responsible to the existing Legislature, is not clear. *Ex*

* For convenient reference the reader will find in the *Bulletin of International News*, Vol. XIX, Nos. 7 and 8, April 4 and 17, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 10, St. James's Square, S.W.1., the full version of the "Declaration" with a useful chronology.

hypothesi, a Ministry of this character would have no basis in law or constitution; for the demand was one which ignored the fact that the existing authority of Government in India rests on British law. The only way whereby this authority could be changed or transferred is by a new Act of Parliament. In form, such an Act would be a measure like any other; but in fact it would be an enterprise of such magnitude, in preparation, in discussion and in the process of passing it through all its stages in Parliament, that it could not be undertaken in time of war. It was this compelling reason that set the limits to immediate action, on the one side, under the Government's Declaration of March 29. The limits on the other were set by the Hindu-Moslem division which was sharply brought before the public once more in two cabled messages received by Mr. Churchill on March 8. The first, from the Hindu Mahasabha, demanded "a Proclamation of the Independence of India with co-partnership equal with Britain in an Indo-British Commonwealth." In the second, with equal emphasis, the President of the Moslem League urged the Prime Minister not to be "stampeded into a constitutional scheme" which would prejudice the Moslem demand for all that was expressed in the name Pakistan. Here the vicious circle was complete once more; and it remains to be seen whether on second and more mature thoughts, the various contending parties in Indian politics will realize that the Cripps Mission offered them a unique opportunity of new service both in war and in peace.

The second aspect of the Cripps Mission is to be seen in the comment upon it in the press of the entire civilized world (the civilized world not here including publications of the Axis Powers!), and especially in the United States of America. American opinion has always displayed active sympathy with Nationalist India; and, at every turn in recent constitutional controversy between Britain and India, the main volume of American press and platform comment has been at once critical of British caution and more than friendly to Indian desires. It seems almost as if the Cripps Mission had suddenly revealed to the American public the intricate internal complications of the problem of Nationalism in India and to have shown them that, compared with China, India presents a much more difficult task of fulfilment than any other in Asia. If India still hesitates to accept the good faith of Britain in India, it is hardly too much to say that the people of the United States are at last convinced.

The third aspect of the Mission is Sir Stafford himself. Though he is of sanguine temper, he cannot have supposed that his task in India would be simple. He did not, indeed, embark on it as a forlorn hope, but he knew from the onset that the tangible material was intractable and the intangible factors inharmonious. But he had countervailing elements to rely on. The visit of Chiang Kai-Shek brought the characteristic Chinese realism to bear on the Government of India and the Nationalists alike. The sound of Japanese bombs in Ceylon and Madras must also have had their effect. And his own personality and reputation were the best possible advance agents preparing the way for his arrival. These influences would surely have helped him to carry the day if there had been any real disposition in all parties to approach the problem in hand free from the freezing effect of past commitments, feuds and preconceptions. It was the dead hand of an evil inheritance from days gone by that strangled Sir Stafford's hopes. Yet he, being a man whose eyes and mind are set on the future could, even in the moment of defeat, speak of the immediate task ahead of India as not devoid of hope. He has indeed declared that the position now reverts to it *status quo ante*, meaning that the Declaration, which he was authorized to make, could not now be made; and that the structure of the Indian Government remains as it was before. In constitutional law and in administrative fact, that is true. But the situation of all the parties under that law is changed and cannot ever be the same again. To that change, even in the moment when he says "As you were!", Sir Stafford Cripps is living witness.

No British Government, of whatever colour, will ever go back upon the "Declaration" which, once made, carried the policy of Britain in India one long step nearer to its ultimate goal. Mr. Churchill's Government, or their successors, may have to retrace their present steps in order to find some other way to reach the appointed destination; but the main purpose will not be relinquished, nor the goal lost to sight. In that conviction, common to all or nearly all in the United Kingdom, I look for the next step, not in Britain, but in India. It is difficult to believe, though in truth nothing in politics is incredible, that India (if I dare speak of her as one person) will fail to see her opportunity to-day. What we have heard so far is not, it cannot be, India's last word.

CANADA—

Her contribution to the British Commonwealth and the American Continent.

BY ROSITA FORBES

CANADA is half of a continent as well as a nation. She has to cope with all the problems which are inevitable in a land of different races, creeds, traditions and historical backgrounds. There is no *one* Canada by whose example the whole sovereign state can be judged. Many and diverse peoples have created and are still vigorously contributing to her greatness. It is casually supposed that the Dominion which should be able to interpret Europe to U.S.A. and Washington to London, is divided into French speaking and English speaking citizens, each influenced by the land of their original stock. But there are large districts, especially in the Middle West where the average farmer or villager talks Polish or Ukrainian. There are also considerable numbers of Russians, Central Europeans, Scandinavians and in Vancouver, Japanese.

Many a factory to-day gives the impression of a League of Nations in miniature. The workers, whether men or girls, include types of every European race. I talked with Dutch and Germans, with Scots, Syrians, Norsemen and Slavs who considered Canada their own country. Their children were already Canadians. But some of the habits and ideas to which for centuries their peoples had been accustomed, endured with religion and language and at times with music, cooking or folk-lore.

Quebec Province is the citadel of the French-speaking Canadians, but there are many thousands of them further West. The greater part of Quebec Province speaks French, rigorously adheres to the Catholic religion, is dominated by its priests and to a lesser extent by its own local politicians, prides itself on villages and institutions solidly established for 300 years, but is—in fact—more sympathetic to modern Britain than to modern France.

The French-speaking Canadians represent more than a third of the Dominion's total population. With their enormous birthrate it is probable that within our own generation, certainly within the next, they will outnumber not only the British, but the sum total of all the other races in Canada. Therefore it is exceedingly important to understand their point of view. As a minority, they are the best and most tolerantly treated in the world. In Quebec Province, citadel of their ancient culture, of their earliest colonizing traditions and of their Faith, they have their own churches, schools and language, their newspapers and their provincial law.

Montreal is, to a great extent, the capital of French culture in all the Americas. In this decorative and interesting city there is a brilliantly sophisticated French civilization centring on the Universities, but dominated by a France which does not exist to-day. The free-thinking Republic has no part in the jealously guarded ambitions, traditions and purposes which make up the political and cultural form that is now French-speaking Canada. "We would like to be a completely independent nation with the same King and Queen as you have," is an occasional remark in Montreal or Quebec.

The broad international point of view is rarely expressed in French Quebec. As in the case of all minorities, however powerful, the local struggle for rights and privileges is apt to dominate the average mind to the exclusion of the most vital world problems on which the very existence of Canada may depend. Once anything has become a political issue, it ceases to be a matter of common sense. French-speaking Canada is as patriotic as any other part of the Dominion. There is no sacrifice that townsman or backwoodsman would not make to defend the land their ancestors discovered and on which their mark is so profound, but Canada to them is a separate entity which they find difficult to consider in relation to the rest of the world.

This is the explanation of the prolonged resistance to compulsory training for service abroad. First of all, it has become, in the minds of the general public, a political question. Secondly, it is only the active minded newspaper reading public of the towns and the railway-belt who can be expected to regard Singapore or Madagascar as in any way connected with Canadian security. Thirdly, if French-speaking Canada is to participate whole-heartedly in any form of compulsory training she must be assured of her own regiments and recruiting

officers. She must run her own publicity campaign. Her Church must approve and her own local politicians give a lead.

There is no impossibility about any of these things. Canadian priests have blessed this war as a Crusade. Many a French-speaking family has every able-bodied man in the Forces. It is only necessary to convince the ordinary people who, because of their own complicated local and political interests are averse to an international outlook, that Canada's defence is not limited to her own frontiers.

Meanwhile the Dominion has proved herself an invaluable ally. A young country faced by every problem, racial and material, she has taken up the Nazi challenge on four fronts. For while increasing her production of food and raw materials, she has put about one-fifth of her total population into war-industry and multiplied her fighting strength more than thirty-fold. Her population is approximately 11½ million against the United States' 130 million. Her fiscal income was estimated last year at 6,000 million dollars against America's 90,000 million. Yet she has 350,000 men in the active armed forces, which in terms of her great neighbour's population would mean nearly 4 million. In the first two years of the war, she spent over 2 billion dollars including financial aid to Britain, which would mean something like 32 billion in the ratio of U.S.A. fiscal income.

Canada, as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations was free to declare war on the side of Britain, France and Poland, or to remain neutral with the United States and the other American democracies. Disregarding her continental, geographical and to a considerable extent her commercial necessities, she threw in her lot with the pioneers in this cosmic struggle for freedom. Mr. Mackenzie King justly stated the objectives of his sovereign country when he said on June 17, 1941, "our people went to war for the sake of Canada, but not for Canada alone. We went to war as well for the sake of Britain, for North American civilization . . . and for the sake of that humanity which is above all nations."

By his reference to the continent of North America, the Prime Minister showed prophetic consciousness of its indivisibility. For as India—whatever her future relationship to Britain—must be conscious of her Asian responsibilities, so Canada is aware of a dual destiny, linked with our Commonwealth and with the American continent. Logically, she is a part of the new world which should provide the pattern for

succeeding centuries. By blood she is British or French, Polish or Ukrainian. By nature and spirit, she is one thing only—Canadian. But her methods and range of business are American. So is her rapid, practical growth and the whole of her domestic and social life. She accepts American standards of production. The tempo of her living is no different from that on the other side of a frontier which may pass through the middle of a village street. Architecture, expenditure, habits or travel and entertainment, family budgets, wages, clothing and therefore appearance, possessions, household and commercial time-tables are duplicated in the two North American democracies. There is vastly greater wealth in U.S.A. but the pattern of life is the same. Consequently, apart from her geographical position which inevitably links her defence with that of the States, Canada has responsibilities to America as well as to the British Commonwealth. To both, she is essential. In both, she is obliged to play a leading part.

Neither Canada nor U.S.A. can remain unaffected if Russia proves to be the dominating factor in freeing Europe from Nazi-ism and becomes the model for a reconstructed continent. Already in the huge Manning Depôts where, between Atlantic and Pacific, youth of every race is being trained for the Air Force, there is continuous discussion of the new place and the new power to which the Soviet Republics will be entitled. After the air and the war, the most vital subject in the minds of tens of thousands—the young men who as pilots, observers and gunners come to us from Canada in an unending stream—is whether Russian successes to-day justify the last twenty-five years of Soviet policy. Admiration and interest are equally blended and the conviction is constantly expressed that "there must be a whole lot of good in a system which can put up such a fight in its own defence."

Before the war, Communism in Canada was theoretical among the intellectuals, and on occasions a bargaining counter among workers intent on higher wages. It is still far removed from a practical ideal because the whole of North America is accustomed to personal initiative and to a standard of living unknown in Russia. Individualism and mechanization are satisfactory in double harness. So there is no place at present for the harsh discipline and sacrifices necessary to the Soviet experiment. But if Europe is to owe her freedom and the model of her future existence to Moscow, North America must surely be the final test of democracy. Thus Canada becomes

as vitally important to the world as to the British Commonwealth.

By her position, she is the natural link between the English-speaking nations of Pacific and Atlantic, as well as the shortest air-road from the States—across the Pole—to Europe. In view of such 'sky-conversion' which means that, when problems of frost, moisture and de-icing are solved, the Arctic airways will be busier than the sea-routes of the last decades, Canada becomes the natural highway to China and Russia, countries which must play at least a major part in the destinies of Asia and Europe. Already the new air-way from Edmonton to the Yukon and Alaska is known familiarly as the "bomber road" to Vladivostok and—possibly—to Chungking. This is one of the Dominion's greatest achievements, for it shortens the distance between Chicago and Shanghai by 3,000 miles. If Hitler drives further East into the Caucasus and Japan invades India for the purpose of effecting a junction of the Axis forces, the threat to the whole N. American continent will be emphasized and also located. For in the extreme North West, the frontiers of Siberia and Alaska are only separated by a stretch of water scarce twice the width of the English Channel. Fortunately neither Canada nor the U.S.A. have been blind to this danger. Washington has spent fifty million dollars on a colossal air-base with an elaborate system equally suited to defence or offence at Fairbanks in Alaska. Canada has made a series of well-equipped aerodromes across Alberta and British Columbia so that, were the rugged coasts of N.E. Pacific threatened by Japan, within a matter of hours, a considerable striking force could be transported along the 'trail of 42,' the North West Passage of the future.

This 2,000 mile airway is likely to prove as historic as the Burma road. Already heavy transport 'planes are carrying troops and material along it to Alaska. In slightly more than five hours, the U.S.A. can now move a squadron of fighter 'planes from the Canadian border to what at any time may be a battle-front in the neighbourhood of Fairbanks. It takes eight days to send troops to Alaska by sea from the American port of Seattle, but eight hours' flying time suffices.

The inland route, East of the coastal range, was specially chosen by Canadian experts to avoid the heavy fogs which often blanket the Northern Pacific seaboard. It follows the 'Great Circle,' shortest route through the sub-Arctic to Asia

and passes over clear-weather country where both climate and altitudes are comparatively moderate. The Air Services' branch of Ottawa's Department of Transport had long foreseen the importance of such a route and had made surveys for airport sites in 1939. But the men who tackled the job a year later in mid-winter, with three feet of snow on the ground and the temperature thirty below zero, were the hard-bitten, tobacco-chewing bush-whackers who had already harnessed the rivers and broken the forests of the bitter North West on a score of mineral raids. The plans called for main aerodromes at Grand Prairie, Forts St. John and Nelson, Watson Lake and White Horse in the Yukon. The first two and the last were near enough to railways to eliminate the worst transport problems. But Fort Nelson was 300 miles North of anything and Watson Lake was a pinpoint on the map in the middle of wilderness and muskeg bogs.

Tractor train No. 1 started from Dawson Creek and the final edge of civilization on February 9, 1940. The first section consisted of a "bulldozer" or battering ram for hewing down trees and cutting the tops off hillocks, with a caterpillar engine hauling several cabooses, which are wooden huts on sleighs, and two bunk houses for the crew of twenty-eight. The second section comprised a blacksmith's shop and five sleigh-loads of heavy materials. Mile by mile the tractor train cut, pushed and flattened its way into the bush. Sometimes it achieved ten miles in twenty-four hours, more often only three or four. At the end of a week working without pause it had covered over thirty miles.

Then Spring began to break. It was much too early, but ice thawed and the heavy tractors crashed through into swamp and had to be hauled out again. It took nearly two months for the first party to reach Fort Nelson. They had seen nothing living but wolves.

The Summer campaign necessitated floating reinforcements and equipment from the port of Wrangel in Alaska down the Stikine and Dease rivers. This meant 350 miles by rocky waterway with seventy-five miles of portage through solid bush. As soon as ice broke on the rivers barges were loaded with trucks, tractors, grading-machinery and two saw-mills with their equipment. At times the crews had to wade in the still freezing water and dig out rocks to widen or deepen the bed. But everybody and everything reached Telegraph Creek safely and a shipyard was set up at the other end of the portage

where—on Dease Lake—power-boats and larger barges were built for the next river stage. Then came a final haul through forest, breaking a road with the tractors that had journeyed in sections from Wrangel and were put together on the spot. So, 400 miles from the coast, some of Canada's toughest pioneers, making history instead of the fortunes of the gold-rush, reached Watson Lake and erected their sawmills. With the bush timber they built their houses and boats. Their spare stores they cached on high platforms to keep them from grizzlies while they prospected. Then the airport was planned and created by men living in complete isolation. To-day there are five modern airports with 4,000 feet runways, radio and weather stations, beam apparatus and lighting facilities for night-flying in all weathers over country hitherto unseen by anything but eagles. The States' huge Flying Fortresses on their way North to Alaska—perhaps North West to Vladivostok, Russia's strongly fortified naval and air base on the Pacific—use the re-fuelling facilities of White Horse. Once a trappers' and trading post, this small, alert town is growing as quickly as any wartime camp. It is one of the busiest places in the North, with a swallow population speaking most languages, bound for the most startling destinations. For White Horse is the key to the whole Northern airway system linking two continents and a dozen potential fronts.

Canada, too, has turned many hundred acres of plough and pasture-land into the most modern buildings of concrete, steel and glass. She started production before the roofs went on, and covered an army of machines at night with tar-paper and sacking. She experimented with men who dreamed new tools and made them as if on another day of Genesis. She called upon all her craftsmen, and in three months instead of three years gave them some idea of how to make guns and tanks which they themselves had previously never seen! It was a struggle of enthusiasm and determination against inexperience. And the old-timers of to-day responsible for 'shops' or foundries an eighth of a mile long with perhaps 3,000 of the most modern American machines engaged in straight line production, were the victors of those first battles to *invent* the necessary material.

Within the last few months I visited enormous plants making rifles, shells, boilers for fighting ships, trench and smoke mortars, parts for every kind of weapon and army vehicle, which prided themselves on machines that had not stopped

for a consecutive hour since production began. I saw dock-yards built on reclaimed land by river or great lake, with a dozen or a score of war-ships on the slips, which had been waste ground in the Summer of '39.

I found about 50 to 60 per cent. of the total workers in light industry were women. They came from offices, shops and domestic service and they spoke of having "stopped worked when war began and taken on a job." I was told that it took six weeks to make the average Canadian girl "tool-minded" and that when she had learned her particular machine she stuck to it and was "better than a man at repetitive routine stuff for she had more patience and could endure more monotony." Inspection of separate parts and of finished weapons or munitions is done largely by girls who have graduated in science from the Universities.

Except for the office staffs, I saw no women employed in heavy industry or in shipyards and on the whole I imagine their factory infiltration is not yet on such a large or general scale as in Britain. But it was officially announced early last winter that another 200,000 women would shortly be taken into war industry to release men for even more "active service."

The industrial front in Canada is already a vital advance post so far as the Allied Fighting Forces are concerned. For continuous shifts are working night and day. Some of them last ten hours with men and women giving voluntary "catch-up" service during their "lunch-periods" when very often they can be seen standing beside their gigantic hydraulic or mechanical presses still in action, with a sandwich in one hand and a bottle of milk in the other.

At this moment Canada is spending on armaments and transport five times as much per day as in 1914 to 1918. In the last war the mechanical transport of an infantry division consisted of 153 vehicles. To-day it comprises 3,500 motor vehicles of 160 different types. The cost plus upkeep of this armament under battle conditions for one year is twelve million Canadian dollars as against the two million necessary in the last war when 4,400 horses supplied the major part of an infantry division's transport.

More than 150,000 army vehicles have already been delivered from Canadian factories and are in service, the larger proportion overseas. It is calculated that the premier Dominion is producing one automative unit every three minutes day and

night. Among the most important is the universal carrier, in essence a baby tank which travels up to forty-five miles an hour on caterpillar tracks, manoeuvres easily on almost any ground and is equipped with machine guns. One Canadian plant alone produces enough of these carriers every day to equip a battalion and in a fortnight sufficient for an infantry division. Between Atlantic and Pacific, the Dominion is making fourteen different types of gun, heavy and light tanks which are already in action on several fronts, shells and other munitions in astronomical figures: She is building corvettes, mine-sweepers and freighters, twelve different kinds of bombers, fighters, transport and training 'planes, using on the latter her own spruce and birch, a good deal of her own steel and incidentally her own glue made from milk. She is turning out every form of equipment from gauges and optical instruments to flare parachutes and gas decontamination suits or to marine smoke floats and anti-submarine gear. While doing this with no lessening of effort in field and forest, on which we largely depend for food and timber now that our European sources are closed, she is patrolling two seaboards prodigiously indented and stretching to the Arctic. Up till last November Canadian sailors had shared with British the task of convoying 40 million tons across the Atlantic. Since then the Dominion's work has been doubled by Germany's systematic attack on lone ships in North American waters. The result has been a waiting-list of five thousand for the Dominion Navy, Coastal Command patrols co-operating with U.S.A., and the establishment of an effective 'shipwreck pool' near the busiest port on the Atlantic seaboard to which all the survivors of Axis torpedoings in Canadian waters are taken. The reports of these men from every part of the Commonwealth and the Empire, from Scandinavia, the Balkans, the Low Countries, the Middle East and South America, from every land which still ventures on the sea under the flags of freedom, are systematically collected and compared. The information thus collated is sent to Naval H.Q. and it has proved the value of the quick, collective analysis by which it was induced.

So Canada fights and works, fulfilling her part of the allied programme from which she has never been deflected. So is she preparing to play an equally important part in the reconstruction of a world which may be regional and federal rather than nationally isolationist.

POST-WAR TRADE AND BRITISH EXPORTS

By JOSEPH A. KRONSTEN

FROM the many schemes for post-war world trade some guiding principles seem to emerge. Those most widely advocated demand large economic units with free economic intercourse within their frontiers, an internationally planned distribution of staple goods, stabilized currencies and, above all, a wholesale abolition of trade restrictions whatever their nature and purpose.

One notion of the several popularized by Dr. Schacht will presumably survive, *Grossraumwirtschaft*, the economy of large territorial units. There is little doubt that post-war trade will mainly be between large economic units such as Great Britain and the Empire, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China: and, too, the European and Latin-American continents may be organized as a small number of federal, confederated or economically interlinked states.

On the other hand it is hardly likely that these large new units should be able at a stroke to introduce unrestricted trade within their respective boundaries. Even in a comparatively homogeneous area like South America there are differences between the countries sufficient to prevent an immediate and indiscriminate unification of their economic systems. This is even more true of Europe where the issue will be additionally complicated by political considerations and the programme of reconstruction. Can the U.S.A., where inter-state trade discrimination still persists in the guise of public health and security regulations, be quoted as an example for a territory like Eastern Europe, where for instance, the average 1937 pig-iron consumption per head of population, amounted to 1.8 lbs. in Bulgaria as against 239.0 lbs. in Czechoslovakia? It appears therefore that the abolition of tariffs "in one lightning stroke," recently advocated by Mr. Oswald Dutch in his *Economic Peace Aims*, whether between the large economic units of the future or within their respective frontiers, would in many cases be practicable only if a rigid system of quotas were enforced instead.

With the question of tariffs and quotas we embark upon the key problem of post-war trade, namely, whether the inevitable systems of restrictions should have a commercial or a financial basis. In other words, it still remains for us to decide whether there ought to be a free flow of goods within a system of rigidly interlinked national currencies or a system of free and independent currencies at the cost of severely enforced quotas. We have to sacrifice either freedom of trade to freedom of exchange or *vice versa*: the former solution is mainly favoured by financial circles and the latter by merchants and some manufacturers.

The "free exchange versus free goods" controversy is in fact a three-cornered issue, since many advocate a common currency within each of the large economic units at least. But radical cultural and political changes will have to precede international collaboration close enough to produce common monetary standards: until they are adopted multilateral clearing arrangements are perhaps the best temporary device for regulating inter-state trade within each of the large units. The working scheme suggested years ago by Professor Milhaud and the London Chamber of Commerce might no doubt be brought to light again for this purpose.

The post-war distribution of commodities still appears a gigantic jig-saw puzzle: but it is possible to foreshadow some extensive, internationally administered or at least internationally advised scheme for dealing with it. It may be assumed that existing or temporarily dissolved cartels will be used as instruments of a planned world trade system. But it is unjustifiable optimism to anticipate idyllic international Round Table committees of producers and consumers with statistical surveys of consumption and stocks as the panacea for mismanagement and extortion. Collaboration with consumers' representatives such as that practised by the International Sugar Council and the International Rubber Regulation Committee is, as yet, rather exceptional. It is doubtful therefore whether an all round international cartel system could be enforced without much state or inter-state interference at the beginning and a large measure of permanent control.

While, as Mr. Lyttelton cautiously put it some time ago, "import control may have to be maintained for some years after the war," much of the trade in the first two post-war years will fall into the Relief Programme class, already comprehensively planned by the Inter-Allied Committee under Sir

Frederick Leith-Ross. The development of the war may still greatly widen the scope of the Relief schemes: they should however prove insignificant in comparison with the rapidly growing flow of normal, that is, "remunerative" trade, provided that sound economic measures are universally adopted.

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The first unknown factor is the qualitative and quantitative contents of post-war international trade. Since the war started almost all countries have had to embark upon new ventures in mining, industry and agriculture or considerably enlarge their existing ones, the belligerents in order to increase their war potential and the neutrals to make up for the loss of their customary sources of supply. In both cases it would be ridiculous to expect a return to the *status quo*. Just as the last war left England an economic legacy of the dye-stuffs and sugar-beet industries, a number of others lately developed here and elsewhere have definitely come to stay.

The Dutch diamond, the Viennese leather and the Paris fashion trades recently established in England can be regarded as representative of the many refugee enterprises which so vividly remind us of the Huguenot factories that sprang up in this country and others as a sequel to another great persecution. History shows also that refugee industries seldom leave their country of adoption and there is no reason to expect an exception to this rule.

The problem of re-converting the tens of thousands of war-factories in this country and the U.S.A. and throughout Europe will also affect considerably the range of post-war international trade. In many cases the switch-over will have a direct effect on the import requirements of particular countries, in others it will be felt indirectly: there should be for example a colossal expansion of air transport on account of the change from military to civil aircraft production. Similar though less conspicuous changes are bound to affect agricultural production. Millions of reclaimed acres will remain under crops for good. Afforestation can absorb only a fraction of the surplus land, and to turn it back into marshes would be as foolish as difficult. Thus both the qualitative and quantitative features of world trade are likely to show considerable and permanent changes.

It is far too early to predict the actual ways and means of carrying out the Relief Programme mentioned. We do not even know if the countries now occupied will obtain direct

supplies or credits to effect purchases themselves, and whether the commercial side of these deals will be negotiated by their respective governments or left to appropriate business agents. In any case, the more comprehensive the schemes for bringing relief to Europe, the greater the chance of getting the Continent back to normal. This time however raw materials and industrial equipment will be of no less importance than food and clothing: and saving the Continent from its economic paralysis means business, not charity. For, as Professor J. M. Keynes stressed so clearly in his *Economic Consequences of Peace*, "there must be imports before there can be exports."

In the earlier stages of post-war economy we shall probably see a considerable amount of barter trade, transacted or sponsored by particular states. War conditions have of course encouraged barter transactions on both belligerent sides and among the neutrals. The U.K.—U.S.A. pioneer rubber-cotton deal has been followed recently by the U.K.—U.S.S.R. diamond-platinum transaction, and the pitiful trade between neutral and subjugated European countries is being conducted to-day mostly by means of barter agreements.

Should no satisfactory solution of the world's monetary problems be reached in time, barter may prove the most practical way out, at least in regard to foodstuffs and other staple commodities. This will tend to handicap private enterprise in view of the difficulties of financing, storing and transporting the large quantities of goods exchanged. Organizations like the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and the U.S.A. Export-Import Bank seem predestined agents for such deals.

Here again we are touching the crux of the whole problem: who is actually to run the entire complex machinery of international trade, or, let us say, of the world trade in foodstuffs, raw-materials, semi-manufactured goods, means of transport and heavy machinery? Should we live to see a universal adoption of industrial and, probably, agricultural output quotas, the schemes in question ought simultaneously to provide export markets to absorb the surpluses expected. The agent to handle these exports would be either the manufacturer himself, an industrial organization such as an export group or a trade association or some kind of state agency.

International groups of producers and distributors of every important class of merchandise might well manage to gain control of planning and management of the various sections

of trade. But in order to operate efficiently there would have to be either a compulsory enrolment of members or a ruthless discrimination against outsiders, and an internal struggle for power and profits would be unavoidable. Therefore, except in the case of groups particularly favoured by trade conditions there would most likely arise a *bellum omnium contra omnes*, strikingly similar to pre-war conditions.

The first period of post-war trade should be a genuine boom in which the clash of interests would not be obvious. However once the consuming markets had satisfied their long-accumulated requirements and laid in extensive stocks for fear of shortage a new crisis might arise unless internationally organized precautions were taken in time.

The Committee for Political and Economic Planning has recently advocated the adoption of a differential system of commodity prices depending on the purchasing power of poor, undeveloped or war-stricken countries. Thus, with a fuller share in world trade, they could gradually afford to pay normal prices for their import requirements as their economic recovery or development proceeded.

While state intervention in the field of trade *sensu stricto* may be accepted because of its temporary or limited character, it is likely to prove most expedient in regard to the international transport and storage systems. The re-mobilization of world transport, the delivery and distribution of relief and other bulky supplies, the setting up of regional commodity stocks, the improvement of the existing system of general and special storage, are all tasks that will call for state or inter-state financing and control. It may even be asserted that state control, though not exactly state ownership, of the transport and storage system to be re-organized or modernized after the war would prove the best means of state supervision of international trade.

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This country's position in the post-war era will unfortunately not be an easy one. To prove that no illusions are cherished in responsible quarters, let us quote both the promise of the President of the Board of Trade that "everything will be done to preserve our post-war trade" and the warning uttered by the President of the Federation of British Industries that "export trade once lost is extremely difficult to regain."

Britain's industry, with more than 300 branches of production concentrated already on supplying war needs, cannot be expected to readjust itself quickly to economic conditions of peace as different, maybe, from those of 1938 as from these of 1942. Moreover, a considerable number of shippers, export merchants and agents have had to quit business with the loss of most of their overseas markets and with their normal wares no longer available for export. In spite of the undoubted advantage of amalgamating smaller export interests, the amount of goodwill and direct commercial contact lost as a result of war conditions is obvious enough.

Another serious feature is the inevitable shrinking of Britain's overseas investments, which not only constituted one of the pillars of her balance of payments but also attracted British goods to many countries. Similarly British shipping is likely to find itself at the end of the war with its carrying capacity diminished, both in terms of actual tonnage and through conversion for war purposes, need of repair and reconditioning and so on. The unfavourable effects of the war on British banking and insurance are bound further to weaken the tissues of Britain's balance of payments, whilst an immeasurable amount of damage has already been inflicted on the United Kingdom as the *entrepôt* of world trade.

On the other hand, all the Dominions have considerably strengthened the basis of their future economic expansion. Chains of new industries have sprung up in the Dominions, most of them with guarantees of post-war development bestowed upon them in their very cradles. In view of the industrialization of the Dominions, now in full swing, they may be expected to dispense in future with a great many imported goods regularly featured in their pre-war import trade returns. The same applies to India, Palestine, Egypt, etc.

The economic system of the U.S.A. will probably be less affected than that of this country: the future alone can show too whether New York is a mere "reception area" for the intermediary trade and finance evacuated from London or whether this transplantation is designed for longer than the duration. Whatever the case may be, we have to face the *fait accompli* of inter-American economic collaboration, resulting in the entrenchment of U.S.A. exporters in South and Central America. The process of industrialization will also have altered the character of Latin-American markets and a growing proportion of their requirements is bound to be supplied

within the South American trade system. China, of course, must in due time become one of the world's most important economic units: it will take the place of Japan who with the loss of her Asiatic possessions will gradually sink into a mere dependency of the Far Eastern economic system.

The thoroughness with which Russia sacrifices both her population and her wealth for the sake of a common victory is bound, unfortunately, to handicap her post-war trade. The deterioration of her agricultural, mining and industrial output and of her transport and power systems as a result of the destruction already wrought may make Russia a liability rather than an asset to the world economy for several years. But should she receive all the assistance required, Russia may, perhaps, prove less reluctant than before to collaborate genuinely with the outside world. How this would widen the range of international trade can best be illustrated by comparing the value of foreign trade per head of the population (1937-8 average) amounting to 1.32 U.S. dollars in the U.S.S.R. as against 85.50 U.S. dollars in England.

Germany on the other hand will have to undergo a painful process of re-adapting her industry to peace-time conditions: this might however be greatly facilitated should the final phase of the war take place on German soil and be followed by an intermediate period of semi-anarchy. It would of course be necessary for her to return to the rightful owners all the industrial plant, machinery, means of transport and storage, etc. looted on the Continent. Military guarantees imposed on Germany together with the psychological reluctance of her present victims to avail themselves of her commercial services might cut out the bulk of Germany's *entrepôt* trade. This should have a beneficial effect on European trade since instead of linking, Germany has always divided Western from Eastern Europe, while her "economic mission" has amounted to distributing cheap overseas commercial credits at extortionately high profits to herself.

Eastern Europe, an area with immense economic possibilities, will then be able to enjoy the full benefits of world trade, its rising level of consumption opening a vast new field for British capital, goods and initiative.

France may only gradually recover her lost position: having never aimed at becoming the centre of European commerce she will presumably concentrate mainly on the economic development of her empire. Close collaboration between Holland,

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Belgium and the Scandinavian states seems probable, while Italy should be able to range herself advantageously with France.

The solution to the post-war trade problem lies either in commercial collaboration between the U.S.A. and England or in their competition. The better course is obvious, but while wholeheartedly endorsing Mr. Winant's slogan, "collaboration without discrimination is the corner-stone of reconstruction," we should desire nothing other than permanent collaboration, even if it implies economic concessions and trade sacrifices on both sides. A comprehensive agreement with the U.S.A. would entail probably Britain's withdrawal from Latin America except for selected classes of export in return for the United States restricting themselves merely to selected exports to imperial markets. Joint U.S.A.—British commercial expansion, based on trade specialization rather than on a division of markets, would have a great mission to fulfil in the Far East, the Middle East and Russia, while Europe would become closely interlinked with the British economic system. None of these schemes of course is meant to suggest predominance of the U.S.A.—British combine to the detriment of the legitimate interests of either customers or competitors. Latin America and to a lesser extent the U.S.A. will naturally continue to supply the Continent with many of its products, although the centre of European trade would be fixed more firmly than ever in this country, the economic link between Europe and the overseas markets.

A vital change in the mentality of British exporters is an important condition of their future success. The adoption of the decimal system of weights and measures and of international trade denominations, a greater interest in foreign languages, customs and local conditions, and an improvement in the commercial intelligence service, both private and official, are indispensable to the British exporter embarking on his difficult and responsible post-war tasks. Furthermore, action and sacrifice ought to be regarded as sheer necessities with Great Britain short of invisible exports and faced with the post-war alternatives of export or pauperization.

(Dr. Kronsten is a Polish economist engaged in research work in England).

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AS A NATIONAL LEADER

BY D. W. BROGAN

THIS handsome and admirably edited collection of documents* would, in normal times, interest the student of political science, the expert in American affairs, the modern historian. These classes will find their needs admirably catered for, but the four volumes of Mr. Roosevelt's *Public Papers* deserve and will get far more attention from the common reader than they would have had in more normal times. The reason is not far to seek. Over each volume the shadow of Nazi megalomania is thrown longer and longer; in every volume the uneasy tossing of the American giant in his sleep brings him nearer to the complete awakening of December 6, 1941, one of the turning points in the history of the world.

There is, of course, in all the volumes, even in the last, much that concerns internal American politics only. The President did not allow his increasing absorption in the ways and means of defeating the German menace to weaken his interest or his pride in the New Deal. When a great new dam site was dedicated at Chickamauga in 1940, scene of one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War in 1863, Mr. Roosevelt did not forget what the Tennessee Valley Authority had set out to do and had done in the way of economic and human rehabilitation. In his campaign speeches, he did not forget that the New Deal had paid special regard to the needs of the common man, to that "one third of the nation" that is, in the striking American term, "underprivileged." This concern for domestic issues is, of course, more obvious in the earlier than in the later volumes. The excesses of judicial review, the blind and dangerous conservatism of the Supreme Court, are more the theme of the 1937 volume than is the Nazi danger. But even the 1937 volume has its high-water mark in that "quarantine" speech at Chicago which was, alas, ahead of American opinion.

With 1938, the year of the *Anschluss* and Munich, the centre of interest moves eastward and outward and, thenceforward, the main task of the President of the United States is to prevent the outbreak of war, then to keep the United States out of the war when it breaks out—but to

**The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*. With a Special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt. 1937, *The Constitution Prevails*; 1938, *The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism*; 1939, *War and Neutrality*; 1940, *War and Aid to the Democracies*. Macmillan, four volumes, six guineas

secure that the United States is not left alone to fight the last, desperate battle of freedom in a world dominated by the pirate and robber states. This is the most living theme of the last three volumes. It recurs in messages to Congress, in appeals to rulers of states, in appeals to American public opinion and in the frank editorial introductions and notes that the President has contributed. And it is the main theme of what is the most novel feature of these volumes (novel here, as the previous series has not been published in Britain), the reports of the Presidential press conferences. Here we see the President explaining, answering, debating the issues and news of the day with the Washington correspondents of the great American newspapers and some of the most illuminating comments on events, some of the most revealing reactions, are in the *obiter dicta*, on or off the record.

We have set out here, candidly though openly from one side of the question, the history of recent American foreign policy, of the attempt to save America from the grim realities of the modern world by optimistic legislation, a characteristic political superstition of an excessively legally-minded people. We have here the President's regrets for the aid and comfort he gave to this superstition by signing the various neutrality acts. And we have the records of the unavailing attempt to alter that policy in 1939 when there was still ground for hope that Hitler could be made to hesitate by such an alteration. (One of the most impressive relevant documents printed here is not by the President, but by Mr. Hull).

The attempt to repeal the Neutrality Act while Europe was still nominally at peace failed. But, war once declared, the President tried again, this time with success. The arms embargo was repealed and the so-called "cash and carry" policy adopted. It may not seem very important now, but it was thought to be very important then. And those who thought it important were right, for the repeal of the Neutrality Act showed that, once faced with the danger of a Hitlerite victory, the American people was ready to do what then seemed enough to ensure his defeat. What then seemed enough, not more. For like ourselves, the American people are human and continued to hope for an easy way out of the bad situation in which they and the world found themselves. How bad it was they did not understand in the apparent lull of the winter of 1939-1940. Neither did we; neither did our rulers and in clarity of vision and foresight, the leader of the American people shone by comparison with the then rulers of Britain and France. If the invasion of Poland and the outbreak of war did not surprise the President or, probably, most of the American people outside Congress, it is evident that the President's sense of urgency did not communicate itself to the people as long as the "phoney war" lasted. The war was remote;

American people was not neutral in sentiment; it detested Hitlerism far more unanimously and warmly than it had detested Kaiserism in 1917; but it was not an American interest that was at stake—or so the man in the street—and in the Capitol—thought. Or, rather, American interests were not in danger, for there was no doubt that Britain and France would win and teach the paperhanger a lesson. This illusion was fostered by the politicians like Senator Nye who had denied the reality of the crisis, the reality of the war, the existence of any danger to America. It was fostered by the more ingenious Nazi propagandists who did not waste their time on imitating the tactics of "The Link", in trying to convince the American people that Naziism was a good or tolerable thing. The conviction that Germany, however evil, was not really formidable, was the American attitude that best suited Hitler's book. And of course, all these dangerous illusions were encouraged by the Communists and their "fellow travellers" who denounced the imperialist war, spread the slogan "the Yanks are not coming" and did the work of Berlin more effectively and zealously than direct agents of Goebbels or Bohle could hope to do it. It was this dream world that was shattered by the *Blitzkrieg* in France and the Netherlands, after being threatened by the invasion of Denmark and Norway. And that process of shattering is admirably illustrated here.

The threat of a Europe dominated by Hitler and of an Asia dominated by Japan produced mixed reactions. One which is of some importance at this moment is the spontaneous view, natural in a people to whom seafaring is now a minor interest, that naval defence means the stationing of naval forces near the American coast. It is an old enough story. In the Civil War, especially in moments of great strain like that produced by the victories of the *Merrimac* over the wooden Federal ships, there was a panic demand for stationing vessels off New York or off Philadelphia or off Boston. Such demands were a plague to Lincoln and to his Navy Secretary, Gideon Welles. Less justifiable was the odd panic that struck Boston in 1898 when the alleged approach of the Spanish Armada under Admiral Cervera induced the more excitable of the solid citizens of Boston to transfer their strong boxes inland to Worcester (Mass.). And the Cervera panic of 1898 has been repeated to-day, with the senior Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. David Walsh, with the due authority attaching to his position as chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, asking for the withdrawal of the American fleet into home waters. This is to make not command of the sea but ineffective command of the coast the aim of naval policy and here we are shown President Roosevelt at a press conference explaining the indivisible character of naval war. On May 14, 1940, before the full weight of the German attack could be estimated, the question was discussed at a press conference. The President objected more than once to the phrase "a

two-ocean Navy . . . because it is not sensible to talk of naval defence in those terms . . . Of course you are supposed to have a Navy that will go anywhere for national defence purposes, and no human being can say where it will have to go—nobody.”

And the dialogue continued, with a topicality of a painful reality to-day: “Isn’t it conceivable we may have to split the fleet if something happened out in the Netherlands Indies and then—” but the President replied, “I am afraid that is a leading question.” But he went on:

If you break things down in those terms, we ought to have Navy ships in the mouth of every harbour to protect that harbour against any possible attacking for us because, you see, they might attack Portland, Maine, and Boston, Massachusetts, at the same time. Now, wouldn’t that be awful? You really ought to have two navies.

But if the President had a firm grasp of naval realities (a far more practical view of the necessities and possibilities of the case than had some publicists and politicians, not to speak of the man in the street) in the early summer of 1940, no one in America yet understood the full implications of the *Blitzkrieg*, of the revolution in the scale of mechanized war. Politically, the President was fully alive to the realities of the world of gangster states. He pointed out that thirteen and a half months had elapsed from the American entry into the last war and the first appearance of American troops in action. The United States would not be allowed this long breathing space in a new war. “We were completely free from any attack. Now, that will never happen again in the history of the United States. As far as I can see that was just a bit of sheer luck.” Perhaps the President’s opponents would not have objected to the view that it was luck, but they held the view that “God looks after children, drunkards and the United States.” Pearl Harbour was the answer to the optimists.

But what was involved in full preparation for modern war was not fully appreciated in Washington, even in the White House. On May 26, 1940, with the crisis and the Battle of France at hand, the President gave out some comforting figures. They would have been comforting before May 10, before the immense weight of German might had been revealed. There had been great progress since 1933.

In 1933 we had only 48 modern tanks and armoured cars; to-day we have on hand and on order 1,700 . . . In 1933, on the personnel side we had 1,263 army pilots. To-day the Army alone has more than 3,000 of the best fighting fliers in the world, who last year flew more than one million hours in combat training.

The *Luftwaffe* and *Panzer* divisions that destroyed France, the immense weight of men and metal that bent but did not break Russia, make these figures rather pathetic. And the belief that America could rearm without a fundamental reorganization of American industrial life, as an extra, not as the main job of American industry, what may be

called the Knudsen theory, has died hard. The President explained that the new orders for tanks were on a scale that made their provision by regular Army contractors, like the Baldwin Locomotive Company, impossible.

You cannot build a tank with an automobile outfit. They let, the other day, that contract—what was it?—\$50,000,000 for medium tanks to Chrysler. My Lord! He has to put up a new plant for it . . . He gets a \$50,000,000 order, \$30,000,000 for tanks and \$20,000,000 for a plant. I suppose it will take Chrysler a great many months before he gets that actually into full production.

“He had to put up a new plant for it.” That was the Detroit attitude. For if existing plants were used, they could not produce cars, the real business of Detroit, and if they did not produce cars, how would America move, live and have her being? It was not an unnatural attitude or one to be too complacently condemned. And when the effect of American entry into the war is estimated, it should always be remembered that only that entry, only the insult of Pearl Harbour, could have made it possible to enforce such an economic revolution as the suppression of new cars, new radios, new refrigerators. The American people had to be angry and feel itself both humiliated and endangered before the mental readjustment, the acceptance of the view that power comes before plenty and is the essential condition of plenty, could be reasonably expected. After all, it is only now, well on the way to our fourth year of war, that the great national industries of betting on horses and dogs is seriously threatened. If we seriously interfere with the extremely elaborate and, in war-time, wasteful organization that provides the necessary mechanism for the improvement of blood-stock, we shall be doing something comparable to the American acceptance of no new models in cars or domestic gadgets.

In 1940, it must be remembered that the American people for all their passionate interest in the war, for all their generous admiration for the spirit of Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain, still thought of it as something to be kept away from their door by policy, by foresight but above all by resolving that it should be kept away. Like all democratic societies, political stress on the value of the people’s will had bred a superstition that you can, if you are rich and intrinsically powerful enough, have what you want if you really want it. We had and indeed have our own stiff dose of political Couéism to repent of and to pay for. Neither Britain nor the United States had appreciated the deep wisdom of Mr. Dooley’s dictum that you may refuse to like a man, to be his friend, to hate him, to lend him money, but if he insists on a fight “you have got to oblige him.”

The illusion of unlimited freedom of choice died hard. The President was forced to reckon with it. American sentiment, like American

legislation, was firmly set against the sin of re-entering the war of 1917. Don't do what was done between 1914 and 1917 and all will be more or less well. So there had to be political promises like: "We will not use our arms in a war of aggression; we will not send our men to take part in European wars . . . But we will repel aggression against the United States or the Western Hemisphere." So the President spoke in a message to Congress sent on July 10, 1940. It was a promise—and it has been kept. The United States has been the attacked, not the attacker and it is in a world war, with battle raging in every quarter of the globe, with American ships being sunk in sight of the shore, with the California coast territory being shelled and with American troops fighting a brilliant but uneven battle on what is still American territory, that Congress has removed, without a discussion, all restrictions on the use of American troops. The Axis is everywhere; so must the anti-Axis be, too.

But the year 1940 showed, in an unprecedented fashion, how seriously the American people already took the crisis. They did not as yet fully understand its meaning, but they recognized its existence. For the election of President Roosevelt for a third time was a demonstration of this crisis mentality whose dramatic character was naturally underestimated in Europe—though not, one may be sure, by the rulers of Germany, Italy or Japan. The strength of tradition in American political life and, especially, of the tradition against giving any President more than two terms, can hardly be appreciated by a European who does not know the country at first hand—and even such an observer will only note the strength of the tradition, he will not feel it in his bones, as almost all Americans do. That President Roosevelt consented to run again, that he was nominated and elected, were the greatest proofs of the success of the educational efforts of Herr Hitler. But almost equally dramatic was the nomination of Mr. Wendell Willkie who had voted the Democratic ticket as late as 1932, who had never held any political office and who yet was given the Republican nomination over veteran, skilful, and cautious politicians, some of them fairly young in years, but old in political arts. It was because those arts were too obvious and too irrelevant and that statesmanlike caution too terrifying in a year of destiny like 1940, that the rank and file Republicans forced the nomination of Mr. Willkie.

Mr. Willkie's candidacy, of course, is not adequately illustrated in these documents; what is recounted is rather the incidental and semi-farcical sides of the campaign like the throwing of a cantaloupe at Mr. Willkie at Detroit, where later a British Ambassador had to endure the trial by ordeal of that missile-minded city. But Mr. Roosevelt, of course, could not campaign so long or so thoroughly as did Mr. Willkie.

I told the people, told the Convention that night on the air, about midnight, that whether I liked it or not, I happened to be the President of 130 million people, the United States and dependencies—territories— and things are in such shape this year, that it is, of course, perfectly obvious that I cannot do any campaigning as you all know.

It did not quite work out like that. Campaigning is a duty for a President who is running for re-election and it was just as well that the American people were given a full education in the personal and administrative issues involved for, fortunately, there was no fundamental difference in foreign policy between the two candidates. There were vivacious exchanges of charges and counter-charges, but the campaign of 1940, from the point of view of the believer in democracy, was one of the most hopeful indications of the capacity of a great people to choose a course of action and to choose a leader. And it was in this spirit that on the eve of the election, the President, in his last campaign speech ended with a prayer, "that, through obedience to Thy Law, we may show forth Thy praise among the nations of the earth. In the time of prosperity, fill our hearts with thankfulness and in the day of trouble, suffer not our trust in Thee to fail. Amen."

When the election was over, the President thanked his supporters—and those who had opposed him but who, the popular will once expressed, had sent "pledges of loyalty and support . . . These messages, in particular, reflect a spirit of national unity in essential things which is most welcome. In union we shall find our true strength." And it was to that spirit of union that the President appealed in his fireside chat of December 29, and in his message to Congress of January 6, 1941, almost the last documents of this series: "In the recent national election there was no substantial difference between the two great parties in regard to that national policy." And what was the policy ratified by the millions who voted for Mr. Willkie as well as by the millions who voted for Mr. Roosevelt? An acceptance of the truth and the implications of the truth that

principles of morality and considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom.

Because the American people and their leader made that decision, Berlin and Tokyo were forced by the logic of their own ambitions and their own desperate needs to strike in the dark. But as they were wrong about the spirit of the American people, they will be wrong in their estimate of the fruits of treachery. As the record of the growth in American determination and American power, in American understanding and American purpose, these volumes will have as great a historical as they now have a topical value.

CO-OPERATION OF THE SERVICES

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

THOSE who before the war were so misguided as to believe that the Navy and Army had lost much of their importance in war and thought that the strengthening of the air arm was the only thing that really mattered, must be now convinced of their mistake. The situation in the Far East has obviously arisen from our lack of adequate naval strength to meet our world-wide commitments, and it has been made worse by lack of strength on land to protect air bases. No increase of air power alone would have enabled us to check the Japanese onslaught.

The Navy is and must always be the primary factor in our defence and of course the air weapon is an indispensable part of its armament. Only the Navy can give the Army and R.A.F. the strategic flexibility which minimizes the necessity of their dispersion and enables weak detachments to be reinforced as circumstances demand. Those who proclaimed the flexibility of air force appear to have failed to realize that this flexibility is confined to the tactical sphere and that strategically it is almost as dependent on land and sea communications as are armies. That must remain so until air transportation reaches standards of efficiency and range that are not yet in sight.

The Army depends on the air weapon quantitatively to an even greater extent than the Navy, and that is probably the most valid argument for denying the Army a specific air component, sufficient to meet its maximum requirements. For it would obviously be uneconomic to lock up in a separate compartment a large proportion of air power designed solely for direct co-operation with land forces. Air power undoubtedly has an important independent rôle both defensively and offensively which requires training, equipment and organization which has little in common with what is needed for co-operation with the Army. But just as it would be uneconomic to lock up too large a proportion of the air power for purely army co-operation, so also is it a mistake to maintain an undue proportion trained and equipped for a purely independent rôle.

Whether the Air Force should be treated as a separate Service as is the case with ourselves and Germany, or as a part of the Army as is the case with Japan and the U.S.A., seems from experience to be largely immaterial. Either organization can clearly be made to work satisfactorily provided there is efficient higher control. What has apparently been lacking in our organization is higher control strong enough to ensure that the Air Ministry should

attach as much importance to the co-operative rôle of the R.A.F. as to its independent rôle. It is now generally admitted that the *Luftwaffe*, although an independent organization, developed its co-operative functions to the utmost without apparently reducing its powers of independent action. Similarly the Japanese Air Force, though an integral part of the Army, is evidently quite capable of independent action.

It has of course been argued by many people that what we need is a combined General Staff of all three Services which, while leaving the Services separate, would improve the higher control which the Chief of the Staffs Committee, though a step in the right connection, does not fully exercise in many matters. The main argument against such an organization is the obvious difficulty of providing personnel of sufficient all-round knowledge and experience; especially since in naval matters there is a multitude of problems which do not affect the other Service and which require a highly specialized training to appreciate. With these latter arguments I confess I entirely sympathize, and have always felt that the demand of the Navy for complete responsibility over all aircraft, whether shore-based or ship-borne, specially designed and trained for operations against or for the protection of shipping should be its responsibility, is fully justified. No doubt it would be economical and advisable in specific localities and circumstances to train a proportion of the R.A.F. for shore-based co-operation with the Naval air force so that the latter could be reinforced quickly when the situation demanded it. Such training would naturally be carried out by attachments to the naval organization.

That leaves us, however, with the problem of securing higher control of co-operation between the Army and R.A.F. As matters stand I am not an advocate of amalgamating the two Services; it would undoubtedly imply a long period of soreness and friction. On the other hand, there seems to be a strong case for establishing a combined General Staff of the two Services, functioning continuously and in one building. Such a combined staff would be less cumbrous and much easier to fill with personnel of the necessary experience than a combined staff of all three Services. Its main function might be to ensure the co-operative training of the two Services, and it should include a dual inspectorate to ensure that co-operative training was efficient. At the same time it would, I think, be advisable that it should have some control over the planning and intelligence staffs of the individual Services, in order to ensure that there is no waste of effort on independent actions when maximum co-operation is required. For instance, the bombing of targets in Germany when maximum co-operation was of vital importance in France is now generally admitted to have been a mistaken application of independent action. Similarly no army operation should be planned without the certainty that adequate air co-operation could be provided. The questions of provision of suitable aircraft for army co-operation, of the most effective

anti-aircraft ground defences and protection of aerodromes would also naturally fall within the scope of the functions of the combined staff. Maintenance of liaison with the Admiralty would of course be of the first importance, but that might be provided by Naval officers attached who could bring to notice all points on which the Admiralty must be consulted. Combined operations in which all three Services might be engaged must obviously require special consideration as regards training for them, provision of specialized equipment and the planning of specific operation. For that I suggest there be a permanent sub-Committee drawn from the dual general staff and with additional naval representatives. For the planning and execution of specific operations the Sub-Committee would probably require considerable *ad hoc* expansion, or it might be dealt with by a combined staff specially constituted.

The appointment of a chief of the dual combined staff might possibly raise difficulties. Each of the three Services must clearly have its own chief of the staff and it would not be easy, or advisable, for any one of them to combine his duties with that of chief of the combined staff. But from what Service should the individual be drawn? It certainly might be argued that he should be an army officer, because the Army can do comparatively little to assist the Air Force beyond forcing the enemy to offer targets for attack; whereas co-operation of the Air Force with the Army is always indispensable. The Air Force is the producer, the Army the consumer, and the consumer must be satisfied. Furthermore the organization and problems of the Army though less specialized are more complex than those of the R.A.F. Yet it is worth recognizing that once an air force chief of the combined staff was convinced that co-operation was not all that it should be he would probably be able to exercise more influence in his own Service than would an army officer. As a working compromise selection might be made, in peace time at least, from the two Services alternately, as was the practice adopted in selecting the commandants of the Imperial Defence College. Naturally in time of crisis or war the Government would not be bound by such procedure.

The Chief of Staffs sub-Committee, with the Chief of the Combined Staff, as an additional member, would presumably continue to act as advisers to the Government on all matters of general military policy, and it would provide an opportunity for the head of an individual Service to make representation as regards orders issued by the Combined Staff from which he dissented.

There are reassuring signs that the Services are making great efforts to ensure a better standard of co-operation, but that all is not yet well is implied by a statement Sir James Grigg is reported to have made the other day to the effect that, "although the Air Ministry was satisfied with the improvement made the War Office was not"—a difference of opinion that often maintains between the producer and consumer. Libya, fortunately, has provided a magnificent training ground and there the men on the spot have worked out

their own salvation. It is not easy, however, for others without constant practice and effort to apply the lessons learnt.

Everyone is ready to give the Air Ministry full credit for the magnificent standards the R.A.F. has attained and for the quality of its equipment. It cannot be said, however, that there is such general satisfaction with the use the Ministry has made of the weapon it has created. It is not denied, I think, that the R.A.F. Staff began the war in the belief that independent air action would prove the main instrument in achieving victory. That belief might have proved justified if France had held out and if air power had been allowed unrestricted action, but it now has few supporters. Yet the influence of the belief appears to remain in an unwillingness to admit that co-operative action is at least of equal importance, and that it requires training complicated by the necessity of acquiring a knowledge of the methods and problems of another Service.

It will not, I hope, be thought that I consider that co-operation between the Navy and the other Services is of secondary importance; but it is of a different order from that of R.A.F. and Army co-operation, especially now that the Navy has its own air arm; and it would become more so if the Navy acquired full responsibility for the air coastal organization.

What I have written refers mainly to operational co-operation. The problem of higher strategic direction to ensure the best combined effects of the actions of the three services, influenced as they often are by political and economic considerations, is different and more complex. Is there not a case for dealing separately with the two problems which often tend to be confused?

COMMAND OF THE SEA

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

SINCE the entry of Japan and America into the war the essentiality of the command of the sea to us, always great, has been more forcibly brought home to the man in the street, though it does not yet appear to have made a decisive impression on those responsible for the main direction of our strategy. Although there has been no want of understanding of fact that the Atlantic sea route is a "life-line, the sea lines of communication have now shown a heightened importance. The fall of Singapore, due fundamentally to the loss of command of the sea and its acquisition by Japan, has been followed by the appearance of Japanese naval forces in the Indian Ocean, the occupation of the Andaman Islands as an advanced base for operations against Ceylon, the Indian ports on the Coromandel coast, the trade of the Bay of Bengal—which is presumably now at a standstill—and as a stepping stone towards the route from the Cape to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Our loss of command of the sea has enabled Japanese naval aircraft (and it will have been noticed the aircraft are integral units of the Japanese Navy and that this does not appear to have diminished the efficiency or the flexibility of the air arm) to operate in strong forces in the Bay of Bengal, inflicting on us the serious losses of the cruisers *Dorsetshire* and *Cornwall* and the Aircraft carrier *Hermes* and also a bombardment of the naval base at Trincomali. The Japanese armies in Burma can now be supplied by sea through the Burman ports, an advantage in the transport of their heavy supplies of munitions and food which we, who have so often profited in our foreign wars from our ability to furnish our armies with their needs by way of the sea will be the first to recognize. The many lines, too, of communication of other Japanese armies—those in the Philippines, the Dutch Islands and in the approaches to Australia—are able to proceed without serious interruption. Lines of communication—as a recent cartoon of Low's showing a monkey hanging from a palm leaf by its tail, marked "communications," and reaching out with one paw for a nut denoted "India" and with the other for another "Australia" concisely expressed the situation—are the master-key to the situation in the East: and one of the locks is Ceylon.

Elsewhere the lesson is that communications dominate the issue. It is no less plain in the Mediterranean where the fortunes of Rommel's—and

Auchinleck's armies depend on the use of the cross-Mediterranean routes to Libya and Egypt or Palestine: hence the heightened activity of the Axis air forces in their endeavour to render the air fields of Malta and the harbour of Valetta useless or untenable and to break the spirit of resistance of the people of Malta. For the flotilla forces operating from those airfields and creeks are the principal obstacle and hindrance to an adequate supply of men, munitions and food to the Axis army. So too we have seen an attempt made by the Italian navy, making one of its rare appearances at sea, and of the air forces of the two powers, to destroy a British convoy carrying much needed supplies to the island: an attempt most brilliantly defeated by Admiral Vian and his small cruiser and destroyer force. In the Dodecanese and in Crete a massing of material is reported, transport aircraft, gliders, landing craft, small craft—suitable for a crossing of the sea and an attack, or attacks, on Egypt, Cyprus, Syria, Palestine or Turkey. The line of military communications in the Levant is obviously one of the vital areas in the forthcoming campaign.

In the North it is the same. There we see the intense desire of the enemy to cut the line of American and British supplies to Murmansk. Attacks on this line of supply have been conducted throughout the winter, and an attempt to capture the port of Murmansk and so close that channel was launched, with great expectations of success, in November: the early fall of the port was foretold by the propaganda machine. But both the attacks by aircraft and "E" boats on the convoys and the land assault failed. Now the matter has become more pressing as the volume of military supplies has steadily increased with the increased output of the allied factories and the scale of attack has developed. Not only "E" boats, aircraft and mines are employed: heavy ships, destroyers and submarines in combination with them are now in use. So on March 9 the battleship *Tirpitz* made her first reported appearance from Trondheim to attack a convoy, but put back to port after being attacked, though unfortunately in small force only, by aircraft. A few days later (March 14 and 15) a running battle was fought by the British escorting squadron of destroyers and motor gunboats against a force of "E" boats in which the Germans lost five of their "E" boats and the British the destroyer *Vortigern*. A fortnight later enemy destroyers, submarines and aircraft attacked a convoy on its way to Murmansk when off the north of Norway. The engagement began with air attacks off Tromsø. These were beaten off by the aircraft of the fleet air arm and the fire of the vessels of the convoy and escorting force. Two destroyer attacks by flotillas from Tromsø and Trondheim followed, in turn defeated by the cruisers and destroyers of the escort with a loss of one destroyer by the enemy and, finally, a last attempt to stop the convoy was made off Kola itself by a combination of dive bombers from Kirkenes and Petsamo, submarines and destroyer flotillas, in which Russian aircraft from Murmansk joined in the defence of the convoy.

All convoy operations tend to bring about a battle. The advantage lies

with him who anticipates his opponent in the provision of superior force. In the last war the attacks on the Norwegian convoys began with small forces of destroyers, which wiped out an escort. Then came an attack by two cruisers which destroyed the *Mary Rose* and *Strongbow*. Then the escorts were strengthened by cruiser and battleship forces and in April, 1918, the High Sea Fleet put out to intercept and overwhelm the detachment. So now the enemy appears to intend to create as strong a force as his means admit consisting of the *Tirpitz*, the two battlecruisers recently returned from Brest as soon as they shall have been conditioned for service again, the two remaining "pocket battleships" and presumably such of his cruisers as are available; in fact, a "battlefleet" of all arms in which we may be sure aircraft will figure. No pains will be spared to bring this force up to the greatest strength possible, and the lessons which are to be got from the Japanese use of aircraft will not pass disregarded.

Thus we have three main areas of military sea-communications—the Pacific, the Mediterranean and the North Sea and Arctic. Command of the sea is the only foundation of success in those campaigns and that foundation must be laid both quickly and surely. It cannot be repeated too often that the first object in British warfare must always be to obtain this command, which, if lost—as we see it lost in the Indian Ocean—spells disaster not only in that theatre but in others as well.

The part played by aircraft, in the Eastern campaign in particular, has been of decisive importance. Two British battleships, two large cruisers and an aircraft carrier are the price that has been paid by the navy for the want of air components in the fleet. That ships can be effectively guarded against aircraft by aircraft was shown by the episode of the running of the gauntlet by the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Prinz Eugen*. Whereas those three ships were effectively defended in their run up channel, even against the whole available strength of the British air forces of the various commands in the southern area, there was no such protection given to the British battleships off Malaya or the cruisers in the Indian Ocean, neither of which were attacked by forces so numerous as those in the Channel. It is indeed no small shock to read that the *Hermes* when attacked at, apparently, no great distance from the coast of Ceylon, though she was not taken by surprise and was expecting the attack, received no support from shore based aircraft in the island. It is now over four months since Japan entered the war, and during those four months we have been told of numerous bombings of factories and harbours in Germany or German occupied territory, accompanied by no small losses of aircraft. We are told too that our air forces have now reached high figures. Yet not enough have been spared to give the navy the support which the plain evidence of facts shows that it needs to enable it to contest the command of the sea, that vital element in our strategy. An offensive against the centres of production of German war material in Germany and elsewhere is undoubt-

edly an aid to Russia; the destruction of the Renault motor factory was a blow the effect of which can hardly fail to injure the mobility of the German army up to a point. But if such blows, useful though they may be, are effected only at the expense of the loss of the command of the sea by which the advance of Japanese armies into Burma and India is facilitated materially; if for want of British air action at sea British fighting ships are lost and Japanese fleets—of which the aircraft are integral units—are able to attack the trade of India and link up in the Indian Ocean with a German movement directed against Egypt and the Middle East; and if communications with Murmansk are cut or seriously interrupted in the period of prolonged daylight that is now ahead of us; if these and other unfortunate occurrences should take place, then it can only be said that there will have been a most grievous misuse of our air strength. "Hard blows," Mahan once wrote, "are useless unless aimed at the right spot." The blows on the Ruhr, on Hamburg, on Lubeck and Cologne have doubtless been hard and have effected no small damage to the interests centred in those districts. But the blows which Japan, by her command of the Eastern seas, has been able to strike at Great Britain, have been harder, and that those blows have been possible to her has been due in part to the insensate reductions of the Navy by the Treaty of London and in part to the absence from the British navy of a sufficient, properly equipped and trained naval air force; of those units, in other words, with which Japan has struck some of her principal blows. It is surely time that those who direct our strategy should have become aware of the simple principle, so well known to our ancestors, that our first object in war is to obtain command of the sea and that all arms of the fighting services capable of taking part in the struggle for command should be devoted to that object. In the building of a house the first thing that is done is to lay a solid and assured foundation. The walls follow. Command of the sea is the foundation upon which the fight for the defeat of the enemy must rest. One thing at a time is a good maxim, taught us in our copy books and preached and practised by every great master of war. Dissipation of effort in two or more efforts is a contradiction in practice to this fundamental principle.

While the events in the three areas referred to above have occupied a prominent place in the minds of most of us and in the columns of the Press the other great area across which vital supply routes run, the Atlantic, has continued to be the scene of a hard struggle. That struggle has not slackened though it may have changed its position. The developments in the defence by means of an increased number of small craft and of aerial fighting craft appeared to have driven the enemy further to the westward, but the Prime Minister had to tell us that the Atlantic situation had worsened—temporarily, it was to be hoped. German submarines have been active in what seem to be large numbers and operating, with the help of supplies from places on the American continent, in the Caribbean Sea; and it is not to be forgotten that some thirty-

OUR CHINESE ALLY

BY SIR FREDERICK WHYTE

ON July 7 the war in China will enter its sixth year. It broke out on a large scale at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937, though it may truly be said to have begun in 1931 when Japan opened her Manchuria campaign with the bombing of Chang Tso-lin's train outside Mukden. Judged on either scale, and certainly in the operations since 1937, it was the first act in the drama of our own world war; and the resistance of China bids fair to have a powerful effect on the ultimate result.

China's power in war was rated low by friend and foe alike. The comparison between the war potential of the two combatants in the Far East, reckoned in material resources, in organization and in discipline seemed to leave no doubt that Japan must win with comparative ease. So axiomatic did this conclusion appear to be that the Japanese General Staff themselves failed to examine their strategic task and embarked on operations against China without defining their objective: or, it may be truer to say that their appreciation of their campaign made no allowance for those factors which have enabled the Chinese Armies to foil their opponents at every turn in the struggle. Relying on superior power, and operating with command of the sea, Japan reckoned on a short war. No one in Tokyo foresaw that the Japanese Army would be powerless to bring the Chinese to any decisive engagement; nor did any Japanese forecast accurately appraise the cost, either in time, or in actual expenditure or in casualties. In all three, the event has proved that Japan went to war against China in a confident mood in which she committed the strategist's cardinal sin of undertaking an unlimited liability and made the sin more heinous by underestimating the power of her opponent.

Doubtless the Japanese Staff have a good excuse. Who would have supposed that China would still be firm on her own feet, with her main armies in being and the spirit of her people undaunted, after she had lost her entire sea-coast, had seen her capital fall into the hands of the enemy, and with it all resources and wealth of the Yangtse Delta? Who indeed?

except those who knew China, who bore in mind the size of this unlimited field of war and understood the nature of the combatant terrain in the hinterland. Who again, except those who had realized the recreative power of the National Movement which had made China anew? In a word, who but the Chinese themselves? And they knew all these things. The whole world knows them now too; and if we are rightly surprised that the Japanese (of all people!) ignored them, may not the reason be that the root of Chinese survival lies in those moral factors which the Axis Powers have not yet learned to reckon at their supreme value. Japan, the sedulous and apt pupil of the Machine Age, believed that the power of her war machine must overwhelm the less mechanized Chinese; and, failing to understand both the physical and still more the moral limits beyond which the "machine" cannot overpower the "man," she is now ruefully driven to acknowledge that all her Chinese conquests do not spell victory, and that their cost has reduced her resources to a point where her power to sustain a long war on the new maritime and continental scale against the A.B.C.D. powers is not great enough.

Not great enough, that is, unless her Far Eastern successes contribute to the shortening of the whole war by enabling the Axis in Europe and Africa to win soon: or, unless they so materially replenish her own inadequate and partially consumed resources as to enable her to face a much longer struggle. We may surely say, without incurring the charge of a sanguine complacency, that the first alternative is not to be realized. However serious we must reckon this, the third crisis of the war, it does not portend the final defeat of the Allied arms; for the Axis Powers as a whole do not to-day enjoy the unchallenged control of the initiative (except in the Far East), and the reinforcement of the Allied Powers, both actual and potential, by American participation in the war ought to assure the final result. The second alternative, by which Japan would gain new resources from Malaya and the East Indies, is not so favourable as it may appear at first sight. If the Japanese victories in South East Asia had rewarded her with the possession of its material wealth intact, we should have to acknowledge that she had thereby repaired her chief weakness and enabled herself to confront the Pacific war with better assurance of success. May I refer the reader here to my own *Japan's Purpose in Asia** for an estimate (made five

*The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The discovery of the artificial transmutation of elements turns on the previous discovery of isotopes. It is usual to picture the atoms, of which elementary substances are composed, as consisting of a small heavy nucleus, in which most of the mass is concentrated, surrounded by a system of very light, negatively-charged electric particles, the well-known electrons. The more sophisticated inhabitants of physical laboratories are no longer content with such a simply visualized model, but for our purposes it will serve well enough.

The existence of isotopes is based on the fact that, as might be expected, the chemical behaviour of one atom when it comes in contact with another is determined by the number and disposition of the outer layers of electrons, whereas its mass is dependent on the heavier particles which lie deep within its nucleus. It is therefore possible to have two or more types of atoms with the same chemical properties but different masses; and they are called the different isotopes of the same element.

The essential procedure in the artificial transmutation of a substance is to alter the configuration of its outer layers of electrons. This cannot be done in a permanent way by treatments which merely affect these outer layers themselves; for they are in electrical equilibrium with the inner nucleus, and if this equilibrium is disturbed, it soon becomes restored during the interaction of the atom with its neighbours. A genuine and permanent transformation can only be brought about by an alteration in the electric charge on the nucleus, since this, lying so thoroughly shielded by the outer layers, cannot, as a rule, easily change back into its former condition. But the very fact that the nucleus is so closely guarded makes the technical problem of affecting it a very difficult one. It can only be done by bombarding it with small particles moving at extremely high speeds. The great advances in physics in recent years have depended on the development of the massive "atom-smashing" machines capable of speeding up particles sufficiently to enable them to disrupt atomic nuclei. The problem is essentially an engineering one—of harnessing currents running into millions of volts. It was first successfully tackled by Cockcroft and Walton in Cambridge; but the cyclotron, the newer apparatus developed by Lawrence of California, seems now to be the most satisfactory appliance for the purpose.

Although the nucleus of an atom which has been knocked askew by a fast moving particle cannot easily react with any other atoms in its neighbourhood, it may be spontaneously unstable owing to an internal lack of equilibrium. This is the basis for the most important practical application of atom-smashing. If the nucleus of an atom becomes unstable it will, after a longer or shorter period, break down into a more stable form; and while it does so, it gives out what may be regarded

as the superfluous material, in the shape of one or more rapidly moving particles. It behaves, in fact, like radium, spontaneously shooting out of itself a characteristic type of radiation. The important point is that by the new method of transmutation, one can manufacture a number of radio-active elements which are isotopes, that is, have the same chemical properties, as many of the common atoms which we usually come across in stable and non-radio-active forms.

As soon as the production of radio-active forms of common atoms became practicable, the medical profession became interested. For of course it is well-known that the rays given off by radium are of great therapeutic importance. The fast moving particles of which the rays consist are highly injurious to the complex chemical substances on which the activities of living cells depend. One can say, in a rough way, that the more intensely alive material is, the more sensitive it will be to radio-active substances. In particular, tissues which are growing fast suffer greater damage than more slowly growing ones; and hence the wide use which can be made of radium (and of the somewhat similar X-rays) in the treatment of cancer, which is, after all, mainly characterized by the excessive growth of the cancerous tissue. Natural radium is such an extremely rare and costly substance, that the artificially produced radio-active substances can compete with it, in spite of their comparatively high cost and of the small quantities which can be made, although they would be quite out of the running as substitutes for any other class of substance.

But the artificial products, like several of the modern *ersatz* substances, are better, and in some ways very much better, than the original "genuine article." Radium itself is both very rare, so that one cannot afford to lose any of it, and is not a substance with which the human digestion is normally called upon to deal. The only way of bringing it into the neighbourhood of a cancerous growth is therefore to seal it into small tubes or "needles," and to place these, usually by means of an operation, into the required situation. With some of the new radio-active substances, a much easier and much more efficient method is sometimes possible. One can, as we have seen, prepare radio-active forms of many of the common elements which are contained in ordinary articles of diet. Now the different tissues of the body have different chemical requirements, and absorb, out of the digested food substances, much more than their fair share of the particular elements which enter into their special composition. For instance much the highest concentration of iodine in the body is found in the thyroid gland, where it is used in the production of the thyroid hormone; and if a dose of radio-active iodine is administered, some of it is soon passed out of the body again, some spreads throughout all the tissues, while in the thyroid

quite a considerable quantity may accumulate. By selecting a suitable dose, one can so arrange things that it is only in the thyroid that the concentration of radio-iodine becomes large enough to produce any noticeable effects. Instead of having to perform one troublesome operation to introduce the radium needles into the right place, and another to remove them, a treatment which is, effectively, completely localized can be given merely by administering a suitable radio-iodine pill.

The natural localization, which depends on making skilful use of the body's own processes, has greater advantages over operative procedures than mere simplicity. Some types of cancer are caused by excessive growth of cells of a particular kind which are not strictly confined to one organ, such as the thyroid gland, but are scattered all over the body. For instance, in the cancer-like disease known as leukemia certain of the cells floating in the blood multiply too rapidly. There is no way of putting a radium needle in contact with them, since they are continually moving all over the body; the only conceivable hope would be to catch them at the place where they are first formed, which is in the marrow of the bones, but even that is clearly almost impossible in practice, since the insertion of a needle into the marrow of every bone would be altogether too much of a good thing. But the problem can be solved with radio-phosphorus. Bones, of course, contain a large amount of phosphorus, and one would expect some of the radio-phosphorus given to a patient to reach his skeleton; but, luckily enough, phosphorus is also required by rapidly growing cells, and it therefore becomes concentrated in any growing cells floating in the blood. Again, one can achieve in this way just the localized application of radio-activity which is required. Dr. Lawrence, of the Crocker Radiation Laboratory in California, who invented the method, claims that it is "a simple method of giving localized whole body irradiation in a single cocktail"—a truly spectacular advance in medical technique, and one wonders whether even the fast-moving Americans could yet bring themselves to call such a cocktail an Old Fashioned.

As a matter of fact, this method of administering artificial radio-active substances has only been used in medical therapy for a year or two. The results so far obtained are still to be regarded as promising beginnings rather than as the achievements of a completely mastered technique. But as far as they go they are very satisfactory. By the radio-iodine method it is already possible to reduce the growth of the thyroid gland to any extent which seems necessary, and the radio-phosphorus technique has given the physician an encouraging degree of control over blood and bone cancers.

Experiments with other radio-elements are also giving some promise

of useful results. Radio-strontium is, like radio-phosphorus, mainly stored in the bones, but unlike that substance it does not affect the blood cells to any great extent. It is being tried for use in patients with bone tumours. But the preliminary steps in the introduction of a new treatment are laborious and need very careful and cautious work. One has first of all to find out where a given element goes to in the body, and then to test the effects of different doses of it. The first stage, the problem of where an element becomes absorbed, can be fairly easily investigated by the use of the artificially radio-active substances themselves. In fact, this was the first use to which they were put in biology. Previously it has not been at all easy to follow the course of a given substance through the processes of digestion, absorption and excretion. The best one could do was to feed an abnormally large quantity of a substance and look for any local concentrations of it, or of substances which the body might make out of it. But one could never be quite sure what interpretation to put on the results. Had the normal functioning of the body been upset by the unusual food? And if one found, after feeding some particular substance, that the animal's body contained a high concentration of some other compound, was this made out of the actual substance one had administered, or was it produced out of atoms which were already present? There was no way of being absolutely sure. But the radio-elements put all such questions on a much more secure foundation. Radio-active phosphorus is not a substance which an animal comes across in the ordinary course of its existence; and if some is found in a particular organ, after a dose of it has been administered to the animal, one can be quite certain that the radio-phosphorus detected was really the actual substance which had been given, and not something which had been present in the body beforehand.

The radio-elements can therefore be used as "tracers," as they are called, to follow out in detail the chemical changes which go on in living organisms. Their advantages are very numerous. Not only is one quite sure of what one is dealing with, as we have just seen, but once the substances have been manufactured, the technical methods are fairly easy. The rays given out by a radio-active substance affect photographic plates. One can measure the concentration of radio-substance in any part of the body by the darkness of the image it can produce by its own radiation, when it is laid on a photographic plate in the dark; or one can measure the radiation by simple electrical means.

The first results obtained with "radio-active tracers" were nearly all confirmations of theories which biologists had already put forward on the basis of more elaborate experiments involving more doubtful chains of argument; and some sceptics thought that nothing of much importance was going to come out of the new method. But as time has

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gone on, the "tracer" results, particularly in the hands of American workers, have become more and more exciting, and it now looks as though they are going to be responsible for a completely revolutionary change in our ideas of the kind of chemical processes which go on in living matter.

First of all, new light is being thrown on some of the basic chemical reactions on which life depends. Perhaps the most important reaction in the world is that by which plants, by the aid of their green colouring matter, chlorophyll, and of the energy which they receive from the sun's light, convert the carbon dioxide of the air into the starches and sugars, from which, at second or third hand, all other living things obtain their energy. Now biologists have long believed two dogmas about this reaction; firstly that it is only performed by organisms containing the pigment chlorophyll, and secondly that it can only occur if there is enough light to contribute the necessary energy. The tracer studies have shown that both of these theories are untrue. Plants containing chlorophyll can form starch out of carbon dioxide even in complete darkness, though they do it very slowly; and most living things can use carbon dioxide, in a small way, even if they do not contain any chlorophyll. Our whole ideas about what has been called the fundamental reaction of life have got to be revised; other tracer studies (using "heavy" oxygen and radio-carbon) are already beginning to give the outlines of a more correct picture.

Important though these advances are, they are not of a kind which will cause a radical alteration in our general picture of a living organism. But that is just what some of the tracer studies are producing. They are showing that many reactions which we had thought of as simple one-way processes are actually more complex two-way interchanges. To take a simple example. The small hairs on the roots of plants absorb nutrient salts from the moisture in the soil. Botanists had normally regarded this as a straight taking-in of substances by the root; but the tracers show that there is really a two-way traffic of salts, outwards as well as inwards, so that what we had previously observed is not the whole process, but only the excess of the inward over the outward stream.

Obviously this means that the chemical processes in living cells must be much more rapid and manifold than biologists had thought. And that seems to be very generally true. In particular, it turns out that a large number of compounds which had been looked on as relatively inert and stable are actually undergoing continual change, being constantly broken down and rebuilt out of different atoms. The American biochemist Schönheimer was first able to demonstrate this for the fats. As a tracer, he used an isotope of hydrogen which is not radio-active,

but which has a heavier nucleus than the normal kind; it is somewhat more difficult to detect, but the principle of its use is exactly the same as that of the radio-compounds. He found that his tracer hydrogen could quite soon be detected even in fats which appeared to be merely storage deposits, and had previously been thought quite inactive. He then went on to use a heavy isotope of nitrogen, technically even more difficult to handle, but making possible an attack on the proteins, which, as the Ministry of Food keeps reminding us, are the body-building substances. Body-building they may be, but they are not an inert skeleton like bricks or concrete. Tracer nitrogen is found to have been built into them within a few hours after being administered. In fact, in living things the flux of chemical breakdown and rebuilding is so all-pervading that even the protein framework is involved in it. It has for long been a platitude to compare a living system to a flame—a thing which retains its individuality in spite of a continual flow of material through it. But the analogy turns out to be much more exact than its users had thought. Scarcely any part of a living organism stays put—there are a few exceptions, as always in biological material—but life seems to imply incessant antagonistic activities of decay and renewal, and to be, in fact, merely the result of a lack of perfect balance between these two opposing processes.

THE PACIFIST SCHISM

BY JOHN ARMITAGE

MORE than two and a half years of war have helped to clarify the position of the Christian pacifist. The emotional 'hang-over' experienced by many a young man reaching manhood in the unprincipled 'thirties showed signs of disappearing in May, 1940 and was finally blown away in June, 1941.* This much may be said for those who united under the banner of pacifism before the war: they sensed the lack of leadership, the drift to war and the poverty of statesmanship. They had been nourished, this generation of post-Versailles youth, on the milk of the League of Nations and they lived to see the milk turn sour as one after another the nations either left the League or shrank from courageous action as likely to lead to an evil result for their individual interests. The League foundered but the pacifist clung to his policy of peace. It was a policy without machinery; yet it was still a considerable thorn in the flesh of a Government possessing the machinery but no policy.

The decline in pacifism since the outbreak of war is irrefutable. The pacifist may argue that the fall in the percentage of conscientious objectors with each successive age-group registered is due to one cause: the idealism of youth giving way to the disillusion and cynicism of old age. That is partly true. Youth is ever eager to play the martyr while old age feels the pressure of its responsibilities. But it is by no means the whole story. The character of the war has changed, if not in fact at least in the eyes of men.

Only a very small part of pacifism has remained whole after two and a half years of war and that is the essence of Christian pacifism. Many of the young men who swelled the ranks of Christian pacifism did so less—although they did not know it—from the commands of their own conscience than from the reflections in the shallow waters of their minds of stern thoughts born not without travail in the minds of others. Such reflections did no one dishonour but the Christian pacifist is well rid of these supporters. Christianity begins in the mind, the conscious searching after truth, while conscience is the child of intellectual conviction. It cannot be the outcome of emotion.

The great trouble with pacifism before the war was that it abandoned its true rôle of the intellectual leaven in society by the attempt to supplant quality by quantity. It would be uncharitable and indeed untrue to

pretend that the leaders of the pacifist movement have not in the past ten years enriched Christian thought; in more than one instance they have been the spearhead of that thought. At the same time the fretful mouthings of some of their supporters have been hard to bear. One imagines that many a serious student has been turned aside from a proper consideration of Christian pacifism by the pacifist's meagre understanding of his own creed. It is even doubtful if it is possible for a very young man to be a Christian pacifist. He neither knows nor has experienced life enough. Yet it is to the young man that pacifism most appeals; to callow youth who still knows right from wrong. He is the crusader, the would-be martyr and, too, the sensitive and shy.

The Christian pacifist has been mistaken in allying himself with others who sharing his pacifist persuasion are unable to accept his reasons. Whatever the arguments that the non-Christian can summon in defence of his attitude it is little more than coincidence that he arrives at the same decision not to fight as his Christian neighbour. To make the decision the bond of union is false; it is the argument supporting the decision that is all important. Minority opinions often embrace strange partners but the Christian must account it odd if the circumstance of accidental agreement with the heathen on a single point means more to the Christian pacifist than all the treasures of a common heritage.

That for the non-Christian pacifist the house of pacifism had shallow foundations has now been proved. It is scarcely probable that they rested on any foundations whatsoever beyond an earnest and by no means despicable ideal that the world should not again be plunged into the horrors and miseries of war. Life is not so easy to arrange as that, as this war has shown. Never before have so many innocents, nations as well as individuals, suffered so vilely from the evil depredations of their stronger neighbours. Never before has it been so clearly shown that unprotected virtue arouses not chivalry but lust. And to be fair many erstwhile pacifists have recognized this; they have seen enough to make them think again.

But for the Christian pacifist the position remains fundamentally unchanged. His argument is based not on the effectiveness of non-resistance to stop aggression, at least not as a short-term policy, but on his right, or as he might express it, on his duty to withdraw from society at this point and to refrain from taking part in what every fibre of his being tells him to be wrong. He does so with his eyes open. He knows the consequences; the probable loss of his own skin and the skins of those he loves. Yet he hopes that in return he will save his soul and theirs. For him the decision means the Cross and he is prepared to hang there.

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* One pacifist I knew renounced his pacifism in August, 1939, judging the Hitler-Stalin pact as the final blow to his cause. He joined the territorials. Another judged Hitler's attack on Stalin the final blow.

It is at this point that some Christian pacifists, doubting their own fortitude or questioning their own reactions at the moment of trial, waver. Can they be sure that they would face the Cross if it stood before them? Cranmer, Latimer and Ridley managed it well enough four hundred years ago and Latimer's words still stir one with the deepest possible admiration.* To face the Cross oneself may be a big decision but it is still easier than making pacifism a political issue and forcing others who have not accepted the arguments for it to abide by the results of the policy. The Cross has no meaning for the unbeliever.

A devout Christian pacifist, and a prophet not without honour for his work in his own borough, said recently with a sigh: if only we could bridge the gulf between the pacifist and non-pacifist Christian. He saw this gulf as a great division in the minds of Christian men, cleaving brother from brother and making all spiritual contact impossible. For this attitude he was not alone responsible. The unwelcome publicity given at one time to the less meritorious appeals at tribunals and the fierce glare of newspaper spotlight on the activities of certain public figures made pacifism synonymous with disloyalty, a charge which all Christians must face if loyalty means putting King before God. No one has yet stated that this is so although the man who squares his shoulders for God Save the King in church and shuffles through the Creed gets near to expressing it. The Christian pacifist is not disloyal, nor does he necessarily lack physical courage. Indeed during the period when he was being most criticized pacifist units were gaining honours for personal bravery in the most heavily 'blitzed' areas of London and elsewhere. At the time of the worst raids I had supper before the sirens sounded with one unit in their eyrie at the top of a tenement block in Stepney. What they most lacked was a sense of domestic propriety (the butter was under a tin hat); not physical courage.

Yet as a result of passionate feelings aroused by the condition of war a pacifist schism has been allowed to take place. Moreover the schism is fostered among the pacifists themselves by their sense of isolation and by the main body of Christians who affect to ignore their brethren or who notice them only to upbraid in this hour of trial. No schism can be good. At its worst it puts the schismatics into a hopelessly false position and at its best the schismatics are guilty of making a part more important than the whole.

What is peculiar to the present situation is that the gulf visualized by the devout Christian pacifist already referred to is entirely imaginary. The point at which men say they will not fight does roughly divide those who are called pacifists from those who find war compatible with their

* "Play the man, Master Ridley; and we shall this day light such a candle by God's grace in England as I trust shall never be put out."

Christian conscience. But among the ranks of pacifists there are men of every gradation of opinion just as there are among the men who find themselves in or support the armed forces. Between these who prefer prison to any form of national service which may help the war effort and those who think that the only good German is a dead one (are there still Christians who think this?) there is indeed a great gulf fixed. But the bridge is already across the gulf. They are linked by their Christian brothers who in a steady progression from prison to downright militarism make a chain of thought via agriculturists, non-combatants, reluctant and enthusiastic militarists.

Most Christians come in the reluctant class. That is they see the war as the result not the cause of evil although recognizing that war does undoubtedly bring fresh causes of evil in its train. The fact that Christians as a whole have accepted the war in a contrite spirit is all to the good. It is difficult for anyone who has studied the Gospels to imagine Jesus taking a pleasure in war even if one can see him punishing with righteous anger. All know that in war the innocent suffer at least equally with the guilty but most feel that however they apportion blame there is little to be gained by systematic presentation of the other cheek. That is reducing the argument to a dangerously low level and it would be better perhaps to eschew the temptation to elucidate why the meaning of the Cross is interpreted in so many different ways.

What should emerge quite clearly is that no Christian can expect or should desire to judge for another. There is no universal rule for determining right or wrong. But the individual Christian has it in his power to determine what is right or wrong for him. This is a matter which lies solely between him and God. He must wrestle with his problem as Jesus wrestled in the Garden of Gethsemane before choosing the Cross. And he must pray using the same words: nevertheless not my will, but thine, be done. All through this life the Christian is living part of the time in the Garden of Gethsemane, continually struggling to get a little nearer to the truth. It is unlikely that the man who reaches old age with the same religious views as he held in childhood has made much effort to learn God's will and it is not surprising that it is just this man who will condemn so easily the opinions of others.

The story of pacifism is similar to much else of Christian experience. It is largely a matter of compromise. How, when and where does one determine to say to the world or society: thus far and no farther? To most Christians it seems illogical that a man who has played his part in society in time of peace, objecting no doubt to this and that but nevertheless conforming in the main, should, at the outbreak of war, refuse to fight. Years ago, they say, the dragon's teeth were sown and now we reap. But man is illogical not least of all

THE PACIFIST SCHISM

in his conduct of war. Ferocity is tempered by mercy, except apparently in a merciless section of the German people, and hate by a kindness which in individual cases comes near to love.

There are some who take delight in pointing out the illogicality of the pacifist's actions. The fact is that no man can think for another and what appears illogical in action is not necessarily illogical in conscience. Possibly the Christian pacifist, who for one reason or another has failed to get total exemption at his tribunal and elects instead of service to go to prison as regularly as the law requires, demonstrates the nearest approach to logic that can be achieved. But even he finds that he does not satisfy his conscience in all respects.

Illogicality is the rock on which the tribunals founder. There is something very comforting in our system of tribunals for conscientious objectors and providing fair-minded men are selected to sit on them there seems at first sight no reason why they should not produce a very good result. But apart from an ability to detect humbug, which able and experienced men may be expected to do, it is to be doubted if any group of men can be relied upon to gauge the relative qualities of conscience in terms of total exemption, agriculture or non-combatant service. The argument which sounds poor in the ears of the men constituting the tribunal may well be so according to the logic of the hearers but it is not the objector's logic which is being measured but his conscience and for this quality there is no common denominator.

If this is so it is plain that the Christian must not fall into the trap of judging the conscience of others by the yardstick of his own. If there is any meaning at all in the idea of the Universal Church it is obvious that Christians must begin by accepting the fact that there is a divergence of opinion on many matters of most vital importance. All Christians are agreed that war is bad and that somehow or other we must find a way of overcoming it. But from that moment there is a great parting of the ways. Christian pacifists supported the League of Nations and disarmament as complementary elements of the same idea; Christian militarists supported the League of Nations and felt that it failed because it refused to face up to the necessity of backing its decisions by force. Christian pacifists said that if you prepared for war you got war; Christian militarists said that if you disarmed you became the victim of non-Christian society. For myself I believe that the world will not live in peace until the people in it have accepted Christian principles for themselves; I do not believe that God's laws can be imposed by combinations of peoples and nations with different codes of honour and ideas. For Christians the first step is surely to unite as Christians and to achieve this they must abhor the very thought of schism like the plague.

AN AIRMAN SPEAKS

BY JOSEPH BRADDOCK

TO climb the dark, dare all, there's something here
Beyond the slow security of peace,
Children, the city train, the week-end garden.
This balanced machine protects the well-loved earth,
Fields falling away in dusk; dissolving towns;
Watching England asleep like any mother.
To win safety for those we love, bred from our soil,
Flesh of our flesh, bone of our bone, the ideal
We aim at, part achieve when we stake lives
Roaring our rhetoric across the sky,
Flashing, knight-errants, over lands beleaguered,
Freedom's men, with Zeus' thunderbolts, avenging flame.

"Know thyself," so said Thales. Cut the classics.
How do you really feel? A lonely man
Within a mechanistic marvel sent
Upon a doubtful mission. O death-bird
Swifter than swift, like sphinx-moth wonderful,
Fantastic plane among the hordes of killers,
Death-dealing robots, why should you take me thus
To hurl destruction upon many people
Victims of evil, inherited bad blood?
No more. Not that way. Do not think like that,—
Of monstrous pyrotechnics, spouting fire,
Flash, crash and smoke and shudder, rocking plane
Above a total combat as when Gods
Fell upon Titans, but in that hell below
Knowing the shrieking child, the innocent girl,
The boy she now won't marry, old people
Dragged from the stinking rubble before their time.
What joke is this? What devilry the bomb-racks?
There was a face beside a lake at Fürberg,
A body perfect beyond the greatest sculpture
Symmetry ripening for my mutilation,
Live springing hair that grows on in the grave;

AN AIRMAN SPEAKS

Two brothers who with straight eyes laughed in Munich,
 Child-bloom complexions, perhaps to-night they're bloody,
 Burned, twisted, mangled. Ah! Obscene, obscene.

There England ends, begins the shining water,
 The Channel, pathway for small beetle convoys
 Indomitably succouring this so hard-pressed fortress,
 Blackly proceeding over moonlit water,
 Daring red belches from a hostile coast.
 (There's no way out. We chose the lesser evil
 Shunned over long, reluctant, forced upon us).
 Humanity in prison waves us welcome
 As, liberators on the daylight aether,
 We ride and soar and swoop to man's assistance,
 Aiming our blows at the Cruel Heart, the crouching
 Widow-spider lurking, foul, in Central Europe.

Now in my veins flows an upwelling glory
 Glows in my veins fresh ichor, ecstasy
 To cut the knot of bestial tyranny
 And liberate, liberate all the martyred nations,
 Even Germany.

There is something here
 Beyond those flannelled, cynic hours of peace.
 When peace meant nothing but a mean betrayal,
 Comfort, vicarious thrills and faked adventure,
 Money-making, flat celluloid romance.

Suspend my ship between the earth and stars,
 Support me, plane between the moon and God,
 And aid me as I thunder with my squadron,
 Good midwives all, to bring to birth a World!
 When terrible parturition is accomplished
 And agony's only a spent out fever,
 May someone look upon an infant Europe
 And read the dawning promise in his eyes.

The Channel! flashes faint and the wind's cold
 Upon my face, and there is Cassiopeia
 Stretching among the legions of the stars.
 My peers are now white Jupiter, red Mars,
 My invitation's to a dance of death.

POINTS OF VIEW

II. THE FARM LABOURER

BY FRED KITCHEN

MAN was given a pair of hands, and for generations his pride and glory were in his handiwork. The result was, the earth was enriched and beautified by the work of his hands—and his handiwork endured for generations. Not only works of art, beautiful statues and noble buildings, but in an humbler way the tiller of the soil acquired great skill in handiwork, so that even husbandry became (though unrecognized) a fine art. He ploughed, sowed, reaped, stacked and thatched, with a skill, and an eye to artistry, worthy of a nation's applause. He got none, for the simple reason, his artistry was but for a season, to be pulled down and started anew each year. But that he took pride in his handiwork there can be no doubt—as did every craftsman who lived by his hands. Then man invented a machine. It was intended to give rest to his hands, and to increase the comfort and wealth of the community, but so engrossed was he in creating more and more machines, that he lost the use of his hands, and craftsmanship became a lost art. The machine became so all important, that it ruled supreme until it made and finally destroyed the man who made it.

And in the midst of this great holocaust man cries out, "Wherewith shall we be fed?" Our grandfather's methods would not do, for they lacked machinery. Their simple method was to fatten their cattle when nature opened her larder in spring and summer, then when autumn came to kill their fat stock and salt enough of it down to last through the winter, keeping only stores and milk-cows during the winter. The same applied to some extent with the milk-cows. Nature, of course, decrees that animals shall produce their young in the spring of the year, but of recent years, the gestation period of the dairy-herd has been completely reversed. It was much better so, providing enough foreign feeding stuff could be procured for winter feeding; and the dairy cow—being an obliging sort of animal in these matters—was connived with to calve between October and about Christmas time. This resulted in an increase of milk at the time of year when milk would be normally scarce, and was an advantage to the producer and consumer alike. Now, of course, the war machine has cut off foreign cattle food, so the question is: "How

to produce milk in winter?" and the obvious answer is: "Produce it in summer! turn the herd round again to calf in spring, and make all the milk you can—and can the surplus—while the grass is good and plentiful." But it would take time to divert a herd back again to spring-calving—and, bless your life, it wouldn't require machinery. So machinery is set up whereby the cattle are deprived of eating too much spring grass, which is mown green and stored away in silos for winter use. To encourage the use of silage it has been proved that this stinking rotten mixture is rich in protein, and though we believe it is so, the cattle seem to have doubts about it, and instead of relishing it, as they would fresh green grass, eat it sparingly, and refuse to get fat.

Against the question of whether we should produce our beef and milk in summer, comes the question of farm-yard manure. Unless we have a considerable number of cattle housed in the winter, there will be a shortage of manure, and consequently a loss of fertility in the arable lands. On the other hand there will be more food and straw for the store cattle—which will eventually be converted into manure—so with no extra cake available, there doesn't seem much point in keeping animals in winter, which can be fed more cheaply in summer, and the beef salted—or frozen—for winter use, and the surplus milk dried or tinned. And what about this drive and urge to drink more milk? Undoubtedly it is the natural, and therefore the best food for growing children, but surely the Almighty didn't give us wisdom teeth to chew milk. For all the boosting of milk as a national beverage, lots of thirsty souls still find "body in John Barleycorn" to supply a refreshing drink.

Where do we stand now? and how can we make the best of this "blessed plot of earth—this England?"

There was a time when the farmer had only Providence to rely upon, and if "whoats were fetching nowt," "wheat were a fair price," and he thanked Providence, that "things were no wosser than they were." Then machinery was set up to create a new kind of Providence in a Minister of Agriculture, and then the farmers grumbled—as they always do—because they found the new Providence not quite up to the standard of the old Providence, and after an average of two new Providences a year, they found out farming could not be done from Whitehall.

And the war came; and this happened. A shortage of skilled labour on the farms, and politicians and everyone wondering what had become of 'em, when all the time they had helped to drive them away by advocating more machinery. Now they are trying to call them back again, and, baiting them with a modicum of cheese, have, after much hesitation, awarded them a princely minimum of £3 per week (there are boys, unskilled, on munitions getting twice as much).

But the farm-worker will not grumble, providing he can pay his way,

and he can be depended on to do his best toward filling the nation's larder. Most farmers agree that a £3 minimum is no more than just to the man on whom he depends for the success of his crops, for no class of employer is so much in the hands of his men as is the farmer. But there's no denying it, there are others to whom the paying out of a few extra shillings is more nerve wracking than an all-night blitz, and from these come pitiful wails about charging rent for the service cottage. Many M.P.'s, and other people who potter about after our social welfare, condemn the system of the "tied" or "service" cottage. The system is sound, and beneficial to both master and man. It is the cottage and not the system that should be condemned, for while on the big estates the cottages are generally good, in some districts, the tenants ought to be paid a rent for their courage in occupying them, rather than having to pay rent for living in such rat-holes.

A £3 minimum for the war period is not sufficient, if the skilled worker is to be kept on the land. His position should be made more secure, for after the war his wage will be the first to suffer a reduction, for the cry again will be for cheap food, and once again the farm-worker will be left aside—to be called for. The land-worker, therefore, should be given a proprietary interest in the land; if this were done, better use of the land would be the result, and the skilled worker would not be missing in the country's hour of need should that occasion again arise. To achieve this, every skilled farm-worker should be given the opportunity of farming on his own account. Cobbett said, "A man will love his country all the better for a pig," and it's true to say, he would love it still more if he had a plot of earth to go along with it. But not on the already dying system of landlord and tenant, for a small-holder's life under these conditions would be one of intense drudgery, where he and his family would have to pinch and scrape from daylight to dark to eke out a living. But the present large landowner system is wearing away, and in justice to the farm-worker, and as an insurance against national hunger, and to prevent the loss of skilled men on the land, whenever a large estate is broken up the State should become the owner and plant it out with that most profitable product of the countryside—the skilled farm-worker. They should be given fifty-acre holdings under Government grants, and set up on a co-operative basis, so getting back their former status and independence, which the Enclosure Acts of one hundred years ago, robbed away from their forefathers. And why not? Though leaders of every political party advocate larger farms and more machinery, it must be borne in mind the Government is paying out millions of pounds each year to keep them afloat, without much hope of return. Whereas, if the State were the landlord, the money would be an investment, not a subsidy: the land would produce more per acre by

individual attention, and the skilled worker would remain on the land.

It will be pointed out—with a mass of figures to prove it—that a large farm can be worked more economically than a small one. But figures prove nothing, they are movable digits, while the land—especially those fields lying a long way off the muck-yard—stays put. Agriculture is a process, not a manufacturing concern, and cannot be run on factory lines. To run a big farm on factory lines, those far off fields would have to be brought home and placed four or five storeys high, which—thank goodness—no machinery invented has yet been able to bring about. So the far off fields remain a mile or so away from home—and the manure heap, and receive less attention than the fields nearer home. This would be remedied if the outlying fields were made into holdings for approved farm-workers and could be done at no more expense than is now paid on subsidies.

Farming is a slow process, and to get a paying crop out of neglected land a farmer may have to wait several years before he sees any return for the capital laid out in reclaiming impoverished soil. Therefore he must have security of tenure—and isn't it worth while to make the skilled worker equally secure? After all the soil is the common heritage of the farm-worker as well as of the farmer. Nay, often his roots lie deeper in the soil than do his master's, for, during the last Great War, as in this, speculative farmers bought farms, whose only idea of the soil was a commodity out of which to procure more money. On the other hand, the farm-man looks on the soil with reverence and understanding, having no other motive than to encourage the fruit of the earth. No one grieves more at the breaking up of noble estates than do the tenant labourers, and to preserve these beautiful bits of old England from the speculator and jerry-builder, they should become State property on which to settle skilled workers—not as a concession, but as a national trust, so that never again need our land become derelict, or be unprepared to meet a national shortage of food.

One way to keep the young farm-worker from drifting into town, would be a more comprehensive use of Agricultural Colleges. At present, farm institutes and colleges are largely monopolized by the sons of farmers, and such as have enough capital to provide their sons with the education in agricultural science and up-to-date practices given by these institutions. The son of a farm-worker has little chance to avail himself of these opportunities—scholarships to agricultural colleges are very few—one reason being, of course, lack of interest on the part of the young farm-worker.

When land is laid down to grass, as during the past twenty years, it offers no inducement for the young to become interested in agriculture. The skilled stacker and ploughman is not needed, so the youth has none

of the motives that caused his father to cling to the soil in spite of lean times and adversities.

With all the rapid progress made in agricultural science, the "four-course-system" laid down by Lord Townshend in the 18th century still remains the soundest contribution to keeping the soil "fit" and in good heart, and with temporary leys instead of permanent pasture, the soil never becomes sick of either corn or cattle.

It also means more men will be needed on the land, and to keep them there, and to give the young farm-worker an incentive to take up agricultural education, his parents should become state-tenants and not mere landless labourers.

Likewise agricultural education should embrace all village industries—agricultural mechanics, the wheelwright, and wood-craft. The great danger of large farm units is to draw the rural population under the depressing influence of mass-production. In country towns and large villages where the facilities of adult education are plentiful you can see the effect of mass-mindedness—a dog race has more attraction than the pleasure of art, music or science—and the same thing would happen to the farm-worker herded on factory farms. To build a happy England would be more worthy than to patch up a "Merry England."

Regarding child labour as a help in the war-effort! The average schoolboy, picking potatoes, rips in as though he never meant to leave off work again. This spate lasts for about an hour, after which he has no further interest in potatoes. His knowledge of aeroplanes is remarkable, and every 'plane that comes over he recognizes at once, Lysander, Beaufort, Wellington, twin-engine, four-engine, what crew they carry, what speed they attain—he knows all. But of devotion to duty—especially to potatoes—he has learned nothing. Wherever a group of school-children are employed on field work, they should be under the supervision of a school-teacher. On no account should they be placed in a mixed company of casual land-workers. No one would say that the conversation was not "educational"; but it is scarcely the kind of education to promote good citizenship.

But just now, the question is, how to make the most of the land available? To look at the British Isles on a map, there doesn't seem much land to do anything with, while towns, railways and roads appear so closely together, that to adopt "prairie" methods seem impracticable. No doubt it would be beneficial to stub up many of our hedges, for, whoever planted them seemed to have lost all sense of direction, and a hedgerow full of bends and twists causes a lot of unnecessary labour in cultivating the field, besides taking up space that might be growing more food. Even with the shortage of labour, it would pay to have them removed, a job which could very well be done in frosty weather

when land-work was slack. But not all of them! No one would wish to make "a scorched earth" of English hedgerows and spoil an æsthetic taste, for the mundane, though pressing, taste of our stomachs. Of course farming would be carried on more economically without the interruption of hedgerows, but then, Economics is only an over-worked theory dating no further back than Adam Smith, whereas the cultivation and enrichment of the earth goes back to a much earlier Adam.

And that dreadful word Economics leads us to the question of "speeding up Agriculture." It just can't be done! unless someone invents a process of speeding up the seasons—and let us be thankful that so far no one has proved brainy enough to alter the clock of nature. All we can do is to bend our energies on producing the most from our limited acreage. In this present case of national urgency the question of money and economies does not matter, the one thing needful is to grow more food per acre, and without a doubt the small units centred around the manure heap will produce more than the extensive acres lying a long way off the farmstead. A case in point is Mr. Tom Wiberly who successfully provides enough food, meat, milk and cereals, to satisfy four persons per year off only one acre of ground. Of course such intensive cultivation could not be carried out on general farm lands, but it does show that individual units of land can receive better attention than a wide expanse of acres depending on one centre.

But really, it's beyond the cope of a mere farm-hand to sum up the situation on the farm-front. He can only do his best at his own particular job, and wonder why he does some of it. For instance, farmers are given a bonus of £10 per acre for growing more potatoes than the nation can possibly eat, and the ploughman wonders why and is told: "The surplus is made into potato flour." It seems a waste of effort when many times that quantity of flour could be made on the same acreage of wheat.

Another question that puzzles the farm-worker is: "Does farming pay?" He never hears a farmer boasting of having made a fortune out of the soil, and in his own summing up of agriculture, since the last Great War, it has been one of the best money-losing businesses in England. But—and here comes his greatest puzzle—every month in the land-workers' own special magazine there appears a list of farmers' wills proved. They number about a score each month, and the sums involved range anywhere from ten thousand to one hundred thousand pounds. It seems queer for a decaying industry, and leaves one with the impression that, though the farmer lives all his life "on the rocks," he manages somehow to die "in clover."

CORRESPONDENCE

SIR BERNARD PARES AND POLAND

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

May I correct some statements contained in the article of Sir Bernard Pares *Britain and Russia* (March number of THE FORTNIGHTLY) which I consider mistaken?

Sir Bernard states that Poland robbed Russia of a big territory inhabited by 14 millions of Russians. "This territory was recovered by the Soviet government when the Polish army was defeated by Hitler and otherwise it could only pass to him . . . fortunately it is a precedent for the British view on the question of the frontier line recommended to both parties by Lord Curzon in 1920." In one of his former articles (in the *Manchester Guardian*) Sir Bernard estimated the number of Russians subjugated by the Poles at 10 millions "only." It is true that the increase in the Soviet population has been very great; but nevertheless it seems highly improbable that since Sir Bernard's former article was published, the increase should have reached 40 per cent. over the figure given in it. The truth is that the territory occupied by the Russians in September, 1939, during Poland's fight against Hitler had a total population of 12 millions. Among them there were 120,000 Poles, 4,800,000 Russians, that is, 1 per cent. Besides there were: 4,800,000 Poles, 4,125,000 Ukrainians, 1,700,000 White-Russians and 1,050,000 Jews. (It should not be misunderstood—the White-Russians are as different from the Russians or Ukrainians, as the Spanish are from the French). The north of that territory has been purely Polish and so it has been since the 10th century. The southern parts, with a rather mixed population, belonged to the Polish state for at least 400 years; some of those provinces never were under Russian rule, not even for the shortest spell; others, and the smallest parts were dominated by Russia only since the partition of Poland. The treaties of this partition of Poland occurred in 1772, 1793 and 1795, and were officially declared void and null by the Soviet Government on April 9, 1918, and that decision of the Soviet Government was notified to the German Government on October 3, 1918.

The Polish Soviet frontier as settled by the Riga treaty was a compromise between both states and not in the least was it based upon any Polish intention to exploit Poland's military victory to the detriment

of Russia. Poland gave up about 120,000 square miles of the territory which she could claim for herself on the ground of the Soviet declaration of April 9, 1918. As to the Curzon line it is worth mentioning that both Poland and the Soviets rejected the frontier suggested by that proposal, a fact Sir Bernard seems to forget. The negative attitude of the Soviets towards the Curzon line was several times officially stated in Soviet diplomatic documents addressed to the British Government. Incidentally, the Curzon line originally presented no special British point of view; it merely reiterated the proposal of the Supreme Allied Council of December 8, 1919, which had drawn only a temporary demarcation line between the fighting armies, without pretending to fix any boundary. It should be added that the Supreme Allied Council when submitting this proposal explicitly recognized Poland's right to further claims for territories situated to the East of this temporary demarcation line.

Whilst I fully share Sir Bernard's good intentions towards Soviet Russia, I am unable to see why these should be substantiated by inaccurate statistical and historical data.

Yours faithfully,

JAN SZELIGA.

55, Exhibition Road,
S.W.7.

Sir Bernard Pares writes:

I cannot accept the Polish statistics put forward in the controversy over the debated territory. I am aware that the facts are much disputed. With regard to the suggested inconsistency in my own statement on the subject, it is difficult for me to check this, as Mr. Szeliga does not give the reference, but of one thing I feel quite certain—that I never used the word 'only' (ten million) which he attributes to me in quotation marks. It is quite clear that the Ukrainians and the White Russians, among both of whom I have lived, are variants of the Russian nationality and not of the Polish: nor has Polish policy ever given the slightest encouragement to their independence. The Polish frontier of 1939 cut White Russia exactly in half. The vast majority of the Christians lay in Russia, and to absorb them the Poles would have to march nearly to the Volga.

But surely the point of the whole matter is that this is a question which the Poles will have to settle with the Russians of themselves. My citation of the Curzon line (I do not accept Mr. Szeliga's qualifications of the details) is to show that the British government did actually express an opinion on the subject, and that for our part we cannot be asked to go beyond it. The Curzon line is reasonably close to the Russian

frontier of 1941, in which, like Mr. Szeliga, I should like to see some modifications. But unless we are to fight Russia for what lies further East, I cannot see what the Poles expect us to do to advance their claim.

From 1907 to 1917, when Poland was off the map, I worked hard for the Polish cause in close co-operation with the Polish leader, Mr. Roman Dmowski, and I have established the first posts for the study of Poland in two British universities. In 1917 those Russian statesmen with whom I had been in the closest touch, as almost the first act of the Provisional Government of that year, conceded full independence to the Poles. I am quite convinced that it is exactly the interest of the Soviet Government that there shall be an independent Poland and an independent Czechoslovakia, relying on Russian support against German aggression. But I cannot agree that we are concerned in fighting out the Polish claims with Russia, or that they would be in the interest of the Poles themselves.

RECONSTRUCTION AND THE LAND

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

May I be allowed to put in a demurrer to your reviewer's misinterpretation of a passage from my *Reconstruction and the Land* which he quotes in his closing sentences (March number).

Surely the context of the passage makes it plain enough that in describing the eighteen-sixties as the 'Golden Age' of British Farming, with wheat above 50s. a quarter and wages at 12s. a week, I was reporting the farmer's point of view of the past now remembered by few.

The passage cannot be construed as bearing on the 'national interest'; it is a simple factual statement that farmers were making money in those years and looked back to them with regret.

The whole purpose of the rest of my book is to show that the national interest in agriculture is not to be measured by the current prosperity of farmers only, but by the extent to which the land can be made to subserve the needs of the population in general.

A. DANIEL HALL.

Long Sutton House,
Basingstoke.

Mr. John Stewart Collis writes: I got the impression—though no doubt wrongly—that Sir Daniel Hall seemed to share the pleasure which those farmers felt for that 'Golden Age.'

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

WHEN this war began, Mr. Anthony Weymouth had the idea of keeping a diary which would not only recall his day to day experience but also put on record what he learnt through official contacts with significant persons whom he met in his work as organizer of Talks for the B.B.C. His first volume, *A Psychologist's Wartime Diary*, was published by Harrap in 1940; the second, *Plague Year*, is now before us, and for half a guinea one can revive the emotions of a crowded twelve months down to February of last year. Memories have been so battered with stimuli that they can hardly function so completely as usual, and it is not only in future periods, less familiar with the sound of bombs, that this review of happenings will be welcomed. Yet the impression which he produces on my mind is that of a man half dazed; and indeed it would have been untrue to the temper of the time portrayed if his diary set out a clear story of those weeks in which France and the Low Countries were overrun, or of the others in which London was bombarded night after night. It is surprising that Dunkirk appears only as a glorious name; I thought we had all visualized that tragic deliverance. Yet after all most of what he has to tell us is less about public events than individual encounters—mostly with civilians such as his friend the foreman brick-layer who objected to having men called off their work during raids. "Let 'em be; then if they machine-gun us, only two will likely be shot. But if they crowd us together, they may get as many as forty." Sense as well as valour spoke there; the work would go on, for its own sake, and for a gesture of defiance.

Again, it is interesting to know that after France surrendered, G.B.S. wrote a Talk which contained this sentence. "The future of the world may well be in the hands of the U.S.A. and Russia—that's why I'm always so civil to Russia"—Russia being then in alliance with Germany. Unluckily the Talk was held up because Mr. Shaw had remarked that Hitler was no less sure than Lord Halifax of having God on his side. "If so," said the script, "we shall have to fight God as well as Mr. Hitler." But G.B.S. went on to express his reasonable belief that "God would see fair." However the situation altered so fast that the talk regrettably had to be scrapped. I agree with Mr. Weymouth that it would have been of value to the Allied Cause that Mr. Shaw should "tell the world that we must fight." Nobody has ever doubted his pugnacity—but it was not often in line with the British Government's wishes. Yet whatever the British Government may do at any moment, the British people always like and listen to this Irishman—who, according to Mr. Weymouth, was quite ready to see Ireland invaded if necessary by British troops, whatever Mr. de Valera might say. Mr. de Valera brought civil war into Ireland in the name of nationalism: Mr. Shaw, another Nationalist, would have done as much for an international purpose.

All sorts of topics, personal and impersonal, civil and military, come naturally into Mr. Weymouth's record; and perhaps there is more to be learned from another book of more limited scope which I have read with unexpected enjoyment; for Mr. Michael Joseph was known to me by name only as one of the more recently established publishers, and did not seem a likely man to give account of the charm which the British army ever exercises over those whose association with it has been temporary and accidental. Yet he has done this. *The Sword in the Scabbard* (which his firm publishes at 10s. 6d.) opens by saying that even before the war began there was a rush of ex-officers wanting to get back. "To say that they volunteered is an under-statement; they seemed to spend most of their time trying, at first without success, to rejoin." Even he with four years service and a special knowledge of machine guns to his credit, and only forty-one scored up against his age record, did not easily get in. Yet, he says, though I do not think he proves it, that the army is right in giving great preference to younger men. The colonel under whom I served most of my time was well on in the fifties, but most of us counted him the best commanding officer in the division, and the men at whose head he fell did full credit that day to his training. What is more, Mr. Joseph's own account makes it plain that he himself was a useful addition to the hasty levies that were forming after Dunkirk—under conditions of which till I read him, I had no conception.

However, this is not the book's main interest: I find that in the description of a literary man's experience with the professional British army. That battalion of the West Kent's was commanded by a thoroughly typical British officer, zealous for all the rigours of discipline; but behind the martinet was a human being of cultivation and charm. Mr. Joseph makes us all feel, what some of us experienced, that the British army is a grand field for friendships—and singularly welcoming for those who come into it from outside its peculiar pale. The messes of to-day have an element that we did not know a generation ago—men not professional soldiers, yet veterans, they like Mr. Joseph himself may bring a critical influence to bear on the army's methods—which, as he sees, imply abundance of time. You can turn out fighters quicker than soldiers, is how this book put it. Simply teach them the use of their weapons, and encourage the offensive spirit. Australian troops were quickly produced, and there is really no reason to believe that people of these islands are not just as good fighting material. The truth is that the British army was formed deliberately for a special purpose—to prevent wars. That is not what Hitler had in mind—or Napoleon. British training dispensed with all notion of personal dislike for the enemy; it made an army ready to fight without malice against those it was ordered to subdue. But under the modern conditions which Germany has so lavishly provided, men come into the army wanting to kill Germans (and now Japanese also) and this is an aid to producing fighters on which the army has never been accustomed to count. Mr. Joseph holds that, given this aid, much more expeditious methods of training could be devised. For one thing, he wants to bring propaganda into the barrack room; and he may be right. But on one point I call him misleading; this machine gunner condemns the bayonet. "Bows and arrows were useful weapons once," he says. That has nothing to do with it. Missiles belong to a different order of ideas, but so long as fighting exists, there will be the chance of the ultimate rough and tumble, in which the bayonet is supreme; and men can be given confidence in this weapon—though not I think by the

ordinary bayonet drill. There is no better physical exercise than fencing with spring bayonets, and it is much too often neglected.

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One thing is clear; the army that Mr. Joseph describes was a happy army; the people among whom Mr. Weymouth recorded his experiences were a people morally sound. Alas and alas! Mr. Thomas Kernan's *Report on France* (Lane, 10s. 6d.) has a very different theme. As director of the Paris edition of *Vogue*,

The Voice of France

this American had lived long in Paris before the war, and while his country was still neutral, he remained in charge of his paper and its offices, and had full opportunity to appreciate the elaborately thought out methods by which Germany took control of all French business life. No doubt equally well-digested schemes for dealing with the British currency, the banks, the Stock Exchange and so forth are ready for application if occasion should arise; and this part of Mr. Kernan's book is most instructive—and terrifying. What the Germans did at least stands to their credit for efficiency; what the French did, and did not do, makes the most painful of reading. I do not wish to discuss his analysis of the reasons why in certain cases officers deserted their men, doctors and nurses their patients. Admitting that these cases were exceptional, if they happened even in one out of a hundred instances, the falling away from 1914-18 was appalling. It recalls to me that three or four years after the armistice, I talked with a young Frenchman, half Irish and very modern. France, he said, was *un pays pourri*. "What about the war?" said I. The war he said was only a *sursaut*—a spasm. "A *sursaut* that lasted four years," I retorted—and thought I had the best of it. But now, what is one to think? Yet suppose in the days of Dunkirk, England had not found Mr. Churchill. Clemenceau saved the situation in the last war. Was it only a chance that France could not find a man to galvanize her superb qualities in 1941? The choice of Pétain was disastrous; he was the man against whom no one had anything to say. Plenty of men had had plenty to say against Clemenceau and Lloyd George and our present Prime Minister; their qualities were not negative. Mr. Kernan in the later chapters of his book lets us know how much might be said with justice against the general conduct of France's leading men. In so far as this is a raking up of gossip, it seems highly undesirable; M. Reynaud in particular whom I have heard discourse impressed me not only as an able and honest man but as conspicuously a gentleman; I do not like to hear a gentleman's love affairs discussed in the tone which this editor of an American fashion paper thinks appropriate. He knows France in a certain way intimately; I do not feel that he knows those qualities in France which make the help of France indispensable in any reconstruction of Europe's civilization. Whether the voice of France be the voice of a republic or of a monarchy, it will be the voice of a free civilization, which will command understanding and response through all Europe such as no Anglo-Saxon utterance can ever hope to secure.

* * * * *

Two books of real interest for students of poetry have proved less enjoyable than I hoped. One is the reprint in Everyman's Library of Alexander Gilchrist's *Life of William Blake*—edited by Ruthven Todd and published by Dent at 3s. The other is Mr. Stephen Spender's *Life and the Poet*, published by Secker in the Searchlight library at 2s. Mr. Spender, writing with a great assumption of

The Poet and Life

authority, says that the business of a poet is to be perpetually "asking questions about life and death and the universe." Blake was even too persistent in such questioning. Yet nobody could be more truly a poet than this artist craftsman who before he was fourteen had written one of the loveliest things in the Golden Treasury. But the trouble with Blake is that he went mad, and the company of even a gifted madman is wearisome. Wordsworth said that there was something in Blake's madness that interested him more than "the sanity of Lord Byron or Walter Scott"; yet I had sooner read a life of either Byron or Scott by almost any author than Gilchrist's over-detailed account of Blake's odd existence. Still in all the history of poetry there are few things more moving than the way in which Blake managed to bring out his first poems, engraving them letter by letter and selling the prints.

But let us consider Mr. Spender, who complains that a world full of "impersonal machine gods and the too successful class devoted to them" is unpropitious for poetry. One might remind him that Shakespeare was also discontented with his period. But I cannot help thinking that Shakespeare or Homer, if we could get hold of them, would tell Mr. Spender to look about him and be thankful for profusion of inspiring materials. There has no doubt been a deal of profiteering; but at present the rich are being flayed to the bone, and are not complaining; the world is full of men clamouring for the chance to put themselves in positions of the utmost hardship and danger. Surely Mr. Spender must see all about him personages on the grand scale for good or for bad, for splendour and for meanness. Quisling might have come out of the *Iliad*, so might Chiang Kai Shek. Or again, in this so-called mechanical age, look at the part played by Gandhi. It is only fair to say that Mr. Spender does not encourage the young left-wingers to repudiate war as a subject for poetry; he handsomely admits that it may convey moving and valuable experience—whatever their imbecile preciosity may think. But I cannot sympathize with his plea that government, when it gets poets into the armed forces, should provide them with time and seclusion for writing. Verse can be composed without chair and table; a deal of it probably was turned out in trenches; that is where poetry has the pull over prose. What Mr. Spender does not fully accept is that poetry is written very much for the fun of the thing, to get pleasure and to give pleasure; it does not affect the sacerdotal. A poet does not consciously, like a lecturer, address himself to other people; he is, and has got to be, his own audience; he sings first to himself, and he should never forget the part of Everyman that is in every poet. It is as his own audience that he insists on melody, accepts the joy of beautiful words; but also, as his own audience, he ought to look after Everyman's interest and see that the utterance can be understood. To judge by some of the verse that Mr. Spender quotes with approval (for instance from Mr. Dylan Thomas) he disregards this part of a poet's function—and to that extent denies to Everyman the appropriate pleasures of poetry. He says some fine things and acute things—as for instance that an old truth uttered by a new poet is not merely repeated; it has been lived again in different surroundings and is therefore reborn. But on the whole I should fear that he discouraged rather than promoted both the making and the reading of poetry, which he seems to present as rather a joyless job. But, thank God, the old springs of delight are always open—and may always be multiplied.

BRITISH LABOUR'S RISE TO POWER, by Carl F. Brand. Oxford University Press for Stamford University, California. 21s. 6d.

Here are eight studies by an American Professor of History, dealing with as many phases of British Labour history, all, except the first, subsequent to 1914. They illustrate very well both the merits and the defects of current history, written mainly out of periodicals and reports, by a careful student who knows the general political background of his subject, but lacks the intimate acquaintance with its events and personalities needed for successful placing of things in their correct order of significance and practical importance. Professor Brand has studied assiduously some, but not all, of the Labour and Socialist periodicals; he has raked through the reports of the Labour Party, the Trades Union Congress, the Independent Labour Party, and the Communist Party; he has unearthed the details of the quarrels between the rival Internationals after 1918, and between the Labour Party and the Communists over the twenty years before 1939. Any student who wants a careful record of these disputes, a summary of successive Labour pronouncements on War Aims in the course of the last war, or a record of votes cast on important issues related to these matters at successive Conferences of the Labour Party and the Trade Unions, will find in this book a great deal that is useful. He is a chronicler, and not a historian; and his chronicle has all the limitations of the 'research' made by someone who is neither enough of an insider to make his chronicle a living document, nor enough of an outsider to take a balanced and objective view. In particular, the effect of the news-

papers which Professor Brand has studied most assiduously is to overweight his narrative with material derived from I.L.P. sources (he has made comparatively little use of George Lansbury's *Herald*, and appears not to understand its position), and also to give the always small and never influential British Socialist Party an altogether undue prominence.

Of the eight studies, the first purports to deal with the conversion of the Trade Unions to political action. But it deals in fact only with one phase of this conversion—that of the Reform movement of the 1860's. From this point Professor Brand skips over nearly half a century, which includes the period during which this conversion really took place and first the I.L.P. and then the Labour Party were formed. He comes straight to a study of Labour's part in the Coalition Governments of the last war, and thence to a series of essays on Labour's Peace Aims, Labour's reaction to President Wilson's Fourteen Points, the war-time history of the Labour Internationals, and kindred questions; and thence again to his post-war studies of the rebuilding of the Internationals and of the troubled course of relations between Social Democracy and Communism in the world between the wars. The title of his book is thus really a misnomer; for he does not study Labour's rise to power, but only certain incidents related to it. There is, for example, hardly anything about the Labour Governments of 1924 and 1929, or about the effects of the General Strike of 1926 on Labour's political or industrial position.

The plain truth is that the details of the Labour Party's bickerings with the Communists, or of the manoeuvres of the rival Internationals after the last war, are

profoundly uninteresting unless they are interpreted as well as chronicled. It would make a most interesting study to try to find out exactly why the British Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress, after quarrelling most vehemently with the German Social Democrats during the last war, became so speedily their allies in the post-war Second International, against the parties, such as the French and Italian, which stood a good deal further to the left. It would be exciting, as well as important, to discover why the Communists made so much less impression on the British Labour movement after 1917 than on almost any other national section of the Labour 'International.' It would be well worth while to analyse both the objective forces and the personalities behind the various movements, and to attempt to estimate their relative influence. But these tasks are not for Professor Brand, who thinks he has done his job when he has correctly copied out the resolutions and set the merely external events before his readers in due order.

G. D. H. COLE.

PROBLEMS OF THE DANUBE BASIN, by C. A. Macartney. Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.

The problem of the Danube Basin is only a segment of "that shifting intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests, rival peoples, and antagonistic faiths that is veiled" as John Morley once said "under the easy name of the Eastern Question." But it is an important segment and certainly not the least complicated.

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practical experience. Yet this book is, in some degree disappointing, the more so as the introductory chapter is as brilliant as anything I ever read on this subject. My main criticism of the book is that Mr. Macartney pre-supposes a much greater knowledge of the subject than the average reader of this series is likely to possess. Or does he take for granted that his readers, using his book as a starting point, will have the industry and patience to expand his highly concentrated essence for themselves?

The truth is—paradoxical though it may sound—that the smaller the canvas the bigger ought to be the brush wherewith you paint. Otherwise you overcrowd the picture with detail and fail to make it as a whole intelligible. Again, the more concentrated the narrative the greater the necessity for perfect lucidity of style. This canon also Mr. Macartney fails to satisfy. Again and again I have found it necessary to reread a sentence or a paragraph more than once before I could be certain of its meaning. So rapid, indeed, is Mr. Macartney's thought, so elliptical his style, that some of his statements seem (to duller minds) hardly consistent with each other. For instance: from page 40 I learn that it was the "steady aim" of the Habsburgs "to break down all popular institutions and to transform its patrimony into a centralized, unified and autocratically ruled whole." On page 42 the Habsburgs "had no wish and never tried to change the national individualities, as such, of their subjects." But on page 43 the object of the Habsburgs was "to reduce all national feeling to a common level, to extirpate from anywhere any feelings except that of attachment to the dynasty." Doubtless Mr. Macartney would have made all this

clear enough if he had not been compelled to such rigid compression. But what in the meantime, is the inexpert reader to conclude was in fact the Habsburg policy?

Once more. In reference to the Compromise of 1867 between Austria and Hungary Mr. Macartney writes: Bitterly as the Compromise was attacked, it cannot justly be called an immoral arrangement" (page 101). That leaves one reader puzzled as to why the *Ausgleich* ever should have been criticized as "immoral." But let me desist from criticism of details which in the interests of the ordinary reader I feel constrained to make. I hasten to add that the little book is full of "good stuff" on subjects with which it is the duty of every intelligent citizen to inform himself.

Personally, I have never ceased to regret the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. Palacky, the great Czech statesman and historian declared in 1866: "If the Austrian Empire had not existed of old it would have been necessary in the interests of Europe and of humanity to create it." "Ramshackle" in some senses it may have been: but it was an immense convenience. With two of Mr. Macartney's conclusions, then, I cordially agree: that "the maintenance of the security and stability of the Danubian area is a vital interest of the whole world," and that "some form of association for common defence, entailing necessarily a degree of common foreign policy is indispensable for the security" (of the Danubian States).

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE FUTURE, by Donald Hughes. *Cambridge University Press.* 3s. 6d.

There has been a great deal of criticism of the Public Schools in recent times. Most of it is from those who can see no good in the Public School system and would sweep it away altogether. The attacks of these critics are of little value since they ignore the tremendous contributions which the Public Schools have made to this country's history. In this book there is a reasoned and sincere belief in their future and a constructive scheme for correcting their faults and preserving their virtues.

One of the difficulties in discussing this subject is to find a satisfactory definition in answer to the question "What constitutes a Public School?" In a recent letter to *The Times*, the Headmaster of Winchester points out that "the contrast is not between the secondary and the public schools but between day and boarding schools."

It is of the boarding school system that Mr. Hughes writes, believing that its very great advantages justify its much greater cost; he is sure that more self-reliance and confidence are found in the boarder and that there is a far deeper "sense of belonging to a community and of the obligation to be loyal to something other than himself." The book is not for this reason an attack on the day school: the best day schools seem really to be those which have assimilated as far as possible the boarding-school system.

The author's one really adverse criticism of the boarding schools is their general aimlessness, the solution to which is a far greater emphasis on religious training so that Christianity becomes so live an interest that it's importance in boys'

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lives supplants the present aim, as often as not the mere winning of 1st XV colours.

If we accept the principle that the Boarding School has more to offer by its very corporate existence as a community than any other form of educational system, then we must ensure that these schools are in reality made Public and that the question of admission is decided not merely on financial grounds but on whether the boy is intelligent enough to profit from further education. To throw open the present Public Schools to unrestricted competition by examination only to boys who would be maintained at State expense would defeat its own object since so revolutionary a proposal would destroy at once the characteristics of the Public School as it is. Equally has it been rightly pointed out that merely to open a few places to state scholars at each school would meet neither social nor financial difficulties.

Mr. Hughes would meet both by maintaining 60 per cent. of the places for those who would enter in the normal course of events and 40 per cent. for boys chosen on merit who would be paid for by the State. He supports this suggestion by arguing that the schools must retain a considerable proportion of normal admissions in order to retain their character and independence, while the introduction of so large a number of State scholars would ensure that they would not feel isolated among strangers.

When all are under a common discipline and engaged on the same tasks and interests, there would be a real sense of belonging to one community and any feeling of class would quickly disappear: certainly such a common aim would dispel the make-believe atmosphere which is found in so many holiday camps

and similar organized parties where it is not really possible, even with the best intentions, that the mingling of classes should be on equal terms.

Mr. Hughes has also many sound and provocative things to say about all other manner of things; he is particularly good on the teaching of Shakespeare for School Certificate, he is ready to retain corporal punishment but would abolish fagging, and he has some wise things to say on the abuse of athleticism. The whole book is well-balanced and stimulating and deserves to be read by all who have taken an interest in the many discussions that have taken place on the problem and those who have at heart the future of our educational system.

J. F. BURNET.

THE SPORTING QUEENSBERRYS, by The Tenth Marquess of Queensberry. *Hutchinson*. 15s.

During the month when Commander Stephen King-Hall and Mr. Vernon Bartlett, two Members of Parliament who, more than most, have made a profession out of the Man in the Street, call loudly for an end to be made to pleasure, especially of the ring and the race-course, it is pleasant to find that Lord Queensberry estimates the ring as equal to all the other activities of life put together. Each chapter of his book is given half to the ring and half to the rest: even when history is found to move faster than pugilism, so that the mind has to make a considerable temporal adjustment in the middle of every "Round."

Through the second part of each "Round" pass all the boxers who ever achieved fame; with a pressure of gory and shady anecdote that threatens to overwhelm the chroni-

cles of the house of Douglas, and promises to provide material for an indefinite number of further volumes. Two important constructive suggestions emerge. Lord Queensberry is one of the many who consider that every title contest should be fought to a finish, and maintains the view, not infrequently encountered, that "Tunney did not deserve the victory which came to him from the hands of the referee at the end of his ten rounds with Dempsey in Philadelphia." Of course, Tunney's contemptuous attitude to professional pugilism was highly disruptive of what may be called 'million dollar gate morale'! Lord Queensberry would also impose restraint on the "minor operations" performed in the corner of the ring, such as pouring caustic into an open wound, and opening a swollen eye with a razor blade. The squeamish may be consoled to learn that "I have the word of scores of boxers that to be knocked out is entirely painless, and leaves the victim perfectly capable of continuing the contest as soon as consciousness returns."

Lord Queensberry is neither historian nor stylist; and his account of the wild Douglasses is as disappointing as was Mr. Bernard Falk's of the mad Seymour-Conways. Both Lord Queensberry and Mr. Falk start with Old Q: but Lord Queensberry equally fails to bring him to life.

On the Eighth Marquess of Queensberry somewhat more light is thrown. This strange man not only formulated the famous Rules (which are here set forth in full, both original and present drafts) at the age of twenty-two, but, at the same age, succeeded in winning general support for them from the anti-English and anti-aristocratic Irish-American boxing promoters of

the 'seventies. He also founded the present system of weight distinctions. Equally important, of course, is the fact that he was mainly responsible for the downfall and destruction of the potentially greatest writer of English comedy since Ben Jonson. Lord Queensberry's information on page 172 about his uncle, Lord Alfred Douglas's works, and the literature of the Wilde cult generally, is comically inexact and inadequate.

Lord Queensberry's father, though he discovered the Canadian nickel deposits, as well as several remarkable gold mines, consumed £300,000 in eighteen months, and died penniless. His funeral was attended by a vast concourse of the needy, obscure, and afflicted. Perhaps the best thing in the book is Lord Queensberry's detailed account of the miseries of life at Harrow on two shillings a week pocket money.

On page 44 there is a delightful misprint (among others):—"George IV. would not have tolerated in his entourage anyone whose character was so much as tinged with dissolute tendencies."

The history of the Douglasses, as of the Seymour-Conways, remains to be written.

ROBERT FORDYCE AICKMAN.

ENGLISH WOODLAND, by John Rodgers. *Batsford*. 10s. 6d.

ALPINES I HAVE GROWN, by Russell Leslie. *Drummond*. 7s. 6d.

In his preface, Mr. Rodgers explains that war conditions made it impossible for him "to revisit the woods that have charmed me so often." He therefore had to rely on his memory and on his books. His memory must have been well-stored and his books have enabled him to amplify his text with generous quotations from the novelists and the poets. From Epping and Wychwood and the Forest of Dean

in the south to Inglewood and the Forest of Rothbury in the north, he has omitted none of the more considerable woodlands of this country, and his enthusiasm is infectious. This is all to the good, especially at a time when the demands of war are once again depleting this important (though underestimated) part of our national heritage. Something will have been achieved if Mr. Rodgers's book should awaken zeal for the beauty of our dwindling woodlands. Nevertheless, when the last word has been said about their beauty (and there is plenty to say) the uncomfortable fact remains that England is the most deplorably afforested country in Europe; and how much more Mr. Rodgers might have achieved if he had gone on to stiffen that zeal with indignation at the way in which the more utilitarian aspects of our woodlands have been, and still are being, neglected?

Whatever attempts are made after the war to reorganize our rural life and agriculture upon a healthy basis will have to take afforestation very seriously into account. Life is one and indivisible: the health of the land is a measure of the health of the people who live on it. And the health of the land is conditioned in no inconsiderable manner by the state of its woodlands. It is of no use in the long run, for instance, to spend vast sums on reclamation, on the conversion of pasture to plough, and on increased food production all over the country, if at the same time we deplete our already insufficient woodlands and take no steps—or even take inadequate steps—to plant where we have felled. Restoration of fertility will have to be the basis of any future land policy in England; but that policy is doomed in advance unless felling is accompanied by equivalent planting.

Mr. Rodgers commends, along

with Jubilee Oaks, a suggestion recently put forward in *The Times* to the effect that, instead of sending a wreath to a funeral, we should plant a tree in memory of the dead; but such well-meaning contributions are a mere drop in the ocean. Even the work of the Forestry Commission is altogether inadequate at present to meet the growing need. Nor can that work have any lasting, satisfactory outcome so long as the guiding principle of the Commission remains what it apparently is to-day, namely, a consideration for the commercial value of the kind of trees used for planting. Regimented acres of conifers all over the country would still leave the problem unsolved. Mr. Rodgers himself cites an instance from East Poland, where, he says, "the pine trees died of blight, because the birds left the woods when the broad-leaved trees were felled." Similarly, no attempts at re-afforestation in England can be of any permanent value while, as was the case during the year 1937-1938, 11,000 acres of conifers are planted as against 2,500 acres of broad-leaved trees.

It is a pity therefore that *English Woodland* should devote no more than one chapter (of five pages only) to this all-important aspect of its subject. Woodland flora and fauna, too, are only mentioned in passing, and more might have been said about the various wood-crafts which are surely integral to the theme. Folk-lore and legend are briefly touched upon and Mr. Rodgers is extremely well-informed on the history of our forests. Finally, it almost goes without saying that the book is well illustrated, though it must be confessed that photographs of trees, and very little else but trees, tend to pall long before the publishers' generous allowance of a hundred has been exhausted. . . . Of Mr. Leslie's book there is little to say. The

thirty or so wood-engravings, which are the reason for the brief, informative text, are charming, though they suffer both from the war-time paper on which they are printed and from a certain heaviness in the design. If there still remains anybody, in these unaccommodating times, able to console himself with the cultivation of alpinism, he should nevertheless add this little book to his library.

C. HENRY WARREN.

THE SOLITARY MAN AND OTHER POEMS, by Richard Church. Dent. 7s. 6d.

THE BURIED STREAM. COLLECTED POEMS 1908 to 1940, by Geoffrey Faber. Faber & Faber. 8s. 6d.

GAUTAMA THE ENLIGHTENED AND OTHER VERSE, by John Masefield. Heinemann. 5s.

Mr. Richard Church, by long apprenticeship and patient integrity, has brought his art to a point of perfection. On the strength of his new book alone, attractively produced in a limited edition, Mr. Church would have to be considered an important poet, with the best of his generation still writing, Edmund Blunden, V. Sackville-West, T. S. Eliot, Robert Graves. For in *The Solitary Man*, a book that moved me deeply, he has, "life's discipline grown fruitful," with "slow words most deliberately planned" given us an artistic statement that nobody else could have given. If he commands no sweeping, compelling music, his use of half-rhyme and subtle cadence much attract an attentive ear; which, above all, reflect his predominant mood—pain. There is a poignant intimacy about these poems which are full of images of martyrdom, a severely harnessed personal note—one thinks of Emily Dickinson—yet this is a sweet austerity. Ripeness is all, and something of the mellowness of

From behind
the counter



To despatch
riding



Speed . . . interest . . . good
fresh air, instead of standing all
day in an overheated shop . . .
He's one of the people who may
no longer need

'SANATOGEN'

Regd. Trade Mark

Nerve-Tonic Food

light in Keats's *Ode to Autumn* is over certain passages, for example in the sonnet *Late Love* and in *A Gardener's Farewell*. Yet generally for Mr. Church

Grief is articulate, but joy
Is a dumbfounded boy.

He is dumb, he has nothing to say.

The theme, personal and philosophic, of *The Solitary Man* is the agony of war and the war between good and evil, expressed in "grieving rhythms" and in places with a "stabbing agony," but always symbolically, poetically. He sees

Poor Shakespeare with a bullet in his throat,

And a scarred Cross, the relic of a Faith.
But he has his solution, his poet's answer:

And think again, if an armed man
Shall desecrate your house,
In a few years that noise will sound
Like a foraging mouse.

It might be misleading to select for particular emphasis titles from the many fine poems in this book, but I feel confident that Mr. Church's muse would make a comfortable ninth beside the eighth which he has destined recently for immortality.

A careful reading through Mr. Geoffrey Faber's *Collected Poems* brings with it a respectful sympathy for a brave and idealistic spirit. It is possible that this record of a soul's pilgrimage through chaos to chaos has more of a religious than an intrinsically poetic value, and the poems inspired by religious passion are perhaps the best, for example *Cowardice* and *O Greater Than Greatness*. For Mr. Faber reveals a soul seared by the last war and dreams broken. Although his book is by no means without literary echoes, he somehow manages to preserve the integrity of what he has to say. Generally speaking the

longer poems and those written in freer metres are the most successful, for elsewhere he sometimes shows a badly defective ear, like Donne who "for not keeping of accent, deserved hanging"! But many of the poems in the second half of the book are good, to choose at random *Memorial to Michael Lawrence*, *In Piam Memoriam*, *Welsh Inn Parlour*, and *Dark River*. I have no space here to take up the gauntlet thrown down in Mr. Faber's over-modest Preface, except to say that he ignores the truism of *plus ça change* . . . There does not seem to me to have been so great a break in tradition as he postulates. Nor can I agree that the sonnet is, or is likely to be, *démodé*, but suggest that it will continue to flourish as obstinately in England as cricket.

In *Gautama The Enlightened and Other Verse* Mr. Masfield takes delightful holiday. In the title-poem the motive springs from joy which is true spirituality. Elsewhere

Art is the Sun which shines.

If these four longish poems lack some of the vitality of the early work, the story-teller is in good evidence. *Shopping In Oxford* invites comparison with another poem on a similar theme, *Miss Thompson Goes Shopping* by Martin Armstrong. They should both be read aloud, and the palm awarded! There is some good descriptive writing in the ballad, *Mahdama's Quest*:

Up, from the brake, the wild-duck
scattered,
Up, in a V, into the sky.
The river wimpled, the reeds fluttered,
The reed-birds breathed their warning
cry.

Admirers of Mr. Masfield will enjoy themselves here.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

JUNE, 1942

WAYS OF PEACE IN ITALY

BY KARL WALTER

FOR most Italians, Italy is now just part of the hinterland of a German south-eastern front, drawn upon for men, arms and supplies like other conquered and vassal countries; still in the war, but no longer as a partner. They expect us to break up that front; and, of all consequences of this, their main interest lies in the question of how soon thereafter the Germans will be driven over the Alps. Whether they help us in either of these tasks will depend upon our moral influence as well as our military strength. Indifference to the major issues, even in the climax of the war, was to be expected in a country whose dictator has lost or given away every card he held for war or peace.

Dribbles of personal news from Italy colour the public impression of a people turning to seek the ways of peace in their daily lives, getting as far away from the war as possible. "As much as we can we are making a life as you knew it." Young men known to have been in the forces are named in surprising number as enjoying normal employment. Unhappy children born and bred pro-British are now "getting on very well in every way" at school. Friends are now "getting on very well in every way"—and certainly not by admiration of Mussolini. Former British and American residents receive pointed messages. "The house is ready whenever the signori are ready to return." Other residents who had been interned are living in their villas again. "We are expecting you . . ."

A new phase in the endurance of increasing hardships is indicated by the official voices of press and radio. The exhortations are no longer against defeatism; all Italians know they lost their war against France by a too tardy intervention, and against Greece and Great Britain by ordeal of arms. For many, this is the eve of peace; they have passed beyond the defeatist phase into a twilight of nonbelligerent indifference. For others, it is the eve of disaster and chaos, and they rage against that indifference, fearing what may spring at them out of the dusk, chained to their German masters.

In these circumstances at least one current of Italian thought, constant in its direction, may be traced with some confidence even where it has gone underground. To some of her public men and

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lesser officials whom I know as well as I know my own kin, Italy's future place among the nations will to-day be worth only a shrug of the shoulders, and the fate of the régime a rude noise. But their indifference will not extend to those institutions of the régime upon which so largely depend the orderly economic ways of peace and above all the social security which was steadily being won by the workers. Just as we have reason to believe that among the masses there is to-day a strong tendency to seek the ways of peace, so we may assume, from previous knowledge guided by passing indications, that these men, their leaders in all that has been socially constructive in recent years, will be looking for ways of civil peace and social order through the coming period of political disruption. That is where we must be prepared to meet them, being indeed pledged to meet them in these ways by the declarations of the Atlantic Charter.

The problem of Italy's future and our relations with her in a new world order is not faced by those who think the destruction of Fascism will solve it. We cannot foresee what will happen to a country which has lived for so many years enclosed in totalitarianism, as in an iron lung. But a necessary process of any orderly reconstruction, we may be sure, will be the disentanglement of useful public institutions from the intricate network of the Fascist régime. Whether this is to take place under a monarchical or republican system is not our concern; the question comes under that article of the Atlantic Charter which declares the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live, and the less we say about it the better. In any case, compared with questions of their economic existence and social security, that of the House of Savoy is of little interest to the Italian people.

The Fascist Party is quite a different proposition, as part of the present constitution of the realm, or as a candidate for survival among the social institutions of the country. Among its civil functions there is nothing that could not be done better by other agencies; in any case they are secondary to its military character and purpose, which condemn it to abolition under the disarmament article of the Charter, even if it survive defeat. The Party is not so much, as it is sometimes pictured, the cement which binds together the institutions of the régime, as the stucco surface which gives the building its totalitarian appearance.

The first and most obvious step in reconstruction, disentanglement from the Party, was already desired and, as much as possible, practised before the war by the social leaders of Italy whom I envisage to-day as looking to the ways of peace. They had built

up a great system of labour organization and social services, whose material achievements many a democrat would envy while deploring, as many members of it did, its political servitude. They had taken pride in preserving some of the rudimentary principles of freedom in its ranks and minor offices, necessarily submitting to the constitutional obligation of party membership for major appointments, whether by election or nomination. The growing popularity and influence of their confederations, particularly that of the industrial workers, compared with the decadence of the Fascist Party, in the later thirties, was their special—and not always secret—pride. They rejected insistent German proposals—for instance, for a propaganda exchange in 1938; and various incidents marked their resistance to the Hunnish invasion, including the expulsion of Dr. Ley's representative for being too unpleasantly German and aggressive. When the Germans later insinuated themselves into strategic positions everywhere in Rome, the labour officials who had opposed them were removed from contact with them, but were not disgraced. Most of them retained some official position connected with labour and social services. To-day, and unquestionably tomorrow, their aim will be to preserve these institutions and adapt them to the conditions of a new régime.

There are and will be divisions of opinion on the old ideological lines, and on others unforeseeable. Some so blindly hate the word that they will want to destroy everything that ever bore the name of Fascist and tear twenty pages out of Italian history. The label has indeed been plastered over everything; but in many cases it is no more than a label. To abolish every institution which is called Fascist to-day would be to create a chaos in which the people would look back to their present oppressed but orderly existence as to a golden age. At best it would mean reverting to the very conditions which produced Fascism, and nobody in Italy wants to go back to that, ignoring the often bitter but not always unprofitable lessons of these years. Least of all do they want to go back to the turmoil of labour conflict, whatever may be their political aspirations. A peaceful method of determining labour conditions and dealing with labour disputes has been in operation now for sixteen years. A labour-capital equilibrium has been maintained by means of collective contract-laws jointly negotiated and written by the syndical representatives of the workers and the employers and passed by them to the executive government for promulgation. The procedure, dependent upon the parallel institutions of the two interests, has allowed the workers to win a position which, in some

material respects, is more privileged than that of British and American workers.

The institutions in question are to-day labelled Fascist, but there is nothing peculiarly Fascist in the method of peaceful labour relations or in the abolition of strikes and lockouts. The collective agreements of some of our own trade unions have the same general application to all shops and workers in a trade, and to make those agreements enforceable by law, as many good democrats believe desirable, we also should have to surrender the appeal to force.

The industrial peace which the country has enjoyed through the syndical institutions, and the advantages to both interests directly concerned, will be strong reasons for their conservation. But there are weightier reasons to which the labour leaders can appeal for the preservation of their own organizations. A free vote of the workers on that issue would show an overwhelming majority in favour of their continuance under a new régime. For, besides their function as pressure organizations, the syndicates are trustees for various funds in which every worker has some interest—savings, insurances, pensions and other equities, such as the solid indemnity payable to every worker on dismissal according to length of employment. The worker who counts on this—and therefore especially the steady worker—will not favour the abolition of the institution which assures it.

Another working-class motive of conservation will be to retain control of the labour exchanges. This was won by the labour confederations after a long and obstinate fight which was none the less to the credit of their leaders because of its limited publicity—everybody in the organizations knew what was going on and how bitterly it was contested by the employers. Just as popular as this privilege are the health services of the unions. The relative importance attributed to these in the syndical world is well indicated architecturally in the new headquarters many of the provincial unions have built for themselves, in which the whole of the ground floor is devoted to health, on a scale to provide for an annual preventive overhaul of every worker and every curative treatment the rich man can buy, with the labour exchange on the next floor, and above them the contracts department and other offices. Other welfare activities, including free legal aid, are part of the syndical system; and every provincial union, as well as the confederations, has a research department to equip it for negotiations and to brief its representatives for the increasing part they were taking in the direction of industry.

None of this is due to the Fascist Party; much of it has been

achieved in spite of the Party. Abolition of the Party would have little or no effect on any of these social and economic amenities, and need have none. The appreciable change would be in the greater freedom which the electoral system of the syndicates would enjoy, limited as it was yesterday and evidently in abeyance to-day. The most important and indeed vital difference which severance from the present régime would bring, would be that the administrative heads of the confederations, instead of being chosen from a panel by a *Duce* and being ex-officio members of the Fascist Grand Council, would be elected outright by the councils of the confederations (the representatives of the national federations) and would take whatever place in government might be assigned to them under a new régime. Collaboration between the trade unions and the state is attained by us in a different manner, but in a country where it has been established for so many years a formal connection may be expected to continue.

Among the employers, the motive of conservation has not such a broad basis. Their syndicates are essentially pressure organizations and have few ramifications of a social order. Fascism in its earlier stages was their creed to a much greater degree than in the labour organizations, where opinion and aims have always been influenced by their ideological inheritance from the old syndicalist movement. As Fascism revealed its National Socialist character, however, with all the centralization and state interference which this implies, the employers turned with some hope of relief to the development of corporations, jointly with the labour syndicates. At one time the project of a corporative state looked as if it might leave Fascism behind, as some of its more ardent propagandists predicted; but this eventuality was countered when the central body of the corporations was established, by making it a Chamber of Corporations and *Fasci*. With the *Fasci* excluded, Italy might yet have a corporative economy under a liberal régime, as some of the leaders on both sides desire.

But whether or not the corporative practice is deeply enough rooted to survive, anyone in Italy with a constructive or reconstructive mind, and used to responsibility, in looking to the ways of peace will be looking for the conservation of the labour syndicates and their social services as an essential part of the apparatus of society. Without their influence as natural instruments of public order—in upholding the standard of living of the workers and providing them with the sense and some substance of social security—it is difficult to imagine anything but a catastrophic emergence from totalitarianism—civil war, or at best a violent and

reactionary scramble for regional power. For the authority of the appointed provincial and municipal governors will lapse with the breakdown of Rome. The local gangsters of the *Fasci* will find themselves stranded like German "hedgehogs"; they will fight under leaders who will not scruple to use any device that may serve. Experienced leadership against them is only to be found within the present social system, whatever may later emerge from the political exiles who have endured at home or the scores of absentee candidates who have kept the banner of the ideal flying in England and America. The leaders of the labour syndicates can muster a disciplined force against the gangsters; in recent years they have shown on more than one occasion that they can successfully meet the Fascists in the violent encounters of the piazza. And it may be noted, to complete this speculative excursion, that the same conflicting tendencies mark the land forces—syndicalism in the regular conscript army, and gangsterism in the Blackshirt legions.

We return to less speculative premises when we consider how the syndical system which has been outlined should be regarded in the light of the Atlantic Charter, steady beacon for our ways of peace however diffuse its beams. The guiding principle in it expresses the Anglo-American

desire to bring about fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security.

No serious public comment on the Charter was to be expected in Fascist Italy, where nearly all progressive talk and planning went unreported or took place in private even in the days of peace. In this way, however, it will have been discussed, the military and political principles of it, but especially the implications of the article quoted. The objects we avow in it, the progressive leaders of syndicalism will have noted, are those which they have at heart and for which their institutions are devised. And they will be wondering whether we yet realize that it is to them we shall have to turn, perhaps in a night, if future collaboration is to be of any avail.

The climax of the war brings nearer the challenge to our preparedness for the ways of peace to which the Charter points. It may be objected by those who perhaps do not like the sweeping terms of its economic profession, that collaboration is to come only when "all nations" shall have entered a new defined and codified economic order. With Italy, let us hope, and not with Italy alone, there will be a more propitious approach, that collaboration may be an organic growth whose first experiences will justify and

facilitate a progressive application of the humanitarian economics of the Charter. One such approach suggests itself for countries which, like Italy, will be not only bankrupt but hungry and politically perplexed. Relief will be the first business of collaboration. If it is extended through such native agencies as the workers' own organizations, relief might be reconstructional, in effect, as well as charitable, adding to the domestic prestige of the institutions which dispense it, and to ours as discriminating foreigners in choosing them. Such action would also set at rest, once and for all, the question in many continental minds, rather exploited than implanted there by the "plutodemocracy" propaganda, whether we are on the side of the people, whether we are in earnest about a new deal for all the peoples of the world. We can effectively dispose of the pseudo-proletarianism of Fascism only by making this convincingly clear. In Italy particularly we shall need to strike the right note in this regard from the earliest moment of renewed relations. Nowhere else, except in Russia, shall we be watched with such critical eyes, because nowhere in the world has the division between employers and workers been so systematically defined for so many years; and whatever the form of a new régime, organized labour will have something more than a half share in it.

What is expedient and right for tomorrow has a present aspect. A discriminatory view of the future is equally desirable in our attitude to-day. We must not underestimate the intelligence or the diversity of opinion which lie behind the artificial veil of totalitarianism. One object of effective political warfare is to propagate in the mind of its enemy public a prospect of defeat that seems tolerable; to include all the institutions of Italy among those we intend to add to her historical ruins will not serve that purpose. Only a few Anarchists there would welcome starting all over again from the second verse of Genesis, free from the fear of a national disaster that would make their country "without form, and void." Recent observers report that this fear is general, and in a country without any visible alternative administration it would have the effect of prolonging the war much more than elsewhere. We do not want to eliminate that fear, but to polarize it, intensifying it among those men and institutions we mean to destroy, whose end will benefit their country, but minimizing it where we can encourage or implant the hope of survival after defeat, where survival seems possible and desirable for the public welfare.

We ought to be picking the Fascist régime to pieces, not in rage, but with discrimination for what is bad in it and what may be good, for what is doomed and what may endure. We are not doing this, as anyone knows who has listened to our Italian broadcasting long

enough to have a fair knowledge of its character. When we give the news or talk about ourselves it is well up to B.B.C. standards, but the best of our commentary on Italian affairs runs in finely worded sarcastic periods and sentiments reminiscent of a bygone age, or sounds like Italian refugees deservedly enough, we may think, "getting a bit of their own back." Talks of British authorship about Italy have been mostly historical or sentimental or both, and for comment on Italian problems of to-day and tomorrow, instead of analysis and suggestion, they favour the refugee bias. "The émigré," wrote Sir Ernest Benn to *The Times* shortly before the war, "is, of course, afflicted with a bias, and cannot be an agent of peace and understanding." And this is just as true in these days of general affliction if we are to insinuate a desire for peace and understanding into the Italian mind. The desire is there, widespread, among the simple people and those who are unchangeably our friends. But those who are in a better position to influence events need to be shown, by our understanding of their problems and our respect for their vital institutions, that we are as much in earnest about the benevolent declarations of the Atlantic Charter as we are about the wholesome severity of its military prospectus. Recently I came across the following in a syndicated article by Michael Chinigo, International News Service correspondent, one of the last American newsmen to leave Italy:

Before I left Italy popular leaders and many Italian officials who are Fascist by profession only, praised the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Charter. But they wondered, and assured me that millions of Italians are wondering to-day, just how the Atlantic Charter will apply to their country and to them, individually.

THE BURMA TRAGEDY AND CHINA

By O. M. GREEN

WITH the loss of Lashio and Mandalay positional fighting in Burma appears to be, at least temporarily, at an end. Heroically as the Allied troops have fought, enduring such hardships of heat, hunger and thirst as only those can dimly imagine who know how intolerable the climate of Burma can be even when mitigated with copious ice and electric fans, the odds against them were too great. They never had more than a handful of aeroplanes and these, as a study of the telegrams suggests, only intermittently; while the overwhelming numbers of the Japanese were further aided by active Burmese fifth columnists.

How much more of Burma will have gone before these lines are in print one can only gloomily speculate. Both General Alexander and the Chungking military spokesman have already forecast a stage of guerrilla fighting while the Allied nations work up to their full strength. But the inhospitable nature of so much of the northern Burma terrain and the difficulty of obtaining supplies from India does not make this a very hopeful prospect. It is a sad climax to one of the saddest chapters in British history.

What makes matters worse is the feeling which will not be denied that it need never have happened, notwithstanding the burden of Great Britain's responsibilities elsewhere, if greater forethought and imagination had been shown, particularly in making use of the Chinese armies. Once the Japanese had penetrated into Malaya the vital importance of striking at their rear and their communications with Thailand along the Kra peninsula leapt to the eye. That it was perfectly feasible to do so was shown by the ease with which the Japanese crossed the mountains, seized another aerodrome and established themselves firmly in Lower Burma. We could do nothing because, as since revealed, we never had more than a few hundred troops in Lower Burma. It remains a mystery why we did not redress the balance by calling upon China's help which would have been readily, even eagerly given. The unlimited man-power of China is proverbial, and to judge by the quantities of arms thrown away in Singapore (which, as all who know the

island agree, was never defensible against a serious attack from the land side) we could have supplied them with the necessary materials. As Asiatics themselves, the Chinese would always be more skilful than Western troops in detecting Burmese renegades or disguised Japanese, of whose tricks, moreover, they have had nearly five years' experience. The Chinese soldier is essentially an individualist, who is at his best when thrown upon his own resources and in native ingenuity he is more than equal to a Japanese. Yet even after the Chinese troops had entered Burma a considerable time passed before any use seems to have been made of them. It is a grave thing to say but there have been many indications, small in themselves but in the aggregate formidable, of a tendency in London to undervalue the Chinese as a fighting race and their enormous importance in the struggle with Japan. The War Office never, so far as can be ascertained, thought it worth while to send out officers to watch the Chinese methods in coping with Japan in China, and to that may be attributed much of what has happened in Burma. We began by underestimating Japan and certainly we appear to have been equally at fault in our estimates of China.

The loss of Burma will not have been wholly in vain if it serves to correct this bad judgment, as assuredly it should do. For even through the arid wording of official *communiqués*, it is clear that the Chinese have fought magnificently in Burma, and the names "Tounggoo," "Yenangyaung" and "Taunggyi" (though the ultimate outcome was less happy) deserve no less meritorious a place in their history than Taiierchuang and Changsha.* At Tounggoo 7,000 Chinese, with no air protection, kept at bay a whole Japanese division, and only when all their food and ammunition were spent did they withdraw in good order. At Yenangyaung the Chinese, having marched thirty-five miles under high pressure, flung themselves into the battle and recaptured the position, thus contributing notably to the extrication of a considerable British force which the Japanese had got behind. And Taunggyi the Chinese recaptured on April 26 after two days' fighting, an important success at the time though it was neutralized by the subsequent rapid advance of the Japanese armoured column through the Shan States upon Lashio.

These achievements, scored not only against much superior numbers but against Japan's almost unchallenged command of the

* At Taiierchuang in May, 1938, the Chinese inflicted the first square defeat on Japan that she had ever suffered and wiped out two Japanese divisions. The Chinese victory at Changsha last October—the third within 12 months at the same place—is no doubt remembered by most readers.

air, ought to convince the most doubting Thomas not only of the Chinese fighting qualities, but of the vast progress they have made in military science in the last five years. The southern provinces, Kuangsi, Kuangtung, Hunan and Yunnan and the northern provinces of Honan and Shantung produce fighting men as good probably as are to be found in any country: incidentally, they are to be counted in many millions. But until the present war soldiering ranked very low in Chinese estimation, the lowest place in fact in the four traditional orders of society—scholars, merchants, farmers and soldiers; and of military science and training and a properly organized corps of officers there was little or none.

When Japan invaded China in July, 1937, General Chiang Kai-shek, with the aid of the German military advisers whom he had engaged in 1929, had built up an army of 300,000 men, known as "the Generalissimo's Own," which, though short of equipment as compared with the Japanese, were fully equal to them in other respects and proved it in their heroic defence of Shanghai in the autumn of 1937. But the bulk of the Chinese armies, though showing great personal bravery, were in no respect to be reckoned equals to the Japanese. The troops of Sung Cheh-yuan during the first encounters with the invader around Peking and Tientsin stood their ground against overwhelming metal and fought and died like heroes. But in equipment, training and leadership they were hopelessly outmatched. The wonder is that they inflicted so much damage on the Japanese as they did, particularly in the fighting for the passes through the Great Wall and from Hopei into Shansi, where the famous guerrillas of the Eighth Route (Communist) Army first came into action and the Japanese lost a great many men and suffered one decidedly expensive setback on the border of Shansi.

To-day the Chinese say that they have 5,000,000 men under arms, of whom 2,000,000 are in the field, another 2,000,000 in reserve and training, and 1,000,000 are represented by the guerrillas. These numbers are probably no exaggeration considering China's vast population, though it seems scarcely possible that the equipment of all is equal to that of the best. The constitution of the armies is peculiar to China. There are "the Generalissimo's Own," the Government army, and the provincial armies. Loyalties among Chinese troops have always been directed rather to particular leaders than to the State as a whole, and the Kuangsi mountaineers, who are perhaps the hardest soldiers in China, still largely regard themselves as the troops of the two famous Kuangsi Generals, Pai Chung-hsi, General Chiang's Chief of Staff, and Li Tsung-jen, whom they adore. But this sentiment makes no difference to the

unity in action of the whole force, for the simple reason that all the peoples of China for the first time thoroughly understand what they are fighting for and are truly united in resistance. The question is sometimes asked: "How far are the old warlords in harmony with General Chiang?" The answer is simply, "All of them." The two Kuangsi Generals just mentioned are a conspicuous example; they fought furiously against Chiang in 1929 and very nearly did so again in 1936; but to-day he has no abler or more ardent lieutenants. The quisling Wang Ching-wei, head of the Nanking puppet government, has never been able to attract to himself a single Chinese of any standing. That the Japanese have been able to enrol some puppet troops in the occupied areas is merely an example of Chinese common-sense philosophy. These men argue that they have families to support and that it is definitely better for Chinese territory to be policed by Chinese troops than by Japanese: when sent out against the guerrillas they fire in the air. There is an authentic case of puppet troops, who had accidentally killed some guerrillas, sending a messenger to the guerrilla leader to express their profound regret for this wholly unintentional misfortune. Recently two considerable bodies of puppet troops, in all about 10,000 men, have killed their Japanese officers and gone over to the Government. More of this sort of thing may be expected. And once the Chinese armies are equipped to start a big counter-offensive the puppet troops will turn upon the Japanese as one man.

Two respects in which perhaps the most marked improvement has been made are in the officering of the forces and the timing of movements. General Chiang, who sixteen years ago at the Whampoa Academy at Canton produced the first really effective body of officers trained on modern lines that China had seen, has paid particular attention to the building up of an efficient officers corps: those of "the Generalissimo's Own" bear no inapt comparison with Cromwell's Puritans; they have an Officers' Club, admission to which is a high honour only to be gained by Spartan self-denial in the normal pleasures of mankind, drinking, smoking and so forth. In the early years of the war many defeats were suffered because of the Chinese inability to co-ordinate their movements properly: for time counts for little in Asia, especially in a country with 4,000 years of continuous history. How great the improvement in this respect has been was shown at the battle of Changsha last October, when the Japanese were allowed to advance right up to the city, with lines of communication nearly 200 miles long, before the Chinese fell upon them from all sides. It was an action which called for the greatest nerve and good timing, and it came off perfectly. All Chinese forces now are provided with field

radio sets with which to communicate with each other and with Chungking.

Many arsenals, well scattered and camouflaged in West China, produce a sufficiency of light arms and ammunition, the raw material for which is all under the Government's control. According to a recent report the Chinese are now producing synthetic petrol already in quantities enough for 1,500 vehicles a month. For the greater part of their transport they fall back on human muscles, inexhaustible in numbers and more experienced in carrying heavy weights over long distances than any in the world; on the sturdy little ponies of West China; on mules, yaks and camels. The Chinese guerrillas take a steady toll of Japanese life, which has been conservatively estimated at as many as forty casualties a day. The successful raids on Nanking, Shanghai, Amoy, Canton and elsewhere early last month are a good example of what can be done. These troops consist mainly of men deliberately left behind by the Chinese Government in 1938 when it retreated to the West, to harry the Japanese rear. It is not generally recognized that nearly three-fifths of the territory overrun by the Japanese remains wholly under the control of the Chinese Government, which sends to the guerrillas money and arms. They also capture a good deal of equipment by raiding Japanese outposts and convoys.

That China suffers a heavy blow by the temporary loss of land communications with her Allies is self-evident. The road from Manipur, the terminus of the Bengal-Assam railway, through Bhamo to a point on the Burma road 105 miles from Lashio which was expected to be a useful adjunct, is closed by the Japanese advance to the Chinese frontier. There are some tracks from Assam through Myitkyina in northern Burma into Yunnan, but these cannot be of any great value. The north-western road into Russian territory remains undisturbed, but Russia cannot spare much for China now. The new road from West China along the Tibetan border through Assam into India—its exact direction is a secret; but by General Chiang's forethought it was begun directly the Japanese occupied northern Indo-China in August, 1940—should be ready for use by the end of this year. Till then China can only get from her Allies what can be sent by air.

There is, however, no fear that China will give in. She has not stood up single-handed to all the might of Japan for four-and-a-half years, and proved again and again, though with still very slender help from outside, that she can defeat the enemy, in order to lose faith now in the ultimate recovery of her freedom and the satisfaction of her national ambitions. She has suffered terrible losses, all her seaboard and her best cities and millions of her sons, and she

has come through undaunted. The loss of Burma, little as it was expected, is only one more test of China's inexhaustible patience which she will endure as she has endured countless tragedies in her long history. She cannot conquer the Japanese and drive them into the sea until she receives heavy artillery and aeroplanes from her Allies; those she must and no doubt eventually will have. But she can with her own resources continue to pin down a million Japanese and wage a steady war of attrition upon them.

So much for the military aspect of the Burma tragedy so far as China is concerned. But there is a political side which ought not to be overlooked. It is, of course, unthinkable that General Chiang Kai-shek would go back on his joint pledge with all the Allies to make no separate peace, and all the best minds of the nation are with him, like the millions of humble Chinese for whom "what the Generalissimo says" is the last word. Less than a month ago (on May 5) a National General Mobilization Act came into force which gives the Government practically unlimited control of all China's man-power, war material, prices and capital. That is symptomatic of Chinese morale and will-to-win. But it would be wrong to ignore the not very pleasant tone of some of the Chinese papers in recent weeks, or the uneasy thoughts undoubtedly present even in the minds of Chinese well placed to take a comprehensive view of the whole world. The suspicion that Great Britain and America regard the Far East as a side show, deepened by some rather injudicious remarks last January by Colonel Knox, the United States Secretary for the Navy, has not been diminished by subsequent events. There is an undeniable feeling that China's position in the war has never been fairly appreciated, the more acute because the Chinese have always justly maintained that in fighting Japan they were fighting for the West as much as for themselves. Recently, too, the Chinese have begun to ask questions as to what will be their own situation *vis-à-vis* of the Allies after the war. It would hardly be surprising if they remembered how badly they were let down at the Paris Conference when it was revealed that their Allies had secretly agreed to the Japanese retaining the former German possessions in Shantung; and after this war very much more will be at stake than after the last.

Thus, writing in the *New York Times Magazine* of April, Madame Chiang Kai-shek said:—

Both the East and West have foolishly tried to be self-sufficient. Neither has succeeded nor could succeed. Each must acknowledge that the other has something to teach.

We hope the West has now learned the value to them of China's spiritual strength which sustained us in our darkest moment. We in China must

learn the value to us of scientific developments of the West.

In the world society that we are going to create there must be no thought of superiors and inferiors. We must be equal men and women of all races pressing forward to a great ideal.

This article attracted great attention in Chungking where it reflected and stimulated the thoughts of many people. According to the *Manchester Guardian's* well-informed correspondent, Mr. Gunther Stein, these feelings can be crystallized into two desires as follows:—

1. That Britain should more quickly learn lessons from the past, emulating elsewhere the spirit and performance shown in the British Isles.
2. The Allies should draw up a special Pacific charter guaranteeing to all the peoples of the Far East the fullest equality after the war, thoroughly changing the pre-war status in every respect.

Now this surely is a matter of supreme importance and if we can satisfy Chinese thought as regards our intentions for the future we shall have done much to wipe out their misgiving that we have treated the Far East as a side-show, which in any case future events will no doubt disprove as the Allies rise to their full strength. But the Chinese are keenly conscious of what they are fighting for—freedom, independence, recovery of national rights and grandeur—and they need to be assured in no unmistakable way that the Allies are fighting for these too.

It is regrettable that Chinese papers seem to have forgotten that Great Britain's set policy for over fifteen years has been, not only the complete abandonment of the old so-called "gunboat policy," but the return to China of all the special privileges and concessions acquired in the 19th century; furthermore a golden opportunity was lost not long ago in London of underlining and reiterating the fact.

In May, 1941, in a letter to Dr. Quo Tai-chi, then on his way from London through the United States to take up the post of Foreign Minister in Chungking, Mr. Cordell Hull said:—

It goes without saying that the Government of the United States, in continuation of the steps already taken towards meeting China's aspirations in its international relations, expects, when conditions of peace again prevail, to move rapidly by the processes of orderly negotiation and agreement with the Chinese Government towards the relinquishment of the last of certain rights of a special character which this country, together with other countries, has long possessed in China by virtue of the agreements providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction and related practices.

Shortly afterwards Mr. Eden made a similar statement in the House of Commons. But there was nothing in the report of what he said to show to the uninstructed and forgetful world that we were doing more than follow in America's footsteps.

The facts are very different. For in a lengthy memorandum in December, 1926, which he reiterated a month later in a speech at Birmingham, the late Sir Austen Chamberlain solemnly proclaimed Great Britain's intention to surrender all her special rights and concessions in China. In fulfilment of this pledge the British Concessions at Hankow, Kiukiang and Chinkiang were given back to China* and in the summer of 1931 an agreement for the abolition of British extraterritoriality had actually been initialled by Sir Miles Lampson and Dr. C. T. Wang, then Chinese Foreign Minister, when the Japanese invasion of Manchuria postponed its fulfilment. There is not the slightest doubt but that, if the Japanese had not further invaded China in 1937, Sir Austen Chamberlain's declaration would by now have been carried through to the last clause.

There is a strong case for the issue now by Great Britain of a further declaration, recalling in detail what she has actually done to meet China's aspirations and reiterating the Chamberlain policy. An expression of admiration for the gallant behaviour of the Chinese troops in Burma would furnish a suitable peg on which to hang the declaration, which would go far to assuage their feelings as regards the past and reassure them as to the future; and they certainly deserve it.

Such a statement is the more desirable since there are probably some in this country, not perhaps many but influential, who will want to bargain the cancellation of British extraterritoriality against special consideration for our financial interests in China. Those interests are unquestionably very great—landed property, factories, banks, shipping, insurance, a total that has been estimated as high as £300,000,000. But obviously there can be no huckstering with such an Ally as China, who will yet be, in all probability, a major factor in bringing down Japan; and the sooner we make it clear that there is no such thought in our minds the better. If we approach China on a basis of frank equality, leaving the dead past to bury its past, looking only to the future in a spirit of co-operation and mutual trust, there need be no fear for the welfare of our interests at her hands.

* The Territory of Weihaiwei was restored to China in fulfilment of Lord Balfour's pledge at the Washington Conference in 1922, showing that Great Britain's decisions regarding China had been framed four years before Sir Austen Chamberlain put them in detailed form.

EQUALITY OR EQUITY?

BY THE BISHOP OF TRURO

THE word "equal" belongs to mathematics and has a strict meaning; but it is used in various social and political connections with a dangerous looseness. In the agreed statement published in *The Times* of Saturday, December 21, 1940, signed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, and the Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council, five principles are enumerated of which the second is:

Every child, regardless of race or class, should have equal opportunities of education, suitable for the development of his peculiar capacities.

In Clause 4 of the Roosevelt-Churchill Declaration on the policies of the United Kingdom and of the United States, broadcast on August 14, 1941, the word "equal" occurs again:

They will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

These two examples must suffice. In both cases the word "equal" does not mean strictly or mathematically *equal*. Nor, of course, in the famous French trio—"Liberty, Fraternity, Equality"—did *Equality* mean that either. There it simply meant "equality before the Law," an equal right to justice.

In 1941 a number of drastic reforms in the organization and arrangements of the Church of England were suggested for the consideration of Church people in a little book entitled *Putting our House in Order*, and the foreword was signed by over a hundred of the leading bishops, clergy and laity. Here the writers recognize the ambiguity of the word "equality" in such a context and they express themselves as agreeing that there should be "a reasonable equality of stipends" among the clergy. But it will be observed that accuracy would require "reasonable inequality" rather than "reasonable equality." Indeed it may be said that in most instances where the word "equality" is used what is in mind is a contrast with some piece of unreasonable inequality, and the contrast really intended is that between reasonable and unreasonable inequality.

Now it may be argued that all this is obvious and the people who use the word "equal" in responsible pronouncements are well aware that they are not using the word in its strict mathematical sense. But unfortunately they are liable to be taken in the stricter sense by at least two classes of persons.

The first are the over-conscientious: such persons, for example, as those who urge statesmen to formulate their war-aims or their peace-terms, and afterwards hold them to a literal exactness which may have quite unforeseen and even disastrous consequences. With such critics waiting to pounce, statesmen may well feel unwilling to commit themselves to anything but general principles or to details which are certain and crystal-clear. The word "equal" is one of the words they should avoid. The second class of persons who are liable to take the word mathematically when it was not meant to be so taken are those whom Dr. Johnson used to call "weak heads." These persons, who are very numerous, are always pleased to be told that they are equal to others who hold positions of greater responsibility or influence than themselves. "Nor is any man," said Dr. Johnson, "more an enemy to public peace, than he who fills weak heads with imaginary claims."

Social reconstruction of a thorough-going kind is long overdue, and even the more conservative may welcome a determined offensive against the anti-social elements in our present system. But let us give the real enemy his true name. The real enemy is not inequality: the real enemy is injustice. What we must strive for is not equality but equity. Aristotle says (*Politics*, III, 9):

All men cling to justice of some kind, but their conceptions are imperfect and they do not express the whole idea. For example, justice is thought by them to be, and is, equality, not, however, for all, but only for equals. And inequality is thought to be, and is, justice; neither is this for all, but only for unequals. When the persons are omitted, then men judge erroneously.

The most interesting modern discussion of "equality" is that by Dr. R. H. Tawney in the Halley Stewart Lecture for 1929. In his opening chapter Dr. Tawney quotes an observation of Matthew Arnold to the effect that in England inequality is almost a religion. Dr. Tawney admits that much has changed since Matthew Arnold's time, but he himself seems to have swung so far in the other direction as to make equality almost a religion. But that will not do either. Preachers of a Gospel of Equality often refer to Wordsworth,

and particularly to the ninth book of his autobiographical poem, the *Prelude*. But while Wordsworth wrote movingly of "man and his noble nature" (355), he never maintained that men are equal. Indeed his misgivings with regard to a monarchical system of government were largely due to his "beholding that the best ruled not, and feeling that they ought to rule" (213, 214). Other apostles of equality are fond of quoting a saying of Mr. Hilaire Belloc's: "What is common to all men is not *more* important but *infinitely more* important than the accidents by which men differ." But those elements "common to all men" are present in various individuals in various degrees, and men differ by more than "accidents". Nor, even if two persons are equal in things of the spirit, does it follow that they are, or should be, equal in everything. Nature has certainly not made men equal in mental and bodily powers, and certain inequalities of privilege follow naturally from inequalities of mind and body.

Let us take an illustration which is in itself rather naïve but which does bring out a real important factor in the whole complex situation of to-day. Here are two gardeners, A and B. Their gardens are exactly similar, but A is a far better gardener than B, and his garden produces a great deal more. It is only right that he should reap some extra benefit. Indeed he naturally will, unless the extra is wrested from him. This extra benefit will probably be translated into terms of money. But money is only a means of exchange adopted in civilized countries whereby advantages of various kinds may be obtained in return for others. Out of the products of his labour A will purchase various advantages for his family as well as for himself. A and his family will be better off than B and his family; and it is equitable that he should be. We have equity though not equality: and it is equity and not equality that we want. Continue this differentiating process into the next generation. A¹ and his family will be still better off than B¹ and his family: the difference will have grown wider: and so into the third and succeeding generations. No doubt, in the ordinary course of nature, such a process seldom gets very far. Before long a generation of family B will prove themselves superior to the corresponding generation of family A, and the difference of privilege will be reduced. Moreover all along outstanding individuals will appear as exceptions to the general trend at the moment. Superiority of the kind we have here in mind should be acknow-

ledged. The better stock must not be put in irons to force it to the level of the inferior.

Progress depends, Dr. Tawney himself admits (page 86) "on a willingness on the part of the mass of mankind—and we all, in nine-tenths of our nature, belong to the mass—to recognize genuine superiority, and to submit themselves to its influence." "Subordination," said Dr. Johnson, in 1763, "tends greatly to human happiness." Strict equality could only be obtained, and could only be preserved, by repressive force, and the employment of such repressive force would be as disastrous as it would be unjust.

The question, of course, arises, under a freely working equitable system what extra advantages may the community rightly and wisely allow to be purchasable by the members of the more gifted or industrious, that is to say the higher-earning, family? Fresh air and pure water must be free to all; the roads must be for all to walk on, and so on. The answer to our question will depend on the assets available in the community at any given period. The crucial point is education. A's family will be able to enjoy various little amenities which should make it easier for his children to learn to equip themselves. But are they to go to exactly the same schools and universities as B's children? At any given moment some schools are better than others, some universities are better than others. Most students, if given a choice, would probably prefer Oxford or Cambridge to one of the more modern provincial universities. But room at Oxford and Cambridge is limited. How are the nine or ten thousand students for these universities to be selected out of the many thousands who are to have a university course? Competitive examinations—it is to be hoped of a revised kind—may be employed in the selection of students. But examinations are not always very reliable tests; and to fill Oxford and Cambridge automatically with the nine thousand students who came at the head of the examination lists would be a bad thing for the other universities and not good for Oxford and Cambridge themselves. Perhaps the greater number of the vacancies at these two universities should be filled in that way; but some should be left for students from families like A's who, while not among the first nine thousand academically, have attained a sufficiently good standard to benefit greatly from a university course, and can bring with them a little from their family's earnings. That such a prospect should attend superiority of the kind we are

considering is both equitable and also in the ultimate interests of the community at large. To the ordinary man the best part of his reward for application and labour is that which can be applied for the benefit of his children. Parental aspiration should receive appropriate—not, of course, excessive—encouragement.

If it be argued that under present conditions privileges commonly go to persons and the children of persons who do not deserve them, for the kind of superiority they possess is not serviceable to the community as a whole, that argument is rather beside the present point. Conditions must be improved until the kind of superiority rewarded is the kind that is of benefit to the whole community. This, of course, is an immense, as well as an urgent, task; and we shall undertake it all the more effectively if we do not allow ourselves to be confused by a misleading theory of equality.

Moreover two subsidiary considerations must not be overlooked. The first is that a society arranged rigidly in horizontal layers according to merit of the kind that is tested by examinations would be taut and steel-hard. The constant examinations involved would be an intolerable strain, and would perpetuate the incessant competition which is an already acknowledged evil. The presence of a certain number of worthy candidates at levels rather above those corresponding to their own personal abilities has a valuable cushion effect. The second consideration which must be taken into account has already been touched upon: selection by any examination hitherto devised does not always produce satisfactory results, least of all when the candidates are at an early age; and candidates who have shown good, but not outstanding abilities, and come of a stock which has already given some indication of its worth, often in the long run amply justify their selection.

Unfortunately there is a great deal of obvious humbug connected with the advocacy of equality. In his *Augustus* (page 330) John Buchan remarks:

He (*Augustus*) was free from equalitarian whimsies, a malady from which the ancient world did not greatly suffer; he did not believe in that degeneration of democratic theory which imagines that there is a peculiar inspiration in the opinions of the ignorant and a singular nobility in the character of the penniless.

The dock-worker can easily be roused to indignation at the inequality between himself and his employer. The inequality in wages between him and the seaman who

braves all the perils of the voyage at sea does not worry him nearly as much. Most people are inclined to be somewhat tolerant of inequalities in their own favour. One of the strongest of human passions, alas, is jealousy; and very often the driving power behind the agitation for equality is three-parts jealousy. Society should not pander to so discreditable a motive. Is England to-day really class-ridden? Is America really happier? Or Russia? Not yet, at any rate. The principle *Noblesse oblige* is not much in evidence to-day, but the last time I heard the motto quoted it was quoted by a Labour Member of Parliament, a sound and generous Scot. If that principle is allowed to fall into oblivion, it will be a grievous loss.

Some years ago I happened to be in a French village when some very high Government official paid it a visit. I was surprised at the little respect shown to him. Lack of respect is widely characteristic of modern society, and is an unhealthy symptom. It is partly accounted for by the history of inequality which, as outlined by Dr. Tawney, rouses indignation. In many instances there should still be a reduction of existing inequalities, and the common aim should be that if some may have more than others, all should have enough. He says (page 118):

Individual happiness does not only require that men should be free to rise to new positions of comfort and distinction; it also requires that they should be able to lead a life of dignity and culture, whether they rise or not, and that, whatever their position on the economic scale may be, it shall be such as is fit to be occupied by men.

To this end should be enlisted the practical co-operation of all men of good-will, but none of them should be required to subscribe to a sweeping and inexact equalitarian formula. A further question suggests itself at this point: if there is a lower limit below which no one must be allowed to fall, must there not be an upper limit of inequality above which no one must be allowed to rise? Clearly there must; but a discussion of the point lies outside the limits of this present article.

Men are not equal. But the Christian Religion recognizes them as brethren. Too many people have a very soft and sentimental notion of Christianity. True Christianity is critical: it proves all things, and holds fast only to that which is good. My Christianity does not require me to accept the statement that when A and B bring a child C into the world, C has a right to a contribution from me for his maintenance.

I recognize no such *right*. A and B cannot *demand* a contribution from me towards the maintenance of their child. But as a Christian I sincerely want to be of assistance to them all, and contribute I certainly will if the need is genuine, and I am in a position to help. There is scope in human life for charity as well as for justice. The word charity has been woefully misused. But it is a good word, standing for a great thing—"Friendship to all the world," as Bishop Jeremy Taylor defined it. My Christianity does not prevent my feeling that this continual harping on the word equality is mischievous. Nevertheless I am willing to pay heavy taxes in order to improve the educational opportunities and the general well-being of the workers and their families who are worse off than I am.

Mr. Michael Roberts in his masterly book *The Recovery of the West* refers to the optimistic view of human nature commonly taken by the socialist. He writes:

His faith in progress and in the innate goodness of man is such that he thinks that rising prosperity is normal and inevitable and that there is no need to protect the qualities of application, enterprise and co-operation on which all progress depends.

But Mr. Roberts goes on to say that "in practice, this optimistic view of human nature has not been justified." Quite so. The Christian religion from the first has always recognized that human nature left to itself is not good enough, and one of the essential elements in Christian worship is aspiration; the lifting up of our desire towards the Ideal, towards the Perfect Good. The Christian Church is a worshipping fellowship, a fellowship not of the equal but of the aspiring. It aims at shibboleths have no place. The individual is not required to subscribe to any such theory or creed as that of equality, but to use his talents to the fullest extent in united sustained effort to achieve practical improvements in human affairs. Programmes and prospectuses are better without blessed words of ambiguous significance. I agree with the eminent ecclesiastics, but I would leave out their word "equal." The clause is honest without it: "Every child, regardless of race or class, should have opportunities of education, suitable for the development of his peculiar capacities." I agree, similarly, with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, but I would substitute "equitable" for "equal" in the only place in which they use the word and read: "access on equitable terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world."

MORALE AND SHORT TERM EDUCATION

BY STEPHEN SPENDER

THERE is a growing sense to-day that the war effort is not as great as it might be. This is to some extent due to glaring examples of bad organization, which can be remedied. But there is a deeper uneasiness caused by the lack of co-operation amongst different classes. This disunity is due to more than defective organization.

The sense that the war effort is not 100 per cent. is usually conveyed by such words as "complacency," "Blimpishness," "slackness" and "apathy." These words correspond to forms which suspicion assumes between two classes of society. "Complacency" and "Blimpishness" are used to describe upper class defects: "slackness" and "apathy," those of the workers. So that the very use of these words, which are used of different classes of society, denotes the presence of something other than the surface faults they connote. Beneath "Blimpishness" on the one hand, and "apathy" on the other, are mutual suspicion, lack of unity, lack of co-operation, and an atmosphere of recriminations.

To anyone, like myself, who has lived for several months in working class conditions, with workers, it is quite clear that our home propaganda is unsuccessful amongst most of them. It will never be a success unless propagandists tackle first and foremost the problem of class disunity. One does not have to look far to find examples of failure. This country has now been at war for nearly three years, against an enemy who has behaved with appalling brutality. Moreover, he has greatly lowered the standard of living of the countries over which he has been victorious. Yet it is doubtful whether the government has ever really succeeded in convincing the ordinary people here that they are very much better off than they would be under Nazi rule. They show a curious unwillingness to believe this and turn a deaf ear to the stories of atrocities committed in Poland and elsewhere.

Yet although the workers show little interest in the Nazi treatment of the Occupied Countries, and even with how the Nazis would treat them themselves should Germany win the war, yet they show the utmost enthusiasm for Russia's struggle against Germany, and would regard it as an unqualified catastrophe should the Germans defeat the Russians. The many people who cynically say that conditions will be much the same for the workers should the Nazis conquer England, would never say the same of a possible Nazi conquest of Russia.

There are two points of view here which may seem incompatible—that the Nazis have committed atrocities in Russia, but that German atrocities in Poland and Czechoslovakia are just atrocity stories of the kind that were put about, and which we learned to disbelieve, in the last war. Yet, really, there is a remarkable consistency concealed within this apparent incompatibility. If you believe in something positive, the destruction of that thing is in itself an atrocious catastrophe, so that all the minor atrocity incidents follow from the greater tragedy necessarily. If you do not believe in the positive good of the society within which you live, then its destruction is not a tragedy, and any number of atrocities and disasters which may take place in the course of the murder of the society itself, only seem so many isolated examples, which even if they can be proved to be true, demonstrate nothing. As a matter of fact, it is remarkably difficult to prove to people who know nothing of Poland that atrocities have taken place there, if they maintain an attitude of scepticism. So what Sir Stafford Cripps called the 'disinterestedness' of people over here about the war, in comparison with the interestedness of the Russians, is really the lack of a belief in the positive principle of our own democracy: from this follows the lack of concern with the evils of fascism.

It is possible for intelligent people to have faith in the 'lesser evil': indeed, one might label our cause, as it is presented to us, with all the emphasis on 'that wicked man Hitler,' rather than on those good men who form our own governmental class, the 'lesser evil.' This idea particularly appeals to people who benefit from the existing system: morally, they may not have much faith, but, none the less, they survive quite comfortably, they are able to uphold a certain standard of culture and they enjoy individual freedom. This, which is the argument of our propaganda, is an argument which appeals to the intellectuals, and to those who are comfortably situated, such as officials in the Ministry of Information and the B.B.C. It is not an argument which has much appeal to the workers, who are scarcely aware of the existence of culture, and who have little security.

To people who enjoy economic independence, who are able to rise above limiting circumstances to the expression of their individuality, freedom of self-expression is the greatest value in democracy. Even when they feel that there must be something wrong with the whole structure of this society, that they still care for it because they have enjoyed this freedom and they can envisage the horror of losing it. What they really value is the opportunity to become themselves. But to people whose nominal freedom is outweighed by their actual misery and insecurity, freedom of individual expression may seem a cut flower, cut off from its roots in the well-being of the whole society. As insecurity increases, these masses of people become more and more suspicious of the value of freedom of self-expression.

It is possible to preserve freedom, but not if it is felt by the majority to be for the few at the expense of the many. What is it the people want, which is

growing to appear to them even more important than the freedom of the intelligentsia? So much so indeed, that there is a danger of individual freedom of self-expression being regarded as a superstition waiting to be superseded? I think the undoubted answer to this question is that the people are coming to value the unity of the whole of society more than they do individual freedom. For this reason they admire Soviet Russia, because they believe that the Russians are a united people, working together for common ends which will benefit all.

When a patient fails to remember his real dream, and invents the parts he has forgotten, psycho-analysts tell us that the new substitutions may be as revealing of his character as the original dream. In the same way, one should study the idea which people have of Soviet Russia, without dismissing it because it may not resemble the reality. I think that the popular myth of Soviet Russia in the minds of English people to-day has several very striking features. In the first place, people are not so deluded as to imagine that the majority of Russians are better off than we are (this in itself should give pause to our propagandists who assume the value of pointing out that the worker is worse off under Hitler). Secondly, the people show a curious indifference to questions of the amount of liberty enjoyed by individuals in Soviet Russia. These questions, if they arise, have an academic rather than a pressing interest. Thirdly, the people are quite conscious of the fact that they imagine more than they know about Russia. However, they believe the Russians imagine that they have a government which represents the interests of the whole people, and not only vested interests. They do not pretend to be certain that the ordinary Russian is justified in his faith in Stalin. But the point is that he has such a faith. As I heard some people in a Cornish pub say when Russia came into the war: "The Russians may be being kidded, but at least they believe that they've got something worth fighting for. We may have something worth fighting for in reality, but we haven't any faith."

Therefore, the idea of Russia in the minds of the people who are not communists, but who are most enthusiastic about the struggle of the Soviet Union to-day, is a more or less conscious myth of what they would like our society to be. The essential point is that we should have faith in ourselves. Few people would say that we want to imitate the Soviet system; though many would say we want "something on the Russian lines." This is because they feel the necessity of faith; and they regard as the indispensable condition of faith—unity. Unity, I think, and not freedom. Therefore, if those of us who care for freedom want it to survive, we must make sure that it is rooted in unity. Otherwise it will be swept away as one of the hypocritical pretences of a society which is lacking in economic democracy.

In a recent number of *Britain To-day*, a propagandist magazine issued by the British Library of Information, and sold in America, the editor says that

it is easy to preserve good morale in times of victory and success, but that the testing time comes when we have reverses. This statement does not really meet the problem of morale in Britain at all; in fact, the truth is almost the opposite. It is unfortunate that our propagandists so often work on an entire misunderstanding of the situation, which our enemies understand very well. The fact is, as Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain showed, that when we are directly attacked and have reverses, there is no problem of morale at all. Our danger periods are lulls, and minor successes. Also our imperial reverses represent a danger to morale, but not of the kind that the editor of *Britain To-day* fears. The trouble about the loss of Malay, Singapore, etc., is not that they are regarded as serious reverses (if they were taken as this they would unite the people at home), but that they emphasize class disunity at home, because they are regarded by the workers as judgments on the incompetence and injustices of our rule in the empire, for which the workers themselves feel in no way responsible. Our most serious danger (from the point of view of morale) would be if the Axis left this island completely alone for, say, two years, and attacked the empire piecemeal all round the globe.

At the back of the minds of some other officials, there is an idea, I think, that morale does not matter. Their argument is that, if attacked, we do not have to worry about morale; and if not attacked, we can 'muddle through' with a great deal of grumbling, as we have done before. This argument fails to take account of the peculiar nature of this war, which is a total one. That is to say, it is a war that demands above all unity. Hitler's whole success has been built on the thesis, 'divide and conquer.' You cannot divide England by attacking, but you can, perhaps, by leaving her alone; and if left alone long enough, she will lose her strategic advantages. So that a negative kind of unity which functions when we are attacked is not sufficient to win the war; still less, to win the peace. Any thoughtful person looking at the situation to-day must be nervous of the possibility of such unity as we have collapsing after the war, unless there is a great change of attitude in the next few years. And, in order to win the war, it is becoming more apparent that we need offensive unity, as well as our wonderful power of co-operating when we have our backs against the wall.

How is a unity to be achieved which will carry us both through the war and the peace? The basis of such a unity is to pull down the class barrier. At present, the chief cause of apathy is due to the failure of the workers to envisage any sort of future in which they will play a part. The soldiers see the end of the war as waiting to be demobilized; unemployment; or, at best, a return to the pre-war job, under worse conditions. They cannot believe that we will ever return to 1939; yet they feel, that if things are altered, they will be for the worse, "unless someone makes a revolution." It does not usually occur to them that they themselves might take any part, even in revolution.

The workers do not require promises and bribes, which in themselves imply

that there is a class of 'haves' in a position to offer something in their possession to a class of 'have-nots.' It would even be a mistake to talk of more wireless sets, motor cars, etc., for all. These things are made to live for, not to fight and die for. People will only fight for faith, and the faith required is simply this: that the government truly represents the interests of all both in the war and the post-war period. There should be a declaration not of promises, but of common aims of social improvement: aims, because they depend not on the leadership of the nation alone, but on the co-operation of the whole nation with that leadership. As long as we are sure of those common aims which will benefit the whole community, sacrifices will be made willingly. The most unifying appeal of the war was Churchill's offer of 'blood, sweat, toil and tears.' The communist party (then anti-war) made a grave psychological mistake in deriding this.

The basis of morale at home is to transform the frustrated energy wasted in class conflict into the united energy of a society co-operating to achieve aims which will benefit all. There is also the question of the attitude of our own people to our Empire. At present this is one of apathy, refusal of responsibility, and a complete unawareness of the consequences that colonial losses will have on the standard of life of ordinary men and women. The working class are apathetic about home affairs because they feel that they are oppressed and exploited; they are apathetic about the Empire and they want to thrust the responsibility for oppression and exploitation on to the ruling class. They would change their attitude if they felt that just as the government stands for them it also stands for the well-being of ordinary men and women like themselves in the Empire. In other words, we are only entitled to hold on to our Empire if we perform a service to humanity there, in protecting our possessions from being taken by the fascist countries, and in developing these territories in the interests of the people living there.

We must remove the class division from politics, and remove it from our propaganda. Our propaganda, like everything else, suffers to-day from being run on a class basis. A class of people who are educated and in a position to obtain knowledge which is inaccessible to the ordinary people—lectures—through the wireless, the press and the Ministry of Information—another class of people, living completely different lives and in no position to judge the truth of what they are told. Most of the speakers on the wireless, or sent round to factories by the Ministry of Information, most of the writers in the newspapers, are talking across a gulf which divides them enormously different circumstances from those of the audience whom they are addressing. Essentially the audience is talked down to. Propaganda is not a means of exchanging ideas and co-operating mentally but is a disguised form of giving orders and imposing an official attitude of mind.

The public happens to be particularly ill-adapted to receive these mental orders at present, for a variety of reasons. In the first place, for years before

the war—its capacity to think realistically about fundamentally the same situation as the one in which we are now living was derided and mocked by the papers who published statements that there would be no war, by politicians (still in power to-day) who denied the figures of German re-armament, by a general attitude of mind encouraging escapism of every kind. In the second place, the public has reasons to distrust the wisdom of the publicists who so consistently make statements about the war which are soon shown up as having no real grasp of what is happening. So that in addition to class feeling, there is also profound distrust of everything that the newspapers, the wireless and the Ministry of Information say.

Our propaganda, instead of being exhortation by a class of directives to a class of people who are directed, should consist much more of a co-operative effort by all to understand the tasks of the war, the aims of democracy, how these can be achieved in the war and in the peace, and how the total effort of the society is related to the particular effort of the individual in the factory, the army, the Civil Defence unit. Propaganda must mean the education of the whole people in the tasks that lie ahead of them. This propaganda should be based on two realities; the common aims of the whole society, and the fact that a generation of men and women now adult has in a comparatively short time—say five years—got to transform the world as we know it; moreover, a great many individuals must now equip themselves mentally to seize the opportunities and fulfil the tasks of that new society.

As far as possible, this education, which one might label Short Term Education, should be led by people who lead the same kind of lives as those whom they are instructing. The A.R.P. worker, or the factory hand, is far more likely to listen to someone who is dressed in A.R.P. uniform or in dungarees, than to someone who comes out of a Ministry. If Firemen, for example, are talked to by a fellow Fireman, it immediately occurs to them that they might know what their teacher knows, that both are faced by the same problems and both are making an effort to win the war on the same terms and for the same reasons. The immediate tasks of Short Term Education should be to make everyone aware that the war is in the interest of the whole community and that it requires the utmost effort of every member of the community. Everyone should as far as possible have some whole picture of the war in his mind so as to see how he himself fits into it. The worker in a particular job should be instructed by the worker in touch with a rather wider world, outside the factory; at the same time this instruction should have something in it of a mutual exchange of values, because the man close to his job certainly has something to give to the man with a vision of the whole society outside the particular job.

What democracy needs is a mass education movement springing from below, and not imposed from outside and above, though certainly use should be made of available educationalists 'to educate the educators.' But there

should not be a rootless, artificial class of people, connected with nothing but propaganda, going out to lecture people who are connected with the realer conditions of their own work. The workers should have their own educators, appointed in every factory, corresponding to Army Education Officers. The existing academic institutions should be used to train these instructors in their work.

There are good reasons for thinking that the time is ripe for such a development. In the Fire Service a scheme of Discussion Groups has been started, which has had an altogether surprising success. It started as a scheme for harmless entertainment, but it has turned more and more into an education scheme, on account of the insistent demands of the men in the Fire Service, who say, in one form or another at almost every meeting: "We cannot work Democracy, because we are not educated."

In Russia, propaganda has for long been treated as education of the individual in the needs of the whole society. The Political Commissar gives the man at his post a picture of the whole life of the society in which he lives, and of its furthest aims. The individual has a living connection with the life outside himself, and the educator is the means of putting him in contact with a wider source of energy, which at the same time demands the contribution of his own effort. If we did not believe that the generalized life of the whole society had energy to give, and a contribution of work to take, from the individual, and that in order that this may be achieved, there must be an active and conscious relationship between the two, we would not talk about morale, for that energizing relationship is, precisely morale. In this country, we have lived too long on mechanical effort—a mere accumulation of millions of grudging morsels of work into a grey and colourless total which somehow muddles us through. Although the machine continues to work, life is colourless and without the illumination of a faith that our society is performing active good. There is much that is good in it, but the majority of people require that they should see the connection between their own lives and even such things as the achievement of science, the running of factories and the writing of books. When they do see such a connection an amazing energy and happiness is released; then miracles can be performed. The majority of people in England think that Russia is performing just such a miracle, of which they themselves, in their hearts believe themselves capable, if some barrier which renders everything mechanical and meaningless were lifted from their lives. 'The people of England have never spoken yet.' When they have been taught to speak, they will astonish the world with their vitality, their intelligence, and the richness of their capacity for enjoying life. I am convinced too that their true development is towards freedom and tolerance: the two qualities, which in their strength and truth, and not in their isolation and ineffectiveness, the world to-day most needs.

THE SITUATION IN INDIA

A letter to an Englishman

Dear T—,

I was glad to have your note asking me to explain why India wouldn't take the Cripps offer. Other friends have put the same question and several organizations want me to come and tell them the pros and cons of the Indian business. At last India is news in this country, the press having seen the possibilities for sensation and the public having been awakened from its apathy by the Japanese walk-over through the Malayan archipelago, across Burma, to the very eastern doors of India! But never mind how this interest was provoked. I welcome the fact that it has been aroused at all. For India is facing, literally, one of the greatest crises in its long history; and, as you will realize, England bears the main responsibility for the fact that my country finds itself in such a precarious state of moral and material unpreparedness before this crisis . . .

As a matter of fact, on the surface at least, Sir Stafford Cripps's mission to India, too, seems to have been conceived in a belated recognition of this consideration. 'Why, then, did India reject his offer?' you ask. Before I answer that question it is very necessary for me to tell you exactly how the mission was brought about and what were the terms of its offer. Various pro-government publicists have told this story in their own self-righteous manner. So a nationalist view of the history of the past two years of Indo-British relationship is important for an understanding of the present *débâcle*.

Perhaps you know that immediately after the late Mr. Chamberlain's declaration of war in September, 1939, the Viceroy proclaimed India to be a belligerent country. The new 1935 India constitution was annulled forthwith and rule by ordinance and decree of the Viceroy began in India. The governments formed by the Indian National Congress party in the nine provinces of British India, where the Congress had won overwhelming majorities on an 85 per cent. poll in the 1937 elections, resigned from office. And the emergency measures of the Defence of India Act came into force.

While sympathizing wholeheartedly with Britain in its struggle against Hitlerism and aggression, the Indian National Congress asked what were the British Government's war and peace aims. The Congress is one of the biggest political parties in the world, certainly the biggest in India and based not on religious, sectional, caste or class basis but on a united stand of the peoples of India for national freedom. It asked if, as the British Government

declared, the war was really being fought for freedom and democracy, how these twin ideals were going to be applied to India and the colonies. It added that India would be more than willing to do her bit in the war for freedom and peace in the world, but was not interested in the war if these principles did not apply to her. And it demanded the immediate recognition of India's right to freedom and an agreement by the Government that India's future would be determined by a democratically elected constituent Assembly.

The British Government replied in a very offhand manner and Lord Linlithgow repeated the age-old promise of Dominion Status for India some time in the nebulous future. Meanwhile, he offered to form a consultative committee of Indians who would help to propagandize the war effort.

At Poona, on July 7, the Congress made a last offer to meet the British Government, reiterating the national demands and asking Britain to create a provisional national government which would be able to command the confidence of the central legislature and to get the co-operation of the other legislatures.

The Secretary of State for India turned down these proposals and dismissed the idea of a national government out of hand as completely unacceptable. On August 8, 1940, the Viceroy again repeated the old formula that the enjoyment of Dominion Status was India's appointed destiny, and he invited representative Indians to serve on his executive council, proposing also a war advisory council which was to meet every two months. The representatives on both these would have had no power except to make submissions. Therefore the Congress rejected this declaration.

The last exchanges between the Viceroy and Mr. Gandhi brought no relaxation of the authoritarian grip at the centre and Mr. Gandhi launched his campaign of civil disobedience by asking individual Congressmen to offer themselves for symbolic arrest. Most of the Congress leaders thus went to prison. Apart from them, hundreds of peasant and trade union leaders had already been interned without trial, or put into prison, for the crime of talking about freedom and democracy. The All-India Trade Union Congress, the All-India Peasant League, the Depressed Classes Association, the Sikhs, the Indian Christians and all Mohammedan organizations, except the Moslem League, supported the Congress in the stand it took about Britain's attitude.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru intervening on March 14, 1941, as from a Liberal Conference at Bombay, sought to move the British Government to an explicit declaration of Dominion Status at the end of the war, and asked for Defence and Finance to be transferred immediately to Indian hands. But Mr. Amery rebuffed him with the most perfunctory of Imperial gestures. A later appeal by the moderates to Mr. Churchill for a settlement elicited no response.

The entry of the Soviet Union into the war through Hitler's treacherous and unprovoked aggression had already changed the perspective of war for the subject peoples of India and the colonies, as indeed for the peoples of the whole world. The progressive Anglo-Soviet alliance made the people of

India eager to participate in the war effort of the threatened democracies. When the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Charter was declared, most people believed that a new chapter in the collaboration of democratic peoples was opening. Indeed, of its eight points, the third which conceded the right of the people to choose their own government seemed specially significant. Here, then, people thought had been conceded, in unmistakable terms, what India had been demanding for years. But it was not long before the fond hopes of the lovers of democracy and human freedom were dashed to the ground. For, in answer to a question in Parliament, Mr. Churchill declared that this document did not apply to India, Burma and other parts of the British Empire.

Meanwhile, the gravity of the international situation was increased by Japan's sudden offensive against the democracies. The rapidity of the Japanese advance leading to the fall of the Singapore key base opened the doors of the Indian Ocean to the aggressor. General Chiang Kai-Shek visited India at this stage, met the Indian leaders and spoke frankly to Britain, asking for real power to be given to the Indian people.

What the insistent demands of the Indian people and the pressure of democratic opinion in Britain could not do, however, the success of Japanese arms in the far east, in the Dutch East Indies and Burma seemed to achieve:

The crisis in the affairs of India arising out of the Japanese advance has made us wish to rally all the forces of Indian life, to guard their land from the menace of the invader —thus began the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on March 11, 1942. And, he informed Parliament that Sir Stafford Cripps would be going out immediately with a Declaration which had the unanimous approval of the British War Cabinet behind it.

The Prime Minister was candid enough to indicate that the new proposals were mainly an attempt to clothe the bare outlines of the declaration of August, 1940. But the fact that Mr. Churchill asked the press, and responsible opinion, to withhold comment and not to prejudice the Lord Privy Seal's delicate mission, as well as the fact that Sir Stafford was professedly a socialist and a friend of the Indian people, made even the shrewdest observers wait with bated breath for the revelation of the terms. Perhaps, perhaps . . . the day of freedom was really dawning for India. Anyhow, everyone was anxious for a settlement.

Sir Stafford flew to India. On arrival he declared, rather tactlessly it seemed, that he had more important business in London and so would only be in India for a fortnight and that the proposals he had brought were the final word of the British war cabinet, admitting of no alteration or revision, as if it was a question of 'take it or leave it.'

Now what were these proposals? The Declaration was in two main parts. The first part laid down that the object of His Majesty's Government is 'the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, with the right to secede from the British Commonwealth later if it so desires.

There was nothing new about this offer of Dominion Status except that this time, at any rate, a date had actually been fixed for the granting of the gift. The date was, of course, after the cessation of hostilities! And yet, as if to show how concrete were the aims of the war cabinet, even the exact procedure for evolving a new constitution had been worked out. All this seemed to suggest that we were getting down to brass tacks after all.

'What is wrong with this offer?' you will ask. 'Why didn't India accept it?' First of all, because, as Gandhi said to Sir Stafford Cripps with characteristic shrewdness, 'it is a post-dated cheque.' The Mahatma did not add, what may have been in his mind, that the old British firm which was offering it may not be there in its *present form* after the war to honour it.

Secondly, if we look at the first part of this offer in passing, it at once reveals the kind of torn and divided India that is envisaged by the British Government. For, if the Indian Dominion was vouchsafed the right of secession, any part or province of India which did not want to enter the Union would be allowed to remain apart and become a Dominion in its own right. With this right to non-accession to the Dominion of any part or province of India, the Moslem League is conceded the demand behind its slogan of a separate Mohammedan state in the north of India, Pakistan or Holy Land; and the whole trend of Indian history towards basic social and political unity is deliberately arrested. The Indian princes who hedged at the acceptance of the last federal scheme would think twice before negotiating new treaties which may in any way confine their autocratic powers. So that we shall have, as an Indian nationalist paper aptly put it, three different Indias, Hindustan, Pakistan and Princistan! And, since all the forces which want to disrupt the unity of India for their own reactionary purposes are given no uncertain measure of encouragement, we might look forward not to one, but to five hundred different Ulsters, acting in the interests of an alien power, although that power makes such a brave show of relinquishing control over the internal affairs of India!

And it is not only the 'Ulsterization' or the 'Balkanization' of India which is thus contemplated, but the very procedure about the framing of a new constitution through an electoral college is so conceived as to nullify the substance of the proposal which concedes to Indian people the right to frame their own constitution. The proposed electoral college which is to choose the constitution-making body is to consist of all the members elected to the lower house of the provincial legislature, when a new election takes place after the war under the 1935 Act, and the representatives of the Indian states in proportion to their population. Innocent enough on the surface, this proposal loses its charm if we remember that only about 13 per cent. of the people of India are allowed to vote; and the ingenious devices invented by Britain for separate representation on a communal-religious-sectional basis leave very little elbow room for democracy even in that restricted franchise. If we add to this the proposal that, side by side with the elected delegates to

the electoral college, we shall have the representatives of the Indian princes, *nominated by these autocrats and not elected by the peoples of the states*, we can hardly expect a constitution which will err on the side of democracy. Instead, the princes and partitionists will be enabled to break India up into as many fragments as they like and thus ensure the success of Britain's old policy of *divide et impera*.

But it was not the intricate mechanism of post-war freedom which held the attention of the Indian people; it was rather the wish to mobilize the man-power and the material resources of the country for the immediate defence of India against fascist aggression. So that the Congress was naturally very much more interested in that part of the declaration which dealt with the present. Now, strange as it may seem, all that the British Government offered India in this respect were a few more seats for the leaders of political opinion on the Viceroy's executive council! If one looks at the short clause (a) of the Declaration which grants this boon, one is left gasping in a vain attempt to realize of what the authors of this document could be thinking!

Anyone who has learnt the lessons of the Japanese campaigns in the Far East knows that it was not so much the power of the Japanese military force as the weakness of allied effort and, principally, the indifference of the populations subject to British and Dutch rule, that ensured such easy victories for the fascists. Where, as in the Philippines, the native population had been promised liberation, it was not only sympathetic but it fought with the utmost gallantry and held up the Japanese advance for months. No one can blame the natives of the conquered colonial countries, however, if their bitterness against British or Dutch Imperialist oppression overflowed into acquiescence of, or as in Burma, positive assistance for the new invader.

Therefore, Congress asked for the creation in India of a National Government, such as Sir Stafford Cripps had talked of during the first days of his mission, and the appointment of an Indian Defence Minister who could enthuse and mobilize the people against fascism. The Indian leaders insisted on this also because the example of Russia and China, the only two countries which have put up a successful land struggle against the fascist armies, showed that, apart from the regular army, a guerrilla force of the local people and a large-scale militia alone could successfully counter the unorthodox infiltration tactics imposed on the defence by the fascist enemy. Such a force can only be raised by an Indian Defence Minister whose sympathy with the aspirations of the people would muster the necessary response from the masses.

After elaborate consultations, a formula was evolved by Sir Stafford Cripps. According to this it was suggested that the responsibility for defence should be divided between an Indian Defence Minister, and the Commander-in-Chief who was to be a War Minister. The former would be in charge of public relations, canteens, demobilization and post war reconstruction, petroleum,

the stationery office and social arrangements for receiving foreign missions, etc., while the latter would actually control the armed forces and, inevitably, the conduct of the war in India.

The patent absurdity of expecting an Indian Defence Minister, one of whose chief functions was to organize canteens, to inspire the people to fight for their motherland is obvious. The British Government was not willing to concede any real power to this minister . . . And what is more, whereas Sir Stafford had been talking in the initial stages of the conversations about an Indian National Government, he began to emphasize later that this was the name he had given to the Viceroy's executive council, and that what he had really meant was to invite Indian leaders to sit on this existing council. If it is remembered that seats on this exalted council had already been offered to representative Indians, and been refused, because the Viceroy and his home member form a full quorum in this body and can together throw out any suggestions put before the council, you will realize the true nature of the responsibility offered to the Indian leaders in the interim period. How any self-respecting Indian leader could accept such an abject and humiliating position and then have the face to go to the people to ask for their enthusiasm and support in the war effort is difficult to imagine.

The significant fact is that, though the grounds of their rejection of the declaration may differ in some ways, all the vital parties in India from the Congress, the Moslem League and the Sikhs to the depressed classes and liberals turned down the proposals. In spite of this fact, however, statesmen and publicists in this country have sought to put the responsibility for the failure of the negotiations on the intransigence of the Congress leaders, and talk of Hindu-Moslem differences has been revived. The publication in the press of the Cripps-Azad correspondence, as well as of the white paper, however, hardly leaves room this time for the familiar perversions of the yellow press. There has been a lot of recrimination against the Congress leaders and it has been alleged that they wanted to impose a 'tyrannical majority' on the whole of India when they asked for 'a national Government with cabinet responsibility.' But the unfairness of this slander will be seen if it is realized that the Congress asked for an emergency all-parties National Government responsible to the existing central legislature; and it is conceivable that that would have been better than the existing dictatorship of a Scottish baron of inflexible views! . . . No one can read the balanced rejoinders of the liberal leaders, Sapru and Jayakar, to Sir Stafford's proposals and have any doubt left that while the Congress and other responsible parties sincerely sought a basis for negotiation, the British Government's offer, unanimously agreed upon in London, was unalterable and final and left no room for discussion.

So that the self-congratulatory attitude of those who seek to claim sincerity and integrity for Sir Stafford and the war cabinet alone and, openly or by implication, damn the leaders of India as irresponsible, is revealed as the

sanctimonious humbug of bad propaganda. While they try to show the people of Britain and the United Nations how noble was the British offer, they themselves admit that there was nothing new in it, that it substantially repeated the previous declarations of H.M. policy in regard to India, and that the only originality in the scheme was the personal intervention of Sir Stafford Cripps as a sponsor and guarantor of British intentions with regard to India. Since, however, Sir Stafford was not only a faithful messenger but also signified his complete agreement with the British Cabinet's proposals, the only element of novelty was, perhaps, his personal emphasis, though even that seems from his recent broadcast talks to have reverted too closely to type to make the proposals plausible.

'And what now?' you might ask me.

I can only say that while the whole of India will never be conquered by the Japanese, the situation for Bengal and the strategic points on the coast of India has passed the zero hour. And, as India stands with its hands tied behind its back it says that it will not in any way embarrass the British defence, while it will offer moral resistance to embarrass the new invaders. . .

Such is the invidious position to which nationalist India has been forced by a recalcitrant government. I do not want to disguise from you that the gulf between Britain and India has appreciably widened since the Cripps mission, which was not the success several publicists have tried to imply but a signal and historic failure at a juncture when such a failure might harm the allied cause badly.

Perhaps the *facts of history* will create the necessary basis for new negotiations between Britain and India. But, as you know, we are the makers of history and if we, the people of Britain and India, understand the true implications of the present *débâcle* and raise our voices together we can elicit a change . . .

Yours,

MULK RAJ ANAND.

POLAND AND RUSSIA

BY STANISLAW GRABSKI

FOR the last thirty years—and not since July, 1941, only—I have been, and I still am of the opinion that, in the interest of both Russia and Poland, these two nations should be not only good neighbours but also friends sincerely co-operating in the defence of Europe against German aggression. To this view, which I have held for so long, I may add to-day my belief that the present war is creating a new Polish-Russian tradition of brotherhood-in-arms in the joint fighting against the perennial enemy of all Slavs—a tradition which will help to sweep into oblivion old Polish-Russian antagonisms.

As far as Poland is concerned, this goodwill has existed for a very long time. Over a hundred years ago, the greatest Polish poet, Mickiewicz, who was driven into exile by Russian persecution, wrote in France a poem of farewell *To My Russian Friends*. In his *Books of Polish Pilgrims*, which were a Bible of patriotism for many generations of Poles to come, he foretold that, of the three nations which carved up Poland: "Only the Russian nation will see the light, and be forgiven by God." In 1830, when the Poles rose in arms to defend not only their own freedom but also the newly-won liberty of France and Belgium against the tyranny of Tzar Nicholas I, the Polish régiments inscribed on their banners the famous device: "For Your Freedom and Ours." During the last World War, in spite of the fact that Russia had oppressed the Polish population throughout her rule, while in Austria Poles enjoyed a large amount of self-government, the great majority of the Polish people was on the side of Britain, France and Russia in the war against Germany and Austro-Hungary.

But in 1830 the Polish slogan: "For Your Freedom and Ours" did not arouse the faintest echo even in the most liberal circles of Russian public opinion. The greatest Russian poet, Pushkin, wrote then a poem in which he attacked English and French writers and politicians for their defence of the Polish rising, because, he said, the essence of the Polish-Russian conflict was "whether the Slav streamlets are all to merge in one Russian sea, or if the sea itself is to dry up." Pushkin thus mirrored the deep and almost mystical belief of the whole Russian ruling class of *boyars* and bureaucrats that it was Russia's historic mission to unite all the Slav nations under the sceptre of the Orthodox Tzars. Almost all the Russian writers of the 19th century, even those as liberal in other respects as Dostoievski, were inimical

to the fight of the Polish nation for its liberation from the Tzarist yoke. In fact, there were only three great men in Russia who fully understood the impulse of the Poles to recover their national independence, and gave it their full support. These were Hertzen, the leader of the Russian liberals in the fifties of the last century and editor of the famous Russian paper *Kolokol* (The Bell), published in London and circulated secretly in Russia; Bakunin, the friend of Marx in the First International and Lenin, who made Marx's theories realistic in Russia.

On October 3, 1918, Lenin signed and communicated to the German Government a resolution of the Council of Peoples' Commissars denouncing the treaties of 1772, 1793 and 1795, partitioning Poland, and also all subsequent treaties and acts of state concerning that part of Poland under Russian rule.

The Poles, like every other nation, have many faults, but they have one virtue—perhaps because they were often abandoned during the hundred and fifty years of their slavery—they never forget the friendship and assistance shown to them. For this reason, in 1919, when the Tzarist General Denikin, who headed the counter-revolutionary movement against Lenin's Russia, asked the Polish Commander-in-Chief at that time, Marshal Pilsudski, to join forces against the Red Armies, the Polish Government rejected this proposal, notwithstanding the fact that it was backed by one of the principal Allied powers, and that Polish and Red Armies were then fighting each other. This attitude of the Polish Government may be explained by its confidence, shared by all Polish parliamentary leaders, that it would be possible to terminate the skirmishes between Poles and Russians, and to reach a lasting and honest understanding with Soviet Russia. The Poles considered that Soviet Russia had, by the above-mentioned resolution of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, definitely abandoned the traditional and aggressive Tzarist Imperialism. They thought, furthermore, that such an understanding with the old Russia would have little chance of enduring.

For what issue were the Polish and Soviet armies fighting in 1918 and 1919? For the lands which at the time of the Polish partitions were detached by Empress Catherine II from the Polish Commonwealth. When, after the collapse of the Central Powers, the German Armies had left these territories, occupied by them in 1918, the Polish Armies advanced from West to East in order to reunite all the lands of the old Polish Kingdom. Simultaneously, the Red Army invaded these lands from the East. Although the Soviet Government had waived its legal claims and titles to these territories by denouncing the Partition Treaties, it considered it necessary in the interests of world revolution to extend its authority as far to the west as possible. It should be borne in mind that at that time Bela Kun had carried out a Communist *coup d'état* in Hungary, while in Germany numerous and sanguinary battles were in progress between Communists and Social Democrats in various large cities.

In the 14th century the Russian, White Russian and Ruthenian principalities

ties, ruled by princes of the House of Ruryk, and subjugated two hundred years earlier by the Mongols, began to shake off the Tartar yoke. The eastern principalities were united under the sceptre of the Dukes and later Tsars of Moscow, while the western and southern petty dukedoms in the river-basin of the Dnieper were united by the Grand Dukes of Lithuania, and after the Polish-Lithuanian union of 1385 came under the Polish crown. At the end of the 18th century, White Russia and Western Ukraine were as closely knit culturally and politically with Poland, as Scotland with England. But during the partitions of Poland between 1772 and 1795 Russia annexed all the Polish lands east of the rivers Bug and Zbrucz. Notwithstanding the partitions however, the bonds between Poland and the territories annexed by Russia remained as close as ever. The greatest Polish patriots of the last two centuries were born in these lands: Kósciuszko, the leader of the insurrection of 1794, Traugutt, leader of the rising of 1863, the poets Mickiewicz and Slowacki, the novelists Kraszewski and Sienkiewicz, and the pianist Paderewski. It was in the country around Wilno that the participation of peasants in the Polish rising of 1863 was most pronounced. However, one hundred and fifty years of ruthless Russification, particularly severe after the collapse of the 1863 rising, could not fail to produce some effect. For instance, Poles were forbidden to buy land even from other Poles, and signs were placed in all offices and schools forbidding the use of the Polish language under heavy penalties. As one gets further to the East of Wilno, which still remains a strong centre of Polish civilization and political thought, the weaker grow the links between these lands and Poland, and the stronger becomes the influence of Russian civilization.

For this reason, the Polish National Committee in Paris, which was recognized in 1917 by all the Allies as the legal representative of the Polish nation at war with Germany and Austria, decided in a spirit of sound realism to claim the return to Poland of less than one-half of the lands seized by Russia at the time of the partitions.

This was a very modest programme. Its modesty will be fully apparent in the light of the fact that, on January 28, 1920, the Council of Peoples' Commissars proposed to "The Polish Government and People" an armistice on a line well to the east of the frontiers claimed by Poland; this line ran through the towns of Polock, Borysów, Cudnów and Bar, and the Council also suggested that this line should be adopted as a basis for the peace negotiations with regard to a new frontier between Poland and the U.S.S.R.

At that time I was Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Parliament and I can state authoritatively that all the Polish parties were decidedly in favour of accepting these proposals. The Polish Government entered into preliminary negotiations with the Soviet Government—these were however soon broken off by a difference of opinion as to the choice of a place in which to hold this Peace Conference. The Polish High Command

suggested the town of Borysów for this purpose, while the Soviet High Command was absolutely opposed to it. The break-down of negotiations in their preliminary stages for such a trifling reason was possible only because the decisive voice both in the Polish and Soviet High Commands belonged to men who, against the will of their peoples, desired to prolong the war. In Poland, Marshal Pilsudski considered it imperative not to deny assistance to the Ukrainian nationalists, then fighting under Petlura for Ukrainian independence and liberation from Moscow. In Russia, Trotsky claimed that it was the duty of the Red Armies, equal to that of destroying the so-called White counter-revolution, to break the barrier formed by Poland, which had made it impossible for Russia to afford effective help to the German Communists. After the winter lull, early in the spring of 1920, severe fighting broke out on the Polish-Russian front. In the first stage, the Polish Armies were successful, and occupied Kiev, but later the Russian counter-offensive forced them to retire almost to the gates of Warsaw. But in the three-day battle of Warsaw, the Russian Armies were utterly defeated and driven back in confusion to Minsk.

In spite of this victory Poland did not aim in the least at destroying the Red Army, or at imposing humiliating peace-terms on Russia. While military operations were still in progress, Poland opened peace negotiations with Russia, first at Minsk and then at Riga. The Polish peace delegation, in which were represented all the Polish Parliamentary parties, at once proposed to base the Peace Treaty on the following principles:

- (a) A peace without victors or vanquished.
- (b) Equal consideration for the vital interests of the two countries.
- (c) The delineation of a frontier which would draw an equitable line through the territories inhabited by mixed populations, which had belonged to Poland before 1772, and were annexed by Russia during the partitions—a line which would end once and for all the age-old Polish-Russian conflict with regard to these territories.

As a member of this Polish peace delegation, I am glad to say that the Soviet delegation was no less anxious than the Polish one to put an end to the frontier disputes between Poland and Russia and to provide a firm basis for good relations between the two countries. It was the spirit of Lenin, and not of Trotsky, which inspired the Soviet delegation. The address of M. Joffe, the Chairman of the Soviet peace delegation, at Riga on the occasion of the signing of the Peace treaty on March 18, 1921, was not merely courteous but truthful, when he said: "The atmosphere at Riga was always such that it assisted the conduct of the negotiations and facilitated our arrival at the desired result." In particular, the tracing of a new frontier was accomplished without any friction. The frontier-line proposed by the Polish delegation was accepted by the Soviet delegation after a discussion lasting only one hour. Nor was this surprising. Although the Polish Armies continued their advance, and the Russians their retreat, the Polish delegation proposed a frontier-line which, at many points, was a hundred kilometres

west of the line proposed by the Soviet Government in January, 1920, before the final armed clash.

As I was Chairman of the Frontier Committee of the Polish Delegation, I was often attacked later by some sections of the Polish public opinion for the excessive moderation of our territorial claims at that time. They were in fact extremely moderate. The Treaty of Riga returned to Poland only one-fourth of the area seized by Russia at the time of partitions, and left about 120,000 square miles of lands formerly Polish to Russia. But the Polish Delegation was seriously and sincerely anxious to "pay equal attention to the vital interests of both sides." We agreed with the Soviet Delegation that Ukraina was a vital Russian interest, while White Russia and the territory of Wilno was a Polish one. For this reason, Poland returned to Russia a part of Ukrainian territory which was at that time already occupied by the Polish forces, while Soviet Russia declared, in Article I of the Peace Treaty, that "the problem of the territories under dispute between Lithuania and Poland is a problem concerning these two countries only," and surrendered to Poland two counties, at that time not yet occupied by the Polish forces, thus giving Poland a common frontier with Latvia. Poland did not however claim the whole of White Russia for herself. She left the White Russian capital, Minsk, to Russia. She considered that her vital interests were limited to the restoration to Poland of that part only of White Russia where the majority of the population was Catholic and clearly gravitated towards Polish culture. In the whole area of the Wilno territory and Polish White Russia, 52.5 per cent. of the population is Roman Catholic, 37 per cent. Orthodox and 9 per cent. Jewish. For scores of years these Catholics resisted the Tzarist Russian authorities when the latter tried to suppress Polish sermons and hymns in the churches.

I do not regret that I and my colleagues of the Polish Delegation were so moderate at that time. Subsequent events have proved us right. Every conflict between Poland and Russia can be advantageous only to Germany. It is to the vital interest of both countries and peoples to establish a working relationship, and even friendship. The best proof of this sincere desire on the part of the Polish nation is afforded by its moderation in territorial claims on Russia after the victory of 1920. Another proof is the enrolment in mass to-day of Polish volunteers in the Polish Army in Russia. All these volunteers have had experience of Soviet deportations, imprisonment and concentration camps.

Poland has no territorial claims on Soviet Russia. Furthermore, though Polish ideals are vastly different from those of the U.S.S.R., the Polish nation sincerely desires the strength of the Soviet State, and the happiness of its peoples. Poland believes that a Russia following the path of progress and civilization will rid herself completely of the tradition of aggressive imperialism and will become a pillar of world peace.

Actually, Poland is afraid of one thing only as far as Russia is concerned: namely, that the war, which quite naturally revived a fervent Russian nationalism, should also revive the dormant Russian greed for neighbouring lands, especially those peopled by Slavs. Stalin however is the heir of the genius, Lenin, not of the short-sighted doctrinaire, Trotsky. During General Sikorski's visit to Moscow in December, 1941, Stalin told him that he desired to see a strong Poland established.

In fact, a strong Poland, friendly to Russia, would be the best guarantee to the latter against any German aggression in the future. Of course, those who speak of a strong Poland could not contemplate weakening her by the seizure of a part of her eastern borderlands. The U.S.S.R. is so vast that an addition of a few million people would be of little importance. But should the same few millions be severed from Poland she would be greatly weakened, and any such act would provoke a sense of deep wrong amongst the Poles, a feeling which would render any good and friendly relations in the future impossible. The security argument, namely that Russia must have more advantageous frontiers to the West for strategic reasons, is a fallacy: it is a fact that Soviet authorities had to deport to the interior of Russia almost two million Poles, Ukrainians, White Russians and Jews, that is to say, about 15 per cent. of the population of Eastern Poland under Soviet occupation, to secure their rule there. It is obviously much better to have a friendly neighbour than to control a territory so uneasily held that such measures have to be applied.

The Polish National Council, which replaces a Polish Parliament in Britain, unanimously adopted on March 17, 1942, a resolution to the following effect:

An honest understanding between Poland and Russia is equally necessary and useful to both parties, and the Council will support the Polish Government's policy aiming at the liquidation of the points of friction still extant between Poland and Russia.

I do not doubt that all such points of friction will be eliminated if the principles proclaimed at the Kremlin by Stalin and General Sikorski of full respect for voluntarily incurred pledges are properly observed. I think that the Polish National Council was right in stating, in the latter part of its resolution:

The first and indispensable condition of a working partnership between two nations and of their friendship must be the mutual confidence that neither of them will ever re-open disputes from the moment they are settled by valid treaties.

I can assure the British public that on Poland's side no one intends to reopen any such disputes.

(After Professor Grabski was released from a Russian prison when the Polish-Soviet Treaty was signed he came to England and is now Chairman of the Polish National Council.)

A FATEFUL SUMMER

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

ALTHOUGH the war has become world wide, the number of theatres in which vital issues will be fought out or where new dangers may develop, tends to diminish.

On land the Russian situation dominates all others, for Germany has so far entangled herself that there, and there alone, can she hope to clear the road to further enterprises which might lead to decisive results. In the Far East the strategic issue turns on depriving Japan of control of sea communications in Eastern waters; land operations, disturbing as their results have been, are not of vital importance, except so far as they affect the naval situation. The Battle of the Atlantic is bound to continue with varying fortune, but universally as its influences are felt there is little prospect that it will be the scene of decisive encounters. Air warfare so far as it may have decisive results, independently achieved, centres over Germany.

It is operations in these theatres which must engage our attention during the coming fateful summer. Certain theatres where at one time vital dangers threatened have been eliminated, either temporarily or completely, from the picture. Temporarily at least, invasion of these islands, in view of our vastly increased strength in armaments and in the air and of Germany's commitments in Russia, is a danger that has receded; although as a desperate venture, promising the most decisive results if successful, it is a possibility necessitating the fullest precautionary measures consistent with offensive plans. In particular, if Germany had to decide to cut her losses in Russia an attack on Britain might be attempted as a forlorn hope. Invasion of Spain and collaboration with Vichy to secure control of the Straits of Gibraltar and the North African seaboard striking at the Mediterranean and Cape routes, appeared at one time to rank high on the German offensive programme, but full exploitation of the plan is hardly feasible in view of the Russian entanglement and the entry of the U.S.A. into the war. The possibility that the Middle East should become the objective of German major offensive operations—the much talked of great pincer operation—must almost certainly now be made dependent on what can be achieved in Russia. Last year a drive towards Iraq and Egypt through Turkey was considered to be too risky an undertaking in spite of the fact that our Middle East forces had been weakened by Rommel's counter-offensive and by reverses in Greece, because Russia was a potential danger. Surely it must now be out of the question in view of our stronger position and of the offensive power Russia has revealed. It is true that the Red Army has been driven back and is no

longer an immediate menace to the communications of armies operating through the Balkans and Turkey, but, on the other hand, in view of Russia's growing offensive power, a defensive attitude in Russia would not liberate German resources sufficient to sustain long-range and probably prolonged operations through Turkey. Much less would German resources suffice to conduct major offensives in both directions. It seems clear, therefore, that Germany has no alternative to a renewal of her offensive in Russia with the primary object of destroying the offensive power of the Red Army. The complete destruction of that army can, after last year's experience, hardly be considered by the most sanguine German to be feasible, but if it were deprived of offensive power then a drive towards Egypt might be undertaken.

The most obvious and quickest way of destroying Russia's offensive potentialities is to secure possession of her oil resources and of as much of her industrial organization as can be reached. Under present conditions it is probably now more important to Germany to deprive Russia of her oil resources than to secure possession of them for her own use. That, I think, is the main reason why it must be expected that the main German offensive will be directed towards Caucasia. A renewal of attacks on Moscow must of course also be expected, if only with the intention of engaging Russian reserves and protecting the left flank of the southern drive from counter-attacks. There is, of course, also the necessity of relieving the "hedgehog" key points now so closely threatened by the Russians. North of the Valdai hills it would not be surprising to find the Reichswehr standing on the defensive, content merely to maintain the investment of Leningrad. Whether Stalin will be satisfied to await the development of German plans or will attempt to anticipate them we must wait to learn. That he has no intention of relying on passive defence or further evasion strategy is, however, clear from his confident pronouncement, and our clear duty and interest is to do everything possible to sustain his offensive power and not merely to take such action as might reduce the weight of the expected German attack.

Although it seems certain that the main theatre for Germany's summer offensive must be in Russia, it would be perfectly sound strategy for her to take the offensive in secondary theatres provided that it would not make exorbitant demands on her resources, and that there were objectives which would affect the issues in the main arena.

Does Libya stand the test of these provisos? Are we to expect Rommel to undertake a fresh offensive and if so under what circumstances? For an isolated undertaking it would seem unlikely that he possesses sufficient strength to achieve any success of importance, and to reinforce him while his sea communications remain precarious would probably prove costly with the percentage of losses rising as the target increased in size. Nor would it appear that an offensive by him would have any diversionary influence in the Russian theatre. Under existing circumstances his rôle therefore is probably defensive, denying us the air fields of Cyrenaica and access to Tripolitania,

which have such an important bearing on our use of Mediterranean sea communications. The attacks on Malta, presumably undertaken in order to lessen risks on communications with Libya, may have been made in order to pass sufficient reinforcements and stores to him to render him self-sufficient before all available German aircraft are needed in Russia.

There is, however, another theatre where it has always seemed to me that Germany might open a new offensive, that is in European Turkey with the limited object of securing passage through the Straits. Secondary action of that character would have a direct bearing on the main operations in Russia and might also give Rommel an opportunity to undertake diversionary action of importance. The arguments that appeal to me are that unless the Straits are opened to the passage of Italian ships and German submarines there is no immediate prospect of depriving the Russian Fleet of its dominating position in the Black Sea, the importance of which has perhaps not been sufficiently recognized. It no doubt made essential contributions to the prolonged defence of Odessa, to the defence of Sebastopol and in general to Crimean operations. Moreover, by denying the use of sea communications to the Germans it has thrown a heavy strain on their southern land communications, a strain which will increase if the main German effort is directed towards Caucasia. The distance from the Bulgarian frontier to the Straits is so short and Bulgarian airfields have been so thoroughly reorganized that a blitzkrieg attack with a minimum of warning might hope to achieve rapid results and, with the objective limited, not entail prolonged operations or heavy demands on resources needed in the main theatre. The co-operation of the Bulgarian Army could be relied on and should the coup succeed it might be made largely responsible for the defence of ground gained. The Turkish defences are undoubtedly strong and there is presumably little chance that Turkey would be taken entirely by surprise, but in a limited arena paratroops might play an important part. Failure of the coup would not entail great risks, for the Turkish bridgehead in Europe does not present many facilities for counter-offensive action. Turkey, however, would become a base for British aircraft.

Whatever course a war with Turkey might take British assistance would of course be given her, but a diversionary offensive by Rommel might limit its scope. A limited offensive against Turkey would of course be of a very different order from an attempt to force a passage through Turkish territory to the Middle East, but, on the other hand, any bridgehead secured by the limited operations would be of great value to Germany in case the course of events in Russia made a drive towards the Middle East a more practicable proposition than it is at present. The opportunity to by-pass Turkey with the acquiescence of the Vichy Government in Syria having been lost, a pincer attack on Egypt would now in any case almost certainly involve an attack on Turkey. These may be idle speculations, but if I were a Turk I should not place much value on von Papen's assurances.

THE WAR AT SEA

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

THE position in the Indian seas to the westward of Burma remains in dispute, though to the eastward the Japanese have as yet a practically undisputed command of the sea. The last month however has witnessed checks to the Japanese advance at sea, though their land advance continues and will continue until the allied navies can effectively interrupt the lines of supply of the enemy's armies in Burma and the islands of the South Pacific. But there is ground for solid satisfaction in certain of the recent events. The defences of Ceylon disappointed the hopes of the attackers of Trincomali and Colombo where, it is assumed, the enemy expected to repeat their success of Pearl Harbour; and it is not without some feelings of reassurance that we read that steps were taken as early as last November to strengthen the defences of the island, before the Japanese aggression began. Again, in the approaches to Australia the combined forces of Australia and the United States have held up the attacks on Port Moresby and inflicted what appears to have been a sensible amount of loss on both the air forces and sea transport of the enemy in New Guinea and at Rabaul: while the action in the Coral Sea (about which the details are still undisclosed at the time of writing) gives the impression of having resulted in the repulse of a formidable combined movement against Australia or some position in the approach to that continent. The battle was clearly indecisive in that the great object in battle—the destruction of the enemy's fighting force—was not attained. But indecisive battles have often had a positive result in war at sea. Thus the indecisive battle between Graves and De Grasse was tactically indecisive; but inasmuch as Graves was unable to deprive de Grasse of the command of the sea, Yorktown fell. The battle of Ushant was tactically indecisive, but the failure of the British fleet to destroy the enemy prevented the help that was needed in the American seas from being sent thither, and from that followed the misfortunes of the British arms. So, in this engagement in the Coral Sea, if its result has been to inflict such losses on the would-be invading forces that the purpose they had in view has had to be abandoned, for the time at least, the effect may reach far. It is plain that time is of no small importance to the enemy, and the delay which appears to have been imposed on him is all a breathing space to the allies in which the defences can be strengthened and the preparations for an offensive brought nearer to completion. Finally, there is much ground for satisfaction in the

expedition to Madagascar. There we have been given evidence of forethought—the Prime Minister has told us that the preparations took three months to make. Secrecy, that essential element in such operations, was completely preserved; a most refreshing sign, for how many of our oversea enterprises have failed for want of it! The force that was sent was not cut fine but was decisively superior to that which it was expected it would have to meet. Nothing, in fact, was left to chance in the preparations, while the conduct of the landing was marked by the fullest co-operation of the land, air and sea forces and by skill, dash and determination. The anxiety with which Mr. Churchill tells us he read every mention of the word “Madagascar” can be well understood. Though it is not easy to define any precise limits to reticence in pointing out spots in the various theatres of war in which hard blows may be struck there is a danger in too good guesses and of putting the enemy on his guard, even though he, accustomed as he is to imposing complete silence on forthcoming events, may be lulled into security by such references, deeming it impossible that they would be allowed to appear if there were any real intention of executing such designs. In fact, a judicious admixture of fact and fiction in forecasts and suggestions is probably the most useful course, and the more places about which he may be made anxious the better.

Napoleon's saying that war is a matter of positions has often been referred to in these columns. Japan, during the five months in which she has been at war, has observed that dictum with consistency. She has steadily improved her positional strength. Hong Kong, Singapore, the Dutch Islands, New Guinea, Rabaul, the Solomons, Rangoon and more recently Akyab—all these have fallen to her arms and put her in a very strong position both to pursue her military offensive and to conduct, when the time comes, her defence against expulsion from her conquests. The allies have been forced continually to fall back, in the South to the Australian ports, in the Bay of Bengal to Ceylon. These they hold, and their hold on them gives every sign of growing stronger. To those positions they have now added Madagascar. But the whole strategy has been of necessity defensive; it could not be otherwise with the command of the sea so completely in Japanese hands after the losses at Pearl Harbour and in the China seas. Wars, as everyone has now discovered, cannot be won by defence alone, though there were people not very long ago who talked about “defensive” and “offensive” types of ships and weapons. Nor, however, can they be won without defence, and to secure the positions while the strength needed for the offensive is being brought into being and to the desired spots is an obvious necessity. It is not unreasonable to feel some confidence that that force is building up. The naval construction of the United States is proceeding faster than it was either scheduled to be or expected to proceed. When the repairs shall have been completed, and the new construction have passed into service, the initiative should undoubtedly pass into the hands of the allies, provided always that

they establish as the primary object of their strategy the winning of the command of the sea. Given that command, the armies of Japan, scattered as they are between China, Burma, the Indian Ocean, the islands of the China Sea and Australia, and dependent upon the sea for their supplies and maintenance, will be in danger. Given that command, too, the supplies which Russia requires for her armies will reach her without fail both in the Arctic and by way of the Cape and the Persian Gulf; so too will those for the British and their other allies in Egypt and the Middle East. The pressure on Germany from her isolation will steadily increase. We may indeed compare the reasons which drove Napoleon to attack Russia in 1812 with those which sent Hitler on the same course last year. The damning Molotoff Memorandum on German atrocities in Russia gives some indication of Germany's needs in the orders issued to the invading armies for the plunder of the country. The economic plan provided for the shipment to Germany of all stocks of raw materials and commodities. “All raw materials, semi-finished and finished goods which we need must be withdrawn from the market by means of orders, requisitions and confiscations.” All platinum, rubber and magnesium must be seized, all stocks of provisions, articles for general and personal consumption, clothing, boots, leather, beasts, agricultural implements—everything in fact of which the Germans are in need must be taken. In the Secret Document called the “Green File” the aim is unblushingly set out. “Obtain as much food and oil for Germany as possible; this is the main economic task of the campaign.” It is not without interest to compare this policy of plunder with the arguments which the German jurists—and it must be added some English and other writers as well—employed to effect the abolition of the capture of what is called “private property” at sea. In land warfare, so these folk asserted, private property is exempt from capture. The same rule should apply to sea warfare and capture at sea prohibited. It is to be hoped that we have now heard the last of such nonsense. It was the pressure of sea power which drove the enemy into forestalling the attack which, it is plain, he would eventually have made upon Russia when he should have disposed of his other enemies, in particular Great Britain: and that attack has resulted, we are told by the Prime Minister, in losses to the German armies exceeding those of the whole of the last war.

Unfortunate and disquieting as the situation is in India there are many encouraging signs in the checks and delays that have been imposed on the enemy. There is further encouragement in the purposes and results of the recent aerial operations, which have tended more directly than hitherto towards strengthening the command of the sea. Rostock and Lubeck may both be properly regarded as nodal points in the sea warfare, places in which the instruments of sea warfare are produced. Trondheim has had a visit, and, though the German cruisers from Brest succeeded in regaining their home ports through the Channel, it is now known that both the battle-cruisers are in dock, the one at Kiel, the other at Gdynia, as a result of the

attacks made on them in Brest and in their passage up Channel. These contributory events must not blind us, however, to the pressing need of obtaining command of the sea by the actual and direct destruction of the enemy's fighting sea forces, including those in the air, which are playing so important a part both in the eastern seas and in the Mediterranean. Our own air forces in the East are performing most essential work in the strategy of delay, and that part will be even greater when the surface forces have regained their strength and can begin their offensive with the destruction of the Japanese navy in view. The loss of three destroyers in a single air attack off Crete is an unwelcome reminder of the need of the navy in its air components and it may well be of some lack even yet of a unified command. It is interesting to note that the United States have experienced the need for an unified command of the forces, sea and air, engaged in the operations of defence of trade off their coasts, in precisely the same manner as we experienced it in the early stages of the Atlantic Battle. At the beginning of American participation in the war the American Army planes, like those of the Royal Air Force, were acting in "co-operation" with the vessels of the Navy; but though it was said as it was said here that the co-operation was full and complete, the interchange of information unrestricted and the cordiality all that could be desired, in practice the organization was found to yield results so disappointing that, by a joint decree issued by the Army and Navy Departments on March 28, all the Army planes engaged in the work at sea along the coasts, both in the East and in the West, were placed under the naval command. So the evidence continues to mount up in the plainest fashion that the subjective conception of the position of aircraft in naval operations must be substituted for the objective conception of the purpose to be fulfilled: that it is not the nature of the instrument or the manner by which it moves that decides its place in the category of fighting services, but the object that has to be attained. We shall make a great stride in our progress towards the achievement of commanding the sea when this fact becomes recognized, and with that a step towards ultimate victory.

CHANSON LIBRE

By C. C. GOULD

O SONG sung,
Winging,
Distant lands among;
And still bringing,
When the singer's dead
And his last note said,
Minute influences
To senses
Now perhaps old,
But young when the song was told;
Unfledged, unshorn,
Could be, not even born.

Silence then is not
Sound-vacuum
Or voice-forgot.
In the unheard hum
Things whisper
You know no thing about:
The baby lisper
In his tenement
A thousand miles away;
Still Attic calms
Born on far wind's chordless shout
Despite the jackboot
Of the rowdy conqueror;
His voice too, sore
With the loud oppression
Of dumb hurt;
Owls that hoot,
And echoes that die,
Forgotten as the day at midnight.
Unwitting Memory can be curt
And maim confession;

And ears hear things,
Yet not knowing that the silence
sings;
And eyes be open, yet enjoy not
sight.

Sounds are as ripples,
As stipples
Of rain
That pain
Quiet pools to circles,
A myriad, ring and core,—
The ring the ripple,
And the core the stipple.
Stay!—Disturbance is no more:
The reason for the ripple has gone;
It is soon done.
Sounds are adornment of the
silences,

As songs that have been sung:
We hear their passages,
As we watch spear, flung,
Until no longer seen,
But known to be still flying.
To us it has been,
Is dying
In thought of sight;
But elsewhere others watch its
flight.
"Somewhere the arrow strikes to
ground"
You say, "The same with sound."
I disagree.

You see
 A stretched string plucked
 Keeps on forever murmuring,
 Unending, and still singing.
 Echoes flung into the distance
 Do not die,
 . . . not die,
 die,
 They sigh
 In sleep elsewhere,
 Not despair
 Existence.

O Sung Songs,
 Sleeping in my heart!
 Events apart
 Raise up the hell-bent jealousies,
 The memories
 Of sharp divisions
 And of deep decisions,
 Hard edicts over little things,—
 Each sings.
 The final bourn of sound is the cased
 heart.

Sensations lie there, half-asleep,
 But ready to dart,
 Challenging heavily,
 Ox-strong,
 And long.

O Songs *unsung*!
 Drive in among
 The unturned ordure,
 Sweeten for fresh verdure,
 Spread wetting hoses
 And raise roses.
 O Songs sung
 Distant lands among,
 Distant times among,
 Circle round my head,
 Show you are not dead,
 Speak into my ear
 Like a messenger;
 And then start
 Things long said,
 Thoughts long dead,
 In my head,
 In my heart,
 O Songs sung!

MODERN PROSE FORMS

IV. TRAVELLERS' TALES

BY ERIC GILLET

THERE has always been a demand for travellers' tales. Ulysses, Drake, Columbus, Coryat, Munchausen, Robinson Crusoe, and James Boswell are only a handful among the thousands who have found eager readers for their records of adventure. In pre-war days Aunt Augusta entertained a crowded Village Institute with her experiences (illustrated by lantern slides) on a cruise sponsored by the Hellenic Club. Bert and Alf thrilled a deferential circle at the Local with their account of a day trip to Boulogne by paddle steamer. Victorian travellers, with the exception of Kinglake, Waterton, Darwin, Russel Wallace, and a few others were inclined to make rather heavy weather of their adventures. There was too much moralizing and an almost alarming wealth of unimportant detail. With the present century the literature of travel may be said to have come fully into its own. Ever increasing facilities have made the world a very much smaller place. Air transport has brought the remotest parts of the earth within a few days of each other so that efficient young men and women armed with fountain pens and typewriters can serve up their experiences piping hot. All these innovations and improvements have made writers more wary. Dr. Cook discovered that it was not enough to say that he had been to the North Pole. It did not take long before his unwise assertions were disproved and himself discredited. Since his day dense tropical jungles and desert fastnesses have been traversed by intrepid ladies in shorts, who came not as single spies but in ever increasing battalions.

T. E. Lawrence once remarked that a foreign background made some Englishmen more inflexibly English. He was thinking of C. M. Doughty, the author of *Arabia Deserta*. Many competent critics consider this to be the greatest of all English travel books. There is something craggy and austere like the Arabian landscape, about Doughty's style. The man himself was like a rugged monument. His personality towered. It is not surprising that the Arabs took to him and venerated his memory long after he had left them.

Arabia Deserta is not a book from which to hack chunks for quotation. It is an extraordinary achievement, born out of its own time. It is the

story of the life and habits of a remarkable people; it was used as a military text book in the last war and it will be read as a literary masterpiece many years hence. It can never be popular. There are too many foreign words and terms. Doughty made no concessions to his readers, but his book is a tonic, albeit a bitter one, and there is no better book for reading to-day.

It would be almost impossible to find a greater contrast in style than between those of Doughty and Henry James. James was one of the most urbane of writers and of travellers. He wrote at length of his experiences in France, England and the United States. His *Little Town in France* is a miniature masterpiece, and is widely known. Much less attention has been paid to *English Hours*, charmingly illustrated by Joseph Pennell, which appeared in 1905. This book embodies the fine freshness of its author's earlier impressions of this country. Here is a lovely passage on English cathedrals, evoked by a visit to Chester:

The great tower . . . rises high enough to seem to belong, as cathedral towers should, to the far-off air that vibrates with the chimes and the swallows, and to square serenely, east and west and south and north, its embossed and fluted sides. English cathedrals within, are apt at first to look pale and naked; but after a while, if the proportions be fair and the spaces largely distributed, when you perceive the light beating softly down from the cold clerestory and your eye measures caressingly the tallness of columns and the hollowness of arches, and lingers on the old genteel inscriptions of mural marbles and brasses; and, above all, when you become conscious of that sweet cool mustiness in the air which seems to haunt these places as the very climate of Episcopacy, you may grow to feel that they are less the empty shells of a departed faith than the abodes of a faith which may still affirm a presence and awaken echoes.

It has always seemed to me that nothing like adequate justice has been done to James's sense of humour. *English Hours* has numerous happy examples of it.

So much attention has been paid to Henry James's influence upon contemporary fiction that it is worth noting that it is to be found also in at least two books of travel. One is the late Dixon Scott's far too little known book on Stratford-on-Avon, Warwick, and Leamington, certainly inspired by "The Birthplace." The other is Miss Rebecca West's *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, which has been fully reviewed too recently to need attention here.

A literary traveller who delighted the young intellectuals in the early nineteen hundreds and has continued to entertain innumerable readers ever since is Mr. Hilaire Belloc. Beer and ballads, virile conversations and deep, unaffected piety, long tramps are most prominent features of *The Path to Rome*, and *Four Men in Sussex*. Belloc probably derived from Stevenson who in his turn owed much to Hazlitt, but Belloc founded a school of his own, of whom Mr. J. B. Morton is a shining example.

I was told recently that among writers who have died in recent years

Joseph Conrad is one whose work is still widely read. There is no doubt that whatever one may think of the novels, and some of them are too highly-wrought for their plot content, some short stories, and both *A Personal Record*, and *The Mirror of the Sea*, are exquisite examples of this author's work. Nowhere else does he write with such passionate frankness about the sea:

The sea—this truth must be confessed—has no generosity. No display of manly qualities—courage, hardihood, endurance, faithfulness—has ever been known to touch its irresponsible consciousness of power. The ocean has the conscienceless temper of a savage autocrat spoiled by much adulation. He cannot brook the slightest appearance of defiance, and has remained the irreconcilable enemy of ships and men ever since ships and men had the unheard-of audacity to go afloat together in the face of his frown . . . the most amazing wonder of the deep is its unfathomable cruelty.

Surely no one has ever written with greater feeling and sympathy about ships unless it is the present Poet Laureate. W. H. Hudson and R. B. Cunningham Grahame had South American sympathies in common. Cunningham Grahame's travel sketches are well worth reading. They are sensitive and vivid, but Hudson was not only a born naturalist and traveller. He was also a writer of great gifts, which are not at first apparent because of the deceptive simplicity of his style. *A Shepherd's Life* gives pictures of Salisbury Plain which have never been equalled. *The Land's End*, from the literary point of view at any rate, does full justice to the marine beauties of the Cornish coast, and in numerous other books Hudson has written with an almost scientific precision on nature and the countryside. His knowledge of two worlds gave him a rich store for comparison and reminiscence which give light and colour to his writings.

One of the most interesting and enigmatic among senior contemporary writers is Norman Douglas, whose last published work was, I think, his 'autobiographical excursion,' *Looking Back*, which came out in 1933. Mr. Douglas kept for many years a box of calling cards not only those of friendly visitors to the house but also those collected on journeys, and as he looked at them memories of his friends returned to him. This simple formula for writing a book of reminiscences has proved an adequate peg on which to hang some most unconventional tales of past experiences. *Looking Back* contains glimpses of people and places so strange and varied that it is a catalogue of the unexpected. It would not be unfair to say that all Douglas's travel books come into that category. He has great erudition and is one of the most companionable of writers. He has the ability to extract confidence and friendship from the most unlikely people and he is one of the most resourceful of travellers. *Sirenland*, *Alone*, *Together*, *Fountains in the Sand* are among his best contributions to the literature of travel, and there is nothing else

like them in English. Douglas is a master of relevant digression. He may and often does fly off at a tangent, but his digressions spring quite naturally from his mood of the moment.

Of the many books which dealt autobiographically with travel and war experiences during the last war, the most notable are Mr. Compton Mackenzie's account of his experiences in the Mediterranean, Henry Nevinston's war books, T. E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, and Mr. Brett Young's *Marching on Tanga*. It would be difficult to fit these books into a single section. All their authors show determination, some subtlety, and a great capacity for endurance. They display different facets of the British temper in face of adversity, but it would take a good-sized volume to examine them critically. Their value has been proved. It is enough to commend them here.

In an earlier article I wrote of Dame Ethel Smyth's exceptional talents as a writer. *A Three-Legged Tour in Greece* shows her at her liveliest. Dame Ethel adopted her unusual title because it seemed to her that a tour carried out by a great-aunt and her great-niece has something of a three-legged race about it. The exuberance of the younger partner has to be toned down to the scale of his yoke-fellow—who thereupon becomes equal to feats of pace and endurance that could not be performed in single harness. Like those of Mr. Norman Douglas Dame Ethel's books read like very witty and vivacious talk.

In them you will find nothing of the rich intensity which is the principal characteristic of D. H. Lawrence's descriptive pieces. In almost all of them the phallic obsession seems to be lurking just round the corner, but Lawrence was a great painter in words. There is a dark brilliance in his descriptions which is stamped with his unmistakable imprint. This is nowhere more definite than in his *Mornings in Mexico* with its wonderful and thrilling pictures of the Indian dances, those round dances in the dark near the fire, with the drums going, and the strange sounds of the men's voices. The rhythm of the dance comes to life again in Lawrence's account of it:

What are they doing? Who knows? But perhaps they are giving themselves again to the pulsing, incalculable fall of the blood, which forever seeks to fall to the centre of the earth, while the heart, like a planet pulsating in an orbit, keeps up the strange, lonely circulating of the separate human existence.

But what we seek, passively, in sleep, they perhaps seek actively, in the round dance. It is the homeward pulling of the blood, as the feet fall in the soft heavy rhythm, endlessly. It is the dark blood falling back from the mind, from sight and speech and knowing, back to the great central source where is rest and unspeakable renewal. We whites, creatures of spirit, look upon sleep and see only the dreams that lie as debris of the day, mere hints of wreckage from day-consciousness. We never realize the strange falling back of the dark blood into the downward rhythm, the rhythm of pure forgetting and pure renewal.

I have never cared for the word 'exotic' as an epithet for prose style,

but it seems to me that D. H. Lawrence often used an instrument which is not found elsewhere in English music. Of its beauty and power there can be no question.

I believe that Mr. Evelyn Waugh is largely responsible for the shape that books of travel and adventure have taken since he wrote *Labels* which was published in 1930.—At that date he was already the author of a book on Rossetti which should be more popular than it is, and of the two admirable comic novels, *Decline and Fall* and *Vile Bodies*. *Labels* which was sub-titled "A Mediterranean Journal" is an extremely sophisticated chronicle. There is the same blend of self-mockery and cocksureness and beauty with some really good comic stuff, which was afterwards with the addition of grimmer material to serve Mr. Waugh, Mr. Peter Fleming, and others extremely well. In a few lines Mr. Waugh can get his effect with complete assurance. At Oxford he once paid fifteen shillings for a 'stunt' flight, during which the pilot performed various aerobatics:

In 'looping,' the aeroplane shoots steeply upwards until the sensation becomes unendurable and one knows that in another moment it will turn completely over. Then it keeps on shooting up and does turn completely over. One looks down into an unfathomable abyss of sky, while over one's head a great umbrella of fields and houses have suddenly opened. Then one shuts one's eyes.

It is Mr. Peter Fleming in his *Brazilian Adventure* who has written the book most representative of the Between-Wars period. None of his later works show the same high spirits or zest for the comic encounter which make this as good a travel book as there is in English. It has the perfect opening for such a crazy enterprise:

It began with an advertisement in the Agony Column of *The Times*. I always read the Agony Column first, and the news (if there is time) afterwards. This is a practice which most people will deplore, saying that it argues, not only disrespect to a great journal, but an almost impudent lack of curiosity to what are called World Events The world of the Agony Column is a world of romance, across which sundered lovers are for ever hurrying to familiar rendezvous ('same time, same place'): a world in which jewellery is constantly being left in taxi-cabs with destinations which must surely be compromising: a world of faded and rather desperate gentility, peopled largely by Old Etonians and ladies of title: a world of the most tremendous enterprise, in which Oxford B.A.'s, though equipped only with five European languages, medium height and the ability to drive a car, are ready to 'go anywhere, do anything': a world of sudden and heroic sacrifices ('Owner going abroad'): a world in which every object has a sentimental value, every young man a good appearance, and only the highest references are exchanged: an anxious, urgent, cryptic world: a world in which anything may happen

Mr. Fleming dared to write an account of a dangerous expedition, deeply tinged with irony and bubbling over with humour which spares neither himself, his companions, nor the people and events of this South American journey. There is an encounter with a wandering Archbishop ('a tall, disconsolate man in a long black robe, violet stockings, and a

'kind of gothic bowler hat with a sprig of green stuff tucked jauntily into the band') which is one of the funniest things I have ever read.

Almost as funny and even franker in its implications is Mr. J. R. Ackerley's delicious *Hindoo Holiday*. As far as I know Mr. Ackerley has only published two books, this one and an acutely observed play, *The Prisoners of War*, which deserves a much greater popularity. He went out to a small Indian native state as tutor to the Maharajah's son, a child of two years old, and became the companion and confidant of the peculiar potentate himself, of whom he has painted a picture which manages to be exceedingly funny and very sympathetic.

As outstanding as *Hindoo Holiday*, but dealing with widely different aspects of travel are Dr. F. D. Ommanney's *South Latitude* and *North Cape*. There has never been a better description of Antarctic life than the former. Its author states modestly enough that it is merely a record of personal experiences and is in no sense an official account of the work carried out under the supervision of the "Discovery" Committee on behalf of the Government of the Falkland Islands. What an excellent thing it would be if official accounts of public enterprises were written with the snap and descriptive power, with the artist's feeling and the scientist's precision, which inform Dr. Ommanney's pages. With five other members of a survey party he was stranded on King George Island and his account of this ordeal provides some finely written chapters about a nerve-racking experience.

His second book has not so tremendous a theme. The author signed on as a Deck Hand in one of the Grimsby trawlers and the book is about the hardships and pleasures of the crew. Few men have written with such realism and beauty, of the sea and sailors and ships as Dr. Ommanney has done. He would make the perfect historian of the convoys which have accomplished such magnificent work in the present war.

Two travellers have written memorably about this country during the last decade. Some day justice will be done to the many-sided activities of Sir Arnold Wilson. Soldier, administrator, M.P., expert on a variety of subjects, rear-gunner in the R.A.F. when he met his death, and, above all, a great Christian, Arnold Wilson had the knack of making his countrymen talk. It was his delight to wander about his constituency, entering cottages and inn parlours, and telling the people that he was their Member, with the result that he soon amassed a vast amount of information and anecdote which he used with fine judgment in his *Walks and Talks* and *Thoughts and Talks* books. There is something of Cobbett in the style. It is forthright, like Wilson himself. To meet him before one really got to know him was rather an intimidating experience, so wide was his knowledge, so copious his flow of quotation. I never found its equal in any other man.

City dinners, sermons, famous personalities, chance encounters in public places and railway carriages formed the material for these books. To read them is a challenge. If it be true that there is a gradually rising revolt against present day standards of official and business morality in this country, widespread reading of Wilson's books would hasten its progress considerably. So, I think, would a reading of Mr. J. B. Priestley's *English Journey*. It is my belief that Mr. Priestley is at his best when he writes personally. This book irritated a great many people when it was published. It ought to have made numerous pompous city and town councillors profoundly ashamed of the conditions in the rabbit warrens they administer. In Swindon Mr. Priestley found the Pang Bros., Chinese Laundry. Then:

The very next shop I came to . . . was one of those hotch potch second-hand establishments you find in these places. One large window was filled with strange musical instruments, not only ukulele banjos and mandolines and flute hummers and the *Kentucky Trap Drum* outfits but also *Real Pigskin Tom-Toms* (Deep Tone) and *Korean Temple Blocks* and *Beaters*; and for a moment I had a wild vision of all the people in these streets, headed by the Pang brothers beating and beating away at these pigskin tom-toms and Korean temple blocks . . . The only other article offered for sale in that street that I noticed was a present for any good child called Jolliboy II Quick-firing Machine Gun (See How Quickly Pellets Are Ejected), and as I walked away I hoped that the jolly boys who played with it would never find themselves caught in the barbed wire with a stream of hot lead disembowelling them. The people who sell that toy might be encouraged to give away with it a few photographs showing what its parent toy can do to a man's guts.

Mr. Priestley made his tour in 1933. He has an eye for the essentials of the national character which few of his contemporaries possess, and he has also a sense of place, which enables him to see and depict the beauties of Bruddersford as easily as the urbanities of Norwich. He frankly admits that he is a little Englander, and he is proud of it too.

It is not often that one sees in conjunction the names of Mr. Somerset Maugham, Mr. Bruce Lockhart, and Mr. Osbert Sitwell. All three have written brilliantly about the East. Mr. Maugham's polished and effective notes on his trips are always delightful to read. Yet I feel that they are not altogether satisfying. Is this because Mr. Maugham is so assiduous in collecting slightly morbid or acid anecdotes with which to salt his traveller's tales? *The Gentlemen in the Parlour* is probably the most highly wrought of them but it is not, in my opinion comparable in merit to Mr. Osbert Sitwell's beautifully written record of journeying from England to China including a trip to Angkor, called *Escape With Me*.

Mr. Bruce Lockhart whose romantic and arduous life has enabled him to write a number of successful 'personal stories' is at his best in *Return to Malaya*. Of course he is a born traveller. He can settle himself in a place as though he was a native of it. He can write with

astonishing frankness about his own private affairs and that is the main reason for the resounding popularity of his books. There is something pleasantly naive about them which saves them from vulgarity. Mr. Lockhart lives and writes with zest. In an anæmic world that is an exceptional and a very welcome quality.

Before Mr. Auden and Mr. Isherwood migrated to the United States, Mr. Isherwood went to Berlin and wrote about it. Afterwards, with Mr. Auden, he went to China and wrote about it. Mr. Auden and Mr. MacNeice went to Iceland and made a Book Society choice but all the same a not very good book out of their trip there. Mr. MacNeice visited the Western Isles and wrote an entertaining book with some good verse in it: *I Crossed The Minch*. A treatise could be written about the architectural travels of Mr. Sacheverell Sitwell. Mr. H. V. Morton, a most capable descriptive journalist and from the box office point of view, the most successful travel writer of the present day, has written widely on biblical and other subjects. Mr. Guedalla has had a word or two to say about South America, and very graphically he has done it. Mr. Aldous Huxley and Mr. Alec Waugh have both written with charm, and discernment about the West Indies and elsewhere in *Beyond the Mexique Bay* and *The Coloured Countries*. Mr. Grahame Greene's *Lawless Roads* gives a haunting picture of Mexico. Among the travel books recently published I think that Mr. Sean O'Faolain's *An Irish Journey* takes a high place. The author knows his country and his countrymen and women really well. His book is as witty, irresponsible, and unexpected as the Irish character is to an Englishman. Mr. O'Faolain makes no attempt to be comprehensive. He went where his will took him and where he hoped to find enjoyment, which he passes on to his readers.

Mr. Clifford Bax has managed to make Essex enchanting in his *Highways and Byways* volume. Sir John Squire is always a companionable writer, and not least so when he is describing his rambles in *The Honey-suckle and the Bee*. Mr. Maurice Collis finds rare material in Burma, and Mr. A. F. Tschiffely is in his element with his legs astride a horse. All these people enjoy doing what they write about. That is one of the charms of contemporary travel books.

It is sad to think that the travel books of the immediate future are likely to be the grimmest that the world has ever read.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

TWO members of the House of Lords publish books that seem to have general value and importance, instructing the nation at a time when guidance is much needed. Lord Strabolgi in *Singapore and After* (Hutchinson, 8s. 6d.) helps a bewildered public to understand the amazing success of the Japanese; his "Study of the Pacific Campaign" shows us at least where he would put the blame. Lord Davies in his book *Facing the Future* (Staples 8s. 6d.), let me say at once, assumes his John Citizen to be the least fastidious kind of reader, such as prefers to hear the Italians called "ice-creamers", and is stimulated to attention by the kind of stories specially devised for platform use. That no doubt is why he writes the sort of stuff which he thinks will be popular—though he knows it would not be good enough for the House of Commons. I wonder whether the average citizen may not be aware that he is being treated with less than respect; Mr. Gladstone never thought it necessary to talk down to him; nor in reality did Mr. Lloyd George, nor does the Prime Minister of to-day. Lord Davies is too modest in believing that his very competent thought needs such tricks to recommend it. I take his book first because its scope is even wider than Lord Strabolgi's and has a more definite purpose. Lord Strabolgi wants us to know why a great section of the World War has gone exceedingly wrong; Lord Davies asks us to consider how we are to make sure that even if we win now there will not be another world war in another generation. What he recommends is nothing less than a Federation of the English-speaking peoples.

It is serious thought, set out by a man, who knows thoroughly how political institutions work in our democracy. 'John Citizen' must often find that the candidate who represents his wishes in domestic affairs is dead against them in the international sphere. Yet there is a way out, and America has used it; Switzerland uses it; there is the referendum. We have all heard that the Peace Ballot organized in 1935 by the League of Nations Union was a main reason why the British Government went in for "appeasing" Italy and Germany; but Lord Davies points out that in the ballot "seven million votes went for joint military and naval action by the members of the League against any aggressor." If that policy had been acted on, if a force of some fifty thousand aeroplanes had been kept ready at the League's orders, there would, he holds, have been no second European war. The League was paralysed, for several causes, but chiefly because in the democracies those political leaders who were ready for this international policing stood also for domestic policies which did not find favour with the electorate. Lord Davies is clear that there must be this police force, but that it will be useless unless those who control it are so organized as to keep their function distinct and

separate. It lies outside the ordinary routine of national existence, which the ordinary political institutions deal with. But if a man attempts to rob another in the street, ordinary citizens interfere as a matter of course, calling in the police, and helping them, not out of chivalry, but because it is to the interest of all that the peace shall be kept. Most definitely Lord Davies looks to the ordinary citizen rather than to governments for the world's improvement. Whatever authority is to control foreign policy and military action must be amenable to an electorate voting specially on these subjects. If I understand him rightly, this electorate would be spread over all the British dominions and would vote as a unit. This is a first step, but in his ideal, the electorate would take in, or rather be merged into, the entire English-speaking community. Such an electorate would have immense power, and he goes so far as to propose that no one should have the privilege of voting in it except after a qualifying test. How and where this new form of degree is to be taken, he does not specify and he is wise; no other proposal in his book seems so likely to make readers hostile and sceptical.

They will be impressed by his examination of the case of Poland, which to-day has all our sympathy; yet in fact during the era of the League of Nations, Poland showed a fine contempt for international legality; it seized Vilna, it seized a slice of White Russia, and later still it grabbed Teschen from the Czechs. There was no effective international Court or police force to restrain these actions, and the result of them left Poland dangerously isolated in the community of nations. What Lord Davies wants is "an international Magna Carta" in which the rights of nations as nations will be affirmed, and the duties of nations to maintain those rights will be defined. Inevitably he wants an Imperial War Council—such as Mr. Lloyd George set up in the last war—a precedent not followed in this one.

Briefly the book is a plea for a better organized unity—first of the English-speaking world, and finally of civilization. Individual nationalities will need to give up some of their unchartered freedom—of which Eire gives an edifying example. The unity is not only needed for police purposes; Whether individually or collectively, the nations must organize against economic perils; and he quotes the German labour training corps as "the only good thing he saw there." Half a year or a whole year for everyone, spent on "some useful manual work", instead of conscription, is his prescription.

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Lord Strabolgi's book might serve Lord Davies for a complete example of what may happen when a piece of international aggression is condoned. Japan's annexation of Manchuria and of two purely Chinese provinces in 1931 was acquiesced in by the civilized world though manifestly "a violation of the Kellogg Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations." But no steps were taken on behalf of the League, until 1932 when Japanese troops attacked the Chinese in Greater Shanghai, outside the International Settlement. This action—which directly threatened interests other than the Chinese—was denounced by resolution and the Japanese agreed to withdraw their troops from the last occupation. But the whole question of Japanese action in China was now before the League, and the Commission of Enquiry set up under Lord Lytton condemned the invasion of Manchuria. Lord Strabolgi takes seriously the intimation then given by Mr. Stimson (the Secretary of State), that if economic sanction

were applied, the United States would join in them. Unfortunately however the fall of the Labour Government removed from office Mr. Henderson, "the most enlightened Foreign Secretary that the British parliamentary system had known for half a century." Lord Davies's John Citizen would be interested by this appraisal, coming from a hereditary peer, trained from boyhood in the Royal Navy. Lord Simon, who replaced Mr. Henderson when the Coalition Government was formed, may serve as an excellent example of those who work for the traditions of secret diplomacy and keep John Citizen well away from contact with the controls. When the proposal for economic sanctions came before the League, "the chief Japanese delegate excused himself from making any defence, as he could not do it better than Sir John Simon had already done."

Next came the case of Abyssinia, and the same personages were in control of Government policy. After that, Austria and the Czechs were separately looted without concerted opposition from the nations that looked on. Then came Poland, and opposition was not only threatened but declared. Yet by this time Lord Strabolgi holds that the "Maginot mentality" was well developed, and when Poland was attacked the united power of France and England failed to establish a second front. Nor in his opinion were the necessary risks by the democracies taken when Germany plunged into a Russian campaign.

Even in the Far East, where on the face of things America, Great Britain and China should have been more than a match for Japan, the English-speaking powers played for safety. America put her navy at Hawaii to be well out of danger, when its effective station should have been on the high seas, farther east. Pearl Harbour followed and after it the American navy certainly took a long time to recover neither it nor the British could offer effective help to the valiant Dutch—so Java fell. Singapore fell in Lord Strabolgi's view, because the British government had neglected to form a local force, for which more than two million Chinese were available in Malaya, to say nothing of the Malays themselves. His book does not make cheerful reading: how should it? but he holds that when a resolute offensive is adopted, striking north from Australia and south from the Asiatic mainland, Japan must fall. For the present, she owes her success to "a new technique of using massed skirmishers for widespread infiltration purposes." But that is a game at which two can play, and "the young Englishman, Scotsman, Welshman, and not less the Irishman, usually shows great power of initiative, until he comes under barrack square influence."

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Those who value the memory of Irish regiments will value the addition in that last sentence. I am not sure that they would include Mrs. Nesca

A. Robb; her book, *An Ulsterwoman in England, 1924-1941* (Cambridge University Press 8s. 6d.) has enthusiastic reference to the Ulster Division but shows no sign of know-

ledge that another Irish Division fought side by side with it. However the book's purpose is to tell us what she felt about England, which she watched in critical years with the sense of separateness that Ulster shares with the mere Irish. Her record really begins with Munich—the "Crisis" of September, 1938—and she describes "exultancy of relief" which followed it—"not without a small bitter residue of shame." Many of us were more aware of the shame than of the exultancy. But her finding is that England

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England

in those days wanted peace at any price. "Lord Baldwin," she says, "has been held up to much obloquy for his confession that in 1934 he withheld the truth about the European situation because he knew that to tell it would mean losing the election." I cannot myself recall this utterance, and in such a case words should be quoted; but "Ulsterwoman" goes on to assert that the British public was not less to blame than its Prime Minister. This is singular thinking. If Lord Baldwin said what she asserts he did, he stated a definite fact—to wit, that he deliberately failed to call on the people for sacrifices. We are in quite another order of ideas when we assume that the people would have refused to make them. In point of fact it was not the British public who shirked; it was the political leaders. Oddly enough the best part of this book will be found in its references to Italy; Mrs. Robb has real feeling for the Italians. Her account of London under the *blitz* does not add much to what we all know and admire; but she justly points out the danger which has followed from England's "rooted distrust of any kind of mental activity." Germans, Italians and Japanese do not share it; and we see the deplorable consequences when the best brains in England (and there are none better) are called in, too late.

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Miss Phyllis Bentley has a pleasant theme when she writes on *The English Regional Novel* in the series of P.E.N. books (Allan and Unwin 2s.) She opens with an argument to show why two English cities separated by only a few hours' railway travel may be fundamentally much more unlike each other than American cities two or three thousand miles apart. Their local character was formed in the many centuries when, for instance, York was four or five days travel from London. Again, the country itself has an admirable variety of landscape and geographic character. It was the Brontës who set the example of exploiting this local distinctness—both of scene and of character. Miss Bentley does not stop to observe that "the Scotch novels," as the "Waverleys" used to be called, had given a clear lead—for she thinks this is national rather than regional. At all events, the regional novel began with Yorkshire and has continued to flourish there. In the list of novelists arranged county by county there are no less than sixteen names for Yorkshire including her own: no other region claims more than four. One may agree that Yorkshire is specially conscious of its own distinctness; a Yorkshire man or woman will soon let any new acquaintance know where they hail from. Yet that is just as true of Devonshire—and we have only three Devonian names, of whom Hardy figures against several shires. Has she not forgotten Charles Kingsley? She pays tribute to Trollope for having created through "imaginary topography" a regionalism of his own in "Barsestshire", somewhere in the south-west, yet not to my thinking regional in the same real sense as George Eliot's work or Hardy's. It is amusing to read, on the matter of using dialect, that George Eliot felt herself "constantly checked by the artistic duty of being generally intelligible." What progress we have made, to be sure! How many writers, both in prose and in verse have spat upon all inartistic subservience to this contemptible end! Let me hasten to say that Miss Bentley, at all events as a writer of criticism, is admirably clear.

CONDITIONS OF PEACE, by E. H. Carr. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.

A Daniel come to judgment! Professor Carr, by his shrewd analysis of the *Twenty Years' Crisis* published in the autumn of 1939, performed a useful service in puncturing the bright-hued balloons of British idealism; at the same time he laid himself open to the charge of being a purely negative critic. In his new book, though the note of realism is still conspicuous, that faintly acrid tone, which had the stamp of the Foreign Office about it, is no longer heard. The author has mellowed, and the result is a compelling and constructive design for twentieth-century living which stands by itself in contemporary writings on public affairs.

Professor Carr's purpose is unambiguous. Sadly conscious of the mistakes and shortcomings of Versailles—he was a member of the Foreign Office delegation at the Peace Conference—he wants us first to appreciate fully what went wrong in the inter-War period and why—and, then, lest war-weariness again set in, to direct our minds now to the shape of things to come. "Much will depend," as he says, "on the existence of a government ready to give a clear and decisive lead": and the book is a call for such leadership.

What is to be the goal of our endeavour? The conventional answer would be peace, that is freedom from fear—or security, that is freedom from want. These things, however, the author reminds us, are static aims, and therefore apt to be overborne by the stream of life. Indeed, the very condition of security is continuous advance. First, then, we have to understand the salient characteristic of the times we live in. It is a revolt against the three predominant ideas of the nineteenth century: liberal democracy, national self-determination and laissez-faire economics.

These themes are the substance of Part I of *Conditions of Peace*. Professor Carr shows us how the "democracy" which emerged from the centuries-old struggle with feudalism was rooted in certain conditions which have now passed away. It meant—and still means in all the text-books—a society organized to make the world safe for the property-holder. But latter-day economic developments, and the rise of the masses to power, have made nonsense of such dogmas. Democracy needs to be re-defined as "a system of government based on political rights valid not merely against military, but against economic power." Sir Stafford Cripps made the point, somewhat timidly, in his recent broadcast; and, incidentally the success of Independent candidates is a manifest reaction against "the supremacy of the party machine dominated by economic interest which has become the conspicuous feature of our political life." Self-determination, likewise, has up to now been interpreted exclusively in the nineteenth-century setting of political rights. And, naturally, it has come more and more into conflict with the realities of military and economic power. This can be remedied, however, if we are careful to distinguish the principle of self-determination from that of nationality—to give up the idea, born of the French Revolution, that nation and state should normally coincide. Men may "determine" themselves, as we are reminded, "into larger as readily as into smaller units"; it is all a matter of combining different loyalties according to different purposes. The first thing is to establish securely the broader military and economic framework.

What is no less important, and deserving of emphasis, both for democracy and for national self-determination, is the need for

obligations in correlation with rights. Social obligations will be an essential factor, too, in the new economic democracy. It has been neglected in our generation, and in the last century, because most of us, consciously or unconsciously, accepted the doctrine of the harmony of interests. The bankruptcy of that doctrine was a major theme of Professor Carr's last book. Because, however, we have not yet discovered a comparable basic assumption of the coming age, our fundamental problem to-day is one of moral purpose. The moral crisis persists. Chapter 5, analysing the elements of the new faith with which alone we shall win through, is perhaps the most effective—and surprising—of the book.

In Part II, which deals with "Outlines of Policy", although the author time and again insists on the tentative nature of his conclusions, they are, to my mind, completely sound. He makes out a convincing case for beginning the "revolution" at home. Big changes are necessary in British domestic policy—and the war, of course, has provided the great opportunity for them. He touches lightly on such subjects as public works, the social minimum and the need for subsidizing consumption—to the end that the essentials of national housekeeping, food, housing, clothing, fuel—are really treated as a national responsibility. He does not despair of satisfactory collaboration with the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. after the war. But he is insistent, and rightly so, that, as geography ordains, it is Britain who must take the lead in Europe, who must shoulder the chief responsibility for effective operation of the European Planning Authority and ancillary Commissions which will be required.

All this is, necessarily, sketchy—and the chapter on Germany certainly does not probe deep enough,

though one must agree that the important thing is to give the Germans an interest in—and a share of responsibility for—the new Europe. But the book as a whole exhibits a healthy distrust of blue prints of any kind and bears witness to the essential truth that the conduct of the war and the making of the peace are not distinct and contradictory operations but are part and parcel of the same process.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

INTELLECTUAL AMERICA, by Oscar Cargill. *Macmillan*. 21s.

In a review of Mr. H. L. Mencken's *Notes on Democracy* Mr. Walter Lippmann urged that the book should be judged "totally, roughly, approximately, without definition, as you would a barrage of artillery, for the general destruction rather than for the accuracy of the shots." I pass on this order of the day, for which I am indebted to Mr. Cargill himself, to all readers about to subject themselves to the Cargill barrage. If they will follow it faithfully, they will find the main body of their perplexities about American contemporary culture gradually succumbing to the quick-firing Cargill anecdote and the really heavy guns of Cargill erudition, though remaining unscathed by many of the wilder shots.

To drop the metaphor—there are things in this volume which will annoy the critical reader. Mr. Cargill's portentous words, his echolalia and aposiopetic and moniliform, are a bore because they obscure rather than reveal, and some of his fundamental dicta similarly darken counsel. To say that the modern mind was formed between 1850 and 1870 and then entitle one whole section of modern American culture *The Freudians* seems a contradiction in terms. Then, Mr. Cargill has no good words for

British writers after 1870, and few for those before; all, all are "tame and imitative." Mass execution on this scale is never endearing, and when it is supported by such assertions as that *John Bull's Other Island* is one of Shaw's most popular productions and that MacLeish's *Hamlet* surpasses Shakespeare's in several important particulars, the lion may be excused if he twitch his too long-suffering tail. But these are the mere jocular flourishes of long-standing and mutually respecting fencers; more serious is the Cargill fetish of "indebtedness". In Mr. Cargill's eye every writer resembles some other writer; and really these resemblances are fetched too far. Pearl Buck suggests Zola, Lytton Strachey is derived from Frank Harris, Hart Crane's "benzene rinsings from the moon" is an "echo" of Poe's "opiate vapour, dewy and dim." With an eye attentive to resemblances" is too much the operative clause throughout this book.

The European reader may tend at first, too, to be impatient at the devotion of so much space to accounts of French and German and English thought, which seems to delay the writer from his theme. But such impatience is not Mr. Cargill's fault, for he announces his aim, and the structure of his book, clearly enough in his foreword. Defining an ideology as an agglutinated and powerful collection of ideas as opposed to that individual orderly system of thought which is a philosophy—an admirable distinction—he proposes to study the impact of the prevailing ideologies since 1850 on the American mind, with its result in the contemporary product of American culture. After a sketch of the "invading forces" of foreign thought, therefore, Mr. Cargill deals comprehensively with contemporary American writers under the

"ideological" headings: Naturalists, Decadents, Primitivists, Intelligentzia and Freudians. One does not always agree with his classifications, naturally; Santayana does not seem to me a Naturalist, Bierce a member of the Intelligentzia or Hemingway a Primitivist; Faulkner and Caldwell strike us here as conditioned by the South in a way which Mr. Cargill does not indicate; *Judgment Day* is surely not an appendage to the story of Studs Lonigan but its climax, its inevitable tragic close. And so on. But Mr. Cargill is sensible and generous in his interpretation of labels, and to have a classification attempted at all is a great step forward. The significance to American literature of such facts as the loss of sea power in the Civil War, the establishment of "tourist third" on Transatlantic liners, the arrival of the frontier at the Pacific in 1849 and the invention of car and radio, is perceived and clarified, for which one is very grateful.

Mr. Cargill's literary knowledge is without any doubt enormous. For its biographies of contemporary writers alone—always a difficult matter to secure while the writer is still alive—this volume is very valuable. At a rough calculation, more than a hundred American writers are dealt with in the course of the text. Mr. Cargill has not only read everything they have ever written but everything anybody has ever written about them; he has thus an enormous store of entertaining anecdote with which to illuminate their minds and lives.

The second volume of this work will deal with *Ideas in Conflict*, where we shall meet the "stabilizers and mobilizers" respectively, in the great conflict for social democracy which Mr. Cargill sees as ranging from 1850 to the present day.

To sum up, the present volume, though unnecessarily long—for

readers of such a work do not need plot summaries of famous novels or translations of famous poems—is a mine of information, and a warm-hearted, vigorous, often penetrating attempt to systematize modern American literature. The author's description of his work as a cornucopia, with the great plenty of contemporary American writing gushing from it joyously, is thoroughly justified.

PHYLLIS BENTLEY.

MODERN BRITAIN, 1870-1939, by D. C. Somervell. *Methuen*. 6s.

BRITAIN AGAINST NAPOLEON, by Carola Oman. *Faber & Faber*. 12s. 6d.

MY EARLY LIFE, by Winston S. Churchill. *Macmillan*. 10s. 6d.

All these three books are good examples of different historical methods successfully adopted. Mr. Somervell's work, in spite of its new found dignity of 'library edition,' is a text book for students; Miss Oman writes for a wider audience although the romance of the incidents she describes is sufficiently well documented to attract the serious reader who is anxious to obtain a general impression of the period; Mr. Churchill, in a volume which was first published twelve years ago, is himself, a good historian, a fine writer, and a first-rate narrator of personal adventures. It is an interesting thought that in the present Prime Minister and the present Archbishop of Canterbury we have two of the ablest journalists of the age.

Anyone, like Mr. Somervell, who undertakes to bring history up-to-date leaves himself wide open to attack. One reader at least must confess himself amazed at the justification submitted for the South African war. Unless I construe him incorrectly (page 52) Great

Britain declared war in order to prove to Canada, Australia and New Zealand "growing into nationhood" that mother's apron strings were better than independence. Such a statement seems appallingly cynical and on the whole rather unlike Mr. Sovervell who maintains a very fair balance despite a certain lack of sympathy with the politics of the left. It is difficult to be free from bias even in a text book and I hesitate to praise wholeheartedly a history which gives the student so little cause for uneasiness or so little incentive to greater effort.

Nevertheless the book is both good and interesting. It relates facts neatly and with effective emphasis, while it draws attention to the kind of domestic detail, which previously school history books have largely ignored. It is good for instance to see the work of Miss Buss of the North London Collegiate School and Miss Beale of The Cheltenham Ladies' College given rightful prominence.

There certainly is an odd resemblance, as Miss Oman points out, between the condition of the people of Great Britain to-day and their forefathers 130 years ago. For Hitler read Napoleon, for Home Guard read Volunteers; the same tremors about invasion; evacuation plans; "The Russians were retiring in good order before a force three times their number. Bonaparte (Hitler) had left a shattered Smolensk, and was following the line of the Russian retirement towards Moscow." And this despairing cry from Mrs. Piozzi, Dr. Johnson's old friend, has a familiar ring: "We have no Cook."

As a general rule I like my history plain, free that is from the inventive genius of writers who put into the mouths of characters thoughts which may or may not have been theirs. (To say nothing of paint-

ing in the backcloth of an imaginary scene). But Miss Oman has a way with her. She causes the reader's imagination to travel with her as she arranges the coloured pieces of her story with expert hands. *Britain Against Napoleon* is a valuable book as well as entertaining and it is easily read.

The adventures of young Churchill are a necessary introduction to a proper understanding of the character of the Prime Minister. Some astonishing facts emerge, not least of all the failure of Harrow to discover his genius, leaving him to begin his education when he started seriously to read (when not playing polo) while a subaltern in India. Mr. Churchill made the most of his opportunities in his early life and did not shrink from creating the opportunities for himself. Persistence enabled him to take part in the action in the Mamund Valley on the Indian frontier and later, in spite of Kitchener's reluctance to have him there, he was to charge with the cavalry in the battle of Omdurman in the Soudan. His political career was undoubtedly helped by the glamour which attached to his adventures in the South African war and at this time he was always seeking for experience and adventure. He certainly got both. *My Early Life* is history at first hand, written by one who profited by his experiences in more ways than one. It is a great book because it is stamped (as an autobiography should be) with the character of the author, and at the same time it is a brilliant and compelling chronicle of historical events.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

BORDERLINE RUSSIA, by H. Foster Anderson. *Cresset Press*. 10s. 6d.

This is an extraordinarily interesting and valuable book, for its author has not only had a long and intimate experience of the countries he describes, but he is palpably a philosopher with a remarkable eye for what is under the surface of things.

A vivid account of life as the manager of a great Russian estate before 1914 is followed by the tale of his life among the Baltic peoples. His participation in the last war, at Gallipoli and in Flanders, he barely mentions. From his headquarters at Riga, where he became a member of a most exclusive club, one where Balts and patricians would congregate, he conducted the business of a timber agent until conditions changed and he returned to Russia. He was to go to that country at various intervals subsequently and what he has to say of the Russians is thus of considerable importance. For instance when the British Embassy had been withdrawn and a Canadian in Moscow had urged him not to risk a journey down the Volga he found, on the contrary, that the Russians were most helpful. They all seemed to know about the break in diplomatic representation, but this they regarded more in sorrow than in anger.

They appeared touched that I should come all the way to see them, for they were terribly proud of the U.S.S.R. . . . so the grand generosity of the Russian in Tsarist days had not been due to riches. The habit of being 'large' in all their dealings was and is inherent in the Russian.

Throughout this book we find the most enlightening pieces of observation. In the summer of 1939 when the author was at Berlin on the way to eastern Europe he met a German whom he knew. 'If we lose this war,' said the German, 'we shall pray for the Paradise of the Versailles Treaty.' And when for

the first time Mr. Anderson goes to Warsaw he finds that the Poles do not come up to his preconceived notions of them, for although he knew that they were Slavs yet his eyes said that they looked like Tyne-siders, tough and alert. He says:

By accepted standards Poland was not a democracy. Yet she struck the first blow in the struggle for the regeneration of democracy that had lost its spiritual force.

It is very satisfactory to learn that when in Vilna at a peculiarly critical time, in charge of a relief mission from Britain for Polish refugees, the author found that fundamentally there was great kindness on the part of the Lithuanians, despite all the agitations of the past; this augurs well for the future of these neighbouring people. It may even be that the personal union of the Middle Ages will again be brought about in the new Europe. There are memorable pictures, sharp-edged and epigrammatic of the Finns, Swedes and others with whom the author came into more than momentary contact.

How touching it is to read of the Poles that

never during the darkest hours of these days did I once hear a Pole regret the decision his people had made in facing Hitler nor a doubt that victory would be achieved.

It is difficult to stop quoting from this fascinating book. At Vladivostok the author and his wife visited the State Bank, where they saw several hundred women employed. The men had all been taken for the army. 'The hills around invited excursions, but the strategical importance of Vladivostok would have made the most innocent walk take on another meaning, so we confined ourselves to the town.' And finally:

I felt that the U.S.S.R. was much quieter than in the years when loud speakers on the squares and posters on the walls told of great plans. But behind the silence there were signs of almost feverish activity.

HENRY BAERLEIN.

OF MEN AND WOMEN, by Pearl Buck. *Methuen*. 6s.

The wood of war-time publishing, however sparse the great trees, pullulates with little books on large subjects. Most valuable when most personal, they can play the part of a good conversation, stimulating us to look again at something familiar. Their weakness is that they are bound to over-simplify. They impose a shape whose dim lines are barely discernible, they force a conclusion that has not yet arrived. For you cannot have loose ends in little books, and a little book that really took account of its subject might turn out to be no more than a loose beginning.

All the same, for our preoccupied days, the little book distilled by a lively mind from a rich experience is apt reading. Mrs. Buck has a clear and lively mind, and a rich experience of two civilizations, Chinese and American. What she has to say about the lives of women in both countries is worth a hearing. She sketches the two contrasting civilizations. The Chinese woman, until lately confined to her home, uneducated except by family life, debarred from taking any part in politics, the professions or business, but not from marriage and child-bearing since polygamy and the parents' care assured to every woman a husband and a home. She traces the painful and difficult adjustments that followed the government's recent decision to emancipate women and establish monogamy, and mentions that since the war the Chinese have returned to a modified

polygamy, as in some degree every country does in war-time, love growing more imperious and recklessness of consequences in the face of so much death.

Mrs. Buck loves China and admires the Chinese women. She writes with much less sympathy of the woman of America. Theoretically a daughter of liberty, a free, educated citizen of a democratic country, she is actually, in Mrs. Buck's view, a spoilt creature who spends her life eating her cake and having it, who demands at once the privileges of the kept woman and of the equal citizen, and who is often unconsciously disliked by the man who earns the money to pay for her manicures and for her lecture tickets and library subscriptions. For the American woman, Mrs. Buck wants fewer privileges, more justice. I think that she concentrates too much on one class of American woman, and does not fully appreciate how far the basis of their problem is the injustice of the whole economic system—but a good many of the things that she has to say about the relationship of men and women in work outside the house are shrewd and worth hearing.

She draws a sharp distinction between 'femininity' and real womanhood, and sees that the great hindrance to a full and satisfying life of men and women side by side in the world and in the home, is the fear of losing something. The man is afraid of losing prestige and power based on administrative and economic superiority. The woman is afraid of losing his love and protection.

I am not sure that I agree altogether with Mrs. Buck's attempt at solution. I am sure that she is right in saying that it lies somewhere in education, but I believe that she starts too late with the Kindergarten. It is in the very

early years of emotional development that the really free man or woman is made, and it would seem that parents would have to be educated first to give the baby boy or girl the right start towards confident, generous and unashamed woman or manhood. But I am sure that she is right in her main conclusion.

"If," she says, "a woman is a real woman no kind of work can spoil her quality. For the real, female quality is something tough and strong and resistant," and out of the strong comes forth sweetness."

LETTICE COOPER.

FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE: Reflections and Reminiscences, by Dr. Milan Hodza. *Jarrolds*. 18s.

A GERMAN PROTECTORATE: the Czechs under Nazi rule, by Sheila Grant Duff. *Macmillan*. 12s. 6d.

In *Federation in Central Europe*, Dr. Milan Hodza, one-time Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, tells of his life's work as a statesman both in the old Habsburg Monarchy and in the post-last-war Czechoslovak Republic. It is therefore to some extent a personal story, but it is also much more than this, for Dr. Hodza explains three things which our peacemakers should know when, after the allied victory in this war, they come to the difficult and vital problem of the Danubian region. He tells of the various ideas which were put forward before the last war for solving the "Austrian" (which meant, in those days, the "Danubian") problem by means of federation, and explains how the failure to reach a federative solution led to the break-up of the Habsburg Empire; he shows how Czechoslovakia was destroyed because of the impact of the new German Im-

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perialism of the Nazi dynamic upon a Central Europe divided against itself; and he outlines a practical after-the-war scheme for bringing together in federation the various countries of the Danubian basin.

Both in his recapitulation of the past and in this planning for the future, Dr. Hodza renders the service of making it clear that only by federative means will Danubian Europe be able to preserve itself against the aggression of predatory Great Powers, and thereby save Europe as a whole from another conflagration. Dr. Hodza's scheme for Central European Federation is one which should recommend itself to the statesmen of Western Europe, both because it is workable, thought out by a statesman and economist of great practical experience and not just the "paper" scheme of a theoretician; and because what he suggests for Central Europe might well become the blue print of wider federative schemes.

Miss Sheila Grant Duff's *A German Protectorate* gives a picture of the conditions which prevail in German-occupied Czechoslovakia—and this brings home not only the horrors of Nazi "slave state" idea in actual practice but the realization also that unless there is in the future a constructive solution of the Danubian problem, such as that advocated by Dr. Hodza, or something like it, there will always be the dire alternative of a repetition of the Central European tragedy which is mirrored in the conditions in

Czechoslovakia to-day.

Miss Grant Duff has taken as her main sources the administrative acts of the German rulers of the Czech protectorate, statements and declarations of Nazi politicians and officials and articles in the German and German controlled press. Out of their own mouths the Germans stand condemned.

Miss Grant Duff has an exceptional knowledge and experience of Czech affairs, gained at first hand as a correspondent in the country, and this forms the background of the material she had collected and collated of conditions in the Czech lands under the Nazi tyrant. Her careful marshalling of hard facts gives a better idea than any more polemical method could possibly do of the systematic German attempt to reduce the Czechs to the level of a slave people and eventually to obliterate their very nationhood.

I would strongly advise all students of international affairs to read both these books. That of Miss Grant Duff is the factual record of the present German infamy in Hitler's first European "colony." That of Dr. Hodza is at once an historic explanation of how such a state of affairs came about through the lack in the past of a real Central European organization and an indication as to how such an essential organization may be brought about in the future. Reading the two together brings the whole picture into focus.

C. F. MELVILLE.

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