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THE DEFENCE OF INDIA

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THE crisis in Indian politics that developed early last year compelled His Majesty's Government to intervene. A Cabinet Mission went to Delhi and evolved a scheme of compromise between the rival claimants to power. The British ministers declared roundly that Pakistan was a strategic impossibility; Indian unity, if only for military reasons, must be preserved. To induce the Muslims to agree to a union, a system of grouping the provinces was elaborated, which gave the Muslims a sphere of influence adequate, it was thought, to ensure them against Hindu predominance. Provincial parliaments would elect a Constitutional Assembly which in due course would frame a constitution for the Centre and the provinces. The Muslims with extreme reluctance agreed to give the scheme a trial; Congress, on the other hand, demurred to the grouping, especially of Assam. They were, however, finally induced to accept the proposed arrangement, but so obviously with mental reservations that the Muslims lost confidence and withdrew their acceptance of the Mission plan. Meanwhile, an interim government had been founded at the Centre, ostensibly a coalition of the League and Congress. The Constituent Assembly was duly elected by the provincial legislative assemblies; the Muslims refused to join. They re-asserted their claims to a separate State; there were violent outbreaks of communal strife in Bengal and Bihar, involving tragic loss of life. The trouble spread to the Punjab and the North West Frontier; the League was determined to oust the Congress government from the latter province as well as the unfriendly coalition government in the Punjab, where the League was the strongest party. The country was drifting into civil war; Congress were threatening to leave the interim government and to start an aggressive movement, unless the Leaguers were ejected from the Cabinet and control placed in Congress hands.

H.M. Government again felt it necessary to intervene. They took the extreme step of announcing, on February 20, that they would quit India by June 1948, handing over power to any government or governments that might meanwhile have been formed. The effect was electric. The League realized that it must make its position secure in the Punjab and the North West Frontier; it redoubled its agitation. The Punjab government collapsed; administration was taken over by the Governor. Thereupon, the Sikhs started a violent counter-movement which led to clashes with the Muslims who retaliated with appalling outrages in the north-western districts. The trouble spread later on to the south-west Punjab between the Muslim Meos of the Alwar State and the Hindu

peasantry of the adjacent British Indian districts in the neighbourhood of Delhi; the disturbances, in fact, fell little short of civil war.

The danger was more insistent on the North-West Frontier. The Congress government there headed by Dr. Khan Sahib, a local Pathan, was an anomaly. Ninety-five per cent. of the province is Muslim; most are Pathans who do not regard themselves as Indians. Congress, realizing that they could not hope to rule India unless they controlled the North-West Frontier bought their way into office there in 1937 at enormous expense. Khan Sahib and his brother, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, had built up a strong faction known as the Red Shirts, composed of a group of young Pathans opposed to the party of the Khans or big landowners. Khan Sahib was in control of the government during the elections of the Spring of 1946, which placed him in a strong position against the League; this, with a lavish expenditure of money—each Pathan seat is said to have cost a lakh of rupees (£7,500)—and the support of the Sikhs and Hindus who, are heavily over-represented, enabled Khan Sahib to form the existing government. It is generally recognized that the League defeat was mainly due to bad leadership.

Competent observers assert that most of the Pathans are anti-Congress and for the League, and that a fresh election, held free from official influence, would give them an overwhelming majority, despite Dr. Khan Sahib's pledges to introduce socialism and to re-distribute the land of the province. For the League it is a matter of life and death to eject Congress from the Frontier. Pakistan could not exist with a hostile government on the opposite bank of the Indus backed as it would be by a strong force of Hindus, Sikhs and Gurkhas at strategic points. Not unnaturally the League have been making desperate efforts to oust Khan Sahib and his Congress ministry. There have been demonstrations all over the province, leading in many cases to murderous outrages. The frontier towns of Tank and Oghi have been partially destroyed; so has Dera Ismail Khan. In some cases trans-border tribes have been involved; Wazir and Afridi *jirgahs* (tribal assemblies) have declared that they are opposed to Congress rule. Dr. Khan Sahib arrested his opponents by the thousand; the agitation still went on. The danger of an onrush of frontier tribes was increasing daily. Should this occur the Pathans, after overthrowing the Congress Government, might proclaim their independence or link themselves with Afghanistan, in which the province was, for over a century, included.

Neither H.M.'s Government nor political Hinduism could contemplate the loss to India of the Afghan borderland with equanimity. The Western Punjab, a part of Pakistan, would ally itself with the Afghans; if the Kabul government could hold its own, militant Islam would be a constant threat to Hindu India. There would however be little hope of a peaceful border under such conditions. The Kabul government finds it difficult to control its own tribes on its side of the Durand line; the added responsibility of dealing with their kinsmen on the British side would be beyond it. Dynastic troubles are always possible in

Kabul; the frontier tribes on the British side are only too ready to intervene. For example, a great *lashkar* of Wazirs from the British side of the line carried Nadir Shah some twenty years ago to the throne of Kabul. The Wazirs enjoyed the adventure and the loot it brought; they would not hesitate to repeat it if opportunity offered. In fact there have since been several attempts at king-making by tribes in the British sphere of influence, only kept back by heavy pressure from Delhi. With Delhi no longer in control there might be intrigues against the ruling dynasty leading to trouble, possibly giving an opening for Russian intervention.

That was one danger. There was another still more intense. Unless Hindus and Muslims could come to an understanding, civil war, on the departure of the British, would be a certainty. The border would be involved; could Russia stand aloof with the possibility of a flame of Muslim fanaticism spreading from Delhi, across the Middle East and perhaps to Egypt? Muslim tribes in the adjacent Russian provinces would inevitably be drawn in.

Russian intervention would not stop at the Frontier. India would be an easy prey. Only a third world war between Anglo-Saxon and Slav could hold her back.

The risk was obviously not worth taking. By this time leading Hindus had begun to realize the threat to their independence that might arise from widespread disturbances on the Afghan frontier. Could India, even with half a century's respite, defend herself against the Slav power of the North West? "Russia is knocking at our doors" exclaimed a prominent Congress leader a month or so ago. Might not history repeat itself in a terrific onslaught from Central Asia? Only by allying herself with the British Commonwealth could India find security against possible disaster. The political atmosphere was growing more favourable for a compromise. H.M.'s Government felt that the time had come for a fresh effort. The result is that the two great political parties have accepted the advice of the British Cabinet and agreed to form two Indias, both to be included at least for the time being as separate Dominions in the British Commonwealth.

Thus H.M.'s Government has been convinced that not only is Pakistan not strategically impossible but that it is a strategical necessity. Political Hinduism has at last grasped the unpleasant fact that independence is impossible for an undefended India. They must shelter themselves behind the British Commonwealth against storms that might develop on the North West Frontier, or for that matter in the North East. For might not a resuscitated China feel that its position would be immensely strengthened if it had a port on the Bay of Bengal? Rangoon would be a tempting prize. Would China stop there? It is believed that Assam and Burma are shown on Chinese military maps as part of China.

But India cannot have a Commonwealth guarantee unless she works up her own military potential. It seems unfortunately certain that Mr. Jinnah will

not agree to a Union army. The risk would be too great from his point of view if the army were organized on present lines, which distribute the Muslim element (about thirty per cent.) among the various units. A skilfully conceived *coup d'état* might in such conditions give political Hinduism complete control. The present War Minister, Sirdar Baldev Singh, a leading Sikh, endorses Mr. Jinnah's view.

The Indian Army has a splendid record, enhanced by its loyalty during the present events. Competent observers notice signs that the strain is becoming too severe to be resisted much longer. That the army will not retain its present morale when the British officer element disappears, goes without saying. The presence of British officers has inspired confidence in the rank and file that the claims and interests of everyone will be impartially considered. In a mixed regiment commanded, for example, by a Sikh and officered entirely by Indians, would Punjabi Musalmans feel that the C.O. would do them justice? In most cases one might say that such mistrust would be unjustified. It would nevertheless exist.

The problem of officering the new armies, Hindu and Muslim, will present many difficulties. There is a lack of senior officers. The quality of the new element varies greatly. Many of the Indian commissioned officers are first class; on the other hand a large proportion is second rate. A considerable number were absorbed in the technical services, the Army Service Corps, and Army Headquarters, and so did not undergo the test of the front line. It will take years before a reliable cadre of officers can be built up. In the interval if India remains in the Commonwealth there seems no reason why British officers should not be retained.

Meanwhile a quarter of a million or more troops remain to be demobilized, a difficult and dangerous problem, if power is to be handed over to Indians in the next few months, as envisaged in the offer of H.M. Government. Doubtless the matter has been considered. To digress a moment, it might be suggested that H.M. Government should, by some mark of favour, show its gratitude to the Indians who fought for their country and the empire during the war. The Indian soldier, the peasants who worked on roads, aerodromes and in factories making munitions, suffer from land hunger. Land is not available to any great extent in India; there are millions of acres overseas, in North Borneo, British Guiana, New Guinea, which could be developed by Indian settlers without prejudice to the handful of indigeneous folk domiciled there. Australia and India must, in their own interests, co-operate both in the economic and military spheres; an invitation from Australia to India to help develop New Guinea should have favourable reactions in India. An offer of the kind by H.M. Government in the other regions mentioned might help to restore confidence, goodwill and friendship between Indian and Briton.

The outstanding military problem for the Indian Dominions when formed is to ensure the security of the Afghan frontier. The naval forces of the

Commonwealth will protect the 4,000 miles of Indian coast line. The bulk of the Indian army is stationed along the thousand miles of Afghan borderland from the great military base of Quetta in Baluchistan to the Malakand on the Peshawar border. Half or more of the rest of the military forces of the country are located in the Punjab, in the near vicinity of the border. Apart from regular troops there are some 25,000 irregular corps, militias and constabulary, mostly Pathans, employed in the day to day protection of the frontier. The necessary finance is supplied by the Government of India, which also provides the funds required for maintaining relations with the tribes (pay of political officers, etc.) and to pay the allowances made to various tribal groups in return for specific services such as protecting the roads through their country.

The new Muslim State could hardly be expected to provide at its own cost for the defence of the Afghan borderland. Its financial resources would be inadequate; Hindu India would be in a perpetual state of anxiety if the Frontier were entirely in the hands of the Muslim League. The Hindustan government would not be prepared to help to finance the Muslim forces required, nor to subscribe to the expenses of tribal border administration, without some guarantee that the money would be spent in the interests of India generally.

The only solution the Hindus would be likely to accept is that responsibility should be shared between the two great parties. But this would only be possible with British co-operation. Could Britain be expected to play such a rôle?

Now it is practically certain that if Britain is to maintain her position in the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean areas and in the South East Pacific, she must have a strong military base or bases in the best possible strategic position in those regions. Malaya and Kenya have been mentioned in this connection. Would such bases be adequate? After all, the most pressing danger is the North West Frontier. Why not grasp the nettle? If India fell into Russian hands there would be no hope of Britain retaining her position in the Indian Ocean and the South East Pacific. She would lose half her overseas trade; the standard of living of the British working classes would drop by half; Britain would become a third class power. Mr. Bevin undoubtedly had a possible disaster of this nature in mind when a month or so ago he insisted on the necessity of Britain maintaining her position in the Middle East if she wished to avoid economic troubles.

From the point of view of strategy it would seem that Quetta on the Baluchistan plateau is well worth considering as a British military base in the Indian Ocean area. It is not British India; the Hindu Congress has no claim to it; it belongs to the Khan of Kelat and is held on lease. It has an equable climate and is easily accessible from Karachi, a port which would fall within the Pakistan area; its use would be readily conceded to the British Government by the Muslim League. A more direct route from Karachi than at present could be obtained by constructing a railway through Las Bela in Kelat territory.

Baluchistan is a curious agglomeration of political entities. There is an area (about 40,000 square miles) which was ceded by treaty to the British; Agency territories under British control (not, by the way, British India) cover 43,455 square miles, inhabited by sparsely scattered semi-independent Afghan tribes (the Zhob and Loralai valleys); the rest, some 80,000 square miles, is the territory of the Khan of Kelat, much of it occupied by tribes standing in feudal relations with the Khan. The country is, for the most part, mountainous and arid; its total population barely exceeds a million. The Khan of Kelat acknowledges the paramountcy of the British Crown; paramountcy will disappear with the evacuation of India by the British; the Khan will be at liberty, theoretically at least, to make a new treaty with either or both of the new Dominions or to revert to the original position of his State as a feudatory of the Afghan King. He would unquestionably prefer to renew his treaty with the British Commonwealth and would doubtless include both Pakistan and Hindustan in the agreement.

The Muslim League, from what prominent members have told the present writer, would welcome British co-operation in Border defence. In point of fact, despite the feeling that Britain has let them down, members of the League have for a long time been ready to join the Commonwealth on the understanding that the Muslims got a fair deal in the Settlement of their territorial claims. Doubtless extreme supporters of the Congress would welcome a declaration by H.M. Government that they would not allow Dominion Status to the Muslims if Congress stood aside; that, however, is unlikely. It would mean of course that Britain could not share in the defence of the Afghan Frontier. To refuse to accept such responsibility would be unfair to the League and to the Middle East (almost entirely Muslim) generally. The Muslim world stood by the Allies during the war. Had they joined the Axis it might have meant disaster for the Allies. It would be a shame and disgrace to Britain if she refused to help to maintain peace on the Afghan frontier, the great barrier to Russian aggression. Should it collapse, this might mean, apart from the subjugation of India, the establishment of Russian rule over the Middle East generally. Congress could not impute a breach of faith to Britain should she join hands with the new Muslim State on the Afghan Frontier. Her troops in Baluchistan would not be stationed on Indian soil; in other military stations, the Khyber Pass, Razmak, for example, her troops would be in such places in agreement with the tribesmen who owe no allegiance to India apart from agreements with the British which lapse when the British retire.

It would be a simple matter to recruit Gurkhas from the independent State of Nepal for service on the North West Frontier. In fact the major portion of the British occupying forces could be of that composition. Their officers would be mainly British.

The prospect of the disappearance of the British from the Afghan frontier is causing much anxiety in Kabul. The military position of Britain in India

and on the Afghan frontier was a guarantee of peace in the Middle East, a barrier against possible aggression from the North. An alliance with an India that lacked the means of self-defence would be no substitute. Many Afghans indeed feel that if Britain goes from the Frontier they might well claim Afghanistan *irridenta* to the Indus. That would strengthen their military potential. They would undoubtedly welcome a plan of joint defence of the Frontier in which Britain continued to play a part. A strong progressive and self-reliant Afghanistan would be a stabilizing influence in the Middle East and on the North West Frontier. Such an improvement in status can only be achieved by the development of the economic resources of the country, especially the wealth that lies beyond the Hindu Kush. This is only possible with outside co-operation, especially in technique. Britain and India working in combination could do much to help. In point of fact it might be well worth while for India to give Afghanistan a loan for economic development.

The question of the relations of India with the border tribes between the Durand line (the political boundary between India and Afghanistan) and the administrative border can only be settled with British co-operation. These tribes can muster over a quarter of a million fighting men, mostly armed with modern rifles. Their country, as already noted, is not British India; they can and do claim an independent status, subject to the various agreements, tacit and otherwise, with the British Government. They have been told officially that their agreements cease to operate with the British withdrawal; that they will be at liberty to conclude fresh arrangements with the successor government or governments. Constitutionally they could revert to Afghanistan if they wished. They would almost certainly do so if the Hindu Congress tried to rule the Frontier. With Britain sharing in the defence of the borderland they would be prepared to carry on the existing arrangements. A joint commission composed of representatives of the three parties, Britain, Pakistan and Hindustan, might maintain relations with the tribes and assume responsibility for improving their economic position, the key to ultimate pacification. The cost of this and of the commission generally, as well as of the irregular military forces, should be borne in agreed shares by the Muslim and Hindu States, whether or not the Hindu Government accepts joint responsibility for defence. The amount fixed could, if necessary, be a charge on the customs.

For nearly a century and a half Britain has guaranteed the external and internal security of the Indian States. In return the Princes ceded territories which make up something like half of the British India now to be ruled by high caste Hindus, a privilege never enjoyed by their forbears in three thousand years of history. A further condition that the Princes would support the British Crown in the defence of India has always been loyally fulfilled. The guarantee disappears with the departure of the British. All that the Princes received in compensation is the abolition of paramountcy and the reversion of the rights and privileges conceded to the Crown. There is no question of the



return of the ceded territories. Faced by what might be a strong and hostile Hindu government the Princes would be in no position to re-assert the rights H.M. Government tells them they will recover. Their main interest in the future will be external defence. They would welcome the retention by Britain of responsibility to share in Frontier defence in which, if permitted, they would undoubtedly be prepared to play a part. The British guarantee of Frontier defence would be some return for the repudiation of the military protectorate over the States.

The defence of the North East Frontier might similarly be a joint responsibility of Britain and the two Indian Dominions. A small force of Gurkhas would be a sufficient contribution on the part of Britain. A joint commission could, at least for a term of years, maintain relations with the border tribes, such as the Nagas who fought valiantly for Britain in the world war. They would welcome an arrangement of the kind which would protect them against the exploitation to which they would otherwise be exposed. The adjacent tribes on the Burma side of the border might well be included in the scope of the commission. Britain is under a deep obligation to them. They have no affinities with Burmese nationalism and the Burmese have no valid claim to administer them.

So much for the defence of the Indian frontiers. The two Dominions could meet their liabilities with small but efficient and well-equipped military and air forces. To make rapid expansion possible in an emergency, they must build up heavy industries. The big Hindu industrialists who finance Congress have extensive plans with this end in view. The Muslims will doubtless operate on a smaller scale. Agrarian discontent is wide-spread, communism is infecting the countryside in many parts of India. Relieved of anxiety about Frontier defence, Congress politicians would be able to devote themselves to urgent measures of social and economic progress. As a member of the commonwealth, Hindu India could look to Britain and the Dominions generally for support and co-operation in improving the economic life of the country. Is it too much to hope that with British partnership in defence and co-operation in the economic field not only would happier relations develop between Britons and Indians, but also that the foundations of a lasting peace might be firmly laid in the Middle East and the S.E. Pacific, to the benefit not only of Britain and India but the world at large?

*(Sir William Barton, K.C.I.E., late Indian Political Department, has recently returned from a visit to India.)*

## A NEW HONG KONG

BY JACK CHEN

HONG KONG has made the biggest post-war rehabilitation progress of any place in the Far East between Ceylon and Tokyo. In the first weeks of 1947 it was handling seventy per cent. of its average pre-war volume of trade and the situation continues to improve. Though the Hong Kong dollar can now still only purchase as much as thirty cents did before the war, prices are decreasing steadily. From 769 points in January 1946 the price index is now down to around 500, though no one expects it to go all the way back to the 100 points of 1938.

This busy harbour, the busier streets and shops, smiling faces, a steady influx of Chinese seeking security from political persecution or economic pressure inside Kuomintang China, the opening of 500 textile factories, new buildings—these are facets of life in the most prosperous place on the China coast. In June last year there were few cars. Now new taxis and automobiles give an air of opulence even though one knows that several of them belong to commercial collaborators who are now venturing to display some of their ill-gotten gains.

Hong Kong's steady recovery is due to the natural resilience of the Chinese population and the efficiency, enthusiasm and hard work of its British civil servants. I heard nothing but praise for the early military government under Major-General Festing which did a fine job of cleaning up after the occupation. Such well tried measures as bulk buying and price control to eliminate the black market played a major part in getting things back to normal paths of development. But what I found most heartening for the future is the fresh approach by government to old problems, the rapid headway being made by government-fostered co-operatives and the direct and helpful interest being taken by the Colonial Office in London. Thus not only is rehabilitation being achieved but a complete transformation is foreshadowed for a colony that used to be notorious among the Chinese for its die-hard *taipans* and the snobbish imperialism of "the Peak".

Old Hong Kong was frankly run with the interests of the *taipans*—the big merchant houses—very much in the foreground. This was an early and "normal" characteristic of imperial colonial policy. Then the rich Chinese merchants won a larger say in affairs. Now the government is taking a direct, helpful interest in the problems of the common folk. Old Hong Kong administrators will naturally protest that Hong Kong has for years been one of the

best administered areas in China, where Chinese normally have had a better opportunity of making an adequate living than in most parts of China proper. This is so, but I am considering the development of Hong Kong now, not in comparison with the backward areas around it but from the point of view of what could and should be done by administrators who are pledged to the ideals of a Christian democracy and who are looking to the future. On this standard it must be admitted that old Hong Kong made a pretty poor showing. There were and are shocking differences in conditions of life for the dwellers on the Peak and in the slums at its feet.

Because of objective conditions progress has not been equally rapid in all spheres. The medical services were badly destroyed. It will take years to put them on the level of a really modern service, though few could have done more in so short a space of time than has Dr. Selwyn-Clarke, the energetic M.O. Education has done a fine job in getting over 98,000 children back into school out of a shifting school age population of around 150,000. But further advances are likely to be slower since the department is now up against the very stubborn problems of lack of buildings and teachers. The University buildings were almost wiped out. And of course commerce has made more rapid recovery than industry mainly because of the high cost and relatively low level of skill of industrial workers. These problems will be settled along more or less routine lines, but the approach to the problems of fishing and agriculture has been inspiringly new.

The fisherfolk and farmers form a big proportion of Hong Kong's 1,500,000 population. Their standard of life has been greatly improved by two big schemes of government-sponsored co-operative marketing. These are under the general direction of Dr. Herklots, a biologist of Hong Kong University and now head of the colony's Development Department. The 70,000 fisherfolk of the colony were formerly completely under the thumbs of the astute fish-dealers or *laans* who "squeezed" them unmercifully. Now a government market, in whose management the fishermen participate, collects, weighs, and sells their fish in open auction to registered retailers. All fish must be sold through the market. It is brought in by the fishermen themselves or for them by one of the ten official syndicates in the main fishing villages. The market and syndicates provide transport, advance low interest loans and sell necessities like ice, salt, flour, rice and tackle at little over cost price. The fishermen pay only six per cent. commission on sales to cover the whole cost of the organization. The fisherfolk are still notoriously spendthrift. There is a saying that when they sell their catch they think first, not of "what can I buy best for this money?" but, "how quick can I spend it?" A "returnable commission" of two per cent. has therefore been instituted to encourage habits of thrift. This is really a compulsory savings scheme. Every half year the fisherfolk receive their accumulated savings in a lump sum plus two per cent. interest. For the current four months period at the time of my visit a trawler was averaging 1,500 HK\$, and

a long liner 3,000 HK\$ in savings.

The market is modern and a model of cleanliness. Coolies here also benefit from the scheme (this will influence conditions of coolie labour under private contract at other wharves). They get 160 HK\$ a month with free meals, one day's holiday a week, a new year's bonus of two months pay and sick relief in case of illness. 273 people are employed and paid out of the proceeds of the scheme. In its first year of work the market handled fish worth 21,000,000 HK\$ (£1,312,500), earned 1,260,433 HK\$ commission and ended with a clear profit of 300,000 HK\$ which is being used to develop a banking scheme, a fish canner and smoking plant and a school which will train men who will eventually be able to take over and run the scheme on a completely voluntary co-operative basis.

With this encouragement, the fisher folk, who were among the most backward of Hong Kong's population, are already producing their own leaders. Every fishing village already has at least one co-operative marketing organization. Only the government-run syndicates and most efficient dealers can compete with these co-operatives. In a typical instance a fisherman, new to the scheme, marketed an equal amount of fish through a dealer and through a 'co-op'. Each lot of fish fetched the same price at the market the same day, but the 'co-op' was able to pay the fisherman an additional profit of 600 per cent.

In nearby Portuguese-controlled Macao the fish dealers take only six per cent. commission on sales, but they deduct over twenty per cent. of the weight of the fish in weighing! In Hong Kong now these rapacious middlemen have been virtually eliminated; the fisherfolk are gaining a new consciousness as an organized community. A real change for the better has been brought about in the lives of nearly 100,000 people.

The vegetable market *laans* were even more tight-fisted and unscrupulous than the fish *laans*. They considered a 400 per cent. profit was normal business. Father Ryan, a Catholic priest who has an intimate knowledge of Chinese affairs is the temporary civil servant charged with the difficult job of helping the farmers market their produce without the "aid" of the *laans*. The marketing scheme is similar to that for fisheries. All locally produced vegetables must now be marketed through the central government wholesale markets and the villages already have democratically elected representatives on co-operatives to bring their produce to market and supervise the weighing, auctioning and payment. The Agricultural Department now has officials living out in the villages and here too its plans are having an immediate beneficial effect on the lives of the colony's 120,000 farmers. By fostering co-operative enterprise, and making low interest loans available, the government is taking the first steps towards breaking the numbing power of the village gentry and elders, the *laans* and money lenders who squeezed interest rates of up to 100 per cent. per year from the poor farmers.

- Conditions in the Hong Kong countryside (Kowloon and the New Terri-

tories) have not been very different from those just over the border inside China. The average holding is 3 mau per head, and the poor peasants are as a rule in debt due to the age-old disadvantageous conditions of rents, loans, and marketing. The government marketing scheme is the first big breach in this wall of backwardness. It is handling half a million dollars worth of vegetables a month at a commission of only eight per cent. It gives free transportation from any point in the colony. A visit to the excellently run market and the eagerly expressed approbation of the farmers leaves no doubt about the benefits the scheme has brought them. The market employs coolies to move baskets around and supplies baskets for a small fee. Tobacco dust fertilizer costs ten cents, a catty from the market. It costs eighty cents, a catty from the *laans*. Ammonia sulphate costs thirty-five cents, a catty. It used to cost two dollars. Peanut cake costs thirty-five cents, instead of sixty-five cents, on the black market. The 700 people of San Ha village market 7,000 piculs of vegetables a month through their own co-operative organization working through the market. Chung Mok-fo used to bring in his little load of vegetables to market in the old days, wasting much of his time on the journey. Now he markets for the whole village, elected to the post by the village elders with the approval of his neighbours. Fair market conditions have attracted Chinese sellers from over the border. Local tomato growers have established co-operative marketing for export; several whole villages have combined to sow new types of vegetable seeds as co-operative undertakings. Retail prices are agreed upon and published daily. Licensed buyers and hawkers are seeing that the moderate regular profits they can make on an organized market are preferable to speculative but uncertain profits. 5,000 middlemen including the sixty big *laans* who formerly monopolized the trade have been either eliminated or have taken a normal place in the scheme. The die-hards naturally make a considerable to do about the suppression of "private enterprise". But these two schemes and the developments they foreshadow are clearly a practical approach to the problems of the basic strata of Hong Kong's population.

This is of course only a start. Besides the 250,000 farmers and fishermen, there are the 300,000 industrial and handicraft workers and several thousand casual labourers and coolies. Their conditions of life—even those of the thirty per cent. who are skilled labourers, cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Factory conditions are poor and with high prices for food (particularly rice) and rents they are having a hard time making both ends meet even though they receive a cost of living allowance which is fixed according to the current price index. Though rents are controlled there is a deal of key money being paid. It is notorious that the coolies along the Bund are shamefully exploited by the contractors and foremen. These abuses can of course be remedied only by government action plus the development of trade union organization. In Hong Kong there are eighty workers' organizations. But just as the co-operative

movement (which now includes the first artisan and consumer co-operatives) still lacks proper legislation, so there is still no such thing as a legal trade union with fully recognized rights in the colony. Nevertheless plans are afoot for the organization of a general association of trade associations and guilds, and with the appointment of a labour officer this situation should shortly be remedied. Labour circles have expressed considerable satisfaction at the official support given the schools for workers' dependents which were formally opened in March for 1,300 children.

It is a pity also that plans for political democratization of the colonial régime still hang fire. The government is thus depriving itself of important support for its long range plans of economic and social progress. Wider and more conscious support from the Chinese population would ease the position in regard to the recently introduced income tax and make it easier to raise funds for public housing and other public works. This is also of crucial importance for the future of Hong Kong. Good though administration is at present, it is still in the nature of paternalism, and it is clear that the people of Hong Kong will not be satisfied with paternalism. The peoples of the East have "grown up" and those of Hong Kong are no exception. The national ties between Hong Kong and motherland Chinese are very real. Hong Kong in the old days was regarded by the Chinese as a military-imperialist threat to the home country, as a relic of the hated Unequal Treaties. As such it was the target of the general strike of 1925. Though its significance has changed as a result of the transformation that has taken place in Britain's position in the East, it is certain that if Hong Kong is regarded as a colony in exclusive British possession it will inevitably become a source of discord in Anglo-Chinese relations.

The Chinese population plays a major part in the business and industrial life of the colony and an increasing part in administration. Here people of all parties enjoy a freedom denied them inside Kuomintang China. They take a realistic view of things. They know from close observation of neighbouring Canton how well off they are. No progressive group of Chinese in Hong Kong or China wants Hong Kong to be handed over to the Kuomintang as it is at present constituted. But every Chinese I have met wants Hong Kong to be returned to China at some stage when a united and democratic Chinese government can guarantee to the people of Hong Kong the same level of well-being and hope of progress that they now enjoy. In Chinese breasts the tide of nationalism runs strong. It will not be stemmed.

Some extremely conservative British opinion would like an unequivocal statement from the British government that Hong Kong will remain British. A writer in the *National Review* even wants restrictions placed on Chinese immigration. Nothing would be more harmful at this stage. On the other hand there are those ultra-lefts who want Hong Kong to be "scuttled" right away and "not waste money on it". These are short-sighted views. Both

tacitly admit an uncompromising state of feud between Chinese democratic nationalism and British interests in the East. This is by no means an inevitable state of affairs.

Some leading British officials express the hope that Hong Kong can be developed into such a model community that no Chinese will want its status changed. This is a courageous view, but I think it is a counsel of perfection. I am more optimistic about the future of China than such a view implies. Given sound democratic administration I believe that China can and will emerge as the leading Far Eastern power within the next twenty years or sooner. In that event its attraction for the people of Hong Kong—who alone can be the judges of their fate—will be irresistible. At some stage then, and not necessarily at the end of this process, the question of Hong Kong's future will certainly be tabled. If a renascent democratic China, freed of the pernicious control of the Kuomintang right wing, is opposed by a hostile and inflexible Hong Kong policy in Britain, there is no doubt that an explosive situation will develop.

What policy then will best protect and further true British interests in this area? It must first be recognized that Hong Kong's essential importance in the new era is as a means of trade with China. It is a convenient trading post. It enjoys a good port, law and order. (The present military forces there cannot be regarded as a threat to Chinese sovereignty. They are needed to prevent depredations by the extremely active and well organized gangs of smugglers and pirates which flourish in these areas. They are also a reserve for the fulfilment of Britain's commitments as an Allied occupation power in Japan.) Hong Kong is a source of profit and well-being to the large and predominant Chinese population as well as the British firms there. In 1946, China's only active trade balance was with Hong Kong. Though there may be die-hards who wish to make it so again, Hong Kong has lost its significance as an advanced base of British imperialism. It is a point of commercial and cultural contact between British and Chinese. If the problem of Hong Kong is approached from this angle then it ceases to be a problem. There is no room then for a policy of exclusive imperial preference. But recent events in Shanghai or Taiwan (Formosa) indicate what would result if the present Kuomintang régime were to take over in Hong Kong. The development of Hong Kong by Britain in this interim period cannot then be regarded as merely feeding a gift horse for China. It is an investment in future British-Chinese co-operation that will pay worthwhile dividends.

This policy of course only makes sense if it is accompanied by an enlightened effort to bring about the extension of democratic responsibility and consciousness among the Chinese inside Hong Kong. It is clear that the hopes placed in a few rich Chinese merchants (whose position in fact was somewhat analogous to that of collaborationists with British imperialism) were unfounded. These men proved just as ready to collaborate with the Japanese when the time

came. (Though in their defence it must be recorded that they insist that they were only carrying out the instructions given by the pre-occupation British authorities.) Sympathy for Britain must be put on a wider basis than that. Anyway these props of the old Hong Kong have entirely lost "face" among their compatriots though they still sit on government committees. It is in such schemes as those for the fishermen and farmers, in its new Trade Union policy, in its plans for an extension of real democratic participation in government by the Chinese population, in a development of its university and cultural possibilities that Britain must place her hopes of the future in Hong Kong.

There must be a consistent approach in all aspects of policy. There must be an end of all aspects of racial discrimination, as for instance in matters of pay or social intercourse. While it is understood that critics of the Kuomintang who have found shelter in Hong Kong must keep within the law so far as their criticism of the Kuomintang or indeed of any friendly government is concerned, a firm stand should be taken against the Kuomintang intrigues and attempts at terrorism against non-Kuomintang elements in Hong Kong. It is well known for instance that the official headquarters of the Kuomintang in Hong Kong maintains special agents who spy and have attempted to intimidate people suspected of being either anti-Kuomintang or "too pro-British". There is no necessity to "appease" the chauvinists of the Kuomintang who are agitating against Hong Kong now. The days of their dominance in Chinese affairs are ending.

If consistency is brought into all departments of policy and the local Chinese are effectively mobilized in support of progressive plans, Hong Kong can be turned into a permanent Sino-British co-operative trading centre no matter what its legal status is in the future. Policy for Hong Kong must be placed in the context of a forward looking policy towards China as a whole based, as in Hong Kong, on collaboration with the democratic elements of unity and enlightened nationalism.

In that context, the granting of aviation privileges, the use of port and dock facilities, adequate compensation to any British enterprises that suffer through a change of sovereignty—these are purely technical problems that present little actual difficulty.

*(Mr. Chen, the son of a former foreign minister of China, has just returned from a four months visit to China and Hong Kong.)*

## THE AMERICAN NEGRO

BY J. E. MORPURGO

THE realization of the evils of race antagonism is immediate to any visitor to the United States. The existence of a problem is not potent in an Englishman's mind until he has assimilated sufficiently the atmosphere of America so that he can appreciate America's difficulties.

England has been subjected to a long indoctrination to the theories of liberty. In principle, the Negro stands equal before the law. "*Quamvis ille niger, quamvis tu candidus esses*", though he be black, though you be white. Lord Mansfield's sturdy decision of 1777, "the air of England has long been too pure for a slave, and every man is free who breathes it", has won the sentiment of the nation. Re-assured by Harriet Beecher Stowe's propagandist flattery—"the Union Jack—symbol of liberty"—Englishmen have accepted the ideal as a national virtue, at least where English-speaking Negroes are concerned. They are, in consequence, slow to grasp the bitter truth that the "Negro problem" is a white man's problem. The Negro cannot solve it, the Southerner cannot solve it; it is not even limited in its implications to the boundaries of the United States. If we, in England, can criticize the American for anti-black discrimination, it is because the small numbers of Negroes in this country create for us a problem that is hardly more than academic. Our instincts are little different from the instincts that have occasioned America's outstanding and permanent failure, and the vital obstacle to solution, the barrier against miscegenation, has been constructed by instinctive white prejudice.

Over-explanation has resolved America's problem into two principal factors: the difficulty of race assimilation, and economic competition. But, though both are stupefying and seemingly insuperable embarrassments, the factor that is eternally damning is an inhibited distaste among the whites for close association with Negroes. Implicit to this distaste is the objection to miscegenation.

All other races save the Oriental and the Negro have been assimilated into the American "race". Even the Indian has had to be artificially preserved from submersion. But the Negro cannot become an American in the full sense. The reasons, sunk as they are in the morass of innate psychological reaction, are beyond analysis. Despite his repugnance for friendships and for marriage, the white male has no objection to having sex-relations with black women. In fact, in many countries with mixed populations, coloured women are looked upon as particularly desirable and their erotic skill is emphasized

with salacious eagerness in conversation and anecdote in many clubs, bars and common-rooms. In the Southern States the illicit but ever-current definition of a "Southern gentleman" is a man who has had sex-relations with a Negress.

Beyond the limits of ordinary moral conscience a white man feels no particular shame in admitting that he has slept with a black woman, but if a white woman, from love, passion or financial need, associates with a black man, she will be socially ostracized and he may be lynched.

Although some Negro leaders, hurt and angry with white insistence, have supported white prejudice and encouraged their own race to reject the possibility of intermarriage, to the Negro the most immediate problems are economic, political and, in a legislative sense, social. He has no implied objection to miscegenation, and, his deep conviction of his own Americanism makes him eager for the overthrow of inter-racial inhibitions.

The white conscience is troubled, but even in the boldest personality conscience cannot overcome instinct.

The division between Negro and white has been exaggerated by tradition. Negro savagery, the myth on which white lynch-law lays its foundations, was a dangerous certainty already in the eighteenth century and both sides in the American Revolutionary War imputed the use of Negroes to their opponents, with that same air of horror that we to-day might use if our enemies practised bacteriological warfare.

The Tory sneered at Washington's army:

The rebell clowns, oh! What a sight  
Too awkward was their figure  
'Twas yonder stood a pious wight  
And here and there a nigger.

and the American retaliated by coupling Negroes with the most hated man in Revolutionary America, Benedict Arnold:

Then in this class of Britain's heroes  
The Tories, savage Indians, negroes  
Recorded, Arnold's name shall stand.

Godwin in *St. Leon* gave the Negro a Gothic unreality as a great untamed child of nature but the eighteenth century already knew the patronizing certainty of white superiority and had become convinced that if the Negro had qualities to compensate for his savagery, they were the qualities of humility, fidelity and cheerfulness. When, in 1781, *Robinson Crusoe* was first dramatized and staged in London, Man Friday was played as an American Negro, and the paradoxes of his character: naïveté and native intelligence, servitude and fidelity, cheerfulness and brutality are as much a twentieth century conception of the black as an eighteenth.

The unauthentic and erratic genius of Stephen Foster, a man from Pittsburgh who knew a good tune but hardly knew a Negro, the muddled polemics and over-drawn sentimentalizing of Mrs. Beecher Stowe, and the fruity cheerfulness

of Hollywood have combined to keep the fallacies alive. Christy's Minstrels, and even such an exquisite novelist as Ellen Glasgow, have added to the tradition. Skilled, and coloured, interpretive artists like Hattie McDaniel and Bill Robinson have given the whites more evidence for their traditional beliefs by playing the Negro in the style which the white man expects, and many modern American coloured poets seem unable to shake off the emphasis on cheerfulness, and implied inferiority. John Holloway's "Black Mammies" for example, has the same falseness and banality as a cork-blackened minstrel show:

But she trusted in de shadder, an' she trusted in de shine  
An' she longed fo' one possession, dat heaben to be mine  
An' she prayed huh chil-en freedom, but she won herself de peace  
Peace on art' amids' huh sorrows, an' up yonder heavenly res'.

The cult has convinced many Negroes. Jerry in Chesnut's *The Marrow of Tradition*, who tried to straighten his hair and to blanch his skin with lotions, has his imitators. There are still Negroes who can say with him "I'm gwine ter keep my mout' shet an' stan' in wid de Angry-Saxon race—ez dey call dey-selves nowadays—an' keep de right side er my bread an' meat. W'at nigger ever give me twenty cents in all my bawn days?" Even among intellectual and professional Negroes I was always struck by their childlike acceptance of the theory of white superiority, and the aristocracy of black America itself is recognized by the Negro rather from the comparative paleness of his skin than from his moral or professional qualities.

But white America is waking to the certainty of its own failure. The old traditions are no longer conscience-salving. It is no longer enough to plead white superiority; no longer enough to blame the South alone; for the modern South is more tolerant though less understanding of the Negro than the South of seventy years ago. There is hardly an American who has no opinion of the Negro problem, and there are few intelligent Americans, even in the South, who do not feel that theirs is the guilt of race discrimination.

Personal relations between Negro and white were probably happier on a good plantation in the Old South than they are to-day in New England or New York. The relationship was simple and sentimental. The qualms of the white slave owner could be easily quietened by the realization that he treated his slaves with kindness. Like Patrick Henry he could pay devoir to virtue and lament his want of conformity to her precepts. Even in self-accusation there was always a compensatory breath of self-praise. The Negro, on a good plantation, was well-fed, well-housed and economically safe.

To-day the Negro struggles alone. Technological progress has made his unskilled labour unmarketable. He is free—to starve, but not free to be educated. He is an expatriate living in his home country, an American without America.

A few Negroes feel that improvement may come, through love or through

violence:

I am the darker brother  
They send me to eat in the kitchen  
When company comes,  
Tomorrow,

I'll sit at the table  
When company comes.  
Nobody'll dare  
Say to me  
'Eat in the kitchen'  
Then

Besides  
They'll see how beautiful I am  
And be ashamed.—

I, too, am America.

But the white American knows that he must solve the problem and will not; should and cannot. He has no love and he will not accept intimidation. Bewildered he hides his confusion in legislation that cannot be enforced, and flatters his conscience with facile apologetics. After all, he claims, the black is better off in America than he would have been in the jungles of Africa.

There are many and excellent books on America's race question. Much can be learnt from the conduct of white Americans and much from a study of the pathetically brave efforts made by Negroes to maintain their racial dignity—students at Hampton Institute trying, under a White President, to build an aristocracy of learning and an aristocracy of labour . . . a Negro doctor closing his conversation just before the train reaches Washington though he knows that you are travelling to the same town in Virginia, for South of Washington you are over the Mason-Dixon Line and there are Jim Crow cars on the trains . . . Marion Anderson singing in the open to an enormous crowd, white and black, who feel with her for the insult she has suffered in being refused the use of the hall owned by the Daughters of the American Revolution. But the observer who wishes to grasp something of the state of mind of the American Negro can learn more from Negro poetry than from any sociological analysis or personal investigation.

The Negro achievement in poetry is not all polemic. Lynch-law, intellectual frustration and race antagonism overshadow their work, but technical and artistic virtuosity is more apparent in the small group of Negro poets than in any group of a similar size in modern poetry in English. The black writer suffers the disadvantage of his race in all the professions, and, if he is to survive, he must be a poet of extraordinary determination and extraordinary skill.

Intellectually he may cry his equality and may refuse to be considered as an "exception"—a poet who happens to be also coloured, but race consciousness and



feeling cannot be taken from his inspiration. He is a black man who happens to be a poet, and as a poet he must proclaim his troubled mind. "Uncle Tom is dead" is the frequent stated boast of the Negro intellectual, who wishes to outlive and live down the toleration, that his race has shown to the Negro who "knew his place".

'White folks is white', says Uncle Jim  
'A platitude', I sneer;  
And then I tell him so is milk  
An the froth upon his beer

but, however strong his desire, the Negro cannot change the colour of his skin, and its bruised blackness is mirrored in his poetry.

A few extremists have, with considerable skill, turned ostrich to the question of race, and have written as conventional or unconventional poets whose exposition was the expression of beauty. Uncle Tom would have made nothing of William Braithwaite's polished English verse, and the Hollywood red-cap would lose his grin in perplexity had he been faced with Braithwaite's immaculate Shakespearean scholarship. No critic can find racial symptoms in the Sorbonne-trained accents of Jessie Fausset's translations and even the most consistent propagandists, and the best poets, among Negro writers, turn sometimes from their bitterness to strike the more normal notes of English verse. James Weldon Johnson, for example, long the Negro laureate, has written poems conventionally inspired and conventionally executed:

The glory of the day was in her face,  
The beauty of the night was in her eyes.  
And over all her loveliness, the grace  
Of morning blushing in the early skies.

Countee Cullen renders homage to Keats

Folks seeing me must think it strange  
That merely spring should so derange  
My mind. They do not know that you,  
John Keats, keep revel with me too

without proclaiming his race, and Sterling Brown's "Effie", though there is some desperation and some gaiety in her easiness, might have been any prostitute of any race.

Dialect is almost dead. For me only Paul Dunbar, the first Negro poet to win international recognition, could confirm my ninepenny-seat image of Negro accents, and though Johnson and Sterling Brown occasionally play upon the limited instrument of Negro dialect, with its two strings, comedy and pathos, "poets are seeking to find a form that will express the racial spirit by symbols from within rather than by symbols from without."

Two major conflicts perplex the Negro's mind and make his poetry. He is a patriot who is the victim of the country he loves and a religious being damned by his God. Africa is only a memory of the blood:

What is Africa to me;  
Copper sun or scarlet sea  
Jungle star or jungle track  
Strong bronzed men, or regal black  
Women from whose loins I sprang  
When the birds of Eden sang?  
(One three centuries removed  
From the scenes his fathers loved,  
Spicy grove, cinnamon tree,  
What is Africa to me?)

America is in the mind and the heart and yet—"America never was America to me."

He is a Christian but Christ was a Jew, and though the Jews have suffered they have been accepted. What could a Jew know of a black man's torment?

Way down South in Dixie  
(Bruised body high in air)  
I asked the white Lord Jesus  
What was the use of prayer.

Some Negro intellectuals, sceptical of the possibility of solving the problems of their race within the ideological organization of the United States, have sought elsewhere for curative philosophies. No change of party majority in America, no replacement of Democrat by Republican will improve the hideous lot of the black man. America, they argue, will always be a white man's country. Communism is the obvious refuge to which Negro intellectuals fly, for with Communism there can be no Jim Crow, and in Communism might lie the solution of the economic problems of the black race.

Stalingrad—  
Never Paradise—  
Just a city on the Volga  
Trying peacefully to grow,  
A city where some few small dreams  
Men dreamt came true.  
A simple city  
Where all worked, all ate  
All children went to school.  
No beggars,  
No sick without attention,  
No prostitutes,  
For women had jobs  
And men had wives  
People respected each other's lives.  
Communal brotherhood,  
A city growing toward the good.  
Stalingrad—not Paradise—  
Yet not bad.

The Negro poet stands back, and with just pride, claims the nationality of poetry. His race does not matter, nor his country; what are important are his

belief and his craftsmanship; his inner being and its outward expression. He is a poet and a believer in equality, not a black American.

It is easy to force explanation upon criticism and to analyse poetry to such refinement that the poetry disappears and the poet's hot intention is doused, left cold, logical and unrecognizable even to the poet himself. Yet in Langston Hughes's "Stalingrad" as in many seemingly unracial poems by coloured poets, there is an insistent proclamation of the poet's race.

The problems that Stalingrad has overcome (in Hughes's opinion) are those very problems that beset the Negro in America. "All worked and all ate"; obviously technical progress had not driven the unskilled labourer to unemployment. "People respect each other's lives"—no lynchings. "No prostitutes"—the easy way of a white man with a black girl is anathema to coloured leaders. "Communal brotherhood"—that is the Negro's dream.

Seeing such adulation, struck uncritical by distance, casual white observers have imagined that the Negro forms an ever-present Bolshevik cell and creates an imminent threat of Communist insurrection in the United States. His unsatisfied needs are sharpening his capacity for political activity and economic revolution is preached by many Negro thinkers, but the most stimulating and extraordinary quality of the Negro conscience is its patriotism. Despite his bitterness and desperation, the Negro is a good American convinced, with his white countrymen, that America is "the cradle of liberty", "the home of democracy" and "the land of opportunity."

Though "Stalingrad" is a eulogy of Russia, even though Langston Hughes may be a Communist himself, his near-paradise is full of strangely American symbols and it seems that, if he had his ambition, Communism would be imported into America and reorganized by free enterprise. Comrade Babbitt would join the Elks and the Volga would flow alongside Main Street.

America is an ideal, a dream, but the dream and the ideal are shared by Negroes.

A long time ago, but not too long ago, a man said  
 ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL . . . ENDOWED  
 BY THEIR CREATOR WITH CERTAIN INALIENABLE  
 RIGHTS . . . AMONG THESE LIFE LIBERTY  
 AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS.  
 His name was Jefferson. There were slaves then,  
 But in their hearts the slaves believed him too.  
 And silently took for granted that what he said was meant for them . . .  
 ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL.  
 NO MAN IS GOOD ENOUGH TO GOVERN ANOTHER MAN  
 WITHOUT MAN'S CONSENT.  
 BETTER TO DIE FREE THAN TO LIVE SLAVES.  
 Who said these things? Americans!  
 Who own these words? America  
 Who is America? You, me  
 We are America.

These proud and determined words were written by a Negro, that same rebel who pledged Stalingrad, the rebel Langston Hughes.

The sacrifices of two wars have made Negroes more conscious of their Americanism, more disappointed and yet more proud. Stories may pass from black to black of the Negro soldier who announced his epitaph as "here lies a black man killed fighting a yellow man in defence of a white man" and a few Negro veterans may voice their longing for the comparative equality of Great Britain, but Negro indignation was loudest when their race was refused the right to fight. All black America applauded Wendell Willkie when he complained that "when we talk of freedom and opportunity for all nations the mocking paradoxes in our own society become so clear they can no longer be ignored", but Willkie was an American criticizing America, and their applause is American applause for an American criticism.

Religion is not as comforting to the modern Negro as it was to his father. The sensual primitive faith of the spirituals does not hold the new intellectualized, politically-conscious Negro, but Christ's most appealing virtue was forbearance and forbearance is a quality that Negroes share and admire.

These truly are the Brave  
 These men who cast aside  
 Old memories, to walk the blood-stained pave  
 Of sacrifice, joining the solemn tide  
 That moves away, to suffer and to die  
 For Freedom—when their own is yet denied.

And as the Crucifixion was the dramatic crisis of Christianity so is lynching the dramatic crisis of the black struggle for equality.

The analogy of the sacrifice is obvious to the Negro mind and repetitive in Negro poetry. Each movement in the Passion has its parallel, each even its echo: "Why what evil has this man done? I have found no cause of death in him . . . But they were instant with loud voices, asking that he might be crucified."—"Did this man sin? Nay but some one told how some one said another did." There is the accusation: "We found this fellow perverting the nation." There the torturers "plating a crown of thorns, scourging him and striking him."

Quick! Chain him to that oak! It will resist  
 The fire much longer than this slender pine  
 Now bring the fuel! Pile it round him! Wait!  
 Pile not so fast! Or we shall lose  
 The agony and terror in his face.

There the mockers who "spit upon Jesus, bowed the knee before him and mocked him":

And little lads, lynchers that were to be  
 Danced round the dreadful thing in fiendish glee

and there the hideous realization, "all the people that came together to that sight, beholding the things which were done, smote their breasts and re-

turned " :

There was a design of white bones slumbering forgottenly upon a cushion of  
ashes

There was a charred stump of a sapling pointing a blunt finger accusingly at  
the sky

\* \* \* \* \*

Scattered traces of tar, restless arrays of feathers, and the lingering smell of  
gasoline

And through the morning air the sun poured yellow surprise into the eye  
sockets of a stony skull.

There was but one Crucifixion; the black has known many Calvaries, and many sensitive Negroes feel that their race has overplayed its faithful imitation of Christ. They would not pray for the forgiveness of their enemies.

Yet the Negro is emotional as a black and sentimental as an American. He must have patriotism. Both Christianity and Americanism are optimistic ideologies; the one preaches equality of heavenly promise, the other equality of earthly opportunity. The deprived Negro clings to his optimism, for optimism is his life.

## AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (II)

By W. W. Rostow

AMERICAN post-war foreign policy has been formed around two factors central to the world scene: the new weapons, capable of threatening the United States, from distant interior air bases; and the diplomacy of the Soviet Union, which has appeared capable, under certain circumstances, of bringing the bulk of the Eurasian Continent under unified economic and political, if not military control. The problem of American foreign policy has consisted, at its base, in meeting the Soviet challenge in a manner compatible with the development of a well organized and stable framework of world peace.

Against this background four particular strands of policy can be distinguished:

1. The prevention of the use of military power by any country outside the terms of international agreements. This is the over-riding consideration for the American position in the Security Council.
2. The pursuit of settlements which would diminish the rôle of military strength in the world, and which would minimize the possibilities of its employment. This objective has, of course, governed the American position in the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations.
3. The pursuit of settlements of particular diplomatic issues throughout the world which promise local or regional stability, which do not threaten to create control of the Eurasian continent by a single power, and which are consistent with the successful evolution of the United Nations. A balancing of these criteria has been required on many issues, but notably in the formulation of policy designed to achieve unity in Germany and China.
4. The taking of such actions as are compatible with international agreements which encourage the maintenance and extension of political and economic practices abroad most congenial to American conceptions, and thus sustain an international environment in which those conceptions are likely to survive at home. A great deal of American trade and loan policy has had this ultimate rationale, as well as the measures taken to strengthen the military power of the Greek and Turkish governments. Mr. Marshall's recent statement at Harvard represents the highest expression of this branch of policy.

No responsible element in American public life would, I suspect, deny that

each of these strands has a place in American foreign policy at the present time. Debate centres rather on the relative energy and emphasis to be devoted to each, and to the aptness of particular formulations within them.

A first and prior judgment required was whether Soviet activities justified immediate declaration of war by the United States. Apart from its political impossibility, the facts, soberly weighed, have justified no such action.

The second judgment required, and one which is still under debate, concerns what might be called the issue of regional unity or schism. It arises from a pervasive paradox in the post-war position. I shall discuss this issue mainly in the context of Europe, but it obviously relates as well to the Middle East and to the Far East.

The great post-war diplomatic conception, based on the military Grand Alliance, was that upon all major issues of common concern Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States would seek agreement by consultation; and that the post-war world and the United Nations would be shaped about this hard core of unified Big Three policy. On the other hand, the war ended with the armies disposed in a very particular way; and even before the end of the war agreements had been reached which allotted the zones of occupation throughout the world largely on the basis of the expected position of the armies. Within the zones of occupation there was and there is a very strong tendency to proceed simply with policies of national advantage; but in all such areas at least formal and verbal acknowledgment has been made of the legitimate concern of all the major powers. This applies, of course, not only to areas literally occupied but also to such special cases as Poland and, in a sense, China. It applies to the older spheres of influence as well as to those created by the war or re-allotted upon German and Japanese defeat.

Nowhere was this paradox more evident, or more important, than in the Potsdam Agreement as it concerned Germany. The early portions of that document, relating to general economic and political policy objectives, were easily agreed among the three powers. With respect to reparations, which involved the immediate disposition of German resources and in fact the whole management of the German economy, responsibility was allocated as between the Soviet Zone, on the one hand, and the three Western Zones, on the other. The reparations agreement, in these terms, was hurriedly written at the very end of the conference after a long and fruitless wrangle over definitions of 'war booty', at a time when the evidence available to the British and American representatives appeared to indicate that the Soviets were already proceeding vigorously with a unilateral reparations policy. Thus, from the beginning, the operation of a unified Germany by agreement among the major powers was compromised.

It would be, I suspect, an error to blame the negotiators at Potsdam for the schizophrenia of that document. It has become evident that if a unified Germany is to be created out of a four-power agreement it will come about only by

a long and patient exploration of issues and of objectives, economic, political, and military. Given the history of Russian relations with the West over the previous forty years—for Russia a history of defeat and frustration, for the West of intervention, fear, and exclusion—there would appear to have been no simple diplomatic formula by which a unified operation of Germany might have been decreed in the summer of 1945. The flaws in the Potsdam Agreement are not, on the whole, fortuitous, despite the unsatisfactory circumstances which surrounded the drafting of the document.

Two courses were thus open to the Occupying Powers in the period after Potsdam: they could accept the split of Germany on the Elbe as permanent; or they could exploit the Control Council in Berlin, which was virtually all that remained of the concept of unity, to seek uniform solutions for all Germany, involving inevitable compromises among the powers and a dilution of unilateral authority in each of the zones. The split of Germany in the short run appeared to have certain advantages: it simplified the problem of policy formation, and it gave to both the East and West, in Europe, minimum assurance that Germany as a whole could not be turned offensively in either direction. On the other hand it offered no process whereby occupation could be ended by mutual consent; it threatened to cut Europe down the middle, in violation of that continent's natural political and economic structure; it threatened to make the economic and political life of Europe over the indefinite future a ground for manoeuvre between the Soviet Union and the two great Western powers; and on a range of issues between the Soviet Union and the West, of the greatest importance to each, it threatened to violate the concept of Big Three unity and thus to undermine in a decisive way the rock on which the United Nations had been founded.

This momentous issue, which may well set the pattern for Soviet relations with the Western Powers throughout the world, has been examined by the Foreign Ministers at Moscow; and will be approached again in November, in London. Although the final issue remains in doubt, there is a central hopeful fact: neither the Soviet Union nor the Western Powers appear content with the present schism in Germany. This is a matter which has been much debated in the United States, and one on which policy has been formed since August, 1945. The predominant theme in American policy has been to seek a united Germany; that is, positively to achieve the compromises which might lead to major-power agreement in the centre of Europe, and thus to bring closer to reality in a crucial area the concept of Big Three unity. And, in fact, the American authorities in Berlin and elsewhere have sought vigorously to overcome the schizophrenia of Potsdam.

At its core, in the American view, such unity must have two agreed bases: a firm and explicit pact among the major powers that would keep Germany militarily disarmed; and a political structure for Germany based on free elections, which would make future German governments the function neither

of a German minority nor of an external power.

In terms of military politics, such a solution, by explicitly neutralizing Central Europe, is designed to remove the danger to the Soviet Union that Central or Eastern Europe might again be a base for invasion of Russia by land; and it would, symmetrically, remove the fear of military domination of Western Europe by the Soviet Union or by a Germany in alliance with the Soviet Union.

This solution would leave the political orientation of Germany to the vicissitudes of the open market of a free political life.

The concept evolved with respect to Germany can be generalized. It assumes that in some meaningful sense security issues can be separated from political and economic issues. It notes that the Big Three, none of which is strictly a European power, were forced to fight a bloody and expensive war when the structure of continental Europe proved unstable, and that each has a legitimate and continuing interest in seeing that the continent is never used again as a military instrument. It seeks to achieve on security issues, defined in a limited sense, firm agreement among the Big Three, and to leave the political and economic life of the area to self-determination. It recognizes the probability of continuing competition of ideas and influence between the Soviet Union and the West, but is willing to face that social science conflict so long as the rules are agreed and they do not involve the employment of force. That has been the dominant pattern of American policy in Germany, in Europe, and indeed in Asia, over the first post-war year.

This regional conception has been by no means as fully elaborated, with respect to particular areas, as the requirements for stability may ultimately demand. The pursuit of a unified Germany, in the larger interest of Big Three unity, does not fully take account of the legitimate fears in Europe of a united Germany as a political and economic force. In the context of Europe's future coal situation, for example, it would obviously be unwise to permit the coal exports of the Ruhr to be manipulated as a purely German resource. France could under such circumstances quickly fall under German political and economic dominance. And some provision for the disposition of Ruhr exports on criteria other than the German national interest will almost certainly be called for in the final German settlement.

Even more broadly, it seems likely that the stability of Europe, if it is not to split on the Elbe, may demand some form of United States of Europe related fully to the United Nations—avoiding a violation of its unity—as a further regional check on German actions, as well as to meet older and wider European aspirations. These considerations lead American representatives to propose, in the summer of 1946, an Economic Commission for Europe, to work within the orbit of the United Nations, and to begin the process of bringing the European Continent towards unity, on a democratic basis. While the large security issues of treaty-making have been loudly argued at a high diplomatic level, the Economic Commission has been unanimously accepted, and has quietly

proceeded into motion. Its fate depends on many factors, and above all on the achievement of an agreed settlement in Germany by the major powers. Its existence, however, attests to the reality of the will of Europe, East and West, to find terms on which it can develop as an undivided community.

An Economic Commission for the Far East has also been created. In that area, however, the major powers are even further from the goal of providing an agreed framework of security arrangements than in Europe. Nevertheless the general shape of a hopeful pattern of post-war evolution for all areas in dispute can be discerned, even if dimly through the confusion of current controversies among the major powers. In the American view it would involve:

1. A progress of transfer of military power from national authorities and regional alliances to the United Nations.
2. A series of major-power agreements on outstanding security issues, which would involve definite, concrete, long-range commitments for the United States in Europe and Asia; and machinery, either within or outside the Security Council, for dealing with other security issues that might arise.
3. A process of transfer of economic decisions from a national to a world basis, with the possibility of regional sub-organizations of the United Nations.
4. A gradual agreement on the conception of political self-determination, and its application gradually to various areas where one or another of the major powers now regards it as in dangerous abeyance.

Within this scheme the ability of American political and economic conceptions to survive, and their qualities of attraction for the rest of the world, would be left to the unfolding and competitive processes of non-military history.

The immediate obstacles which confront those of all nations who are engaged in attempting to achieve some such world structure are evident enough; and if one thing is clear, it is that we face a long effort at creation if we are to overcome the dangerous heritage of modern diplomatic and military history: an effort which, as Mr. Acheson recently said, will be with us through our lives "like the pain of earning a living."

The possibility of re-shaping the world in this image turns in large part, of course, on two issues: does the Soviet Union intend to use military force in pursuit of its national interests? Is the Soviet Union prepared to limit its direct intervention to security issues in the limited sense in which we should be likely to agree?

On the evidence of the post-war period it seems most unlikely that Soviet policy envisages the use of military force outside of international agreements, and the war that would follow. Looking ahead to the likely developments in weapons, it is indeed difficult to envisage a time when any responsible Soviet rulers would consciously undertake the risk of war. And thus far, at least, Soviet rulers have been responsible. Their policies have looked to the long sweep of the Russian interest. They have not, like the Nazis, been adventurers,

risking the fate of their nation in a wild gamble. And to do so runs counter both to the doctrines on which they are trained and to Russian prospects in a world at peace.

More serious doubt attaches to the ability to find among the Big Three the specific terms of the agreements that must be laid down, the rules that must be accepted and followed, if a unified framework of major-power accord on security matters is to be provided to the rest of the world. It is evident that the formulation of such agreements and rules will, at best, take a considerable period of time; for there are real and honest differences involved, of background, training, and national outlook. In Germany, for example, overt Soviet support for the Socialist Unity Party has been regarded with a certain suspicion in the West as an unwarranted interference in German political life, while the Soviet authorities have looked with equal suspicion on an organization of the British Zone which for long left considerable authority in the hands of a highly conservative, but nominally neutral, Civil Service. In the end both zones have had reasonably free elections. The issue of Germany and the problem there of finding common terms is by no means settled; but the evidence thus far does not rule out the possibility of our achieving, ultimately, solid agreement.

The history of negotiations since 1945 is clearly inconclusive; but it justifies the patient, if somewhat weary optimism with which American diplomats have pursued their travels. They are not an easy or a one-way process, these major-power negotiations. They require a creative effort of understanding on the part of all the persons and powers concerned, and a re-examination of conceptions, prejudices, and habits of thought which are only painfully disturbed or altered. All the participants in these discussions, at the various points throughout the world where they take place, must often have thought how much easier it is, emotionally and intellectually, to fight a war than to find the formulæ of peace. As Mr. Byrnes once remarked and Mr. Marshall will no doubt echo: "The Council of Foreign Ministers is a very difficult committee." But neither the personal nor the national will to continue the process of negotiation has yet been broken or even deflected.

Success depends, of course, not only on the Soviet Union, and on the other powers, but on the United States. There are, perhaps, four basic requirements which must be met if the United States is to contribute fully to a hopeful diplomatic evolution. First, the public interest in foreign affairs must be maintained, and their relation to the American interest driven home by constant education and re-education. Secondly, a national foreign policy must be maintained, and the present *ad hoc* arrangements for achieving it developed into agreed political practice. Thirdly, the United States must deal effectively and promptly with the onset of severe depression. Fourthly, American policy must avoid the danger of developing into a negative exercise in checking the initiative of the Soviet Union, and must furnish both resources and democratic leadership in the process of reconstruction which is likely to consume, at least, the

post-war decade.

All of these requirements are challenging, given the structure and traditions of American society. The last of these four requirements has been recently dramatized in the discussions which followed Mr. Truman's statement on aid for Greece and Turkey. It was widely appreciated in the United States that surplus military equipment was not enough; and that the success of Anglo-American intervention in Greece will depend, in the last analysis, on the ability to make the Greek government and the Greek economy operate effectively, rather than on the quantity and calibre of the guns delivered. Similarly, in the long run, and even perhaps in the short run, our ability to increase production of Ruhr coal is a matter of greater moment than the terms of membership on the permanent Danube River Commission; our ability to formulate and execute a constructive policy of economic welfare in the Middle East may well determine our influence there more than the disposition of troops; America's ability to export wheat, absorb imports, and avoid prolonged unemployment will certainly count for more than diplomacy designed to affect the method and outcome of East European elections. At the present time both elements in foreign policy are clearly legitimate. There is no question of abdication of positions, or of responsibilities: there is a question of emphasis and balance. It is to this question that an increasing amount of thought is likely to be given, in the United States, over coming months.

To the difficulties of the post-war world the United States brings a certain strength, as well as weaknesses which must be overcome: the physical resources of the country; the depth and unbroken continuity of its democratic tradition; a history of successful, if occasionally slow and raucous, adjustment to new circumstances; a willingness to experiment; a constructive energy; a persistent strand of idealism. These are the assets which it is the task of American statesmanship effectively to mobilize. The structure of American political life does not make that task easy. Although the recent revolution of American diplomacy is likely to hold the United States actively in world affairs, fluctuations in the degree and efficacy of American intervention are to be expected.

American history has been marked by only occasional periods when the full strength of the nation has been unified and made effective—usually in the face of crisis and under great leadership—but the intervening periods have not been without purpose. There are sober grounds for believing that the faith and the hope of many peoples which have suffused the adventure of American democracy from its beginnings will not be wholly disappointed in the era of diplomatic pioneering we all now face.

*(The first part of AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY by Professor Rostow was published in the June 1947 number of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)*



## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## I. THE GERMAN PROSPECT

DR. W. FRIEDMANN, in the first of two articles on the Military Government of Germany, said: "In attempting to solve the problem of Germany at Moscow, the Foreign Ministers cannot but reflect with grave hearts on the results of the first two years of Allied Military Government in Germany."\* However gravely the Foreign Ministers may have pondered the problem, they did not find it possible to agree on a solution. "All these things," said Mr. Bevin in a recent foreign affairs debate,† "led on to a discussion of fundamental issues in which agreement was found on some points, divergence of opinion on others, and disagreement on the remainder." Unfortunately, taking the delegations as a whole, it seems true to say that the more fundamental the issue, the smaller the measure of agreement upon it. It is valuable, and even, as the Foreign Secretary claimed, encouraging, that the Conference should have succeeded in reaching a "tentative decision" about the control and co-ordination of the police. It is even more important that the delegations should have concurred in the view that the Potsdam figure for the quota of steel production should be revised. But the twin obstacles of reparations and a unitary constitution for Germany still stand, as they stood before Moscow, in the way of a quadripartite agreement on Germany and of a stable settlement of Europe.

Meanwhile, in spite of the immense achievements which stand to the credit of the Military Government, the outlook is even less promising than it was on the collapse of the German war machine two years ago. Materially, it is true, order has been brought out of chaos; a system of government has been created, shattered communications have been restored, a start has been made in restoring war damage, and the vital production of coal has been given its proper priority and, up to a point, the monthly figures have risen steadily above the levels of 1945 and the early months of 1946. Morally, the position has deteriorated. The high prestige of the conquerors has lapsed, partly because of their failure to solve the almost endless problems that have confronted post-war Germany and of the consequent sufferings of the German people, partly because of their failure to agree among themselves. The German lacks faith either in himself or his rulers, he sees no hope for the future, he has few if any consolations or rewards in the present and a great capacity for self-pity. He has few positive incentives to do good work, and being on the whole humanely treated,

he does not need to work out of fear. In these circumstances some at least of the benefit of the material reconstruction that has been accomplished is being lost, and the figures even of coal production have tended to fall.

But above all, the German is seriously short of food, to an extent that has never been experienced in this country and is therefore but seldom imagined here. Not only are the rations themselves low, but the rigours of winter and the selfish hoarding spirit of the German farming community have made it impossible to honour the rations that have been authorized.

It is against this background, of quadripartite failure to agree and of the lack of any firm foundation for faith in the future of Germany, that the agreement for the reorganization of bi-zonal economic agencies in the British and American zones of Germany must be viewed. Great hopes for the beneficial effects of this have been expressed on high authority. On what are they founded?

In order to answer this question it is necessary first to examine the text of the agreement. It should be noted that it is to be in operation "pending the creation of administrative and governmental institutions for Germany as a whole," and "in order to facilitate the solution of pressing economic problems and the reconstruction of German economic life by the popularly controlled German agencies": in other words, the main responsibility for solving Germany's problems is to fall upon the Germans themselves.

The machinery by which these objects are to be attained consists of, first, an Economic Council selected by the *Landtag* of the various *Länder*; secondly, a full-time co-ordinating and executive body known as the Executive Committee and subordinate to the Economic Council and, thirdly, executive directors, responsible to the Economic Council for the administration of the bi-zonal departments, under the supervision of the Executive Committee. The Military Government is to delegate maximum responsibility for the conduct of bi-zonal functions to German agencies with due regard, it should be noted, to the principle of decentralization of administration. Decisions of the Council and of the Committee are to be taken by majority vote.

The functions allotted to the Council make it, subject to the approval of its decisions by the bipartite board of the two occupying Powers, virtually an economic parliament for the two zones. The Executive Committee, to be composed of one representative from each *Land* serving on a full-time basis, has the two functions of preparing ordinances for adoption by the Council on the one hand and of making regulations to implement, and co-ordinating the execution of, such ordinances on the other.

Such is the framework of the agreement. Many of its advantages are obvious. That responsibility for the "economic reconstruction of the two zones on the basis of a new plan for the agreed level of industry" should be placed on German shoulders is unquestionably right. How far the two zones can be reconstructed except within a united Germany remains extremely doubtful. They can only

\* THE FORTNIGHTLY, April 1947.

† *Hansard*, May 15, 1947. Vol. 437. No. 105, col. 1728.

achieve a balanced economy, and a reasonable way of life, on the basis of food imports from either the Russian zone or the United States. There is no hope, till the London Conference of next November at least, of Germany being treated by the four Powers as an economic whole. Consequently, until then, plans for the reconstruction of the two zones must go forward on the footing that for a sufficiency of food they must be dependent on Anglo-U.S. finance. Indeed, at the moment of writing *The Times* is reporting that the Minister of Food for North Rhine-Westphalia has proposed to Lord Pakenham a long term plan based precisely on large scale financing of the purchase of bread grains by the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

The efficacy of any remedy for any part of Germany must remain in doubt while the essential condition of the economic integration of the country remains unfulfilled. In spite of several satisfactory features, two questions have to be answered before it is possible to form any estimate of the new agreement's prospects even of partial success. Will the *Landtage*, which select members of the Council and the Committee and are the instruments for the execution of their ordinances, work for the welfare of the whole or promote local aims? How long can Britain, with her depleted stocks of dollars, continue to finance, mainly out of them, nearly £80,000,000 of relief imports? If she ceases to do so before November, what will be left of the bi-zonal agreement, or, indeed, of the zones themselves?

W. T. WELLS.

## II. HUNGARIAN ANVIL

In material damage Hungary suffered more perhaps than any other European country involved in the 1939-1945 war, always excepting Soviet Russia. The Germans wrought havoc during the winter campaign of 1944-1945, particularly in the course of their retreat. The Russians contributed their share of destruction with the siege of Budapest; then, after liberation, their troops had their fling during the hundred days of looting and rapine—they had the savage deeds of the Hungarian forces fighting with the Germans on Russian territory to avenge; and thereafter, they took care to place the country in economic bondage by crippling reparation demands.

There followed the nightmare inflation period which came to an end with the stabilization of the *forint* currency on August 1, 1946. Seventy per cent. of Hungary's industrial plant was rendered inoperative or ruined and the basis of her agricultural export trade was destroyed. The grim facts, together with some characteristic vignettes of the plight of Hungary, were depicted by an American correspondent, Hal Lehrman, in *THE FORTNIGHTLY* in April last year. And yet, such is the resiliency of this gifted nation, so well has the four-pronged Coalition Government husbanded and administered the country's modicum of resources that, until the other day, Hungary appeared to be, more than any

other part of Eastern Europe, on the high road to economic recovery.

For, alongside the creation of a consistent price and wage structure, which ensured that nominal income should not exceed the value of available goods and services, industry and agriculture were fundamentally reorganized. In agriculture, the large estates were broken up and distributed to the peasants in rent-free small holdings, the effect being to transform the peasantry, generally speaking, into a conservative element. (So much so, that in one area the peasants are said to have sent a deputation to ask for the right to pay taxes, so they might feel that the land really belonged to them!) In industry output in 1946 reached 40 per cent. of the 1938 figure and now, it is said, the figure is more like 60 per cent. The national income for 1946-1947 showed an increase of 30 per cent. over that of 1945. (That increase, it is true, was largely in mining and in industrial production. The bulk of the nation has continued to eke out a wretched existence in conditions of poverty such as we can scarcely imagine.) Finally, a favourable balance of trade has been achieved, in the first place by exchanges with the other Soviet-controlled countries and Russia herself, but with good prospects of a wider range of markets.

It is important to emphasize that the stabilization of the currency was attained without foreign aid. But Hungary's achievement in self-help was duly recognized in the Western countries. Apart from supplying six million dollars' worth of raw cotton and grain seeds, the United States authorized a loan of fifteen million, later increased to thirty million, dollars to be expended on surplus American stocks in Germany. The Under-Secretary of Finance, Mr. Kemeny, a Social-Democrat, secured from London banking credits of £500,000 for the purchase of much-needed raw materials, cotton, rubber, machine-tools, etc., and these credits not only had the approval of the Treasury but carried with them also an Exports Credits Department guarantee to ninety per cent. of the risk.

All this has now been jeopardized, all hope of a smooth passage to a stable and progressive economy has been shattered by the Russians' crude exercise of the political domination which was indisputably theirs by right of victory and geography but itself a reaction to dollar-diplomacy, new style. Hungary is the first victim of the recent intensification of American-Russian rivalry. The hasty decision of the U.S. Government to apply the sanction of suspending all further credits, following the summary removal of Hungary's Prime Minister, can only have the effect of hastening the process of "Eastern democratization." Though Austria may prove to be the ultimate testing-ground, these latest developments mean that Hungary becomes inevitably the anvil on which the Russians will be beating out their peculiar conception of democracy. There is little or nothing that Americans can do about it except deliver notes of protest, and Britain's rôle as a moderating power is fatally impaired.

Compared with the Balkan peoples, it is true, the Hungarians are tough metal. It is because he knows his countrymen very well that Mathias Rákosi, the able leader of the Communist party, has always favoured the policy of *festina lente*.

Thus, in the autumn of 1945, against the will of Moscow, he agreed with the other party leaders to the holding of free elections, which resulted in a clear majority, in the country and in Parliament, for the Smallholders and, despite a great propaganda onslaught, a vote of no more than 17 per cent. for the Communists. This spring he was not in favour of forcing the issue when, following the timely discovery of the 'plot' to restore the Horthy régime, the Committee of Privileges decided that they would not surrender M. Béla Kovács to the judicial authorities, depriving him of his parliamentary immunity. On the very eve of the arrest by the Russian Army authorities of M. Kovács (February 26, 1947), Rákosi had joined in an inter-Party agreement that M. Kovács should merely be invited to present himself 'voluntarily' to the political police.

In the matter of the elimination of Mr. Ferenc Nágy Rákosi appears to have been a consenting party to the Russian stratagem, at the same time doing all he could to soften the blow for his Ministerial colleague. There is general agreement among those who have met him that Rákosi's ruthlessness will never be obtrusive. In his youth he was a member of the British Labour Party, then Under-Secretary of Commerce in the Bela Kun Government before spending fifteen years in Hungarian gaols and thereafter becoming for a time a Soviet citizen.

Contrary to common belief Russian influence does not depend mainly on dominance in the Control Commission and the occupation troops, of whom there are no more than 20,000 tucked away in the south-eastern corner of Hungary. It hinges rather on party leadership, superior in every way to that of the other parties in the Coalition, on Communist control of the political and military police, and on substantial economic power, through the joint Soviet-Hungarian industrial undertakings, control of the oil industry, air and river traffic and trade ties.

By the latest *coup* the Russians will probably have achieved what has been their principal aim since the shock of the November 1945 election, the disintegration of the Smallholders' Party. With the outlawing of all Hungarian middle-class elements who could in any way be identified with the Horthy régime and thus implicated in the recent, or any future, 'conspiracy' it becomes a solid agrarian party which can only form an opposition, outside the ranks of 'democracy', as interpreted in countries behind the 'iron curtain'. Numerically, it is true, they would form, together with the Freedom Party, which split off early last year, a strong combination, if real political freedom obtained. But the indications are that the elections, now scheduled for the autumn, after the harvest, will follow the Polish or Bulgarian pattern. The other parties cannot withstand a Communist demand for depriving a substantial section of the 1945 electorate of the franchise. No matter that the Social Democrats claim to have stronger roots in the working class than the upstart Communist Party. Because of the new pattern of power in the international sphere the Socialists are destined to lose ground, especially if, as seems likely, the Hungarian economy

becomes progressively closed to the West.

The banks will henceforth be firmly under State control, and Mathias Rákosi and his colleagues can now go ahead with their version of the Three Years' Plan which excludes foreign aid. It will mean a great deal more hardship for workers and peasants but, given the psychological background of Hungary, the fear of a new fascism, supported by the Truman doctrine, all the forces of the left will be rallied to the national appeal which the Communist leaders are now making.

WILLIAM RYDAL.

### III. RESPONSIBILITY OF GENERALS.

The myth of the impeccability and invincibility of the German General Staff dies hard in Germany. In the shambles of the Third Reich, many Germans still probe hopefully for evidence that their Generals did not fail them. Of all the Nuremberg decisions perhaps the least popular in Germany was the conviction and sentencing to death of Field Marshals Keitel and Jodl. The Kesselring verdict has in turn been badly received. And the support given to Kesselring's cause by eminent Englishmen may well foster dangerous illusions in Germany.

The prestige of German generalship has survived many previous disasters. Mr. Sumner Welles has gone so far as to say that "the authority to which the German people have so often and so disastrously responded was not in reality the German Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of to-day, but the German General Staff." Now the generals are doing what they can to keep their glory alive and untarnished. There are the fostered fantasies in Berlin about Field Marshal Von Paulus's army on the Russian steppes. There is the studied effort of the German Generals to re-establish the faith of the German people in their military prowess and to dissociate themselves from the mountain of war crimes which even they now admit to have taken place. "To attempt to shake this indictment as a whole would be useless," said Keitel's Counsel at Nuremberg. Yet there has been a consistent effort by the Generals to evade all personal responsibility either for Germany's defeat or for the atrocities committed by the German armed and police forces. Manstein, for instance, attributes the Wehrmacht's defeat to the fact that Hitler interfered too much in military affairs. Throughout the Generals have denied that they committed atrocities. Any which did occur they say were committed by men like Himmler and agencies like the S.S. As for the launching of aggressive wars on unwarned and unsuspecting peoples—that was Hitler's doing. The High Command's blueprints for invasion were done merely in the course of military duty. The generals themselves were without influence on the course of events. These are now the familiar arguments of the generals.

The refusal of the Nuremberg Tribunal to declare the German High Command and General Staff to be a criminal group or organization on the face of it

strengthened the generals' cause. In fact, however, the Tribunal made it plain that although the General Staff and High Command was neither an "organization" nor a "group" within the meaning of the Tribunal's Charter, the criminal responsibility of German generalship was overwhelming. Of the officers who constituted the General Staff and High Command, Lord Justice Lawrence stated:

They have been responsible in large measure for the miseries and suffering that have fallen on millions of men, women and children. They have been a disgrace to the honourable profession of arms. Without their military guidance the aggressive ambitions of Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been academic and sterile. Although they were not a group falling within the words of the Charter, they were certainly a ruthless military caste. The contemporary German militarism flourished briefly with its recent ally, National Socialism, as well as or better than it had in the generations of the past. Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier's oath of obedience to military orders. When it suits their defence they say they had to obey; when confronted with Hitler's brutal crimes, which are shown to have been within their general knowledge, they say they disobeyed. The truth is they actively participated in all these crimes, or sat silent and acquiescent, witnessing the commission of crimes on a scale larger and more shocking than the world has ever had the misfortune to know. This must be said. Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to trial so that those among them who are guilty of these crimes should not escape punishment.

It is not the strength of character but the personal weakness of the generals which emerges most vividly from the captured German documents of the 1933-1945 era. For the most part the generals backed Hitler in 1933. But the Nazis did not want them as mere allies. Hitler wanted the generals completely under his thumb. I remember vividly how one of the generals whispered to me in the Herren Club in Berlin in 1934: "Just you wait. Soon we will have these wild men of the Nazi Party under control." In fact the next decade was the decade of the wild men. By 1935 Hitler had the whole military machine firmly in his grasp. As General Telford Taylor stated at Nuremberg: "Devoid of political skill or principle, the generals lacked the mentality or morality to resist."

The outcome of their ambitions and their ineptitude in their relations with Hitler was that with very few exceptions they cheerfully pushed our civilization over the precipice of war and caused their own armed forces to be used for foul practices of terror, pillage, murder and mass slaughter.

When the war ended, the day of reckoning came. Several German field marshals and generals have already been tried and sentenced for breaches of the established laws of war. The American authorities at Nuremberg recently indicted Field Marshal Wilhelm List, Field Marshal Maximilian Von Weichs, Colonel General Lothar Rendulic and nine other Wehrmacht generals who took part in the German military occupations of Norway and the Balkans. Mass murder, terrorization, plunder, pillage and wanton destruction are the main charges against them.

The British trial of Kesselring was a parallel contribution to this vital effort to destroy the myths surrounding German generalship. Kesselring himself remained loyal to Hitler to the last. He ousted Rommel as Commander-in-

Chief Southwest because he was prepared to do what Hitler wanted, whereas Rommel was only willing to do what he himself thought correct tactically. On July 20, 1944, Kesselring was the first German commander to congratulate Hitler on his escape from assassination. But it was not for his espousal of Hitler's cause that he has been sentenced to death. A court of British officers found him guilty firstly of being concerned in the killing, as a reprisal, of some 335 Italians in Ardeatine Caves, outside Rome, and secondly of inciting and commanding the German armed forces and police in Italy under his command to kill Italian civilians as reprisals, as a result of which many Italian civilians were killed. Both offences were a flagrant violation of the laws and usages of war.

It is now suggested by some of our publicists that these proceedings are unjust because the German generals could say *tu quoque* to the British officers trying them. The facts do not warrant any such implied acknowledgment of guilt on our part. Atrocities there may have been in the heat of battle. Individual atrocities may have been committed from time to time. There was a case early in the war, when we were hard pressed, in which a senior British army officer struck some German prisoners of war. But this officer was court martialled for doing so—and dismissed the service. Nazi atrocities were on a quite different plane and scale. So far from being punished, they were planned and ordered by higher authority. To the Ardeatine massacre there were parallels all over Europe. To the murder of the 50 R.A.F. officers who escaped from Stalag Luft III there were hundreds of equivalents on the Eastern Front.

The clamour in Kesselring's favour is dangerous. The whole object of our occupation of the British Zone of Germany is to de-nazify and to de-militarize it. It is therefore remarkable that the very men who personify that militarism should now be defended by British publicists in the name of Christian forgiveness and chivalry. The French are already asking nervously—must the British learn another lesson? Tread gently, you apologists for Kesselring. For you are treading on dynamite.

F. ELWYN JONES.

## THE MONNET PLAN AND ITS CHANCES

BY R. P. SCHWARZ

THE post-war economies of Britain and France are faced with problems of reconstruction which, though different from each other in size and degree, show great similarity in kind.

To take differences first, France is appreciably more self-sufficient in food supplies than Britain. Whereas, in terms of value, Britain, during the pre-war years, produced just over half her food on her own soil, France could, on average, during the five years 1934-1938, satisfy about 85 per cent. of her needs from domestic production. Even in 1946, France covered about 82 per cent of her food consumption—reduced, it is true, to lower standards—from home sources. In this field, present shortages and deficiencies are due far more to unsatisfactory distribution and an inefficient system of rationing than to insufficient production.

A second difference is the less intense industrialization of France, compared with Britain. Whereas in Britain, in January 1947, 10,733,000 men and women, that is 52 per cent of the gainfully employed population, worked in industry (including building, public utilities, transport and shipping), the corresponding figures for France, in July 1946, were 5,600,000 and 27.65 per cent. British industry grew on coal. But French coal resources are insufficient. In 1938, for instance, French coal production covered only 69 per cent. of consumption and imports amounting to 22 million tons had to provide the rest. In the same year, Britain was still the world's largest coal exporter, with 37 per cent of the world's total coal exports.

Thirdly, "old age" had become an acute problem in France during the inter-war period. This applies both to the age distribution of her population and to her productive equipment. No doubt, some relationship exists between the ageing of the workers and that of the economy in which they work. True, the same problem was beginning to preoccupy Britain at about the same time. But while the position was deteriorating this side of the Channel, it had become critical in France. The small increase in the French population since 1900 was almost entirely due to the influx of immigrants. Britain's population was still rising. The increase since the Census of 1931 amounted to nearly 2,000,000. As for age distribution, the French economist and demographer A. Sauvy summed up the position when he wrote that

among the countries other than France in which the ageing process of the population has gone farthest—Britain, Sweden, Norway, Belgium—the proportion of old people (i.e. people of 60 and over) is that which existed in France in 1900. We (the French) are

thus half a century in advance of these countries (if the word advance is appropriate in this context.)\*

Even when diagnosed in time, this ageing process, on its human side, is not easily influenced by deliberate and planned action. Effective human action is, however, possible to prevent the ageing of a country's economy. Yet, neither France nor Britain showed sufficient energy in opposing a Malthusian evolution. It would be difficult to say which of the two countries was more remiss in this respect. But if we assume the same degree of inertia on both sides of the Channel—and at times, France's political and economic cadres seemed even more closed to new ideas than their British counterparts—its effects, other things remaining equal, were bound to be considerably more serious for the French economy, inferior to the British in accumulated capital, intensity of development and potential resources.

Other things did not, however, remain equal during the 1939-1945 war. From recent statistics it would appear that France's capital losses during the war were heavier even than Britain's. An estimate of French losses published in *The Economist* of April 6, 1946, arrived at a total of Frs. 990 milliards of 1938 value (5,820 million at the average exchange rate of that year). In to-day's purchasing power, that sum is equivalent to roughly £10,000 million. Another, earlier, estimate arrived at a figure of about £7,000 millions of present-day purchasing power.† If we assume that French capital losses were no more than equal to the British figure of £7,300 million (the estimate given in Command Paper 6707), their incidence on French economy must have been far more severe.‡

## II

Racing against time, both Britain and France must to-day make good the errors and the neglect of the past and renew their whole apparatus of production. In both countries, the necessity of heavy capital expenditure has made it imperative to draw up an inventory of existing resources, to be set against a list of probable requirements. In Britain, the *Economic Survey for 1947* (Command 7046) fulfilled this, mainly analytical, task. In France, Monsieur Jean Monnet, with the help of Messieurs Marjolin and Vergeot and eighteen *Comités de Modernisation* (the equivalent of the British Working Parties) established the *Premier Plan de Modernisation et d'Équipement*, published in December 1946. The *Rapport Général* which embodies this Plan and the reports of the various working parties are, in part at least, devoted to a similar comparison of resources and requirements. But the *Rapport* goes much fur-

\* Alfred Sauvy, *Bien-être et Population*, Edition Sociale Française, Paris, 1945.

† See Henri Solente, *Les Conditions de la Reconstruction*, in *Le Monde*, Paris, April 22-23, 1945.

‡ At a rough estimate, the incidence represents 36.5 per cent. of national wealth in the French case against 25 per cent. in the British. This assumes that French national wealth corresponding to Britain's £30,000 million (Cmd. 6707) was £20,000 million. The latter figure is derived from the 60:40 ratio agreed upon in 1939 between Britain and France for the division of war costs payable abroad.

ther than the British White Paper in that it is at the same time a comprehensive four-year investment programme which specifies production targets, priorities of execution, cost estimates and methods of finance. As compared with the White Paper, the Plan covers a far wider field, both in space and in time.

### III

Over the four years 1947-1950, the Monnet Plan foresees total capital expenditure of Frs. 2250 milliards subdivided as follows:

|                                                               | In milliard Frs.<br>(Prices of June 1946) | Equivalents<br>in million £<br>(£1 = Frs. 480) |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| Reconstruction .....                                          | 1100                                      | 2292                                           |
| Deferred maintenance .....                                    | 430                                       | 896                                            |
| Modernization and increase in capacity of<br>production ..... | 720                                       | 1500                                           |
|                                                               | <u>2250</u>                               | <u>4688</u>                                    |

Of the total expenditure, Frs. 1210 milliards (£2,521 million) represent expenditure on buildings and public works and Frs. 1,040 milliards (£2,167 million) expenditure on plant and equipment.

The cost estimates are, by now, obsolete on account of changes in the price levels, both external and internal, since June 1946. French wholesale prices rose by just under half between June 1946 and March 1947. American wholesale prices have risen by a third since the same date. As price levels will undoubtedly undergo further modifications, upwards or downwards, over the four year period 1947-1950, the financial cost of the Monnet Plan can best be measured by comparison with the latest estimates of French national income.\* The authors of the Monnet Plan expect French national income, at the prices ruling in June 1946, to total Frs. 2,700 to 3,000 milliards (£5,625 to £6,250 million) in 1947 and to reach Frs. 3,700 milliards in 1950 (which is 37 per cent. more than the lower and 23.3 per cent. more than the higher figure for 1947). The estimated total cost of the Plan thus represents the equivalent of 9 or 10 months' national income as it accrued at the beginning of its fulfilment.

During 1947, the first year of the Plan, investments are expected to total Frs. 460 milliards (£958 million), that is, between 15.5 and 17 per cent. of the national income. Including maintenance, capital expenditure during 1947-1950 is estimated to reach annually between 23 per cent. and 25 per cent. of the

\* National income is defined as "the total mass of goods and services available to the French population during the year considered." A note on page 88 of the *Rapport* foreshadows the publication of a French "National Income White Paper" on the methods and sources used in computing this income. The Sterling figures above as also those given elsewhere in this article must not be taken to represent precise equivalences. Frs. 3,000 milliards will not to-day in France buy a mass of goods and services equivalent to that which could be secured in Britain for £5,625 million. On a conservative estimate, the domestic purchasing power of the French Franc is 30 per cent. below the figure corresponding to its exchange rate. Conversions are given exclusively to convey an idea of the orders of magnitude involved.

national income. That does not, however, mean that Frenchmen will have to achieve this unusually high rate of savings. Of the Frs. 460 milliards required in 1947,\* just under one-third, namely 140 to 150 milliards are expected to be secured from foreign credits and only the remainder will have to come from current private savings (240 to 250 milliards) and undistributed profits (70 milliards).† Current private savings and undistributed profits combined represent some 10 per cent. of the national income.

### IV

Thus, the financial requirements of the Monnet Plan will compel a temporary reduction of consumer expenditure and, conversely, a higher expenditure on capital goods. The same principle has governed all Soviet five-year plans. In the French case, the reasons for the adoption of this same principle are, however, non-military. Nor does the Plan sacrifice the consumer to anything like the same extent. It is so conceived as to raise French production to the 1938 level, by the end of 1946; to the 1929 level (which was about 25 per cent. higher) by the middle of 1948; and by a further 25 per cent to about 155 per cent of the 1938 level, by 1950. That does not however mean that the French consumer will enjoy the full measure of the increased output. A far larger part of the production will have to be exported than in the past. For there is no other way of restoring equilibrium in the French balance of payments. Its present disequilibrium is worse than that of British external accounts.

But whatever the short-term sacrifices, the authors of the Plan plead rightly: Each of the fundamental tasks with which French economy is confronted leads back to the necessity of renewing its productive equipment and its methods. It would be illusory to think that France could shirk this effort and return to her mediocre pre-war condition. The alternative to modernization is not a return to the position of the past, but constantly growing material decadence . . . In conclusion, one cannot say that France has any choice. For there is no choice for her other than between progressive decay and immediate action.

If the targets set by the Plan are reached, output in key industries will develop as follows:

|                                         | 1938 | 1947 | 1950 | 1950 in<br>per cent. of<br>1938 |
|-----------------------------------------|------|------|------|---------------------------------|
| Coal production (million tons) .....    | 47.6 | 55.5 | 65   | 136.5                           |
| Electricity (milliard KWH): total ..... | 20.7 | 26.0 | 37.0 | 178.6                           |
| from water-power .....                  | 11.6 | 13.0 | 20.5 | 176.7                           |
| Steel production (million tons) .....   | 6.2  | 7.0  | 11.0 | 177.4                           |
| Cast-iron mouldings (ditto) .....       | 0.7  | 1.2  | 2.7  | 385.7                           |

\* The *Economic Survey for 1947* (p. 31) states among the targets for 1947 the expenditure of 20 per cent. of the national income on capital and maintenance.

† Whether this is comparable to the 8 per cent. shown in Table 11 of the British National Income White Paper (Cmd. 7099) for private savings including undistributed profits, must remain in doubt. Too little is known at present of the methods used for computing the French national income



|                                       |     |       |       |       |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-------|-------|-------|
| Cement (million tons) .....           | 3.8 | 6.0   | 13.5  | 355.0 |
| Agricultural machinery (thousands)    |     |       |       |       |
| (a) Tractors .....                    | 2.7 | 12.3  | ?     | —     |
| (b) Cultivators .....                 |     | 6.0   | 16.0  | —     |
| Railways (million tons carried) ..... | 133 | 160.0 | 240.0 | 180.4 |

Great emphasis is placed on the modernization of French agriculture. In this field, the aims are (a) to increase output of cereals per acre by at least a quarter so as to obtain, by 1950, from a smaller sown surface at least the same output as the average of the 1934-1938; (b) to intensify production of secondary cereals, fodder, potatoes and industrial plants (hemp, oilseeds, flax, tobacco); (c) to increase the livestock population, raise meat production to the pre-war average and lift milk and cheese production substantially above that average; (d) to mechanize agriculture by the large-scale use of tractors and cultivators. On this last point, the *Rapport* recalls that before 1939, France numbered one tractor to every 200 farmers, against 43 in Britain and 22 in the U.S.A. Capital expenditure on agriculture is budgeted for at Frs. 366 milliards (£754 million) of which Frs. 192 milliards (£400 million) are allocated to agricultural machinery. The gross increase in value of the annual agricultural output expected from this investment is conservatively estimated at Frs. 60 milliards. At that rate the new capital would be amortized within six years or so.

Higher output and greater productivity are indeed particularly necessary in agriculture. With 7,140,000 workers, agriculture and forestry, in 1938, occupied 35 per cent of the total gainfully employed population. It was therefore the largest French industry. Even in 1950, agriculture and forestry are still expected to occupy first place, with 6,250,000 workers (approximately 30 per cent of all gainfully employed). Through greater productivity, the Plan expects from a labour force reduced by 9 per cent in numbers an output representing 111 per cent of the 1934-1938 average. Labour productivity would thus increase by about 27 per cent.

## V

France suffers from a shortage of manpower much in the same way as Britain. The increase in output, expected from the Monnet Plan, can only be achieved by more intense mechanization, by greater productivity of labour, and by longer working hours. France cannot count on any appreciable increase in the total labour force. Excluding the distributive trades, public administrations, the professions and the armed forces, the labour force active in production should, according to the Monnet forecasts, reach 14,450,000 by 1950, that is 800,000 workers more than in 1946, but 200,000 fewer than in 1938. Of the additional 800,000 workers, part is to come from organized immigration (estimated at 350,000 for 1947). Reduction in the strength of the armed forces is to provide another 150,000 to 200,000. The remainder is expected from the distributive trades, rehabilitation of disabled workers,

postponement of the retirement age, displaced persons, and last but not least, from women not at present gainfully employed who number close on two million. But the main effect must come from greater productivity of labour and longer working hours. In 1938, the average working week in industry did not exceed 39 hours. To-day, the normal length of the working week is 48 hours (even though its legal definition remains at 40 hours with overtime remunerated at higher rates). All the estimates of the Monnet Plan are indeed based on a 48-hour week. Other things remaining equal, this factor alone should, in theory, cause output to rise by about 23 per cent. The main increase is, however, expected from increased mechanization and rationalization measures. Compared with 1938, these two factors alone are to provide increases in output per man-hour ranging from 13 per cent. (coal mining) to 57 (automobile industry).

In a general way, the French worker, according to the *Rapport*, produced, before 1939, only about one third of the output of the U.S.A. and only about half that of the British worker, largely on account of inadequate capital equipment and insufficient rationalization. Comparative figures in this field have no more than indicative value. But there is no doubt that a wide margin separates French productivity from that of France's chief industrial competitors. And even the improvements expected as a result of the Monnet plan reforms may not suffice to wipe it out.

## VI

French production figures for the first quarter of 1947 show continued progress. But as they reflect action taken even before the Plan was officially adopted, on January 11, 1947, they teach us little about its actual fulfilment. The latest known index of industrial production (January 1947) was still 11 per cent below the level of 1938 which should, in principle, have been reached by the end of last year, although indices for some individual industries (coal, glass, rubber, electricity output) substantially exceeded the 1938 level.

The success of the Monnet Plan depends evidently on a conjunction of numerous individual factors. They may conveniently be subdivided into external and internal factors, according to origin. Among the first, none is more important than the position of the balance of payments. The execution of the Plan requires imports of plant and equipment to the extent of Frs. 250 milliards (£521 million), but equally of raw materials and, in a smaller degree, of food. By 1950, the Plan expects the balance of payments to be in equilibrium. Meanwhile, the deficit on current account, for the four years 1946-1949, is expected to reach Frs. 625 milliards (£1,302 million) of which the deficit for 1946 (the year before the inauguration of the Plan) represents Frs. 248 milliards (£577 million). In reality, the 1946 deficit, thanks to the satisfactory progress of exports, but perhaps also on account of a lag in imports,

seems to have been appreciably lower, namely, Frs. 149 milliards (£310 million).<sup>\*</sup> This figure is only £90 million lower than the estimate for Britain's deficit in 1946. But it derives from a balance sheet total that, at a rough estimate, is at best no more than one-half of the British, and thus denotes even worse disequilibrium.

The Monnet Plan expects to cover the total deficit of Frs. 625 milliards (£1,302 millions)

|                                                           | <i>In milliard<br/>Francs</i> | <i>In million<br/>£</i> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| by the disposal of gold reserves and foreign assets ..... | 240                           | 500                     |
| by foreign credits already secured .....                  | 222                           | 462.5                   |
| by foreign credits still to be secured .....              | 163                           | 339.5                   |
|                                                           | <hr/> 625                     | <hr/> 1302.0            |

Against the last-mentioned item, France obtained in May of this year a credit from the Bretton Woods Bank of \$ 250 million (£62.2 million) and a further \$ 25 million (£6.22 million) on short-term from the Bretton Woods Monetary Fund. That leaves some £267 million to be covered. If the Plan shows results, that sum will no doubt be forthcoming. Substantial amounts of foreign currency, gold and other assets are still being hoarded in France. But, meanwhile, French dollar and hard currency expenditure seems to be running ahead of schedule. In a general way, to forecast the evolution of the balance of payments for another four years is at the best of times an extremely difficult and risky business. The accuracy of the Monnet forecasts hinges in a large measure on developments in the level of world prices, on the evolution of American economic policy and on the avoidance of another American slump. In two of these three respects at least, prospects are unfavourable.

As to internal factors, the endorsement of the Plan by the employer and the labour sides alike and, in particular, the return to the 48-hour week, are favourable elements. But against this, French internal prices have not yet found a stable level. There is an evident disparity between the wholesale prices of agricultural products, on the one side, and industrial products, on the other. Taking the 1938 level as 100, the indices of March 1947 stood at 945 for agricultural, at 756 for industrial, products. Hoarding by the peasants maintains in being a black market the "indices" of which move in the economic stratosphere. As requirements cannot be satisfied at official prices, there are constant strikes for higher wages. This factor endangers the whole financial basis of the Plan. Yet, hoarding will not cease before French public finances have been reformed, thus removing monetary uncertainties. The French peasants will not increase their deliveries as long as they expect a further depreciation in the purchasing power of the franc. While the Monnet Plan recognizes that capital expenditure must be covered by borrowing, at home and abroad, it also emphasizes the necessity of balancing the ordinary budget.

<sup>\*</sup>See Pierre Uri, "Survey of French Economic Conditions", London and Cambridge Economic Service, Vol. XXV, Bulletin, II, May 12, 1947. Monsieur Uri is a member of the *Commissariat du Plan*.

The ordinary budget cannot be genuinely balanced without a wholesale reform of the present unwieldy and antiquated fiscal system. Until this is achieved, the success of the Plan will be in doubt. The financial Inventory published in March 1947 on the instructions of the Minister of Finance, Monsieur Schumann, provides a useful analysis of the present tax structure and throws light particularly on the evolution of tax receipts and the tax burden. But it is a static analysis, not a dynamic reform plan. Any serious attempt to reform French public finances must contain three elements: simplification of the tax system; unification of the budget; redistribution of the tax load as between agriculture and industry. The position, in 1946, was preposterous. Direct taxes were collected under eleven different schedules. Local taxes, producing in all Frs. 10.4 milliards (£22 million) were collected under 22 different headings, from a tax on street sweeping to one on dogs and fun fair machines. The industrial and commercial profits tax and the tax on wages and salaries were expected to produce, respectively, 5 per cent and 13 per cent of total budgetary receipts; agricultural profits tax no more than 1.06 per cent. Yet, according to the estimates of French national income for 1946, agriculture produced, with Frs. 460 milliards 18.2 per cent. of the total national income.<sup>\*</sup> This situation has been constantly growing worse for many decades until it has, by now, reached the point of absurdity. French peasants have in practice, if not at law, succeeded to the fiscal privileges of the class which they dispossessed in 1789. And they may be preparing for themselves a fate very similar to that of their noble predecessors. Since 1939, France, under the pressure of events, has compelled her *rentiers* to pay taxes by doing away with bearer, in favour of nominative, securities. Wage earners, even before P.A.Y.E. was introduced in 1939, have long been under a "disability" from the point of view of tax evasion. The tightening up process remains to be completed by compelling the French farmer to bear his share of the fiscal burden and, to a lesser degree, by subjecting the professional classes, next to the farmers probably the greatest tax evaders, to stricter accountancy rules.

At this point, the Monnet Plan becomes a political problem. From the political angle, the reception it received had its favourable and less favourable aspects. Among the first counts the agreement, already mentioned, of capital and labour on the execution of the Plan. It is the combined work of both and therein resides its value. Among the less favourable aspects count the reasons for this agreement, which are frequently conflicting and sometimes diametrically opposed. Yet, even this factor may ultimately be turned to good account. For no party can wish to take power in a country the economy of which is well-advanced on the road to self-extinction. This negative factor may still offer the Monnet Plan its fairest chance.

<sup>\*</sup> Pierre Uri, *op. cit.*

## THE TEN-YEAR HOUSING PROGRAMME

BY GILBERT MCALLISTER, M.P.

FROM the General Election of 1945 to February 28, 1947, 360,000 families were found new homes in the United Kingdom. Of these 151,000 families were provided with accommodation by the repair of existing dwellings, including 112,000 families re-housed by the repair of unoccupied and severely war damaged dwellings and 39,000 by the conversion and adaptation of existing premises: 170,000 were provided with houses by the construction of new dwellings of which 70,700 were permanent and 99,451 were temporary houses. A further 40,000 were found accommodation by the requisitioning of unoccupied houses for residential purposes (26,000), by the provision of temporary huts (3,500) and by the occupation of Service Camps (10,000). Of the 70,000 new permanent houses, 37,000 were built by private builders under licence and 33,000 by local authorities. Of the 37,000 built by private enterprise, 32,000 were built for sale or at the request of private owners: 4,000 represented houses totally destroyed during the war and since rebuilt, again for private owners.

This achievement is a considerable one and so incomparably better than the results achieved immediately after the 1914-1918 war that those who set out to criticize the Labour Government's success in housing are easily answered by Government supporters pointing to the fact that in the first full year of re-housing after the General Election of 1918 (the year 1919-1920) only 3,502 houses were built in England and Wales. So whatever mistakes may have been made, whatever failures in co-ordination there may have been, the Government's record on the facts alone is an outstanding one, both legislatively and administratively.

In addition to this achievement there have been war damage repairs to houses which had suffered varying degrees of damage from slight to substantial. During the twenty-three months ending February 28, 1947, 692,000 war-damaged dwellings were made wind and weathertight, and, indeed, within limits of materials available, restored to their pre-war standard. This is a fact which is easily lost sight of because it does not affect the number of dwellings provided; it does not provide a single new house for one additional family, but nevertheless it absorbs a large part of the manpower available and is a heavy drain on the material position.

Nor indeed is this the end of the story. So far I have merely summarized the houses actually completed and the families actually re-housed. But re-

housing a nation—and the provision of four million new houses in the United Kingdom between 1945 and 1955, which is the Government's objective and which is a public works operation without parallel in any period in any country, is a cycle of events and not simply one event. There is the acquisition of sites, there is preparation of these sites, there is the tendering for contracts, there is the allocation of contracts, there is the actual building process. To take at any point of time the figures of houses completed, therefore, as I have done on February 28, 1947, is by no means to tell the whole story. It is also necessary to consider the number of houses in course of construction. On February 28, 1947, new permanent houses under construction amounted to 213,000, while temporary houses in the same state were almost 10,000. The number of houses under construction therefore reached a total not exceeded in any year after the 1914-1918 war until 1927, eight years after the Armistice. Again a convincing proof of housing activity with no small drive and energy behind it and incomparably more successful than Coalition efforts after the 1914-1918 war.

Obviously if a re-housing programme is to be achieved the necessary manpower and materials must be mobilized. Obviously, too, if the operation is to be successful the supply of materials to the sites must keep pace with the labour available. During the war an acute scarcity of building labour was anticipated by Lord Portal, Mr. Willink and the other Coalition Ministers responsible. From the General Election of 1945 to the end of December 1946 operatives employed in the building industry had increased by seventy-four per cent. and operatives actually at work by eighty-one per cent. At the end of December the labour employed in the building industry numbered 1,250,000 men, a figure which shows a remarkable recovery from the devastating dislocation of the war years to the point where the industry, from the labour supply point of view, was nearly back to normal and indeed was only 60,000 short of the maximum pre-war figure. The Government showed an admirable sense of urgency in building up this labour force because it was natural to expect that many returning soldiers previously in the building industry might have sought new occupations in which they could use techniques acquired during their war service. There was therefore a rush to get started with the programme, a rush which has had some undesirable consequences but which was nevertheless fully justified if the building industry was to be put in a position to carry out the gigantic Ten Year Plan. Equal success did not attend the Government's efforts to mobilize materials and at the beginning of 1947 the Government had to state that "the scarcity of materials is a major obstacle to the 1947 building programme." "Production during 1947," the Government said, "is dependent on many uncertain factors, particularly on the supply of fuel for production and transport, the recruitment of further labour, and the possibility of finding alternatives for certain of the scarcer raw materials, some of which, such as soft wood, lead, and linseed oil, are scarce

throughout the world."

The responsibility for these world shortages cannot in any case be apportioned to the British Labour Government. The Government indeed has made the most desperate efforts to overcome these difficulties. But when Sweden, from which normally can be expected large supplies of timber, laid down the condition that she would only export timber if she received coal, the Government was placed in a dilemma which was not easily resolved. The brick position was for a time a matter of acute concern and indeed was brought back to peak production only to be faced again with a sharp decline caused by the fuel crisis which began in January 1947. To meet the 1947 programme a monthly production of something like 450 million bricks was required. Faced with drastic fuel cuts, production in January 1947 dropped to 380 million while the stock position was 600 million bricks less than it was twelve months earlier. Other materials suffered similarly; cement production dropped to less than half the necessary production figure of about 400,000 tons. The production of plaster boards fell to considerably under half of the necessary production. The manufacture of metal doors and windows went down to almost one-third of what is necessary. It is therefore clear that the Government's statement that "production during 1947 is dependent on many uncertain factors" was more than justified, and the further announcement that the target of 240,000 houses to be completed by December 31, 1947, would not be fulfilled was not surprising. It is difficult to form a realistic estimate of what will in fact be achieved but if 180,000 houses are completed by the end of the year then the Government will have performed a prodigious feat of national re-building.

It is clear that the manpower position has over-run the material position, a state of affairs which can be attributed first of all to the world scarcity of basic materials. It is also due to a failure of co-ordination in the placing of contracts and the faulty allocation of materials between Government departments and between local authorities and private builders. To say that the licensing position became chaotic is perhaps both to over-state and oversimplify a complex and difficult matter but to say that there were many demands by different agencies for the materials is to under-state the failure to achieve over-all planning. It is true that the Ministry of Health issued repeated and grave warnings, the first as early as November 1945, telling local authorities to restrict their programmes, and especially their contracts, to what could be achieved in the ensuing twelve months. It is equally true that local authorities paid no attention to this, placed far too many contracts, gave far too many permits to private builders, and that the Ministry of Works itself sanctioned the construction of too many buildings not remotely connected with the re-housing programme. This in turn led to considerable disparity between the time taken by private enterprise to complete a house for private sale and the time taken by private enterprise to build a house under contract

for a local authority. The period of construction by private enterprise of a house for sale averaged about eight months, the period of construction of a house by private enterprise building for a local authority averaged twelve months in England and Wales and a good deal more in Scotland.

Was it that the contractor building for the local authorities just did not care? Was it that the workers on the houses for sale received completely illegal incentive rewards? Was it that the building labour was not producing the amount of work which they ought reasonably to produce? These are questions that permit of no easy answer but certainly there is sufficient evidence to suggest that all three questions could be answered in the affirmative.

In determining their target figure of 240,000 houses in 1947, the Government obviously based its calculations on the fact that of the total labour force 300,000 men were to be allocated exclusively to the building of permanent houses. Indeed, in the White Paper published in January 1947 the Government says quite clearly that it thinks it "reasonable to estimate that the building force will be sufficient to complete 240,000 permanent houses during the year," a total made up of 190,000 local authority houses, 15,000 houses destroyed during the war to be re-built by private enterprise, and 35,000 houses privately built for sale.

Before the war the proportion of houses built by men employed in house-building was one to one, so that in twelve months the 300,000 men who were employed in house-building built 300,000 houses. (It should be remembered that this ideal state of affairs was not achieved until seventeen years after the 1914-1918 war, in the years 1936, 1937 and 1938). Building larger houses than the pre-war standard municipal house, the Government in its calculation is assuming that the production of one house will absorb fifteen man-months of labour, so that three men will now produce three houses in four years. Therefore, with a labour force of 300,000 the hope was that 20,000 local authority houses would be completed every month. This was certainly not an unreasonable objective if the contingencies of fuel and materials which had to be taken into the reckoning had not so quickly turned from a possibility to reality. But again it should at least be recognized that the Government was aiming at a standard rate of house construction in 1947 which was not achieved in the United Kingdom until eight years after the 1914-1918 war. The Government therefore cannot be accused on any account of complacency in this matter. They have attempted boldly to bring the industry back to a pre-war production rate in record time and the only mild censure that they may deserve is that since people seize on target figures and ignore all the conditional 'ifs' and 'ands' there is certain to be some degree of disappointment that they cannot be reached.

Before turning to the difficulties in the building industry itself, let me examine briefly the temporary housing position. From the moment that Mr. Winston Churchill announced the programme of temporary pre-fabricated

bungalows in his broadcast speech in 1943 I condemned the project. It was probably the most misconceived, ill-begotten attempt at the formulation of a housing policy that the world has ever seen. Mr. Aneurin Bevan as Minister of Health was undoubtedly right to condemn the whole fantastic scheme and to announce soon after he had taken office that his aim would be to construct the maximum number of permanent full-sized houses as quickly as possible. The Coalition Government estimated that 10,000 men could produce 100,000 temporary houses in one year. That this was nonsense, setting out to delude the public, is proved by the fact that the British Iron and Steel Federation undertook to supply 20,000 pre-fabricated steel bungalows by the end of December 1946: in fact they supplied 264. In no single instance has the idea of houses being factory built and ready for delivery to the site on the mass production basis achieved by the aircraft and the automobile industries been realized. The nearest approach to this realization has been the production of aluminium houses under direct Government control and organization, inaugurated by the Labour Government. Nevertheless so much work had been done on the preparation for the production of temporary houses, so many architects, so many senior executives and so many high-grade technicians of all kinds have had to concentrate their energies on the design, prototype production and production planning of the temporary housing programme that it would have been equally wrong to drop the plan altogether before similar work could be done on the production of permanent houses of a non-traditional character.

Mr. Aneurin Bevan therefore announced a restricted temporary housing programme and, as I have shown, the number of temporary houses built in the United Kingdom by February 28, 1947, reached 99,451. The production process had been steadily improving. The production of two temporary houses (without regard to the preparation of the sites and the servicing) absorbed the labour of one man for one year. The time taken for erection on the sites decreased from four months to two months. By the autumn of 1946 production of temporary houses had risen to 2,600 a week. It was at this point, in my view, that the Minister of Health should have had the courage to change his mind. He should, I think, have announced his intention to proceed with the construction of temporary houses for a further six months. This would not seriously have affected his plans for the production of permanent houses (although there would have been some diversion of labour and materials) but it would have given the country an additional 20,000 temporary houses and avoided a great deal of unnecessary dislocation and some degree of unemployment. The spectacle of factories—some of them in the development areas—which two months earlier were performing a vital part in the national housing drive, standing idle, many of the workers declared redundant and their management at wits' end to find new opportunities of service to the public, was not a pretty one and a more flexible Minister would have seen to

it that the change-over from the temporary housing programme to the permanent housing programme was not so sudden nor so drastic.

Now let me turn to the building industry itself. The building industry in the United Kingdom consists of the National Federation of Building Trades Employers and the National Federation of Building Trades Operatives. The former is inevitably private enterprise and traditionally Conservative and the latter is inevitably Labour and traditionally Socialist. But it is in this industry and in these two organizations that the difference between the Conservative outlook and the Socialist outlook is so small as to be microscopic. It is true that the building industry in the past has had much to put up with and nowhere more than in house building. In these days of full employment and higher wages it is difficult even for those concerned to throw their minds back to the time when a fully qualified craftsman received only 1s. 6½d. per hour and a labourer 1s. 2¾d. per hour—the position in rural areas in 1941. This meant that for working a forty-four-hour week the building trade craftsman got 67s. 10d. a week and the labourer 54s. 1d. a week—if he had the opportunity to work a full week. The biggest curse of the building industry and of the building trade employee was loss of work through inclement weather, "wet time" as the men called it. It was not until 1937 that the first steps were taken to abolish finally this hardship and handicap. To-day, however, the building industry has its guaranteed week. It is perhaps the only industry whose wage rates, both minimum and maximum, are laid down by Statute. Both sides of the industry have until now resolutely set their faces against anything in the nature of an incentive bonus scheme. The Government, it is said by some, has been timorous and has failed to take the necessary drastic action in the face of the opposition of the building trades unions. It is easy to advise drastic action: it is perhaps not so wise to adopt it in dealing with an industry whose co-operation must be wholehearted if success is to be achieved. At the same time the industry must face the fact that men work hardest and that production is highest where there is additional reward for additional effort. It is clear that some private contractors working on the production of houses for private sale are, despite the illegal character of the transaction, offering incentive bonuses of one kind or another (tax-free services are not unknown) and as a result are getting their houses up more quickly than where they are working for a local authority which naturally cannot easily countenance any practice outside the law. Nor is it easy to apply to an industry so many-sided as the building industry, representing so many different crafts and skills the idea of the *standard hour of work*.\* Until the standard hour of work is known for every trade and for every district the universal application of incentive bonus schemes would not be

\* As we are going to Press the Rt. Hon. Charles Key, M.P., Minister of Works, announces that an agreement has been reached in principle between employers and employees on the need for incentive schemes in the building industry. The Minister's statement is, however, described as "premature" by building trades union leaders.

possible. But to say that and to admit difficulties is one thing. To say that it is impossible is quite another thing. It is at least certain that the present position of wages, which are dependent on time and no other factor, is fraught with the utmost danger to the nation's house building programme. At the end of 1945 an increase in the wage rates was granted. Since then there has been no discernible improvement in production. There has on the contrary been in certain trades a discernible decrease in production, while the output of the bricklayer in Glasgow particularly has become a byword. The Unions recently made another claim for an increase in wages but this has been rejected. There may be a period of labour difficulties as a result. Surely the time has come for both sides of the industry to examine the whole problem afresh in the light of modern industrial knowledge and practice to see whether a new and more satisfactory scheme might be evolved. An incentive bonus policy need have no adverse repercussions on the minimum wage rate structure.\*

Mr. Aneurin Bevan, Minister of Health and therefore the Minister charged primarily with responsibility for housing (a function discharged in Scotland by the Secretary of State, Mr. Joseph Westwood), is a man of energy, resource and enormous dialectical ability. In debate he is among the foremost Parliamentarians of our time. In his first speech as Minister he revealed an over-all grasp of the housing problem which has not been excelled by any of his predecessors, even if I had to enter a caveat against his perpetuation of the policy of special subsidies for tenement buildings on expensive sites (a practice which subjugates the interests of decent housing to the high land costs). He has vastly improved housing standards. He has a singular appreciation of questions of amenity. He is altogether against the one-class community so characteristic of the pre-war dormitory housing scheme. He pays lip service to Lewis Mumford whom he may have read but has not studied. Occasionally he goes haywire and following Le Corbusier (before he saw the light) advocates skyscraper flats as a feature of the English rural scene. He can claim a large share of the credit for the success of the housing policy. He has to share along with the entire Government responsibility for the failure of co-ordination which was inevitable as soon as the Government abandoned their election intention to create a Ministry of Housing. That there has been a failure of high level co-ordination is clear beyond a doubt and efforts to remedy the deficiency on the regional level will only mitigate but not cure the disease. There is in addition a puritanical reluctance, based partly on party beliefs and party misconceptions, to trust the great private organizations within the building industry. The best of these in war and in peace have given magnificent service to the country; the worst of them have gained for the

\* The standard hour of work is defined as the amount of work an average workman, working at average speed and making allowance for fatigue and other factors can produce in sixty minutes of time. It is the basis of well conceived incentive bonus schemes.

whole industry an unpleasant reputation.

Labour Members of Parliament cherish a good many hates. They hate the landlords perhaps above all, they are not very keen on bankers, but they cherish a special malevolence for the "the speculative builder." He is the author of a hundred wrongs, from ribbon development and shoddy building to the pitiless robbing of the ex-Serviceman and the widow. And there is just enough truth in all that to make sense. But in their condemnation there is little discrimination. That may be pardonable in a back-bencher but is intolerable in a Minister. The building industry, and especially the large-scale building industry, was willing and is still willing to place its entire resources at the disposal of the Government. They are not encouraged by "let's shoot the lot" speeches or the suggestion that individually and collectively they are rogues and scoundrels. They are not encouraged either by the fact that in Great Britain to-day there are 68,000 building "firms" on the register, each consisting of one man. This is not to deploy a labour force: this is to dissipate it and render it incapable of action on a national scale. It is not too late, but it is certainly not too early, for the Minister and the Government to seek the whole-hearted co-operation of the building industry on a national housing project which rises above sectional interests and secondary concerns.



## BOYS' CLUBS IN BRITAIN

BY LORD ABERDARE

THE growth of the boys' club movement shows clearly that the national attitude towards the welfare of youth has undergone a radical change or rather, a series of changes, within the last hundred years. From small beginnings the movement has become a vital force permeating the activities of thousands of adolescent boys, a force which gives purposeful direction to those who are about to face the tasks of adult life.

To-day, we are accustomed to hearing that youth is the golden age of opportunity, a statement which, in spite of its hackneyed use, is no mere platitude or truism. For the modern generation, and especially its younger members, the opportunities are indeed great. The raising of the school leaving age, made possible by the Education Act of 1944, the institution by many local authorities of evening classes in technical and other subjects, and the increasing number of scholarships for public schools and universities, have opened up new avenues of hope and encouragement, both in professional and industrial spheres. The provision of further education at public cost has brought to the many the privileges formerly enjoyed by the few.

As recently as the end of the eighteenth century, however, (when the first boys' clubs were fighting their early struggles to seek recognition and improve the social conditions of their members) a very different set of circumstances prevailed. The expansion of the great manufacturing cities which followed the Industrial Revolution had intensified the fight for existence among the working classes, in conditions of incredible squalor and poverty. Although the Factory Acts had alleviated some of the hardships, especially in relation to the employment of women and children, these reforms were but a drop of oil in the ocean of human misery. The slums, with their appalling filth and overcrowding, remained; so did the beer shops and "gin palaces", where the anodyne of temporary forgetfulness could be bought for a few pence. Undernourishment was the common lot of the poor, whose wages were frequently spent on alcohol—while their children, impelled by necessity, were often reduced to "scrounging" and petty pilfering. In the absence of home life and places of free amusement, boys resorted to the streets where they formed themselves into gangs under a chosen leader, and since they had no facilities for playing football they found an outlet for their high spirits in gambling and fighting.

The late Charles Russell, whose book *Lads' Clubs* has become a classic of

its kind, describes how a party of boys from one street would band themselves together and fight similar gangs from other streets with results that can be easily imagined. Occasionally, when really serious rows developed, the police had to interfere and separate the contestants. Dangerous blows were exchanged, not only with the fists but with the buckle end of a leather belt, or even with an earthenware mineral-water bottle. Russell adds that the "rougher and more unscrupulous gangs" would even vent their hooliganism on an unknown passer-by, in the absence of better sport, and it requires little imagination to envisage the dangers and consequences of such acts. If the ringleaders were caught a term of imprisonment or period in a reformatory school was likely to follow, but such measures, though instituted for the protection of society, were punitive rather than corrective. By blighting the lives of young offenders the Victorian prison and reformatory system tended to aggravate the evils which it was designed to suppress. The lack of elementary psychological understanding, both in magistrates' courts and corrective institutions resulted all too frequently in recidivism, the product of a confirmed anti-social mentality.

Among a few enlightened men there was a feeling that these evils could be lessened by providing working-class boys with premises for recreation, where an outlet could be found for natural exuberance under tolerant supervision. The aim behind most of the pioneer efforts inspired by these sentiments was admittedly of a somewhat negative and limited character, the main intention being, apparently, to keep boys off the streets. Thus the organization known as Youth Institutes began to take shape, but whether they were boys' clubs in the modern sense of the term is rather uncertain. It is quite definite, however, that the boys' club movement developed from these Institutes which, in turn, owed their origin to the Ragged Schools started in the middle of the eighteenth century by John Pounds, the crippled cobbler of Portsmouth. To the category of Ragged School workers belonged General Gordon who has often been claimed as the founder of the first boys' club. Gordon lived at Gravesend between 1865 and 1871, where he taught boys and kept a house for them; but there is no evidence to show that he founded a club, even though some aspects of his work bore a close resemblance to the activities of club life. The first record of a genuine boys' club dates from 1872, when the Cyprus Club was established in Kennington, London; and in 1886 the late Alexander Devine started the Hulme and Chorlton-on-Medlock Lad's Club, Manchester, which was followed soon after by the formation of other clubs in the North of England and elsewhere.

Before the end of the century some of the boys' clubs in London had formed themselves into a federation, thus strengthening their influence, and in 1907 the Manchester clubs followed their example, apparently independently. Although federated in their own areas, the clubs of the one city made no endeavour to benefit by the experience of those in the other, but there was a grow-

ing feeling that some central organization should be formed to give advice and help on all matters of common interest to clubs throughout the country. In 1917, an informal meeting was held in London to discuss the problems affecting club work generally. There the matter rested for the time being, without any conclusive agreement having been reached on how the suggestions made on this occasion could be implemented. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the formation of a national organization was discussed at all, though one of the members taking part (the late Mr. F. Geoghegan, Chairman of the London Federation of Boys' Clubs) subsequently wrote in a letter that he had always regarded this meeting "as the conception" of the National Association of Boys' Clubs.

Partly because of the war, and partly due to the caution of those concerned, no constructive action was taken to form a national organization until 1924, when a Provisional Committee was set up "to prepare a scheme for assisting boys' clubs throughout the country." In due course the committee drafted a constitution which was adopted on October 24, 1925, during a conference held at Toynbee Hall, Whitechapel. On this date the National Association of Boys' Clubs can be said to have been born. A year later its membership consisted of 297 clubs, of which 253 were affiliated through local federations. To-day it has a total strength of nearly 190,000 members, belonging to 2,440 clubs; and there are over 2,500 leaders (full-time, part-time and voluntary) and 10,000 voluntary helpers. In the light of these figures it is interesting to recall the opinion of Devine, whose pioneer work has never received the recognition it deserves. In 1923 he expressed the view that clubs would not be interested in forming a national organization; they were only interested in their local federations. Fortunately, Devine's scepticism has not been justified by subsequent events.

So far, only the brief outline has been traced of the early development of the boys' club movement in this country—but what of its aims and policies? The negative purposes of the boys' clubs have already been mentioned, but after the formation of a national organization one would have expected to find a clear enunciation of its primary aims, based on positive ideas. Strangely enough no such fundamental principles appeared in print for some time. Indeed, when Mr. W. McG. Eagar suggested that they should be formulated he met with considerable opposition, but in 1929 a sub-committee of four members was appointed informally to deal with the matter. Thus the document known as *Principles and Aims of the Boys' Club Movement* came into being. Its authors stressed the necessity of providing clubs for working-class boys under wise leadership, in an atmosphere of comradeship. Moreover, they expressed the need for fitness and defined the word from the club standpoint. The "Three-fold Fitness", as it has been described, was the club ideal: spiritual fitness, moral fitness and physical fitness. Regarding club rules, it was made clear that these should be reduced to a minimum: "The real rules of a club lie in an un-

written tradition formed by the club and preserved by its members." No set rules could manufacture character, for character grew by opportunity and influence. The natural expression of boy nature, given decent guidance and adequate freedom, could produce something at least as high as anything devised by adult wisdom. Clubs were encouraged to achieve these aims through self-government and self-discipline.

*Principles and Aims* was accepted and adopted with enthusiasm as the policy of the movement in July 1931. The document, simple and concise, had conquered all opposition; it expressed clearly the ideals to be aimed at, while leaving the methods of their achievement mainly to the initiative and efforts of the clubs themselves. Within recent years, however, the headquarters of the National Association of Boys' Clubs has developed an intensive training system of its own, both for leaders and boys, to supplement the efforts of its affiliated federations and clubs. The latest training developments include a residential one month's course for voluntary leaders and the setting up of a mobile training wing with three instructors and a shooting brake to tour the country, giving instruction courses on the lines of the Army's flying wing. Through the generosity of Lord Joicey there are residential courses at Ford Castle, near Berwick-on-Tweed for senior boys, to fit them better for their own part in club life, and in 1945 the National Association acquired St. Pierre, a fifteenth-century manor house at Chepstow, Monmouthshire, for the training of full-time club leaders. This was made possible through a capital grant by the Carnegie Trust and by maintenance grants from the Jubilee Trust. Last year an Arts Training Centre was established at Baker's Cross in Kent, where courses on drama and handicrafts are held regularly.

Since 1933 the National Association of Boys' Clubs has followed a policy of decentralization, so that individual clubs should receive more personal attention than was possible through contact only with the central organization. This has been achieved by the formation of county associations of clubs which act as an extra link between the parent body and the local clubs. These associations now cover areas containing three-quarters of the population of the country.

The development of boys' clubs has been helped considerably since the war, through an unexpected source that originated in a prisoner-of-war camp—Oflag 79—in North Brunswick, Germany. One of the inmates of this camp stood one day, gloomily viewing his surroundings of barbed wire, when the thought struck him that his conditions were probably little worse than those under which thousands of boys in the back streets of Britain had to live. Thus the idea was born in his mind of starting a new club in Britain, and a camp committee was formed to discuss the matter. A subscription list was opened to which the prisoners themselves contributed over £13,000 and after their liberation, when the story was told to the public, a "Brunswick Appeal" was launched on a national basis to extend the original scheme, the intention being to form as many clubs as possible. Already the appeal has collected £350,000.

The future of the boys' club movement depends very largely on whether it can be equipped to take its place as a strong partner in the field of further education. Since 1939, when the Board (now the Ministry) of Education asked local education authorities to set up youth committees the State has assumed an ever-increasing responsibility for the welfare of young people. In some areas voluntary organizations were encouraged and supported by local authorities, but in other areas they set up and controlled their own recreational institutes, without showing any desire to co-operate with voluntary clubs. The Ministry, recognizing the dangers of a State-controlled uniformity and regimentation in the field of youth service, has urged the local education authorities to pursue a policy of partnership with the voluntary organizations, since (to quote its own words), "any other step would be wholly alien to the spirit of this country." The grant-aid which the Ministry has placed at the disposal of the National Association of Boys' Clubs has made possible developments which would otherwise have been impossible; there can be no doubt that the full extension of such a partnership, so that it operates between the N.A.B.C.'s county associations and the local education authorities, would do much to further the growth of boys' clubs.

Although beginning merely as a movement to make good the deficiencies in social welfare, boys' clubs have now become an accepted part of further education. There is a growing feeling that the N.A.B.C.'s work in the future will also be concerned with research and experiment, in order to discover more about the interests and aptitudes of its members. In this respect the advantages enjoyed by a voluntary organization are clear. Such a body has freedom to pursue its objectives in ways that are denied to the more rigidly controlled statutory authorities.

(Lord Aberdare is chairman of the National Association of Boys' Clubs.)

## RELIGION IN EDUCATION

BY W. R. INGE

CANON LEESON rightly regards the *purpose* of education as the primary question which must determine our views on the methods of training the young.\* The teacher must have some philosophy of life which he will, even though unconsciously, express in his daily work, if he is to regard his choice of a profession as a spiritual vocation. Broadly, two answers may be given as to the object of education. We may call it the full development of personality, or the preparation for citizenship. Both are true, but insufficient and even dangerous if either is taken in isolation. Personality, which is not given us to start with, is the realization of what is in us to become. The ideal object of education is that we should learn all that it concerns us to know, in order that thereby we may become all that it concerns us to be. The wise man is he who knows the relative values of things, who knows what things are best worth winning for their own sakes, and what price we must pay to win them. What are the things which, since we cannot have everything, we must be content to let go, and what are the things, which we must on no account lose? We must know ourselves, and know our world, in order to give and receive the best value for our sojourn in it. This wisdom can obviously not be won in isolation. The self-centred life has no circumference, and is maimed. The man who has no experience is made no wiser by solitude. On the other side, we cannot devote ourselves to others unless we have a self to devote. It is one of the primary truths of Christianity that all reforms must come from within, and energize outwards. The inside of the cup must be cleansed first. As Horace says, "*sincerum est nisi vas, quacumque infundis acescit.*" There can be no good citizenship without good citizens, and we must not deify the State, which is an organization, not an organism.

The danger with us is not that we have too narrow purposes, but that we have no definite purposes at all. The Englishman, said Bishop Creighton, not only has no ideas; he hates an idea when he meets one. He has a notion that the only irreparable mistakes are made by consistent logicians. He believes in muddling through; he says to Britannia: "Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever." But this vagueness is blindness to ultimate values; it is vulgarity, which Robert Bridges calls spiritual death. In practice we often fall back on unworthy aims, for example in education. The phrase 'a liberal education' perhaps sounds out of date. It means an education which is its

\* *Christian Education*. The Bampton Lectures for 1944. Longmans, Green. 15s.

own end. "Of possessions," says Aristotle, "those are useful which bear fruit, those are enjoyable where nothing accrues beyond the use." Liberal education is disinterested: illiberal education is uninterested. Premature specializing and the examination system are no friends to real education. I have heard with regret that elaborate precautions are taken to prevent the pupils, and the masters, from getting hold of the papers which are to be set in public examinations.

The phrase 'climates of opinion' has now become popular. Canon Leeson quotes Lecky. There is a hidden bias of the imagination which determines in each succeeding age the realized belief. The success of an opinion depends much less upon the force of its arguments than upon the predisposition of society to receive it. Definite arguments are the symptoms and pretexts, but seldom the causes of the change. He might have added that these temporary currents of opinion are just the things which we take for granted and do not argue about, and that each generation loves to consign the household gods of its predecessor to the scrap heap. It follows that he who marries the spirit of his own age is likely to live to be a widower in the next. We old Victorians have lived through phases of nationalism, economism, and democratism. Now "we see not our tokens; there is not one prophet more"—or perhaps there are too many.

But may we not say that behind these changing winds of doctrine there are two indestructibles, two permanent acquisitions on which the whole of our civilization is based, two rivers which after their confluence have irrigated the entire mental, social and spiritual life of the European nations and their offshoots beyond the seas? These two are Christianity and Hellenism. We may call them indestructible, because we hope that our civilization is indestructible; but they are both threatened to-day as they have never been threatened before.

All educationists give a place of honour to Plato. Platonism, says Canon Leeson, is not a dead order but a living spirit, still working and kindling our spirits in an altered world of the same men. A Christian before Christ, Plato has been called; in his old age he was a Hildebrandian before Hildebrand; some would say, unfairly I think, a Nazi before Hitler. There have been three Greek revivals, says Sir Richard Livingstone, in European history. The first was when Greece lay prostrate in the ruins of its lost independence, and Rome turned to her to learn literature, thought, and civilization—unfortunately not her science. The second was in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance. But we ought to distinguish the first, the religious and Aristotelian Renaissance of the schoolmen, and the second, the Platonic, scientific, artistic and semi-Pagan Renaissance, stimulated by the recovery of Greek after the fall of Constantinople. In the earlier Renaissance the Church was for the last time in full concord with the intellectual movement of the age. This is the more remarkable when we remember that the "master of those who know" was for St. Thomas Aquinas not Plato but a more questionable ally, Aristotle. The second Renaissance was the beginning of modern history; some think that it has lasted till our own day,

and is now stricken to death. The third, Sir Richard Livingstone says, began with the opening of the nineteenth century, and, he hopes, may still continue. He points out how many of the most influential men in the nineteenth century were either good scholars or were steeped in Greek literature; Shelley, Matthew Arnold and Bridges in poetry; Gladstone, Asquith, Bryce, Cromer and Milner in politics; Mill, T. H. Green, Macaulay, Matthew Arnold and Ruskin in prose literature. We owe it to the two great traditions, Christianity and Hellenism, that the industrial revolution did not turn England into a new Carthage, all its thoughts given to industry and commerce. As it was, the faith of Plato was never forgotten. He wrote: "It is not the life of knowledge, not even if it includes all the sciences, which creates happiness and well-being, but a single branch of knowledge, the knowledge of good and evil. Without this knowledge, the use and excellence of the sciences will be found to have failed us." Prophetic words indeed.

But the Church has not welcomed the new Renaissance as it did the older one. "Nothing," says our author, "has shaken her influence for good more gravely than her flight at the approach of the new knowledge revealed in the last hundred years." Institutionalism is a fatally potent antiseptic. It preserves some gains from being lost, but it prevents many obsolete errors from being rectified.

And now very few of our young people learn Greek. It was to be expected; but the Trojan victory is in part due to the bad tactics of the Grecians. Very little was done at our public schools to encourage boys to love the Greeks and to continue their Greek studies in adult life. To read in snippets, with special attention to the 'principal parts' of verbs irregular to the verge of impropriety, was not the way to make boys love the classics. They must now be read by the majority in translations or not at all.

Our other great tradition is in no less danger. Scholars who are concerned with the purity and dignity of the English language have often pointed out how much our best writers have owed to their familiarity with the Authorized Version of the Bible, which used to be in every cottage. Who reads the Bible now? The young clergy do not, as I discovered when I was a Bishop's examining chaplain. And what do the children learn about God in school or in their homes? In most cases nothing at all.

The cause of religious teaching in the schools was ruined by the pitiful denominational squabbles in the last century. Both sides were in fault. The non-conformist ministers, irritated by social snubs and the relics of legal penalizations, hated and distrusted the established Church. The Church on its side sometimes took no advantage of its privileged position, but too often it tried to do so. Besides, the religious teaching given at the Church schools was often incredibly stupid. 'Lists of Jewish kings'; unhistorical and sometimes very unedifying chapters from the Old Testament—this is not the way to teach the Christian religion. Have we not seen the old-fashioned examination papers? "What do you know of Chedorlaomer, Jehosabassabet the Tachmonite,

Mahershalalhasbaz, Huz, Luz, and Uzzah? "

Stupidity was not the worst. The Catholic Church like other totalitarian States knows the value of getting hold of a child young. In the horrible words of Newman, the aim of education is "to pour truth into a child's mind, and to seal it up in perpetuity." This is the worst kind of abortionism, said Bernard Shaw. Castration would be a better word. We remember the answer of the Stoic, when an Epicurean asked him why an Epicurean hardly ever became a Stoic, though Stoics often became Epicureans. This policy is not often followed deliberately in the Anglican Church; but it is often hoped that the child will always be content with what he learned from "his grandmother Lois and his mother Eunice." More often, when the pupil puts away childish things, he 'throws out the baby with the bath-water' and gives up religion altogether.

Religious dogmas are not taught in the State schools. But other dogmas often are. The social position of the county school teacher is not well-defined. He or she may be the best educated person in the parish, but the school teacher is not invited to the squire's table. There is a great deal of bitter class politics in this profession, and the children soon learn it. There is a real risk of the artificial creation of an educated proletariat, always a dangerous class.

In some ways there have been changes for the better. The relations between Anglicans and Free Churchmen are far more friendly. The old 'conflict between religion and science', which was really a battle between dogmatic materialism and materialistic dogmatism, has died down. Both sides have lowered their colours. It is increasingly recognized that natural science is an abstract study, valid in its own sphere, but not a philosophy of ultimate reality, and that religious dogmas are symbolic of truths which can only be formulated in the inadequate language of space and time. Our leading thinkers are not irreligious; they are inclined to a mystical faith, which some of them hope to find not only in Christianity but in the wisdom of the East. The old-fashioned uncritical bibliolatry is now confined in low intellectual strata. But there is widespread unhappiness. The last century lost its faith in God, but kept its faith in man. Our contemporaries have lost their faith in man, a faith which is difficult to hold in face of the unexampled horrors which we have lately witnessed. A deep discouragement has followed the disappearance of what was merely a superstition, the belief in an automatic and ineluctable law of progress based on wishful thinking and a misunderstanding of evolution. The path is open for a return to religion. "When he slew them they sought him and turned them early and enquired after God." There will be a revival of religion, but not necessarily of the higher religion. Now that science has moderated its claim, there has been a lamentable recrudescence of puerile superstitions. Who could have predicted that intelligent people would come to believe in astrology and 'precognition'?

The real peril is of a breach in our traditions, affecting both the fundamental bases of our civilization. The two wars, the greatest calamity that has ever

befallen the human race, may quite possibly be the herald of a new Dark Age. The last Dark Age lasted six hundred years. I do not however think that the prospect is so black as this. War is the next abomination to go, and if war can be abolished I believe that civilization will survive. But has there ever been a time before when nothing beautiful was being made? The state of the fine arts is most discouraging.

The religious lesson in the schools is perhaps not very important. Religion is usually caught, not taught—caught from someone who has it. If the teachers are religious, that is to say if they believe that God has revealed Himself as absolute goodness or love, truth, and beauty; if they hold communion with God in prayer, and 'think on' whatever things are true, noble, just, pure and of good report, their pupils will learn essential Christianity; by seeing it in action. It ought to be possible to choose teachers of high character, and not only of intellectual competence. Did not Plato suggest that the Minister of Education should be the greatest of all the great officers of State and that "great care should be taken that the choice falls on the citizen who is in every way most suitable for the post"?\* The type of Plato's Republic is laid up in heaven; but he gives the right answers to most questions. "The intelligent man," he says, "will prize those studies which result in his soul getting soberness, righteousness and wisdom, and will less value the others." There is no reason why these studies should be reserved for a leisured class; but there is every reason why they should not be made more difficult either by utilitarianism or by class jealousy.

Canon Leeson's book marks a new departure in the long series of Bampton Lectures. But no one can object to the latitude which the electors have allowed for this survey of ideals and experiments in education by a distinguished headmaster of Merchant Taylors and Winchester. The Church of England has reason to regret the falling off in clerical headmasters, for in the past many of our most distinguished bishops have come from the public schools. Canterbury and Durham are now the only important sees held by ex-schoolmasters. Canon Leeson may very likely join them on the Bench.

## CORRESPONDENCE

## THE PRESS IN THE PROVINCES

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY,  
Sir,

May I respectfully draw your attention to inaccuracies contained in the article "The Press in the Provinces" by Newsman in your May 1947 issue?

For instance he describes Mr. Malcolm Graham as Editor of the *Wolverhampton Express and Star*, and "a good organizer and a strong personality." May I point out that Mr. Malcolm Graham is managing director of the company owning the *Wolverhampton Express and Star*, is not, and has not at any time been, Editor of that or any other newspaper. He is Chairman of the Publicity Committee of the Newspaper Society.

I would suggest that, in referring to the South Coast resorts and the openings for additional evening papers there if and when supplies of newsprint improve, Newsman overlooked the fact that there are substantial and highly prosperous evening newspapers published at Brighton, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Southampton, Bournemouth, Weymouth and Torquay, in addition to the Brighton evening paper having a well-established localized edition at Hastings.

He refers to the lifting of restrictions last September when it became possible to increase circulations, and he says that "some district journals reported forty to fifty per cent. increases." The term "district journals" is quite unknown in the newspaper industry but if, as appears to be the case from the context, your contributor intends to refer to local weekly newspapers, then he has under-estimated very considerably. Increases of up to 100 per cent. were reported in net sales by a number of weekly newspapers, and by way of tribute to those very successful publications I think it should be made quite clear that a very large proportion of the immediate sales increase of last September has been held. At the present time a number of weekly newspaper offices are producing and selling more than 100,000 copies weekly.

Without a closer knowledge of the economics and structure of the newspaper industry Newsman was bound to commit a number of errors in touching on the managerial aspect of provincial newspapers. That he is lacking in reliable information on this aspect of the industry is quite clear when he refers to any provincial or London suburban newspaper living "a precarious existence financially." That is not true of any of the papers referred to. He is also without the necessary information to express a reasonable opinion when he suggests that "if Lord Beaverbrook entered the evening newspaper field in Manchester or Liverpool the result might be the disappearance of *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Liverpool Post*" because of their reliance on the profits made by their associated evening newspapers.

Newsman has expressed opinions with regard to the production of provincial and London suburban newspapers and editors to whom newspapers appear only as "pieces of property", but that is a highly controversial rather than a factual matter. Without knowing the identity of your contributor it is not possible to say whether his opinion on these or other editorial matters would carry any weight.

It is, however, unfortunate that as he has set himself the task of looking at the press throughout the country, he should, in dealing with the Midlands and Eastern England,

have been so very perfunctory. Your contributor cannot have studied the newspapers—daily and weekly—of such places as Cambridge, Oxford, Nottingham, Leicester, to name only a few—when he wrote "the lamp burns rather low in the Midlands and Eastern England." I write in this connection, not only as P.R.O. to the Newspaper Society, but also as a practical journalist with more than twenty years of newspaper experience.

In that dual sense I would also say that your contributor's reference to "ingrained meanness" on the part of provincial newspaper proprietors towards their editorial staffs is quite erroneous. Your contributor may, in fact, be very much surprised to learn that responsible journalists in the provinces are to-day receiving salaries which compare very favourably with salaries for similar appointments in and around Fleet Street. Further, to suggest that "most first-rate journalists are compelled to look on provincial experience as a stepping-stone to London" is certainly not the case. There are many notable instances of Fleet Street journalists who have gone back to the provinces because they preferred to work there and because of the financial inducements to do so. It is true, of course, that a very large number of journalists migrate from the provinces to Fleet Street because—as you will know yourself—quite apart altogether from financial matters there is a fascination and a glamour about Fleet Street that draws men from all parts of the country.

If Newsman proposes to write again on this subject I trust you will be good enough to ask that he will make sure of his facts and seek that complete information that alone makes possible reasonable and accurate conclusions.

Yours faithfully,

LEONARD FLETCHER, Public Relations Officer,

The Newspaper Society.

Newsman writes:

Mr. Fletcher's technical correction on Mr. Graham I accept. It is no more than that. Is there any doubting who is the presiding spirit and personal inspiration of the *Wolverhampton Express*? The other "inaccuracies" I challenge. I do not 'overlook' the existence of evening papers in Brighton and Southampton. I refer specifically to them. But Southampton, Portsmouth and Plymouth are not "resorts", and Plymouth and Torquay are in the West.

The number of forty to fifty per cent. increases in weekly paper circulations last autumn was substantial enough to justify comment. The number of 100 per cent. increases was infinitesimal, and did not last. If Mr. Fletcher really thinks that no papers in the provinces are living precariously, he should "seek that complete information . . ." etc., which he commends to me. Has he heard about the recent purchases, by one firm, of papers in the London area? Month by month, the independents go to the wall. I wonder if Manchester would be as unconcerned at the arrival of Lord Beaverbrook as Mr. Fletcher is at the prospect.

Mr. Fletcher bids me study the papers in Nottingham and Oxford, among other towns. If he had been less "perfunctory" (his word) in his reading of my article, he would have seen that I have done that.

Finally, Mr. Fletcher shall have just a couple of examples of "ingrained meanness". Shortly before the war, a senior reporter on a provincial paper with a national reputation was earning £7 a week. During the war the "managing editor" of a prosperous bi-weekly came to London because the N.U.J. minimum there was a distinct financial improvement for him.



## THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

### MORE BOOKS IN SWITZERLAND

By René Elvin

THE first fine, careless enthusiasm of Swiss publishers who, during and immediately after the war, appeared to be bent on replacing, with the intact but limited resources of a country of four million inhabitants, the crippled book industries of their four neighbours, seems to have waned considerably in the past few months. The reason is not far to seek, and is mainly due to the economic plight of Europe, which has grown worse instead of better during that time. Currency difficulties have restrained to a minimum the export of Swiss books to the rest of Europe and, faced with this intractable problem, many of the firms which had sprung up in Switzerland during the hostilities closed down again, while even old-established publishers had to restrict their output.

Nevertheless, a fair quantity of books of more than local interest continues to come out from the Swiss presses, which for excellence of production are still unrivalled in the world to-day. In design, typography, binding, paper, illustrations and layout, they have established a standard which even the Americans, with their unlimited resources, only achieve in their luxury editions.

What about the contents? They vary, of course, as much as in this country, but they include a far larger proportion of translations than here, American and English best-sellers being snapped up and published in German (less often in French) almost as soon as in their country of origin.

Original Swiss works of imagination are relatively few, and large-scale novels like Emanuel Stickelberger's *Künstler und König* (Huber, Frauenfeld) even rarer. This is the last work of a huge trilogy devoted to an extraordinarily incisive and acute study of King Henry VIII and his times as seen mainly from the point of view of his court painter, the German-Swiss Hans Holbein. The present volume runs to nearly 700 pages, but the interest never flags, and the reconstitution of the rough, bawdy, luxury-loving period is an amazing *tour de force*, especially for a foreigner studying documents at second hand. When more spacious conditions come again for English publishers, this is one of the works which would amply deserve the courtesy so abundantly granted to English books by Swiss firms.

A list of translated English books would serve no useful purpose, but I should like to make an exception of Pierre-Louis Matthey's *Un bouquet d'Angleterre*, (Mermod, Lausanne), an anthology of some of the best-known English poems from Shakespeare to Stevenson, in French adaptations of notable skill, elegance and charm. One phrase will have to do as example. The first line of Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn" becomes: *O toi toujours promise à des bras toujours clos . . .*

Uniform with that handsomely presented volume is a series including such pleasingly varied titles as Longus's *Daphnis et Chloé* (in Amyot's sixteenth-century translation), Tolstoy's *Maitre et Serviteur* (edited by the late C. F. Rumuz), and Francis Jammes's *Elégies et autres vers* (Mermod, Lausanne).

Equally heterogeneous and even more beautifully produced, the German-Swiss *Manesse Bibliothek der Weltliteratur* (Conzett & Huber, Zürich) features unaccountably neglected masterpieces of world literature, such as Turgenev's *Zapiski Okhoinika* (in German, *Aufzeichnungen eines Jägers*, in English, *Notes of a Sportsman*), and exemplary antholo-

gies such as the Italian short stories from eight centuries (*Italianische Novellen aus acht Jahrhunderten*), selected and edited by the Swiss poet and novelist Giuseppe Zoppi, or Michelangelo's poems and autobiographical writings. Another interesting title in the series is the complete edition of Grimm's Fairy Tales, whose grim ruthlessness is in startling contrast with the delightful and innocent *Biedermeier* woodcuts of Ludwig Richter and Moritz von Schwind.

Grimm's Tales seem to be favourites of Swiss publishers, and numerous editions of them have appeared lately, some of the best illustrated under the imprint of Charmer Publications, Zollikon, who have also revived with great success the old-fashioned keepsake literature, to which Goethe and Schiller did not disdain to contribute.

At the extreme opposite of these lavender-water kind of books is C. Giedion-Welcker's fascinating and extravagant *Anthologie der Abseitigen* (Benteli, Bümplitz), a collection of forgotten futuristic poems in German and French, in which painters like Picasso and the Douanier Henri Rousseau hobnob with dadaists like Tristan Tzara and Benjamin Péret, all firmly if unconsciously following the Gilbertian maxim: "The meaning does not matter, if it's only idle chatter of a transcendental kind."

Swiss writers, seldom creative in the highest sense, are often excellent and perceptive critics. One of the best of them at present, Max Rychner, has just published under the title *Zeitgenössische Literatur* (Conzett & Huber, Zürich) a series of sensitive studies of contemporary authors including Paul Valéry, Thomas Mann, André Gide and Aldous Huxley, which with their judicious blend of sober appraisal and contagious enthusiasm are among the best works of their kind to come out of Switzerland.

Political books, though less abundant than during the war, have gained interest with the publication of memoirs illuminating the tortuous manoeuvres of highly placed but timorous anti-Nazis such as the former German ambassador in Rome, Ulrich von Hassell, who was "purged" after the plot of July 1944 failed. His book, *Vom andern Deutschland* (Atlantis, Zürich) proves, if it can be said to prove anything, that there was not much to choose between Hitler's *Reich* and the Germany of the aristocratic military and diplomatic clique which served him with mingled zeal and reluctance. The conclusion bears out Bismarck's considered judgment about the Germans' lack of *Zivilkourage* (civic courage), even though the conspirators paid with their lives for their ill-fated attempt to liquidate the Führer and his war.

One category of books which at one time threatened to flood the English-speaking market—hasty reminiscences of globe-trotting journalists busily buzzing from one storm-centre to another—is almost unknown in Switzerland. One exception to the rule is the shrewd and keen-sighted reporter of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Walter Bosshard, whose book *Erlebte Weltgeschichte* (Fretz & Wasmuth, Zürich), sums up five years of war coverage—with no axe to grind.

The Swiss have been for a long time pioneers in architecture and town-planning, and the publications of their best specialists in those arts cannot fail to find interested readers among their colleagues in this country. Of such is Bernoulli's *Die Stadt und ihr Boden* (Verlag für Architektur, Erlenbach), an elaborate and sometimes abstruse treatise on the fundamentals of technocracy as applied to the building of cities. His forceful logic is compellingly allied to a masterly command of all relevant facts, and should make his book "must" reading for Mr. Lewis Silkin and his associates.

Art books are outstanding in Switzerland, even among the general high standard of production there, and of those recently available in this country the splendid anthology of Spanish painting, *Spanische Malerei*, with an excellent text by Gotthard Jedlicke, and the revealing study of the early Swiss master, *Tobias Stimmer*, both offer beautiful examples and valuable works of reference.

(The first BOOKS IN SWITZERLAND article by Mr. René Elvin was published in the April 1946 number of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)

**IN DARKEST GERMANY**, by Victor Gollancz. *Gollancz.* 8s. 6d.  
**EUROPE'S SUICIDE IN GERMANY**, by Tibor Mende. *St. Botolph Publishing Co.* 6s.

Both books impressively illustrate the gigantic tragedy which the treatment of defeated Germany is preparing not only for Germany herself but for the world.

Mr. Gollancz's book is mainly a 'documentary'. A series of letters written from the autumn of 1946, together with 144 photographs, show conditions in the bigger towns of the British zone of Germany. This qualification is important. In a condition of growing chaos and collapse of economic controls one of the worst features is the increasing gulf between town and country. In the bigger towns and industrial centres of the West, the food, housing and work position is rapidly assuming the proportions of one of the major catastrophes of modern times. In many parts of the country, on the other hand, the standard of living is substantially unaltered. Farmers and, of course, anyone who has something to offer, whether cigars, nails, grease, cuts down deliveries as the controls slacken, and he acquires what he wants through direct barter.

Mr. Gollancz has been one of the first and the most persistent opponents of the economic but in particular the ethical perversion which dominated the Allied approach to German problems immediately after the war, and the letters reprinted in this book show again the clarity and firmness of his conviction that the treatment of Germany according to standards preached by the Nazis is not only bad ethics, but also poor policy. Beyond the re-statement of this belief, and some first hand evidence on health and nutrition standards, the book is not, and does not claim to be a contribution to the incredibly complex problem of Allied Military Government in Germany.

Mr. Mende's little book is a very interesting and illuminating contribution to some aspects of the German problem. The

author's thesis is obvious from the title. He gives a brief but accurate survey of the comparative psychology of the four zones including an estimate—which I believe to be correct—that the Russians have a fair chance of winning substantial support in their zone, as the memory of their first period of retaliation fades and the situation in the West deteriorates. I strongly agree with the critical observations on the seclusion of the British and American personnel, by comparison with the Russians.

The author also correctly notes dangerous signs of social reaction in the West, and the superficiality of the feeling of guilt of Germans (matters have not been made any easier by the disastrous policy of treating all Germans as equally guilty). He favours a definite socialist policy as the only means of preventing a revival of the worst forms of German militarism and reaction, a closer collaboration between Socialists and Communists, and a renewed attempt at "functional" collaboration of the Allies, in such matters as international control of the Ruhr, and the European integration of other German activities. Unfortunately, the prospects for such a development have further deteriorated since the book was written, and there is now a definite danger that an eventual recovery of Germany may result from one of the worst possible causes: an increasing tension between West and East, and the consequent reactivation of the respective parts of Germany as part of a general strategic concept.

W. FRIEDMANN.

**THE CHANGING SCENE IN CHINA**, by Gilbert Baker. *Student Christian Movement Press.* 6s.

During the Japanese invasion of China Kunming, capital of the remote southwestern province of Yunnan, became the refuge (for many a "stony-hearted step-mother") of Chinese from all points of the compass; professors and students striving against incredible poverty to rebuild the universities which the Japanese

had destroyed in east and north; wealthy families paralysed by the ruin of their world in Hong Kong and Shanghai; terrified fugitives from Burma; and for all alike the hardships of life immeasurably aggravated by the rapidly depreciating currency. Mr. Gilbert Baker lived through all this and his admirable and beautifully written book presents an intensely graphic picture of various characteristic types — professors, students, young men and women in the new relationships produced by war and the loss of their families, soldiers and officials.

Mr. Baker writes always as a missionary, to show what Christianity has done and can do for China. But even those who are not particularly concerned in missions will find his book of absorbing interest. A better presentation of modern China and the peculiar difficulties with which the transition from "old custom" confronts her one cannot recall.

The best chapter, and the most important since it deals with the big class on whom China's future must be built, is that devoted to the student. Lonely at heart, eager for action, but neglected, seeing no outlet and floating in a mental void without moral anchorage, the student too often has no hope but to get abroad where perhaps he may find a cure for his troubles. Both in its refusal to send students into the army till the war was virtually over and its attempts to put the students in a fascist strait waistcoat, the Government's handling of these young men has been singularly inept. The picture of the professors is altogether delightful. From a missionary point of view Mr. Baker's well-timed admonition: "These scholars will not be won by contempt for learning—by ill-educated advisers," recalls what the Jesuits knew three centuries ago.

The coming of the American troops, their boisterous though generous ways and their prodigal wealth upheaved all Yunnan. "We must remember," said one professor gently, "that all the Americans are not very well educated."

Mr. Baker shrewdly observes that the overwhelming strength of the Allies deepened the Chinese sense of their inferiority in modern warfare and intensified the violent, thorny self-assertiveness which at present prevents China from accepting the help she needs. But there are those, as Mr. Baker shows, in whom the humiliating contrasts between Chinese and foreign standards of efficiency have developed a power of self-criticism which gives hope for China's future.

O. M. GREEN.

**THIS HOUSE AGAINST THIS HOUSE**, by Vincent Sheean. *Macmillan.* 16s.

If you scratch a good American you might well expect to find a good European. The casual mixture of the leading races of Western man, at a sufficient distance away from Europe, ought to provide the educated citizen of the States with the best possible vantage point from which to observe European affairs. The benevolent ignorance of Woodrow Wilson, however, followed by twenty years of isolation, had taught us by 1940 that things did not often work out that way. Yet now we know again that unless the leaders of American thought can understand and successfully influence European affairs, there is little chance of peace in our time. Perforce we have come back to hoping that America will learn. The appearance of *This House Against This House*, and the interest it has aroused on both sides of the Atlantic, are hopeful straws in the wind.

Vincent Sheean's latest work (it follows *Between the Thunder and the Sea*) is curiously built. Part I contains a study of the Treaty of Versailles, a record of the shifting American attitude towards the League and a comparison between Europe in 1919 and Europe now. Part III contains the thought of Part I. But in the centre of the book are, rather surprisingly, 240 pages of war reporting. They have all the power and polish of high-grade New York journalism. They have also

its brief topicality and therefore they are now dead. They can reasonably be omitted. The rest of the book is more than sufficient justification for its appearance.

The essence of Mr. Sheean's thought is contained in his quotation from Richard II:

O, if you raise this house against this house  
It will the woofullest division prove  
That ever fell upon this cursed earth.  
Prevent it, resist it, let it not be so,  
Lest child, child's children, cry against you  
'woe'!

The problem is the familiar one, that from which few educated minds, waking or sleeping, can long remain free, the problem of whether we can avoid another war. The freedom to struggle for freedom is, writes Mr. Sheean, "*unconscious* in the collective mind of the West." It expresses itself "not by dialectical proliferation, as other ideas do, but by the ordinary acts of life in which Western man *behaves* like a free man, says and does what he likes or protests against any restraint upon his right to do so." What Western man understands by freedom is, in Mr. Sheean's view, not at all what Russians understand by it (in our sense there is no freedom in Russia) but this should not blind us to the fact that the direction of the Russians' effort, in spite of the vast disparity in methods, is the same as our own. They pursue the greatest good of the greatest number. And yet "the single man could be happy in the aboriginal forest, as he was in Periclean Athens or the Renaissance, and as he may be to-day; but social man, man in society, courts disaster at a rate so vertiginous that his annihilation now becomes a matter of where next he plants his reckless step or how much he can learn to think in a few years of grace."

The author offers no solution and indeed no easy hope. But his analysis is brilliant. It is a real contribution to what we have to learn in these few years of grace.

GORDON WINTER.

**THE RISE OF CHRISTIANITY,**  
by Ernest William Barnes, Bishop of Birmingham. *Longmans.* 15s.

Not since the days of the late George Tyrrell has so direct and forthright a challenge to the conventional interpretation of the Christian faith issued from out of the bosom of the Church as the Bishop of Birmingham's study of the origins of Christianity, and, now as then, it is likely to arouse strong, not to say fierce and bitter denunciation on the part of those to whom that historic interpretation is sacrosanct. No cry of 'Modernism'—that word which frightens only theological old women of both sexes—will, however, be an adequate answer, for the volume calls for "straight" thinking free from all theological prejudice.

Dr. Barnes seeks through his outline of the history of the first 300 years of Christianity to disentangle therein the essential and original truth from what he believes are secondary and irrelevant accretions. The upshot of that examination is his conviction that an original core of ethical idealism based on the revelation by Jesus Christ of a God Who is Love, was overlaid, hidden and distorted by apostles and evangelists who lived in a world in which mystery religions were all important, and who, to a greater or less extent, shared in the prevailing superstitions of their time. The original faith as preached by the Founder of Christianity was reasonable and ethical, and setting, as it did, the highest possible value on human personality, it made an irresistible appeal to the proletariat of the first and the immediately succeeding centuries. In the combination of these two facts Dr. Barnes finds the secret of the rise of Christianity.

He arrives at this position by an examination of the relevant documents stretching all the way from the earlier letters of St. Paul to the writings of the early fathers of the Church, so including the Gospels themselves, and in the course of which, it is fair to say, the more radical school of New Testament scholars is taken, some-

what uncritically, to be the more accurate. Dr. Barnes has threaded his way through them with very great skill, and, for the size of the volume, with commendable fullness. Of the honesty of that examination, and of Dr. Barnes's belief that thereby he has succeeded in giving us a version of Christianity which the modern man can accept, there can be no question.

This is the work of a thinker for whom truth is all, and who feels compelled at the end to use the blue pencil freely, not only on the ancient creeds of Christendom, but on the Gospels themselves. Miracles are unthinkable because they conflict with our modern conception of the uniformity of natural law; neither of the two great dominical sacraments of baptism or eucharist means what a plain reading of the Gospels would seem to say, and the story of the Virgin Birth is a mythological transcript from the mystery religions.

Now that insistence on ethical religion is all to the good, especially in these days when the flight from reason seems to be in full swing in at least some important schools of current theological thinking and we are being asked to accept authoritative tradition, whether of the Catholic or the Protestant type, in place of reason. It is an entirely different thing, however, to say that the story of the rise of Christianity can be expressed in Dr. Barnes's simple formula, and that that explanation adequately covers all the facts. Two things have to be said, and the first is, that if it be true, then the survival of Christianity becomes more of a riddle than ever.

The puzzle can be put in a single question: "If noble moral idealism be the full answer, why was it that Judaism and Stoicism ceased to be ethically creative whilst Christianity survived to be a creative force in the world's history for the best part of 1,800 years?" That question leads directly into the second observation, that the explanation does not account for the plain facts. Banish every miracle if you will, and eliminate every trace of the possible influence of the mystery religions



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on Gospels and Epistles, one obstinate fact still remains. Cut the New Testament and Gospels where you will, and they bleed with the steady and unvarying conviction that not only have the early Christians seen new ideals, they have laid hold of a new power, not their own, to realize them. That was the factor *par excellence* which differentiated Christianity alike from Stoicism and Judaism; it was this factor, found to be true in actual human experience, which accounts for the survival of Christianity, and it is precisely this difference between the mystery religions, Stoicism and Judaism on the one hand and Christianity on the other, with which Dr. Barnes does not deal. The result is that, for all its honesty and courage, this book is very much Hamlet without the Prince, and we suspect that it is so because Dr. Barnes has seen as mainly a problem of ideas what is in fact primarily a transaction in the realm of the human spirit.

B. C. PLOWRIGHT.

**THE HOUSE OF ORANGE**, by Marion E. Grew. *Methuen*. 16s.

Morally if not legally, the purchaser of this book might have some claim to have his money returned, not because of its faults but because of its misleading title. The House of Orange means to most people the House of Orange-Nassau, the family from which our William III derived. An admirably heraldic dust-cover adds to the book's outward promise, encouraging the reader to expect an account of that family and a solution perhaps of the problems which still surround it. But the late Mrs. Grew was interested in William the Silent and his descendants only in their (very incidental) capacity as rulers of Orange itself. Her book is about that principality in relation to its successive—and mostly absentee—dynasties, and also in relation to the rest of Europe. As such it can be highly recommended. The misfortune is that so much industry should have been lavished on a subject so narrow in scope.

The Principality of Orange had ad-

mittedly a certain importance. It lay in that borderland which might adhere either to France or to the Empire, and it retained its shaky independence until as late as 1703. It was a bargaining counter for diplomatists and a refuge for oppressed minorities. Its flag appeared on battlefields and gave to privateers an air of strict legality. Placed but a little further eastwards, Orange might have retained to this day the sort of national identity accorded to Andorra or Liechtenstein. It might even now draw its revenues from the world's philatelists. But fate or Louis XIV willed it otherwise and the story of its dynasties lacks the interest of a picturesque survival.

As for Orange itself, the town, the fortress, the former boundaries, its history might be worth the telling. That is not, however, what the authoress chose to do. Omitting to explain where Orange is, and as reticent about its military or economic value, she wrote mainly of its religious dissensions. Certain weaknesses in the book—the lack of map, plan or bibliography and the inadequacy of the index—are the result, no doubt, of the authoress dying before her work was in proof. But its faults are mainly inherent in its theme.

Despite these limitations, this is in some ways a remarkable book—or the work, at least, of a remarkable woman. The product, as her style reminds us, of Victorian Oxford, she spent an active and useful life as teacher, as organizer of the Women's Trade Union League, and finally as a wife. She was well over sixty when she reverted to her earlier historical interests, aroused by Sir John Marriott and dating back to the time of Jowett, Mark Pattison and Mrs. Humphry Ward. She was sixty-nine when she undertook the researches on which this book was based and if this argues no ordinary degree of resolution, it is still more astonishing that she should have brought them to a triumphant conclusion seven years later, during the dark days of 1942. Given such a background, such a combination of age and inexperience, the



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authoress who could write as well as she did must indeed have been a gifted and courageous woman. Within the bounds she set herself, she did her work with patience and skill, fitting the story of Orange into its diplomatic framework and showing much knowledge of the periods described. Whether this exact task was worth doing may be doubtful. But the wonder remains that it was done at all.

C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON.

**MORE LEGAL FICTIONS**, by A. Lawrence Polak. Illustrated by Diana Pullinger. *Stevens*. 6s.

In his previous volume of *Legal Fictions* Mr. Polak drew stories from classical mythology and founded upon them a number of imaginary law suits; their humour and the faithfulness of the legal language employed drew praise from the discerning and left an appetite for more. This the author has sought to feed with a similar volume based on Shakes-

peare, and he has repeated his earlier success. The book is pleasantly illustrated by Diana Pullinger.

Mr. Polak defends his impertinences entertainingly by the citation of Shakespeare's own unflattering opinion of lawyers in general, evidenced by quotations of many passages from the plays, and thus enters the (admittedly unrecognized) plea of 'Tu quoque'. Following this introduction come ten cases of which the first (*Attorney-General v. Albany—King Lear*) and the last (*Shylock v. Antonio—Merchant of Venice*) appear the best. The handling of the various judgments is cleverly done; each has the authentic ring, though it is not possible to feel that the case chosen is itself always equally convincing; the sub-poena of the ghost in Hamlet proved an irresistible attraction, but the final points in the summing up of this case are handled rather too summarily to give entire satisfaction.

On the other hand the judgment con-

cerning Lear's maintenance by his daughters is a brilliant exposition, and in every case the transition to modern courts of law is excellently conceived.

Mr. Polak has set himself a difficult task, since in so far as his readers' amusement depends on some knowledge of the law there is a risk that what may entertain lawyers may be above the heads of laymen. It could not be denied that the professional should derive a richer enjoyment from his examination of the cases on legal grounds than the general reader can expect to find, but all of us are sufficiently familiar with legal intricacies and jargon to appreciate the major part of the author's subtleties. Judgment (with costs) to Mr. Polak.

J. F. BURNET.

**THE LOST TREASURES OF LONDON**, by William Kent. *Phoenix House*. 12s. 6d.

It is a long time since a workman searching in the ruins of St. Paul's Cathedral after the Great Fire of 1666 for something on which to cut a mason's mark, for incorporation in the new building, casually selected a piece of gravestone on which was inscribed a single word: *Resurgam*.

But from the days of Boadicea succeeding generations of Londoners have been no strangers to the destruction of their city by fire, though the year 1666 still vies with 1066 as one of the two dates that the most ignorant of its citizens remember. The great funeral pyre of the Middle Ages reduced much of London to ashes in five days, leaving so little for us to treasure and protect.

The bombing of Barcelona and the destruction of Guernica had already raised grave apprehensions in the minds of all Londoners. We knew that the 'military objectives' of the docks here were but a stone's throw from some of our priceless possessions. This book recalls for the Londoner the grim days and nights when the whine and crash of bombs left the city scarred and broken. Over the wounds and gaps the flowering weeds now soften

the tragedy; human minds accept the new outline and forget the beauty that has gone for ever.

The author in the tradition of John Stow seeks to draw up a balance sheet of the losses London suffered during the blitz years, and conveys the items of his bookkeeping during the course of a series of 'walks' which he invites his readers to share. For their guidance he includes a set of maps showing the main thoroughfares and principal buildings. Much we had forgotten, if indeed we ever knew, and the full measure of our loss is made obvious. Happily there is a credit side revealed by him of what remains to us.

The book is well illustrated and contains a chapter devoted to the damage sustained by historical buildings in Greater London. It is a fitting epilogue to this skilled chronicler's *An Encyclopaedia of London*.

One notes with regret the lack of reference to the destruction of domestic architecture of the Georgian period. Perhaps in a future volume this omission may be rectified and the author may be prevailed upon at the same time to give us his views on the various plans now in existence for the rebuilding of London.

HERBERT T. BANYARD.

**CHINESE POEMS**. Translated by Arthur Waley. *Allen & Unwin*. 8s. 6d.

**DECEMBER SPRING**, by Jocelyn Brooke. *John Lane. The Bodley Head*. 6s.

One of the tests of a cultured mind might be, perhaps, the degree of importance which it attaches to the present, the purely contemporary, against what endures from the timelessness of the past. Chinese poets were nothing if not cultured; and though their balanced poems, reflecting moods of resignation, were taken from their day to day life, the subjects themselves nearly always transcended the contemporary interest and had a wider, universal appeal. Above all, the Chinese poet was a master of evocation, of suggestion.

Here in one volume are nearly all Arthur Waley's justly famous translations of Chinese poetry, revised and with additional notes, and with a few new translations added. The poems are from "170 Chinese Poems" (1918), "More Translations" (1919), "The Temple" (1923), and "The Book of Songs" (1937). There are many more translations of the poems of Po-chu-i than of any other poet because, as Mr. Waley explains: "I find him by far the most translatable of the major Chinese poets." He asserts that he is not unfamiliar with the works of the other great T'ang and Sung poets, but modestly disclaims success in his attempts to translate Li Po, Tu Fu and Su Shih. I think it is a great pity, however, that Mr. Waley has not reprinted his Introduction to "170 Chinese Poems" as a Preface to this collection, for it is excellent and helps to prepare the mind of the reader for the right approach to Chinese poetry when this is wanted. He shows us that Chinese poetry is gently reflective rather than forcefully dynamic: "Our poets imagine themselves very much as Art has portrayed them—bare-headed and wild-eyed, with shirts unbuttoned at the neck as though they feared that a seizure of emotion might at any minute suffocate them. The Chinese poet introduces himself as a timid recluse . . . a neat and tranquil figure compared with our lurid frontispieces." Such reflective nature poetry—often poems of regret and parting—Arthur Waley's unrhymed, rhythmical verse seems successfully to transmit.

It is difficult to quote from so many poems, from so much quiet beauty; but in one instance, from Po-chu-i, one is reminded of Wordsworth's "I wandered lonely as a cloud".

*December Spring* is in some ways an exasperating book, for it has merit, yet such defects! A part of it belongs to the know-all, believe-nothing generation of a too slick cleverness, but the war experience of the author must excuse much bit-

terness. It strives hard in places to be appropriately sophisticated, drearily contemporary, and succeeds in being prosy:

Easy, we thought, to escape  
From the matey wirecracks and the pin-up girls,  
The *Blighty* jokes, the jam-session, the slick  
False-dentured, brylcreem culture: easy to bend  
The will from the nude and hard compulsion of  
The athletic Death:

with an inverted left-wing snobbery of phrases such as "the posh Edwardian town" which are merely tiresome. But Mr. Brooke is a well-known botanist, as well as having been a serving soldier; and his detailed knowledge of flower and myth often produces good nature poetry:

April came up from the South, with lily and tulip  
Spring in the young wheat, and the cyclamens  
Darting their tongues of dusky and crimson fire  
Suddenly sunward from the Plutonic dark,  
Heralding May-time and the precocious summer,  
The rose-hung hedges, the harvest over in June.

There is one poem, however, which seems worth most of the rest. It is called "Lament". Here a moving sincerity of emotion conquers all tricks of an experimental diction, as may be seen from the last stanza:

I have seen the sharp-toothed vampire  
Hanging beneath the eaves;  
I have heard the dawn-wind singing  
And the night-wind which grieves  
For the children with hair like flowers,  
And the loud bells ringing  
In tall tree-haunted towers  
Now broken and fallen apart;  
There is death in the wind's singing—  
The soldiers have eaten my heart.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

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## BOOKS ON THE TABLE

INDIA, almost for the first time in its history, has become regular front page news even in the more popular 'dailies'. The British public, conscious of its ignorance, comments cautiously, perhaps realising that the ease with which they compromise is not given to those whose political beliefs are linked inseparably to religious faith. Even now it is not too late to benefit from an understanding of the background and a student could hardly do better than to make his start with *THE BRITISH IN INDIA* by P. J. Griffiths (*Robert Hale*. 10s. 6d.) Mr. Griffiths's book is remarkably objective and easy to read. A man of great experience—fifteen years a member of the I.C.S., a magistrate in the Mindanapore district and leader of the European Group in the Indian Legislative Assembly—he answers elementary questions with admirable clarity and leaves us not only with the feeling of knowledge but of understanding. To quote one sentence: "To the Moslem, a determined individualism and the belief in equality are natural—to the Hindu they are unnatural."

**The glance backwards**

Of India, in his selected speeches, *PURPOSE AND POLICY* (*Hutchinson*. 12s. 6d.), the Prime Minister has a little to say in a broadcast talk on Government proposals given on September 19, 1945. Political speeches seldom read well a year or so after the event but Mr. Attlee comes out handsomely from this glance backwards. His powers of oratory are slender, yet his quiet dignity and sincerity, allied to conviction and a pleasing pedestrianism are effective. The reply to Mr. Churchill's first election broadcast reads effectually and it is easy to discern from it where Mr. Attlee's strength lies. Not a great war leader, perhaps, or the man for the moment of emotion, but truly a man of peace. Since Lord Aberdare is writing in this issue, I turned particularly to see what Mr. Attlee had to say when

he spoke at a luncheon of the National Association of Boys' Clubs. Himself a former club manager in the East End and with a memory of boys' clubs going back forty years, the Prime Minister was on familiar ground. He said: "Everything really rests on personality rather than on set rules." He meant, I imagine, personality in the sense of example, a key to his own character.

**Noble words**

There is nobility about another book of recaptured words, written for the moment as leading articles in *The Manchester Guardian* and now reprinted under the title *FAITH IN FRANCE* (*John Sherratt & Son, Manchester*. 10s. 6d.) Professor D. W. Brogan writes a Preface and claims justly that these articles on French themes were "the sanest, best-informed, most generous and so most wise lead given to British public opinion . . ." The same sturdy spirit of unconquerable faith was not shared by all of us in those black years 1940-1944; it may not be shared now. For who can echo in the words of the final leader, "France enjoys to-day advantages greater than she has enjoyed at any time since the Revolution, for at this moment (September, 1944) the ideas of that Revolution are a greater force for unity than they have been since 1789"? Old values are being challenged and denied, yet these leaders bring balm to troubled minds, expressing finely what many men still wish to believe.

**Is it the last?**

A man who stood for most things which *The Manchester Guardian* so resolutely stands against has in death become the subject of a best-seller. *THE LAST DAYS OF HITLER* by H. R. Trevor-Roper (*Macmillan*. 10s. 6d.) has taken the town by storm by virtue, I think, of its author's narrative style. It is a brilliantly told story, as exciting and compelling as

the best of detective tales and truly astonishing when we reflect that it is the result not of imagination but of careful research. But has Mr. Trevor-Roper destroyed the Hitler legend? I think not, nor do I think that his estimate of Himmler, and perhaps of others, will be final. We have not heard the last of them by a long chalk and about Hitler we shall be fated to read and read.

What happened in Hitler's bunker in Berlin has had to be reconstructed; what happened at Nuremberg is known. It has been put on record for us in convenient form by R. W. Cooper of *The Times* in *THE NUREMBERG TRIAL* (*Penguin Books*. 1s.). This is an excellent summary and, at the present time, about as much as most men will wish to stomach of this revelation of man's calculated cruelty to man. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe's foreword takes the reader into the controversial arena of the wisdom of such trials. Those who have read Mr. F. Elwyn Jones's comments in this issue on the guilt of generals will find this foreword an interesting corollary.

Another character, who has played a part in the wings of the same stage, is Haj Amin El Hussein better known to us as the Mufti. His story is related for us in *MUFTI OF JERUSALEM* by Maurice Pearlman (*Victor Gollancz*. 6s.). The activities of the Mufti have not been favourable to this country. He is a man, as Lord Harlech once said, "of quite unlimited political ambitions"; yet the plea of Mr. Pearlman, to bring Haj Amin to book, is not necessarily the best advice to follow.

**A long association**

To turn to more pleasant matters and to make a start with a stalwart friend of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, Sir John Marriott. Sir John wrote for this journal over a span of more than forty years. His first article was in 1900, an appreciation of his friend Sir W. W. Hunter; his last, "The Problem of Central Europe" in April, 1945, two months before his death. *THE FORTNIGHTLY* honoured him much and,

in his closing years, perhaps particularly as a reviewer whose age and experience helped him to discover the originality in a book and to praise it where praise was due. On his subjects he knew what had been written over the past sixty years and his own library was wonderfully complete. But he was away from his books when he wrote his autobiography *MEMORIES OF FOUR SCORE YEARS* (*Blackie & Son*. 12s. 6d.) and it does not do him justice. Sir John had a full life and, right up to the end, in letters, reviews and articles maintained his interest in current affairs—or, as he would say, politics. The autobiography reflects these interests as a mirror without depth. Those who moved in the same social world as Sir John, with like memories, will enjoy his stories but to those of a younger generation there must be regret that so little of real worth is told of such important matters, for example, as the early days of the Oxford University Extension Delegation to which Sir John succeeded as secretary in 1895.

**Educating ourselves**

If the reader is one of those to whom the State educational system of the country, and particularly the changes since the Education Act, 1944, are barely comprehended he could hardly do better—assuming that for him a large book on education is out of the question—than to read *EDUCATION AND THE COMMUNITY* by John L. Hardie (*Art & Educational Publishers*. 2s. 6d.). Mr. Hardie has caught the spirit of the Act, and with a few good pictures to help him, is able to impart his knowledge in a friendly way. So small a volume must have many omissions; Mr. Hardie makes up for them with an extraordinarily well-selected book list for the reader, if inclined. In the same series, which are called "The New Era Books", also published at half-a-crown, is *LEARNING TO LIVE* by Ross D. Waller, almost as useful, but not I think quite, on adult education.

Ronald Rubinstein in *JOHN CITIZEN AND THE LAW*, a double *Pelican*, (*Penguin*



*Books.* 2s.) offers education of another sort. Disarmingly, he dedicates his book in particular to his wife, and in general to all those who conscientiously read and digest the Preface before they begin on Chapter 1. He thus ensures that his reader gets the necessary warning that no one must take the author's generalizations as applicable to the facts of his particular case. A good book this and one which really does succeed in its object of making clear the "rules and regulations" by which we are governed.

#### Distinctive stories

Occasionally we are made aware of an author, as if for the first time, in spite of a passing acquaintance with his or her work for a number of years. Such was my experience on reading *FIRST LOVE AND OTHER STORIES* by Viola Meynell (*Jonathan Cape.* 9s.). Viola Meynell's stories are not completely satisfying. She seems to stand aloof from her characters as if propinquity might mar or break their outlines; yet the writing is delicate and distinguished, the observations acute and the emotions real. Perhaps we may see her achievements and her present failings in the longest story in this book, "Pastoral". Stripped down it is the story of a girl who marries, in a moment of despair, the wrong man George, a farmer who adores her. She recovers her will to live, agrees to run away with Alistair, the man she really loves and then finds she cannot. This is very nearly a magnificent story. It falters at the scene between Marie and Alistair and thereafter the tension does not heighten as it should. The climax, long anticipated by the reader, is in fact anti-climax. Miss Meynell's art is fragile; one false step and the illusion of sharing an emotional experience is broken. It is a penalty of aiming high, yet Miss Meynell is right to do so for the quality of her work commands admiration even if she has yet to write the perfect story.

Mr. Eric Allen's work contrasts strongly

with that of Miss Meynell. His *BROADCAST STORIES* (*Rich & Cowan.* 9s. 6d.) come into the category of yarns. Unhappily the time-space demand of the B.B.C. becomes aggravating when it is translated into thirty-one consecutive stories in a book. Obviously writing stories for this medium ceases to be an art and becomes a journalistic feat. Mr. Allen is a competent performer.

Is Lear immortal for his nonsense rhymes? It is not for my generation to decide, brought up as I was to sing "The Owl and the Pussy-cat" with my head just above the key-board of the piano-forte and no knowledge at all of the man, Lear. Yet, surely, there will be few who can deny his charm now displayed in modern omnibus form in *THE COMPLETE NONSENSE OF EDWARD LEAR* edited and introduced by Holbrook Jackson (*Faber & Faber.* 12s. 6d.). Mr. Holbrook Jackson refers to his "invincible boyishness", a grand phrase, but what other boy has ever thought of such a rhyme as 'dumbs' to follow 'thumbs' in that glorious self-portrait

He has ears, and two eyes, and ten fingers,  
Leastways if you reckon two thumbs;  
Long ago he was one of the singers,  
But now he is one of the dumbs.

Or such ludicrous pictures and titles for his nonsense botany?

#### A miscellany

The three miscellanies which preceded the *DAILY TELEGRAPH FOURTH MISCELLANY*, compiled by Campbell Dixon (*Hutchinson.* 6s.) did not come my way, so I cannot compare them or define the exact purpose of the series. The result is pleasant enough and anyone who enjoys the handy book for the pocket which talks about such things as wine, letters, cricket, and gardens will find this selection a happy one.

My colleague, Grace Banyard, is on holiday which is why "Books on the Table", for this month only, is signed

JOHN ARMITAGE.

# THE FORTNIGHTLY

AUGUST, 1947

## THE IDEA OF LATIN AMERICA

BY WILLIAM C. ATKINSON

NOTHING so impresses the visitor to Latin America to-day as the range and depth of current preoccupation with the problems of what may be called, in the widest sense of the term, the "spiritual" rôle and destiny of the New World. The traditional European conception of this continent depicts it as a mere offshoot and prolongation of the civilization of Spain and Portugal. That conception has always involved a curious disregard for certain basic factors which transcend even community of language, of religion and of social organization. It has now long outlived its earlier relative validity, and calls for recognition as the anachronism it is. Of recent years we have seen Falangist Spain, with its crude "Hispanity" campaign, seek to capitalize for the mother-country some of the old prestige and the moral leadership of pre-emancipation days. The failure of the campaign throws into sharp focus, not merely the incurable myopia of Spain in her relations with America, but the instinctive repudiation by a score of nations, firmly convinced that they march in the van of human progress, of any claim to tutelage by one whose ideology is essentially medieval.

But those strange terms that stud the intellectual horizon across the Atlantic—Chilenity, Peruanity, Mexicanity and the rest—are not merely a *riposte* to "Hispanity". Nor are they simply an affirmation of nationality, the attempt to create that national consciousness without which political sovereignty must still sound hollow. They represent a new and a searching inquiry into the fundamentals of nationhood, into the complexities of ethnology and environment, of tradition, temperament and aptitudes; they are a search for reality, resting on more than a suspicion that the "reality" of the Hispanic traditionalists is part myth and, even where true in the past, in large part untenable after a century and a quarter of independence. One result must inevitably be to underline the differences between these many nations, differences often as profound as those separating the divers peoples of Europe, to whom too a common creed and even a common language across frontiers are not unknown. But another and more significant one will be the elaboration of a new concept of Latin America as a whole, in which the Iberian heritage will be but one ingredient of several.

Something of this was already glimpsed by Canning in 1823. His famous "calling of a New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old" was more than a mere variant of his resolve that, if France were to have Spain,

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"it should be Spain without the Indies". The one is positive as the other is negative. It recognizes moreover something as existing in its own right, and above all something new, that may no more be held a replica than a dependency of the old. Independence, though accompanied by a natural fervour of repudiation of all things Spanish, did not of itself bring any thorough-going revision of values in the ex-colonies. As the century progressed, the fear that they might prove to have shaken off political dependence on Spain only to fall into economic dependence on the United States led indeed to a deliberate stressing and closing of cultural links with Europe. The *Ariel* (1900) of the great Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó is the most eloquent expression of this phase of Latin-American thought. A blend of the Hellenic and the Christian traditions, it sought to engage Latin America in a preferential pursuit of the things of the spirit, represented by Europe, in conscious opposition to the formula "Washington *plus* Edison".

Then came the 1914-1918 war, with its threatened collapse of European values and its invocation, in succour of these, of military and moral support from both the Americas; and a powerful stimulus was given to the emergence of a new independence of criteria and to the search for the elements of an autochthonous tradition. The "University Reform" of 1918 which, beginning in Argentina, straightway spread across the Plate to Uruguay and then over the Andes to Chile, Peru and beyond, was perhaps the most conscious rejection of a European intellectual inheritance and a convincing demonstration of the extent to which, in given directions, this had become stagnant and unserviceable. And now that, for the second time in a generation, the New World has been called in not merely to restore the balance of the Old but to help preserve from destruction all that this stands for, less and less is heard of "Arielism" and of cultural dependence on Europe. This does not mean any readier acceptance of the cultural values of the North. But the North at least is America, and has achieved something distinct from Europe. Why should not the Centre and the South, with so much stronger grounds for differentiation, achieve as much?

This present spirit of inquiry in Latin America, it may pertinently be recalled, was paralleled in an earlier age by much keen polemical discussion among scientists and scholars in Europe. Buffon, it will be remembered, threw the first pebble into the waters with his theory of the "immaturity" of the New World, based on the striking absence there of the greater mammals. A continent without the elephant, the rhinoceros, the hippopotamus, the camel, the dromedary, the giraffe, with fewer than sixty quadrupeds, when the Old World knew 130, a continent where animals transplanted from Europe or common to both sides of the Atlantic all, "without exception," showed a falling-off from European standards, and where native man comes off even worse from the comparison: all this argued not so much a hostile Nature as a Nature weak and undeveloped, a continent, in short, but recently emerged from the waste of ocean. Vast areas of it were still under water, others were marsh—Buffon stressed the proliferation of insect life as nowhere else in the world. The two

nearest approaches to civilization discovered in America, those of the Aztecs and the Incas, were found precisely on the high tableland of Mexico and in the Andes of Peru. (Bacon had already hinted at the alternative explanation with his thesis of fugitive survivors from the waters.) A certain vacillation in Buffon between immaturity and degeneracy, as the clue to such a degree of divergence, is magnified in the writings of those who followed. America was now very young, now very old, now both together, as the Abbé Raynal argued ingeniously, postulating a late re-birth after eclipse: "Doubtless it was peopled at the same time as the Old World, but the flood may have overtaken it at a later date."

Meanwhile the Indian himself was becoming a pawn in the famous eighteenth-century debate between the critics and the defenders of organized society. Rousseau's generous enthusiasm for the noble savage had notable antecedents. The Brazilian natives whom Montaigne encountered in Rouen in 1555 had already profoundly disturbed some traditional concepts: they moved Montaigne to a first criticism of hereditary monarchy, and of capitalism, and may be allowed thereby some part in the genesis of Marxism. The Prussian De Pauw, sustaining now the contrary thesis, would have none of Buffon's "immaturity": the Indian showed what man became apart from society—a degenerate. Around De Pauw the storm of controversy raged. Voltaire, Marmontel, Galiani, Hume and many another tossed the aborigine to and fro, until from across the North Atlantic Thomas Jefferson, author of the "Declaration of Independence", brought the theorists down to fact with his own first-hand experience of Redskins: "The inferiority of the Indian is due exclusively to circumstances and not to nature; it is due to his way of life, his inadequate diet, his exposure to constant danger and exhausting physical labours." Jefferson poured scorn on the suggestion that Nature had sided with those born on one side of the Atlantic against the other. The more perspicacious European minds had already sensed, in the immaturity of the New World alongside the senescence of the Old, something of the vast potentialities of youth. Galiani, foretelling even before 1776 the westward shift of the centre of gravity of the Anglo-Saxon world, was moved by the events of that year to reflect: "The time has come of the total collapse of Europe and of the transmigration to America. Everything is falling in decay around us, religion, laws, arts, sciences, and everything will be built up again from the foundations in America." Even Raynal had written prophetically: "If some happy revolution ever takes place on the earth, it will be due to America. This New World, having been devastated, must flourish in its turn *and perhaps even rule over the Old*; it will be the refuge of our peoples victimized by politics or driven out by wars; its savages will become civilized, and men oppressed in other lands will there know freedom once again."

In all this debate there was common ground at least in the assumption that, whatever the New World signified, that something was *sui generis*. Spain and

Portugal had been in possession for over two centuries, but it occurred to none to hold Central and South America simply an extension of the Iberian Peninsula. Such a contention could only have been justified, and can only be justified to-day, on the basis of one of two pre-conditions: either the virtual extermination of the native populations, or their complete and willing absorption into the full inheritance of Iberian civilization. It is because neither of these conditions holds that Latin America is at long last emboldened, not merely, as with the eighteenth-century encyclopaedists, to ignore the contention, but to challenge it.

The New World has witnessed three great experiments in the creation of new societies, the English, the Spanish and the Portuguese. The conditions the early colonists found, of geography, climate, native races, had much to do with what each made of the experiment; but much too depended on what they themselves were and what they sought. The men of the *Mayflower* sought religious freedom. Of the natives they asked only the modest territories necessary for their new home, and as they were drawn neither by the lure of gold nor by any desire to impose their faith on others, white man and Indian went each his separate way. The Spaniard sought gold, which entailed, first, conquest, and, this achieved, native labour. He went imbued too with the crusader's zeal for the propagation of his faith, holding justified all means necessary to that end. The Portuguese, as is well known, went to America by accident and consequently without a motive. A third of a century elapsed between that first contrary wind of 1500 and the first settlement in 1532, a third of a century during which we may imagine Portugal debating with herself whether she was really intended, or interested, to be there at all. If therefore it be of the essence of virtue in a virtuous action that it be void of ulterior motive, the Portuguese launched their enterprise in Brazil under the fairest auspices of all.

Portuguese and Spaniard were however at one in this, and it constitutes the vital difference between Anglo-Saxon and Latin America: unlike the Puritan settlers, who went as families accompanied by their womenfolk and endowed thereby with their own social sufficiency, they were explorers, *conquistadores*, who for reasons of polity as well as of instinct had no alternative but to consort with the women of the races they subdued. In this they were helped by a notable absence of race- or colour-prejudice, the fruit of eight centuries of contact with Islam and Africa in the Peninsula and, for Portugal, of her pioneering experiences in Africa and the East. While, therefore, Anglo-Saxon America is white with insignificant Indian reservations and a clearly defined Negro element in the South, and the half-breed is an isolated phenomenon of no social standing, Latin America is essentially the continent of the half-caste, a racial medley of white, Indian, Negro, mestizo (descendant of white and Indian), mulatto (of white and Negro), zambo (of Indian and Negro) and of the endless permutations and combinations of all these. In countries like

Ecuador and Bolivia some eighty per cent. of the population is Indian or mestizo. In Mexico and Peru the figure is ninety per cent. or more. And the Indian blood in the mestizo generally far out-weighs the white. In Brazil close on twenty of the forty-five million inhabitants are non-whites, more than five million being pure Negroes. In Paraguay Spanish is merely one language out of four, having failed over four centuries to oust the native Guaraní, Quechua and Aymará. Quechua is still the tongue of five million Latin Americans, which is the population of Chile, or of Ecuador and Uruguay combined. The European tradition, in a word, means little or nothing to some seventy-five per cent of the 130 millions who inhabit Latin America.

What is perhaps even more significant is that the new critical attitude towards that tradition, if indeed it finds most forthright expression in the predominantly mestizo countries, springs not from the oppressed native masses themselves but from the dominant white and near-white minorities, from the favoured products of that tradition and those who by education and training are best able to assess it. What is the gravamen of their criticism? Let it be remembered first that the discovery of the Indies was held by Spain at the time as divine recompense for her eight centuries of struggle against Islam, and—in the field it offered for proselytism—as compensation for the inroads of the infidel in Europe. The gold of the Indies was coveted to buttress Spanish policies in Europe, and mercantile policy deliberately subordinated the agriculture, industry and commerce of the New World to those of Spain. Colonial legislation was often generous to a fault—in intention. Many indeed were found to argue with Sepúlveda that the Indians were slaves by nature and—since the Aristotelian doctrine that some men are born to be slaves conflicted with the teaching of Christianity—to level against them monstrous accusations of bestiality, thus salving their consciences by denying to them human status.

Across the Atlantic it was the reality that counted. The Indian was free in law; he became a serf in practice. From 1501, with the introduction of Africans, serfs in theory and in practice, human flesh was admittedly an article of merchandise. The first Europeans carried feudalism to America just when it was dying out in Europe; they introduced a cultural tradition, typified by the Inquisition, that was already parting company with the new trends of Renaissance and Reformation thought, and they imposed an administrative and legal system that ignored the structure and the interests of native society. The Indian was not overthrown by any racial or ethical superiority of the European; he was overthrown because the European possessed gunpowder. It was a purely military victory. Nor did the Spaniard ever succeed in demonstrating that the civilization he brought was superior, in the Indian's own interests, to those he destroyed. In imposing it by force, moreover, he offended against every biological principle. Law in Latin America preceded custom, dogma and forced conversion preceded the birth of faith, grammar preceded language. Now time has taken its revenge, and Latin America pays the penalty in a society

where the letter is constantly at variance with the spirit.

Soon the creoles, Spaniards born in America, added their dissatisfaction: by the reservation of high office for Spaniards from Spain they found themselves reduced to a second-rate citizenship. And the reason for the discrimination is clear. Spaniards born in America were already something other than Spaniards. They were Americans, the product of their environment, and at one with Indian and mestizo in subscribing only under compulsion to the furthering of Spanish interests. In the beginning it was the Spanish authorities on the spot who had defeated the intentions of distant Madrid with the famous formula: "*Se obedece pero no se cumple*" ("I obey but I do not comply"). Towards the end Madrid too is wedded to a policy of obscurantism. "*No conviene ilustrar a los americanos*," said Charles III: "it is undesirable that the Americans should be enlightened." And Charles III is accepted as the most progressive of the eighteenth-century Spanish Bourbons.

Spain, in brief, gave to America all that she was capable of giving. If she did not give what she did not herself possess, religious and intellectual tolerance, the spirit of compromise, a constant co-ordinating of civic rights and responsibilities, a true conception of government as the art of teaching men to govern themselves, to state this is not to formulate an indictment but to record a fact. It has become fashionable in Spain, in assuagement of the bitterness of loss of empire, to argue that the rebellious individualism that impelled the colonies eventually to revolt was perhaps their most Spanish trait, and that their ultimate freedom was thus one more gift from the motherland. Bolívar on his death-bed could see no cause for gratitude here. "America," he wrote in the moment of his bitterest despair, "is ungovernable. Those who have served the revolution have ploughed the sea. If ever it were possible for a part of the world to relapse into primitive chaos, that would be the last phase of America." There, in the political and social sphere, he saw the true heritage of Spain. And if, over a century and a quarter, Latin America has been painfully learning to govern herself, her successive achievements on that thorny and uphill road represent so many victories over the Latin part of her American self.

The emancipation is to Latin America her Renaissance. The New World to-day is more cautious than was eighteenth-century Europe over accepting analogies with the Old. But in so far as the analogy may serve an illustrative turn, the temptation is strong to many thinkers in Latin America to regard the three centuries of the colonial epoch as her Middle Ages, a long sleep from which she is now awakening to the re-discovery of her true self. That self is compounded first of the inevitable effect of environment on character and society. It is now accepted as a truism even by Spaniards that the Spaniard—and the Portuguese—became a new man as soon as he settled in the New World. There was more to it than politics when the creoles in revolt stressed their spiritual kinship with the Indian and on occasion affected Indian names,

more than "literature" when the greatest poet of the New World, Rubén Darío, who had Indian blood in his veins, wrote: "If there is any poetry to be found in our America it is in the old things, in Palenque and Uxatlán, in the legendary Indian, in the refined and sensual Inca, in the great Moctezuma of the golden throne." Deep down, in the blood, like was calling unto like. Creole, mestizo and Indian are together sons of the earth, of the same earth, America. It is for this reason that in a country like Chile, where the Indian represents, numerically, a mere two per cent. of the population, the keen observer, alike Chilean and foreign, can still speak of his "ubiquitous presence". "The Chileans," wrote Keyserling, "have no longer anything Latin about them. A new people is being born in Chile which is more Araucanian than Spanish." Argentina and Uruguay are the "white" countries *par excellence*—with the increasing influx of heterogeneous elements from all over Europe, and beyond, the term "Spanish" or even "Latin" is undergoing constant dilution—yet the appreciation and revalorization of the autochthonous strain even here is one of the most marked aspects of recent sociological inquiry.

But Americanism rests not merely on the conditioning factors born of environment. The European Renaissance signified in the first place the re-discovery of an earlier civilization and a return to its ideals. In the New World the parallel breaks down inasmuch as the civilizations of Mayas, Aztecs, Incas, Chibchas were non-literary; their achievements do not lie in the realm of the mind, and they are incapable accordingly of liberating spiritual energies and idealisms of revolutionary significance in the modern world. They were none the less civilizations, and the Indian, who has never acquiesced in their destruction and who is admitted to-day by his conquerors to have lost rather than gained after four centuries of "Europeanization", looks back to them with pride, and forward, not altogether without hope, to a measure of social and cultural *revanche*. He is strongest to-day precisely where his forbears achieved most, in Mexico, Peru, and the Andean countries generally. In Mexico, with the great social revolution of 1910, the *revanche* is already well under way, and the rehabilitation of the indigenous element as rightful owners of the lands seized by the despoilers is as notably enshrined in the Constitution of 1917 as it is in the murals of Diego Rivera. In Peru APRA ("Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana"), the one indigenous political philosophy that Latin America has produced, is a forthright assertion of Indo-against Latin-Americanism. The thesis of Indian and mestizo degeneracy, so popular in the time of Rodó and the "Arielists", is to-day a thing of the past, and autochthonous values are recognized as possessed of outstanding qualities not merely of survival but of assimilation. The "Indianizing" of the Spaniard in these countries is a well-attested phenomenon. For the rest, it is clear that in any country where the vast majority of the population is Indian or mestizo, on the day when political democracy becomes a reality the future will no longer be in the hands of a numerically insignificant white minority.

It would be gravely misleading to think of a Latin America animated and even divided to-day by conflicting racial ideologies, to picture countries of resurgent Indianism, violently at odds with European tradition, alongside predominantly white countries liable to be provoked in self-defence to a renewal of earlier oppressive methods against the indigenous element. The reality is at once more simple and more complex. Such is the infinite shading from white to brown or black that nowhere can clear-cut racial lines be drawn; and in the result the entire continent is concerned rather to take stock of the situation as it is, to aim at social justice for the dispossessed masses, victims of four hundred years of incomprehension, on in the interest of all to draw on the constructive capacities of all for the common weal. The major crime of the *conquistadores*, their true sin against the light, was the attempt to destroy civilizations not as inferior but as different. The civilization of Latin America henceforth will not be a reversal to these, but neither will it be a Latin civilization. The *homo americanus* is already a blend of Indian, European, African, and one happily superior to the petty racialisms of the Old World. Himself still at a loss to define the differential characteristics of his mind and outlook, he is confident at least that these must fructify into something distinctive. Meanwhile, he asks of Europe recognition of the fact that the leading strings which bound him once to Spain, to Portugal, to Latinity, have long since been cut. Whatever the impress that remains, there is no longer subservience. "Latin America" has become a misnomer, dangerous because it is deceptive. The New World has come of age, and her debt to a European past can never again outweigh her responsibility to an American future, which must be a future for all her sons, the seventy-five no less than the twenty-five per cent. It cannot fail to be an intensely interesting New World.

(The author, who is Stevenson Professor of Spanish at Glasgow University, has recently returned from a lengthy visit to Latin America.)

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### THREE VIEWS ON THE MARSHALL OFFER

#### I. EUROPE'S NEED

THE Marshall offer suddenly presented Europe with a new hope and a new incentive. The pulse of recovery, which in many European countries as in Britain, had been beating strongly up to the end of last year, had been weakening during the past six months. The economic exhaustion of the war was proving far greater than either patients or doctors had at first imagined. The blood transfusion effected by the beneficent operations of UNRRA in eastern Europe and by the American loans in western Europe was coming to an end, but the anaemia was still there. Though collapse had so far been staved off, it was still an imminent possibility, unless the artificial stimulus could be maintained. Without that the prospects for the winter were grim indeed. If the flow of American food, raw materials and capital goods dried up, because there were no more dollars to pay for them, the result might be catastrophic for Europe, and might even be the beginning of a recession in the United States, which would be catastrophic for everybody.

The Marshall offer sprang from a realization of these things. It gave Europe fresh hope of further American aid, but only on condition that Europe made a collective effort to help itself. For a long time past thinking Europeans all over the continent had realized that its division into twenty-five watertight compartments was under modern strategic and industrial conditions a political anomaly and an economic anachronism. If instead of indulging in suicidal struggles its 300 million people had worked together to organize their resources and those of their colonial dependencies into a coherent economic system, they might have achieved not only much higher standards of living for themselves, but an economic position in the world comparable to that of the United States. The need for unity had been made even more obvious by the disastrous impoverishment produced by the war, and now the United States was actually providing a powerful incentive to initiate the process.

But Europe was not its own master. It had finally lost its old predominance, which would have allowed it to reform itself on its own lines. It was divided by a rigid arbitrary line into two halves, and the eastern half lay under the shadow of the new Russian imperialism, whose expansionist ambitions were unlikely to favour any move towards unification. On the contrary, a complete breakdown of European economy might create those anarchical conditions, which are supposed to favour the advance of Communism, and if at

the same time a slump overtook the United States, the conquest of Europe without war might yet be accomplished. These were generally believed to be the guiding notions of the Kremlin, and Mr. Molotov's brusque negative at Paris went far to confirm the belief. Europe was refused the right to work out its own salvation, except under pain of incurring Russian displeasure.

There was not much doubt that left to themselves all the countries of Europe would eagerly come together to work out their economic requirements and to ascertain how far they could meet them by their own common efforts before calling for outside help. The lead given by Mr. Bevin and Mr. Bidault was enthusiastically welcomed not only in the west but also in the east, because it offered the prospect of sorely needed material aid, while responding to a historical need of the times. Europeans were beginning to see that a divided Europe could never recover its prosperity and might not even survive at all. Moreover apart from the dreams of a united Europe, to which they were now invited to give practical shape, there was no escape from the present chaos without once more drawing western and eastern Europe together and without once more integrating Germany with the economy of both. The natural outlet for the agricultural surpluses or the timber and pulp of Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was not the U.S.S.R. any more than it was the United States, but the industrial areas of Germany, Italy and Britain. In their turn these eastern countries were in desperate need of tractors, fertilizers, clothing and consumer goods of all kinds, much of which could largely be supplied by central and western Europe, but which the U.S.S.R. is incapable of supplying. The same was true of the equipment which they need to develop their water-power, to build new roads and railways, to relieve the congestion of the countryside by industrialization. Imposing "plans" had been announced by the Bulgarian, Polish and Yugoslav Governments for doing some of these things, but they were likely to remain largely paper exercises without the help of the west—and the west means not only the United States, but also western Europe. The eastern countries have no means of producing the steel, the turbines, the locomotives, the electrical machinery and other capital equipment, without which they can neither procure a healthy economic balance nor lift their peoples out of their chronic poverty.

But they had to ask whether they would be allowed to do this. Like the Czechs, while they punctiliously went through the motions of obeisance to the east, they were looking wistfully westwards over their shoulders. Of course they wanted to take their part in the plan for rebuilding Europe, because it afforded them the only real hope of reasonably rapid recovery. Of course they knew that Russia, which was struggling against the paralysing effects of even greater dislocation and devastation, could not possibly furnish them with the markets or the capital goods or the technical services, upon which that recovery depended. Of course they knew in their hearts that under a joint European plan they would be protected against American interference in their internal

affairs, if they ever took that bogey seriously. Knowing all this, they were no doubt sorely tempted to accept the Anglo-French invitation and once more take the train to Paris. But it was not to be. Russia imposed her veto so irresistibly that even the Czechs, who had actually bought their tickets, abandoned the journey. The Eastern countries had to turn sadly away and put the best face on it which they could.

Whatever the result of the Paris meeting, it will mark a new phase in eastern Europe. By killing their best chance of rapid recovery the Soviet Government has made itself directly responsible for the miseries and hardships of its satellites. This is unlikely to redound to the popularity of Communism, especially if in western Europe prosperity begins to revive by the conjugation of its own efforts with American assistance.

In one other respect the Russian rejection of any European plan implies a change in the grouping of political forces. Aware of the serious plight of the country, French opinion appears to be overwhelmingly in favour of making the most of the Marshall offer. Russian obstruction has therefore weakened the communist opposition and has swung the French Government into closer collaboration with Britain and the United States. A prospect of finding a joint solution of the problem of the Ruhr and of the relation between French and the Anglo-American zones has thus been opened up, without which the reconstruction either of western Europe or of Europe as a whole is impossible. There is little hope for either, unless their needs are assessed not by each nation in isolation but by international bodies armed with real authority.

The dollar shortage affects every country and every group of countries in Europe except Switzerland. Their needs for food, electric power, coal, steel and other raw materials cannot be successfully surveyed or met, except by joint action. The task of allocating priorities and of pooling resources will be immensely difficult. To enable the goods needed for recovery to flow freely from one country to another will demand some relaxation of the trade prohibitions, quotas, customs duties, and most-favoured-nation rights, which will not be easy. But thanks to the Marshall offer an impulse has been given, which may generate the collective will necessary to overcome these obstacles. The European community has been stimulated by Mr. Bevin's energetic lead, for without British initiative little or nothing could probably have been done. Though the Russian veto has debarred the whole of Europe from participating in the common enterprise, a beginning in the west will afford it a better hope than has yet been offered it. If it is resolutely grasped under the leadership of Britain and France, the present opportunity may prove to be a turning point in the decayed fortunes of Europe. If it is frittered away in sterile debate and discord, the continent may well fall into decline leading fatally to irremediable collapse.

HAROLD BUTLER.



## II. THE ECONOMIC ANGLE

MANY commentators on Mr. Marshall's aid-to-Europe proposals have presented the new American move as Europe's last chance. To be accurate, this interpretation must be qualified. In the first place, the statement is true only to the extent that it refers to Western Europe. Secondly, if the Marshall proposals are Europe's last chance to survive within the political, economic and social framework familiar to the present generation, they are also America's last chance to maintain her present economic and social structure. However much Europe may be in need of American goods and, therefore, of dollars to pay for them, the United States, as long as it is bent on preserving an unplanned economy based on "free enterprise", multilateral trade and the rest, is hardly less in need of maintaining an outlet for a substantial part of her national product. But if there are two "last chances", complementary in their aspects, there is a difference in the speed with which they must be seized. For Europe, with no reserves left, the problem is one of overcoming desperate scarcities; for America, it is the problem of overcoming an abundance that grows increasingly embarrassing and cannot be disposed of as long as she maintains her present economic framework. The urgency of Europe's problem is obviously far greater. But in the long run, the American problem is equally serious. For, unless the Marshall proposals lead to some peacetime system of lend-lease, to use once more Mr. Roosevelt's camouflage terms for gifts, America, cannot in the end, any more than Europe, escape economic, hence political and social upheaval.

Mr. Churchill notwithstanding, there are no unsordid acts in either economics or politics. And from the economic angle, the American proposals foreshadow another "Act to promote the Defence of the United States", which is the title, too frequently forgotten, of the first Lend-Lease Act on the American statute book. The new American approach is quite evidently compelled by sheer economic necessity. Even prosperous Sweden, a non-belligerent in 1939-1945, had to cut her imports from the dollar area some weeks ago, because of dwindling dollar reserves. What was, in Sweden's case, a move dictated by caution more than by immediate necessity, is for the European ex-belligerents a matter of the most desperate urgency. Their situation is indeed such that their dollar reserves will be completely exhausted within the next nine to fifteen months at the latest. True, total U.S. exports may not represent more than from seven to eight per cent. of American production. But a substantial contraction of exports may in adverse conditions make all the difference between a recession and a slump, between a slump and a catastrophe in American economy.

The approaching exhaustion of dollar reserves comes as no surprise to the critics of the Bretton Woods economic philosophy and its concrete manifestations such as the U.S. loan agreements with Britain and France. Were the

subject less serious, they could to-day indulge in quoting some of the more foolish statements of the apologists of Bretton Woods. Even before the meeting of the Bretton Woods conference (July 1944), it was evident that American economic policy, as it was then conceived, would be inadequate to cope with the difficulties certain to confront world economy at the end of the 1939-1945 war. What Lord Keynes conceded of the loan to Britain—that it was "cut too fine"—applied to the whole American post-war programme. For one must not look at the amount, in absolute figures, of American credits to Britain, France and other countries, but rather at the needs, even then discernible, of devastated Europe. As one can see now—as some predicted even then—it was not possible to achieve "on the cheap" the American object of reviving the multilateral system of international trade. And, in particular, it was impossible to do so without tackling the central problem of present-day world economy, that is, the enormous surplus in the U.S. balance of payments which America's debtors for years past—indeed for decades—have been unable to settle by the natural means of paying in goods and services.

So much has lately been written on this subject that one hesitates to revert to it. But it is perhaps worth recalling that during the years 1919-1939, the consolidated U.S. balance of payments showed a total surplus of \$14,450 million on current transactions (mainly derived from the export surplus of the U.S. balance of trade). The debtors of the U.S. had to settle this balance, *grosso modo*, by transfers of gold amounting to \$10,900 million, only the rest being covered by American credits.\* During the years 1942-1944, the U.S. balance of payments showed, temporarily, a deficit, as Lend-Lease supplies called for no financial settlement. With the end of Lend-Lease (August 1945), a new surplus arose: \$4,200 million in 1945, \$8,200 million in 1946. That surplus could only be balanced by American credits (\$1,800 million in 1945, \$3,300 million in 1946) and generous relief and rehabilitation gifts (\$4,300 million in 1945, \$3,200 million in 1946). Both these sources are irregular in flow and precarious in nature. As to the current year, the surplus now accumulating is likely to beat all previous records.

The Bretton Woods system was evidently not designed to cope with a problem of such magnitude. The International Monetary Fund, in particular, was not intended to deal with a "fundamental" disequilibrium in the balance of payments of a member country. Yet, the deficits of America's debtors are obviously for the most part "fundamental": they have lasted for over two decades and have constantly grown worse. Nor is the World Bank, with its limited capital and the restrictions imposed on its lending policy by its articles of agreement, capable of providing the solution, the fact apart that American bankers, for obvious reasons, show little inclination to help the Bank break their own lending monopoly. The third gear in the Bretton Woods mechan-

\* Figures from *The United States in the World Economy*, table I at end of volume, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, 1943.

ism, the International Trade Organization—the creation of which is still problematic and which was the subject of a recent conference meeting at Geneva—could not, even if successful, produce sufficiently quick results in breaking down trade barriers to stave off the catastrophe which threatens at short term.

The new American proposals are realistic in that they recognize, by implication at least, that the Bretton Woods programme has failed. But will this new deal for Europe support for which is at present confined to the American executive, be endorsed by Congress? And if it is so endorsed, does it dispose of the problem of the U.S. balance of payments? And thirdly, what of the Russian attitude? These three questions arise inevitably on any examination of the new approach.

That a scheme should be logical and necessary, even from the American angle, is not in itself sufficient reason for its adoption by a legislative body dominated in its considerations, particularly in 1947, by short-term electoral motives. It is, in the last resort the attitude of the electors which will be decisive and their attitude will largely depend on whether Europe or at least a large part of Europe puts forth a bold and economically plausible plan for reconstruction. Perhaps, they can be "sold on the idea" that an insurance premium representing no more than about three per cent. of present-day U.S. national income is a small sum to sacrifice for a number of years if it protects world economy from total, and U.S. economy from at least partial, breakdown. If so, Congress may follow suit. But it would be foolish to expect too much on either the European or the American side. On the latter, in particular, the Marshall proposals, logically, call for the re-introduction of price controls and a measure of planning. Both are anathema to American business. History has shown only too often that its progress requires the lesson of catastrophe. One would be delighted to be proved wrong, in this instance.

In any case, the proposals cannot finally solve the problem of the U.S. balance of payments. Once Europe is reconstructed, American supplies, welcome to-day, will become "imported unemployment" for their beneficiaries. The aid-to-Europe programme postpones the issue for a number of years. But in the end, only a redistribution of U.S. national income can produce the solution. No such redistribution is possible without profound social changes in the U.S., which its governing classes can be expected to resist to the limit of their power. These changes imply a vast increase in the incomes of the poorer classes enabling them to absorb not only the largest possible share of the national product, but also a much larger volume than previously of imports. They also imply a reduction in working hours to slow down the rate of growth of the national income. In the end, the United States must, on a far larger scale than Victorian and Edwardian England, become the *rentier* of the world by accepting a large import surplus.

At Paris, on July 2, Mr. Molotov must have had in mind the Russian equivalent of "*linco Americanos et dona ferentes*". But the fear of the Trojan

jeep cannot explain everything. In fact, if the Russian leaders are convinced that in the long run, whatever the transient tactical moves, Russia will have to fight American capitalism, then they should, logically, have accepted the gift, for equally tactical reasons. As there is no generosity in politics, so there is no gratitude. And the gifts of to-day might have helped to forge the weapons of to-morrow more quickly than Russian resources alone would permit. Such might have been the Russians' reaction had they felt that Mr. Marshall's inclusion of Russia in his proposals was genuine. But they apparently concluded that it was a manœuvre and that Mr. Marshall had only wanted to give the impression of swinging over to Mr. Wallace's policy because he knew anyway that Congress would have rejected a plan that included Russia. Russia, having prevented the participation of her satellites in the second Paris conference, would seem to feel stronger than some observers have recently tried to make out: either because she counts on a rapid weakening of America's position as a consequence of an approaching slump, or because of an improvement in her own position, or for both reasons. But in that case, the break between East and West has been consummated and July 2, 1947, the date of the breakdown in Paris, may in relation to the future, come to assume the same importance as March 7, 1936, the date of the occupation of the Rhineland, in relation to the events of 1939.

### III. AMERICAN ATTITUDE

In the critical summer of 1940 it was a matter for grave and extended argument amongst Americans, engaged in awakening their fellow countrymen to the need for resistance to Hitler, in what terms to depict the plight and peril of Europe. Was the case for aiding the Allies to be argued on the basis that Europe's need was desperate, that without American aid the continent would collapse? Or was it better to depict the remaining democracies of Europe as going concerns, national incarnations of European self-reliance, needing only as much as America could spare of her super-abundance to tip the scales in the direction of victory? The first line of argument invited and received the rejoinder that a continent so water-logged was bound to sink anyway, and American hands had better be kept at home to man the pumps of the western hemisphere which no doubt was the next target for the aggressors' design. The second contention lay open to the objection that it seemed to under-play the urgency of the moment, to invite a continuation of too little and too late, to encourage the hope that America could after all be saved by Europe's exertions. In the event, circumstances resolved the dilemma. As the Hitlerian knife went through the continental butter the beauties of self-reliance faded like autumn leaves. But equally the Battle of Britain disposed, with temporary finality, of the contention that because much is lost all is derelict. There then emerged,

in the twelve months before Pearl Harbour, a pattern of American aid based on a recognition that Europe's needs were crucial, but her plight by no means hopeless, and finding expression in the compromise of Lend-Lease and other methods 'short of war.'

Ever since VE Day the same dilemma has haunted the council chambers and the policy conferences of Washington. For a while, in the after-glow of San Francisco, it was hoped that the United Nations would resolve it, by setting Europe in the new context of a world organization. It was in this supra-European setting that UNRRA was maintained, the Anglo-American financial agreements, set in the world pattern of Bretton Woods, were passed, and the Byrnes experiments in getting along with Russia were conducted.

But the "one world" solvent proved inadequate. The European flint remained hard and intractable. It was in Europe that American-Russian co-operation proved most difficult, in Europe that displaced and starving persons persisted to harrow the American conscience, in Europe that Yugoslav aircraft shot down American pilots, in Europe that Communism conducted its most shameless variations on the themes of Nazi means for Marxist ends.

Forced back on its dilemma the American administration has grasped each horn in turn. The reconstruction loan to Western Europe, the post-UNRRA relief appropriation have alike posited a European economy strong enough to keep itself alive once the initial pump-priming has been administered. On the other hand the tone, if not the substance, of the Greco-Turkish Aid Bill presupposed an imminent peril, a plight so desperate that nothing but immediate and strong action could avert disaster. Merely to persist in either of these tactics is, however, scarcely possible any longer. The pump-priming has patently failed: the European bilges are filling faster than American aid can empty them. Moreover the major premise of Europe's fundamental soundness no longer rings convincingly in any American ear; the Battle of Britain whose victory in 1940 lent credence to the optimist has turned in 1947 to the admitted defeat which Mr. Herbert Morrison announced to the House of Commons on July 8. But if European self-reliance is exposed as a sham, so also the invocation of the European death-rattle, as over Greece and Turkey, is a dangerous appeal to repeat. For one thing it lies too uncomfortably near to the truth, evoking the never-to-be-quite-stilled American suspicion that the only permanently satisfactory European continent is the lost Atlantis, and that American efforts to keep the land mass above water are only delaying actions against the inevitable (and because inevitable, proper) action of Time and Providence. For another, it is a cry which, to be effective, must not be repeated too often: to save a drowning man once is all very well, to rescue a continuous succession of victims imposes a burden at which a mere bystander, however able-bodied, is entitled to demur. Worst of all, perhaps, it may tend to falsify the facts of the situation. In 1947 the Europe to be saved is not, as in 1940, a succession of nation-states threatened by aggression from without; now the

menace is from within, in physical decrepitude, in industrial and agricultural disorganization, in loss of heart and, in some cases, of skill.

For all these reasons the novelty of the Marshall offer is to be welcomed. It avoids each horn of the dilemma. Accepting the European sickness, it does not assume either that the patient is incurable or that the American physician can by his own mere endeavours effect a cure. It calls upon Europe first to prove its own vitality, by an effort which it alone can make. Then, and not until then, it argues, will American medicines be effective. However well or ill such an approach reflects the facts of a diseased Europe, there can be no doubt that it is excellently attuned to the psychosis of post-war America. The United States at the moment has reached a stage of peculiar difficulty and uncertainty in relation to Europe. She has invested big sums in the relief and rehabilitation of this continent. In the words of Mr. Marshall: "Since the termination of the war, American goods in the amount of some 82,000,000 tons valued at over 9,000,000,000 dollars, have flowed into Europe from this country." On this gigantic investment there has been so far virtually no return. The investor has now to make a critical decision. Is he to stop, cut his losses and pull out? The idea is almost impossible—though not quite as impossible to a Kansas taxpayer as to a Labour Party delegate confidently complaining about dollar diplomacy. More feasibly, is he to continue the present palliatives, by no means small in terms of the American budget, but too little in terms of the imbalance of trans-Atlantic economies to be anything but a gigantic Speenhamland for Western Europe? To do so might be just sufficient to keep the commercial wolf from the door without over-harassing the American taxpayer in a year in which he chooses his presidential and congressional rulers at the polls. But it promises no positive return, and it adds, at the meanest calculation, a sizable sum to the budget. Does the investor then take his courage in both hands and go forward, in Mr. Morrison's words, and devise "some means whereby billions of dollars' worth of North and South American production could be transferred across the Atlantic without the necessity for immediate payment in the form of an equal and opposite flow of European goods"? (The investor, of course, well knows that "North and South American" necessarily means "principally United States" and that "immediate" is under-statement for "within measurable time.")

If the investor is to do this he must, being American, seek assurance on at least three points. First of all he will need to be convinced that he is not throwing good money after bad. He will demand that the European watertight national economies be opened to admit a reasonable flow of intra-European as well as extra-European trade. If it be complained that such demands come ill from the homeland of Senator Smoot and Congressman Hawley it will be replied on a point of fact that both these gentlemen are dead and on a point of principle that to find an American equivalent of European tariffs you would have to suppose that Illinois and Pennsylvania were empowered to ex-

clude each other's steel or that New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts had only just succeeded in effecting an experimental customs union. Almost ninety years ago Lincoln regarded it as axiomatic for the American union that there was "no line, straight or crooked, suitable for a national boundary, upon which to divide" and even before his time Americans had marvelled at a Europe which would find so many crooked boundaries for its national constituents. If the United States could merge its internal sovereignties after only one civil war, is it too much to ask of Europe, says the average American, to move in the same direction after two? Upon the answer to his question depends to an enormous degree the backing which he will give to the Marshall Plan. His conviction is deep-rooted that if Europe is as sick as his newspapers and his government and the size of his national debt tell him she is, then the root of the malady is to be found in the cancerous growths of her nationalism. Consequently he demands, as the first evidence that the patient is curable at all, that she take what steps are in her power to cut away these strangleholds upon her economy and her society.

Secondly, the average American needs to be convinced that he is not being "played for a sucker". He knows the plight of Europe is desperate, but he is not so sure that the governments of Europe who are the channels for his investment are not going to divert it to ends of their own and leave him, poor credulous fool, a victim of his own charity and their artifice. Americans old enough to remember the 1914-1918 war are also old enough to remember the war debts and the 'Shylock' cartoons; Americans who can only remember the 1939-1945 war are not without equally powerful, and far more recent recollections—of Russian non-recognition of Lend-Lease, of allegations that dollar diplomacy animated American payments to UNRRA, of British politicians protesting against the negotiation of the American loan and the same politicians urging its repudiation, when obtained. It is of little importance that to all these controversies there are two sides and that there are other generousities besides those of Spam and dollars—of little importance because in the immediate situation it is still the same side to whom Europe looks for assistance, and still Spam and dollars in which she wishes American generosity to express itself. No doubt a nation long schooled in the arts of world government, confident of itself and sharp-set on its objectives would care little what reaction its subsidies provoked provided they produced the concrete results at which it aimed. But the United States is no such nation—nor could be, without becoming imperialist to an extent which even its critics never imagine. To a degree which interferes with its own best interests it is sensitive to what is said and thought about it, sensitive above all to being led up the garden path by cynical confidence men. To rebuff its overtures is consequently not difficult. Marshal Tito has learnt the art to perfection. Mr. Will Lawther is a brave apprentice, welcoming the Marshall plan in one paragraph of his speech to the National Union of Mine-

workers, but sternly warning in the second: "This nation will not sacrifice all it did to defeat Hitler to sit at the foot of some new financial oligarchy." It will take a close student of Mr. John L. Lewis's bargaining style to make such *finette* intelligible in the United States.

Lastly, of course, our American investor is going to ask himself what the effect of Communism is going to be on his investment, and of his investment on Communism. There is no doubt that he feels relieved that Russian manœuvring, Russian legalism, Russian obstruction will not be represented in person at the European councils which will handle any system of aid which develops from the Marshall offer. His relief will undoubtedly be reflected in a greater willingness by Congress to vote funds without crippling safeguards or restrictions. But he knows that no dollar curtain will keep Russia out of Europe. He knows that without the co-operation of Eastern Europe and the Russian zones of Germany and Austria the plan's difficulties are increased and its chances of success diminished. He knows too that Russian influence oversteps national boundaries and that the communists of many lands can be relied upon to unite in submissive obedience to orders from the Kremlin. All this, if other conditions are encouraging, will not prevent him from going forward with the offer, but his enthusiasm for it and the freedom which he will allow to European spenders of American dollars will necessarily be dependent on his conviction that it is being harnessed to a constructive democratic purpose. No doubt he will prefer that that democratic purpose was expressed in terms of a *laissez-faire* as nearly pure as its extremely un-*laissez-faire* pump-priming would permit, but it will be contrary to two profound American impulses—the impulse to self-determination and the impulse to world peace—if he insists on such an interpretation as a pre-condition of his aid. If Europe, or Britain, or our back-bench Marxists on either side of the House of Commons, are still worried that he will, one can only say *solvebitur ambulando*—but at a good, brisk, business-like pace, not in a goose step or a funeral march.

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## THE FUTURE OF THE INDIAN STATES

BY SIRDAR IKBAL ALI SHAH

WHEREAS most people feel relieved that at last the major problems of Indian politics are solved by partition, it is understood that no lasting settlement can occur unless the position of the Indian Princes is definitely knitted into the Indian polity of tomorrow. Anxiety persists, however, at the contradictory nature of two statements, the one made by the late Duke of Connaught, representing the King, in February, 1921, at a Delhi durbar and the other by Mr. Attlee during the second reading of the India Independence Bill. The Duke proclaimed on behalf of the King-Emperor: "The assurances given on many occasions by my Royal predecessors and myself, ever to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes of India," and added, "the Princes may rest assured that this pledge remains inviolate and inviolable." Mr. Attlee said: "If I were asked what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government to any State which has decided to cut adrift from its neighbours and assert its independence, I would say to the Ruler of that State, 'take your time, and think again.'"

It will be noted that several considerations arise out of these statements. First, the political contact of Great Britain with the Indian princes for the last two centuries and a quarter, has left no doubt that explicitly binding engagements exist between this country and the Indian States. Secondly, such engagements cannot be declared null and void unilaterally. Thirdly, only a few years ago an express undertaking was given by this country to the Princes that the transfer of paramountcy would not be undertaken without the consent and the knowledge of the Indian States. All these commitments are said to have been broken by the decision of His Majesty's Government through their recent declaration of not only removing paramountcy, but also by discouraging any States to seek the renewal of their political contact, either with the British Government or the Crown. The significance of this question cannot be fully comprehended without first considering what these Indian States are, their relative physical and moral importance, their value in Indian or Pakistan federation and their desire to remain completely independent and sovereign.

There are 562 Indian States, covering a combined area four times that of France with a population of nearly 94,000,000: Hyderabad alone is the size of Italy. They are generally divided into four groups: the Rajputana group, in existence before the Mogul Empire; a second group brought into being by nobles during the Mogul period, such as the Dominions of the Nizam of

Hyderabad; a third section emerging in the period of the decline of the Mogul power, as a result of the Mahratta Confederacy, and a fourth, the newer States such as Kashmir, which were set up at the advent of the British in India.

The policy of the East India Company towards these groups, collectively and individually, was one of non-intervention in their internal and external affairs. All the agreements, signed between their representatives and those of the East India Company, reveal that the Indian States were on an equal footing with the growing power of the Company, and little suggestion of subordination was apparent. After the transference of the Company's prerogative to the British Crown in 1857, Queen Victoria pledged herself to maintain the treaties and engagements concluded by the Company with the States; and in appointing Lord Canning as Governor-General, the Queen used the expression: "Our first Viceroy and Governor-General". This phrase was understood by the Princes to mean that they were in direct treaty relations with the person who occupied the British Throne, a position which was, perhaps, emphasized by the East India Company, when it undertook to respect the rights and privileges of the Indian States. In return it expected the States to have no intercourse with one another, and to remain strictly isolated in matters of policy, local or foreign.

The same position was maintained up to the beginning of the twentieth century; and whereas during the Company's period of governance, the question of paramountcy was neither broached nor definitely exercised, it was Lord Curzon who said in 1903, at Bhawalpur: "The sovereignty of the Crown is everywhere unchallenged; it has itself laid down the limitation of its own prerogative." In pursuance of this departure from the Company's policy, by the representative of the Crown in India, many examples can be cited to show that the Crown's representative could, and in fact did, interfere in the local affairs of the Indian States, directly or through the Political Department of the Government of India. Matters were left to drift in this form until the outbreak of the 1914-1918 war, when the Princes gave wholehearted support to the Imperial cause, and by virtue of the Act of 1919, there was an urge on the part of the Indian Princes to have their position clarified on the control of the paramount Power, and on the point that as they were no longer isolated islands in the body politic of India they were henceforth expected to act as a corporate body of the Chamber of Princes.

During the next seven years in India there was intense political agitation, in which the peoples of the Indian States were also deeply interested. In tune with their fellow-countrymen in British India, the subjects of the Princes demanded a share in the administration of their homeland. The peculiar point to note here is that, through an unwritten law, the British and the States spokesmen undertook not to interfere with each other's territory in any political sense, and therefore when the nationalist spirit surged high in British India, the rulers of the States, generally speaking, because they discouraged the invasion of British Indian ideals into their several territories were styled by

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their countrymen in British India as anti-Indian reactionaries. In point of fact, the rulers were conforming to their engagement with the British Government, in return for the so-called moral and material protection which the British had promised to them; as evinced by the many edicts passed in British India in favour of the Indian Princes.

In any case, the time had arrived when a clear-cut definition had to be found of the nature and extent of paramountcy, in its conception and application, over the States. Lord Reading's notorious letter to the Nizam of Hyderabad in 1926, over the question of Berar, had brought the whole issue to the forefront: "The right of the British Government to intervene in the internal affairs of the Indian States is another instance of the consequences necessarily involved in the supremacy of the British Crown . . . ." Under the chairmanship of Sir Harcourt Butler in 1928, an Indian States Committee was therefore set up to investigate the precise limits of the paramount Power. Excellent though its Report was, it failed to give any definite ruling on the point for the purpose of which it was avowedly appointed, so that the matter remained where it was.

By now, both in British India and the Indian States, there was political disquietude; and when, as the result of the Indian Act of 1935, federation was sought from the Indian States, the natural reaction of the rulers was to go back to their original demands. Finally, they did not come into the federation scheme until war started in 1939. True to their traditional engagement and putting aside the contest, the Indian States, big and small, threw their weight into the successful prosecution of the war.

Their services were as illustrious during this last war as they were during the previous one. His Highness the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar, the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, rose in the Chamber at the outbreak of war to move a resolution of loyalty and resolute devotion: "The Chamber of Princes requests His Excellency the Crown Representative kindly to place before His Imperial Majesty the King-Emperor the firm determination of the Ruling Princes and Chiefs of India to render every possible assistance in men, money and material to His Imperial Majesty and his Government in their heroic struggle for upholding the cause of justice and maintaining the sacredness of treaties and covenants . . . ." The testimony proudly published in the official documents of the Chamber of Indian Princes, covers fifty-six pages in its most condensed form, of help in men, material and money, and is a worthy monument of that attachment to their friends which 560 Maharajas and Nawabs of India nobly vindicated in the name of India.

Since the conclusion of the war many political comings and goings have occurred between this country and India, the outlines of which need no recapitulation, up to the latest phase of the Indian question, so happily solved barely a few weeks ago. And now the Indian Princes are faced, not with a dilemma, as some would regard it, but with the adoption of a clear policy

either of joining one or the other Dominion, that is, India or Pakistan, or of standing alone on their sovereign rights as a result of the removal of paramountcy. The scattered groups of the Indian States of Kathiawar and Gujarat resolved in June to form a confederation for the purpose of entering the Indian Union. Similarly, another group, led by the Maharaja of Nawanagar, decided only recently to form another confederation, called the "Union of Rajasthan"—in which the presidium will be the Executive of the Federation, to be advised by four members. The last named, like the Confederation of Kathiawar, in Western India, has in view the association of the people of their States in the venture; so that, preserving a monarchical form of Government, it may join the Union of India, as a democratic body, under the leadership of the Maharana of Udaipur. With the dismemberment of the Chamber of Princes, following the recent controversy in India, it is a happy augury for the future of Princely India that this grouping is taking place, because three hundred and twenty-seven nobles and chieftains, who formerly had no representation in the Chamber, now have that opportunity through the medium of this grouping. The States in the northern Punjab and in the United Provinces, along with the other groups already mentioned, when making an approach for federation with the Indian Union, may be confronted with uncomfortable problems; the Indian Congress may require them to surrender, according to Mr. Patel, the important sovereign rights of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. Those States which may surrender these rights, would perhaps require an assurance that the Indian Union would not make the mistake, as did the British Indian Government from time to time, of interfering in the domestic affairs of the Princes and their States.

In the nature of things, the Indian States must federate, either individually or in groups, in their own interest and in the interest of India, with the Indian Union or Pakistan. This dictum, however, does not apply to those who may wish to remain independent of these attachments; for instance, Kashmir, Bhopal, Travancore and Hyderabad. Each one of these appears to have full justification for remaining outside and choosing its own course. The question of Hyderabad provides a test case, and to examine it minutely is to understand one of the fundamental principles which should guide the Indian politics of tomorrow.

Hyderabad, the premier State of India, occupies an area in the Deccan the size of England and Scotland together; its population is sixteen millions—two and a half times that of Canada—and its Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, has formally declared his State's independence, to date from the British withdrawal on August 15. The present dynasty is descended from Asaf Jah, a famous ruler of the time of the Mogul Empire. This noble was called the "kingmaker", due to his power and great influence at Delhi; and when the Mogul Empire ceased to exist, the Nizam, as Viceroy of the Deccan, became an independent potentate. This independent status of the Nizam, at the time of



the British advent in India, has been acknowledged in numerous treaties made between successive Nizams and the East India Company, and later with the British Crown direct. In the seventh treaty, for example, in support of the idea of Hyderabad's independence, we find the following passage: "The three contracting parties having agreed to enter into the present war, should their arms be crowned with success in the joint prosecution of it, an equal division shall be made of the territory, forts, and whatever Government may become possessed of from the time of each party commencing hostilities." When Queen Victoria took over the engagements of the East India Company *en bloc* she agreed to respect all these treaties, and thus this particular one, with others respecting the independent status of the Nizam, still stands. It is on record too, that Lord Hastings in 1818, urged both the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh and the Nizam of Hyderabad openly to assume the title of kings of their own territories; a step which the Nizam at that time did not consider necessary. In consideration of these and other treaties international lawyers and historians support Hyderabad's right to maintain independent sovereignty. Another relic of history also serves to remind the people of the State of their traditional freedom. On the 19th of June each year is celebrated the anniversary of Hyderabad's Independence, dating from 1712, the time of Asaf Jah. It is interesting to note in this connection that in the official publication of the Chamber of Princes, the British Agent at Hyderabad is mentioned as "presenting his credentials" to the Nizam: a procedure well known as applying between sovereign States. In July 1789, another important treaty in the constitutional history of Hyderabad was signed by Earl Cornwallis, in which he recognized the State's right to conduct external affairs with neighbours: "I agree that in future either party, without a breach of treaty shall be at liberty to receive and send vakeels (emissaries) to correspond with any powers in the Deccan in such manner as may be expedient for the benefit of their own affairs."

In the contemporary sphere, the Nizam's position rests partly, too, on certain sovereign powers vested in him by usage and tradition; in the words of Professor Panikkar: "The recognized outward symbols of sovereignty, such as the right to give titles, to have coins and stamps (of their own), to be inviolable and above law, to have the authority to promulgate legislation which commands unquestioned obedience, the major Indian States possess and are guaranteed in their possession by treaties. They give titles of honour and distinction to their subjects. The Nizam gives the title of Maharaja, Rajah, Nawab, and all the rest of the recognized Indian titles of honour."

Briefly, then, the Nizam's right to independence for his Dominions may be said to rest on the documentary evidence in which such freedom is explicitly accepted; upon letters and pronouncements; and upon rights which are universally accepted as those of sovereign States, such as those of coinage, judiciary, and the right to bestow titles. Then there is the less tangible, but none the

less operative, historical evidence of usage; the people's recognition of the omnipotence of the Nizam, for example, and the innumerable other aspects so admirably described by Professor Westlake in his comments on the relationship of the ruler with the paramount Power, as a living, growing relationship, shaped by circumstance and policy, in a mixture of history, theory and modern fact. The future programme of these States which have chosen to retain their independence will probably be very similar to that of Hyderabad. In the words of the Nizam in his latest pronouncement: "The result in Law of the departure of the paramount Power in the near future will be that I shall become entitled to resume the status of an independent sovereign. But the question of the nature and extent of the association or relationship between my State and the units in British India remains for decision at a latter stage, when their constitutions and powers have been determined. Whatever form of constitution they ultimately adopt, it will be the desire of Hyderabad to live in the closest friendship and amity with both." It may also be added that the thorny question of the ownership of Berar is now happily adjusted, for although the Act of 1935 had recognized the Nizam's sovereignty over Berar, the effect of Clause (1) (b) of the recent Indian Independence Bill makes the Nizam's ownership of that part of India actual.

One thing, however, is certain from the repeated assertions of the Nizam. When the State regains her complete sovereignty, she will remain in the British Commonwealth as a Dominion, and has affirmed her determination to stand by all the existing treaties with Britain. The British Government, having declared through the India Act that all treaties between this country and the States will automatically lapse upon the establishment of India and Pakistan as Dominions, thereby proposes to denounce unilaterally her treaties with these States. Hyderabad thus would have no alternative but to maintain its independent status and arrange fresh treaties based on an alliance with Great Britain, as well as with the other Governments being set up in British India.

More or less on similar grounds Travancore could also justify her independence, in addition to the fact of her Dewan's recent fear of the rapid progress of communist influence there and his refusal to entertain any diplomatic association with the Soviet Union, which Mr. Nehru's government enjoys at the moment. Without careful consideration of the attitude of these major Indian States, the plethora of ills in India cannot be said to have been finally cured.

## SPAIN REVISITED (I)

BY A. F. WILLS

SPAIN has ever been a land about which it is extraordinarily hard to generalize. And when one has been absent from it for over ten years, with little opportunity during most of that time for following the course of events, the sudden plunge back into the Iberian atmosphere of harsh contrasts both material and spiritual is bound at first to be disconcerting. Soon, however, one begins to piece together the patch-work quilt, which remains a true symbol of the country from every point of view.

One need not be in the country more than a few days before noticing a certain feeling of isolation from the rest of the world—a feeling intensified in the consciousness, no doubt, by the interruption of direct communications with France. Foreign newspapers and books are scarce and expensive, and one is at once exposed to the full blasts of nation-wide propaganda. Occasionally a leading article may appear in a paper like the Monarchist *A.B.C.* which can, without too much strain, be understood as implied criticism—though in very general terms. Recently, for instance, this paper was fairly outspoken on the subject of the draft Law of Succession, the text of which was broadcast by General Franco on March 31, and, for a day or two after, a shadowy sort of sparring match took place between it and the party organ *Arriba*, seasoned with an ironic courtesy on the part of the former which could not fail to raise a few smiles. However, it is doubtful if even so much as this could have happened without official approval. The authorities make out that the control exercised is "preventive" rather than "coercive" but, at all events, the printed word remains largely the controlled word, except for the clandestine publications on single sheets of paper whose negative message produces its own type of frustration.

The sensation of control exercised in the interests of "public order" is not felt particularly strongly anywhere. In the capital, however, and in large cities like Barcelona, a strict, continuous though discreet, "surveillance" is maintained over possible "foci of infection", the general public being left to its own devices. Certainly, in cafés, bars and such places tongues appear to be no whit less busy "*echando pestes*"—showering abuse—on the Government as ever they were under a non-authoritarian one. Yet a foreigner cannot but notice the greater reserve displayed by most people to whom he is casually introduced. For the rest, people's movements are watched and travel permits have to be obtained to go from place to place. But for the foreigner there is

complete freedom to move around, subject only to normal police control.

Meanwhile, habeas corpus—or anything of that nature—simply does not exist. It is this which, above all, makes the régime unpalatable, if not detestable, to many of the intelligentsia. For justice in the courts is arbitrary. One is at the mercy of the police, while one's past history may be interpreted in such a way as to supply a plausible reason for depriving one of one's living and rightful professional status. In such circumstances, personal integrity counts for nothing against the petty vindictiveness of some minor official. One feels alone, bereft of the normal moral support which an unbiassed civil authority automatically provides. Small wonder, then, that the more sensitive find this atmosphere "*irrespirable*"—unbreathable.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that most Spaniards resent, or are even more than vaguely aware of, these restrictions on personal liberty. The Spaniard is not nearly so concerned with publishing his disagreement with the "state of affairs" as is the Englishman: it largely suffices him if he frequents a reliable coterie in whose ears he can pour out the vials of his pent-up wrath. Nor has he been accustomed to the rule of an impeccable, or near-impeccable, justice, to which the police forces have to bow the knee just like any ordinary citizen. Liberty, for him, is based far more on a sense of individual worth vis-à-vis other men than on the public expression of individual opinion or the enjoyment of individual political rights. In would seem, in fact, that, provided the material wants of daily existence are adequately assured, the ordinary Spaniard is not disinclined to accept an authoritarian government with something very nearly approaching a sigh of relief—relief in the sense that now there's nothing which he personally can do about it; so heigh-ho! let's get on with our own more important occupations—football, bull-fighting and the like, and leave the self-constituted authorities to manage those troublesome public affairs as best they can! Thus, after the nightmare of the Civil War, all the more reason why the present Government should be accepted, if not welcomed, as a bulwark against the recurrence of strife. Furthermore, the Spaniard's interest in party politics is not easily maintained, unless there happens to be some fairly immediate prospect of his particular "fancy" occupying the seat of power.

On the other hand, great reserves of devotion can be called upon when the opportunity is presented to express in action a common ideal for man in general, though involving—as it invariably seems to do—the suppression or expulsion of minorities unwilling to share in that ideal. The true Spanish approach to life's problems thus remains to-day, as it was in the sixteenth century, essentially a religious—or integrating—as opposed to a political—or opportunist—approach, however disguised in sheer opportunism it may at times appear, now as in the past. Brutality has marked this present régime—as it has marked outwardly similar ones in other countries—with a dark and sinister stain. But with all the harsh treatment meted out to dissident minorities, it still

remains true that in the course of the Civil War an ideal of social justice was painfully elaborated; that this ideal has since been staunchly upheld by General Franco and subordinates most concerned, and practical results obtained from the pursuit of it.

The guiding principle behind the National-Syndicalist movement led by the late José-Antonio Primo de Rivera, elder son of the dictator, may be roughly described as the humanizing of the relations between employer and employed, so that labour ceased to be regarded simply as a commodity which the employee offered for sale and the employer bought from him. Instead, what was offered and what was bought was the product of labour or, alternatively, the workman's service, and this gave back to labour its natural dignity, placing it above the hazards of an employer's irresponsibility towards his employees. It is around this fundamental principle of the dignity of labour—so forcefully enunciated in the famous encyclical of Leo XIII—that the social services under the present Government have been built.

The social services are many and varied. It is enough to say that compulsory insurance covers injury, sickness contracted in the exercise of one's profession, health and maternity, family allowances and old age pensions, the ratio of contribution as between employer and employed varying according to the particular service. The number of wage-earners insured under this scheme is nearly six and a quarter million out of a total working population (inclusive of all professions and trades) of 8,500,000, and up to June 30, 1946, benefits spread over the previous eight years and amounting to 5,300 million pesetas were paid out. It is worth noting that of this latter total 3,425 million pesetas, or say approximately two-thirds, represents payments made under family allowances to something over 3,250,000 beneficiaries, the number of insured persons at that date being around two and a half million. The general purpose of family allowances is to furnish wage-earners with financial assistance in proportion to the number of persons for whom they have to provide, special provision being made for agricultural labourers, widows and orphans, marriage loans and birth premiums. Contributions amount to six per cent. of salary; five per cent. being paid by the employer and one per cent. by the employee. What it amounts to is that a tax is levied on industry—in its widest sense—to ensure national support for the wage-earning family, the implication being that a nation's truest asset is its people.

Housing and land settlement are two other practical problems which have, in the main, been energetically tackled from the National-Syndicalist angle. At the end of the Civil War, Spain was left with over 80,000 new houses to build and a serious lack of locally-produced materials for building them. The supply of local materials is still far from satisfying the demand; but all industries auxiliary to the building trade have been specially encouraged with the result that the production of cement, for example, is now over three million tons per annum. Building activities ranging from miners' homes in Asturias (where 5,000 new houses have solved the shortage) to university cities and from

rural homesteads to dams and reservoirs indicate a forward-looking policy.

The government department chiefly concerned with the building or rebuilding of homes is the *Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda*, created in April 1939. It has the enviable reputation of working, not against, but in co-operation with, the different local authorities, and is now well on the way towards the completion of its original programme. But it is not the only public body engaged in reconstruction work. There is also the *Dirección General de Regiones Devastadas* whose job is to rebuild not just houses but whole towns and villages, such as Brunete, which was completed towards the end of 1945. At the end of December 1946 it had nearly 16,500 new or rebuilt homes to its credit, in addition to numerous schools and public buildings of all kinds, including 150 parish churches, while a further 700 public buildings had been rebuilt out of funds administered by the organization. With a nation-wide reconstruction scheme of this sort, centralized in Madrid, there has been obviously a certain amount of wastage and overlapping. But the municipalities of these shattered towns and villages could never, of their own accord, have raised the necessary funds for rebuilding. Furthermore, there were the distinct advantages, obtained by this centralization, of the most up-to-date building devices that could be employed, the first-class architectural talent that could be engaged and that local authorities and other public bodies less directly concerned could be easily and naturally associated with the scheme.

It is sometimes pointed out that reconstruction work in Spain has been slow; that more use could have been made of prefabricated houses; that the great thing is to get a roof over peoples' heads, irrespective of what the roof looks like or how long it may last. It should be remembered, however, that, quite apart from the supply difficulties already referred to, Spain is still predominantly an agricultural country, which means that in very many cases building a house means building the right sort of a house, with maybe a walled-in yard and outhouses for domestic animals into the bargain. Certainly, the housing shortage in Madrid is acute, and, on the face of it, far more use of cheap, temporary constructions might have been made there. But only the west and south-west outskirts of the city were severely damaged, and the shortage is the direct result of an increase of over half in the population since the Civil War.

The drift to the towns is proceeding in Spain as in other countries, and with more reason perhaps than in most, for conditions in some of the rural districts, especially of the south and south-west are still very bad. This is an old legacy for which the present Government is no more responsible than was the Republican government before it. Each, in turn, has adopted a scheme for settling the landless on the land, and, to a certain extent, the present Government has taken up the task where the previous one left off. But whereas, under the Republic, the colonist was envisaged as the eventual proprietor of his piece of land at some remote and unspecified date, remaining until further notice a rent-payer to the State, under the present Government a definite target limit is

fixed by the end of which time he should be completely independent.

This changed attitude has a double effect. It encourages the colonist to take the job seriously in order to become a small proprietor within a reasonable time; while the State enters into a far closer, more personal, contractual relationship with the colonist. Thus its interest in him is not merely economic but formative; that is, it is not just concerned with his livelihood and means of repaying the loans and costs of farming materials provided; but also with his development as a social being, fitting him for responsible ownership through education, medical services and whatever may aid him to rise to a superior human level. Normally, the colonist passes, after a five years' probationary period, to the position of potential owner, becoming absolute owner at the end of a further period of twenty years, by which time it is estimated he will have paid back in easy stages, either in money or in kind, the value of the advances made to him. But there is no hard-and-fast rule. The system is sufficiently flexible to allow for unforeseen circumstances and individual treatment of each case.

The chief zones affected by this scheme are in Lower Aragon, Murcia and along the lower reaches of the Guadalquivir. Altogether there are fourteen zones actually in course of development, of which thirteen are on the basis of irrigation. Up to the end of last year some 20,000 families had thus been settled or re-settled on the land, an average of 4,000 families a year since 1942 when the government department concerned—*Instituto de Colonización*—first began to be effective. I have made an extensive tour of the Guadalquivir region, with the special object of studying the working of this land-settlement scheme there. Much remains to be done; but what has been accomplished is truly remarkable. From miserable huts thatched with dry grass to solid, four-roomed homes with kitchen and w.c., yard and stabling, kitchen garden and four and a half hectares of good, irrigated land, with church, school and clinic all within easy reach—such is the measure of difference! Many of the colonists in this area were composed of those who had already begun to be placed there under the *Reforma Agraria* in the time of the Republic. The remainder had been selected by the *Instituto* and mostly came from neighbouring towns whence they had drifted, originally, in search of work.

These projects, designed to raise the standard of living of the humblest, go hand-in-hand with an ambitious plan for supplying the entire country with cheap electricity. U.N.E.S.A.—the Electricity Co-ordinating Board—controls about eight-five per cent. of national production. The supply of electricity has doubled since 1939 and the present year should see an increase of 600 million kilowatts' worth of new energy available. The engineers estimate that if there is no interference with the present rate of progress, Spain should, within a relatively short time, be freed from the burden of importing fuel. Spain must become progressively industrialized if she is to maintain her population which increases at the rate of one million every four years.

The rise in the cost of living has, unfortunately, reduced—at any rate for the present—the net advantage it was calculated that the mass of people would derive from the measures of social reform already outlined. Sr. Girón de Velasco, Minister of Labour, has more than once in his speeches regretted that prices were continually outstripping all attempts at a fairer distribution of purchasing power. There have recently, however, been slight indications that prices were beginning to fall. Should this tendency persist, thanks to sufficient harvests, steady advances in industrial production and, not least, the new trade agreement with the Argentine, present dissatisfaction with the régime among the poorer class in the large cities is bound to diminish.

Enough has been said, I think, about the Franco régime from the material angle to indicate why General Franco can reasonably expect to receive a fair measure of support from the Spanish working-class in addition to the strong backing upon which he has always been able to count among the middle-classes. Propaganda abroad has done its best, or its worst, to pour scorn upon the spontaneous and nation-wide manifestations of solidarity of December 9, 1946, after having contributed largely towards bringing these about; but facts will not be dislodged so easily. The régime has its bitter enemies of course, and they are by no means only to be found among Leftist groups. On the contrary, there are all the disgruntled big business elements whose wings have been clipped to a considerable extent and who long to have them grow again under the benign rays—so they imagine—of traditional Bourbon-Habsburg monarchy. There are also all those of genuine Liberal tendency who view with ill-concealed disgust the present closed system of education, the inordinate influence of the Church in that sphere, and the pathetic efforts of party-trained men to fill educational posts which, in the past, were occupied by men of the highest professional competence, many of whom are still abroad.

Thus, though the country is progressing materially, it is obvious that spiritually it has been put into reverse gear. It has been too easy for upstarts, jealous and bent only on their own material advancement, to invoke lack of orthodoxy or past "anti-Spanish activities" on the part of their professional superiors and so relegate them to subordinate positions, or keep them out of professional posts altogether. True, one or two great Spaniards and international figures, like José Ortega y Gasset and Gregorio Marañón have returned within recent years to carry on with their work, and have publicly declared themselves in favour of the present régime. But even they, with their prestige, were not immune—at any rate at first—from calumny and misrepresentation in the clerical press.

(Mr. Wills, who lived in Spain before the Civil War and has recently returned to that country, will discuss in the second part of his article, to be published in September, the spiritual and political atmosphere.)

## WAR AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES

BY BEN S. MORRIS

AFTER the 1914-1918 war there was a growing public recognition of the contributions which could be made to the welfare of the community through the development of psychological services. Practical techniques for dealing with problems in education and industry rapidly became more widely available, and the help of medical psychology became increasingly sought for the alleviation of mental suffering. Parallel developments have already begun to take place since the conclusion of the 1939-1945 war. There are, however, many profound differences between the situation now and in the early 1920's. Not only is the scope of the psychological contribution seen to be very much wider than it was hitherto thought to be, but public awareness is at a much higher level.

This awareness is, however, double edged and it is necessary for psychologists to take their social responsibilities extremely seriously. There are many people who are still convinced, not only that what there is in psychology, which is not commonsense, is nonsense, but that it is dangerous nonsense, at that. The more general attitude, however, is that psychology is 'on trial' and there is a readiness to accept psychological help where this is felt to be practical and likely to lead to immediate results which may be regarded as beneficial. There is as yet little realization that psychology, like any other branch of science, needs to investigate its problems by properly validated methods of research, and that it cannot guarantee either immediate results or that the results themselves, when available, will be welcomed by all concerned. A story which is related of some work in the Army may be quoted in illustration of this latter point. Investigations showed that the supply of well qualified applicants for commissions was greatly increased when the rank and file of units were allowed to nominate for candidature those of their fellows whom they felt might make good officers. Candidates nominated in this way, of course, underwent the same selection procedure as those nominated by their C.O.'s in the normal manner. The story goes that in spite of this, the procedure was held to be rather too radical and the experiment was discontinued.

The official Report of psychological work in the Services\* in the 1939-1945 war is concerned with summarizing methods and results from the many specialized fields in which psychologists and psychiatrists worked, and in making

recommendations for the improvement and development of the work in the Services themselves. It demonstrates the extremely wide range of problems towards the solution of which psychological methods have been found capable of making a contribution. The contrast between the scope and volume of psychological work in the 1914-1918 war and that reported here is staggering. In 1914-1918 the assistance of the psychological sciences was sought to help in the solution of two main problems. These were selection and grading of recruits and the treatment of "shell shock" or "battle neuroses" cases. (The latter problem received more attention in the British Army and the former in the American.)

In the 1939-1945 war the services of psychological specialists were called upon in relation to a vastly wider range of problems. Beginning, on the one hand, with provisions for recommending the rejection of those mentally unfit for service, and for the treatment of psychological disturbances arising in Service life, and, on the other, with the selection and grading of recruits for allocation to different Service employments, psychological work rapidly expanded in its scope to cover—to take the more important examples—methods and conditions of training, the design of operational equipment, the selection of officers, the morale of fighting units, psychological warfare, the study of German prisoners of war and the resettlement of returning Service men.

Many of these problems required highly specialized training and research. There was work for almost every kind of psychological specialist, ranging from those with expert knowledge of the special senses, such as vision, to those whose work lay in the relief of mental suffering through psychotherapy. Moreover, the nature of Service requirements brought psychologists into contact with many novel problems. This was so not only in fields where concepts and techniques were already fairly well developed, for example, in methods and conditions of learning but also in fields in which there had previously been very little progress, as in social psychology and in particular the study of problems of leadership and group morale.

It is difficult to present a coherent picture of the highly varied pattern of work which developed. This is due both to the wide range and variety of the problems studied and to the fact that the scope of these studies varied very greatly between the three Services. Moreover, the picture is complicated by the different rôles assumed under different conditions by the various types of psychological specialist. Broadly speaking, non-medical psychologists were concerned with assessing educability and personality, with ascertaining the best conditions of learning, training and working methods and conditions, and with investigating the inter-relation between individuals and groups. Psychiatrists, that is, medical psychologists, were primarily concerned, like other medical officers, with maintaining health, but because of the growing awareness of the need for a mentally healthy community, the psychiatrist's traditional function of alienist tended to become subsidiary to his tasks in preventive

\* *The Work of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in the Services.* H.M. Stationery Office. 2s.6

medicine. It was found in practice that the fields of work with which medical and non-medical psychologists were concerned were often identical and much of the most fruitful work came through the active collaboration of both these branches of the psychological profession. For example, in the three inter-related spheres of selection, training and morale, the clinical experience and techniques of the psychiatrists turned out to be the indispensable complement to the more exact scientific methods of non-medical psychologists.

The Report does not and could not be expected to deal fully with any particular line of work. Nor does it attempt to assess the general implications of the work it reports for the development of psychology in relation to the practical problems of human life. The main body of the work reported is of immediate interest only to specialists. It is probable that the most far-reaching implications of psychological work in the Services will be found, not in the extremely interesting but highly specialized developments in say physiological psychology or in clinical psychiatry itself, or even in the selection of personnel—that most popular topic—but rather in the developments in social psychology concerned with problems of leadership, of morale, and of interpersonal and inter-group relations. Some of the most important of this work was done after the completion of the evidence for this Report, but the more general implications of work already done do not seem to have been fully realized.

Perhaps the best known of these developments is officer selection in the Army. After Dunkirk the flow of volunteers for commissions from the ranks became dangerously inadequate in size and of very poor quality, as was shown by the high rejection rate at Officer Training Units. This situation was remedied by the introduction of psychological techniques of selection which were manifestly fair and careful and which were conducted in a social atmosphere in which the rigid barriers between commissioned and non-commissioned ranks were at least partly broken down. The essential feature of the new technique was not the special tests or interviews which were used but the active participation of military officers, psychological technicians and the candidates themselves in the common task of finding those most suitable to go forward for training as officers.

The effect of this development on the number and quality of candidates for commissions was quite startling. There was thus a major improvement in morale, which may well be claimed as the most important result of this work, quite apart from such scientific proof as was obtained, that the new methods did in fact select better officers than the old. What in fact happened was that the traditional and rigid class structure of the Army was broken down, resulting in a vast increase in 'social mobility' which was of the greatest benefit to the Army as a whole.

Another very important result was a complete change in the concept of leadership which emerged among those engaged in officer selection. Leader-

ship was clearly seen not to be some mysterious quality possessed by a few specially endowed individuals but rather to be a rôle conferred by a group on one or more of its members to enable the group to carry out its appointed tasks. Under experimental conditions it was found that, left to themselves, groups of men invariably throw up their leaders who, after being 'tested out' by the group were either confirmed in their function, or rejected and their place taken by others. The number of individuals who could successfully assume leadership in this way was found to be surprisingly large.

Again in attempting to make provision for repatriated prisoners of war the military authorities early became aware (chiefly owing to a pioneer investigation conducted by a psychiatrist) that these men presented a severe problem to themselves, to the Army, and to the civilian community. Most of us have some personal knowledge of the fact that repatriates on their return felt strange, dissatisfied, and out of place, and that their relatives, after the initial raptures of reunion had passed, were also affected by difficulties in resuming previous relationships. This problem was in essence solved through the creation of special communities, Civil Resettlement Units—for which repatriates could volunteer—which were half way houses between the prison camp on the one hand and normal Army and civilian life on the other.\* The essential feature of these communities was that they were democratically organized to allow these men to work their own way through their problems, with guidance and help from military officers, civilian organizations and psychological technicians. It was this active participation of all concerned together with very great and real freedom of action that enabled many of these men, their relatives and their employers mutually to readjust their relations to each other. The psychological staff concerned with this work considered that the problem was essentially one of creating social conditions in which the tensions and barriers created between prisoners of war and their home communities could be dissipated and broken down, by participant responsibility.

The real significance of these undertakings lies in the fact that they illustrate an attempt to deal with the problem of mass human adjustment by scientific means. It is fairly obvious that the concepts and techniques developed have wide implications in the field of normal community life. Industrial morale and the planning of new communities are two examples which quickly spring to mind. Shrewd observers have already recorded their conviction, not only that production problems are often largely problems of morale and that industrial morale is generally far below what it might be, but that this is so, not primarily because of poor economic incentives, extremely important as these are, but because of tensions and barriers which exist between management and workers, even in the most benevolent industries. As a result, the workers

\* Described in *The Serviceman Comes Home* by A. T. M. Wilson, Pilot Papers: 1946: I. Pilot Press.



feel, and rightly feel, that they are not really, that is, humanly participant in production, but only participant in terms of their labour value. These tensions are present even where Joint Production Committees exist and this phenomenon is clearly one which calls for investigation by scientific methods.

One other development begun in the Services and which is of prime importance may be noted. This was the investigation by Army psychiatrists and psychologists of the mentality of German prisoners. The results of this investigation clearly showed the way in which the Nazi outlook develops. Its roots were seen to lie deep in the social and family traditions of German life, which are highly conducive to the development of an authoritarian character—that is, a kind of personality which functions at its best only within a rigid hierarchical structure, where status, and the giving and receiving of orders, are the most important considerations, and which is the natural breeding ground of sadism and terror. This study lays bare the psychosociological determinants of German aggression. Before a complete explanation can be given of why this form of society should have developed to the limit in twentieth-century Germany, these psychological findings will have to be closely related to the economic and material facts of German history in its world setting.

The link between the three lines of investigation quoted may not be obvious at first sight. The key lies in the concepts of the 'authoritarian character' and the 'authoritarian institution'. Authoritarianism is not an exclusively German characteristic. Shorn of overt sadism and modified by benevolent attitudes and partially democratic procedures, the authoritarian way of life permeates to a greater or lesser extent all human societies which at present exist. An army, as we know it, even a so-called democratic one, is essentially an authoritarian structure. Officer Selection Boards and Civil Resettlement Units were, by contrast, in essence and within certain limits, participant democracies. This was the reason for their success in releasing tensions, breaking down barriers and so creating conditions which, in the one case allowed officer candidates spontaneously to reveal their true personalities, and, in the other, allowed repatriated prisoners of war and the home community to effect mutual re-adjustment.

Why these developments first took place in the Army is an interesting historical problem. It may be, in part, that the Army was the largest of the Services and thus presented the problems in their most pressing forms. It is certainly true that a partial explanation is to be found, again for historical reasons, in that psychiatrists and psychologists employed in the Army contained among them a large group of those whose interests lay in the fields of personality study and of psychotherapy. This group tended to approach the problems of Army life as a whole from a 'clinical' standpoint, that is to say, in much the same way as modern psychopathology regards the maladjustment of the individual—whether soldier or civilian—as due to stresses in his emotional

life, so they tended to view the broader problems of the Army in terms of tensions, largely unconscious, existing between individuals, between individuals and groups, and between groups. Very often these tensions were found to be related to authoritarian individuals and the authoritarian way of life. Since the experiments described aimed at releasing these tensions and restoring social 'health' this work has not inaptly come to be called 'social therapy'.

What are the limits of this 'social therapy' and to what problems may it be applied? It is now reported that UNESCO have adopted as a major research project an inquiry entitled "Tensions Affecting International Understanding", in which it is proposed to study and attempt to reduce inter-group tensions, at various levels of social organization. Is it perhaps to developments of this sort that mankind must look for its salvation?

The solution of the Service problems discussed here, was in essence simple—in practice extremely difficult. Officer Selection Boards and Civil Resettlement Units were created and had to survive in the face of very considerable opposition. Indeed, by far the most interesting and pressing problem for those social scientists interested in such work, is the diagnosis and treatment of the resistances which society itself displays in any attempt to deal with its problems along these lines. These resistances take forms which are strikingly familiar to the psychotherapist in his work with individuals. They resemble closely the resistances displayed by neurotic patients to any attempts to give them back their health. From this point of view, the social scientist who investigates these problems with a view to helping towards a solution finds himself in a position in which he is regarded with highly mixed feelings. He himself is a source of tension and problems: on the one hand, there is an attitude which asserts that these problems are psychological and need psychological help for their solution, and, on the other, an attitude of anxiety and hostility rooted in a deep-seated feeling that a solution will involve the sacrifice of values and privileges which are held to be indispensable to the happiness of those concerned.

Taking the widest view of the situation, it may be seen that while the 1939-1945 war produced, on the one hand, a demonstration—on a macroscopic scale—of the tremendous powers of self-destruction now in the hands of human society, on the other, it produced a demonstration, very much less dramatic and less convincing and only on a microscopic scale, that human knowledge and skill when applied to human problems are capable of understanding and of relieving, if not of eliminating, conditions which give rise to many of the anxieties and hostilities which bedevil human relationships.

As has so often been said, the resolution of the present crisis in human affairs is a matter of whether or not men can, quickly enough, gain an understanding and control of themselves and their relationships, commensurate with their understanding and control of physical nature. Dilemmas of this very general order are not unfamiliar to those who have undertaken a long-term

view of the history and development of human society. The development of the very conditions which seem to threaten the existence of a society is often accompanied by the development of methods for dealing with these threats. The two sets of factors are clearly part of the same complex process which is at work in the growth of human communities. In the past, particular civilizations have perished not simply because they contained within themselves the seeds of their own doom, but because they were unable to utilize the powers they also had within them to remedy the diseases from which they suffered.

The major issue facing mankind at the present time is whether the particular societies which make up industrial civilization will be able, in time to avert disaster, to utilize and develop such knowledge and skill in the handling of mass human problems as they have already gained. Small though this knowledge and skill is, in proportion to the issue, we may well ask whether hope is to be found anywhere else. It should by now be clear that no basic solution is possible through economics and politics in themselves, for it is precisely in these spheres that human conflicts are writ largest. An attempt must be made to discover what lies behind these forms of thought and action in terms of basic human needs and strivings. The minimum equipment needed for such an investigation would seem to be a combination of the values of humanism, and the methods of scientific inquiry, along with an attitude of genuine tolerance and humility, sufficient to allow us to accept what may turn out to be unwelcome findings about our own way of life. This applies with equal force to all societies which make up our civilization. We may of course feel that the 'British Way of Life' is almost beyond criticism and that "if only America . . . ." or "if only Russia . . . ." But this displacement of problems on to outside objects is a phenomenon only too familiar to the psychologist. Problems exist in others too, but in this, as in other matters, therapy must begin at home. The crucial question would seem to be whether as a community we have sufficient tolerance and humility to undertake such a self-examination.

*(Mr. Ben Morris, B.Sc., Ed. B., was engaged during the war at the Research and Training Centre, War Office Selection Boards, and is now on the senior staff of the Tavistock Clinic and Tavistock Institute of Human Relations.)*

## AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION

BY CHARLES CROWTHER

THE impact of two world wars upon the elaborate structure of our modern civilization, with its continuing threat to the maintenance of the standards and amenities of living that we have been accustomed to regard as the essential minimum, has forced us back to the ever-present awareness of primitive man that our pre-eminent requirement is food. This alone is far from being our sole need, but without it we can satisfy no other. Nor can we in spite of the imposing achievements of science, obtain it as yet, other than through the practice of agriculture which, even in its most highly-elaborated modern forms, still rests mainly upon the great mass of empirical knowledge accumulated by its craftsmen throughout the ages. Some day, no doubt, the scientist will achieve, through the synthesis of proteins, fats, carbohydrates and other essential ingredients of our dietary, the supreme triumph of wresting from nature some considerable part of her age-long monopoly, but that day is not yet in sight. Meanwhile in our dependence upon the farmer it is prudent that we should not only provide for him conditions under which he will be content to perform his task, but that we should also see that he is left with no pretext for ascribing the blame to us if he does not.

By steps that we do not entirely understand the art of husbandry has been steadily developed and perfected, although the first eighteen centuries of the Christian era added astonishingly little of basic importance to the store of accumulated practical knowledge recorded in Roman literature. Of book-learning there was abundance, but in the main it had little influence on actual field practice. Recognition of the need for something more than tradition received its first impulse from the development of the enclosure movement, especially from the middle of the seventeenth century onwards but it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that the need for organized educational facilities received academic recognition by the foundation in 1790 of a chair of agriculture at the University of Edinburgh and the Fordyce Lectureship at Aberdeen, followed in 1796 by the Sibthorpe bequest for the establishment of a Professorship of Rural Economy at Oxford. In each case, however, the aim was probably more that of providing facilities for individuals to devote themselves to study and research in the sciences related to agriculture than to systematic instruction in husbandry, since at that time instruction could amount to little more than teaching what every intelligent farmer knew and practised.

Whether this was so or not, little or no progress was made in the development of agriculture as a teaching subject at the universities until Robert Wallace,

in 1880 or thereabouts, instituted the degree course in agriculture at Edinburgh, which provided for instruction in both the practice and science of crop and animal husbandry. This proved to be a momentous step in the history of our agricultural educational organization, since most of the men who during the next two decades were entrusted with the development of agricultural education in England and Wales were recruited from Edinburgh graduates.

Far more potent in its influence upon the development of agricultural education than these early university foundations was the remarkable advance made by the chemical and physical sciences in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This brought with it not only new knowledge and a clearer understanding of the precise significance of existing knowledge, but also the ability to forecast with more assurance of success the directions in which agricultural practice could be still further improved. With the increase of useful knowledge, notably as to the possibilities and effective use of artificial manures and feeding-stuffs, the farmer's task became more complicated and the need for more systematic training in the newer knowledge than practical experience by itself could give was more clearly recognized.

The final impulse to the establishment of an organization for systematic agricultural education was given in the 'thirties and early 'forties of the last century by the classic work of von Liebig, in which through collation of existing knowledge he was able to deduce the basic chemical principles underlying the processes of plant and animal life and thereby to lay the foundations of a true science of agricultural chemistry.

By the early eighteen-forties the stage was thus set for the beginnings of systematic instruction in the principles and practice of agriculture, though scientific advance was still not ripe for its development at the universities. The initiative was taken, in accordance with the age-long tradition of the land, by the landed interest when, through the enthusiasm of a body of progressive farmers and landowners, implemented through the newly-founded Royal Agricultural Society and supported by royal patronage, the first agricultural college was founded at Cirencester in 1845, and opened to students in April 1846. It survives to-day as the Royal Agricultural College, more prosperous than ever, to celebrate its centenary.

This early enthusiasm seems to have waned in the ensuing golden age of modern British farming of the mid-Victorian era, and no further development in training facilities took place for some fifty years, apart from the establishment of a few private colleges, such as Downton and Aspatria, on the Cirencester model, and the beginnings of some examinations for the encouragement of private study.

With the onset of the prolonged agricultural depression in the 'eighties, however, and the enforced attention of governments to the problem of providing relief and assistance for the industry, the entirely inadequate provision for agricultural education became too patent to be ignored. Since the landed

interest was no longer in a position to provide and finance its own educational requirements the subsequent history of the development of agricultural education has been almost entirely one of a steadily increasing assumption of initiative and responsibility by the State, both directly and through the local government organizations.

The systematic provision for agricultural education, supervised and largely financed from national taxation and local rates, that we now take for granted, had its inception in the Technical Instruction Act of 1888, by which local education authorities were empowered to provide technical, including agricultural, instruction. This was further implemented in 1890 by the allocation to the newly-established Board of Agriculture of the residue ("whisky money") arising under the Local Taxation (Customs and Excise) Act of that year. This led to the establishment in many counties of small staffs for the provision of peripatetic technical instruction in agriculture for farmers and others engaged in work on the land,—a provision that has now become universal throughout the United Kingdom.

To this period belong also the foundations of the two existing endowed residential colleges of Harper Adams and Seale Hayne and the two colleges established by local authorities, Wye and Midland, which have recently become university departments of agriculture. Of the institutions and university departments providing agricultural training to-day only the Royal Agricultural College (1845) and the Agricultural Department of University College, Bangor (1888) date any further back.

Financial aid by the State for agricultural education amounted in 1890-1891 to £4,840, but by 1899-1900 the total expenditure by local authorities in England and Wales had increased to £77,000, of which about two-thirds was provided by the Exchequer. A corresponding increase in institutional facilities took place, and in 1908 the Departmental Committee on Agricultural Education presided over by Lord Reay was able to report that the foundations of a national system of agricultural education had by then been laid. Further provision of funds on a much larger scale for new work was next made possible by the Development and Road Improvement Act, 1909, and a substantial part of this was applied to the creation and extension of advisory work and agricultural research. By 1914 the annual maintenance expenditure by local authorities had risen to £86,000, and annual maintenance grants of about £19,000 were being made by the Board of Agriculture to the university departments and agricultural colleges.

By that time the national agricultural educational organization had developed the basic structure that it was to retain substantially until the end of the 1939-1945 war. Instruction at the highest level was provided by the universities, at the intermediate stage by the agricultural colleges, and at a lower level by the county agricultural education authorities, mainly by peripatetic teachers but supplemented in a few counties (eight in 1914) by the establishment of

residential training centres now called farm institutes. General advisory assistance to farmers and other food producers was provided by the county staffs, this being supplemented by the work of scientific specialists operating from educational centres each serving a group of neighbouring counties. There were also specialized research institutes and grants were made in support of individual research in the universities and colleges.

With the end of the 1914-1918 war, however, the enhanced public appreciation of the importance of home agriculture to the national economy, and the widespread demand for agricultural training from ex-servicemen, necessitated a large and rapid expansion of agricultural education. This the local authorities and institutions would have found difficult to provide but for the greatly enhanced Exchequer assistance made possible through the fund (£850,000) set aside under the Corn Production Acts (Repeal) Act of 1921 and the further £400,000 placed in 1924 at the disposal of the Ministry of Agriculture. Although the greater part of these monies was spent on research—considerable development was also made in instructional and advisory work, the grants to universities and colleges having risen by 1933-1934 to £56,000, and the maintenance expenditure by local authorities to £330,000. By that time, in the period of about forty years, starting from practically nothing, a great national organization had been built up comprising fourteen colleges and university departments for higher education, and for primary education seventeen county farm institutes and a staff of nearly 600 highly qualified men and women spread throughout the counties in constant and close touch with the farming community. In addition a specialist advisory organization and a series of research institutes covered the greater part of the field of scientific research bearing upon agricultural problems. Though still inadequate in relation to the size of its task, its most generally admitted defect was a lack of any effective mechanism for the co-ordination of the various instructional, advisory and research services which were independently controlled. This was substantially the position on the outbreak of the 1939-1945 war.

The plans prepared in advance for this war emergency visualized so great a dislocation of the normal activities of national life as to require an almost complete suspension of institutional courses of agricultural instruction, and a concentration of their resources upon the practical training of women volunteers for farm work recruited by the Women's Land Army. In the case of the colleges and county farm institutes this plan was brought into operation immediately on the outbreak of war, while the university departments made little or no change in their normal procedure. Fortunately also the course of events soon made it possible for most of the colleges to resume their courses, although the injurious effects of the breach of continuity and revision of staffs persisted throughout the first two years, and were accentuated in the later stages by the necessity for some shortening of the period of training in order to meet the requirements of the recruitment boards.

As for the farm institutes the 'black out' of normal training courses persisted throughout the war period and it is only within the last year or so that they have been able to resume their functions. A similar, though less sweeping, restriction was also placed upon the extra-mural instructional activities of the county staffs, most of whom were transferred or seconded to the County War Agricultural Executive Committees, charged with the practical direction of the national food production drive. In due course many of the agricultural educational staff of the counties, colleges and universities were brought into active co-operation with the work of the committees, both for administrative and advisory activities. The value of their work is writ large across the national record. This success represented in large measure the harvest of forty years' steady infiltration of instruction, advice and the results of research into the industry. To those concerned with the work of the educational organization throughout the inter-war years nothing was more encouraging than the steady growth in all parts of the country of a more sympathetic and practical interest taken by the general body of farmers in the work of the educational services, and this did much to help the application of the more drastic measures of persuasion that war conditions imposed.

With this impressive demonstration of the possibilities inherent in an efficient combination of practice with science it seemed that the time had arrived for a review of agricultural education. The necessary action was taken by the appointment in July 1941 by the Minister of Agriculture of a Committee under the chairmanship of the late Lord Justice Luxmoore "to examine the present system of Agricultural Education in England and Wales, and to make recommendations for improving and developing it after the war." The presentation of the Report\* of this Committee in January 1943 was followed by the appointment in July 1944 of two Committees, both under the chairmanship of Dr. T. Loveday, and with an element of common membership. The one Committee, appointed by the Minister of Agriculture, was charged "to consider the character and extent of the need for higher agricultural education in England and Wales and to make recommendations as to the facilities which should be provided to meet the needs"; while the other, appointed jointly by the Ministers of Agriculture and of Education, was charged "to advise on all aspects of agricultural education to be provided by Local Education Authorities and particularly on the educational policy and methods of training to be adopted at farm institutes." The Report of the Higher Education Committee was presented in December 1945; the Joint Committee has so far presented a Report (April 1945) on the Provision in Secondary Schools of Courses preparatory to Agricultural Employment, and an Interim Report (November 1946) on Agricultural Education in Agricultural and Horticultural Institutes.† With these reports available the stage was now largely set for the next development of

\* Cmd. 6433. H.M. Stationery Office.

† H.M. Stationery Office, 1947.

agricultural educational organization.

Of the committee reports chief interest has been taken in that of the Luxmoore Committee since its wider reference made it possible for it to undertake a broad and frankly critical review of the character extent and quality of the then existing system of institutional and non-institutional education. On the nature and quality of the educational facilities provided the Committee had little serious criticism of the system to offer, but were more outspoken about its organizational defects.

The main defects of the present system are due, in our opinion, to (a) the absence of any authority charged with the positive duty of providing any form of agricultural education, (b) the number of different authorities which, at the present time, provide education, and (c) the diversity of the sources and available means of finance.

As far as (a) was concerned, it was probably not generally recognized that the Ministry of Agriculture up to that time had no direct control over agricultural education, nor power to act on its own initiative in providing, or requiring the provision of new places for institutional education such as colleges or farm institutes. The Ministry could only exercise a partial and indirect measure of control through its grants to and inspection of aided institutions. For farm institutes and extra-mural educational facilities the responsibility for initiative and development lay entirely with the county councils, and being optional was fulfilled more nearly in proportion to the rating capacities of the various areas than to their agricultural educational needs. In general the predominantly agricultural areas were less adequately and efficiently provided for than others.

The solution proposed by the Committee envisaged the setting up of a central statutory authority (which we call the National Council for Agricultural Education) charged with the positive duty of providing, at the cost of the National Exchequer, for the different branches of agricultural education and with the necessary powers to enable it to perform this duty. This council should be so constituted that it is outside the Ministry of Agriculture, but is under the control of the Minister who should be answerable for it to Parliament.

This Council was to be charged with the duty of providing a comprehensive system of agricultural education; it was to take over all existing farm institutes and provide a sufficient number of new ones. It was also to replace the existing county and provincial advisory services by a national advisory service. Its organization, it was thought, should also include an educational inspectorate with

the duty of inspecting the centres of agricultural education other than university departments and of raising and safeguarding the standards of the examinations.

The basic defect of this proposal was that it would have accentuated still further a difficulty that has always been experienced in securing efficient co-ordination of rural educational effort. Throughout modern history the organizational relationships of agricultural education to the national organization for general education has been the subject of recurrent discussion and inquiry. As yet no more than a compromise solution, which has depended for its satisfactory working upon the relationship between the two Ministries concerned, has been

found. There may be a strong case for specialized supervision, and even control, of the more narrowly technical aspects of agricultural education. There can be none for a weakening of its all too slender organizational relationship to the general educational system, such as its transfer to an 'outside' body would involve.

It is not surprising therefore that the proposed new organization has not found official acceptance, but in the subsequent agricultural legislation increased powers have been granted to the Ministry of Agriculture which have made it possible to bring into being already the major reforms that the 'National Council' was to have undertaken. In particular the consolidation of the advisory services into a national advisory service has been effected, there are to be more farm institutes and the arrangements between the two Ministries for the division of responsibility are brought into line with the changed situation in general education created by the Education Act 1944. With the raising of the school leaving age to fifteen and the prospect of compulsory further education to eighteen there will be the double advantage of a longer general education and the raising of the educational standard required for admission to the training institutions.

The reports of the two Loveday Committees deal mainly with matters of specialized detail relating to the estimated needs of agricultural educational facilities for various purposes and how they can best be met quantitatively and qualitatively, and are therefore primarily of interest to those engaged in the organization of the educational services. It is agreed that it is desirable to continue to provide facilities for institutional training at three levels, university, college and farm institute, although the Loveday Higher Committee inclined to anticipate that the need for the intermediate level would tend to diminish as the level of general education rose. The correctness of this view will be determined by educational factors and by the direction and rate of social and economic change. It is already clear that the agricultural student seeking a career not in practical farming but in the advisory or other services ancillary to farming must in future be trained at the highest level in the universities. It is to be expected also that the intending farmer of outstanding intellectual ability will incline more and more to prefer the university to the more restricted cultural and social possibilities of the college or farm institute. His numbers, however, are likely to be only a small fraction of those requiring institutional training, and among the majority of farmer recruits there will always be many above the average in intellectual ability, who will be unable to go to the university and whose potentialities of intellectual development will not be adequately provided for by the one-year course at the farm institute.

So far as the training of the prospective farmer is concerned the basic problem of its precise aim and how best it can be achieved, still awaits solution and urgently needs reconsideration before new schemes and curricula are settled.

All too long the old Edinburgh curriculum, with its purely technical aim, has dominated the farmers' training especially at college and the farm institute. Both agricultural practice and agricultural science have become far too intricate and specialized to warrant continuance of the old mistaken effort to give the student "all there is to know". Such effort can do no more than turn out husbandmen learned in the book-lore but little versed in the practical art; crammed with scientific snippets of knowledge but with little capacity for the application of scientific method. The field of study to be covered in such a curriculum is moreover so wide as to demand for its treatment all the time that the unfortunate student can reasonably be expected to devote to study, leaving him but the haphazard chances of his leisure hours for finding and making the most of the opportunities for cultural and social development that institutional life should provide. The question is whether the aim of our training should be not so much that of "teaching agriculture" but of "teaching the agriculturist". Instead of being content to teach husbandry ought we not to aim at turning out an educated farmer?

Abstract considerations, true, but bringing powerful reinforcement to the case for reconstruction of existing curricula on the purely pragmatic grounds that the extent and diversity of the teaching still being attempted are too great not only for the time available, but also in most cases for the financial and personnel resources of the institution.

Sooner or later, if the education of the farmer is to keep abreast of the development of his general education there must be a breakaway from the present narrow materialistic conception in order to bring within its scope the more humane elements that affect his life. After all the lure of the country resides more in the life than the living, and that life cannot be lived to the full if the achievement of material prosperity is not increased by the ability to see and understand the infinite possibilities of satisfaction to body and mind that country life can afford. In the words of an American writer:

Shall the farmer plough and sow and reap and gather into barns; toil early and late, sweat and strain, merely that he may wring more dollars out of it all? No; the end and purpose of better farm practice and better farm business is a better farm life. If we don't get that, we fail.

(Dr. Charles Crowther, a member of the Higher Education Loveday Committee, was principal of the Harper-Adams Agricultural College from 1922 to 1944.)

## SCHOOL AND LIFE

BY WALTER JAMES

The Central Advisory Council for Education is an eminent body set up under the 1944 Act to advise the Minister. It numbers among its members distinguished dons and heads of schools, some scientists, some administrators and one bishop. Its first report on *School and Life*\* has been much criticized, but for its most striking failure the Council cannot be blamed. Having boldly set out to discuss "The Moral Factor" the members found that they could say nothing of significance about it, because they disagreed on the nature of man and, in consequence, on the ultimate purposes of education. Their impotence (some might hold) falls amusingly, for under this same Act of 1944 religious instruction has for the first time—*pro bono publico*—been made compulsory in schools.

Having disagreed, they preferred, rather than cut the chapter, to tell people how it came about. The moral values, without which no society can exist, grow out of an accepted tradition. Unfortunately the tradition of this country, stemming from Greece and Rome and Palestine, is disintegrating. "Thus the characteristic feature of the present situation is a greatly increased moral perplexity and confusion." And a little later:

For a large number of men and women science has been enthroned as the authority and hope for man's future; for them science has displaced God, and the scientific attitude has eclipsed both the Christian and the classical lights.

We may suppose that this "large number" had their representatives on the Council, beside the Christians and the classicists, and that this confrontation of the unlike, which merely reflects the present intellectual condition of society, stultified the chapter. But, unsettled in their minds, they still gave advice. What did they urge the schools to do? To present children with the different elements of our tradition—Greek, Roman, Christian and scientific, not forgetting "other codes of conduct resting upon different beliefs"—and to leave the choice to them. Every issue is declared open; the hapless child of our time is confronted with the serried ranks of the philosophers and told to take his pick. The Council show little sense of the burden they cast so urbane on young shoulders.

The members must be distinguished from the Council. Most of them will have convictions, but they do not share them, so the Council has no convictions. The Council, in fact, is in the state of man as described by Pascal:

\* H.M. Stationery Office. 2s.



When I see the blindness and the wretchedness of man, when I regard the whole silent universe, and man without light, left to himself, without knowing who has put him there, what he has come to do, what will become of him at death, and incapable of all knowledge, I become terrified, like a man who should be carried in his sleep to a dreadful desert island, and should awake without knowing where he is, and without means of escape. And thereupon I wonder how people in a condition so wretched do not fall into despair.

But Councils cannot despair; only their members can.

As the Council's predicament is that of our society, it is worth examining. What Aristotle said of the State is equally true of any educational system. "He who would duly inquire about the best form of State ought first to determine which is the most eligible life; while this remains uncertain the best form of the State must also be uncertain." A national scheme of education must stay bereft of purpose so long as it is uninformed by an accepted view of the "eligible life".

In the past the needed view of the "eligible life" has been presented by religion. It is doubtful whether philosophy based on some conception of "the good of the community" or "the progressive development of scientific enlightenment" can take its place. Compared with religion, as Professor Toynbee has pointed out, philosophy lacks spiritual vitality, and it does not touch the great mass of simple men. Rivarol put it well: "Let history remind you that, wherever religion and barbarism come together, religion triumphs; but that, wherever barbarism and philosophy meet, barbarism is the victor." Polybius and Burke would have agreed with him heartily, though neither were markedly religious men.

So important is religion, not only for giving direction to education, but for forming the crust of social habit and supplying moral standards to society, that there are strong calls upon us to return to it for solely practical reasons. Obviously the teachers of a great nation cannot for long be fed on the stony diet of "The Moral Factor".

To any return to religion for practical reasons only, however, serious objections would seem to exist. First, there is the old truth which Dr. W. R. Inge stated in the July issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*: "Religion is usually caught, not taught." If this is true of individuals, it is certainly true of societies. A religion that had to be re-imposed by the State, because its own votaries had failed in their mission, might no longer have the old magic. The Holy Spirit, so the most ordinary Christian might suppose, is not outpoured by earthly decree.

The second objection to any course of this sort in Britain is that our predicament is Western in character and not to be escaped by insular action. The spiritual health of these islands is bound up with that of the West, the great civilization in which our people share. If the whole body is corrupt, health cannot be restored to a single limb. A return to religion in Britain is unlikely without a similar return in Europe; certainly it would be unavailing without

its counterpart, for the West will be saved whole, if at all.

The third objection to an imposed return to religion for social and political reasons was long ago put most eloquently by G. Lowes Dickinson in his chapters on "Religion: A Criticism and a Forecast".\* It is one thing to look into history and trace the part religion plays in the growth of civilizations and in the life of healthy societies. It is quite another to set to work, by compulsion and propaganda, to restore by force something that first won men's hearts as a lover his bride, through gentleness and sacrifice. Grant that, for any reasons, the State may impose religion, and the principle of the Inquisition has been embraced.

The Christian in England will probably be restrained by these three objections from assenting to any future attempt at imposing upon his agnostic neighbours or their children the faith he holds. At the same time the chapter on "The Moral Factor" makes him heavy of heart, for he knows better than many what its sterile counsels portend. It is not pleasant to live in a disintegrating society, even if there is still the hope that it may be saved by example. For the average Christian to-day realizes that his example, and his Church's, is not good enough; he is touched in his own way by the agnostic sickness. Nevertheless, his one assurance is that more powers are concerned with this great matter than are visible. "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world."

\* *Letters from John Chinaman and Other Essays*. Allen & Unwin, 1946.

## THE ROLE OF LITERATURE

BY PHYLLIS BENTLEY

AT its nineteenth International Congress, held in Zürich in the first week of June, the world association of writers known as P.E.N. found itself, like many other societies, institutions and nations to-day, in a transitional stage where its aims had dissolved from their wartime fusion but had not yet coalesced into their post-war form. The question of what this post-war form should be, what, that is, the rôle of literature in general and the P.E.N. in particular should be in the modern world, though sometimes the open subject of discussion, was more often pushed impatiently aside; nevertheless it was this question which really emerged as the special P.E.N. problem, now clearly posed for solution by future P.E.N. Congresses.

The avowed purpose of the P.E.N. is to promote friendship and intellectual co-operation between men of letters in all countries, in the interests of *literature, freedom of artistic expression and international goodwill*. The Congress found itself torn between the conflicting claims of these three ideals. During the war, freedom of artistic expression became a national no less than a political, spiritual and literary question. If one believed in freedom of expression one was ranged on the side of the United Nations against Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy and the Mikado's Japan. Now that the war is over and nationals of former enemy countries are released from their allegiance (sometimes forced) to their respective dictators, it becomes the duty of the P.E.N., in the interests of literature and international goodwill, to transcend these national barriers; at the same time freedom of artistic expression must continue to be sternly safeguarded. Expressed concretely, this means that the P.E.N. should seek to re-establish its branches in former enemy countries, at the same time insisting on certain guarantees in order to ensure that, as Vercors (of *Le Silence de la Mer*) put it, no P.E.N. member from an occupied country need fear that he might receive as colleague a man who had been his torturer during the war. Naturally there were divergences of opinion on the degree of guarantee necessary; the occupied countries demanded strictness in the interests (paradoxically enough) of freedom of expression, which must not be threatened by the P.E.N.'s lending support to its opponents; the less embittered countries leaning to a somewhat milder control in the interests of international goodwill.

A really passionate debate, in which the speeches were not on a very high level because the ideals animating them were all taken for granted and only the details embodying hates and fears were discussed, accordingly took place

on the proposed reconstitution (under control) of the German P.E.N. The vote was taken by roll-call—always an exciting and solemn moment—and the reconstitution was passed "in principle" by a substantial majority. It was a pleasure to all present to hear the French delegation generously voting yes. An even more passionate debate—and one, to speak frankly, on an even lower level—followed on the constitution of the committee of control; but after some hours of intemperate utterance which the excessive warmth of the day did nothing to mitigate, a workable compromise was at length reached, mainly through the intelligent action of Margaret Storm Jameson, English member of the International Executive. The Congress sighed with relief and went off to enjoy an evening excursion on the lake of Zürich, one of the admirable arrangements for our pleasure made by our kind Swiss hosts.

This re-establishment of the German non-Nazi P.E.N., with the re-establishment (not, of course, with similar controls) of the Austrian centre, were the main or at any rate the most obvious achievements of the Congress. It is not without significance that the P.E.N., the first international association to cause its Nazi members to withdraw—for this happened under the presidency of H. G. Wells in 1933—is now the first international association to re-establish its German non-Nazi centre. This is not the work of chance or a mere coincidence, but the result of an honourable adherence to its fundamental principles.

Another action which successfully fused the P.E.N. principles was the passing of the English proposal incorporating what was known as "the American Resolution" of last year's Stockholm Conference into the International Rules, to form a permanent part of the P.E.N. Charter. This resolution pledges P.E.N. members firmly to the principle of a free press—"unhampered transmission of thought within each nation and between all nations"—but equally firmly to oppose the evils to which a free press is subject, namely deliberate falsehood and interested or merely ignorant distortion of facts. It calls on members also "with that great power of the written word" to dispel hatreds and champion the ideals of one humanity living in peace in one world.

Expressed in these general terms such resolutions are well within the scope of P.E.N. action, but when specific names and peoples are mentioned, resolutions are apt to become, or at least to appear, "political" and thus cease to deserve their inclusion in P.E.N. agenda. Unfortunately a resolution on the encouragement of Jewish culture, for which everyone wished to vote, contained two unlucky phrases which might bear a political interpretation. The delegate from Arab Lebanon so interpreted them, and a debate ensued which the Congress decided not to continue, though with regret that the matter could not be more comprehensively considered.

The difficulty of the problem of the rôle of the P.E.N., and by analogy of literature, in the modern world could not have been more effectively illustrated. Between the literary and the political championing of cultural causes

there lies but a razor edge. Again, Thomas Mann delivered, on the opening morning of the Conference, a lecture on the philosophy of Nietzsche. Is that political or literary? Or both? We knew without argument that it was right for us to listen to it, a privilege and a pleasure; nevertheless there might be times and circumstances in which such a lecture might take on "political" meaning. For literature to seek the escape of the ivory tower while the peoples toil in the blood, sweat and tears of politics below, is certainly "*trahison des clercs*", but it is equally treason to give up to politics what is meant for mankind; this is the problem confronting literature and the P.E.N., put in plain terms.

On the literary side of the Congress, certain attitudes were approved, certain steps taken. The English moved a resolution calling for "more literature" in future Congresses, asking in particular for a report each year on the contemporary progress of the literature of the country acting as host, so that P.E.N. delegates might be genuinely informed of fresh artistic achievements and fresh technical trends. Less attention than the constructive policy he outlined deserved was paid to the speech of the International Secretary, Hermon Ould, who urged the P.E.N. to devote itself to its real and special task, the fight against the enemies of literature. Certain tendencies of mass production and standardization, the squeezing out of the small publisher, the withdrawal to radio and film of literary talent, the effect of shortages of paper and labour—on all these points literature needs active assistance. One might add that the general faith in the solution of problems by intelligence and goodwill rather than by corruption and violence needs to be strengthened and supported, and this is a task to which literature might devote itself without violating its integrity or lowering its standards. Stephen Spender, who attended the Congress as representative of UNESCO, gave a comprehensive and striking account of the work of UNESCO in aid of literature, speaking of the reconstruction of education in devastated countries, the fight to reduce illiteracy, the provision of cultural equipment, the promotion of translations, the surveys of the conditions of literature in some fields where spontaneous native forms of expression are disappearing, and of the rôle of the arts in education in those and other fields. It was agreed that the P.E.N. could and would give useful assistance in some of these activities by the provision of information and that expenses incurred in this work would (in principle) be reimbursed by UNESCO, whose budget however required strict concentration on essential tasks. A very real harmony pervaded the Congress as it contemplated the contribution it might make to these cultural tasks, so universally approved. For my own part I wished heartily that a constructive policy of measures to preserve and improve the art of literature, to increase its study, to encourage faith in its value and to facilitate its practice would soon replace on the P.E.N. agenda the semi-political resolutions which are the aftermath of war.

Perhaps the most illuminating discussion of the problem of the P.E.N. was, however, made after the Congress had closed, by the newly elected Vice-President, Denis Saurat, professor of French Language and Literature in the University of London. (The P.E.N. has not previously had a Vice-President, but the election as President of Maurice Maeterlinck, who accepted after explaining that his age and health made active participation difficult for him, rendered the new office advisable.) M. Saurat offered to give an address in Zürich University on the morning following the closing session, to explain his own views of the rôle of literature in life. A lively, witty, practised lecturer, M. Saurat gave a brilliant exposition of this difficult matter with which, as has been said, the Congress had been whether consciously or unconsciously struggling all week. He pierced the core of the subject at once by saying that two great matters are not going well in modern life, namely politics and religion, and literature is naturally tempted to intervene in these matters and attempt to set them right. The temptation should be resisted, though not entirely. It is not literature's duty to fill up the holes in politics and religion. Indeed it is literature's duty not to cede itself to *any* ideal, but to criticize all in the name of its own ideal, namely that of harmony and beauty. This, the ideal of art, is more disinterested even than that of religion, for even religion has "*un but utilitaire*," the saving of man's soul. Literature, an intellectual form of beauty, satisfies man more completely than any other form of art, appealing both to intelligence and heart. The P.E.N. is an important twentieth century conception; we do not nowadays boast great single geniuses but perhaps, said M. Saurat with a smile, the whole P.E.N., a plurality of authors, adds up to one such great spirit. For writers of many lands to meet, to talk, is a great thing; for so will gradually disengage itself a common ideal of art, in spite of diverse religious and political ideologies. He invited the members of the P.E.N. to lay aside for a time during International Congresses their own ideals which they held as citizens, in favour of this common ideal of art. This admirable discourse freshened for all who heard it their faith in the P.E.N. which had been perhaps a trifle weather-beaten by the week's political storms.

The P.E.N. is now so large and important a body, and its yearly Congresses receive so much attention—350 members attended, representing thirty-four nations—that it would seem wise to conduct these Congresses on rather more formal lines than have been necessary in the past. An English member of great political experience with whom I discussed this suggested that definite Standing Orders should be drawn up by an appropriately chosen international sub-committee, that the text of all resolutions should be considered with great care by the International Executive and that a very detailed Agenda should be issued in good time, showing resolutions and amendments accompanied by the names of proposing and seconding delegations. Much of this is, of course, attempted already, but some nations through no fault of their own lack the

experience of democratic procedure so familiar to more fortunate countries, and are somewhat at sea among amendments, substantive resolutions and such phrases as "lie on the table"; to them a set of printed rules and a very detailed Agenda would be definitely helpful. "It is easier in England where procedure is settled and known to everybody," as the very able interpreter remarked to me. The contribution made to world order in every sphere by the development and acceptance of a recognized democratic form of conducting meetings is really immense, and the Anglo-Saxons are entitled to be proud that they make this contribution.

In one respect, however, the English cannot be proud. With honourable exceptions, we remain shockingly poor linguists. A German delegate of the London group who chanced to sit beside me during Thomas Mann's lecture wrote down for me, paragraph by paragraph while Mann spoke, a summary *in English* of what he was saying. It was an admirable linguistic feat—and one so impossible for me in a reverse direction that I have decided to spend any leisure hours next winter in renovating my French and building up my scanty German as a small but necessary contribution to world peace.

## MARRIAGE

BY HERBERT PALMER

THERE'D be no world without love,  
For nought could abide.  
We were born through bright love,  
Or love crucified.

Oh, too oft is love lame—  
Pierced, twisted and bowed!  
And few see the flame  
In the rent of Life's cloud.

Here too many choose wrong;  
So they love but a day.  
Blood and limbs sing Life's song,  
But the spirit's away.

Yet they wed ere Time rolls;  
And the dance of Death starts,—  
No communion of souls  
And no blending of hearts.

So the moon swirls in gloom,  
And the sun veers aside.  
Bride turns from her groom,  
And the groom from the bride.

Let the winds hide their shame!  
Love twisted and bowed!  
How few see the flame  
In the rent of the cloud!

Looks and lips sing the song,  
Hair, sinews, and eyes.  
All's right; but all's wrong  
When the Soul gets Love's size.

For it spurns the false strength,  
Every lure that feeds lies,  
Brazen width without length,  
And the wing that ne'er flies.

How they moil, green to red,  
Shapes and hues that can't mix!  
There are nails in Love's bed  
And the marsh fires of Styx.

When the nightingale sings  
The rook takes the hour,  
And the monkey-foot clings  
To the meadow-sweet flower.

Time halts ere he rolls,  
But the dance of Death starts,—  
No communion of souls,  
And no blending of hearts.

Thus bad swallows good,  
And the winds coil and strive.  
Faith wilts in the mud,  
And the bee eats the hive.

Sin and shame, sin and shame!  
Love twisted and bowed!  
How few see the flame  
In the rent of the cloud!

Learn of fifty that went  
And of fifty that are!  
How few probed the rent  
To the intimate star!—

To the light that shines warm  
And entrancingly kind,  
A sure refuge in storm  
And a power unconfined;

Where two lives become one,  
And resolve the same rune,

Where the soar of the sun  
Hugs the dance of the moon;

Where to die or to live  
Is in essence the same  
If together they give  
Their strength to the flame;

Where heart, limb and soul,  
Body, spirit and mind  
In unshakeable whole  
Are enlaced and entwined;

Where the closest embrace  
Is a sacrament song,  
Where the heart shares its grace,  
And the spirit its wrong.

## REGATTA

BY E. M. MARTIN

THE tide returns at length, covering all  
The estuary; waters meander  
While the holly, and blue sea lavender  
Are strewn by the incoming swell; they fall  
By enamelled pools; spread wide is the call  
Of the sea bird, his note is harbinger,  
He has covered the course, a messenger,  
With tales of the sea the mind to enthrall.  
But now the tension increases, the pull  
Is on hempen sail and rigging. For youth  
The signal is given, the contention  
Is for mastery, even as the full  
Tide and changing wind drive some on uncouth  
Sandbanks: the battle of boats has begun.

## MUSICAL DEDICATIONS

BY VINCENT SHEEAN

ON the evening of May 7, 1747, as the king of Prussia was about to begin his evening concert, a chamberlain came in with a list of the travellers who had just arrived in Potsdam by coach. Frederick was a talented and experienced flute-player with a repertoire of some three hundred concerti grossi in which he performed almost every night for forty years, with the exception of Mondays and Fridays, which were opera nights. The room, we must imagine, was one of those salons at Sans-Souci with long windows and delicate, elaborate decorations, and the forty gentlemen who played various parts at various times in the chamber music must have been seated in their places, either to play or to listen—wondering, perhaps, if the King was going to keep better time tonight, or whether he would allow his rank to betray his taste as it often did. There were no ladies, for he kept them isolated, perhaps because the obligation to be polite interfered with his musical and intellectual diversions; and there were always more Frenchmen than Germans. "What's this?" says Frederick, rising from his chair. "Old Bach," says he, "old Bach has come by the coach, gentlemen. Send for him at once. We must have him here."

Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach—"young Bach"—must have been absent that evening. He had been Frederick's cembalist for seven years and was already longing for freedom. He must have been at his own lodgings in Potsdam to receive his father. For we are told that the chamberlain sent at once for "old Bach" and the celebrated contrapuntist and pedagogue of the Thomas-Schule in Leipzig, tired and dusty from his long journey in the stage coach, was made to come to Sans-Souci at once without washing or changing his clothes. He would have liked a chance to put on his Lutheran cantor's black robe, without which he never travelled, but the King's impatience gave him no time.

We know Frederick II's habits. When he sat down to his evening meal he liked to stay at table for hours, talking of philosophy, literature, history and the like. Sometimes he sat down at seven o'clock and rose from the table at midnight. This being so, it is likely that the chamber music concerts were before dinner; and this would fit in more plausibly with the time of arrival of the stage coach. We are thus to imagine Sans-Souci on a spring evening, in the time of crocuses and violets, with old Bach, who was sixty-two, and the King, who was thirty-five, in delighted converse. We do not know the terms in which they talked—authorities never give enough detail—or even the language,

but it was probably German. And from what we know of Frederick it was probably in that peculiar third person form ("er") which has since disappeared from the German language, but which in those days indicated address to a person of inferior rank. If it was in any other style of address the condescension of Frederick would have been even more phenomenal than it was.

For the King in fact insisted on showing Bach all over the house, abandoning the concert for the evening, and asking the famous pedagogue to try the new Silbermann pianofortes he had bought. Bach asked Frederick for a theme and the King improvised one on the flute, asking the master to produce a six-part fugue on it. This Bach provided then and there, to the admiration of the forty courtiers and musicians who had trailed them from room to room. When the tour and all the compliments were over, and Bach was at home again in Leipzig, he wrote down a version of this six-part fugue on the King's theme and sent it to Potsdam, throwing in for good measure a trio for flute, violin and clavier. This was the *Musikalisches Opfer* of July 7, 1747, dedicated to "a sovereign admired in music as in all other sciences of war and peace."

There is no probability that Frederick appreciated these works and there is no certainty that he ever played them. Bach was not much appreciated as a composer in those days; it was as a dazzling performer and contrapuntist that he had acquired fame. What Frederick liked was a much more pedestrian music, principally that which was composed for him by his flute-master, Quantz. And what is more, the accomplishment shown by royal and aristocratic ensemble playing seems far greater to us, through the enchantment of distance, than it really was. Years later when Mozart was at Potsdam and Frederick the Great's nephew, Frederick William II, asked his opinion of the chamber orchestra, the young Salzburger said: "If the gentlemen would play together they would make a better effort." It is probable that Frederick the Great's players were much the same, since a taste for music, on the part of the busy and mighty, is by no means a guarantee of excellence in its performance. Emanuel Bach was unhappy for twenty-seven years in Frederick's service because of the stereotyped repertoire and the impossibility of forcing the King to play in precise time—Emanuel Bach, the father of modern pianoforte playing, of whom Mozart said: "*Er ist der Vater, wir sind die Buben.*" We need not, therefore, exaggerate the virtues of Frederick II's musicality. It was probably like his French poems and prose, a tribute to taste and to the fascination of art rather than a contribution to its living body.

And yet how charming is the scene, how gentle the climate of those relationships! The relation of English poets and their patrons in the same and earlier periods is not really comparable, because explicit flattery in words is essentially a vulgar and mercenary enterprise, demeaning poet and patron alike. It becomes bearable only when the distance between the two is astronomical, as it was (for example) between Racine and Louis XIV. But the flattery of music is delicate, pure, indirect; it seems to ennoble the patron by including him in a



sort of worship given the abstract beauty of form; it is not an obeisance from one man to another, but an act of generosity in which the prince is forgiven his power and the rich man his wealth for the space of those moments in which they share to some degree in the glory of creation.

Bach, of course, was a practical man. For all his Lutheran piety he did not hesitate to write music for the Catholic version of the mass when he wished to please the Catholic King of Saxony; and, fortifying this compromise by some examples of his more secular art, he obtained the official title of "*Königliche Hof-komponist*." But his compromises were extraordinarily few, and if every compromise with principle produced something like the B-minor Mass we should indeed welcome them all. In his daily life at Leipzig he did not come much into contact with the great; it was a world regulated by the needs of the churches, the schools and the University. Neither Potsdam nor Dresden affected it much. The moment we move on to the Viennese composers we are in the midst of the full tide of eighteenth century patronage, and the stately names fall upon the pages like leaves in autumn. Esterhazy, Radziwill, Lobkowitz, Lichnowsky, Erdody, Kinsky, Galitzin—to all these feudatories and their princesses were inscribed a great part of the work of Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven. The economic reasons were apparent: many of the Viennese princes maintained orchestras large or small, and several of them played instruments or sang. A composer had a better chance of earning a living if he wrote for these gentlemen and tactfully dedicated his compositions to them. Sometimes (as in the case of Haydn with Prince Esterhazy) a master would be employed for years in the establishment of one of these princes. In 1784 Mozart's papers show that he practically lived on the Esterhazy and Galitzin establishments, alternating his performances between them; and from this arrangement came great work—the pianoforte concerti in E-flat, B-flat and D (numbers 449, 450 and 451 in the Köchel catalogue) and the quintet in E-flat (K.452). Mozart's difficulties of temperament probably were as much responsible for his poverty as anything else, since there is ample evidence of the interest taken in him and in his work by a number of the Viennese patrons. And the interest worked both ways: Karl Lichnowsky, his pupil, who was afterwards Beethoven's patron, enjoyed his genuine friendship.

It is Beethoven, however, whose whole life is a kind of recital of dedications. By the time he arrived from Bonn there had taken place a change of heart towards musicians. Perhaps the tragic death of Mozart and his burial in a pauper's grave had made some difference; it must have remained forever in the sensitive mind of Karl Lichnowsky. At any rate, Beethoven was consistently supported throughout his life by the Viennese aristocracy, and in spite of his violently revolutionary principles he reciprocated by inscribing to them all the best of his works in large and small forms. They permitted him every liberty. He must have been the worst possible guest in the house, since he would not pay the slightest attention to the hours of meals, came and went at

his pleasure, had no manners and no tact. There were times when his quarters were kept for him in two or three palaces at once, while he was off somewhere else in a rented room. Prince Lichnowsky was especially forbearing with him; he instructed the servants that if his own bell should ring at the same time as Beethoven's, the composer's should be answered first. When Beethoven discovered this he fell into one of his fits of egalitarian passion and went out and hired a servant of his own to answer his bell. He was so class-conscious that the least attempt on the part of any of the princes to infringe on his prerogatives threw him into a rage. There was a famous incident when Prince Lobkowitz, for a joke, surreptitiously learned a new Andante of Beethoven's and played it to him as a work of his own, thus bringing upon himself a terrible outburst of insult and vituperation. And yet to this same Lobkowitz Beethoven dedicated his third, fifth and sixth symphonies, the quartet in E-flat (Op. 74) and the exquisite song cycle "*An die ferne Geliebte*."

It used to be a sort of game among musical historians to search Beethoven's inscriptions and dedications for evidence as to who "the Beloved" was. A favourite candidate with some of these writers was the Countess Giulietta Guicciardi, who was supposed to be the mysterious person to whom those two passionate love-letters found in Beethoven's desk after his death were addressed. The sonata in C-sharp minor (Op. 27, No. 2) had been dedicated to her years before; but her own explanation is so matter-of-fact as to dispel any notion of a life-long romance. "Beethoven gave me the rondo in G," she said, "but since he wanted to dedicate something to Princess Lichnowsky he took the rondo away and gave me the sonata in C-sharp minor instead." Thus coolly she removes the moonlight from the Moonlight Sonata.

Beethoven, of course, had practical reasons for every dedication he made, but he seldom went far afield: everybody to whom he inscribed a work had shown him some sign of appreciation, and was thus included in his act of worship, given the benefit, at least, of a generous doubt. The exception, I must say, is the King of Prussia, Frederick William III, who was a dull dog and in no way entitled to have the Ninth Symphony dedicated to him. On the other hand the lovely, melancholy Empress of Russia (Marie-Louise of Baden, who took the name of Elizabeth Feodorovna as wife of Alexander I) deserved something better than the Polonaise in C (Op. 89). She was genuinely fond of music and during the Congress of Vienna she went out of her way to distinguish Beethoven with her attention—some say at Archduke Rudolf's, some say at Prince Razumovsky's house—in a way which aroused much jealousy. In his last days, stone deaf and hopelessly immersed in trouble over that worthless nephew of his, Beethoven seems to have entertained great hope for help from Russia, either from Galitzin or the Empress. He would have done better to dedicate the Ninth Symphony to Elizabeth Feodorovna and let Frederick William have the Polonaise.

But in all the inscriptions and dedications of the golden age of music, an age

which at every turn exhibits the relations of art and society in a light altogether different from that we know—a candle-light, perhaps, falling from crystal chandeliers on bare shoulders and soft silk—there are two in particular which delight and bemuse me. In these brief notes I have given most weight to what was, after all, the chief motive in all such inscriptions, the desire of the artist to interest or pay tribute to a patron. By far the greater number of the dedications in music were of that kind. There were notable exceptions: Mozart dedicated six string quartets to Haydn, for example, and wrote lovely piano music for Frau von Trattner, the wife of the Viennese bookseller. But my choice out of them all would be the second motet of Bach, "*Jesu, meine Freude*," for two sopranos, alto, tenor and bass unaccompanied, written for the funeral of Frau Käse, the wife of the Ober Postmeister of Leipzig; and the C-sharp minor quartet of Beethoven (Op. 131), dedicated to Baron von Stutterheim.

Frau Käse, indeed! Can you not see her now, the good, firm Lutheran lady, with her prim mouth and plump cheeks, rustling in silk to the Thomas-Kirche on a Sunday morning? Underneath her dress she wears at least a dozen petticoats, the inner ones of flannel and the outer ones of stiffly starched material that help to push her external garments into a billowing solemnity. The dress, I think, is of black silk with broad bands of velvet, and she has a white fichu and cap of the best lace from the Low Countries. Her mittened hands clasp a prayer book: *ein' feste Burg*, she seems to say, is all around us. No question upon the order of society or the destiny of man has disturbed her neat and dutiful mind from the cradle to the grave; she is Mistress Cheese, wife of the High Postmaster of Leipzig. She knows how to preserve fruit and keep a house as it should be kept, and her children were brought up in the right way, even though they do say that little Hans was rather wild in his younger days and Gretel, too, had moments of rebellion; Frau Käse did not permit them to show these aberrations in the Postmaster's parlour. Now, at last, she goes to her reward, with all her petticoats and her silk and laces immured in a coffin of black and silver, her mittened hands folded on her bosom. There she lies before the altar, immortal to the end of time, because over that coffin there float, in the voices of the boys from the Thomas-Schule, on this Sunday, July 18, 1723, the long, pure phrases of the motet "*Jesu, meine Freude*," the prayer of an incomparable genius. Never could Frau Käse have known or guessed that her death would make her live for ever.

As for Baron von Stutterheim, he probably did know, in a vague way: after all, Beethoven was abundantly appreciated in Austria and a multitude followed him to the grave. But the way in which the Baron knew was that of the barrack-room, the small country house, the fringes of the court, the coffee-houses of Vienna. I can hear him after dinner in the regimental mess, talking to his officers over the port. "You've heard of the composer Beethoven," says he, more and more offhand about it as the years pass. "Queer duck, you know. Never saw the fellow, but do you know what he did? Damnedest thing you

ever heard of. Dedicated a string quartet to me. Had some crazy idea I might be kind to a worthless nephew of his that used to be in the regiment. A good-for-nothing lout if I ever saw one. We soon got rid of him. What? What's that? Oh, no, good God no, I never *heard* the thing. Music's not much in my line. My wife's cousin Sophie—she plays the piano very nicely—says this Beethoven was a terrific character in his day. Old-fashioned now, of course. Sophie says he got deaf as a post and all his music shows it. She says this quartet he dedicated to me sounds as if he was not only deaf but crazy. Just my luck. He might have given me a good sound march or a waltz, something the regiment could use, but he sends me a blasted string quartet! Oh, no, I didn't keep it. I sent it to my wife in Vienna and she mislaid it somewhere. Almost anything can happen to a fellow when he gets into the army, but damned if I'm not the first colonel I ever heard of that had a string quartet dedicated to him."

In the autumn of 1826 Beethoven and that wretched nephew Carl took refuge at Johann Beethoven's house at Gneixendorf, about fifty miles west of Vienna. Johann was the ridiculous brother who, after buying a house in the country, had his visiting cards engraved: "Johann Beethoven, *Gutsbesitzer*." (Johann Beethoven, Man of Property). He was a stingy, disagreeable and stupid man, married to a flighty wife; his brother the composer, loud, rude and deaf, found him and his wife alike insupportable. The nephew, Carl, having failed in the University and in the Polytechnic school and then attempted suicide, was arrested by the police and banished from Vienna; in all his dramas old Ludwig gave him the most adoring support. Carl had been the legacy of the other brother, the light-fingered Caspar, now fortunately dead. At Gneixendorf, Johann's wife flirted with the worthless nephew; the composer, at work on his last two quartets, was a tempest of alternating rages and wild good humour; Johann busied himself trying to save money on fires and food. On top of all this the absurd miser served notice on Beethoven that he was going to have to pay for his keep and that of nephew Carl; so the composer decided to risk the ire of the police and return to Vienna. He had to do so in an open post-chaise, caught a cold in his stomach, took to his bed and never rose again. During those last weeks of his life young Carl made off, of course, having called for his uncle a casual doctor whose name he obtained from a neighbouring billiard-hall. Beethoven's devotion to the nephew never flagged, in spite of everything, and as death approached he decided to make another attempt to help him. Carl was with his regiment by now; the colonel of the regiment was named Baron von Stutterheim; Beethoven decided to withdraw the dedication originally intended for Prince Galitzin and to inscribe the quartet in C-sharp minor, Op. 131, to Baron von Stutterheim.

The pathos of the act should not blind us to its majestic confidence. Beethoven was as sure of the immortality of his work as Shakespeare was of his. Old and ill now—he was only fifty-six but he seemed eighty—he felt that nothing

he could do for the commander of his nephew's regiment would confer a more permanent renown than the dedication of this master work. Immersed as he was in music, living it, breathing it, dying in it, it never would have occurred to him that the Baron von Stutterheim could not understand an honour so great. It is true that he regarded all his work up to now as merely preparatory to the work he intended to do: "a few notes," was the way he described the body of his life's accomplishment. And yet he certainly did know that it lived of its own life, organic but indestructible; he was fierce against any who wished to change it (as Sonntag did with the soprano part of the Ninth Symphony). "There it lies," he said, "and there it must lie." So, struggling with the fever and the dropsy, attended only by the fourteen-year-old son of his old friend Breuning, visited sometimes by the awe-struck young Schubert, he got through the winter, hoping that even if his own greatest work might never come to be written, some part of the last firm flow of his heart's blood might be of use to his nephew Carl, through the kind offices of the Colonel Baron von Stutterheim.

## CORRESPONDENCE

## GERMAN OPINION

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY,  
Sir,

I have read the articles about Germany with great interest. Dr. Friedmann's survey about the Military Government of Germany\* is, I think, the best I have read. His frankness is, by German standards, astonishing—but I think we have to accustom ourselves again to the freedom of the press. On most points he is right, though nobody, except the tough Nazis, doubts the goodwill of most MG-men. But is it a question of personnel, and I think it was true of the former German army too that not the best men were in administration. Everybody who has a good job at home, wishes to go home.

Many people in Germany—I only speak of those democrats who wholeheartedly are democrats and not pseudo-democrats—think that British policy as regards Germany has no clear line, and a lot of measures, which nobody can understand, seems to be a proof. For example, the introduction of double summer time, which has given the Nazis a lot of water on the mill, though it seems to be a question of minor importance. But a lot of people think this introduction to be one of the measures to destroy German *Lebenswillen* (will to survive).

"Pattern for German Agriculture" by Hermann Levy† is another article which has interested me very much. It is a key to the question of German land reform, and I myself think it is a main task to improve German agriculture. But the opposition, especially of

\* THE FORTNIGHTLY, April and May 1947.

† April 1947.

the great farmers, is too hard. They are in opposition even to the mildest form of land reform.

The article "The Press in the Provinces"\* has interested me especially, because I myself am a journalist. Only a few people in Germany know that—in England—there is a provincial press. Most people think that there are only the *Daily Mail*, *Daily Express* and *The Times*. I discovered this, when I gave recently a survey of the English and American press in a school for printers.

Yours faithfully,

A GERMAN.

Germany.

## RESPONSIBILITY OF GENERALS

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY,  
Sir,

Mr. F. Elwyn Jones is indignant in the July issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY, with those who sought to excuse Kesselring and implores them to "tread gently."

I have not read these apologists but in this matter have always felt that it is the "liberal" somewhat anti-militaristic school who should tread gently. I suspect Mr. Elwyn Jones of being of that school. For in broad terms the case against the German Generals is that they did not oppose their government's (Hitler's) methods on the ground of conscience. I personally agree with that indictment, but have an uncomfortable feeling that many English who call loudest for independent expression in a serving German General are the same persons who would abhor this trait in the British prototype. Even Field-Marshal Montgomery's innocent utterances are not met with excessive cordiality, and if he, or other generals displayed that "political skill and principle" for lack of which German generals are reproved, I shudder to think of the frenzied flutter in the political dovecots.

The difficulty that meets the anti-militaristic mind is the fact that the conscience can be jarred by other things than brutality to an enemy. A senior soldier may feel that certain government action, such as the pre-war lack of armament, will prove injurious to his own nation. And, surely, a man's conscience may trouble him if he is asked to acquiesce in steps harmful to his own kith and kin. Should he be permitted to speak out boldly? I think so. But I fear that many would prefer dumb acquiescence. If so, is it not difficult for them to blame German Generals? Should they not "tread gently"?

Yours faithfully,

H. MINCHIN, Brigadier (Retd.)

Kent.

\* By Newsman. THE FORTNIGHTLY, May 1947.

## A RECONSIDERATION OF GEORGE ELIOT

BY RICHARD CHURCH

I CAN recall nothing worthwhile written about George Eliot since Leslie Stephen's biography at the beginning of the century. There have been a few attempts to portray her in France, and a book by one Romieu was translated into English about twenty years ago. It was a facile piece of work.

Mr. Bullett's new biography and study of her novels\* will do much to atone for the neglect of George Eliot. He has had recourse to the American research into the problems of her life (especially those relating to her 'marriage' with George Henry Lewes), and he has re-read her books with the eye of a mature critic and creative artist. The result is a book which one reads with delight because of its distinction of style, its insight into motive and achievement, its nice balance between detachment and sympathy.

Marian Evans came from the same social class, and from the same county, as Shakespeare. Her father was a builder who became bailiff on the estate of Francis Newdigate at Albury, Warwickshire, where Marian was born on November 22, 1819. Mr. Bullett recalls the wave of startled re-action which was sweeping over England at that time. "In the garish light of what had happened in France, religious observances were seen as a patriotic duty: the landed gentry on the one hand, and the large employers of labour on the other, lost no time in enlisting God on the side of firm government, government whose first care it was to keep the lower orders busy and quiet." A land agent's household was likely to be representative of this fearful conservatism, and it is certain that the girl spent the first twenty years of her life walled in by conventions symbolized by squire and parson. The smoke of industrialism, under which the benefits of the Christian faith remained unripened and such sour grapes, was creeping over the country, dyeing it in the characteristic murk of the nineteenth century.

Such was the general tone of the world in which Marian Evans had to find her niche. After schooling at Nuneaton and Coventry, she went home at sixteen (following her mother's death) to keep house for her father. She also worked at French, Italian, German and music, and for a time became obsessed by religious asceticism.

The making of literary friendships, however, soon awakened the girl to her own true self, and to her capabilities. She rebelled against the faith and ideas amid which she had grown up, and a quarrel with her father ensued. It was patched up, however, and they were still living together when he died. Her grief was a gate to greater freedom, and she was soon out into the world and at the beginning of her career. Mr. Bullett's skill in portraiture here is admirable. By collecting extracts from contemporary accounts, and linking them with his own sensitive commentary, he presents both her person and her character so vividly that the readers feels an actual contact with her. And from that moment until the end of the biographical section of the book she lives and moves and grows, gaining stature and a public recognizability without losing her real self. It is no easy matter to continue to perceive a personality beneath increasing cloaks of success, with their burdensome weight. It is Mr. Bullett's undiminishing sympathy that here makes him succeed.

Though never beautiful, even in youth, Marian Evans carried openly the signs of her great mental power and her genius. "She was then about one-and-twenty," says the first friend who recognized her latent power, "and I can well recollect her appearance

and modest demeanour as she sat down on a low ottoman by the window, and I had a sort of surprised feeling when she spoke, at the leisured, highly cultivated mode of expression, so different from the usual tones of young persons from the country." That voice was widely noticed. Herbert Spencer was attracted by it. "In physique there was, perhaps, a trace of that masculinity characterizing her intellect; for though of but ordinary feminine height she was strongly built. The head, too, was larger than is usual in women . . . Striking by its power when in repose, her face was remarkably transfigured by a smile; but with her smile there was habitually mingled an expression of sympathy, either for the person smiled at or the person smiled with. Her voice was a contralto of rather low pitch and I believe naturally strong. On this last point I ought to have a more definite impression, for in those days we occasionally sang together; but the habit of subduing her voice was so constant, that I suspect its real power was rarely if ever heard. Its tones were always gentle, and, like the smile, sympathetic." Emerson saw her when she was twenty-two, and recorded "that young lady has a calm, serious soul."

The general tone of Mr. Bullett's portrait is in the same key as that phrase from Emerson. He quotes from her early journalism when she was a young woman in Fleet Street. "The fundamental faith for man is faith in the result of a brave, honest, and steady use of all his faculties." That shows her after she had lost her Christian orthodoxy. Mr. Bullett comments: "This was George Eliot's own faith, and being what she was, a rationalist in the broader but not in the narrower sense of the term, we can be sure that when she said 'all his faculties' she meant just that. Sympathy, the vital impulse of the heart, was for her the light of the world. Love guided by reason, but not originating in it, was the sum of her religious creed."

But Mr. Bullett is not too solemn, nor hagiographic. Little phrases here and there show his detachment and coolness of judgment. He says that Spencer "fell heavily into friendship with her"; a most concise description of a subtle relationship. And in his summing up at the end of the portraiture, he concludes that "she seems to have had almost no capacity for unreflecting joy. She was an inveterate moralizer even of her pleasures. In work she could sometimes forget herself, and live—but her mind in repose was apt to be 'sad'—not necessarily with sorrow, but with the heavy sadness of an ill-cooked cake."

That detachment is even more marked in Mr. Bullett's assessment of the novels. I think he is too severe on *Romola*, which he says is a complete failure. Surely the character of Tito is remarkable in its relentless portrayal of the fruits of moral cowardice? And the setting of Savonarola's Florence is as vivid as that given in Merejkowski's *The Forerunner*, which has the same setting?

The fact remains, however, that George Eliot has been less read of late years than the other major Victorians. Is it due to what Mr. Bullett believes to be her cardinal and persistent fault? "Nearly all the Victorians indulged in didactic asides to the reader, but with George Eliot the habit was something more than a mere following of literary fashion. It arose from something in her character which, whether innate or acquired, was ineradicable: an ingrained Puritanism, an excess of conscientiousness, a felt need to give to the practice of art a moral justification." And he says later, and more humorously: "if you are a character in a George Eliot novel the chief thing you have to fear is your author's unqualified moral approval. If that cannot destroy your pretension to reality, nothing can. Not only by commentary, but in the subtler processes of characterization, by the very speeches she puts into your mouth and your mind, she will do her best to expose you for what you are, or what you would be but for her own imaginative power, a walking shadow, a garrulous embodiment of qualities she is resolved to admire."

But he maintains, in spite of such searching criticism, that "among the great novelists of her time she alone, who theologically speaking denied its existence, was deeply concerned with the human soul."

\* *George Eliot*. Collins. 12s. 6d.

**A HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY**, by William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff. The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction. Kegan Paul. 25s.

The publication of this book of 644 pages coincided with the untimely death of Dr. Karl Mannheim, Professor of Education at London University, the founder of the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, which in a few years has given us much enlightenment on complex sociological problems. The present volume, written by two American professors of sociology, is not only what a handbook is expected to be, a concise guide. Sociology is still an infant science embracing all the conditions, habits, attitudes and regulations of social life and therefore a host of phenomena and facts which can hardly be scheduled one by one. The index of the book testifies to completeness, for it records, apart from the more general sociological problems, such heterogeneous items as "Zionism", "weather", "the differing tests-intelligence of twins", "hysteria in cities", "domestication of animals and plants" and the "English language".

But however widespread and disintegrated the scope of sociology may be, writers of a "handbook" should attempt to bring some systematic order into this labyrinth and it is that order which is lacking. Would it not have been appropriate to acquaint the sociological student in at least one chapter with the history and development of sociology and to give some bibliographical and critical account of the work done by sociological pioneers? Far from presenting a methodical structure this book, well written and full of interesting observations, provides us with essays on certain aspects of sociology; it deals with selected factors in the social life of man, with culture, human nature, collective behaviour, communities, social institutions and social change. All in all it impresses the reader with much learning in various economic,

social and sociological fields, but at the end he will still ask the question which so many have asked before: what *is* sociology?

While the authors, whose knowledge is to a large extent based upon specifically American experiences, are on many occasions at pains to adduce detailed facts and trends as a proof of their arguments, they are here and there apt to leave the reader with some superficialities. For instance, when dealing with Malthusian theories of population they claim that "in England at the close of the eighteenth century . . . the food supply could only be increased by adding more land to the cultivated areas," and they forget that the law of diminishing returns as applied to already cultivated soil was as much a handicap as the limitation of land itself. Similar superficialities are found in the last chapter where the authors acquaint us with their conception of social planning.

Also they say: "Planning has the virtue of looking ahead, which is essential in a changing society." It is, indeed, a virtue to look ahead and the careful British businessman cannot be said to have lacked this great quality in the past. While his success expressed itself in Britain's increasing wealth, the success of long-term plans in a quickly changing society has yet to be proved. When the authors contend that planners lay their emphasis "on the practical rather than on aspirations of the fantasy type" a good deal might be said at the present moment to reverse this assumption.

In spite of such superficialities however the parts of the book which concentrate on special sectors of sociology deserve praise. But there is no real interlocking between the material analysed in these parts and the general conclusions to which the authors lead their readers. Sociology still remains a science which is apt to become enigmatic when the attempt is made to draw a theory from the mass of intermingled phenomena.

HERMANN LEVY.

**ADULT EDUCATION: THE RECORD OF THE BRITISH ARMY**, by T. H. Hawkins and L. J. F. Brimble. Macmillan. 15s.

In one of the reports prepared by the Adult Education Committee of the Board of Education, the scope of adult education was defined as extending "to every aspect of life in which men and women have interests upon which the processes of thought can throw light, and to all the pursuits of leisure which have a cultural value, and which are therefore a means towards a good life." It is in this sense that adult education has been interpreted in H.M. Forces, and the whole of the work which has been planned in the past seven years—not excluding the plan for the future of Army education announced by the Secretary of State for War in March 1947—has to be viewed in the light of this definition.

One of the remarkable developments during the Second World War was, as the authors of *Adult Education: The Record of the British Army* rightly emphasize, "the growth of education in His Majesty's Forces"; and it is to an examination of the educational work developed to meet what the Haining Committee described as "the greater variety of needs of the wartime as opposed to the peacetime Army" that Major Hawkins and Mr. Brimble have devoted the greater part of the present study. At the same time, they are to be congratulated on having resisted the temptation to confine their analysis to those developments which were devised to combat wartime conditions and the educational problem created by the demobilization of large numbers of civilians. By including an authoritative, comprehensive and documented history of the educational provisions in the British Army from the days of the first regimental schools to the outbreak of the late war they have performed a major service. As they suggest "the work may not have been spectacular," but education had won an established place in the training of

peacetime recruits. The negotiations which were commenced in 1939, and which resulted in the creation of the Central Advisory Council and the appointment of the Haining Committee, marked the rebirth—and not, as has frequently been assumed, the birth—of Army education.

In writing of the wartime and release schemes, Major Hawkins and Mr. Brimble have made the fullest use of official documents; but they have enriched these with a wealth of personal experience and knowledge. Their account of the changes and experiments which have characterized educational work in the Army in the past seven years has a twofold merit: it is both balanced and inclusive. The vast organizational changes which wartime conditions necessitated, the work of A.B.C.A., the preparation of correspondence courses to meet a variety of individual needs, the establishment of education centres, the provision of basis education, and the development of facilities for the practice of the arts and handicrafts—all these have a place in the narrative. Nor are those aspects of the work with which the authors were not personally concerned treated less generously. Separate chapters are devoted to "Education Overseas", "The British Liberation Army", and "Prisoners of War"; and the scope of the education scheme for the release period is also discussed.

Because this study will appeal to many who have had no part in shaping the developments so ably described, it is, perhaps, regrettable that the authors have abandoned the rôle of chroniclers. The final section, in which they attempt to suggest how some of the wartime schemes can be adapted to meet civilian needs, is incomplete and unconvincing—partly because much progress has been made in the year which has passed since the manuscript was completed, and partly because the selection of topics is narrowly arbitrary. More misleading, however, is the chapter entitled "Criticisms and Comments" which concludes the account of

the wartime schemes. Many of the criticisms require revision in the light of the fuller information which is now available; too many of the comments are quotations.

J. MACKAY-MURE.

**DEMOCRACY AND CIVILIZATION**, by Geraint Vaughan Jones. *Hutchinson*. 21s.

This book, as its title implies, is a contribution to the problems of contemporary civilization including politics. In the main it is concerned with theology, politics, the meaning of history and, in a lesser degree, philosophy, although it "is not intended primarily for the philosopher or the theologian, but for the 'intelligent reader' who is as puzzled and as disturbed as is the author by the state of contemporary civilization . . ." First and foremost, however, the author is a Christian thinker and his arguments are resolved, and the present crisis interpreted, in the light of Christian understanding and beliefs.

"A Christian philosophy," says the author, "begins not with politics but with a conception of life, in which politics have a necessary place." This is fundamental to his argument and following from it he reminds his readers "that politics and morals are indissociable from each other." At the same time the Christian philosophy of life is centred around the creative and the free. Thus, from the Christian standpoint, the most desirable political form is one which encourages the creative in the individual and gives him his freedom (as distinct from anarchy). It follows naturally from this, says the author, that "democracy, having as its basis a particular conception of man, is the most 'Utopian' form of political theory." Mr. Jones then affirms his belief in a Protestant democracy, "for the record of the Roman Catholic Church as a tolerant community is not very inspiring," and in a liberal democracy "because democracy by itself does not necessarily imply the preservation of the values

which have come to be organic to Western Civilization."

The study of the meaning (if any) of history is considered at length and in detail. Although it may be true that "We do not know whether Western civilization is static, disintegrating, or advancing" and that, in the words of J. B. Bury, "it cannot be proved that the unknown destination towards which man is advancing is desirable," we must surely agree that "it is through the redemption of man that history itself will be redeemed." If man himself can be redeemed from his past sins, need we suppose that the same is not true of a living generation in relation to past history? Not to accept this, is to admit defeat. The author concludes this part of his review with the statement that "the purpose of history is the development of individuals into free beings who can be called the children of God . . ."

These, we may say, are the two main themes running throughout the book. First, has history a meaning and, if so, what is it, and how is history made? Secondly, the idea that the development of an "open" society is essential if Christianity is to become, and remain, alive. Among other aspects of life considered are the possibility of the recovery by democracy of a militant form in the post-war world; the way in which world democratic government might, and could, conform with Christian beliefs; and the dangers inherent, in the form of the demonic, when we accept freedom and when we interest ourselves in the creative and in being creative. As far as the last-mentioned is concerned, we are left with the firm conclusion that the only way to combat the demonic, which is a part of the creative, is through Christianity and agape.

Any Christian approach to problems of the day must inevitably devolve into consideration of individual men and women, for Christianity is so basically concerned with the individual. Not only do we need to know the truth about political,

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economic and social problems but, as the author says, the people in high places, because they are human and, therefore, liable to error and open to temptation, must in the future be imbued with a high sense of moral responsibility.

Of all forces and trends in society, the moral one is perhaps the most difficult for a living generation to see in itself. We do not know what moral forces may be afoot at the present time. New outbursts of moral energy may be in part caused by reaction against excessive materialism. *Democracy and Civilization* may be symbolic of, and contributing towards, a moral re-awakening.

R. S. BURLLES.

**THE GREAT GLOBE ITSELF**,  
by William C. Bullitt. *Macmillan*.  
8s. 6d.

This book, written by a former Ambassador of the U.S.A. in Moscow, is a

statement of the extreme anti-Soviet position. It is written with force and logic, and without qualification or refinement. According to Mr. Bullitt, one issue dominates the world situation, democracy against Communism, and the only effective course is to create "a Defence League of Democratic States." The Soviet Union is "a totalitarian dictatorship, controlled by men who by their own volition, by their own free will, deliberately and consciously, have chosen to declare themselves the enemies of all peoples who live in freedom." Lenin himself said ". . . it is inconceivable that the Soviet republic should continue for a long period side by side with capitalist states. Ultimately one or the other must conquer. Meanwhile a number of terrible clashes . . . is inevitable." "The aim of Soviet foreign policy is constant," Mr. Bullitt declares, "to establish Communist dictatorship throughout the earth."



There is nothing unfamiliar in this general analysis, and even the view that the late President Roosevelt was out-maneuvred by Marshal Stalin into selling European freedom when, by standing out for a guarantee of the 1939 frontiers at the time when Russia desperately needed material help from the United States, he might have preserved it, is not novel. Incidentally, if the analogy between Hitler and Marshal Stalin is as close as Mr. Bullitt suggests, it would be interesting to know why he should attach any value to any such undertaking. What is perhaps more remarkable than his views in themselves is that a man of Mr. Bullitt's standing should have allowed his heart to control his head to the extent that he has done in his mode of expressing them. For, even if the Soviet system be an evil thing and the menace to the rest of the world that Mr. Bullitt suggests, it is hard to believe that his development of his theme is adequate.

It really is not enough to say that the Soviet system is "a much more efficient and unscrupulous Tsardom." Such good social democrats as the Webbs found it an absorbingly interesting social experiment. It seems at least unlikely that a mere military tyranny backed by a fifth column should have exerted the influence on European life and thought that the Soviet has had. Why, to ask only one question, should such willing and efficient fifth columns be found? If Communism is a menace, it is only by seeking to answer such a question as this last that the true source of its danger can be found. It is not because his analysis is wrong—it may or may not be so—that Mr. Bullitt's arguments are unsatisfactory, but because he does not give sufficient evidence to confirm it, or make a serious effort to analyse the causes of Russia's military and diplomatic successes.

None the less, Mr. Bullitt's book, refreshingly vigorous and sincere, is particularly relevant to the present time, for it unquestionably reflects the opinion that a large number of Americans hold

and express about General Marshall's Harvard speech. It shows the immense difficulty of any rapprochement between Russia and the States, and it is worth mentioning that Mr. Bullitt permits himself one good quip in a reference to "the replacement of the right of habeas corpus by the right of habeas cadaver."

W. T. WELLS.

**AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS**, by Sir Gilbert Campion, K.C.B. *Macmillan* 18s.

The reviewer called upon to discuss a book written on a complex subject by the world's greatest authority on that subject necessarily approaches his task with diffidence. The procedure of the House of Commons, compounded as it is of Standing Orders, case law, precedent and historical survivals, is complex enough to those who live very close to it: and there can be no doubt that Sir Gilbert Campion is the leading authority on it in the world to-day. He holds this position by dual right. First, he is the Clerk to the House of Commons, and therefore the senior of the small professional *corps d'élite* who are, as it were, the Civil Service of Parliament. Secondly, he is the editor of the current edition of Erskine May's *Parliamentary Practice*, which is the standard authority on Parliamentary procedure.

Sir Gilbert's Introduction is not, of course, intended as a rival to the compendious learning of Erskine May. It is in his own words, intended as "a practical guide to the procedure of the House of Commons." It is, however, more than that: it is also an eminently readable book on Parliamentary procedure, a claim that can scarcely be made for Erskine May. There is in the world one enthusiast who has read Erskine May from cover to cover thirteen times: but such industrious devotion must be as rare as it is admirable. For most people it is a book of reference only, to be consulted for the authoritative interpretation of

specific and vexed questions. Sir Gilbert's book, on the other hand, while having considerable value for reference and quotation—except on points of order in the House, where Erskine May alone has binding authority—is primarily a book to be read from cover to cover, with rare profit and pleasure, by the growing band of people interested in Parliamentary procedure and the history of its development.

The form of the book is well suited to this purpose. It begins with a sketch of the historical development of Parliamentary procedure, short but lucid and indispensable as background. Thereafter it proceeds to another background sketch of Parliamentary law and machinery, before coming to the main business of describing Parliament in action, both on the floor and in its varied committees. There is a chapter dealing with the work of committees, a comparatively modern element in the Parliamentary system, and another dealing with finance. This last is a very useful chapter, not least because to the layman there must often seem to be a confusing inconsistency of theory with practice in this part of Parliament's business due to the modern tendency to use the machinery of financial control to initiate discussions on policy.

This is the second edition of Sir Gilbert's book, appearing eighteen years after the first. But for the war it would have appeared considerably earlier, for a second edition was in print in 1937. Publication was, however, deferred until the publication of the fourteenth edition of Erskine May, to which many references are necessarily made and which was in turn delayed by the war. Sir Gilbert has, however, incorporated in the text matter dealing with developments since the first writing. Thus there is, for example, an appendix on the Emergency Procedure necessitated by war, and valuable new material on the various aspects of delegated legislation, which have assumed so much wider an importance since the first edition of the book.

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Some descriptions of procedure read a little strangely to-day. For instance, there is now no White Paper or Order Book issued to Members, in these days of scarcity of paper; and the Blue Paper has turned a sickly green. The references to Private Members' time now evokes only nostalgic regrets, though perhaps this, with the White Paper and the Order Book will return in ampler days. It is perhaps a pity that Sir Gilbert was not able to include reference to the reports of the Select Committee on Procedure, which has reported during the lifetime of the present Parliament, since in it are contained some of the signposts to the future.

But these are small points, and do not constitute a blemish on an interesting, authoritative, and readable book, which can confidently be commended alike to members of Parliament and members of the public.

DEREK WALKER-SMITH.

**ARGENTINA**, by Norman Mackenzie, Gollancz. 6s.

The value of this book is not so much in its well documented attack on President Perón, as in its placing of him in historical perspective. Mr. Norman Mackenzie shows that the basic conflict in Argentina during recent years has been that of the land-owner *versus* the industrialist. So long as Argentina possessed no domestic industry, the national economy was almost entirely subservient to that of Great Britain. Cattle and grain were exchanged for railways, barbed wire, agricultural machinery, and every kind of manufactured goods. Argentina was in fact Britain's sixth dominion. The Argentine land-owners were naturally opposed to tariffs, as these would have fostered local industry and upset the international economic balance. Therefore, politically, the landowners were (and are) Conservatives.

The earliest change in this state of affairs occurred during the first world war, when the supply of manufactured articles declined, and not even the Argentine

*estancieros* could prevent the production locally of (as Mr. Mackenzie puts it) "shoes, saucepans, bedsteads and so forth." In the political sphere, these industrial interests were supported by the Radical party, who of course were no more revolutionary than the land-owning Conservatives but did represent the newer tendency in the national life. The power of the land-owners was undermined, however, not by the Radicals, but by the world slump of 1929, which resulted in a drop in the demand for Argentine foodstuffs and provided a very real indication of the degree in which Argentine economy was at the mercy of the country's principal customer—Great Britain. "The good old days could not be conjured back."

At this point more and more Argentines began to feel (in Mr. Mackenzie's words) that "it was high time that the Argentine economy was run by Argentines for themselves." Thus was born Argentine nationalism. Domestic industry continued to grow, and "by the time the second world war broke out in 1939, the traditional partnership of Argentine agriculture and British industry was beginning rapidly to disintegrate." Yet the political groups which opposed the land-owning oligarchy still (with the exception of the small and mild Socialist Party) had no clear social policy, and they were profoundly divided among themselves.

The second world war accelerated enormously the growth of Argentine industry. Temporarily the internal struggle was postponed, since the foreign demand for Argentine foodstuffs was intensified, without menacing in any way the domestic industrialists (import of manufactured goods having almost entirely stopped). It became evident, however, that at the end of the war the fundamental rivalry would have to be terminated. It was then that General Perón stepped into the arena with a social and economic policy calculated to win the support of the working-class. His policy included wholesale increases in the wages of the lower-paid

workers, enforced reductions in rent and a programme of social insurance. His direction of national affairs was immediately seen to be not only demagogic and ruthless, but also imaginative and coherent. He brought into articulate participation in the life of the nation a whole new social class, the men and women on whom depended the future prosperity and power of Argentina. Neither the reactionary *estanciero* nor the capitalist factory-owner could withstand this avalanche. Henceforth agriculture and industry were to serve the interests, not of foreign countries and individual rentiers, but of Argentina herself. Agriculture and industry were not to be rivals, but complementary forces in the realization of Argentine independence. As Mr. Mackenzie says, the traditional political parties had failed to solve a long-standing crisis; democracy was vacillating and inefficient; reform was deeply desired by the mass of the people—and, since the taking up of the crusade by someone was ultimately inevitable, the emergence of an energetic military officer in the rôle of saviour was not in itself a surprising event. It was Argentina's misfortune that the intervention, when it came, introduced not merely a number of much-needed reforms, but also many of the most unpleasant features of the totalitarian way of life.

J. C. DEL VALLE.

**THE GREAT CHALLENGE**, by Louis Fischer. Cape. 18s.

The opening sentence of Chapter IV—"I find it endlessly exciting to look back over the recent past . . ." stamps Mr. Louis Fischer's new book as yet another of these solemn egotistical commentaries on world affairs which are periodically thrown off—or thrown together—by eager American newspapermen. A sequel to *Memand Politics* (1939), this record of free-lance roving during the war—which included visits to this country, India and Palestine—and high thinking on the major issues of contemporary poli-

tics, specifically on the central problem of the relationship between Russia and the rest of the world, was no doubt calculated to make its American readers feel good—and was lapped up at the time by a public awakening wide-eyed to the existence of such problems. At this distance, and in these latitudes, the information imparted and the observations are almost unbearably trite and obvious.

Mr. Fischer knows quite a lot about Soviet Russia—he is the author of a book *The Soviet and World Affairs* and a renegade Stalinist; so that he does understand the nature of the challenge which is the principal theme of his book. As he says, "Russia is Peter armed with Marx." He appreciates the weapons, the only weapons, with which the challenge can be met; it is a question of effecting sometimes those social, economic and political reforms in our Western sphere of influence which will cut the ground from its Communist besiegers. The formula is:

"WHOSOEVER will, let him take the WATER of LIFE freely". (Rev. xxii., 17)

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WILLIAM RYDAL.

**FOUR CENTURIES OF WITCH BELIEFS**, by R. Trevor Davies. Methuen. 15s.

In this well written and documented thesis there is unfolded one, amongst the many perhaps, of the tragedies of our national history. The great witch terror, which swept the country during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had its origin in no more than a surmise based, on what Mr. Davies assumes, to have been "superstition and pure delusion." It is of that prevailing supposition and its consequences, as the complexity of the subject demands, that the author writes with admirable clarity of style, maintaining throughout a scientific impartiality.

For the layman, the witch now leaves far behind the bounds of the nursery, and those of *Macbeth* become a too real part of Shakespeare's England. The paradoxical war, when heinous crimes are committed in the name of the Christian religion, finds here a new and grim reality, in method equal only to that of the Gestapo, and of those who sent thousands on their way in the tumbrils of the French Revolution. It should be realized, however, that the instigators of these horrors were, for the most part, and according to the dictates of their conscience, fighting the most atrocious perversions and loathsome degradations of the Christian tenets. The votaries of this hypothetical evil were found usually to be of the aged, particularly women; but there was an additional undue employment of children as mediums. The facility afforded to informers, and the unscrupulous futility of the trials, led to executions on the slightest pretext.

Disregarding witchcraft superstitions in

this country prior to the accession of Elizabeth, which were treated with comparative indifference and if need be kept under control, it seems that the contact in which they had been placed with pseudo-scientific witch beliefs on the Continent, was the main stimulus for the returning Marian refugees to lay blame on the many tragic victims of the English countryside. In so much that the national traits of character had remained unaltered, these Protestants must be said to have fanned the fires of the first great witch terror.

The alternating fall and rise of witch mania under the successive reigns is well traced, and the interdependent causes, divided mostly between the striving factions of Roman Catholicism and Calvinism, Royalist and Cromwellian, nicely weighed; although the balance in these centuries comes down on the side of the Puritan. Roman Catholicism in the middle of the thirteenth century condemned witchcraft as heresy, and from thenceforward the stringency of the Inquisition aggravated the fear. At the time of the Reformation this was intensified to a manifold degree owing to the Puritan doctrine of original sin, and the depravity of man.

This valuable exposition is the result of wide reading. It incorporates the issues of recent research during the last twenty years, and includes wisely selected passages on the subject from contemporary writers of the period, many of whom were to be numbered amongst the leading statesmen and ecclesiastics, whose books now are seldom to be encountered.

The outstanding question which Mr. Davies investigates, is that of the probable rôle played by the witch terror in the fall of Charles I and the institution of the Protectorate. For this, he offers a well prepared argument, in the portrayal of the enlightening scientific influence permeating the upper classes during the latter years of James I's reign, and of the tolerance of the Arminians, together with the attempt on the part of Charles I and his Council to extinguish the witch mania. The reluctance of the Royalist members

of the Long Parliament to make prosecutions incited the opinions of the nation, now for many years grounded in the fear of witch terror, and had its own influence in the rift between the members, the majority of whom represented the Calvinistic south-eastern counties. Although, possibly, much turns upon future research, it was this, Mr. Davies suggests, which finally turned the tide against the King and the Royalist party.

FRANCES PAUL.

**THE DICKENS STUDENT AND COLLECTOR**, compiled by William Miller. Chapman & Hall. 30s.

In bibliographies it is helpful when the title acts as a keynote so that the reader may know what to expect, but here the title gives the lie—even if it is the Lie Direct. However Touchstone need not be worried unduly, because the author states his aim clearly: it is to compile a bibliography not of the writings of Charles Dickens, but rather one devoted solely to the ana which concerns and bears upon his life and works. Such an objective immediately recalls a similar task carried out by the late F. G. Kitton—although Mr. Miller's handicap of beginning over fifty years later this time proves to be more of an advantage than a drawback. Since 1886 much has been said upon Carlyle's "Honest Man", and a good deal of material which was unavailable to Kitton has been unearthed.

Take one example: the music section. Whereas Kitton lists twenty-three items, Mr. Miller, as Mr. Robert H. Haynes points out in the introduction to the new volume, sets down two hundred and forty-eight; and in this division, as elsewhere, the compiler has made no attempt to catalogue all the articles that have appeared in the press, but merely the most vital and important. Nor is the pursuit of this type of contribution as easy as it seems, for it is only the strong man with a resolute mind who is not swayed by current fancies and who, despite will o' the wisp whittings, can maintain his true

independence of judgment. On this score Mr. Miller acquits himself well. He has arranged his Dickensiana in nine parts: the opening one relates to the man himself and his works whilst the others are grouped round poetical, dramatic, musical, anthological, plagiaristic and bibliographical aspects of the same subject. By far the largest section is the critical one which is sub-divided into four: into reviews of individual works, the letters of Charles Dickens, Forster's *Life*, and writings of an appreciative and depreciative nature about the novelist and his books. It is the latter which is the most interesting division.

Some years ago Mr. Hugh Kingsmill edited an anthology of *What they said at the time*. In it, in a chapter devoted to Dickens, he selected the famous review of 1838 of *Pickwick Papers* from the *Quarterly Magazine*: "he has risen like a rocket, and he will come down like a stick" (a phrase which, be it noticed, was originally used by Thomas Paine in an attack upon Burke). There the quotation ended, and Dickens's reply—"I will watch for that stick, Mr. Lockhart, and when it comes down, I will break it across your back"—was not included. So it is on looking through Mr. Miller's book, retorts which were perhaps once noted in the lower third or on a long train journey, come back, as it were through a pelmanistic process, as one flicks over the pages. This, at least, is one of its minor virtues. Its other virtues, over which Mr. Miller is so modest that his preface only covers a score of lines, are legion—the four cardinal ones being precision, scholarship, reverence and accuracy.

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## BOOKS ON THE TABLE

RETURNING from the Kerry Drama Festival at Killarney and the adjudications of Mr. Lennox Robinson, the Abbey Theatre producer and a playwright too little seen in London now, it was "sweet chance" to find on the table *THE OTHER THEATRE* by Norman Marshall (*John Lehmann*. 15s.). Every evening deserving the prize for the 'best individual performance', Mr. Robinson's manner—tentative, courteously absentminded, gentlest of all for blame (in fact, in Irish, he is the darling man)—wholly failed to disguise the shrewdness of his judgments and his ripeness in plays and acting.

#### 'Non-commercial' theatre

For comparison's odious sake it was necessary to turn first to Mr. Marshall's chapter on "The Amateur Theatre". And here the criticism is naked: "few amateurs believe they have much to learn from the professional," and "the amateur has only himself to blame if he has contributed so little of importance to the theatre as a whole."

In stating that his book "is no more than a personal record" Mr. Marshall is less than fair to himself. Of course the director and owner of the Gate Theatre should devote a couple of chapters to that courageous and worthwhile experiment, and of course the producer of several 'West End' successes should write pertinent paragraphs on the 'commercial' theatre. But the sections on the Oxford Playhouse, the Lyric at Hammersmith, the Cambridge Festival Theatre, the Sunday theatre, the Old Vic, English ballet and the repertories outstrip merely autobiographical interest, and make the whole an indispensable history of the 'other' theatre to the thoughtful playgoer. Only one omission seems regrettable: in the index of plays, theatres and companies the wretched authors might have been included against the first. The numerous illustrations recall pleasant mem-

ories and induce regret for good things missed.

#### The Wesleys

The endeavours lately used to procure subscriptions for building a new playhouse in Bristol give us not a little concern. . . . Though John Wesley wrote these words it must not be supposed that the Methodism of his day was entirely opposed to the theatre, and the great spell-binders were quick to see and use the connection between stage and pulpit. Did not Garrick say that he would give £100 if he "could only say 'Oh!' like Mr. Whitefield"? *METHODISM AND THE LITERATURE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY* by T. B. Shepherd (*Epworth Press*. 10s. 6d.) has a chapter on this theme. The book gives a scholarly appraisal (with a comprehensive bibliography) of the effect of the political, educational and literary publications of Wesley and of the poetry of his brother Charles in newly arousing ideas of liberty. Dr. Shepherd substantiates his claim that Methodism prepared the way for the Romantic revival, and the relevant essay is absorbing.

#### Looking and seeing

Absorbing, too, is a little book *A WAY OF LOOKING AT PICTURES* by Allan Gwynne-Jones (*Phoenix House*. 3s. 6d.) which, though probably intended for those who for any reason suddenly feel an interest in painting, will also help the established I-know-what-I-like gazer to sort out his prejudices. One of the far-reaching curses of childhood is being told by grown-ups what to admire, and Mr. Gwynne-Jones, himself a practising painter who has managed apparently to keep intact his own artistic integrity, is able to give back to his reader something of the clear vision of the very young. He handles nine pictures (which are reproduced), from a Rembrandt to a Picasso, lightly enough to avoid either superim-

posing his own preferences or trying "to train a person to recognize 'good taste'."

#### To suit all moods

Hazlitt would not of course accept "natural taste" in an art lover as a substitute for "having studied the means"—the "technical notions". The essayist is brought to mind by a tribute to his influence (shared by this reader at the identical age; Hazlitt climbing to the niche occupied by Lamb, just before Chesterton knocked them both over, without however permanent damage) paid by Mr. Malcolm Elwin in *THE PLEASURE GROUND*, edited by him (*Macdonald*. 8s. 6d.). This is a satisfying miscellany of stories, sketches of travel and reflection, philosophical and historical comment, theatre and literary criticism, with a section of poetry. Among so many contributors not to be invidiously singled out, death makes an exception of Elizabeth Myers, whose acute little tale makes one regret afresh, passionately now, that she used her short time here for the writing of three novels which gave only promise when she might have been perfecting her great gift for the short story. This putting of the cart before the horse, to one who felt so surely that only by long practice in the more difficult medium could she discipline her magnificent feeling for words, is tragic.—Short stories are well represented in *MODERN READING 15*, edited by Reginald Moore (*Phoenix House*. 6s.), which maintains the standard of its predecessor previously commented upon in these pages. Poetry has an important place, the extracts from books to come are discriminating, and the photographs of London scenes are in danger of being ripped out for inclusion amongst the books on the shelf special to the subject.

#### Tales from the East

In their preface to *INDIAN SHORT STORIES* (*New India Publishing Co*. 6s.) the editors, Mulk Raj Anand and Iqbal Singh, affirm that while the ancient fables of India can be regarded as the

prototype of the short story, modern India has been the recipient rather than the transmitter of literary trends, so that contemporary writers are confronted with the problem of how to combine satisfactorily the two. The ensuing collection often shows this conflict, though the first story, by Rabindranath Tagore, is as free from it as was all his work. The two editors are represented, the author of *Untouchable* by a study full of the pity and shock ("and we sat in the terrible darkness of our minds") which characterized that best of his books.—A different aspect of humanity actuates the *FOUR CAUTIONARY TALES* which are translated from the Chinese by Harold Acton and Lee Yi-Hseih (*John Lehmann*. 8s. 6d.). Mr. Arthur Waley's preface explains that the tales were published in 1627 by Fêng Mêng-lung, and seeks to prove their dissimilarity from Boccaccio's *Decameron*: "as well compare Dryden with Beowulf." As far as possible the translators have kept to the original form, which is a mixture of poetry and prose with the insertion of an old story of a familiar character to parallel the modern one. This process is successfully achieved; the renderings are witty and malicious, with a kind of scandalous charm.

#### The British model

Back to these shores with *ENGLISH STORY*, the seventh of the series edited by Woodrow Wyatt (*Collins*. 8s. 6d.), and to such practitioners in the art as James Hanley and T. O. Beachcroft. These eleven stories appear to justify the contention in the editor's cynical little foreword: "The individual is . . . trying to work out his own salvation amidst a collapsing society: if he succeeds so will society. The writers see this clearly and write about it here."—A spate of revaluations of the force and achievement of H. E. Bates as a short story writer is about due and might well be precipitated by the appearance of his *THIRTY-ONE SELECTED TALES* (*Cape*. 10s. 6d.), a convenient peg on which to hang the ar-

gument. It is not proposed to undertake this re-assessment here beyond noting that all the stories stand for his mature work and have a species of detached tautness about them which should be the envy and probably the despair of the aspiring young.

### Two journeys

VAGUE VACATION by Joan Grant (*Arthur Barker*. 8s. 6d.) is written in so sprightly and desperately sophisticated a fashion that it might well be a piece of fiction rather than the personal record of a post-war two-thousand mile car tour of France and Switzerland by the author and her husband. The situations, often comic and maybe calling for humorous treatment, are marred by the facetious note. And did husband and wife ever talk alone so self-consciously as do these two? Nevertheless, this is one of the books on the table that was read at a sitting—quite literally there is not a dull moment.—“Vague vacation” would be a good description of that period in Byron’s life just before he became involved in the Greek struggle for independence. Mark Aldanov’s novel FOR THEE THE BEST (*Cape*. 8s. 6d.) tells of the initiation of Byron into the Carbonari and of the final struggle around Missolonghi. Nicholas Wreden has made the translation from the Russian and, the pet aversion of ‘real-life’-heroes-supplied-with-imaginary-thoughts apart, the book is exciting, not least because of the light thrown on other British personalities, such as Castlereagh and Wellington, from a foreign angle.

### Two American novels

The reactions of the critics to the recent over-sweet film portrayal of THE YEARLING by Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings (*Arthur Barker*. 10s. 6d.) kept this reader away, and would have kept her away from the book too had not the editor placed it *willy nilly*, as Mr. Leslie Henson would say, on the table. Now, to make amends, the pleasure that the reading gave must be recorded. It is a

study, entirely faithful to boy-character, of life in the Florida scrub with Jody, his silent father and mother, the dog Julia, and his pet fawn. The book is full of a gentle pathos; one can see why filming it might be the undoing of Hollywood, which could make little (and so, far too much) of this picture of a boy’s passing from childhood:

Somewhere beyond the sink-hole, past the magnolia, under the live oaks, a boy and a yearling ran side by side, and were gone for ever.

—A few hundred miles further west is the mouth of the Mississippi, where the scene of DELTA WEDDING by Eudora Welty (*The Bodley Head*. 8s. 6d.) is laid. Here the family is loquacious enough, with a brilliance convincingly conveyed. All live in a state of excitement: “The truth was, slowness made any Fairchild frantic,” and it must be confessed that the reader finds this exhausting. Some of the action is seen through the eyes of Laura, the motherless cousin on a visit, fascinated as are all small girls by other people’s families. *Delta Wedding* is Miss Welty’s first novel, written with the perception that makes her short stories so good.

### “Heaven’s Reflex”

No politics, no foreign affairs, not even Russia on the table this month! But not so strange an experience after staying in a country remote from the problems of to-day; though not from material ones—the over-all standard of living is probably higher in England than in Eire where, in the rural areas at least, the divisions, according to the obsolete lines of the hymn:

The rich man in his castle,  
The poor man at the gate

appear to be more sharp. It is a mental and spiritual remoteness there. “But”, firmly said the sapphire-eyed boatman as he rowed us to Innisfallen Island, ‘where learning began’ over twelve centuries ago, “isms are what is wrong with the world.” And who can deny it?

GRACE BANYARD.

# THE FORTNIGHTLY

SEPTEMBER, 1947

## THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

DAY by day more and more people are becoming aware that in this country we are in the throes of a crisis of morality. The exhortations that men should do their duty by their country in the circumstances of peace, less dramatic but more exacting than those of war, seem to fall on deaf ears. The very conception of duty, as applied to the common round, the daily task, appears to have become faint and remote and old-fashioned. It would be counted tactless in the extreme, or a monstrous solecism, if the coal-miners and the building operatives who go slow, were roundly declared to be traitors to their country. And, in fact, though there is plenty of justification for thus denouncing them, the conception of the commonweal implied in such a denunciation has never been really operative in this country. The workers are merely behaving as the employers behaved before them. No large body of opinion has ever regarded it as a scandal to the commonwealth that employers in a given industry should combine to protect the least efficient from bankruptcy by raising their prices against the consumer; they were never denounced as traitors to their country. To denounce the workers as traitors when they employ the same methods for their protection would be a manifest injustice.

That is perfectly true. But the fact remains that, in both cases, the commonwealth was, and is, being betrayed, by what is reckoned to be normal behaviour on both sides. The root of the trouble is that during a long period of abnormal national prosperity, based on our virtual monopoly of the techniques and resources of industrialism, we were able at once to indulge our individualism, and to increase the national wealth. It was a period of profound moral confusion, in which social duty and personal inclination seemed to be identical and were for the most part represented, even by the philosophers, to be identical. The citizen, in order to be a good citizen, had only to strive to become legitimately rich; and society, in order to be a good society, had only to impose the minimum of limitations on that effort. That was freedom. Since this conception of freedom also included freedom of speech, and ultimately political equality, it had its points. It was sustained by the buoyancy of an invincible but short-sighted optimism which inspired men with the belief that the more freedom, the more progress—freedom being considered as the absence of external restraints.

Quite suddenly—in relation to the tempo of history to which we are accustomed—this blessed period has ended. But the habits of thought and behaviour

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which it created persist, as do the political institutions which those habits fashioned for themselves. These political institutions worked because the harmony of interests which they presupposed did, in fact, exist, and because the values esteemed by either side of the apparent political antithesis were roughly the same. They are, in themselves, wholly admirable political institutions, of which other nations are understandably envious. The outer world will have still greater cause to envy them, if they can successfully stand the strain of the years which lie immediately ahead.

That is the question. We need to realize that these political institutions of ours—in spite of their familiarity—are really in advance of our own moral achievement. They were developed in a period when it was, so to speak, easy to be good. Now they have to stand the strain of a period when goodness is going to be difficult. Henceforward, for the citizens of democratic Britain, duty and inclination will pull in very different directions; and if inclination has the victory, as it is having to-day, there will be a quick decline into catastrophe.

The moral issue may be translated into explicit political terms in either of two ways. If the present Government is defeated at a general election, it will be largely due to the resentment felt by the majority of the public at the lack of industrial discipline which has diminished real productivity. In that case the moral issue will present itself as the question whether a government elected to impose discipline on the workers will be obeyed by the workers. Or it may arise while the present Government is still in office. It may be compelled, however reluctantly, itself to attempt to enforce industrial discipline. Will the workers obey it? No one who forms a dispassionate judgment of social morale in Britain at the present would reply to either question with a confident "Yes". Yet, if the workers were, in either case, to refuse to obey the Government, our democratic polity would be on the point of shipwreck.

Those who maintain that the present Government has done wisely in refusing to force the issue and postponing it as long as it can, have this strong argument on their side: that you cannot force workers to work in a democracy. It may be true; but it is a double-edged truth. As a maxim of government in democracy, if it means more than that you cannot force workers to work at the point of the bayonet, it is pernicious. If it means that a democratic society is compelled to maintain its workers, whether they work well or badly, democracy is doomed to moral and economic disaster. Ultimately, under democracy, the Government must be granted by general consent the power to use compulsion, in the most expedient forms, to compel its citizens to work. If a Labour government were to exercise this power upon the industrial workers, and they were to disobey, they would be plainly refusing to obey the orders of their own chosen political representatives. The anarchy would be obvious; but it would be equally anarchical if they were to refuse to obey the orders of a government democratically elected in opposition to Labour.

Democracy does indeed depend upon consent: but the consent upon which it depends is not the positive consent of all citizens, and all bodies of citizens, to every piece of legislation which it enacts. The consent on which it depends is the consent to the working of democracy. In other words, it is of the essence of the democratic "contract" that its citizens agree in advance to be bound by the decisions of the sovereign parliament, however much those decisions may be contrary to their own inclination. The condition on which they enter into this agreement is that they are entirely free, by choosing another parliament, and another government, to revoke or amend those decisions; but until the decisions are thus revoked or amended, the citizens of democracy undertake to obey them.

This tacit agreement is the moral "contract" on which democracy is based. Once it is broken by any considerable number of citizens—too numerous to be peremptorily coerced—the dissolution of the democratic society has begun. That, as far as one can tell, is the condition of France at the present time, where the peasants on the one hand, even more than the industrial workers on the other, are flouting the laws of the Republic with regard to the delivery of grain, in addition to having extorted a fantastically privileged position in respect of taxation.\* The democracy of Britain is not so far advanced in decay. But it would be folly to pretend that she is not on the slippery slope. The overt political challenge to democracy has been so far avoided, because the Government has confined itself to exhortation of the workers. That wise restraint, or unwise weakness—it is too early to pronounce which it is—has been made possible by the large-scale charity of U.S.A., which is now nearly exhausted. When it comes to an end, the citizens of Britain will be faced with the straight question whether, in order to maintain their present standard of life, they are prepared to do more work for the same wages. If any large section of them refuses, political deadlock and economic paralysis will follow.

There is an economic duty for every citizen to do to-day, to work harder and more conscientiously for the reward he is now getting. But the idea of an economic duty to the commonweal is really, in spite of all the propaganda, uncongenial and unfamiliar to British citizens. Their economic duty, they have become habituated to feel, is primarily to themselves. With their political duty in the narrower and negative sense they are more familiar. There is at present no real support in the country for any movement which aims at the political overthrow of democracy by the violent seizure of power. But the idea of positive political duty is really no more familiar, and perhaps no more congenial, than that of positive economic duty. Such positive duty would consist, for example, in encouraging the Government to exact a standard of efficient work, or to stabilize wages on a basis of all-round justice. Unless it is remedied, this failure to accept positive duties, whether in their economic or

\* See R. P. Schwarz: *The Monnet Plan and its Chances*, in THE FORTNIGHTLY, July 1947.



their complementary political aspects, will necessarily destroy even the negative sense of political duty. If the peaceful procedures of democracy have for their result the widespread evasion of social duty—if, in other words, the freedom that democracy cherishes in fact is merely the freedom to be socially irresponsible—then the only alternative to sheer anarchy is authoritarianism.

There are two main points at which the moral basis, or presupposition, of democracy becomes plainly evident. The first is the fundamental political freedom whereby the political minority at any given moment is free to criticize the existing government and organize an alternative to it. This is the necessary guarantee of real political equality. That this is rather lightly esteemed by the present Government is shown by its imposition of a cut in newsprint, as though newsprint in a democracy were on a level with other imported commodities. That is a dangerous fallacy. The material necessary for the communication of information and expression of criticism should, in a democracy, have an *absolute* priority over all other necessities. Though we do not, for a moment, suppose that the mis-estimate of the newspaper press by the Government is reasoned and deliberate, the fact that it can inflict such a vital deprivation upon the country, as it were, automatically is ominous. It indicates the advance of totalitarianism in the unconsciousness.

If we ask ourselves *why* the citizens of democracy should be passionately concerned to keep political freedom undiminished, there is ultimately no answer except that we recognize it as the moral law that every citizen of the democratic society should be secured the maximum of freedom compatible with the ordered existence of society as a whole: that is, compatible with the maximum of freedom for others. Freedom is thus seen to be immediately dependent on duty—the duty of maintaining freedom for others. It consists not merely in a willingness to obey the law, but in the acceptance of a very definite conception of what the law is—it is the legislation necessary to maximize freedom within a cohesive society.

This is all fairly familiar in terms of purely political philosophy, owing to that peculiarity of British history whereby we are enabled to advance in the political field while letting the economic take care of itself. The dissociation was deceptive. For the technical progress which it has accelerated has had for its consequence an almost entire inter-penetration of the political and the economic, which sets before us the old, indeed the eternal and essential political problem, in an unfamiliar guise.

It was easy enough to work out a practical conception of political freedom when the economic side of the nation's activity could be left to itself. But two new factors have completely changed this comfortable situation. The first is beneficent: the emergence and general acceptance of a new conception of social justice, which insists that the citizens of democracy has the right to be economically secure, and that it is a remediable wrong that unemployment and poverty should be forced upon him. The second is not so good. It is the almost entire

destruction of Britain's position of economic privilege, relatively to the rest of the world, by the effect of two world-wars, and the development of other centres of industrialism. The victory of the new conception of social justice thus synchronizes, and is indeed causally connected, with an enormous diminution of the material resources with which to implement it.

It follows that, if the new conception of social justice is to be implemented, it can only be by the universal adoption of a new social morality. The margin which might have enabled the demands of social justice to be temporarily met without a revolution of our social morality does not exist.

The first question to ask is whether the new demands of social justice are, in themselves, just: that is, in accord with the peculiar and very definite conception of democratic justice, whereby that is just which tends to the maximization of freedom, provided that it is compatible with the continued existence of ordered society. I do not think any reasonable person can deny that the new demand for social justice is itself just. It arises, logically and inevitably, from the previous demand for political equality, which has been generally accepted by the free society of Britain as just. The establishment of political equality (which depends on the maintenance of political freedom) has produced, quite inevitably, a demand for the establishment not of economic equality, but of economic justice. It has produced that demand, in the sense that it has enabled it to become not merely vocal, but a definite directive to the government of the country. In other words, Britain, functioning as a society of political equality, is determined to establish social justice. Or is it merely that she has the desire to do so? There is a difference.

How can that determination be carried through, or that desire satisfied? Obviously it cannot be carried through at all, unless it is accompanied by an equal determination to maintain society in existence. If society is to guarantee economic security to its citizens, its citizens must guarantee their work to society: and if they will not do this voluntarily, they must be compelled to do so, if society is to survive. The basic principle is perfectly plain. Unfortunately, its operation can be postponed, by living "on tick" so long as tick is available; or obscured by the current confusion between an increase in money wages and an increase in real income; or ignored because there exists no norm of the amount of work required to justify the worker's security or his claim upon society. What is certain is that at the present time the inhabitants of Britain are consuming much more than they produce, and that it is charity which enables them to do this.

When the charity comes to an end, Britain's consumption will have to be limited to what she produces. If the present standard of living of its citizens is to be maintained, it can only be done by increasing production without increasing the money-claims upon it. That is to say, people will have to do more work for the same wages. The only alternative is to let the standard of living decline.

But it is very difficult indeed in a democracy in which the working-class is in political control to persuade people to accept either a reduction in their standard of living, or the duty of working harder for the same wages. Although it is true that, if they do not work harder, a reduction in the standard of living will be imposed on them, simply because the goods will not exist for them to buy with their money, the probable reaction will be not to work harder to produce more goods, but to demand higher wages to meet the rising prices of the scarcer goods, the only result of which will be that prices will rise still more. There are two main causes of this inadequate and indeed infantile reaction. One is the lamentable lack of understanding of the true economic situation: which we may call lack of education. The other is the working-man's simple feeling that it is unjust to require him to work harder while so many members of the same society live in conditions of obvious luxury. Some of these work hard, no doubt; but others no not. And perhaps the most obnoxious of all are the many new rich whose overwhelming motor-cars are manifestly the reward for operations on the black-market. Education into the realities of the economic situation cannot diminish the feeling of resentment at economic inequality of this kind.

At this point we are plunged in a chaos of moral confusion. For the working-class is not enamoured of economic equality. As between themselves the workers in various industries actively resist any suggestion that wages should be equalized. They cling stubbornly to the idea that an engineer should be paid more than a carpenter, and a coal-miner more than an agricultural labourer; and they are just as eager as ever that their children should escape from industrial occupations altogether. It seems that their idea of social justice is entirely vague and incoherent; as incoherent perhaps as is the Labour Government's idea of Socialism, which permits it to create a new galaxy of prodigiously remunerated posts on this or that new board of control.

In normal circumstances one could trust to the mere operation of political democracy eventually to produce some order out of this moral chaos, and to achieve, by trial and error, some concrete pattern of social justice which was generally admitted to be just. But the circumstances are not normal. We cannot take the continued existence of the democratic society for granted. The urgent problem is to secure its economic foundations. And those, it seems, cannot be secured unless there exists in the general mind a pattern of a just society which can command their enthusiasm. At present there is no such pattern. Such enthusiasm as there is among the politically-minded working-class for a new pattern of society is for the pattern of Soviet Russia. Naturally, it commends itself only to a tiny, though fanatical, minority, because it is demonstrably a society in which the foundation of social justice in British eyes—namely, political equality—has been ruthlessly destroyed. Unfortunately, the Labour Party during its propaganda period, made no serious attempt to construct a pattern of democratic Socialism which would be viable in itself and

could be understood by the working-class. The blessed word "nationalization" was made to serve instead; but, as the Labour Government itself now realizes, "nationalization" solves none of the economic problems of the nation. "Nationalization", as actually practised in Britain, creates no more industrial discipline, and produces no more goods than before: in fact, it has diminished both.

Nationalization is a valid social conception only if it is accompanied by a new sense of social responsibility among the workers in the industry nationalized. They have to realize that they have become the trustees, on behalf of the nation, for the industry. They are, in that capacity, entitled to demand security of employment, and decent conditions of work; but in return they must give the best work of which they are capable. Such a conception is fatally remote from the minds of the coal-miners. Apparently, their attitude is roughly this. They have a new boss, the State. Unlike the old boss, he has no real control over them. On the contrary, they—through the political power of their union—have a real control over him. Therefore they can extort from him wage-rates and conditions of work which are quite unjust to the community at large. That the State represents the community at large, and that they are under a moral obligation not to exploit the community which has placed them in a new position of security and privilege, apparently never enter their heads.

The only remedy for such a situation is education into the responsibilities of democratic citizenship. Catastrophe and privation is one means of education; but in the present condition of British democracy it is a most dangerous means. For economic catastrophe on the scale required may and probably will put an end to democracy itself. Education by exhortation, which is now being attempted, meets (as we have seen) with the grave obstacle that social justice is so very imperfect. Why should the miners work harder, when the black-market-boys and the spivs flaunt their ill-gotten gains? One may conclude that education by exhortation will continue to be fruitless as it has been until there is that overall direction of labour which the Trade Unions have hitherto resisted. The rudiments at least of a new social discipline must be imposed by the State, which represents the community as a whole, and at the present time, the working-class in particular. Whether our democracy can move forward from a rudimentary to a more refined discipline, depends on the widespread acceptance of the necessity of discipline. But a beginning must be made somewhere. It is fantastic that a social democracy should continue to tolerate the blatantly anti-social behaviour of the spivs and the absentees.

But even when these crying scandals have been suppressed, there is still a long way to go before the rough foundations of a new social morality have been laid. The time to do it is perilously short. And it is no use making scapegoats of the coal-miners, or the builders, or the dockers. It is true enough that if they were to redouble their efforts, democracy would be saved. But—they not unreasonably protest—why should they alone be called upon

to make the effort? A universal effort to work harder and more conscientiously is required, not merely from the manual workers, but from the vast army of state and local officials, from the employers, professional classes, and above all from every educative agency in the country. For the people of the country have to be indoctrinated with the idea of social democracy: of what a democracy of social justice requires of them.

When the nature of the problem is soberly considered, it is preposterous that the totalitarian societies, both Communist and Fascist, with their relatively simple task, devoted a large proportion of their energies to indoctrination; but British democracy does not. The reason probably is that democratic indoctrination is a far harder task. But it is just as necessary. To neglect it because it is far harder is to court disaster.

The difference between the two kinds of indoctrination is patent. The totalitarian society indoctrinates its subjects—they cannot justly be called citizens—with the idea that duty consists in obedience to an external command. If democracy were to do that it would destroy itself. Democracy has to indoctrinate its citizens with the idea that duty is self-imposed. Just as the democratic society freely chooses its government, so the democratic citizen must freely choose to do his duty to the commonweal. He puts his conscience in control of his actions. He obeys the law, not as an external command, but as the expression of his own better self, which wills to act in obedience to a law which its reason recognizes to be necessary. Democracy is, essentially, a form of society which embodies an act of faith in the fundamental good-will of man. It is based on the supposition that man is impelled, by a compulsion of his own nature, to obey the moral law.

Why is political equality a good thing, if not because it stands in the nature of man that he should be treated as an end and not as means? And why should we suppose that democracy, in which political equality is established, will produce good and not evil, unless because we believe in the essential goodness of the human will? These things we have taken for granted, in a period when, as we have said, it was easy to be good. Now they are to be put to the test. Democracy is based, not only in theory but in fact, upon the reality of a universal obligation to obey the moral law. If that obligation is not recognized, and acted on, democracy must, in time of real stress, collapse. If the validity of the moral law is an illusion, so is the validity of democracy.

And we must not shut our eyes to the fact that a process of undermining the conception of the validity of the moral law has been going on for years. As the authority of Christianity declined, mainly under the impact of the new claim to a society of justice in this world, so new theories of moral relativism spread among the intellectuals and the masses. The palpable identification of Christian morality with the maintenance of a society of privilege and possession gave this relativism its opportunity. There was, alas, only too much truth in the slogan that "religion was the opium of the people." Yet the idea that

morality was essentially autonomous and independent of religion was too difficult for men.

Nevertheless, on that idea democracy in fact depends. It is not that morality is antagonistic to religion, though it is antagonistic to many forms of religion, even of the Christian religion. But morality does not depend upon religion. Perhaps it would be truer to say that insight into the autonomy of morality is itself the basis of all religion that is good. Democracy is the form of society which consciously or unconsciously is based on the principle of the autonomy of morality. The paradox is that such a form of society has come into being by a gradual process of development, largely in ignorance of its own basic principle. The moment came—not many years ago—when the principle of political equality seemed self-evident at its own level. Men were not compelled to look for what lay beneath, because the economic society still functioned automatically. Political justice secured, economic justice could look after itself. We have learned, or are learning, that it cannot.

But we shall never solve this problem of combining economic justice with political justice without going deeper into the conception of morality. The plain facts are that political democracy in Europe has conspicuously failed to stand the strain of economic distress in the recent past, and that the political system which most plausibly offers economic justice does so by openly flouting political justice. The problem of reconciling political freedom with economic justice—which is the specific and urgent problem of democracy—has nowhere been finally solved. Perhaps it never will be solved finally. Anyhow, it is quite enough to strive for the greatest measure of economic justice that is, at any given time, compatible with the continued functioning of political democracy.

We are not facing the problem seriously enough; we are not yet sufficiently aware of the problem it conceals. It is the question whether men are really capable of obedience to the moral law. In the last resort the problem of human freedom must reduce to that. Obedience to the moral law is the condition of human freedom; and freedom cannot be rationally conceived save as obedience to the moral law. Kant rendered humanity the signal service of making this plain. Nothing could well be more timely than the publication of a whole-hearted vindication of Kant's doctrine of the Categorical Imperative.\* In essentials, Kant's doctrine is impregnable, for it insists on the absolute interdependence of rationality and morality. That it is impregnable does not mean that it must prevail. A vast wave of irrationality is still sweeping over the world, and it can be stemmed only by the resolute exercise of man's moral will, which is also his will to be a rational being in a society of rational beings. On the exercise of that moral will the life of democracy depends. How many of its citizens are being educated into it to-day?

\* *The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy.* By H. L. Paton, Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Hutchinson. 21s.

## THE CRISIS BEHIND THE CRISIS

BY WILLIAM RYDAL

A CAREFUL perusal of Hansard only confirms first impressions of the debate on "the state of the nation" as reported in the press. The Prime Minister's was a pedestrian performance, and his outline of the Government's proposals for meeting the crisis fully deserved the epithets of "hasty improvisation", "ill-considered and incomplete" applied to them by Mr. Eden. The Chancellor of the Exchequer amplified the information about the dollar drain, the immediate crisis of balance-of-payments, and trudged heavily again over the ground covered by Mr. Attlee without, however, giving any more positive indications how "the wide yawning gap between exports and imports" was to be bridged. Only Sir Stafford Cripps, of the Government spokesmen, came down to brass tacks by focusing attention on the fundamental economic setting of the present monetary stress—the crisis behind the crisis—and thereby cutting the ground from under the feet of yapping Conservative opponents. Mr. Churchill's taunt in his Woodstock speech at the week-end, that the Labour Government had frittered away the American loan, was as irresponsible as it was untrue, and the official spokesmen had no difficulty in disproving that charge. Enemy sharpshooters, like Mr. Quintin Hogg, and Mr. Nigel Birch, scored a number of bulls-eyes in indicting the Government for undue optimism and lack of foresight. But the Opposition as a whole showed itself once more bankrupt of any alternative policy. And so there is no question of a political crisis. But the light remains at red.

The case against the Government is not that it has brought about a serious deterioration of the nation's economic position by rash and foolhardy experiments in Socialist planning but that, having accepted the crippling conditions accompanying the American loan, it has failed to appreciate—or at any rate to convey to the nation—what that bondage entailed. With the shibboleths of economic orthodoxy all the time on their lips—multilateral trade and convertible currencies and so on—our leaders have consistently failed to face up to the grim facts of the "artificial" (the word is Mr. Attlee's) economic position in which this country finds itself—and has found itself for a matter of thirty years. They have attempted to do too much too quickly in the way of reconstruction, especially of capital equipment, as if the dollar loans constituted an Anderson shelter when, as we can see now, they could not be anything more than an umbrella at the mercy of the stormy winds of politics.

Sir John Anderson put his finger unerringly on the basic facts which are

simple enough. We are at present consuming as a community to the tune of some 450-750 millions a year more than we are producing: and that concerns our standard of life as a nation, it is not essentially a dollar problem. The Government, as he said, is not responsible for the general situation with which Great Britain was confronted after the war, neither is it responsible for the great inherent difficulty of expanding our exports, nor for the increased price of imports. But it is responsible for engendering "a wholly fictitious sense of well-being", for pretending that the country could afford all the desiderata and the improvements set forth in the Party programme. Each of these things may well have been desirable in itself—shorter hours, higher wages, family allowances, new school buildings, great schemes of colonial development and overdue operations for the re-equipment of our industries. But the aggregate, alongside necessary repairs of war damage and arrears of maintenance, has added up to the picture of a country living far beyond its means: hence the present flight from sterling which is the real meaning of the action of countries like Sweden and Argentina in restricting imports from us in order to turn their favourable balances with us into dollars.

A telling statement on the domestic aspect of the crisis was made by Mr. Roy Harrod, the economist (and Joint Editor of *The Economic Journal*), in an article in the *Daily Mail* on August 6. The object of the American and Canadian loans, he says, was to tide over the immediate post-war period during which the troops had to be brought home and our industrial equipment re-converted or repaired for the production of peace-time goods. Thus we could continue to draw on foreign supplies of food and other essentials without immediately paying for them by our exports during the period of rehabilitation. Now, some six million persons have been released from employment in the Forces and from munitions work, yet certain industries vital for the export trade find themselves still deprived of the necessary men and materials. The excess of capital projects and the initiation of new schemes over too wide a field have stultified the efforts of British industry to refill the pipelines. "Requirements" for materials have been grossly written up, and then, when the Government—owing to the fuel or the present dollar crisis—is forced to impose cuts, the effect may well be to produce a shortage all over the industrial field of particular components that are urgently wanted. Mr. Harrod's conclusion is that cuts in these great capital projects are imperative and should take precedence over cuts in essential consumer goods.

That is what Mr. Eden means when he charges that the Government has shown its worst failure in the broad, strategic planning of national resources. It is the old question of seeing the country's problem as a whole and establishing and maintaining the right priorities. The prime factor for success in any such enterprise is leadership and good team-work, in neither of which necess-

any qualities the Labour Government has made a good showing. Where political courage of the highest order was demanded to resist the pressures from within their own party, Mr. Attlee and his colleagues have too often chosen the easy path, excusing themselves by the need (which the Prime Minister did not fail to invoke) for strengthening and maintaining the morale of the people. Or, lest this be thought uncharitable, let us say that Ministers have been too heavily burdened with the work of their several Departments to see things in perspective, while Mr. Morrison's absence through illness was unquestionably a severe handicap.

This central defect, however, can still be remedied. The technical means lies to hand in the adoption of Mr. Clement Davies's proposal for a small group of Ministers wholly responsible for economic strategy, with no executive tasks—the equivalent of the War Cabinet—to which the new Economic Planning Board should work directly. It is only fair to say that the Government has since the beginning of the year been thinking along these lines. *The Economic Survey of 1947* provides that: "the Government will say what is the best use of resources in the national interest," and now, with the new Supplies and Services Act, it has secured unlimited powers specifically for this purpose. The kind of measures designed to remedy present bottlenecks and maldistribution of labour were indicated in the article "Cures for the Crisis" published in *The Observer* of August 3: the releasing of more men for industry by further cuts in the Armed Forces, especially by reduction of overseas commitments; a lengthening of the working week—at any rate in certain key-industries; a wages policy, specifically one which canalizes labour into bottleneck industries and dollar-earning trades by differential wages; and, finally, greater standardization of products and concentration of production in the most efficient plants. (Methods of compensation for firms closed down could be devised). To which must be added, undoubtedly, a revision of Mr. Dalton's cheap money policy calculated to check the continuing evil of inflation.

All this, however, is therapeutics *within the national framework*—in a word self-help, divorced from the *international* context. And unfortunately, whether we like it or not, it is that international setting which governs the whole situation. Mr. Harrod (in the article referred to above) and other economists talk as if all that is required is a re-modelling of the Government's domestic economic policy. Mr. Attlee himself put intensification of the export drive high on the list of the remedies which the Government now proposes. But what is the use of piling up exports if there is no sure prospect of finding markets for them? It is all very well to set a higher target—of 140 per cent. of the 1938 volume by June 1948 and 160 per cent. by the end of that year. The simple fact is that, in the world as it is, the acceptance of British exports on anything like that scale is nothing more than a pipe-dream.

Already the process of shutting down on British exports has set in—for the

reason that they consist chiefly in manufactured goods. Mr. J. R. Hicks, Research Fellow of Nuffield College, stated the position bluntly in a letter to *The Times* on August 8: "What we have to realize is that we cannot expect an impoverished world to supply us with necessities while we supply frills and furbelows in exchange." As far as the question of exports goes, it means that the dice are against us—until and unless we can resume large-scale exports of coal. *The Manchester Guardian* leader-writer that day reached the identical conclusion, looking at the matter, however, from another point of view, namely the imperative need "to do something to show Europe and the United States that we mean business . . . . The greatest contribution we could make to European recovery would be 10,000,000 tons of coal." How fervently Mr. Bevin echoes the same sentiments!

It was left to a Labour back-bencher, Mr. R. W. G. Mackay, in the House of Commons debate to drive home the real and ultimate lesson of present happenings. The United Kingdom's unfavourable position with regard to the balance of payments, he reminded us, dates back to 1913—in terms of *actual trading*. Up to that time this country was able to buy with its exports and other services whatever it wanted, without relying on the interest from its overseas investments. During the 1914-1918 war some of these had to be sold. But within five years of that war we had largely recovered from that position: in 1927 we had as many overseas investments as in 1941. At no time in the period 1920-1939, however, was this country able to pay for its imports with its exports and services, each year we had to draw on the interest from those overseas investments. This lack of equilibrium—Mr. Mackay is entitled to his Party point—has thus nothing to do with any wicked Socialism. But not only that. The salient feature is that, though international trade as a whole has increased over the past thirty years, the trading in manufactured goods has steadily diminished. (In the nine chief industrial countries it fell by as much as twenty per cent.\* And the trend persists. Of those 1938 U.K. exports, which we are now bidden to take as a yardstick, a quarter was in raw materials, specifically coal, which for the moment alas! do not come into question.) This is the direct result of the industrialization of other countries in the New World and the Old, and our position to-day is thrown into sharp relief, particularly, by the prodigious rise in productivity of the United States. America has an export surplus now amounting in value to some twelve billion dollars—U.S. exports, Mr. Dalton stated, are running at the rate of twenty-one billions of dollars against imports worth eight billions—and she dominates three-quarters of so-called international trade. In other words Great Britain finds herself the principal victim of the almost cosmic change that has come over the international trading system on which our wiseacre economists were reared—of the double disequilibrium, accentuated by the war and its consequences, be-

\* For a development of this argument see Mr. Mackay's article in *The New Statesman* of August 9.

tween primary producers and manufacturers and between the New World and the Old World. We must never lose sight of the fact that, as the above-mentioned *Observer* article points out, the industrial development of the United States during the last ten years has made our industry, and that of any other European country, "obsolete and internationally uncompetitive." Supposing America switches the emphasis of her industrial production still further to exporting—as she may well be forced to do by her own momentum—and starts to compete seriously with us on the world market, what hope is there of finding a sale for many of the products of the export drive? And, in these circumstances,—with Russia virtually outside the international system—is it not an abuse of words to maunder about "multilateral trade"?

The present writer, who is not a trained economist, has always marvelled at the capacity for self-delusion of our economic pundits. As we remember too well, the international trading system bearing the nineteenth century trademark, which successive British Governments after the 1914-1918 war did their best to restore, broke down irretrievably in the 'thirties. So long as this country was able to pursue an expansionist policy based on fortuitous but continuous discoveries of gold, and the exploitation of new markets and new inventions, that system of *laissez-faire* capitalism, enshrining the principle of enlightened self-interest, could work. But—let us frankly face the fact—it was our peculiar form of economic nationalism. Given the primacy of politics, which the economists still find so hard to admit and accept, it was inconceivable that, in the changed conditions of the post-1918 world, other nations would indefinitely dance to our tune. Professor Condliffe, writing in 1939 on *The Reconstruction of World Trade*\* is found observing ruefully: "Sterling . . . was wrecked on the unwillingness of national governments to accept policies of adjustment to economic interdependence organized by private enterprise." But, then, why should it have been expected that the rest of the world would meekly and for all time accept a *British-made* system, the essence of which, as he says, was not in the free export of capital goods but in the existence of an international capital market on a "cosmopolitan" basis, depending essentially, however, on financial leadership from London? That was not the whole story, of course; many irrational factors were also at work, there was the normal interplay of the emotional forces of nationalism and social discontent—and the fact, disagreeable and incredible as it may seem to a professional economist, that public opinion in a particular country not seldom rejects economic criteria altogether in favour of our non-economic values, for example, social security.

After the 1939-1945 war we find the political and financial leaders of the United States preaching the selfsame doctrines of *laissez-faire* capitalism, with the accent more than ever on private enterprise, in a world which has perforce turned away from it and towards national planning—with this country relegated to the status of junior partner. That is, at bottom, the meaning of the

\* Allen & Unwin.

whole complex of measures in which the U.S. has taken the lead: the Bretton Woods Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the efforts towards an International Trade Conference and the dogmas of multilateral trade and convertibility of currencies. What is certain, however, is that this, too, is a version, America's version, of economic nationalism, and the sooner we realize that fact the better. The consequences of following suit are now becoming apparent. The point is that this country was in 1945 fatally committed to a pattern of international economy which is contrary to its best interests—and in any case simply does not fit the facts of the present world. Both Mr. Attlee and Sir Stafford Cripps came near to recognizing this in the recent debate, but both stoutly maintained that our objective was still "multilateral trade and convertible currencies" (their Master's Voice) while admitting that it was "not yet in sight" (Attlee) or "much farther off than had been hoped" (Cripps). The President of the Board of Trade had the grace to endorse Mr. Mackay's reading of the world situation. He spoke of "a historical tendency in the light of which the older manufacturing countries must adjust their economies" and of "the inescapable facts of world development." But he did not haul down the (American) flag.

When the American Financial Agreement of December 1945 was concluded, writes Mr. Nicholas Davenport in *The Times* on August 2, it was assumed, that, "Europe and Asia would be recovering and world trade rising in volume to make the dream of multilateralism come true." But it was only a dream—and for us a bad dream, as the full extent of the war's dislocation and destruction comes to be appreciated and world trade is seen to be shrinking for lack of dollars. To quote the same writer, "not this country only but the whole Western world is heading for a slump born out of an exchange-finance crisis—precisely the event which has been anticipated if not longed-for by the Communist bloc." This process of events could have been foreseen—was foreseen in fact by clear-minded twentieth-century observers like Mr. Robert Boothby.\* This *enfant terrible* of the Conservative Party has the merit of perceiving that in this day and age the issue of private enterprise *versus* socialism is unreal and irrelevant to the fundamental economic problem; that the solution of that problem is to be found, nationally, in the assumption by the State of certain strategic controls directed to the attainment of social security in terms of full employment and the stabilization of prices and wages, internationally in the organization of a number of *Grossraum* economic areas comprising countries at much the same stage of economic development. The effective economic organization of the British Empire and Commonwealth, and of Western Europe, that is to say, must precede, and be the basis of, any wider and more ambitious plans for the "One World" of the economic perfectionists. The Washington Agreements, on this showing, were putting the cart before the horse.

But there we are. At present the Labour Government wedded domestic-

\* *The New Economy*, 1943. Secker & Warburg.



ally to the ideology of Socialism, is tethered, in the international economic field, to the American way of life, its antithesis. Sir Stafford Cripps, who must be only too conscious of the irony of it, still bids us hold on, suggesting that the Marshall proposals may yet provide the magic bridge. Certainly, as he says, the United States have thereby recognized the fact that the *status quo* is not what the economists call viable, that "a great many small and economically separate nations cannot deal individually with the situation." The stage is set, at any rate, for the creation of a large economic area within which we and the other countries represented at the Paris Conference—who are all in the same boat—could, theoretically, secure a market large enough for large-scale modern industrial production, a free trade market of 200 million people. The States of Western Europe, according to Mr. Mackay, provide about seven-tenths of the world trade in manufactures (and of the ten billion dollars' worth of manufactured goods in world trade before the war seven billions came from Europe.) The British Empire and Commonwealth (excluding Canada and India), whose co-operation Mr. Bevin has promised, together with Western Europe and its colonial territories, possess as great a supply of raw materials and economic resources as the U.S.A. But it is going a bit far in the way of wishful-thinking to talk, as Mr. Mackay and his 'Keep Left' colleagues do, of economic union—"a customs union and a common currency"—as being immediately practicable. And heaven knows what conditions Congress may insist on attaching to any scheme of American help for Europe: more likely than not, any offer will tend to keep up those high prices of primary products which are one potent reason for our present discomfiture—and will be accompanied by other restrictions on our economic freedom which would effectively check our own and Europe's measures of recovery.

It would be a mistake therefore to pin all our faith to a satisfactory outcome of the Marshall initiative. Mr. Attlee observed in his speech that the forthcoming discussions with Washington about the stipulations for free convertibility of sterling and non-discrimination—the strings attached to the Loan—must go very much further than an invocation of the "exceptional circumstances" of Clause 12. And he cut near to the bone when he declared that "unless the multilateral system can be made to work, supported by adequate finance, it will become incumbent for us to seek ways out of our difficulties on other lines . . ."

## MR. AMERY'S THOUGHTS ON THE CONSTITUTION

BY SIR ERNEST BARKER

IN the introduction to his four Chichele lectures (delivered in the University of Oxford on the suggestion of the Warden of All Souls College)\* Mr. Amery quotes Spinoza in defence—but no defence is needed—of his own *tractatus politicus*. "It cannot be doubted," Spinoza said, "that politicians themselves have written much more happily about political matters than have philosophers." It is certainly true that Mr. Amery has written with great felicity—all the more so because he combines the temper and training of the philosopher with the experience and the authentic knowledge of the statesman. His book will long be studied; and it may even be ranked with Bagehot's book on the English Constitution. It adds to our knowledge of history as well as to our political wisdom. Mr. Amery has drawn a curtain, and shown history in the making. At two periods, in particular, his revelations are illuminating. One is the period of the genesis and development of the War Cabinet (and with it of the Imperial War Cabinet) in the year 1916 and afterwards, when he and Sir Mark Sykes, as political assistant secretaries, contributed their quota to thinking. The other is the period, from 1924 onwards, when he was Colonial Secretary, and as such concerned not only with the creation of a new Office for Dominion Affairs, but also with the discussions which led to the classical formulation of Commonwealth Relations in the course of the Imperial Conference of 1926. But if these revelations are peculiarly illuminating, they do not stand alone. Again and again there are flashes, as when he raises the question what would have happened in 1936 "if King Edward VIII had persisted in his wish to broadcast against his Ministers' advice"; or as when he suggests the influence of F. S. Oliver's *Life of Alexander Hamilton* alike on the form of the South African Union and on Baldwin's conversion into an "apostle of low political temperatures"; or as when, again, he deals with the working of Mr. Churchill's War Cabinet and the difficulties under which it laboured.

It is difficult for one who has lived for fifty-five years in Universities, among men who are 'children in finance' and philosophers without experience, to review the work of an immersed thinker who has swum in heavy seas (like the Ulysses of whom he loves to write) and undergone the labours which dons only watch from the shore. But there is a passage in the *Politics* of Aristotle

\**Thoughts on the Constitution*, by L. S. Amery. Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 8s. 6d.  
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which may be pleaded in mitigation, and may serve to parry, in some slight measure, the shrewd thrust of Mr. Amery's quotation from Spinoza. In politics as in medicine—so Aristotle suggests—there are three classes of knowledge, and three sorts of judgment. There is the general practitioner, corresponding (let us say) to the ordinary member of the House of Commons. There is the specialist—the man who has gone deep, and acquired a practical wisdom in legislation and politics—corresponding (let us say) to Mr. Amery himself. There is also, for what he is worth, the man of general knowledge—I am not sure that Aristotle does not call him the “man of general culture”—who has done his best to think about politics (and it may be, medicine too), and who has had at any rate a passive experience which entitles him to some say. Aristotle is sympathetic—possibly, indeed, over-kind—to men of this third class. Perhaps the reader too will extend his sympathy to a reviewer who belongs to this modest class, and who can plead no better title than that of knowing what it feels like to undergo both political government and medical treatment.

Here, and in the course of this article, it is only government that is in question. And in that matter the first thing to be said is that the reviewer, on all the great issues, is not only willing to accept, but also eager to endorse, the conclusions of Mr. Amery. There may be differences of approach. The reviewer is only in the third class: Mr. Amery is a specialist. The reviewer is an old Liberal, and belongs to the tradition of 1688: Mr. Amery is a life-long Conservative, and would perhaps prefer to draw his tradition from the Restoration of 1660. But these differences of approach do not matter when it comes to fundamentals. On them there is complete agreement. Mr. Amery goes deep, and he goes straight as well as deep, when he contends that British democracy is not a sort of ‘cascade’ democracy, in which the waters of ‘the will of the people’ descend from the electorate to parliament, and from parliament to a committee of parliament called the cabinet. That may be one idea of democracy: but it is not the British idea or practice. In the British idea and practice there is always present the Crown; and the cabinet, in its essence, is composed of Ministers of the Crown. The Crown matters as well as the People; and it matters for the simple reason that government matters. There must always be initiative, and by its side the responsibility that goes with initiative; and the responsibility and the initiative must always rest with government. Mr. Amery accordingly argues, in the first and fundamental lecture, entitled “The essential nature of the constitution”, that the nature of the British constitution is based on a balance and adjustment between the Crown and the People. “The Crown, as represented by the Government of the day, is throughout the active, initiating and governing element; the Nation, as the guardian of the laws and customs of England, is entitled to refuse its consent to any changes in these without good reason given.” He adds: “The arena in which the two conduct their continual conference, or parley, is Parliament, in which the Government of the day carries on its work of adminis-

tration and legislation subject to the advice and criticism of the Nation's representatives.”

This is admirably said; and this is the foundation. Having laid the foundation, Mr. Amery proceeds, in his next two lectures, to build the superstructure. He also proceeds, at the same time, from analysis of what *is* to constructive suggestions about what *ought to be*. In his second lecture he examines the working of parliament under modern conditions, and proposes a number of ways in which it might be improved. In the third he examines the working of government under the same conditions, and again proposes a number of ways in which that too might be altered for the better. This is political science at its best—political science as conceived by Aristotle, an art of constructive betterment. This is also the core of the argument; and it is informed and nerved by a sense of urgency. “The spatial shrinkage of the world, unaccompanied by any corresponding levelling up or assimilation of ideals or standards of conduct; the almost unimaginable powers of creation as well as of destruction latent in atomic energy; the ever more complex structure of national life brought about by new social ideals as well as new external forces—all these are bound to add ever-increasing burdens.” How can Atlas carry the burden?

In his suggestions for the improvement of the working of parliament Mr. Amery shows a radical edge. It is curious, and almost paradoxical, that here an old Liberal should begin to shy; to halt and to wonder whether the axe is not being laid with too much vigour to the roots of too many trees. A cynic may smile and say: “I always knew that you who call yourselves Liberals were the most crusted of Conservatives, so enamoured of the Parliament of 1688 that, as Tom Paine said of you, you grovel before it and humbly pray, ‘O Parliament, live for ever!’” There may be a point in the jibe; but let us look at the strokes of Mr. Amery's axe. Some of them may command our sympathy, and even our ready assent. When one reflects on the change in the temper and function of the House of Lords during the thirty-six years since the passing of the Parliament Act—a change which many of its Labour critics appear never to have noticed, but a change which has made it a valuable revising chamber and a forum of instructed debate on general policy which deserves, and indeed attracts, the attention of the nation—one readily subscribes to Mr. Amery's view that better use should be made of the House; and there is much to be said in favour of his suggestion of the creation of life peers, who would gradually come to form a majority of the House, and who might be recommended for nomination by a Committee which included the Leader of the Opposition as well as representatives of the government. Here the axe is discreet, and the grafting suggested is good. It is when he comes to the House of Commons that Mr. Amery becomes more drastic and his remedies more dubious.

He is not enamoured of proportional representation; but he suggests that it

might strengthen the quality of the House of Commons if the method of proportional representation were applied to the larger cities. That may well be the case—though there is much to be said for the view that a single-member constituency is better than any six-member aggregate when it comes to the matter of personal contact and living touch between the member and his constituents. But an alternative method which he suggests for strengthening the quality of the House is far more dubious. This is, in brief, "to increase the representation of the universities and to add representatives from special professional organizations." The representation of universities is an old anomaly (introduced by the wise Solomon, James I) in the general scheme of territorial representation which is the essence of the House of Commons. To increase that representation, and to extend it by a further and indefinite use of functional representation, would be a grave departure from history—and from good policy as well as history. What Mr. Amery is here suggesting was suggested as long ago as May 1793, by Mr. Jenkinson, afterwards Earl of Liverpool, in a speech in the House of Commons. The strictures on Jenkinson's scheme which were afterwards passed by James Mill in his *Essay on Government* may still be repeated to-day: "the real effect of this motley Representation would only be to create a motley Aristocracy."

It is the more curious that Mr. Amery should propose some measure of functionalization of the House of Commons, as he proposes in a later passage that a new functional assembly, with advisory powers, should be erected by the side of the House. He goes back to the memory of the National Industrial Council, proposed in 1919, which was to consist of equal numbers of representatives of organizations of employers and representatives of trade unions, and which was to advise the government on industrial legislation. He recurs to the memory of the House of Industry advocated by Mr. Churchill in his Romanes Lecture of 1930. He mentions, too, the German Economic Council which was a part of the Weimar constitution of 1919; and he refers to the creation of a separate functional advisory chamber as one of the few generally agreed features of the new French constitution. (Actually France had a National Economic Council as long ago as 1925, and it was placed on a statutory basis in 1936; but it was only a body attached to the Prime Minister for the study of economic questions.) He might also have cited similar bodies in Czechoslovakia, in Austria (under the abortive constitution of 1934), and above all in Italy under the Fascist system. Their history affords no comfortable reading. Wherever there is a true parliament, that parliament is the one reservoir and gathering-ground of the waters of public opinion. There is a body called the Trades Union Congress; but it exists in the social sphere—and not in the political. May it—and anything like it—continue to remain there, and to do its service there. "A Third House of Parliament" (Mr. Amery uses the phrase) would either be nugatory (which is what is likely) or a nuisance—and something more than a nuisance. It might so impede the working of

democracy that democracy would be imperilled

The matters hitherto raised in regard to the Houses of Parliament are matters of their composition and procedure. Mr. Amery has also suggestions to make concerning their procedure and operation. One of these suggestions is that of functional committees, either of the House of Commons or both Houses, which would be composed of members interested in the work of particular departments, and would be presided over by the Minister concerned. This is somewhat like the committee system of the French Chamber of Deputies, to which critics have often objected as tending to bring departments of government under the constant surveillance and control of the Chamber, and so to impair the efficiency and the responsibility of the cabinet. It is true that the committees which Mr. Amery suggests would be presided over by Ministers (as is not the case in France); and if Ministers used the committees mainly as channels of information, and as means of keeping in touch with members, the result might be a strengthening, rather than a weakening, of their position. On the other hand it may also be argued that an advisory council or consultative committee drawn from the nation at large, and attached to each department for the purpose both of giving and receiving information and expressions of opinion, would be better still than a system of functional Committees of Parliament. It would be less likely to impair the responsibility of the Minister; and it would keep him in touch with the general currents of thought moving in the community at large. Ministers, moving constantly in Parliament, are already in touch with *its* currents. It is the currents stirring in the general community with which they will do well to get into touch.

The other suggestions which Mr. Amery makes in regard to the procedure and operation of Parliament follow more familiar lines. He is in favour of having Parliament broadcast on a special wave-length throughout the session, for the purpose of rekindling, or rather creating, a general interest in its debates. It may be doubted whether this method would improve the quality of debate (it is a distraction, when you are debating, to reflect on a vast audience of millions outside, including your own constituents); and it may be doubted, even more, whether a constant broadcasting of Parliament would not become to millions of listeners a sad and monotonous thing, leading them to murmur querulously: "So *that* is what you do." A newspaper report which digests a debate in an ordered and lucid summary is likely to leave a deeper and even a truer impression. But more important than broadcasting (which is less of a panacea than we are generally apt to think) is the issue of devolution which Mr. Amery also raises. Would it not lighten the burden of Parliament, and improve its working, if there were devolution to Scotland and Wales and to large provincial units in England? It *might*. But "the restoration of the Heptarchy", as Mr. Churchill once called it, is something more than a matter of the easing of the burden of Parliament; and it raises other issues which are perhaps even larger than that. They are issues which deserve, and indeed

demand, to be discussed on their own merits. This is no place for such a discussion. It is sufficient to observe that Great Britain is a community so closely interknit, through all its length and breadth, that devolution of any subject or group of subjects to a system of provincial authorities would prove exceedingly difficult. For good and evil—and of course there is some evil as well as good in the close articulation (or reticulation) of British life—it seems likely that we shall continue to be closely interknit, and therefore to have our complex affairs all handled and ordered in one central Parliament.

The argument has lingered over Mr. Amery's lecture on Parliament; and that for a simple reason. A reviewer who belongs to the third class, and can only claim general knowledge, may debate with him on some sort of footing (though even so it is still a case of *impar congressus*) when he speaks or writes on the structure and function of Parliament. But when Mr. Amery, in his third lecture, comes to treat of the machinery of government, and to make suggestions for its improvement, he is on his own ground; and few can follow him on that ground. A man who has spent at least seventeen years in the work of government in a number of different departments *knows*; and he must be acknowledged as a master by those who do not know. He concludes, on the basis of his experience, that the cabinet, as it stands to-day, is inadequate to its work; that it is inadequate owing to the sectionalism of departments and the immersion of ministers in their sections; and that what is needed is the reconstitution of the cabinet into a central thinking centre—a '*phrontisterion*' or (as Bentham might have called it) a '*panopticon*'. In other words—the words are his own—"I would have a cabinet of about half a dozen, all entirely free from departmental duties." These *Sex Viri* would supervise government generally; but above all they would have "regular meetings definitely set aside for the discussion of future policy." They would have standing committees to aid them in supervising government; but over and above they would also have standing committees (each with its own research and planning staff) to aid them in studying and formulating policy. They might even have the aid of the leaders of the opposition, in and through these standing committees: "it would be in accordance both with the spirit of the constitution and with precedent if the leaders of the opposition of the day were more regularly associated with the discussions of these standing committees." Here, as in his previous suggestion for the method of recommending life peers for the nomination of the Crown, Mr. Amery stands above party, or at any rate seeks to transcend party. Whether that can be done, consistently with the full responsibility of the party in power and the full liberty of the party in opposition, may well be a matter of doubt. Equally it may be a matter of doubt whether a super-cabinet, acting as a '*Panopticon*', is not too lofty for the national temper and too hard for the digestion of Parliament.

The machinery of government is not only a matter of the driving wheel of the cabinet; it is also a matter of the cogs and wheels of the Civil Service. Here

too Mr. Amery has in mind the need of initiative, and the demand for a measure of creative thought which may serve to help in the formulation of policy. One suggestion which he makes, with a view to meeting this need, is that of a quicker turn round in the Civil Service—a much shorter time-qualification for pension, which might attract ambitious recruits by ensuring them an opportunity of taking up work outside with greater facility. It is hardly clear that the Civil Service would be improved by being made more of 'a stepping-stone to higher things.' There is more to be said for his suggestion that the domination of the Treasury side of the Civil Service should be reduced: that the departments concerned with production should have a larger voice; and, in particular, that the new system of making the permanent head of the Treasury the head of the whole Civil Service (a system, as he says, "not calculated for initiative and independence") should be abandoned in favour of a system which placed the general control of the Civil Service in the hands of the Prime Minister or one of his colleagues in the 'policy' cabinet.

The last of the four lectures in *Thoughts on the Constitution* is concerned with the evolution of the British Commonwealth. Here, above all, Mr. Amery is on his own ground. He has the calibre of an imperial statesman: he has been a great part of many of the developments of which he treats; and the historical review which forms a large section of this last lecture has an historical importance of the first order. Here, too, his conception of the Crown comes into its own and attains its height. He sees in the Commonwealth something which matters more to the world, and to its future welfare in peace, than the organization of the United Nations, which he feels, in view of the incompatibility of the ideals and methods of its members, to be more likely to endanger than to promote the cause of peace. "The only international association that is likely to be fruitful is one of like-minded nations." He would therefore cling to the Commonwealth as a free association of autonomous but like-minded members, united in common allegiance to the Crown. He is averse from any system of federalism, such as Mr. Curtis has long preached. Such a system, in his view, rests on two untenable assumptions: the assumption that there can be a division between 'external' affairs, remitted to a federal authority, and the 'internal' affairs reserved to each constituent State ("the whole course of political and economic evolution has tended to obliterate that distinction"), and the further assumption that government, at any rate in respect of a supposed sphere of 'external' affairs, can be government by delegation from an electorate or number of electorates—an assumption contrary to his fundamental theory of the essential nature of the constitution, as stated in his first lecture. These are words of wisdom: and with those words still ringing in our ears we may fitly conclude this summary view of a statesman's thoughts on the constitution.

## INTER-ASIAN RELATIONS

BY IQBAL SINGH

**A**LMOST apprehensively Paul Valéry once referred to Europe as a small "promontory on the vast and mysterious continent of Asia." Mysteriousness is a subjective quality, but there can hardly be any dispute as to the physical preponderance of the great land mass of Asia in the Eastern hemisphere. It is not superfluous to draw attention to this elementary geographical truth, particularly at a time when a profound change is taking place in the balance of relations between the East and the West. The importance of this change is now universally admitted. Field-Marshal Smuts obliquely invoked this fact to support his pessimistic argument during a recent UNO debate; and Mr. Bevin tacitly acknowledged it in the course of his survey of the international prospects in the House of Commons on his return from Moscow. However, although theoretical recognition of this decisive factor of the post-war situation is fairly general, its concrete implications are as yet but imperfectly grasped by European statesmen, pre-occupied as they are with the urgent problems of inter-European relations.

A correct appreciation of these implications is inevitably contingent upon a dispassionate assessment of the new situation in Asia. There is a tendency, especially among British intelligentsia, to apprehend this situation in terms of constitutional precedents. This is apt to confuse rather than clarify the issues, which are too big to be contained in any constitutional categories. The essence of the change that has come over the Asian horizon is that the world's most populous continent is finally emerging from a phase of tutelage and subservience into the main current of history; that after a century or more of comparative stagnation, during which they played at best a negative rôle in shaping human destiny, the nations of Asia are beginning to regain a certain measure of initiative and freedom of action in the political field, even if the period of their economic dependence has not yet come to an end. Demonstrably, the development has momentous consequences which deserve serious consideration.

The process is no doubt still in its initial stages. Nor can it be claimed that it has been entirely uniform in its incidence. There are complex and contradictory trends which cut across the main line of advance. Even in its present stage, it has set up a whole series of reflexes, which extend far beyond the realm of politics and are revolutionary in their psychological impact. Not the least significant of these reflexes is the increasing realization on the part of

Asian leadership that the problems of the continent as a whole are inter-related and that, in fact, Asian polity possesses a valid and coherent unity of its own. It is as part of this new orientation that attempts are being made to find a durable basis for an integration of Asian relations on a regional pattern.

It would be easy, but mistaken, for western observers to regard the conception of Asian unity as the product of a purely transitory enthusiasm. The idea corresponds, however vaguely, to certain historical necessities, and its genesis may be traced back to the latter half of the nineteenth century when, with the early intimations of nascent nationalism in the East, the nebulous dream of a concert of Asian nations, bound together by ties of common cultural and spiritual values, began to take shape in the minds of the advanced thinkers of Asia. The concept had found sufficient general acceptance by the end of the first decade of this century for Count Okakura Kakuzo to say sweepingly that "Asia is one."

The argument for Asian unity was underlined by a number of developments in the international field. First, there had been the spectacular and unexpected victory of Japan over Czarist Russia: this shattered the myth of European invincibility and helped to restore to the peoples of Asia the sense of self-confidence lost through a century of humiliation and defeat. It was followed by the establishment of the Chinese Republic which provided a stimulus to the democratic aspirations of the national movements throughout Asia. And finally, the Russian revolution, which brought the doctrine of racial and national equality to the once oppressed nationalities of Central Asia and Trans-Caucasia, was instrumental in indirectly strengthening the diffuse, but nevertheless compelling sentimental assumption of Asian solidarity.

The conception, however, remained largely metaphorical until the years between the two wars. It was after the end of the 1914-1918 war that the operative possibilities of the idea of Asian unity began to be studied simultaneously in a number of countries. In Japan, for instance, the Foreign Office, realizing the utilitarian value of Pan-Asian ideas for furthering the expansionist plans of the Japanese General Staff, began ostentatiously to affirm its allegiance to the doctrine of Asian unity and managed even to arrange conferences of refugee nationalist leaders from various parts of Asia in Tokyo as a part of its propaganda offensive. In India, on the other hand, the constructive implications of the idea attracted widespread attention, though there is no indication that they were studied with any degree of precision. In general, the thesis was developed that Asian unity was necessary not merely for the purpose of hastening the liberation of the continent from colonial subjection by presenting a united front against imperialism, but also for securing a stable world order which presupposed free and peaceful development of the Asian nations.

A bold and imaginative scheme on these lines was first formulated by the late Mr. C. R. Das. He envisaged the establishment of an Asian Federation on a political basis as the ultimate objective of inter-Asian polity. Despite its

many translucencies, the scheme was sufficiently gratifying in an emotional sense immediately to commend itself to the leadership of the Indian national movement and soon came to be regarded as an integral part of its outlook on foreign policy, particularly appealing to the younger section of the national leadership among whom Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was already eminent. By 1928 the idea had crystallized to the point where it was possible for Congress to pass a resolution instructing its Working Committee to issue invitations to leaders of Asian national movements to attend a conference to discuss common problems. The conference was scheduled to be held in India in 1930. It never happened; indeed, it is doubtful whether any invitations were ever sent and for the next few years India passed through a period of intense political turmoil which made the holding of such a conference physically impossible. But the idea had come—and come to stay.

The quickened pace of Asiatic awakening in the period immediately preceding the 1939-1945 war, and even more during the war years, opened up the prospect for India and the countries of South East Asia of a rapid transition to comparative independence. For the first time favourable conditions were created for some kind of practical affirmation of what had been so far a sentimental postulate. This was fully realized in Indian political circles and Pandit Nehru, soon after his release from jail in the summer of 1945, took the initiative. His preliminary and tentative approaches to the leaders of various Asian countries evoked unexpectedly encouraging response and he was able in the May of 1946 to suggest to the Indian Council of World Affairs—a body which roughly corresponds in its function and purpose to Chatham House and the Institute of Pacific Relations—that it should undertake active preparations for convening an Asian Relations Conference. Thus the conference that met in Delhi for about a fortnight last spring represented the partial consummation of an idea which had been tempting Asian leadership for almost a quarter of a century.

It is relevant, before discussing the work of the conference, to make certain general observations regarding the basic issue of Asian unity. It should be stressed that it is not yet, even at the highest level of Asian leadership, anything more than a concept. Its concrete limitations as well as potentialities were never thought out with any clarity. And for obvious reasons. The emotional compulsion towards unity primarily originated in the negative condition of Asian subjection, although all manner of historical, cultural and even metaphysical arguments have been conjured up to provide a convincing justification. Plainly the conception of Asian unity essentially represents an extension of the idea of nationalism as it has developed all over Asia under the pressure of varying degrees of foreign domination. However, the translation of this concept into positive policy pre-supposed a decisive mitigation of the very conditions which had inspired it. Thus at the point where the idea became practical politics a new situation with its own attendant problems had to be taken

into account.

This is the tantalizing paradox confronting the political leadership in Asia in the post-war era. Nationalism, which had until now been a unifying agent, in the moment of achieving its purpose reveals its inherent ambivalence and may lead to the fragmentation of Asian polity just as it did in Europe at a corresponding stage of development. That this is not merely an imaginary fear is indicated by discords which are already heard. At present these arise over relatively minor issues such as the status of emigrants, rights of minorities, or territorial adjustments of frontiers between certain countries. Such conflicts are obviously symptomatic of a deeper process of alienation, the seriousness of which has not yet been fully realized by political opinion in Asia.

It might reasonably have been expected that the Delhi Conference, representing as it did the first authoritative congress of Asian leaders, would offer an analysis which would illuminate some of the crucial questions relating to the task of stabilizing inter-Asian relations on a long-term basis. Unfortunately, it did not. On the contrary, it appeared that the conveners had meticulously avoided mentioning the fundamentals of contemporary Asian polity in the terms of reference. The scope of discussion was almost entirely restricted to matters of a secondary, though by no means unimportant, nature. The agenda for the conference was confined to racial problems, inter-Asian migration, transition from colonial to national economy, agricultural reconstruction and industrial development, the status of women and women's movements, labour problems and social services, and cultural problems with special reference to education and scientific research in Asia.

The only topic of direct political interest included in the items on the agenda was: "National movements for freedom in Asia." However, it was explained that "it is not intended that the conference should discuss such questions as how these freedom movements were to be conducted or what assistance should be rendered to one Asian country by the others. This topic was put down for discussion because it was considered important that the tendency of these movements to lose sight of their original objectives and degenerate into racial, communal or class conflicts required co-operative study." The discussion, in other words, was to be kept on a more or less academic level. And, in fact, it was.

So was the discussion in the conference in general. There was about its deliberations—in the plenary sessions as well as in the group discussions—what can only be described as a sense of inconclusiveness. It was as if, having called the conference, nobody quite knew what to do with it. The group discussions frequently tended to be brilliant in the diagnosis of the problems facing Asia; unexceptionable broad principles were enunciated, especially in the sphere of co-operation of the economic and cultural policies of Asian countries; but when it came to suggesting effective ways and means of implementing these principles the talks seemed to trail off into clouds of unreality, usually ending on a note of pious but uninspiring exhortation.



In a sense, it may be said, the most striking feature of the first Inter-Asian Relations Conference was its limitations. Some of these were obviously part of a self-imposed censorship. The conference, it should be remembered, was non-official in composition, though it is true there were men of great eminence and influence among the 250 delegates who attended it. It was not meant to go any further than a theoretical study of the questions on the agenda and had no mandatory powers of decision. The organizers of the conference did not wish to encourage discussion of the wider issues of Asian co-operation, whether on a continental or a regional level, without first ascertaining the areas of agreement that existed in relation to less controversial problems of Asian polity. Thus the conference should be regarded as mainly exploratory rather than conclusive in its purpose.

However, even after all these factors have been taken into account, certain limitations still remain irreducible unless they are seen as being inherent in the present stage of development of political thought in Asia. It is customary to speak of the Asian mind as though it were homogeneous. Any objective observer at the Delhi Conference would have at once realized the fallacy of this view. For if there was one thing which it revealed unmistakably, it was a fundamental dichotomy of approach and outlook in the ranks of Asian leadership. This dichotomy mirrored faithfully the conflicting impulses and urgencies which characterize the present transition in Asia. While the dominant section of leadership seemed to hover on the verge of indecision, as though inhibited by some deep-rooted hesitancy of purpose, there was a dynamic group which was anxious for radical solutions of inter-Asian problems. It is true that on most points the former succeeded in exercising a restraining influence, but it was the latter group which, despite inevitable immaturities of outlook, impressed one by its firmer grasp of the forces that are shaping the modern world and even a greater sense of the practical. There could be little doubt that it represented the quality of Asian leadership that is likely to prevail in the near future.

A fact of some significance regarding the conference was that the delegations from some of the smaller and medium-sized Asian countries made more positive contributions to the discussion than those from countries like India and China, which might have been expected to give the lead. To mention only two instances, the suggestion for the establishment of a "neutrality bloc" in Asia came from a Malayan delegate and a comprehensive inter-Asian economic and political mutual aid was proposed by delegates from Burma and Indonesia. This affirmation of effective strength and independence of spirit on the part of the smaller Asian countries may be taken as a happy augury for the future of inter-Asian relations. It is a token that, in any regional organization that may emerge, the smaller powers in Asia are unlikely to allow themselves to be used as pawns of the greater or to countenance a big-power complex as the basis of international relationships.

Did the Inter-Asian Conference achieve anything beyond a purely exploratory discussion of some of the less urgent problems facing the peoples of Asia? It did. The decision to set up an Asian Relations Organization for furthering the aims of the conference marks a major step forward towards the goal of inter-Asian co-operation. The danger with most conferences of this kind is that their momentum usually exhausts itself with their sessions. The creation of a continuation machinery, however rudimentary, means that this danger has been avoided. Furthermore, the fact that Pandit Nehru is to be the president of its provisional General Council is an indication that it will not remain inert. It may indeed be expected that, when the conference meets in China in 1948 as has been proposed, it will meet on surer footing. Much will naturally depend on how seriously the A.R.O., when it begins to function, takes its task of instructing Asian public opinion in general and Asian leadership in particular regarding the vital issues of inter-Asian polity. But the initial psychological reluctances have been overcome and in these matters it is the first step that presents often the greatest difficulty.

The conference served another useful purpose. For the first time it provided some reliable data about the attitude of various countries of Asia to the problem of Asian security. The subject was not on the agenda, but informal consultations showed the direction in which Asian opinion is moving. Pandit Nehru in his inaugural address indirectly referred to the issue. While firmly disavowing the doctrine of pan-Asian exclusiveness and any desire to create yet another "bloc" in a world already overburdened with them, he stressed the need for some form of integration of Asian relations as a step towards the ultimate attainment of the larger ideal of "one world."

He did not indicate what form this integration should take, nor what kind of apparatus should be devised to regulate Asian relations. However, talks with a representative cross-section of the delegates led one to the conclusion that far-reaching plans for an Asian Federation or Confederation, such as those which have attracted many leaders of Asian movements, must for the present be regarded as dreams. Equally unpractical is the suggestion, which has found favour in some Asian circles, of adapting the Monroe Doctrine to Asian conditions. That doctrine embodied a unilateral declaration of national policy based on the concept of a preponderant continental power. Any attempts to apply such a policy in Asia at the present stage is certain to be resented. The integration of Asian relations, as far as one could judge from the trend of thought at the conference, is more likely to be achieved by a series of interlocking multilateral or bilateral arrangements of the kind which were envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Tentative, though not very successful, experiments on this line have already been made in Asia; there was the now defunct Saadabad Pact and the working example of the Arab League. Under the new conditions, such regional arrangements may be expected to have greater reality and efficacy.

On a realistic analysis, the regional pattern of security in Asia would demand, as the ultimate condition of its success, an overall understanding between China, India and Russia. Opinion on this point, however, is far from being crystallized. The partition of India, contemplated under the new constitutional plan, is bound in some measure to complicate the issue still further and may delay the evolution of an integrated pattern of Asian security. But it is unlikely to affect the problem adversely on a long-term view. For although the Muslim League boycotted the Inter-Asian Conference—in which, paradoxically, the Muslim countries preponderated numerically—the League High Command's outlook on international affairs is barely distinguishable from that of Congress. It is, therefore, not unduly optimistic to predict that the two units of India will be able eventually to work out a joint policy of co-operation in the tasks of Asian reconstruction.

One last point may be made in this brief survey of Inter-Asian relations. The Delhi Conference, besides focusing the problems of Asian polity, indicated the new spirit of self-reliance and self-assertion which is abroad in Asia to-day. It would be well for Europe and America, and especially those western countries which, like Britain, have long historical associations with the peoples of Asia, to take note of this fact. Observers from London, Washington and Moscow were present at the conference and one trusts that they formed a correct assessment of the situation. The need for a re-orientation of Western outlook on Asia cannot be too strongly emphasized. True, the old imperialistic policies are being modified, even if slowly, but there is always a time-lag between a theoretical change of policy and the requisite mental readjustments without which changes in policy cannot be effective. There is, one feels, still a lingering belief among some influential circles in the West that somehow the course of history can be reversed or, at any rate, that the old relationship of dependence between Asia and the West can be re-established in a new form through some sort of subtle manoeuvre.

This is a delusion fatal to any hope of inter-continental harmony and as such to world stability. Responsible sections of Asian leadership are fully aware of the politico-economic interdependence of the structure of world prosperity as a whole. However, they are in no mood to acquiesce in, and even if they were, those whom they lead would not tolerate the interpretation of this interdependence as a relation of perpetual dependence and servitude for the Asiatic nations. The sooner this fact is grasped in the West the sooner it will be possible to establish a balanced inter-continental relationship based on equality. The finding of that equilibrium is one of the major problems challenging world statesmanship in our time.

## SPAIN REVISITED (II)

BY A. F. WILLS

AFTER a bitter fratricidal struggle such as Spain experienced between 1936 and 1939, moral reconstruction was bound to take place much more slowly than material. It is not difficult to muster the necessary practical enthusiasm for removing the outward scars of war; but who shall heal the deep and festering sores left in the human spirit? I remember how startled I was when on a visit to Fredericksburg in Virginia in 1938 to discover how the outcome of the American Civil War could still rankle in a Southerner's breast after nearly three generations.

It is not surprising that feelings of vengeance still hold sway in many a Spanish heart. One has to lose one's nearest and dearest at the hands, not of some outside foe, but of one's own neighbours before the immense sacrifice genuine forgiveness entails can be rightly appreciated. I know, personally, of only one family here in Spain which, by a collective act, has plainly shown that forgiveness for the cruel murder of one of its members is inspired by true Christian feeling. As for the Church, it seems as though it missed a tremendous opportunity during the course and since the end of the war. In spite of its martyrs—and they were many—if only its weight could have been brought to bear steadily, methodically, tirelessly on the side of humanity, who knows what stores of love and devotion it might have heaped up for itself in the popular breast? As it is, numbers of men and women young enough to have thrown all their energies into the war on the side of Marxism have definitely been lost to the Church—whatever religious lip-service they may find it convenient to pay—and the Church itself turns to the rising generation for renewal.

However, this generation, too, has been steeped in the general tragedy—albeit in a passive way. It is now growing up in a "provisional" atmosphere characterized by anti-liberal feeling, political indefiniteness, universal black market, bureaucratic corruption. At too early an age life's difficulties and rottennesses have been impressed upon its consciousness, so that it has had to create its own means of defence against a "tough" environment: it has gone "tough" itself.

Not long ago, I was talking with a distinguished lady, the principal of a co-educational school—one of the very few of its kind in the country—valiantly attempting to continue something of the liberal spirit that used to animate the former government-sponsored *Instituto Escuela* and independent

*Institución Libre de Enseñanza.* Tears came into her eyes when she said how sometimes she and her assistants (mostly unpaid volunteers) wondered whether, in spite of all their efforts, they were not building upon sand. She told me that some little time before my visit a man who was trying to escape from the police was shot at and killed by them not far from the school gates. Everyone rushed out immediately to see what had happened. She said only one or two of the children seemed at all perturbed at the sight of the man's body lying there still warm; most took it all as a matter of course; for a few it even provided a subject for mirth.

I have only room here to touch on the subject of education. For most children it is a question of attendance at either a Church or State school. For some time now a struggle has been in progress between the two types of school, both aiming to get into their hands the greater share of national education. The State schools have been losing ground owing to the size of the classes in so many of them—often eighty to a hundred pupils or more, where it is obviously impossible to teach or maintain proper discipline. Thus, parents who can afford it are taking their children away from the State school to have them sufficiently coached in an independent one in time to be able to pass the *Examen de Estado*, which corresponds to our school certificate. Religion is taught in all schools. Naturally, however, the religious schools—apart altogether from the economic motive—like to think they are better qualified than their rivals to give the child the traditional Catholic background.

Among all serious educationists—lay or religious—I have found a deep concern to make Spanish education correspond with Spanish psychology. It seems that this is a lesson which the Civil War rammed home with considerable force. There is little doubt that in the immediate past there were too many indigestible pedagogic imports from abroad. Indeed, however much one may admire the personal qualities of the knot of men and women of liberal outlook who set themselves to become in Spanish education the "leaven which should leaven the whole", one is compelled to question the soundness of their vision in so far as it might bring benefit to more than a very limited minority of their fellow-countrymen. For, so long as Spaniards refuse to recognize the colour grey—the liberal colour *par excellence*—so long will every subject treated in the country be a matter of black or white. Perhaps it is not so much a question of conscious refusal as one of instinctive constitutional aversion.

In the universities, the Church has made up its mind to be amply represented. Every faculty in Madrid University now has its own chapel\* and student hostels are in the charge of members of religious orders. There is nothing remarkable in this in a Catholic country; nor are students likely to alter their habits for better or worse merely on that account. But the Church's active presence in their midst right up to the moment they enter upon a career will

\* This does not entail organized chapel-going.

be a daily reminder that religion is the natural basis upon which to build any life worth living, any activity worth the effort.

Informed opinion suggests that little output of any value need be expected under present conditions from the *Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas*, which replaces the old *Centro de Estudios Históricos* and its offshoots as the national centre embracing all branches of learning. Riddled with favouritism in the matter of appointments, the *Consejo* may be regarded as presenting, above all, a notable example of elaborate window-dressing.

But the cultural field is not the only one to suffer from serious problems of morale. The public administration is crowded out with hosts of officials, largely composed of ex-combatants and any others with some "patriotic" claim, however remote, to nail upon the State. Spain has for long been notorious for graft in public affairs. However, taking into account the ridiculous salaries paid to State officials, Spanish graft could, in the past, be compared not too unfavourably with that obtaining in other countries. Salaries have not appreciably altered. But whereas, before, there were generally recognized limits beyond which no "honest man" cared to venture, now no such artificial barriers appear to exist, leaving everyone to place his own interpretation upon the precise extent to which he is "deserving of his country".

In commerce and industry, things have reached such a pass that it is impossible to carry on business in a straightforward manner. For instance, firms which have to base the price of their finished product on the cost of raw material find little or no margin of profit if the price of their particular product and the cost of the raw material are both controlled; for, usually, the raw material is unobtainable at the controlled price, and the actual price which has to be paid for it is too high to leave any profit. All kinds of methods have to be resorted to, therefore, to wriggle out of the enforced-price mesh. Exactly the same applies to agriculture, the peasant refusing to be crushed under the dead hand of over-centralization and to accept less for a thing than the actual cost of producing it. He is merely incited to "pass the buck" to the unfortunate townsman. There is the ever-present danger, however, of falling under the ban of the *Fiscalía de Tasas* (Price-control Commission). The remuneration of this organization's officials is derived from the fines they can impose for non-observance of the price-laws, rather in the manner of the Inquisitors of bygone days. It is hardly necessary to add that such a system produces blackmail and bribery in the case of the rich; harsh treatment in that of the poor.

The distribution of foodstuffs, under the centralized control of the *Comisaría de Abastecimientos*, provides further opportunity for administrative dishonesty or incompetence. In view of the very bad harvests of 1944-1945, it may be necessary for the Government to continue exercising some control over prices and distribution. But the whole object for which this department

exists is largely nullified by an excessive rigidity and the fact that other government departments and the provincial governors flagrantly authorize the buying up of stocks wherever they can be found, in order to make themselves as independent as possible of the *Comisaría's* vagaries. Scarcity in the open market for the ordinary consumer (or the black market) is thus greatly aggravated.

But perhaps the palm for barely disguised jobbery should go to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, whose Import-Export licensing bureau levies a sort of unofficial tax on incoming and outgoing goods, with at least *this* plainly discernible result. No other capital in Europe can boast so many of the latest and most luxurious models of American motor-car production as Madrid, and none, for the size of its population, has such a broken-down, overcrowded public transport service.

All this from the moral point of view smells—and smells bad. Yet such is the atmosphere in which the post-Civil War generation is growing up. If only education could act as something of a counterweight! But education itself shares in the general uncertainty about the future; how far, for instance, it is to become again a monopoly of the Church? In the meantime youth throws itself with furious zeal into any subject of immediate practical value. Learning for its own sake languishes. Life is too grim a struggle to allow for such a pastime.

General Franco is no saint. Yet even if one thinks him a devil, one must give him his due. In spite of the seamy side to his régime—which it is easy enough to discover—there is no doubt about his sincere desire to promote the welfare of the Spanish people, nor about the long and arduous hours he devotes daily to achieving that end. About his past there is nothing hid, or which need be hidden; so he can afford to be truthful with himself. He had a distinguished military reputation long before he became leader of the *Movimiento*—as it is called. It is unlikely, therefore, that he would be sticking to his present post merely through ambition or vanity.

The danger, in the case of such a man, lies in his trying to govern by semi-military methods for longer than the actual health of his country requires. This is precisely what conservative and liberal opinion alike complains about most. It says: one thing is to save a man from drowning; another is to keep him to his bed on the pretext that he has to recover from that experience, when, in point of fact, he feels as right as rain. The Spanish body-politic urgently requires exercise: it can be given exercise and still be kept from "rushing down a steep place into the sea". This, it says, General Franco apparently cannot or will not recognize.

On the face of it, the complaint seems justified. But one should be wary of unquestioningly accepting it. How many men of liberal opinion who, before the arrival of the Republic, found it hard to find words with which to express their abhorrence of the monarchy and all it stood for, were, after

a year or so's experience of republican government, pathetically forced to recognize their mistaken zeal? How many of such men, awaiting the firing squad during the Civil War, must not have remembered the palmy days when mob-rule was merely something one read about in history books? If the victims ruthlessly cut down on either side could speak, what would be their counsel?

That a number of talented, energetic people should be impatient with things as they are is readily understandable. But, this time, the pace is being set, not for the fastest, but for the slowest. Much leeway has to be made up. Some has had to be made up in the face of extremely adverse circumstances, political, financial and meteorological. Too bad for the intellectuals! But what ordinary people want is a steady amelioration in material conditions and a peaceful transition to some form of constitutional government. The other day I overheard a woman who was queueing up to draw bigger rations than usual say: "If rations like these could be distributed a little oftener, a lot *we* should care who was, or was not, sitting in the Pardo Palace!"—which remark was received with general approval. And this is how the foreman of some workshops, who has had to live through all the political upsets which have recently befallen his country, expressed himself to me: "We have had, in the course of some twenty-five years, a monarchy, a dictatorship, a republic—and now a syndicalist régime, which is by no means altogether satisfactory, but which will be replaced by some other form of government when the time is ripe. Meantime, Spain reacts to foreign pressure like a man who, in a crowd, finds himself being prodded in the back when he is making his own way forward as best he can. He turns indignantly to those pushing him from behind and closes his fists."

If these opinions are at all representative, then what ordinary people want at the moment, above all, is some one with balance at the head of the country's affairs. And balance is undoubtedly a quality General Franco possesses in marked degree. This has been interpreted by some people as merely the expression of a vulgar self-complacency. But that is a shallow view. On the contrary, this balance is the reflection of a powerful inner assurance. It explains why he has gained so many outstanding political victories—notably that of keeping his country out of the 1939-1945 war. It is this same balance, or sense of control, which has placed him, kept him and is keeping him where he is.

Then—it may be legitimately asked—if all this is true and General Franco is sincerely doing his best for the country, how is it that in so many respects the administration is so scandalous? I think the truest answer is that a political artist (if we can be unprejudiced enough to concede General Franco that title) is just as limited as any other type of creative artist by the qualities and defects of the material in which he has to work and by his own individual vision as artist. Obviously a ruthless and bloody social upheaval is not the

best source from which to obtain the material, and the individual vision is a military one. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that, both during and since the end of the war, General Franco has had to reconcile a host of conflicting interests among the various institutions and political groups which gave their support to the *Movimiento*. At the beginning, each one considered itself—in thoroughly Spanish fashion—most truly representative of the struggle against Marxist Communism. Within less than a year, General Franco, to save precisely that type of wasteful quarrelling which was the ruin of their opponents, gave the supremacy to the Falangists. In all “win-the-war” accommodations—as we know to our cost—the bill is presented on the day of victory. Since the end of the Spanish war, this has meant ever sharper and more bitter divergence between Falangists and non-Falangists. In such an atmosphere the execution of any internal policy has to be tempered with the maximum of caution, so as not to precipitate serious sectional loss of support for the Government. No doubt temporizing has gone far enough and a thorough clean-up of the administrative machine needs to be undertaken. But this is unlikely to happen while such intense hostility to the régime prevails abroad.

Though there is no reason to doubt General Franco's strong monarchist principles, or that he has ever had in mind any candidate for the throne other than Don Juan, it is quite clear from the Law of Succession which was submitted to referendum on July 6, that he seeks to make the return of the monarchy conditional on the acceptance of the present national-syndicalist régime as the basis on which to fashion a more liberal type of government on elective principles suited to Spain. Don Juan, on the other hand, claims his right to the throne as an hereditary one, subject to no conditions whatsoever, other than those obtaining at the time of Alfonso XIII's abdication. These would, naturally, include the holding of elections for Cortes embracing *all* political parties. But I have yet to meet the monarchists who regard the holding of elections in such circumstances with anything other than genuine horror.

Meanwhile, the wisdom of the Pretender's action in issuing a declaration recently to a foreign newspaper may be questioned, since it contains statements calculated to disconcert both clerical and conservative opinion. Indeed, it has helped to manœuvre the monarchists into a false position—one in which they might come to be regarded as in open opposition to the régime; whereas, the truth is that, while fully recognizing the services rendered by General Franco and all the forces under his command (including their own) in saving Spain from Communism, they feel that every sensible person must now realize that this régime has served its turn and that a resumption of more constitutional methods of government is imperative. The question at once arises, however, what would happen to Spain during the taking-over period? It is a big question and one in which the Left parties have quickly discerned a golden opportunity.

General Franco can count on three main sources of support: the Church,

which admits that never in its palmiest days has greater deference been paid to it; the Armed Forces, which, in their turn, enjoy great prestige and superior ratings to those of the civil population, and the general mass of people, caught, as usual, between either extreme, which prefers the order (with its own particular benefits and disadvantages) it knows to the disorder which it shrewdly suspects—and with what excellent reason!—would supervene on the disappearance of the régime, unless very strong guarantees could be devised to tide over the awkward period while a new Constitution was being elaborated.” General Franco knows well enough, of course, how to play upon all these fears or satisfactions to the advantage of his own government's position.

It remains to be seen how UNO will judge the efforts so far made by General Franco to pave the way for a more liberal form of government. These efforts may not seem to amount to very much. But UNO will be wise to refrain from adopting too violent or too schoolmarmish a tone, unless it wishes to see the Spanish ranks closing again round their leader, thereby delaying still further the return of the monarchy, which, in any case, can now only come back gradually and, it would seem, after certain readjustments in points of view—probably on both sides—have been made. This at least is certain: Don Juan cannot return at present on his own terms: General Franco can continue at present on *his*.

*(The first part of Mr. Wills's article was published in the August 1947 number of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)*

## STORM CENTRES

## I GREECE

MARSHAL TITO is at Belgrade, and M. Dimitrov at Sofia. "And Uncle Sam is in Athens. A war of nerves is in progress, and Greece is once again the scene of conflict between East and West. Already the life of Greece, broken many times by similar pressure from outside, was in a neurotic condition, split into political extremes, racked by poverty. Now East and West accuse one another of causing this latest intensification of Hellenic chaos. In a period of such acute rivalry, what possibility can there be that an international organization may contrive to smooth away the friction? The chances are slight. It seems inevitable that commissions appointed by UNO shall be identified with the one faction or the other. Meanwhile both sides continue the pressure, waiting for the rival force to weaken.

In all the mountain areas that divide Greece from Europe, political idealism and banditry have long been associated. The Greek liberators of the last century were bandits who fought their way down from the heights, clipped their moustaches, and became party politicians. The traditional association of highway robbery and revolution persisted right up to 1939, and was then much in evidence during the Italo-German campaigns and occupation. To-day every purge by the Athens Government drives political refugees up into the mountains, and when they return to the valleys it is as guerrillas. With them there come some of those desperate and hungry 'displaced persons' who are now so numerous in central and southern Europe. Such desperadoes are naturally attracted to the regions where tension is greatest. The frontiers of Greece are not only perfect terrain for banditry, but are also the very point where East and West meet and clash. Here then the guerrillas, consisting of Greek idealists and international adventurers, conveniently serve the purpose of the U.S.S.R.

The present Greek Government has the good wishes of most of the population, but it could not survive without the support of the U.S.A. It is therefore the natural target both of the U.S.S.R. and of those Greeks who resent the fact that their country—almost alone among European nations—is still subject to a right-wing régime. Inevitably this Government is regarded as the successor to that of the late General Metaxás, who in 1936 conjured up the communist bogey as an excuse for establishing a personal dictatorship. Metaxás declared strikes illegal, proclaimed martial law, and deported his opponents to the prison-island of Anáfi. It is true to say that Metaxás was largely respon-

sible for the creation of class-consciousness in Greece. His oppression began the work of forming a really communist opposition.

While the energies of Greece are being wasted in political acrimony and frontier warfare, the Great Powers proceed with the development of their strategy. During recent weeks considerable provocation has come from the Left both at home and abroad. In the middle of July the Greek communist leader, M. Zachariades, from his hiding-place announced that it was his intention to establish an independent 'democratic' government on Greek soil (presumably in the Konitza-Florina area). Preparatory guerrilla operations occurred on a large scale, but without decisive result. Simultaneously wholesale arrests were being made by the Athens Government, while the U.S.A. at Lake Success was attempting to force through a scheme whereby Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria should receive the attentions of a UNO commission of 'conciliation and investigation'. On July 29 Mr. Gromyko vetoed this U.S. proposal. On August 4 UNO rejected by nine votes to two (Russia and Poland) Mr. Gromyko's resolution denouncing the Greek Government and foreign intervention as being responsible for recent developments in the Balkans; but on the previous day Belgrade had published the news of the Yugoslav-Bulgar 'political, economic and cultural' Agreement, which an Athens spokesman described as "the first step in a Slav siege of Greece." The implications of this Agreement are far-reaching. One intention no doubt is to assist the eventual separation of northern Greece and the absorption of that district into the Slav Communist Federation. On August 12 at Lake Success Mr. Herschel Johnson, the U.S. delegate reiterated the accusation that the Slav powers were responsible for Greek unrest; stated that the Greek frontier question would have to be taken to the Assembly; and promised that the U.S.A. would co-operate in whatever action was found to be necessary to protect Greek independence. On August 13 Washington denied that the U.S.A. would send troops to Greece. When the remaining British forces are finally withdrawn "in September or October", however, it is to be assumed that U.S. assistance to the Athens Government and their army will have been very considerably strengthened.

The truth of course is that matters would not have reached the present critical condition, had not the internal situation invited foreign intervention and infiltration. The fighting in Greece did not originate in decisions taken by any other power. It was started by the Greeks themselves after a long period of party political chaos. I recall most vividly a certain starlit night in 1932, when I was living in a house that stood back among the vineyards on the road that joins Kifissíá to Athens. That night there was suddenly a shattering din of rifle fire and of bullets clattering into metal. It was an attempt to assassinate Venizelos as he drove past in his car after dining at Kifissíá. In my diary of 1934 I have the following entry dated Athens, November 14: "Joined the procession that was marching to the Albanian Legation to protest against



the repression of Greeks in Albania. In Academy Street there broke out cries of "*Nero ibne!*", and we all ran for shelter as the fire brigade came dashing along, spraying water onto the crowd." Throughout the 'thirties local politicians wrangled bitterly, and political parties and newspapers sprouted recklessly. There was a classic remark: "If you do not give me a post in the Government, I will found a party and a newspaper." Greece had still not recovered from the centuries of Turkish domination, the Balkan wars, the bullying and bribery to which she was subjected during the 1914-1918 war, and the disaster of Asia Minor. Then Germany began to rise again: Dr. Schacht revealed himself as an excessively eager client for Greek produce. King George of the Hellenes became a pawn in the political game. Metaxás arrived to impose order but, so doing, intensified the ferment. The 1939-1945 war further increased the wear and tear of Greek social and economic life. Since 1945 Greek politics have been even more violent and corrupt than at any previous time. The extremes are now irreconcilable, and such moderate figures as old man Sophoulis have no following. Foreign Powers of East and West during the past year or more have added fuel to the fire, but M. Tsaldaris and his colleagues are themselves more than sufficiently active in fanning it.

The constant arrests and deportations, the equipping of an ever larger army, the demand for sanctions against the Slavs: these and other similar measures by the Government merely serve to prolong and aggravate the fighting. The only action that can bring peace is a general amnesty founded on a wide and energetic campaign to improve the conditions in which the poorer classes live and work. The chances that the present Government will undertake such a programme are remote. The outlook both internally and internationally is grim indeed.

GEORGE PENDLE.

## II INDONESIA

Three and half centuries of Dutch rule have probably bestowed more benefits upon the archipelago than can be said of the administration of most other colonial powers in the areas under their control. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the comparative absence of a "colour bar" and the sending of first-class experts, familiar with the country, its languages, and its culture to provide roads, railways, hospitals and modern cities have been some of the reasons for the relatively late awakening of nationalist sentiments within the indigenous population. Moreover, Indonesia is the sole Asiatic country possessing a fairly numerous population of European (mainly Dutch) descent, numbering several hundred thousand who are partly linked by ties of inter-marriage with the Indonesian population or otherwise firmly rooted in the country by decades of settlement. There is also a Chinese minority of some three million and a long established Arab population of about 100,000, mainly merchants in

the more important cities. The indigenous population, almost 70,000,000, is divided into a great number of ethnical groups speaking a variety of languages. The two most important ethnical groups are the Javanese, about 40,000,000, and the Soendanese, about 12,000,000, the latter mainly concentrated in West Java. With the exception of the island of Bali which has retained its ancient Hindu religious and cultural traditions, and apart from some of the more primitive peoples in Borneo and New Guinea, the majority of the population is Muslim, although important Christian communities now exist in the Minahassa region of Celebes and on the island of Ambon.

The beginnings of Indonesian nationalism were, in the first decades of the twentieth century, of a pronounced Muslim character, and were later strengthened by organizations of a political nature. Small scale outbreaks of unrest culminated in a rebellion in 1926. During the war nationalists supported the Japanese in the hope that they might thus gain independence for Indonesia. When the Allies landed they found a Republican administration established on the model of the Japanese-sponsored Burmese Government, headed by President Soekarno with the anti-Dutch politician, M. Soebardjo, as Foreign Minister. Later moderate elements gained power, notably M. Sjahrir, who has a Dutch wife and who together with M. Sjarifoeddin, the present Premier, favoured co-operation. Laborious negotiations were begun under the chairmanship of Lord Inverchapel, and later Lord Killearn.

While relations improved the young Republic underwent a process of internal consolidation. Its army, the T.R.I., under the command of General Soedirman, assumed control of the many fighting organizations formed by political parties and religious groups and the provisional Indonesian Parliament, the K.N.I.P. (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Poesat*), was more than doubled by a decree of President Soekarno, benefiting the communists and minority groups such as the Chinese, the Arabs, and the Indo-Europeans, who were given their own parliamentary representatives. This decree was opposed by the largest political party, the Maspoemi or "Muslim League", whose leader, Dr. Soekiman, demanded greater Masjoemi representation within both Parliament and Government, while at the same time rejecting any agreement with the Dutch. A severe crisis broke out when the "Working Committee" of the K.N.I.P. under the chairmanship of Dr. Radjimanwediodiningrat rejected the increase in the number of M.P's as "unconstitutional". President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta threatened to resign, and only a last minute withdrawal of the Masjoemi demands prevented them from doing so.

The Dutch continued their negotiations with the Republic and also arranged conferences at which the future of Indonesia's political structure—as far as it was to affect the territories under Dutch control—was to be decided. Under the guidance of the Lt. Gov. General Dr. van Mook, a conference held at Malino, Celebes, established a principle of an Indonesian Federation in which the Republic would share as an equal partner. Then, at the Conference of

Den Pasar, Bali, the administrative region of the "Great East" was transformed into the State of East Indonesia with Macassar as its capital. This State was given equal status with the Republic, as was later West Borneo ('West Kalimantan'), with Pontianak as capital.

Meanwhile, a Netherlands Commission-General was appointed under the chairmanship of the former socialist Prime Minister, Professor Schermerhorn. After its arrival in the Indies, it contacted the Indonesian Delegation, led by M. Sjahrir and laborious negotiations led to the draft of a provisional agreement at the village of Linggadjati near Cheribon. In Holland the Government successfully overcame the parliamentary opposition of the Anti-Revolutionary and the Christian-Historical Parties, but circles hostile to the agreement rallied to the support of the "Committee for the Preservation of Imperial Unity", set up by the wartime Prime Minister, Professor Gerbrandy, and containing also some Catholics led by the former Colonial Minister, M. Welter. However, the agreement was ultimately ratified, both parties recognizing each other's right to adhere to their own "interpretation" of this agreement, which provided for the setting up of the United States of Indonesia, to be linked with the Netherlands, Surinam, and Curacao in the "Netherlands-Indonesian Union" under the Dutch Crown. All groups of the population were granted freedom to express their own will with regard to their political future, and demands were made by a political group, allegedly representing the majority of the (mainly Christian) population of the island of Ambon, desiring secession from the State of East Indonesia and closer attachment to the Netherlands.

A further threat to the agreement was the formation of the Partai Ra'jat Pasoendan. The Soendanese, ethnically distinct from the Javanese, and speaking a different language, originally possessed a State of their own which was later absorbed by the more powerful of the various Javanese empires. They had been under Javanese domination until the advent of Dutch rule. The Soendanese Freedom Party demanded the establishment of an autonomous state, with Bandoeng as capital, and opposed any inclusion of West Java into the Republic. At a rally held in Dutch-occupied Bandoeng, the State of "Pasoendan" was proclaimed, Dr. Soeria Kartelagawa appointed President and Dr. Koestomo Prime Minister of Pasoendan. The Republican authorities were naturally violently opposed to the establishment of a Soendanese State but will perhaps grant the Soendanese greater influence in the Provisional Parliament.

The worsening of the situation finally induced the Dutch Prime Minister, Dr. Beel, and Dr. Jonkman, Minister of Overseas Territories, to undertake a three weeks' visit to the Indies for information. During this time they did not have any contact with the Republican leaders, and they did not take decisions on the spot. While the two Dutch Ministers thus never set foot on Republican soil, a number of Dutch journalists and socialist members of Parliament, as well as a semi-official delegation of the Netherlands-Indies Government, were impressed by the achievements of the Republic after visits to

Jogjakarta and the Malang debates of the K.N.I.P and the Indonesian Trade Union Congress.

After the return of the two Dutch Ministers to the Hague it became obvious that the Netherlands Government was no longer prepared to tolerate Republican violations of the truce, while the Republicans on their part accused the Dutch of having infringed the armistice. Repeated Dutch requests, regarded by many as having the character of an ultimatum, demanding that the Republican Government should put into practice the provisions of the Linggadjati Agreement met with little Republican response, although the Republican Delegation appeared willing to make some concessions. These concessions, again reiterated as a result of foreign diplomatic activity in a broadcast by M. Sjahrir, were however rejected by all parties in Jogjakarta, including the *Sarap Kiri*—the Federation of all Left-Wing Parties—thus forcing M. Sjahrir to resign. M. Sjarifoeddin, a socialist and Christian, took his place as Prime Minister while Dr. Gani and Dr. Setyadjit—a former Labour Party member of the Dutch Parliament who had recently arrived from Holland, became Vice-Premiers. M. Sjarifoeddin also seemed prepared to make concessions.

However, the activities of Hadji Agoes Salim—who despite his stay on foreign soil—was raised to full Ministerial office and who continued to conclude friendship treaties with the countries of the Near East, were strongly resented by the Dutch who held that the Republic could not claim the status of a sovereign state even under the Linggadjati Agreement. This and the Republican refusal to accept a joint Dutch-Indonesian constabulary again led to a severe crisis. Diplomatic action by the U.S., British, French and Chinese Governments and Consuls-General in Batavia did its utmost to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, but without success. On July 20 the Netherlands authorities started their "police action" which was intended to be of a "limited nature". The military campaign was characterized by very little actual fighting, extremely few casualties, (less than 100 killed, and less than 200 wounded), the rapid advance of the Netherlands forces throughout Java and the Dutch occupation of nearly all principal cities and ports. Jogjakarta and its surrounding countryside were deliberately left unoccupied.

Meanwhile, Australia and India had raised the Indonesian conflict with the Security Council while the U.S.'s good services for mediation were accepted by the Dutch Government which had declared that it would follow a Security Council "request" but not an order to cease fire. The Netherlands Government greatly resents the Security Council's "interference" in what it regards as an essentially "internal" Dutch affair, comparable perhaps to a possible conflict between the U.S. Federal Government and one of the states, and has been supported in this attitude by the East Indonesian Government in Macassar. Thus the international repercussions of this conflict cannot at this juncture be foreseen.

H. H. B. MOSBERG.

## THE TREATMENT OF THE P.O.W.

BY T. C. SKEFFINGTON-LODGE, M.P.

THE war was not fought to establish slave States but to abolish them. It was also fought and won to ensure that spiritual dungeons should be things of the past. In spite of these two truisms public opinion has so far been unable in this country to do more than obtain for the prisoners of war still in our hands both here and in the Middle East, a series of so-called concessions. Though welcome to the men these somewhat meagre improvements in their status do not exonerate us from the justifiable charge that our conduct is morally indefensible.

The Geneva Convention to which we were subscribers states that prisoners must be sent home as soon as possible "after the conclusion of peace." It is further specifically stated in it that there shall be no exceptions on the plea of using their labour for reparations. This document to which appeal is sometimes made to justify our present policy most certainly never anticipated the enforcement on Germany of a war policy of unconditional surrender by her conquerors. It was obviously drawn up also on the understanding that all belligerents would have Governments in being to sign treaties, and that the victors in any war would be of one mind about the peace conditions to be imposed on their beaten foes.

It is now well over two years since we, together with our Allies, assumed responsibility for Germany's future and for all her nationals both inside and outside her borders. The story, so far, of how we have performed our self-chosen task makes a sorry chapter in the history of mankind even though the difficulties to be grappled with have been immense. In no aspect of it however have we fallen so short of the democratic faith and sense of decency and justice for which we fought, as in our handling of the prisoner of war problem.

The gradual improvements in the conditions of our own prisoners for which I and other Members of Parliament have fought hard and long are good in themselves. But it is a healthy sign that they have failed to satisfy the public conscience. When the war began many of the men in our midst were mere boys of twelve, thirteen or fourteen years old. To-day they are grown up. The blood and lust and hate of the war years has (inevitably) left an indelible impression on their minds. To get away from any reminder of the war is their ambition and their hope. Yet here they are—inhibited, frustrated, a body of rootless and displaced men eating out their hearts in sorrow and loneliness because they are still cut off from their families and still unable to realize, even

a little, the ideals common to all young manhood.

Not long ago I met a constituent who had been a prisoner in Germany for over four years during the war. He told me he felt ashamed whenever he saw Germans in the country lanes or walking the streets of our towns. To be stared at by those you were once ordered to kill, to feel you must lower your eyes when you meet them face to face because you are branded by your uniform as a guilty man, to carry about with you in an alien land the weight of defeat without knowing what has happened to your wife and your children, these are considerations which constitute the degradation we are inflicting on men whose only crime was to be born German, and to be caught up in the Nazi war machine.

I have talked to hundreds of these men and I am satisfied that Mr. Bevin's recent plea that "physically they are not being injured" and that their retention is "a great advantage even to Germany" completely ignores the mental and moral strain which their long, unnatural detention constitutes. Some 260,000 are still held here, not to mention the 75,000 men out in the Middle East. The remoteness and greater needs of these latter should not escape our concern. I recently signed a memorial to the Prime Minister pressing for a speeding up of repatriation. Since last September the rate of return of the prisoners has been 15,000 a month. This is far too slow. Even the grave economic crisis and their great usefulness to us, in agriculture especially, should not override our obligation to get them home more quickly. To double the present rate of discharge from the many camps and cages in which they live would go a long way towards improving the low morale of the German people. It would also enable the urgent steps in Germany's rehabilitation to be taken more rapidly and effectively.


I would completely revise the conditions under which the prisoners can volunteer to remain in Britain as free workmen, by extending this facility to all under-manned industries. At present they can only stay in agriculture if applied for by a farmer who can offer them accommodation. The directives issued by the French Government for their prisoners are both wider in scope and more liberal in conception than anything we have so far adopted, and we might well draw up and operate something on the same lines here with beneficial results for ourselves and the men. Although no official census has been taken I have reason to think that up to ten per cent. of the men in some of our camps are anxious to remain in this country for one reason or another. The rest should go back as soon as transport can be arranged. At the same time we should initiate a plan whereby those prisoners who wish to do so can volunteer to return here after they have satisfied their natural curiosity about their homeland and their relatives. The adoption of these suggestions would, I believe, provide us with a reliable labour force of at least 20,000 men. If more are needed then I have little doubt that a scheme calling for volunteers to come over and help us at harvest time and when other special difficulties face

us would bring a response from those outside the ranks of ex-prisoners which would be quite surprising. As long as coal in the Ruhr is in short supply many ancillary industries are either closed down or on part-time work. This inevitably means unemployment and the latest figures are a depressing indication of the fact that many men in the British zone are without any regular duties.

The Government will only move if the people of this country wish it. Italians can come back and help us, and have done so in considerable numbers. To treat the Germans differently is wrong, and is merely to perpetuate that form of racial discrimination which was the hall-mark of Hitler's policy. Our prisoners offer us a wonderful opportunity of implanting in the Germany-to-be the democratic spirit we wish to see established there. The proposals I have made will help very greatly to bring this about; we shall find among the prisoners enough friends and admirers of our British way and purpose to influence their fellow countrymen to see this as the only real road to peace.

## ANTARCTICA

BY FRANK ILLINGWORTH.



INTERNATIONAL interest in the Antarctic has never before been so marked. Britain now has seven semi-permanent outposts in the Far South. Admiral Byrd's recent expedition was the largest in the varied history of exploration, and it was replaced in the Antarctic by the small "unofficial" United States expedition led by Commander Finn Ronne. The Argentine's demand for the transfer to her of British Antarctic territory was followed by the despatch of an Argentine vessel to the Falkland Island Antarctic Dependency of Marguerite Bay, and Chile and the Argentine are now preparing to establish a permanent meteorological station on the Southern Continent. An Australian party, complete with aircraft, is leaving for the Dominion's Antarctic Territories this year in the former American polar research ship *Wyatt Earp*. New Zealand and South Africa are also likely to establish permanent research stations on the Antarctic Continent, and a joint Anglo-Scandinavian expedition is now preparing to leave for the Far South.

Why should nine countries suddenly become interested in five million square miles of wilderness which, apart from its whaling industry, would appear to be valueless? The answer is that now important areas in the Arctic were little more than names on the map ten years ago; recent scientific developments suggest that what came to pass in the Far North may be repeated in the Far South, and if the purpose of the present spate of expeditions is officially one of scientific research they are also designed to test the validity of conflicting territorial claims.

That Britain anticipated delicate post-war diplomacy over the Antarctic is suggested by the secrecy with which in 1943 she despatched a small party to Marguerite Bay: there it built a base within a few hundred yards of Admiral Byrd's old camp. Questioned on the need to maintain a semi-permanent "mission" in territory disputed by the Argentine and Chile and likely to be claimed by the United States, the Colonial Office replied that the expedition was engaged in "secret work". Doubtless this party has put its time to good scientific purpose; but its continued presence and the despatch of two further permanent parties this year (bringing the number of British Antarctic parties up to seven) must appear political rather than scientific to other interested countries.

It would perhaps be as well to define at this point the extent of territorial claims in the Antarctic. The countries interested include France, Norway,

Sweden, Chile, the Argentine, Britain, Australia, New Zealand. The Norwegians claim all territory between longitudes 40°E and 20°W on the grounds that all recent exploration in this area has been undertaken by Norwegians. Swedish and French claims are made on the same basis. On the other hand, the United States refuses to admit the claims of other countries in the Antarctic, and at the same time she has consistently refused to accept the territory claimed on her behalf by American explorers, considering that the partition of the "Sixth Continent" is a matter for the conference table. With considerably less tact the Argentine has repeatedly claimed all territory between Cape Horn and the South Pole, in spite of her lack of interest in active exploration, on the ground that she is the nearest sovereign State; by the same argument Canada should belong to the United States and Scandinavia to the Soviet Union.

Britain has been the foremost pioneer in the exploration and development of the Antarctic. Of one hundred and seventy expeditions since 1502, thirty were Norwegian, twenty-five United States, nineteen French and seventy-five British. Britain recognizes the French claim to Adelie Land (lodged in 1938) and that of Norway to Queen Maud Land (1939). The Falkland Islands Dependencies, administered by the Colonial Office, comprise the South Orkney Islands, South Shetlands, Sandwich Islands, South Georgia, Graham Land and Coats Land. This claim is in strict conformity with international law, which, broadly speaking, three stages must be fulfilled in claiming a territory.

The first step is discovery. This confers an "inchoate right" which is not complete unless the second requirement, "commencement of occupation," is fulfilled. This in turn must be followed by "complete acquisition by occupation," which involves establishing a local administration. The New Zealand Ross Dependency (annexed in 1923) and the Australian Antarctic, and the coming Dominion of Antarctica "missions" to the Antarctic will fulfil the final requirement under international law—"acquisition by occupation."

This stage was fulfilled many years ago in the case of the Falkland Islands Dependencies, which come within the area claimed by the Argentine and Chile. Discovered and explored by British expeditions, the Dependencies were annexed by Letters Patent in 1908 and 1917. They were taken over by the Colonial Office after the First World War, the survey stations were steadily increased in number until permanent outposts of Empire are now maintained at Marguerite Bay, Port Lockroy, Signy Island, Hope Bay, Deception Islands, Argentine Islands and Admiralty Bay. The last two were those established this year. All have magistrates and a postal system, indicating and emphasizing British sovereignty; those on the South Shetlands, South Orkneys and South Georgia dating back to the earliest days of the Antarctic whaling industry, pioneered by the Commonwealth. It will be seen that British territorial claims in the Antarctic are unchallengeable. The only ground on which they can be gainsaid is the moral one that all countries should benefit from the partition of a new continent. That we have always appreciated this fact, at least in relation to the

Antarctic, is reflected in the readiness with which Britain granted the Argentine permission to establish whaling and meteorological stations, and later post offices, to serve the Argentine's outposts in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.

An Argentine supply-ship recently called at some of the furthest British outposts in Antarctica, including that at Marguerite Bay, which is the focal point in the present argument over ownership of the Southern Continent.

Marguerite Bay, in the Falkland Island Dependency of Graham Land, situated due south of Cape Horn, was the base for Admiral Byrd's 1939-1941 Expedition. The United States Ronne Expedition now there was the subject of carefully-worded statements in Washington and London last December. The Foreign Office denied reports that the United States had asked for the British party to be withdrawn from its base in this area, "which is part of the Falkland Islands Dependencies," a denial that also served to reiterate the British claim to this region. The (then) U.S. Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, replied tactfully that the Ronne expedition was unofficial and should not be confused with the official United States task force then on the Ross Ice Shelf under the leadership of Admiral Byrd and in territory discovered by Americans and not claimed by Britain. The Foreign Office stressed that the British "mission" at Marguerite Bay would, "without prejudice to British territorial claims," move to another site three hundred yards further from the hutments built by Byrd; but at the same time it stressed that there was insufficient room in the Bay for two parties and not enough seals on the ice to provide for more dogs.

British reaction was considerably firmer when, on March 13 last, the Stars and Stripes appeared over the American hutments at Marguerite Bay. The leader of the British party, Major H. Bunce-Butler, immediately took the matter up with Commander Finn Ronne in the following written terms:

I am directed by His Majesty's Government to inquire the reason for the United States flag being flown on the north-west point of Stonington Island. I assume the United States Government has made no claim to this territory and that flying of this flag is merely an indication of the presence of a United States expedition. If that is so I have no objection to the raising. If, however, this flag is intended to represent a territorial claim I am bound to protest on behalf of His Majesty's Government, as this violates British sovereignty and I shall have to report the matter to His Majesty's Government for instructions.

Major Bunce-Butler signed as a magistrate, indicating that a Court of Law had been established at Marguerite Bay. Commander Finn Ronne was quick to reply that the United States flag was being flown from an "American-built flagpole at an American camp," and that he had no objection to the British building their flagpole as high or even higher than the American flagpole. Thus the romance of Antarctic exploration was reduced to the level of post-war international diplomacy, and we can be certain that a British and an American party will be maintained at Marguerite Bay indefinitely. However, it was agreed last June that the British and United States parties at Marguerite

Bay will work together during their coming spring and summer field work. A member of the British expedition will join the American party and a member of the Ronne Expedition will join the British party, which will also have the support of American aircraft. This agreement between the two expeditions ignores territorial claims, which remain a matter for their respective Governments.

This American expedition is in a different category from that led by Admiral Byrd to the Ross Ice Shelf last winter. The former is a "holding force". The latter, comprising 4,000 men, thirteen ships including an aircraft-carrier, and the largest aircraft ever to operate from carrier-decks, served to show the Stars and Stripes in territory which America is one day likely to claim; but it was primarily a task-force to test military equipment under polar conditions.

The search for uranium, freely advanced in some circles to explain the revival of interest in the Arctic, is irresponsible. The geological formation of some parts of the Antarctic Continent resembles that of uranium-bearing districts of Arctic Canada; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that a continent one-and-a-half times the size of Europe contains uranium. Fairly large quantities of many other basic minerals have been discovered there. The New Zealand Ross Dependency is rich in coal, and if much of this is soft and brown and coked by volcanic action there are valuable coal fields in Parker Land\*, only five hundred and fifty miles due south of Cape Horn. Extensive oil fields have also been found in Parker Land, which is perhaps one reason for the Argentine's and Chile's interest in this area; and geological formations suggest extensive gold, silver, iron and copper deposits at a score or more of locations throughout the Antarctic Continent. But even if the primary minerals were found in commercial quantities the problem of winning them is not likely to be solved for many years to come. Not only is the Antarctic Continent sheathed in a moving ice-cap averaging four thousand feet in thickness but it is devoid of harbours, lashed by constant and intense gales and hemmed in by immense ice fields.

Nevertheless the Antarctic has an immediate purpose other than its whaling industry. Meteorological conditions over a wide area of the South Pacific and the South Atlantic originate in the Far South, and a chain of weather stations in the Antarctic would prove invaluable to air and sea communications over a major portion of the Southern Hemisphere. One purpose of the Australian expedition now being fitted out is to establish a permanent weather station in the Dominion's Antarctic Territory, and this is the ostensible purpose of the coming Argentine and Chilean expeditions.

It is also thought that the Antarctic may provide data leading to increased knowledge of fundamental physical laws. For example, the Southern Ice Cap offers unique opportunities for the study of cosmic rays, one of the objects

\* The American name for Graham Land, there being doubt whether this promontory was first located by a British or an American ship's crew.

of the Anglo-Scandinavian expedition scheduled to leave for Queen Maud Land under the leadership of Dr. Hans Ahlmann this December. This is probably the only post-war expedition entirely disinterested in territorial claims in the Antarctic: aided by aircraft, it will be engaged in glaciology, climatic history, meteorology, geology, and radar research.

A full survey of Admiral Byrd's latest work in the Antarctic is not yet available, but the report that two ice-free valleys were discovered deep in the ice cap is authentic. The reason for the existence of these comparatively warm areas in an otherwise frozen world is a matter for conjecture; but we may have the answer when Dr. Ahlmann's party reaches a similar valley discovered some years ago in Queen Maud Land.

It is thought that in time these (and perhaps other) "temperate" valleys might be utilized as permanent bases for the further exploration of the Antarctic Continent, in meteorology, and in the establishment of permanent research stations for the uninterrupted study of the fundamental physical laws. There have been almost dramatic cures of consumption among men who have joined South Polar expeditions, and sanatoria may one day be built in Antarctica. The suggestion that the Antarctic's ice-free valleys might one day be utilized as air bases on long-distance air routes may at first appear far-fetched. But it is barely ten years since the far-sighted prophesied trans-Arctic air routes, a prophesy that has been fulfilled in marked measure.

The wind blows with persistence in the Far South; in Adelie Land an air-stream fifty miles wide maintains an average speed of fifty miles an hour the year round. Given a means of harnessing the wind, power would be available for the development of the Antarctic's mineral resources. This may be considered the ultimate in imaginative thinking, but it is certain that the Powers interested in the Antarctic are looking far ahead. The days of the heroic dash to the Pole are over. Instead we have a new kind of long-term assault planned and implemented by governments. The present conflicting territorial claims result from the contradictory surveys of generations of explorers; the rival claims of explorers who annexed territory in the names of their governments have added to the confusion, as has the opportunism shown in recent years by countries that took little or no part in the exploration of the Antarctic Continent.

Claims to Antarctic territory cannot be settled until the "Southern Continent" has been adequately explored and mapped. This would undoubtedly take many years even with the aid of aircraft, and its completion would require international co-operation. The coming Anglo-Scandinavian expedition, sponsored by the Norwegian Government and actively supported in Sweden and Britain, could prove a model for future larger international expeditions to facilitate the division of the Sixth Continent.

It will be asked if the prize is worth the endeavour. Who can say? But when Voltaire called Canada "a few acres of useless snow" we knew as little about it as we do to-day about the Antarctic.



## CRUSADER

BY JAMES MONAHAN

THIS man saw Calvary. Yet little sign  
 to show he watched a different horizon  
 from yours, from mine; our trivial, close summits  
 seemed summits also in his landscape, fading  
 to those ranges, the same, the day-dreamed. He seemed kind  
 but only as you or I, with the common kindness  
 whose flights of wilder charity are clipped  
 to fit the borders of the cageing day.  
 Seemed mean no less than you or I, with meanness  
 of the regular dripping on the virgin stone  
 that wears a line, a river and a life.  
 And average driftwood also, such as gathers  
 the wisps of straws of custom on the voyage,  
 even finds anchorage, yet one so frail,  
 so fleeting that it rather seems a pause  
 in the current's urgency than any gesture  
 set like a positive rock against the time  
 between the source and the devouring sea.

But war's a hurricane will not distinguish  
 or slurring fecklessness or pretty habit  
 folded about us to a thin cocoon.  
 The hurricane takes equally, leaves only  
 the nations, murderous, and the naked man.  
 We'll seek new, desperate cover then; we'll don—  
 so much is given us—the great compulsion;  
 and some will find their sanctuary there,  
 wearing compulsion like a purpose, holding  
 their terrors steady through the storm. But most  
 want subtler comforting and most ask more—  
 obedient to the drill yet cannot stamp  
 their hearts to concrete of the barrack square.  
 So some put on the patriotic story,  
 there finding mantle and respect enough;

others, the faithful at Utopian shrines,  
 tailor those fragile vestments to their need  
 and that, it seems, suffices them. But most  
 will turn to digging in their legacies  
 to bring to the light some toy, some amulet  
 that a boy discarded at a mother's knee—  
 they'll wear it again to warm their nakedness.

So this man dug with the rest, found nothing new,  
 only the muddled lines of his tradition,  
 scraps of lip-service counsel, stereotyped  
 patter of parents and of dusty preachers—  
 now quickened to a flower, to a cause.  
 And this the hill, the dying Galilean,  
 and this the sun of his world. I say he knew it  
 not as another prayer-book piety  
 but as the touch of his hand, as the drum of his heart.  
 The vision was the whole of it. The reasons  
 were only the Jews and Romans, witnesses  
 taken so quickly in his glance he scarcely  
 saw them at all until our questions came.  
 But then we found that he had no more fear—  
 not that the start and the sweat and the sudden cold,  
 not that his treacherous body quite was conquered—  
 but at the centre there was no more fear,  
 other than fear of shame. For shame he thought it  
 to balance a miser's pound of likely mercy  
 against a miser's reverence for hell.  
 And this he thought the ultimate, craven sin:  
 that those who valued nothing above living  
 should yet die brave and he be one to falter,  
 he of the vision and the certainty.  
 But where the fear of dying had receded  
 did not the fear of killing come like a tide?  
 He laughed at that, found it a little thing  
 to put against the need to risk being killed,  
 ay, to the limit anyone would face  
 who faced it because of the rules, because compelled,  
 because Utopian or patriot,  
 because most ignorant and blind and brave.  
 Oh! but the man was rich and gay with sureness,  
 if right, if wrong, because of Calvary.

He died, not arrogant and not defiant,  
 believing the blind were braver. But suppose  
 a more equivocal ending—he, survivor  
 after the hurricane was done, returning  
 to doff his brief and high necessity,  
 to put on all the littleness again.  
 Would he be glad to shed the clarity  
 that bathed him, was his courage, was his beacon?  
 Not that I reckon—rather he'd try to raise  
 walls to enclose the miracle. But could he  
 so guard its stark, authoritative glory?  
 I see him again, oh! much as we had known him  
 before the simple time: the ivy habit,  
 the casualness, the smooth, the slow, corroded  
 channel the waters wore through days and days.  
 I see him circumscribed in our horizon—  
 unease faint at the edge of it, a sense  
 of some more towering prospect, all forgotten  
 save that he thinks that once he knew it well.  
 I see him easy in his native hills,  
 his boundary, and there the trumpets dying,  
 that once had heralded his lost crusade.

## THE NATURE OF POETRY

BY RICHARD CHURCH

ARISTOTLE began his definition of poetry with these words: "Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, are all, viewed as a whole, *modes of imitation.*" Towards the end of his famous fragment, the foundation of all constructive criticism, he says this: "The poet being an imitator just like the painter or other maker of likenesses, he must necessarily in all instances represent things in one or other of three aspects, either as they were or are, or as they are said or thought to be or to have been, or as they ought to be."

Now that definition seems to me to be final. Everything is included, so long as it has existed either in nature or in the mind of man as an ideal or fantasy. You see, even, how by those last few words, "or as they ought to be", the wise old Grecian biologist covers the whole of sociology, morals and politics. No critic, and no practising poet, has ever been able to evade the responsibility which Aristotle's definition has put upon the art of poetry. It was reflected in Milton's great mind when he set out on the long journey of his *Paradise Lost*, his purpose to "justify the ways of God to Man." At the beginning of another of the monumental poems in our language, Robert Browning retold Aristotle's definition in his own picturesque way. He spoke it as a challenge, because the place of poetry in his time, the boastful period of the Age of Industrialism, had become obscured.

But the thing that troubles us, with a divine unrest, is the very universality of all this. Talking about poetry in this way embraces so much that it might as well have no bounds at all. It is so broad a definition that it ceases to be a definition. And where does it leave us? Well, it has left us debating for the last two thousand years, and it leaves us still debating to-day, battling our way towards some sort of re-statement of the idea that has been hovering in the mind of man for so many centuries. It is obvious that a precise, mechanical definition, stated with scientific objectiveness, cannot satisfy us. We know poetry to be something more than a mere plastic medium, of words, or paint, or modulated tones. It is more subjective than that. It is a condition of the mind and the senses, a force that troubles us. We have to try to find out in what way, and under what conditions, it troubles us, and toward what end. Mechanics is not enough. Plato knew that; he was afraid of the forces latent in poetry; he saw danger even in the forms of poetry. He said in *The Republic*:

Suppose then, that an individual clever enough to assume any character and give imitations of anything and everything should visit our country and offer to perform his compositions, we shall bow down before a being with such miraculous powers of giving pleasure; but we shall tell him that we are not allowed to have any such person in our commonwealth; we shall crown him with fillets of wool, anoint his head with myrrh, and conduct him to the borders of some other country. For our own benefit, we shall employ the poets and story-tellers of the more austere and less attractive type, who will reproduce only the manner of a person of high character and, in the substance of their discourse, conform to those rules we laid down when we began the education of our warriors.

You see the difference; between Aristotle's attempt at a scientific definition, and Plato's realistic one. For I want to point out something which so many people overlook to-day: science is not necessarily realistic. All this, however, is so big a subject that to venture on it now is to risk being swamped by metaphysics, and the reconsiderations of the authority of science in modern life. That authority is being challenged to-day. The mob-mind, that once attributed magic powers to priest-craft, still tends to believe that the scientist is the substitute for the old Presbyter. Magic-mongering is something that will never quite die out; and its last refuge will be in the mass-mind, that belated, inert power of darkness which statesmen labour in vain to control. In the consideration of these matters, however, lies the root of the true nature and function of poetry.

It leads to the belief that poetry is a power of life itself, and not a mere mechanical imitation. That being so, the philosopher has to start on a new journey, exploring the dark interior of a continent which may be called aesthetics. But I prefer to call it reality; the very stuff of life—yes, and death too; for this way of looking at the universe does not, any longer, trust to frontiers and hedges. Life and death are part of the same adventure. It is an exciting adventure, and its reasoning is so beautiful that sometimes it seems almost to make the heart stop beating—that sensation which becomes a loss of sensation; that religious moment which is too ecstatic to last, but is unforgettable, and an influence for the rest of our lives. The philosophers of our time have already set out on the exploration. I think especially of Bergson, Croce, Santayana, who have specialized in the analysis of the enormous part played by aesthetics, or *reality*, in the desires and doings of man; also, perhaps, in the functioning of what we used to call inanimate nature. Neither the word inanimate, nor the word nature, is large enough to-day to contain the whole of our conception of these things.

From all this, it may be thought I am a disciple of the Romantics who at the beginning of the nineteenth century made such heroic claims for the poet and his place in society. You remember how Shelley and Wordsworth both wrote lengthy definitions of poetry, giving it a hierophantic authority. Wordsworth made the poet a sort of Senator of the Parliament of Man, to whom the working and legislations of humanity must be referred. What he says points the way directly to the discovery which I am trying to make here. It

leads us at once into a wider appreciation of the part that poetry plays in our daily lives, whether we are conscious of it or not. Here are his words:

Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge. It is the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science. Emphatically may it be said of the poet, as Shakespeare said of Man, "that he looks before and after." He is the rock of defence for human nature; an upholder and preserver, carrying everywhere with him relationship and love. In spite of difference of soil and climate, of language and manners, of laws and customs; in spite of things silently gone out of mind, and things violently destroyed (how appropriate that phrase is to-day!) in spite of these things, the Poet binds together by passion and knowledge the vast empire of human society, as it is spread over the whole earth, and over all time. The objects of the Poet's thoughts are everywhere. *Poetry is the first and last of all knowledge—it is as immortal as the heart of man.*

And now come words that are a direct prophecy of events hanging over our heads to-day, with the coming of the Atomic Age. You can almost see Wordsworth peering into the future out of those deep-sunk, cavernous eyes of his. "If the labours of men of Science should ever create any material revolution, direct or indirect, in our condition, and in the impressions which we habitually receive, the Poet will sleep then no more than at present."

We are in the middle of that "material revolution" of which Wordsworth speaks. He saw only the clumsy, alchemical beginnings of it. We see it now looming almost like Apocalypse; and those people who have any imagination at all, those who have any sense of responsibility toward mankind, its tragic story in the past, and toward its problematic future, are shaken by fear. We know, more clearly than ever, that objective knowledge, as accumulated by the executive genius of man, through law, science and politics, is totally lacking in moral significance. It is nothing but the raw material out of which we are to rebuild that single, unified habitation, the House of Man. And that building is a process of creating order out of the digressive riches, the luxury of information, which Science has piled up during the last two centuries.

But what is the secret of this moral responsibility? That question brings us back again to the search for the true nature of poetry, and in particular to a quotation from Shelley:

The great secret of morals is love; or a going out of our nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own. A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause. Poetry enlarges the circumference of the imagination.

I hope that I am not building up a false or restricted impression by all these references to moral good, and so forth. Be sure that the poet has nothing to do with the regulation of human conduct. He does not regulate it, he inspires it. His job is neither that of a priest nor a schoolmaster. On the contrary, he urges his fellow creatures to jump over the dogma of the priest

and the curriculum of the schoolmaster. His way of looking at things is, as Shelley says, the way of love. That is, the way of pleasure, enthusiasm, sympathy, intuition, the expression of the positive side of your nature; the side that takes hold of experience with both hands, and revels in it.

I have said what poetry is not. It is not a mere verbal technique, a tool bag of the grammarian. It is not a sermon, preached against the sinner. It is not a lesson intended for the ignorant. For once again like love, poetry moves in the mind of the sinner and the illiterate as freely as it does in that of the saint and the scholar. But that freedom implies moral responsibility. You see, I am beginning to doubt the possibility of saying what poetry is. Perhaps it is like the British Constitution. Has anybody ever tabulated the British Constitution? No, but it is the most coherent, the most unassailable of any amongst the nations of the world. All the rest, so logically prescribed, are brittle in comparison, and from time to time have to be patched together again after revolutions and wars have tumbled them down. But wars, or indeed any of the major experiences of life, seem to leave poetry only the more virile. The poetic element in our nature feeds on disaster. The troubles of our life often destroy all the superstructure which we build on the foundation of that nature. But after the storm the foundation stands there, fully exposed to view. And we see that it is the thing which I am trying to define; the prime motive by which we make our lives coherent, whole. We may call it by many names; intuition, instinct, faith, religion. Its real name is poetry.

John Keats, in one of his letters, spotted the truth that poetry is a power within ourselves that neither preaches nor teaches. He said the poet "works by a negative capability." Again he put his finger on the point when he said that the poet is a man who "hops with the sparrow on the gravel path." It is the whole thing in a nutshell. It is the power of becoming, through intense sympathy, the thing which you are watching. In another letter Keats said that the poet is nothing more than a mirror, reflecting his environment. But how much more that mirror is than the intellectual machine of the scholar, the priest, the legislator, those people who sit in authority over human society.

So the poet is a mirror, a creature of 'negative capability'. That is to say, he approaches every new experience without any pre-conception; as far as possible, without any personal colouring, either of conscious memory or knowledge. He is perpetually ignorant and innocent, and looks at everything with excitement and wonder, as though for the first time. That is the meaning of 'negative capability'. But his ignorance and innocence are not the sign of dullness of mind, or lack of experience. They are due to a highly developed mental digestion, which completely absorbs all that he learns by scholarship or by living.

The way of poetry is the way of life. The bird singing, the lion sitting motionless upon a rock, the child leaping and dancing on the sand by the sea-

shore; all that is done through the mechanism of poetry. Not by laborious and conscious thought. And underlying our more deliberate processes; our politics, our international conferences and the like; underlying the argument and the legalities of those slow-moving affairs, there lurks the hidden authority of poetic impulse, directing men on to a rough justice, beyond the reach of the deliberations which have been going on for so long. Is this thing, then, no more than instinct? You might also call it faith. We can be sure of one thing, that we are able to judge the power of poetry not in its roots but only in its flower. So it comes to light again and again in the most unexpected people. In *All's Well that Ends Well* (a title most apt to our argument!) Shakespeare makes his Helena say,

He that of greatest works is finisher,  
Oft does them by the weakest minister:  
So holy writ in babes hath judgment shown,  
When judges have been babes; great floods have flown  
From simple sources; and great seas have dried,  
When miracles have by the greatest been denied.  
Oft expectation fails, and most oft there  
Where most it promises; and oft it hits  
Where hope is coldest, and despair most fits.

Here is an indication, by the most mighty of all poets, of the way in which life and hope are maintained in us when all the evidence points the way to defeat. In June 1940 the whole English people made a gesture that was the gesture of poetry. It was illogical, it was unacademic. By all the rules of the learned, England as a power and as a conception was broken in 1940. But she stepped back, against the wall of poetry, and stood there. The result can be summed up in another quotation from *All's Well that Ends Well*. The King says to Helena:

Methinks in thee some blessed spirit doth speak  
His powerful sound within an organ weak:  
And what impossibility would slay  
In common sense, sense saves another way.

We need this power to-day: the power of poetry, in a world that is being choked in statistics and arid legalities. The individual, without privacy of soul and the sacred right to a self-chosen way of life, is being threatened once more. In the past, with society ordered on a predatory basis, with might being right, the individual was enslaved by brute force, by some bigger neighbour. To-day a cold abstraction is getting at him; an ideology, a trick of the money-market, an Order in Parliament. The way of immediate, happy and natural human relationship is being clogged. And despair and cynicism are setting in again. If we let that mood control us, then the end of the human race is in sight.

But is it really possible to believe that this logical absurdity will finally engulf us? Or do we know, *in our bones*, (that is, poetically) that suddenly something will break, some tension give way, and the sweet force of Shakes-

pearean common-sense emerge, from which "some blessed spirit doth speak"? I believe that. And the blessed spirit is that thing which I have been trying to locate, and give a definition. If I have succeeded, it is rather by saying what it is not than what it is. But I know it is the only hope we have, because it is the only way of knitting together all our various faculties, from the animal to the divine, with which we make our way in this world. Our only hope—in these years after what is practically a decade of horror and destruction. We have seen, in our generation, the break-down of civilization, and the sudden—and also gradual encroachment of bestiality and ignorance. The sweet things of life, the fastidious and tender things, the gentle approaches and the subtle understandings in the light of tradition; all these have been damaged, and in some parts of the world utterly destroyed. But still we do not despair. We have a cause for hope. It lies in that faculty for disinterested poetry which finds a meaning behind meaning, a perfect type behind the imperfect example here and now. That is what Plato saw over two thousand years ago.

## CORRESPONDENCE

## RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

*To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY,*  
Sir,

The June issue of your esteemed magazine carried an article by Mr. Walter J. Kolarz, entitled "Russia and the Middle East." Unfortunately, this article contains a number of biased and distorting statements which may give the uninitiated reader an incorrect idea about the policy of the U.S.S.R. in the East. May I hope that in the interests of truth and objectiveness you will not decline to give me, a Soviet journalist making a study of Eastern problems, space for some critical remarks on the above-mentioned article in THE FORTNIGHTLY?

Mr. W. J. Kolarz proceeds from the entirely unfounded assumption that the U.S.S.R. is allegedly pursuing expansionist aims in the East. He apparently regards this assertion as some sort of a "generally acknowledged axiom" for he does not even take the trouble to cite any facts in substantiation of his statement. And yet it is in complete contradiction with all the well known facts. Throughout the thirty years of its existence, the Soviet State has never demanded any foreign territories, zones of influence or privileges incompatible with the sovereignty of other nations. On the contrary, unlike some other powers, it has consistently and undeviatingly denounced the policy of imperialist expansion. Ever since its origin, it has based its relations with the Eastern countries on the principles of complete equality and absolute respect for their sovereignty. Allow me to recall that it has voluntarily renounced, on its own initiative, all the advantages and privileges formerly enjoyed by Russia under the unequal treaties and capitulations, setting no conditions and demanding no compensation. In particular, the Soviet Government completely renounced the policy of domination pursued by Czarist Russia with regard to Iran; it withdrew on its own initiative the Russian troops from that country, and transferred without any compensation the extensive Russian concessions to the Iranian state. This policy has no precedent in the history of international relations, and, as is generally known, the attitude of other great powers towards the Eastern nations is quite different to this day.

The U.S.S.R. maintains no troops, no military or air bases outside its borders in the Middle East; this cannot be said of some other States, which exert themselves in exposing "red imperialism", ascribing to the Soviet Union the most absurd and fantastic designs. The Soviet Union has not sent any military missions, economic or financial "advisers" to the Eastern countries. It is known that neither Millspaugh, whose "financial" direction caused no little damage to Iran, nor Schwartzkopf, now heading the Iranian *gendarmarie*, nor John Glabb-Pasha, commander of the "Arab legion", nor Lansford who has secured control over the Turkish army, are "Soviet agents". The oil companies which practically absorbed Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia into their own countries, do not belong to the U.S.S.R. The large squadrons appearing with increasing frequency in the Eastern Mediterranean to back up the claims to domination of some powers are not sailing under the Soviet flag. And it is not the Soviet Government that is concluding agreements for "financial aid" which are converting the Near Eastern countries into military bases of foreign powers and allowing foreigners to dominate their economy. But all this does not prevent Mr. Kolarz from seeing a

"menace" to the Middle East from the direction of the U.S.S.R.

Inventions about the Soviet "expansionist plans" have lately become the favourite keynote of the vicious propaganda which poisons the international atmosphere and sows seeds of discord among nations to the detriment of peace. From time to time public opinion is treated to a fresh "sensation" about "Soviet preparations for aggression", "concentration of Soviet troops" on the Turkish and other borders, etc. Mr. Kolarz does not resort to crude inventions which may be rapidly exposed by the course of events. He clearly realizes that it is impossible to try endlessly to deceive public opinion by absurd fables about an "inevitable Soviet invasion" of the neighbouring countries. But he makes up for it by inventing a new aspect of the "Soviet menace". According to Mr. Kolarz, this menace consists in the moral influence exerted by the economic and cultural development of the Soviet nationalities of Central Asia and Transcaucasia—the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Azerbaijanians, Armenians and Georgians—upon the peoples of the backward neighbouring countries. He sees a "menace" in the fact that bordering on these States are no longer the desolate hinterlands inhabited by oppressed nationalities with a culture frozen at a low level, as was the case under the Czarist régime, but industrialized and culturally advanced republics, where the people enjoy all the benefits of contemporary civilization. Baku, complains the author, has become a Mecca for Azerbaijanians of Iran. Stalinabad has developed into a large centre with a population of 100,000, with a fine theatre and a state library, threatening to outgrow Kabul, as it has already outgrown Herat. With unconcealed anxiety Mr. Kolarz writes: "The attraction of a modern city with big white buildings and trolleybus lines making its appearance in the once most neglected part of Central Asia is calculated to be irresistible to its neighbours and may indeed prove so to be."

No less "concern" is caused to Mr. Kolarz by the progress of Soviet Armenia. He does not deny the fact that the U.S.S.R. has saved the Armenians from complete physical extermination by Turkey. He honestly recognizes that Armenia, with her textile mills of Leninakan, the chemical enterprises of Kirovakan, the machine tool plants and scientific institutions of Yerevan, has progressed from a neglected agrarian region into a highly industrialized country which derives forty-five per cent. of her income (as against fourteen per cent. before the Revolution) from industrial production. It would seem that this progress should give profound satisfaction to all those who do not adhere to the racial theories which maintain that all small nations must live in a state of eternal backwardness. But the author suddenly draws an add conclusion to say the least: that the "menace to Turkey" emanates precisely from the fact that "Soviet Transcaucasia is developing at a tremendous pace, while Eastern Anatolia is in a state of relative stagnation. The existence of Yerevan, and also of Batum and Tiflis in Soviet Georgia is a challenge to North-Eastern Turkey similar to the challenge of Baku to North-Western Persia and of Stalinabad to Afghanistan."

I do not deny the fact that the sharp contrast between the cultural and economic development of the Soviet Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics, and the backwardness of the neighbouring countries is bound to exert a considerable moral and psychological influence on the population of the latter countries. And, indeed, lying on one side of the border are countries where power stations, irrigation systems, large industrial enterprises are being built, which have modern cities with universities, theatres, libraries, model hospitals, where tractors and combine harvesters are employed in the fields, where the people take an extensive part in the administration of their country, where they study in their native language and are free to develop their national literature and art, and on the other side—is the typical spectacle of Asia frozen in a state of centuries-old backwardness; regions where the land is cultivated with the primitive wooden plough, where handicrafts prevail, where culture and education are lacking.

The very same nationalities which to the North of the border have their own universities, are to the south of the border denied even the right to study in their native language in the elementary schools. It is clear that under such circumstances the population is bound to make comparisons unfavourable to the régimes prevailing in their own countries and to appreciate the advantages of the system which introduced a different order.

But Mr. Kolarz is profoundly mistaken when he tries to explain the concern of the Soviet Government for the borderland of our country by fantastic "expansionist" designs. The U.S.S.R. is a multi-national state which for the first time in history properly solved the national problem on the basis of complete equality of the peoples inhabiting it. This principle would have remained a theory if it were not carried into practice, if all the necessary material and cultural conditions were not created to secure practical equality for all the nationalities constituting the U.S.S.R. The borderlands of Russia were in a state of age-old backwardness. The Soviet Government spared no efforts to raise them to the level of the advanced Soviet republics and ensure them the opportunities for a life as good as in those republics. Mr. Kolarz is profoundly mistaken when he thinks that "white cities", trolleybus lines, power stations, theatres and libraries are being built for the sole purpose of luring the Tajiks, Azerbaijanians and Armenians across the borders. They are arising also in the Siberian taiga, in the Far North, in what was but recently the most neglected outlying corner of the Union. It is rather astonishing that he should say the Firdousi anniversary celebrations, or the lively interest displayed by the U.S.S.R. in Nizami and Navoi, the brilliant poets of the past, are explained by "propaganda" aims. The Soviet intelligentsia holds the cultural heritage of the past in high esteem. We are observing not only the anniversary of Firdousi, but also of Shakespeare, Balzac and Pasteur. It is natural of course that the great men of our own peoples should be particularly close to us. If we read, publish and study Nizami and Navoi, it is not because we are trying to influence the foreign Azerbaijanians and Tajiks, but because their names are part and parcel of the history of the peoples which make up the united fraternal family of the U.S.S.R. Walter Kolarz ascribes to us the trend of thought characteristic of other States. That is why he sees "a menace to Afghan oil" in Aibek's poetical book about Navoi, which gives a truthful picture of the historic events of the past and of the great poet.

It is characteristic that the author maintains inexplicable silence concerning responsibility for the backwardness of the Middle-Eastern neighbours of the U.S.S.R. Far from suffering from the war, Turkey derived tremendous profits from her trade with Germany at a time when the Hitlerites were fighting against all the freedom-loving nations. She had every possibility of means to an improvement in the position of Eastern Anatolia. But it is a fact that the Turkish rulers manifested no interest in this matter. This is not difficult to understand if it is remembered that the population of this region is composed largely of ethnic minorities: Armenians, Kurds and Lazi, whom Turkish reaction, which worships racial ideas, denies even the rights of citizenship. Kars, Ardagan and Erzerum remain neglected, declining towns, as is the case with most of the provincial Turkish towns. But Ankara did spend during the last five years about 2,500 million lire on its military schemes, and without any need whatever is contemplating the allocation of further hundreds of millions for the construction of "new Singapores", military aerodromes, unprofitable strategic railways and army barracks. At a time when the Turkish people are protesting without any result against this insane waste, it is being energetically encouraged and even financed by foreign imperialist circles. It is clear that under these circumstances Eastern Anatolia is doomed to remain for a long time in its present state of desolation.

The Azerbaijanians of Iran tried to establish an autonomous régime in their country,



in order to lift it from its ancient backwardness and secure human conditions of life for its population, without harbouring any intention of separation from Iran. But the Iranian Government, obviously urged on and supported from outside, launched cruel oppression against them. Who is to blame then if Iranian Azerbaijan is destined to remain a savage borderland, and Baku is regarded as a Mecca by its population?

We do not know whether Mr. Kolarz realizes how slippery is the road suggested by him when he describes the peaceful construction in the Soviet border republics as "dangerous" on the pretext that it represents a "menace" to the neighbouring backward States. There is but one step from this to the assertion that any progress of any State is allegedly fraught with danger to others. There is hardly any need to prove that this "worship of backwardness" has nothing in common with the contemporary ideals of the nations.

Yours faithfully,  
V. STAMBULOV.

8, Stankevich St.,  
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U.S.S.R.

#### THE MARSHALL OFFER

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY,  
Sir,

I found it significant that the three contributions on the Marshall offer in the August issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY were typical of the three stages in the world's reaction. The first was unconditionally enthusiastic, like the general reception of the offer. The second, the economic analysis, is already the expression of the European scrutiny which, inevitably, followed the initial enthusiasm. The third contained a good summary of the American attitudes which make Europeans reluctant to accept outright such a seemingly fabulous offer.

Mr. Schwarz's exceptionally able summary of the economic background once again convinced me of the efficacy of economic analysis as the safest method to get to the roots of contemporary problems. His contribution seemed to me particularly valuable because it explained briefly and convincingly that the Marshall offer means no less than the official burial of the Bretton Woods utopia which meant an attempt to resurrect the economic system of the nineteenth century with the help of American administered artificial respiration. The world will be one step nearer to a reasonable approach to our problems if this fact is more widely accepted.

As for Mr. Nicholas's interpretation of the American attitude toward European nationalism it is somewhat exaggerated to accept the comparison with the American Civil War that led to inter-state unity. The perspective of three thousand miles may compel Americans to view European sovereignties in the length of kilometers. But the realities of neighbourhood compel Europeans to feel in depth of centuries. The French reaction to the American plans in the Ruhr ought to be convincing enough to warn the Americans against this fallacy.

Yours faithfully,  
TIBOR MENDE.

Paris.

## THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

### INSTRUCTION FOR FARMERS

By S. L. BENSUSAN

BETWEEN the beginning of the sixteenth century and the opening of the eighteenth, books on agriculture were sufficiently plentiful. They are not exciting, they are not reliable but that which is written, printed and circulated, whatever its intrinsic merit, may claim attention however brief. From Fitzherbert whose *Boke of Husbandry* saw the light in 1523 to Jethro Tull who wrote *Horse-Hoeing Husbandry* in 1731 the reader's track is over difficult country. Men who had nothing to say, authors whose authorship consisted in plundering or re-copying earlier writers, pretenders whose attitude towards the land may have given useful hints to vendors of patent medicines, purposeful men who were ill-informed, painstaking cultivators who felt that if they could farm successfully they became authors by first intention, all these litter the passing years. Of the most of them be it said that they "to no such aureate earth are turned as buried once men want dug up again." There were a few interesting figures; Arthur Young would be notable had he written earlier, but we are told "he did not commence author till 1760."

Mr. G. E. Fussell\* has brought indomitable perseverance to *The Old English Farming Books* but it is not easy to say that he offers much more. Perhaps the material to be handled is too dull, perhaps the conclusions of men of past generations are outworn—"their ploughs are rust, their bones are dust, their souls are with the Saints we trust."

Happily Mr. Fussell has included in his volume more than a dozen plates, chiefly title pages and frontispieces, which are of enduring interest for they have a story to tell without the aid of more than the few words they carry.

Take for example Markham's *Way to get Wealth* published in 1638 and setting out "the knowledge use and laudable practise of all the recreations meete for a gentleman," together with "the office of a housewife, in physicke, Surgery, extraction of oils, Banquets, Cookerie, ordering of Feasts, preserving of Wine, conceited secrets, Distillations, —and the profits of Oates. The last of six books gathered by Masters for the benefit of Great Britaine." Such an appeal is quite illuminating, it has the quality of a plea for attention. Markham stole freely and wrote indifferently.

Twenty-six years later in 1664 we find the first English book on potatoes and the grandiloquent title page is preserved, to our great content. It reads: "England's Happiness Increased, or A Sure and Easie Remedy against all succeeding Dear Years by a plantation of the roots called Potatoes." "By the planting of these Roots," we learn, "ten thousand men in England and Wales who know not how to live or what to do to get a maintenance for their families, may of one acre of ground make thirty pounds per Annum." It is a pity that nothing is recorded here of cultivation or costs.

We have a plate showing John Worlidge's masterpiece, a seed drill. This farmer-author published a *Systema Agriculturae or the mystery of husbandry discovered!* His design was not used until half a century later when it was found unworkable; but the

\* *The Old English Farming Books: From Fitzherbert to Tull*, by G. E. Fussell. Crosby Lockwood. 12s. 6d.

model illustrated in his *Systema* and reproduced here is imposing.

Moses Rusden, Bee Master to the Merry Monarch and author of *A further Discovery of Bees* is dismissed in half a paragraph, but some atonement is made by the aid of a plate showing an eighteenth century hive surmounted by the Crown and Arms of England; perhaps such a decoration was expected to stimulate honey-flow. Another interesting title page shows the first English work on clover. The title reads *The wonderful advantage by and right management of Clover*; it was written by Andrew Farranton of Worcestershire and published in 1663.

The general appeal of those old books is frankly commercial. By following instructions the reader is to make a fortune or at least contribute to one. We are reminded of the cheapjacks at the country fair, the men who sold solid gold watches jewelled "in forever o'holes" and pure silk handkerchiefs the last of a batch lately sold to the Emperor of China to the complete satisfaction of that ruler who was loud in their praise. There is something connecting these makers of books with the men who livened occasions that were the delight of an unsophisticated countryside.

It is interesting to learn a little, perhaps less than we would welcome, about the first agricultural newspaper described as "a succession of pamphlets." The title was *A Collection of letters for the Improvement of Husbandry and Trade*, and first saw the light in 1681. John Houghton, F.R.S., who was responsible for the publication was a prosperous business man and obviously of a kindly and honest disposition for when he admitted advertisements to his Journal he graced them with a preface of which brief sentences may be quoted: "This part is to give away and those who like it not may omit the reading of it. I believe it will help on Trade, particularly encourage the advertisers to increase the vent of my papers. I shall receive all sorts of advertisements but shall answer for the reasonableness of none." Who among our newspaper proprietors would go out of their way to admit as much?

Mr. Tim Nourse lived in the opening years of the eighteenth century. He did not approve of common lands but thought they served a useful purpose yielding "a body of hardy rascals to draw upon in emergency. They are inured to hardship and make good labourers; and they make good soldiers, fit to kill or be killed—excellent good food for powder." Nourse is the author of *Compania Foelix*; a volume graced by a pleasing frontispiece, duly reproduced.

The popularity of beekeeping in the early eighteenth century is suggested by the success of Joseph Warder's book *The True Amazons; or the Monarchy of Bees*. It gave recipes for mead and achieved eight editions.

This record of work on farming holds a measure of interest that can only be found by wading through a mass of material with which some of us would gladly dispense. Side lines give us a glimpse of rural England and of the hard conditions under which farming was carried on, but the writers were always more concerned with profit than with a way of life. As a class they claimed to have taken all knowledge to be their province; some work has been lost but, judging by what remains, regret is not called for. Tradition, rule of thumb, and a wealth of conjecture would seem to have served those whose work we have seen and Mr. Fussell may be presumed to know them better than most of his contemporaries since Lord Ernle left the world poorer by passing from it.

The book can hardly appeal to the general reader; it is too much like a catalogue with an average of more than three items to the page, but it should be of definite value to those who wish to study the general literature of our greatest national industry, or to find out what they can about an old book whether on farm, garden, orchard, or apiary that may have come into their possession.

Those who read diligently from cover to cover will not only have gained a little knowledge, they will have acquired much merit.

**THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW**, by Frances Perkins. *Hammond, Hammond*. 18s.

**AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MAKING, 1932-1940**, by Charles A. Beard. *Yale University Press: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press*. 18s.

"Franklin Roosevelt was not a simple man," says Miss Perkins. "He was the most complicated human being I ever knew." As the Franklin Roosevelt literature accumulates this fact stands out in startling, undeniable relief, whatever ambiguities and controversies surround the rest of his career. Born to the American purple, he wins office as the champion of a radical political movement. The head and front of left-wing idealism, he seeks and wins support from some of the toughest, most hard-boiled machines in American politics. Gifted with a phenomenal power of popular appeal, he yet scarcely scruples to conceal the fact that the company of the average politico is socially distasteful to him. Capable of a disinterested devotion to colleagues whose retention was a political liability he was also able to reject, almost with a flick of the wrist, members of his party who had committed no other crime than that of differing from their chief on some political issue. Regarded in this country as a one-man advance-guard of American intervention, he was at the same time sprinkling his speeches in the United States with assurances which, as Professor Beard has little difficulty in showing, were couched in the very language of the isolationists. In his own lifetime he aroused extremities of love and hate; after his death the argument goes on with little abatement and no sign of resolution.

For dealing with a subject of such complexity as this Miss Perkins's book has one supreme merit. It accepts the complexity, does not try to resolve it, is content even with something less than a full explanation of it, and seeks in the first place simply and honestly to present it. The result is that probably for the first time

the English reading public has before it a picture of Roosevelt in the round, not idealized, not harnessed to some thesis or cause, but described as he was seen over a good many years by someone who was pretty close to him in good times and in bad. It is, of course, a sympathetic portrait; Miss Perkins was not only a political colleague, she was a personal friend, but their intimacy was not for her grounded in a blind devotion, and she does not believe in raising to the chief-tain's memory a tombstone merely of catalogued virtues. Others will have more to say about his faults and will assess differently the balance of his qualities, but it will be a matter for surprise if they unearth any shortcomings which are not recognized in some measure here.

Miss Perkins's method is not, of course, primarily analytical. Her book is a narrative of her relations with Roosevelt from their early association in the government of New York State down through the New Deal years to the war and the return from Yalta. It is thus against the background of his political activities that the President's personality emerges, and not the least interesting feature of Miss Perkins's book is the light it throws on the pressures and problems which Roosevelt had to cope with even at the moments when he seemed most master of the political scene. These pressures and problems are wonderfully absent from Professor Beard's remarkable non-judicial exercise in war guilt appraisal. Professor Beard, at eighty, is rightly loaded with distinction as perhaps the foremost of living American historians, but he must also bear no small blame for having steadily lent the weight of his reputation to the great illusion of the 'twenties and 'thirties that the United States had a perfect freedom of choice as to whether it should become involved in war or not. Now, by an assiduous compilation of quotations, he seeks to show that Roosevelt deceived the American people as to his intentions and was responsible for their eventual involvement in war. The thesis and the treatment are alike un-

worthy of the author's pen. They do, however, pose a question of deeper significance for America and for democracies everywhere; how far can a people be made to see the truth, and what should its leaders do when it prefers to look away? Roosevelt had at least a pragmatic answer; Charles Beard has none.

H. G. NICHOLAS.

**ECONOMICS FOR THE EXASPERATED**, by Gordon Rattray Taylor. *John Lane, The Bodley Head.* 10s. 6d.

**ASPECTS OF BRITISH ECONOMIC HISTORY 1918-1925**, by A. C. Pigou. *Macmillan.* 15s.

Mr. Taylor has written a very intelligent book. Taking unemployment as a starting point, he proceeds to discuss the main problems of present-day economics in language accessible to the ordinary reader. His approach owes a great deal to the under-consumption and over-saving theory associated with the Keynes-Beveridge school of economic thought. At the same time, it makes effective use of Mr. Colin Clark's investigations into the output, national income and income distribution of the main industrial countries. Perhaps the greatest merit of Mr. Taylor's book is that it explains our contemporary economics in terms of goods, as opposed to terms of money. The author is one of those economists, not too numerous even now, who recognize that monetary phenomena are no more than a "reflection in the mirror"—and a distorting mirror at that—of concrete economic movements which can only be properly measured in terms of goods. The mirror here alluded to happens to be Alice's looking-glass, for Mr. Taylor uses quotations from Lewis Carroll with telling effect to preface many chapters of his book. Mr. Taylor's investigations into the curious contradictions, prejudices and misconceptions which govern the modern *homo oeconomicus* show clearly that Lewis Carroll's fantasies are at least as good a guide through

modern economics as the average textbook.

It cannot be claimed that Mr. Taylor's analysis of our irrational economic system and its defects, is altogether new. Nor are the remedies which he proposes, in order to render it somewhat less irrational. But Mr. Taylor has the gift of the unorthodox approach, and for apt aphorism, as when he writes (p. 387):

In a sane society, people consent to work in order that they may consume. In America, people must consent to consume in order that they may work. Surely, this is the final *reductio ad absurdum* of capitalism?

Good in all essentials, Mr. Taylor's book could have been better still if he had taken care properly to read his proofs, to check historical data and to watch out for slipshod English and irritating clichés. His political and economic history of the inter-war years suffers from over-simplification. On page 273 (note at foot of graph), the printer made millions out of billions (American style). Negations are frequently omitted or, on the contrary, inserted, making nonsense of more than one sentence (p. 194, line 15, the word 'unemployment' is used instead of 'employment'). There are even occasional errors of reasoning, as when the author sustains (p. 325) that the devaluation of the dollar in 1933 handicapped American export industries. For obvious reasons, the contrary was the case. On page 339, Monsieur Paul Reynaud is made minister of finance in Monsieur Blum's second cabinet. Unfortunately for that government, he never served in it.

Professor Pigou's book is a *pièce de circonstance* which, despite some interesting features, is unlikely to rank as one of his major works. Written at the request of government departments for their guidance in the post-war period, it attests the foresight of the authorities in preparing for a then still distant future and their determination to avoid mistakes in economic policy such as were committed after the 1914-1918 war. But Professor Pigou's volume, despite its lucidity,

is the product of the academic mind writing for other academic minds. One wonders what its effects could have been on those for whom it was intended, particularly as the author is over-cautious in his judgment on past errors. To judge from a passage on page 197, he even seems to question whether Britain's decision to restore the Pound to its pre-war value by April 1925, was a mistake. Even on the abandonment of industrial controls, he goes no further than to say that

With a less impetuous abandonment of them, the Government would have had the power—though not necessarily the will—to enforce some evening-out of the industrial activity during the three years that followed the armistice, and so might have rendered the distresses of the great post-war depression less serious than they were (p. 126).

*Qu'en termes galants ces choses sont dites* . . . In 1947, the greatest value of the book lies in the thirty-six pages of its statistical appendix which contains much material not to be found elsewhere.

R. P. SCHWARZ.

### THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF THE DANUBIAN STATES:

A study in Economic Nationalism, by Frederick Hertz. *Victor Gollancz.* 15s.

It is always difficult to review a book which consists mainly of statistics. To doubt its conclusions or even to praise it conscientiously would require as much research work as the author's.

The latest book of the author of *Race and Civilization* has a definite purpose. It is to prove from the history of the hacking up of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy the follies of economic nationalism. More broadly stated, the book's aim is to investigate certain powerful economic tendencies of our time in the light of the experience of the Danubian area after the 1914-1918 war.

Professor Hertz maintains that after a steep rise in national income and in spite of a variety of circumstances favouring the continuation of this improvement, the breaking up of the Empire's area into

competing, sovereign States led to a decline of their respective national incomes. It is significant that the author's conclusions contradict Mr. Colin Clark's findings in *The Conditions of Economic Progress*. Mr. Clark found that the average real income per head in the Succession States, but particularly in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, was distinctly higher one decade after the 1914-1918 war than in 1913. Professor Hertz's investigation, with the employment of different statistical methods, reveals a very different picture.

Beside a comparative study of national income, which forms the main part of the book, the author examines in great detail the origins and methods of the restrictionist and protectionist methods which were so characteristic of the Danubian area between the two world wars. He warns that the economic difficulties of the region were not merely due to world depression but had the seeds of malaise in their own economic nationalisms. He also maintains that this economically motivated isolationism facilitated Hitler's penetration in eastern Europe and, indirectly, was one of the chief causes of the 1939-1945 war.

The latest work of Professor Hertz is copiously documented and is a scholarly thesis to prove a case. On the factual side it would be difficult to disagree with the author. Less evident are, however, the implied conclusions. That Danubian economic nationalism was a folly, is too obvious to need any documentation. Whether, under the given political circumstances, economic co-operation in the region would have been possible, is less evident. Tendencies which emerged in the Danubian area may not warrant generalizations to be applied to other regions. The implied alternative, economic universalism, is undergoing a test in our own days with no very positive achievements to its credit.

Professor Hertz's book, however, will remain a valuable contribution to the discussion on the Danubian region. Even

if the unconditional condemnation of economic nationalism may have to be modified under the very changed circumstances of our days, the material collected by Professor Hertz will be of great help to research workers who will continue to explore the problems of that fascinating region of Europe.

TIBOR MENDE.

**EVENTS AND SHADOWS**, by Lord Vansittart. *Hutchinson*. 10s. 6d.  
**RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIANS**, by Edward Crankshaw. *Macmillan*. 9s. 6d.

Diplomatic history is being made at a pace which is without precedent and which as yet shows no sign of slackening. As a consequence, books of topical interest on international affairs now run the risk of being outmoded within six months of publication—surely unsatisfactory from the publisher's point of view and a very inadequate reward to the author for long hours of hard work.

The Marshall offer and subsequent developments in Europe have transformed the situation which Lord Vansittart reviews in his latest book, so that much that was shadow at the time of writing has since assumed substantial form in the world of events. If this transformation had not been in line with the general trend of international affairs as seen by the author the book would be already out of date. Since, however, the immediate aim of his "Policy for the remnants of a century" is a greater degree of Western co-operation, his views are still of interest.

Unfortunately his writing abounds in blithe remarks and pert phrases which might well enliven an after-dinner speech but which in print appear moribund. Moreover this striving after effect has over-simplified some of the major political problems which any discussion of closer European integration must involve. All this may be done consciously, of course, for the author considers that 'selective history' may serve a useful pur-

pose: but it will come as a disappointment to the serious student of international affairs, who knows what a fund of wisdom is concealed behind the superficial façade of catchwords and clichés.

The greatest of all contemporary problems in the international sphere, and one which is too often over-simplified, is that of Russia and the Russians. Let it be said outright that Mr. Crankshaw tackles it with a competence and impartiality which deserve unstinted praise. In 250 pages he paints a picture of the Russian scene which is just what the perplexed British public needs and which is at the same time easy to understand and enjoy. The subject is too vast for so small a canvas, but by allowing himself the licence which is due to an artist Mr. Crankshaw presents an interpretation of it which is satisfying both in perspective and colouring. It is this interpretation, this hypothesis induced from a wide field of fact, which distinguishes his book from many others which have attempted to survey the background to Russian politics.

The author's approach is practical and to the point. He wants increased understanding of Soviet policy—and understanding is here by no means synonymous with weakness or appeasement—which can only be achieved by fuller appreciation of the historical and philosophical roots from which it springs. He argues that Russia cannot be understood from a purely intellectual standpoint. Both peasant and politician in Russia are emotional characters, with whom feeling and sentiment weigh heavier than argument; in order to judge them fairly an act of faith is required, a self-denying ordinance on the part of the intellect in favour of the emotions.

Mr. Crankshaw tries to get to know the Russian temperament emotionally, but the final weighing-up is left, as it should be, to the intellect. The weaknesses of the Soviet position are not camouflaged and the harshness, rigidity, cruelty and inhumanity of the Soviet

political system are fully depicted: so fully that an isolated assertion to the effect that "the basic cleavage between Russia and, at any rate, Great Britain, is one of temperament rather than one of principle" strikes an unmistakably discordant note. For one of the virtues of *Russia and the Russians* is that it demonstrates clearly how fundamentally the two peoples differ not only by temperament and by tradition, but equally in their political principles and their moral standards. There is no more important lesson for the British public to learn to-day, if an unbiassed appreciation of Soviet policy is to be achieved.

NIGEL BRUCE.

**LORD COCHRANE: SEAMAN—  
RADICAL—LIBERATOR**, by Christopher Lloyd. Longmans. 15s.

Lord Cochrane's biographer would have had an easier task had his subject been content with a single career, or even with one career at a time. In point of fact he had three or four different reputations and the energy to support them all. The author of this latest biography has wisely compressed the story of the *Speedy* and the Aix Roads into six chapters, leaving room to deal with Cochrane's political career and his adventures under foreign flags. In the ranks of the Radicals Cochrane was an incongruous figure. His interest had been initially in naval reform, coloured by a personal dislike of Lord St. Vincent, and thence it spread to the general Radical programme. Gifted with little or no political sense, he was bound to fall victim, sooner or later, to the exasperated government of the day. But the Stock Exchange Trial of 1814 gave his opponents an exceptional opening. The evidence did no more perhaps than to prove his association with the swindlers, but it gave excuse for Lord Ellenborough's savage sentence, promptly followed by the removal of Cochrane's name from the Navy List. At the time

of his imprisonment it seemed as if his career was at an end. What no one could have predicted was that the year 1848 (a year indeed of Revolutions) would find him an Admiral, a G.C.B., and the Commander-in-Chief on the American Station.

The story of how his sentence came to be reversed is a curious one. The fact that he had in the meanwhile secured the independence of Chile, Peru and Brazil was more or less irrelevant. With the Tories in office it would have told, if anything, against him. What had happened was that the reforms for which he had agitated in 1807 had become in time respectable. His friends had come into power. As for his political enemies, he could never have defeated them. But he could outlive them; and he did. The crowning touch to his career came during the Crimean War when the command of the Baltic Fleet was denied him, not because he was too old at seventy-nine but because "there is reason to apprehend that he might deeply commit the force under his command to some desperate enterprise." It is sad to think that he should have died at eighty-five before his judgment had fully ripened. "What a tribute," writes Mr. Lloyd, "to Dundonald's vitality!"

Readers of the author's other books will not be disappointed in this. Mr. Lloyd writes ably and persuasively, sure of his facts and yet easy in his style. If the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, is to disappear as we have known it, its final broadsides are worthy of the distinguished men who have taught there and of the great officers it has bred.

C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON.

**THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1945**, by R. B. McCallum and Alison Readman. *Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press*. 18s.

The next social study of a single general election could be better than Mr. McCallum's and Miss Readman's work. But theirs is a prototype. It gives us for

the first time a good, documented academic study of this political and sociological phenomenon.

The authors have limited themselves to recording and analysing material selected from the principal newspapers, from party literature and propaganda, in surveying qualifications of candidates and examining statistics. Their aim has been to give a reasonably clear and balanced picture of the events, issues and personalities of the 1945 election period, from the break-up of the Coalition to the evening of Thursday, July 26, when Mr. Churchill tendered his resignation.

If this book fails to portray the political emotional atmosphere of the time, the weakness is inherent in any conventionally produced textbook.

Mr. McCallum and Miss Readman have produced a shrewd, readable interpretation with touches of humour even among the statistics:

The Conservatives provided the only example of that admirable but unpopular class, the company sergeant major, who presumed to present himself to the electors. He was not elected.

The authors stress that election addresses—averaging 1,000 words in 1945—are the most fleeting of political documents. Surprisingly, none of the main political parties acquired a full collection from its candidates. (The Conservative Central Office was best, with addresses from three-quarters of its candidates.)

Expressive of candidates' personal views, these election addresses provide an intriguing chapter of the book. ("On the whole, the party line is followed loyally enough, but there are often significant omissions and variations.") The authors analyse the differences in choice and treatment of topics among the rival candidates.

Practically, too, they appreciate that the influence of the election addresses must remain a mystery. "They serve, if nothing else, as a reminder" to electors.

It is unfortunate that the chapter on the Press is devoted only to the daily Press, with inevitable emphasis on nation-

al daily newspapers. The authors consequently overlook in their survey of the 1945 election the influence of Britain's fourteen hundred local newspapers.

These local newspapers were able to portray candidates in detail as national papers could not do. In these days of public inquiry into Press activities, an authenticated survey of the attitude of such newspapers during the general election would have made a good test case for discussion. As things are, frequent public allegations on the political bias of the Press are based—as in this chapter—on study of only our widely circulating national newspapers.

The book is well-indexed and has four useful appendices of tables and analyses relating to the election results. One appendix designed in part to show the possibilities of statistical analysis, challenges "the only serious statistical attempt to account for the general election result" (that published by Mr. Mark Abrams in *Pilot Papers* January 1, 1946).

Though there is still truth in the allegation, "there are lies, damned lies, and statistics", political forecasters who study this textbook can hardly go more wrong than they have been (usually, excepting of course, Dr. Gallup). They will be poor readers of this book if they still base their forecasts for the next general election on "straw votes", general impressions, and wishful thinking.

JAMES BARTLETT.

#### MEDIAEVAL CHANTRIES AND CHANTRY CHAPELS,

by G. H. Cook. *Phoenix House*. 21s.

The Middle Ages are not to be understood by looking at surviving medieval buildings, however carefully. Monastic as well as parochial buildings have indeed received full treatment. It is widely recognized that when the lesser and then the greater monasteries were suppressed a phase was ended not alone of the religious and architectural but of the social life of England. But that is not the whole story. For two centuries before

the Reformation, with increasing intensity, a movement had been spreading for the endowment of chantries and chantry chapels. An Act of Edward VI dissolved the chantries, the Elizabethan Prayer Book declared the doctrine of Purgatory to be "a fond thing vainly imagined," and all over the country chantry chapels were destroyed or dismantled and the chantry priests dismissed.

The subsequent employment of many chantry priests as teachers in the new grammar-schools has been illustrated from the records of Dunstable Priory. They had often combined such masterships with the duties of their chantries before the suppressions. The chantry chapel itself disappeared, along with the doctrine which sanctioned or required the performance of daily masses for the dead. The result is reflected in one way or another in nearly every pre-Reformation church, big or little. Thus the unusual size of some parish churches in small places, as well as their bareness, is explained by the fact that aisles, transepts and choir were filled, and often constructed to be filled, with chantry chapels. These were often retained as family burying places by the squire of the place—they might even become roomy squire's pews, still surviving here and there from the age of Sir Roger de Coverley, complete with fireplace. Here is the contrast of religious practices in its extreme form. For the chantry chapel owed its original to a strong and almost universal religious impulse. The founder of a chantry provided for daily prayers in permanence, in the most solemn rite of the Church, for his own soul and those of others, living and dead. His tomb was to be a shrine also. He surrounded it—frequently in his own lifetime—with symbols of mortality and immortality. The architectural expression of his faith, where it has not been disturbed, remains in exquisite form and colour.

This book is the first wholly devoted to the subject, and that is seen to be no offshoot but a part of the main story of

English ecclesiastical architecture, interpreted with reference to its doctrinal background. In spite of destruction, first under Edward VI, later, as at Peterborough, by the Cromwellian soldiery, later still by unhappy restoration, the author is able to reveal and describe, with the aid of full-page plates and plans of the sites occupied by chantry chapels, a surprising number of surviving masterpieces great and small. Westminster Abbey provides the opposites in Henry VII's chapel and the tomb of Chaucer—which is a chantry chapel with room for the priest to kneel beside the altar. But who knows for example of the Guildhall Chapel chantries (destroyed in 1822) or of the Kirkham Chapel, still almost intact, in Paignton Church? We may learn the real purpose of the "squin", so often misapprehended; it was to enable the chantry priest to make his own celebration coincide with that at the high altar.

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Much curious lore will be found in these pages, which are fully documented from wills and royal ordinances, as in that of Henry VII for his *obit* at Bermondsey Abbey. The *obit* was a mass sung on the anniversary of a man's death and its endowment was less costly than that of a chantry. Henry ordered among other ceremonies the singing of *Placebos* and *Diriges*. The *Placebo* was Psalm cxvi: "I will please the Lord in the land of the living" and *Dirige* is for *Domine dirige nos*: "Direct us, O Lord, in all our doings"—Psalm v and the motto of the City of London. A stimulating and careful work, offering a contribution to knowledge in a field almost neglected hitherto.

W. THOMSON HILL.

**SEVEN ESSAYS**, by George Sampson. Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.

Among contemporary literary forms the English essay holds a commendably high place. Sir Max Beerbohm, Mr. J. B. Priestley, Mr. Robert Lynd and Mr. E. M. Forster all excel in honouring what had become the Cinderella of literature and now here is Mr. George Sampson, sanest and most forthright of critics, with a book that cannot fail to delight readers who are fully adult with his mature and witty reflections on life, music, education and letters. There is too in this collection a masterly appreciation of Henry Irving which will find its way into any representative anthology of English essays.

As Mr. Sampson says, a writer whose first volume was published in 1897, who has made numerous contributions to periodicals, daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, and who waits fifty years before issuing a collection of miscellanies, can hardly be called a young man in a hurry. Indeed he is not but there is a youthful zest and pugnacity in some of his judgments that reminded me of another apparently eternal youth, Mr. Sampson's pet

antipathy, Bernard Shaw. Only one does not find in this book any of the will to shock for the sake of shocking that makes some of the sprightly nonagenarian's opinions resemble the snook-cocking and tongue-protruding of a preparatory schoolboy.

Two great enthusiasms have informed Mr. Sampson's life—literature and music. It is not surprising, therefore, to find him, after a characteristic warning—"Comparisons between one form of art and another are generally unprofitable and often mischievous"—devoting twenty-four pages to "Bach and Shakespeare". It is impossible not to quote a part of his conclusions: "Bach, like Shakespeare, is for all time and for all men. He is a universal genius, the last of the medieval composers and the first of the moderns. Just as no poet can write without some influence from Shakespeare, so no musician can be left untouched by Bach. The best of Bach, like the best of Shakespeare, has an idiom that transcends its own age, and becomes the speech of every age. They are the greatest masters of rhythmic utterance we know, and the magic with which they set rhythm against metre they might have learned from each other. In their moments of simplicity as well as in their flights of complicated beauty they can achieve in triumph effects too audacious for lesser men. It is almost amusing to recall that both have been denounced for their incorrectness and indifference to rules. There is in both a largeness and breadth of understanding, a sense of human joys as well as of human tears.

The longest essay in the book, "A Boy and His Books", which would stand any comparison with a famous piece by Hazlitt, gives rise to the hope that Mr. Sampson will embark upon a more protracted autobiographical study. It is a remarkable description of happy Victorian youth and should be read by all the dreary young things who look back with horror and loathing at an era known to them imperfectly, and understood not at all. "Truth and Beauty" reveals a fact too little comprehended to-day, that we are

so busy teaching that we give our pupils no chance to learn, and that we anticipate curiosity, and begin at once to answer the questions that no one has begun to ask, and somewhere at the back of our minds is the thought of a coming examination.

I have not read for a very long time a book more stimulating or more beautifully phrased on literature, music, and education than Mr. Sampson's *Seven Essays* and that is not surprising when one considers that only he could have written it and that in his seventy-odd years he has published so little of his own. A new and prosperous career as author lies before this youthful septuagenarian.

ERIC GILLET.

**THE LETTERS AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF WILLIAM MAKEPEACE THACKERAY**. Edited by Gordon Ray. Oxford University Press. Volumes III & IV. Four vols. £6 6s. the set.

The third and fourth volumes of this work deal with the last eleven years of Thackeray's life and enable the reader to judge him by his own diaries and letters for the first time.

The third opens at the time when *Esmond* was published, the first of his novels to appear in three volumes. Thackeray was now gaining great popularity by touring the country reading his work, a form of entertainment that was popular at this period. At the end of the year we see him leaving his daughters with their grandmother and, lured by the very generous remuneration offered, going off to enhance his fame amongst his American readers.

Already at this time Thackeray's health had begun to show signs of deteriorating, and there is frequent mention of his ailments in his letters. He made them the excuse to take Eyre Crowe with him as his secretary, to relieve him of the strain of making his own travelling arrangements.

As time passes his letters, written on both visits to America, go more and more

to his daughters and amount more or less to a diary of all that he is doing and the people he is meeting. As usual he has the capacity for making many friends; the greatest in America were undoubtedly the Baxter family, to whom he wrote copiously when he returned home.

The two most striking facts in his letters when away from home are his dislike at being separated from his nearest relatives, which is a characteristic to be noted also in his early letters to his mother in India, and his constant reference to his need to carry out his lecture tours in order to ensure that adequate provision would be made for his dependants. He tells his daughters that the number of dollars accumulating to protect their future is his only justification for such long absences.

Thackeray struck up a warm friendship with his new publisher, George Smith of Smith Elder, which resulted in his

## CRIME AND BANDITRY, DISTRESS AND PERPLEXITY WILL INCREASE UNTIL THE BISHOPS OPEN JOANNA SOUTHCOTT'S BOX

What the Bible says about the Box  
and the Bishops:

"And the temple of God was opened, . . . and there was seen . . . the Ark (Chest or Box) of his Testament (or Will)".

"And round about the Throne were four-and-twenty . . . Elders (Bishops) sitting. . . (and they) fall down and cast their crowns (their wisdom) before the Throne".  
— Rev. xi., 19; iv., 4, 10.

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being asked to become the first editor of *The Cornhill Magazine*. As his letters show, he gathered in as contributors all the great writers of the day, amongst whom was the founder of THE FORTNIGHTLY to whom Thackeray wrote: "Dear Mr. Trollope, . . . let me come to the pleasure and say how very glad indeed I shall be to have you as co-operator in our magazine." Later in writing to Mrs. Baxter he expresses the opinion that *Cornhill* readers like Trollope's writing better than his own. *The Cornhill* was a great success under Thackeray, but he felt his strength unable to bear the dual strain of writing and editing a monthly magazine and resigned quickly.

His later letters are written from 2 Palace Green, a house he built to his own design. The last part of the fourth volume is devoted to his undated and undateable letters. Thackeray frequently illustrated points in his letters by means of the most delightful sketches, and these are reproduced where they occur.

Dr. Ray has added copious notes and appendices, which are very helpful to the reader. He also promises a further volume of letters, derived mostly from collections in this country, which the war prevented his including in their correct rotation. It will be interesting to see what further gaps in Thackeray's life are filled thereby.

The letters give a most enlightening description of the life, first of a struggling journalist and then of a great man of letters, who made his name famous on both sides of the Atlantic. His grandchildren are to be congratulated on allowing this vast correspondence to be shared by the rest of the world.

J. A. WALEY COHEN.

**GAMES FOR COURT AND GARDEN**, by Gordon Winter. *Pilot Press*. 6s. 6d.

Apart from lawn tennis, which has now an almost universal appeal, most of the games here described are played by

only a small number of enthusiasts. Yet squash rackets, fives and badminton all provide good exercise in any weather conditions and have all that is best about games to commend them. It is good to have the information about them, together with the less violent sports of archery and croquet, so conveniently collected together with a foreword by Lord Aberdare. If the book inspires the hesitant to venture upon something hitherto untried it will achieve its purpose. The author has wisely added chapters on less formal games (such as rounders and quoit tennis) from which much additional joy of life can be obtained.

Lord Grey of Fallodon once said that he could never even watch from a train window a small boy trying to catch a fish with a bent pin and a piece of string without envying him. It is something of this spirit that is needed if more of the vast crowds who watch games can be shown how great also is the pleasure to be gained from playing them. Such is the emphasis of this little book, which is simple and sensible, and, moreover, soundly illustrated with good photographs.

J.F.B.

**BEFORE THE ROMANTICS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT**, chosen by Geoffrey Grigson. *Routledge*. 10s. 6d.  
**ENGLISH SONNETS**, edited with an Introduction by Walt Taylor. *Longmans*. 8s. 6d.

The title of Mr. Grigson's new book suggests that it deals with anticipations of the Romantic Movement, the glimmer before the dawn, the first twitches of the Picturesque and the Gothic of which the later developments were so excitingly displayed by the same editor in *The Romantics*. This impression is corrected by the sub-title, for here is an anthology of the Enlightenment, of the poetry and prose of form, reason and common sense.

Among the many misleading differentiations between the Classical and the

Romantic is that which equates the first with reason and the second with imagination, or even with the irrational. Yet to me, the eighteenth century is at its most romantic precisely in its cult of reason. The introvert mind of the poet may rot and ruminate over tombs and rocks and storms, but for the majority of ordinary men for two hundred years the romantic dream has been one bright gigantic bubble of optimism, expanding at the rate of the universe until the atom bomb burst it. Its popular prophets in the eighteenth century were Defoe and Robert Paltock, in the twentieth century, Wells; it enveloped Wordsworth and Shelley as well as Stephenson (George) and Edison, Godwin as well as Livingstone. There is much of such optimism and curiosity in the first section of this book. John Ray and Thomas Burnet, for instance, ridiculing the idea that the universe was created for Man, and John Tillotson ridiculing the idea that it wasn't—"Would the mole have admired the fine gold?". Burnet and Ray are known to many of us mainly through Basil Willey's *The Eighteenth Century Background* (a book which seems to lie behind this collection), and here we will find admirable quotations juxtaposed with skill and wit. The second section is the corrective. Mr. Grigson can prescribe Swift both for the neo-romantics and the neo-classicists:

Or oft when Epithets you link,  
In gapping Lines to fill a chink,  
Like stepping stones to save a Stride,  
In Streets where Kennels are too wide:  
Or like a Heelpiece to support  
A Cripple with one Foot too short.

In the third section we return with affection and with slacker collars to Smart's flowers, Shenstone's grove and the Dusky Region of the Soul. This book does not give a complete picture of its time, of course; it is selective and personal, but like all Mr. Grigson's anthologies it gives a greater proportion than do most of work which is good to read and which otherwise might never have been discovered by the average reader. And that surely, is what an anthology is really for.

The second book is less of a personal selection—it is a collection of English sonnets, designed to show the development and scope of the form. Mr. Taylor's choice is at times hard to understand (Hartley Coleridge, for instance, has six sonnets to Donne's three; Rupert Brooke nine to none by Auden), but on the whole you will find all the great sonneteers well represented, with solid samples from those Elizabethans who are not, perhaps, easily accessible to everyone.

The sonnet is a product of the Renaissance, and it was at the Renaissance that it flowered in full richness. Then, in spite of its fairly rigid form, it achieved great variety. On the one hand the miraculous twining loveliness of Spenser, where each sonnet opens out into the next like rock-pools and grottoes linked by a falling stream, and on the other the passion of Donne, kicking and exploding till the shape rattles. Shakespeare in himself combined the braided effect of Spenser with the wit of Donne, and beside these there was the courtliness of Sir Philip Sidney, the big-limbed resignation of Drummond of Hawthornden, and the unblunted masculinity of Drayton. With Milton, of course, "the thing became a trumpet", but after Milton the sonnet has been practised with real success only by those poets who were able to recapture something of the spirit of the Renaissance—by Keats, looking back to Spenser and Sidney, or by Hopkins, catching fire from Donne. Even Wordsworth's sonnets, noble as the best of them are, would have been better poems, I think, if they had been written in another form. The rhyme system was too stiff for him, and Milton, "living at this hour", had to drag "bower" and "dower" behind like the chains of Marley's ghost. Moreover, though the sonnet is a short form it is clear that only a few poets have enough to say to fill it, and not many of those in the latter part of this anthology are among them.

NORMAN NICHOLSON.

## BOOKS ON THE TABLE

Mr. Ivor Brown's *SAY THE WORD* (*Jonathan Cape*. 6s.) sets the standard for these end-of-summer pages. His studies on living language, of which this is the fourth, incite those who care about style to vow never again to be guilty of the shopworn, the slapdash or the shoddy in speech or writing. This time he berates "puddering", defined as "the jargon of the learned or of those who pretend to rare wisdom," and translates the Lord's Prayer into Pudderesse which, instead of the expected shock, gives the reader a new realization of the original's perfection. As a result of Mr. Brown's too disarming remarks about the supposed and real errors in his text, the impulse to inform him that he has deprived H. L. Mencken's name of its 'c' on page 21 proves irresistible. Those who can never have too much of this very good thing of his will be relieved to know that the publishers forbade Mr. Brown to call the present book *Having the last word*.

## How to write a letter

How great a master of the written word was Mendelssohn is demonstrated by *MENDELSSOHN LETTERS*, edited and translated by G. Selden-Goth (*Paul Elek*. 16s.), a book which can only deepen the spell cast by his radiant personality. Whether he is the twelve-year-old telling of his meetings with Goethe, or with Thibaut six years later, or of the overwhelmingness of London and of what the Hebrides meant to him at the age of twenty, his powers of observation and of apt description never failed. His considerable gift for sketching (how sound this was may be judged by his advice on the practice of painting written a few months before his death), his zest for experience and his deep affection for his relatives, make these some of the most charming letters ever published. They attest his maturity as a

child no less than does his music. So often has he been scolded for his too facile technique, for the storms and stresses that passed his inspiration by. Lucky Mendelssohn! Had he lived through a hundred unhappy years he would never have excelled the masterpieces of his happy youth. So his is one of the few premature deaths of genius unregretted by the lovers of his music. These will find this book a treasure; the reproduction of the jottings Mendelssohn made in music (all 'hummable'), of his drawings and water-colours, of the portraits of him from childhood to his last sleep, the whole lavish and loving format, call for longer treatment than it can receive here.—Fanny Kemble was playing in a Leeds theatre when she heard of Mendelssohn's death in 1847. She was another "born letter-writer", whose correspondence has been collected by Henry Gibbs in *YOURS AFFECTIONATELY, FANNY* (*Jarrolds*. 18s.). One could wish that the method in the former book, whereby editorial comments are confined to the beginning of each period of the subject's life, had been used here. The actress's views, not only on plays, actors, acting and playwrights but on current affairs, like railway accidents at home and slavery in America, are always so shrewd and lively that Mr. Gibbs's diligent interpolations grow into rather wearisome interruptions. This volume, too, is exceedingly well illustrated and study of the nineteenth century playbills is particularly rewarding.

## Film heyday

Memories that could only belong to the twentieth century are evoked by C. A. Lejeune's *CHESTNUTS IN HER LAP* (*Phoenix House*. 10s. 6d.). This is a collection of her *Observer* film criticisms from 1936 to 1946 and, once past the irrelevancy of her pride in her son and his in her, it will be seen that they easily

stand up to the test of reprinting. Her intelligence, her turn of phrase, her wit, and, above all, her unquenchable enthusiasm for the cinema make these stimulating essays on the implications of the films, good or bad, of which they treat.

## Full lives

And now into the daylight with John Stewart Collis whose *DOWN TO EARTH* (*Jonathan Cape*. 9s. 6d.) is so much more than the story of an agricultural labourer and a forester with a taste for writing. It is rather the recording of the thought and feeling of an 'intellectual' (dire word) who has turned his back on the clutter of towns and has thereby found contentment. His reflections on the potato, the ant, the cloud, or the plough are reinforced by his scientific and technical knowledge but he keeps intact his sense of the poetry, the balance, in nature. As trees are to him beings to be revered, it is not surprising that he found his deepest satisfaction in the wood which he cleared and thinned. David Koster's wood engravings do more than illustrate Mr. Collis's themes; they have the feeling of his philosophy.—J. R. P. Postlethwaite, too, sees that life is good. *I LOOK BACK* (*T. V. Boardman*. 9s. 6d.) is the autobiography of a man who was born in China, went to school at Haileybury, knew what it was to feel like the office boy in a London business house, became a Provincial Commissioner in Africa and, after retirement, served in the Ministry of Food and with UNRRA. The recounting of such a busy, interesting life calls perhaps for the touch of complacency and excuses a lack of what Mr. Ivor Brown would call "the flowers of speech."

## Haworth Parsonage

These belonged as if by birthright to the Brontë sisters. Royston Millmore celebrates the centenary of the publication of the novels with *BRIEF LIFE OF THE BRONTES* (*W. R. Millmore*, 11 *Heights Lane, Bradford*. 5s.). In spite of the headings scattered throughout its

pages, giving it the appearance of an old-fashioned textbook, this is an entirely readable, complete little biography to supplement Mrs. Gaskell's study and to correct some cherished fallacies. To those who are permanently fascinated by the contemplation of Charlotte, Emily and Anne, any further gleanings are welcome, and these and the more familiar details are imparted with a terseness which does not disguise the author's belief that the Brontës were "the most remarkable family in the history of literature."

## "untimely death"

A penetrating assessment of Charlotte Brontë and her work is to be found in *DEMETRIOS CAPETANAKIS* (*John Lehmann*. 10s. 6d.). By the death of Capetanakis in 1944 at the age of thirty-two the world lost a poet and a philosopher it could ill spare. He came from Greece in 1939 and lived here to the end, learning to write with ease in the foreign tongue. Some of his friends have combined to make this book a just tribute to his gifts and personality: John Lehmann contributes the Introduction, Edith Sitwell discusses the poetry of Capetanakis, and Panayotis Canellopoulos and William Plomer write of their intimate contacts with him. His poems are included, together with a group of essays on Rimbaud, Proust, Dostoevsky, Thomas Gray and Horace Walpole among others, and the whole portrays as Miss Sitwell says, "the high and noble spirit of a Greek hero."

## Russian writing

The opportunity to amplify the scanty knowledge of Russian writers, which is all that most Britishers possess, comes with the publication of two books: *SOVIET LITERATURE TO-DAY* by George Reavey (*Lindsay Drummond*. 8s. 6d.) and Janko Lavrin's *PUSHKIN AND RUSSIAN LITERATURE* (*English Universities Press*. 5s.). The first is a sympathetic analysis of what Mr. Reavey describes as "the trend of Soviet literature over the last decade . . . as it reflects the march of

Soviet life." Such chapters as "The Principle of Soviet Realism", "Anniversaries, Deaths and Funerals" and "The Idea of the Hero in Soviet Fiction" confirm that the book is more than a "narrow literary history". He has much to say about the Pushkin of the other volume and this, its author says, "is not so much a biography as an attempt to present to a foreign audience a great literary figure through his own creations and against the background of the epoch in which he lived." As Pushkin is regarded as "the most vital link between Russian and English literature", in this connection the reader would profit by reading the second book first.

#### Whitman whole

The understanding of Whitman as democrat and poet has too often been retarded by the habit of serving up indigestible chunks of his verse at any and every meal. It is good therefore to have all the poems in one larder, as it were, where they can be sorted on to their appropriate shelves or poured into the proper receptacles. Everyman Library (*Dent*, 4s.) has issued a new edition of *LEAVES OF GRASS* with comprehensive notes and an introduction by Emory Holloway of Queens College, New York City. Shed of the sociological and political moralizings that have clung about it in a thick legend, his purpose stands out clear and simple when he says:

Of Life immense in passion, pulse and power,  
Cheerful, for freest action form'd under the  
laws divine,

The Modern Man I sing.

Nevertheless, reading him again at length corroborates a youthful impression that he wrote great, gusty dollops of prose cut to look like verse.

#### The book of the play

The only novel on the table is *THE CABBAGE PATCH* by Noel Langley (*Arthur Barker*, 8s. 6d.). The scene is mostly Lady Buckering's house where the

rent and the butler are unpaid and the uproar is incessant; the characters: herself, her four daughters with husbands or boy friends, a maternity nurse, and the family doctor. If the author is not the Noel Langley writ large in the credit titles of a recent 'film offering' it would still be surprising if he concocted this book without the cinema in mind. This reader, however, sees it so much as a theatre piece, one of those enjoyable comedies of family life which run interminably, that the absence of stage directions as the tale progressed was positive irritation. Moreover, types are so identifiable that even the cast could be assembled. Once he stops straining after far-fetched symbols Mr. Langley's bear-garden becomes very good fun.

#### R.A.F. vignettes

There is fun of a more desperate sort in *THE SURVIVORS* by John Sommerfield (*John Lehmann*, 8s. 6d.), who might well be counted among the more outstanding chroniclers of the R.A.F. with this collection of stories. They seem to have been written while he was on active service overseas, particularly in the desert, and his people are real enough as individuals to indicate that there is possibly a large slice of autobiography in his pages. Phil, for instance, in the tale that gives the book its name is quite recognizable, behind his pilot's uniform, as the young man he was before the war. This ability to keep personalities separate in situations of collective danger and death is always a feat. The dialogue, too, seems to be utterly convincing, as in "Nobody got roasted", and the scene is lit no less by Mr. Sommerfield's prose than by the burning aircraft itself. What he will make of civilian material remains to be seen but after this book it looks as if he could not fail.

GRACE BANYARD.

# THE FORTNIGHTLY

OCTOBER, 1947

## FREEDOM IN EDUCATION

BY ERIC JAMES

THE great reorganization and expansion of our educational system which is at present taking place necessarily raises a number of questions both of personal and of institutional liberty. Further, education is, in one of its aspects, a means for the transmission and perpetuation of moral and cultural standards: in another, it is one of the most powerful instruments of social change. Thus it is related to society both as a stabilizing and as a revolutionary force, and is therefore particularly sensitive to the ideas of freedom and authority current in society itself. We are concerned, moreover, as part of education, with teaching immature people our beliefs upon the most important questions, of which freedom itself is one. It is for these reasons that a discussion of freedom in education may be held to have interest for others than those professionally concerned with it.

Liberty is concerned with the proper adjustment of relationships, and in education a number of different kinds of relationship are involved. The relations between the teacher and the pupil, the teacher and the school, the school and the parent, and the school and various outside bodies, one of which may be the State, are all capable of raising questions of the proper extent of authority. So when we speak of liberty in education we must specify with the greatest care which particular kind of relationship we are discussing. It is for lack of such precision that there is the greatest confusion in current educational literature in the use of such phrases as "a genuinely democratic education."

We may find, perhaps, the most suitable starting point for our inquiry in the relations of pupil and teacher. In no field of education has there been a greater change in the last century, and particularly in the last twenty-five years, than in the degree of freedom allowed to the child. Two hundred and fifty years ago even as superficially advanced a writer as Locke put absolute obedience high among juvenile virtues; Wesley's celebrated advice: "Break their wills betimes: begin this work before they can run alone, before they can speak plain, perhaps before they can speak at all, whatever pains it costs, break the will if you would not damn the child . . ." shocks us even more than it shocked his biographer, Southey. The difference between this and ordinary contemporary practice is striking enough; the contrast with the most extreme modern doctrines is that of two religious systems. The Augustinian theology of Wesley led him to the view that since the inclinations of the child are naturally wicked, liberty has too many dangers for him. It is important to recognize

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that the school of completely free expression rests upon a no less dogmatic belief in natural goodness, though this doctrinal basis is not usually explicit. A point of view diverging from both of these in foundation, though leading to an authoritarianism similar to the former, is that which sprung from Plato. If we believe that the knowledge and experience of some adult minds gives them some knowledge of the Good, have we not an obligation to impose upon the young the standards so obtained? If this view is adopted there is only a very limited place for legitimate liberty in this department of education. This is a question to which we must return. At this point I will merely draw attention to an inconsistency in the views of those who advocate complete freedom for the child from restriction or even guidance. Mr. A. S. Neill, for example, one of the best known of such advocates, admits that in questions of personal cleanliness authority must impose rules of behaviour in order to preserve health. The weakness of this admission is obvious. If the health of the body necessitates limitations on the child's freedom how much more the health of the soul, replies the Platonist or the Christian. And to defend himself from this attack, the libertarian must retire into an agnosticism concerning any except the most material aspects of life so profound as, in the opinion of many, to disqualify him from legitimately assuming the title of teacher. It is, of course, such agnosticism that has been one of the contributory factors in the growth of libertarianism in education. In the moral and spiritual spheres there are few things that teachers regard as certain enough to make the basis of an imposed code of belief and action.

In addition to an increased liberty for the individual child, there is also a contemporary movement that gives greater liberty to children as a group in the school as opposed to other authority, a movement that obviously owes much of its impetus to the development of political democracy. It is not always clear what is implied by the word 'democracy' in educational contexts; often what is meant is in fact an oligarchy of prefects. But from the general idea springs various experiments, some of undoubted value, involving school councils, form parliaments, and similar devices of self-government in the schools. Attractive though many of these schemes are, they must be examined most critically, for in my view they are dangerous for several reasons. Such experiments make the assumption that patterns of behaviour inculcated in childhood will express themselves in analogous terms in adult life, that is to say that the child who has practice in electing his form captain will be more likely to become an active and intelligent voter than one who has not. This assumption is at present without any great foundation. On the other hand it is an experimental fact that children can be extremely cruel and undoubtedly unjust, and any system which gives them the freedom to tyrannize over others in the name of liberty is full of danger. Further, among the principal psychological needs of children is security. A system that may give the impression of an absence of fixed rules, and in which too many alternatives are open to the child's own

choice, lays a responsibility and a sense of lack of order upon the child that may well be too heavy. Such systems of self-government also often have an essentially unreal character that children are quick to recognize. In practically no school could a vote of the school council succeed, for example, in getting the school hall painted crimson, or in eliminating some essential subject from the curriculum. At such a point authority would step in, and the reply: 'But they would never *ask* a thing like that' indicates the unreality that underlies many of these experiments in so-called democracy. In so far as the lessons learned at school are carried on to adult life, then the practice of a counterfeit democracy in which real power does not lie with the 'people' might be held to produce a subsequent distrust of the whole idea. The school is a community which, in fact, is not comparable to a State of adult citizens. This is not to say that we must fall back on a pure authoritarianism, which tells the child what is the right course, and exacts obedience. We must not forget the educative effect of making choices. It is possible, however, to have such scope for choice, as it is to employ methods of co-operation and consultation at every level in the school, without the apparatus of spurious and inappropriate democratic forms.

There is one further aspect of freedom in the relationship between pupil and teacher: that which concerns the choice of the subjects of study. Obviously the consensus of opinion is in favour of some very clear restriction in the earlier stages, since the essentials of literacy are necessary for any kind of further study and for citizenship itself. But beyond the primary stage there is no such agreement. In schools of the grammar school type there are usually a number of compulsory studies, and the universities lay down, as is well known, a certain standard in a group of subjects for all their entrants, whatever their specialism. Such a restriction of freedom is manifestly based on the idea that there is a core of knowledge which all educated men should possess, though it is curious and unfortunate that little definite thought has gone into the positive formulation of what constitutes that body of knowledge in a democratic community, for individuals of different levels of intelligence. There is, in my view, no more difficult and important educational task. It is interesting to see that in America, where the freedom which could regard unrelated courses in world history, agricultural chemistry, English grammar and physical education as an adequate preparation for citizenship, has hitherto flourished, there are now signs that the idea of a basic liberal education is gaining ground, whether in the form of the 100 necessary books as at Chicago, or in the prescription of certain groups of studies as in the recent reports from Harvard and Columbia. In this country, on the other hand, forces are at work which will certainly have the effect of increasing the child's freedom in the choice of subjects and diminishing the obligatory elements. In my opinion such a tendency is almost entirely lamentable. I believe that unless we realize that for various abilities and aptitudes there are groups of subjects more valuable than others, our whole society will be the poorer.

I have indicated thus far that my attitude towards the pupil-school relationship in the three broad fields of moral teaching, general organization and intellectual training is rather more authoritarian than is at present fashionable, for in all these aspects of educational activity I feel that though authority must be more rational and less arbitrary than it has sometimes been, yet authority there must always be. At once a new question presents itself: who should be the guardians of this authority in our schools and universities? What, we may ask, is the appropriate form of government, and how much power should it exercise? If we agree that the headmaster should be able to tell the school council that he will not have the school hall painted red, we must decide who is to issue similar prohibitions to the headmaster. In fact the controlling authorities may be the central government, the local government, or a body of governors, and vaguer though real forces include such influences as that of parents or of religious bodies. In questions of curriculum we must add to these the demands of universities, of examining boards, of professional bodies and of industry. The forces which limit the freedom of the school, which in this context means the teachers and headteacher, are thus numerous and overlapping, and their authority differs in weight with the kind of school and with other variables. We thus have to discuss not only how much control over liberty there should be, but also which body is appropriate to exercise it. At the present time in education, as in much else, control is becoming more concentrated in the instruments of the State or of local government, and it is this tendency which gives rise to much contemporary concern, since it is feared that this must lead to 'loss of liberty.' But, it may be argued, does not this concern show a fundamental distrust of the democratic idea itself? To some degree I believe this retort to be justified, and the fear of State control and even of local control of education to be ill-founded. But the position is more complex than it sometimes appears, and in considering the apportionment of ultimate authority for the conduct of schools the following factors must be borne in mind.

First, ability tends to follow power, and if the powers of individual teachers are too much curtailed, as some local authorities tend to do, the calibre of men and women wishing to teach rather than to administer will decline, with disastrous results. Secondly, in a democratic society dispute should be dealt with as far as possible by discussion. Such discussion is only fruitful if it follows from personal contact and interest, and therefore I believe that the claim that every school should have its own governing body is well founded, even if that body is but an intermediary between the school and the ultimate democratic authority. Thirdly, and this is by far the most important point, it may well be that some elected bodies really are incapable of exercising authority wisely over the whole field of education. For consider, in the light of what we have said, how wide that field is. The ultimate authority is not concerned only with bricks and mortar, with enforcing literacy and with seeing that public money

is wisely spent: it is charged with the transmission of moral and cultural values. Its work ranges from the problems of plumbing to those of belief. It was for this reason that in the Platonic republic the highest duty of the guardians was the supervision of education. In the absence of philosopher kings it is doubtful whether any one body can or should be the ultimate authority on questions from different parts of so wide a field as that comprehended in the single word 'education'. It is, of course, true that the elected authority is perfectly fitted to decide many educational problems. It will probably be admitted that society has the right and the duty to impose certain minimum standards upon schools and parents, standards of health, of attendance, of pedagogic competence and so on, and for the discharge of these primary obligations the elected authority is probably the right instrument. But for dealing with other kinds of questions it is by no means necessarily so. There are few who seriously maintain, for example, that local education authorities are competent to administer universities. Yet the spiritual and intellectual problems involved in the highest forms of some schools are not vastly different from those of the university.

It may, of course, be objected at this point that local education authorities have the advice of experts in their directors and their staffs, while the central government has both an administrative staff and an inspectorate. But if, indeed, the directors are to direct, the concentration of power over a social force as potent as education in so few hands offers great dangers, and these dangers are, at any rate theoretically, not lessened by the high qualities of many of those who at present hold these positions. It was for this reason that a director who is perhaps as well fitted as any to pronounce on questions of value remarked that he disliked the phrase 'director of education' as implying far too great a concentration of power. The same reservations must be made concerning the central government as the ultimate authority in education. In short, though the individual school should be prepared to accept the direction of a democratic central and local government in a number of matters affecting its life and work, and though it must listen with respect to their advice on the context and final direction of education, there legitimately can and should be misgivings when it is suggested that their direction in these matters should be absolute. The questions we have to answer concerning educational freedom are thus not only: 'Who shall exercise authority and how much authority shall they wield?' but also: 'in what specific fields of educational work is a particular body thoroughly competent to speak?'

It is usually, then, for the content and ultimate idealism of education that we are concerned when we use such phrases as 'academic freedom' or when we show apparent distrust of the democratic method by referring to 'outside interference with the schools or the universities.' The demands, for example, that 'politics should be kept out of education,' though strictly impossible since, as Plato showed conclusively, the two are almost aspects of the same



problem, have a foundation in the feeling that we mean something by 'the tradition of culture' which should maintain a degree of continuity in spite of changes of power within the State, and to this extent should transcend as far as it may its authority. Nevertheless the content of education, with all that it implies, must be under some control. It cannot be left to the unsupported opinions of individual educators. What then is the appropriate controlling force if the elected bodies in the State and their servants are felt to be incompetent for this particular task?

Ultimately the sovereign power in this field of education can only be the consensus of academic opinion, working through a variety of agencies. In practice this is to a great degree the method by which control is at present exercised. Through examining bodies, co-opted members and representatives of learned institutions on education committees and governing bodies, through professional organizations of teachers and the Ministry's inspectorate, and through committees appointed by the Ministry for various educational purposes, the 'clerisy' makes its influence felt and curtails the freedom of individual educators. That such forces are at work to maintain the character and the standards of the content of education is perhaps so obvious that it may be thought not worth mentioning. Yet I believe that it is a fact of great importance, for the guardians of this tradition are not sufficiently conscious of their function, and there are, moreover, tendencies developing in our society which may either destroy this control and replace it by a disintegrating libertarianism, or hand it over to bodies which are incompetent to discharge it. It cannot be maintained that the academic class, what I have called for want of a better term the 'clerisy', now feels any real sense of responsibility for the character of education as a whole. Its interest is lukewarm and inexperienced, when it is not purely sectional. Nor is this surprising when we consider what has happened to this class under the pressure of social and economic changes. It has expanded enormously and it has lost homogeneity. Further the division of the 'clerisy' into specialists, even at the higher levels, has created a grave lack of concern for the nature of education in its broadest sense, and one result has been that the most fundamental questions of educational policy, such as what shall be taught in a rapidly changing social and cultural environment, have hardly been discussed at all. The very conditions which make such discussions more than ever vital have made them the less often conducted.

The danger is apparent when we consider the abrogation of responsibility on the part of the universities which is implied by the creation of professorships of education. We may have unquestioned experts on the history of education, in the techniques of testing intelligence, in child psychology, or even in the practice of teaching. But such experts need not necessarily have a truer vision of the proper ends of education in its fullest sense than a professor of mineralogy, though some of them do, of course, possess such a vision. Again, though we must welcome the growing use of committees and councils for

educational inquiries, as an encouraging sign that means are being sought to voice and maintain the authority of the tradition of culture in educational questions, yet the composition of such committees must be scrutinized with the greatest care. Such bodies, in my view, should exercise great authority, but this authority will only be a source of danger if it puts the power to modify our whole national culture into the hands of those who, whatever their distinction as administrators, or psychologists, or teachers, are without a synoptic vision of that culture. The development of isolated fields of knowledge has, I believe, no result more dangerous than the creation of specialist experts in education itself. It should be a humbling thought that there have been very few even moderately good books on education, and only one great one, and that it required the greatest of all philosophers to produce that one.

The expansion of the group concerned with education does not, therefore, imply a strengthening of its power, but rather a weakening. Yet some authority is especially necessary when we are faced with the danger that in an effort to create a common or democratic culture, standards may be submerged by too great reverences for the opinions of majorities in matters, such as morals or aesthetics, where they are not valid. Our educational institutions also, in a rapidly changing environment, are subject to constant pressure to adjust themselves to what are ambiguously called 'the needs of society.' Thus the 'needs of society' are sometimes held to demand that Spanish rather than Greek should be the fourth language in grammar schools, or that a chair of plastics-technology is a more proper part of a modern university than one of classical archaeology. The discussion of the proper meaning that should be attached to such phrases as 'relatedness to life', or 'the needs of society' in educational thought would take us too far from our central topic, but in my view it cannot be too clearly realized that the only check upon such pressure, is a lively, informed, and articulate concern on the part of the 'clerisy', working through advisory panels, examining bodies and the like. No confusion in educational thought is more serious than that which sees in the needs of society simply a response to economic and social forces and fails to interpret them also in a moral and spiritual sense.

We can see an example of the indifference and impotence of academic opinion in the contemporary attacks upon external examinations. The subject may seem a very narrow and specialized one, unworthy of notice in a general survey. Yet I believe that more important principles are involved than is usually realized. Hitherto it has been held that all pupils in grammar schools should attempt to reach a common minimum of attainment in certain groups of subjects. The school certificate, imperfect as it is, is in fact laying down a criterion of general education for the boy or girl of certain intelligence. With the abolition of the school certificate such an agreed core might disappear. It may be that this result will not follow; it may be that the freedom from an external examination will be for the curriculum a legitimate and healthy free-



dom. The point that I wish to make is that a change so radical that may have profound results on the whole of higher education should occur with little thought and less comment at the higher academic levels, whose vital concern it should certainly be.

I believe, then, that in the content of education with all that this implies—the maintenance of a living culture, the proper adjustment of curriculum to contemporary economic and social changes, and the embodiment of new psychological discoveries—the only competent bodies should be composed mainly not of administrators, qua administrators, nor of those who are expert in special areas of the educational field, but of those who may be supposed to have explored the really fundamental issues involved, and these can be found mainly in the highest academic groups. The problems of liberty and authority in education impose on them a grave responsibility which there are signs that they are unwilling to assume; a responsibility to make themselves knowledgeable and concerned over general questions of educational policy; to speak with the authority that comes from an awareness of the values of a culture whose inheritors they are and whose boundaries it is their highest function to extend. It is for them to create an authority that is strong, yet which never crystallizes into an inelastic orthodoxy.

If the ultimate authority on the intellectual aspects of education must be the consensus of informed academic opinion expressing itself through a new 'clerisy', what are we to say of the moral and religious aspects? It would, of course, be quite wrong to make a definite division between the cultural and the moral elements in education: at every point the two overlap. Yet it is true that in practice there is a difference in the readiness with which we are prepared to accept a compulsion to teach all boys arithmetic and one to teach them all divinity, and, indeed, such a difference is legally recognized by the right given to parents to withdraw their children from religious teaching and not from that of other subjects. I have already touched on some of the questions ultimately involved. It is an essential part of education to inculcate certain moral attitudes: so much is scarcely ever seriously denied. Very many thinkers would indeed maintain that its chief aim, to which all activities must be subordinated, is the creation of goodness. But there will be deep divergences if we attempt to state which principles of moral experience are sufficiently agreed as to form a basis for teaching, and still greater controversy as to how far such moral teaching must have a religious basis. It will be generally agreed that society working through all its educational agencies, official and unofficial, has the right to demand that its schools shall teach its children, for example, that lying and stealing are wrong; over the question as to whether such moral behaviour shall be related to the character of Jesus there will be less agreement; and a demand that all teachers should be compelled to teach that Jesus was the son of God would be regarded as a grave infringement of proper liberty. We are here faced with a genuine dilemma which arises from the whole character

of modern society, and which is seen in its most simple and acute form in the schools. The difficulty is one to which I have already drawn attention. If we believe that we know the nature of the Good then surely it is our most pressing educational obligation to indoctrinate others with that knowledge. Yet it is precisely for that view, shared of necessity to some extent by any educator, that naïve and superficial thinkers accuse Plato of being a fascist before his time. And there is this justification for their view that our own society has agreed that over the areas of experience covered by morality and religion there shall be the widest possible tolerance.

Nevertheless, the difficulty remains. In particular it may be questioned how far the basic principles of social behaviour rest upon religious beliefs. From 1870 until 1944 the State in its control over the schools took the view that the two were quite distinct, so that schools were free to give religious teaching or not as they thought fit; if given, such religious teaching must be free of dogmatic elements though the difficulties of such a position were left discreetly unclarified. The controversies of 1870 and of 1902 showed how deeply the questions of the religious background of education affected the national life. By the Education Act of 1944, however, State-aided schools are obliged to include religious worship and religious teaching in the education they provide, though tolerance is preserved by the fact that such teaching must be undenominational in character, and freedom by the right of withdrawal. The Act is thus trying to overcome the moral dangers of the secularization of education to which A. E. Taylor, for example, drew attention when he wrote: "It may quite well be that the future philosophical student of history will yet find the most significant and disquieting of all the social changes of the 'Victorian Age' to be the combination of State-enforced primary education with the transference of the work of the teacher to the hands of the layman under no effective ecclesiastical or theological control. . . . It is of the very nature of a living religion to claim the supreme direction of effort and action. If the claim is disallowed, religion itself ceases to be real; if it is allowed, it is idle to dispute the right of religion to be made the foundation of education." (*The Faith of a Moralist*.) The question thus remains to be answered: what "effective ecclesiastical or theological control" can be regarded to-day as competent to decide the character of religious teaching? The answer is: none at all. In matters of religion it is useless to expect that coherence of belief that I have urged as a necessity in the intellectual field. This is a characteristic of our age and our society, and its full discussion would take me beyond my subject. I must content myself with the observations of a practising teacher on the problem.

First, is its existence as disturbing as it sometimes appears? The absence of a recognized authority over certain fields of life is simply the price we pay for tolerance. It may be that the whole experiment of religious tolerance is mistaken and doomed to perish in a general disintegration of standards. If

we believe this, then we must declare ourselves as honestly intolerant and be prepared to define the authority that we would be prepared to accept. We cannot have it both ways; speaking wistfully of the need for spiritual authority and at the same time hoping to reap the virtues of toughened individual consciences that should be produced by a greater freedom in these fields. Secondly, we must ask if the disintegration is as deep as we sometimes imagine. If we seek new ways to formulate them it may well be that there are more pre-suppositions than we are prone to believe where there is still agreement, and which can be safely made the basis for moral education and legitimate indoctrination. Finally, we must not make the mistake of confusing tolerance with indifference. It is not only right but necessary for teachers with strong moral and religious beliefs to state them. Such freedom must be subject to limits, and it may be objected that I have stated that there is no relevant authority to pronounce upon these matters. I would contend, however, that while no single authority can pronounce positively, a number of educational authorities have the right to lay down the limits beyond which the individual should not go in moral or religious indoctrination. Such questions are, I believe, best solved individually and on the merits of each case. It is an error, into which we too easily fall, to despair if we cannot, with complete generality, lay down rules to govern every problem of belief in education. The whole assumption of a free society is that individuals are, on the whole, sensible, and it is on this sense expressing itself in individual decisions that we must rely for the limitation of illegitimate liberty in the moral and religious spheres.

But what many will call a dangerous libertarianism in the religious field (and whether dangerous or not I contend only that it is unavoidable), may be stabilized by that genuine authority in our intellectual life that I have already stressed. The two fields are in the closest degree inter-related: a necessary freedom in one must be balanced by a determination in the other to maintain with all possible resolution that not all views are equally true, nor all pursuits equally valuable. Such an emphasis on the value of the educated judgment as opposed to that over-emphasis on the personal opinion, whatever its weight, that is one of the dangers of democracy, such a new note of conviction and re-affirmation of authority in our academic life would have a bracing effect on all our activities, and not least in the moral sphere. It is the function of inspectors, of administrators, of the schools and perhaps most of all, of the universities, to supply it. Upon them rests the responsibility for maintaining the standards of Western culture through an era of immense social change, and of ensuring that as wider social groups come into their inheritance of that culture it has not been mortgaged in the name of liberty.

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## A POST-MORTEM ON THE LOAN

BY R. P. SCHWARZ

BRITAIN'S political and economic pundits have, for a long time, preferred Coué to Cassandra. That has landed them and us where we are now. Among the Couéists one must, in this instance, unfortunately include even so outstanding a man as the late Lord Keynes. In his defence of the Loan agreement, he found himself suddenly in the company of all the minds mediocrity could muster. That fact alone, if nothing else, should have warned him that there was something fundamentally wrong with that defence.

It is not, perhaps, superfluous to quote the five chief arguments which Lord Keynes developed in the course of his last speech in the House of Lords (December 18, 1945):

Questions have been raised—and rightly and reasonably raised—about the willingness of the United States to receive repayment (of the Loan) hereafter. This is a large subject to which I have given a great deal of thought, but I shall not have time to develop it fully to-day. I am not, as a result, quite so worried as most people. Indeed, if in the next five or ten years, the dollar turns out to be a scarce currency, seldom will so many people have been right. It is a very technical matter, very emphatically within their past experience, but not so easily the subject of future prediction. I am afraid I must content myself with a few headlines. First, it is not a question of our having to pay the United States by direct exports; we could never do that. Our exports are not, and are not likely to be as large as our direct imports from the United States. The object of the multilateral system is to enable us to pay the United States by exporting to any part of the world and it is partly for that very reason that the Americans have felt the multilateral system was the only sound basis for any arrangement of this kind. Secondly, all the most responsible people in the United States, and particularly in the State Department and in the Treasury, have entirely departed from the high tariff, export subsidy conception of things, and will do their utmost with, they believe, the support of public opinion in the opposite direction. That is why this international trade convention presents us with such a tremendous opportunity. For the first time in modern history the United States is going to exert its full, powerful influence in the direction of reduction of tariffs, not only of itself, but by all others.

Thirdly, this is a problem of which to-day every economist and publicist in the United States is acutely conscious. Books on economics are scarcely written about anything else. They would regard it as their fault and not ours if they fail to solve it. They would acquit us of blame—quite different from the atmosphere of ten or twenty years ago. They will consider it their business to find a way out. Fourthly, if the problem does arise, it will be a problem, for reasons I have just mentioned, of the United States *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world and not us in particular. It will be the problem of the United States and the whole commercial and financial arrangement of every other country. Fifthly—and perhaps this is the consideration which is least prominent in people's minds—the United States is rapidly becoming a high-living and a high-

cost country. Their wages are two and a half times ours. These are the historical classical methods by which in the long run international equilibrium will be restored. (*Hansard*, Lords, 18-12-1945, cols. 792 and 793.)

Of these five points, Lord Keynes has been right only on one, the fourth, and even then only because he assumed, by this particular argument, that he might be wrong. As to the rest, seldom has so brilliant an economist proved himself so wrong, so decisively, so quickly.

On the first count, Lord Keynes was wrong because, with the exception of the lend-lease period, the dollar shortage has been, for a long time, a world-wide experience, steadily growing worse in extent and intensity. During the relevant years, the decisive fact was the *overall* surplus in the United States balance of payments. The United States, in other words, showed an excess of claims on foreign countries, over the aggregate claims of all other countries on the United States. Individually, at one time or other, a given country may have been its creditor. But the total claims of all the countries which found themselves in this fortunate position, were then—and are even more so now—inferior to the total indebtedness of the remainder. Had this not been so, no overall surplus could have arisen in the United States balance of payments. This fundamental fact was as clearly perceptible in 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945 as it is to-day. For, nobody could assume, even then, that the sudden deficit in the United States balance of payments during 1942 to 1945, was anything but a passing phenomenon, exclusively provoked by the war and the peculiar lend-lease method adopted to finance it.\*

On the second count, Lord Keynes was equally wrong. It could not be unknown to him that even among "all the most responsible people in the United States" the comprehension of America's economic position and of the consequences that followed from that position, was by no means as thorough-going as he would have it. Had this even been the case, its practical importance would still have been by far inferior to Lord Keynes's hopeful expectations. One cannot help remembering the old story about the dogs which bark, but don't bite. It is all very well for us to know that, but does the dog know? What mattered, therefore, was not the opinion of "all the most responsible people". Far more important was what all the not so responsible people believed or disbelieved. Had the opinion of responsible circles mattered so much, why would fear of Congress have led the American negotiators of the Loan to reject, one after another, the initial proposals which Lord Keynes had brought to the States? As the incident of the Wool Tariff Bill, recently vetoed by President Truman, again clearly demonstrated, the incomprehension

\* *The Economic Journal*, Vol. LVI, No. 222, of June 1946, published posthumously an article by Lord Keynes under the title *The Balance of Payments of the United States*. In this article, he developed in greater detail the arguments first advanced in his speech in the Lords. The article contains impeccable statistics. But its conclusions rest on the sanguine assumption that all conceivable favourable factors would simultaneously come into play, without interference by any adverse factors. Such is essentially the assumption of the Monte Carlo gambler.

of the not so responsible people is still an important factor to be reckoned with. That was even more so the case in 1945. And only the proneness of the intellectual to over-estimate the importance of opinions held by other intellectuals, can account for the weight Lord Keynes attributed to the minority views of the U.S. State Department and U.S. Treasury.

No less erroneous were Lord Keynes's views on the third count. For while it is quite likely that "every economist and publicist in the United States is acutely conscious of the problem involved"—which is that of the United States balance of payments—it does not follow therefrom that he is also aware of the right solution. In fact, the vast majority of American economists were then, and are still, inhibited by two equally optimistic assumptions, namely first that the expansion of world trade as such, to be achieved by multilateral methods, would be sufficient to remove the worst obstacles at present arising from the dollar shortage, the "supply of dollars" being increased if U.S. imports expand in volume and amount; and, secondly, that failing the success of this method, singly, foreign lending would do the rest. But practically all of them resolutely dismissed from their minds the shocking thought that both methods combined might still not be enough.

The touchstone of real understanding on the other side of the Atlantic was not therefore, mere consciousness of the problem. Lord Keynes's third argument would have carried weight only had he been able to point to a considerable body of public (and not only expert) opinion admitting the necessity of a permanent import surplus in the United States balance of payments. But the truth is that even enlightened American opinion does not go further than to advocate an increase in American imports. It does not recommend an actual import surplus, *which is the only solution of the problem*. That means heavy reductions in the American tariff, and *unilateral* reductions at that. This is, of course, a political impossibility at present, even though it be a logical and economic necessity. But unless and until politics are squared with economics, only expedients, but no solution, can be found.

No less rash was it, on Lord Keynes's part, to assume that the United States would "acquit us of blame" if the problem could not be solved. If the Loan Agreement succeeded in passing Congress, it did so only after many Congressmen had abundantly blamed Britain. And it might not have passed this hurdle even then, but for the fact that over the period occupied by its discussion in Congress, it had, in the eyes of most, ceased to be a measure designed to help Britain, to become a distinctly anti-Soviet measure. And if, to-day, Congress were to take action on the Marshall offer, it would be in similar circumstances and for the same reasons.

But nowhere was Lord Keynes's misjudgment more serious than on the fifth count. "The United States is rapidly becoming a high-living and a high-cost country," he said. And a similar sentence will be found in his article, already mentioned, in *The Economic Journal*. In any case, the argument thus invoked

—the restoration of international equilibrium by a rise in the American price level, leading to a reduction of American exports—can apply only on a long-term view. For such a rise, except in cases of galloping inflation, takes a considerable time to make itself felt. But is the argument correct even then? It is quite possible that America may become a country of even higher living costs than heretofore. In fact, living costs in the United States have for a long time past been higher than in most countries. But it is just for this very reason, namely, the high cost of living unaccompanied by a corresponding expansion in the purchasing power of the lower income brackets, that the pressure to export is considerably increased. It may not be a case of "export or die" but it is at least one of "export or slump". And while high living costs may adversely affect industrial costs, the high rate of technological progress and the savings secured from mass production for an enormous domestic market, have so far more than sufficiently compensated the high cost of living. *A priori*, there is no reason to believe that this compensation will suddenly cease. The whole of Lord Keynes's fifth argument rests on a confusion between high *living* costs and high *industrial* costs—a remarkable confusion indeed for so subtle an economic theorist.

It is, however, possible to be right for the wrong reasons. Thus, Lord Keynes could have been wrong on each individual count, yet right on the whole aspect of the case. But even that merciful interpretation of his views has been utterly disproved by events. The fact is not surprising. A policy based on the most sanguine expectations, a policy which, at the same time made no allowance for adverse factors, stood every chance of suffering shipwreck. Lord Keynes's second incursion into international economic-political affairs thus proved no happier than the first. The first bore the title *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*; the second will obviously be called *The Economic Consequences of Lord Keynes*.\*

## II

Is all this only rear-view or wisdom after the event? By no means. The economic doctrine of Clause 7 of the Mutual-Aid Agreements and its sequels, the Bretton Woods agreements and the American loans to Britain and other countries have been rejected in this country, since 1943 at least, by *The Economist*, *The Times*, Mr. L. S. Amery, Mr. Robert Boothby, M.P., Mr. Norman Smith, M.P., Dr. Paul Einzig, Dr. Thomas Balogh and myself†—and this list of names lays no claim to completeness. In France, Monsieur J. Lévy-

\* I should not like the reader to believe that it gives me any pleasure to criticize a man who can no longer speak in his defence. But it is impossible to pass over important facts in silence. For my high valuation of Lord Keynes as a theoretical economist, see my article *A Posthumous Debate: Maitoux versus Keynes* in *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, December 1946.

† *Bretton Woods* (October 1944); *Bretton Woods and the Debtor Countries* (October 1945); *The Anglo-American Agreements* (February 1946), all in *THE FORTNIGHTLY*. See also L. S. Amery, *The Washington Loan Agreements* (1945); Dr. P. Einzig, *Currency after the War*, etc.

Jacquemin, in his book *L'Economie du Monde*\* arrived by a somewhat different reasoning at very similar conclusions.

The fact that writers of very different political complexion made common cause in condemning the wishful thinking of our economic Couéists, should have warned the authorities that this was a matter in which thinking counted more than voting. The Governments of the day—first Mr. Churchill's coalition, then Mr. Attlee's Labour government—contented themselves with taking the opinion of their experts. That opinion was indeed something to go by, particularly as among these experts, some men could be found whose advice had in the past been successful in maintaining the number of Britain's unemployed around the two-million mark, while others had learned their economics from them. Safe their opinion was in so far as it did not stray from well-trodden paths, but, alas, not sound. Admittedly, though, one factor in the situation might have misled even a far-sighted government: Lord Keynes had this time joined the ranks of the orthodox. Yet, he had previously been an "unsafe", an unorthodox, expert. Thus it happened that in the view of the orthodox, the minority view, diametrically opposed to their own, became known as "A Page of British Folly".

"The indifference and the doubt of responsible British people (in regard to the Anglo-American Agreements)" wrote the author of a pamphlet published under this very title, "constitutes, to my judgment, an unparalleled folly. The detailed plans so far put forward may well contain points that should be criticized. But the criticism actually emanating from respectable sources in this country has been mainly ill-informed and often quite absurd."

Any comment on this passage could only weaken its involuntary humour.

Yet, it was such minds as this, expressing platitudes in servile language, who advised other minds of similar calibre. The one mind that cannot be thus dismissed, Mr. Churchill's, was unfortunately in matters economic unburdened by any deeper understanding of the issues involved, and in matters political strongly biased in favour of any solution that would maintain a common Anglo-American front. He and those who think like him seem to be closed to the thought that this front could be maintained—and on a much more solid basis—without any British subservience or the abandonment of reasonable British interests, if only because the U.S.A., in its hysterical fear of Soviet Russia, needs Britain, as we have already been assured, in the pleasant rôle of "shock absorber".

Britain's governments, for decades past, have been haunted by the mistaken idea that the United States must be appeased at any cost. In this respect at least, there is little to choose between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, on the one hand, and Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin, on the other. And not all the votes of Bournemouth, Margate, Southport or, for that matter, Blackpool will ever make a great Foreign Secretary, only a policy will.

In *THE FORTNIGHTLY* of February 1946, I wrote:

\* Sirey, editors, Paris (1946).

But if the Coalition Government is responsible for having initiated the general policy of these agreements (the Washington Loan Agreements), the present Government must take the blame for having done very little to find an alternative policy. It confined itself to painting in the darkest colours the fatal consequences for this country which a rejection of the Washington Agreements would have entailed. Undoubtedly, that course would have led to a serious aggravation of present stringencies. But the Government has assumed rather too quickly that the nation would have rejected further privations *had it been aware of the issue involved*. One can understand that a Conservative government, for reasons of social and economic affinity with a free-enterprise America, should decide to link the fate of the country to that of the United States; also that for this very reason, it should not have been over-anxious to explain the issue to the nation between July 1944, date of the signing of the Bretton Woods Agreements, and July 1945, date of its defeat at the polls. But it is . . . an irony of history that a Socialist government should follow the same policy. If one observes the privations borne by liberated Europe, if one considers the sacrifices which Russia has accepted for the past quarter of a century—precisely in order to remain master in her own house—it is difficult to believe that the British people, so proud of its independence, would have refused further sacrifices, no doubt far less grievous. As nothing was done to enlighten the nation on this vital issue, the conclusion follows that one would hardly have acted differently had one not wished to find an alternative

Rejection of the credit may have meant a gamble. But its acceptance is nothing else. At least, the first course meant a gamble on independence while the second is a gamble on subordination. True, to see its chances in the gamble on independence, this country would have had to apply the lesson which Dr. Schacht taught the world in the inter-war period. *Fas est et ab hoste discere*. Dr. Schacht's lesson, well-known to every company liquidator, is universally valid and, moreover, *morally neutral*. It is nothing but a statement of facts. It reads in one sentence: "If you borrow *very large sums*, you, the debtor, are stronger than your creditor." That lesson can be applied dishonestly, as it was by the Nazis to ruin their creditors. But it can also be applied honestly, to negotiate a debtor's return to better fortune and enable him gradually to pay his debts in full. . . .

If the Washington Agreements fail, which in plain terms would mean a default on the credit, the political repercussions are likely to be far more serious than rejection without default could possibly have entailed. That would mean getting the worst of both worlds.

The risks of a default are indeed far more real than the chances of even a limited success of the Washington Agreements. By no conceivable stretch of the imagination does it become clear how this country could, in the short space of five years expand its exports from a present volume (January 1946) of forty per cent. of the 1936—1938 average to 175 per cent. of that volume. An agreement whose success, in substance, rests on this assumption, is not even a gamble for ordinary stakes, it is playing *va banque*.

All the privations and the whole austerity régime which the Loan, according to its defenders, was supposed to spare the country, will now have to be suffered, and more. But in addition, the default on essential clauses of the Washington agreements is, by now, a fact. And a British government must *unnecessarily* go cap in hand to Washington and beg to be released from an undertaking which, because of its economic masochism, should never have been signed.

Does anybody really believe that Britain would have "funked" the issue had

the Government told the country what was involved? Was it not crazy to base policy on empty rhetoric about "unsordid acts"? Since when does a great nation conduct its affairs on the assumption of *Tout ira bien, Madame la Marquise*? Does not experience show that there are no unsordid acts in either politics or economics and that, in a general way, policy must prepare for the worst and plan for the best?

### III

In Britain's present misfortunes, one of the most heartening facts is the suspension of the convertibility provisions of the Loan Agreement (clauses 8 and 10,a) which have already been thrown overboard. This suspension marks the beginning of the end of the Loan Agreement in its original form. It is, indeed, an act unprovided for in the text, which in its clause 12 merely states that:

Either Government shall be entitled to approach the other for a re-consideration of any of the provisions of this agreement, if in its opinion the prevailing conditions of international exchange justify such re-consideration with a view to agreeing upon modifications for the presentation to their respective Legislatures.

The unilateral suspension that has taken place, is not an "approach for reconsideration".\* It is a *fait accompli* the irreversibility of which is not in doubt. It is a recognition of the fact that, in the words of the French legal saying, *l'impossible, nul n'est tenu*. And whatever Washington may say or do, the non-discrimination clause of the Loan Agreement (clause 9) is equally as dead as the convertibility clause. No country has ever starved its population in peacetime for the sake of maintaining a principle, in this case the principle of non-discrimination as misinterpreted by the U.S.

But criticism, like charity, had better begin at home. In that respect, the U.S. is less to blame for having pursued a policy which, on a short-term view at least, must have appeared advantageous, than are both Mr. Churchill's Coalition and Mr. Attlee's Labour Government. The incomprehension of the U.S. was born out of short-sightedness; the incomprehension of Britain was born out of blindness to her vital interests and her own position.

### IV

I have previously argued in these columns† that

People who are short-sighted enough to prefer a small turnover with high, but fleeting profits over a short period, to a large turnover with lower, but lasting profits, may gain in the short run, but they will lose their gains—and deserve to lose them—

\* I am aware that the Treasury has invoked clause 8 (ii) (b) to justify suspension of convertibility. But this clause provides that restrictions on convertibility may be maintained in exceptional cases, after consultation between the U.S.A. and the U.K. From Mr. Dalton's letter to Mr. Snyder, it is clear that the restrictions came first and the consultations afterwards.

† *Bretton Woods*, THE FORTNIGHTLY, October 1944.

several times over in the long run.

The moment approaches when the U.S. will, and not for the first time, make this experience. In continuing my argument, I wrote:

Yet, the rest of the world cannot recover in a free-for-all fight in which it is, on a world-wide scale, in the same helpless position as is unorganized labour in its relations with an employer who holds a *de facto* monopoly of resources and employment. If these influences prevail in the United States and confront the world with an economic *diktat*, they will bring about the constitution of a single debtor, as opposed to a single creditor, front. Nobody can view with indifference the prospect of a policy that from economic, would lead to political, antagonism. But America's evident incomprehension of the world's and incidentally, its own, economic problems may produce this result. And one can imagine the Marxist battle-cry: "Proletarians of all countries, unite" yet to be shortened to "Proletarian countries, unite."

This forecast, too seems to get nearer fulfilment, even if the debtor front, has, for the time being, still the shape of a bread queue at the Paris Conference. In conditions of famine, bread queues have been known to revolt.

## V

Despite Britain's present straits, her future is by no means hopeless. On the economic side, she has now recovered some measure of freedom. This process of recovery must be pursued and intensified, not because an "internationalist" policy is undesirable as such—the contrary is the case—but because it does not stand the slightest chance in the present-day world. *Si monumentum requiris, circumspice*. An internationalist policy is possible only when a certain degree of general prosperity prevails all over the world. But at the present time, such a policy is one of "give" for the debtor countries, of "take" for the creditor country. Recovery of economic independence must find its parallel in the political field. It is not Britain's task to pull America's chestnuts out of the fire. Do not trust Russia, by any means. But distrust America as much. For, in her conduct of great policy, one is worth a penny and the other two ha'pence. It is Britain's task to negotiate her "alliance potential" to her best advantage.

But it is also her task to maintain that potential, nay to increase it as much as possible. That means that Britain must learn again how to work—a thing the country, in its affluence, has not really done since the Victorian era, the war years excepted. There is no room for a five-day week among manual workers because there is no room for long week-ends, of the Friday-to-Tuesday golfing variety, among intellectual workers. *La semaine "anglaise"*—it is significant in itself that it should be so called in France—a *vécu*. If it has not, the country has. The case has been put, in terms which I could not attempt to better, by Mr. J. Middleton Murry in his article "The Moral Foundation of Democracy" (*THE FORTNIGHTLY*, September 1947). Not only brawn, but also brain must produce more. At present, they are fraternally united in fighting shy of work.

## SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES

BY H. C. DENT

IN August 1939 that distinguished body, the British Association for the Advancement of Science, assembled for its Annual Meeting in the Royal Burgh of Dundee. But its sessions had hardly begun before they were rudely interrupted by the strident clamour of war. Urgent summons that could not be denied decimated the ranks of speakers and audiences; it is recorded that at least one learned paper passed through four pairs of hands before its delivery could be concluded—to almost empty benches. As a result, the meeting quickly broke up, in "most admired disorder". It was not to re-assemble for eight years.

The war over, Dundee renewed its invitation. It was only fair that it should be accepted, that the first full gathering of the "B.A." since that hurried exodus should take place in the historic Scottish city which had witnessed it. So to Dundee the British Association came in August 1947. And, with a due sense of the fittingness of things, its Council had decided that, "to emphasize the positive contribution of science to human progress," the deliberations of the meeting should be focused on the theme of "Swords into Ploughshares."

It was, of course, clear that this could be no ordinary meeting. There was so much to be said, and—unhappily—so much of vital interest that could not be said. It is hardly an exaggeration to suggest that the Dundee meeting could not be other than unique. For though the British Association had had a previous experience of re-uniting after a world war, the circumstances in which it met in 1919 were fundamentally different from those in which it met in 1947. This year's President, Sir Henry Dale, put the point succinctly in his presidential address:

We are faced now by the contrast between the parts played by science in the two world wars. In that from which we recently emerged, science, no longer a mere accessory, has moved right into the centre of the picture. The belligerent use of science has undergone a rapid transformation, turning it into a weapon and a combatant in itself, released from afar for the indiscriminating infliction of death and destruction, at rapidly growing ranges and on an ever increasing scale.

That passage underlines—if such underlining be needed—the crucial importance of the theme chosen for discussion at Dundee. What science can do in the way of "death and destruction" we have all been made painfully aware. Can it put out a comparable effort on behalf of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"? If it be agreed that, of all bodies, the British Association



speaks for British science, and accepted that the choice of the theme "Swords into Ploughshares" implied a deliberate intention to attempt to answer that question, then the Dundee meeting of the Association could hardly be other than a landmark in world history—whatever answer might be given.

With that thought in mind, it is of more than ordinary interest to record that on the first day of the meeting Sir Henry Dale announced that whatever its scientific outcome might be, its numerical success was assured; and that on the day after it concluded he told a press conference that the meeting had been "a resounding success". Nor did he make the latter statement as an expression of personal opinion; he had behind him the full support of his cabinet, as witness the resolution passed by the General Committee of the Association that:

By common consent, the meeting in Dundee has been one of the happiest, most brilliant, and most fruitful of many within the recollection of those present.

That is what they thought of it at the centre. This article offers the observations—possibly presumptuous but certainly sincere—of one who occupied a privileged but peripheral position at Dundee, being at the meeting but not of it and consequently (I hope and believe) able to view it with detached and open mind.

Before examining the meeting itself, I feel that mention should be made of three incidental factors present which should be highly conducive to the success of any gathering. First, the weather was superb. Secondly, as the Scots themselves euphemistically put it, the food situation is undoubtedly "easier" north of the Border than south of it. Why this should be I do not know, for the rations are the same. Thirdly—and I mean this as the place of honour—Sir Henry Dale did not in the least exaggerate when he spoke of the "splendid act of generosity" of the Council and citizens of Dundee. From the Lord Provost to the caretakers of the buildings in which we met and the conductors of the trams and buses (on which we rode free), one and all laid themselves out to make our visit a happy one; and they succeeded. This applies equally to the hotel, hostel and boarding house keepers, and the private residents, "outwith" Dundee who so cheerfully and competently put us up—and put up with our haphazard comings and goings at all sorts of untimely hours. Perhaps a special word should be added here for St. Andrews, for it might almost be said that if the association met formally in Dundee it also met informally—into the early hours of the morning—in that exquisitely beautiful and supremely interesting university city.

And may I at this point, speaking as a member of that inquisitive and exacting fraternity "the press", pay a very warm tribute to the cheerful efficiency of those, both professionals and amateurs, who were detailed to attend to our needs? Sir Henry Dale was good enough to say that the meeting had been most accurately and fully reported, with "a notable absence of gaffes." Without the devoted helpfulness of the P.R.O. and P.O. departments (despite the

shortage of telephones) it would have been far more difficult for us to achieve so successfully what was in truth a sufficiently arduous assignment.

And now, the scene set, *à nos moutons*. Can the president's claim that the 1947 meeting of the British Association was "a resounding success" be substantiated? Not even "the very noble effort" of Dundee and the surrounding districts in contributing over 1,700 local members to a total gathering of 3,236 justifies the epithet. Numbers alone are no criterion of success; they may even militate against it.

Professor Eva Taylor opened her presidential address to the geography section by recalling "the question derisively asked by the educated public about the Fellows of the Royal Society in the early years of their incorporation. 'And what have they done? What have they done?'" It is not unfair to apply this test to the members of the British Association meeting at Dundee. But before doing so, a preliminary and not unimportant question may be dealt with: "Who are they?"

It has recently been suggested in more than one quarter, so several members from more than one section informed me, that the British Association is declining in authority, that fewer and fewer of the leading scientists attend it, and more and more of them prefer to present their more important papers to other bodies or in other places. Speaking as a lay member of the general public I should say that an association which commands the allegiance of such eminent figures (I cite almost at random) as Sir Henry Dale, Sir Henry Tizard (next year's president), Sir Richard Gregory, Sir Edward Appleton, Sir Lawrence Bragg, Sir Alexander Fleming, Sir Robert Watson-Watt, and Professors J. D. Bernal, J. D. Cockcroft, D. H. Robertson, and S. Zuckerman—the list could be made double or treble as long and yet omit many top rank scientists—is as yet in little danger of speaking with other than the voice of highest authority.

By way of preface to an attempt to answer the question: "What have they done?" I would like to recall the purposes for which the British Association was founded in 1831, and to record that in his presidential address Sir Henry Dale declared that the original definition could not be improved upon to-day.

To give a stronger impulse and a more systematic direction to scientific enquiry;  
to promote the intercourse of those who cultivate science in different parts of the British Empire with one another and with foreign philosophers;  
to obtain more general attention for the objects of Science and the removal of any disadvantages of a public kind which impede its progress.

To that definition should be added that:

no technical qualification, nor any form of nomination or proposal, is necessary for acceptance as a Member or Associate. Admission is open to all who are interested in Science and in its relation to the well-being of mankind, and who are prepared to pay a subscription.

The most cursory glance at the statement of aims and the conditions of membership shows how wrong is the unfortunately widespread impression that the proceedings of a B.A. meeting consist entirely of the reading of

abstruse and erudite papers intelligible only to the initiate. Such papers are delivered; there were some this year, though probably fewer than in a normal year (owing largely, of course, to the wartime preoccupation of scientists of all grades with urgent practical problems of applied science), but anyone who saw the absorbed attention with which undergraduates and even schoolchildren—the Dundee schools were closed for the week of the meeting—listened to some of the more popular lectures this year would laugh to scorn the suggestion that a B.A. meeting is an exclusively 'highbrow' affair. Public information and propaganda—in the best sense of the term—are essential functions of the B.A.

"To obtain more general attention for the objects of science." Thanks largely to the press, I should say that the Dundee meeting succeeded in implementing this aim beyond all expectations. Day after day *The Times*, *The Scotsman*, *The Glasgow Herald* and other papers devoted three full columns or more (and how much that means to-day only a newspaperman can know) to the proceedings of the B.A. As a result, admirable summaries of the papers delivered to, at most, a few hundred people must have been read by hundreds of thousands and studied with eager interest by many thousands. A rich feast it was, too; Professor Cockcroft on the peace-time applications of nuclear fission, Sir Alexander Fleming on penicillin and other anti-biotics, Sir Edward Appleton on the scientific consequences of practical developments in radio and electronics, Professor D. H. Robertson on economic planning, Sir Robert Watson-Watt and a brilliant team on operational research, the president and an equally brilliant team on the education of the man of science, Dr. Kirtley F. Mather, of Harvard University—as guest speaker for the American Association for the Advancement of Science—on petroleum to-day and tomorrow.

So one might go on for another page or so. But this is a critique, not a catalogue, and at this point a different note must be sounded. We are to-day, all of us, sufficiently seized with the *importance* of science, in our daily life, in national and international affairs alike. There is no need for the B.A. to emphasize that. What we would like to be reassured about is the *objectives* of science, and even more the *intentions* of the scientists. In other words, what had the B.A. to say about "a more systematic direction to scientific inquiry"? Unhappily, its answer was much less clear than could have been desired; or rather, it proffered two answers which were divergent if not actually conflicting.

In his presidential address Sir Henry Dale, after the not over comforting assertions that "it is certain that the scientific activities of peace never witnessed anything like the intimate collaboration of British and American physicists and engineers which finally played so important a part in giving full effect to the triumph of science in the service of war," and that it would have taken decades of research at the peacetime rate to achieve the progress

made in six years of war, went on to suggest that, having profited by this and other valuable lessons taught by war:

It may be of at least equal importance that we and the world should, with all rapidity and thoroughness, forget other lessons which ought to be discarded . . . I am concerned with the fact that the response to war's demands has led the majority of scientists of this country to devote nearly the whole of their thoughts and efforts, during six years or more, to practical problems presented to them for rapid solution.

Sir Henry's conclusion was:

Does anyone doubt that, to enable science now to render its best service to mankind, we need to take a long-range view and to give our first care to the extension of fundamental knowledge, unconstrained by aim at any practical objective?

Apparently, quite a number of not undistinguished people *did* doubt it; and had no hesitation in saying so. So much so that a correspondent to *The New Statesman* wrote on September 6 that:

This year's meeting at Dundee has revealed a division which may amount to schism between those who want scientific freedom without responsibility and those who insist that responsibility is the price of scientific freedom. It has been brought to a head by Professor Bernal's demand that the wartime scientists should be recalled to deal with the crisis by methods which were proven during the war. Sir Henry Dale . . . opposed this in his presidential address; he wanted scientists to get back to their labs and inveighed against the "constriction of science" and "totalitarian planning." He was answered by a formidable combination which included Sir Robert Watson-Watt, of radar fame, Professor Zuckerman, who as Tedder's scientific adviser was largely responsible for changing bombing strategy from "area bombing" to the precision targets which were decisive in the final stages of the war, and Bernal, who was the scientist behind Mountbatten in Combined Ops. At a public meeting on "Operational Research", Watson-Watt challenged "the Walled City of Ivory Towers" which shut out the cries of the world, and the advocates of planning detailed ways in which they could effectively help in the crisis.

Possibly the antagonism of these two schools of thought is not so absolute as might superficially appear, though as one who was present at both the presidential address and the operational research meeting I am compelled to admit that neither Sir Henry Dale nor Sir Robert Watson-Watt 'pulled his punches'. To the detached observer the immediate controversy—fundamental research or first-aid to the nation by applied research—seems both silly and unnecessary. Obviously, both are needed; and equally obviously there are some scientists particularly fitted to do the one, some to do the other. No doubt the committee to see what science can do to help the nation in the present crisis, which Professor Bernal persuaded the B.A. to set up, will quickly come to this conclusion.

But, as *The New Statesman* correspondent indicated, behind this topical (and easily settled) controversy lies the possibility of schism on quite fundamental matters. These all—to my mind—hinge upon the crucial question of the freedom of the scientist. Is this to be freedom without responsibility, or responsibility at the price of freedom? Many subsidiary questions emerge from this central one, of which two may be selected in illustration. If it is to be freedom without responsibility, what precautions may a democratic gov-

ernment legitimately take to prevent harmful exploitation of the results innocently achieved by scientists in the pursuit of pure knowledge? If, on the other hand, it is to be responsibility at the price of freedom, what are to be the limits of that responsibility; is it to be responsibility within the domain of science alone, or should it extend (as more than one address at Dundee tended to do) into the domain of politics?

The ultimate answers to these and cognate questions clearly lie in the realms of morality and ethics. Consequently, it was most fitting that the final meeting at Dundee should be concerned with the education of the man of science, and should be open to all the sections of the association. But alas! despite a platform of scintillating stars, the discussion did not get very far; for nobody could answer the question posed by the High Master of Manchester Grammar School: "What is education?" In his summing up Sir John Lennard-Jones made a gallant attempt, but could not get beyond a succession of "nots" and "may be's":

It is not simply the acquisition of knowledge, the filling of the mind with facts, or even familiarity with a particular culture . . . . It may be more the method by which knowledge was acquired, the habits of thought and concentration engendered by study or discipline of the mind produced by long and severe mental application. Or again it may be the cultivation of personal aptitudes and abilities to enable a man to live a useful and satisfying life.

Sir Lawrence Bragg fell back on the old (but only partly true) saying that education is what remains after what has been learned has been forgotten; and Sir Henry Dale declared that "education should provide not only a training adequate for the technical needs of the man of science in his profession, but should fit him also for his part as a good citizen and an acceptable member of a cultured community"—which is admirable (so far as it goes) if no one is troublesome enough to ask for definitions of "a good citizen" and "an acceptable member of a cultured community." But education should provide more than this. Middleton Murry put the point in a single sentence in his article in the September number of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*:

Obedience to the moral law is the condition of human freedom; and human freedom cannot rationally be conceived save as obedience to the moral law. Until that lesson is incorporated into the education of the scientist all else will be in vain.

Summing up, I would say that the Dundee meeting of the British Association offered an interesting and valuable survey of the progress of science during the war; indicated ways in which that progress is being turned to peaceful ends; pointed to lessons learned and dangers to be avoided; provided a useful opportunity for informal contacts between British and foreign scientists; aroused much local and considerable national interest in the achievements and possibilities of science; and, above all, brought out into the open fundamental problems which must be faced and solved if civilization is to survive. That last service alone amply justifies the meeting.

## THE FARMER'S EFFORT: CAN HE MAKE IT?

BY DOREEN WALLACE

WE are to produce a hundred million pounds' worth more food and feeding-stuffs from the land: this goal to be attained by 1952.

It sounds terrific: but let us look at some figures relating to the past few years. Taking a norm of 100 as our pre-war production of wheat, we reached in wartime a peak of 209; we are now asked to reach only 160. If we so greatly exceeded this figure in wartime, we can attain it now without over-strain. True, this year's wheat figure, compared to the norm, is only 119; the drop is partly accounted for by the reversion of marginal land to its former state, partly also by too hasty sowing down of reasonably good land to grass to save labour; there is to-day more grassland than can be fed down by the existing stock in a normal season.

The targets for oats, potatoes and sugar-beet are likewise lower than in the peak year of war. Only barley is higher. I take it that in aiming at a very large production of barley, the Government is thinking less of beer than of providing barley meal for a greatly increasing pig population.

The main arable crops, then, should offer no insuperable difficulty. We had no more labour during the war than we have now (though labour is still a problem, which I shall discuss in due course) and if we greatly overshot the present target then, we can surely reach it now.

When we come to stock, the picture is rather different. Milk, eggs and beef are to be greatly above the pre-war norm; mutton and pigs are not expected to reach the norm, but must show a great improvement upon present production. There was no wartime peak in these things, to give us guidance for the new effort, but instead a wartime zero: the only product which increased was milk, and this is to increase still more. As to the others, we are starting practically from wartime rock bottom. For instance, compared to the pre-war norm of 100, our this year's output of pigmeat is only thirty-two; we are to aim at ninety-two, assisted by the increased acreage of barley.

In beef production, we are to achieve a ten per cent increase over pre-war, assisted by whatever fodder crops we have room to grow at home and by a promised import of cattle-food. But we are not expected to bring our sheep population up to pre-war numbers; indeed the figure is twenty-three per cent. lower. I think the reasons for this are several. First, after last winter's disasters to hill flocks it would be pretty hopeless to expect a quick and large increase; secondly, Australia and New Zealand are glad to supply mutton and

wool *ad lib.*, and since they are 'sterling' countries, it is less needful to save money on these imports; and thirdly, in arable districts sheep and cows cannot be run on the same farm, if there is to be a satisfactory acreage left over for corn-growing, because of the large amount of winter feed they both require: and of the two, the cows are more greatly needed.

I have always held a brief for arable sheep; so do many other knowledgeable farmers. Sheep, besides producing mutton and wool, are dual-purpose land improvers when kept in folds on arable land. The root crops grown for their consumption are great cleaners, since they have to be hoed between the rows and between the plants: and when the sheep come to graze upon them *in situ*, they consolidate the surface and muck it without labour costs. I judge that the sheep target for 1952 is meant to encourage only hill and marginal flocks, and I am sorry, but I do see the point of it, in this time of stress.

The incentive to the farmer to increase his production of both crops and stock is a set of fixed prices designed to show him a profit, besides an acreage payment on some crops to induce him to embark on new things, and a larger grant for ploughing up. As far as one can judge at present, these payments are adequate. They cover the new increase in the workers' wage and leave something over for the farmer's pocket. This is wise, for unless or until we are collectivized *à la Russe*, profit is the only motive for enterprise: our labourers themselves demonstrate this, working far harder at piece-work than at day-work. But I cannot foretell just how long the proposed prices will prove adequate. If retail food prices go up, town wages will go up; consequently town workers' products, boots, clothes, processed foods, etc., will go up—and then the farm-worker's wages will go up again, and the farmer will temporarily be left without incentive to employ labour and increase production. This has happened a good many times both during and since the war, and I see no reason why it should not happen again. Adjustments in an upward direction are constantly being made: and the people who suffer are the fixed-income group, professional men and pensioners, who cannot demand higher wages.

It looks as though the farmer is sitting pretty for about ten years to come. When he needs further incentives, he will get them; for as long as this country is short of food and dollars, he is just about the most important person in it. But money is not all; he has other problems to face.

I think the problem of machinery has been over-stressed. There is more agricultural machinery in the country now than ever before. The Minister of Agriculture has said that some farm-machines are to be held back from export, for use at home. That is all to the good, provided they do not go to farmers who already have more than enough because they have chosen that method of disguising their profits. I know of one farm of 300 acres (admittedly it is run by a War Agricultural Committee, but that does not make the story any prettier) where there are seven tractors, of different types and sizes; I am

surprised that there isn't one to wheel the baby out in. Any machinery which is held back from export should be most carefully allocated. Some of the district machinery pools, even, from which the smaller farmers may hire such machines as they cannot economically buy, are overstocked.

What is needed in this department is the production of spare parts, so that existing machines can be kept in use. And we want many more of the lesser and commoner implements, such as ploughshares, hoes and forks. I am glad to see that fencing-wire is to be put on the farm-priority list, and I hope wire-netting will come under this head, for on light land the rabbit consumes far too much human food and cannot be exterminated by the much advertised gassing method.

Another kind of machinery which has not been mentioned, as far as I know, by any responsible person, but which should certainly be included among essential farm machines, is the motor-car, utility brake, van or truck. Some of these ought to be held back from export and earmarked for farmers. The present home allocation of new cars is ridiculous: it is upon the basis of pre-war usage, with the result that London and the great towns, well supplied with trains, Undergrounds, trams and buses, get nearly all the new cars, while the farmer "puts his name down" and waits two years or more, meanwhile paying through the nose for a series of second-hand wrecks because he has big distances to cover and must save time somehow.

Admitting, then, that there is probably plenty of farm machinery in the country if it were rightly distributed (while requiring some additions in the way of spare parts and means of transport) we next need somewhere to keep these things. The general condition of farm buildings is quite deplorable. This is a major problem, for it concerns not only the proper shelter for valuable machines, but also the housing of stock.

Before the war, the majority of landlords and owner-farmers were too poor to maintain buildings in good order. The only farm premises, broadly speaking, which have been kept consistently in good repair are cow-houses, because since the advent of the Milk Marketing Board, milk has been encouraged and is profitable; and some of these, even, would be rather a shock to milk drinkers. Throughout the war, there was no stock-keeping to speak of, so cattle-sheds were allowed to fall down and the walls of the yards to crumble, not through poverty, in wartime, but because materials and labour were hard to come by. Cart sheds, too, fell into disrepair, and all the farm gear lay out in the open, exposed to rain and sun, the ironwork rusting and the woodwork splitting. Only in rare instances do the numbers of farm machines, though mostly in working order, look like anything but scrap-iron. Building repairs seem to be rather out of favour nowadays, but unless men and materials are released for this purpose, there cannot be a great increase of cattle in arable districts, or pigs anywhere, and there must be a further deterioration of machinery.

In districts which are so ill-adapted to arable cultivation that they have

escaped the plough-up, cattle are grazed in the open, so the buildings question is less acute, but the cattle are usually sold when half grown, to be fattened elsewhere in yards. In those parts where formerly bullocks could be fully fattened on grass—the Midlands and the grazing west—arable land has usurped much of the grass, and must continue to do so because of the corn programme; so here, as well as in the old arable country to the east where stall-fed cattle are traditional, farm buildings must assume priority if the beef programme is to materialize. And pigs must have buildings to live in, wherever they are kept; the breeding sow must have a warm dry place in which to farrow, the store pig a reasonably sheltered yard in which to fatten. Unless the congeries of Ministers responsible for building will turn their attention to farm buildings, the small farmer, who embarked on the war years in a state of pitiful poverty, will be unable to take his part in the drive for meat production.

Judging from press comment by both farmers and journalists, the manpower problem is going to be the biggest worry in the carrying out of the new plan. Here, again, in my opinion, the fuss is too loud and too general. In some parts the shortage is acute, but not in all. The real difficulty is going to arise over the stock-keeping part of the programme, not the arable; that is to say the specialist workers, though fewer in number than the general labourers, are going to be far harder to find.

The Midlands, which used to be grass but are now arable, have the worst labour problem. Of old they have lacked farm cottages and little farming villages—they have not needed them. The countryside was grass, with good farmhouses, and the working population was industrial, concentrated in towns. At the start of the wartime plough-up, these districts were in desperate straits for implements and labour: six farms could not boast one plough between them, or any person who could use a plough. They received special attention in the shape of machinery distribution, and Women's Land Army and prisoner labour, and they will have to go on receiving it. It is here that the need for labour camps of Displaced Persons is greatest; here and in such parts of the one-time dairying West as have compulsorily turned to arable.

In the Eastern corn-growing lands, which were always "mixed arable" (corn and roots on the land, cattle and pigs in yards), labour shortage is at least in part the farmers' own fault. The recent availability of prisoner labour has demoralized many of them. At busy seasons such as chopping-out time for sugar-beet, harvest, and lifting time for potatoes and sugar-beet, they have simply telephoned the nearest P.O.W. camp for large gangs of men, and the work has been done quickly with no worry. Between-times these farmers have employed almost nobody. They have taken no pains to retain local labour or recruit local boys. They seem to have forgotten that long before there were any prisoners, they managed to be arable farmers. The increase of land under plough in these parts is not large, for there was never much

land unploughed. With the return of men from the army (and, contrary to some suppositions, they do come back to the farms) and the growing up of village boys, and the increase in labour-saving machinery, there should be no great shortage of field labour here, if the farmers will only pull themselves together and organize their farms as of old. The shortage will be felt in the case of specialized workers such as stockmen and pigmen. Little stock could be kept during the war, and anyway these jobs are not popular because of the Sunday work.

There is a perennial shortage of cowmen, for the same reason; that is nothing new, and will only be made a little worse by the new programme.

I am, then, optimistic about the labour supply for field work. We are promised D.P. workers, and our local lads will not disdain a basic wage of £4 10s., with house rent limited to 6s. On our own farm, we have done without prisoner labour for the past year, and can face our arable cultivations with confidence—provided that if our young men want to marry, there will be houses for them. This is the real crux of the general labour problem. Workers must have roofs, and their wives want water and light laid on. Let the authorities attend to this, and three parts of the arable difficulties will disappear.

There remains the special worker; he needs training. The field-worker does not; we have always taken boys fresh from school, and they have learnt by working with their elders. The skilled man, however, cannot pick up knowledge in this way. He may have done so in the past, but conditions have changed. In milk production, for instance, the old insanitary and un-economic methods will not do. Not only must a cowman know about hygiene, he must also be capable of recording the cows' performances and grading their feed accordingly. This is a bit different from hoeing a field of 'tannups'. Men who look after cattle and pigs must at least be capable of weighing and measuring the food and looking out for ailments. I do not stress the highly skilled job of shepherding, because, as I see it, the only sheep to receive Governmental blessing are the hill flocks, where the farmer himself is the arch-shepherd: but if any arable farmer wants to keep a flock, he is going to need a trained man. And there is another class of specialist greatly needed since the wartime increase in machinery—the farm mechanic.

Now, how are these skilled men to be found? The high wages may tempt them (for they get far more than the basic wage) and the deterrent of the seven-day week can and must be provided against by some system of relief workers; but what can provide the skill?

The training scheme for ex-service men has not brought forth the desired results, largely because it has been misunderstood. It is not meant to train master-farmers, but farm workers: yet a great number of those who go in for it are ex-officers who have ideas far beyond a wage of £4 10s. a week (with piece-work and overtime extra) as labourers, or £6 and upwards in

specialist jobs. The training given under the scheme is much more down-to-earth than that provided in an agricultural college or under a private premium-paying arrangement; it is, indeed, the ideal training for the wage-earner—and surely the wages in prospect are not to be despised! Yet few 'working-class' ex-soldiers go in for it, though many wish to work on the land. I suppose they do not realize that training is needed, especially for the better-paid posts.

I would like to see the scheme extended to cover others besides ex-service men. Ordinary land workers could be urged to go into it, to acquire the special skills which would earn them higher wages. It has been found difficult to place trainees, naturally enough. The number of farmers fitted to be trainers is limited, and private accommodation for trainees is even more so. Could there not be a hostel in each market town, from which the trainees could bicycle out to their work? Alternatively but more expensively, a great increase in Farm Institutes is called for. But none of this is much use unless potential land workers, and existing lower-grade land workers, are convinced of the advantages of training. Propaganda, thus far, has been rather 'high-brow'. Few people read official pamphlets; farm workers are not among the few.

I am not very optimistic, then, about labour for the stock-keeping and milk side of the new programme. I think we shall attract the numbers, because of the very good wages (if we resolutely establish pools of relief workers to provide for reasonable days off) but I have doubts of the quality. Young countrymen have not had the chance to learn the work from their fathers, since much of the work was simply abandoned during the war, and if they will not submit to training, they are going to be nothing but a nuisance to their employers.

Still, the difficulties are not insurmountable, given a good line of propaganda. And it must be remembered that every year machines become more efficient, so that output per man is improved.

And now, supposing that we manage to get a sufficiency of workers, both skilled and unskilled, has the last word been said? Prices satisfactory, cottages and farm-buildings attended to, manpower enough: what more is required, to reach the appointed goal in 1952?

Work. I hate to have to say this, but the absentee habit is beginning to percolate through to the agricultural community. The reason is plain enough; there is more money in the pocket than can be spent on food, clothes, or household goods while these are so scarce, so it is spent on unauthorized holidays. Farming is not yet nearly so great an offender in this way as other industries, but the germ is there. And it is most evident at the top; I often wonder whether in other industries too it does not begin at the top. If the master, director or manager is known to take days off at the seaside and weeks off abroad, or to absent himself continually on flimsy excuses, it is small

wonder that the workers follow suit.

Then again, agriculture has always been particularly prone to go-slow tactics; the contrast in pace between day-work and piece-work is almost ludicrous to the outside observer. This does not begin at the top—it is a piece of simple cunning evolved, perhaps subconsciously, by simple minds. It is exasperating to the employer, since there are many farm operations which cannot be treated as piece-work, but he cannot do much about it, for the worker does not see the point of working harder in order to put money into the master's pocket. He does not see the point of working overtime to put money in the Government's pocket either; if overtime were exempted from income-tax, there would be an improvement in output. I imagine that the farm worker is not much different from other workers in having an outlook limited to his own point of view; people who not so long ago were living near the poverty line may perhaps be forgiven for not being remarkably patriotic and for being unable to understand high finance. Those who might have taught them, their Union leaders, have only very lately begun to mention the word 'work'. The outlook for food production might have been brighter if these people had been in the habit of combining their agitation for higher wages with some suggestion that the wages ought to be conscientiously earned. *Conscience* is perhaps the biggest need of all, in all sections of the farming industry, if the Four Year Plan is to succeed.



## PUBLIC RELATIONS

BY NEWSMAN

THE historian of public relations, when he is appointed, will doubtless find the origins of "P.R." a suitable subject for a thesis. That the idea came from the United States is an undoubted fact. If it had not been, it would have been necessary to invent it. Preliminary research has suggested that the term was first used by John D. Rockefeller, who, having got himself a bad name for his severity in putting down strikes, employed a man named Ivy Lee to get him a better one. Other industrialists followed suit in America, not always for the same sort of reason, but because they were attracted by a form of publicity which, as an earlier student of the topic has said: "avoids the limitations of advertising on the one hand and the blatancy of direct propaganda on the other." In Britain the Post Office and the Empire Marketing Board, followed more gingerly by other less commercially-minded departments of Government, and by public utilities, adopted the notion. Meanwhile, in America, a divine afflatus had animated the profession, and public relations officers had become public relations "counsel", headed by "chief counsellors" whose oracular and increasingly expensive advice was sought by all and sundry.

Over here, big industrial concerns were likewise beginning to seek men of talent who would "express the firm's personality" and when the war came, public relations received a great fillip. The special effort of co-operation between people and government, the concentration of many national activities in State hands, the need to commend and to explain a great many complicated and hampering orders and regulations, all called for increases in the numbers of P.R.O.'s and for advances in their techniques. For the first time in Britain the recruits to public relations included many men and women already well-trained in journalism, advertising, publicity and display. Thanks principally, but not entirely, to their experience and skill, governmental public relations from about 1942 to the end of the war were successful in creating a climate of public opinion in which acceptance of restriction and shortage was cheerful and complete, and knowledge of the national effort in all its phases widely spread and appreciated. One thinks of J. H. Brebner in the News Room at the Ministry of Information, of J. L. Henderson at the Ministry of Supply, of the Crown Film Unit's magnificent documentaries, of Mischa Black's exhibitions and St. George Saunders's pamphlets. Unfortunately most of these people had jobs to go back to when peace came. Now, in the throes of a

crisis of equal magnitude, the Government and its satellite organizations have largely to rely on the services of political propagandists, rigid civil servants, or well-meaning bunglers with a pathetic belief in the "mystique" of "P.R.", while the publicists who by their very success from 1942-1945 had proved that no such thing exists, are for the most part employed by industry and commerce, with whom the Government is continually at loggerheads.

Let us examine more closely this "mystique" of public relations. It makes, to begin with, a determined effort to dissociate itself from that vulgar thing, publicity. Publicity is for the masses, the common herd. "P.R." on the other hand, addresses itself to the educated minority who are presumed to form opinion and direct it. The P.R.O. of a gigantic industrial combine actually went so far at a conference of his fellows this summer as to declare: "X is such a complicated organization that it is almost impossible to simplify a message sufficiently to be understood by the 'man in the street', and yet not to oversimplify it so that it makes no sense." This is a counsel of despair. Most P.R.O.'s are more sanguine. They believe that by appearing to take the public into their confidence, they can make the ways of their department or firm seem reasonable and its actions public-spirited.

It is possible to employ any one or all of a number of methods. Charm in private correspondence is one. A light, deprecatory touch in the "Letters to the Editor" column is another. To appear on the leader page of *The Times* wins a first prize. A veteran P.R.O. once wrote a note of congratulation to a newcomer who had broken into this citadel for the first time. "Now", he said, "you have won your spurs!" Accessibility to interviewers is another important method. Of course, they seldom stay long, or come away with anything. But it is the principle—of admission to the presence—that matters. Public-speaking is another asset. Applicants for posts may even be called upon for a gay little impromptu by the appointments' board. Service on public committees is considered a good way of demonstrating the firm's public spirit. Then there are books and magazines to be published, films produced and exhibitions held. These can, if the P.R.O. has the measure of his employers, bear little or no relation to the firm's activities or products. Describing a magazine published by his firm, a senior P.R.O. speaks of the editorial board of "professors from Oxford, Cambridge and London Universities and the Astronomer Royal, about as authoritative a team as you could get together; all these men are zealous to see that nothing which could by any stretch of imagination be called an advertisement for X gets past them." What a delightful picture that conjures up of sub-editing in academic circles! Why, then, does X print the magazine? Because "the fact that they agree to serve is evidence that they are impressed with what X is doing and consequently will be able to relay their impressions to others." Truly, it may be said of your well-equipped public relations officer that he can put an ethical gloss on a sales campaign, and that through thick and thin he will

promote Matthew Arnold's gospel of "sweetness and light". It might also be said, unkindly, that he displays all the contortions of the sibyl, without the inspiration.

Because, on the whole, public relations are not being tackled in the right way it does not mean that there is no need for them in a democratic society seeking a compromise between the unplanned and the totally planned. Our society is becoming increasingly technological and scientific and there is need for information and publicity services, both in Government, whether central or local, and in industry. The latter may too easily seem remote even from the people whom it employs, and even more easily still from the community at large. The projection of our industries, whether nationalized or not, in simple, readily understandable terms, its dramatization through graph and picture and story are not merely worth while, they are essential if the national economy is not to founder on apathy. Tom Harrisson of *Mass-Observation* recently pointed out that many of the words in the popular version of the White Paper on the economic situation were unintelligible to the bulk of the population at which Mr. Attlee said it was aimed. And so half the population has started again its study of the back-page mathematicians and its filling in of the pools, while at the next county council elections, many will be returned by under ten per cent. of the electors. The "informed tenth" is not enough. Nor is it enough to be "vocal to the wise" for, as Pindar went on, 2,500 years ago, "the crowd, they need interpreters."

If White Papers are not enough, neither is Hansard. Exhibitions and pamphlets and films may do a good publicity job for industry, but government, touching the lives of the people at more points almost every day, government, with its vast, complex machinery and enormous increase of power, must rely, for its explanations, to a great extent on the press. In principle, and in practice, there has been, in the last two generations, considerable progress, which accelerated during the last ten years to an astonishing degree, in the relations of press and government. J. A. Spender, speaking to the Imperial Press Conference in 1939, said:

When I first came on the scene, those relations were irregular and capricious, and both sides pretended that they did not exist. How much of a pretence that was may be seen from the numerous memoirs in which Victorian statesmen are revealed in intimate touch with editors and journalists and endeavouring to use newspapers, sometimes for their private and sometimes for public purposes. The rigid virtue which is sometimes attributed to the statesmen of former times is mostly a myth. It has always been highly improbable that members of a Government would keep their hands off their principal means of communicating with the public and influencing opinion. They never have, but there has generally been a flavour of the illicit in their relations with newspapers. In spite of the much better and fuller information now given out by the departments this state persists, and leads to a reserve on both sides which might, I think, be broken down with advantage to both in these times.

A great deal of that reserve was broken down by the war, but despite the fortnightly press conference on economic affairs now taken by Mr. Morrison

and the weekly one on food by Mr. Strachey, relations between the Government and the press have not been so hostile for many years. And that is not only because a Socialist Government is in power and most of the newspapers are capitalist-owned.

It is only fair to the press to state that it has been antagonized not by the existence of official sources of information and news, but by the attempt to erect "public relations" into a system, and by the methods, which have been described above, employed by too many P.R.O's. Some editors feel that by whatever name they are called, these practitioners in public relations are equally offensive, and constitute a dangerous restraint on newspaper enterprise. They see the newspapers exploited for personal or political prestige; they see official errors glossed over, official incompetence shielded. They would prefer to go back to the old days of independent access and inquiry. Other editors, less antagonistic, object nevertheless to the spoonfeeding of reporters and the standardization of "hand-outs". There is something to be said on the other side. The average reporter is still not a fully educated man. He may be sent to cover a highly specialized subject of which he is entirely ignorant or which he is incapable of assimilating at all intelligently. Hence the growth of specialist groups, of industrial and agricultural correspondents, for instance, who were welcome to the ministries because they grew increasingly knowledgeable, and could be given confidential background information enabling them to write with authority. Recently, however, editors have awakened to the danger that a group loyalty may supersede loyalty to the paper and exclusive information become almost unobtainable. Since the Empire Press Union at its conference in London last year passed a motion strongly disapproving of the group system, it has declined in importance.

Apart from ignorant reporters, there are ignorant inquiries, to which even an expert correspondent may be condemned by his news-editor in pursuit of a 'light' or a 'human' story. The demand for such stories does not seem to diminish with smaller papers. Often the disorganization of other work involved in answering such inquiries is altogether out of proportion to their value, and the information officer may be justifiably excused an almost permanent sense of exasperation at the triviality of news standards.

It may be of interest to those who are not in regular communication with them to be given some impression of the more important or characteristic of these agencies of information as they exist to-day, of their virtues and shortcomings. The biggest disappointment in the Government field has been at the top where the warmly greeted appointment of Francis Williams two years ago to be Public Relations Adviser to the Prime Minister has proved to be no protection against steadily deteriorating relations between the Cabinet and the newspapers. Here was a man, it seemed, who had all the necessary qualifications. He had been a journalist, and a very distinguished one. He had been in the Ministry of Information and had done much to humanize it. He was

wit, thinker, and honest man. It is generally believed that he has been the victim of contending forces within the Cabinet itself and that on a number of important occasions his advice has been totally neglected. It was no great surprise when an announcement appeared in August that he would shortly be returning to literary life. The Government now pins its faith to S. C. Leslie, an Australian whom Morrison has been grooming for stardom. They were together during the war at the Ministry of Home Security. Since then Leslie has been with the Council of Industrial Design. Now he is one of Plowden's planners. Whether he will be able to design and produce for public consumption a blueprint of the economic future as neatly as he did the "Britain Can Make It Exhibition" remains to be seen. He is not gifted with the common touch, but should be incapable of such social and artistic solecisms as the John Bull with the Union Jack waistcoat who still adjures us from the hoardings that we must work or want.

It is to be hoped that he or somebody else will be able to co-ordinate Government information before the system is brought into contempt by any more blunders. The most spectacular of these, last year, involved one of the most popular and markedly successful of Government Public Relations men, Shelton Smith of the Ministry of Food. Believing ration cuts to be imminent, he organized a press conference, with full authority from his immediate superiors, to prepare the public for the return of Sir Ben Smith from America with the bad news. The whole story was subsequently denied by No. 10, and apologized for in the House by the Minister. A short while afterwards, it all came true. Nobody apologized to Shelton Smith. He is another Australian, volatile, energetic, an ex-journalist. His Ministry makes headlines every day, and Shelton Smith, unlike some of his colleagues who believe that happy is the Ministry which has no history, enjoys seeing it there.

At the Foreign Office publicity functions are divided between Ridsdale and Kirkpatrick. In charge of the News Division, his openhanded methods, at any rate with diplomatic correspondents, and understanding of press conditions have earned Ridsdale the respect not only of British newspapermen but of foreign correspondents also. Kirkpatrick, late of the European Division of the B.B.C., a professional diplomat of the old school, has not yet succeeded in imposing any real unity on an untidy foreign publicity machine which now includes the British Council as well as press and broadcasting attachés in most countries. The Council are usually the better housed abroad, and their officers have a more coherent idea of what they are supposed to be doing, but the senior appointments are still too often made from the regular navy and army, neither of which is the ideal training ground for acquiring cultural values or for making the acquaintance of the press.

It is a melancholy sight to observe the fighting services, having made a thoroughly good job of their public relations during the war, slipping back into their shells. Journalists, who were colleagues when they were war cor-

respondents, have now become outsiders again, to be treated courteously but distantly. Press officers once more count it one of their chief tasks to avoid giving information when asked for it. Even the Air Ministry, which appeared to have the best chance of surviving as a human institution in peacetime, is afflicted by this "reference to higher level" complex. Perhaps the C.I.G.S., who has his own ideas about publicity, will save the situation at the War Office. It is an Alice in Wonderland situation when news about the forces is harder to get because there is no war on and no security regulations to speak of.

Another and more surprising inadequacy in Government public relations is in the Commonwealth and Colonial Offices, where in spite of information office staffs which look good on paper, no consistent planning which would bring 'the red on the map' to life is discernible. Whitehall seems to have abandoned the projection of the Commonwealth to High Commissioners. Colonial publicity is hand to mouth in conception and hangdog in execution. True, it is hard to make the Empire 'news', as Lady Kemsley has found, but because the press is allergic it does not discharge the appropriate publicity men from the duty of telling, in other ways and through other media the still magnificent story of the prototype of a world community. A ha'porth of the enterprise and gaiety of the old Empire Marketing Board would be welcome to-day. Think of the vivid posters, the well-printed pamphlets, the exciting films! And where is Stephen Tallents, the man behind it all, to-day? In retirement, growing willows for cricket bats and cultivating his herb garden. If we cannot find new publicity men let us at least seek out the old. Cincinnatus may still come out of Kent.

Some good men of the younger generation have stayed in Government Public Relations or have drifted into it, Williams-Thompson of Supply, Matthew Crosse of National Insurance, and a newcomer, Alford of Civil Aviation. But for the most part neither the financial inducements nor the status of the job can compete with those of industry. If the publication of *Coal*, as unwanted and inept a journal as ever left the presses, is to be characteristic of the publicity of the new Government Corporations, there is a long trail of new disappointments ahead. "Corporations have no souls," said Coke, the lawyer, in the sixteenth century. Nor any sense, it seems. The Coal Board in its infancy sent round a junior official to the corporations already in existence, such as B.O.A.C., asking for tips on how to set up a public relations department. Doubtless B.O.A.C. were able to provide an imposing list of advisers and controllers and officers. Newspapermen nowadays may easily find themselves entering the wrong stratum in the hierarchy. It is all very impressive, on paper, but these large staffs and large budgets still seem to some old hands to produce so much less than a man named Brenard, nicknamed the 'Baron', who worked almost singlehanded for Imperial Airways before the amalgamation. The Post Office, too, which used to have such a good record with the press, misses its Brebner, now with London Transport. The efficiency of London Transport

publicity, Frank Pick's baby, still matches the efficiency of London Transport services, which are incomparably better than those of any other capital city.

The remainder of the field is too vast to be considered in detail but it is noteworthy that film correspondents are complaining that the P.R. set-up of the Rank organization, with its butler and its thick pile carpets, is now as hamstrung by red tape as the worst Government department, that the B.B.C., which used to have a public relations division, now has a publicity department with a narrower scope, that the political parties are served much as one would expect them to be, Labour solidly but without inspiration, Liberal gallantly but with little money, Conservative ebulliently but unevenly. The personality of the bunch is a genial Irishman, O'Brien, of the Conservative Central Office, but it was the Labour Government who put a baton in every P.R.O's knapsack when the publicity secretary of the Labour Party became a baron.

The increasing tendency of municipalities to appoint P.R.O's is one which on the face of it would seem admirable, for the lack of interest displayed in local government is already anti-social in its extent. But when some towns declare that they are planning their own publications on the ground that there is no space in the press for council matters, there is a clear threat to the local newspapers, which will naturally resist any usurpation of their function. In short, it seems inevitable that the improvement of public relations services will increase the pressures to which editors are exposed. The newspaperman says to the P.R.O. this: "By all means provide us with basic information. Give us easy access to your colleagues. Satisfy our legitimate curiosity. We can help you to prevent a "They" and "We" concept growing up about your organization in the mind of the public. You can help us in our job of making the world of the present day intelligible to the people. But, please, we want no special pleading, no glorification of individuals, and we do not want to be told that all your geese are swans."

## NATURAL JUSTICE AND UNNATURAL PROCEDURE

BY NORMAN BENTWICH

THE Royal Prerogative to hear an appeal from any court within the British orbit is one of the foundations of British justice. The appeal lies from a judgment, order or decree given by a British tribunal outside the United Kingdom to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which advises the King as the fountain of justice for all his subjects. It lies in criminal as well as in civil cases. But the right is subject in criminal matters to certain restrictions that were declared eighty years ago in a leading case which came from New South Wales. There it was said: "It seems undeniable that in all cases, criminal as well as civil, arising in places from which appeals lie, it is the inherent prerogative and, on all proper occasions, the duty of the Queen in Council to exercise an appellate jurisdiction with a view not only to ensure, as far as may be, the due administration of justice in the individual case, but also to preserve the due course of procedure generally. The interest of the Crown is at least as great in this respect in criminal as in civil cases; but the exercise of the Prerogative is to be regulated by a consideration of circumstances and consequences. The interference by Her Majesty in Council in criminal cases is likely in so many instances to lead to mischief and inconvenience that in these cases the Crown would be very slow to entertain an application by its officers on behalf of itself or by individuals. The instances of such appeals being entertained are so far rare. When, however, suggestions, if true, raise questions of great and general importance, and also when, if true, they show the due and orderly administration of the law interrupted or diverted into a new course, and also when there is no other means of preventing this consequence, it would be proper for the Crown to entertain an appeal if referred to it for its decision."

In a criminal case, then, the appeal to the Privy Council can only be brought after a petition for leave has been heard and granted. The principles on which the Judicial Committee grant leave were laid down thirty years after the declaration quoted above: "They must be satisfied that there is some clear departure from the requirements of justice, and it is shown that, by a disregard of the forms of legal process, or by some violation of the principles of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done." A year ago the Judicial Committee took the opportunity, in dismissing applications for leave to appeal from judgments of an Indian High Court, to re-state those principles with some amplification: "The Judicial Committee was not a revis-

ing court of criminal appeal. It was not prepared to re-try a criminal case, and did not concern itself with the weight of evidence or the conflict of evidence, or with inferences drawn from evidence . . . . Neither was it concerned to review the exercise by the previous tribunal of its discretion as to permitting cross-examination of a hostile witness or in awarding punishments. They could not be asked to review the facts of a criminal case or set aside conclusions of fact at which the Tribunal had arrived. The Committee would only interfere where there had been an infringement of the essential principles of justice."

Two recent examples will illustrate their action—where a death sentence was passed in the Somaliland Protectorate, and the accused was deprived of the chance of having an advocate to prepare and conduct the appeal in the Court of Appeal, because the Court refused to adjourn so as to give time to Counsel to arrive, the Committee ordered the appeal to be restored for hearing. When an African had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but the court in the colony failed to put to the jury the question whether there was sufficient provocation to reduce the murder charge to manslaughter, the Committee held that the failure constituted a failure of justice, and the appeal was granted.

This year the exercise of the Royal Prerogative in criminal cases has been called into question because of the extraordinary use of the right of appeal in two parts of the Empire, the Gold Coast of Africa and Palestine. In both cases persons were sentenced to death; and the issue was whether the Prerogative should be exercised to commute the sentence. In both cases a section of public opinion was deeply stirred; but while in Africa it was stirred against the commutation, in Palestine it was frantically anxious that the death sentence should not be executed. The Secretary of State for the Colonies was attacked in Parliament in both cases: but for opposite reasons. He was charged with weakness because he would not order the Governor of the Gold Coast to commute the death sentence. He was charged with giving way to threats in Palestine, because he allowed the execution of a terrorist to be postponed pending the application to the Privy Council.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is not directly concerned with the exercise of the Prerogative of Mercy. That is expressly delegated to the governor or High Commissioner of each colony, protectorate or mandated territory by the constitution. And the manner of exercise of the Prerogative is expressly laid down in the royal instructions to the governor, which require him to consult his executive council, but at the same time to act on his own judgment even if that does not agree with the advice of his council. A residuary power of pardon remains with His Majesty after the governor has made his decision; and in the exercise of that ultimate right, the Colonial Secretary is the adviser of the King, just as the Home Secretary is the adviser in the exercise of the power of pardon for cases arising in the United Kingdom.

A long tradition has established that the advice to use the Royal Grace is given only where there appears to have been a miscarriage of justice. For the application of that advice the minister is responsible to Parliament. But the colonial governor's exercise of his delegated prerogative is not a matter which can be discussed in Parliament. That appears to be the constitutional position.

In order to understand the excitement and emotion aroused over the two recent cases, and the novel problems which they provoked, it is necessary to summarize the main facts. Eight men, two of them sons of a ruling chief, were tried in 1944 by a judge and African jury in the Gold Coast, for the ritual murder of another chief, and sentenced to death. An appeal to the West African Court of Appeal was dismissed; and then application was made to the Privy Council. In the Palestine case the condemned man was tried by a military court under emergency regulations, convicted of participation in a terrorist attack on a police post, and sentenced to death. He refused to plead, but mention was made in the judgment of his good war service in the British Forces. There was no appeal to a higher court; and the General Officer Commanding, who by the same emergency regulations was vested with the power of confirmation or commutation, normally exercised by the High Commissioner, confirmed the sentence.

What was novel was the ingenious use of ancient writs, designed to protect the subject against oppressive action by the executive, so as to gain time and avoid a sentence passed in one instance by the civil court, in the other by the military court. In the African case an application to the Judicial Committee for leave to appeal was dragged out for half a year. The application was refused, because the Committee found that there had been no violation of natural justice in the conduct of the case. Acting on the principle that, while there is delay there is hope, the lawyers for the condemned men then appealed to the court of the colony for a writ of *Certiorari* questioning the jurisdiction. The application was immediately rejected by the Supreme Court of the colony; but their judgment gave the opportunity to turn again to the Privy Council with a fresh application for leave to appeal. The result, as was to be expected, was again abortive. But another effort was made with another prerogative writ, of error, which requires the consent, or *Fiat*, of the Attorney General. The writ was abolished in England in 1907, when the Court of Criminal Appeal was instituted; but was still available under the Common Law in certain colonies. When the Colonial Attorney General refused his consent, yet another writ was brought into service. Application was made for an order of *Mandamus* to require him to give his authority. On refusal of that application, a third petition was brought to the Privy Council, and dismissed.

By this time nearly two years had passed since the original trial. Failure did not damp the ardour of the lawyers for the prisoners. Their next move

was extra-legal and parliamentary. The Governor of the colony was informed that a memorial of British Members of Parliament would be presented to His Majesty for the exercise by him of the residual Prerogative of Pardon. In view of that intimation the Governor felt bound to grant a respite of the death sentence. After more delay the memorial was presented, and according to the constitutional convention, the Secretary of State for the Colonies was called on to advise. He saw no reason for interference by His Majesty with the Governor's discretion; and once again the execution, thrice postponed, was fixed. The rejection of the memorial did not silence the Members of Parliament. Question was raised in the House, and the adjournment moved, in order, if possible, to force revision of the sentence by the Governor himself. That was the occasion of the attack on the Colonial Secretary who, to meet the storm, addressed a request to the Governor for reconsideration. The Governor adhered to his previous decision.

Once more, on the very day when the postponed sentence was to be carried out, application was made in the Court of Accra for a writ of Habeas Corpus. The order to show cause was discharged immediately by the judge, and without more ado three of the condemned men were hanged. The lawyer, however, had time to give notice of the intention to lodge another petition for leave to appeal from this order to the King in Council. Faced with the notice, the Governor once more suspended execution of the sentence of the survivors; and after further questions in Parliament, announced that he had decided to commute the penalty to life imprisonment. He did so reluctantly and against the advice of his Executive Council which included African members. Public opinion in the colony favoured the law taking its course to the appointed end, and resented the effort to avert it by deliberate tactics of delay. But the motive of sparing the convicted men the agony of twice awaiting the gallows prevailed.

The condemned man in Palestine would not appeal because he repudiated the jurisdiction of the British court. Members of his family from America, however, were moved by the Jewish community to intervene and to apply for a writ of prohibition, first to the Palestine court, and when it was rejected there, to the Privy Council. The Judicial Committee dismissed the petition on the preliminary point that the petitioner had no standing, because he could not be said to be personally affected by the rejection. Before further steps could be taken, the condemned man, and five other Jews who had been convicted by the military court, were hanged.

The gravity of the two cases is not restricted to local repercussions. It concerns the broad administration of criminal justice in the colonies and overseas dependencies, at least so far as capital sentences are concerned. In the light of these precedents it would seem possible, if no change is made in the law and practice, to secure by deliberate measures so protracted a delay between condemnation and final decision that it would offend the sense of humanity

to let the law take its course. It would mean, indeed, one law for the rich, and another law for the poor man convicted of murder in a colony, since the recourse to the Privy Council must involve considerable costs.

It is probable that the Privy Council in future will be called on to give its principal attention to civil and criminal appeals from the colonies. The Dominion of Canada looks like following the example of Eire in abolishing altogether appeals to His Majesty in Council. It has already done so with regard to criminal appeals; and a bill was introduced during the war into the Dominion Parliament to make the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada exclusive and ultimate. The Privy Council themselves have held that, in view of the Statute of Westminster, the Canadian Parliament has authority, if it wishes, to enact the bill. The independent dominions of India and Pakistan, too, may at any time introduce legislation to reduce, if not to rescind altogether, the right of appeal to the King Emperor in Council. And for many years Indian appeals have formed far the larger part of the work of the Judicial Committee. The Australian Commonwealth and the South-African Union have already legislated to reduce appeals. The main function then of the Council in its judicial capacity may be more and more to assure even justice to the sixty million subjects of the British Crown outside the Dominions, who belong to all races and creeds. But if it is to be the guardian of natural justice between man and man, it must not be the butt of unnatural procedure. Lord Simon, writing with the authority of an ex-Lord Chancellor, has suggested that, in order to prevent repetition of the misspent ingenuity of legal advisers for condemned men, it should be laid down that a petition for leave to appeal must contain all the grounds relied on, so that, if it is dismissed, the law will promptly take its course. The Colonial Secretary, too, made a statement in Parliament, pointing out that the responsibility for postponing a death sentence lay entirely with the governor. An application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council was not a barrier against carrying out the sentence; and if the governor came to the conclusion that it was without real foundation, he should not allow the fact that the application was pending to affect his judgment in ordering execution.

The value of the Supreme tribunal in the Empire, manned by the highest judicial authorities, in maintaining standards of justice, particularly in criminal matters, cannot be over-estimated. That service, however, may be impaired if, after the Judicial Committee has considered a petition, and declined it because no case of miscarriage was made out, it can be repeatedly approached in the same cause by applications to appeal against orders of the colonial courts discharging exceptional writs. The principle of *Res Judicata* may be applied to secure finality in confirming a conviction as well as in not disturbing an acquittal. The residue of the Royal Prerogative, which gives an ultimate opportunity to extend the grace of pardon, is a sufficient guarantee that, if judicial error is discovered after the legal provision has been exhausted, the King's mercy will correct it.



## CHINA BETWEEN ZEAL AND BIGOTRY

BY TONY GIBSON

IT is easy to dismiss the Chinese student as someone like his opposite number in Europe or America, rather fond of political agitation and prone to large and noisy demonstrations in which flags are waved and slogans shouted, with little result. Alternatively, one may think of him as a poor, shabby devotee of learning who plies his brush by a lamp of peanut oil and wears out his eyes in the night hours. Both pictures are, in part at least, true. But there is another factor in China which brings the student movement into the limelight and makes what elsewhere would be the transient excitements of hot headed youth a major factor in the destiny of the nation.

China has always venerated her teachers and made the pursuit of learning a vocation worthy of the respect of even the highest official. The educated class has formed so tiny yet so essential a part of the vast population that the group has possessed, potentially at least, a power out of all proportion to its size. Until recently student activity was unco-ordinated and when the Government were from time to time criticized by the student groups, it was possible to repress this criticism on the spot without danger of the contagion spreading. But in the last six months there has been a significant change. Living through the tragedy of the war with Japan into the tragedy of the present Chinese Civil War has brought to Chinese students a new stature, a new sense of self-control and of citizenship. Their poverty has always had latent in it a sense of community with the under-privileged of the nation. Their student vocation rests upon a common schooling, and a common cultural inheritance. The old classical tradition has always insisted upon the virtues of moderation and compromise. These are now bearing fruit in a national student movement which has taken its stand in opposition to the Civil War and, in spite of the intrigues of *agents provocateurs*, has resolutely refused to be identified with either of the contending parties in that war. The movement began with agitation for the betterment of student conditions, which were adversely affected by the war and the inflation which it has brought. But these grievances have been the occasions, not the underlying motives, of protest. It is apparent that it is a sense of community, and of nationhood, which are actuating the students. It is this which, for the first time for more than two decades, has made them a power which the Government cannot afford to disregard.

During April and May demonstrations many thousands strong were held

by students in most of the university cities. These culminated on May 18 in a huge movement of student protest all over China. The demonstrators demanded that the Government which had called the People's Political Council to meet on May 20 should initiate peace negotiations with the communists. Two or three of the more independent newspapers dared to support and publicize these demonstrations. The Government vacillated between attempts to repress the students. They offered to release the ring-leaders who had been arrested and in some cases already sentenced, if the students would stop their agitation. But it was too late to buy silence. On May 20, nineteen members of the Kuomintang dared to table a resolution in favour of peace negotiations, and they succeeded in carrying the People's Political Council with them.

Since that date the Government, recognizing the challenge which this unorganized coalition of moderates and liberals already constitutes, have evidently decided to smash opposition while there is still time. Publication of the independent newspapers has been suspended; journalists have been arrested; universities have been surrounded by troops and barbed-wire barricades, and plain clothes police and members of the Government's semi-fascist youth organization have attempted to intimidate opposition by beatings up and by secret arrests. But the opposition continues. The entire faculty staff of the famous Yen Ching University in Peiping have signed a manifesto in favour of peace and condemning the Government attacks on civil liberties. This manifesto is circulating in important cities all over China, and in spite of the implicit dangers many are daring to add their signatures.

The writer was present recently at a series of student discussions in Shanghai on the function of the universities in the salvaging of China. One student summed up the feelings of many when he said in halting English: "The most zealous revolutionaries have ended up the most bigoted reactionaries. We must perfect our approach." He was feeling his way towards the basic idea of the Chinese philosophers. The problem with which the students are grappling is to combine zeal with moderation—the ancient doctrine of the golden mean. They are not alone in this mental evolution. Thousands of industrialists, professors, merchants and professional men have now reached the conviction that China's future lies in progress between the extremes of reaction and revolution.

For several years now the older men among the liberals and moderates have nursed their frustrated ideals in private. The 'managerial' class, the merchants, even the shop-keepers, are reaching the end of their patience. Less concerned with the principles at stake, commerce and industry are beginning to conclude that a change of government is a condition of recovery and is therefore becoming a business interest. But it has been left to the young hot-heads in the universities to make the first big move towards establishing

an alternative. The student has become the middle-man. He stands between the two extremes of Kuomintang and Communist. Within the last six months his public protest has defined the issue. His courage, born of desperation, has evoked the support of groups inside and outside politics, which have been too cautious to take the initiative on their own. The Government, harassed by economic and military failures, and stultified by political corruption, find themselves able to persecute, but too weak to suppress.

This is a far cry from the "Kunming Incident", at the end of 1945, which was the writer's first introduction to "Free China". Then Government plain clothes police forced an entrance to break up a student discussion of political affairs. This was long before such discussion had brought students to the point of political action. Students were beaten up or disappeared into concentration camps. Two liberal professors were killed. The "atmosphere of unhealthy criticism" was dissipated. But the event was nevertheless a landmark. In the eighteen months since then the economic, political and military barometer of the Chinese Nationalist Government has sunk steadily lower.

Economically, it has been a story of steady disintegration. The black market value of the Chinese dollar which at the end of 1945 stood at 1,000 to the American dollar stood in May 1945 at 40,000. The official rate was 12,000 but a Government official told me quite openly that it was customary to negotiate a compromise black market within Government offices at 25,000. It is an open secret that much of the exchange manipulation and purchase of gold bars which has accelerated the inflation has been undertaken by Government officials.

Politically, it may be said, the efforts of Government under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to set up an effective coalition with the Democratic League and the Young China Party have not succeeded. This is mainly because the Generalissimo has hung on to oligarchic power through the Nationalist Kuomintang Party. In defending the constitutional unity of China against communist separatism, his party has a good case. But he has not been prepared to broaden the basis of the régime in fact as well as on paper. Recently he invited members of the Democratic League and the Young China Party to accept minor cabinet posts. It is significant that the leaders of these two minority groups felt themselves strong enough to refuse co-operation.

From a military point of view the Nationalist offensive this spring reached its high point in the capture of Yen-an, the communist capital. This was after it had been bloodlessly evacuated by the communists who carried with them their equipment, their industries and their supplies. After the jubilation was over the Government awakened to their predicament. Instead of seizing a prize, they had walked into a trap. They were forced to hold a long salient in barren and unproductive territory. Meanwhile the communists, whose base was in the fertile country of Shansi and Western Shantung, launched a

series of crippling counter-offensives. The Generalissimo's credit has seldom been lower in recent years.

On the communist side, political power seems better consolidated and less corrupt than their opponents'. The régime is in many ways quite as totalitarian in its claims, but it is able to enforce these claims with greater thoroughness. This very ability is a symptom of the outstanding fact about the Chinese communists. However one-sided and even vicious their propaganda, it seems clear that their government is by the consent and their warfare with the active support, not merely the passive acquiescence, of the common people. This is a strange thing in China, where the profession of the soldier and the performance of the bureaucrat have seldom been much esteemed. The Communist Army officers and civil magistrates are living under the conditions and for the pay of private soldiers and peasant farmers. Within a period of a few months, I had interviews with the Nationalist Governor of a Province of 34,000,000 people, and the Communist Chairman of a Province of 20,000,000 people next door. The Governor, who was immaculately dressed in an expensive uniform with mirror-like riding boots, had a swarm of equestrians who brought him everything from his digestive tablets to his State documents. The Chairman wore the tattered blue padded uniform of a soldier of the 8th Route Army, and if he wanted anything done he shouted. But he usually got it done. His associates behaved with him as simply and with as little ostentation as they used towards the sentry outside the gate. The Chinese communists appear to have been working on these lines for over twenty years, and it looks as though they will so continue.

The régime has concentrated upon the division of land among the small farmers, and the introduction of elementary adult education. Everything else is left over until the civil war is won, and to this end the farmers are organized into militia units, the wall newspapers carry the Party line into every hamlet, and a form of self-governing village community council is rapidly taking over the Government responsibilities for recruitment and for propaganda. In the past this has been recognized and reported as fact by neutral correspondents in the "communist show room" at Yen-an. It can be said from personal observation that it is as true for the "grass roots communism" in the outlying areas of the Border Governments, where there is neither the occasion nor the opportunity for window dressing.

In economics, the communists have achieved a kind of self-sufficiency based on agriculture, but they have been isolated from the outside world and their industrialism is negligible. Hence they do not possess the experienced industrialists, engineers and managers who could take over China's growing coastal industries. Within their borders their currency is relatively stable, but it is unlikely that they alone could take over the enormous financial problem caused by the inflation in Nationalist China. They would have to rely on the co-operation of economists and merchants whose first allegiance would

be to private profit.

But Chinese communism is an indigenous growth and in spite of its ruthlessness and many other surface similarities, it should not be confused with the communism of the West. I met several former landlords who had positions of importance in the communist administration. The communists will not work with the right wing Nationalist Government, but they have shown that neither capitalist nor communist is averse from collaboration when their Chinese pragmatism indicates that it is worth their while.

Militarily, while the communists are able to deploy experienced and courageous guerrilla forces, they are without sufficient trucks, heavy artillery, and ammunition. Above all they lack the aerial cover which is essential if they are to extend their present defensive campaigns to the systematic conquest of the rest of China. Their favourite marching song is the "Guerrilla Anthem". Its theme runs: "We have no clothes, we have no arms, we have no ammunition, but we are not worried because the enemy is well supplied with all these and he will doubtless be persuaded to let us have them." The shrapnel which is picked out from the bodies of the wounded on both sides is from American shells. The captured trucks which carry the assault forces of the communists in their pitched battles are of American make. But American planes cannot be so easily wrested from their opponents. Whilst enough equipment can be captured to supply the harassing warfare of attrition which the communists are waging, they cannot by these means secure an overwhelming superiority. Without this it is impossible to convert stalemate into victory.

Meanwhile, on both sides there are men of integrity and drive, but few have been active in moderating the totalitarian claims of their Governments. There was a momentary gleam of hope during the Marshall peace talks in 1946. It seemed then that Kuomintang and Communists would reach one of those patch-work yet practical compromises at which Chinese are so adept. At the last moment, however, as General Marshall himself said, it was extremists on both sides who destroyed the chances of a compromise peace. For twenty years China has suffered from the zeal of her revolutionaries and the bigotry of her reactionaries. It is a disappointing story.

There are now men in China who are out of sympathy with both parties, and who desire a new order which to achieve they know must involve zeal and self-discipline. They are sick of a war in which many battles are won and few decisions reached. While ninety per cent. of China's people are illiterate they see eighty-six per cent. of the Nationalist budget spent upon maintaining and equipping the Nationalist armies and three per cent. on education. They observe with bitterness the gulf that lies between the golden unities of Chinese philosophy and the drab confusion of contemporary polemics. One fact is forcing its way inexorably into their minds; if China is to survive as a nation rather than as a collection of Balkanized provincial

groupings, there must be a "Government of the Middle Way". Such a government would serve the self-aggrandisement of neither extreme, and yet could interpret the reforming spirit of the communists alongside the constitutionalism of the nationalists. Nor is this the slender last hope of disillusionment and desperation. The Marshall talks came within an ace of succeeding on precisely this basis. It is a "practical" solution, and therefore in China especially, a practicable one. A government founded on the Chinese tradition of compromise is of all the best suited to rule strongly and to keep China together. But it is not only tradition which shapes men's reaction to the present chaos. They are as powerfully influenced by the new ideas of the western democracies. As one student leader in Peiping remarked: "We are not communists or anything like it. We have been brought up on the text books of the democratic west and our inspiration comes as much from the great democrats of England and America as it does from our own Chinese philosophers." And the appeals of China's nascent liberal movement are as much to the outside world of the democracies as to the apathetic and illiterate millions of China itself.

How will the Governments of the west respond to this appeal? To many Chinese, American intervention has appeared to be predominantly on the side of reaction. This has already done much to alienate the western sympathies of Chinese liberals, but it is not yet too late. The British Government have as much at stake as any in China's future. Our commercial interests are small; our military commitments a fraction of what they were before 1942. But China is already the battleground between the competing interests of Russia and America. If an atomic war is to break out anywhere it is in China that the chain reaction may well begin. So long as China is reft between two extremes backed respectively by two foreign powers, the danger of a direct clash between the backers is great. With a liberal, "middle way" Government there is the chance that Chinese internal differences can be rectified, and a stable State built up which denies its territory to the political, military and economic infiltration of both Russia and America.

At this time the leaders of this potential middle way government are beginning their first big battle. So far it has been almost a secret battle. Within the two conflicting zones of China the news of what is happening is suppressed or distorted through controlled Government presses. Outside China no one is prepared to give the publicity and to show the interest which so vital an issue demands. Neither of the Parties in China is oblivious of our reactions. Both know that the large number of educated Chinese who are not Party members can still be influenced by the attitude and the opinion of this country to Chinese affairs. But so far our attitude has appeared to be one of indifference, and our opinion has not been voiced. This is not for lack of able and vigorous analysis of the issues by British Foreign Office representatives in China. But they cannot be expected to do more than

analyse. It is for the Government and the press in this country to act. Our very lack of our old commercial and military interests in China places us in Chinese eyes "above the battle" and renders British opinion thereby of greater weight. Although there is control of the organs of Chinese critical comment in China this does not mean that news cannot get round. It merely deprives the progressive forces in China of institutions which can command respect and attention for the news and comment they purvey. The British press and the British Parliament do command this respect and attention from educated Chinese, to an increasing extent and in spite of the distances that divide us. This is true also of the United Nations Organization, both at its headquarters and in the Far Eastern Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization which is now being set up. In both of these, Britain has a voice which should now be raised.

*(The author has just returned from China where for nearly two years until he resigned he served as a field administrator with the Friends' Ambulance Unit, mostly working in Honan Province, on the North China Plain, which covers the border line between Communist and Kuomintang Forces.)*

## AN INDIAN CELEBRATION

BY MARGARET PATERSON

MY husband and I spent August 15 in India celebrating with a mixed community of babus and coolies, of Assamese and other Hindus, with a sprinkling of Muslims. As a community we are more akin to a country district at home as opposed to cities or industrial areas. Altogether there are 6,177 people on the estate and we are twenty miles from the nearest small town, though we have *bustis* (hamlets) around us.

On the Thursday before the great day we were sent a programme of the celebrations for the fifteenth which read as follows: 8 a.m. Procession; 10 a.m. Flag Hoisting; 2 p.m. Sobah (Puja); 4.30 p.m. Meeting; 7 p.m. Lighting; 8.30 p.m. Bhawna (Theatrical Performance). During the night of the fourteenth there were sounds of many drums. This was merely a 'warming up' in preparation for the morrow.

Then the morning of India's freedom dawned. From the early hours the men and boys were busy erecting their pavilion. This consisted of a bamboo structure with open sides and tarpaulins on the roof. Full use was made of the palm fern and the banana palm for decoration purposes. At the entrance to the ground where the celebrations were to be held an arch was erected with 'Bonde Mataram'—'Oh! Mother India take my salute'—written on it.

The flag hoisting took place at 10.15 a.m. (This was marvellous timing in a country where everything, from trains to celebrations, runs late. However the procession had still to take place!) The babus arranged their flag hoisting very well indeed. Two circles were drawn round the flagstaff. Within the inner circle stood the two officiating babus. Between the two circles stood some of the children, the babus' wives who were not in purdah, the two girls who were to hoist the flag, and us. Behind stood the labour force, the babus, and villagers from the near-by *busti*.

The babus who were officiating stood one on either side of the flagstaff. One led the singing in "Oh! Mother India, we salute thee". Then the two girls were led forward to unfurl the flag, one girl being the head babu's daughter, and the other a girl of the scheduled classes (the 'untouchables'). When the flag of the new India (orange, white and green, with the spinning wheel) was flying the second officiating babu led the singing in "The National Flag" and the Assamese National Song. 'Jai Hinds' were called for Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru, and so on. The procession formed up immediately afterwards with drums and cymbals, and toured the roads, sing-

ing and dancing, finishing again at the flagstaff.

In the afternoon the *Sobah*, the real fun, started. First (much later than scheduled) the priest blessed the food which had been bought for the occasion. The company remained bowed to the ground, before the altar and the priest, during this part of the proceedings. All the time drums and cymbals clashed and boomed.

Then all the coolies, their wives and children, were sat down in rows while the *chowkidars* (men who help to keep order), under the supervision of the *babus*, served out the food. Banana palm leaves were used for plates. The food consisted of rice, lentils, *mati kolai* (a kind of inferior lentil) and chopped cocoanut, all mixed up together and salted. Bananas and sugar-cane were also passed around. Everyone was told to wait till all were served.

The children were a treat to watch. They heaped their food up like a sand castle, then patted it down. They looked around to see what was happening and how much longer they had to wait, then they repeated the sand castle process. After a time, growing tired of that, they started picking out the bits of cocoanut and putting them to one side. When the order was given they ate with a capital 'A'. In this, to them, the most important part of the day, we two lone Britons were not forgotten. On banana palm bark, very cleverly shaped into the resemblance of an oblong cake basket, we were ceremoniously presented with pieces of cocoanut and bananas.

At this stage of the proceedings my husband and I went home for a much needed cup of tea and a bath. We did not attend the meeting. We knew that the Indian staff would try to explain this change of government. They met with as little success as our earlier attempts to explain the change over. It is not that these coolies are unintelligent but anything to do with governments is too far removed from their lives. All they wanted to know was were we too going away. When we assured them we were not they said "*Tik hai*"—"All's well".

We are just ordinary folks, my husband and I. This reaction to the change-over happened on most tea gardens in Assam. The coolies depend on us to see that they get a fair wage for their labour; that they get their rations of food and clothing fairly measured out; that their houses are kept in good repair, and that, when necessary, they receive the medical attention they require. They are a simple, good-natured people when fairly dealt with, but they do not trust the Indian staff. There is so much bribery and corruption amongst Indian officials that distrust of the Indian for the Indian is inherent. This does not reflect on the tea garden Indian staffs who are no worse, and often much better than other Indian officials.

In the evening we turned out again to see the lighting up and to go to the theatrical performance. All along the verandas of the main buildings and round the doors of the private houses there were little earthenware bowls about three inches in diameter. These contained a little oil and wick, and

were lit with due ceremony. On that dark Indian night the resulting fairy lights were very pretty. In due time we proceeded to the place where the theatrical performance was to take place. When we appeared there were cries of '*Jai Hind*' for us. Literally translated this means 'Hail Hindustan' but has now come to be used as a greeting of friendship. We sat down and were offered cigarettes. Then some boys and men, on their own initiative, began to fan us and through the night relays kept up the fanning. This was a quite involuntary tribute to us, a friendly gesture, and was much appreciated by us as the night was very hot.

There is no stage at such a performance. A small space is kept more or less cleared in the middle of the crowd and there the scenes take place. As usual the actors, or rather dancers, said very little. The story was read in Assamese while the performers danced the action of the story in the half-stamping, half-shuffling gait of Indian dancing. There was of course the beautiful woman, (acted as usual by a man), who did the undulating dance usual to such a part. The story depicted was of the king who went into the forest hunting and was captured by an evil spirit. After various adventures he was rescued by his wife.

All through the night the drums and cymbals kept up their noise and the audience talked and sometimes moved around. Occasionally *babus* or *sirdars* ('gaffers' or bosses) or *chowkidars* would pass amongst the dancers to reach another part of the audience to hand round '*Pan*' and cigarettes or to quieten some who were noisier than they thought necessary. No one minded this, least of all the dancers.

In the early hours of the morning we left amid cheers of '*Jai Hind*'. We reached home with a feeling of love and responsibility for these grown up, good-natured children and with a greater hatred than ever for the agitators and the *goondas* (armed bands to whom anything offers an excuse for stealing and killing) who make life a thing of fear and distress instead of joy for these simple people.

## CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN VENEZUELA

BY E. J. COHN

**A**MONG the many strange situations that the war brought about was that of an eminent Swiss corporation lawyer who by the exigencies of his professional work saw himself transferred from his native country to Venezuela where he had to remain throughout the war. What does a man do who is a lawyer—not only by profession but also by disposition—when he is transplanted into a foreign country with plenty of leisure on his hands? He studies the law of the land.

The civil and commercial law of Venezuela is based on modern Continental law, as are all the South American laws, and therefore is not very remarkable. Far more interesting to the stranger is the constitutional law. Since 1811 the country has had more than twenty constitutions. According to one authority it has had fifty-two revolutions in a century and to another 104 (not counting small unrests) within seventy years. Clearly the constitutional law must mirror the moral and social life of the country and its people. So the exile delves into the constitutional law (no virgin territory, by the way, as there is already a remarkable native literature including a not yet completed three-volume history by a writer of erudition\*). The result is a work† that, had it not been written in a distant part of the world and in Spanish, might have become a best-seller in the market of books on constitutional law. This Swiss jurist with his very European background introduces his readers to a world that is at the same time strange and familiar. There are novel problems, and men of whom we have not heard. Yet the same forces are working that we know so well. Against this unfamiliar background we witness the well-known struggle between law and order. We see how the law is used as a disguise, as an instrument or as a pretext, but also—though more rarely—as a source of moral strength.

Venezuela has no democratic tradition. It has been trying to become a democracy since 1935. In that year the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gomez was overthrown. Gomez has become well-known in Europe since O'Rourke's book exposed him as the *Tyrant of the Andes*. But he was no isolated

\* Gil Fortoul: *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela*. Of this work no less than three editions have been published.

† Ernesto Wolf: *Tratado de Derecho Constitucional Venezolano*. Prologo del Dr. Carlos Morales, Decano de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Central de Venezuela y Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Los Estados Unidos de Venezuela. Two volumes. Caracas, Tipografía Americana, 1945.

figure. He was merely the last of a succession of dictators who had been in power in Venezuela ever since the time of Simon Bolivar, interrupted by few and short intervals of non-dictatorial régimes. Two of these dictators, Guzman Blanco in the last century and Gomez in this, had managed to remain in power for several decades. Theirs was a complete dictatorship—so complete that it even produced its own ideology. Of course, it was "native ideology"—neither Fascism nor Naziism. It was called "democratic Cæsarism", an excellent name in a country with a strong background of Latin culture which to all intents and purposes is identical with the earlier phases of Nazi ideology. Students of the Nazi theory of law should read something of the writings of Vallenilla Lanz and Pedro M. Arcaya.\* It is a surprise to realize that in distant Caracas excuses for dictatorship were invented which occurred to Professors Binder, Koellreutter, Larenz and other Nazi writers only between ten and twenty years later. Dr. Bouquet has said that for the brain of the hominidæ there are only a certain limited number of types of solution to the riddle of the universe. The same seems to be true of the puzzle of government and society.

Lopez Contreras, the first Venezuelan President, after the revolution of 1935 certainly faced a formidable task. It is clear that in a country like Venezuela full-blown democracy on the Anglo-American model could not possibly be introduced immediately. It was necessary to go about it warily. Errors were unavoidable. They could be made and were made at both levels, the political as well as the administrative-technical. Foreign precedents could not always be studied or understood from a distance. There were problems for which no foreign precedents were available.

In this country we have the universal franchise. We consider it as a democratic principle that there should be a universal franchise. But is that right in Venezuela where seventy per cent. of the population are illiterate? Is it wise to extend the franchise to those who cannot read and write? Is it democratic to do so? The question has in Venezuela been the subject-matter of considerable dispute. The law at present in force has answered it in the negative. The decision is probably wise. But it is a decision on the political level. The administrative-technical question that arises from it, that is, how to give effect to the principle, is not an easy one either. How is one going to ascertain whether the individual voter can read or write? To demand a certificate of ability to read and write from every voter requires an administrative organization that a backward country does not find easy to establish. To confine the right to those who have gone through some form of schooling, is unjust to those who became literate by their own efforts. The present law is more lenient. The individual voter has to affirm his ability on oath. If he is unknown to the election committee he must bring two witnesses who can

\* Pedro M. Arcaya's book *Venezuela and its actual régime* has been published in English, New York 1936.



certify to his knowledge and who are known to the committee. In doubtful cases the right to vote thus depends on the strength of existing connections—direct or indirect—with the election committee. Clearly the administrative-technical problem is not satisfactorily solved.

In this country we have a fairly homogeneous mass of voters, all with insignificant exceptions—belonging to European civilization. But what about a country whose civilization is predominantly European and whose inhabitants are predominantly either uncivilized or non-European or both? Most countries in this situation—with the exception of some of the British colonies, like Jamaica—confine the franchise to the European population. But this is rarely frankly stated as what it is: a political decision. It is usually hidden away behind some administrative-technical curtain. Few countries want to confess to this type of restricted democracy. In the U.S.A. there is a poll tax. Venezuela has adopted a much more ingenious procedure. Every voter is required to present to the electoral committee an identity card with his photograph and his finger prints. The costs of the photograph are sufficiently high to deter large sections of the poorer non-European classes of the population, even though they might pass the reading and writing test.

The ideal of party democracy is that there should be organizations fighting for different ideals, but united in the desire to advance the welfare of the community and respecting the person of their opponents. In many countries the organizations, calling themselves parties, have never corresponded even faintly to this description. In Venezuela too, the parties are "personalistic" organizations. They are formed for the purpose of satisfying individual aspirations or the aspirations of a closely-knit group. This is a commonplace among Venezuelan political writers. The "liberal" slogan is "new men". It means that the party desires the spoils of office for its leaders. The "conservative" party proclaims as its goal "constitution, peace and order" meaning thereby that it prefers to retain these spoils for itself. Can the law remedy such ills? Venezuelan law has made a gallant effort to do so. It provides that the formation of any political organization requires the authorization of the President of the State. To obtain this it must submit to him its articles of association and a concrete programme. Approval must not be given if fundamental problems are left to the decision of a board or of a committee, instead of to the general meeting of the members. Against a decision rejecting an application for admission an appeal lies to the Federal Court. It is hard to believe that the personalistic character of the parties will really be affected by such measures. But it is difficult to see what else could be done on the technical legal level. Here is one of the ills that the lawyer cannot well cure.

Another problem is that of the non-democratic parties. All South American countries have had many dictatorships. Those that are democracies are therefore greatly afraid of dictatorial parties and have every right to

be afraid. They are also greatly afraid of the communists. Is it the duty of a democratic state to permit the formation and operation of a non-democratic party? The history of the German Weimar Republic affords an illustration of the dangers resulting from an affirmative answer to this question. Until 1945 an express ruling of the Venezuelan constitution prohibited communist and anarchist propaganda. One section of the constitution states that war propaganda and propaganda intended to undermine the social and political order is not permitted. This was followed by a ruling to the effect that communist and anarchist propaganda was always considered as being intended to undermine the social and political order. This ruling was abrogated in 1945, following the example of both the United States of America\* and Switzerland. It would appear that the provisions of the electoral law which require every party to obtain a licence from the President of the State would be sufficient to prevent abuses of political freedom. On the other hand experience in Venezuela—as elsewhere—has shown that rules like the anti-communist law have a fatal tendency to be applied against those for whom they were not intended and to make martyrs of those whom they were intended to suppress.

In Venezuelan practice parliament, ministers, cabinets and—consequently—elections will never gain the same importance as they have in the European democracies. For the preponderance of the power of the President reduces them all to a very secondary rôle. The presidential system is deeply ingrained in most South American States. Venezuela is its classic territory. The constitution lists all the powers of the President expressly. The article containing this list is the longest in the constitution. The President is not only Head of the State; he is also its Prime Minister. He appoints and removes the other Ministers. He is the head of the army and of the fleet and the superior of the Governor of the Federal District in which Caracas, the capital, is situated. He appoints and he dismisses all civil servants. Perhaps it would be more correct to speak of "State employees", because, of course, under conditions such as these a civil service in the English sense of the term can hardly be expected to develop.

Venezuela is a federal State. In addition to the Federal District and several "territories" there are no less than twenty states. Each has its own legislative assembly, each its own President who is assisted by a Secretary-General. But the federal structure in no way restricts the powers of the President of the Republic. On the contrary it enhances it. This strange situation has been brought about by the fact that the legislative assemblies of the states have mostly seen fit to delegate their power of appointing the President of the state to the President of the Republic. Where this has been done the latter has adopted a wide interpretation of the delegation and assumed power to appoint also the Secretary General. Where no such delegation has taken

\* *Schneidermann v. U.S.A.*, 320 U.S. 118.

place, the President of the state is nevertheless in fact the nominee of the President of the Republic. The extent to which the Presidents of the states have become the servants of the central President can be seen from two significant decisions of the Federal Supreme Court. In one of them the Court actually held that the President of the state of Carabobo did not have his habitual residence in that state:

The residence which Señor J.R.P. saw himself obliged to accept at Valencia because of his nomination as President must be considered as temporary and not as permanent, if one takes into consideration that his nomination was the work of the Federal Executive and not of the Legislative Assembly of the State. He was consequently subject to being replaced at any moment at which the President of the Republic considered this advisable from the point of view of his policy and the interests of the country.

In another decision the Federal Court held that a state that had once delegated the power of nominating its President to the Federal President could not withdraw the power thus granted—not even by an alteration of its constitution. The result, of course, is that Venezuela is a federal State in name, but not in reality. Federalism requires more than a network of legal provisions to become a reality. But the fact that it cannot become a reality without some foundation of fact does not mean that the legal network that has been established is wholly ineffective. On the contrary: it is a well-known rule of experience that legal rules which are inconsistent with the factual situation produce a great deal of mischief. Venezuela confirms this experience. Dozens of handbooks for international legal practitioners contain the information that lawsuits in Venezuela are exceedingly expensive and exceedingly long-winded. The federal structure of the country has supplied one of the reasons, if not the chief reason, for this deplorable state of affairs. Until 1864 the country was divided into five appeal court districts. From the appeal courts a further appeal was permitted to the Supreme Court. In 1864 federalism stepped in and overlaid the country with a judicial organization wholly inappropriate to the two million inhabitants of its thinly populated territory. In the capital of every one of the twenty states appeal courts were formed. From these the further appeal went to the twenty Supreme Courts formed also in each of the state capitals. It is clear that in no country of comparable size can a sufficient number of capable judges be found. Complaints against the administration of the law by the state courts multiplied. But the answer to these complaints was not a centralization of justice. All that was done was that the Federal Supreme Court was given power to quash sentences of the State Supreme Courts. The result was that a case had to run through four instances before the final decision was possible. No wonder that in many cases it was years before this goal was reached. Since 1945 an improvement has taken place. The State Supreme Courts were abolished, so that the appeal lies directly from the State Appeal Courts to the Federal Supreme Court. But the number of appeal courts is

still too large for a small country. Justice need not everywhere be as strictly centralized as it is in Britain. Yet it seems clear that Venezuela hardly needs twenty appeal courts, if this country can do with one.

Venezuelan law provides for a strange institution, called a Procurator General of the Nation. This official combines in his person functions that at first glance would seem difficult to combine. He is the representative of the State before all tribunals of the country, civil as well and criminal; but he is also responsible for the financial side of the administration of justice. In the European Continental countries the Minister of Justice is as a rule in charge of the financial side of the administration of the courts and a separate official under his orders is responsible for the representation of the State in all courts of law. We are assured that the Venezuelan institution has not led to abuses. But another rule of the constitution seems more open to objections. The judges of all courts are appointed only for what is called the "constitutional period", that is, for five years. The assurance that they cannot be removed during this period must be understood to mean that they can be removed after it has expired. The decisions, even of the Federal Court, show traces of a strong tendency to approve anything the administration does. Administration in countries where the opposition is apt to meet with all sorts of difficulties, legal and factual, has a good chance of surviving the constitutional period. So has a judge who tries to uphold the administration.

Venezuela is, it is clear, still far from being near the ideal of democracy. But is it on the road to it? Nobody who has not lived in the country and actually taken part in its life has the right to pronounce a view on this question. But one may draw some inferences at least from the fact that a work of nearly 1,000 pages could appear at Caracas, containing very frank criticism of persons and of conditions, and that its author—far from being held in disgrace—was made a Professor at the University for publishing it and that the Foreign Minister, who is also the Dean of the Faculty of Law, wrote a graceful preface to it, fully recognizing its merits. The number of European countries where this would to-day be impossible has unfortunately become very large. In the sense in which tradition understands the word "democracy" Venezuela would appear to-day to have more claim to be called democratic than many countries with a far older tradition and a much more settled society.

*(The author is a Member of the English Bar and a Doctor of Philosophy (London) in Comparative Jurisprudence.)*

## PERPETUUM MOBILE

BY GORDON SYMES

HERE and now I state my joy  
In kingfisher, dragonfly,  
And the spectrum in the spray.

Me mobility enchants;  
Bats' maze, meteors' plunge;  
A million sunsets. Change.

Change of seasons, leaves and sky.  
Sparks or swans momentarily  
Inscribe the clouds, end day.

All's flux a fugitive pattern prints  
Only with what significance  
The corner of the eye invents.

Never look too searchingly.  
Yield to currents, be ruled by  
The body's endless chemistry.

I know when thunderclouds impend  
Oilily, when birds are stifled and  
The too-green day is glassed and bound,

For an end my senses cry—  
Whether downpour or struck tree—  
To the mirage of eternity.

Storm or shock their solace have.  
Wind, blow the leaping bonfire love  
Or hunt its ashes. Only move.

## THE LEGACY OF HISTORY

BY W. THOMSON HILL

A MOMENT came in the story of mankind when his past became articulate. Unknown and uncounted centuries had passed. How many? How filled? How much truth survived in verbal memory? Archaeology attempts, with increasing confidence, to dig through these centuries and reduce its discoveries to an ordered system. It is forced to leave great gaps and to devise chronologies too soon falsified by new discoveries. It ventures even to correct the dates of written history. Yet until we reach written history we still peer through a dim curtain.

That moment came to different peoples at different times. In this island history began at a precise date. A soldier led two expeditions from Gaul and went back to write his dispatches. A thousand years separated Caesar's pacing of the cliffs of Boulogne from those of the Norman duke with whom English 'low-brow' history begins: seven hundred and more from those of Napoleon. Adolf Hitler also came thus far.

History does not always fall into these dramatic sequences. Britain happens to possess no recorded history before Julius Caesar wrote the first chapter. We can, however, see from some such rapid glance how the imagination can be kindled by events which leap across the centuries. Epochs recognize one another: great men too. We can also understand better how the historians of the ancient world were prompted to fix their eyes on some peak of time which seemed to tower above the rest. Every such spectacle is soon dwarfed in a lengthening time-perspective. Every latest chapter in history ceases quickly to be the last. Within living memory English history as taught in schools came to a stop with the battle of Waterloo. Once it ended with the "Glorious Revolution". The Tudor chroniclers on whom Shakespeare drew saw time stand still with the union of the houses of York and Lancaster.

If we must then be for ever shifting our gaze can we find no firm outline? Is there no consistent pattern? Can we draw no solid conclusions? Are there no valid lessons? Professor H. A. L. Fisher confessed he could find none. Acton and Toynbee sought for the threads and displayed some of the colours and their weaving. The elder historians had no doubt what their purpose was. The first great European prose work begins with this sentence: "What Herodotus of Halicarnassus found out by careful inquiry is here set forth, in order that past events may not be blotted out by time from the memory of men, nor great and wondrous deeds of Greeks and foreigners lack renown, nor in

particular the reason why they fought against each other."

Thucydides says in his opening paragraph that he had begun his task of collecting materials at the very outset of the Peloponnesian War, in the belief that it would be great and noteworthy above all that had gone before, seeing that the rest of the Hellenic race was preparing to take one side or the other in "the greatest movement that had ever stirred the Hellenes, extending even to the Barbarians, and so to speak to the greater part of mankind."

Polybius, like Thucydides, treated past history as the best guide to the present. Plutarch's whole aim was to show by the contrast of their lives where famous men had failed. So with all the great historians until the specializing writers of the present day. Their translators followed them. John Brende, the sixteenth-century translator of Quintus Curtius, wrote of history as "the most excellent kind of knowledge, the chiefest parte of civyl prudence, and the mirrour of men's life . . . For in them men may see the groundes and beginnynges of common wealthes, ye causes of their encrease, of their prosperous maintenance, and good preservation, and again by what means they decreased, and came to ruine."

A familiar note is sounded in these extracts. The writers were convinced that they were describing the greatest of all wars up to their time. Nor were they usually wrong. The same description was applied to what we now call "World War One"; that was moreover to be "the war to end war." In 1947 "World War Two" has obliterated all others—we are not quite so sure if it was a war to end war. The men of 1815 were equally sure there had been nothing like that eighteen-year struggle before. The trenches of the Civil War are still to be seen in the Southern States, and a contemporary writer inscribes on his title-page "The Greatest War in History."

If by the lack of a clear pattern in history we mean that men have never learnt from it how to avoid war we may accept the denial. Beyond doubt, however, history does present us with a number of groups of events with fairly clear-cut outlines, if with ragged edges. Within the limits of these periods history becomes a unity. They have often been followed by longer or shorter periods of settled peace. Great empires fought their enemies to a standstill and imposed their will upon them. At these moments it might seem that an equilibrium had been reached. History paused to take breath. An appearance at least of stability and tranquillity had been attained. This was the aim, and this the excuse, of every predatory conqueror. However his power had been acquired it was used to maintain internal peace. The conquered peoples accepted its benefits and absorbed the conqueror's culture; if the conquests proved permanent, his language also.

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Such a moment seemed to have arrived in the Augustan age. Rome had

inherited most of Alexander's conquests, had destroyed Carthage, conquered Spain and Gaul, dominated the Mediterranean and had reached the Channel, which Caesar had crossed, and opened our own history. Greek liberty had long disappeared. Athens was no more than the capital of Achaia, a Roman province. Civil war had been suppressed, with the old Roman virtues. An epoch had begun. If ever that word, now used so carelessly, was justified, it was then.

Rome then assumed a place from which the prestige of her name was not finally dislodged until Napoleon destroyed the last feeble remnants of the Holy Roman Empire. The Catholic Church still maintains the name and world-wide claim of Rome. The languages of Western Europe inherit its speech. Latin America finds a cultural unity in that name. Until days almost within memory Latin was the universal vehicle of learning. English has borrowed from it so freely that we can hardly write a sentence without it. Main lines and road arteries follow the routes planned by Roman engineers. When the fabric of the empire broke up modern nations rose from its decline and fall, and when they began to emerge from the dark ages the name of Rome was on their lips. The Teutonic races who became our own ancestors brought with them a few Latin words already learnt on the fringes of the empire. Gothic architecture sprang from an attempt to imitate the derelict buildings of the Roman provinces. Czar and Kaiser used an imperial title. Soviet Moscow has not forgotten that it succeeds to a dominion whose capital was on the Bosphorus. The history of Poland is a series of footnotes on the division of the Eastern and Western Empire under Diocletian.

Yet Imperial Rome was new in the first century. Behind Rome stood Greece. The culture of Greece came down to us through Rome, which had first to go to school. This is no figure of speech. Cicero employed Greek teachers and brought many Greek words into Latin currency. Horace acknowledged his debt in his Epistle about "our rustic past":

Greece, captive brought, her captors captive made:

To civil arts rude Latium homage paid.

Every educated Roman found it necessary to read and write in Greek. "Illustrious Romans chose the idiom of Plato as the best vehicle for their own thoughts; dramatic poets gained a reputation by versions of the tragedies and comedies of Athens; and every versifier felt himself compelled to receive with rules of uncompromising prosody the metres of ancient Greece." (Donaldson)

This picture reminds us of the second Greek conquest of the West at the Renaissance, of which the results and inspiration are with us still. Shakespeare is its child. The vitality of Greek thought and imagination and Greek methods of expression cannot be suppressed even if compulsory Greek has disappeared from the universities. Conspicuous in this Greek tradition was the treatment of history—a word used by Herodotus in the opening sentence already quoted and meaning learning by diligent inquiry. The historians and geographers of

the time of the Caesars are the most important of the Greek writers who flourished under Roman patronage. Their opportunity came with the fact that Rome had as yet no school of historians and that the rapid extension of the Roman dominion created a demand for knowledge about new peoples and their countries.

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Four additions to the Loeb Library\* illustrate this period, although one of the authors, Quintus Curtius (a Greek who wrote in Latin), can be assigned no certain date between the early part of the first century A.D. and the opening of the fourth. None of them has the quality of the Attic writers. But they are all in the Attic tradition. Diodorus Siculus has the curiosity and sometimes the naïve credulity of Herodotus and like him was an unwearied traveller. He tells us that he spent thirty years in preparing materials for his book, which he called "The Library of History" and intended to be an encyclopaedia of all known events and nations up to his time. His inspiration was his conviction that a common civilization was coming into existence with the universal domination of Rome. This was not a solitary belief. Polybius traced with full approval the steps which had led to the Roman triumph. And it has been suggested that a trend towards absolutism was inherent in the great Athenian writers themselves.

What if this were true and we could explain it in modern terms? A recent English work has dismissed Socrates, Plato and Aristotle as little better than fascists, upholders of a slave society and the enemies of the people. This may seem foolish enough; yet the Attic historians seem to yield up their personality more readily if we find them out of ease with "the People". Democratic Athens banished Xenophon and Thucydides and condemned Socrates to death. Cleon is the immortal demagogue. The Athenian democracy brought Athens to ruin. Moreover the greater Attic writers were soldiers. If we were to label them Die-Hard Tories and members of a ruling class the anachronism might pass as a pointer to the mood of the fourth century B.C. To serve in the national militia was indeed the elementary duty of the free Athenian. Xenophon's life was saved by Socrates at the battle of Delium, where he fought with the Athenian cavalry. In a later generation Arrian was a successful general in Asia Minor; he called his history *The Anabasis of Alexander* in direct imitation of Xenophon's famous story of the Ten Thousand, and he relied on soldiers' memoirs, notably that of Ptolemy. Polybius was the son of a general and himself a commander of cavalry in Macedonia. All these men compiled history with a soldier's accuracy of fact and a soldier's eye for

\* *Diodorus Siculus*, vol IV, books IX-XII, translated by C. H. Oldfather. *Dio Chrysostom*, vol IV, discourses XXXVII-IX, translated by H. Lamar Crosby. *Quintus Curtius*, *History of Alexander*, vol. I, books I-V; *Quintus Curtius*, vol II, books VI-X, translated by J. C. Rolfe. Heinemann. 10s. each.

the country.

Here then was the legacy of history inherited by the Augustan age. Here too was the historical frontier between an old world and a new. Such was the theme. There was no Thucydides or Xenophon to develop it. In their place we find Diodorus Siculus and Quintus Curtius, with Dion Chrysostom, master of rhetoric and much the best writer of the three, but only incidentally an historian. Diodorus can be erected into a figure of fun. He was so far from being a soldier that he confused the right and left wings of an army. He cannot be dismissed so easily. Much of his enormous output is lost. The books or fragments remaining are cited in modern bibliographies, as they were in antiquity. His Greek is easy to read and his story is told with that "generous amenity" which a French scholar has attributed to Herodotus. Some flavour of this has been passed on by his translators. Henry Cogan revelled in his author's prolixity and added his own when he wrote in 1653 that "what the whole Universe is in comparison of one City, or Nation, the same are his writings in regard to others; for whereas we can draw out of them as out of a Rivulet or a little Brook, the Acts but of one City, or Prince, we may out of him, as out of a great and spacious river, draw all that hath been done by the most eminent States, and flourishing Commonwealths."

It is fair to quote Diodorus in his own person, and we may take a passage from a long digression about the Sicilian law-giver Charontas, who framed a law requiring that all the sons of citizens should learn to read and write, the State providing the teachers' salaries:

In fact the law-giver rated reading and writing above every other kind of learning, and with right good reason: for it is by means of these that most of the affairs of life and such as are most useful are concluded, like votes, letters, covenants, laws, and other things which make the greatest contribution to orderly life. What man, indeed, could compose a worthy laudation of the knowledge of letters? For it is by such knowledge alone that the dead are carried in the memory of the living and that men widely separate in space hold converse through written communication with those who are at the furthest distance from them, as if they were at their side; and in the case of covenants in time of war between States and Kings the firmest guarantee that such agreements will abide is provided by the unmistakable character of writing. Indeed, speaking generally, it is writing alone which preserves the cleverest sayings of men of wisdom and the oracles of the gods, as well as philosophy and all knowledge, and is constantly handing them down to succeeding generations for the ages to come. Consequently, while it is true that nature is the cause of life, the cause of good life is the education based on reading and writing . . .

It is this is a digression it tempts us to follow the writer along his by-path, and that is worth while for it leads on to such topics as quarrels caused by step-mothers between fathers and their children and the rights and wrongs of re-marriage after divorce. But nobody can imagine Thucydides allowing himself such excursions. Compare with this kind of writing the terse summing up of the Athenian disaster at Syracuse:

This was the greatest event in the war, or in my opinion in Greek history: at once most glorious to the victors and most calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten at all

points and all together: their sufferings in every way were great. They were totally destroyed—their fleet, their army, everything—and few out of many returned home. So ended the Sicilian expedition.

There can be no doubt which is the more modern writing.

It is tempting to extend such comparisons, to ask ourselves how Livy and Tacitus addressed themselves to similar tasks, how Quintus Curtius followed Alexander into India without understanding his geography, or how Dion Chrysostom brought the arts of rhetoric to the analysis of character. But this would take us farther still; and we should want to take down Gibbon from the shelf, refresh ourselves in Voltaire and De Tocqueville, reach for a favourite volume of Clarendon and look into the moderns from Macaulay to Trevelyan. The theme is explosive and paper is restricted. We must be content with such hints as emerge of the unity of history, and with the contentment to be drawn from dipping again into the classical sources. Competent translations and maps make this easy with "Loeb" at our elbow—or our bedside.

## CORRESPONDENCE.

### EDUCATION IN GERMANY

*To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY,*  
Sir,

You may have learnt from visitors to post-war Germany that, besides other public things, education in general is lacking in many necessities which a civilized country should possess. This is primarily due to the material and mental destructions of the war. In consequence, as far as the British occupation zone, which is not very much different from the others, is concerned, even the efforts of individuals are in vain.

Elementary and secondary schools have many pupils but the number of teaching personnel cannot keep up with them since a great many of the former teachers were dismissed because of their political attitude. In addition to that there is the acute shortage of school buildings, books and the like. Thus, the pupils have an average daily lesson of three to four hours which is far too little, since there has not been any teaching for almost a year. Though the desire to attend the universities to-day is exceedingly widespread, ex-senior officers and those with a Nazi-political background are forbidden to matriculate and only a very few of those graduating from the secondary school may go on to the university. The average age of the beginner students is now about twenty-five, and they must live under extremely hard conditions. But they are eager to learn, perhaps because the terms of various facilities now grant that everybody who holds a university degree has it with full right.

But besides all these regular educating institutions other things to raise the common level of the German people's mind are springing up out of the ruins that once were Germany. Nearly every larger city has what we call a "People's High School" with lessons for everybody, held in the evening to allow the working men to attend, and dealing with all interesting branches of knowledge, comprising science, literature, languages, jurisprudence, politics, medicine, and so on. These lessons, for which such a small fee is paid that everybody can afford it, are mostly divided for beginners and intermediates and are based on an average preparatory training. The teachers for these high schools are professional lecturers and are honoured to teach in them. Of course there are also other means of education, such as all the private schools and private teachers lecturing on subjects for progress in industry and the professions.

Yours faithfully,

WILLI HOMMEN.

British Zone,  
Germany.



## THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

### PUBLIC LIVES

BY JOHN ARMITAGE

WHETHER the aim of a biography, or an autobiography, is to record with accuracy and understanding the life of a man, or to write history so that, in Professor R. G. Collingwood's word, it gives "insight" into the moral and political problems of an age, or frankly to entertain, the plan of it presents the author with initial difficulties not easily overcome at the first essay. The temptation to experiment with new forms is strong; but, more often than not, the chronological approach proves simplest and best.

Even the chronological approach, however, in these days of short books of not more than two to three hundred pages long, presents fresh difficulties of its own. The practice of John Morley, for example, of inserting long passages of contemporary evidence to support his narrative—as is done brilliantly in his *Richard Cobden* but too overpoweringly in his *Gladstone*—is denied to the modern author. Nor can he, as Mrs. Gaskell does in her unforgettable life of Charlotte Brontë, spend twenty pages in painting in the backcloth before introducing the essential character well on in chapter three. Even more must he beware the pitfall of believing, or pretending to believe, that the shortness of his task relieves him of the necessity for research.

Some day we shall return to appropriate length in biography and cease to pot great lives; for the then newly educated many will have learned to do without elaborate visual aids and to read with the seriousness of the educated few of fifty years ago. Meanwhile most writers, while accepting the chronological approach as the only form for their autobiography or biography, will continue to try out ways of curtailing that form's insatiable demands on space.

Three such experiments have lately come to hand. All have much merit, all are worthy of our serious consideration, yet two at least disappoint, as they might so easily have thrilled, if they had been planned differently for a greater length. The bigger disappointment, because a serious historian could not be expected to confine what he had to say on the subject in so short a space and because more is attempted than is actually done, is David Ogg's biography of H. A. L. Fisher.\* His intention, acknowledged on the title page, was to write a short biography but he did not follow it up by planning a short book. His book is attractive because his opinions—notably in the chapter on "The History of Europe"—are lively and controversial. But there are occasions when the reader is uncertain whether the book is a biography of Fisher or Fisher a chopping block for the views of Mr. Ogg.

For this suspicion the plan of the book may be partially to blame. Early pages which quickly lead from schooldays to Oxford give way to chapters which confine Fisher to one pigeon hole after another, denying to the reader a sight of the whole man. Thus we are given "Sheffield and India", "The Education Bill", "Cabinet Minister: The League of Nations", and so on, valuable essays, chronologically arranged, but unsatisfying as biography.

A particular example of the fault is the chapter on the Education Bill which became the Act of 1918. This is commonly known still as the Fisher Act and in Mr. Ogg's chapter the student naturally hopes to find precisely in what way Fisher influenced it.

\* *Herbert Fisher—A Short Biography*. By David Ogg. Edward Arnold. 10s. 6d.

What he gets, however, is an account of "some traditions in the earlier development of education in England" and the main provisions of the Bill. None of these facts, though supplying useful background information, has much to do with Fisher. When he became President of the Board of Education at the end of 1916 the demand for educational reform was already loud and most of the provisions of the Bill had been canvassed for many months. Early in 1917 *The Educational Supplement of The Times* stated in a leader that Fisher was determined not to outstrip public opinion. If this was his intention he seems to have kept to it and the part he played was the good one of piloting the Bill through Parliament and making a strong impression on the country from the platform. But of what went on behind the scenes and Fisher's private opinions Mr. Ogg can tell us little.

*Autobiography* by Neville Cardus, the second of our three volumes, is a book to excite all those who love good writing, enjoy a well told story and take for their pleasure a day at Lord's or an evening at Covent Garden.\* Curiously perhaps, it is not cricket or music which makes this book memorable but Part One "The Struggle" describing the upward climb from the slums of Manchester to the staff of *The Manchester Guardian*. This is brilliant autobiography. Dickens would have revelled in it, for life abounds and unforgettable characters tumble from its magic pages.

Alas, having arrived, Mr. Cardus abandons the whole man, dividing the remainder of his tale into two sections: "My Summers", that is cricket, and "My Winters—and Music". From now on the book is mainly entertainment, the author marking time with important friends in two walks of life—and a self-consciousness that fame too readily brings. Mr. Cardus is not altogether satisfied with his reputation as "Cricketer"; he sees it, we fear, as a stumbling block to his proper appreciation as a music critic. These chapters are delightful and as pleasant and amusing as Noel Coward's biography, *Present Indicative*: but they lack the depth of the earlier part which, in its own way, is comparable in excellence with Sir Osbert Sitwell's *Left Hand, Right Hand!* and *The Scarlet Tree*.

The third book, *The Brontës* by Phyllis Bentley, is one of the first two titles in a new publishing venture, "The English Novelists Series."† The aim of these short books (in Miss Bentley's work 115 small pages) is largely to help those readers who discovered the great English novelists during the recent war. They are also expected to appeal "to the scholar and book-lover." That latter task may seem to be euphemistically expressed but the field is large without this nebulous class and a series maintaining the standard set in Miss Bentley's study can admirably achieve the former purpose.

Miss Bentley's plan is neat. She divides her book into five chapters: one long one which is biographical followed by three short critical essays on the works of the sisters and a final summary on "The Brontës' Place in English Literature." Little enough, perhaps, is added to our knowledge of the remarkable Brontë family but here and there are touches of understanding which show the capacity of a sister novelist for a work of this kind and there is an emphasis placed on the Brontë children's day-dream world, which repays our attention.

The plan of the book serves its purpose well. The smallness of the scale of the work makes it impossible to regard it otherwise than as a useful guide for beginners; but it is one likely to excite interest in the Brontës, enticing the reader to seek the novels and poems with a sound appreciation of what to look for. It therefore does its job well and the only regret is that here is a synopsis of a much bigger book which may never be written.

\* *Autobiography*. By Neville Cardus. Collins. 12s. 6d.

† *The Brontës*. By Phyllis Bentley. Home & Van Thal. 6s.

**THE HISTORY OF JAPAN**, by Kenneth Scott Latourette. *Macmillan*. 20s.

**JAPAN, PAST AND PRESENT**, by Edwin O. Reischauer. *Duckworth*. 8s. 6d.

In his preface to Dr. Reischauer's book Sir George Sansom justly remarks that before the war in the Far East "there was no single short book which gave a lucid and tolerably complete picture of Japan's early history and development in modern times." (Sir George's own beautiful book on Japan stops short at the Meiji restoration: one is still waiting hopefully for its sequel.) Meanwhile the two books under review fill the deficiency admirably, either apart or better still together since in some ways they are complementary. Dr. Latourette rejoices in facts and dates which he handles clearly and tersely with a nice selection of the essential where, in a book of only 270 pages, so much must be omitted. This is aided by an excellent chronology of significant events in Japan's history and numerous illustrations. Dr. Reischauer does not ignore facts but deals rather in broad effects which bring the successive phases of Japan's development vividly before the reader. Both books are extremely interesting whether for students or general readers.

What we would, but shall never, know, is where exactly the Japanese came from and what has made them so entirely different from other Asiatics. Insularity from the mainland has no doubt done much and Japan's fairy-like beauty still more. But in their faculty for discipline and organization, their enterprise and marked political genius (not always exerted for ends that please us but none the less real) they stand alone. As Dr. Reischauer points out, it seems almost incredible that a people who had no written history nor even writing until they learnt it from China and seemed indeed largely primitive, should, under Prince Shotoku, their first constitution-builder in the seventh century, have de-

voted themselves so avidly to absorbing the wisdom, culture and polity—even the conception of a capital city and how to lay it out—from the Chinese, who were then, under the T'ang dynasty, at their greatest and most glorious.

Another curious feature is that the Emperor has nearly always been a puppet. First the dominant power was the Fujiwara family (which even to modern times always supplied Japan's Empresses) but neither they nor any of the Shoguns, even the totalitarian Tokugawa who ruled despotically for 250 years, thought of displacing the Emperor. No doubt his alleged descent from the Sun goddess protected him and because of his prestige with the people it was convenient for the Shoguns in Yeddo (Dr. Reischauer uses the less common romanization Edo) to "have a partner, Mr. Jorkins" in Kyoto. The evil use made by the Army in modern times of this divine marionette is, of course, known to all.

As now one looks to the near signing of the peace treaty with Japan, the grand question is how far she has changed from feudal to democratic mentality. The past supplies an interesting comment. Thus the rise of the mercantile class under the Ashikaga Shoguns recalls a similar development in England when the barons were slaughtering each other in the Wars of the Roses: then it was, in Japan, that the foundations of the *zaibatsu*, the great commercial and financial syndicates, were laid, paving the way for Japan's modern economic expansion. Dr. Latourette shows how from the moment of a constitution being granted in 1889, the Diet struggled for power and reality. A similar struggle, backed by the *zaibatsu*, came in the 1920's with so much success that the Army revolted and seized control of the Government. But to-day, again, in the general elections of 1946 and 1947, the enthusiasm shown by voters (now entirely free from police terrorism) is surely a promising sign. How it may turn out will depend not a little on the character of the peace treaty and especi-

ally on the attitude hereafter of other peoples towards the Japanese. From this point of view both Dr. Latourette and Dr. Reischauer might have given more attention to the very real grievances which, on any impartial reading of history, Japan has had against the West.

A particularly interesting section of Dr. Reischauer's book deals with Japan's artistic and literary eminence, the rise of the drama, the graceful tea ceremony, landscape gardening, and the remarkable novels of modern times. Less pleasing was Iyeyasu's creation of a secret police, the first of its kind as an organ of State. Readers of Dr. Reischauer may also learn how the Japanese Emperors are descended from the Sun goddess; and the little-known fact that Japan was once ruled (as ancient Chinese tribes were) by women. Well, Japanese women now have the vote and have members of their own sex in the Diet. So perhaps they may yet avenge the long centuries of their enslavement to men.

O. M. GREEN.

**LIFE IN RUSSIA**, by John Lawrence. *Allen & Unwin*. 12s. 6d.

**ESCAPE TO LIVE**, by Wing-Commander Edward Howell, O.B.E., D.F.C. *Longmans Green*. 8s. 6d.

The worst feature of the ordinary educated Englishman's attitude towards Russia is his ignorance. However deeply he may approve or disapprove of Soviet foreign policy or Soviet methods of government, he knows little or nothing of the everyday lives of the Russian people. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that, because of the popularity of Tolstoy and Chekov, the average reader knows more of Russian day-to-day life in the latter half of the last century than he does of Russia in 1947. This ignorance is not entirely due to the limitations of the iron curtain. In part it has been caused by a deliberate myopia when looking towards the east of Europe. The effect, in any case, is that we still read

about life in Soviet Russia with much of the wonderment and credulity with which our ancestors listened to travellers' tales from India and Cathay.

John Lawrence's *Life in Russia* is of particular value because of its moderation and its obvious authenticity. Few men have had better opportunities for writing such a book. In 1942 he was sent to Russia by the Foreign Office to take charge of all British publicity in the Soviet Union and to edit *The British Ally*. His work gave him more freedom to travel than was available to the average Englishman in wartime and he made many journeys—east as far as Sverdlovsk across the Urals, south to Azerbaijan, and south-east to Uzbekistan and Turkmenia.

Many of Russia's wartime scarcities are of interest because they involve problems that have only overtaken us since the war ended. The shortage of consumer goods and the excess of purchasing power over commodities became acute in Russia early in the war. This in turn led to a shortage of food because the peasants "did not feel the need to undertake long and difficult journeys to town to sell their products in exchange for a pocketful of roubles with which nothing could be bought." The Russians solved the problem by turning out more consumer goods and making them available to the peasants through State-owned "commercial" shops at prices high enough to absorb the surplus purchasing power.

To the many who still have inaccurate ideas on the Russian social system, it is instructive to read that "all well-to-do people have some domestic help and as a matter of fact it is much easier to find servants in Moscow than it is in London. The money wage is not high but the employer has to feed his servants and clothe them too, or at any rate to help them out with clothing."

The Russians have developed a most useful little word for a faculty which every Englishman is now learning but for which we have as yet no special word:

There is a special technique of living in

the Soviet Union under war or near-war conditions. The Russians call this technique "Blat", a word which includes everything from the know-how of getting things done to practices which may come very near to corruption. In Soviet Russia there is no corruption in high places whatsoever, so far as I have heard, which is indeed remarkable when one considers the unenviable reputation for corruption of the Tsarist bureaucracy. But Blat is everywhere. Blat is what the French call 'le Systeme D'. It involves knowing the right people for getting things done, and it involves giving one's quid pro quo.

Of Russian methods of enforcing State discipline John Lawrence has no illusions: "Much suffering and loss of life is caused by sheer childish incompetence, but I have not heard of sadistic cruelty."

*Life in Russia* covers a range of subjects almost as wide as the vast geographical area with which it deals—from hospital treatment in Moscow to Shakespeare in Tashkent. My only adverse criticism is the lack of maps. It is tiresome to be told (on page 229) of a scheme "to bring Oxus water to the Murghab oases and eventually to the Tedjen—see map" and to find that the only map is a small-scale diagram on the endpapers which shows neither the Tedjen nor Murghab.

Lack of maps except on endpapers seems to be an infectious complaint. Edward Howell's remarkable escape story suffers from an exactly similar weakness, though to a lesser degree since one of the end-plates is of a reasonable scale. He was badly wounded in the invasion of Crete, was captured and taken to a German hospital in Salonika. With both his arms still useless, he escaped and made a difficult journey on foot to the Aegean coast. From there he got away by caique to the Turkish island of Imbros. The story is exceptional for the author's faith in his own destiny and for his unusual power of narrative. His account of the generosity and courage of the Greek people, always ready to risk their lives to help him on his way, is good reading and a reminder of qualities

which we must not allow ourselves to forget.

GORDON WINTER.

### ECONOMICS OF MIGRATION, by Julius Isaac. *Kegan Paul*. 18s.

Refugees from political, racial and religious persecution, the slave labour used on an unprecedented scale by the Nazis, the mass population transfers, such as that partially effected by the Italian and German governments in 1939 in the South Tyrol, have created in Europe a considerable instability in population movements. It is not these movements *per se* but their connection with political factors that has given them their cardinal importance and their news value. Mr. Isaac's study comes at the right moment and provides a useful corrective to the muddled and often sentimental thinking which to-day surrounds the whole question.

He has in the main restricted his work to the problem of the migration of free individuals and to the economic aspects of emigration and immigration which, as he points out, "are not merely the same act seen from different points of view; they are two different phenomena." Immigration connotes the settlement of an individual in a country willing to accept him as a permanent resident; emigration is generally connected in the emigrant's mind with the notion of a temporary absence from his own country whether the motives be economic or political.

After a preliminary historical survey Mr. Isaac devotes his book to an exhaustive discussion of the control and effects of migration, and its financial results on trade and capital movements.

The nineteenth century was pre-eminently the age of large-scale migration, caused by the unparalleled increase in the population of Europe. The numbers rose from 187 millions in 1800 to 401 millions in 1900. Until 1880 the majority of emigrants came from the British Isles and of the fifty-two millions

who left Europe between 1846 and 1932 more than one-third came from the same source. The situation to-day is totally different. Europe's population is on the decline and vast population movements will not in future flow from Europe. It is in Asia where more people live to the square mile than has ever been the case in the continents of the Western hemisphere that a great aggregate increase of population is to be expected and it is this fact which will in course of time have a major influence on the general distribution of the world's population and on economic developments.

Concerning the present-day situation Mr. Isaac calls attention to two important factors which influence migration, from the point of view of volume and that of direction. State education, social services, nationalist propaganda all create a climate unpropitious to migration. "The individual has to overcome strong inhibitions before he is able to sever the links with his nation for mere economic reasons."

And the nineteenth century rule that an individual sought a country with a higher standard of living than his own has been invalidated, thanks to technical progress and the levelling of civilization. Wherever he goes the migrant may be sure of seeing Donald Duck and Gary Cooper on the films, and wherever he is he can hear broadcasts from his own country.

Mr. Isaac comes to the inevitable conclusion that although the migration of free individuals has in the past made notable contributions to human welfare, planning and control must of necessity be applied to migration in future.

Of the twelve million persons who were scheduled as "homeless" at the end of the war in Europe, only some two million remain to-day and it is estimated that the "core" for whom no easy solution can be found will amount to 500,000 persons. These figures are a tribute to the organizing agencies which have been subjected to an incessant fire of criticism and to con-

siderable political pressure in the course of the accomplishment of their task with Displaced Persons. The absorption into the world economy of the last 500,000 is not a great problem. The essence of the migration problem is the establishment of the correct inter-relationship between the international movements of capital, goods and men. By his impartial, well-documented and sober examination of all the issues which govern and influence these movements Mr. Isaac has made a valuable contribution to economic and sociological study.

H. DU COUDRAY.

### PUZZLED PEOPLE. *Mass-Observation: Victor Gollancz*. 7s. 6d.

### IS THERE AN HONEST GOD? by J. W. B. Worsley. *Macdonald*. 10s. 6d.

Mass-Observation, on the suggestion of the Ethical Union, has produced a volume which deserves the keenest attention not only of all religious leaders, but of all publicists as well. Closely documented as it is, it presents in semi-statistical terms, a picture of the mind of an inner ring suburb in London, and that particular picture is filled out by the observations and comments of Mass-Observation's own special staff in different parts of the country. There can be little doubt that they have, between them, drawn an accurate picture, and that the ethical and spiritual situation is even so. One may doubt the conclusions they draw from their facts and the interpretation they give of the situation; there can be no doubt at all this is the mind with which both priest and politician have to deal. From this point both alike have to start.

The greater part of the book is taken up with the part that religion plays in the mind of 'Metrop', to use the name given to the area on which the report is based, and, quite logically, it begins with the prevalence of belief in God. About two-thirds of the men and four-fifths of

the women said that they believed in God more or less. One man in three, and one woman in five expressed definite doubt, whilst one in twenty, mostly young men, were uncompromising disbelievers. Broadly speaking, the same sort of proportions held good throughout all educational strata, but it is to be noted that there were twice as many non-believers among the young as among the old. The significant thing is that the war was responsible for very little loss of faith, and this, in turn, means that we have to do with an epochal and general trend. We may say that one person in four has doubts about the existence of God.

Belief in God, however, by no means implies acceptance of conventional Christian teaching. Not more than eleven in every twenty of those who go to Church of England Churches believe in life after death, including those who believe in reincarnation, whilst the remainder are at all stages of disbelief and indecision. Nor is the picture any more reassuring when it is a question of such beliefs as the deity of Christ, the Virgin Birth, or such practical issues as an understanding of the meaning of life and attendance at Church. To sum up, it is a picture of a public mind in which religion is steadily losing hold, and of a Church which is itself permeated by doubt and uncertainty. When we remember that these statistics include those for the Roman Catholic Church, it is clear that the situation in Protestantism is appreciably worse than the general statistics suggest.

So far, the mind of 'Metrop' as revealed by this survey shows little that is new, and the figures are remarkably similar to those reached by Mr. Mudie Smith in his survey of the religious life of London a full generation ago. What is new is the emergence of scepticism as a general constituent of the modern mood. Not only religion, but science and politics are being engulfed by it, and this means that in the mind of 'Metrop'

there is a growing vacuum with nothing on the horizon at the moment to fill it. That is a political portent of the utmost gravity, for when men are without God, without hope and without any clear understanding of the meaning of life, they are a prey ripe and ready for the political adventurer who is prepared to provide them with at least the two latter and claim for himself the loyalty hitherto only given to the former. A world which suspects everything is a world prepared to believe the most incredible nonsense whether it be religious or political. A disturbing, even a grim book, but one which will be neglected at our peril.

To turn from *Puzzled People* to Mr. Worsley's volume can only be described as a descent from realism to what it is not too much to call intellectual bathos. Mr. Worsley has not a few shrewd criticisms to make of both orthodox and unorthodox Christian faith, but it cannot be said that he has much to put in its place. His book is cast in the form of discussions between a group of people who sit at the feet of one, Scrooby, who is alleged to be a lecturer in the philosophy of religion at some unnamed university. At the end of the book one of Scrooby's hearers says: "We've found God in values and the spirit" but it never seems to occur to Scrooby to ask "Whose values?" or why one particular set of values should be preferred to any other—issues which would be raised by the callowest undergraduate. However the questions raised by our first volume will be answered, it is safe to say that they will not be answered by the prim preciosity of the second.

B. C. PLOWRIGHT.

**KING HENRY III AND THE LORD EDWARD:** the Community of the Realm in the Thirteenth Century. By F. M. Powicke. *Oxford University Press. Two vols. 42s.*

This is a historian's history, a work of deep erudition. For the ordinary

reader it will be like a daunting quarry, rather formless, yet with its own austere beauty; out of it many, usually lesser men than its author, will draw material for lighter works that will more easily catch the multitude.

It is long and much of it is not easy reading. But those who dream to-day of "One World", those who would have established for all nations a common law and the elements of a common culture, will gain from studying these pages. The Middle Ages were a second Rome. Their peace was neither so profound, nor their ways so cultivated, but a man could walk the length and breadth of Europe and always find understanding.

The figures in this book make a course of internationalists, at home on any western soil. Simon de Montfort, the brilliant rebel, always more French than English, a younger son of the Ile de France, could be offered the governorship of Jerusalem and the regency of France, but chose to be Earl of Leicester and governor of Gascony—an English career that ended at Evesham. Henry III's brother, Richard of Cornwall, refused the crown of Sicily and was made king of the Romans at Aachen. Peter des Roches, born in Poitou, "the friend and companion of popes, emperors and kings," held in time the rich bishopric of Winchester. These men moved easily in a world that knew no frontiers as we know them, along whose roads rode slowly from kingdom to kingdom the legates and innumerable messengers of the Holy See—mundane emissaries of an order supernaturally founded.

This medieval background is more solid than the figure of Henry III himself. Few who lived between Rome and the Renaissance can easily be brought to life. The period is not rich in memoirs (in our sense they did not exist) and chroniclers were not greatly interested in human psychology, or, rather, they were unable to analyse it in detail. Henry III was devoted to the idea of the crusade, to the artistic and religious life;

he venerated relics and went often on pilgrimage to England's local shrines. Westminster Abbey was re-built by him to glorify the remains of St. Edward the Confessor. In these things his heart lay. But he had a keen sense of his right and of what pertained to the King of England, and out of this rose the storms that troubled a life that would have been quiet.

In 1255 Henry accepted from the papacy the crown of Sicily for his son Edmund, but Sicily, in the hands of the Pope's enemies, had first to be conquered; that was part of the bargain. It was the pinch of Henry's efforts to raise money for the Sicilian venture that led to an alliance of the English laity and churchmen against their King and the Pope, and in this clash "began half a century of uncertain, but none the less real, development in whose course parliament and convocation took shape, and

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THE BOOKSHOP KNOWN THE WORLD OVER

the doctrine of representation and consent was given a practical form." In the wars between a king who would go his own way and choose his own counsel and barons who felt they had a right to give the king their counsel and so direct his way, especially when what he did touched their pockets, lies the beginning of the great chain of English constitutional history. But all action, it is necessary to remember, was instinctive and expedient. No prime mover on either side was a political theorist; there was no prophetic Jefferson or Burke. The constitution's first shoots sprang out of appeals to old custom and established rights. No one worked to the pattern of what was to be, for none saw it, or aspired after it.

In these tumultuous rallyings of royalists and rebels, in their prolonged negotiations (where the nature of English bargaining already stands so clear) the book finds its climax. Simon de Montfort is the great and tantalizing character of this period—tantalizing because even the author cannot make him understandable.

This is an academic history in the tradition set by Ranke, an attempt to narrate events and the social scene as they actually were—*wie es eigentlich gewesen*. If the truth in history can never be reached, it is noble (and an immense labour) to seek to get as near to it as possible. Sir F. M. Powicke does not sacrifice humanity in the process, for what is warmly human in the most intractable material he delights to bring out. He has let in more light than any other man to the thirteenth century in England.

WALTER JAMES.

**STRAVINSKY: A CRITICAL SURVEY**, by Eric Walter White. *John Lehmann*. 15s.

**HISTORY OF THE PIANO**, by Ernest Closson, tr. Delano Ames. *Paul Elek*. 12s. 6d.

A penetrating survey of the work of

Stravinsky is still needed. The three best known ballets in their concert-hall form have long ceased to puzzle, but the apparently random changes of style and direction shown in the later works need some explanation. When *Pulcinella* is given a concert performance, and the programme states that it is based on themes by Pergolesi, how can it avoid comparison with, for example, Tommasini's *Good Humoured Ladies* or Respighi's *La Boutique Fantastique*? The average listener receives an impression of a poorly executed work conceived in questionable taste. And what is he to make of those works in which the composer eschews all obvious emotionalism even to the extent of choosing the least expressive instruments and directing them to be played *sans nuances*: the Octet, for instance? Clearly some guidance is due.

In many ways the new book on this remarkable composer is exciting. It presents well integrated factual information about his life and works and one expects to find, and does find, answers to many questions, sidelights on Stravinsky's personality, and much anecdotal illustration. The index seems excellent, the appendices listing works, recordings and books are invaluable for reference, and the fourteen plates are well chosen.

No better series of notes on the works could be imagined, and yet it falls well short of being a critical survey. Perhaps it is too much to hope for more penetrating and wider criticism from one who is evidently a devotee; the reader must attempt his own assessment using the facts here presented. It does not help to be told by Mr. White that *Pulcinella* was a "cheerfully planned rape", and other witticisms of the sort.

Mr. White makes an attempt to deal with the composer's musical philosophy in a short chapter, "The Historical Sense", in which he draws a parallel between Stravinsky and T. S. Eliot. One doubts if either gains by the analogy, but it serves Mr. White well enough in ex-

cusing Stravinsky's fondness for using "derivative material". Other people, more bluntly, have accused him of lacking original melodic invention.

In 1931, complaining about the public's reception of some of his new works, Stravinsky is reported to have said to Heinrich Strobel:

What am I to do? Some say they want me to write music that is shocking and provoking like my earlier works; others say that only now do I write proper music. They think I write like Verdi. Such nonsense! They don't listen right. These people always want to nail me down. But I won't let them! On the next occasion I shall do something quite different; and that bewilders them.

This hysterical outburst sounds almost like a gesture of despair, not defiance, of a man who realizes that he has cared too much about the impression he has been making on the world, his critics and fellow-artists. Possibly here, coupled with unsettling changes of nationality, we have a clue to the reason for his apparent lack of artistic direction. This whole question needs study and readers will be grateful to Mr. White for preparing the ground so adequately.

A romantic pageant of names is unfolded when the history of the piano is considered. It is necessary to go back more than four centuries in order to establish the logic of the development of the piano from its predecessors, the clavichord and the harpsichord and its variants. It is true that the ubiquity of the modern piano has had a pernicious influence upon the appreciation of pre-piano music, and it has been charged with all sorts of crimes against Bach, but it should not be forgotten that the clavichord and harpsichord were both the subject of much dissatisfaction in their own day. Their virtues are unique, but the one has inadequate volume and the other no capacity for nuance. The piano has neither limitation.

The *History of the Piano* covers very well the period concerned and makes one realize that the piano came near to being invented earlier more than once. A

detour of two hundred years was made when, in the sixteenth century, development in the "hammered" instruments (as in the clavichord) was abandoned for the plucked instruments: the first piano action had to wait until the beginning of the eighteenth century.

This book was originally published in Brussels and we may presume that a little lucidity in the technical parts was lost in the translation: some of the diagrams seem curiously divorced from the text. However, the photographs are excellent—there are seventeen—and so is the layout which leaves a refreshing amount of blank paper.

PHILIP MORRIS.



## ALL THE CONFERENCES ARE FAILURES. THIS IS INEVITABLE FOR HOLY SCRIPTURE DECLARES THEIR FUTILITY IN THESE WORDS:—

"Associate yourselves, O ye people  
and ye shall be broken in pieces."

"Take counsel together, and it  
shall come to nought; speak the word,  
and it shall not stand."

"LET GOD BE YOUR FEAR.  
AND LET GOD BE YOUR  
DREAD." (Isaiah viii.)

"And it shall come to pass,  
that WHOSOEVER shall CALL  
on the name of the LORD shall  
be delivered." (Joel ii. 32)

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## BOOKS ON THE TABLE

HAD the walrus contemplated the table's present diversity he might have included a stanza thus: 'Of schools and clocks and Labour's lapse and yucca-moths and rings'. MY WOODLAND FRIENDS by S. L. Bensusan (*Blandford Press*. 10s. 6d.) is no random starting-point however. It is deliberately preferred because its concern for the elementals may be said, at the risk of being portentous (which Mr. Bensusan never is), to make it the natural leader of the remaining sixteen books wherein man-made activity is for the greater part exhibited.

Although "No botanist has anything to learn from me" says Mr. Bensusan, surely with a chuckle, tree lovers wandering about his twenty-acre wood in Essex will learn from him a deeper understanding of the habits and needs of trees, will discover that the lords oak, elm and ash, the ladies birch, beech and lime, and the decorators—sycamore, elder and hawthorn—have a well-defined place, apart from their beauty, in nature's scheme. But most of us love trees first of all because they are beautiful and Mr. Bensusan shows how instinctive is this emotion and how akin to worship. The wood for him is an apotheosis, the cradle of folk-lore and religion. He is stored with legend and fairy-tale and pours out these riches for his own and our delight. To make his book perfect he strictly observes his own maxim: "Modesty and humility should walk side by side with observation."

And Joan Rickaby's woodcuts are as instructive as they are near to Mr. Bensusan's philosophy and intention.

## Departed glories

Continuing the story of man's search for God is VISION OF PERU by Violet Clifton (*Duckworth*. 21s.). In her hands the geography of the region "beyond the Andes" is tied and tangled with myth. She tells of Indian and Spaniard, of slaves and kings, of con-

querors and saints, through the long history of South American civilizations and makes a bright embroidery of it all.—Sir Leonard Woolley's UR: THE FIRST PHASES (*King Penguin*. 2s. 6d.) takes us across Africa to the Euphrates valley of 5,000 years ago. The essay is a pendant to the author's *Ur of the Chaldees* and describes the cemetery, the contents of the tombs and the background that made them possible. Yet the present-day visitor to southern Iraq is forced to wonder "that this unpromising land should have been the birthplace and seat of a great civilization." The sixteen coloured plates quicken the imagination, for they paint without garishness the perfection of art and craft in jewellery, architecture, pottery and weapons.

## Marking time

As a contrast to those days when time was measured by the light and the dark, the tyranny of the clock in the historical age may be estimated in all its tiresomeness. But R. W. Symonds in another *King Penguin*, A BOOK OF ENGLISH CLOCKS, is mainly concerned with the story of the mechanical ones dating from about the thirteenth century. His book is profusely illustrated with photographs that are sufficient in themselves to indicate the progress of the craft. Even the unmechanically-minded will enjoy this book, so pleasantly presented is the erudition and so satisfyingly enlightening is it on many points hitherto uncritically accepted.—It is but a step to the history of a shop and BROWNS AND CHESTER (*Mass-Observation*; *Lindsay Drummond*. 15s.) is an engrossing study of a century and a half in the drapery business. Not merely changing fashions are recorded, in all their allurements, but the story of a family and a city is here bound up too. Particularly interesting are the chapters on the political associations of the firm from those days when to be "a campaigner for the Liberal Party" meant for a tradesman the taking

of a tremendous decision.

## Practical idealism

A modern Liberal, Mr. Elliott Dodds, has undertaken THE DEFENCE OF MAN (*Herbert Joseph*. 5s.), a heavy task for these beleaguered times. He points conclusively to plans which would ensure increasing freedom instead of the increasing restrictions which he feels are being imposed by the Labour Government. He seems to have combined successfully Liberal thought and practical Liberal measures.—Norman Mansfield, too, in FAILURE OF THE LEFT (*Staples*. 10s. 6d.) utters "a plea for the return of the liberal spirit to politics." Though he prefers a small 'I' he and Mr. Dodds are thinking along the same lines. His final section, called "Liberalism the key", stresses that "the liberal must find his idealism in practice and only thus can democracy have the prospect of success."

## The revolutionary spirit

In THE BABEUF PLOT (*Routledge*. 7s. 6d.) David Thomson claims that the *mystique* of Babouvism "casts some light on the meaning of republicanism and democracy in the Fourth French Republic." Babeuf planned a conspiracy in 1796 to overthrow the Directory, and the "Manifesto of the Equals", which was the groups' charter, aimed at restoring the original spirit of the revolution. How this plot failed, how the instigator was brought to trial and execution and how the influence of his theories survived is now told by Mr. Thomson to an English-speaking world which knows all too little about them.—A hundred years ago another nearly forgotten Frenchman was born. His was a spiritual growth, traced by Emmanuela Polimeni in LEON BLOY, THE PAUPER PROPHET (*Dennis Dobson*. 6s.). The most striking quality of his mind is expressed by Miss Polimeni as "his insight into those truths which lie just beyond reason." It is not primarily as a denunciatory prophet that she presents him but as one "whose faith in the Gospel verities led

him to look upon the absence of sanctity among the professed followers of Christ as the world's major disaster."

## Some poetry

Alexander Reid in STEPS TO A VIEW-POINT (*Andrew Dakers*. 5s.) tumbles us from the mystic to the terse with his saying on "Morality":

Let all the sages moralise,  
Life's hollow as their bones,  
If men rise up at morn with sighs  
And go to bed with groans.

But that he is moving towards the formulation of an ideal, or what he fashionably calls "a new synthesis", is clear from his last poem, which is a kind of "These I have loved" recital but with an awareness of the horror that in February 1914 had not yet touched the radiant Rupert Brooke.—In THE INN OF NIGHT (*J. M. Dent*. 6s.) Stanley Snaith has his horrors too. But his bitterness in "The Burial Party" is offset by his tribute to W. N. P. Barbellion, and this second book of poems marks his progress as a poet whose breath is joy

But schooled by pain, that strict-lipped  
doctrinaire.

—FIRST AND SECOND LOVE is a collection of forty-four sonnets by Eleanor Farjeon (*Michael Joseph*. 5s.) which though written over thirty years ago have been withheld until now. One wonders why, for she proves herself a master in this most difficult of all media. So moving, so self-pity-lacking are these sonnets that the reader feels a sense of intrusion; as if the reason for their belated appearance might be that, unlike Byron, their author could not "parade a bleeding heart".

## Where to place them

And now for some sound advice on how to approach a publisher, an editor, a theatre management, a film company, the B.B.C., the markets for music, photographs, drawings and designs, with your book, article, play, scenario, script, score, libretto, camera-study, picture or greeting card. THE WRITERS' AND ARTISTS' YEAR BOOK 1947 (*A. & C. Black*. 6s.)



is the sort of publication that once opened encourages a browse. Of course it is indispensable commercially, though this is computing its merits at the lowest worth. —Another indispensable, educationally, is *THE PUBLIC AND PREPARATORY SCHOOLS YEAR BOOK 1947*, edited by J. F. Burnet and L. W. Taylor (also *A. & C. Black*. 15s.). But let no one from mere lack of a son to place be deterred from study of its pages. As well as the pleasant pastime of comparing the characteristics of schools, there are sections devoted to the pursuit of an occupation in the Services, in Holy Orders and in a long list of professions, from which much concise information may be gathered, just for the sweet satisfaction of curiosity. Who, for instance, could have thought previously that here would be weighed the prospects for a career in veterinary science or in dentistry?

#### A gentle snob

Jane Austen would have revelled in the particulars of our older and more expensive public schools, preoccupied as she was in her pages by the eligibility of the sons of gentlemen. Monica Dickens discusses this obsession with matrimony in her introduction to a new edition of *EMMA* (*Williams & Norgate*. 8s. 6d.) and her essay will whet the appetite of the newcomer and call forth ready agreement from the addict. Without being an extreme Janeite, that is the unswerving reader of a nightly portion, one can always be caught afresh by the special and elusive charm of this book, which as Miss Dickens so truly says, "relies for its substance almost entirely on character, and hardly at all on incident." Like *Persuasion*, its predecessor in this edition, *Emma* is attractively bound and printed, quite an asset psychologically in a "classic".

#### Mr. Morgan and the novel

The bad angel in Charles Morgan's novel *THE JUDGE'S STORY* (*Macmillan*.

7s. 6d.) is an avid rare-book collector. One is always puzzled to discover why a Charles Morgan novel is not entirely satisfactory. His characters are credible enough—it is what they do, as a compulsion from all that they have thought or said, that probably causes the strain. The affair of the wager in this book, for example, is so improbable that the attention wanders, just when the tenseness of the situation should be overmastering. The judge with the book inside him that he has been waiting all his life to write is a living parable and as such may be recognized in every one of us. His love for his ward is real enough too. But the disappointment persists, all the more keenly because Mr. Morgan writes so beautifully.

#### Symbolic embers

The behaviour of the old eccentric in *EMBERS*, by Frank Baker (*Andrew Dakers*. 7s. 6d.), arises spontaneously out of the circumstances of a man living alone in a one-time cricket pavilion, surrounded by cats and clutter, and avoiding the world. In his involuntary contacts with other people his wildest and most irascible statements have in them a grain of shrewdness, of wisdom moreover, which makes his conversation something to be watched for throughout the book. Not all his antics, real or assumed, can make him lose our respect; it is only from his disgusting cats that we recoil. The pattern of young Martin Ward's life seems to be a vague repetition in some respects of the old man's. Ward, too, "lived at a time when less than ever did men want song." The music and the reaction to it are very well conveyed and are in fact inseparable from the atmosphere of the book. Its theme is less tortuous than that of the author's last novel, *BEFORE I GO HENCE*. Nevertheless, that—like this—is a book to ponder well.

GRACE BANYARD.

# THE FORTNIGHTLY

NOVEMBER, 1947

## MEDIEVALISM AND EUROPEAN UNITY

BY SIR HENRY SLESSER

THE unity of Europe, which is now so eagerly and generally sought, in the past has twice been achieved, though in very different forms. First, under a system of military power, administration and technique, supported later by universal law rationalized by the prevailing Stoic philosophy. Secondly, by a far more subtle and tenuous culture, as pervasive as the first, but far less consciously organized; a congerie of many peoples and tribes without any central domination, a spiritual society held together by a common religion rather than by any strong physical or governmental nexus; that unique civilization compacted of piety and cruelty, learning and ignorance, art and crudity of execution, affluence and destitution, philosophy and gross superstition,—unlike the Roman aggregation of provincial cities, a predominantly rural agricultural polity—the medieval Holy Empire.

To us, in the present jeopardy, this society has more direct interest than the classic one in that, like ours, it was compelled largely to proceed by a method of salvage; unlike ancient Rome, it had to build upon a foundation already long prepared. Rome, which to the early fathers, once it had been converted, was the chosen instrument to spread the Faith, (albeit it had previously been denounced as Babylon) was the synonym of civilization. Culture and philosophy and political theory (of Greek origins mostly), law and administration, learning, art and science, all that went to make life other than barbarous, was her heritage. Her very conquerors sought to imitate her ways; Boethius, the minister of a Gothic Roman king, founded himself upon the teachings of the great Christian neo-Platonic philosopher and saint, Augustine, and from these derived those Platonic and other philosophic elements which until the rediscovery of Aristotle were to furnish the middle ages with their mental content. This resulted in the culminating and eclectic achievement of St. Thomas Aquinas who, indeed, took all extant learning as his province, using it for the only purpose which ultimately concerned him, the greater glory of God. It is scarcely to be disputed that, in the West, the instrument most potent to preserve Roman life and to extend its culture among the barbarous and half-civilized was the Church. Through its Popes and Bishops in the towns, and evangelical monastic orders in more rural (pagan) village areas, a new Christian society arose. Fighting its way between the Muslim and heretic Arians, by the military triumphs of Clovis, of Pepin, Charlemagne and others the Roman Empire was re-established upon a Catholic basis—orthodox in faith,

CLXII

looking in administration to an Emperor now avowedly Christian, as the ordinances of the papally consecrated Emperor Charles, dealing as much with spiritual as with secular matters, so clearly show. The physical universality of his Empire, as is well known, did not survive his death. Almost from the first what is now France extorted a practical independence, England also, but the fundamental conception of Rome reborn, a Christian Rome, as a cultural institution had come to stay with varying vigour for at least five hundred years.

Despite superficial disagreements between the secular and spiritual authorities, at all "levels" as we should now say, there is little doubt, when the matter is examined without prejudice, which was the stronger influence. Medieval man was always in fear of the Judgment, his certainty of the perils of damnation never wavered and survived the Protestant Reformation. It was this notion, that few could hope hereafter to enjoy the Beatific Vision, that all would suffer the ordeal and disciplines of Purgatory, that Sin was real and that the Devil was among us, that Angels and celestial powers were interceding for fallen man, which made possible the allegiance given to the Holy Father, to the Bishops and Priests, unarmed and helpless men in an age of violence and very imperfect secular law. Compared with the feudal nobility who were gradually absorbing the lands of the earlier Roman and Gothic commanders and officials, the Church was democratic; many Popes and many of the Hierarchy were of comparatively humble birth. In the priestly order hereditary right, which was gradually establishing itself in the lay world, was unknown. Nepotism and ecclesiastical influence were never so certain as secular inheritance, the Church for the most part stood open to talent and learning, fighting, to quote Gilbert, "was not its trade."

Even Homage, that peculiarly medieval device, and international treaties sought their sanction in religion, as does juridical oath-taking to this day. In brief the medieval system was through and through theocratic. The Ordeal, until abolished by the Church itself, Trial by Battle and the consecrated authority of kings all reposed upon an ecclesiastical foundation.

Another matter, which tended in the earlier medieval period to emphasize its religious nature was the view taken by the Fathers as to the nature of all worldly government, which, they declared, was the fruit of the Fall and man's consequent liability to sin. Slavery and all royal and official governance was thus but a temporary necessity; we detect a similar outlook in the communist writers of our age; once the Kingdom comes, law will be no more and government otiose. Thus, from this viewpoint, administration and power are not in themselves a good, and, being but corrective to sin, came to be regarded as no more than regretful necessities, and, in the tradition of Saint Augustine, themselves tainted with wickedness. Many gospel sayings could be and were cited in support of this final hope of holy anarchy. Those writers who have regarded the constant dispute between Pope and Emperor as a conflict of spiritual and secular have missed the true significance of the quarrel; the Emperor, like the

Pope, claimed a *spiritual* jurisdiction. It was God, who in his consecration had given him the Sword. The sanction for his government and those under him, he claimed, was as spiritual as that of the clergy. The dispute was really about functions. In nothing have the nineteenth century publicists been more astray from the medieval ethos than in their misunderstanding of the Guelph and Ghibelline contentions.

In the thirteenth century, however, largely owing to the renewed study of Aristotle, a change was to come. That philosopher had accepted society as a natural order for man; indeed the Greeks on the whole regard man as only able to achieve his full stature as a member of the city state, and these views, in contradistinction to the notion of law as a protection against sin, were accepted from the Stagyrice, among many other matters, by St. Thomas of Aquin. The renewed study of civil law at Bologna had made this social doctrine already acceptable and it is good law rather than religion which St. Thomas demands of a king, so much so that he who does not govern with justice disentitles himself thereby to the allegiance of his subjects. It must be confessed that St. Thomas follows Aristotle also in the dubious defence of slavery or serfdom, though the age-long argument whether serfdom was to be justified by the natural law or by the law of nations need not detain us. St. Thomas ignores the fact that many of the Stoics, and indeed the early fathers, had denounced slavery, nor can it be said truly that the Church, as such, did much to emancipate the serfs, apologists to the contrary notwithstanding. If any class of Christians fought for their freedom it was the heretical Lollards. Only the citizen was in Greece a free man, and St. Thomas and his followers were willing to make a similar limitation.

It has recently been declared that man will only work when compelled by want or direction. Though the serf was attached to the land he was not a proletarian in the modern sense. Though the compulsion imposed by feudal custom operated to make him yield part of the fruits of his labour to the lord, as the lord in his turn would be required to furnish men at arms to his superior, he could not be deprived of his customary holding.

To compare such subordination with the powers of modern governments would be an error. The duties and rights of the serf and small landholder were defined by usage; custom was the basis of medieval jurisprudence. Legislation in the modern sense was almost unknown in this country; not until the customary services had broken down, largely owing to the effects of the Black Death, were ordinances and laws such as the Statutes of Labourers passed to restrict the tendency of the serf and peasant to wander or find work away from his master; where towns had won rights they were accorded by Charter when not established by practice. St. Thomas in his work on government assumes custom to be the foundation of law. Such a notion, however, was bound to conflict with the growing study and application of the Roman system, itself derived from Byzantium and Justinian, which deprecates even the follow-

ing of case law, by judicial authority, and says that the Emperor alone may make, or alter, laws. Thus, once the Roman Law had taken a hold, the elements of absolutism implicit in it were present; whether the sovereign should or should not be advised by a council or parliament was comparatively unimportant. What we detect in the fourteenth century and onwards is an increasing tendency to interfere with custom by direct edict or legislation. Even in England, where the Roman Law never found a permanent footing, legislation, dealing particularly with matters of land holding, is modifying the older laws, and this is especially noticeable in the time of Edward the First. Municipally, guild regulations are interfering with the older unwritten civic rights.

In the Church canon law plays a very similar part; papal decrees become more numerous and uniformity of liturgy and discipline is enforced. From the fourteenth century we feel that we are passing into an "authoritarian" era. It remains to see how far the change in outlook, as expressed in philosophy and cosmology, can account for this.

To the medieval, it need hardly be emphasized, man is the direct interest of God; each must come separately to judgment, each may partake in the benefits of redemption by the holy sacrifice and the mass, each has an immortal soul, to be saved or damned. Popes and bishops, kings and emperors are all possible candidates for hell fire, as Dante very clearly shows; thus, essentially, the medievalist was a democrat, or at least an egalitarian, however inconsistent with that condition might be his secular treatment of the humble. But then this world, he would say, was not a place for comfort or enjoyment, but for salvation, and there was always the monastery for those, however wealthy, who wished at the expense of their worldly dignity and power to follow their Master. Then again, the earth itself was central to the Universe. The stars, regarded in Aristotelian fashion, revolved in an outer sphere, rotated by angelic forces: below the earth, the infernal region, hell. All were within the creative and sustaining power of God, but for creatures on earth the Natural Law (an inheritance of the Greeks and the Stoics) in particular energized matter in form, life and so the activities of man. The last, being possessed of reason, is also controlled by the "Law of Nations" and his own local municipal law and has, through the Church and revelation and the scriptures, a limited knowledge of the divine law as well. Thus all was explicable; the assertion of Bertrand Russell that the Universe is meaningless, or at any rate that man can never know its meaning, if there is one, would have been denied by the medieval thinkers of all schools. Their reasoning proceeded according to form, being framed upon the logic of Aristotle for the most part. Of change and progress, other than the entelechal development of each creature according to the divine plan, they reckoned nothing. Heaven was unchanging, and the less the things of earth changed the nearer the world resembled heaven; in all this the men of the middle ages were essentially conservative.

Of economics (the consuming interest of modern times), in a Europe pre-

dominantly agricultural, the Church had little to say, save that, as a whole, she regarded all economic questions as a department of ethics. The production of wealth was a minor matter, it is the duty of the rich to endow public buildings and live munificently, niggardliness, "*parvicentia*" is a vice. When trade appears, it also must be regulated on moral grounds, usury is condemned, so also the sale of goods other than at their "just price". The guild is supported by a patron saint, and property, though privately owned, must be used in stewardship, under the virtue known as liberality, to help the less fortunate and enrich society.

"The medievals insisted that all production and gain which did not lead to the good of man was not alone wasteful but positively evil," writes O'Brien in his invaluable essay on medieval economic teaching. In all things Charity rather than the motive of personal gain is encouraged by the prevailing Christian theory; manual labour is honoured and is, indeed, a rule in many monastic orders. The notion of the "classical" economists that competition is the best method of sustaining the community, whether correct or not, is the direct contrary of medieval opinion.

It is notorious that, from the fourteenth century onwards, the ideas and principles of the middle ages were discarded. The concept of a universal Holy Empire yielded to the notion of sovereign independent states, the acceptance of a natural law ceased to find favour—a few years ago a Chancery Judge said that there was no such thing, and a Professor of Law at Cambridge wrote recently of the Law of Nature that it had "long since had its brains knocked out." Philosophy became "emancipated" and, no longer, as with the Schoolmen, sought to defend belief upon rational principles; economics ceased to have any ethical significance and comfort and material power took the place of the Beatific Vision as man's final good. Though a nominal allegiance was given to principles peculiarly Christian, in fact the world was increasingly conducted upon secular considerations. The acceptance of mathematical and experimental knowledge, in what has come to be known as Science, became the sole criterion of truth, and pragmatism and relativity in logic and ontology produced a fundamental scepticism as to the capacity of man to understand anything beyond Universe in flux; all this was considered to be a novelty and sign of progress and emancipation—in reality, in many respects, it was a reversion to the pre-Christian Epicurean conception, to be found in the writings of Lucullus and other materialistic and sceptical philosophers.

This tendency, which has lasted some five hundred years, is now, it is suggested, reaching its last term. Already in Western Europe there are signs of a reversion to an earlier standpoint. Thus in the field of international politics the notion of self sufficient national states is being qualified, and it is occurring to many that it is not true that what may be right on one side of a frontier may be wrong on the other. The preamble to the Charter of the United Nations affirms once more a belief in "the dignity and worth of the human person and

in the equal rights of men and women"; the duty to make recommendations for "promoting respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all" is cast upon the Economic and Social Council—these are notions of natural law which had been declared by Pope Pius XII to have fallen into oblivion and disrespect.

In economics also, regardless of political affiliations, the Manchester school policy of unlimited competition is yielding to moral considerations of protection for the weak and encouragement of vocation and co-operation in industry, and dire need has brought us once more to distinguish between essential and undesirable trades; a contrast markedly medieval. Law once more shows signs of becoming international, both in its civil and criminal aspects; the equality of man is accepted in a manner which only the most advanced of medieval moralists could have conceived possible; in this and many other matters a case could be made for the assumption that already the tide has turned and that the ethos of the last centuries is being abandoned; that Charity is resuming her sway over power as a final regulative factor.

At the same time, it would be superficial to ignore many features of modern life and thought which differ very considerably from the medieval ones. Faith which, it is evident, was the heartblood of the earlier era has not returned. "I have been entrusted with all power, unless, which God forbid, I desert the Faith" was the cry of a recalcitrant emperor of the Middle Ages. To-day religion no longer supports the best parts of society, but, instead, a modernized Stoicism, such as would have found favour with Marcus Aurelius or Seneca, is accepted. Bertrand Russell, whose ultimate views have been quoted, represents, I think, the prevailing opinion of educated people. The ultimate dissolution of organized being, a process continually at work in entropy, is assumed by the great majority, nor, on the material plane, have any valid scientific reasons been given to doubt it. Beliefs in ultimate values of goodness, beauty or truth, existing eternally outside the time-space process, the heritage of Plato, are upheld by few thinkers and at our Universities are unpopular—the reaction from utilitarian progress as an ideal does not appear so far to have found any intellectual or spiritual justification. Our actions would appear to be dictated solely by the regretful consideration that post-medieval principles no longer work and that we must escape as best we may.

Thus, when we hear orations upon European unity, we are constrained to ask ourselves in what does it consist. As at present disclosed it would appear to be limited to the preservation of law and personal freedom and the avoidance of internecine war, important objectives but sadly negative, or is it that the recrudescence of the recognition of Europe as an entity, which is not by any means the same thing as what used to be known as Christendom, though the two are often confused, is but a defence against the challenge of Communism from the east, as Christendom itself was knit by challenge and response from the Arian and the Muslim? If so, it is at a great disadvantage in confronting a

great secular movement which, whether it is to be approved or not, at least has behind it a vigorous faith and a consistent, albeit misguided, philosophy. We cannot avoid the consideration of the challenge of Communism and if we are to meet it we must reckon such assets of the West as have survived centuries of egoistic acquisitiveness and, in trepidation, again cast our balance sheet.

The Bolshevik doctrine which, by persuasion or compulsion, now influences the greater part of Eastern Europe consists of two parts accidentally welded together. If Marx had not studied Hegel, that element in Communism which calls itself the 'materialistic dialectic' might never have arisen; indeed a strong case founded on Christian charity can be made for Communism upon religious assumptions, and throughout the middle ages there were not wanting men, denounced as heretics, who advocated for all an apostolic poverty. It has been said by the orthodox that the early fathers limited their communism to the faithful, in which condition it is still encouraged in the monastic life, but it was a communism sought to be founded upon mutual love. The Russian type is supported, in the view of its believers, by necessity. This deterministic element is the Hegelian contribution. Although Hegel himself in his metaphysic sees the flow from Idea to its *Other* and so to a greater synthesis in terms of Mind (the idea was not with him original), one part of his followers applied this doctrine of "Challenge and Response" to material things, and it was this school which Marx favoured. Having got the principle of 'thing and its opposite' on a philosophic foundation, what easier task than to apply it to the struggle between capital and labour and hence, in his synthesis to the classless society! True to his Hegelian dialectic, he proclaimed this development inevitable. The first stage, the growth of trust and combine from the competition of small traders, has occurred over a wide field, though by no means exclusively; in its turn the State has taken over the trusts (though not, curiously, in Russia where for the most part they never formed) but the classless society is still to seek—so far the result has been, apparently, to throw up a new aristocracy of managers and commissars. So much for Marx; to him must be added the support which the Orthodox Church, always Erastian from Byzantine times, gave to the feudal State of Russia and later to its absolute monarchs. The Church in the eyes of all Russian reformers came to be associated with tyranny, as in our days it has become identified in Spain. As a result, atheism came to be accepted as an emancipating force, yet all the time Communism could have developed as a Christian polity, with more ease to the conscience perhaps than some forms of plutocracy now prevailing in ostensibly Christian countries.

It is interesting to note that the right of property in private hands, now upheld by Catholics as a guarantee of personality, was not defended on that ground by the Schoolmen, but rather on the plea that without hope of gain men would not labour—the compulsion by fear of want.

When, however, we come to liberty and its concomitant rule of law we stand on firmer ground, for here we find a real divergence with regard to the

rights of personality which the Russians, judged only from their own publications, hold as unimportant compared with the welfare of society as a whole, whereas, with all its qualifications it is the view of Western Europe that a society not based upon free persons is not an organic, but a mechanical aggregate. Here the Catholic medieval insistence upon free will, a doctrine in which it disagrees with Calvin, which finds its completest expression in the works of Duns Scotus, laid the basis for that respect for the individual which is lacking among both the Greeks and the Romans. By a paradox the Protestants, who took their stand upon the rights of the person as against the Church, were themselves, more especially if Calvinist, spiritual determinists, and their heresy in this matter has lingered on until the present day. Here, at any rate, the modern Westerner, having defeated the despotic oriental phase to be found in Fascism and its German equivalent, can claim descent from the great medieval Schoolmen. The belief in the liberty of man is consistent with the Christian acknowledgment of the fatherhood of God, but, in fact, the challenge of the Church to the State became feebler as the princes grew in power. Many publicists, Machiavelli and Marsiglio at their head, were found to support the secular monarch and even accord him absolute power. Luther, inconsistently, is of the same opinion, and the doctrine of the Divine right of Kings, as developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, finding echo in these realms, was similarly a denial on the basic medieval assumption that the State is a convenience, the Church, militant and triumphant, eternal.

All this may be, historically, very true, but still the question arises and will take no denial: is it possible to restore the philosophy, morals and creed of the earlier Europe, based upon credal assumptions which few to-day will find acceptable? We fumble and refuse to face the issue; in our Churches we still pray for rain, regardless of the fact that modern meteorology declines to give any countenance to the petition; we still, despite astronomy and astrophysics believe that in some way this earth is of greater importance than the rest of the universe, and that man, despite the physiologists is something other than an animal, and that, psychology notwithstanding, somehow or other he has a soul—even though Professor James denied it. Thus we are confused, irresolute and self contradictory; a medley of tradition, emotion, scientific scepticism and personal yearning. Above all we differ from the middle ages in doubting, in many cases, the promise of personal immortality.

Is it possible then out of this evasive confusion to refound Western culture, and if so, what manner of culture shall we hope to establish? From the middle ages we may at least borrow the dogma of charity, of personality and of law, possibly of international sovereignty, but it would appear, little more.

Dr. Demant, in his latest work, *The Theology of Society*, has suggested that for a society to be Christian it is not necessary for the logical consequences of a body of dogma concerning the relation of God and Man to be consciously

held by the many. If the prevailing culture will induce a man to act in a Christian way and Christian assumptions are the cultural basis of a society, it may still resist disintegration. No longer are the activities of man, however, he points out, related to God; we are possessed of a functionless ideal such as "full employment", without consideration of the purpose or value of an occupation which is no longer vocational. An internationalism, which merely demands larger areas of governmental power, is useless when the purpose of the nations is not related to worship; in other words, though he does not say so in terms, Dr. Demant would have us recover the dogmatic convictions as to the dependent position of man upon his God which moderns have forgotten—and we may add, of the supreme concept, so long as man lives upon this earth, of the Kingdom of God. So in ethics morality is the effect and not the cause of redemption, but to the modern mind the whole conception of sin and redemption therefrom is almost meaningless. For this we may in part blame the Church itself for inadequacy of teaching and example. Whatever may be the effect of science in the philosophic sphere, in the realm of values, redemption stands as a need of man.

Another weakness in the demand for the unity of Europe is its insistence upon geographical considerations. Much of Europe has departed from its earlier culture, but, on the other hand, the European tradition has spread overseas and is now perhaps as strong in the Americas and the Dominions as it is in England or in France. There is a sense of unreality in these days of rapid communication in stressing these physical proximities which we call Europe and this confusion may prove very injurious to the success of the underlying notion. In the middle ages Christendom was a geographical entity, at times it excluded parts of Spain and, later, of the old area of the Eastern Empire; on the other hand it spread to parts of the Germanies and Scandinavia which had never been a part of the Roman imperium even at its widest extent. It would appear therefore to be impossible, if by Europe a culture is meant, (there are as many Catholics in the United States and Australia as in Western Europe), to restrict it to the western end of a sub-continent. Indeed, notwithstanding Hilaire Belloc, "Europe is the Faith and the Faith is Europe", the medieval notion of Christendom, as in the acceptance of converted Jews or Turks into the family, knew no boundaries of race or area.

At bottom, however, the most essential difference between the medieval and the modern mind lies in the conception of the relationship of reason and faith, for, as St. Thomas wrote, the will is directed by the intellect. The early apostolic fathers, it may be conceded, followed St. Paul in discounting the value of general thought, that is of philosophy, which was never characteristic among the ancient Jews. With the Hellenic conversions a new attitude developed, the neo-Platonic schools, particularly that of Alexandria, realized that to satisfy the full nature of man, who after all is a reasoning animal, though his reasons may often be erroneous, it was necessary to recon-



cile the Christian creed with metaphysic. This task was attempted by St. Clement of Alexandria and his successors who identified the Platonic Logos with Christ or, later, with the Holy Spirit, and, avoiding gnostic heresies of emanation, saw in the Incarnation and Creation that passage from the one to the many which was the outcome of Greek philosophic thought. From the Alexandrian school came Athanasius, whose trinitarianism had a philosophic foundation and St. Augustine, greatest of Christian neo-Platonists.

The Platonists held to the doctrine of Universals, the conception of ultimate values, which have an independent reality apart from time or space, and this view, undoubtedly, was easier of assimilation to the Christian idea of the Godhead than the later Aristotelian denial of them save as mental conceptions, a view expressed first in logic by the Nominalists and, later, by philosophers such as William of Ockham at the end of the medieval epoch. But even St. Thomas, who remains the chosen Doctor of the Roman Church, was sufficiently influenced by the new Aristotelian approach to deny that either the cardinal doctrine of Creation, or the Trinity could be defended on rational grounds, here differing from the earlier thinkers. Thus he, the intellectual defender of orthodoxy, drove a wedge into the unity of faith and reason, a divergence which steadily developed, until finally, the pious, particularly the Protestant, abandoned any attempt to reconcile the two. Faith became a matter of grace which needed no intellectual support while, on the other hand, the secular philosophers gradually abandoned faith altogether in the interests of reason, but by this time the medieval period was over and Descartes and Kant reigned supreme.

In our time we have witnessed the overthrow of the reason in its turn, not in the interests of religion, but in that of instinct or emotion. The view of Duns Scotus that Will dominates Mind is more acceptable to the moderns than the Thomistic insistence on the supremacy of Reason. However this may be, here is another obstacle to the re-integration of Europe, an intellectual one, for modern empiricists, whether called pragmatists or existentialists, relativists or behaviourists, not to speak of the founders of the new logic (which would curtail altogether the powers of reason to the relative and make of God a meaningless expression) are to be found outside Europe, in the United States as well as in Vienna or Paris.

A reading of the Giffard Lectures, devoted to the relation of Man, the Universe and Deity, discloses, to those who analyse them a complete absence of any prevailing belief; they are eminently personal and idiosyncratic, and the number who speak with such orthodoxy as would have satisfied the most liberal of the medieval Schoolmen is very limited. Despite the persuasions of Gilson, Maritain and the neo-Thomists the school of modern European thinkers who base themselves upon the methods or creeds of the medievalists is very small, and, it would appear, likely to remain so.

Yet another cleavage between modernism and the middle ages lies in the

application of toleration, for man has never been very receptive of ideas which he conceived to be evil or inconvenient. To the medievalist the supreme crime was infidelity—once that is grasped his attitude towards heresy becomes more intelligible and the Inquisition, though not to be defended, at least a consistent institution. On a less penal plane, the constant examinations of ecclesiastics and others suspected of false doctrine cannot escape the notice of the student of the times. Treason was a local, a municipal, crime, immeasurably less serious than the danger to man's salvation involved in the teaching of wrong ideas. Sinful behaviour is the lot of every man, but the denial or perversion of faith was inexcusable. To-day we have reversed the order of demerit; to betray the nation or subvert the constitution, or to attempt to do so, is a wrong almost unpardonable; the secularist and the atheist may conduct their propaganda with impunity, and blasphemy as a crime is almost as obsolete as witchcraft.

We are not concerned here to commend or condemn this shift of emphasis; it arises from the general mental climate of the two ages, but it illustrates their incompatibility and the difficulties which lie in front of those who think that a restored Europe will be likely to establish once more those ancient ways of life derived from Greece, from Jerusalem, and from Rome which made united Europe what it was. To-day the young are untaught in Latin, the universal language of the medieval scholar, nor versed in Greek which it was the glory of the Renaissance to recover. A secular gradation of power is referred to as 'hierarchy', persons of an exact mind are called 'meticulous'—the classic meaning of words is fast being lost and the culture of the old grammar school of the "Liberal arts", the trivium and quadrivium, is at an end; modern education is scarcely calculated to restore medieval or classical values.

Is then Europe anything more today than hypostatized geography? It is a question not easy to decide; economically a case has been made, apparently, for co-ordination, but how far that involves the institution of a novel culture or the recovery of an old one is a problem which only the very wise or the very rash will be inclined to determine.

This much, however, may be observed, that the apparent unifying influences which at present obtain, namely those of general scientific knowledge and application, facility of communication and administrative capacity are just those in which the middle ages (though not classical Rome) were most deficient. On the other hand, as has been so often declared, medieval men possessed a common spiritual and idealistic principle which to-day is very lacking; in modern phrase they had, what we have not, a uniform and coherent ideology. The fissure between modern conceptions of democracy held in West and East is far deeper than the much emphasized conflict between Church and State, in Pope and Emperor; besides modern incompatibilities the conflicts of papacy and the councils appear to be mere difference of administrative power. The future will decide whether the material necessity of union or the possession of a common morality and metaphysic is the more compulsive and enduring.



## GERMAN REPARATIONS

BY TIBOR MENDE

THE question of reparations from Germany has been one of the principal conditioning factors in inter-Allied relations since the end of the 1939-1945 war. The urgent need to repair quickly the devastated economy of the Soviet Union and to save its people another long period of hardship and economic up-hill work, has determined the Soviet rulers' attitude on the question of reparations ever since the Potsdam meeting of the Big Four. Once the hopes for a direct American loan to the Soviet Union were frustrated, Soviet demands for large scale reparations from Germany became more and more insistent. The conviction that the Soviet Union had borne the brunt of the battle against the common enemy and the consequent moral claim on Allied assistance to alleviate the efforts of the devastation suffered, have given added emphasis to Soviet claims and have given to these demands a psychological colouring in inter-Allied negotiations. The principal testing ground of the Soviet claims has been the debate over reparations from current German production.

The signatories of the Potsdam Declaration recognized that speed was an important factor in carrying out the German reparations programme by agreeing that the Occupying Powers should determine within six months from August 1, 1945, the amount of industrial capital equipment to be removed from Germany in reparations, and by allowing two years thereafter for the physical removal of that equipment. Special provision was also made for advance deliveries to begin immediately. The Paris agreement of November 1945 which created the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency (I.A.R.A.) also emphasized the early completion of the reparation task. Though with various delays, I.A.R.A. was notified of allocations of removable equipment and has been carrying out its functions ever since its first Assembly meeting in Brussels in February 1946. The last list of reparations allocations, just submitted to the Agency, and completing reparations in equipment and machinery removed from Germany, will mark the end of reparations of this kind as soon as the earmarked machinery is distributed among the nations entitled to reparations from Germany.

The estimated value of the 682 plants, the final total of removals from the British and American zones, is about \$200,000,000 but it is conceded that their real value to-day may be around four times this figure, or just under one billion dollars. In addition, however, the Allies have already received as

reparations German shipping to the value of \$145,000,000. Some external German assets still await distribution. Their total value is estimated at nearly one billion dollars but, largely owing to the reluctance of the Swedish and Swiss Governments to release them, no one expects that more than a fraction of that amount will be available for distribution in the foreseeable future.

All this together amounts to one and a quarter billion dollars at best, an insignificant figure compared to the damage suffered by Germany's former victims. Even if one considers heavy capital removals from the Soviet zone of occupation and the steady drain of current production by the Occupying Power, with the additional over a billion dollars reparations, these add up to a very small figure compared to the \$20,000,000,000 accepted by President Roosevelt as a basis for discussion on the amount of German reparations, at the Yalta Conference.

This, however, completes the story of only one type of reparations from Germany and leaves the question of reparations, from current production or in the form of German labour, unaffected. With the total amount of reparations removals from the western zones finally determined, it is certain that the reparations thus allowed are inadequate to compensate for even a reasonable part of the damage that Germany inflicted on the majority of the countries entitled to reparations. As a result, their continued demand for reparations will carry great weight with their respective public opinions and will also command considerable sympathy among world public opinion as a whole.

The history of this problem goes right back to the time of the Crimea Conference. Part V of the Crimea Protocol, entitled "Reparations", detailed three types of reparations to be exacted from Germany: removals, "annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed," and the use of German labour. In the Potsdam Declaration it was stated that the payment of reparations by Germany "should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany, the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports."

Four weeks after the Potsdam Conference, on August 30, 1945, upon his return to the United States, Edwin W. Pauley, the personal representative of President Truman and head of the U.S. delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations which met in Moscow between Yalta and Potsdam, declared in a public statement that "with respect to the amount of and time limit on, annual recurring reparations—reparations extracted in the form of current production from year to year—no decision can be made until the character and amount of removals of industrial capital equipment have been determined by the Allied Control Council and the future economy of Germany is more clearly defined." This statement, of course, does not indicate that the head of the United States'

delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations believed that Potsdam had ruled out current production as a source of reparations.

But at the Moscow Conference of March 1947 both the American and British delegations maintained that Potsdam had annulled the provisions of the Yalta agreement on reparations from current production and they refused even to study the question. The French stood for a compromise and M. Molotov, to counter the British and American attitude, introduced a hitherto unpublished protocol to the Yalta agreement signed by President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin, dealing with the problem of reparations. The protocol, at the time, still marked 'top secret' in American archives, was published in the Moscow papers of March 19, 1947. Its Section B, apart from removals and the use of German labour, clearly provides for German reparations from "annual deliveries of goods from current production after the end of the war for a period to be determined." The Soviet and American delegations agreed, according to the same protocol, that the Moscow Reparations Commission in its study of the question "will adopt as a basis for discussion the proposal of the Soviet government that the grand total of reparations" of removals and from current production "is to be \$20,000,000,000 of which fifty per cent. of this sum goes to the Soviet Union." The British delegation maintained that until the examination of the reparations question by the Moscow Reparations Commission, no reparations figures should be named. This, then, is the only concrete indication of the amount of reparations from Germany the Soviet authorities expected.

Since this original agreement the actual situation has completely changed. The zonal divisions in Germany have been perpetuated for a number of reasons, the refusal to allow reparations from current German production being, probably, one of the principal among them. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has proceeded to compensate itself both with removals and deliveries from current production from its own zone of occupation. No one, of course, is in a position to estimate the value of equipment and goods thus obtained. There can hardly be any doubt, however, that even with the addition of the Soviet share of reparations from removals from the western zones, the Soviet Union could hardly have obtained anything like \$10,000,000,000 worth of reparations from Germany, the amount claimed at the Yalta conference.

In all probability the desire of the Soviet rulers to accelerate their country's economic recovery still figures among the principal considerations moulding Soviet external policies. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that a renewed Russian demand for reparations from current German production would be one of the principal conditions posed in case of a last-minute consideration of German unity at the next meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. In fact, Russian pre-occupation with economic reconstruction would justify the conclusion that the acceptance or refusal of such Russian claims might decisively prejudice the chances of an eventual last-minute unification of Germany.

It is possible to maintain that the Potsdam Declaration can hardly be regarded any longer as a common denominator for any new departure on the question of a united Germany and that the partitioning of Germany ought to be regarded as a lasting arrangement. Even if one accepts this reasoning, the question of reparations from current production is likely to remain a live issue. Should Germany's partitioning be lasting, the reparations claims of the U.S.S.R. and Poland may be disregarded but the eighteen member nations of the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency may still raise their claim for such reparations.

In fact, at the November 1945 Paris Conference on Reparations twelve of the eighteen members of I.A.R.A.—Albania, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway and Yugoslavia—recorded their conviction that their justified demands for reparations will not be met without recourse to current German production and services. There is, of course, no reason to suppose that these twelve countries have had any reason to change their attitude since that conviction was recorded.

The basic question is, naturally, whether Germany is or will be able to pay reparations from current production. Accustomed to the flow of bleak news from occupied Germany, one is inclined to dismiss the question as absurd. Closer examination of the problem, however, may reveal different facts.

The Potsdam Declaration provided that a living standard should be maintained in Germany "not exceeding the average of standard of living of European countries" excluding the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. Standard of living is a peculiarly vague term and it would be difficult to calculate exactly what living standard for Germany this clause really prescribes. Taking Colin Clark's figures for average real income per head, of occupied population, in different countries, expressed in international units for the period between 1925 to 1934, German average real income during this period was more than 30 per cent. above the Continental average. In other words, a reduction of some 23 per cent. would have been necessary during the period under review to bring the German level down to the Continental average. For comparison, we may use what is reported to have been the western Allies' argument on this subject at Inter-Allied negotiations during 1945 and 1946. It was assumed that over fifteen years before 1939 the average income of Continental Europe was about thirty per cent. below that of Germany's and in 1932, for instance, her average income was some thirty per cent. below that in 1938. Thus, it was argued, the 1932 German consumption levels can be regarded as a broad guide to the average level that has to be achieved in post-war Germany. This, therefore, accepts a standard of living thirty per cent. lower than in 1938.

As is well known, on the basis of the new level of industry announcement, altogether enough industrial potential is left in western Germany to achieve by 1951 the industrial level of 1936. According to an official announcement, moreover, Germans in the combined zones might reach eighty per cent. of their pre-war standard of living by 1951. If the Potsdam Declaration's pro-

vision regarding Germany's future standard of living is still valid, and there is no moral reason why it should not be, a reduction of Germany's pre-war living standard by about thirty per cent. by 1951 would be necessary. This is ten per cent. lower than what is now officially promised to the Germans.

It cannot be forgotten, moreover, that between 1933-1939 Germany's expenditure on armaments totalled about R.M. 90 billion or about twenty per cent. of the average yearly national income. In other words with armaments production non-existent an industrial level some twenty per cent. lower than in 1936 ought to result in the same standard of living as in that year. Thus, to bring post-war Germany's standard of living in line with the continental average, her productive capacity ought not to be equal to that in 1936 but at least twenty per cent. lower. Even if one considers the population increase in the western zones this would still mean a reduction, leaving not eighty but about seventy-five per cent. of pre-war living standards as consistent with the Potsdam Declaration's provisions. This, of course, accepts that the standard of living of the European countries will be restored to pre-war levels by 1951, by no means a certainty. If by 1951 therefore, western Germany is to surpass the average Continental level of living standards, it will depend merely on the rate of her industrial and agricultural recovery as to when, between now and 1951, she will reach the actual point beyond which she could pay reparations from current production without lowering her living standard below that prescribed in the Potsdam Declaration.

Many of the countries entitled to German reparations would thus obtain goods which were sold to them in the past exclusively by Germany and would not constitute any competition to their home industries. Moreover, the bulk of Germany's exports are expected to be sufficient to pay for her essential imports some time before 1951. When in five to ten years' time the present sellers' markets will be replaced by buyers' markets, it is unlikely that Germany will be able to sell all the goods she would like to in the world markets. The stream of reparations goods may then conceal an unsaleable surplus and may not even constitute a real deficit from export capacity. Its significance in maintaining full employment for a period of years, in at least some of Germany's important industrial branches, on the other hand, is self-evident.

It is important to point out that reparations deliveries from current German production would be consistent with any global assistance scheme for this continent. If the countries entitled to reparations from Germany could obtain urgently needed machinery and other goods from Germany, such deliveries would speed up their individual economic recovery and, indirectly, the revival of European prosperity.

German deliveries, over a period of years, would certainly diminish the amount of financial assistance the countries in question would require of the United States. A certain gain in efficiency and corresponding economies would also result from the fact that German reparations deliveries could be planned

so that Germany might supply materials and goods suited to specific local requirements instead of standard qualities produced for the ordinary market. It is likely that the sum total of advantages accruing to the various recipient countries from German deliveries, expressed in their accelerated rate of economic recovery, may far exceed the possible disadvantages of an eventual delay in balancing Germany's external trade accounts. By making Germany the workshop of the countries she formerly exploited, the amount of direct U.S. dollar aid required by these same countries would proportionately decrease.

With the announcement of the new level of industry plan for western Germany and the publication of the final list of plants earmarked for removal, the decision has become apparent to leave Germany in possession of sufficient industrial potential to allow her to continue to dominate Europe's economy. The threat to the nations of the European continent implied in these decisions makes the integration of German productive capacity into a peaceful European economy more imperative and more urgent than ever before. The planning involved in the delivery and reception of German reparations from current production would be a first step towards such integration.

To determine the date from when Germany would be able to pay reparations from current production is a matter of statistics. But to make it sure that she does pay such reparations is a matter of justice. Opposition to such deliveries, whether it is on the part of German political leaders or Allied officials, can mean only two things. The first is that the one-and-a-quarter billion dollars' worth of reparations already delivered or to be delivered by Germany, in addition to what the Russians have already taken out of their zone, is sufficient to compensate Germany's former adversaries for all the destruction and misery she inflicted on them. The second is that Germany is entitled to be left in a dominating economic position in the centre of the European continent. The first is obviously unconvincing and the second is understandably repellent to the countries who will have to continue to live on the same continent with the Germans.

## EMPIRE MIGRATION

BY SIR J. HOPE SIMPSON

GREAT BRITAIN cannot live save by the import of very large amounts of food. In the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 enemy action seriously interfered with the flow of imports. In the former of these two wars the nation was at one time in acute danger of starvation. In the possible event of another war, it is argued, the interruption of supplies to Great Britain is likely to be even more acute, owing to the technical improvement in the submarine, in its speed, in the power of its armament and in its capacity for prolonged submersion. This danger of starvation, it is said, can only be completely overcome by production, within Great Britain, of sufficient food to maintain its population. This is not possible if the population to be fed remains in the neighbourhood of fifty millions.

The same argument, however, applies to the import of arms, ammunition, military equipment of all kinds, petrol and oil, and raw materials of manufacture, all of which are essential to the conduct of war by Great Britain. As a means of survival in war, it is certainly not enough that the country should be able to feed its population on home-produced food. The necessity for imports of other kinds on a prodigious scale would continue, and the suggested reduction of the population by ten or fifteen millions might well so weaken the country as to render victory much less certain.

To-day the Dominions, especially Australia and Canada, are in need of largely increased population, both for their material development and for safety in time of war. In the last war, Australia escaped invasion only by the intervention of the United States of America. Her population of seven and a half millions is in no sense adequate to defend her territory, were she to be attacked.

A further reason for a rapid increase in Australia's population lies in the pressure of population in many far eastern countries, notably in India, in parts of the Dutch East Indies, in China and in Japan. In India alone the annual increase of population amounts to five millions. There is obvious political danger in the existence of wide empty spaces in a White Australia, which could provide *lebensraum* for some of the surplus population of those countries, but to which access is refused. It is easy to understand and to accept the principle of a White Australia, but it is not equally easy to defend that doctrine, unless effective steps are taken to fill the empty spaces with a white population.

Australia now seriously plans to increase her population as rapidly as she can with the help of immigration from Europe, and particularly from Great Britain. The Minister for Immigration has stated that it is the intention of the Australian Government to raise the population of the country to twenty millions in the course of the next two generations, that 400,000 people now in Great Britain wish to migrate to Australia at once, of whom Australia would like to take at least 50,000 a year as an immediate measure, but that the ultimate target is a minimum of 70,000 a year. If, however, the plan for an Australia of twenty million inhabitants in sixty years is to be carried through, the annual addition should be some 210,000. Allowing for natural increase at rates prevailing during recent years, the plan would demand an average of 150,000 immigrants each year.

Canada also hopes for a material increase in her population, which is to-day about twelve and a half millions. She has a Commissioner for European emigration in charge of an office in London. The rate of natural increase in the population of Canada is large. In 1944 the birth-rate exceeded the death-rate by 14.1 per thousand, and the estimated population in 1945 exceeded that of 1941 by 53.2 per thousand. It is, however, believed that the country could easily support a population of fifty millions. The natural resources and the agricultural possibilities of Canada are very great and their exploitation to the full might have an immense effect on world prosperity. The production of a fully populated and fully developed Canada might indeed rival in importance that of the United States.

Canada does not want unplanned migration. At the Third Unofficial Conference on British Commonwealth Relations, held in London in 1945, one of the Canadian delegates stressed this point. "Canada has often taken migrants 'in large gulps' . . . and has found them difficult to digest."\*

Willingness to accept migrants from Great Britain has also been expressed by the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa. Many are already on the move to that country. More wish to go when transport conditions permit. This is a new feature in migration. "While it would seem desirable from the point of view of the white population of South Africa that it should be strengthened numerically, the country has had little attraction for immigrants."†

Political conditions in the Dominion are much complicated by racial problems. Of a total population of about ten millions, one-fifth only is of European descent. Of these over fifty per cent are of Dutch, over thirty per cent. of British origin. Between the whites and the natives of the country, of whom there are some seven millions, there is a class of 'coloured' inhabitants of mixed white and dark blood, which numbers three-quarters of a million and is said to be increasing rapidly. Again there are 200,000 East Indians, of whom eighty per cent. were born in South Africa. The large majority are in

\* *The British Commonwealth and World Society*, p. 117. Oxford University Press, 1947.

† *The British Empire*, 2nd edn., p. 73. Royal Institute of International Affairs: Oxford University Press, 1938.

Natal. Against strenuous opposition, these Indians demand social, economic and political advantages at present only enjoyed by the white population. There is further the political struggle between the Dutch and the British elements in the white population.

In addition to political malaise, social and economic difficulties abound for the immigrant into South Africa at the present time. Housing is as scarce as it is at home and rents for dwellings on lease and prices for those for sale are inflated. The annual average income per head in South Africa is some twenty-seven per cent. higher than that in Great Britain, but the cost of living is high. South Africa does not seem to offer an outlet for any large number of would-be emigrants from Great Britain, though there are doubtless profitable openings in that Dominion for a limited number of skilled men and women in various occupations. There is no question here of filling up empty spaces by the admission of families or groups.

New Zealand, in area larger than Great Britain and Northern Ireland, has to-day a population less than two millions. Emigration to that country has not been large in the past, and it is remarkable that, in the years 1934 to 1937 inclusive, the number of those leaving the Dominion exceeded the number of immigrants by 2,400. The argument for an increase of population in Australia applies, though with less urgency, to New Zealand, which is more remote from the congested Pacific areas and has a climate less well suited to oriental peoples. At the moment opportunities for priority admission to New Zealand are restricted to persons qualified for certain classes of employment, with age limits of twenty and thirty-five. Some four thousand people have applied, of whom 370 have so far been transported. These are all single, and in its Information Paper for prospective settlers the New Zealand government writes: "In view of the acute housing shortage in New Zealand and the lack of shipping, it will not be possible to include married couples or family groups in the immigration scheme for at least two years." This sentence is underlined.

At home the urge to migration, which was wide-spread after the war of 1914-1918, is to-day, as a result of the World War, even more obvious and more wide-spread. Mr. Calwell's statement, that 400,000 have registered in London as wishing to emigrate to Australia, was amplified by Mr. Winston Churchill in his broadcast of August 16 last. He said: "I read and am told that, after two years of Socialist rule, more than half a million of our people have applied to emigrate from this island to Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and several hundred thousand more want to go to the United States of America or South America. These must be among our most lively and active citizens in the prime of life, who wish to go to some place where they can make the best of themselves and their children."

There are ample reasons for this ferment. Many have been unsettled by life in the various branches of the armed forces during the war with its attend-

ant adventure and experiences. Many, again, who were engaged in modest and monotonous work before the war, rose to positions of responsibility and ended as senior officers. These, naturally, are now reluctant to return to their pre-war positions. Yet they cannot find openings in this country which they think to be fitted to the ability which war conditions have shown them to possess. The acute shortage of housing and the restriction in the standard of life, which began under the stress of war and have become even more acute since the war ended, cause much discontent. In addition there is progressive interference with personal freedom due to governmental controls, which are necessary and inevitable in the circumstances of to-day, but which are none the less irksome. From these emigration seems to offer an avenue of escape. In certain classes of the population greatly increased taxation and increasing insecurity of capital have created or stimulated the wish to emigrate to some country where, it is thought, the attack on wealth would be less severe and taxation less oppressive. It is noticeable that in its Memorandum attached to the Immigration Questionnaire, the South African Government gives examples of taxation. Among other examples, these show that a single man with an income of £5,000 a year would pay slightly over £1,500 in income tax, a married man without children with income of £600 would pay slightly less than £29. Reports from residents in the Dominions often suggest that conditions of life there are easier and more comfortable than at home, and these tend to stimulate discontent, unrest and the desire to emigrate.

There are thus reasons to-day which will result in the migration of perhaps from half a million to a million inhabitants of Great Britain to the Dominions or elsewhere, as opportunities for travel become available. Seemingly the classes from which these migrants will be drawn will in the main be of the well-to-do who hope to export their capital and live on their income elsewhere, and of those, aged under forty, whom Mr. Churchill described as "our most active and lively citizens in the prime of life." The movement has been caused by temporary conditions and there is at present no evidence that it will persist, or that it will gain momentum so as materially to affect the size of the populations in Great Britain and the Dominions.

In the United Kingdom to-day, the under forty group numbers some twenty-nine millions—over 58½ per cent. of the estimated population at the end of 1946. Were this group to be reduced by ten millions, the percentage of those remaining would be slightly over 48½ of the reduced population. Even more serious would be the increase in the percentage of the over sixty group. This was 15.3 per cent of the estimated population at the end of 1946. The migration of ten millions of the under forty group would raise the figure to nearly nineteen per cent. It is, of course, obvious that the migration of anything like ten millions could only be carried out over a term of not less than twenty, or, more probably, not less than thirty years. But the ultimate effect, if migration were confined to those under forty, would be largely to increase

the proportion of that class of the population which is an inevitable burden on the national economy and, by reducing the number of those on whom that burden falls, to increase its weight. Clearly, if an emigration policy on a large scale is approved, steps must be taken to ensure that the emigrants are not confined to the younger generation, but include a fair share of those over forty.

A further matter which must gravely affect the decision on a policy of extensive migration is the debt of this country, both, at home and abroad. The nominal value of the National Debt at March 31, 1946, was £13,450 million. This is about £272 per head of the population. A decrease of ten millions in the population would raise the per capita sum to over £340 on those who remained. The difficulties in connection with the foreign debt, especially the dollar debt, would become even more acute. To-day a colossal increase in exports is demanded, combined with severely restricted home consumption. The labour force is already not large enough to produce all that is needed. No material reduction in that force could be allowed, unless accompanied by some arrangement under which a proportionate amount of the foreign debt was accepted by the Dominion to which the migrants were transferred.

In so far as the export drive is planned to meet current costs of food, a reduction of the consuming public by ten millions would result in a corresponding fall in those costs, and, if agricultural labour were not affected by migration, imports of food would fall even more than proportionately. That would imply that the whole of the migrants would belong to the other and mainly the industrial classes of the community. This again would mean that raw materials for manufacture would not be needed on the same scale as they are needed to-day, which would in its turn reduce the current costs of imports. It would, however, also mean a large reduction in the production of goods both for home consumption and for export. Before a policy of mass migration were adopted, this aspect of the resultant economic effect would require careful, expert examination.

In Great Britain the plans of the late Coalition and of the present Labour government, plans made on the basis of existing and prospective population, have provided for very wide development in the social, educational and economic conditions of the country. These have inevitably meant a very large increase in the national yearly expenditure. Health and education alone are calling for an increased annual expenditure of hundreds of millions. Plans have also been laid for the development of electrical power to meet the needs, domestic and industrial, of the population of Great Britain as it is to-day and, in the absence of mass migration, may be expected to be tomorrow. Were a policy adopted which aimed at the reduction of the population to thirty or thirty-five millions plans already made must be revised,—extensions contemplated and in part begun, must be curtailed. Mass migration would have inevitable and important repercussions on domestic policy.

In an article in a recent issue of a popular journal Mr. Calwell wrote: "Great Britain would be better off and the Empire would be in a far better position, if some ten to fifteen millions of people could be transferred from Britain to the Greater Britain overseas. A long-range policy should aim at bringing about this transfer . . . Since Britain is over populated, it is greatly to the advantage both of those who go and of those who stay, that there should be a movement of millions of people from Britain to the Dominions. A man who leaves Britain for Australia helps himself, he helps Australia and he helps the British Commonwealth. But above all he helps Britain. . . ."\*

The important questions seem to be whether Great Britain is, in fact, over-populated, whether it is desirable, in the interests of Great Britain herself, the Dominions and the world in general, that a material portion of the population, say one-third, should find homes and livelihood in the Dominions, and, if so, what measures should be taken to ensure that result. The long view and a definite policy are demanded, but it is clear that it would be to the serious disadvantage of the Mother Country that she should lose millions of the under forty age-groups and be left with a largely increased proportion of the population above that age. Nor can she afford to lose large numbers of the well-to-do.

That Australia is under-populated may well be accepted as a true statement of fact, but Mr. Calwell does not support his allegation that Britain is over-populated by any evidence. During the slump of the 1930's there were two million unemployed in this country, a fact which might be adduced as an argument that the country contained more people than it was able to support. That argument, however, at that period, might be used to support the view that the United States was grossly over-populated, as the number of unemployed in that country was certainly six times as great as those unemployed in Great Britain. Yet it has never been suggested that the United States are unable to support the existing population. The standard of life in the United States, in normal times, is higher than that in any other country in the world. In normal times, the standard of life in Great Britain is more than adequate and is higher than that of most of the highly developed countries of Europe. It cannot be denied that to-day the standard of life in this country is threatened, but the threat is due to the special conditions produced by the war and is unlikely to be permanent. The report of the Third Unofficial Conference on British Commonwealth Relations, to which reference has been made above, contains the following words: "It seems to be fairly certain that Great Britain will only be able to supply a small number of emigrants, so small that they will not have any appreciable effect in helping to solve the population difficulties of the Dominions . . . ."<sup>†</sup> At that Conference there was no suggestion, either on the part of the British or of any other delegation, that Britain is

\* *Picture Post*, September 20, 1947. p. 24.

<sup>†</sup> *op. cit.* p. 29.



over-populated. That the country is thickly populated is obvious, and, with the rise in the birthrate which is now in progress, it is possible that the population may become excessive, but it does not seem that over-population in Britain to-day can be used as an argument in favour of drastic reduction by migration.

The matter is of such grave importance to Great Britain, to the Dominions and, indeed, to the world in general, that it deserves serious study on the part of the British Government, in consultation with the Dominion Governments concerned. Were the decision to approve of the policy so forcefully urged by Mr. Calwell, the next step would be to constitute a planning board, on which both the Mother Country and the Dominions were represented, to work out the details of a scheme for organized migration over a period of years,—a scheme which would necessarily include organs of propaganda and the provision of preliminary training for would-be emigrants. If immigration into Australia, Canada and New Zealand is to be a matter of millions, these can only be absorbed, in large part, by settlement on the land. The failure of experiments after the war of 1914-1918, in the course of which many ex-service men were settled in Kenya and in Australia, points to the essential necessity of such preliminary training. The belief that any man can farm if he be given the land, the tools, the seed and the live-stock with which to make a start is commonly held but gravely mistaken. Much could be learnt from the methods of the Jewish Agency, which has been so conspicuously successful in training its pioneers for settlement in Palestine.

Great Britain has now to submit to direction of labour. Were a policy to be adopted, aiming at a reduction of the population to thirty or thirty-five millions, direction on a much more acute scale would be needed. The Government would have to take power, both to direct would-be stay-at-homes to emigrate to a given Dominion, and to direct would-be emigrants to remain in Great Britain, if their migration were contrary to the public interest. The British people are rapidly becoming used to direction, but it is not conceivable that direction on the scale necessary for a drastic reduction of the population would be accepted.

## SCIENCE AND THE STATE

BY W. T. WELLS, M.P.

SINCE the end of the war there has been ample recognition that, in order to prosper and even, indeed, to survive, our country must encourage and promote the development of the sciences. The war taught the lesson in unmistakable fashion; the creation of new weapons, the need to counter those of the enemy, and finally the revolution wrought by the explosion of the first atomic bomb, brought it home in general terms to the least inquiring mind. Other, more specific lessons enforced themselves on circles of people far wider than the professional scientists: for example, that while in pure science Great Britain led the world, in its application to practical problems others, including the Americans, surpassed ourselves. The relevance of science as a whole, and of this last deficiency in particular, to our economic plight of to-day equally requires no argument. In the short term, the maintenance of our present standards of life depends mainly upon the best being made of the industrial equipment now available and, within the limitations imposed by existing equipment, upon improved methods of production. In the long term, both the raising of our standards of life and the preservation of Great Britain's position as a world power depend upon better machinery and equipment, new methods of production, a new and better utilization of materials, and in general upon new techniques both in peace and in war.

When such is the importance of science to our life and livelihood, a layman need not apologize for raising the questions whether the present arrangements for promoting scientific research and furthering its application to industry and defence are satisfactory, and how they should be improved. So far as the answers to these questions can be found within the fields of Government activity and Government expenditure, the Select Committee on Estimates, of which the writer is a member, set itself the task of finding them in the Session of Parliament that has just come to an end; and much of the material discussed in this article can be found in the Third Report of that Committee and in the Appendices thereto.

The general picture presented by this Report is one of great activity, but somewhat unbalanced activity. In paragraph 79 the Committee formulated four criteria by which the Government's research should be judged: "whether the sum granted for fundamental research, whether free or directed, bears a reasonable relationship to that allocated to the conduct of applied research and development; whether the sum spent on directed fundamental and applied

research is distributed in the best proportions between the several main lines of civil and military research; whether sufficient is being done to enable the universities to improve the quantity and quality of their human output; and whether the inducements offered are such as will attract a fair share of this output into the Government's scientific service."

In applying these criteria, and in order to decide how far the lack of balance that the picture of Government activity presents is blameworthy or not, it is essential to remember that the research and development financed and promoted by the State are but a part of the whole. In the words of the Report itself\*: "... though there are important exceptions, what is often referred to as 'pure' or 'fundamental' research (that is, research directed to the advancement of knowledge irrespective of how that knowledge may ultimately be applied to the practical needs of man) is carried out in universities and independent scientific institutions, either with or without financial aid from the Exchequer. Research directly undertaken by the Government is in the main confined to the attacking of problems which have a more or less direct bearing on the field of Government responsibility and to the application to those problems of the knowledge gained by pure research."

Further, in the field of applied science at least, industry in general, and particularly in the bigger concerns, clearly makes a great contribution already, and probably has a still greater contribution to make in the future, to the advancement of scientific knowledge and its application: though here the natural if regrettable tendency of privately-owned industry to keep its secrets to itself and even, sometimes, not to make use of them at all, because of the anticipation, right or wrong, that their owners will make more profit from standing in the old-established ways than by exploring and exploiting new fields that the scientists have opened for them, must not be forgotten.

These factors must make it very difficult for the scientist, and obviously make it impossible for the layman, to assess whether the present apportionment between fundamental and applied research is correct or not. But the formation of the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy, under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Tizard, should ensure that the correct balance is found and kept. The Council's terms of reference are: "To advise the Lord President of the Council in the exercise of his responsibility for the formulation and execution of Government scientific policy," and the memorandum published as Appendix 1 to the Select Committee's Report states that "its establishment is designed to meet the need for some central body which can give advice on general principles and which can ensure that the resources of science are used to the greatest possible extent in the solution of the country's economic problems." In one form or another the Government finance scientific work in the universities and other institutions for teaching and research to the tune of over £7,000,000. These

\* Third Report from the Select Committee on Estimates. Session 1946-1947. *Expenditure on Research and Development*. H.M. Stationery Office. 1s. 6d.

institutions are ridden with such an extremely loose rein in the way they spend public money that they can scarcely be said to be subject to any control whatever, and it is an understatement to say that the last charge that could be preferred against them is that of subordinating pure to applied science. Pure science and fundamental research are the foundations of all scientific advance, but applied science too has its claims and is equal in importance, particularly at a time of economic crisis such as the present. There is more than a tendency in academic circles in Great Britain to regard applied science as a mere ancillary to pure science, and it is quite clear that this trend is contrary to the public interest.

Where grants of public money are made to educational institutions it is probable that pure science receives more than its fair share. Looking at Government scientific expenditure as a whole, on the other hand, the greater part is undoubtedly devoted to applied science and it may well be that in future a larger sum should be allotted to fundamental research. If so, the composition and character of the Advisory Council are well calculated to ensure that the necessary claims should be put forward.

The figures of estimated expenditure on Governmental research and expenditure for 1947-1948, as stated in paragraph 3 of the Select Committee's report, reveal at first sight the lack of balance suggested above. The total amounts to over £69 million. Of this figure over £60 million are divided between the Admiralty and the Ministry of Supply, which is responsible for the armament and equipment of the Army and the Royal Air Force. At a time when our most urgent preoccupation is with economic rehabilitation this apparent disparity between military and civilian expenditure calls for the most serious and searching inquiry. It is true that the real disparity is less than the figures stated suggest. The Ministry of Supply holds responsibilities for civil aviation and for the engineering industry. Far more important in this connection, it is also responsible for research into, and development of, atomic energy, of whose potentialities for peace, at least, we are now only on the threshold. From evidence submitted to the Committee it appears that defence requirements account for about sixty-five per cent. of the whole scientific expenditure in all departments.

The question whether such a high proportion is necessary involves technicalities on which the layman cannot reach a conclusion, but broadly two considerations are in issue. First, it must never be forgotten that, in the words of Adam Smith, defence is better than opulence, and no responsible person would challenge this opinion. But the alternatives confronting the country to-day are not opulence or a modest sufficiency: they are an economy that will permit our survival as an independent force in world affairs, on the one hand, or an economy that does not so suffice, on the other, and even our military power can only rest on the foundation of a stable and well-balanced economy. It would therefore be a poor service to the cause of national defence to starve either fundamental research, or the study of the application of its results to

industry, for the sake of pursuing the immediate objects of the Service Departments.

The difficulty of resolving the conflicting claims of military and civilian expenditure is not, of course, confined to the field of science. It is, indeed, a familiar call, made after every war we have fought in recent times, that we have only scraped through by a narrow margin and accordingly that for the future a higher proportion of our expenditure must be on defence.\* The easy solution, as Gibbon would have called it, of our constant victories by narrow margins is that the Channel has always saved us. It would be an interesting subject of study to investigate what connection, if any, exists between our unpreparedness for war and the economic, technical, and psychological reserves with which we win it. This is not the place to pursue that theme; but while of all forms of preparation for war scientific expenditure is the easiest to justify, the high proportion that scientific expenditure on defence bears to such expenditure on medical research, agricultural research, and all the other manifold purposes of peace must occasion particular disquiet in this age of economic planning.

The third criterion put forward by the Select Committee on Estimates is whether sufficient is being done to enable the universities to improve the quality and quantity of their human output. This question really divides itself into two parts: whether the universities are being helped to recruit the right students in sufficient numbers, and whether they are being helped sufficiently to educate their students when they have got them. The low proportion of university graduates to the general population in Great Britain compared both with the U.S.A. and the countries of Western Europe is notorious, and must be remedied. Further, in spite of the scholarship system, including the recent State scholarships, there is still too much selection by wealth, with the result that while a few well-to-do young men† take up precious places of which they will be unable to make proper use, entry is denied to those poor young men and women who would better serve both their own interests and those of the country if they could be enabled to graduate at a university.

As is well known, the Barlow Committee in its Report on Scientific Man Power‡ stated that the doubling of the number of scientists and technologists within the next ten years was a matter of urgency, and this estimate has been generally accepted as a correct assessment of our minimum needs. At the same time the balance between the arts and sciences must be preserved, and for this purpose a doubling of our university population will not suffice. It thus becomes a matter of high policy to ensure that the Government gives the universities every possible help and impulse in their programme of expansion. The increase of funds made available to the University Grants Committee is

\* There is, equally, a tendency on the part of civilians to call for indiscriminate cuts in defence expenditure.

† Probably not young women.

‡ Cmd. 6824.

good, and the Treasury deserves great credit for it. But more needs to be done, and directly relaxation of the immediate stringency permits, building for university purposes deserves a higher priority than has hitherto been given to it. In the meanwhile, the charges made by the keepers of lodging-houses in university towns constitute a very serious problem, and it is at least questionable whether powers should not be given to requisition for the purpose of establishing hostels until some more satisfactory solution of the problem can be achieved.

As for the question whether the Government should not do more to ensure that the universities give their undergraduates the type of education that modern conditions demand, this raises a number of controversial problems, including the most thorny of them all, the sacred right of academic freedom. This is indeed more than a mere shibboleth, and broadly speaking it is best that the universities should be left free to educate their pupils after their own fashion; but it is so not because universities are particularly sacrosanct institutions to be kept immune from the criticisms of the vulgar, but because the public interest will as a rule be best served, and the pupils best educated, by these institutions and the individuals who compose them having a wide field of choice and experiment. Where British universities as a whole have clearly fallen behind those of other countries and the urgent demands of the country's situation, as in applied science and technology,\* the Government must clearly intervene and take steps to ensure that the gap be filled. Following the Report of the Percy Committee on Higher Technological Education, the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee has framed proposals for a closer linking of the higher technological institutions of the country with universities.† It is to be hoped that the Minister of Education and the University Grants Committee will concert action on these lines.

The fourth criterion was whether the inducements offered are such as to attract a fair share of the scientists trained by the universities into the Scientific Civil Service. The Government cannot hope to escape the consequences of the general shortage of scientific manpower and it would be disastrous were it so to raise its terms that industry and the universities could not compete, but in view of the importance of the work of scientists in the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Medical Research Council, the Agricultural Research Council, the Ministry of Supply, and other departments, it is essential that a reasonable proportion of the best scientific brains should be attracted into the Government service and that there should be a certain measure of interchange of staff between Government scientists on the one hand and industry and the universities on the other. The conditions proposed in the paper *The Scientific Civil Service*‡ and in substance accepted by the present Government

\* This is a generalization to which there must necessarily, and happily, be a number of qualifications and exceptions.

† *Colleges of Technology and Technical Manpower*. Issued by the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee. Heffer & Sons. 1s.

‡ Cmd. 6679 of 1945.

represent a considerable advance on the past, though apart perhaps from pension rights and security of tenure they are naturally far below what industry can offer by way of salary scales.

The four criteria laid down by the Select Committee bear mainly on the two questions of finding a sufficiency of trained men and women and of the correct apportionment of existing resources. It is possible to suggest a fifth criterion, namely whether the Governmental organization of scientific activities is sound in its principles. The Lord President of the Council is responsible for the formulation and execution of Government scientific policy. The Advisory Council on Scientific Policy, under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Tizard, has been set up to help him in this part of his duties. The Lord President is answerable for the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Medical Research Council, and the Agricultural Research Council. Each of these operates both by means of research conducted directly by its own staff and by means of co-operation, through grants, awards, and otherwise, with external organizations and institutions. Further, and distinct from the organizations responsible to the Lord President, a number of the civil departments, such as the Post Office, pursue research for their own purposes.

Such is the broad pattern of research for civil purposes. Apart from one or two fields in which considerations of national security have to be taken into account, the intention is to diffuse the knowledge acquired as widely as possible for the benefit of the industry, agriculture, and medicine of the nation, and on the whole this intention is carried out, though in one or two respects better publicity and interchange of information seem desirable.

In the field of defence, the Minister of Defence occupies the place corresponding with that of the Lord President in civil research. The Defence Research Policy Committee exists to advise him and the Chiefs of Staff "on matters connected with the formulation of scientific policy in the defence field"—principally, in effect, on the fixing of priorities and the allocation of resources: to ensure co-operation with the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy the chairman of both bodies is the same, Sir Henry Tizard, and the Secretary of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research is also a member of each committee. The Admiralty is in charge of research and development, affecting the Navy, whereas the Ministry of Supply is responsible for such work for the two other Service Departments: the General Staff and the Air Staff formulate the requirements, subject to technical advice about what is possible, whilst the staff of the Ministry is primarily concerned to find and execute means of fulfilling them.

This broad statement of the outlines of the organization necessarily ignores most of the niceties, some of which are not unimportant. The organization is not a tidy one, particularly, for example, when it becomes a question of tracing the inter-relation and allocation of duties between the Agricultural Research Council under the Lord President, on the one hand, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Department of Agriculture for Scotland, under their

respective Ministers, on the other. It represents an intelligent attempt to fit the organization of scientific research into the elaborate and intricate machinery of British government, rather than an attempt to set up science as a department of life and government on its own. In spite of some loss of unification and singleness of purpose, it seems on the whole that this approach is the right one, for science, apart from its educational value, exists to serve the purposes of the community and not to determine what these shall be.

But because the framework is sound it certainly should not be imagined that the structure is complete. The most obvious deficiency is in the facilities for research in the smaller industries. The field has not by any means been neglected but since approximately three-quarters of the concerns in the country employ fewer than three hundred people, the problem is one of primary importance. Many industries have their own research associations, which undertake work of varying character and utility; but in the past voluntary effort in this respect has been impeded by two serious obstacles, the reluctance of the small manufacturer to part with his secrets and his aversion from paying subscriptions to finance activities which he sometimes did not consider necessary. The latter difficulty, temporarily surmounted by a regulation empowering the Board of Trade to levy subscriptions from individual concerns, has now been tackled by the Industrial Organization and Development Act, 1947, which empowers the Department concerned to set up a development council for any industry that it deems appropriate; and one of the principal functions that may be assigned to a development council is promoting or undertaking scientific research. A development council has power to make levies and to obtain information, and it may fairly be said that the machinery for creating adequate research facilities for British industry now exists; whether that machinery will be properly and fully used is another question, and manpower will be a limiting factor here as in other fields. It would normally be quite wrong were influences outside any particular industry to foist any particular line of development upon it contrary to the opinion of those who had spent their lives working in it; but any such possibility seems to be precluded by the constitution of the development councils as laid down in the Industrial Organization Act.\* The object of the Act is rather to give free play to the progressive elements in industry than to place industry in a strait-jacket devised in Whitehall. It is to be hoped that the greatest possible use will be made of it.

Thus the first need is for the Government to do more to organize research in those smaller industries whose prosperity is essential to the national well-being. The second need is for the proportion of our resources allocated to military research to be reduced at the earliest possible moment consistent with national

\* Section 2 (3). "A development council shall consist of members of the following categories, that is to say, in the case of every development council:

(a) persons capable of representing the interests of persons carrying on business in the industry,  
(b) persons capable of representing the interests of persons employed in the industry, and  
(c) other persons . . . (referred to in this Act as 'the independent members').

security; and for a strict scrutiny to be established to that end.

The third demand of the situation is that a new relationship, for this country, shall be established between science and technology. Steps must be taken, by means of making more adequate provision for degrees in various technologies, and perhaps by founding great national institutes of technology comparable with those of the United States and Germany, to attract into technology a fair proportion—and of course not more than a fair proportion—of the scientific talent of the country.

Finally, the fourth desideratum that emerges from this review is that, in order to promote the necessary exchange between academic science, Government science, and industry, provision should be made for scientists to be interchanged between them without material loss to themselves. The first two can scarcely hope to compete with the last in material rewards, and although the security they have to offer may to some extent compensate for the higher salaries, the disparity cannot, in all probability, be wholly removed in the foreseeable future; but it should not be beyond the wit of man to devise some form of seconding from one branch of activity to another that should meet the need.

In the field of science, the paramount need, if Great Britain is to play a part in the future at all comparable with her rôle in the past, is for constant examination and consideration of the contribution that science has to make and of the methods whereby it can be made. It is in the hope of demonstrating this point, and of drawing attention to one or two lines of approach, that a layman ventures to intrude into this highly complex and technical subject.

## THE FATE OF THE ITALIAN COLONIES

BY L. JAMES

BY the terms of the Italian peace treaty which came into force on September 15 of this year, Italy was obliged to renounce her sovereignty over her overseas empire. The disposal of these colonies awaits a final settlement by the major powers; this must be reached, according to the terms of the treaty, by September 1948. So far, the Dodecanese Islands have been awarded to Greece, but the only part of the Italian empire in Africa whose fate has been decided is Ethiopia. Apart from the eastern area of the Ogaden (sometimes called Abyssinian Somaliland) which continues under British Military Administration, Ethiopia has regained her pre-1935 independent status and territory. Although the Emperor has expressed some fears about this continuation he has been assured that Ethiopia's final sovereignty over the area is not in question. The remaining three territories formerly constituting the Italian African empire, Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Libya, remain for the present under British control, with the exception of the interior region of Libya which is under French administration.

The three territories of Eritrea, Italian Somaliland and Libya have a total area of some 890,000 square miles, but the greater part of this total consists of desert and semi-desert; they contain only very small areas favourable for human settlement. Their total population amounts only to two and a half millions (Eritrea: 600,573—1931 Census; Italian Somaliland: 1,021,572—1931 Census; Libya: 888,401—1938 Census). In the period when Africa was being divided up into colonies and protectorates at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, Italy failed to acquire the two areas she wanted most. The French forestalled her in Tunis when they occupied this area in 1881, and the Abyssinians, by their defeat of the Italians at Adowa in 1896, were able to reject the Italian efforts to subjugate their country, and only when Italy's capacity for waging war had become immeasurably superior to that of the Abyssinians, did Ethiopia pass into Italian hands (1935-1936). By the 1914-1918 war Italy had acquired her three separate territories in eastern and northern Africa; as a result of the 1915 Treaty of London, the two colonies of Italian Somaliland and Libya received some additional territory after the end of the 1914-1918 war, but these gains were not of a sensational nature. The western frontier of Libya with Algeria was extended in 1919 to run from Ghadames to the Tummo (War Mountains) and in 1925 Britain ceded the more valuable Jubaland territory to Italian

Somaliland. A further frontier change took place in 1925 when Egypt ceded the small oasis of Jaghbub to Libya. These changes in the boundaries of Libya were of comparatively little significance since the frontiers run for hundreds of miles through desert.

The Italian empire in Africa began with the purchase in 1869 of the port of Assab on the Red Sea coast, by an Italian shipping company. The money for this venture however was supplied by the Italian Government. The Egyptians who occupied this stretch of the Red Sea coast at this period made some objections, but nevertheless in 1880 Assab was declared to be permanently occupied by the Italian Government and two years later became a crown colony. In 1885 the Italians further occupied Massawa and on this occasion they had the prior approval of Great Britain. The Italians, gradually extending their occupation of territory around this port, very soon aroused the suspicions of the ruler of Ethiopia and in 1887 they suffered a defeat at the hands of the Abyssinians at Dogali. With the death of the Emperor of Ethiopia in 1889 the country became involved in one of its numerous internecine struggles over the question of the succession. Menelik, one of the claimants to the title, invited Italy to intervene on his behalf, and in the famous Treaty of Ucciali, signed in 1889, Italy obtained a portion of the Ethiopian plateau. Although Italy recognized Menelik as the Emperor, and he in turn recognized the Italian possessions on the Red Sea coast (which became in 1890 the colony of Eritrea) the Italians thought of the Treaty of Ucciali as the beginning of Italian protection over the whole of Ethiopia, and in 1891 Britain recognized Ethiopia as being within the Italian sphere of influence in return for Italy recognizing Britain's special interest in the Upper Nile region. Menelik, however, was anxious to maintain a complete independence and the hopes of Italy were dashed when General Baratieri's tactical mistakes at Adowa in 1896 ended Italy's aspirations in Ethiopia for forty years. In the peace made at Addis Ababa in the same year, Italy recognized the complete independence of Ethiopia but kept Eritrea; the frontiers of this colony were subject to a number of adjustments and the Danakil frontier was fixed in 1908.

From the first, Eritrea was a completely artificial unit with no physical or ethnic unity. It was brought into existence through the historical accidents of the late nineteenth century; it is a unit without distinctive traditions and it has failed to arouse any loyalty akin to nationalism. Its inhabitants are divided between the people of the southern plateau (who are racially and linguistically allied to the inhabitants over the frontier in Ethiopia) and the Moslem peoples of the northern plateau and coastlands. There exists no strong reason why this political unit should continue; schemes have been put forward for its dismemberment, and Ethiopia has claimed that it should be incorporated into an enlarged Ethiopia. Since the re-establishment of her independence her rulers have made some extravagant claims to neighbouring territory, either on grounds of "historic right" (nearly always a dangerous and

pernicious doctrine when applied by young and exuberant nationalists) or because they believe that Ethiopia is entitled to compensation for the miseries and losses endured under Italian rule. Ethiopia may legitimately claim part of Eritrea but her claim to the whole on grounds of "historic right" is patently absurd, and only slightly less realist than the Egyptian claim to the port of Massawa occupied together with neighbouring areas on the Red Sea coast from 1864 until the Sudan revolt forced Egypt to withdraw in 1884.

If Eritrea is not to remain a separate political unit, it ought to be partitioned between the Sudan and Ethiopia, and the actual division needs to be based on historical, ethnic and economic factors. The centre of the colony is occupied by a plateau which is essentially a continuation of the Ethiopian highland area. In the south it has an elevation of 7,000-8,000 feet, and westwards it merges into an arid plain area that is part of the Sudan; its eastern edge is fairly sharp and overlooks a narrow coastal plain. The only settled area of the colony is the high southern plateau occupied by the Tigrinya-speaking people who, by their Christian religion and racial origins, form part of the Tigray province of Ethiopia. When the Italians conquered Ethiopia in 1935-1936 they re-organized the administrative regions and re-united the Tigray province within the Eritrean division. Since the occupation by the British the old pre-1935 frontier has been re-established and the Tigray unit has again been divided. On ethnic grounds this area of Eritrea ought to be included in an enlarged Ethiopia.

The port of Massawa and the Danakil coastal strip ought also to be included in Ethiopia because of the latter's need for an economic outlet to the sea. If Ethiopia is to become a modern State, she must secure better links with the outside world. Although the port of Massawa is situated in the Moslem belt and has no real ethnic connections with Ethiopia, its inclusion within an enlarged Ethiopia is urged on the grounds that this port is essentially an outlet for northern Ethiopia; the coastal strip south of Massawa consists of an extremely arid and sparsely populated desert area of importance only because it contains the port of Assab which is the terminus of the road built by the Italians leading to Dessie, and this road serves central Ethiopia. The remaining part of Eritrea in the north is occupied by mostly rural Moslem groups and, although they speak many different languages, one factor that unites them is their dislike of the Abyssinians. Their real affinities lie with their fellow Moslems in the Sudan.

Although the Tigrinya speaking peoples are closely allied with their kinsfolk over the border in Ethiopia, they are not wholly agreed about the desirability of being incorporated within Ethiopia; there are two main groups, those who seek complete and immediate incorporation within Ethiopia (the Unionists), and those who wish to be associated with Ethiopia in some kind of federal union which offers the ex-Eritrean group complete autonomy (the Federalists). There is a minority that is even prepared to argue in favour of



the Tigrinya-speaking peoples of Ethiopia being united with Eritrea into a separate political unit, but this is scarcely a realist attitude. The Federalist argument that the Tigrinya-speaking people of Eritrea ought to have a separate and special status within Ethiopia having their capital at Asmara, is justifiable because the Italians spent very large sums on development schemes during their fifty years of administration of this area. They built good roads and constructed modern buildings and gave the area a sound health service; as in the case of their other colonies, they spent more money in the colony than they received from it. There is little to be said for allowing any area in Africa to slide back because it is all too difficult to bring progress. Although the present rulers are making numerous efforts to modernize their country, the Ethiopian standard of administration is very backward. The Ethiopians have emerged from the 1939-1945 war in a very suspicious frame of mind and reject anything that savours of foreign interference, but the unqualified incorporation of the Tigray province of Eritrea into Ethiopia ought not to take place until the Abyssinian administrative capacity has improved. There is quite a good case for calling in UNO to assist in the administration of this area, or at least that it should exercise a supervisory control over the Tigray province temporarily, without prejudice to the final Ethiopian sovereignty.

Another problem in the settlement of Eritrea is the fate of the comparatively large Italian colony living there. Apart from the trading element which has invested large sums in it, the Italians include many with technical abilities needed by the colony to maintain and improve the general standard of life. Eritrea is a poor area from the viewpoint of its economic potentialities, and the cost of the British Military Administration is partly financed from the British Treasury. The Italians of course are anxious about their future and some hope for an eventual return of the colony to Italy, although the majority realize that the most that can be expected is a decision to place the colony under UNO with Italy undertaking the rôle of trustee.

The Italian colony of Somaliland came into existence in 1889, but its frontiers remained arbitrary and uncertain, and it was the Somaliland-Ethiopian frontier "incident" of 1935 that was the signal for the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. The discussion of the future of this colony at the Paris meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in April 1946 brought the interesting and useful suggestion by Mr. Bevin that a greater Somaliland should be created which would include the British and Italian Somalilands and the Ogaden districts of Ethiopia. This suggestion has been favourably received by those anxious to secure frontiers which bear a close relationship to geographical, ethnic and economic realities. The frontiers over most of the African continent are extremely unsatisfactory, for most of them came into existence as a result of the rivalries between the powers during the period of the scramble for Africa. In the case of the Somali, the frontiers imposed on north-east Africa divided this homogeneous people between four different political units (British, French

and Italian Somalilands and the Ogaden district of Ethiopia) and the Somali frontiers have remained ill-defined and in practice have had little meaning for this nomadic tribe in search of fresh pastures for its large herds and flocks. The creation of a large Somali unit—the three territories specified by Mr. Bevin make up an area of some 350,000 square miles—would bring together in one political unit the Somali people whose total number is roughly three millions. Such a unit offers a useful example in working out the principle of integration that it is so urgently needed in the African continent.

Mr. Bevin did not include the small unit of French Somaliland in his proposal for a greater Somalia, but it should be noted that the Somalis number only about a third of the total population (40,000) of French Somaliland. There is also the important point that French Somaliland contains Jibuti, the terminus of the Addis Ababa railway which is the outlet for central Ethiopia. The proposal to include the Ogaden district of Ethiopia in the greater Somaliland is obviously sound, but the rulers of Ethiopia have included aspirations to incorporate Italian Somaliland in a greater Ethiopia rather than actually lose territory to the proposed new unit of Somalia. It is unlikely, therefore, that they will be willing to forgo their territorial ambitions, and although it can be argued that Ethiopia is likely to get an addition of territory in the Tigray area of Eritrea, and therefore could regard this as compensation for the loss of the Ogaden, in fact the rulers of Ethiopia will resist any encroachment upon their 1935 frontiers and, on the contrary, press for additions of territory from the whole or part of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.

That the future of Italian Somaliland ought not to be entrusted to Ethiopia is beyond question: to take only the most outstanding point, the dominant group of Ethiopia consists of the Amharic-speaking Christians, and the history of Ethiopia is very largely the struggle to preserve this Christian island in the midst of an Islamic sea. It is this struggle that has given the people of Amhara their distinctive tradition and solidarity, and has been the outstanding factor in the maintenance of Ethiopian independence. Undoubtedly the influence of Italian rule has resulted in the emergence of something approaching a national consciousness among the diverse peoples who occupy the Ethiopian plateau, but the view of Ethiopia as a nation-State on European lines is incorrect. Right up to modern times Ethiopia has been merely a conglomeration of provinces and districts, ill-defined, loosely connected, and generally at war with each other. Regionalism is extremely strong and owing to the disaffections of local rulers, greatly helped the Italians in their 1935-1936 campaign. There is certainly no sound reason why the pre-1935 frontiers should be considered sacrosanct, on the ground of their antiquity, or because of their ethnic or geographical correctness. The claims put forward by the Ethiopian rulers to extensive additions of territory must be considered as the tendency so frequently manifested by nations emerging from foreign domination; in seeking independence for themselves, they seem all too ready to deny

it to the neighbouring peoples they desire to incorporate by drawing frontiers as far afield as possible.

In deciding the future of Italian Somaliland, Mr. Bevin's suggestion for a greater Somaliland is thus by far the most hopeful one. The actual administration of the nomadic Somali is no easy task; the tribe is turbulent and divided by numerous conflicts. Cattle raiding has long been an established tradition, and adds to the difficulties of administration. The whole of this area is arid; poor scrubland predominates, and only in the Nogal, Webi-Shebili and Juba rivers can agriculture be practised. The Italians spent considerable sums in extending irrigation, and they had some success in growing crops like cotton, sugar-cane and maize, but the experiment of planting depended upon a liberal supply of money from the homeland. Efforts to get the Somali to take up settled agriculture have not been very successful. They think in terms of herds of goats, cattle, camels and sheep, and of quantity rather than quality. As a consequence of such large herds, overgrazing occurs in many areas, and soil erosion follows. This is always a problem in semi-arid areas where keeping animals gives social status. The Somali, like most nomad pastoral peoples, do not welcome attempts to re-orientate their attitude, but unless they can be persuaded to reduce their herds and increase quality they can only look forward to a progressive deterioration of their grasslands. The main hope for the future lies in improving the water supplies by tapping underground sources and building dams and introducing a system of controlled grazing.

The new Somalia will quite obviously require the assistance and supervision which can only come from a power experienced in the administration of backward peoples. UNO will undoubtedly assume the ultimate responsibility for its control and welfare but it seems not unlikely that Britain, which is at the moment administering, will become the power exercising the trusteeship, and thus the present military control would be turned into a civil administration, until such time as the Somali have developed to the point where they can "stand by themselves in the strenuous conditions of the modern world."

Owing to the great importance of Libya in Mediterranean strategy, many powers are interested in its fate. It consists of the two separate areas of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, backed by the Fezzan and the Libyan deserts. The greater part of Libya's total of 680,000 square miles consists of desert capable of supporting only a small nomadic population.

Before Italy acquired this colony in 1912, it was part of the Turkish empire; during the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries the Turkish connection was only nominal and the colony was ruled by the Karamanli dynasty. In the nineteenth century the Senussi came to dominate Cyrenaica. This Moslem sect is named after its founder, El Sayed Mohamed El Senussi (1787-1859), who preached a puritanical gospel, urging a return to the early Moslem faith when it was uncontaminated by Christianity or city life. Under

his leadership and that of his successors, the influence of the sect spread over a large area of the Sahara and came into conflict with the French in the area round Lake Chad. Cyrenaica remained its essential homeland, however, with its centre in Jaghbub. This oasis contains the tomb of the Grand Senussi (the main reason why Italy put pressure on Egypt to cede this remote oasis in 1925) but the Senussi headquarters were transferred to the even more remote oasis of Kufra when Turkish rule pressed too closely on the sect in the later nineteenth century.

When the Italians invaded Libya in 1912 the Senussi had accepted the Turkish overlordship, and the Turks encouraged them to resist the Italian invaders. This opposition lasted until the early 'thirties. During the 1914-1918 war the Italians completely lost control of the interior and were able to maintain their garrisons only at odd points on the littoral. The Senussi, aided by Turkish and German money and leadership, even attempted an invasion of Egypt, but they were repulsed. They had never succeeded in including Tripolitania in their territory, and the two areas of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania have evolved along different lines over the last decades. In both regions the population is Arab, but there is a Berber element; Tripolitania contains roughly three-quarters of Libya's total population. The Italians encountered opposition from both regions in the course of the 1914-1918 war as the Arab peoples of Libya felt that they were fighting to obtain their independence. The way in which the Turks had yielded up Libya to the Italian invaders encouraged the Libyans to feel that they were entitled to claim complete independence. After 1918 the Italians fairly soon put an end to opposition in Tripolitania, and in their subsequent administration relied greatly on the co-operation of a large pro-Italian element. In Cyrenaica the Senussi kept up their opposition to the Italians until the efforts of General Graziani at last succeeded in 1931. The measures used in these campaigns against the Senussi tribesmen were extremely ruthless and form one of the worst chapters in any colonial record. Inevitably Cyrenaica suffered great losses of men and livestock in the course of the Italian efforts to put down Senussi opposition. The leader of the Senussi, El Sayed Idris, went into exile in Egypt after the coming of Fascism to Italy, but the campaign was carried on in his name. Italian methods and their final success in 1931 drove many Libyans into exile.

When war broke out in 1939 these Libyans in exile saw it as an opportunity to free their country from its Italian rulers and set up an independent State. After Italy joined Germany in 1940, the Libyans raised the Libyan Arab Force which gave great assistance to the Allies in their Libyan campaign of 1940-1942. On a visit to the Middle East in January 1942, the British Foreign Secretary thanked El Sayed Idris for his help and promised that "at the end of the war, the Senussis in Cyrenaica will in no circumstances fall under Italian domination." The expulsion of the Germans and Italians from North Africa in 1943 brought Cyrenaica and Tripolitania under the control of the

British Military Administration; the Fezzan, captured by French forces, has remained under the control of France. Pending a final solution to the problem of how the Italian colonies shall be disposed of, the British have a difficult task as the interim authority in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. The British promise to the Senussi that the Italians would not be permitted to return, along with the withdrawal of Italian nationals and the fact that the Senussi are united in their acceptance of El Sayed Idris as their leader, has made the task rather easier in Cyrenaica than in Tripolitania. There, the British have given no definite promise that the Italians will not be allowed to return and some 46,000 Italians remain amid a total of some 685,000 Arabs; although in 1921 the Tripolitarians asked El Sayed Idris to assume leadership for all Libya, there are numerous divisions among the Arabs of this region and they are by no means so completely united as are the Senussi.

The general line of policy pursued by the British has been laid down by the necessity of observing the Hague Convention dealing with the administration of enemy occupied territory. In Cyrenaica the withdrawal of the Italian population has eased the problem, and Arabs have taken over again the lands from which they were displaced. Economically, large sums were poured into the scheme for Italian colonization in Libya. Although this was very efficiently planned and executed, it disregarded normal economic factors and was designed to assist Italian economy by making up deficiencies in the homeland and to help Italy solve her problems arising from population pressure. In Tripolitania the Italian colony, shorn of its fascist elements, is not unnaturally anxious about its future. As the Hague Convention permits changes to take place only if necessitated by military reasons, the British have left many Italians in administrative and professional posts, and govern the territory on the basis of Italian law, purged of its fascist elements of course. The Arabs have not always understood the fact that British Military Administration policy is dictated and restricted by the Hague Convention but, apart from the anti-Semitic riots of November 1945, relations between Arabs, Italians and the administration have been on the whole friendly. The uncertainty of the last five years has tended to encourage the more extreme elements among the Arabs, and there is a large and growing group seeking unconditional and complete independence.

Although the Tripolitarians are by no means so united as the Senussi they also look to El Sayed Idris as the natural leader of a united independent Libya. Mr. Bevin's proposal to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Paris in April 1946, that Libya should be granted complete independence, certainly reflects the wishes of the vast majority of the people of both Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Independence would have tremendous repercussions throughout North Africa and the Middle East since the whole Arab world is seeking to free itself from outside control and the independence of Libya would clearly have a great significance for France in the neighbouring western ter-

ritories of North Africa. Libyan independence would certainly hasten the day when France, now unwilling to do so, must make much greater concessions to the people of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. France has therefore tended to favour some form of trusteeship for Libya and has proposed that the Italians should be allowed to return to Africa under the general supervision of UNO. The Americans too have favoured this course. Apart from asking for a frontier adjustment at Sollum and the return of the Jaghbub oasis, Egypt has expressed the hope that Libya should be placed under Egyptian or Arab League trusteeship.

The wishes of the inhabitants should clearly be the real criteria in making the final decision; there can be little doubt that they seek independence. They wish neither for incorporation into neighbouring territories, nor for any form of trusteeship, either by any of the great powers or by Italy or Egypt.

Throughout North Africa and the Middle East, the most important single factor at work is the growth of a nationalism based on Islam as the common religion, and Arabic as a common language. The feeling of solidarity between the peoples of the Arab countries will undoubtedly grow stronger, and although the Arab League has many rifts and divisions within its ranks, it will tend to unite the Arab speaking world into one of the great divisions of mankind. The people of Libya, believing they have a clear right to complete independence, will closely associate themselves with the Arab League (it should be noted that the Secretary-General of the League is of Libyan origin) and share in what they feel is the common destiny of the Arab peoples.

The problem which tends to be overlooked by the Libyans in their claim for complete independence is that of economic resources. Libya is inherently a poor country, with no mineral or other outstanding source of wealth. Its agricultural basis is very restricted, and it is capable of only limited development in certain directions such as that of live-stock and the cultivation of certain fruits. The material progress achieved under the Italians in the field of social services was the result of generous but uneconomic financial assistance; Italian rule unfortunately did not give the colony a generous supply of trained technicians drawn from the Libyans themselves.

The authorities who will recommend Libya's final status to the four major powers would be wise to pay heed to the growing demand for complete independence among the Libyans and other Arab peoples. Nothing less will satisfy them, and since the western world has laid down in the Atlantic Charter that territorial changes ought to reflect "the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned" (Point Two), the only satisfactory way to decide the fate of Libya is to give complete and unconditional independence while offering technical and economic assistance under the aegis of an international body such as UNO.

*(The author, after a short period in England, has returned to his work at Farouk 1st University, Alexandria.)*

## CEYLON'S FUTURE

By T. REID, M.P.

**D**URING a century and a half of British rule Ceylon has progressed enormously. It has had in recent decades one of the best and most up-to-date Colonial administrations in the world; and British rule, just, lenient, efficient, incorruptible, was carried on in the interests of the Ceylonese.

They are a kindly, tolerant people and their lovely, well-watered island enables them to live free from the terrible poverty of India with its unreliable one-monsoon rains. The coconut palm and the rice field in the wet zones of Ceylon supply most of the essentials of the simple life and other products and industries supplement the prosperity of the island.

But educated Ceylonese never denied freedom of expression or of association under British rule, copying India next door, demanded, but always by constitutional means without violence, advances towards self-government. It was gradually granted by instalments without much resistance.

In 1931 the Donoughmore Constitution was a revolution in Colonial politics. It gave Ceylon self-government in internal affairs and set up ministries manned by legislators, elected by adult suffrage. The power of elected legislators without executive responsibility was superseded by a system which gave them power and the blessed boon and burden of responsibility. This constitution has functioned fairly well. But there is no half-way house between bureaucracy and democracy and in response to Ceylonese demands the Soulbury Constitution which came into force in October 1947 removes the three official nominated ministers, the Chief Secretary, Financial and Legal Secretaries, and gives a Prime Minister and his Ministers a voice in external affairs with the Governor; while a Senate is added to the lower House, now that the Governor's emergency veto is to be abolished.

Meanwhile, India and Burma have been granted independence, so why should it be denied to loyal Ceylon? And Marxist parties in Ceylon demand it, thus outbidding the moderates. So, Dominion status has been promised to Ceylon and the new Ceylon Government will negotiate with Britain about its implementation and the consequences of such implementation which are of great importance to Britain, the Empire and beyond.

During the war the Ceylonese leaders and people stood in with Britain. This was the result of former good British rule and above all of wise British statesmanship in meeting in time the natural desire of a subject people to rule themselves.

In Ceylon there is a plural Ceylonese society of about 4,000,000 Sinhalese, mostly Buddhists, 2,000,000 Tamils, Hindu in religion, some Moslems and about 10,000 Europeans. But the different races are not as hostile to each other as are the races of India; and the propagandist inciting people to racial hate never had much success in the island. The relations between British and Ceylonese are very friendly and Ceylonese leaders are well aware of their own helplessness internationally. A small section of the extreme left desires union with independent India but the leaders of the United National Party and the future and first Ceylon Prime Minister, Mr. Senanayaka, do not desire union with India on ideological, racial, fiscal or other grounds.

So, the question arises, how is Ceylon to be defended, and the obvious answer is, by Ceylon and the British Commonwealth and Empire. The Ceylonese rulers are too intelligent to rely on the squabbling United Nations Organization hamstrung by the veto. They see little prospect of security in a union or alliance with a now partitioned and distracted Hindustan. In fact they are faced with possible dangers, if not at once, at least in the future, from their oriental neighbours east and west, not to mention the all pervading dangers from an aggressive, tyrannical communist imperialism with its fifth column in every land.

The defence of Ceylon is not a problem affecting the Ceylonese alone. In the strategy of war the great natural harbour of Trincomalee, now a British naval base, is as important to-day as it has been for centuries. Colombo, one of the world's great ports, is a Clapham Junction of the east situated on the trade routes between east and west. The island of Ceylon itself, strategically and commercially, is situated in a key spot in the Indian Ocean.

Yet, under Dominion status the control of Ceylon would be completely in the hands of Ceylonese who may not in future elevate to power people like the present experienced, responsible rulers. At the elections held in September 1947, the United National Party won forty-two out of the ninety-five seats. It is a party that cuts across communal divisions. A Tamil communal party won a few seats, Independents won twenty-one seats and left wing groups more than a dozen. But no man can say who will win the elections in future or even what the effect will be of removing the three official ministers from what were key posts in the Constitution of 1931, and of depriving the Governor, British or otherwise, from executive functions under Dominion status in future. Ceylon may one day even decide to quit the Commonwealth, as the communists now desire her to do.

At this turning point in the island's history it behoves all concerned to think deeply, to think internationally, to eschew insularity and colour bars, white or brown. So far the Commonwealth has been composed of white peoples mainly British, except in the case of South Africa, where the white minority rules.

But Ceylon has led the way in attaining responsible government and using

it to fight side by side with its former ruler, Britain, in the great crisis of mankind from 1939 to 1945. Unless colour and race inhibitions are to decide grave issues in international politics there is no valid reason why Britain and Ceylon should not, before Dominion status is established, make effective, permanent and lasting arrangements for the defence of the island and the Commonwealth and Empire. Bases were freely given in the West Indies to America to enable her to defend the Panama Canal. South Africa gave Britain a naval base in South Africa. Naval bases may be given to America in the Mediterranean. In my opinion, formed by a lengthy knowledge of the Ceylonese, they would welcome the existence of such bases in Ceylon because they know from the recent war how necessary they are for the safety of their coveted island and because they have not a suspicion of hate for us nor we for them.

*(Member of Parliament for Swindon since 1945, the author was Mayor of Colombo 1919-1924, and Member of the Ceylon Legislature, 1926-1931.)*

## THE STUDY OF NATIONAL CHARACTER

BY SIR GEORGE SANSOM

THE art of living depends in large measure upon our ability to judge how others will behave in given situations. As we mature, experience within our own society gives us some useful general knowledge about the behaviour of individuals, but it is as a rule empiric and intuitive. Organized studies in human psychology have however made a good deal of progress in recent years, and perhaps we can look forward to the development of a truly scientific method of judging the character of our fellows—though too much certainty would deprive life of some interesting hazards. The study of national character has not made such advances, for we are still influenced by myths when we permit ourselves to make categorical assertions about the behaviour of men as members of a national community.

Most of us who pondered during the war on the nature of the enemy felt dissatisfied with the verdicts of the authorities on German or Japanese life. Their explanations of the conduct of whole peoples seemed to lack internal consistency and left us wondering whether they had all the evidence before them and, if so, whether they had used it without prejudice. Different writers drew different conclusions from the same facts, so that in the end we became confused and impatient. We began to ask ourselves whether there was such a thing as national character or whether it was not an altogether illegitimate concept. We knew that social anthropologists had done a great deal of useful and revealing work on the cultures of small communities, such as tribes of American Indians or Polynesian islanders, but most laymen felt that such studies had little bearing upon our understanding of complex modern societies. For my own part it happens that I have devoted some years to a study of the cultural history of the Japanese people, but I have always felt dissatisfied by my failure to discern some guiding principle which would account for seeming inconsistencies in their behaviour. I had to resign myself to describing as best I could the march of events and the growth of ideas without being able to fit them into a pattern, and I consoled myself by supposing that human behaviour was anyhow formless, irrational and unpredictable. No doubt for lack of training, I found little guidance in standard works on group psychology, and concluded sadly that it was only the creative artist and not the pedestrian student who could, by flashes of insight, illuminate the problems of national character. To take a modern instance, it appeared to me that Somerset Maugham's *Don Fernando* made the Spanish temperament more intelligible

than any treatise on Spain which I had read; and often a vivid line, a telling phrase in a novel or a poem seemed to light up obscure places in ancient or modern history. But if this was true, then the dilemma of the sober historian was a grave one, for he could not truly describe what he did not fully understand, and he could not fully understand what he did not truly describe. He could not fulfil his function as a historian unless his interpretation of events was based upon some valid working hypothesis as to human behaviour, since history is of little use if it tells us only what men do and not why they do it.

It was under the influence of reflections such as these that I opened a recent work on the national character of the Japanese. It is entitled *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*,\* a name designed to emphasize the seeming contradictions in the Japanese character—the aesthetic sensibility and unimaginative ruthlessness, loyalty and treachery, passionate interest in the new and fervent attachment to the old, discipline and insubordination, stoicism and sentimental self-pity. Dr. Ruth Benedict is a distinguished American cultural anthropologist, who was in 1944 invited by the U.S. Government to "spell out" what the Japanese were like. She was to use her professional techniques in order to furnish to the authorities a basis for judgment as to how the Japanese would behave when faced with the prospect of defeat. Her book is an account of her findings. It is a valuable book, for not only does it give in very clear language an accurate picture of certain dominant features of Japanese life, but also it encourages one to believe that, in skilled hands, the technique of the social anthropologist may presently be applied with success to the study of other great societies. As the author observes in her preliminary chapter:

One of the handicaps of the twentieth century is that we still have the vaguest notions not only of what makes Japan a nation of Japanese but of what makes the United States a nation of Americans, France a nation of Frenchmen and Russia a nation of Russians. Lacking this knowledge, each country misunderstands the other. We fear irreconcilable differences when the trouble is only between Tweedledum and Tweedledee, and we talk about common purposes when one nation by virtue of its whole experience has in mind a quite different course of action from the one we mean.

Nobody can deny the truth of that statement in an era when we swing violently from hopes of universal peace to fears of universal disaster. We really must learn something about the springs of conduct in the great organized societies of to-day, if we are to avoid blunders fatal to our civilization—assuming them to be avoidable. It will not do to be merely optimistic or merely pessimistic. We can at least make an effort to understand ourselves and one another; but it is a task which must be undertaken in a scientific spirit. "The job," says Dr. Benedict, "requires a certain tough-mindedness and a certain generosity. It requires tough-mindedness which people of good-will have sometimes condemned. These protagonists of One World have staked their hopes on convincing people of every corner of the earth that all the differences between East and West, black and white, Christian and Mohammedan are

\* *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. By Ruth Benedict. Secker & Warburg. 12s. 6d.

superficial and that all mankind is really like-minded." Tender-minded people seem to think that the brotherhood of man depends upon everybody thinking alike—a dreadful prospect of paternal unanimity. But "tough-minded people are content that differences should exist. They respect differences. Their goal is a world made safe for differences." These are sensible words which should be taken to heart by those who are now busy trying to impose their doctrines upon peoples utterly unprepared to receive them.

A systematic study of national differences requires also a certain generosity. "The comparative study of cultures cannot flourish when men are so defensive about their own way of life that it appears to them to be by definition the sole solution in the world." The English reader of that sentence may be tempted to remark that this is peculiarly true of Americans, but he had better be careful! For though Dr. Benedict readily admits that Americans are given to urging their favourite tenets on all nations, we may be sure that she could if called upon produce many rich examples of that habit from the contemporary life of other peoples.

I have dwelt upon the nature of Dr. Benedict's approach, because it seems to me that the important thing about her book is not so much the degree of its success in explaining the character of the Japanese people as the fact that the method she has used produces some extremely interesting results which no student of Japan can afford to neglect. It may be that she hits the mark so often because of her natural good judgment rather than because of her acquired techniques, but let us examine some of her findings. I think we shall conclude that her method, skilfully applied, is one which deserves respectful attention from historians. It would not be appropriate here to try to follow her argument in detail, for that would require a close discussion almost as long as her own book; but we may select one or two of her main conclusions and see how they were reached.

She opens by a chapter on the Japanese at war, and postulates that all the ways in which the Japanese departed from Western conventions are data on their view of life and on their convictions as to the whole duty of man. For the purpose of systematic study the student must free his mind of all judgment on the morality of these deviations, and apply himself to discovering on what assumptions they were based. She notes the apparent inconsistencies between the extreme rarity of surrender of Japanese troops and their habitual co-operative behaviour when they became prisoners; between the insistence of Japanese leaders that the Japanese spirit would conquer occidental materialism and the almost cheerful way in which they laid down their arms, without fighting in the last ditch, once the Emperor issued the order to surrender. How are these inconsistencies to be accounted for? In a closely argued chapter called "Taking one's proper station" she develops a very plausible theory of the reliance of the Japanese upon order and hierarchy which contrasts so strikingly with the American faith in freedom and equality. Though she makes due reser-



vations, I think that here she does not entirely free herself from American assumptions as to what is a good society. The importance of hierarchy is more easily understood by Europeans than by Americans, as she recognizes by quoting de Tocqueville, who was surprised to find that in the new Republic they trusted equality as they trusted nothing else. In their deep hierarchical sense the Japanese are perhaps not so exceptional as she makes them appear; but this possible lapse from objectivity by no means invalidates her reasoning. She goes on to show, by well-chosen illustrations, how "behaviour that recognized hierarchy is natural to them as breathing." But she sees, what some students of Japan have failed to recognize, that this is not a simple occidental authoritarianism. By examining evidence in past and contemporary history as to Japanese habits of behaviour in the family, in social organization and indeed in almost all departments of life, she makes it clear that the Japanese idea of hierarchy depends upon a closely-knit system of mutual obligations. He who has rights has corresponding duties and the emphasis in Japanese life has always been on duties rather than on rights. All this is brought into perspective by a close analysis of the development of class-relationships in feudal Japan and of the way in which during Meiji reforms the class structure (thanks to a flexibility which is not present in more rigid systems of caste such as that of India) was carried over into the modern age without revolutionary disturbance. She makes a good point, which is often missed by those anxious to see root-and-branch reform in Japan, when she argues that there was in 1940 little difference between the Japanese system of government and that of such western European monarchies as Holland and Belgium. The true difference here was not in form but in functioning, because traditional spheres of authority persisted after the Meiji restoration of 1868. Thus the Meiji Constitution, which has just been replaced by a startlingly advanced charter of popular liberties that renounces war as an instrument of national policy, was on the whole a liberal document, which would have allowed a considerable growth of political freedom had it been worked with that intention. But Japanese tradition decreed otherwise; and the question therefore arises whether this new Constitution and other changes brought about during the period of occupation have any essential durability. History teaches, and I suppose social science confirms, that even when one people learns voluntarily from another, the lesson is always adapted by the pupil to his own capacity to assimilate. What Japan was taught by China, Rome by Greece and Gaul by Rome was only that for which their historical development had prepared them. This is something to be borne in mind when considering how far the indoctrination of defeated peoples at the hands of their conquerors is likely to succeed.

The remaining chapters of *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* are devoted to a systematic examination of certain well-established standards of conduct in Japan.

There is *on*, which expresses the complementary ideas of "favour and grati-

tude. It stands however not for a sentiment but for a governing principle of behaviour. *On* is an obligation laid by one man upon another which has to be repaid not once for all but throughout life, so that by strict Japanese standards each man's existence is conditioned by the inescapable debt which he owes to his parents, his teacher and to even more incidental benefactors.

There is *giri*, which is on a somewhat lower plane and covers a man's obligations to himself rather than to others—the calls of his honour, his dignity, even his peace of mind. It stands for obligations incurred by one's own voluntary acts rather than laid upon one by circumstance. Dr. Benedict devotes a great deal of attention to analyzing these and other terms that express Japanese ideals and rules of conduct. She even sets forth a full "schematic table of Japanese obligations and their reciprocals" which seems to me to labour her points too much; and to give sharp definition to concepts which are less rigid than she supposes. I cannot help feeling that social anthropologists are on dangerous ground when they attempt to reduce complex and erratic human behaviour to simple, classifiable elements. I think that her use of etymology leads her into some errors. She takes a Japanese phrase like *kinodoku*, "poison of mind", which is used by way of apologetic thanks for some benefit conferred, and she infers from this that a Japanese, when he says "Thank you" is letting it be known that he has a poisonous feeling because he has put himself under an obligation to a stranger. This really seems to me excessive. Surely all that the speaker means is that he is sorry to have troubled his benefactor; and when we in English say to a friend that we are sorry to take one of his few cigarettes, we are not expressing grief or exposing a sore place in our self-esteem but merely making a decent social gesture. Without a very full linguistic equipment our social scientists should walk warily. But whether Dr. Benedict is right or wrong in these details, there is no doubt that her general thesis can be sustained. The life of the Japanese is governed, as the life of us other modern people is governed, by an extremely strict and coherent code of behaviour. It is not, in the occidental sense, a moral code. It does not derive from any religion, whether Buddhism or the indigenous Shinto. It is something unique which the Japanese have developed in their own seclusion. It is what makes their hierarchical system work, by providing checks and balances to prevent the extreme exercise of arbitrary power by one group or class. It means that the Japanese thrive, or appear to thrive, under a yoke of social pressure which would be quite intolerable to most, if not all occidental people. It is almost as if they said to themselves (not without some encouragement from Chinese philosophy in which the Book of Rites is canonical): 'Morals are hard to establish. Let us not endeavour to decide as to Good and Evil, but content ourselves with a strict code of rules of social conduct. Then we shall know what to do in all situations.'

Dr. Benedict does not tell us whether the U.S. Government took her advice. Their actions at the time of surrender, and in the beginning of the occupation

period, were in conformity with some of her findings, and it would be well if those who in the future will be responsible for relationships with Japan could pay some attention to the nature of traditional Japanese culture. It is very deeply rooted, and to destroy any of its essential features without putting something better in their place is only to leave bleeding wounds. We must not suppose that ours are the only valid beliefs and ours the only right practices. It is here that the social anthropologist can be useful, for if he is true to his profession he is immune to national prejudice.

Yet I must end on a slightly sceptical note, since after reading Dr. Benedict's remarkably penetrating study I still ask myself whether it has arrived at any firm conclusions about Japanese character which could not have been reached by empiric methods. I am not sure. She has well described how Japanese behave, she has explained phenomena which are puzzling to the Western mind; but we are still left wondering how the Japanese came to evolve their remarkable system of social ethics. The riddle is still unsolved. The historians must get to work again and see whether *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* will help to clear their minds, for however one looks at it, this is an important book.

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## MIGUEL DE CERVANTES

BY WILLIAM C. ATKINSON

“OLD soldiers never die.” Cervantes, the veteran campaigner, who was prouder of having fought at Lepanto than of having written *Don Quixote*, made a more forthright gesture of immortality than most when his call sounded. On that same April 23, 1616—if by a divergent calendar—on which Shakespeare died, Cervantes instead, “with his foot in the stirrup,” as he himself put it a few hours before his departure, rode off gallantly into the unknown. It is fitting that no record should remain of his last resting-place. His bones matter not: his spirit lives on. Fitting too that none should know just when or where he was born, leaving the present quater-centenary celebrations to hinge on his christening in the university town of Alcalá de Henares on October 9, 1547.

The link with Shakespeare has in the past evoked much spilling of ink and oratory, and for such as are content to murmur “genius” and to luxuriate in its inexplicability the theme is suggestive. At a crucial moment in the story of mankind, one of the great cross-roads of history, the two greatest powers of their day, predestined to clash because they stood for incompatibles, each threw up in a single master-mind the quintessence of its national spirit, a spokesman to all time of the glory that was England and the grandeur that was Spain. For the curious who would discover the real England, the real Spain, what deep down in their souls each would wish to be, nature provided a Shakespeare and a Cervantes. To Englishman and Spaniard they have the further function, that in moments of national eclipse, of aberration, of spiritual dejection, we may turn to them for a renewal of faith and resolve. This we have been, this therefore we have it in ourselves to be. The fault lies not in our stars, but in ourselves, that we are underlings.

If such be one of the abiding purposes of great minds, to help us to self-realization, centenaries in themselves have a more specific utility. They are occasions for critical stock-taking, for the attempt to discover more about the great mind, about the workings, if not the nature, of genius. Cervantes offers a peculiar interest in this respect. Shakespeare's gifts matured early and easily. Sprung of good family, nurtured in the lap of nature, fortunate in the moment of his impact on London and the theatre, gifted with an open-sesame to his chosen doors in the hall of fame, he knew no setback, took no single false step in his career as actor, manager, dramatist. At forty he was writing imperishable masterpieces, before he was fifty he had retired to acclaim

and affluence. There is no evidence that he ever had to wrestle either with life or with his craft. We, his readers, must wrestle back unaided from the creation to the creative process, and, asking ourselves how much we have uncovered, we catch his enigmatic smile.

Cervantes achieved his goal the hard way, by trial and error, with many a disappointment and thwarted ambition, with much deep reflection also on the problems of his craft; and among his most genial qualities is the way in which he takes his reader into his confidence. The ultimate secret, in Cervantes too, is doubtless his alone. Only another Cervantes could write another *Don Quixote*. But no genius was ever more conscious of his art as primarily a craft, and his pages are still an incomparable school of craftsmanship for the apprentice to letters. It was his *Exemplary Tales*, it will be remembered, that first inspired Scott with the urge to excel in fiction, and until crippled by illness, Scott tells us, he remained a constant reader of them. They are a fount no less of encouragement, for Cervantes' was a late flowering, after a lifetime of struggle against unpropitious circumstance. Had he died, as Shakespeare died, at fifty-two, he would be unknown to fame. The First Part of *Don Quixote* appeared when he was fifty-eight, the Second only ten years later. *Persiles y Sigismunda*, that was to be his masterpiece, he completed on his death-bed, penning the dedication but four days before, aged sixty-nine, he rode away.

The essential biography of a man of letters is that of his mind, and of external events only in so far as they helped to mould it. Piety moves us to hoard the scraps of fact or tradition that pass for knowledge of how Shakespeare lived, honesty to add that their importance for his plays is nil. With Cervantes it is otherwise, if only because in a life so prodigal of vicissitude the relation of experience to imaginative creation is raised in an acute form. The accident of birth under the shadow of a famous university—forerunner of that of Madrid, whither it was transferred in 1836—can have meant little to the fourth of seven children born to an hidalgo whose *hidalguía* could exempt him from taxation but not keep him out of prison for debt, and whose profession of itinerant leech-doctor pointed to that other university from which his son was to derive later his true liberal education—the open road. Some schooling we must assume, and an omnivorous taste for reading we can postulate with certainty; but no further fact, nor a single mention of his name, can be adduced between Miguel's christening and his appearance twenty-one years later in Madrid, but lately—in 1561—become the capital of Spain. There we find him in 1568 in the academy of one López de Hoyos, whether as belated student or as pupil-teacher we may not now know. We do know that he wrote verse there, and that it was to take another forty years and more to convince him "that of my prose much might be hoped, of my verse nothing." It was his first wrong turning.

But life was still only beginning. The peripatetic tradition was no prerog-

ative then of the scholar in the university. On the plane not of letters but of life it lay open to every Spaniard in that spacious age. Portugal, Italy, the Low Countries, India, the Americas—here was God's plenty of adventure, experience and the throws of fortune, not to speak of a useful enlargement of his sphere of action to a wanted man, should our author be in fact the Miguel de Cervantes for whose arrest a warrant was issued in Madrid in September 1569 "for having inflicted certain wounds on Antonio de Sigura," and who was under sentence to have his right hand cut off—the first narrow escape of genius—and be exiled from the kingdom for ten years. The Cervantes we know exiled himself, not wholly voluntarily, for twelve, and suffered instead the maiming of his left hand in battle. By December he was in Rome, where, after serving for a spell in the household of a cardinal, he turned soldier in time to figure honourably in the great naval victory over the Turk at Lepanto in 1571, "the most memorable and lofty occasion that past centuries have seen or centuries to come can hope to." Another four years of varied service, and Cervantes sailed for Spain in 1575, only to be captured at sea by Barbary pirates and carried to Algiers, where followed five years of servitude, diversified by five daring attempts at escape, and ransom at last—a second narrow escape of genius—as he lay in chains on a galley about to depart for Constantinople.

Back in Spain, we see him over a lustrum striving to make for himself a niche as a writer, composing occasional verse, frequenting the theatre, where Lope de Vega was then laying the foundations of the national drama, and publishing in 1585 his first book, a pastoral romance, the *Galatea*: it was his second wrong turning. He had just married, at thirty-seven, a girl of nineteen, who brought him in dowry some vineyards and an orchard situate in the village of Esquivias, between Madrid and Toledo, together with forty-five hens, a rooster, and four beehives. And there, in his bee-loud glade, he took his third wrong turning and wrote a number of plays, perhaps twenty or thirty, as he tells us long afterwards. Only two have survived, but even if it be true that "all were staged without tribute of cucumber or other missile, sans hisses, catcalls or turmoil," they failed to secure him either repute or a competence.

For fifteen years, from 1587, Cervantes was lost to literature. Employment as a government commissary requisitioning stores for the armed forces—the Invincible Armada was to sail to its doom in the following year—gave him at least such a knowledge of Andalusia, its highways and byways, its inns, farms and authorities, especially its authorities—he too knew imprisonment for irregularities in his accounts, and excommunication for laying hands on supplies belong to the Church—as made it almost impossible thereafter for him to place his characters anywhere in that part of Spain without reliving his own experiences. But as a career it had its drawbacks, and already in 1590 he was petitioning the King for a post in the Indies. The petition was

refused—it was the third narrow escape of genius—and the grinding hand-to-mouth existence began again. The year 1595 brought a prize of three silver spoons for a religious poem, but there was no symbolic efficacy in the award. In 1597 he was again in gaol, and not apparently for the last time. To keep his own affairs in order was beyond him, how much more so Treasury accounts. His disappearance from public view in 1600 argues most probably a return to Esquivias and the real beginning, for posterity, of his writing life. The remaining years are punctuated by little save the publication of successive works, *Don Quixote i* in 1605, the *Exemplary Tales* in 1613, *Eight Plays and Eight Interludes* and *Don Quixote ii* in 1615. The *Persiles* appeared posthumously, in 1617. In the first-mentioned year he moved to Valladolid, temporarily the capital, and in 1608 to Madrid, become the capital once again. Some slight patronage from a noble Maecenas he knew at length, and popular esteem; escape from penury never, nor from a household of women—his wife, two sisters, a daughter, a niece, a serving-maid—who must at times have strained even his charity.

Such was the background against which Cervantes, now in his fifties, was able at last to devote himself seriously to literature. Three times, as we have seen, he was all but lost to letters. Three times he took the wrong turning, and from his persistence to the end of his life in straying down those same unprofitable byways of poetry, the pastoral and the drama critics have elaborated the theory that he never knew the true nature of his genius. On his death-bed he was still promising a Second Part of the *Galatea*. *Passe encore*, for the pastoral novel was a respectable literary kind and a proper vehicle for the neo-Platonism of the Renaissance; nor was the *Galatea*, however imitative, the worst in the vein. But that strange "northern romance", the *Persiles y Sigismunda*, that to the modern reader fresh from *Don Quixote* commonly suggests the delirium of high fever, how explain its author's boldness to assert that it would be found to be the best work ever written in the language? It has become a commonplace of criticism to say that Cervantes is great in the measure in which he keeps close to experience, and that once he parts company with this genius deserts his pen. The contention has survived even the demonstration, on which modern Cervantes scholarship rests, that a serious and consistent core of thought runs through all his writings. This dichotomy between the thinker and the artist, however conceivable in the abstract—one may recall Socrates' vital discovery that a poet was often the last person to know what his poems really meant—is wholly inadmissible with Cervantes, in whose thought the aesthetic problems of literary creation are precisely the most recurrent and most seriously debated element. But the basic heresy, that realism is a prime merit in the imaginative writer, goes deeper still, and strikes at the roots of Cervantes' every expressed judgment on the literary art. In the preliminaries to *Don Quixote* is to be found one that to our mind is conclusive. Cervantes there passes verdict on the *Tragicomedy of Calixto and*

*Melibea* (1499), one of Spain's great books, in which however a highly idealistic and tragic conception of true love at issue with fate is obscured by such a masterly portrayal of grosser elements as has caused the work to be proclaimed in all the manuals a masterpiece of realism and to be re-christened after its most ignoble character, the bawd *Celestina*: "A divine book," writes Cervantes, "if only the human were less in evidence."

Cervantes' problem never was how to get experience on paper, but how to create. His earliest surviving play, hinging on his captivity in Algiers, was a mere transcription of experience, and is devoid of artistic merit; and whenever thereafter he allowed the memory of things seen or done to control his pen, as in certain of the *Exemplary Tales*, the result is the same. In his first prose work, the *Galatea*, he is at the other pole, in a wholly artificial world wherein courtiers disguised as shepherds discourse on ideal love; and here too Cervantes was conscious of failure—his Prologue admits it. And for the same reason. What Cervantes lacked at this stage was knowledge of the fundamentals of aesthetics. It is impossible to trace his development, to appraise his achievement, and in particular to give content to the claim that he is the father of the modern novel, unless we take into account not merely his commerce with life in the raw but his intellectual formation. Of him too we know that he had little Latin and less Greek. Of Italian literature, whether in the original or in Spanish translation, he had read at least the current masterpieces. But his ideas on the literary art did not come from fellow-artists; they came from writers on literary theory.

This was a fecund branch of critical writing in the Italy he knew, though again there may be reasons for thinking that he found all he needed in the works of his compatriots, and at a much later date. But whether he drank at the wells of Castelvetro, Robortelli and Piccolomini, or from López Pinciano's *Philosophía antigua poética* (Madrid, 1596), there can be no doubt that this discovery of Aristotle, even at second or third hand, with the revelation that literature had its own body of precept, its rules, was the great aesthetic experience of his life. It was there he came upon the fundamental principle of verisimilitude, that put experience in its place. Art was the imitation, not the reproduction, of nature; it told a story, with beginning, climax and dénouement, as nature did not, and it was no recommendation of the incidents composing the story that they had happened, but only that they could have happened. Better, that is, the impossible probable than the improbable possible. Cervantes learnt too that truth was not single and absolute, but multiple and relative. Historic truth, that dealt with recorded fact, was one thing; poetic truth, that dealt with the larger intangibles, was another. "On this account poetry is a more philosophical and more excellent thing than history: for poetry is chiefly conversant about general truth, history about particular." Literature, further, should instruct as well as delight: in giving aesthetic pleasure it should possess too a doctrinal content, in the sense

of a definite bearing on life and the business of living. He learnt finally that poetry was a matter of fable, conception and treatment, not of the accident of verse, that the epic, for example, could be in prose, and that the epic, incidentally, had this advantage over tragedy that, being narrative and of undetermined length, it allowed of episodic digressions and thereby of a greater variety of interest.

Here, and not in Cervantes' personal experience or mysterious "genius", we have the kernel of the modern novel. Where the sixteenth-century preceptists went beyond Aristotle was in extending the mantle of poetry to works written in prose and in creating thus for the prose romance—now equivalent to the epic—a place in the hierarchy of the kinds; and the re-emergence of the Byzantine novel, with the finding at the sack of Buda in 1526 of the Greek manuscript of Heliodorus' *Aethiopian History*, has here an obvious importance, which Cervantes himself was shortly to underline by modelling his *Persiles* on that very work. Where Cervantes went beyond the many other poets who sought to recreate the epic in what, quite apart from the peculiar prestige attaching to the epos at the Renaissance, was for Spain an epic age, was in acting upon this new licence and casting his epic in prose. Spain had already, as it happened, evolved the prose epic independently, in the romance of chivalry: López Pinciano admitted as much, and allowed that the best of these were not without merit. But inasmuch as they had not had access, as Cervantes had now, to the rules, they inevitably infringed these at every step, and most notably, to Cervantes, in the matters of verisimilitude, doctrinal content, and style.

But *Don Quixote* is not simply a romance of chivalry that keeps to the rules—the *Persiles* was to be Cervantes' effort to show what could be done with the Byzantine variety. Still less is it merely the parody of the kind that generations of readers, taking their warrant from the Prologue, have assumed it to be. Neither Heliodorus nor the *Amadis de Gaula* had heard of the theory of double truth. And neither to Aristotle, who formulated it, nor to the sixteenth-century preceptists who renewed its currency, had it occurred that the two truths could be contrasted for dramatic effect and that from their interaction something new in literature might come to birth. Historic truth, it is true, is to Aristotle but the record of past events and has its proper place in the epic when the hero is a figure of history. The poet must then build his fable around fact, limiting his imaginative licence to the episodic and contriving a poetic truth which shall be other than, but never in conflict with, historic truth. Cervantes' innovation lay in interpreting historic truth as the factual approach to reality, as an attitude of mind which does not go beyond the evidence of the senses, and in placing this in constant juxtaposition with that other attitude which rejects the evidence of the senses and holds things to mean—what the individual believes them to mean. To call this the conflict of realism and idealism is to confuse the issue. *Don Quixote's* world is as

real to him as Sancho Panza's other world is to him; more so, since it impels him to action and makes him a shaper of destiny, his own and other people's, whereas Sancho can only accept passively such cards as destiny may deal him. And *Don Quixote's* truth is operative also in another direction. Sancho can perceive only his own truth, and holds his master mad. *Don Quixote*, in recognizing the existence and validity of Sancho's truth, admits with that logic that Sancho can never touch the possibility that, if there be two, there may be more. "This that to me is Mambrino's helmet," he says to his squire, "seems to you to be only a barber's basin, and perhaps another man will take it to be something else." This is the key-text in *Don Quixote*, and the clue to the fable is the clue also to the philosophy of life it enshrines.

We reach at this point an important question not only in Cervantes criticism but in the larger consideration of immortality in literature. No writer can command immortality. The artist can only give of his best and truest, according to his vision, to his own age, and hope that later ages may still be able to appreciate alike his sincerity and his message. Cervantes' two criteria, verisimilitude and the quest for philosophical truth, are still incumbent on the artist. But if truth be relative, and verisimilitude no less so—the fable, Cervantes reminds us, must always be wedded to the reader's understanding: he is the judge—then the survival value of any work of the imagination hinges on the peradventures that from age to age shape man's conception of the true and the probable. Cervantes himself has been in a particular measure the victim of this law. In *Don Quixote* he knew that he had achieved something new; that he had achieved immortality he did not know. To his contemporaries the book was a mine of joyous entertainment, no more. Its cardinal message of the relativity of truth lay beyond their apprehension, while a generation brought up on the romances of chivalry was not one to assess merit by verisimilitude. To Cervantes, and to his age, the *Persiles* was his masterpiece. Its readers, into whose ken the whole new world of the Americas had but lately swum, found nothing improbable in its misty northern geography; its doctrine was the pure milk of the Counter-reformation. Had Spain succeeded in her bid to re-impose the universality of that doctrine, and had man's imagination not shrunk along with his capacity for belief, the *Persiles* would to-day too be acclaimed the masterpiece, not *Don Quixote*.

*Don Quixote* would still be held the progenitor of the modern novel. For from this interplay of truth on two different planes there derived other novelities. First, the interplay of character. Previously, alike in the romance of chivalry, the picaresque tale, the pastoral novel, character is static. The hero is as spotless, the villain as deep-dyed, at the end as at the beginning; and should the two extremes meet, compromise being impossible, one must go under. Cervantes is the first to present character in solution, the product of an infinite becoming. It has been possible to plot the graph of the reciprocal

action of Don Quixote on Sancho, of Sancho on Don Quixote, and even to mark the point of intersection of the descending curve of the knight, as his faith gradually wilts under the incomprehension of a hostile world, with the ascending curve of his squire who, gradually catching his master's faith, ends the optimist of the two. If psychology has become the chosen field of the modern novel, it is to Cervantes we owe it. Second, humour. Humour, that "capacity or habit of mind which apprehends and appreciates the ludicrous sympathetically," is in essence a thing of two planes linked reciprocally by the spirit of tolerance and compromise. Single, dogmatic, truth cannot compromise, and humour is a stranger to it. There is wit in the *Persiles*, but no humour. And if humour is the hallmark of the modern novel, the touchstone of its humanity, again to Cervantes we owe it. Third, the roving comment on existence and the universe. The scope conceded by Aristotle to the epic for diversification of interest by episodic digression Cervantes expanded until the canvas of the novel became large as life itself; and even more noteworthy than the wealth of incident in *Don Quixote* is the wealth of philosophical reflection on life. By throwing Don Quixote and Sancho, each seeing the same things through different eyes, into such close company, he caused their conversation to develop into a running commentary, not merely on the latest adventure or the prospects of that to come, but on the whole gamut of experience and the nature of life and death. "The one good thing in the romances of chivalry," says the Cura in *Don Quixote*, "was the opportunity they allowed a man of understanding to exercise his parts. Now he might show himself an astrologer, now a cosmographer, a musician, a man knowledgeable on matters of state, even, if the whim took him, a necromancer." Or even, though the Cura did not say so, a philosopher. And if the modern novel is become the dominant kind in contemporary letters, capable as of old of entertaining an idle hour, holding children from play and old men from the chimney corner, yet capable no less of coming home to men's business and bosoms as guide, philosopher and friend, once more we must recognize where our indebtedness lies.

In his Epistle dedicatory of *Don Quixote ii*, Cervantes tell of the public curiosity to see this Second Part appear. "And none has desired it more than the great Emperor of China, who sent me a messenger a month ago with a letter in Chinese asking, nay begging me to send it him, inasmuch as he wished to found a College for the study of the Castilian tongue and was desirous that the text to be used should be *Don Quixote*. And along with this he would have me go to be Rector of the said College." The Emperor having omitted to send his travelling expenses, Cervantes stayed at home. But from China to Peru, *Don Quixote* is still the text for all who would know not merely the Castilian tongue but the finest flower of the Castilian genius. He is the poorer spirit who has not read it.

## DIALOGUE

BY R. N. CURREY

**I***F the earth stopped turning  
Would the seas fall from their sockets?  
Asked my son.*

Would fires fly off like rockets,  
And money drop from pockets,  
And eyes fall from eye-sockets?

*And where d'you think they'd fall to?*  
Asked my son.

*Look how the dusk is piling  
Up like snow,* said my son.

Gently drifting, softly filling  
Hollow valley and lane, and piling  
Over the trees to the skies' ceiling . . .

*But of course that would be space,*  
Said my son.

*Where are we going with all this turning?*  
Asked my son.

This snow snowing and sun burning,  
Wind blowing and rain raining,  
Tide flowing and trees leaning  
Against the wind of the world's turning . . .

*Turning where?*  
Asked my son.

Always asking and never knowing,  
Never coming and always going . . .

*Would the seas fall from their sockets?*  
Asked my son.



## THE CRAFTSMAN AS WITNESS

BY F. W. WENTWORTH-SHEILDS

IT is seldom that a painter lays down his brushes to write criticism. He is generally far too preoccupied with his own problems, his enthusiasms and prejudices to concern himself with the task of estimating the achievements or failures of other artists. This right and natural obsession with his own affairs is an obviously poor qualification for criticizing with sensitive impartiality. Furthermore, he is probably ill at ease with the unfamiliar medium of writing. On the other hand, just because he is a painter one may always expect, and sometimes get, deft and telling judgments that only a painter could make, the kind of empirical comments that are quite beyond the capacity of any professional critic who has had no experience as a practising artist.

Sickert writes: \* "I am convinced that it is impossible to approach art criticism except from the core, from the material and its nature, outwards to its resulting message and to a consideration of the aims and effects, moral, social, political, aesthetic or sentimental, of the work." Sickert's critical writings are enriched, not only by the quality of painter's insight, but by an uncommon capacity for direct and fluent expression, a characteristic in common with his painting. He found the right word, phrase or illusion with the same unfaltering certainty as he found the right line, tone or colour. In his writing, there is no laborious paddling with words any more than in his canvases there is any tentative fumbling with paint. And because his approach is direct and certain it is also spontaneous and convincing.

"When I am writing on these subjects," he says, "I believe my only claim to utility is that I know myself to be quite incapable, by want of training as a student and writer, of authoritative synthesis. I therefore limit myself to a rôle that may be defined as the craftsman as witness. I endeavour to confine my testimony, as a witness should, to such aspects of the panorama of art history as have come under my own observation."

What then were his credentials as witness? And what aspects of the panorama of art history came under his observation? The questions demand a brief survey of his training and an inquiry into his influences and background. His career as an art student, which began at the Slade when he was twenty, was preceded by three years' experience on the stage. Two years later, he met Whistler who liked him, saw his promise and took him to his studio as an

apprentice. The implied compliment was tremendous. Whistler, brilliant, magnetic and famous, was above all things discerning in his choice of associates. It was inevitable that Sickert, learning to paint, draw and etch under Whistler's explicit supervision, should have absorbed much of the master's habits of mind and methods of work. A young man with less individuality might well have been submerged. Yet, although it is clear that Sickert regarded Whistler with considerable respect and affection, it is equally clear that he preserved his own identity by assimilating only so much as he needed for his personal equipment. Beyond that, he maintained a reserve and developed his own ideas. Nevertheless, his association with Whistler was an indelible experience and it is interesting to analyse the nature and extent of its influence. In broad terms, it is accurate to say that while Sickert admired Whistler as a craftsman and shared his reverence for the materials of their art, he had small sympathy for Whistlerian practice. What he did acquire from Whistler was a lasting delight in the art of oil painting, its nature and its proper use. If this sounds obvious and no more than you might expect, consider the particular significance that it derives from Sickert's own definition of what he called *la bonne peinture*. "As much, and the kind of truth, shall I say?, as can be expressed by the clean and frank juxtaposition of pastes, considered as opaque rather than transparent, and related to each other in colour and values by the deliberate and conscious act of the painter."

Now consider how this definition explains his enthusiastic appraisal of Whistler's little panels, his *pochades*. "The relation and keeping of tone is marvellous in its severe restriction. It is this that is strong painting. No sign of effort with immense result. He will give you in a space, nine inches by four, an angry sea, piled up and running in, as no painter ever did before. The extraordinary beauty and truth of the relative colours, and the exquisite precision of the spaces, have compelled infinity and movement into an architectural formula of eternal beauty. Never was instrument better understood and more fully exploited than Whistler has understood and exploited oil paint in these panels." His fervent admiration is infectious. This was the kind of painting that he loved. Indeed it was the kind of painting that he practised. His own phrase, "the extraordinary beauty and truth of relative colours and the exquisite precision of the spaces," applies justly to a large number of his own paintings. This was the Whistler he revered, Whistler the Impressionist, painting directly and with masterly certainty, undistracted by flirtations with the Japanese, unencumbered by notions of Art for Art's sake.

He lamented the fact that Whistler should have discarded the sound influence of his French training for a clutter of self-conscious ephemeral ideas which diluted the potency of his work and obscured his real *métier*. "More and more do I find myself confirmed in the opinion," he writes sadly, "that Whistler's too tasteful, too feminine and too impatient talent had need for its development to remain in the severe and informed surroundings of Paris, the

\* *A Free House, or The Artist as Craftsman*. Being the writings of Walter Richard Sickert. Edited by Osbert Sitwell. Macmillan. 25s.

robust soil where his art had its birth. A wholesome fear of the tongue of Degas, if nothing else, would perhaps have nipped in the bud his growing reliance on the *snobismes* of *réclame* and *mise-en-scène*."

Much later, in 1912, Sickert looked back over the years. "How much these pictures required the defence of the brilliant and sympathetic personality that produced them. What poor aesthetics they seem to-day! A certain vivid and superficial appreciativeness of Greece and Japan and Velasquez; a plant without roots and bearing no fruit . . ."

These extracts serve to define approximately the extent and limits of the Whistlerian influence. But it would be totally misleading to regard his influence as exclusive. In 1883 Whistler sent him to Paris as escort for the famous "Portrait of my Mother" which was to be exhibited in the Salon. He gave him letters of introduction to Degas and other painters. He entrusted him with a catalogue of his etchings which he was to present to Degas with the comment that Whistler was "amazing". Degas, who received him most cordially, made a profound impression on him. Sickert's subsequent and frequent visits to France strengthened a mutual regard and friendship which lasted until Degas died, in 1917. Although there is no detailed appreciation of the work of Degas in Sickert's writings, there is no doubt of the reverent affection he felt for "this truly great man" as he calls him. He quotes him frequently. As, for example: "I have often heard Degas say that in painting you must give the idea of the true by means of the false." Or again: "I remember Degas once pointing out to me how Monet always got his *masses d'aplomb* intuitively." If there is no explicit tribute in his writings, there is certainly an implied and handsome tribute in his paintings. Such works as the portrait of Victor Lecour (1922) and *The Trapeze* (1920) are precise evidence of the admiration that Degas provoked in him. But whereas he learned the approach to *la bonne peinture* at Whistler's hands, the example of Degas showed him an approach to draughtsmanship. "The bulk of the work of Degas is founded," he wrote, "like the old masters, on drawings."

So far, only the influences of two men have been discussed. Both were considerably older than Sickert. Both, in a broad category, were Impressionists. It is strange to consider that Sickert's close adherence to these two influences had hitherto prevented him from making any acknowledgment of the work of such painters as Cézanne, Gauguin, Van Gogh and Seurat. He had been backwards and forwards, many times, to and from the Continent. He had doubtless seen and discussed every aspect of contemporary French painting. Yet he had remained seemingly aloof from the new movements and ideas that had created a ferment in Paris. Until, in 1910, Roger Fry organized the first Post-Impressionist exhibition in London, at the Grafton Galleries. "It has caused a rumpus," Sickert wrote in *THE FORTNIGHTLY* of January 1911. "The rumpus has collected, and the crowd is quite willing to listen to reason and to learn. . . . John Bull and his lady, who love a joke, walk up and learn a few

things, some of which have been known in Europe for a decade and some for a quarter of a century . . ."

A rumpus there was. Painters and critics talked themselves hoarse in fierce and fevered discussion and argument. Some ranged themselves on the side of unqualified censure, others on the side of ecstatic approval. In his rôle of critic, Sickert was obliged to commit himself to an opinion. In his capacity as teacher, he felt that it was his responsibility to act as a calm, wise counsellor and pronounce clear and unmistakable judgment. He considered the hypothetical case of a student wrestling day after day with the exacting problems of drawing and painting. Supposing the student should come to him in bewilderment and say: "What about Matisse and Picasso?" The question has an almost strange topicality and it is no less difficult to answer to-day than it was thirty-six years ago. Sickert's reply was unequivocal. "I have heard the defence put forward for this stuff that these painters are so gifted that they have done everything that accomplishment can achieve, and that therefore only monstrosity is left to interest them. There is only one thing they have not done, that is the work of fine quality. If they had, they would not have left it off so soon and they would have found it takes a lifetime to develop a tiny talent to its utmost."

If he saw fit to dismiss the works of Matisse and Picasso in such round terms, it was surely because they were the very negation of the value that he had absorbed from Degas and Whistler, the values that he was handing on to the students whom he taught. But in his critical writings of this period, Cézanne emerges as a third and minor influence. Sickert had, of course, been familiar with his work for a long time. When his paintings first appeared in London, they were no novelty to him. There was a novelty, however, in watching the diligent attempts to build Cézanne's reputation into a gigantic monument. "Nothing can prevent his masterpieces from taking rank," he said, at the same time protesting that appreciation was becoming foolishly unrestrained. He admitted the unique quality of his work, admired him for his passionate and sincere research, but when Clive Bell wrote in his book entitled *Art*, "Cézanne is the type of the perfect artist," Sickert quoted the sentence and bracketed it with his own contradictory comment, "He is the archetype of the imperfect artist." There were two things about Cézanne, he said, ". . . the very real beauty of the tiny percentage of Cézanne successes, and the immense respect and sympathy inspired by Cézanne's character and industry. To criticize him is, morally, almost like criticizing an artist without arms . . ." Sickert complained of the absurdity of labelling Cézanne as a Post-Impressionist and derided the crazy, unstable structure of theories built on the uneasy foundation of Cézanne's utterance that all the forms of nature "*peuvent se ramener au cône, au cylindre et à la sphère*." That, he scoffed, had been "written in all the current shilling manuals on drawing from time immemorial." He held that Cézanne was inextricably part of the Impressionist movement. It was cer-

tainly the Impressionist element in his work that appealed to Sickert. He deplored his drawing but admired his use of colour relationships to express recession and solidity inasmuch as they were applicable to, and a development of, *la bonne peinture*.

Another influence in his life, which deserves a fourth place, was his stay in Venice during the years 1900-1903. During that time, he looked with admiration at the great Venetian masters, and fell especially under the spell of Tintoretto. His handling of colour made a deep impression on Sickert, and he was enchanted particularly by the brilliant colours of the grounds which glow in a muted way through the semi-transparency of the overpainting, by his use of colours, not merely as agreeable adjuncts, but as leading elements in a picture. It is easy to see how aptly this conception of colour related itself to his Impressionist upbringing.

Apart from this reference to Tintoretto, this survey has been confined to describing the effect of three personalities on the process of Sickert's development. Of course, there were many others. During his long life from 1860-1942, a most distinguished concourse of painters peopled the years. There were Corot, Millet, Daumier, Courbet, Pissarro, Manet, Monet, Renoir, Rousseau, Gauguin, Van Gogh, Seurat and a hundred more of lesser stature. These artists represented "the panorama of art history that came under my observation." Sickert, who was eagerly interested in the work of other men, travelling often to the Continent, saw their paintings, made his own penetrating and balanced estimate, returned to London and continued to be Sickert. To have retained his own identity, more than that, to have made his own original contribution and, in so doing, to have won the high regard of his most distinguished contemporaries, is an indication of Sickert's calibre. The credentials of the craftsman as witness are unexceptionable.

## CORRESPONDENCE

### THE MARSHALL OFFER

*The Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY,*  
Sir,

In "Three Views on the Marshall Offer", published in the August 1947 issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, Mr. H. G. Nicholas indicates conditions on which twenty billions of dollars may be voted by Congress; Mr. R. P. Schwarz intimates doubts of electoral approval and states reasons that should sway the electorate to pass favourably on the Marshall plan.

But Mr. Schwarz by no means exhausts the determining factors. He speaks of the cost as involving only three per cent. of U.S. national income. It is evident, however, that the cost will be this *plus* increased domestic prices to American consumers by reason of exportation of the commodities affected. Also, Mr. Schwarz writes as if there were a surplus of commodities available for exportation. It would be more realistic to make a list of such. I know of none except obsolete munitions of war—such as we are sending now to Greece and Turkey.

Furthermore, in appraising the prospects of the money being voted to implement the plan, these things should not be overlooked:

1. Secretary Marshall announced the plan as his personal contribution to the well-being of Europe and hence to the prospects of peace. I know of no explicit endorsement of the plan by President Truman, and Secretary Marshall's official status is but that of an adviser to the President. I am certain also that Secretary of the Treasury Snyder has never given his unqualified approval.
2. There were rumblings of discontent in Congress when the last loan was voted to Britain and the President's vetoes of the Taft-Hartley law (enacted over his veto) and of income tax relief (which barely failed in the Senate to pass over his veto) have certainly lessened the weight that Congress will accord to the President's recommendations.
3. Broadly considered, donations by Congress are a compulsory gift by American taxpayers—a contradiction in terms. The sole ground on which this donation could be made is the national security, and so far as appears, with Russia and her "satellites" excluded, such a loan may tend to detract from, rather than to further, the national security.

Yours faithfully,

CHARLES B. COLLINS.

1531 Shattuck Avenue,  
Berkeley—9, California,  
U.S.A.

## THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

### A SIGHTSEEING PILGRIM

BY C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON

ARNOLD VON HARFF was a knight from the neighbourhood of Cologne who, in 1496, made a pilgrimage to the Holy Land by way of Rome, Alexandria and Cairo, returning by way of Constantinople, Spain and France. His account of the journey, written on his return, was circulated in manuscript and several contemporary copies of it still exist. It was not printed in German until 1860, and is now published in an English translation for the first time. Reliable in the main as a description of places visited, the work is not exactly a diary of travel. It was written as "a trusty sign-post" for other pilgrims and, nominally at least, for the author's overlord and patron, the Duke of Jülich. It omits as irrelevant, therefore, some parts of the journey as actually performed—divergencies from the beaten track which others need not, and perhaps should not, imitate. On the other hand, von Harff, who was only twenty-five when he set out, had rashly announced beforehand where he meant to go and refused to admit, on his return, that he had not been there. His narrative accordingly includes a brief and unconvincing description of Ceylon, India and the sources of the Nile, mostly borrowed from Marco Polo and Mandeville. This interlude has led some scholars to doubt the authenticity of the remainder. That it is genuine, however, is now generally admitted, and an English translation of it is the more to be welcomed. The Hakluyt Society has done well to sponsor such a work.\*

But if the Society was fully justified in publishing an English version of the *Pilgrimage*, it is still more to be congratulated on securing Mr. Malcolm Letts as editor. The rendering into English of a work written in a dialect of the Lower Rhine gave him, one imagines, no special difficulty. But his introduction, footnotes and bibliography are a model of good editorship. Without obtruding his own personality, he adds just as much explanation as is needed, showing at the same time a wide learning and an admirable restraint. He must share the credit for this volume, however, with the publisher, who has lavished on it the blessings of excellent paper and type, a strong binding and nearly fifty illustrations reproduced from the woodcuts of the German edition. Only in the absence of a map does this book fall short of perfection in its kind.

Von Harff was a pious man and journeyed at a time when the Indulgence traffic was already a scandal. Although occasionally sceptical about relics—as well he might be—he is careful to record the exact benefits to be derived from every shrine his itinerary touches. This continual balancing of a spiritual account—the debit side of which may, incidentally, be inferred—coupled with a Teutonic passion for recording distances, makes part of the narrative tedious. But the author was no ordinary pilgrim and it is to his interest in social customs, in commerce and in languages that the *Pilgrimage* owes most

of its value. He travelled for preference with merchants and, whenever possible, passed for one himself. This saved him, as he explains, from many of the discomforts and exactions to which pilgrims were exposed. It also saved him from the error of supposing that the overland trade to the East was languishing at the time that Vasco da Gama made his famous voyage. Whatever later historians may have thought, Von Harff at least knew better. Indeed, of the impressions gained from reading the *Pilgrimage*, the chief, perhaps, is of the well-established trading connection between East and West. It is with the author's account of Venice that this book's importance first becomes apparent.

Von Harff stayed at the Fondaco dei Tedeschi—the Venetian Staple of the German merchants, originally connected with the Hansa—and from there explored Venice both as pilgrim and as sightseer. Following his valuable account of the Arsenale, a Naval Base designed for rowing galleys and modified in our day to accommodate submarines, he gives some interesting facts about his voyage to Alexandria and, more generally, about Venetian ships and merchants. "Item at the time", he explains, "the council of Venice sends each year fourteen galleys to all countries . . . two to Alexandria, item two to Beiruth, two to Tripoli, item two to Barbary, item two to Constantinople, item two to Jaffa, in which the pilgrims are accustomed to travel every year to Jerusalem, item two to England, item two to Flanders." What is not clear from this list is the comparative numbers of merchantmen and men-of-war. It might appear from the context that all fourteen were trading vessels. But the ship in which Von Harff himself voyaged to Alexandria was clearly a man-of-war, sailing in ballast with a crew, as he says, of five hundred, and acting as escort to the other ship and to a number of merchantmen that sailed in company. Even so, she was a larger vessel, by his account, than one would expect and larger, indeed, than one can altogether credit. In the list, however, of the ship's armament—which is obscure—it is perhaps the translator who is (for once) at fault.

Von Harff, who was neither seaman nor soldier, is more explicit in detailing what he himself, as a passenger, needed for the voyage. More valuable still is his account of commercial transactions; his purchase, for example, of bills of exchange negotiable in Alexandria, Damietta, Damascus, Beiruth, Antioch and Constantinople—bills which were honoured by the merchants, as he says, without question "although they are heathen." At Alexandria, again, he describes the merchant houses or Fondaci kept by the Venetians, Genoese, Catalans, Turks, Moors and Tartars. Religious and national rivalries were evidently no great impediment to trade or to travel. On the shores of the Red Sea, for example, he met ". . . two Genoese merchants who wished to travel to India, to a trading town called Madagascar, in order to traffic there. They were waiting for the ships from India with the spices, in order to travel back with them . . ." This was in 1497, at almost the very time that Da Gama was driving his terrified crew round the Cape. There was apparently no great difficulty about the overland journey. There would probably be far more difficulty now.

Describing the homeward journey, Von Harff noticed at Milan "the loveliest women in all my travels." But Spain he heartily disliked from the moment when, crossing the frontier, he found that he needed to procure a certificate that he had brought "such a horse, of such appearance and size" into the country; a certificate without which his horse would not have been allowed to leave. About France he has little to say, as being too well known, but it was at Paris that he found ambassadors from his master the Duke of Jülich, with whom he travelled back to Cologne in 1499. He had covered nearly 4,000 German miles. It is sad to think that he should have found at home ". . . chatterers . . . who think there are no other countries under the sun except those in which they live . . ." But he had his remedy: he could write a book. And this, fortunately for us, he did.

\* *The Pilgrimage of Arnold von Harff, Knight*. Translated from the German and edited by Malcolm Letts. Bernard Quaritch, for the Hakluyt Society (Vol. 94, Series 11). 45s.

**SOVIET LAND:** The Country, its People and their Work, by G. D. B. Gray. *A. and C. Black.* 12s. 6d.

Mr. Gray follows the usual lay-out of a geographical survey: structure, climate, soils, vegetation, historical background, population, agriculture and industry, but does not proceed with detailed regional studies. The material is presented in an attractive and readable form; visual aid has been exploited fully in the use of many diagrams, excellent photographs and maps.

The survey of the chief agricultural regions is introduced by an analytical account of the measures which have been taken to improve the balance of agriculture, extend the area under crops and increase yields. Although the outline of historical development ends somewhat abruptly at the New Economic Policy (1921-1928), the economic and financial background to the Five Year Plans is included in the chapter on industry.

It could have been shown that the rapid industrialization resulting from a tight control over consumption in order to further capital accumulation, and the direction of capital into heavy industry, is reflected directly in the age of machinery in use: in 1940, over seventy per cent. of industrial power equipment and up to eighty per cent. of all metallurgical plant had been produced and installed after 1929. While the study of the types and growth of settlements is especially commendable, the division of workers into (a) collective farmers and (b) workers in factories and offices, is quite inadequate; a more detailed occupational distribution would have given some indication of the relative importance of various industries to each other and to the total national income. And in view of the peculiar position which it holds in a planned economy, it is surprising that there is no account of foreign trade.

Most of the information relates to the pre-war years of 1938 or 1940, and only occasionally does Mr. Gray quote more recent figures and developments. The

main criticism of the book, therefore, lies in the fact that it is already out-of-date; none of the material from the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-1950) is included, although it was made available in March 1946. The new plan shows clearly that although the main task of this period of reconstruction is the restoration of agriculture and industry in the devastated areas, the expansion of economy in the Urals and beyond is to continue. When it is remembered that the industrialization of these eastern areas, which was a feature of the Second (1933-1937) and Third (1938-1942) Five Year Plans, received a forceful impetus from evacuated plant and labour, and grew at an accelerated rate during the war years, it is seen that they can no longer be regarded merely as useful adjuncts to the older industrial areas of the west and south.

The tone of the book is, in general, uncritical, and in view of the necessity of using so much secondary material, and this largely from official Russian sources, this is understandable. There is sufficient evidence elsewhere, however, of wastage of men and material, of technical inefficiency and faulty judgment, of forced labour and suffering, to question the official complacent and *simpliste* exposition of achievement. The statement that the use of convict labour on the construction of the Baltic-White Sea Canal was a "successful experiment" would hardly be confirmed by those who worked there with inadequate food, clothing and shelter, and saw their companions die of privation and disease. As Leonard Hubbard wrote: "humanity becomes the slave of economic progress."

D.E.J.R.

**THE GREEK DILEMMA**, by William Hardy McNeill. *Gollancz.* 7s. 6d.

After all, it is not impossible to write impartially of modern Greece. Mr. W. H. McNeill has produced a painstaking and balanced account of Greek affairs from 1812 to the present day. As U.S.

Assistant Military Attaché, Mr. McNeill spent nearly two years in Greece, and he evidently travelled widely. His book is rather in the style of a conscientious official despatch; but on such a controversial subject this dryness is welcome. There is a glossary of Greek political abbreviations. The biographies of prominent figures, such as Zachariades and Zervas, are interesting though colourless.

The author's most valuable contribution to an understanding of the plight of modern Greece, is in his analysis of the economic situation. Greece is chronically over-populated. The soil is cruelly barren. Lack of raw materials and power make industrial development almost impossible. In the past, periodical outbreaks of disease, war and famine eased the over-population. Occasional territorial expansion and constant emigration also helped—but both of these outlets are now firmly closed. Greek specialized products (such as tobacco and currants) form such a large proportion of the country's exports, that any depression abroad has immediate and disastrous effects on the local economy (preventing the import of vital wheat supplies for instance). Remittances from emigrants to their families in the homeland, and income from the merchant marine, formerly almost covered the trade deficit; but the generations of emigrants are gradually dying out, and eighty per cent. of the Greek merchant fleet was sunk in the war. Any attempts at economic recovery to-day are hampered by the greatly increased cost of labour and by the unwillingness of capitalists to risk anything in such unsettled times: "Workmen regard their employers as natural enemies . . . Employers are stout conservatives almost to a man and regard any concession to their workmen as a concession to communism." Yet the fact remains that only by some form of economic alleviation can peace come to the Greek people.

Mr. McNeill suggests that the U.S.A., instead of offering loans, should admit

Greek immigrants. How could Russia help, if Greece became a member of the Communist Federation? The U.S.S.R., says the author, is not at present in a position to send adequate supplies of food, coal, and manufactured goods. The Communist Party might improve discipline in local industry. They might also solve the problem of surplus population by organizing labour gangs for work in the U.S.S.R. Or they might find it necessary to let the Greeks starve.

GEORGE PENDLE.

**AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS**, by J. M. Spaight. *Longmans.* 25s.

Since the publication of the first edition of this book in 1924, Mr. Spaight has been an acknowledged authority on the air aspect of international law, not only in this country but over a much wider field. The end of the 1939-1945 war, which had led inevitably on the one hand to wide modification of former practice and on the other to the emergence of many new problems, clearly called for a new edition of the work. As a text book for the international lawyer and the air-staff officer the third edition will be invaluable, though it will also have a wide general appeal.

Though the development of an air arm of the importance which it was to attain during the war of 1914-1918 was then unforeseen, a declaration was signed at the Hague in 1907 by a number of nations, including Great Britain and the United States of America, laying down a number of rules regarding air bombardment; the Land Warfare rules signed at the Hague in the same year also deal with a number of air matters. These instruments were never generally ratified, but the problems which arose in practice during the war were, broadly speaking, decided in accordance with them by the various belligerents, though naturally interpretation varied between nation and nation. A commission of jurists, representing six

countries, met at the Hague and produced, in 1923, a set of Draft Air Warfare Rules. Unfortunately, this remained no more than a draft and was never embodied in an international convention, but its existence undoubtedly had a pronounced influence on the practice of belligerents and neutrals in the 1939-1945 war.

Thus the world entered upon its second experience of almost total war still lacking a body of generally accepted law to govern the action of what was clearly going to be an infinitely more important and perhaps the decisive arm in the struggle. During its course, the problems of the first war presented themselves again and found equally varying solutions, but new problems inevitably arose with the introduction of new weapons and new methods of warfare. Of all the new problems, as Mr. Spaight points out, probably the most difficult is that of the status of the "civilian". The conquest of the air has for the first time put into the hands of the belligerent the ability to strike not only at the *users* but also at the *makers* of armaments. Can the latter category, even though they do not wear uniform, claim to be any less combatant than the soldiers who use the guns and ammunition which they have made? Our bomber offensive on the Axis was based on the premise that they cannot and that they are therefore legitimate objects of attack. Despite the frenzied complaints of the Germans, when the day was going against them, that we were making war on the aged and weak and violating the rules of war, there seems every reason to believe that ours is the only logical view to take.

It cannot be denied that the totalitarian character which air power has imparted to modern warfare has introduced a greater degree of brutality than was countenanced under the old rules of civilized war. The task of checking the illegitimate use of the limitless potentialities for destruction is therefore all the more urgent. Engines of war have made their appear-

ance in the course of the conflict whose untrammelled use could only lead to the extinction of civilization. It is a matter of urgent concern that the codification of the rules of air warfare in the light of recent experience and their presentation for acceptance by all members of the United Nations Organization should not be long delayed.

DOUGLAS COLYER.

**INTERNATIONAL ROAD TRANSPORT:** Postal, Electricity and miscellaneous questions, by Sir Osborne Mance. *Oxford University Press, Geoffrey Cumberlege.* 12s. 6d.

This is the penultimate volume of a useful series on international communications, transport and kindred subjects, emanating from Chatham House. The author is a member of the Transport and Communications Commission of UNO and was a well known figure in international transport circles in those uneasy years between the wars.

The book outlines the conventions and machinery governing international road transport, electricity transmission, pipe lines and postal services, and there are valuable chapters on freedom of transit, aspects of co-ordination of differing forms of inland transport, statistics and customs formalities. It is interesting to trace the real progress that has been made in the twentieth century, and also to note how much remains to be done to achieve the recognition of the principle of freedom of transport. In outlining the difficulties confronting future negotiators the volume is a useful corrective to any complacency that may exist.

If this work assists in the gigantic task of ensuring that future international agreements on transport are based on technical and commercial considerations rather than on political ideologies it will have been very worth while the labour entailed in its preparation.

Once again it can but be regretted that such a well thumbed text book as this

must prove should be bound so differently.

HERBERT T. BANYARD.

**COMPANION TO THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS,** by Kathleen Freeman. *Blackwell.* 25s.

To the Greeks may rightly be given the credit of being the first people to concern themselves with the problems of knowledge and metaphysics. Their importance to us lies, first, in the fact that from them may be dated the beginnings of rational science and the substitution of the study of nature for the acceptance of pure myth; secondly in their conversion—(though the positive value of this change is to some extent a matter of dispute among historians and philosophers)—by Socrates from the study of nature to the study of human life, and in Plato's and Aristotle's interpretation of the world in the light of this new standpoint.

At all times their attempt to understand the world and man had as its aim the conversion of men to the right conduct of life, and this attitude has particular significance in an age which provides plenty of evidence that the burden of bewilderment seems more than too much for those who make any attempt to think seriously.

The essence of all philosophical progress lies in asking the right questions, and to the pre-Socratics must go the particular credit of having asked the question on which all later thought was properly based. Their thought may be described as dominated by the search for something abiding in the state of flux—what Gomperz aptly described as "the permanent element in change"—in fact the simple question: "What are things made of?"

Their answers to this question and indeed the beginning of all such thinking must be of permanent interest to scientists and philosophers alike; and however full or admirable the histories of any period of philosophy may be it is not possible to make any serious study with-

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In this re-issue of *International Relations Since the Peace Treaties*, Professor Carr has given, in small compass, a concise and readable account of the international scene up to September 3rd, 1939. "A model of its kind. It is an invaluable aid to an understanding of the world of today." *The Times.* 7s. 6d. net

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out adding to such reading some knowledge of original sources. This is not an easy task without guidance, and the present work is the outcome of experience gained in teaching the period generally described as "Early Greek Philosophy".

A selection has been made following the plan of Diels's great work *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* and presenting what is known of the life and of the teaching of each thinker, with full references to the texts themselves. Though correctly described as a companion to Diels's book, this volume is itself an admirable summary of pre-Socratic thought, wholly satisfactory as a work of reference and (though necessarily more detailed than the general reader would normally require) in itself presenting the complete story from the cosmological and astronomical writers of early times to the days of the sophists whom Socrates came to discomfort.

J. F. BURNET.

**SUCH IS THE KINGDOM,** by Lord Elton. Collins. 6s.

Lord Elton is convinced, partly by recollections of incidents in his own childhood, that there is a profound truth in Wordsworth's famous Ode. Whatever we may think about pre-existence—and Wordsworth himself did not wish to be classed as a believer in reincarnation—we do, the author thinks, come into this world trailing clouds of glory from the spiritual world. When Christ said that only those who are like little children can enter into the Kingdom of heaven, He meant much more than St. Paul's words, "in malice be ye children, but in understanding be men." He meant what the medieval mystic Julian of Norwich meant when she said: "To me was shown no higher stature than childhood."

There are children who make it possible to understand this. There are children whose lives are mysteriously irradiated with the beauty of holiness, as if

they were born with a clearer vision of God than most of us can ever hope to acquire. Your reviewer has known one such child in his own family. When he thinks of that short life of eleven years, his mind is full of wonder and deep reverence. It was such a child on whom the epitaph was written: "*Experta vitae consilium spinis iter Clausit tenellum sumen et vidit Deum.*"

But we must not be too sentimental about childhood, as if such cases were common. The trustfulness and strange fearlessness of the baby prove only that he has known nothing but kindness. My two-year-old grandson on seeing the tiger at Whipsnade shouted affectionately "Pussy!" Most children as they emerge from babyhood show that they have not escaped the taint of original sin. We can all sympathize with the little girl who said: "Mummy, if I am very good in heaven, shall I sometimes be allowed to have a little devil up to play with?" But what of the horrid child who was seen burying a piece of paper in the garden? It proved to be a letter. "Dear Devil, please come and take Aunt Jane. Yours affectionately, Molly."

Poets mature early, and like Wordsworth, Coleridge and even Shelley, lament that the spirit of delight now rarely visits them. But this does not necessarily mean that they have travelled further from the heart's true home. The light of common day may be less lovely than the roseate hues of early dawn; but it is not a threat of darkness.

In middle life undoubtedly a sclerosis of the conscience often sets in. A man has come to take himself as well as his wife for better and for worse. He has made a working agreement with the world, the flesh and the devil. He will serve them in moderation if they do not get him into scrapes. This is the subject of Bourget's striking novel, *Le Démon de Midi*.

In old age there is a reversion to a negative innocence. We have done with the world; the flesh has done with us;

the devil thinks us no longer worth bothering about. But all through life there may be and should be much of the child nature to keep the character sweet and happy.

Lord Elton, following most Christian moralists, finds that pride is the cardinal sin, and thinks that children are humble. But is pride quite the right word for the sin which he abhors? The Pharisee in the parable was not exactly proud. His was a meaner fault—self-satisfaction. St. Paul was not self-satisfied. Luther, in identifying *fides* with *fiducia*, totally misunderstood the source of St. Paul's religion. But was there not some pride in his scornful protest, "with me it is a very small thing that I should be judged of you or of man's judgment"?

The author surely goes astray when he says, "to be learned or intellectual is not fatal to the perceiving of the things which are, but it is a handicap. On broad issues the ordinary man in his millions is more likely to be right than the expert and the professor." This extraordinary notion may have comforted Lord Elton when he was a Labour candidate at parliamentary elections; but no more deadly advice can be given to an Englishman than to bid him say to Britannia: "Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever." Irrationalism is treason to our highest endowments; to our countrymen, who, as Bishop Creighton says, not only have no ideas but hate an idea when they meet one, it is downright poison.

There are many beautiful thoughts in this book. Why is it that nearly all our good religious books are written by laymen?

W. R. INGE.

**LORD, I WAS AFRAID**, by Nigel Balchin. Collins. 12s. 6d.  
**"NOW BARABBAS . . ."**, by William Douglas Home. Longmans, Green. 6s.

In *Lord, I Was Afraid* Mr. Balchin, the writer of *The Small Back Room* and *Mine Own Executioner*, expert and

much praised matter-of-fact novels, has thrown caution overboard, and in order to say what he has to say has given us something which I cannot describe as either a novel or a play; but rather as a huge dramatic fantasy or phantasmagoria, unactable on any stage but with possibilities for broadcasting, mirroring facets in the lives and characters of seven different people who came to maturity between the two world wars. This is Mr. Balchin's criticism of life, or rather of a much tried generation, and he stands before us as showman every now and then shaking his kaleidoscope, producing scenes of allegory, satire, symposium, and implied pleading for values which are valuable and are in danger of disappearing from the contemporary world. This "kind of super-play", as the publishers describe it, is really a burlesque, tragic extravaganza in which the progress of the seven characters, their hopes

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and failures, their disillusion allow almost everything to be presented, as love, marriage, children, faith, war, dictatorship, bureaucracy, business, art, politics, God, and so on.

I do not pretend to have understood Mr. Balchin's whole meaning, for some of the writing is impossibly obscure. But in other well-contrived scenes one guesses his attitude. I liked particularly the scene in the air-raid shelter, the scene where the British and Americans comment on each other through the bars of a zoo, the scene in the post-war department store where there is little to sell and the game of Happy Families is sold as Happy Communities, the session of the Brains Trust—some excellent writing here—and the final scene on the summit of Mount Ararat where Methuselah "sits stroking the head of a baby brontosaurus, and gazing out at the Ark, which rides, very red and green and white and shining, a few hundred yards away." The book is exasperating in parts, and one could wish that it had been shorter. But against much elsewhere that is mediocre and plays for safety, one must salute courage in an author, especially when it is accompanied by great talent.

"Now Barabbas . . ." is the text of the play by William Douglas Home, presented in an attractive format, which has already aroused much interest since its two stage productions in London, at Boltons and the Vaudeville, early in 1947. It is illustrated with sixteen photographs by Angus McBean of the West End production, and has a Foreword by Sir Alexander Paterson, H.M. Commissioner of Prisons, which emphasizes its value as a social document of importance. Here the attack, unlike Mr. Balchin's, is direct, and Mr. Home has written a reserved, skilful, and well-carpentered play in which prison life today is shown and its effects on the different characters of the men studied. The cogency of Mr. Home's attack upon our natural human sympathy lies in his compassion, the tenderness and pity with

which he handles his characters, for there is not only sadness, but humour that gives a sense of reality, although as the plot develops with dramatic inevitability the play does become almost unbearably sad. Although the play by reason of this compassion is perhaps more than a documentary, it is special pleading, for young Tufnell, in love, inclined to poetry and a romantic love of life and nature, is painted in deliberately attractive colours. He has shot and killed a policeman with a young family, for no more reason than a loss of temper when the policeman was doing his duty. His reprieve is refused, and he is hanged. As another man says on the morning after the hanging: "'Taint natural . . . That's what I say, 'taint natural . . . And wot ain't natural, ain't right.'" One may agree with the author and with Mr. Shaw that the remedy for one murder is certainly not to commit another! But the danger here is in our forgetting the policeman.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

#### FLAUBERT AND MADAME BOVARY, by Francis Steegmuller. Collins. 12s. 6d.

This is a new edition of a book published in 1939. It does not claim to give a complete biography of Flaubert, for it reaches its climax with the publication of *Madame Bovary* in 1857. The remaining twenty-three years of Flaubert's life, and his subsequent writings, are very briefly considered.

Mr. Steegmuller does not put forward any remarkably original interpretation of Flaubert's greatest novel. The interest of his book lies rather in his account of the circumstances which culminated in its production.

The events of Flaubert's youth and early manhood, his travels and friendships, and his love-affairs, all serve to illustrate the development of his personality, which found its fulfilment in the writing of *Madame Bovary*. In particular, Mr. Steegmuller has brought out the contrast

between Flaubert, with his contempt for fame or popular appraisal, and his friend Maxime Du Camp, the worldly careerist. He has shown too the essential part played by Flaubert's other friend, Louis Bouilhet, who thrust the subject of *Madame Bovary* before him, convinced him that he must set to work upon it, and then served as his adviser and most exacting critic throughout its composition.

A considerable part of the book is concerned with the relationship between Flaubert and Louise Colet, which lasted precariously for nine years, despite their fundamental incompatibility. It may be felt that Mr. Steegmuller has allotted too much space to this chequered story of raptures and reproaches. Certainly a more balanced picture would have resulted if he had amplified his remarks about one whose influence on Flaubert was probably deeper and more lasting. He does, it is true, make some scattered allusions to Flaubert's youthful and long-remembered love for Madame Elisa Schlésinger, but he never mentions her by name. She remains a shadowy figure, and the slight glimpses which are provided of her are not sufficient to make us realize the extent of Flaubert's affection, entirely Platonic although it appears to have been. Similarly one must regret that only one sentence should have been devoted to Flaubert's friendship for George Sand.

The importance of Louise Colet is primarily due to the fact that she became Flaubert's principal correspondent, during some of the most notable years of his life, and that his letters to her are among the most revealing documents that any author has written about himself and his work. The whole process of literary creation is nowhere described more fully than in these letters which he wrote to her while laborious composing *Madame Bovary*.

Mr. Steegmuller has made good use of this material, incorporating in his text a large number of translations from Flaubert's letters and journals, and other con-

temporary sources, especially the *Souvenirs littéraires* of Maxime Du Camp. (He rightly says that Du Camp's information is not always dependable, but he might have made his comment more explicit, and referred to the jealousy and petty malice too often apparent in these memoirs.) As the letters are seldom quoted in their entirety, it would have been useful to indicate the places where they have been abridged, and also to date them more consistently. The translations themselves maintain a very fair level, although occasionally there are some unhappy renderings.

CHARLES GOULD.

#### MERCHANT OF ALPHABETS, by Reginald Orcutt. Jarrolds. 16s. CROFT AND CEILIDH, by Colin Macdonald. Moray Press. 7s. 6d.

Seventy-seven different countries have been visited by Mr. Orcutt, an American,

"WHOSOEVER will, let him take the WATER of LIFE freely". (Rev. xxii., 17)

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who sold the Linotype around the world. From Iceland to Patagonia, from Borneo to Lapland he has travelled as a merchant of alphabets, and one of the few regions he does not seem to have frequented is the Highlands of Scotland, the scene of Mr. Macdonald's interesting book. However, as the Gaelic expresses itself in no exotic alphabet Mr. Orcutt did not feel particularly attracted to it. He would have been very much at home with some of the odd characters of whom we learn in Mr. Macdonald's pages, such as the tinker woman who, in the neighbourhood of Dingwall, begged for a fill of tobacco. It happened that Mr. Macdonald had a friend with him. "Indeed," quoth the friend, "I haven't that for myself. I haven't had a smoke to-day and I can't get one till I reach the town." "Oh, helpless man," exclaimed the tinker woman, "you should never let your tobacco run so low as that," as she handed him a couple of fills.

Mr. Orcutt's observations are often acute and amusing. He has evolved a theory that all Englishmen hate each other until 10.30 a.m. or thereabouts. At breakfast in his London hotel he noticed them sitting aloof at what he calls miniature bridge tables, in impenetrable isolation behind the pages of *The Times*. Silence, he says, is then absolute and smiles are absent—presumably he saw no one reading the fourth leader—not so much, says he, because smiles are prohibited as because they simply could not be. The French and Italian waiters, he thinks, have long given up trying to understand what it is all about. They have learned to move in almost utter silence and seem to have developed a sign language of their own.

The languages with which Mr. Orcutt came into professional contact were, indeed, legion. The public printer of Persia, His Excellency the Arbab Khailkhosrov Sharokh, informed him that, although they use the Arabic alphabet, they have six more letters than are used in Cairo and for every letter four forms:

the letter by itself and the same letter in what they call the primary, the medial and the final form, depending on where it is used in the word. Let it not be thought, however, that Mr. Orcutt's book appeals merely to Linotype experts. It is full of all kinds of information which in the course of his unending travels the author has gathered for our edification. Thus, to return for a moment to Persia, in the time of the late Shah the numerous bandits were swiftly and severely punished when they were caught. They were then taken to the scene of their crime, tied to stakes and walled in up to their necks in concrete, which, in setting, slowly broke their bones and left their hideous skulls as warnings for all to see. One day in Teheran, the capital, Mr. Orcutt's car nearly ran over the prostrate form of a man, who turned out to be drunk. While Mr. Orcutt and the chauffeur were pulling him out of the way they were interrupted by a mullah, or priest, whose green turban showed that he had made the pilgrimage to Mecca. "It is the will of Allah," said this personage, "that the man should lie on the road. He has drunk wine, which is forbidden by the Prophet."

In Albania Mr. Orcutt was advised to take a couple of soldiers on the running board of the car, because if a soldier gets shot by the brigands they have to pay a much heavier penalty than if they shoot other people. We are told that Dr. Salazar's educational programme in Portugal provided the stimulus to printing that brought Mr. Orcutt back to that country; but he does not mention that, in spite of education having been obligatory for a good many years, the proportion of illiterates in Portugal to-day is still very great.

In the Highlands of Scotland, on the other hand, one must admire the general level, whether in the Gaelic or in English or both. Mr. Macdonald brings back the old hilarious days, as in the account of how one Paruig Mor was initiated, after being blindfolded, into the brother-

hood, with the very active assistance of a bullock and a fierce old goat. His solution of the problems of depopulation is to have stags grazing along with sheep and cattle, which appears to have been perfectly successful. Nor can I think of a more successful episode in any book on the Highlands than the striking account of how, as a boy of twelve, Mr. Macdonald took part in the great trek to Ullapool for an overwhelming catch of herrings.

HENRY BAERLEIN.

### HIGHLAND NATURALIST AGAIN, by Dugald Macintyre. Seeley Service. 15s.

Many country-lovers will be familiar with *Highland Naturalist*, and Mr. Macintyre has also given us *Highland Gamekeeper* and *Wild Life in the Highlands*.

The value of *Highland Naturalist Again* lies in its particular observation of the unusual in fairly common animals, birds, and fish, and in that it is by no means esoteric, but will interest even those who know little of natural life. This record of a gamekeeper's observations and discoveries is simply and directly written without literary pretensions. The style and short chapters make it easy reading for those outdoor people who regard books as something of a labour.

While adding to common knowledge of wild life, Mr. Macintyre is not dully scientific; he introduces us not to a mere conger, rock pigeon, or fieldmouse, but to the personalities of Snapper, Blue Rock, and Longtail, and their individual adventures. Black-Crest and Skirly, for instance, were green plover who with the migratory flock one autumn lost their southerly direction in a gale, and arrived by mistake in Newfoundland. Viewing the prospect with distaste, this enterprising pair, with family and a few mutineers, made back for Britain, and with

Black-Crest as guide, spent the winter in southern Ireland. In spring the pair returned to their old nest, but Skirly decided to make a new one a few yards away on black peat moss. The ground colour of her eggs became black to match the earth, and the keeper's theory is that this natural camouflage is due to a sort of colour photography done through the eye during the process of egg manufacture.

Another interesting personality is Eyes Right, the flounder, who has both eyes on the right side of his face—he must be as rare as a four-leaved clover, for flounders normally have both eyes on the left side. Anyhow, he eventually mates happily with Eyes Left, and one wonders if his progeny will be "eyed" on the human principle.

Mr. Macintyre gives several examples of maternal courage: there is the mother rabbit who chases a stoat from her burrow, and later hurls herself at a cat. And Hara, the hare who has two leverets, charges at large dogs on two occasions and frightens them away. Then Fulica, the bellicose coot, splashes defiance at a keeper, and has the nerve to repeat this performance for the benefit of a peregrine falcon.

There is a fascinating account of a greater black-backed gull catching a crab by a claw, rising with him, and dropping him on the rocks until he is in a suitable condition for his captor's lunch. Hiero, the Iceland gerfalcon, whose mating call is aptly described as like "the clang of falling metal", ate a herring gull a day one winter. He employs the "grip and let go" method of killing, for he will drag the screaming gull through the air, release it, and kill it in his next swoop.

These are only a few of the wide fields of interest covered by Mr. Macintyre in a book which is well produced and well printed, and illustrated by several excellent photographs.

PHOEBE HESKETH.

## BOOKS ON THE TABLE

SOME eighteen months ago in another place this reader made a wish that publishers would reprint some of those largely hearsay representative books of the nineteenth century, so that this generation might judge for itself. Since then the fairy wand seems to have waved in duplicate, sometimes in triplicate, and now comes an edition of *AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY* by Anthony Trollope, this time published by *Cambridge University Press: University of California Press* (21s.). Bradford A. Booth, who edits the American magazine *The Trollopian*, writes an Introduction which is all the more valuable for keeping "this side idolatry". Probably unwittingly, Professor Booth also confirms the long-held suspicion that this might be Trollope's best book. To re-read the chapters on the art of writing novels, on English novelists and on criticism is to be impressed again by the durability of many of his predictions and of the commonsense of most of his opinions. And, is it only prejudice that detects a note of pride in his self-castigation as he writes of his own magazine?

... and still it is *THE FORTNIGHTLY*. Of all the serial publications of the day, it probably is the most serious, the most earnest, the least devoted to amusement, the least flippant, the least jocose,—and yet it has the face to show itself month after month to the world, with so absurd a misnomer.

## Enjoying work

In *I DO WHAT I LIKE* (*Macdonald*, 15s.) W. A. Darlington seems to have found the perfect title. Though written in a world that Trollope never knew, Mr. Darlington's autobiography has much the same *raison d'être* as that of Trollope. To have seen the theatre from both sides of the footlights and to have kept the enchantment is the happy lot of the author of *Alp's Button* and the dramatic critic of *The Daily Telegraph*. This book is full of good stories, recourse to which (in those future moments when one says: "W. A. Darlington's character study of

Marie Tempest is an eye-opener' or 'W.A.D. was so kind to Gordon Craig—I'll find it for you') will be extremely difficult because of lack of index. But perhaps this was omitted purposely, for fear its inclusion should imply only theatrical chit-chat. How much more is in the book may be judged by the irrelevancy of the author's lighthearted observations, as this: "Any clever fool can sneak into a reputation by picking holes, but a critic must stand or fall by what he admires."

## Some yesterdays

Two more books within the realm of autobiography are on the table. The first is *THE DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY* by R. A. Scott-James (*Frederick Muller*, 10s. 6d.), in the form of a diary from October 1934 to April 1939, of editorial articles from *The London Mercury*. Concerned though each was with literature, the arts and "kindred questions which touch the life of the mind or kindle the imagination," the shadow of things to come already overhung the civilized preoccupations. Mr. Scott-James's book is full of such intimations as, for example, in February 1937: "The poets are thinking it their duty to drop poetry and write tracts." It is hard to put this kind of history down; there is the fascination of horror in greeting again those apprehensions which in the 'thirties tinged all our pleasures.—*THE LETTERS OF PHILIP MEADOWS TAYLOR* to his cousin, Henry Reeve, edited with an Introduction by Sir Patrick Cadell (*Oxford University Press*, 16s.), is the second book. Naturally the author of *The Confessions of a Thug* was primarily interested in military and political affairs, arising out of his duties with the army of the Nizam of Hyderabad. General Fraser selected him to take charge of the feudal state of Shorapur and Taylor's tact and patience served his country well. The letters cover the period from 1840 to 1849 and

the editor's notes at the head of each greatly enhance their value in non-military eyes.

## Europe and Bath

The architecture of India is sometimes reminiscent of the interiors illustrated in *JEWISH ART IN EUROPEAN SYNAGOGUES* by George Loukomski (*Hutchinson*, *Three Guineas*). This is perhaps accounted for by Cecil Roth when he explains that the "decoration of certain Central Eastern and European Synagogues, hitherto regarded as a local peculiarity, points back to a remote antiquity." Dr. Roth contributes a scholarly Historical Introduction to this lavishly produced volume, which in these meagre times is a delight to handle. The lists, the cataloguing of the various national styles and, above all, the hundreds of photographs and drawings make the book an authoritative history of a relatively little known branch of art. And it would not be surprising if those Jewish friends who do not already possess it should give this reader the pleasure of lending the book.—Back to familiar architecture with *THE BUILDING OF BATH 1747-1947* by Bryan Little (*Collins*, 15s.). There cannot be too many books written on, or too many photographs taken of, that treasured city and this, "an architectural and social study", holds its own with the array on the bookshelf. In truth, it goes further than most, with a penultimate chapter on "Modern Bath" and a final one that takes a long look into the future with "The New Plan".

## A nightmare

It would be something like sacrilege to include the next book with the two last, so, as if it had the measles, it is segregated. It is of course closely allied in theme but in style is one of those determinedly funny American books. *MR. BLANDINGS BUILDS HIS DREAM HOUSE* by Eric Hodgins, and illustrated by William Steig (*Michael Joseph*, 10s. 6d.), is about the struggle to convert a "sweet old farmhouse" into a habitation. When it

is *not* being determined it is very funny indeed; Mrs. Blandings' desire for thirty-two cupboards will wake an echo in every feminine chest, and for once the 'blurb' finds hearty agreement when it describes the encounters between man and landlord the world over as "the machinery of jungle ethics and slaughter-house manners." Mr. Steig's drawings seem to typify the sort of person who *would* have 'Blandings' for a surname.

## The poet's gift

*THE DERELICT DAY* by Alan Ross (*John Lehmann*, 5s.) is a return to the reality that the Americans who were at home during the two wars never knew. These poems were written by a naval officer in Western Germany between June 1945 and July 1946. Thus they owe their inspiration to the first year of occupation; the atmosphere, sombre, desolate, hopeless, is poignantly conveyed from that land where the "cratered cities are already history" and so acute is the poet's power of observation that his handling of other themes, not merely for escapist reasons, is anticipated.—Arthur Ball in *SEA ACRES* (*Peter Ratazzi*, 216 High Street, Slough, 2s. 6d.) also displays that gift for seeing which is so special to the poet. His fifty-seven poems range widely and the contrasts are well seen in "Air Raid Garden: 1943" and in lines from "To John Milton":

In solitude man finds a populace,  
His silence is a poetry of sleep  
When, through the trance, might rise some  
poet's face  
Like yours, half chiselled marble, half pure  
light.

## From the original

In their Preface to *TRANSLATION* (*Phoenix Press*, 10s. 6d.) the editors, Neville Braybrooke and Elizabeth King, discuss the stimuli that denote a good translation of poetry. This book has the usual effect of stimulating one reader's regret that she cannot read Heine and Dante in the original and many Frenchmen but stumblingly. Classical, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Spanish-American, Brazilian, French, Dutch, German, Czech,

Croatian, Estonian, Russian and Hebrew poems are represented and the many well known names of the translators should reassure the timid that here is no work from writers called 'hack'.

### Selected Items

There is a tendency to prefabricate, or pre-digest, the work of the giants which seems to be yet another sign of the current inability—on the part of the public, of course—for sustained effort. So the next two books are recommended, by one who takes her poets 'neat', not for the poems they contain but for the essays of the compilers. The first is *SHELLEY IN ITALY*, an Anthology with an Introduction by John Lehmann (*The Chiltern Library: John Lehmann. 8s. 6d.*) and the second *THE POETRY OF THE BROWNINGs*, an Anthology compiled by Clifford Bax (*Fredrick Muller. 10s. 6d.*). Of course it is true that "while Shelley was in Italy he composed some of the greatest poetry that exists in the English language" but his previous work had been pointing out the upward way—the leaf is no less interesting as a study than the flower. Mr. Lehmann's essay, however, is a real contribution to the thought on Shelley as man and, what matters, as poet. The classification of the book in the shelves is going to be hard; tearing out John Lehmann and putting him with the Blunden, the Maurois and the others, and throwing the rest, which the full collection nearby makes redundant, on the fire seems to be the solution. The same treatment might be accorded the second book were it not that Mr. Bax scatters his most percipient sayings among the poems. He engenders a warm feeling of gratitude as he points to the beauties in Elizabeth Barrett's writings (he is hereby informed that at least one more person has read the whole of *Aurora Leigh*) and he saves Robert from the Brownings with most convincing reasons for the obscurities. Particularly potent is the suggestion that "Browning began writing in order to dis-

cover what he wanted to say."

If either anthologist should plead that the lesser evil is to entice an uncaring generation to read "selections" than to leave it in complete ignorance, in this peculiar age the justice of the plea must be granted.

### Sugared history

The carping note creeps over into the last paragraph: the historical novel also gets a black mark from this reader; nevertheless, though preferring history 'straight', she is very willing to be proved unreasonable. *THE BLACK ROSE* by Thomas B. Costain (*Staples Press. 8s. 6d.*) had a sale in the United States of over 1,500,000 copies, which fact is contemplated with ever-deepening gloom; a million and a half Americans can't be wrong. The publishers say that the story sprang out of Mr. Costain's "fascination for two magnificent figures of the thirteenth century who lived at opposite ends of the world: Bayan of the Hundred Eyes, the greatest, most colourful general of the Mongol armies, and Roger Bacon of England, the most famous of early scientists. To fill in the background with authentic details, Mr. Costain read or consulted over 500 books as well as numerous documents and diaries. He even employed a Chinese scholar and a research worker who could read medieval Latin and French. But when he came to weave his tale around real people and events, he found his imaginary characters running away with the story and turning history into high adventure and romance. The result is a superb love story . . ." (Ay, there's the rub!) This lengthy quoting is fairer than an attempt to assess the book from one who has only managed to read two-thirds of it in time for press. If she finds her first impressions of pretentiousness, or wordiness over the unimportant, are erroneous, and if the Editor agrees, she will gladly recant in the next number of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*.

GRACE BANYARD.