THE FORTNIGHTLY

JULY TO DECEMBER 1943
VOL. CLIV NEW SERIES
(VOL. CLX OLD SERIES)

EDITORIAL OFFICES:
13 BUCKINGHAM STREET, STRAND, W.C.2


PUBLISHING AGENTS:
LONDON:
HORACE MARSHALL & SON, LTD.
TEMPLE HOUSE, TALLIS STREET, E.C.4

UNITED STATES:
FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW OFFICES
13 BUCKINGHAM STREET, LONDON, W.C.2

The Right of Translation is reserved

JL
Ec. M67
M60.154

CONTENTS



Author.	Title.	Page
Anderson, H. Foster	Russia and Europe	217
Armitage, John	Morale and the War Worker	306
Baerlein, Henry	The Transylvanian Problem	187
Bensusan, S. L.	The Countryside: Yesterday, To-day and To-morrow	340
Biegun, Dov	A Mid-European Confederation	157
Bodson, Victor	The Challenge to Allied Education	24
Bokhorst, M.	do. do.	26
Brett, S. Reed	John Pym	405
Catlin, George	Are Americans Foreigners?	303
Charlton, Air-Commodore, L. E. O.	German Air Power since 1914	35
	Belligerent Power	357
Church, Richard	Joy is my Name	200
Clive, Sir Robert H.	Japan: Victory or Defeat	370
Cole, G. D. H.	Planning and the National Trust	225
Drucker, Peter F.	The Currency Plans	73
Fellows, Alfred	The Reform of Company Law	233
Foyle, Arthur M.	Post-War Housing	99
Fyfe, Hamilton	Why We Need a National Theatre	127
Gibson, Wilfrid	The Gulls—*A Poem*	53
Green, O. M.	China's Future Place in the World	9
Gwynn, Major-Gen. Sir Charles	Waiting	41
	The Kursk Offensive	113
	The Russian Situation in Retrospect	183
	Recent Developments	259
	Counting Heads	333
	The Dnieper Battles	397
Gwynn, Stephen	Ebb and Flow—*A Book Commentary* 63, 133, 206, 276, 346, 411	
Haggard, Stephen	Lotus—*A Poem*	126
Harrison, J. W. D.	Marlborough in the 'Sixties	54
Hinkson, Pamela	An Irish Airman	106
Hjelmtveit, Nils	The Challenge to Allied Education	28
Hogg, Quintin, M.P.	Politics and the Present Generation	84
Huender, W.	The Netherlands Pacific Co-operation	1
Johnson, Geoffrey	Constable at East Bergholt—*A Poem*	198
Keeton, G. W.	The Soviet and Eastern Europe	297
Kirke, General Sir Walter	The Reconquest of Burma	171
Klein, Ernst	The Resurrection of Austria	319
Kolarz, Walter J.	Soviet Patriotism and the War	376
Kot, Stanislaw	The Challenge to Allied Education	32
Lambridis, Helle	do. do.	21
Lawther, Will	Miners and the Future	365
LO	The Half-Patriot—*A Poem*	317
Macdonald, N. P.	Hitler and Spanish Morocco	15
MacNeil, Hector, M.P.	The Labour Way to New Economics	164
Marriott, Sir J. A. R.	Slogans and Politics	120
Mass-Observation	Happiness in Wartime	248
Murphy, J. T.	The Communist Party of Great Britain	92
Murry, John Middleton	The Dilemma of Democracy	289

Author.	Title.	Page
Newman, Keith	New Trends in Anglo-Australian Relations	241
Petherick, Maurice, M.P.	The Future of the B.B.C.	326
Richmond, Admiral Sir Herbert	The Offensive Opening	
	The Sea Campaigns	45
	Sicily and the Atlantic	117
	The Italian Surrender and the Far Eastern Situation	179
	The War at Sea	256
	The Far East and the Mediterranean	337
		401
Rowntree, B. Seebohm	The Remuneration of Labour	149
Sayers, Dorothy L.	Aerial Reconnaissance—*A Poem*	268
Siam, H.R.H. Prince Chula Chakrabongse of, G.C.V.O.	Siam in this War and the Last	385
Thomas, Sir William Beach	Feeding Europe	310
Truro, The Bishop of	The Bicentenary of Sir Joseph Banks	271
Warren, C. Henry	Last of our Yeomen	192
Williamson, The Rev. Hugh Ross	The Church Intolerant	48
	The Road to Reunion	262
Correspondence : Robertson, C.	Democracy, Freedom and Education	62

The Fortnightly Library : Contributors to this Volume : *P. M. Allen, John Armitage, Henry Baerlein, Sir William P. Barton, S. L. Bensusan, Pearl Binder, Joseph Braddock, C. L. M. Brown, W. Horsfall Carter, George Catlin, Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton, Richard Church, Mary Crozier, Arthur M. Foyle, W. Friedmann, Eric Gillett, G. W. Keeton, Ernst Klein, Kenneth Lindsay, M.P., Canon Roger Lloyd, Sir J. A. R. Marriott, Gea Morris, John Middleton Murry, The Rev. Cecil Northcott, Richard Perry, The Rev. B. C. Plowright, C. Henry Warren, W. T. Wells, The Rev. Hugh Ross Williamson.*

THE FORTNIGHTLY

July, 1943

THE NETHERLANDS PACIFIC CO-OPERATION

By W. Huender

LOOKING back to-day not only over the war years but further back to earlier days of Japanese aggression, Netherlanders are conscious of one fault in the Pacific policy of the past, fully shared, unfortunately, by both Great Britain and the United States. With the clear warning in front of their eyes contained in Japan's record in Manchuria and China, and shouted for all the world to hear in her propaganda campaign "Asia for the Asiatics," the three powers ought to have agreed upon a common policy years ago. Events have made this too painfully plain to leave the slightest doubt about the Netherlands Government's whole-hearted anxiety to collaborate in joint plans for a sound solution of the Pacific problem.

There are however certain deep-rooted differences between the Netherlands East Indies and all other Pacific islands, which must be taken into account in all such plans. They are particularly not like the Philippines whose near relation they are often assumed to be by non-Dutchmen.

The people of the two groups of islands differ on many points of importance, and the reason for the difference lies in the accumulation of more than three centuries of divergent, and in some respects diametrically opposed, systems of thought, of living and of economic conditions. Let us examine these differences. Discovered in 1521 by Magellan, the Portuguese explorer in the service of Charles V of Spain, the Philippines remained under Spanish rule until the end of the nineteenth century, when the Spanish-American war brought them under the sovereignty of the United States. Magellan himself met his death fighting against the islanders, and the Spanish-American war, three and three-quarter centuries later, was brought about fundamentally by the constant unrest of the Cubans under an unprogressive and unimaginative colonial administration. Guerrillas continued to fight for independence, now against the Americans, for four years. In 1902 Cuba received its independence and the Philippine islands came under American suzerainty. Isolationism, even stronger in the United States then than ten years later, turned a wry face on the new commitment. Torn between embarrassment at the new possession and the reali-

zation that the Filipinos were, unfortunately, far from competent to govern themselves, the Americans decided upon the one course that seemed practical in the circumstances: to prepare the people as quickly as possible for self-government. A plan of deferred independence was the outcome.

The first Spanish settlement in the Philippines was established in 1565 with the essential character of a religious mission. Zealous and completely sincere, the missionaries' one aim was christianization, though motives less pure may have animated many who followed in their train. The missionaries lacked only two things: respect for existing customs and belief, and patience. When gentle persuasion failed or was slow in producing results, they had recourse to swifter methods. Native customs were treated with disdain, mostly with active dislike; not in wilful harshness but in the narrow belief that they were sinful. Every traveller in those parts notices the absence of native arts and crafts in the Philippines. They have been cultured out of existence. Manila itself, the chief town and port, looks typically Spanish. The old town is surrounded by a strong defensive wall pierced by gates. A reproduction of it would make a perfect stage-setting for the fourth act of *Carmen*. The recent American influence shows itself in the new quarter of the town, across the river Pasig, and in the fact that the old moats have been filled in and grown over with grass, to make an 18-hole golf course. Practically the whole of the population of the Philippines is Roman Catholic, and within the narrow streets of old Manila with their Spanish-type houses, are to be found sixty Roman Catholic Churches. English is understood, to some extent, by practically everybody in Manila, but in the provinces Spanish remains the language of lawyers, physicians and other professional men, even if they are of Philippine birth.

The wish for independence remains strong and general, rooted, it might almost be said, in tradition. But the tradition in which it is rooted is not a tradition of independence as much as it is one of hatred of the de-naturalization of the country's ways and the alienization of its soil. Originally a farmer, the Filipino has never been protected against the loss of his land. Big estates and absentee-landlordism, after the pattern of Spain, are the rule. Even the sugar factories (sugar is the Philippines' second export of importance, the first in recent years being gold) do not own the land on which the sugar is grown. Their raw material comes to them under a system of share-cropping with the tenants of the big estates, and the result for the share-cropping producer of the raw material is often dependency on either the landlord or the sugar mill. The islands' agricultural exports cannot compete in the

world's markets. They depend, to produce the high wages paid, mainly upon the free quota and reimbursement of import duties granted by the protecting United States of America.

The deliberate policy to fit the islanders as rapidly as possible for independent self-government led to the pledge in 1934 that full independence should enter into effect in 1946. In the meantime the Americans had done three highly laudable things. They had improved sanitary conditions so greatly that even the thickly populated areas around Manila have become malaria-free. They had imported thousands of school teachers to make English the general language and to modernize the education system of the Spanish administration. And they had gradually handed over practically the whole administration to Filipinos specially trained for the purpose.

In the economic field they have produced great, but markedly uneven progress. Many Filipinos in the larger communities, from which those in the public services and administration are mainly drawn, are earning wages to-day which are double the usual rates in neighbouring countries. But in the smaller communities no such rate of progress has proved possible. This is one of the less favourable effects of the political effort to educate the population quickly up to the standard necessary for self-government. Economically, therefore, the Philippines present a somewhat artificial picture. Politically, there is only one party, the Partido Nacionalista, governed by President Quezon. It represents 70-75 per cent. of the total population, but it does so without agreement between three-quarters of the people regarding detailed points of internal policy. What all these people are agreed upon is the wish for independence, which is the party's main plank.

Now to the Dutch East Indies. Their association with the Netherlands goes almost as far back as that of the Philippines with Spain, but their experience has been very different. No claim however, either direct or implied, for innate Dutch moral superiority over the Spaniards must be read into this bald statement of fact. The "colonial" ideas of those days were pretty crude. There were those who exploited and oppressed, and a few who only exploited. The Dutch were tolerant and non-oppressive in the East Indies, not because they enjoyed a monopoly of goodness, but because, to be tolerant and non-oppressive, was to be anti-Spanish—which they were whole-heartedly by force of circumstances; and because what they had themselves experienced at the hands of the Duke of Alba, had given them a finer store of actual knowledge than anyone else possessed at that time of the effects of intolerance and oppression. They were too shrewd to lay up for their new venture in the East the troubles that had caused their irreconcilable,

and finally successful, resistance to the Spanish régime in their own country. The year 1568 had seen their first open revolt; 1581 had brought their formal refusal to continue in allegiance to Spain; 1602 saw the grant of a trade charter to the Dutch East India Company which had been formed in 1595, under the full impetus of Holland's nation-wide determination to have done with intolerance and oppression. The country's evolutionary stage on the way to full democracy was such that the Act of Union of 1579 and the Declaration of Independence of 1581 contained, in anticipation, many of the principles to be set forth, almost two hundred years later, in the Declaration of Independence of the thirteen English colonies in North America.

In the earlier part of the sixteenth century, in their traditional rôle of shippers and traders, the Dutch were the chief carriers of Eastern produce from Lisbon to northern Europe. But when Portugal and Spain were united in 1580, it became a simple war measure for Spain to shut the rebellious Dutch out from the Lisbon trade. They then started to sail to the East themselves, to fetch the wares formerly collected at Lisbon. Trade, in the form of collecting the agricultural produce of the Spice Islands, was what brought the Dutch to the East Indies in the first place. They had no wish to convert the people or to interfere with existing customs and systems of government. They may, like all overseas traders of those days, have had one-sided ideas of adequate payment for goods delivered to them by simple-minded people lacking any knowledge of the riches to be gained from them, but they found absolution for their consciences for that in the great risks and hardships which were the counterpart of their calling.

When the Dutch East India Company's trade monopoly evolved into a government, the same guiding principles remained operative. In Holland and the East Indies the greatest material self-interest has always been a variegated assortment of mainly agricultural produce, directly dependent upon the population's welfare. This then is probably the factor responsible in earlier days, when public conscience regarding colonial policies was practically non-existent, for Holland's pronounced bias in favour of steadily improving conditions for the home-farmer and his labour in the East Indies. The business connection between the home-land and the new colony was, in the main, a leisurely trade; one of quality rather than quantity, making things easier for everybody concerned if the local labourer was well treated. Though large, and ever growing values—and even a trading company with monopolistic rights—were concerned, in character the connection represented most of the features of small capitalism at its best. Many of the goods

produced met with practically no competition in the world's markets, so that sale prices could be adjusted to gradually rising costs of production.

The Dutch East India Company continued until 1798, when its properties and functions were taken over by the Netherlands Government. The native system of government by local chieftains was not interfered with; the guiding principle remained to allow the free development of the customs and religion of the population within the framework of their own society. Another fifty years passed before the trend of the times brought a change in policy. In 1848 the Dutch Government formally recognized direct responsibility for local administration. It then began to build up a civil service in which Europeans are juxtaposed to native government officials. Educational, scientific and technical services were introduced with the object of accelerating the improvement of the cultural and economic situation of the population.

This intermediary stage lasted until the turn of the century when, half in accordance with evolutionary world thought, and half in advance of it, the Netherlands Government adopted the deliberate policy of developing the East Indies for their own sake and preponderatingly in the interests of the native population. In the meantime it had taken care to avoid one of the worst evils of colonization. It had protected the population against the danger of the alienization of its native soil. The first regulations governing sales and leases to non-Indonesians were issued in 1854, and though the subject bristles with difficulties on account of the often obscure and contradictory provisions of native laws regarding individual and communal rights of possession and ownership, the series of measures passed from time to time have served their purpose admirably. Even in Java, which covers only one-fifteenth of the land area of the archipelago, and where western cultivations are several decades older than elsewhere, only 2½ million acres out of a total of 35 million acres are occupied by estate agriculture. The rest is tilled and harvested by Indonesians for their own food crops. Leases to estates companies are never granted except for "wild" land, and then only after the most searching scrutiny as to whether the grant is compatible with the people's interest.

The same period also brought the first proposal for the *Volksraad*. In 1893 Minister van Dedum formulated a plan for popular participation in local government, to give shape to ideas which had been discussed on and off for several decades. No immediate decision was reached and the subject was merged in the larger question then being studied, of evolving the negative, if effective, policy of government restrictions on exclusive and untrammelled pursuit of

profit into a positive system fostering Indonesian emancipation in the political, economic and spiritual spheres.

The new era was consciously initiated in 1901 by a Speech from the Throne delivered personally by Queen Wilhelmina, mentioning for the first time the "moral vocation" of the Netherlands in the Indies. Since then progress has been accelerated. An outward sympton of its rate of advance may be seen in the fact that the constitution of the Indies was modified four times in the first quarter of the present century. To-day the lowest structure in the governmental machine, the purely Indonesian administration of the village, is linked through the various strata of the civil service with the top of the administration, and it is just as important. The local chieftain is elected, and the supervision to which he is subjected is more Indonesian than Dutch. In 1922 the Indies ceased to be a colony and became one of the four component parts, equal in rank, of the Kingdom of the Netherlands: Holland in Europe, the Netherlands East Indies, Surinam and Curacao. The basic civic rights were reaffirmed with additional guarantees: freedom of speech, assembly and press; protection of person and property; right of petition. Indonesians were made eligible for all public functions, they entered into the highest ranks of the civil administration and an Indonesian, whose recent death is still deplored, attained the full rank of Cabinet Minister. Thousands of elected Indonesians take their share in public affairs as members of municipal, regency and provincial councils.

Directly sharing the highest responsibility with the Governor-General stands the *Volkraad*, the People's Council, consisting of 60 members. One of its standing rules is that the number of Indonesian members equals that of the combined total between Westerners and Chinese members. Thirty-eight of the members are elected, the others designated by the Governor-General. Its majority is thus permanently non-Dutch. So far it has experienced two extensions of power. Coming into existence in 1918 it had a purely advisory character. Ten years later it became a legislative body for practically all internal affairs of the Indies. More recently still, the Governor-General's power of Veto has begun to fall into disuse. No member is ever supposed to consider himself a government nominee, nor has he ever acted as if he were. The council fully reflects the various currents of public opinion in both internal and external questions and it has never hesitated to make itself heard, and listened to, by the Government.

Education has been improved out of recognition. At the time of the Japanese invasion instruction was being given in at least fifteen languages in more than 20,000 primary schools by approximately 50,000 teachers. There were also 1,500 primary schools in which Dutch was the teaching language, and 700 secondary schools. Here, as in religion, the notable feature was the effort to advance the masses along their own lines of thought, not to force other conceptions on their minds. The overwhelming majority of the people remain Mahommedans, and Protestant and Roman Catholics Missions are so distributed that they never clash.

The subject of mass-welfare is too complicated to be dealt with fully. The introduction of western standards, even that of capital, into an originally primitive community raises far-reaching problems. It takes a long time to teach the eastern labourer, with his particular outlook on life, the value of long-term goods or the virtues of saving. Welfare efforts in the East have to concern themselves therefore with things which western civilization is apt to take for granted. Public health, protection against usury, irrigation schemes to improve the fertility of the soil, an endless variety of co-operative organizations to ensure better yields, close supervision of working contracts and conditions, with occasional incursions into the struggle against old superstitions—all these things and many others call for great, and particularly for endlessly patient, effort. An effort leading to a standard of development that can hold its own in comparison with others. The world depression of the nineteen-thirties had a disastrous effect on the economy of the East Indies, but since 1936-37 recovery has been on the whole satisfactory. The Netherlands Government proudly claims always to have maintained the high position with regard to the native population's welfare which it made the foremost point of the programme initiated in 1902.

In the political field the Nationalists of the Dutch East Indies have little in common with the Partido Nacionalista of the Philippines. Even during the first two decades of the present century, when awakening nationalism rapidly rose to its maximum height, there was no widespread clamour for separation from the Netherlands. The nationalist movement in the East Indies aimed more at local self-government and equality with the Dutch. When official investigations were made concerning the political aspirations of the Indonesian population some time ago, no voices were heard for full independence. And when the Japanese invasion came, the situation was such that the Nationalists sank what remained of their disagreements with the Government in wholehearted co-operation with the defence.

Since then has come the announcement of future commonwealth-status. The most advanced of East Indian Nationalists now hold the Government's pledge for the fulfilment of their demands. The

fall of Singapore marked the end of an epoch. A new one will begin when the fraud masquerading under the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics," which the East has already recognized for what it is, has been militarily liquidated. To make peace secure, naval superiority —including aerial superiority—must be secured. This alone entails co-operative services which make collaboration between the powers concerned an obvious necessity, without however covering more than a part of the field in which it will be imperative. Even the few facts cited in this short survey of conditions in the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies are sufficient to prove that collaboration must also extend to the economic field.

But collaboration does not mean uniformity imposed from the outside. It can be achieved without inflicting frustration upon particular ideals and aspirations. This is a situation which brings to mind the many attempts to define what is a nation. A nation is neither a linguistic, nor a geographical or a political accident. Switzerland is an obvious nation, despite three languages in an area of only 16,000 square miles. Americans form a nation despite the almost endless diversity of the racial stocks that go to its making. And the British commonwealth forms something that; whether it be called nation, super-nation or community of nations, makes an entity of which the man at Melbourne is as conscious and as proud as the one at Vancouver, or in the wilds of the African jungle or in the streets of London. A nation, or, in the wider sense of the same conception, a national commonwealth, is in the last analysis a community of people who, irrespective of language, of geographical and other hampering considerations, feel that they want to live together under the same general conceptions of law and government, pursuing a common aim. It is because the Netherlands subjects of the four co-equal parts of the commonwealth feel this that they want collaboration to remain within the scope demarcated by the common interests of the various powers.

(Dr. Huender is Chief of the Cabinet of the Secretary-General in the Netherland Ministry for Foreign Affairs.)

CHINA'S FUTURE PLACE IN THE WORLD

By O. M. Green

SIX years ago, on the 7th of this month, Japan fell upon China at Marco Polo Bridge outside Peking, counting on easy victory within three or four months at most to give her the five northern provinces as the next predetermined stage in her march towards the conquest of Asia. No one, perhaps least of all the Chinese, could have imagined that China, least military-minded and worst prepared of all the nations, would still be fighting to-day in high spirit in spite of grievous losses, pinning down a million Japanese and with not a few resounding victories to her credit.

It is not the purpose of this article to detail the course of the war; but, as one looks back, certain mountain-peak features stand out which it is interesting to recall.

As the Germans are said to have lost the First World War at the battle of the Marne, so the Japanese may be said to have lost their hope of victory when they squandered two months in unparalleled debauchery and slaughter in Nanking. Had they struck straight up the Yangtze at Hankow after the capture of the capital, the Chinese were so broken and demoralized that the conquest of China might have been achieved. When the Japanese did get sluggishly moving again, General Chiang had pulled his forces together and at Taierchuang in May, 1938, they inflicted a signal defeat on their enemy, wiping out the best part of two of his divisions. The moral effect on the whole nation, electrifying it with the discovery that it could beat Japan in pitched battle, was of incalculable value for the course of the whole war.

The second feature is the three victories over the Japanese at Changsha between October, 1940, and October, 1941. Changsha is the key-point on the Canton-Hankow railway (of which the Japanese have never got more than the two ends) and the pivot of Chinese operations in central southern China: it lies about 200 miles south of Hankow. Each time the Chinese, led by a very able young Cantonese General Hsueh Yueh, who clearly showed an excellent sense of timing and an iron nerve, allowed the Japanese nearly up to Changsha before falling upon them from all sides and driving them back to their starting-point with severe loss. Changsha was the classic example of China's new strategy of "space and time," yielding easily the ground of which they have so much until the right moment comes to strike.*

* Brigadier Charles Wingate, leader of the famous Ghost Army in Burma, is reported to have said that he has studied several operation plans of Japanese Generals and "they are third-class"; but that the stubborn Japanese private "is quite another matter." The lack of imagination with which the Japanese Generals thrice tried exactly the same method at Changsha with the same results (and other similar instances could be quoted) seems to confirm Brig. Wingate's view. And in the plains of China there was no friendly jungle, nowhere the Japanese private could dig his favourite foxholes. All of which suggests great future possibilities when Japanese armies can be forced to fight in the open.

One other feature. Just a year ago the Japanese made a fierce drive through Chêkiang, the province south of the Yangtze, and into Kiangsi, in order to push back the Chinese from aerodromes within easy flight of Japan. In July the Chinese drove them back, recovering hundreds of square miles of territory and most of the lost aerodromes. The secret of their success both morally and materially was that they were backed by a few American aeroplanes. That surely is a hopeful sign of what China will do when the Allies can send her full support.

Six years of war, however, have done more for China than teach her Generals to plan, her soldiers to fight, to provide her with armies trained, high-spirited and responsive such as she has never possessed before. Her losses are painfully obvious—all her best cities and most of her coast line in Japanese hands; hundreds of towns and villages devastated by air raids; six millions of her people, it is said, but no one exactly knows, killed or dead in fleeing from their homes before the savage invader. And at present she is the worst blockaded country in the world. Her Allies can send her only a trickle of the supplies she needs; while loss of trade and appalling inflation have gravely hurt her internal economy and weigh heavily on her ever-necessitous people. Nothing in all the story of the world war is more admirable than the dauntless endurance with which China has fought on since the loss of Burma, unshaken in her faith in ultimate victory. Herein is something far stronger than the deliberately cultivated fanaticism of the Japanese, first cousin to hysteria.

There are also certain solid gains to set against China's losses and trials which inspire high hopes for the future. It is not only that China has been refined and toughened by suffering. As Mme Chiang Kai-shek has put it, she has derived spiritual strength by looking back into her ancient culture with a new devotion excited by the contrast between all that her ancestors held to be best in life and the cold-blooded totalitarian tyranny of Japan. But the war has pointed the way to, and even seen the beginnings of, the solution of many problems, some of age-long antiquity, some the cause of violent wranglings and even civil wars since the Revolution.

Perhaps the most important benefit derived from the war is the development of Western China. So long as China remained predominantly agricultural, with industries largely of an artistic nature, such as porcelain, silk, bronze work, etc., practised by small groups of artisans and fairly well dotted about the country, West and East remained reasonably balanced. But with the arrival of the foreigner, industry and finance, both on new and vastly enlarged lines, wealth and activity accumulated rapidly along the coast while Western China remained much as it had been throughout the ages, and North-West China even more retrograde and primitive. The result was the destruction of all balance between one side and the other of the nation, which added greatly to the Nationalists' difficulties in trying to set up a Republic.

Space does not allow a detailed account of the development of Western

China's latent wealth enforced by war and the need of finding work for the millions of refugees from the east, but it has already gone far enough to constitute the birth of a new economic power in the world. Western China possesses vast reserves of iron and coal, oil wells in Kansu* which appear to be of large extent, the world's largest supply of tungsten, and other metals, besides a bountiful production of tea, silk, cotton, cereals and the unique, very valuable wood oil. In the course of developing this wealth the huge and previously almost unknown province of Sikang has become a hive of activity; more roads have been made in Western China since the Government retreated to Chungking in 1938 than previously existed in all the country; several hundred miles of new railways have been or are being built; and when peace returns it cannot be long before the linking of China's railways with Burma's, already agreed with Great Britain shortly before Japan entered the war, gives the trade of West China a new outlet on the world. The upshot must be a better balance throughout all China, socially and politically, better livelihood for her people, a more stable basis for the future constitution of her government.

Closely bound up with the development of Western China is the industrial co-operative movement. So much has been written about "Indusco" as it is called that it is unnecessary to describe it minutely. It is an important factor in China's war effort, producing large quantities of what the army needs from shell cases to blankets, from boots and clothing to machine-gun ammunition, besides, of course, many articles for civilian use. The organization of these societies has been greatly improved since they were begun in 1938 and particular care is taken in forming new ones. They are financed by Government grants and loans from banks, but at least 10 per cent. must be subscribed by the members themselves; and it it to the credit of the Chinese as paymasters and proof of the societies' success that most of the loans advanced in 1938 had been paid off by the end of 1941.

It is no exaggeration to say that "Indusco" brings hope of an entirely new life for Chinese peasants, who number four-fifths of the whole population. For ages the Chinese peasant has had no means of living but "the good earth," which was too often but a "stony-hearted stepmother," prone to wreck his year's labour with drought, flood or storm, in which case he had nothing to fall back upon; while absentee landlords and rapacious agents intensified his burdens. Nothing is more significant of the low standard of living in China than the average small country town shop, whose total stock does not exceed £50 in value, and that composed only of the bare necessities of life. Now the co-operative societies offer new means of making money, comfortably carried on by the peasant's wife and children while he is in the fields and providing him with profitable occupation in the winter months. The system is one that readily appeals to the Chinese instinct for

*One of the tragedies of the loss of Burma was that quantities of oil-refining plant from America, intended for China, were lost in Rangoon.

forming guilds, and it is not surprising to learn that many of the societies have begun to interest themselves in the education of their members, in public hygiene and other social matters.

I would not seem to paint the picture too brightly. "Indusco" has reached but a fraction of the people. The development of Western China, built up mainly on such factory plant as the Government could carry off from the East in 1938, is still but a prelude to what it will be. And there are manifold evils to be overcome—nepotism, corruption and that eternal bogey, vested interests. All I would stress is that a beginning has been made of a practical solution of some of China's greatest difficulties, the reality of which is sufficiently pointed* by the fact that the Chinese are still fighting indomitably with undismayed confidence in their future.

The war has also seen a definite approach to a settlement of that most contentious question, China's constitution, on which all her future unity hangs. Amidst the praise justly given to the solidarity China has shown against Japan, it is forgotten how far from united she was in 1937 in spite of the growth of Nanking's prestige and power and the reforms and improvements introduced by the National Economic Council. The breach between Nanking and the Communists, though patched up after the kidnapping of General Chiang at Sianfu in December, 1936, was not really closed and has broken out again in one or two ugly incidents even during the war. In the south there was still considerable hostility to General Chiang. The huge western province of Szechuan was the fief of an old-time Tuchun, whose attitude when the Government retreated there in 1938 was a matter of great doubt: actually he appears to have behaved well. Another erstwhile Tuchun, Han Fu-chu, reigned in Shantung: he tried to play a double game to keep the Japanese out of his province, for which, to everyone's surprised delight, the Government had him shot. And the Kuomintang have never been liked in North China while their provincial branches, the Tangpu, were cordially detested.

These animosities have been largely obliterated by the war. But political prejudices die hard and if China is to be prosperous and united she must have a constitution which all will accept. The one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang, embodied in the instrument of Government of 1928 and still legally in force will never be tolerated, especially as the Communists, who have long dropped the extremism of early years and are now hardly more than advanced Radicals with agrarian reform as their main aim, attract increasing support among the young intellectuals.

The way to a solution seems to have been found in the National People's Political Council set up in Chungking, composed of 250 members representing

*As this is being written comes news of the Chinese victory over a most formidable Japanese drive on the upper middle Yangtze. The *Manchester Guardian's* well informed Chungking correspondent points out, as two conspicuous features of the battle, the high spirit of the Chinese troops and the fact that their equipment (which must have been mostly made in China) was not nearly so inferior to the Japanese as had been feared.

provinces, professions and business. What actual power it has is not yet clear, but it is already spoken of as "China's Parliament in embryo." In addition, a chain of provincial, county and municipal assemblies has been created; at present they can only advise and make representations; but they are undoubtedly meant to grow into organs of the local self-government which from time immemorial has been so strong in Chinese villages and country towns. Whether the future Government of China can successfully be centralized in one city is an open question. For a country so vast, the smallest of whose twenty-three provinces is bigger than England and Wales, and all displaying wide divergencies of custom and temperament, a United States of China, with of course a federal capital for major national affairs, may prove the best system. In all these questions China has the advantage of a leader of incomparable prestige and ability, who undoubtedly keeps the settlement of the constitutional question in the forefront of his thought.

And then what part will China play internationally? Last autumn General Chiang told the People's Political Council that "China does not want the leadership of the Asiatic peoples, to whom she gives sympathy and help." This was amplified at a Press conference three days afterwards by the Foreign Minister, Mr. T. V. Soong, who said that "under the Führer principle and as practised by Japan leadership means domination. Regarding other subject nations we have responsibilities but no rights." The last sentence is important.

China's culture, her native wealth and industriousness, and the mental purification she has undergone in war all combine to mark her out for leadership in Asia, where the cry "Asia for the Asiatics" is none the less real because in Japan's mouth it means Asia for the Japanese. Chinese papers are taking a keen interest in the future of Malaya, Indonesia and India. The Koreans, aspiring to regain their independence, have for so many years been excluded from self-government, that they will need a guiding hand for a long time yet; and China, once Korea's suzerain, seems naturally cast for that responsibility. Last, and most difficult of all is the case of Japan, of which one may quote an American official's description of the post-war order as "an equation in which all the quantities are x."

Mr. Joseph C. Grew, for ten years before Pearl Harbour America's able Ambassador in Tokyo, believes that when—but not till then—we have so thoroughly smashed the Japanese military machine that it is utterly discredited in Japanese eyes "the Japanese people as a whole will come to the realization that crime does not pay, that they have been forced to follow false gods and that the ways of peace are in all respects preferable to the ways of war."* That is where China's influence may be most effectual.

Japan's story during the 1920's when commoners became Premiers, manhood suffrage was instituted, the army cut down, and naval limitation agreed to at the conference with Great Britain and the United States, shows that

**Report from Tokyo*: by Joseph C. Grew. Hammond.

Liberalism can be a reality in Japan. Its revival would be powerfully stimulated by the mere existence of a peaceful prosperous China. As the Japanese learnt from China all their culture, art and ethics in the 7th and 8th centuries, so it might be again. In trade China would co-operate readily if she were once sure that Japan was willing to exchange and not merely to take. If the picture thus suggested seems over-optimistic, one can only ask what else can we expect except the ruin of all hopes of peace in the Far East? The alternative is the emergence of a true "co-prosperity sphere" made, not in Japan, but in China.

HITLER AND SPANISH MOROCCO

By N. P. Macdonald

IT would be wrong to suppose that German influence in Spanish Morocco, so curiously little publicized, is of recent growth. That would be a comfortable supposition, but it would have no basis in fact. It was clear from the beginning of the Spanish Civil War that Hitler did not assist General Franco merely to have an opportunity to test the results of her clandestine rearmament. Nor was his purpose only the fastening of a Nazi stranglehold on the political and economic life of Spain. It is clear to-day that, in aiding Franco, Hitler sought to parallel in the Western Mediterranean a policy he was already pursuing with success in the eastern basin of that sea.

Superficially Germany had not, before 1939, great interests in the Mediterranean basin. Her shipping passed through it, and some portion of her trade was based in it, but these two factors were common also to other European nations. But if, in theory, there were few vital German interests bound up with the future of the Mediterranean, in fact there were many. In the Balkans Germany had pursued a policy of political and economic penetration since 1933; simultaneously there was intensive Nazi propaganda going on in Irak and Iran, while the German press displayed a suspiciously lively interest in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arabic movements.

To-day the results of that policy are plain for all to see. There can be no questioning the fact that Nazi infiltration in the Balkans paved the way for the rapid success of German arms in South Eastern Europe, originally intended to secure for Germany a vital stepping stone for further penetration in the Orient.

Germany's intervention in Spain in 1936 had a similar aim to that behind Nazi penetration in the Balkans in 1933—the establishment of German influence at an exit of the Mediterranean as a basis for the future extension of Nazi conquests. In that extension Berlin planned that Spanish Morocco should occupy a prominent place. Thus, as soon as National Socialism seized power in Germany, the Nazis set up, at Tetuan, Melilla, Xauen and Larache, four political units of the party, which were to play an important part, three years later, in instigating the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.

That conflict provided Hitler with a splendid excuse for gaining, in Spanish Morocco, a preliminary foothold in Africa. From July, 1936, German agents, although few in number, became very active there. In 1937 *Le Petit Marocain* of Casablanca asserted that there were 8,000 German troops stationed at Melilla, where a centre of instruction under German officers had been established. This centre was divided into three sections, an armoured-

car school, an aviation school, and a school of artillery and engineering.

Technically, Melilla is on Spanish, and not on Moroccan soil being a *precidio*, or district under the direct administration of provincial authorities in Spain. This fact was used by the Germans as the ground for saying that they were not actually in Spanish Morocco. Yet no German subterfuge could change the fact that Arab troops were being instructed and armed by the Germans, whose material was all sent from the Fatherland. Throughout the Riff territory German influence spread, and German arms were passed from hand to hand. Nothing could be done to prevent this, for so long as they did not establish German military centres actually on Moroccan soil, the Nazis could not be accused of contravening the Franco-Sheriffian Treaty of 19 which forbade the landing of foreign troops in Morocco.

The Germans supported their military measures in Spanish Morocco by extensive economic activities. Hitler once admitted that German support for Franco was largely actuated by a desire to obtain iron ore. This desire could, the Nazis knew, be gratified without much trouble in Morocco, where one mine alone—under American management—produces 1,000,000 tons of iron ore a year. Five years ago there were reports that this and other mines had been occupied by German overseers and workmen. Nor was iron ore the only Nazi economic objective; the oil wells at El Gharb and others, soon yielding 50 gallons a second, were equally worthy objects of German attention.

Nazi activities in Spanish Morocco gained from General Franco's victory in Spain; in fact they were greatly intensified. Their purpose at that time remained the same—to prepare a bridgehead for German aggression in North West Africa. As elsewhere, the Italians played their part in preparing the ground for Nazi penetration in Spanish Morocco. As long ago as December, 1938, an Italian naval mission arrived at Ceuta, where it took over some disused barracks, and established sub-divisions in other parts of the Spanish zone of Morocco. The sea defence of Spanish Morocco henceforth appeared to depend on Italian motor torpedo boats, which each carried four torpedo tubes and were propelled by 2,000 h.p. Fiat motors at a speed of 50 m.p.h.

The Germans were, of course, even more active. Pieces of artillery from the *Reich* were constantly arriving at Melilla, where the coastal and anti-aircraft defences are all of Krupp manufacture, and manned exclusively by German gunners. The local airport at Melilla soon passed under joint Italian and German control, and was placed out of bounds even to Spaniards. In May, 1939, German aircraft carrying technicians—some of whom were described as members of a cinematograph unit—were landing at Tetuan several times a week. German money, German newsprint and German news were the main support of the local newspapers, which thus automatically became vehicles for Nazi propaganda.

Before the outbreak of war, the presence of so many Germans in Spanish Morocco was explained by the fact that they were employees of the German Spanish trading company H.I.S.M.A. To those who believed that story

Germans recalled that before 1914 the German Mannesmann brothers had held important mining concessions in this area. It was thus easy for the Nazis to explain their presence in Spanish Morocco by asserting that they were harmless groups of engineers and prospectors engaged in working the former Mannesmann concessions now controlled by the H.I.S.M.A.—Rowak concern, who have a monopoly of all exports from the mines.

There was, of course, another and more correct explanation of this establishment by the Germans of occupation centres throughout Spanish Morocco in the guise of economic activity. Not only did the Nazis establish a firm military and economic grip on Spanish Morocco, but they also succeeded in casting their evil spell over the natives, aided by copies of *Mein Kampf* in the local vernacular. They formed a new political party on Nazi lines among the Moors.

Such, in brief, was the position of the Germans in Spanish Morocco in September, 1939. What has happened there since the outbreak of war?

In the first place there has lately been much road building activity on roads in Spain running from north to south. Former pot-holes have given place to smooth tarmac. Despite the necessity for many more vital public works in Spain, work on these roads has taken precedence of all else. For what reason? There is a petrol shortage in Spain and motor-traffic is sparse. But German mechanized units are at the Pyrenees, perhaps awaiting the signal to drive through Spain to Gibraltar and the Straits. It has been a German boast that these could cross Spain and reach Gibraltar in 60 hours.

There are other Germans who realize that a direct attack on Gibraltar through Spain might prove a hazardous and possibly disastrous undertaking. The great distance through Spain, uncertain conditions in that country, its bad economic state and food shortage, and the possibility of guerrilla warfare on the part of the Spaniards, might well spell ruin to any Nazi march on Gibraltar from the Pyrenees before it began. It might be necessary to approach the Rock from a different direction.

Any state in control of Spanish Morocco can do much to neutralize the value of Gibraltar as a British base, controlling the Western entrance to the Mediterranean. In fact, the heavy coastal batteries facing the Straits that have been placed in position by the Germans the length of the coast from Ceuta to Tangier are of such a calibre and range as to render the passage of shipping through the Straits a matter of great difficulty. The guns at Ceuta, in particular, are thoroughly modern, Concealed by earth works, they are of sufficient range to carry right across the Straits. Thus, by establishing himself firmly in Spanish Morocco, Hitler has sought to secure, at very much less cost, many of the gains that would be his were Gibraltar itself in his hands.

For some time, however, there was a flaw in this scheme. The neutralization of Gibraltar from Spanish Morocco was rendered somewhat less practicable by the fact that the international zone of Tangier remained outside Spanish Morocco, and thus outside German plans. The Germans well knew

that Gibraltar could not be successfully assaulted had the attackers not first gained possession of Tangier. Given the fortifications at Algeciras and San Roque, and those of Ceuta and Melilla, only Tangier remained outside this ring of military works encircling the Rock. To any Power wishing to dominate Gibraltar and the Straits, the possession of Tangier was, therefore, of vital importance. Whoever holds Tangier holds a knife pointed straight at the heart of Gibraltar.

Once before, Germany had attempted to assert her "rights" in Tangier. But the Kaiser's visit in 1905 did little more than draw attention to the danger of leaving the status of the town undetermined. It was subsequently proposed that Tangier should become an international zone, an arrangement ratified by a Convention in 1923.

The Germans, however, had not forgotten the benefits of Tangier. Unlike the Kaiser, Berlin now preferred the strategy of indirect approach; it was recognized that Spanish imperial aspirations would provide a convenient stalking horse for similar German ambitions.

So it was that in 1935 two Madrid newspapers, the then monarchist *A.B.C.* and the independent *Ahora*, suggested that Spain had preponderating claims in Tangier, and that she had the right to annex the town. During the Civil War mention was frequently made in Burgos of "Communist machinations in the Tangier Zone which threaten the peace of the world." It was openly said that the international status of Tangier was an anachronism, and posters appeared throughout Franco Spain asserting that it was Spanish territory.

Any Spanish claim to Tangier naturally found support in Rome and Berlin Mussolini had long aspired to a firmer hold over this former Roman possession, and when, in 1926, there was talk of an alliance between Italy and Spain the Duce had supported Spanish claims for the return of Gibraltar and the abolition of the Tangier Statute.

Berlin was no less backward in supporting Spanish demands in Tangier More than once during the Civil War German warships paid extended visits to the town. Under the heading "The Freemason's Paradise," the *Völkischer Beobachter* described Tangier as "nothing but a private French colony; the town where we ought to have the same rights as the French in a fort and paradise of international free masonism, Marxist communism and Red finance-oligarchy."

When Germany eventually established herself in Spanish Morocco she found the international status of Tangier a serious obstacle to her plans Coincidentally with the fall of France in June, 1940, therefore, the Spaniard incited by the Germans, militarily occupied the Tangier Zone, excusing their action in the familiar phrase "to preserve order."

Madrid declared the measure to be "provisional" and guaranteed all existing services. Yet the following November the local Spanish Commander abolished the Legislative Assembly and Committee of Control. Somewhat significantly this step following a meeting between Hitler and General Franco. In December employees of the International Administration, including a number of British officials were summarily dismissed. In January, 1943, General Orgaz, High Commissioner of Spanish Morocco, declared that Tangier would henceforward be incorporated in Spanish Morocco, saying that Spain had been "compelled to rescue it after it had been withheld by international policy from Spain's tutorship."

Although from the end of the last war until 1933 no German was permitted to reside in Tangier there are to-day more Germans there than nationals of any other country. A German Consul-General—in Tangier the position is equal to that of a Minister elsewhere—has been installed in the Mendoub's Palace, the ancient residence of the representative of the Sultan of Morocco, who was summarily ejected by the Spaniards at Nazi instigation. The first new German representative, Dr. Nöhring, arrived with no fewer than 200 "assistants," all of whom enjoy extra-territorial rights and privileges. To-day the Mendoub's Palace is nothing less than a nest of Nazi spies and agents.

In the summer of 1942 Herr Kurt Rieth, notorious for the part he played, as German Minister in Vienna, in the murder of Dollfuss, and later expelled from Latin America as a German agent, was appointed Consul-General in Tangier, where his arrival coincided with other signs of Hitler's interest in the town. A German air force mission, in the guise of civilian air line officials, visited the local airfields; they were accompanied by a considerable number of "tourists" who were in reality, ground staff. They were followed within a few weeks by the Japanese Ambassador in Madrid, who suddenly decided to visit Tangier and Spanish Morocco.

What has been the effect of the reappearance of these Germans in Tangier? The German Consul-General and his staff dominate the town. They have already introduced a local press censorship, and they are pressing for control of cables, radio and telegraphic communications. The local radio is entirely devoted to Nazi propaganda, and no Allied national of military age is allowed to leave Tangier. Without much delay the Germans showed their propaganda film "Victory in the West" in order to impress the local population with Nazi might. The audience included Spaniards and Moors, the latter of whom applauded vigorously.

Until the Allied landings in North-West Africa, the Germans planned to bring about the final destruction of the French African Empire from Spanish Morocco. To achieve this aim Berlin, as when it was desired to gain control of Tangier, made use of Spanish imperialist ambitions. Thus it was that inscriptions calling for the cession to Spain of Casablanca, Algiers, Oran and Fez appeared in the streets of Madrid, while Spanish pamphlets demanded for Spain not only these areas but the whole of Morocco, and part of British Nigeria. A map on which the southern border of Spanish Morocco was marked *Frontera Provisional* was widely circulated in Spain. The southward

extension of this frontier would, according to German promises, have gained for Spain a band of territory up to the Sebou river. The Spaniards would thus have acquired a considerable and fertile cereal-growing area. The whole of Spanish Morocco is poor and barren—except for an area round Tetuan—and is dependent on Spain for food supplies.

As long ago as 1938 thousands of Spanish Republican prisoners were building fortifications on the French frontier under German supervision. More recently, extensive road-construction in Southern Spain was paralleled in Spanish Morocco, especially on lateral roads leading from hamlets and even deserted spots on the Atlantic coast, towards the main highway to the south, running from Tangier to the French border.

To-day the prospects of looting French Africa have grown dim. Yet Hitler's interest in Spanish Morocco remains. He recognizes that continued German occupation of that territory constitutes a threat to any Allied operations in the Mediterranean basin. The vital railway between Casablanca and Algiers is only 20 miles south of the Spanish border at one point. No less valuable is the function of Spanish Morocco as an observation post commanding sea traffic in and out of the Western Mediterranean. Axis agents from French Africa swarm in Tangier. Erich Schnyder, chief editor of the Transocean News Service, who recently visited that town, significantly reported in a subsequent broadcast that: "In every lodging house binoculars lie on the window sill."

There are to-day extraordinarily large concentrations of Spanish troops in Morocco. United States estimates have placed the total at 250,000 men. Berlin broadcasts have boasted that: "The Caudillo has placed his best divisions in Spanish Morocco, a surprising number of troops." Spanish Metropolitan troops are stationed in the west, on the coastal plain, and Moroccan units in the east, in the mountainous Riff country. The whole military organization in Spanish Morocco has been tightened up by the High Commissioner, General Orgaz, who was recently visited there by the War Minister, General Asensio.

Even more significant is the fact that German troops are in Spanish Morocco. The local authorities have taken considerable trouble to conceal their presence. When they arrived tribesmen on the coast were forcibly evacuated to the mountains of the interior to prevent observation of the German landing. Other inquisitive spectators were discouraged by rumours of a typhus epidemic, spread by the local police who rigidly controlled all travelling facilities. Once landed the Germans, wearing the uniform of the Spanish Foreign Legion, were transported at night along secondary roads to isolated points in the mountains.

Such is the record of Hitler's intervention in Spanish Morocco in the last decade. Germany may have been thrust out of Italian and French Africa, but it would be foolish to underestimate the significance of her continued presence in Spanish Africa.

THE CHALLENGE TO ALLIED EDUCATION

Some Replies to Mr. Lindsay

In his article last month Mr. Kenneth Lindsay, M.P., argued that before this war progress in international understanding languished for want of a common purpose, intellectual preparation and adequate machinery. To quote his own words: "If education can be used as a potent instrument of national policy—and we now know it can be as important as an Air Force—the time has come to examine the comparative educational structures of different countries, to prepare model charters and, above all, to set up an International Education Office with status and powers comparable to the International Labour Office."

From Dr. HELLE LAMBRIDIS, the Greek Eucationalist.

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay's article is a challenge to consistency of thought. That the signs of the times "compel us to reconsider the function of education in national and international policy" is obvious and to be acclaimed. But we should stop to think that not all schemes presented as conducive to an international frame of mind are true to their promise, and that few words can be as misleading, vague, sentimentally fuddled and capable of such extensive insinuation as the word "international."

In describing what was done before the war to foster national as well as international trends of education, Mr. Lindsay dismisses the former by quoting Goethe. With all respect due to Goethe, who however, had no historical sense at all, we cannot accept his verdict about patriotism. For us Greeks and for most of our allies, patriotism is a virtue, clean and forthright and final. That innumerable misdeeds and atrocities have been perpetrated in its name, is none of its fault.

Under the stress of circumstances, and not least during the present war, patriotism has been reawakened again and again and has inspired untold millions to self-sacrifice and spiritual uplift. Where we should be without the patriotism of the Chinese, the Russians, the Greeks, and all the other fighting peoples, is difficult to imagine. Barring religion, there has been no other stimulus in the world to take man so much beyond his own petty material comfort and interest and make him die with gladness in his heart. Surely, what is worth dying for, must be worth living for, too.

In the second place, Mr. Lindsay forgets that patriotism is not only a political instrument of organized states; in fact it has shown itself more alive and fervent under foreign oppression and slavery. It is therefore something transcending any state and incorporating the living history of a national unit. Mr. Lindsay is not, we hope, going to argue national units

out of existence. Mr. Lindsay should perhaps have also considered that distrust of and resistance to interference by the State is not a universal, but a specifically British characteristic. That every nation would therefore wish for its history to live on in the minds and hearts of its young, and for its state to be progressive, just, enlightened and respected, is only natural. All this, however, touches only superficially on the many problems bearing on the right idea of a national education. Nobody, as Mr. Lindsay says, doubts "that the liberated nations will wish to imbue their children with the strongest possible sense of national obligation."

As to international educational policy, Mr. Lindsay mentions at length all pre-war efforts at organizing interchanges of students and schoolboys. Can one really believe that the complicated problems of international understanding could have been solved, or even advanced towards a solution, by extensive peregrinations of Secondary School boys? We are afraid the aims of such travels, as formulated by the London Headmasters Committee, display the same confidence in the innate capacities of undirected youth. Aims 3 and 4 are reasonable and attainable, 1, 2 and 5 are decidedly beyond the reach of immature youth.

It is characteristic that Mr. Lindsay particularly regrets the opportunity that was "missed" in respect to Germany. We, the Allies, consider on the contrary that every single pupil or student who visited Germany between 1933-39 has been a potential danger to our common cause, the cause of justice and freedom, or at least that these young people were unwarrantedly subjected to harmful influences. For there is no doubt that these boys, and presumably girls too, were exposed to the full impact of an indoctrinated and fanatical movement, expressed by every word, action or event they witnessed, and that against it they had nothing but their own poor selves, the hackneyed and derided slogans of an ancient glory they did not believe in, or ineffective pacifist maxims of universal good-will. That the German Youth movement was "captured" by Hitler does not seem to have diminished the eagerness to visit and "understand" the country that had already to its credit numberless Jewish pogroms, whose youth took the oath of allegiance to *Mein Kampf*, whose plans of aggression and enslavement of all peoples were known beforehand to the humblest schoolmaster. And it is to that same Nazi movement's insinuating and prolonged propaganda that even some of the doctrines accepted by Mr. Lindsay as a matter of course are due. It is a German idea that the "humiliation, disillusionment and starvation" following the last war are responsible for the outbreak of this one. Of starvation there is certainly no trace in the physique of the Nazi troops. The Germans' hopes of achieving then what they have temporarily achieved now were shattered, it is true; but is every hope worthy of entertainment? Thirdly, we cannot see, try as we may, in what consisted Germany's "humiliation." Her representatives were acclaimed in the League of Nations more heartily than any other country's when they deigned to join. German industry had captured numerous markets. And to judge by the extent of her rearmament both before and after Hitler's advent, she must have had tremendous material resources at her disposal; we now know that she received in the form of loans far more than she ever paid in compensations.

We cannot but share with Mr. Lindsay the stupor and amazement at the strength of the indoctrination of German youth with Nazi ideals. And his conviction that it has proved beyond doubt that education is an overpowering weapon; that it can almost do what it will. And that, should democracy be able to "capture" education in the same way, there is no limit to the utopias we can hope of the world to be. Can democracy, as it is understood now, do it? Or does Mr. Lindsay try to combine contradictory features, forcefulness with freedom, universal imposition with individual choice? It is in this that lie the greatest difficulties. Freedom and choice have had up to now only a lax, negative meaning. One shrank from trying to persuade the legendary man-in-the-street that one thing he happened to prefer was not as good as another; on the contrary, politicians and thinkers pandered to the imaginary being telling him if only he preserved his "individuality," all would be well with the world.

No convinced or convincing education can be established on such bases. And no interchange of such pulverized atoms of humanity will ever bring about the world of just and free development of cultures and cultured human beings we all dream of.

The only things that can be accepted as reaching beyond the aspirations of patriotism on the one hand, and of undirected, diffuse individuality on the other, are universal and absolute ethical standards, admitting of no compromise, assessing the value of individuals and peoples. Under their imposing sway only can national cultures be "integrated," in Mr. Churchill's happy expression. Under their generally accepted validity, patriotism will consist for each one of us in endeavouring to achieve for himself and his people the highest possible moral level. And instead of justifying, and thus in a way condoning national and international crimes by the causal explanation of history, individuals and peoples will be able to proffer unbiased judgment, acceptable to the culprits themselves.

But such standards need, nay, demand, the indoctrination of youth. Freedom of discussion and acceptance cannot be allowed in primary, basic principles of action. By this kind of indoctrination the negative character of freedom is eliminated, and it becomes a positive creed, capable of inspiring youth—and adults too, for the matter of that—of directing their lives, their politics, their likes and dislikes. And once the youth of all Allied countries have accepted such a universal creed, understanding and co-operation will follow almost automatically.

History will be the first common ground of knowledge which can be elaborated and remodelled on the basis of this universal ethics. Much is said to-day about the possible re-education of Germany. Only when German

youth is made to abhor, feel shame at and endeavour to atone for all that Naziism has done, will there be some hope of understanding and co-operation between them and us.

We, as Greeks, do not want to "understand" why whole nations have become criminals. And we cannot see any other way of regeneration and hope for the world than this acceptance of some universal scale of values.

It may be asked: who will formulate them? Well, there *is* a human conscience, is there not? There *is* something common to us all, some fundamental humanity binding us all together. This *must* be the assumption of the internationalists, or else what are they trying to do? And this war has done a great deal towards stressing and bringing to light the basic and absolutely necessary virtues. Nevertheless, the exact formulation may take some time, and require some genius. Had we not better begin thrashing these things out now, Mr. Lindsay?

From M. VICTOR BODSON, Minister of Justice for the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

To my mind it is the duty of the State to exercise some kind of control over the mental food on which the younger generation will feed. By this is not meant a new edition of Hitler's iron rod, but a much less rigid supervision of education according to a well thought-out plan. In this connection four points should become the leading features of the new system:—

(1) Language training.
(2) Development of character alongside with that of intellect.
(3) International Youth Movements such as Scouting and the exchange of students and teachers.
(4) An International Education Office.

(1) Language training had always occupied a prominent part in Luxembourg school curricula. The mother tongue of the Luxembourgers is a curious patois, neither French nor German. In elementary schools French and German were taught simultaneously, whilst in secondary schools English, Latin and Greek completed the syllabus. Ever since Luxembourg has been incorporated in the *Reich*, her pre-war educational system has been distorted beyond recognition. In fact, her children are brought up on the same level as German youth, except for parental influences which act in the opposite direction. All schooling is subordinated to the activities of the *Hitler Jugend*. The teaching of French has been forbidden in the elementary schools and greatly curtailed in the secondary schools. It is felt that after the war much more emphasis should be put on the study of English which tends more and more to become a universal language.

(2) I think it is agreed that in most Continental countries the standard of intellectual development was fairly high, whilst the development of character lagged behind in a marked degree, and as Mr. Kenneth Lindsay points out in his survey, there had been no mental preparation for a League of Nations and

world citizenship. I do not hesitate to say, and I am sure most readers will agree with me, that whereas intellectual culture is necessary, moral culture, the development of character and the widening of consciousness, is by far the most important

We are in dire need of teachers whose all-round standard is a high one and who are able not merely to cram the children's minds with knowledge, but to inspire them with their own idealistic conceptions, leaving them, at the end of their school life, with a thirst for a wider education and an evergrowing love of service for the community. Those teachers have undoubtedly the greatest influence who live their beliefs instead of preaching them or accepting them only intellectually. I should like to suggest the division of teachers into two classes: those who are paid for teaching agreed facts only, and those whose declared aim it would be to train their pupils in world citizenship. A number of psychologists should be in Government service, who, besides giving lectures in secondary schools and adult classes, would be ready to advise teachers on the handling of individual cases.

An introduction to philosophy should be given in secondary schools as well as much more care than was taken in the past to the awakening and gratifying of the child's aesthetic sense. I am personally in favour of religious tuition, though great tolerance ought to be exercised in this sphere, and the study of comparative religion made available. The watchword should be: every religion is good which improves man.

(3) In his memorandum on post-war youth problems, written in August, 1941, Mr. George Schommer, Secretary General of the Luxembourg Foreign Office and Chief Scout of the Grand Duchy, advocates strongly the restoration and development of the Boy Scout and Girl Guide Movements in the liberated countries. With regard to the number of scouts in proportion to the population, Luxembourg ranked fifth among European countries. It may interest British readers to know that in Luxembourg, before the war, there was one scout to every 131 inhabitants, whilst in Great Britain the proportion was one to 80. Thus the cornerstone has been laid for the building-up of an internationally minded youth, all eager to absorb Anglo-Saxon influence. Education authorities will be called upon not only to provide new or revised text-books and set down the number and nature of lessons to be given, but they will have to draw up plans for organizing the child's leisure time and fill the gap which will exist after the *Hitler Jugend* excitement and the stimulus of the war have been taken away. In this field especially Scouting will be of great value, besides being a means for the establishment of friendly international relations between youth all over the world.

In the report of the London International Assembly, published in conjunction with the Council for Education in World Citizenship—a document whose proposals I should like to recommend in every way—we read:

> We would plead for encouragement and assistance by the State and by the international authority for all such movements existing to train character, mind and body for

a high ideal of social service and the responsibilities of citizenship in the local, national and world community. Camping sites and equipment for visiting guests from other countries, hostels for international gatherings, greatly reduced railway fares, the possibilities for leaders to exchange experiences on aims and methods: all of these could and should be provided by the State and international authority.

All youth movements, therefore, must get every possible support from the State, morally and materially. Provision should be made for well-equipped youth centres and camps, and the number of already existing youth hostels in the Grand Duchy will certainly be increased. An important factor will be the grant of reduced rates of travel and arrangements for exchange visits for pupils and teachers alike. In Luxembourg it will be arranged that scouts will not only find pleasant camping sites and youth hostels, but also an opportunity to spend at least a fortnight with Luxembourg families.

As far as exchange visits are concerned, preliminary arrangements must of course be made with the various foreign countries, and this is where an organization on an international basis comes in. The Luxembourg Government welcomes every advance in this direction and favours not only the idea of an International Education Office or Bureau, dealing with the wider aspects of education—but equally the suggestion of appointing a committee to handle the question of exchange visits of students, teachers, and even other adults. Any British or Allied Association working on these and similar lines is assured of the wholehearted support of the Luxembourg Government.

In conclusion I should like to quote two points from Mr. Kenneth Lindsay's article:—"The problem of youth in this country—and the Allied countries—is not one of providing leisure or uniforms or even a Beveridge security, but of giving them a place in society, a real job to do and faith in a true God." And again:—"They want a real job to do, which demands service and sacrifice, which is pioneer and constructive." The problem of education cannot be tackled by itself. To be really constructive, post-war planning must embrace the whole field of human activities. Reconstruction must be such that young men and women may not only look forward to obtaining a job that provides them with their daily bread and more or less money to buy the commodities of life. They must be given a work suited to their abilities and tastes, a work behind which they can see a purpose. If this condition is satisfied, it becomes the task of education to make every individual realize the meaning and importance of his place in life, and thus work consciously at promoting not only his own happiness, but also that of the community as a whole.

From Professor M. BOKHORST, of the Netherlands Ministry of Education.

Whenever our work brought us into contact with young people in England we used to ask them whether they knew Holland. The number that did was amazingly high. But there were also amazing differences between the results their trips had apparently had with regard to their minds. That a

three months' stay leaves a ten times deeper impression than one of three weeks is not so surprising, but why do Scouts, who visited the famous World Jamboree in Vogelzang not so long before the present war, show better understanding than pupils of secondary schools, who stayed in Dutch families for a week or so? We think, for two reasons: In accordance with the old pedagogical rule, "from the well known to the unknown," the approach of the Scouts to the problem of understanding Holland had been through the similar Scouts' organizations in the Netherlands. This proved to be a better preparation for contact than any previous books or talks read or heard at home. Secondly, the Scout Movement in the two countries proved to be a permanent tie after the trip was over. We know cases of Scout and Girl Guide groups saving money to help Dutch Scouts after the war and of others learning Dutch, in order to take up contact after the war, when "something will have to be done for the friends in Holland."

Our conclusion is: exchange of young people between two countries of a different character has a far greater effect when taking place between those belonging to groups with common interests or ideals in the field of religion, social work, studies or sports, etc. There is another factor determining to a great extent the success of international youth contact: has the visiting youth anything to give, is he a special representative of his own country and does he know his own country? We do not wish to break a lance for a narrow nationalism, but we think that the deeper the love and the knowledge of the visitor's own country, the greater will be the success of his stay abroad. The fact that we know several cases where lack of careful selection of the visitors did actual harm in the country visited, makes us somewhat sceptical about wholesale export of youth. Here too it is quality that counts.

But even before quality comes what Kenneth Lindsay calls the "common purpose." One of the reasons why the League of Nations did not work was that totalitarianism and democracy spoke different languages at the conference table. Here we want to warn against a dangerous optimism with regard to our present enemies: as long as the war-mongering spirit of the Germans, the roots of which lie much deeper than in national socialism alone, has not been radically changed by years and years of re-education by the very few reliable elements like Professor Foerster, at present in the U.S.A., and under strict control of the United Nations, any contact with German youth can be extremely harmful. So before we come to real international exchange, Allied educationalists will have to solve the complicated problem of contact with post-war Germany.

Mr. Lindsay mentions that in 1938 the German Academic Exchange Service had no less than six German Directors in England "dealing with such matters as education, books, hospitality and language courses." Many years of experience with the same kind of agents in South Africa make us doubtful regarding the real matters with which these gentlemen dealt. The

"characteristic thoroughness" of this Service before 1933 served many purposes besides repairing cultural relations.

As to the "disillusionment, starvation and serious unemployment" under which German youth suffered during those years: according to statistics these factors were not greater than in countries of the Allied Nations, including Great Britain, and they should not be used to explain the response of German youth to Hitlerism.

Germany's thorough organization of her youth blinded us during ten years to the dangers of Nazi education. Let us be careful that the attractions of the German youth movement to the untrained and uncritical eyes of our own youth do not blind them to the German danger in the early years after the war.

These facts dispose us towards opposition to plans for immediate post-war contacts with German youth; but even in matters of contact of the youth of this country with that of the occupied and enslaved countries of the continent we must confess to many doubts. We can understand what Mr. Lindsay calls their desire for "the adventure of rebuilding a hungry, diseased and broken world." But now let us be practical, and take Holland as an example. Who can deal better and more efficiently with starvation, disease and chaos in Holland: young and energetic Dutchmen from all over the world themselves, or strangers full of ideals but without much knowledge of the Dutch language and way of living? And will there not be—at least in the first post-war period—a most disappointing lack of understanding between young strangers from a free world and young folks who have gone through the German mill? We—the free Dutch in London—when talking to escapees, realize even now how extremely difficult the contact with our own young people, who have grown old and wise under oppression, is going to be: *palma sub pondere crescit.*

Does all this mean that in our minds the challenge to Allied Education does not exist? Not in the least; but we think that the task before youth "to rebuild a broken world" applies in the first place to their own world at home.

The challenge to Allied Education as we see it, is in the first place a challenge to create what Mr. Lindsay calls the "common purpose" in all countries. But is not "common purpose" in education a problem of so wide a scope, of so great an importance, that this problem alone makes the creation of an International Education Office an urgent necessity? That is why—perhaps from a slightly different angle—we heartily welcome Mr. Lindsay's suggestions. The most excellent work done by the British Council has prepared the ground. It is up to the Allied Governments, now in London, to show their gratitude by giving their fullest support to the endeavours to start the International Education Office now.

From Hr. NILS HJELMTVEIT, Norwegian Minister of Education.

Suppose we begin by trying to define the common purpose which, as Mr. Kenneth Lindsay suggests in his stimulating article, was lacking in the efforts

to achieve international understanding between the two wars. It would appear to be two-fold: firstly, the mutual cultural enrichment of the separate nations through the maximum possible interchange of cultural, social and moral values and achievements; secondly, the fostering of a world—or supra-national—outlook amongst the peoples of all countries. The first of these two aspects implies something which it is to-day still necessary to emphasize —namely, that nationalism has its value. It is based on a recognition that the nation has an identity, a personality which is as much worth preserving as is that of the individual human being. By personality we are here not thinking of biological or mystical conception of the State as a super-being, but of the national inheritance of history, tradition and values which enters into and forms an essential part of the personality of each member of the nation. It is in this sense, for example, that even in the cosmopolitan world of music Grieg makes a special contribution *as a Norwegian* which is different in character from what it would have been had he been born a Frenchman or an Italian.

The second aspect we have suggested for the common purpose recognizes that nationalism alone is insufficient—that "patriotism is not enough." It recognizes that there are common human values, interests and problems which need to be approached from a plane above the level of the nation-state. The unity of the world has become a technical reality: it has to become a political and spiritual one as well. To reach this goal—which the United Nations are already beginning to glimpse in this war—organization is needed. It is not enough, however, that a few leading statesmen and intellectuals should grasp the need and apply themselves to the tasks of constructing the appropriate institutions. The common people throughout the world must also understand what is required. They must become conscious of the need for world organization. They must learn to look at their problems—of maintaining full employment, of preventing war, of improving their material and cultural standards—from a world standpoint. They cannot do this, however, unless they can learn to appreciate the different attitudes and interests of other peoples—unless they can understand those differences which arise from history, traditions, habits, customs, institutions and, in particular, economic interests. The best way for a Norwegian to achieve a world outlook is for him to understand both how a Frenchman or a Chinese is like himself and how he is different.

The key to the solution of the apparent antinomy of nationalism and internationalism is, therefore, to be found in the knowledge of other peoples, their way of life and their problems. This is, in the broadest sense of the words, an educational task. It is a task both for formal education and for the general education which comes from life itself and which goes on throughout the life of the individual. How is this task to be carried out? Knowledge of other peoples and other countries can be obtained both directly, through personal contact, and indirectly, through the printed and spoken word and through

visual impressions. The second of these two methods has been greatly facilitated by the technical discoveries of recent years—broadcasting, television, the epidioscope and the cinematograph. These new techniques have progressed by leaps and bounds during this war, and when peace comes again the educational institutions of each country will have at their disposal vastly improved means for presenting both children and adults with a clear and accurate picture of the world outside the national frontiers. It is vital to ensure that these powerful instruments are used neither for the vulgarization of knowledge nor for the unilateral imposition of fixed ideas.

Nevertheless, however much can be done to bring facts about the outside world to the people of a country, this method can never have the same value as direct personal contact—that is, by travelling to other countries. Norwegians know what this means. Their seamen have travelled to every corner of the globe, and as every Norwegian is at heart, if not in fact, a man of the sea, Norway has thus an ever-open window to the outside world. Everything possible must be done after this war to encourage foreign travel. Yet a mere encouragement of *tourisme* will have no great value. We need fewer of those tourists who come only to gaze at "beauty spots" or to ferret out the quaint, antiquarian aspects of a country, and far more of those worthy travellers who are anxious to get to know something of the real, normal life of the people. Some way must be found of making tourist agencies realize that they have an important educational function to perform. Most of all, however, we need much more organized travel by groups of people whose journeys are inspired by some more conscious purpose than that of recreation. Scientists, doctors, technicians, sociologists, parliamentarians, civil servants, trade unionists and similar professional groups can thus, by meeting their colleagues in other countries and studying their problems in their national setting, gain an insight into the life of the people as a whole. Especially from the point of view of formal education we need much more organized travel by educationalists, teachers, students and school children than we had before this war. As far as the Scandinavian countries are concerned, the war itself came to interrupt a considerable expansion of this type of interchange which had been planned by the ministers of education of the five Scandinavian countries: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland. Extensive facilities had been arranged for school exchanges, for the exchange of holiday visits between teachers *au pair* and for the organization of international vacation courses at the universities and people's high schools. Special importance was attached to the interchange of visits between teachers, and the various teachers' organizations had themselves taken over the responsibility for organizing this work. Even before the war Norway was anxious to extend this system of interchange to other countries, especially to Great Britain, and it is hoped that after this war the British-Norwegian Institute in London and the Norwegian residential primary school at Drumtochty Castle in Kincardineshire will become important centres for Norwegian educationalists, students and pupils visiting Great Britain.

There is, of course, a limit to what can be achieved in this way. It is impossible for all of the people to travel to all countries. The travellers must diffuse and share their experiences when they return home. This will be done partly spontaneously, but it also needs to be organized. Teachers who have been abroad must tell other teachers what they have learnt, and the collective impression of other countries must be passed on to the children, both through oral teaching and through text books. The adult education bodies and voluntary associations of all kinds must also help in the work of diffusing this first-hand experience of the outside world.

In order to facilitate educational travel and the interchange of opinions and ideas on a much wider scale than ever before, it will certainly be necessary to have some kind of international body such as the International Eucational Office proposed by Mr. Kenneth Lindsay. If, however, education is to play its proper part in deepening mankind's consciousness of world unity it will be necessary for the I.E.O. to do more than promote intercourse *between* the nations: it must also have the specific function of directly encouraging "world-mindedness." In order to do this it will need, like the International Labour Office, a permanent staff whose members are responsible not to the individual nations of which they happen to be citizens but to the governing body of the Education Office itself. They must themselves be "world citizens," charged with the responsibility of helping to make other people into world citizens, not by force but by precept and persuasion. It will be their task to study, compare and report on national education plans and to criticize them, in the constructive sense, from the standpoint of the supranational interest. They will have to encourage the study of world history, geography, anthropology, economics, social institutions, and so on. One important part of their work will be to prepare model text books. Before the war, the Norden Society, embracing historians from the five Scandinavian countries, prepared a text book embodying the history of the five countries in a form free from mutual discrepancies. This text book served both as a work of reference and also as a model for historical writers in each country. The Society also examined the history books of the individual countries and called attention to discrepancies in the treatment of events in which two or more of the countries were involved. In this way emphasis was placed on the need to eliminate from the teaching of history that one-sided presentation of facts which often leaves the child with a permanent prejudice against a particular foreign country or even against foreign countries in general.

The United Nations will have a great chance after this war to turn men's thoughts in new directions. Norway, for one, will give its support to all reasonable and practicable proposals which will tend to make it easier for human beings to understand that they are "all members one of another." In this war we have learnt once again what our nation means to us. We have

also learnt that no nation—not even the biggest and still less the smallest—can stand alone and be sufficient unto itself. We shall strive—along with others that have learnt this same double lesson—to build a new society in which the values of common nationhood and common humanity are woven into a durable texture of human relations. In this task education will find its supreme purpose in the post-war world.

From Professor STANISLAW KOT, Polish Minister of Information.

I must confess that I am inclined to be somewhat sceptical whenever I hear the controversies in the Allied countries on the subject of the post-war organization of education in Europe and in particular on the subject of the so-called re-education of Germany. Both in Britain and America, the public are almost unanimous in their demand for an International Board of Education. Some people would like to see the nucleus of such an institution being constituted even now in London and though of course I wholeheartedly agree with this eminently happy concept, I should like to add a few remarks on the conditions, the fulfilment of which will determine the success of this venture. Before the present war there was an International Education Bureau in Geneva, but even the most enthusiastic supporters of this institution must admit that it had hardly any influence at all on the actual educational policies of its member countries. It is true that this institution has published a number of useful and interesting studies on the state of education in various European countries, which are of great value to every student of comparative pedagogy. Nor is it to be denied that in the midst of heated discussions this institution attempted to purge school textbooks of any tinge of extreme nationalism and instil into them the spirit of international co-operation. But it is also a fact that the advice given by this Bureau remained a dead letter and that the educational practice of all European countries was not in the least affected by the spirit of this Geneva Institution. Indeed, we all could see how, under the very eyes of the International Education Bureau, the Fascist and Nazi ideologies were embraced by German and Italian youth.

The main reason for this failure may have been the fact that this institution had no executive authority whatever, and that its resolutions did not affect in the least the school policy of the member countries. When we think to-day of restoring this institution, so necessary for the spiritual rebirth of Europe, we must avoid repeating our own mistakes: we must endow it with real authority and some executive power. In other words, it will not suffice to create an international education office, but it is also necessary to pledge the various countries to accept the guiding principles worked out by this office in their school policy. The International Labour Office succeeded in imposing certain social standards for the working class on the whole of Europe; in particular it enforced the 8-hour working day; similarly the International Education Office or Board must devise a certain minimum common pedagogical programme, a kind of "Charter for the child, the youth and the

teacher," which the Governments of the countries of Europe would accept as the basis of their school policies. The fulfilment of this condition is the only means of guaranteeing that the International Education Office will become a living institution moulding the educational system of the world and not merely a research bureau far away from the realities of life.

The problem of the re-education of Germany, on which the British and American public pins such great hopes, is viewed in a somewhat different light by the Nations under the Nazi yoke. I cannot help feeling anxious when I see the English-speaking public imagining that there is a sufficiently large intellectual class in Germany, still faithful to liberal and humanitarian ideals, to undertake the task of the re-education of the German youth, poisoned by Nazi doctrines. I think these are illusions, the product of an idealistic view of the German people. The nations of the Continent have had closer contacts with the German Nation and they realize that the poisoning of the German youth by Nazi teaching has gone much further than the British public are wont to believe and also how thin was the layer of truly liberal, democratic Germans in the older generation and how quickly it capitulated to the brutality of the younger Nazis. In particular, German scholars immediately compromised with the Nazi régime.

Those who know, be it even superficially, the history of the German *Jugendbewegung*, their longing for paganism, their dislike of Christianity, their worship of the Nietschian *Ubermensch*—must realize that patriotism was a mere outlet for the innermost longings of the German youth. To-day Poles and Yugoslavs, Greeks and Norwegians, Czechs and Russians know from their daily experiences under German occupation that the men who passed through the school of the *Hitler Jugend*, and are filling to-day the cadre of the German Army and Nazi Party formations, are capable of the greatest cruelties. It is the German youth which acts as executioners of the best part of the Polish Nation and it is they who are slaughtering the Jewish Nation in the Polish ghettos. The peoples living under German occupation have come to the conclusion that all German youth is devoid of the consciousness of the unity of European and Christian culture. All young Germans under forty, who have been brought up by the *Hitler Jugend* and the Party are so permeated with its doctrines and spirit that it is to be doubted whether anyone will succeed in redeeming them for Western European ideals.

Nor should one harbour the illusion that the older German generation, and in particular the scholars and teachers, would have sufficient authority and sufficient devotion to liberal ideas to be able to lead the corrupted German youth after the war. The older German generation, and in particular the University Professors and the School Teachers, is passive, frightened and the victim of an inferiority complex, of which it will not rid itself so quickly.

The Weimar Republic was flooded with a very bald, revolutionary, pedagogic literature, and the powerful School Teachers' Unions attempted to control the school policy. But how quickly they capitulated to Hitlerism! We

witnessed with amazement the complete collapse of the School Teachers' Unions and the debasement of the University Professors. I still remember my painful surprise when reading an article by the leading representative of German Humanism, the eminent psychologist and pedagogue and Professor of the University of Berlin, Edward Spranger, printed in the leading German pedagogic periodical *Die Erziehung*, a month after Hitler had seized power. He completely capitulated to the new order, which was the exact opposite of the ideas represented by the German *Geisteswissenschaft*, he idolized Hitler, worshipped militarism and Pan-Germanism and denounced the Weimar Republic. The extent of the fear of the German University Professors and their subservience to Hitlerism may be gauged from the fact that they did not raise even the weakest protest against the murdering of University Professors in Poland and the extermination of school children in Poland, Yugoslavia, Bohemia, and Norway.

The older German generation is too weak and spineless to re-educate Germany. This task must be undertaken from outside. The plan of setting up a Commission for re-educating Germany, moved by the London Assembly, is worthy of note. The head of this Commission should be a man who knows Germany well, free from illusions and having sufficient authority. This man ought to be aware of two things. First, the worship of Hitler in Germany will survive her military collapse; he will be worshipped as the man who made Germany more powerful than ever before in history. We should be under no illusion that the destruction of this worship will be rapid or easy. But, secondly, the Germans are a realistic people: if they are convinced that the Allies are really bent on a complete reformation of the German educational system and will not shirk drastic steps, then they may themselves change their mental attitude. Of course, drastic measures will be unavoidable: all the school textbooks will have to be revised or suppressed, the Universities and schools will have to be closed for a short period, and all the Professors and teachers who worked whole-heartedly with the Nazi régime will have to be discharged.

The re-education of Germany will be one of the most difficult and most complicated post-war tasks. Its solution should not absorb the English-speaking public to such an extent as to make them blind to another task, no less important: the reconstruction of the school systems, libraries, laboratories, etc., in the countries occupied by Germany. The nations who are living now under the Nazi yoke consider this task as no less urgent than the re-education of Germany.

GERMAN AIR POWER SINCE 1914

By Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton

IN the June issue of this review some space was given to an article which contrasted the present day activities of the Royal Air Force with those existing in the former 1914-18 War, and which showed, making due allowance for the changed conditions, that the roots of all our current air successes will be found imbedded in the past. In the following few pages an attempt is made on similar lines to trace the development and growth of German air power.

At the outset of the First World War Germany took the air with 232 aeroplanes and seaplanes, a figure that exactly balanced the combined strengths of France and Britain; and thereafter, until the day of armistice, her aircraft production, her average monthly output, her factory employees and her total air strength at the conclusion of hostilities were about equal to those of the Allies, if each be calculated separately. In the aggregate, therefore, Germany was considerably outnumbered in the air, but this disparity of force did not affect the tactical development of her air power; for over the western front, where the air war was intense and where the rivalry was fiercest, she took good care to concentrate sufficient power to redress the balance, assembling in that theatre, not alone her new and improved aircraft types, but also her best available flying talent. It must also be remembered that she possessed a continually growing rigid-airship fleet, divided between her army and her navy, which represented an important addition to her total power in the air, and which, in bomb-carrying capacity and in reconnoitring ability, fulfilled the functions of a host of aircraft proper. From first to last no less than 131 of these leviathan airships were constructed. It is true that there were few survivors when the final count was taken, but they remained aggressive to the end, the last attempt to raid the towns of England taking place on the night of 5-6 August, 1918, the fourth anniversary of the commencement of the war.

Until trench warfare crystallized the battle fronts German aircraft did little more than perform the routine duty of reconnaissance, and that with no great evidence of continuous or large activity. But when, following on the short-lived war of movement, the trench-lock was complete she began to put her house in order, and, because similar circumstances produce a like condition, her ways and ours bore a strong resemblance. Germany also produced a long succession of co-operation machines for artillery observation and photography, and, as with us, a sturdy line of fighters which such names

as Fokker, Halberstadt and Albatros will pensively recall. Throughout the war, however, our own aggressive spirit in the air, due entirely to Trenchard's driving impulse and masterful propensity, imposed on the enemy an attitude of caution which at times approached a condition of passive defence, and which suffered alteration, in favour of a more offensive inclination, only when superior aircraft types could be arrayed against us in the sky. German co-operative aircraft, as an instance, might only work over the lines by fits and starts, constantly liable to attack in the course of swift progressions, to and fro, by our fighter formations as they continually patrolled. German fighters, on the other hand, accepted the situation so created by British penetration of their air, and made the most of it. Our avowed object was to entice the enemy to combat, and with that aim in view we flaunted our fighter wings over his forward aerodromes and immediate back areas. But in matters of the air it is more than ever certain that it takes two to make a quarrel, and the German fighter pilots, bearing this maxim well in mind, had the option of declining combat altogether or of accepting it on terms, as nearly as might be, of their own choosing. Becoming intimately acquainted with our habits in the air, and respecting our pugnacity, they tended more and more as time went on to agglomerate their fighter force into large formations which might normally be expected to bear down all opposition. In such a way was devised the system of day-sweeping, attributed to Richthofen whose 'Circus' made its first appearance in pursuance of these tactics on April 30, 1917. Massed fighter formations were a distinct novelty in that earlier day of air warfare, and Germany deserves full credit for the innovation. Formation flying had been long in vogue by both sides, and had in fact been practised in the days of peace; but the sudden and well-timed appearance of several fighter flights, combined into a single group, formed a notable contribution to the science of air tactics. It cannot be said that the enemy contributed much else in that field of enterprise, being at all times slow to change the preconceived idea. A stalwart fighter in the air, and resolute at the clearly defined task, the German pilot of that day differed from his British adversary in an inability to adapt himself to the changing circumstances of war. The rigidity of the German military system, permeating every arm and branch of the service, did not encourage a departure from the written word of orders and instructions, and the German air force, much more subordinate than ours to the High Command, peculiarly reflected this inflexibility.

If the German fighter organization contributed little beyond the massed formation principle towards the development of air warfare the same cannot be said of its bomber counterpart. In this field of strategical activity, leaving out of question the mere routine bombing, both by day and night, of purely military objectives over and behind the opposing fronts, they were clearly the pioneers. From the beginning of the war until the very end the Germans built large hopes on the efficacy of the bomb rained down on cities, holding unswervingly to the belief that the collapse of civilian morale, thereby in-

duced, would point the road to victory. Shortly before the armistice a plan was well in hand for the burning of London by means of thermite, and would without doubt have been put into execution had it not been for the course of events in France which made them chary of incurring our vengeance should the war be lost. In the Zeppelin they had an instrument ready to their hand and, unabashed by losses, continuously entered on new programmes of construction. When, in mid-year 1917, it became evident, even to that unyielding disposition, that the rigid airship's day was over they produced, without breaking the continuity of their attacks, the Gothas and the Giants to carry on the day and night bombardments from the air. The results that might accrue from a successful Zeppelin campaign were closely studied by the military leaders of Germany in pre-war days. They became bomb-minded in the process, and fixed in their ideas on the subject; so that when the airships' day of doom arrived they had no option, short of a humiliating admission of defeat, but to continue the air assault of Britain, more particularly on her capital, by other means. The occupation of Belgium certainly brought aid to the tactical design, but the Gothas and the Giants, it must be remembered, were long-distance fliers as well as weight-carriers, and could have been operated from much further afield, even from the Rhine Province, had necessity demanded. Unwilling any longer to suffer blows of this sort without retaliation, in due course we became infected with the same idea. Hence the creation of our Independent Air Force for the bombing of Rhineland cities in June, 1917, and hence the preparation of a fleet of several hundred super-Handley Pages for the bombing of Berlin, a delicious satisfaction which the armistice denied us. It is interesting to remember that, in this respect, we and our adversary were both left with unfulfilled desires at the conclusion of the war; the enemy, with defeat staring him in the face, not daring to execute his plan for a huge incendiary attack on London; and we, for our part, as yet unready for the counter-project of battering Berlin. During the slumbering, uneasy years of peace both designs for bombing, enlarged to include much more than capitals, were turning over in each other's mind, quickening into life as that period hastened to its close. But when the curtain lifted it was to find our enemy much readier than we, and able, as on the previous occasion, to get his blows in first.

In those post-war years eaten by the locusts British air power was, it is true, strewn about and scattered with such reckless waste that it became a miniature of its former self. But German air power had been cut off at the main, and had died a sudden death. Over here we still maintained in being a small, though well-proportioned air force, so that when the fiat for rearmament went forth a firm foundation was in place on which to build, and the walls were not quite level with the ground. But Germany, when she upraised herself again, was forced to build anew. For sixteen years she remained incapable of taking practical advantage of the air lessons of the war, or of translating them in modern terms, her compounded knowledge on

the subject reduced to theory alone, and her theory based on a close observation of foreign methods, coupled with whatever of value rested in a robust growth of civil aviation. By means of this latter she did indeed keep herself abreast of progress in technique, at the same time preserving an industrial capacity; but of practical experience in the strategy and tactics of the air she was denuded.

With Hitler's rise to power the rearmament of Germany commenced with feverish activity, and it was but natural that Goering, at the right hand of the Fuhrer and himself a man of war experience in the air, should be placed at the head of the *Luftwaffe*, stamping it with the impress of his personality and preparing it for the rôle it had been marked out to play. It was also only natural that Goering, entrusted with such huge responsibilities and flushed with revolutionary success, should have conceived of the Nazi air power that was to be in a grandiose and high-flown sense. Accordingly he started off as a confirmed believer in the 'Douhet' doctrine of the air, which, put into a nutshell, inferred that he desired independence for the *Luftwaffe* as an all-conquering arm of strategical offence. A large proportion of the *Reichswehr* generals, past and present, were not however in full agreement with this conception; among the more influential in either category being Ludendorff and Fritsch, the latter an air staff officer in the late war, who voiced the general disapproval and contended boldly for the complete subordination of the *Luftwaffe* under the Nazi High Command. These conflicting theories, for they were no more than that, rested in suspension until the Spanish Civil War broke out, and at once a golden opportunity was provided for a realistic test. The trial ground of Spain was of all the greater value for the composition of the differences in that the Condor Legion, the air instrument of Hitler's 'non-intervention' policy, would find itself confronted by a section of the Red Air Force, then undoubtedly the most advanced in Europe and belonging to a nation with whom Nazi Germany, sooner or later, would be inevitably at war. The Legion thus became a conduit through which flowed, in two-way fashion, not only a procession of picked pilots and other personnel engaged in gathering a ripe experience of modern warfare in the air, but also a constant stream of seniors, expert in their various branches of the military art, who were studying earnestly, and at first hand, the lessons written for them in the sky.

The conclusions thus derived produced a strong reaction against the Douhet doctrine, and dashed all further hopes of autonomy for the *Luftwaffe*. It was reported from the Spanish theatre of war that air attack has no lasting effect unless delivered in intimate relation with the battle on the ground, and even then the effect it has produced must be immediately exploited by the forces of the land below. It was further reported that such close co-operation needs a system of inter-communication between the land and air which must be both unfailing and precise. These were the main consequences of the Spanish dress rehearsal, and on that foundation, laid firmly on a basis of experience, the *Luftwaffe* rapidly took shape to meet the occasion of world

war. It became a welded portion of the purely military machine, its aircraft types, its training, organization and development being conceived from that sole point of view. The Germans are nothing if not thorough in matters appertaining to the art of war, and on this occasion, further to stimulate their energies, they had a date to keep. When the dawn of that day broke they launched forth into battle with an air weapon exactly fashioned for the task in hand, the business, namely, of overrunning continental states, and throughout the process the *Reichswehr* and the *Luftwaffe* worked together in inseparable partnership. It was an effective combination, well-suited to a speedy war of movement.

How brilliantly the plan of air re-organization had been conceived was soon evident on either side of Europe, where nations went down like ninepins before the shattering impact of twin blows delivered from the air and ground, the forces of which were acting in the utmost harmony. The dive-bomber, for instance, with its whistling devices, was exquisitely contrived for the spreading of alarm and despondency in the ranks of untried troops; the ranging of the level bombing aircraft was nicely calculated to neutralize defended areas until such time as the swiftly moving armour could arrive to consummate success; nothing could have been more effective for the demoralization of the defender's front-line than the descent of parachutists in the rear; annihilating air attacks, such as that on Rotterdam, immensely aided by the fact of air superiority, stunned the populace and hushed the noise of battle at the front; liaison between the air and ground, by which the pressure from the former was directed at the shortest notice to the necessary points, was faultlessly arranged. All this was innovation and owed nothing to experience in the First World War. That slate had been wiped clean by the Peace of Versailles, the Nazi air power being entirely a new creation, and its application a novelty in war. As a machine manufactured for a certain purpose, and utilized with all the force of a thing as yet unknown, it was very nearly perfect of its kind. And yet, in a single, grave particular, it fell far short of its intention. It achieved a continental victory, but it was not devised for island conquest. On an uninterrupted land surface the partnership betwixt the air and ground had been proved irresistible, but when water intervened the fastening fell apart. Air power, in the case of Nazi Germany, had been too firmly welded to the framework of the *Reichswehr*.

It is a curious reflection on German military affairs that when they did, in a sole instance, revert to the air strategy of the former war, seeking by means of air bombardment to obliterate our capital and devastate our industries, it was to find their shining weapon of the air unequal to the task. They had licked their lips in anticipation of such sweet revenge, mindful also of the disappointment of their former hope in that respect, but as soon as the *Luftwaffe* was strategically launched on an independent mission, and was thus deprived of ground support, so soon did it fail of its accomplishment. The sources of that failure can be succinctly stated; the Nazi bomber force was

ill-equipped for the work in hand, being weak in defensive armament, inadequate in bombing power and constructionally vulnerable to attack by fighters. In addition to this, faults due to misdirection by the High Command, there was a lack of concentration on the really profitable objectives and strange discontinuity in the series of assaults. The equipment used on this endeavour had fully answered its purpose against the stricken states of Europe in the circumstances of decided air superiority, but that imperative condition was absent over Britain and so the costly and enormous effort was ruinously defeated.

It is very unlikely that the war-making authorities in Germany probed their problem deep enough to discover that one sort of air power was indispensable for rapid continental conquest, and another for the reduction of an island fastness. Able as they are, and have proved themselves to be, in planning with a microscopic eye for detail, and on a scale of almost unlimited immensity, we must be careful not to credit them with longsightedness beyond the range of human vision. If indeed they glimpsed the truth, however faintly, during the years of preparation, then truly were they on the horns of a dilemma. For it would have meant the building of a special air fleet designed in every way for the single purpose of bringing Britain to her knees; the fact that Germany lost 2375 aircraft, in daylight alone, during that David and Goliath struggle, serving to indicate the scale of such an effort superimposed on her already exhaustive strain of preparation. Even the most fervent adherents of General Douhet's doctrine could hardly contemplate its adoption alongside of a continental plan of conquest wherein the *Reichswehr* was a working partner.

Finally, the German air plan, and the growth of her air power that accompanied it, did not even attain a complete continental success. Based on air superiority it certainly swept all before it when attacking the weaker European states, but against Russia, and the powerful Red Air Force, once that country had recovered from the effects of initial surprise, it ceased to overthrow. It was not designed for long-drawn operations, and gradually its point was blunted. Incredulous of being more than briefly halted in their stride, the Germans pursued it with enormous prodigality, the resulting wastage making itself felt eventually in an inability to maintain the furious pace. For the much advertised *blitzkrieg* the enemy built well, and perhaps even better than he knew. But for the lasting purpose of a lengthy war the edifice he reared was not calculated to endure.

WAITING

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

SELDOM in war has there been so much uncertainty as to where and when the next great explosion will occur. Delay action bombs have been dropped in all the theatres of war—possibly by both sides in Russia and in the Pacific—although their exact positions have not been located, and it is doubtful whether even those who have dropped them are certain when they are timed to go off.

In the Mediterranean there is certainly one bomb, perhaps more, sure to explode soon, but the Axis has evidently not definitely located its, or their, positions. There is another in the Channel or North Sea but timing and location are equally unknown, and there is a possibility that the bomb is in store with the time fuse still unset. In Russia the general location of the bombs is pretty certain, but possibly the German bomb may prove to be a dud. In the Pacific the Japanese were believed to have dropped one somewhere in Australasian waters but if so it was almost certainly a dud. The Americans have planted a small one in the Aleutians and may be charging a larger one. In Burma we can be pretty sure that if there is a bomb it will not go off till the monsoon ends in November. With so much explosive material about it is no wonder that nerves are frayed, and it will be somewhat of a relief when it becomes possible to examine the effects of the explosions, in particular those in the Mediterranean where a breach must be made in the protective wall.

A considerable lull in land operations was only to be expected after von Arnim's surrender, and it is possible that the unexpected suddenness of the event may have caught the Allies incompletely prepared for the next move. In any case a large amount of re-organization of the Army after its exertions was obviously advisable. Even when preparations are complete amphibious operations more than any others require to take account of natural phenomena in the timing of their delivery—weather, the state of the moon, etc. The public has, I think, learnt to appreciate the necessity of pauses in military operations if they are not to go off at half cock and has not, so far, shown signs of impatience. The activities of the allied air forces have helped to engage attention and they are making a very valuable contribution towards the development of further offensive enterprises. There is a danger, however, that the very success achieved in their bombing attacks and in securing such a great measure of air superiority may tend to excite expectations of easy success in the amphibious operations to come. There is an undoubted tend-

ency to look on sea borne attacks as being if anything easier and less costly than attacks in normal land warfare. The few advantages, especially in the matter of surprise and uncertainty of the point of attack, that amphibious operations possess, have been greatly exaggerated. Expectations are sometimes based on conditions which have long passed; and I doubt if Mr. Churchill's warnings of the magnitude of complexities and hazards in a modern amphibious operation, on the scale obviously necessary, have been sufficiently taken to heart. Possibly the success of Japanese landing operations has been misleading; for they had always the scales heavily weighted in their favour—complete command of air and sea, and with resistance offered only by weak land forces, cut off from reinforcement and without well prepared defences.

Specially designed landing barges, tanks, air support, and many other things lacking at Gallipoli, may have reduced the hazards of initial landings, although, where defences have been strengthened on a modern scale, they are bound to be great. The capture of a bridgehead, large enough to include airfields and a port where ships can discharge heavy and bulk stores continuously, irrespective of weather, and to afford room for the deployment of a force of adequate size with all the base establishments it needs, may prove a more difficult matter than the initial landing; and at the best may be a prolonged operation. Mechanization, it must be realized, has provided the defence with means of rapidly rushing up reserves and experience has shown that though the air arm may delay and damage motorized troops it can only for short periods stop their movements. Airborne troops and armoured vehicles brought rapidly into action may be able to seize tactical points in a bridgehead area and delay the arrival of the defenders' reserves, but they would require to be reinforced without delay and the supply of all such advanced troops is a difficult problem in the early stages.

Even assuming that an adequate bridgehead is successfully established it must be remembered that there still remains a normal offensive campaign to be conducted, against an enemy probably of very considerable strength who has had ample time to muster his forces, and a congested bridgehead does not provide a springboard which admits many possibilities of exploiting manœuvre. There is, I fear, a tendency to think that a successful landing will bring rapid and decisive results; but I believe it is more probable that it will be followed by tedious and costly operations before the full strength of the Allies can be brought into play, unless successful landings are made on a sufficiently wide front to cause serious dispersal of the enemy's available resources.

Although air power is bound to play an immense and essential part in the struggle it would be unwise to assume that it would make the Army's task easy; and its effectiveness would depend to a considerable extent on the capture by the Army of successive advanced air bases for short-range aircraft. In justice to those who will have to carry them through the difficulties

of the operations should be fully appreciated. Exaggerated expectations of rapid and immediate success, if disappointed, may only give rise to impatience and unfair criticism.

In Russia tension must be as great as in the South and West of Europe. A year ago the thaw lull was broken in stages. By this time Marshal Timoshenko's forestalling offensive had been withdrawn, having partially achieved its object of upsetting German preparations, suffering severely in the process under the weight of von Bock's counter-attacks, and the main German offensive had just been launched. This year there has been no considerable forestalling attempt by the land forces, though on both sides interference with preparations by air attacks has been on a greater scale than last year. German preparations for an offensive undoubtedly are either fully matured or in an advanced stage, though its scale and objective are still uncertain.

General Diethmar's announcement that a defensive policy would be pursued this year has been cancelled, and if the announcement was genuine it seems evident that there was conflict of advice and that the offensive school has won. Assuming that there was a conflict of opinion the question suggests itself whether the use of gas entered into the controversy. Was its use advocated by those determined to adopt the somewhat gambling offensive policy, thereby raising the stakes still higher? One may well believe that Hitler with his gambling instincts and ruthless attitude both towards the enemy and towards his own troops and civil population, would be prepared to accept the risks of retaliation and favour the use of gas. But the offensive still hangs fire. Have the warnings, that retaliation promptly and in full measure will be applied, anything to do with the delay? Is there still hesitation and a new conflict of opinion? There are, I think, grounds for believing that a number of the German generals who had experience of the last war would strongly oppose the use of gas, especially if they believed that the Allies were determined to retaliate strongly and were in a position to do so promptly. They must know how unpopular, to say the least of it, gas warfare had become among their own troops by the end of the last war. There was no point on which German prisoners in 1918 were more bitter, and they abused in no measured terms those who had introduced the use of gas. Many of those men will now be dispersed among the civilians of Germany and the effect of their views on civilian morale, suffering from the consequence of gas retaliation, might be serious. Apart from that the use of gas would place an additional strain on Germany's over-worked communications and retaliation would add to the problems of her A.R.P. services. Hitler of course may override all objections, but if he does is it likely that the Russians will be caught unprepared for gas war? I should say probably not; though some of their young troops may not be fully trained for it. In the pre-war years it is certain that the Red Army almost more than any other, was convinced that the gas weapon would be used if they were attacked, and devoted an immense amount of attention

to the subject. It therefore seems improbable that precautions have been neglected or that Russia is unready to answer in kind. It is an intriguing situation, for if Hitler had looked to gas as the essential weapon for renewal of the offensive and is now persuaded that its use would raise the stakes too high, will he be prepared to carry through his offensive designs without it? Or is it possible that what we may believe is the defensive school will at the eleventh hour get its way?

Russian courses of action are even more unpredictable, but I think it may be taken as a sign of Russian confidence and strength that no forestalling offensive has been attempted this year. The apparent suspension of operations in the Kuban suggests that the situation there may be left to clear itself as a result of operations on a more extensive scale elsewhere.

While the armies everywhere are awaiting zero hour the air arm has of course been increasingly active, though there was a temporary slackening of attacks on German war industries—which may only suggest a pause before still more intensive attacks. In the Mediterranean the great concentration of air attack on Pantellaria, was specially interesting in view of, perhaps, exaggerated expectations based on its successful results. I doubt if much that is new has been learnt and it was mainly a question of taking advantage of an exceptional opportunity to achieve results at a minimum cost. Obviously conditions were uniquely favourable. The island could be attacked from short range with ample fighter cover, it was completely blockaded, it presented a target of limited size and almost complete air supremancy had been established. Furthermore after the collapse in Tunisia the island had lost its value as an offensive base and its garrison had few incentives to offer determined resistance. Its ultimate fate was sealed and it was only a question what sacrifices it was prepared to make in order to deny the use of the island to the Allies as long as possible. Under these circumstances the air weapon was admirably adapted to *induce* surrender though there could be no certainty that it could *compel* surrender by a definite date if the time factor had been of paramount importance. Actual surrender would seem to have been delayed until threat of a landing materialized.

Air co-operation, the stronger the better, is an admitted essential to a successful landing. Protection is required for landing craft and shipping, which postulates air superiority and fighter cover. Air bombardment can play a great part in neutralizing the enemy's weapons during and after the landing, and the destructive effects of air attack can be used to break up counter-attacks and hamper movements of the enemy's reserves. Prolonged preliminary bombing would however never under normal circumstances compel the enemy to evacuate his defence positions or have sufficient destructive effect to reduce materially the number of his weapons; and it would go far to eliminate the element of surprise. On the whole therefore I suggest that Pantellaria should be looked upon as an exceptional incident rather than as one affording precedent for the application of new methods.

THE OFFENSIVE OPENING

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

THE "offensive chapter" in the war, which was inaugurated by the expulsion of the Axis forces from North Africa, began promptly with attacks on the island bases in the Sicilian Straits—the fortress of Pantellaria, the importance of which in the eyes of Italy was given expression by the size of its garrison where apparently 15,000 men have surrendered, and by the efforts expended over many years, and at great cost, in creating most formidable defences; and the lesser position of Lampedusa whose small harbour was a useful base for the motor torpedo boats which have proved a nuisance in those narrow waters. The other two little islands were of no significance, but it was desirable to clean up the whole zone.

The attacks on Pantellaria and Lampedusa have been spoken of as initiating a new method of conducting the capture of oversea territory: but this is not so. What is new is the technique in the use of aircraft to provide the cover for a landing. That the islands surrendered to the bombardments from the air and the sea—principally from the air—does not mean that this was an operation conducted to a finish by one arm of the Services alone, for though the surrender was made before the troops landed the operation was not completed until the islands had passed into the actual possession of the Allies and transformed from enemy into allied bases. It was, in fact, a combined operation conducted in perfect accordance with the old and accepted principle that a landing on a beach protected by prepared positions must be covered by the fire of heavy artillery, if surprise is not possible. Whenever the local circumstances of weather, navigation and shore defences admitted, in the old days, this artillery cover was provided by the fire of frigates, bomb vessels and gunboats, and sometimes, when the bigger ships could come close inshore, by their fire as well. This was called "scaling" the beaches. In the teaching at Camberley and the Naval War College before the last war it was always impressed on those studying combined landings that no attempt should be made, in a daylight attack, to put troops ashore until the beaches and as far inland as possible had been thoroughly shelled and the opposition there broken by this barrage. At Gallipoli, the old battleship *Implacable* steamed in to within 600 yards of the shore of X beach and plastered the cliffs and the shore line with her 12in., 6in. and 12 pounders. To-day this duty is performed by aircraft. It is they which execute the major part of the covering and supporting function; and they can do it more effectively than the ship. Their heavy bombs, falling at a steep angle, are more effective against entrenched

positions and modern types of coastal defence than the horizontal fire of ships' artillery; and they reach further inland. The principle, however, is the same. There have indeed always been three things regarded as desirable in an amphibious operation: surprise, isolation of the enemy from support or relief, and artillery cover to the troops while landing. Whether the two first of these are simultaneously attainable depends on circumstances; they are, to some extent, likely to be incompatible, for if a previous blockade to isolate the place is begun beforehand a warning is thereby given that something is about to happen; but once the attack begins the most effectual means need to be taken to ensure that no help reaches the defenders. There could be no surprise at Pantellaria, for the island was only too obviously a probable objective of the Allies as soon as the mainland of Tunisia was in their hands. Once the attack began, and indeed it would seem before it was launched, isolation was fully achieved by the joint action of the sea and air forces, and no reinforcements could reach the island by water because of the control of the sea route across the Straits and none by air as the landing places were put out of use by the bombers: a most complete piece of work. Cover, the third essential need, was afforded by the systematic and continuous bombing from the air and bombardment from the sea: and, while the defence was thus being broken, physically and morally, the bombers and the ships engaged in the work themselves needed cover from attack by the enemy's fighters and bombers. This was provided by the allied fighters, and these were able to give this cover as the distance from their own bases on the mainland was within their effective range.

Thus this was in every sense a combined operation in which the modern material was used in conformity with established principle: and when those "amphibious operations of peculiar complexity" foreshadowed by the Prime Minister begin, the application of those principles of surprise, isolation and cover will have to be made. Though it is hardly to be expected that surprise, in the shape of catching the enemy unawares and unprepared, will be possible, since he is now on the alert from the north of Norway to the coast of Macedonia, it nevertheless remains possible to keep him in ignorance of where the principal blow, or blows, will fall. Though, too, territory cannot be isolated as an island like Pantellaria or Lampedusa can be isolated, the communications by land can be interrupted. We see both the Russians and German armies in the eastern front attempting to interrupt the rail communications of their opponents. The tremendous effect of the air barrage at Pantellaria shows what is possible if there is a superiority in the air and the extent to which the landing force may hope to be covered, but whether that cover can be effective depends on whether fighter cover can be given to the bombers and sea forces. The choice of objectives may well be influenced by this factor and a limitation imposed upon the selection of objectives—a fact of which we may be sure the enemy is well aware.

By the losses of the two larger islands the enemy is deprived of two bases

from which, throughout the last three years, he has been able to use both his long range and short range aircraft, his submarines and his light surface craft, which cost us no small tonnage; and from which, if he could have held them, he would have been able to harass and impede any large scale allied seaborne or airborne operations directed against Sicily or Southern Italy. The Allies on the other hand, obtain positions of a peculiarly useful nature: advanced bases for their fighter aircraft giving cover to the bombing and bombarding forces, if operations are undertaken against Sicily, and for the protection of traffic through the Sicilian Channel.

These are not the only forms in which cover will be required. There is still that fleet of battleships and heavy cruisers, destroyers and torpedo boats, some of which—the major portion, it seems—are now at Spezia. There, as events have shown, they are not outside the reach of the air arm acting from both the home and the Mediterranean bases. But protected as they can be, and capable of standing severe blows from bombs as they are, no assurance can be felt that they could not throw their weight into the scales if and when a large transport of troops begins. This is the rôle that figures largely, in Italian writings, for the battlefleet. There is a treble deterrent to such intervention on its part; the presence of the British battlefleet, the torpedo bombers which, in these narrow waters, can come as quickly into action and in as large numbers as the Japanese torpedo bombers which sank the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*, and the fact that if, braving these two dangers, they should put to sea, they would not be able to remain in the neighbourhood of the landing for long. The flotilla craft of the several types—destroyer, torpedo boats and motor craft—still exist in considerable numbers, and measures have to be put into force to ensure that they can be brought to action by superior force; and the allied navies will be principally responsible for cover against their attacks; though not only, for it must be a matter of co-operation between the sea and air forces. But the greater share of the responsibility may be expected to rest with the surface vessels as the hands of the air forces will be full and they would need special armaments to deal effectively with the larger ships. In short, the words "of peculiar complexity" are profoundly true of the amphibious operation, wherever it may be undertaken, and we must not expect so easy a surrender as that in the restricted areas of Pantellaria and Lampedusa.

THE CHURCH INTOLERANT

By Hugh Ross Willliamson

A GROUP of professional and business men, some 'regular churchgoers' and others not, recently issued a manifesto calling for a return to the 'fundamental principles of Christianity.' Among these fundamentals they included 'tolerance'. And if by 'tolerance' is meant merely that courtesy toward the differing tastes of others and their opinions on inessentials, which is the inevitable consequence of Christian charity, the business men were, of course, right.

It is not, however, in the sense of Christian courtesy that the word is normally understood. To be intolerant in matters of taste is merely to be ill-mannered and this, though it may rightfully earn the reprobation of the civilized, is unlikely to arouse any deeper passions. The tolerationist asks more than this. And, at least in modern times, it has become an accepted cliché that he should ask it in the name of Christianity. It is true that, almost in the same breath as he claims tolerance as a Christian virtue, he deplores the 'intolerance' of the historic Church; but this paradox is conventionally explained as showing the extent to which the Church has 'betrayed Christ'.

A more rational approach might be to enquire whether, since intolerance seems to be a mark of the Christian Church, tolerance is really a Christian virtue; and this line of enquiry receives some support from the fact that, until the sixteenth century or so, the concept of tolerance—in the sense of religious toleration—did not exist. In the ancient world it was unnecessary because it was universally practised and in Christendom it would have been a heresy punishable by death. This suggests at least a close connection between the religion based on the belief that all truth was finally revealed in Jesus Christ and the refusal of the believers to tolerate any creed or practice based on other assumptions. Whether this attitude is either ethical or utilitarian it is not my present purpose to argue. I wish merely to outline the reasons for my belief, as a Christian, that *in*tolerance is implicit in Christianity, that the idea of toleration is, literally, anti-Christian in its origin and its effects, and that part of the present weakness of the Church in England is that it is not intolerant enough.

II.

The Jesus of the Gospels, as distinct from the 'meek and mild' humanitarian invented by nineteenth century Liberal criticism, can hardly be claimed as a tolerant Personality. He indicted the political and religious leaders of His day with notable invective, threatening them with 'the wrath to come.' He

warned the inhabitants of towns who would not hear the teaching of his disciples that their fate would be less tolerable than that of Sodom and Gomorrah. In the great discourse at the Last Supper, He deliberately excluded from His prayers and promises all but His followers: "Lord, I pray not for the world, but for these whom Thou hast given me." He gave as His reason for speaking in parables that the crowd should not understand lest "they should be converted and I should heal them." The Church, in her most exclusive sacramental doctrine, has made no claim which He did not make for himself: "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, ye have no life in you." In His Person, His teaching, His death and His resurrection he confronted His contemporaries, friends and enemies alike, with an inescapable 'either—or—.' Those who killed Him were completely logical. They realized that either He was what He said was, God Incarnate; or what they said He was, a blasphemous fanatic. There was no room for comfortable and misleading evasions about 'a great moral teacher.'

If the Crucifixion seemed temporarily to witness that their interpretation was the right one, the subsequent Resurrection even more emphatically affirmed the correctness of His claims. And the Church, which was the witness to the Resurrection, was of necessity as intolerant in the matter of Divine Truth as He Himself had been. The Either-Or was henceforth the primary question for and division of humanity.

To avoid misunderstanding, it must be emphasized that this line of thought is valid only for the Christian. The secularist who denies and the sceptic who doubts not only the Resurrection but even the historical existence of Jesus cannot be impressed by it except unfavourably. To him it merely illustrates a blend of ancient superstition and modern obscurantism. But his attitude, legitimate though it may be, must never be confused with that of the Church and it is with the Church only that we are concerned at the moment. Her existence is inseparable from this particular belief. Nor can it be denied, as a mere historical fact, that she has witnessed to it consistently—from the intolerants who somewhat monotonously preferred martyrdom to philosophical acquiescence in the broad-minded principles of Roman civilization to the logical, if lamentable, inquisitors who later endeavoured to safeguard the Faith by inflicting instead of suffering death.

The idea of toleration (which is the political arrangement to safeguard the practice of tolerance) was begotten in the sixteenth century by Renaissance scepticism and Reformation revolt. Though, with the exception of More's *Utopia*, the Renaissance made no direct contribution to the idea, "it sowed the seeds of a rational scepticism without which the latitudinarian interpretation of the idea could not grow."* As for the Reformation, although the very existence of the Protestants was an implicit denial of the Catholic theory, they were no less intolerant. They accepted the same premisses. No less than their opponents, they believed that in Christ was

* T. Lyon: *Religious Liberty in England* (1937).

absolute truth; they differed merely in their interpretation as to how it was ascertainable in their contemporary world. Calvin burnt Servetus from the same motives which inspired the Catholics to burn Huss. The Pilgrim Fathers may have sought a refuge where 'they might worship God as they pleased'; but they had not the slightest intention of conceding the same right to anyone else. Protestant intolerance—in the classic age of Protestantism—yielded nothing to Catholic in theory, however a circumscribed opportunity may have limited it in practice.

Yet the Protestant theory contained within itself the seeds of toleration, because its fundamental postulate—the validity of private interpretation of the Scriptures—was finally anarchic. Once it was conceded that the interpretation of the revealed Truth in Christ was a matter of individual caprice instead of corporate tradition, there were, in practice, as many 'truths' as there were individuals. "As Protestantism continued to define its beliefs and further to divide over them, the number of sects thereby created made some form of toleration inevitable, unless the holocaust of the sixteenth century was to continue indefinitely."

This toleration, therefore, sprang not from belief but from expediency. The end, it is safe to assume, was not perceived at the beginning and the crisis in Protestantism to-day centres round the problem of the restoration of authority (and, consequently, intolerance) without self-destruction—a problem which is finding its solution on the one hand in the mystical megalomania of Barthianism and on the other by efforts to re-define the meaning of 'Church.'

III.

Thus, though the practical effects of the Reformation were in the direction of tolerance, it would be entirely wrong to suggest that the Reformers, as Christians, were anything but intolerant. The tolerationist movement had quite other origins and motives. These have been so well and succinctly expressed by Fanfani* that I make no apology for quoting him *in extenso*.

> It must be agreed that over and above the writings of philosophers and the lamentations of the persecuted, 'the most effectual agent of all in promoting the new ideal was the development of trade resulting from the rise of the middle class. For what possible reason could a trader concern himself with the religious faith of those with whom he traded. For him the one and supreme God is utility, whose earthly manifestation is money; that is enough. To Voltaire the London Stock Exchange seems almost a sacred spot, and certainly more respectable than many courts. There, he remarks acutely, men of all religions treat with one another without asking in whom or in what they believe *et ne donnent le nom d'infidèles qu'à ceux qui font banqueroute.*' Inevitably, the man who has made the increase of his trade and the rationalization of his business his end in life could not accept a restriction of his activity that was unjustified from the economic standpoint. Therefore it is the capitalist who, as more directly concerned, more or less noisily proclaims his spirit of toleration and his aspiration towards religious liberty, even though it was not he himself who inspired the doctrinaires . . . . For him the real problem was that of preventing society, through its institutions, from guaranteeing an order opposed to his own mode of action. To this end the capitalist demands of the State before all else that it should free its action from the influence of religious standards—as he himself has done in his private economic life. He demands that the State should proclaim and guarantee freedom of conscience, so that his action shall be no longer fettered, directly or indirectly, by considerations of a religious order.

*In *Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism* (trs. 1935). The quotation he himself makes is from Gerbi's *Politics of the Eighteenth Century.*

With the basis of this analysis, no modern historian is likely to disagree. The exact relationship between the new creeds and the new capitalism and their interaction one on another; the complication of the problem by the intrusion of the third factor of the nationalist state; the influence of imponderables—these things may still be debated and over-simplifications of them (from the detached 'historical' point of view) be deplored.* But the essential truth of it remains, admitted alike by the Marxist materialist who sees the process as part of the inevitable dialect of civilization and by the Christian who deplores it as a manifestation of the powers of evil. The criterion for the Christian, with whom alone we are concerned here, is indeed of the simplest. He knows that the enemy of God is Mammon. Whatever legitimate disputes there may be about the exact implication of the teaching of Jesus in some matters, there is none whatever about this. "Ye cannot serve God and gold" sounds like a challenge throughout the whole of a Life which was betrayed for thirty pieces of silver. The suggestion made earlier that the idea of toleration is, literally, anti-Christian in its origin and effects is thus no exaggeration. For its origin is Mammon.

The other factor which makes for toleration is the secularist state which, like the capitalist individual, admits the primacy of the materialist motive. In an economic world 'freedom of conscience' is as essential as in a religious world it is impossible. The curious fiction still persists that in England both state and country are Christian, in spite of the fact that the only two offices in the State in which allegiance to the Church is demanded are those of the King and the Lord Chancellor, that the supreme court of appeal for the Church is a Parliament which may be composed exclusively of atheists and that, in the country to-day, at least 85 per cent. of the population are not practising Christians. The State, is, however, completely secularist and, as such, is necessarily tolerant of all religions, so long as those religions make no attempt to interfere with its life.

As Dr. C. M. Ady puts it in *The English Church*: "the establishment of the sovereignty of Parliament and the admission to membership of it of persons professing any or no religious beliefs profoundly modified the relations between Church and State. Theoretically, the moral end of the State was no longer identical with that of the Church. Whereas it had been possible

*The simplification, for example, which connects it exclusively with Protestantism or with the Capitalist 'age.' At the end of the Middle Ages, the Christian merchants in Tunis, for example, deported the Franciscan friars whose preaching threatened to destroy a peace which was highly propitious for trade.

hitherto to treat good citizenship and good churchmanship as one and the same, now the State no longer considered itself bound by the standard of the Church." This state of affairs (which has lasted for nearly a century and has, consciously or not, conditioned the thought of the whole of this generation of Englishmen) is responsible more than anything else for the present confusion as to what Christianity is—including the nonsensical idea that you can have Christian 'ethics' without Christian 'dogma'. And it is from this background that tolerance emerges as a 'Christian' virtue.

IV.

The position of Christians as a tolerated, if despised, minority is not without its advantages. At least it makes it possible to advocate the practise of the Christian virtue of intolerance without giving rise to the misunderstanding that one is advocating persecution. The consequence of intolerance, in present circumstances, is the undeniably Christian action of suffering for it, not the more questionable course of inflicting suffering on others.

Into certain manifestations of this necessary intolerance—as, for example, the basis of State education—it is not my purpose to enter, since they involve political and sociological factors which may confuse the issue. But there is one sphere where the duty of the Christian is obvious and from which, if it were practised, results might spread with some rapidity. I mean the intellectual intolerance which is the consequence of the great 'Either—Or—.' If the revelation in Christ is true, then the Cross is the rationalizing factor in history and every other 'philosophy of history' is false. Dialectical materialism, for example, is not an alternative theory of history which may be held if one's tastes incline that way; it is an error which, if adopted, will have disastrous consequences for mankind. And, by the Christian, it should be treated as such. To one who believes in the doctrine of Original Sin, the idea that mankind, left to its materialist self, will somehow evolve a Utopia is too silly to be taken seriously. To one who believes in the infinite worth of the human personality, the idea of co-operation in a 'machine civilization' is unthinkable. From these three simple examples alone, it will be seen that the Christian in England to-day will, if he is honest, be challenging the everyday assumptions of the great mass of his fellow-citizens at almost every point. And what is necessary, if the Church is not to go down in a welter of compromise and contempt, is that he should do it not apologetically or with the polite implication that 'your belief is as good as mine,' but with the courageous intolerance of those first believers who challenged the Roman Empire and set the West on fire.

THE GULLS

By Wilfrid Gibson

DAY after day the sentries keeping guard
Along the ramparts of the embattled strand
See her still pacing the harsh sallow sand,
Stopping at times to stare again with hard
Glazed tearless eyes across the bleak North Sea—
Day after day. And now they try no more
To hold her back from the restricted shore
To which each dawn her heart remorselessly
Draws her at the first glint of Wintry light
To keep her watch by the indifferent tide,
Impelled by hope that will not be denied,
And only fails her at the fall of night,
To be renewed at daybreak by the cry
Of gulls that reaches her on her sleepless bed—
Gulls that all day will wrangle overhead
With white wings glancing sharply against a sky
Of slatey cloud unrestingly, as she
Faces the desolation of the beach—
Fierce gulls whose every beaked and taloned screech
Tears at her vitals, and yet seems to be
The voice of her anger against the sea that keeps
Her love from her so long—her love who went
From her that raw December daybreak, bent
On the risky dredging of the mine-sown deeps,
Three years ago—the sea that keeps him still,
Keeps him in secret and yields her heart no news
Save that which in the skirling of the mews
Stabs her with anguish, and yet cannot kill
The hope within her.
So, day after day,
The sentries see her pacing, till one dawn
They note the yelling gulls have all been drawn
Into a yammering flock that in the grey
Light hangs above a bundle on the sand,
Where, at length lapt in peace, with ears and eyes
Mercifully deaf and blind to the birds, she lies,
Harassed by hope no longer, on the strand.

MARLBOROUGH IN THE 'SIXTIES

By J. W. D. Harrison

IT was one sunny afternoon in September in the year 1859 that I first made my bow to Marlborough. The drive from Swindon Station was not accomplished in such a stately manner as that of the Oxford Freshman who wrote:—

> From the top of the "Royal Defiance,"
> Jack Adams who coaches so well,
> Set me down in those regions of Science,
> In front of the Mitre Hotel.

Nor could our conveyance have been Jerry Hammond's 'old Bus' for that historical vehicle could hardly have borne the strain of such a journey. Anyhow, we were safely deposited at the Lodge where old Voss reigned with all the dignity becoming such an important office.

I suppose everything is a little awe inspiring to a new boy, but I did not, like the "New boy" of the "Upper School Songs," feel—"a strange desolation, and long for my 'ma' and my 'nuss.'" For had I not served three long years in a private Boarding School? It cannot be said however, that the greeting accorded to a new boy was altogether cordial or indeed calculated to revive his somewhat drooping spirits. He was attacked, one after another, by big boys of the bullying type who demanded information on three important points—"What's your name?" "Where do you come from?" "What's your Father?". If you passed this examination satisfactorily you were given a kick to encourage you and handed to the next tormentor. Simple as it seemed, the last question, if not answered to the satisfaction of the bullies, sometimes (but very seldom) led to unpleasant consequences to the unhappy boy later on. In one case a poor boy was so cruelly treated that his father had to take him away. From this you may gather that bullying was rife in the school at this time (1859-60) mostly of a comparatively harmless, though certainly uncomfortable type for its victims as—for instance—being used as a warming pan on a cold night for one big boy's bed after another as they came up, until there was very little warmth left in your small body.

More really cruel bullying took various forms, such as being roasted inside one of the big fenders which were used in those days, until the victim fainted. But this sort of thing did not last more than a year after Bradley, the new Headmaster, once took the matter in hand. It was not so with fighting! The only fight I had during my six years at the School was immediately after my arrival. I pulled the hair of a boy called Garratt, in Chapel. This was seen by others always keen on managing an encounter, and so it was decided

that honour could only be satisfied by fisticuffs. Neither Garratt or I had the slightest feeling of animosity towards each other, but we had to fight. The encounter took place in our dormitory the same evening, but it did not last many minutes, for the House Master was heard coming his round and on his arrival Garratt and I were saying our prayers! It was later on decided that this fight need not be continued in the morning.

My fight was altogether irregular for I cannot remember another that was fought on the spur of the moment, or directly after. The recognized rule was that the differences of to-day had to be settled after breakfast the following morning. If the fight was likely to be a good one the hall was emptied directly after "licet." But more often you saw two whitefaced little chaps, attended by half a dozen supporters, making their way to the covered playground where all these contests were decided.

Fagging was, of course, allowed, much the same as in *Tom Brown's School Days*. And a most excellent practice it was. I never reached the Sixth and so was always (nominally at any rate) a fag, and thus in a position to give a perfectly impartial opinion. Fagging put boys in their proper places and gave them a wholesome respect for those whose age, diligence or ability had placed them in higher positions.

The food supplied in the Hall, even in my time was poor enough. For breakfast, dry bread and a pat of butter about the size of a small walnut, and tea. For dinner roast beef or mutton, of most inferior quality, and vegetables, and treacle, jam or currant puddings (known as "bollies") and beer (popularly known as "swipes") which was probably innocent of alcohol. Tea was a repetition of breakfast, and that was all. Naturally with so meagre a Bill of Fare all our slender allowance of pocket money was spent in solid food. Our weekly allowance was sixpence a head, doled out to us by old Sellick ("slug") who, for some reason which we never could understand distributed our income in fourpenny bits. "Here's foppence each and foppence between you" was his regular formula. But this did not go very far, so almost all our hampers from home contained such solid food as whole cheeses, hams, cakes, etc. Sunday morning breakfast was really the most substantial meal of the week for those whose cupboards were sufficiently well stocked.. By clubbing together two or three boys could add to the contents of their larder by purchasing a loaf of bread and butter and possibly a few sausages, coffee and sugar. On Saturday night old Voss, the porter, had quite an array of parcels outside his Lodge door, ready for the various claimants. The cooking was done in the class room, and if it did not come up to the modern standard of culinary art, I doubt if I have ever enjoyed meals more genuinely than I did these. Certain I am there never was such coffee! Our system was very simple; we let our brew boil till the scum appeared above the top of the pot and this we brushed off with a knife into, or over, the grate, and repeated the operation until our brew was clear as crystal. The state of the grate when we had finished did not concern us in the least!

A confectioner called Webb, was granted a stall outside the entrance to the upper school: but only for a limited time, after dinner! Here he dispensed such supplementary dainties as still hungry boys could afford, though only the very rich could enjoy the much coveted threepenny chunks of plum cake, and that only occasionally. Another purveyor of edibles was old Goatley, but he was not allowed within the School confines and had to content himself with a pitch outside the gates. His stock in trade consisted, for the most part, of fruit and small cakes, displayed on a barrow. Goatley was popular with the smaller boys, as he was not above accepting postage stamps, and perhaps, personal articles which he considered convertible into cash. I must confess my own store of stamps, sent me from home, did not last so long as they should have done! But you must please remember that we were very hungry! My dear folk at home then tried putting the "Queen's Head"—as the penny stamp was popularly called—on directed envelopes. No good! But when an officially stamped and directed envelope was used, Goatley decided that was not legal tender! And so my letters home became more regular!

There were times when we were particularly flush, from some unexpected tip, when we had breakfast at old "Mother Portingales" who regaled us with hot sausages and mashed potatoes, at her "Restaurant," situated somewhere in the street leading to "Treacle Bollys" Mill. How the mill obtained that sticky title nobody knew. Anyhow there was no vendor of treacle, or any other bollies, resident there in our time. Mr. Duck's establishment at the corner, was a sort of understudy of Whiteleys, providing everything that heart could wish, from the minor requirements of school boys, to the saddle horses on which certain Masters disported themselves on half holidays.

At the end of the Christmas Half we used to have a House breakfast at the Aylesbury Arms Hotel. How such a banquet was paid for I cannot say; anyhow it was a great feast! It was left to us to decide on the drink and it will hardly be credited—though I remember the incident quite well—that on one occasion the ultimate choice lay between mulled claret and spiced ale! For *breakfast* remember! Boys, after all, were not bad judges of what is good even in drinks. Nowadays the popularity of that most poisonous compound the "cocktail" makes one think that tastes must have deteriorated. One of my friends hailing from Bristol occasionally received a bottle of sherry in his hamper from home. *Very* popular was that boy, so long as the sherry lasted! Having no wine glasses we were puzzled how to drink it. However, I dare assert that even Harvey's celebrated "Bristol Cream" loses nothing of its flavour if drunk from a jam pot!

The nearest approach to any trial of physical strength between Masters and boys was really rather comical in that it was recognized by the powers that be as quite legitimate. The old Chapel was quite close to the Porter's Lodge, with gates opening from the Court. Every morning, a Master was on duty, watch in hand, to close the gates at the stroke of the hour. Any boy left outside paid the penalty of 50 lines, but, if the number about to be barred

out was powerful enough, it was held to be legitimate for them to "charge"; and "charge" they sometimes did, with success, and proceeded into the Chapel. I fancy the theory was that, when so many boys were late it must have been the Master's watch and not the boys that were at fault. Immediately behind where the Master stood was a grass verge, guarded by a low rail. I recollect one morning when the Master tripped over this rail and rolled down a shallow bank beyond!

The Masters seemed to me to be a very united and friendly body of men. Of course their dispositions varied, and some—"Old Bull" for instance, were surely unique in their methods of punishment. Here are some instances of Bull's methods:—a boy who was an inveterate bookworm, sitting by the fire reading a novel on half-holidays instead of going up to the field, was sent to Martinsell, some miles distant, to bring back leaves from a tree which grew exclusively in that district—an excellent form of punishment for such a boy. One night (he was Master of the Lower School) he caught rival dormitories having a bolster match. He sent them into the lavatory, made them fill foot-pans half full of water and stand, holding the pans on their heads, on either side of the basement facing each other. He loved to have an "extra lesson" for his form before the rest of the house was up. On one occasion, the boys in the dormitory overhead were making a row so he called them all down and sat them, in their nightshirts, on forms till his lesson was over. 'Twas a bitter cold morning!

Bull was much interested in rifle shooting and he was constantly practising sights on a miniature target fixed on his door. So it sometimes happened that when you opened his door, you were told to stand quite still. "Now I've got your eye!" and you heard the click of the rifle as the hammer fell!

Another Master, the Rev. C. W. Tayler (commonly known as "Chump," from a habit he had of exercising his jaw after the manner of a cow chewing the cud), one of the dearest of men, rather fancied himself as a sportsman. He certainly was fairly good at archery. But his ventures in other directions were hardly so successful. Now and then he went out with the Tedworth Hounds and on one occasion got himself a severe rating from the Master for holloing away a *hare*!

We were always given a whole holiday to celebrate the Queen's birthday. Boys who had friends to go to for the day, no doubt thoroughly enjoyed themselves, but for the rest it was anything but a holiday, for they had to answer a more than ordinary number of "calls" and there was little or no cricket to entertain them. For my part I was lucky, having friends handy. On one occasion, Harry Beloe (for many years Chairman of the Gloucestershire Cricket Club), R. B. Price and I got leave to spend the day with our kind friends, Mr. Hayward and his daughters, at Wedhampton. Our start from the gates caused quite a sensation, as we had chartered a high yellow dog-cart to which was harnessed an equally imposing looking horse.

All our games—cricket, football, racquets and fives were naturally of a less

formal nature than those of to-day. To begin with cricket. The first Eleven ground has changed but little, except for its extension. The pitch however, was, as everywhere else, of a very primitive nature, compared with the billiard-table accuracy of the ground to-day. There were no boundaries, and so it came about that a ball, pitching on the slope, travelled down the hill at a great pace and sometimes took three fieldsmen to return it to the wicket-keeper. The second eleven ground was at the foot of the slope of the first eleven ground. Cricket began much earlier in the year than now. I find an entry in a funny little Diary which I kept for a short time in 1864, that "cricket began" on Monday, March 21st! Further on, I read April 7th "Old Fellows match: they all got out for 23" and next day, "we beat 'Old Fellows' easily." The first eleven had comparatively few Club matches and the only Schools we played were Cheltenham and Rugby. Of the Clubs who came against us I remember only the 'Et ceteras.' A very popular match was that against E. M. Grace's XI and great was the excitement when he brought his small brother, the redoubtable "W.G." to play. I think this must have been the great man's first game of any importance away from his village green at Downend. I forget how he performed. His brother's bats were of great interest to us. The blades, of course, had to be of the prescribed dimensions, but the handles were so immense that few of us could grasp them. Cricket is, of course, a very different game nowadays. Most of the bowling was underhand, either fast or lobs. Almost the only "break" encountered was that caused by the irregularity of the pitch. No doubt the reason for our playing so few schools was the difficulty of transport. In matches against Cheltenham, each side in turn had to spend three nights away from their own school. There was no railway to Marlborough until March 30, 1864, when the new line was opened without much ceremony.

Most of our bats were made in one piece, handle and blade, the wood being ash. Unless you held them very tightly, these bats stung horribly, especially when you hit a ball near the end of the blade. For some time the possessor of a spliced bat was regarded as an extremely fortunate fellow.

We were invited, and allowed to go, to a meet of Mr. Brudenel Bruce's staghounds in March, 1864. The meet was on the further side of the Common and it was the first time I had seen hounds hunt a carted deer, and it has been the last. I wrote in my little diary: "rather disappointed on the whole, but had a ten mile run and came home very tired and hungry." This hunt, as it seemed to me, appeared to lack all the charm of hunting animals, either stag or fox, in their wild conditions and surroundings. Though foxhounds hunted all round Marlborough we seldom saw them; the Tedworth occasionally, and then only at a distance. We had, in hard weather, a hunt of our own, which was, in turn, open to criticism. When the ground was too hard for football, we trudged up to the forest (Savernake) for a squirrel hunt. Objection might have been taken to this form of sport on the ground that the animal hunted was harmless. And so I suppose in this vast forest he was, though

foresters find him destructive to young growth. Anyhow the poor little chap, whom I always loved, is rapidly becoming almost extinct in many parts, at the hands of his remorseless grey brothers, who are indeed a nuisance in every way, and are very properly shot whenever seen. Arrived at the "meet" we spread out, and clad in flannels and football jerseys made rather a pretty sight among the trees. When a squirrel was found, there was a view holloa to which the pack replied and surrounded the trees in which the squirrel was located. Our weapons of attack were sticks and stones and "squalors." These were similar to "life preservers," namely, handles of cane, about 15 inches long, with a lump of lead, the size of a bantam's egg at the end. These "squalors" were hurled at the unfortunate squirrel, without any regard as to where they were likely to come down! It was always a marvel to me that no one got seriously damaged by these falling weapons: but they didn't! If my memory serves me right, the biggest bag of one afternoon's hunt was 27 squirrels. Young squirrels were sometimes taken from their "drawers" and kept as pets. So too were dormice also found in the Forest, and, perhaps oddest of all pets, blindworm, which we generally carried in our trousers pockets!

Savernake Forest was ever a most attractive place for all of us who were country bred. Apart from the squirrels, there were the deer, whose shedded horns were frequently to be found. One or two boys, at any rate, possessed what we knew as "saloon" pistols. I have never seen one of these weapons since those days. They had barrels some six inches in length, and fired a bullet about the size of a slug. I do not remember any execution having been done by these pistols, from the poacher's point of view. But one owner was unfortunate. Carrying the pistol in his trousers pocket, the thing went off and shot him in the leg. There was nothing to be done but go and report the accident to his House Master, to whom he shyly announced—"Please, Sir, I think I've got a bullet in my leg!" "You've got a *WHAT*?" However the wound wasn't serious.

Football was played much on the lines of "Tom Brown," except that there was no hacking. Of matches we had few, the "Old Fellows" and the masters being the only ones I can recollect. We did not play any other school, chiefly, I believe, because of the fear of undue roughness. Clifton was our first opponent and the match was played in the autumn of 1864. Boyle kicked a goal which won the match for Marlborough. I think this may have been the first inter-Public School game ever played. I just missed getting my "Twenty" cap, but was Captain of the "Forty." House matches were most popular games, and were played by the entire house, as in *Tom Brown's School Days*! We wore long flannel trousers, and our jerseys were of the least gaudy appearance possible. I still have mine, a dull grey affair with a mitre C.3 badge. None of our football kit was washed —to the best of my recollection—from one end of the season to the other. The more coated with mud, the more honourable the appearance! After what

corresponded with "bigside" at Rugby, we were regaled with beer (Hall swipes) and "Captain" biscuits of the largest and hardest brand, at the Buttery end of the Hall. There can be no doubt that the modern game is an improvement on the footfall of the earlier days, though some of the Rules appear to me to be a bit tiresome, and the constant practice of kicking into touch does not commend itself to me. You see less of this in School games than with their seniors, and so, to my taste, a school game, played on the ground, not out of it, is the more attractive to watch.

The original racquet court was an open air affair which, as may be guessed, gave small opportunity to learn the game—I well remember being called on to fag to retrieve the straying balls. But this primitive structure was soon replaced by an up-to-date covered court. Lawn tennis was not invented till long after this period. Hockey was only played on the ice with a cork for a ball. Golf was quite unknown in England except at Wimbledon and a very few other places. The "fives" courts were of equally crude construction.

"The Races," as we called them, were run just before the cricket season. I remember no incident connected with them, except, perhaps, that Tanqueray could walk under the "High Jump" and turn around and jump it. For myself, I was rather good at half-mile, and some years later ran this distance in 2 minutes 4 seconds at Selby which was pretty good in those days, over a grass course.

Occasionally, in the dull period between football and cricket, we had a paperchase—a popular competition—which always attracted a good 'field.' The course was about five miles, and took some doing. I once came in first, after a severe finish—Walter Napier and I ran neck and neck to Preshute but he could not "stay" the last few hundred yards, and so I won easily.

In severe winters, which were always encountered in those days, the only bit of ice on which we could skate or slide, was Lynes' pond—as every one knows, of very limited area. It *was* cold in those winters, and the smaller boys had great difficulty in keeping warm, since the fires were all monopolized by their seniors. I well remember trying to warm my hands on the wall of the chapel, outside the stove. Anything like "central heating" had not been dreamed of, and our bedrooms, especially those at the top of the house—could seldom have risen above freezing point, judging by the ice on our jugs. Few of us had overcoats, the fashion being to own a rug. This, placed over the shoulders, much as a farm labourer does a sack, served as a protection against rain by day, and wet as it was, an additional blanket at night! Nobody dreamt of wearing mufflers or gloves. Yet in spite of all these privations we were, as a whole, extraordinarily strong and well.

Almost every spring, however, we had an epidemic of "Rose rash," measles or similar ailment. Except in the case of scarlet fever, these were never of a serious nature. For ordinary ailments colds, etc., we attended dear old Doctor Fergus' surgery, in the evening. There was, I am bound to say, a good deal of malingering, in the hope of getting leave off chapel. If

you had anything in the way of a cold it was worth trying. But the old doctor was not easily taken in. He always had a good supply of his own patent physics on hand. I am persuaded that the remedy for an ordinary cold was nothing more than peppermint and water! How well I remember his stock instructions: "Drink this and gargle this," for a sore throat, "and come and see me tomorrow!" It took some courage to imagine a sore throat, for in that case, not infrequently, a length of whale bone, with a bit of sponge at the end was dipped in some mixture and than rammed down your throat. The same weapon was applied to each boy in turn, after being dipped in a cup of, presumably, some sort of disinfectant. Then, "Please, Sir, may I have leave off chapel to-night?" If this was readily granted, "and morning too, Sir?" followed with varying results. If you were at all seriously ill, you were sent to the Sick Room. This was situated at the back of B House, and overlooked the Master's garden. Soon afterwards the "Sanatorium" was built, which was the first of any school buildings on the opposite side of the Bath Road. I think this building was first used for the only outbreak of scarlet fever that I can remember. We were indeed a wonderfully healthy community: I can only recall two deaths during my long term of residence—August, 1859—Christmas, 1865.

And yet, in so many ways, our conditions of life would give the modern scientist fits. Take washing! In winter, the icy condition of our water jugs gave no encouragement to early morning ablutions, which might generally be described as "a lick and a promise." During the day there was nothing easily accessible in the way of a lavatory. Periodically we had what was popularly known as "toe fug," otherwise foot baths. But an all-over hot bath was a rarity.

Bradley encouraged Public School spirit. Not long ago, a gentleman wrote to the Press advocating the substitution of a "Public Spirit" in schools instead of a "Public School Spirit." With the respect due to the gentleman's high position I venture to disagree with him. Public life would be all the poorer if deprived of that element of Public School Spirit which characterizes some of our greatest public men. I suppose Hitler might fairly lay claim to being regarded as a Public spirited man, but without the slightest trace of anything approaching Public School Spirit in his composition. What then is "Public School Spirit?" A force which encourages a man to "play the game" throughout life even though it be to his own hindrance.

For myself, I can honestly say that the benefit derived from the acquisition of this Public School Spirit has been throughout my life an education in itself of the utmost value.

(*Mr. Harrison was born in* 1848.)

CORRESPONDENCE

Democracy, Freedom and Education

To the Editor of The Fortnightly.

Sir,

I should be grateful if you would allow me to comment on one sentence in Sir Cyril Norwood's recent contribution to The Fortnightly ("Democracy, Freedom and Education," April, 1943). The sentence runs: "Head on collisions are not a mark of statesmanship, and the recent refusal of the London County Council Education Committee to co-operate with the Fleming Committee is an instance of political unwisdom."

The fact is that the London County Council, far from refusing to co-operate with the Fleming Committee, has already appeared, by its representatives, before one of its sub-committees and a date has been fixed for their appearance before the full Committee. I have represented this to Sir Cyril Norwood who in a personal letter has said: "I am sorry that I did you unintentional injustice . . . . I will undertake not to repeat, and to correct, when I hear it, the statement that your attitude is negative and unco-operative."

It is, of course, true that the evidence which the London County Council offer the Fleming Committee is not very palatable to certain interests, and unfortunately many of those who have ventilated their views in the Press have not taken the trouble to see what the London County Council evidence actually is. Our report and statement of evidence is, of course, a public document readily available to those who wish to see it. (P. S. King & Staples, Ltd., 14, Great Smith Street, S.W.1.).

In view of the influence of your journal and of your contributor, I should be grateful if you would publish this letter in order, as far as possible, to correct any false impressions which may have got abroad.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

C. ROBERTSON,
Chairman of the Education Committee of the
London County Council.

The County Hall,
London, S.E.1.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

The Power of the Press

NOWADAYS Universities are put to most unlikely uses, and the Cambridge Press employs an appreciable part of its paper quota in a series edited by Dr. Ernest Barker, which discusses "Current Problems"—at three and sixpence a time. At all events that is the price set upon what Mr. Wilson Harris has to say about *The Daily Press*. It is a little odd, as he himself sees, that this task should be confided, of all men, to the editor of *The Spectator*, but before entering upon his present office he was, for more than twenty years on the staff of a London daily; and can write with full knowledge about "that section of the Press which nineteen out of every twenty families in Great Britain read regularly, on which everyone depends for information, by which everyone is in some degree influenced." Add to these startling affirmations the statement that there "are millions of people in Britain who hardly read a book a year," and that the Sunday paper is even more universally—should one say, studied?—than the daily. Studied or not, the circulation of daily papers is about 95 for every hundred families, but of Sunday sheets 130; the Briton depends on print for information—chiefly, it may be, about cricket or football; but also covering all that will assist him to do his duty as a citizen; and he must be, Mr. Harris puts it modestly, "in some degree influenced" by printed counsel as to how he should conceive that duty.

Mr. Harris makes plain his confidence that no British paper attempts to gain a political end by suppression or distortion of the facts. They can of course be sensationally presented, and a paper in this way can influence opinion—though at the risk of losing authority. I find myself asking, what matters most in journalism—the effect produced on persons who matter individually or on the more numerous who individually do not matter? We are bound, as loyal citizens of a democracy, to think it important how votes may be affected and we cannot disregard the result of any political press campaign, Mr. Harris has one formidable thing to say: "Proceedings in Parliament are now so inadequately reported in all but two of the London papers that it is in the leader columns and correspondence columns of the Press itself that the great debate must mainly be conducted."

War time conditions do not offer a fair criterion. All the papers put together cannot affect opinion half as much as a speech from Mr. Churchill—which they cannot afford not to report. But, thinking back; was the press or was parliament chiefly to blame for what we all see now to have been disastrous neglect in those years when Mr. Churchill was a voice crying in the wilderness? I doubt if the lead then came from Westminster. It would undoubtedly be better for parliament, and therefore for parliamentary democracy, if its proceedings were better reported; and perhaps coalition government is fatal to the best interests of the institution, simply by killing interest in debates and in divisions.

There is a deal in this book which will appeal to curiosity; as, for example, that in 1854 *The Times* had a circulation of more than double that of its five

chief rivals all put together. But the figure was only 55,000. The comparison of outstanding editors puts C. P. Scott of the *Manchester Guardian* in a class by himself. J. A. Spender of the *Westminster Gazette*, A. G. Gardiner of the *Daily News*, H. W. Massingham of the *Daily Chronicle* and J. L. Garvin of the *Observer* "were great journalists in their different ways, but won distinction first and foremost by writing not by organizing." On the other hand, there was certainly a genius in Alfred Harmsworth—who opened the way to many manifestations of what organizing could do.

How far did these popular entertainers affect the opinion and through it the action of their country? No doubt the daily dropping wears away resistance and makes channels for influence; but I am not sure that frequency may not lessen felt effect. Mr. Garvin used to give us weekly a powerful dose of individual conviction—almost exorbitantly convinced. Though he let other people have their say, and gave them full liberty (as I had cause to know for several years) nothing in the paper mattered really but Garvin himself.

* * * * *

Admiral Darlan

Every daily paper must always attempt too much and the multiplying inflow of news makes it impossible to handle any subject adequately. We feel increasingly a need for something that the press cannot give us. This is met, as far as paper shortage allows, by a multiplication of short cheap books—of which the "Current Problems" series offers an example. Another is to be found in "The Documents for To-day" published by Constable in paper wrappers at 3s. 6d. each. In one of them Mr. George Mikes, a Hungarian refugee, gives us a study of Admiral Darlan. It is not a sympathetic study; Darlan though able and energetic does not appear to have been constant to anything but his conception of his own interest—which he was least of all disposed to sacrifice for the advantage of an English ally. When the French army surrendered, the French fleet might have continued the struggle along with the English—and could have helped to hold Africa. We all remember what the British felt constrained to do lest the naval units should pass into German hands; but it is well to be reminded that two alternatives were offered, one of which was that the ships should sail to a French port in the West Indies and be either demilitarized or entrusted to the United States.

Afterwards when Darlan was chief of Pétain's ministers, a new combatant entered the world war; Darlan promptly granted bases in French Indo-China to the Japanese—which certainly helped towards the loss of Singapore. It is unnecessary to trace his later rapid changes of front; but the German failure at Stalingrad seems to have decided him. That was followed by the joint American and British landing in N. Africa: Darlan also landed there, as Pétain believed, to organize resistance; but suddenly he declared himself to be head of the French forces in Africa—and very soon offered to act with the Allies. His help spared English and Americans the detestable necessity of making war on the French soldiers; and accepting the help involved accepting Darlan as their chief collaborator. This however did not please Frenchmen—least of all the young man called Vuichard who shot him. The assassination was formally deplored; yet it would be hard to deny that Vuichard rendered a great service to the cause of the Allies in North Africa at the cost of his life. Nevertheless every political assassination puts back the standards of civilization. England has no truer ground for thankfulness than that such deeds are not in the British tradition. When France begins to be liberated, it is only too likely that Vuichard's action will have many imitators, and men may die whom France can ill spare.

* * * * *

The Commandos

Another of these small-sized paper-covered books is *Combined Operations, 1940-1942*, published by the Ministry of Information and prepared by them for the Combined Operations Command. It costs a shilling and tells first about the formidable training given to the special troops organized under the title of Commandos. "One troop in training once marched in fighting order 63 miles in 23 hours and 10 minutes, covering the first 33 miles in eight hours dead." The book tells us how the men are employed—in various operations. So many of us knew Dieppe pretty well that most will turn to the very full account of what was attempted there—after long planning and preparation—on August 18-19, of last year. As usual in Commando operations, navy, army and air force worked intimately together; the navy got transport done almost without a hitch; the air force developed the occasion triumphantly into a battle; but in spite of desperate valour, the landing itself achieved no more than gaining a deal of information—of which so much is imparted to the public as lets us know that it will be no easy matter to open a second front anywhere in German-occupied Europe. But at the same time every line in the book carries the spirit of confident resolve.

* * * * *

English Prime Ministers

After this I turn to what the publisher—John Lane—describes as "an anthology for the times"; and it comes "recommended by the Book Society." *England is Here*, costs 10s. 6d. and is "a selection from the speeches and writing of English Prime Ministers." Mr. W. L. Hanchart, the editor, supplies an introduction which tells "how the power of prime ministers grew up into its present form." Lord Melbourne, who wrote these words in a letter for Queen Victoria's instruction, considered that "Sir Robert Walpole was the first man in whose person this union of powers was decidedly established." Nearly all the others of the eighteenth century have the formal accent of official personages. Of all the array no one comes out so powerfully individual as that tough old hero, Wellington. "I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every portion of India, ten times over to preserve our record for scrupulous good faith. What brought me through my difficulties in the war and the negotiations for peace? The British good faith, and nothing else." His personal account of Nelson, which I had never seen before, is amazing for vividness.

Of those whom most of us can remember, what an orator Lord Rosebery here shows himself! But old "C.B.," perhaps unexpectedly, proves to be a mine of generous wisdom. Mr. Baldwin reads very attractively when he writes about England: but then Mr. Baldwin became Prime Minister, so far as I could see, because he had this gift of attractiveness. The man of the moderns who is most poignantly presented is Neville Chamberlain. No one, I think, could read what is here preserved of his utterances and not like him—and be truly sorry for him. Yes, even when we hear him saying after Munich that "there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honour."

EUROPE IN BONDAGE. Edited by John Armitage. *Lindsay Drummond.* 6*s.*

The human mind finds it difficult to comprehend the savage brutality of the Nazi régime in Europe. And yet, as Lord Cecil says in his introduction to this book, such conduct is inevitable when "the State is infallible and omnipotent, morally as well as constitutionally." Mr. John Armitage has done well to remind British readers of the precise social and economic conditions now prevailing in the occupied countries. Most of us think we know what those conditions are, but we need to feel them in every fibre of our being. Perhaps then we shall think less about our own Beveridge security and more about the great tasks which await us in the coming decade. Perhaps too we shall learn to value the essential parts of our own heritage of liberty and take less for granted.

The Germanization of Europe is producing pockets of resistance, guerrilla fighting and underground campaigns, but the wholesale impregnation of Nazi ideas and the closure of schools and universities must be spreading as vast poison over the sickly body of Europe. The churches and in some places the school-teachers are just able to defy authority—though not without much persecution. But over large areas the lights of learning are out. How important it is, therefore, for us to preserve the liberal way of life, the humanities and above all the spirit of crusade. After our airmen and armies have broken the resistance of the enemy, we must feed and heal and then re-enlighten a darkened Continent.

Do we realize this responsibility? Are we preparing a generation for any such task? Let the younger generation be told the facts and what is expected of them! The story of the Norwegian teachers, the desperate plight of the Poles and Jews, the daily heroism of Greeks, Belgians, Yugoslavs and Czechs—these are stories which every schoolboy ought to know. It would seem to be a God-given opportunity to make the brotherhood of man come alive as a subject. There is no need to invent stories, no need to preach Utopias. The plain tale of suffering and heroism makes an instantaneous appeal. Start the study of European History with this book and work backwards and then perhaps this generation will grow up with a lively interest in something beyond their own comfort and history. Incidentally, of course, they will quickly learn to appreciate their own history and the responsibilities of belonging to a free nation. Perhaps they will want to make some more history by acting as a free nation not only in war, but during the decades of reconstruction. I hope that *Europe in Bondage* will find a wide circulation and sow seeds of resolution in many younger minds.

KENNETH LINDSAY.

HUNGARY AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, by Francis Deák. *Oxford University Press.* 36*s.* 6*d.*

WHAT TO DO ABOUT AUSTRIA, by E. Muller-Sturmheim. *New European Publishing Co.* 1*s.*

The name of Francis Deák is one of the most famous in Hungarian history. Its bearer was that superior statesman who in 1867 concluded with Austria the great compromise, the "Austrian-Hungarian *Ausgleich*" and thus created the constitutional basis of the Dual Monarchy. It was not Deák's fault that the men after him did everything possible to ruin his work. They succeeded in this so thoroughly that not much more than half a century later the

Dual Monarchy broke to pieces. The national hatred which the brutal nationalist policy pursued by Deák's successors had bred in the nationalities oppressed by them, was allowed to indulge in a vindictiveness exceeding not only all the bounds of justice, but of reason. Hatred is a very bad guide for policy. The Peace Treaties which ended the first World War, are the most convincing proof of this truism.

The present Francis Deák is a professor at Columbia University and certainly a descendant of the great Francis. He gives in his book a historical report on the fate which was meted out to Hungary at those Paris Peace Conferences. His narrative, supported by a great many interesting authentic documents, is that of a learned historian, not that of a professional politician who sees everything through the spectacles of his own political creed. It is a tale of broken promises and arbitrary interpretations of solemnly made assurances and agreements. Nothing more condemns the Big Four who, with the help of a host of "impartial experts" had to draw the map of a New Europe, than the manner in which they forced the ill-fated demarcation line between Rumania and Hungary upon the latter and afterwards found one thousand and one excuses for the violating of this line by the Rumanians. This sort of "just peace" is bearing its fruits now. It would be an excellent preparation for the men who are destined to make peace after this war, to study the book of Professor Deák very closely before sitting down at the conference table.

The booklet of Dr. Muller-Sturmheim, a former high officer in the Austrian Patriotic Front, discusses the fate of the Cisleithanian partner of the Dual Monarchy. Austria was dealt with by the Peace Conferences of 1918 in the same shortsighted manner as Hungary. It had to suffer from the same unjust and unfair national hatred, a hatred which has lost nothing of its implacability even to-day. In spite of all the declarations by Mr. Churchill and other responsible British statesmen who are absolutely convinced of the necessity of Austria's future independence, certain circles in the Successor States are propagating an Austrian "solution" which would mean nothing less than the end of Austria once and for all—its partition between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Germany. Dr. Muller-Sturmheim discloses the absurdity of this plan which is detested and rejected by all national Austrians as thoroughly as the idea of the *Anschluss.* Even those Austrians who formerly for nationalist reasons dreamed of the *Heimkehr ins Reich,* have learnt better now that Adolf Hitler has made this dream come true. Then what to do about Austria? Dr. Muller-Sturmheim has his doubts whether the Habsburg solution, that is, the restoration of the Habsburgs in their Imperial Patrimonial Dominions is feasible. He openly rejects the "Bavarian Solution" which would consist in amalgamating Bavaria and Austria in a single kingdom, because in his opinion it would not be "a matter of Austria being united with Bavaria, but a matter of both being attached to Germany." The main objection to this solution is the fact that it means a dismemberment of Germany which could only result in the revival of a German nationalism, more ferocious even than now.

For Mr. Muller-Sturmheim, who characterizes himself as a democratic Austrian, there is only one solution: the Danube Confederation. It certainly is the most natural and most reasonable. But—if a critic may be allowed to utter a personal opinion—this is the very reason why it will probably not be

made. The writer of this review advocated the Danube Confederation long before Hitler marched into Vienna, but certain present developments leave us less and less hope that the right thing will be done not only about Austria, but about the whole of Central and South-East Europe. However, this fear has no bearing on the value of Mr. Muller-Sturmheim's statements which must be regarded as a most instructive contribution to the discussion of the problems facing the world of the Danube and its nations.

ERNST KLEIN.

THE CHRISTIAN FAILURE, by Charles Singer. *Gollancz.* 3*s.* 6*d.*
NATIONS AS NEIGHBOURS, by Canon G. E. Hudson, *Gollancz.* 4*s.* 6*d.*

Dr. Singer's little volume is in no small danger of being "butchered to make a theologian's holiday"—which would be a great pity, for its plain exposition of the mind of the thoughtful man to-day would make its perusal by Christians a healthy exercise. At the end of it, they would have a much more adequate understanding of the actual situation with which their faith has to contend than they seem generally to possess at the moment. It is that great service which Dr. Singer has done the Churches. He helps them to see themselves as others, possessed by a concern for intellectual and moral integrity, see them. In effect he says: "Between you modern Christians and us there is a great intellectual and psychological gulf fixed. In a world whose fundamental habits of thinking have been shaped by modern science, and whose test of truth is therefore experimental, you persist in speaking in terms of deductions from a first assumption of a revelation which by its very nature is not susceptible of proof such as we can accept. Moreover, your own record, always dubious because of the sufferings which Christians have inflicted on the world, but, in these latter days especially so because of your infidelity to your own avowed ethical principles, puts you out of court as a claimant for the moral leadership of the world."

That was worth saying and Dr. Singer has said it well. It is all to the good that Christians should be compelled to face, even at the cost of some smart, the real nature of the situation with which they are faced. Nor ought anything to obscure that central contention—as it well may. For it would be very easy, almost child's play in fact, to rebut a good many of the deductions which Dr. Singer draws. It would be easy for instance to show that in fact real experience, and a full first-hand experience has entered into the shaping of Christian belief, than Dr. Singer seems to realize. It is impossible to separate the formula of Nicaea from the experience of Christians under the Domitian persecution, and a good case might be made out for the statement that the creeds are what they are because the statements were called for by what had happened to those who framed them. Similarly, Dr. Singer must not be surprised if theologians cock an incredulous eyebrow at his suggestion that the religion of humanism which has, he avers, supplanted Christianity, and of which he offers Communism as an example—(why not Naziism which is in direct affiliation with the Darwinian doctrine of "the survival of the fittest" and has made large use of the latest science of psychology, as well?)—is more tolerant than Christianity. They will murmur that where Christianity has slain its thousands, humanism has already in the space of twenty-five years slain its tens of thousands.

From the tunnels of Corregidor and the fox-holes of Bataan

I Saw the Fall of the Philippines

COLONEL CARLOS P. ROMULO

The first complete and official account of Filipino resistance to the Japs. It is told by General MacArthur's Press Relations Officer (and personal friend), of whom the General said:

"On my staff Romulo played a vital role. Under the most trying circumstances he carried out his work with unflinching devotion. He made 'The Voice of Freedom [the radio in Corregidor]' a voice so stirring that Filipinos in the occupied areas risked execution by the enemy—and many were executed—to take down his broadcasts and distribute them among the civilian population. With the front line troops his was the voice of faith, loyalty and patriotism that effectively bolstered up their morale."

Honest, graphic, moving: and necessary for our understanding of events to come in the Pacific. *Illustrated.* 9/. *net.*

The Political and Economic World we live in

This Age of Fable

GUSTAV STOLPER

A study of this age of false premises, superficial thinking, and political breakdown. The author, an economist of international repute, discusses such ideals as *Gold, Planning, Have and Have-not Nations*, the world's ideas about each of the great powers—America, Britain, Russia and Germany—etc. He writes fascinatingly for the average man; facts are simply stated and conclusions clearly expressed; he stands for a liberal capitalism.

10/6 *net.*

THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT. A pamphlet by Lever Bros. & Unilever Ltd. Praised everywhere as a sound piece of work. 9*d. net.*

New Impression ready

SIR FREDERICK SYKES'S

"most satisfying autobiography"

From Many Angles

A great servant of Empire tells his experiences at a soldier in South Africa and India, creator of the R.A.F., Chief of the Air Staff at Versailles in 1919, first Controller-General of Civil Aviation, Governor of Bombay, and member of Parliamentary Committees.

"Historical document of the first importance."—YORKSHIRE POST.

"May be read with profit by everyone interested in the future."—TIME AND TIDE.

Illustrations, maps and diagrams. 25/- *net.*

HARRAP BOOKS

Dr. Singer has over-simplified his issues. Life is not only a search for facts and the measurable relations between them; it is no less a search for meanings and values and it is these latter which the discipline of science does not seem able to provide. But meanwhile, the question abides — can Christianity ingest modern scientific truth as effectively as it ingested Greek philosophy in the fourth century? Can it present its message in terms of a verifiable experience? Above all, can it find the moral courage to abide by its own ethic? These are large issues, and it is all to the good that Dr. Singer has raised them.

That same over-simplification of issues which we have already noticed in Dr. Singer's book appears again in Canon Hudson's. It has one chapter in it which is unusually realistic and valuable—the fourth, entitled "After the War." Canon Hudson says there some things about the probabilities of the actual situation which are exceedingly timely, but for the rest, it is difficult not to feel that the issues have been over-intellectualized. Two simple illustrations will suffice. The account of the rise of nationalism is in terms of ideas and cold reason and wholly neglects the large place which sheer instinct played in the rise of the idea of nationalism. The same fallacy appears again towards the end of the book where he declares that we can make a beginning with the building of a satisfactory world on the basis of the *lex naturalis* baptised from Stoicism into Christianity. Now the *lex naturalis* assumes that man is a rational creature and will act rationally, but takes no account of the fact that man can act, and, under the emotion of a crisis, does act irrationally. It can therefore make no adequate provision for such times of crisis save restraint by force, which, as applied to nations, means war. It is therefore almost impossible to avoid the feeling that, beginning with an unreal analysis of the problem, the book ends with an equally unreal solution of it. What it offers is the possibility that nations might be neighbours so long as no vital dispute which touched the deep instinctive factors of nationalism arose between them, but it provides no real hope should any such crisis arise.

B. C. PLOWRIGHT.

VOICES IN THE DARKNESS, by Tangye Lean. *Secker & Warburg.* 15*s.*

BROADCASTING FOR DEMOCRACY, by Otto Friedmann. *Allen & Unwin.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

The war has filled the world with thousands of voices, an entangled web of voices perpetually speaking from one nation to another. Through the days, the nights, the weeks and the years, the voices speak, and increase in number. If one views the whole thing from an imaginary point of isolation far above the globe, it does indeed seem that radio has let loose a sinister and even maddening force. It has certainly been used in recent years, and comparatively soon after its birth as a popular service, for the fomenting of war, but it remains to be seen how far it may succeed in helping to achieve peace.

Mr. Tangye Lean, by analysing the radio war in Europe, and more particularly the part played by British broadcasting in its European Service, makes the confused and threatening cloud of radio voices take on shape and meaning, and gives some hope that our broadcasting policy, still being steadily developed, may be a strong force for good. He deals first with "The War in German," showing how

Hitler developed the technique of propaganda, how radio was essentially the servant of the State, and was completely controlled even to the extent that it had to put up a careful pretence, in its presentation, that it was not so completely controlled. Germany's radio keeps one kind of voice for its home listeners, another for occupied Europe, another for enemy countries, and yet another, a strictly practical one, for use in co-ordination with the advancing armies of invasion. An extremely interesting example of this last is the chapter called "Political Warfare Documentary", in which Mr. Lean gives extracts from the German (and French) Radio during the invasion of Holland and Belgium and the fall of France. This is radio militant; the transmitters are seized as the armies advance; news and instructions, keeping pace with the armies, are broadcast to the tottering countries. The French Radio replies in terms which are not only extraordinarily vague and general, but can now be seen to be definitely false and misleading to the French people. This reconstruction of a disastrous period in the war, from radio "documents," is quite unexpectedly dramatic, and proves the tremendous importance of radio properly handled.

And what has been Britain's part among the "voices in the darkness"? All the evidence goes to show that it has been great, and should be greater. Our time has not yet come for accompanying the armies of liberation with voices instructing those about to be liberated; the rôle of British broadcasting has been, and is, to support the spirit of the oppressed, and to bring the light of contact with the sane, non-Nazi world. Paramount among the duties of the European service is the giving of correct news. Letters and messages from all over Europe show that the B.B.C. is relied upon for the truth. In Germany the "radio criminals" who listen to the British news are savagely punished. In France conditions are sometimes easier. As Britain survived, and then began to swing the balance towards eventual victory, the influence of her voice grew stronger. But even at the beginning, immediately after the fall of France, a correspondent wrote: "continue your transmissions in French and English in such a way that they may be heard whatever happens . . . Think of it, you will be the only friendly voice in the whole world."

Not only news, but talks and commentaries, go out in all European languages; exiled Germans appeal to the non-Nazi element that must exist in Germany; there are calls for sabotage, there are replies to German lies. It is a manifold service that Mr. Tangye Lean describes, and which he views with an intelligent and adaptable mind.

Some of the further developments that might be possible and desirable in this service are indicated by Otto Friedmann in his *Broadcasting for Democracy.* The author is a Czech social psychologist who analyses carefully the fundamental nature of totalitarian and democratic radio. Mr. Friedmann holds that we must try to split Germany by showing all Germans that Naziism means ruin; that we should present definite, oft-repeated ideas of unity, co-operation and a fruitful peace, to all European countries (Germany included); that we should approach broadcasting, and train our speakers, much more professionally, and that we should have an Allied General Staff for Propaganda.

MARY CROZIER.

THE RUSSIANS, by Albert Rhys Williams. *Harrap.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

SOVIET PLANNING AND LABOUR IN PEACE AND WAR, by Maurice Dobb. *Routledge.* 4*s.*

What a pleasure it is to be able to give a wholehearted recommendation of a new book on the U.S.S.R. Mr. Williams breaks a long silence with this admirable book which packs an enormous amount of hard fact and shrewd comment into less than 250 pages, and does it in a notably easy style. Why isn't this writer better known in England? His *Through the Russian Revolution* was a documentary book worthy to rank with John Reed's *Ten days that shook the World.* I read it in a battered American edition in Moscow ten years ago.

Mr. Williams deserves to be heard with respect. He was an eye-witness of the Russian Revolution and a friend of Lenin. He has known the Soviet Union over a period of twenty-five years and (vital clue to any real understanding of the U.S.S.R.) he understands the Russian peasants. He has travelled extensively over that vast continent and even lived amongst the Khevsurs of the Caucasian mountains, reputed descendants of a lost band of Crusaders who, until recently, wore mediæval helmets, chain mail and Frankish crosses.

Mr. Williams has a sound historical background and an unfailing sense of humour. Instead of amassing pages of statistics he relates pointed anecdotes and his cool detachment enables him to deal satisfactorily with such delicate subjects as religion in the U.S.S.R., the rôle of the Communist Party (which he suggests works as a lubricant to the mechanics of the Soviet system); the abortion laws, and the elections. I like the story of his return to Russia at the height of the "purges" when he tried to explain to an old Russian workman how distressed the Western world was with the Soviet treatment of its own opposition; the workman's reply strikes home much deeper than all the verbatim reports of the trials.

Throughout the book there is mounting evidence of the Soviet expectation of war and its intense will to defend itself; from the preparation beforehand to leapfrog heavy industry to the East, to the account of the Donbas coal mine where, as the miners left to join the guerrillas, their wives stayed on to man the mine. Mr. Williams is of the opinion that these heavy industries will never return to their former homes but will remain in the East, either to assist in the development of those districts or, in the event of an uncertain peace ending the present war, serve as an arsenal against future aggression. For the Russians, Mr. Williams tells us, are primarily realists. They have been suspicious of us, but had they not reason? They were not always so distrustful but they realize that years of Soviet struggle and achievement had less effect on many Western minds than one Stalingrad. It is our behaviour during this war which will determine the Russian attitude towards future relations between our country and theirs.

Mr. Maurice Dobb also reaches the same conclusion as to the future in his excellent little text-book on Soviet Planning, which contains detailed studies of Soviet Economics, Finance, and Work and Wages. The final chapter dealing with the economic effects of the war on the U.S.S.R. is particularly to be commended.

PEARL BINDER.

ADVERTISEMENT AND BUSINESS OFFICES: 13 Buckingham Street, LONDON, W.C.2
PUBLISHED FOR THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, LTD., BY HORACE MARSHALL & SON, LTD., Publishing Department, Temple House, Tallis Street, E.C.4
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GEERINGS OF ASHFORD, LTD., 80, HIGH STREET, ASHFORD, KENT
PUBLISHED IN ENGLAND

THE FORTNIGHTLY

AUGUST, 1943

LIBRARY
2 FEB 1944
MADRAS LEGISLATIVE

THE CURRENCY PLANS

BY PETER F. DRUCKER

THE currency plan of the British Treasury (the Keynes Plan) and that of the American Treasury (the White Plan) which were published simultaneously last April are not only the first concrete and specific post-war proposals that have been put forward so far by the governments of the democracies and as such of tremendous importance. They also go far beyond the techniques of international exchange and currency regulation which the layman rightly considers not to be his concern. Actually, the technical arguments in the two plans are little more than camouflage. What is at issue are such questions as the future of international trade, the rôle of individual enterprise in international affairs, the position of the United States in the world of tomorrow, the international organization of economic power, and the future of economic imperialism. And these are questions which concern every citizen whether interested in monetary techniques or not.

It is true, of course, that neither government is committed to its plan. They are designed primarily as starting points for the discussion between the United Nations. It is also true that both Lord Keynes and Mr. White speak only for one group within their own governments—though there is probably far less opposition to the Keynes plan within the British Government than there is to the White plan within the Administration. Yet the plans not only formulate in clear and highly expert form the two main approaches to the problem of post-war international economic life to be found to-day in the democracies; they also show how each of these basic policies can be realized and what the consequences of either are likely to be.

The White plan is on the whole an attempt to restore the substance—if not the form—of the 19th century international system. Lord Keynes not only regards the destruction of this system as an accomplished fact; he also wants to put something radically new in its place. Any critique of these proposals must thus start with the question: what are the concrete problems of international economics to-day, the problems which the traditional 19th century system failed to master, and which these plans set out to solve?

The focal problem in all international economic policy during the last twenty-five years has been the relationship between "internal currency" and "external currency". In the 19th century the amount of money and credit was directly dependent upon the amount of gold possessed by a country; and the amount of gold was directly controlled by the country's international balance. If a country could not pay for its imports with the proceeds from its exports—if, in technical language its balance of payments became unfavourable—it had to ship gold to make up the deficiency. The loss of gold immediately brought about a curtailment of the domestic supply of money and credit. This deflation in turn forced down prices and costs. It became more difficult for the deflating country to import foreign goods while its own export products became cheaper and more easily saleable abroad—and thus the equilibrium was restored. Hence, the international gold standard was self-regulating; it restored its own balance. It was automatic; no government action was needed to keep it going, indeed, government action could only disturb it. It kept stable the value of the external currency as expressed in the foreign exchange rate of a country's currency. But it threw the whole burden of international fluctuations upon the domestic economy, the domestic credit structure, the domestic price level and the internal purchasing power of the currency.

The monetary history of the last twenty-five years is one of rebellion against this automatic subordination of the domestic credit and price structure to the external economic relations of a country. One country after the other found it an unbearable threat to its economic and social system. The first objection was that it created large-scale unemployment; for the deflation necessary to restore the international balance means a contraction of production. Secondly, deflation threatens social stability. Falling prices make the creditor gain at the expense of the debtor; and, as American history abundantly proves, there is no more explosive social issue than the enrichment of the creditor in consequence of a fall in prices. Finally, it became very doubtful whether the system was indeed "self-regulating", whether it really tended to restore the balance. Deflation instead of righting itself after a short time, developed a tendency to run on long after it had ceased to be economically justified; the "minor correction" became a major depression. And deflation also tended to become contagious; unemployment and falling prices in one country promptly spread to others in direct defiance of the rules of the automatic gold standard.

Thus one country after the other decided to separate its domestic currency: the volume of credit and the internal price level, from its external currency: the foreign exchange rates. The new policies all proclaim the stability of the internal currency; hence the burden of fluctuations must be borne by the external currency. There are several ways of doing this. Russia and Nazi Germany built a Chinese Wall around their domestic systems and manipulate their international exchanges by direct manipulation of their exports and imports. The Western democracies—under British lead—developed the far more flexible system of the Exchange Equalization Funds. Under this scheme too the domestic economy is insulated against shocks from the outside; short-term changes in international purchasing power are smoothed out, and long-term changes are adjusted by altering the foreign exchange rate of the currency. Of course, there is no way of escaping adjustments; but the shift of the burden of instability from the internal to the external economy eliminates the repercussions of the old system: unemployment, impoverishment of debtors and—above all—self-perpetuating deflation and the resulting international depression.

But the new system creates a new problem fully as difficult as the old one it solves. For just as it is a political impossibility for all industrial countries to-day to subordinate the internal to the external currency, it is an economic impossibility for all but a few very strong and well-integrated countries to subordinate the external to the internal currency. With the exception of the United States and Russia—to which China may have to be added in a decade or two—all industrial countries are so dependent upon imports and exports that their economies could not stand very violent fluctuations in their foreign trade; such fluctuations are, however, inevitable if the burden of economic adjustments is thrown on the external currency.

It is this dilemma between a political and an economic impossibility which has driven so many countries—and particularly those most dependent upon international markets—to strive for autarchy. In order to make possible the politically necessary full employment at home, countries must be made capable of doing without the international market. Or, at the least, they must be able to manipulate the adjustments in their international trade; and that means simply that both export trade and the distribution of imported goods among domestic industries must be government-monopolies.

No argument is needed to show that this cure is worse than the disease. A country may obtain full employment under such a government-controlled self-sufficiency programme; but it does so by destroying the international economic system, by sacrificing

prosperity and progress to momentary security, and by creating international and national friction. What is needed, therefore, is a system under which a country can safeguard its domestic economy against internationally-caused deflation without having to resort to economic totalitarianism.

To find the answer to this conundrum is the first task of any international currency plan; if it cannot give it, it cannot work.

The second concrete task to be achieved by an international economic system to-day would be to find a way out of the impasse created by the international sweep of industrialization. During the last fifty—and especially during the last twenty-five-years, the technological conditions governing industrialization have been completely changed. Whereas formerly there was only one source of industrial energy: coal, there are now three: coal, water-power and oil. There are very few countries in the world which are without a supply of one of the three; and several new sources of energy: alcohol made from vegetable matter, for instance, promise to become commercially usable within reasonable time. The same process of removing the old natural limitations on successful industrial production has been going on in all fields. There are numerous new raw materials, numerous new ways to obtain the old raw materials from new sources—both synthetic and natural—and numerous new ways both to make old products from new materials and to make new products which can replace the old ones. In short, the old theory that one country is "unsuitable" for industrialization or that it suffers from a "natural" cost-disadvantage, while not entirely obsolete, has become of very limited applicability in practice. That India to-day does not produce any electrical machinery at all is no longer a sufficient reason that she should not be the most efficient manufacturer of electrical goods twenty-five years hence.

It is perhaps the most important event in international economics that the will to industrialize has become world-wide. Americans have heard a great deal about the rapid industrialization of Russia, of Turkey, of China; and we are all painfully familiar with the Japanese achievement. But few seem to realize that these are only individual examples of a general trend: the world-wide industrialization of the raw-material producing countries. This war has accelerated the process tremendously. But even without the war the movement was changing the economic map of the world at a tremendous rate. And what is most important: all the new industrial countries concentrate on heavy industries.

The prime mover in this development is not economic; and it would be futile to argue with an Argentinian or an Australian that

his mills will produce less efficiently than Detroit or Manchester for many years to come. For the decision to industrialize is based upon political reasons. Every raw-material producing country is firmly convinced that in this present world only industrial countries enjoy full citizenship. And it is equally convinced that in a world of tanks and planes any country is lost unless it can produce its own basic mechanized equipment.

The world-wide trend toward industrialization—a veritable new industrial revolution—may be turned into one of the most constructive forces which will raise the standard of living of the colonial races and relieve the pressure of population in the raw-material producing areas. But it may also become most destructive; it may lead to economic nationalism on a world wide scale. Two things are necessary to prevent such a disaster. In the first place a way must be found to supply the capital for the industrialization of the raw-material producing countries; otherwise they will be forced to obtain the capital by cutting down the standard of living of their own—pitifully poor—populations which could only be done through a totalitarian economic system similar to a war economy. Secondly, it must be made possible for them to develop their industries as part of a larger, integrated whole; otherwise they will be forced to strive for autarchy.

Finally, there is no longer the international uniformity in the social and economic systems of the leading countries which characterized the 19th century. Of the major powers only England and the United States have maintained the essence of the 19th century free-enterprise democracy. Russia works on a radically different basis; and though we cannot know what form the social system of a victorious China and of a liberated Continental Europe will take, it is more than probable that they will not be copies of the 19th century order. Hence, an international economic system must make it possible for countries of very different structure to collaborate peacefully; otherwise we should have to look forward only to endless semi-religious wars in which each major power would try to impose its own social institutions upon the rest.

It is against these tasks that any proposal for an international economic or monetary system has to be measured. Can it provide a way out of the dilemma between the political needs of industrial society which demand full employment, and the economic needs of most industrial countries which demand a stable international system? Can it provide capital for industrialization and an organization which makes it possible for new industrial countries to fit themselves into an international order of harmony and economic

interchange? Can it provide an international organization to which socially heterogeneous countries can adhere?

It is the most encouraging feature of the Keynes and the White plans that they agree on the whole in the diagnosis of the problems which international economic organization has to master. They differ considerably in the emphasis given to each of the three major issues. Mr. White apparently hopes that a solution of the internal-external currency question would by itself cure most of the other troubles; Lord Keynes seems to think the problem of international industrialization and international investment fully as important as that of foreign exchange and trade.

They are also agreed on what not to do: neither attempts the restoration of the old automatic subordination of the internal to the external currency—and with it the restoration of the gold standard. Even Mr. White who is otherwise strongly for a restoration of the old system, demands a continuation of the present divorce of internal and external currency. Though the White Plan has been advertized as a restoration of gold, there is not one word in it that could be construed as demanding a return to gold as the basis of a country's money and credit structure. The amount of money and credit in circulation inside a country—and with it the price level—are apparently to be entirely independent of the amount of gold it has; in this sense Mr. White proposes simply to continue the system as it is to-day in this and in all other countries. Gold is to be used purely as one means of payment in international transactions; and the total amount needed by the entire world under his plan would not exceed one to two billions dollars—or less than ten per cent of America's present gold-hoard. Actually, even this concession to gold was apparently made most unwillingly and for reasons of political expediency rather than as a matter of principle. Mr. White apparently aims at providing the new governments in reconstructed countries with a money that would command confidence; and gold still retains its prestige. At the same time he was obviously afraid of the political troubles likely to result from a re-establishment of gold as the exclusive medium of international exchange; for with the United States holding 80 per cent. of the world's gold, an international gold standard would make every other country dependent upon American policy. Torn thus between the desire to use gold and the desire to eliminate it in order to avoid political resistance to his plan, he compromised by giving countries with ample gold reserves (that is the United States) the right to use them internationally up to a limited amount, while giving all other countries the right to use instead their own paper-promises within the same limits. On the whole, Mr. White differs

from Lord Keynes in his attitude on gold only in that he wants to retire this old servant on a pension while Lord Keynes proposes to fire him.

But their agreement does not go beyond the negative; they disagree radically on every single positive step that has to be taken. And they differ not only on methods but on purposes as well.

The means which Mr. White proposes for the normal adjustment of international disturbances are the orthodox ones: reduction of prices and costs at home in order to restore the country's competitive position abroad. Such adjustments should however not be precipitated but orderly and controlled; nor need deflation be forced upon a country as the result of short-term fluctuations. Thus the White plan centres on the smoothing-out of short-term disturbances and the cushioning of long-time adjustments. And the tool of Mr. White's international monetary agency would be the international short-term loan to countries in difficulties. A country may thus obtain the means to avoid a sudden cutting-down of its domestic credit and price structure. But it will only be helped if it either deflates in an orderly fashion, or, if the disequilibrium is of a transient nature such as caused, for instance, by a natural catastrophe, a very bad harvest, or a long strike.

In direct contrast to Mr. White, Lord Keynes proposes to subordinate the external currency to the requirement of domestic full employment. International economic organization is seen as a means to obtain full production in the member countries. This intention pervades the whole plan. It leads Lord Keynes not only to allow devaluation but to make it a normal practice—automatic in some cases, enforceable by the international monetary agency in others. And all through the Keynes plan there is the emphasis that deflation in any country is a danger to the entire world to the avoidance of which the stability of currencies is entirely to be subordinated.

The two plans are even further apart on other issues. Mr. White demands that after a short period of transition all member countries abandon "all restrictions and controls over foreign exchange transactions with other member countries, and (that they) not impose any additional restrictions without the approval of the international) bank." That means of course, that international trade and international banking are to be restored to private hands. Mr. White also expressly forbids any regional agreements between member countries.

Lord Keynes, on the other hand, provides for government-control "of outward capital transactions," as one of the measures which the international bank can prescribe for a member country; and

by adding that this can be demanded if exchange restrictions are "not already in force," he implies clearly that any country is entitled to put on whatever foreign exchange controls it deems necessary. Thus it is the absence, not the presence, of governmental restrictions on private enterprise that would be a good cause for international intervention into a national economy. He not only allows regional agreements, he demands them. For under his scheme the smaller countries would not be represented individually on the board but one member would be appointed for a "convenient political or geographic group," that is for a region. It can hardly have escaped Lord Keynes or the British Treasury that this implies not only monetary unity within these groups but a uniform economic policy and integrated regional trade relations.

The cleavage between the two proposals comes out most sharply, however, in the different scope which is given by each to the international monetary agency. Mr. White's international agency has only one task: to give to private enterprise in the member countries freedom from political interference and from the threat of fluctuations in foreign exchange rates. His centralized monetary machine is not supposed to make economic policy or to take the lead in international economic change.

Lord Keynes defines the function of his international agency by saying: "The idea underlying such a (international monetary) union is to generalize the essential principle of banking as it is exhibited within any closed (that is domestic) system."

The "essential principle" of banking, especially in Lord Keynes's economics, is, however, the creation of credit: by granting a credit to a client a bank creates bank-deposits which are accepted in payment by every one so that they are money to all intents and purposes. For Lord Keynes to say that the international bank should exercise the same functions which a banking system has in a national economy is simply saying that it is the international bank which will have to decide how much international purchasing power there is going to be, which country is to have it and what it is to be used for. In Mr. White's international agency all balances would be determined by the trade-transactions of a country's business men; in Lord Keynes' scheme the trade of a country—and that of the entire world—is to be determined by the balances given to each country by the international bank. And lest he be misunderstood, Lord Keynes lays down as one of his main aims the establishment of an *international currency* (a term never used by Mr. White) that would be "capable of deliberate expansion and contraction to offset deflationary and inflationary tendencies in effective world demand."

Lord Keynes also demands the international control of the volume and of the direction of long-term international lending and investment. This follows as a matter of course from his concept of an international bank able to create credit which would be accepted everywhere as equivalent to money. It is also directly expressed in the text of the Keynes plan; though, according to the semi-official London comments the actual control of international long-term investments is to be in the hands of a separate international board, Lord Keynes' international bank will have the right to prescribe investment policy to member countries and will have something akin to a veto-power on all loans and investments of which it disapproves. Lord Keynes' international bank is thus to be stronger than any national central bank has ever been in peace-time—or it is to be as strong internationally as a national banking system should be domestically.

The White plan puts international currency stabilization and Free Trade first; Lord Keynes pivots on full employment in the domestic economies of the member-nations of the system. Mr. White demands that international trade, banking and investment be returned as fast as possible into private hands; The Keynes plan regards all international economic activity as primarily a political matter which must be planned and controlled by a central political agency. While the White plan wants to take politics out of international economic life, the Keynes plan substitutes one extremely powerful international economic government for the many contending national governments. In scope and function Mr. White's international agency is primarily the servant of private enterprise in the member countries. Lord Keynes plans for an international banking system which would create credit and purchasing power and which would control the extent and the direction of international trade and investment.

There is a great deal to be said for the conservatism of the White plan—just as there is much to be said for the conservatism of the old family physician. Perhaps its main merit is that it can be run by any moderately experienced international banker. Ninety-nine per cent. of the operations of Mr. White's international agency would be technical routine stuff such as the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has been handling for years. And with its radius of positive action kept very narrow, the international monetary agency has also little scope for spectacular mistakes.

And yet this conservatism makes the plan unable to deal with the problem with which international economic organization has to deal to-day. Mr. White diagnoses clearly the issues raised by the international sweep of industrialization, by the development of

discordant social and economic systems in different parts of the world, by the conflict between the demands of domestic and those of foreign economic policy in modern industrial society. But his main prescription is to treat them by ignoring them. The strength of his plan lies in its very carefully worked out international techniques; and is a fair guess that any international monetary organization of the future will rely on Mr. White's proposals for its machinery. It is especially its masterly treatment of the problems arising out of the monetary disturbances of the war that should prove of lasting value. But taken by itself the White plan is no real answer to the basic problems.

The Keynes plan, on the other hand, deals directly with these basic problems. It offers a way out, other than autarchy, to industrial countries; for it provides explicitly that countries will be enabled to maintain their international purchasing power (through credits from the international bank) if they have to devalue or if their desire to maintain full employment leads to difficulties in their international economic relations. It makes capital-investment an international function and it mentions explicitly international development loans as one of the things which the international bank will have to arrange; hence it gives a mechanism to supply backward countries with capital for their industrialization. At the same time it clearly envisages the organization of such countries into large, integrated regions which would prevent the economic nationalization for small countries and would provide the continental market which alone can justify major industrial expansion. Finally, it can be adhered to—and operated by—countries of the most divergent social and economic structures.

But if the White plan is inadequate from the point of view of international economic reality, the Keynes plan—viewed as a world-wide plan—fails completely from the point of view of international politics. In the first place, it simply ignores America's unique position. After this war she will be the only one that is likely to have a strong creditor-position in international economics; hence it will be America which alone will have very large surpluses for investment abroad. To internationalize investments, as the Keynes plan proposes, is to ask the United States to give up her strongest card in the international economic game.

It might be argued that the power which the United States might have if allowed free exercise of her investment-potential, is too great to be left in the hands of any one country. Undoubtedly the fear of becoming political vassals of their creditors had much to do with the decisions of Russia, Turkey and China not to resort to foreign borrowing for their industrialization programme. Lord

Keynes would have to offer to the U.S.A. something in consideration for the voluntary abdication which he expects from her.

Even more serious are the consequences of the internationalization of investment from the point of view of the small countries, especially of those in urgent need of foreign capital. The powers of Lord Keynes' international bank are such as to make it the virtual economic dictator of such countries. To be effective this international bank would therefore have to be backed and controlled by an equally strong international political government which enjoys the confidence of the member states and which has the power to enforce its decisions. There is not one word of such a government in the Keynes plan; nor can any plan be considered practical politics to-day which needs such a world-government to be workable.

The Keynes plan thus reveals itself not as a plan for world-organization (as which it announces itself), but as a plan for the organization of regional groups. It is fully in line with the trend of British official thinking as revealed recently by Mr. Churchill in his advocacy of a "European Council" and of an "Asiatic Council" as the actual instruments of post-war policy. For such regional groupings the Keynes plan would be eminently suitable. The strong central power needed to make possible the "generalization of the essential principle of banking" would be provided by one or two major powers around which the region would be organized. And as far as internal relations within a European or a British-Empire Federation are concerned, there would also be no problem of American preponderance. Viewed in this aspect, the strong resemblance which Lord Keynes' scheme has to the reality of American Federal Reserve policy becomes fully understandable. A world organized into a half-dozen or so integrated regional economies—each organized financially on the Keynes plan—would still need an international monetary system for relations between the regions. It may not be entirely without practical importance that for this job: to settle balances between large groups, each of which supplies most of its own requirements of goods and capital, the machinery of the White plan is extremely well suited.

Though neither plan is entirely successful in working out a programme for the realization of its aims, both go much farther than anything we have had so far. And both show—above all in the degree by which they fall short of success—that we cannot work out international economic solutions until we have decided which of the two basic policies we intend to adopt.

POLITICS AND THE PRESENT GENERATION

By Quintin Hogg, M.P.

THE war has left most of the under twenty-fives unattached politically, yet not uninterested in politics. The present position of most of them in the services, the absence of many abroad, and the preoccupation of the remainder with various forms of war work have been enough to ensure this. Young men and women may be hasty but they are neither revolutionaries nor extremists. The objectivity which alone can ensure survival in battle or success in the various forms of war work does not make for prejudice or blind enthusiasms. At the same time their political judgments, though unformed as yet, are rapidly taking shape and no one who is wise can afford to neglect to attract their interest.

This article is written from a definite viewpoint, that of a young, and, it is hoped, progressive Conservative. It is written by a young man for young men and women. Whether the point of view for which the writer stands is fruitful or not depends not upon himself or upon those who happen to agree or disagree with him inside the Conservative Party. It depends entirely upon the number of young men and women who can be persuaded to take Conservative politics seriously, and having done so, to see that they are unequivocally progressive.

However much the existing parties may have become discredited in recent years the party system is built into British Parliamentary democracy. At irregular intervals the electorate is asked to elect members of a new House of Commons; yet if their choice is to yield a significant answer to the great questions of the day, the questions to which each voter addresses himself must be similar in character and therefore limited in number.

There are always people whose vote at an election is determined by trivial or insignificant considerations. In such minds the great issues of national policy are outweighed. Yet if these were to form a majority it would not be possible to deduce from the result of an election any general inference as to the will of the people on general issues. The House of Commons would degenerate into a mere Chamber of Deputies, free to develop its own programme and to allot office to any combination of its numbers after election had made their position safe for a number of years from effective criticism.

That this has not proved to be the case in British politics is largely due to two factors—the power of the executive to control their supporters by advising a dissolution and the preference of the electorate for members of clear cut political parties.

The consequence has been that General Elections have tended to yield intelligible results. The electors give a sensible answer because the existence of parties has ensured that they have been asked a sensible question. They are required to choose not between the individual merits of about two thousand candidates or to express opinions about an unco-ordinated series of individual measures. They are required to choose between one of two or three possible teams and to express a preference for one of two or three coherent legislative programmes. Yet at the same time belief in democratic government and in a party system limits the nature of the loyalty owed to a party. This loyalty should never be inconsistent with the view that there is room for other parties in the State.

Parties are what they are made by their tradition, their organization, and their existing policy. Of these the two first are the more important; the last can be altered by the acquisition of new recruits, or changing circumstances, but to alter the tradition or the constitution of a party is a more difficult undertaking.

The Conservative party tradition is both old and honourable. Macaulay was possibly right in fixing its origin in the Parliament of 1641 amongst the body of men who criticized the King but wished to retain the Monarchy. However this may be, the Tory Party has for centuries had peculiar characteristics which differentiate if from Continental Conservatism. In the first place unlike the Continental movements it has always been a Parliamentary party and desires to impose its will through Parliament alone. In the second place it has always been willing to welcome reform if achieved with caution and without revolution. In the third place, as the experience of centuries of electoral victory and defeat have succeeded one another, it has always tended to attach itself rather to the preservation of institutions than of theories of government. Experience has taught it that there is no political theory, even its own, which does not appear ridiculous in the light of a later generation. It has therefore always been willing to avail itself of the wisdom of an opponent without embracing the whole body of his formal doctrines, and to accept a reform once passed as an accomplished fact without discussion of its merits. A typical example of this can be found in the Conservative attitude to the Parliament Act of 1911. There can be few Conservatives who would not have regarded this as an undesirable measure at the time. If British Conservatism had been of the Continental model it would have destroyed itself in trying to get the Act repealed. British Conservatives made no such mistake. There is not a single member of the Conservative Party who would urge the repeal of the Parliament Act as a practical measure.

The willingness of the Conservative Party to learn from its opponents provides an explanation of another characteristic—its faculty for renewing itself in every generation. It is no mere coincidence that on an average of about twice or more during a century there arises within the Tory Party a

movement of young men decried by their elders as revolutionary who preach reform in the name of Conservatism.

Such a one was Disraeli: such too, was Lord Randolph Churchill. To such a movement in the Tory Party belonged F. E. Smith's Social Reform Committee of 1911. There is reason for thinking that this attitude has become particularly appropriate to the solution of the problems of the present day, and that there is already in existence an organized movement in the Tory Party in the true tradition capable of expressing it.

It is a true fact that political controversy tends to remain petrified and fixed in terms of a society which is already passing away. So in the early part of the Railway and Industrial Age the political clubs continued to discuss policy in the language of the French Wars. We see them at it in the pages of *Sybil*, and we are surprised to note that though this tendency might have been expected of purely reactionary movements, as a matter of fact it is far more characteristic of phrases and doctrines which pass current as progressive.

The thesis of the reforming Tories is that current political controversies have become petrified in the use of phrases and theories which are no longer relevant to social forms. We Tories believe that this stage had already been reached before the beginning of hostilities, and that the tragedy of the pre-war years would only be re-enacted if we permitted public opinion to remain divided on the old issues such as "Socialism" versus "Private Enterprise," "Nationalization" versus "Free Competition," "Nationalism" versus "Internationalism"; we think that the old slogans of Socialism and the Class War which served their turn in their day are now really only the parrot cries of those who are too old in mind or body to see what is happening and has already happened.

At such a period it is always the function of reforming Tories to by-pass controversies of this kind, to re-express abiding Conservative principles in current terms, and to insist on such changes as make current political and social practice correspond with the proved results of modern experience.

It is not too much to claim that Mr. Churchill, as well as being leader of the Conservative Party is spiritually also the leader of the New Conservative movement and that his broadcast on March 22 ought to be the bible of reforming Tories—a bible, however, which they should revere in a modernist and not a fundamentalist sense.

All Tories start with a respect for tradition. We differ from the Parties of the left in that we regard society not as a mechanical construction, but as something in the nature of a living organism. For this reason we dislike violent change, because it dislocates the life of a community—but we dislike a rigid and unchanging view of society still more—because a living organism which does not constantly change ceases thereby to be living.

This view of society also determines our idea of progress. We do not believe in an 'ideal state' after the manner of the philosophers, or like the Individualists (who see one in the past) or the Communists (who see one in

the future). Our idea of the perfect varies as much as our experience of the actual and imperfect. We see the perfection of an old man of eighty as different from that of a child of five, and that of a medieval society as something different from one of to-day. We see the perfection of England as something different from the perfection of Russia or the U.S.A. It follows that we desire to be ourselves without decrying other people.

Our attitude to change is that of Mr. Churchill: "In moving steadily and steadfastly from a class to a national foundation, we must not forget the glories of the past nor how many battles we have fought for the rights of the individual and for human freedom."

We believe that the controversy of "Nationalism" and "Internationalism" represented a valid antithesis in the days when the civilized world really centred on Europe and the European nation state was still the standard civilized political institution. But such is no longer the case. However much we may support the local autonomies demanded by the smaller European nations, nothing will conceal the fact that the smaller national sovereignties, and the effective rights of neutrality which went with it, have had their day. Europe is taking its place as one, and that not the most important, of continental areas. The European national state, independent internally, will be thought of more in terms of the receipt of American or Australian relief or in terms of co-operation with other powers for the preservation of European peace than of the exercise of sovereign prerogatives. Elsewhere mankind is integrating into groups far transcending mere nationhood. Whatever it may be in legal theory the U.S.S.R. is something different in kind from Paraguay. The U.S.A. is not merely a larger Denmark, and the British Commonwealth is not simply a series of sovereign states like Czechoslovakia, Italy and Turkey. Our own country is more important viewed as a part of the Commonwealth that the old self-centred Mother Country of former days. Viewed in the light of considerations like these the Internationalism which was voiced recently by Labour Members of Parliament in the Civil Aviation debate is just as much an anachronism as the views of the man who expects Britain to dominate the seas and markets of the world as she did after Trafalgar.

Our attitude towards National Sovereignty was defined by Mr. Churchill when he said:

> I hope we shall not lightly cast aside all the immense work which was accomplished by the League of Nations. Certainly we must take as our foundation the lofty conception of freedom, morality and law which was the spirit of the League. We must try to make the Council of Europe into a really effective League with all the strongest forces concerned woven into its texture, with a High Court to adjust disputes, with forces, armed forces, national or international or both held ready to enforce these decisions and prevent renewed aggression and the preparation of future wars.

On the other hand our experience of the past twenty-five years has reinforced our doubts of written constitutions. The world is progressing into a new system of international relationships, and these cannot be expressed in terms of nationality alone. Whilst we talk the Middle East Supply Centre,

the Allied Armies in North Africa, the Nutrition Conference, the Relief Conference, the Shipping and Oil committees give examples of the shape of things to come.

We believe that a similar fate has overtaken the controversy between Private Enterprise and Socialism. In some spheres collectivist theory has triumphed. Units of production and distribution have ever tended to increase in size, and since this has tended to monopoly it becomes necessary to reaffirm against private capital, that Parliament, and not boards of directors must determine national policy. We have failed in the past to recognize this sufficiently. We did not remember that a vast monopoly influences the fate of a nation and that if Parliament is not to abdicate its functions Parliament alone can be permitted to have this power.

Examples of our failure to see this are not far to seek. Too many of our foreign investments proved a present to Hitler. Our capital outlay in South America may prove to have been a waste of money. Policy is a matter for the Government, however this is controlled.

But it is precisely this principle which war has established. And having established it we do not find that the need for private enterprise has disappeared. Banking policy is in fact controlled by the Treasury through the Bank of England. Industry is harnessed to produce what the Government orders. Profits are controlled and the price limited. But nothing can alter the fact that the goods are in the main invented and produced by private enterprise or research. Nationalization never produced the Spitfire, the Sherman, the Typhoon or the Mosquito. Independent scientists working under Government subsidy first applied radio-location to war. It is private enterprise which runs the vast quantity of mechanical transport off the production line. The principles of banking management are still determined by the joint stock banks in spite of the fact that banking policy has been controlled. Nothing has been said or done to invalidate the argument that where there is a risk of loss there should be a corresponding opportunity for profit. Nothing has happened to indicate that the place of private enterprise in new or undeveloped industry has been taken by some form of public control. The fact is that old enemies have proved to be friends, capable of reconciliation, even partners in marriage. Mr. Churchill was right in asserting that there was room for both in the new Britain. He was exactly defining our attitude towards private and public enterprise when he said:

> It is necessary . . . . that private enterprise and state enterprise are both able to play their parts to the utmost . . . . There is a broadening field for State ownership and enterprise especially in relation to monopolies of all kinds. The modern State will increasingly concern itself with the economic well-being of the nation, but it is all the more vital to revive at the earliest moment a widespread, healthy and vigorous private enterprise . . . .

On the other hand we accept his warning against bureaucracy. The sovereignty of Parliament and the public control of monopoly should not mean

the appointment of a vast number of private officials. "We must beware of trying to build a society in which nobody counts for anything except a politician or an official."

Similar changes have taken place in the world of finance. We should admit frankly that the orthodox view of the place of finance in national policy was much too narrow. Neither the profit accruing to the individual trader nor the burden on the national Exchequer are themselves proper tests of public advantage or expense. Ribbon development was more profitable to the individual than town planning—because it freed him from the obligation to provide a road system. To the community it was more expensive, even in terms of money, since the cost of laying services like water, electric cable, or gas mains results in permanently higher rates, apart from any aesthetic consideration at all. The financial cost of a housing scheme cannot be expressed in terms of public expenditure, since on the credit side as mere economic items would have to be placed the freedom from preventable disease, crime and social unrest which result from healthy housing conditions.

We have to admit that the old economics was plain wrong. A new economics based on social advantage has to be developed to take its place.

On the other hand, we think that nothing has happened to justify the view that £. s. d. are meaningless symbols. If we substitute the maximum collective effort to the community as a test of what we can afford, there remains a definite economic limit. We must still strike a balance short of perfection between houses, schools, guns and butter. We do not avoid reality simply by abusing the capitalist.

Nor do we fall into the fallacy of thinking that because private profit is not the only, or the best test of public advantage, private profit is not of the most important advantage to the community. The prosperity of the trader is a thing to be aimed at and if he is to run the risk of a loss he must be allowed the chance of a reasonable reward.

Yet these are not the most important controversies which are becoming obsolete. Old talk about the "class war" is meaningless to-day. In the Prime Minister's own words, we are now passing "from a class to a national basis."

There are only 80 people in the country with net incomes of more than £6,000 a year. There are only 1,170 with incomes between £4,000 and £6,000. Out of a total of private incomes of some £7,264 million—only £530 million gross is attributable to payers of super tax, and of this less than £214 million is retained in the hands of the 105,000 odd super tax payers. Death duties more than halve the big estates, and where two or more deaths occur in a short time a great estate may disappear completely in a matter of weeks or months.

At the other end of the scale wages have not remained constant. The agricultural labourer is now paid a minimum of £3 a week. Wages in factories are high and there is no general limitation. If figures like £15 or £20 a week

are unusual, a skilled worker can now earn not much less than some doctors and dons before the war. But figures alone cannot give the true effect of what has been going on. The series of great social reforms of the past fifty years—the Workmen's Compensation Acts, the National Health Insurance Acts, the Pension legislation, and Unemployment Insurances have not merely revolutionized our ideas of the correct relation between the State and the individual. They have altered the whole structure of society; the effect of social legislation coupled with the rise in the educational level has been to create a working class with tastes and standards approximating to those of nineteenth century bourgeois society. The effect of taxation has been to reduce the wealthier classes to more or less the same level. We are rapidly producing, whether we desire it or not, a classless society, not in the sense that we are abolishing distinctions of occupation or locality, but in the sense that the marks of respect which went to wealth or privilege in the past are going to education and technical skill in the present.

A progressive Conservative may welcome and desire to extend these changes. The watchwords of the future years are " work for all " and " social democracy ".

The implications of these facts give the key to the political future. The time is coming when a re-united British people will rise again to a sense of their mission. We have worn sackcloth and ashes too long, and sat too long on the stool of repentance. It is good neither for a man nor a nation to be for ever repenting of his sins. The time comes when he must arise and wash himself and go about the business for which he is sent. Diffidence may show want of purpose as well as Christian humility. Self-respect has nothing to do with arrogance or conceit. National pride is not always the same as Chauvinism. A good man may be proud of his parents. It behoves him also to be proud of his country.

We are neither strong enough nor numerous enough to rule the world, and even if we were we should not wish to do it; but leadership is a different thing from sovereignty and there is a place for vision which does not involve domination.

The basic conception of politics is policy—policy viewed neither as a series of independent measures nor even as a smaller series of chapter headings, but policy viewed as a coherent whole embodying the purpose of a nation's will. The object of policy is a standard of life, that is a standard of life for the individual within a community; but this standard must embody a sense of purpose in the individual as well as material well-being, a sense of usefulness and fellowship with the world in which he lives and an assurance that this usefulness will be recognized by others.

It is an ironical fact that we have achieved in war what we have failed to achieve in peace—a community in which every man has a sense that his work is of value to all and that he receives a reward himself proportionate to his usefulness to others.

Our main political problem in post-war years is to preserve this sense of purpose so that it may be harnessed to the needs of the nation at peace as it has been to the requirements of war. The main difficulty is that whereas each war is in theory a short struggle with a limited objective, the problems of peace are the eternal problems of humanity. The British people is so placed that it can play its own part in the solution of these problems for themselves and for the world at large. Our part in the struggle has not been inglorious. We will be left at the end impoverished but still politically in control of more than a fifth of the world's surface and united in friendly alliance with the most powerful and progressive peoples on earth. Our experience will have taught us a middle way between nationalism and internationalism. Our interests give us knowledge of all the areas into which the world is forming itself. The necessities of war have compelled a reconciliation between private enterprise and public control which with modifications must be preserved in peace. Necessity is forming a society in which the economic differences, are rapidly disappearing in a common level of culture. It is the function of political leadership to point to the opportunities which these factors offer and to the necessity of national unity in order to seize them. They are already realized by the young and the statesman who affirms their truth can be confident of a loyal and enthusiastic following. With faith and courage achievement will follow opportunity.

(*Captain Hogg is National Conservative M.P. for Oxford City*).

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREAT BRITAIN

By J. T. Murphy

UNTIL June of this year the British Communist Party was a section of the Communist International. The dissolution of the latter on the initiative of Stalin, ended a connection which had been a dominating feature of its existence since its formation in June, 1920. The Communist Party had been formed as a direct result of the influence of the Russian Revolution upon a few small socialist groups—The Socialist Labour Party, the British Socialist Party, the Socialist Workers' Federation, the South Wales Socialist Society, some units of the Independent Labour Party, National Guildsmen and other small local socialist societies. Prior to the Russian Revolution they were noticeable mainly for their differences. The S.L.P. was opposed to affiliation to the Labour Party and inclined to syndicalism. The B.S.P. was Parliamentarian and affiliated to the Labour Party. The Workers' Socialist Federation was anti-parliamentarian and anti-Labour Party and so on. It was the influence of the Russian Revolution and Lenin's call for the formation of the Third (Communist) International "free from opportunism" that brought them together.

The principles upon which they united read as follows:*

"Communism as against Capitalism, i.e. the maintenance of society on a basis of social service rather than class exploitation.

The Soviet idea as against parliamentary democracy, i.e., a structure making provision for the participation in social administration only of those who render useful service to the community.

Learning from history that dominant classes never yield to the revolutionary enslaved classes without struggle, the Communists must be prepared to meet and crush all the efforts of capitalist reactionaries to regain their lost privileges pending a system of thoroughgoing communism. In other words, the Communist Party must stand for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."

It was estimated that the Communist Party after its inaugural conference had 10,000 members. By 1922 its membership had fallen to 2,000. During the Miners' Lock-out of 1926 it rose again to 10,000. A decline set in after the defeat of the miners and the membership hovered between 5,000 to 10,000 during the next ten years. At the outbreak of war in 1939 it had reached nearly 16,000. Its rapid increase to 41,000 in 1943 dates from the entrance of the Soviet Union into the war in June, 1941.

* Manifesto of the Provisional Committee for the Communist Party, 1920.

The declaration of its revolutionary principles in 1920 was, of course, a challenge to all other parties in Britain but an especial challenge to the British Labour Party. From that moment the Labour Party had a rival for the leadership of the working class. The differences between the two parties were and remain fundamental differences. In the early stages of the struggle these differences were stated much more clearly than to-day. The Labour Party was a federal party (a combination of labour parties, trade unions and socialist organizations) stating itself to be a people's party with a socialist programme, which it would achieve through a succession of reforms through Parliament. The Communist Party proclaimed that Socialism could not be achieved through Parliament. It stood for the insurrectionary struggle and the proletarian seizure of power, a Soviet Britain and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. While supporting a struggle for the immediate improvement of the conditions of the workers it aimed to secure the socialization of the means of production by confiscation.

From a Communist point of view the Labour Party stood in the way of the British working class becoming revolutionary and the Communist Party hoped by applying for affiliation to the Labour Party to destroy it. Lenin said: "I am prepared to support Henderson by my vote in just the same way as a rope supports the man who has hanged himself," and at the St. Pancras Conference in 1922 T. A. Jackson for the Executive Committee of the Party was reported as saying: "It might be urged that in affiliating with the Labour Party they would be virtually shaking hands with those leaders of the Second International who were in effect the murderers of Karl Liebknect and Rosa Luxemburg. This was true . . . I would take them by the hand! —as a preliminary to taking them by the throat!" Two years later R. P. Dutt in less colourful language said:

> The rôle of the Communist Party must be made clear to the British workers to be not simply the rôle of a propagandist force within the Labour Party and the trade unions for the adoption of certain "views." The rôle of the Communist Party is the rôle of the alternative leadership of the British working class, which the British workers must themselves build up and realize to replace the failure and the decomposition of the Labour Party. This is the fact which must be proclaimed on every side. Out of the ruins of the old electoral associations which were the prey of every petty bourgeois opportunist and adventurer, must arise the solid disciplined force of the mass Communist Party of the future, and of the workers fighting under its banner.

The application for affiliation to the Labour Party was rejected in 1922 by 3,086,000 to 261,000; in 1923 by 2,880,000 to 366,000; in 1924 by 3,805,000 to 193,000. In 1925 the Labour Party decided by 2,810,000 to 310,000 that no communist should be eligible for membership of the Labour Party. In 1943 a renewed application was strongly rejected.

This struggle for affiliation has been conducted as a fight for "a united working class." Although the Communist Party differed fundamentally from the Labour Party on all questions of principle, it was willing as a matter of expediency to accept the constitution and programme of the Labour Party in

the interests of a united working class action on the principal issues of the day: "Aganst the Capitalist offensive," "For Peace and Plenty," "For Collective Security," "Unity against Fascism," "A People's Convention," "A People's Peace," "Down with the War Government," "On to Victory" and so on.

In the course of the struggle for a united front the Communist Party fostered a "Left Wing" Movement within the Labour Party. After the 1925 decision to expel individual communists from the Labour Party more than a hundred Labour Parties refused to apply the decision and were disaffiliated. After a short period in which the Communist Party supported the disaffiliated Labour Parties it withdrew its support and told its members to join the Communist Party, or go back to the Labour Party. This ended the "Left Wing Movement" within the Labour Party.

A similar development marked its relations with the Trade Unions. To develop the revolutionary struggle against the Trade Union leaders and win over Union members to communist leadership the Communist Party first supported the Shop Stewards' Movement which had grown up during the last war. The Shop Stewards supported the Red International of Labour Unions, the purpose of which was to detach the trade unions from reformist leadership and bring them under the direction of the Communist International. The R.I.L.U. organized a bureau in Britain to win over the British unions. The bureau secured local affiliations of trade union branches, district committees and trades councils. These affiliations became the basis of what became known as the Minority Movement. The movement achieved considerable headway until the General Council of the Trades Union Congress and the Trades Union Executives determined to destroy it. They demanded that all their affiliated and associated organizations should dissociate themselves from the Minority Movement. In 1927 the General Council of the T.U.C. set a time limit to this demand. Immediately the Communist Party and the Minority Movement leaders launched a campaign asking all organizations affiliated to the Minority Movement to reject the demand of the General Council. All the large Trades Councils and many trade union branches stood firmly by the Minority Movement until at the last moment as the ultimatum of the General Council expired, the Communist Party and the Minority Movement leadership reversed their decision and told the affiliated organizations to accept the decision of the General Council. The Minority Movement faded out of existence.

The aim of a Soviet Britain did not preclude the Communist Party from participation in Parliamentary elections. In 1922, J. T. W. Newbold was elected for Motherwell, polling 8,262 votes. He was the first Communist M.P. There was no Labour Party candidate in his constituency on this occasion. In this general election W. Gallacher contested Dundee and polled 5,906 votes. Four communists stood as Labour candidates. One was successful—S. Saklatvala for N. Battersea. In the election of December, 1923, both Newbold

and Saklatvala were defeated. Gallacher increased his vote to 10,380. Six communists stood as Labour candidates. In the 1929 general election there were 25 communist candidates. 20 lost their deposits. In the general election of 1931 the Communist Party with 26 candidates polled 74,824 votes. 21 candidates lost their deposits. In 1935 all candidates withdrew except two who polled 27,117 votes. One of them, W. Gallacher, was elected M.P. for West Fife.

The consistency of small returns for large efforts followed frequent variations in policy. At its formation the Communist Party believed with the Communist International that the Revolution begun in Russia in 1917 was still sweeping across the world. Even in April, 1923, the Communist Party issued a manifesto to its members saying:

> We must bring the issue of the struggle for power directly before the masses, not as an ideal ultimate objective, but as the only real practical issue of to-day . . . . The inevitable necessity of the revolutionary struggle and the process of it, the formation of factory and workshop councils, the establishment of Workers' Guards, must be made familiar to all as directly arising out of the present situation.
>
> No compromise.
> On with the struggle to more and yet more strength.
> Unite the whole working class.
> Push forward to the fight for power.

It was not until after the failure of the uprising in Germany in 1923 that the Communist International accepted the situation, and in the December elections of 1923 the party dropped its propaganda for the confiscation of the land and put forward a programme for Labour which went no further than "State control of all land and factories to organize production so as to provide employment for all and produce what is needed—"A Workers' Government and a Workers' Programme."

By 1929 the Communist Party had come to the conclusion that the Labour leaders were "Social Fascists" and it advanced the slogan, "A Revolutionary Workers' Government." It advised the workers to vote 'labour' only when every means of finding an alternative "Left" candidate had been exhausted. After the experience of the Second Labour Government it regarded the Labour Party as having ceased to be an enemy of capitalism; and it was now to be regarded as an enemy of the workers. The campaign for a Revolutionary Workers' Government was renewed, but by 1935 the Communist Party had again decided that it could collaborate with the Labour Party against the National Government. After W. Gallacher had been elected as M.P. for West Fife another application for affiliation to the Labour Party was made. This was refused. So when the war broke out in 1939 the Communist Party declared:

> As in 1914 these Labour Leaders have joined up with the capitalist enemy and have betrayed the cause of the workers and socialism, ... End the political truce. End the industrial truce. End the collaboration of the Labour Party with the Government. Restore the independence of the Labour Party . . . .

When the Soviet Union was forced into the war in June, 1941, the attitude to the Labour Party changed again. It was no longer denounced for collaboration with the conservatives and Mr. Churchill. At its conference in May, 1942, it put on record that

> The Churchill Government is the representative of national unity for the fulfilment of the aims of the British-Soviet Pact, of the United Nations, and victory over Hitler. The weakening of the Churchill Government would mean the weakening of national unity, create doubt and alarm in allied countries, exultation among the fascist enemy, and lead to intrigues for alternative combinations which would open the way to the increased influence of the pro-fascist force.

By 1943 the Communist Party was stating that it sought only to put its point of view "just as other affiliated organizations do." It supported the political truce, the Coalition and wanted to make the Labour Party strong.

These variations of attitude to governments, to Parliamentarianism, the Labour Party and its leaders have been accompanied by changes in estimate of the international situation and policy which have usually reflected changes in the policy of Soviet Russia. In 1920 the Chairman of the Communist International stated:

> The position is ripe for the triumph of socialism. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the order of the day throughout the civilized world . . . . There is no structure as solid as the structure of the Third International, the foundations of which were laid in Moscow in March, 1919. Under the banner of the Third International the working class will triumph throughout the world.

The war of intervention was then still on. The Soviet Government had been refused recognition by all the capitalist governments of the world and was fighting for its existence. The direct appeal to the workers of the world to make revolution and overthrow their capitalists was the means of assisting the Red Army in its fight against the enemies of the Soviets.

When the war of intervention in Russia ceased at the end of 1922 and government after government recognized the Soviet Power the Communist Party took up the call for complete recognition of the Soviet Government by the British Government. But its attitude towards the League of Nations remained hostile until the Soviet Government became a member in 1934. Then it supported the Soviet's programme of international and simultaneous disarmament. It went further than the Soviet Government in that it opposed voting for the armed forces estimates on the grounds that such were for the support of capitalist war. It repudiated the Versailles Treaty, the Locarno Pact, the Kellogg Pact and the Dawes and Young Plans. Its main concern in foreign policy was the defence of the Soviet Union. Every development in international affairs became, to its leaders, a manœuvre for the re-staging of the war of intervention against the Soviets. That there has always been a danger of such a war cannot be questioned but to them it was the over-riding purpose of everything that happened in the relations of nations.

Nevertheless after Hitler came to power in Germany and the socialists declared that it would be necessary to defend capitalist democracy against dictatorship a Communist Party spokesman* declared:

> The slogan of "democracy versus dictatorship" is a direct slogan for the preparation of war. This slogan suits exactly the war preparations of British and French Imperialism, not only in case of need against German imperialism or the attack on Versailles, but still more for the supreme aim of the war on the Soviet Union.

Next the Communist Party itself launched one of the most effective campaigns of its history for the "defence of democracy" in Spain against the Fascist dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini. It denounced the "non-intervention policy" of the National Government and the Labour Party, demanded "arms for the Spanish Republican Government" and organized a section of the famous International Brigade. Hundreds of British communists laid down their lives in this war for "democracy versus dictatorship." This policy also coincided with Soviet Russia's aid to the Republican Government.

The policy of "democracy versus dictatorship" evolved into a general policy of "defence and maintenance of peace by the collective action of France, Britain and the Soviet Union," a vigorous campaign for the defence of Czechoslovakia, and a denunciation of appeasement. The Congress of the Communist Party in 1938 called on the British Labour Party, so long proclaimed as having social fascist leaders and as being in a state of decomposition, to take the lead. "It is the duty of the British Labour Movement to lead the British people and take the initiative of bringing all these sections of the people together . . . ." At the same time it said nothing about the necessity of military preparations, although it continued to urge the National Government to make an alliance with the Soviet Union and France. It concentrated all attention on the danger represented by the Axis powers. As 1939 dawned it tried to keep pace with the writers of *The Communist International* who said that: "The Fascist obscurantists who rule Germany . . . . outvie the most fanatical geniuses for pogrom under Russian Czarism. It has worked brutishness up into a system which makes the terror of the Inquisition seem tame . . . ."

On the failure of the efforts of the Soviet Union to secure an alliance with Britain and France, the consequent signing of the Soviet-German Pact, and the outbreak of war between Britain and Germany, the policy changed again. It was declared to be the waging of war on two fronts—against the Nazis abroad and the National Government at home. Then the war was denounced as an "Imperialist War" and "so far from being an anti-fascist war, is objectively the preliminary stage for the anti-Soviet War . . . . The Soviet-German Agreement of September, 1939, established the Soviet frontiers on an unassailable basis in relation to the principle of national self-determin-

* R. P. Dutt in *Labour Monthly*, July, 1933.

ation while the call for peace to Western Europe placed squarely on the shoulders of British Imperialism the responsibility for continuing the war."*

From September, 1939, to June, 1941, the policy varied from the above call for "peace" to that of repeating the Bolshevik policy of the war of 1914-18, the key to which was "the transformation of imperialist war into civil war" emphasizing that the enemy is the governing class of one's own country. It gave a pacifist cover to this policy by organizing the "People's Convention" with the slogan of "A People's Government for a People's Peace." It would have nothing to do with such questions as "increasing Production" and considered that the way to defeat Hitler was for the working class to defeat the National Government, elect a People's Government which would appeal with its peace programme over the head of Hitler to the German workers.

When in June, 1941, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union it changed its policy again. The war was no longer an imperialist war. Hitlerism once again became the greatest enemy of civilization and for the first time in its history the Communist Party was prepared to support a capitalist government.

(Mr. Murphy was formerly a member of the High Executive of the Communist International, from which he moved the expulsion of Trotsky.)

POST-WAR HOUSING

By Arthur M. Foyle

AT the end of the Great War it was estimated that the national housing shortage amounted to 1,100,000 houses needed at once, plus an additional need of 100,000 houses each year, to clear away the out of date and insanitary property. Even so in the first two years after the war only 30,000 houses were built. The havoc which the war has wrought in the organization of the building industry as a whole, the shortage of materials and above all the great rise in prices led the Government to adopt a policy of subsidies to provide a stimulus for house building. The granting of these subsidies did little to reduce building costs, but it did enable houses to be built for those who otherwise would not have been able to afford them. From 1919-1931 Government subsidies were paid on more than half of the houses erected in Great Britain and on practically all those destined for working-class occupation. A net increase of 1,420,000 houses was achieved.

After 1931 there was a great increase in building activity, mainly through private enterprise. Most of the building was of flats and houses for the use of the middle classes. In the years immediately preceding the present war the volume of this building declined as a result of the turn of the trade cycle and the uncertainty of the international situation, but the activity of local Authorities increased rapidly. Over the whole period 1931-1939 about 2,300,000 houses were built, 40 per cent. more than in the years 1921-1931. It is true then to say that in the ten years before the outbreak of the present war the fight against slums and overcrowding was gradually becoming more intense—due mainly to the efforts of local Authorities and the activities of the Building Societies—while the supply of houses for the middle classes was approximately meeting the demand. There were still however large overcrowded areas and many houses unfit for habitation. Much remained to be done, but there was reason to believe that the housing needs of the population would in time be satisfied provided building activity was not allowed to cease. In September, 1939, all domestic building came to an abrupt end.

It is impossible to make an accurate forecast of the housing needs of the population at the end of this war. A number of houses that are at present war-damaged and uninhabitable will be repaired and put into use again. Large scale evacuation will cease at once, but there are likely to be great numbers of evacuees who will wish to remain in the country. There has been a transference of industry to safer areas and with it the homes of the workers

and this is bound in some measure to be permanent. In addition we may have to face another winter of heavy aerial bombardment. All these factors contribute to the difficulty of determining what will be the nature of the housing situation confronting us, but a recently published estimate by the Ministry of Health suggests that a production of four million houses over a period of ten years would be adequate to satisfy the triple needs of slum clearance, rebuilding of damaged houses and new houses for the increase in the number of family units through marriages. Such a programme means a production of 400,000 houses each year for ten years which however does not include an annual replacement programme of 200,000 houses which will run concurrently. It seems then, that as soon as the war is over a building programme has to be undertaken that will produce about 600,000 houses each year. The problem is at least four times as big as that which faced the building industry at the end of the last war.

How is this great task of reconstruction to be undertaken, under conditions of the utmost urgency and with the means at our disposal? The housing programme will form but one part of the heavy demands on the building industry in the first few post-war years. Schools, hospitals and other buildings will be needed and a large volume of purely repair and redecoration work will be required at once. The usual channels of training and apprenticeship for young men wishing to learn a craft in the building industry are sealed so that a lack of skilled operatives in the immediate post-war years is inevitable, while the switch over to essential building for the war effort has disorganized the nice balance between the various trades which is necessary for the smooth and efficient functioning of the industry as a whole. In addition there will be a substantial rise in building costs. If it is realized that the maximum production of houses in this country was reached in 1936 when 346,000 houses were built, it is evident that an output of 600,000 houses each year is a total which cannot possibly be reached under present conditions. A revolutionary approach to the whole problem is the only way out.

In the immediate post-war situation the factor of speed of erection will certainly—on an annual quota of 600,000 houses—be of paramount importance, and the only method of reaching this quota in a reasonable time is by prefabrication. The principle of prefabrication is not new in the building trade. Metal windows, doors and many items of equipment that go into the modern house are prefabricated units, mass produced away from the site and then incorporated into conventional construction. There is no clear definition of the word "prefabrication," but it is generally taken as applying to the manufacture in the shop or the factory of the component parts of a building which are then delivered to the site and assembled into position. A great proportion of the total work on the building is thus done under cover and the site work is notable for its "dry" rather than "wet" character. The only variable factor need be the foundations, the construction of which will obviously depend on the nature of the site. In America, where prefabrication is

already being tried out on a large scale, most of the systems developed rely on manufacturing large sections of a building, even whole buildings, in the shop and transporting these bodily to the site where they are erected with the aid of specially designed tackle. A method more suitable for this country where supply and demand are not on such a great scale and where industrial resources are considerably smaller is known as "unit construction". In this method the various units—wall panels, window panels and roof trusses for example—are mass produced in the factory. These units are designed to be sufficiently light for handling with the minimum amount of tackle and plant when they are transported to the site. The most successful system of "unit construction" will be the one which makes use of units which can be handled by two men only, which for speed of erection will interlock rather than rely on bolting or welding and in which foundations will be the only "wet" work undertaken. The materials available will also determine the type of system which is evolved.

For some years after the war there will continue to be an acute shortage of timber in this country so that it is likely that British systems of unit construction will choose precast concrete or light metal units for the structural frame. This is in direct contrast to American practice where many of the prefabrication systems rely on a basic structure of timber framed panels. American experience to date shows that the cost of a prefabricated house is probably a little higher than the cost of a similar house constructed by the normal methods. This is to be expected in the early stages of any prefabrication scheme where the initial outlay for equipment, in the factory and on the site, is higher per house than in normal construction. Prefabrication however is essentially allied to mass production and it is certain that due to the great saving in site labour, costs will fall considerably as the output of houses increases.

It is assumed by the opponents of prefabrication that such a standardization of building components will result in dull uniformity, that the variety of house design will be so limited that we shall all be condemned to live in box-like structures which will rival in monotony the appearance of any suburban by-pass. Even if this were true the standard of equipment and general convenience of a prefabricated house, provided it were architect designed, would more than compensate for this—kitchens and bathrooms in the American schemes are ahead of anything that has ever been available at reasonable cost to the general public in this country. Nothing however is farther from the truth. Provided the units are well designed the number of permissible combinations and variations can be legion. Individuality can well express itself in terms of colour and texture, and in skilful grouping to use to good effect the advantages of site and aspect.

Besides the opposition to prefabrication from those who earlier in this century would probably have led the cry against the flat roof, there is bound to be some opposition from the building trade operatives themselves. It

69453

argued that prefabrication spells dilution of labour in the building trade, for the greater the volume of work that is transferred to the factory the less skilled need be the workman employed on the site. This is to some extent true, but against this there are two points to be made. The assembler on the site will not be performing the same action time and time again throughout his whole working day as is the worker in the factory, but be will be performing a definite sequence of similar and related operations. Moreover systems which rely on the use of precast concrete units will need a limited amount of work on the site to make the component parts fit together with a degree of accuracy. For this work some skilled labour will certainly be needed. The other point is that the vast majority of the skilled operatives in the building trade will be engaged on post-war reconstruction work of a permanent nature of which there will be more than enough to go round.

The prefabrication industry is likely to become a specialized and separate branch of the building industry as a whole, for which a new labour force will need to be recruited, drawn partly from craftsmen, partly from the many thousands of people who during the war have had their first taste of handling machines and partly from the pool of young men entering employment for the first time.

It is obviously too early to predict exactly what part prefabrication will play in the post-war building era. That it will play an important part is assured because it is only by resorting to some such system that the required output will be achieved. This is truly the revolutionary approach to house construction which the present situation so urgently demands. Hitherto standardization has been applied only to certain small units such as windows and doors, the mere appendages to a house. Never before has the idea been put forward that the very structure itself could be related by a common system of dimensions, which will allow the minimum of labour and the maximum speed to be used in its assembly. In every branch of our life the influence of the machine has made a permanent impression. We eat mass produced food, wear mass produced clothes, live with mass produced furniture. In every branch of production the machine has come to the aid of the craftsman producing the goods more easily and more cheaply, and giving in the end a more efficient article. The one exception is the building industry which has as yet only been affected by the machine in a random way—the motor car, the triumph of mass-production, is still parked in the mock Tudor garage. The urgent need for houses is now forcing even the building industry to resort to machine production methods as the only way of satisfying an overwhelming demand. In the immediate future prefabrication will be applied mainly to temporary houses which can be "demounted" as soon as permanent housing is ready, but it is reasonable to assume that when the new technique is perfected many of the permanent buildings of the future will be machine produced. The time will come for the house to enter into the category of consumable goods. But the obvious benefits of the new technique will affect the

whole standard of house design in this country only if the fullest co-operation is ensured between the engineer who is responsible for the mechanical perfection of the system and the architect. Never before has the architect had such a responsibility, or such an opportunity, which if handled properly can transform the dull face of our towns into the planned organisms which they should be. A new unity of scale will run through the buildings of the future, a sense of orderliness and restraint which has been all too lacking in this country since the days of Georgian architecture. Prefabrication is potentially a benefit to the community as a whole. Whether it is likely to become so will depend on the number of aesthetically trained minds that appreciate its possibilities and resolve to play a part in its future development.

The history of the steps that the Government has taken to ensure that the solution of the housing problem should be the result of a comprehensive national policy, is one of mixed promise and disappointment. To date three valuable reports on subjects allied to housing and planning have been published. The Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population published its report—better known as the Barlow Report—in January, 1940. Among the recommendations made by the Commission on housing were that national as against local action on replanning is essential and that a central authority with greater powers than those held at that date by any Government department should be established to take action for redeveloping congested urban areas and decentralizing or dispersing industries and populations from those areas. In August, 1942, there appeared the Scott Report on Land Utilization in Rural Areas. This was in many respects an extension of the Barlow Report, but besides drawing attention to the danger of industry invading country districts with no control, suggestions were made for a plan for country housing which envisaged the building of new and compact villages, and for the provision of adequate services and amenities in rural areas. A few weeks later there appeared the Uthwatt Report whose most important recommendation was that the State should purchase the development rights of all undeveloped land outside town areas. In addition recommendations were made in the report for extending the powers of Local Authorities wishing to acquire land, and for simplifying the methods of assessing compensation. Given these recommendations a Central Planning Authority would be in a position to forbid development for housing not in accordance with a national reconstruction plan, while being able to side-step the political and financial opposition implied in the public purchase of all land. All attempts to add beauty and grace to our towns, to get rid of slums and overcrowding, have been baulked by the conflict between private and public interest in the land. The Uthwatt proposals are a bold and competent solution of this problem.

In December, 1942, it was announced that the planning powers of the Ministry of Works and Planning were to be transferred to a new Ministry,

that of Town and Country Planning, and the new Minister, Mr. W. S. Morrison, has recently introduced his Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Bill to the House. The two objects of the Bill are to bring all land in England and Wales under planning control and to strengthen control over development while new planning schemes are being prepared. Local Authorities will now be able to refuse the replacement of an existing building which might prejudice their scheme while the Minister is given the powers to insist that any application for interim development be referred to him for a final decision. The Bill also says that the functions at present exercised by other Ministers may be transferred to the new Minister—"if His Majesty finds it expedient." It is obvious however that a Minister with overriding powers is not to be appointed.

Although practically a year has passed since the Scott and Uthwatt reports were published the Government has not yet declared whether it accepts the recommendations of these bodies, still less whether it is prepared to take action on the lines that they suggest. A Ministry of Town and Country Planning has been set up, but the Minister is only a member of the Committee of Ministers on reconstruction policy. Broadly speaking the new Ministry does little more than take over the planning powers of the Ministry of Health and has no powers to co-ordinate the post-war plans of other Ministries. The ambiguity of the present position was underlined recently by the issue from the Ministry of Health, over the head of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, of a circular to local Authorities urging them to prepare schemes at once for a one year housing programme in order to facilitate a quick start either at once or at the end of the war. It is suggested that future plans should be made using pre-war housing needs as a basis and that sites should be chosen now. The result will undoubtedly be that those Authorities which are on the fringe of areas already densely built up will prepare large housing schemes, while those areas that could suitably accommodate an increase in population are encouraged to do nothing. Planners are agreed that some measure of planned evacuation of people, industry and business from the already swollen town concentrations on the lines of the Barlow Report is essential, but unless the Government housing policy is part of a master plan for reconstruction, the opportunity which the war interval in building offers for the regrouping and redistribution of industrial and housing concentrations will have been irretrievably lost.

Consider for example the plight of a conscientious local Authority who takes seriously the Ministry of Health's recommendation that it should prepare a housing scheme now. Before that scheme could be put into operation consultations would have to be held directly or indirectly with, in addition to the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, the Ministries of Works, Labour, Agriculture and Transport, the Board of Trade and most important of all the Treasury. The recent decision to erect a mere

3,000 cottages for agricultural workers has meant that the Ministry of Town and Country Planning approves the sites on a programme sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture, while the Ministry of Health prepares the plans and the Ministry of Works has a hand in the elevations. The points of view of other Ministries should of course be consulted, but the time has surely come when the Ministry of Town and Country Planning should be given the final decision on a housing project. The new Bill, like previous Town Planning Bills, is negative in character and can only be considered satisfactory if new measures based on the Barlow, Scott and Uthwatt Reports are introduced without delay. The various problems of national planning cannot be tackled piecemeal. Action on the basic questions and the broader issues by a Ministry with overriding powers is essential.

(Mr. Foyle, A.R.I.B.A., is an Associate Member of the Town Planning Institute and of the Institute of Structural Engineers.)

AN IRISH AIRMAN

Wing Commander BRENDAN FINUCANE, D.S.O., D.F.C. and Two Bars.

BY PAMELA HINKSON

"IN the mould of this new profession a new breed of men has been cast," writes Antoine de Saint Exupéry in *Wind, Sand and Stars*. And of the friendship between airmen: "Thus is the earth at once a desert and a paradise, rich in secret hidden gardens, gardens inaccessible, but to which the craft leads us ever back one day or another."

We who walk our old way on the earth that is guarded by these bird-men are shut outside those gardens. We may appear to enter them, being received into a company of which the language can never be ours; we may listen, revere, go away moved and humble. The consciousness of our separation lies heavy on us while our hosts would share their riches, unaware that we cannot accept them because we are not worthy and have not paid the necessary price. Their eyes hold the light seen above clouds, brought back from stars and planets, and we, meeting them, cannot see with them, but are like blind men with only a glimmer telling us of a forever undiscoverable world and of our own blindness.

So—there must be two visions of an airman; one of our company that he has left and one given only to his own comrades. The official communiqués tell us facts that, for all our reverence and sympathy, are beyond our comprehension. Only through an interpreter of his own breed and language can we hope to understand.

The annals of the R.A.F. are starry with Irish names. To hear them spoken in an R.A.F. mess is to realize that so Ireland is seen from this world—a country of gallant and generous young adventurers, flying in the air the flag that earlier generations of Irishmen unfurled on many lands. And in the great company of this new race of men of many nations, one, of whom I am privileged to write, stood out with his own peculiar place, not only of achievement, but of personality.

The official communiqués of 1941 held repeated indications of an at first unnamed Irish airman, described as "an Irish pilot officer attached to an Australian squadron," and so again and again until his identity could not be concealed. That Irish pilot officer was Flying Officer—then Acting Flight Lieutenant—Squadron Leader—and finally Wing Commander Brendan Finucane. Because he was so intensely Irish, his comrades gave him the

national nickname "Paddy," by which the world knew him. But to his own family he was Brendan, as he had been christened with the name of an Irish Saint, who—appropriately—was a famous navigator.

He was born in Dublin in 1920, the eldest of five children (his next brother, aged 20, is a Bomber Command air gunner) and was educated at a Christian Brothers' School where he learned Irish and gained the badge that denotes the proficient Irish speaker. In 1938 the family moved to England where his father is night office manager of an aircraft factory. Brendan, being then too young to join the R.A.F. at once, worked joylessly in an office until May, 1938, when, on the day that he attained the minimum age of 17 years and 6 months, he enrolled in an R.A.F. training course to become a pupil pilot. He went into action in June, 1940, and was one of the "few"—that handful of boys—who fought and won the Battle of Britain which was also the battle of the world.

He was awarded the D.F.C. in May, 1941, the announcement stating that "this officer has shown great keenness in his efforts to engage the enemy and he has destroyed at least five of their aircraft. His courage and enthusiasm have been a source of encouragement to other pilots of the squadron." Soon after he was attached to the first Australian Spitfire Squadron to serve in Britain—this, composed of the pick of the first pilots who had joined in Australia, rose with meteoric speed to become one of the most brilliant combatant units in the history of air warfare. He was picked to teach them by his example and personality as well as by his knowledge and skill and he found worthy pupils. In September, 1941, the announcement of a Bar added to Acting Flight Lieutenant Finucane's D.F.C. stated that: This officer has led his flight with great dash, determination and courage in the face of the enemy . . . . Flight Lieutenant Finucane has been largely responsible for the fine fighting spirit of the unit." The same month he received a second Bar with the record: "This officer has fought with marked success during recent operations over Northern France and has destroyed a further six enemy aircraft. His ability and courage have been reflected in the high standard of morale and fighting spirit of the unit. Flight Lieutenant Finucane has personally destroyed fifteen hostile aircraft." A month later he was awarded the D.S.O. with the announcement that during two sorties on consecutive days he had destroyed five Messerschmitt 109's, bringing his total victories to at least twenty: "He has flown with this squadron since June, 1941, during which time the squadron has destroyed 42 enemy aircraft . . . . The successes achieved are undoubtedly due to this officer's brilliant leadership and example." When, in July, 1942, he fought his last action, he had 32 German aircraft to his credit.

In appearance he was most strikingly Irish, with the face and figure of young Ireland of this time. (Is it a symbol that this boy, who was to die for the United Nations and the world's freedom was born of an Irish-English marriage in Ireland at the height of the Irish Separatist movement, proving

a spiritual union outlasting political changes?) He had black wavy hair—with a suggestion of the wind in it—above a fine wide forehead, a firm, broad jaw, indicating his character, as did the generosity of his mouth; blue eyes, clear pink and white skin. Young, strong, fearless, imaginative—"as clean as a child," a friend described him, and: "when you met Paddy you knew at once that here was a distinguished person."

I recognized the same distinction in his family, in his schoolboy brother and young sisters, and, as their countrywoman, had the clue to that particular quality of distinction—a heritage of the best of Ireland, in which spiritual thoughts and values have been for generations a natural part of everyday life. He had that other Irish heritage, a religious faith that was simply in and of his life and all that was implicit in the air of his home. Of Paddy's religion one of his air comrades said: "You knew that he took a serious view of things." Once, at an outlying station where some Catholic airmen had grown slack with the difficulty of attending Mass, Paddy arrived, ascertained that there was a church in the neighbourhood and quietly led his co-religionists to their religious observances.

His fame makes piquant contrast with his character. "He was silent," one who had served with him, reported, "rather difficult to get to know." He hated the publicity he was given. This Irish Catholic boy, while living, won this remarkable tribute from the local paper of his English home district representing another Christian faith than his own. "With a father a strict teetotaller he has no taste for beer and whisky. As everyone knows now, he is an Irishman and a devout Catholic. All of which may suggest the lines of which our local boys may pattern themselves when setting out. 'Paddy' is a shining example of what our boys may become."

His blood—of an Irish father and an English mother—was a symbol, proving the value of that union. He was at once gay and exceptionally serious, with a gentle voice and manner and exceedingly modest. He tended always to underestimate the number of his victories, reporting only those about which there could be no possible doubt. His immense daring and dash were combined with an un-Irish carefulness of plan and refusal to accept chance. He had worked the technique of flying out to the last detail and, besides his education by example, his brilliant and lucid explanations of the science of fighting made him a wonderful teacher. He declared that he took no risks and they said that any pilot taking unnecessary risks "got it hot from Paddy." And "he was always worrying about the men under him." He was insistent on the first "don't" for young pilots—not to follow a German plane down, when the pursuer would be defenceless if another German came on his tail.

He had phenomenal eyesight, wonderful skill as a shot and a "beautifully efficient mind." They said that he could remember the positions of a dozen planes at once, although these changed in less than a second, and that he seemed to "smell Messerschmitts," but that what really happened was that he

saw them before anyone else could. "If there was any German plane in the sky Paddy would be sure to get it," said one who had flown with him and told me how you would see them first as little specks (like distant birds) and then they'd be in front of Paddy's plane. He was very lucky in spotting things and being in the place where the Germans were at the right time and in battle "he seemd to shoot from all angles and all distances."

He said himself of a fight that "the idea isn't just to get a plane for yourself. You want to see the other fellows get some shooting too." He had the generosity and absence of bitterness of fighting men. When a German plane was brought down near his station he and other pilots visited the wounded German airmen in hospital and he was struck by the fact that, unlike the British system, the German pilot and observer had never flown together before. One of Paddy's pupils said: "He used to make us practise formation a lot."

A happy direction sent Brendan Finucane to serve with the Australians who mourned him when he fell as their personal loss. They found this Irishman "very akin to us," one of them said. In that squadron he formed the close friendship with another famous pilot, Squadron Leader Keith—known as 'Blue'—Truscott and they planned to go together to Australia after the war. There is a Commonwealth significance in Paddy's own account of the friendship.

> He came from Melbourne to England and I came from Dublin to England and in the first moment of our meeting the perfect friendship which will not finish with the war began.

A prophetic speech. Truscott was killed flying off the Australian coast in March, 1943; and it is a gentle symbol that as Finucane's memorial in Richmond is to be a hospital wing, Truscott is to be commemorated in Melbourne by a children's hospital. These two young airmen were consulted by the Australian Minister for External Affairs and their advice acted upon, when Spitfires were sent to Australia to be used against the Japanese. When Finucane was killed, Truscott renamed his plane "Paddy" and swore that any plane that he flew henceforward should bear that name.

"When it came to real stuff he was untouchable and fearless," a flying comrade said of Paddy. From the pilots of the different squadrons with which he served, Australians, Englishmen, Scots, came the same tributes, starkly revealing in their unconscious simplicity. "We thought the world of him." "We would have done anything for him." "We would have followed him anywhere." "His pilots adored him," said a young Scot who had been one of them. And—unanimously: "We had tremendous faith in him."

He came, a Wing Commander of 21, to take over a squadron from an exceptionally good Commander, a famous New Zealander. And "he ruled us with an iron hand without letting us know it. He set the example himself." That report and others, as from his earlier period with the Australians, em-

phasized his immense influence over the young men. A civilian, carrying that report, had spoken of him as "mature". His airman contemporary in age made no explanation, telling facts natural to him. During the period of Paddy's command of that squadron the casualties were light and the results high. "The general discipline was very high," and again the "great faith" in Paddy was mentioned. "He put an offensive spirit into us without making us conscious of it." Flying, he would say by radio telephone: "Don't look now, chaps, but follow me!" and: "You knew something was coming .... Sometimes he was a bit hasty and got us into difficult places and a bit of trouble, but *he always got us out again.*"

He had the feeling for his plane that a rider has for his horse and his Spitfire had always a bright green shamrock, the emblem of Ireland, painted on it. In his brief two years he experienced two entirely different types of fighting. During the Battle of Britain German planes had been plentiful in the British skies. In the following period it was rather a question of going across the Channel to look for the enemy in daily and nightly sweeps. The Germans were often not inclined to fight and Paddy with the Australians who remained "always last in battle," had a habit of staying behind to look for trouble. When they were isolated the Germans used to come down on them and those listening in at home by radio would hear the fight going on. It was by that staying behind that Paddy got and won most of his fights. A picture was made for me of him in the skies, "hacking down Germans," in the R.A.F. language.

His father told me that Brendan had always wanted to fly and recalled him in boyhood experimenting with toy aeroplanes of his own making. His home background first shaped his remarkable character which was to have such influence over men a little younger or older than himself. His devotion to his family and particularly to his mother; the deeply felt and practised religious faith of his home; the fine self-discipline gained in a family of five children, behind whose perfect upbringing lay a splendid choice of industry and self-denial. Many of his comrades had come from care-free lives. He had gone from school to an office. He could be as wildly gay as was expected of his nationality until it was time to go on a job when he would change to absolute seriousness. He would say at dinner, prior to a 'show': "I'd prefer that you didn't drink any more to-night," setting the example himself and his order would be obeyed at once. A little earlier he would have been the leading spirit in some 'rag'.

The civilian mind is amazed by the revelation of the power of command and responsibility of these young Commanders who carry many lives. The "maturity" needs no explanation for one of his own breed, but an older Squadron Leader with the father's feeling, interpreted for me.

> They become old men in wisdom in a year or two, flying.

All that that explanation tells is the more moving, because the mature mind

and character go with a greater outward impression of youth than other men of the same age give.

While Brendan Finucane's fame made headlines—to his distaste—in the British press, the neutrality censorship of his own country forbade public recognition of him in Ireland. But his deeds were recorded although his nationality might not be named in the Irish papers and Ireland talked of him and followed his every adventure. He visited Southern Ireland once on leave and, standing—in civilian clothes—in a queue on Dun Laoghaire pier to board the return boat, had his papers looked at by an Irish policeman, who, seeing his name, saluted him and took him at once out of the queue and passed him through the barrier with royal honours all the way.

Paddy told the airman's own story as no civilian could tell it.

> Before going off on a trip I usually have a funny feeling in my tummy. The brain is working fast and if the enemy is met it seems to work like a clockwork motor. You don't have time to feel anything but your nerves may be on edge—not from fear but from excitement and intensity. I have come back from a sweep to find my shirt and tunic wet through with perspiration. I have been blessed with a pair of good eyes and have learned to shoot straight. The first necessity in combat is to see the other chap before he sees you, or before he gets the tactical advantage of you. The second is to hit him when you fire. You mightn't have a second chance. After a dog-fight your group gets split up and you must get together again or trail on to others. The straggler is easy meat for a bunch of Jerries.

He was engaged to be married but would not marry in war-time because some day going on a sweep he might have the thought then at the back of his mind of how much he wanted to get home that night and that would distract him. He shared the general dislike of low flying and having to beat up ground targets. The office work, involved in his command, he did without pleasure, but thoroughly, before he took to the skies again where he was happiest. He had always a determination not to be taken prisoner—perhaps his racial horror of physical captivity—else perhaps he might have flown landwards, hoping for a later escape, instead of out to sea towards home, when "a million to one chance" German machine-gunshot from the beach near Pointe du Touquet pierced the wing and the radiator of his Spitfire on a day in July, 1942, while he was leading his wing in a large mass attack on enemy targets.

His last hour makes a Greek legend of the air. They had always said that Paddy could not be beaten by the *Luftwaffe* and it was a ground shot that got him—from an unusual single machine-gun post, which, the fighter pilots, flying low over the beach, had not seen until they were almost over it. Paddy did not know that he had been hit until the Canadian Pilot Officer Aikman who was his 'number two' called him up to tell him. He had flown on to attack his target saying to his wing: "Take the right target, chaps. Here we go!" Soon afterwards he said that his engine's temperature was going up and that he was coming out from France and came, flying slowly, without sufficient engine power to gain enough height to bale out. Aikman, flying close to his Wing Commander, could see him in the cockpit, opening his

sliding hood and doing something else—probably releasing his parachute harness. Apparently he tried to make a crash landing on the sea. Aikman told him that he was going to climb so that he would be able to mark his position when he crashed. Paddy called back: "Get as high as possible."

He was clearly unhurt and self-possessed, talking calmly. His Station Commander, listening in, heard the radio telephone conversations of these last minutes of air comradeship. They had got about ten miles from the French coast as if Paddy was trying to put as much distance as possible between himself and the enemy so that he would have a better chance of being picked up by one of his own boats. It was a gambler's chance on a failing engine and it lost. From about ten feet above the sea he crashed and his Spitfire sank at once like a stone. His comrades circled the spot for a long time but he did not come up—they thought that he must have been knocked unconscious as the plane hit the water and they saw nothing but a slowly widening streak of oil. Paddy had talked calmly to the end and his last message, spoken probably as his engine stopped, was: "This is it, chaps!"

(Miss Hinkson is herself the daughter of the Irish poet and novelist, Katherine Tynan).

THE KURSK OFFENSIVE

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

WHEN the German offensive opened there was naturally much speculation and considerable differences of opinion as to its strategic intention. It was obvious that its immediate object was to pinch out the Russian Kursk salient, and to destroy the strong Russian forces within it. But had it in view only this limited object, with the advantages its attainment would bring; or was it intended as the first step in a much more ambitious campaign, aiming at the complete disruption of the offensive power of the Soviet armies, and possibly the capture of Moscow? The degree of success or failure of the offensive will have to be judged by the extent to which its real purpose is accomplished, and it is therefore at this early stage well to form a definite opinion as to the probable scope of German strategy. The Russian High Command must clearly be concerned with, and be prepared to meet, the fullest possible developments of the offensive, but the western Allies are more concerned with the situation which would arise if only its limited objects were achieved.

Personally I find it hard to believe that the offensive has more than the limited object of forestalling Russian offensive plans and of establishing a shorter and more defensible front. The severe defeat or annihilation of the Russian Army in the Kursk salient would of course be a major factor in attaining these objects, and it is possible or even probable that, if they were achieved under circumstances which indicated a serious breakdown of Russian resistance, they would be further exploited. But failing such an improbable occurrence as a complete Russian collapse exploitation would, I think, be confined to such enterprises as would gain time for the consolidation of the defensive front, which the offensive aimed at securing, and more completely disturb Russian plans.

It seems hardly conceivable that Germany has in Russia a more ambitious programme than this; for at the stage the war has reached, with danger threatening in the south and west and with air attack affecting her productive capacity, it would surely be a desperate gamble for her to risk becoming entangled in an offensive which aimed at achieving decisive results—her transport difficulties alone may well be great enough to negative a far-reaching offensive. Admittedly she probably has in Russia armies as strong as those which she had for the offensives of 1941 and 42. But, after all, the offensives of those years ended in disastrous failure and her opponent is now

more experienced and probably in every way stronger, particularly in air power. Moreover, however strong her army may be, numerically and in material, the quality of its human component, for offensive purposes, cannot be as uniformly efficient as formerly; and neither in material nor in man power has it the same backing of reserve resources. The many commitments and wide dispersion of the *Luftwaffe* is perhaps the most cogent reason why an all out offensive is unlikely to be attempted.

Mr. Werth, the war correspondent of the *Sunday Times* in Moscow, is an outspoken advocate of the opposite view; and in a dispatch broadcast by the B.B.C. has scouted the idea that the offensive had a limited objective, and insisted that it is another all out attempt to destroy Russia's military power. Since his views have therefore had exceptionally wide publicity, I should like to discuss some of his arguments with which, as I understood them, I disagree.

His main point was that the Germans would not have employed such great forces and have risked incurring such immensely heavy loss merely to achieve a rectification of the front and to forestall a possible Russian offensive. Essentially he argues that would have been an uneconomic use of force. He considers that the *blitzkrieg* character of the attack and the very high proportion of armour in the attacking armies, was a definite sign of an all out campaign. This view seems to me to be based on the assumption that a forestalling attack must necessarily be a subsidiary operation in which employment of great force would be unjustifiable; and it does not take into consideration the advantages the Germans would gain by a successful forestalling operation or by shortening and strengthening their defensive front. It appears to overlook the ultimate object of a forestalling operation.

My arguments, on the other hand, are based on the belief that Germany's ultimate object is to make her position in Russia comparatively secure in order to be in a position to build up a reserve of sufficient strength, not merely to repel but to defeat decisively any forces which the western Allies succeeded in landing in Europe. If that could be done—and the chances of decisively defeating invasion, given adequate reserves, are to my mind better than the chances of achieving complete victory over Russia—her prospects of obtaining a compromise peace could not fail to be improved. The moral effects of the defeat of allied invasions would be great and the effects of the air offensive, if not reduced, could not be increased to anything like the extent that would be possible if invading forces became firmly established. Briefly the greatest danger of catastrophic defeat threatens Germany from the west and south, rather than from Russia, and to meet it she must aim at having adequate reserves. The time factor is of importance. The danger of invasion, though in a sense immediate, would take a considerable time to develop to an extent that would eliminate all possibility of dealing with it by counter-attack. That interval of time may suffice to enable Germany's position in Russia to be made secure, but it is hardly conceivable that it would suffice to complete the decisive destruction of Russia's war potential. But it is obvious that the

sooner security on the Russian front can be achieved the more favourable Germany's position would be. That, I think, accounts for and justifies the *blitzkrieg* methods she has adopted, and which Mr. Werth takes as indication of her intention of achieving all out results.

The Kursk salient offered exceptional opportunities of rapid success by overwhelming use of armour; except in so far as it was such an obvious objective and so important to the Russians as a springboard for offensive action, that there was little chance of achieving surprise or of finding it lightly defended. For every reason, whether the territorial and immediate object was limited or not, Germany was bound to use the steam hammer she possessed. It gave prospects of achieving rapid results and of inflicting the most destructive effect, on the defending army. That and the probability that Russian reserves would become involved increased the importance of the offensive as a forestalling operation. The terrain was particularly suitable for armoured manœuvre, and obviously the more the battle could be confined to the area the greater the advantages. The difficulty inherent in all *blitzkrieg* armoured operations, of maintaining and defending vulnerable supply lines, would be reduced to a minimum; and the fiercer the battle and the greater the number of troops engaged, the more far-reaching would be the effects of a victory. Provided that the objectives were in fact gained, the maximum employment of armour would essentially be an economic use of force. Economy of force does not mean the use of it sparingly, but to the best advantage.

A remarkable feature of the offensive in its initial stages has been the comparatively small number of normal infantry divisions engaged, with a consequent narrowing of actual fronts of attack. Presumably there are many more in reserve which might be used, either to maintain the impetus of the attack or to widen its front. Certainly many more would be required if there is a question of carrying the offensive to great distances. But the composition of the attacking forces raises the question whether the infantry employed were special storm troop formations. In absorbing the man-power combed out to make good losses, and to provide new formations, has the new material been distributed fairly equally among formations, or has the policy, adopted in the later stages of the last war, of constituting a number of shock divisions been followed; treating the remainder as of inferior class suitable only for a defensive rôle? The expedient has its advantages for definite and limited offensive operations, but it is an indication of weakness and tends to lower the morale of an army as a whole. For operations on a maximum scale it is probably safer to accept as inevitable the watering down of divisions with personnel of inferior quality. The arguments for and against storm troops are many, and in our own army opposition to the principle was at one time very strong. To a limited extent it is now accepted in so far as some men are trained for a particular rôle without attaching the stigma of inferiority to others.

Before what I have written can be published we should have a clearer knowledge of the scope of the German offensive and of its results. My main point, however, is that, should its prospects of success fall far short of what Mr. Werth and others consider its aims, it would be unwise to accept too readily that its objects have not been, or will not be, achieved. German losses, even in the first weeks' fighting, we know have been very heavy, but so also must have been those of the Russians. But German losses have in the main fallen on their armour and, given a degree of success, armoured formations can be reconstituted more rapidly than formations which depend on replacing trained personnel, rather than on the replacement of material. Unless the small number of infantry divisions engaged were of specially selected quality their replacement on a *roulement* system would present few difficulties, and even in their depleted state could be assigned a useful defensive rôle while being re-organized. A limited success might therefore enable Germany within a comparatively short period, to strengthen her central reserve for offensive operations in south or west Europe. If Russia should be forced to disturb her dispositions her capacity for early offensive action might be very seriously affected, all the more because the Kursk salient evidently provided her with a springboard for attack on the Orel salient. The capture of Kursk and the interruption of the Moscow-Rostov railway between Eletz and Valuiki, which a limited German success might effect, would reduce considerably her offensive potentialities. A success limited to the Kursk region might therefore seriously interfere with the co-ordination of an allied two-front offensive—at the worst it might expose the Allies in the west and south to heavy counter-attacks. Failure of Germany to achieve a limited success would of course, in view of the losses she has suffered, leave her in a weakened condition, but in nothing like as serious a predicament as she would be in if she became deeply engaged in an all-out offensive which promised no decisive success.

THE SEA CAMPAIGNS

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

DURING the last few months the prospects of the war at sea have most materially improved in all the three main theatres—the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Pacific: and their interdependence has been made manifest. In the Pacific though we are still a long way from our goal, the situation is very different from what it was this time last year. The allied American and Australian forces on land, at sea and in the air have broken the attack of the Japanese and forced them back upon the defence of those advanced positions which they were able to seize while they had the advantage of an undisputed command of the sea. The naval battles of the Coral Sea and Midway Island were turning points in the campaign and the eviction of the Japanese from Guadalcanal and Papua removed the two imminent threats to Australia. Napoleon's saying, so often referred to by Mahan, that "War is a matter of positions" could hardly receive a greater confirmation than that which is furnished by the events in the Pacific and the Mediterranean in both of which the ejection of the enemy from positions, in the one case in the islands and in the other on the coast of North Africa, has been the essential factor in the attainment of command of the waters, and that command the equally essential factor in the offensive of the land forces. If events in the Mediterranean continue to progress the effect will soon be experienced in the Pacific. Ineffective as the Italian heavy ship forces have been throughout the war, even when they enjoyed the great superiority which they possessed when Italy entered the war, they have nevertheless an influence; for by their presence they have forced us to keep a respectable force of battleships and cruisers away from the Eastern theatre. This is the solace offered to the Italian people for the inactivity of their navy. It has acted as a "containing force" which we were unable entirely to ignore, but in so doing it has lost any capacity for action it ever possessed. Its elimination will set free certain valuable heavy units for service in the Eastern seas, which, joined with the great forces now at the disposal of the United States should have it in their power gravely to prejudice the lines of communication of the scattered Japanese armies in the Pacific. Again, there as in the Mediterranean, position will be the essential requirement; for the ships large and small, surface and aerial, must have bases in the close neighbourhood of the areas they seek to command. That involves a continuance of those combined operations such as General Macarthur had been conducting in the Solomons and the Allies have opened in Sicily.

That attack on Sicily is one of the most remarkable, if indeed not the most

remarkable, oversea operation ever undertaken in the history of war. The boldness of the conception, the immense scale of the forces, the extent of the preparations of material, the world-wide business of making the necessary shipping available and of assembling it with punctuality and secrecy, the skill and organization involved in disposing of that shipping and landing craft in the harbours from which it was to sail, and the seamanship with which those two thousand ships and vessels of all kinds were moved across the sea to the coast where they were to disembark, the achievement of tactical surprise—one of the most difficult things in modern conditions to achieve—and, finally the landing—all of these constitute a masterly performance on the part of the several branches of the allied staffs, operational and administrative. The evidence of long foresight is no less plain and encouraging for the future; for the building of the flotilla of landing craft is a lengthy business and must have been put in hand many a long month ago. When we contrast this with the Dardanelles in 1915 we can see how vast are the strides we have made in our understanding and our performance of the typically British "conjunct operation." So far as it is possible to judge from such accounts as have been received the new implements of warfare in every branch of the Services have been utilized and co-ordinated to the full. There was one thing only for which provision could not be made—the weather. The month and the week might be selected after an examination of meteorological records, but the possibility that the wind would be fickle must remain; and, as we were told in a very admirable broadcast, this actually happened.

Throughout the whole length of the coastline there was no enclosed harbour which could be seized at an early stage and provide security against submarine or torpedo boat attacks. Even though the disembarkation was to be made at a considerable distance from an Italian naval base the possibility that the considerable numbers of all those types of small craft might be used in defence of the country had to be provided for and the necessary measures must have called for a numerous flotilla and skilful dispositions. The obstructions to be expected and overcome range from mines in the deeper waters of approach to stakes and other possible forms of mines in the shallow water and wire entanglements and trenches at the beaches. And if the alarm were sounded in time, the possibility that fast cruisers from the Adriatic base at least might make an attempt to interfere in the disembarkation, unlikely though it might seem from the diffidence these larger vessels have displayed so far, could not be lost sight of.

In the later stages, the fleet has accompanied the army along the coast and provided artillery support with its heavy guns, despite the submarine, mine and aerial dangers. Unquestionably the last of these had been reduced by the heavy air bombardments and the preceding days, but it is singular that so little seems to have been attempted by the enemy submarines. Fantastic claims for sinkings of cruisers, destroyers and transports have been sent out on the air, though no more fantastic than those broadcast about Axis successes in the Pantellaria operations.

Whether in expectation of this offensive against European territory submarines had been withdrawn from the Atlantic to aid in the defence is not, it seems, certain, nor therefore whether this has had any influence in reducing the losses of shipping in the Atlantic. There, beyond doubt, the improvement is most striking and even if some of it should be due to the diversionary influence of the Mediterranean operations it is not they which are principally responsible for the success. It is primarily to the strengthening of the protecting forces at sea that we owe this. We now have larger numbers of escort vessels of improved types, the new type of small aircraft carrier, and the long range bomber. We have had to wait a long time for all these and while we waited the enemy played havoc with our shipping. He enjoyed every advantage. He had developed the means of attack faster than we developed the means of defence and so fulfilled the first requirement of strategy—that of appearing on the scene of action with forces superior to those opposing him. It is hardly to be denied that we were slow in this matter, even though we had to suffer from the blindness of those, who reduced our cruiser and flotilla forces with such insane recklessness during the years preceding the war. Sir Arthur Salter, in the debate in the Commons on July 14, told the House that there had been two periods in which the shipping situation was so serious as to threaten the whole course of the war: the period of the spring of 1941, when our imports had fallen to half the pre-war rate, when we were losing several times as much tonnage as we were building, when our stocks were dangerously low and falling rapidly and there was a grave danger of famine and, from want of the raw materials, of having to shut down factories producing the weapons of the fighting services. We came through that, thanks to help from the United States, but only to be confronted by another grave situation when Japan entered the war and the United States were losing more than they were producing. We have surmounted these dangers for the present and hold the initiative and the upper hand. We must now expect our resourceful enemy to devise either new instruments or scientific apparatus, a new strategy or new tactics to offset his present disabilities and to launch a new offensive. For that we must be prepared, increasing and improving our own material so as to forestall him.

It is most sincerely to be hoped that all these events, in the Pacific, in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic, will have brought home to the people of this country and of the Dominions and Colonies the dependence of all their communities upon sea power, the power which enables us to move our armies and our trade across the sea. It has taken us nearly four years to produce the forces needed at sea to hold what remains to us; we still have much to recover in territory and much we never can recover in ships, cargoes and lives. "Keep the command of the sea as you value your national life. Without it you will soon be blotted out from the list of great nations." So wrote Admiral Colomb many years ago. It is still true.

SLOGANS AND DEMOCRACY

By Sir J. A. R. Marriott

IN all forms of government some dangers are inherent; to particular forms some evidently are peculiar. Of the dangers peculiar to Democracy perhaps the most insidious is reliance upon slogans in place of argument. The habit is attributable partly to ignorance and partly to arrogance. In a State where the franchise is practically co-extensive with the adult population, many of the electors upon whom rests the ultimate responsibility for all political decisions are too fully occupied with earning their living, and too prone to use their scant leisure (and small blame to them) for any purpose except amusement, to go to the roots of an argument. They are content to take both information and argument from the headlines of the newspaper of their choice. To this rule there are, it is true, certain exceptions. Look over the shoulders of your neighbours in the tube or the 'bus and you will see the male studying (in the morning) the "odds", and in the evening the results, of the day's racing. The female (even more exclusively) concentrates upon "fashionable intelligence", or the illustrated advertisements of shops which specialize in costumes for women. These folk have neither time nor inclination for political discussion. This is more particularly true of urban electorates. In the villages there is more political discussion carried on in the village "pub". For this rostrum the towns provide no substitute. A certain proportion of men belong to so-called "political" clubs, and argument on political affairs may sometimes wax hot as the men consume their mugs of beer; but the discussion of personalities is, generally speaking, more to their liking than the more laborious effort to think out the implications of any legislative proposal or the line of policy adopted by the executive government. And the fault, be it frankly confessed, lies in great measure with the politicians. Read in the local newspaper the reports of speeches addressed at week-ends by members to their constituents. Too often the politician is prone to offer them slogans instead of serious argument, being well aware that the repetition of familiar catchwords is more apt than anything more difficult and informative to evoke the cheers which sustain him in his oratorical efforts. Some members, realizing this difficulty, have formed the habit of writing a weekly article or letter which can be pondered at leisure by those of their constituents who give thought to such matters. But how many members, I wonder, pursue this valuable method of maintaining contact with the electors who send them to Westminster?

To descend from the general to the particular. A slogan may perhaps be

defined as an argument or a policy abbreviated into a phrase. Examples of such phrases shall be given presently. But a slogan may consist of a single word. Take the word "democracy" or "democratic" itself, and consider the pitfalls into which the use of the word may lead the unwary. In the hands of a multitude of people it is quite sufficient to condemn any instruction or proposal to describe it as "undemocratic." But how many people realize that the word means something very different according to the democracy in which it is used? Could anything be more undemocratic in the eyes or mouth of the average Englishman than that the government—or more precisely the executive—should not be dependent upon and responsible to the legislature which he has a hand in electing? But to insist upon this essential characteristic of the English Constitution is to identify Democracy with parliamentary government.

There are, in truth, democracies and democracies. An American citizen might well deny that England can be properly described as a Democracy because the head of the executive sphere of government—the Prime Minister—is not directly elected by the people. An erudite American might learn with surprise that, under some circumstances, the Prime Minister may actually be selected (as in theory he invariably is) by an hereditary monarch. What a commentary upon "Democracy" that Queen Victoria, near the close of the nineteenth century, should have been permitted, without any risk of a revolution, to nominate as Prime Minister Lord Rosebery, in preference to Sir William Harcourt, the leader of the Liberal majority in the House of Commons; or to Lord Spencer who, had the outgoing Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone, been consulted by the Sovereign, would have been recommended for the office! Or to take a more recent case. As late as 1923 King George V—a much less autocratic sovereign than Queen Victoria—nominated as Prime Minister Mr. Baldwin, in preference to Lord Curzon of Kedleston, admittedly his superior in ability and experience. It is true that King George is reputed to have acted on advice given to him by Mr. Balfour, the most experienced of the elder statesmen then available; but the choice was the King's and his alone the responsibility for making it.

Take a case from another State which claims to be the only "true democracy" in the modern world. A citizen of Switzerland might well deny to England the character of a "true" Democracy because the British Parliament can make any law without consulting the electorate, and indeed, in defiance (theoretically) of its wishes. That is merely to affirm, in technical language, that it is the legislative and not the electorate which is "sovereign." To a Swiss publicist this is simply outrageous, a denial of the fundamental basis of Democracy. In fact, of course, it merely points to the essential differentia between "direct" and "indirect" or representative Democracy. The "Referendum" and the "Initiative" are admittedly the appropriate, and indeed indispensable, adjuncts of "direct democracy," and perhaps the more indispensable if the State in question happens to be federal

and not unitary. Yet what Englishman would not deeply resent the imputation that because the Referendum and the Initiative had not been introduced into the constitution of his own country the English constitution must for that reason be described or denounced as "undemocratic"?

Take another single word in which ambiguity lurks. To an American citizen the word "constitutional" means something not merely arguable but precise. It means that the validity of a given statute passed by the legislature can be questioned by any aggrieved citizen and that, if declared by the Supreme Court to have been enacted in contravention of the limitations imposed upon Congress by the Constitution, it cannot be enforced. An Englishman accustomed to the unfettered competence of a "sovereign" legislature may be inclined to ask whether the function thus assigned to, and exercised by, the judicial organ is in truth compatible with the idea of democracy. And, as a matter of fact, the action of the Supreme Court in regard to certain items of President Roosevelt's New Deal did create such an awkward situation that the President seriously considered whether he would not be constrained to ask Congress to initiate an amendment of the Constitution. But to carry through a constitutional amendment involves a difficult, uncertain and prolonged procedure. What the British Parliament can do in forty-eight hours requires in the United States the assent of no fewer than thirty-six separate legislatures. Consequently the President, unwilling to face the uncertainty and delay involved in that procedure preferred to exercise his Constitutional power of swamping the Supreme Court. By that means he removed the obstruction which the Court had imposed upon his policy, and attained the desired objective.

For an Englishman it is difficult even to imagine that such a situation could under any circumstances arise. The most that the highest judicial tribunal can do is to interpret an Act of Parliament. It did that in the famous Taff Vale case, and (again effecting a limitation of the powers of the Trades Unions) in the Osborne case. In both cases the legislature was moved to intervene and did in fact confer upon (or as the Trades Unions contended *restore to*) the Unions powers which they believed themselves to possess already, which they had certainly exercised, but which the Judiciary declared that Parliament had not, in fact, conferred upon them. But that is the limit of the competence of the English Courts of Law. Even the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords—the highest tribunal in the land—cannot declare that it was beyond the competence of Parliament to enact a particular statute, and that any action taken thereunder was illegal.

It is always, of course, open to hostile critics of the executive or the legislature to say that the Government or Parliament, as the case may be, was acting *unconstitutionally*. But at the highest such an assertion means no more than that the particular action was taken, or the statute passed, in contravention of a constitutional convention; at the lowest it means no more than that the individual critic was opposed to the policy of the party in power.

Old people with retentive memories will recall that Mr. Gladstone denounced as grossly "unconstitutional" the action of Mr. Disraeli, during the Near Eastern crisis of 1877, in ordering a body of Indian troops to proceed to Malta. All that Mr. Gladstone meant was that Disraeli's action was opposed to the spirit of the British Constitution. Lord Selborne, who had been Lord Chancellor in Gladstone's previous ministry went further (if I rightly remember) and declared that Disraeli's action was illegal. That was clearly a matter which might have been (but was not) tested in the Courts. Gladstone's imputation could not have been.

More commonly, however, a "slogan" consists not of a single word but of a phrase which serves to embody or consecrate an argument. Take a phrase which was on everybody's lips during and after the days of the Peace Conference of Paris. Mr. Wilson was insistent that the Treaty should be based upon the principle of "self-determination". That sounded very reasonable. The phrase was seized upon by the Poles to justify the re-creation of a Poland which should obliterate the effects of the partitions of 1772, 1793 and 1795; by Indian nationalists to justify "Home Rule" for India; by the Irish to substantiate their claim to Home Rule or independence for Ireland. Who stopped to consider the implications involved in the concession of those claims? Who thought that the claims of the Congress Party in India, if valid, might equally justify the claims of the Indian Moslems for *Pakistan*? And if the principle of "self-determination" afforded sufficient ground for the concession of independence to Ireland, how was the application of the principle to be resisted when urged on behalf of Ulster? So stout a Liberal as Dr. A. D. Lindsay, the Master of Balliol, has a passage in his recently published book *The Modern Democratic State* (p. 162) which is peculiarly pertinent to the point I am trying to make. "I remember listening," he says, "in the spring of 1921 to a discourse by the poet and co-operator Æ on the 'Soul of Ireland.' It was a long and eloquent discourse, but it made me say: 'That may be the soul of Ireland, but it is certainly not the soul of Belfast.' To which Æ replied: 'No, but there are strong economic and geographical reasons why the six counties should belong to Ireland. No one was allowed to say that there were strong economic and geographical reasons why Ireland should be united with Britain. The nationalist sauce for the goose of Eire was not to be sauce for the gander of Northern Ireland, and the economic and geographical sauce for the goose of Ireland was not to be sauce for the gander of the United Kingdom.'" Precisely: there we have the pith of the whole matter; nor could any better illustration be suggested of the political danger involved in substituting a slogan for an argument. Incidentally, Dr. Lindsay also illustrates it by reference to the position of the Italians in Switzerland, and of the Italian cities on the eastern shore of the Adriatic; to the position of the German towns "strung along the shores of the Baltic—islands in a Slav country"; to the position of the Czechs, the Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Poles in the old Habsburg Empire; of Austria itself in Germany.

But to discuss these highly pertinent illustrations in detail would carry me beyond the limits of this article.

Take another slogan: "Collective Security." What security did the constitution of the League of Nations afford to the peace of the world? In what sense could it be accurately described as "collective"? Was there a single member of the League of Nations whose country would have co-operated with Great Britain had the League decided to oppose Japan's seizure of Manchuria? Would any government have joined the Government of England in using force to prevent Italy's aggression upon Abyssinia if the League of Nations had decided to take action in accordance with Article XVI of the Covenant? Yet who can forget with what wearisome iteration we heard the slogan "Collective Security" uttered particularly by members of the Labour Party, and, indeed, by all the good people who, while exhorting the Baldwin Government to resist the aggressors, were equally insistent upon disarmament even if it were unilateral, thus depriving us of the only means by the employment of which effective action could have been taken.

Again from half the pulpits in the land we hear denunciations of the un-Christian operation of "the profit motive in industry." Incidentally, it may cause some surprise that besides the punctual performance of their spiritual duties so many ministers, both of the Established and Free churches, should have found time to master the intricacies of economic science or what Bagehot renamed the "Art of Business." But let that pass. With a confidence which nothing less than mastery of that science or art could justify, these ministers of religion, from the highest to the humblest, unitedly proclaim the wickedness of the "profit motive". But the question inevitably suggests itself whether, after all, the phrase, now so familiar, represents the result of careful study and enquiry, or is merely the repetition of a slogan. The best exposition known to me of the theory of profits makes it clear that "profits" are akin to "rent"; that just as economic rent represents the difference between the best and worst land under cultivation for a given market at a given time, so profits represent the difference between the best and the poorest brains employed in a given industry. Consequently, "profits" are neither a deduction from wages nor an addition to price. And practical experience of different business concerns confirms the teaching of theory. Every business man is acquainted with cases where two firms working under precisely similar conditions at the same industry show very different results in respect of profits. The firm that makes high profits pays at least as good wages as the firm that makes little or no profit, and sells its products at least as cheaply. Profits, then, are clearly the result of good management; in fine they represent the reward of brains applied to industry. Is it true that the "no profits" concern is (as the cant phrase runs) "producing for use" while the more profitable business is "producing for profits"? Would it in any way whatever benefit the consumer if all producers were reduced to the level of the "no profits" concerns?

It is, of course, true and admittedly deplorable that there are some unscrupulous employers who make big profits by sweating their employees, or by foisting on the public goods of specious appearance but inferior quality. Obviously it would be to the public advantage if such employers could be entirely eliminated. And, in fact, the way of such malefactors generally ends in more or less speedy disaster. Honesty does "pay": and in the vast majority of cases it is the "good employer" and the faithful servant of the public who accumulates the large fortune which is the legitimate reward of superior competence, and in no degree penalizes the consumer. That everyone who engages in productive or distributive industry does so in the hope of "making a profit" is, of course, true; but that this can be so grotesquely misrepresented as an infraction of Christian virtue passes the wit of plain men to understand. The least uncharitable explanation is that our episcopal and other clerical monitors have lacked the leisure to master the elements of economic science.

Even more immediately mischievous was the demand for the "opening of a second front in Europe." There are still millions of electors who imagine that they are as competent to pronounce upon a highly technical aspect of strategical science, as are others to pronounce, with similar lack of equipment, on questions which are primarily (but not exclusively) economic. In this same way the question of a "second front" had unquestionably its political as well as its strategical aspect. And nothing could fairly be said against the expression of opinions based upon an adequate knowledge of the *political* aspects of the problem. But how many among the crowds who vociferated in Trafalgar Square or Hyde Park about a "second front did in fact possess the equipment essential for forming a judgment upon such a question? For them it was enough to have the voice necessary to repeat a slogan, though they may have neither the leisure to study, nor the brains to apprehend, the arguments for or against a policy they so confidently and so carelessly endorse.

* * * * *

A final word of caution may be desirable if not indispensable. To point out that the parrot-like repetition of slogans is one of the most insidious temptations to which democracy is prone, is not, of course, to decry or undervalue that particular form of government. I share to the full Edmund Burke's noble tribute to the excellence of the Constitution which in the course of centuries has been gradually evolved by the British people in the homeland and wisely adopted by the sister-lands overseas. I have hardly less admiration for the somewhat different forms of Democracy accepted by the peoples of the Helvetic Confederation and the United States of America. But appreciation of the admirable qualities of a friend need not blind us to the temptations to which his character renders him liable: nor should it make us hesitate to utter a friendly warning against indulgence in a particular vice. That is the sole purpose of this article.

LOTUS

By Stephen Haggard

RELUCTANT-FINGERED the priest-sun
Relinquishes the lily-pond,
Surrenders love that was begun
In the white flower fond.

Now spills she from her waxen cup
The dew that their communion fed,
Now yields the holy novice up
Her ritual maidenhead.

And closes from his long caress
To dream in loverhood with death,
To immolate her loveliness
In the dark root beneath.

Seeks now the sun his celibate bed,
Accepts night's ceremonial stole;
Bows Nenuphar her sacred head,
Folds her bright aureole.

WHY WE NEED A NATIONAL THEATRE

By Hamilton Fyfe

ONE of the most puzzling things about the British, foreigners have said to me, is their refusal to take the theatre seriously.

They possess an unrivalled dramatic literature. Many of them are fond of "going to the theatre." They have had—they still have—accomplished actors and actresses, with here and there one capable of rising to heights of passion, stirring pity and terror, while many exert skill and fascination in lighter vein. Yet most of the British will not allow the theatre to be anything more than entertainment for an idle hour. They do not ask to see the famous plays of the past. They have steadily declined to admit that a National Theatre is as much needed for the cultural life of a nation as a National Gallery or a National Museum. They raise little objection to towns supporting orchestras, but the idea of a Municipal Play-house they wave impatiently aside.

Forty-three years ago I had an article in these pages urging that a National Theatre was desirable. That brought me into touch with William Archer and I was asked to join the committee he formed with Mr. Granville-Barker and Professor Gilbert Murray to draw up a scheme. Later, when Sir Carl Meyer put down £50,000 for a Shakespeare Memorial, I became a member of the National Theatre Executive, to which I still belong. So I can claim to have followed closely all that has been attempted, and I think it says much for my resilience of temperament that at 73 I am as keen as ever on getting something done.

The British take a long time to make changes; they distrust new ideas as warily as ever. Not that this is exactly a new idea. It is sixty years since Mathew Arnold urged "Organize the theatre! The theatre is irresistible!" So far the British public has managed to resist it successfully—at any rate, to resist the idea of organizing it. Nevertheless that idea has gradually become more familiar and therefore to some people less absurd, to others less alarming. And this process has, against all expectation, been quickened by the war. At first the feeling of almost all who had worked for it was that no progress could be looked for until peace came. But there has been since 1939 marked progress. C.E.M.A., the Council for the Encouragement of Music and Art, is itself an advance, which can be developed. Local repertory theatres in many places—unexpected places, some of them, like Amersham, Windsor and Llandrindod Wells—have been doing well. Professional companies are going about the country presenting plays to war workers. It may

be war will give us an organized theatre, as it gave us Daylight Saving and whole-meal bread, neither of which we should ever have got otherwise.

For now a great many young men and women are realizing that there is an interest, a delight, in acted drama, which the cinema can hardly ever convey. Few of these young men and women have been in a theatre, though they go constantly to "the pictures." For this speculators in theatre management are largely to blame. They have made little effort to meet the competition of the cinema. Three hours' varied amusement with a comfortable seat for a small price are naturally preferred to paying more for a hard seat, or one that cramps your legs, with one feature only, occupying probably less than two hours when intervals are allowed for. In the cinema, if you do not care for one item, there are others. In the theatre the single play is all you get; if it doesn't please, you feel you have wasted your money.

Compare the usual offering of the provincial manager with the usual kind of "picture"; it is far too often inferior in vigour, in rapid grip, in broad human tones, in plot interest and clear-cut character. Playwrights seem to have been paralysed by the immense vogue of the film. Instead of challenging it on its own ground, which is drama stripped to essentials, they withdraw to a small intimate coterie-world where nothing happens but talk. Few of these conversation-pieces have much success out of London. They are certainly not of a kind to attract new playgoers.

Yet I know that a more solid drama, more stirring, more closely related to life as they know it, is being presented to hundreds of thousands of spectators who have never before seen a play acted, they find there is a fascination in watching men and women act such as the cinema can very rarely offer. Have you noticed how hard it is to recall films? Some leave in the memory a scene or two, a particular figure perhaps—Emil Jannings for instance looking in from the snow at his family enjoying their Christmas Eve without him, or Bette Davis cold and contemptuous amid family ruin, or Leslie Howard humorously wistful in *The Petrified Forest*. But for the most part films leave no lasting impression. Why this difference between screen drama and living drama, which has so powerful an effect on our senses and minds? The reason is that mechanical performances seldom produce any emotional effect. I do not say there is no good acting to be enjoyed on the screen. There is a great deal, but everyone, I think, who knows both will agree that it is somehow different from acting on the stage. How could it be otherwise, given the conditions in which screen plays are put together? They are never, to begin with, acted straight through. They are made in bits and pieces. I have watched scenes that ought to have been tense with emotion gone through over and over again until the performers, who began by putting life into their parts, became jaded and irritable. When at last the picture is taken, it shows them going through the requisite motions and doing so in a highly accomplished way, but without the deeply-charged feeling for which the scene calls.

The methods and standards of the film studio are entirely at variance with those of the stage. Pinero told me how he found this out. He saw a young actress in a film of one of his plays and was immensely pleased with her. She was engaged to play the part with a company on tour. To his astonishment and annoyance he found she could not act at all. Her expressions and movements (it was before the talkies came in) had all been slavishly copied from the producer's instructions. Some producers, D. W. Griffith for one, have said they would rather have dummies of that sort than experienced actors and actresses. The actors and actresses know this and feel it. I never heard one of them say they enjoyed filming. Usually they tell you they hate it. They are conscious of being in a strange, disagreeable element, quite different from the theatre and preventive of the effects they are in the habit of producing.

The difference and prevention become plain when we compare theatre with cinema audiences. Playgoers are moved easily, thrilled, harrowed, held in suspense. They applaud heroes—or used to when there were heroes; they hiss villains. I am acutely sensitive to emotion in the theatre. I cannot remember to have been deeply moved by any film except *Potemkin*, which filled me with wild rage when the bovine, brutal soldiers shot down the crowd on the steps, and *Kameradschaft*, which showed so beautifully how natural human relations might wipe out hatred, malice and war. Nor have I seen others visibly moved, except to laughter, by screen acting. That is why the cinema has remained merely an entertainment: has not become an art: probably never will. For Art must stir emotion and this is almost entirely beyond the possibilities of mechanism. It is by its emotional appeal that the acted drama endears itself to the regular playgoer and contributes something of value, not only to knowledge of human nature, but to the building of character.

To expect that mechanically produced acting can do this is as silly as it would be to substitute for the paintings in the National, the Tate and other galleries photographs of famous people or people of striking appearance; photographic studies of landscape; camera reproductions of figures grouped for such scenes as the Surrender of Breda or Christ in the Carpenter's Shop. To imagine that these could have the same effect as pictures painted by men who themselves experienced the emotions aroused by their subjects and so were able to pass on those emotions to us, would be scouted by everyone as foolish ignorance. No photograph could give us the feeling we get from Moroni's Tailor or John's Herbert Barker; which is conveyed by Whistler's Battersea Bridge or Hobbema's Avenue; which floods our senses when we look at the work of Italian primitives or the early Millais I have just named. Those feelings are artistic, due to art, not to be commanded by any kind of mechanism, no matter how marvellously ingenious it may be. The personality of the painter works on us, makes us see what he saw, awakes in us the emotions he went through.

The same distinction as that which I have drawn between photographs and works of art exists also between the acted and the mechanical drama. This is one of the strongest pleas in our case for a National Theatre. We need organized drama now more than ever we needed it before. The living theatre has been almost banished by the sudden and violent irruption of cinemas. Commercially this was managed with a skill and enterprise which extort admiration. But its effect has been to narrow lamentably the field of art. Not only to diminish the number of playgoers and leave many towns, some cities even, without a theatre, but to affect also the writing of plays. What dramatists now mostly ask themselves is: Will this be bought for a film? Most novels too, by the way, seem to be written with one eye on Hollywood. This means that the commercial element ousts the artistic. Works of fiction are now seldom criticisms of life; or studies of human nature faced by problems, obstacles, temptations; or descriptions of people and scenes familiar to the writer. They are most of them designed to reach the lowest common denominator of taste and intelligence and thus bring in a profit as large as possible. They have been mechanized like screen acting. They have become part of the machine.

If you look on the theatre merely as a place of entertainment, you will ask: "What of it? Why all this fuss? How can it matter?" I don't say that will necessarily be your attitude. Many who go to plays for amusement only will admit they get pleasure from the acting of them quite distinct from and as a rule superior to that which films can give. Even a musical piece of the "revue" order has a vitality on the stage which is lacking on the screen. But suppose you do put to me those interrogatories, I have replies to them which I submit establish beyond cavil the need for a National Theatre and for community theatres in all centres of population.

No one, I believe, will challenge my assertion that the emotional quality of drama cannot be transmitted, save in a very limited degree, by the cinema. Will anyone contradict me if I say that development and training of the emotions are a necessary part of education, that fully civilized human beings cannot be shaped without this, and that it ought therefore to be begun in childhood and continued all through life? I wrote in my article 43 years ago: "There never was a time when a make-weight of the ideal and the poetic was more needed to set off against the material and the sordid in our daily lives." Since then the sordid and material have painfully spread their dehumanizing slime over larger areas of human existence, have deformed more and more characters, have had disastrous influence on nearly all nations. We required the emotional refreshment and discipline of drama in 1900. We need it still more to-day. If all of us, Germans especially, had avoided the consequences of education aimed at intellectual sharpness rather than at cultivating the best qualities of heart and mind, we might have been saved two world wars. Lacking such cultivation, we allowed bad counsellors to persuade us that we were not "our brothers' keepers," that generosity to the

weak was "midsummer madness," that selfishness in the international sphere was more materially profitable than standing up to bullies for the protection of the defenceless.

I am not putting forward the ridiculous notion that organizing the theatre would have the immediate effect of making us completely civilized. The Germans had it organized, the French too. But they did it on wrong lines. In both those countries drama developed mainly along the intellectual path. The great cultural value of British drama is that it has not been a product of the mind, like that of Goethe and Schiller, of Molière and Racine. Shakespeare's universal appeal is due to his being entirely unintellectual. All our outstanding playwrights, except those of Restoration comedy, have been more concerned to touch the hearts than to stimulate the minds of their audiences. They have packed their plays, not with types or mouthpieces, but with men and women. Marlowe's *Faustus* is infinitely more human than Goethe's *Faust*, though nothing like so philosophical. No French or German dramatists have created characters with the magnificent fecundity of Shakespeare, Sheridan or Shaw. Both Dumas *fils* and Galsworthy were satirists, but while Dumas' theses are more speculative, more closely reasoned, and therefore more intellectually interesting, *The Silver Box*, *Loyalties* and *Strife* leave impressions on our sensibilities; they have an influence which may help to mould our lives.

In fullest measure the plays of Shakespeare do this. We remember that "the quality of mercy is not strained." We bear in mind the danger of "a little brief authority." We know the highest seats are the most uneasy and insecure. We are warned against "vaulting ambition." Many who have disregarded preachments against drunkenness have been saved from it by the power of "Oh, that men, should put an enemy in their mouths to take away their brains!" The value of great drama in education is generally admitted. Therefore it is a necessity of our cultural life that we should include drama among its regular, indispensable features. All who care for the theatre as something more than a place of light amusement agree that this cannot be done by leaving the provision of acted plays to theatrical speculators whose only aim is quick profit. It must be taken in hand by the community. That is why we need more than ever a National Theatre to keep up a high standard; to encourage cities, towns, even maybe villages, to do for localities what it will be doing for the nation; and to show the masses that Drama as an art ranking with the others is as well entitled to recognition by the State. Here lies the only hope of saving drama from perishing as an art and as a means to strengthen civilization.

In the 43 years since I wrote the article I have recalled the National Theatre idea has gained a lot of ground. It has been taken more and more seriously as the theatre became more and more completely commercialized. Little, however, has been actually done. Lately there occurred an event which shows that the movement towards an organized theatre has gathered force.

Hungry sparrows are thankful for crumbs. Old-timers like Mr. Shaw and Sir John Martin Harvey, Mr. Robin Littlewood and Sir Archie Flower and I, who have been starved so long, felt gratitude for even so slight an advance towards fulfilment of our desires as the "nationalizing" of an old theatre at Bristol. Perhaps too much was made of this. But the action taken by C.E.M.A. to save and run it as a people's playhouse, which eventually will become citizens' property, was worth creating a little stir about, and that stir has made the public more familiar with the view that Drama is an art worth encouraging.

To include Parliamentary acknowledgment of this among the many plans for a New Britain after the war makes some people laugh; others regretfully shake their heads. But "those that don't ask don't want." In the replanning of the capital there can easily be found a place for a National or a London Municipal Theatre if the will—and the money—are there. Any number of possible sites will offer themselves, far better sites than the two which have been purchased and held for a time by the National Theatre Committee during the past thirty years. The first of these in Gower-street was lent for huts during the 1914 war and then sold. The other at South Kensington opposite the Museum was not an easy piece of ground to build on, but a theatre was planned by famous architects both dignified in appearance and conveniently arranged on both sides of the curtain.

Whether this plan will be used is by no means certain. Indeed, I can go further and call it unlikely. If the ground is required by a public authority for road widening, a new site will have to be looked for. Several London Councillors are hoping it may be found on the new Thames Embankment stretching from the L.C.C. Hall to Waterloo Bridge. It is important this new feature of London should start off well; it must not be developed in the piece-meal hugger-mugger fashion of Aldwych and Kingsway. A Concert Hall to take the place of Queen's and a fine theatre with two stages, one for big productions, the other for intimate comedy, would make a good beginning; and the interest the Council might take in drama and music would be of high value. All this is as yet a dream and imagining of a few county councillors and others. Still it points the way.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

IN this hurly-burly among great powers it is not easy to keep in mind the fate and needs of smaller nations; yet above all, we should never forget Poland. No nation has suffered more, none has faced suffering with more gallantry; and now, on the top of all, comes a blind stroke of fate, depriving them of their leader. We have only to think what it would have meant to us, had the same stroke fallen on Mr. Churchill. Sympathetic understanding is the least that we can offer; we, like all Europe, owe a huge debt to the Poles. Anyone who is willing to be reminded of this may spend hours over one of the most remarkable biographies ever written—the Life of Madame Curie, by her daughter Eve Curie. Written in French, there is an English version, published by Heinemann; and this contains many photographs of which the French edition has none. I do not propose to review here what no doubt was noticed when the book appeared four years ago; but I stress my feeling that nothing could make us understand and feel more clearly what Poland means to the Poles. Madame Curie, then a student in Paris, very nearly refused to marry the brilliant young professor, Pierre Curie, because his life was tied to France, and a tremendous home-sickness pressed her to get back to her own country and clan. Had she yielded to this emotion, would radium ever have been discovered? Eve Curie makes us feel that in this extraordinary marriage of true minds it was the woman who pressed on for what seemed fantastic and impossible. And certainly after a chance of road-traffic had scattered Pierre Curie's brain over the pavement, it was the surviving worker who diffused radio-activity through the world. Her daughter makes us feel that in those long years the woman's life became concentrated almost unnaturally on her laboratory, so that in a sense she even withdrew herself from her two children. But never at any time did she forget Poland; still less, her clan. All the part of this book which deals with her life and her family before she went to Paris has for the first time made me feel almost as if I had lived in Poland, and known not only the charm of these folk but the oppression under which they existed.

Our debt to Poland

What a story—and what a woman! Only a race of rare quality could have produced such a blend of quixotic nobility and intense practical gifts. Such a race deserves to be guarded by Europe as a chief treasure; and because of its geographical position needs guarding. The best way towards this is to fall in love with the Poles; and whoever reads this book will be on the way to that consummation.

* * * * *

A book on *The Quakers* (published by Andrew Dakers at 10s. 6d.) has a true relevance in wartime, not only, nor chiefly, because its author is a German refugee. Mr. Otto Zarek, reviewing the history of the sect which George Fox founded, makes it plain that while discharging all the other duties of citizenship loyally and successfully, Quakers have from the first refused to join in making war.

The "Inner Voice"

Sooner than refrain from testifying against it, they have suffered insult, torture, and death itself. Their right to maintain this principle had in England been unchallenged for a century, when sudden emergency forced on us in 1916 the extreme measure of conscription; and again the Quaker resistance was renewed and extreme penalties imposed. The result was seen in the present war when, under even greater menace, it was provided that objection to war on religious grounds might excuse an individual. The Quakers had won—not for the first time by many. Mr. Zarek, not himself a Quaker, perhaps puts even too high the degree to which their ideals have prevailed. Yet it is a fact that from the first, unlike other dissenters from established churches, they stood for toleration of every religious belief; they combined mystical religion with practical citizenship, holding it a duty not to separate themselves from the world, but to live among other men "in such a way as to call up the good in them." Christianity they held gave sufficient guidance for a general rule of life. When difficulties arose, the "inner voice" must be trusted—and waited for.

Now-a-days, at least throughout the English-speaking world, toleration is the rule; and nobody with the facts before him that Mr. Zarek sets out, can doubt but the Quakers have helped to make it so. From the first they won admiration, and a measure of agreement, among those who opposed and even punished them. When George Fox, founder of the movement, then a young man of four-and-twenty, interrupted service at St. Mary's Church in Nottingham, the town magistrates summoned him to explain his action. He was sent to prison; but when the sentence was completed Nottingham's head sheriff invited him to his house, and the sheriff's wife hailed him as a bringer of salvation. This was after the execution of Charles I.; but Puritanism exercised authority no less sharply than the monarchy, and Fox would not submit to orders that went against his conscience. Yet he had become so much of a power that Cromwell consented to receive him—and let him come into the presence "covered." That first meeting led to others and when Cromwell thought of accepting the Crown Fox repeatedly wrote, bidding him "mind the Crown that was immortal."

Singularly enough, Charles II. showed in the same way a personal admiration for these men whom his agents persecuted. There is a charming story of his interview with William Penn, who, according to Quaker principle, came before him "covered." The king took off his own hat. "Friend Charles," asked the Quaker, "why dost thou uncover thyself?" "Friend Penn, it is the custom of this place for only one man to wear his hat at a time." Charles gave that Quaker more than a witty answer; he backed his endeavour to found a Quaker movement in the New World. It was he who invented the name Pennsylvania. As we all know, neither that community nor any other remained entirely or even mainly Quaker; but ideas were launched. Penn seems to have been the first man to speak of a "United States of Europe." Again, so far back as 1751, all the Quakers in America freed their slaves. Ironically enough, from this Christian example civil war of the most devastating kind was to come; yet its issue cleared America of slavery. And perhaps in bringing to birth the United States of America, that same war was a necessary step towards the creation of a United States of Europe—which many of us may live to see.

* * * * *

Risky Living

Wing Commander R. P. M. Gibbs has written a book (which Cassells publish at 10s. 6d.) in which I must except the title from a very hearty general commendation. *Not Peace but a Sword* seems to me an inappropriate label for a rapturous account, first of the adventure of flying, and then, specifically, of flying bombers in wartime. The whole is thoroughly likable, because we feel that we are getting the confidences of a thorough likable young man who begins by telling us how the chance of a casual journey by air decided his career in life. Instantly, he fell in love with flying—and headed for the R.A.F. With instinctive intelligence he tells us so much about a wholly unfamiliar way of life that I for instance, begin for the first time to understand what is behind all that we hear on the wireless. All about the sea has been brought home to us by so many generations of writing and recounting that I (again, for instance) find it just as easy to enter into any story of naval undertakings as into one concerning the service in which I actually commanded men in action. But, with the air, all was unknown to me; imagination had little to help it. Now this young man comes along and lets us know how he and his comrades live in the riskiest way of living that has yet been invented. What is more, he conveys the special quality which in those conditions comradeship develops. Good luck to his book. Good luck to himself in the perilous adventure which continues.

* * * * *

Anglo-American Relations

Sir Philip Gibbs, one of the most readable among British publicists—and therefore one of the most effective—has harnessed himself to a high task. *Bridging the Atlantic* (published by Hutchinson at 7s. 6d.) is an attempt to stabilize Anglo-American friendship as the way to World Peace. The method adopted is to bring together helpful expressions of opinion from representative minds. Sir Philip himself gives his impressions of the American people in some five-and-twenty pages which left me feeling that I understood our allies a good deal better after reading them. Three of the seventeen contributors are women, and of these I found myself strongly attracted, by curiosity, to Miss Megan Lloyd George's account of Great Britain's Social Services. Like her illustrious father she shows no genius for the written word; but it would be good to hear her let herself go in speech on two matters which she handles here less effectively in print. One is the contribution to reform in education made by H. A. L. Fisher; the other is the Health and Unemployment Insurance Act introduced—and fought through—by a certain David Lloyd George. Sir Philip Gibbs is perfectly right in thinking that it would help Americans to think well of the English, even apart from war conditions, if they realized Christian civilization resulting from this measure; and very right in holding that America would like to hear about it from the daughter of the man who carried through that fight. But in such a collection everybody must pick and choose, and my choice would be to concentrate on the Survey of "Anglo-American Relations" by Lord Samuel, who in the House of Commons always impressed me as having the very highest qualities of intelligence and judgment. He begins with a somewhat devastating review of British action in America down even to a hundred years ago—and with the suggestion that later manifestations led many Americans to think it "the same England that their forbears knew and suffered from." He sets out then, modestly but progressively, what there is to be said in disproof of such a judgment, and

for the assertion that the British and American peoples are moved "by the same fundamental motives" towards a common object. About the immediate purpose of winning the war, there is no difference of opinion; but what is the chance for post-war co-operation? To answer this, he compiles an anthology, of selected utterances from American leaders. One of them, Mr. Milo Perkins, Director of the Board of Economic Warfare, says that "in every civilization of the past" if all that it was possible to produce had been divided among all who were living, the result would have been a miserably low standard of existence. But now, in an era dominated by the machine and the test tube, once the war is over, if we take all that can be produced and divide it among all, all will be very well off. This, he calls the most important change "since the discovery of fire and the invention of the wheel." Such a man might help profoundly in the post-war Anglo-American world. But Mr. Willkie (who fought Mr. Roosevelt for the Presidency) will not hear of building a peace "around the ridge pole of British-American relations." In the reconstruction of the world, Russia and China must meet the English-speaking powers "as absolute equals."

Lord Samuel goes on to discuss, even in some detail, the possibilities of world organization—which must somehow combine a central unity with individual national freedom. For the smaller States, which are hardly of full stature, he considers the scheme of mandates—from some central mandatory power. And he emphasizes the difficulties arising from the fact that a minority of one-third in the American Senate may prevent any action in the sphere of foreign policy.

Much else in this book is admirably suggestive. But if there were nothing in it but Lord Samuel's paper, to publish it would have been an international service.

* * * * *

The Ardent Spectator

Auberon Herbert, twenty-seven years after his death, is probably still a cherished memory to a good many people—and people of the best sort in all classes; for he was a singularly engaging personality. So much as that is made clear by the study of him—*Auberon Herbert, Crusader for Liberty*—which Mr. Hutchinson Harris has written, and Williams & Norgate publish at 15s. But it has been difficult for Mr. Harris to give any clear outline of Herbert's career, for the simple reason that Herbert would not accept any kind of restraint on his individual freedom. He began by entering the army, but in a couple of years sent in his papers because it occurred to him that he might be asked to fight in a war of which he did not approve. This dates from days when he was still of undergraduate age. Politics offered another opening for Lord Carnarvon's son and he tried it—but soon became that pleasant thing, a looker-on. Always an ardent looker-on, he went to have a look at war in Denmark as an amateur, and faced heavy fire to carry out a wounded man. Apart from politics, he was associated with all sorts of people—to mention three, Ruskin, Herbert Spencer and Bradlaugh. He had enthusiasm for that singularly uninspiring person Spencer, and even regarded him as his master. And certainly as an ultra-Radical who regarded Socialism as complete tyranny (since it reduced individual freedom to a minimum), he held Spencer's view. Perhaps—indeed, certainly—he never effected anything definite. But such generous and engaging natures—even if they may be classified as Cranks—do make the world a better place to live in.

SCIENCE, RELIGION AND THE FUTURE, by C. E. Raven, D.D. *Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d.*

Can Christianity become a universal religion again? That roughly is the question which Professor Raven seeks to answer in this book. And his answer—again roughly—is that it can, if . . . First, if Science and Religion can be reconciled. That can be done if Science becomes sufficiently comprehensive. And to a plea for the enlarged comprehensiveness of a true Science the greater part of the book is devoted, though in proportions which are not entirely happy. The space given to the argument that evolution must be regarded as purposeful seems excessive. The mechanists seek to destroy an anthropomorphic conception of purpose which was undoubtedly held by most Christians up to a century ago, but which a contemporary religious mind would regard as trivial. Though the chapter which tells the historic story of the controversy which culminated in the defeat of Soapy Sam by T. H. Huxley is completely justified by its own brilliance, one feels that, by descending to the minutiæ of biological polemic, Professor Raven does not strengthen his case, which is better kept on the high philosophic level where it really belongs. If there are laboratory men who are incapable of grasping the distinction between *natura naturans* and his *natura naturata*, they are best left to themselves.

The purpose for which the man of religion contends in the whole of the process of Nature and History is different from ordinary purpose. One purposes to build a house. Purpose is clear enough. But a much more important purpose is to be good. And straightway the purpose becomes much more difficult to discern. For unless being good is conceived as behaving according to the rules—and it is not that—there is no check upon goodness. The inward experience of the man who purposes to be good is that the affair is taken out of his hands. *L'homme propose, Dieu dispose.* The outside observer either recognizes, or fails to recognize, an experiencing nature, submissive to a higher Power.

So with the process of Nature and History. The religious question is whether all that a finite mind can apprehend of the "goings-on of the Universe" is meaningful or not. And it is doubtful whether conviction of meaning can be produced by intellectual argument; and equally doubtful whether meaning can be asserted save in religious terms. The Buddhist assertion of meaning, for example, appears to the non-religious mind a plain assertion of meaninglessness; less directly perhaps, but just as certainly, the Christian assertion of meaning appears also an assertion of meaninglessness.

Professor Raven rather mitigates the discontinuity between the non-religious and the religious experience. Rightly regarding the science of the field-naturalist as equally legitimate with the quantitative science of the laboratory, he appears to underestimate the difference between the two "sciences". The qualitative "science", rooted in what Goethe called "the awe before the pure phenomenon," undoubtedly does lead, without any real break in continuity, to that comprehensive science which includes the study of the content and consequences of the religious experiences as an important part of human behaviour. It is indeed a preparation for the experience itself: a pathway to the knowledge that "every existence is perfection." It is doubtful whether analytical and quantitative science, in itself, is such a preparation, un-

less the urge towards uniformity is corrected by an act of imagination in the scientist himself: which again is a variety of the religious experience.

How far Christianity can be regarded as the consummation of the reverential approach to Nature and History will depend upon what we mean by Christianity. If the dogmas of traditional theology are to be reinterpreted in the light of the new historical consciousness, it is very necessary to avoid the semblance of equivocation. Such a Christianity is a revolutionized Christianity. The Christianity which moulded a civilization was a quite different thing, rooted in authority and based upon fear. That Christianity has collapsed. If there is to be a new one it will be a minority affair for a very long while to come.

Science, whether largely or narrowly interpreted, will continue to challenge the religion of authority. It cannot challenge the religion of truth. The conflict between religion and science is a transient affair. The conflict between Authority and Truth will probably last for ever.

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY.

WAR AND PEACE IN THE PACIFIC. The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 4*s.* 6*d.*

This preliminary report of the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December last, should be very carefully considered. Delegations representing Australia, Canada, China, Fighting France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States took part in the discussions, which were based upon a wide variety of preliminary documentary material, and which covered most of the major problems which will face the United Nations in the Pacific at the end of the war.

In all the discussions, it was plainly recognized that the result of the war could not be the re-establishment of the pre-war system in Eastern Asia. In any event, the conditions of political activity would be completely changed by the destruction of the military power of Japan, and the restoration of Japan's conquests during the last half-century, as well as by the emergence of China as a unified State, of major importance in Far Eastern affairs. It should also be remembered that no delegation from U.S.S.R. participated in the discussions, for reasons which can be readily understood at the present time, but which may have ceased to exist by the time another Far Eastern Conference assembles. Because of the absence of Soviet representatives, however, it was clearly felt that discussions on a number of Far Eastern questions, both local and general, could only be extremely tentative. For example, it is quite plain that the Soviet will be extremely interested in the post-war political development of Japan, whilst the Soviet contribution to a stable peace system in the Far East will obviously be of very first importance. Even bearing this in mind, however, the discussions collected together in the present volume cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional. Several members of the American delegation uttered warnings against the too easy assumption that America will play a full part in the maintenance of a Far Eastern system, whilst members of the British delegation not unnaturally replied to this that it would be premature to consider any substantial political modifications in Far Eastern colonial possessions of European Powers until the attitude of the United States had become clearer. For this reason, the basic assumption of the Conference seemed to be that the Far Eastern colonial possessions of the European Powers would be returned at the conclusion of the war, and that the most that could be expected would be concerted plans for economic and social development. Possibly the most valuable and realistic contributions to the discussions were made by members of the New Zealand and Canadian delegations, and their view may be not inaccurately summed up in the following observation of a Canadian member:

> I have felt disappointed that we have not come to grips with what I believe to be the fundamental problems that face both this conference and the world. First, I think the attitude of the British members has been that of somewhat complacent acceptance of the position that certain measures of progress towards implementing the Atlantic Charter would proceed at a leisurely pace. My second disappointment was with the American group. At least some members of the American delegation, while criticizing the British position, seem to be unable to give any assurance that the principles of the Atlantic Charter would be approved by public opinion in the United States. I believe that to-day the men and women who are engaged in the prosecution of this war, particularly the younger men who are actually doing the fighting on various fronts, are not fighting for any leisurely development of the world towards a better order but are hoping that this war itself will bring about a better and a fairer outlook for all mankind.

Some problems, for example that of education, only appear to have been very lightly touched upon, and perhaps the work of the Conference may be best summed up by saying that during its discussions the main problems to be faced were carefully defined, and the differing national viewpoints recorded, but it is clear that a good deal of education of popular opinion, both here and in the United States, will be necessary before a genuinely co-operative and workable Far Eastern system will be possible.

G. W. KEETON.

THE SPANISH LABYRINTH, by Gerald Brenan. *Cambridge University Press.* 21*s.*

POLITICAL THOUGHT IN FRANCE from Sièyes to Sorel, by J. P. Mayer. *Faber.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

JEAN JAURES by J. Hampden Jackson. *Allen & Unwin.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

SPEECHES OF GENERAL DE GAULLE. *Oxford University Press.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

Only within the last generation perhaps have students of politics come to appreciate the inadequacy of applying uniform categories, such as Democracy, Liberalism, Socialism, without due allowance for each nation's distinctive tradition. Mr. J. P. Mayer has set his theme against the background of Burke's great disclaimer on behalf of English ways of 1790. More particularly in the case of Spain do we need to be on our guard against the terminology of Western Europe. Nationalism, as Europe knows it, has never struck root in Spain; the unity that once held together the distinctive regional entities was a religious not a political mould. And economic Liberalism, the child of the industrial revolution, has no meaning in a country which still bears the characteristics of an undeveloped primitive economy and where the people is by nature profoundly uncompetitive and egalitarian. What the short-lived period of Liberalism when Mendizabal took away the land from the Church (1835-36) did for Spain, was to throw the clergy and monks, up to then at one with the impulses and interests of the common man, into the arms of the wealthy and privileged.

Because he has studied Spanish problems first-hand and seen them in their proper Spanish setting Mr. Brenan has written a really important book. It sets out clearly and dispassionately the tremendous

problems waiting to be solved. One realizes that with such a welter of forces pulling in different directions the civil war of 1936-39 was well-nigh inevitable—and that the temporary triumph of the Franco régime has solved nothing.

A work of these dimensions, based on prodigious documentation, cannot be reviewed in a few paragraphs. One can only point to certain truths which the author has demonstrated. In the first place there is the chronic weakness of 'the State' contrasting with the astonishing periodic upsurge of 'the people.' Then perhaps because of a continuing affinity with their Berber kinsmen, there is the strong attachment of Spaniards to the small local group, village or municipality, *la patria chica*, which takes the place of the stimulus of national allegiance.

Mr. Brenan is not led astray by Basque or Catalan special pleading: the root of local jingoism, as he says, is economic discontent on the part of the *petite bourgeoisie*. If the Catalans are restive and prone to autonomous tendencies the principal cause is the industrial and commercial apathy of the Castilians. The author's main contribution is his detailed study of Spain's widely differing agrarian problems and a racy, yet profound analysis of the working-class movements, particularly anarchism. Summing up he suggests that, since the loss of her Catholic faith, Spain "has been above everything else a country in search of an ideology," and, unfortunately, the classes that should have shouldered the responsibilities of leadership have provided only sectionalism and selfishness. That goes for the Army, the Church, the Castilan ruling class, the Catalan industrialists, the "Liberal" elements that wrested power from the Church and, of course, the Monarchy itself which in 1931 was no more than a vested interest consisting of the groups making up what Arturo Barea has called 'the Caste' at the expense of everyone else. Here is the book for which generations of students of Spanish affairs have been waiting.

Mr. Mayer's little book is also good, though marred by faulty English. But an analysis of political thought of this kind must to some extent become a catalogue. A final section entitled "Perspectives" makes the essential point that

> the idea of equality before the law which the Revolution established did not imply a solution of the problem of economic equality, though the revolutionary patriotism seemed at times to provide an integration of the 'two nations' which persisted within France.

The best possible example of that attempt at integration was probably the figure of Jean Jaurès. Mr. Hampden Jackson deserves our gratitude for his thoughtful and penetrating biographical study of a man of whom we know far too little in this country. The Prologue, in particular, is inclusive and brilliantly written. Recent French history stands out vividly in the collection of General de Gaulle's broadcasts and speeches presented in an excellent translation.

W. Horsfall Carter.

CAMBRIDGE RETROSPECT, by T. R. Glover. *Cambridge University Press.* 6*s.*

What is the true nature of a University? What, as the theologians might say, is its characteristic note? If Universities disappeared from the land of what elements in its life would the community be deprived?

These questions are answered in Dr. T. R. Glover's short but delightful book, *Cambridge Retrospect.* More correctly, when you have read this book you will know what Cambridge perceives the answer to be. Whether you will agree, whether your strings are tuned to respond to the more intimate vibrations unless you are yourself a Cambridge man it is not easy to be sure. If not, one feels, the author would express courteous regret but would have nothing to retract.

Dr. Glover's treatment of his subject is wise and tolerant—does he not unhesitatingly accept, on being reminded of it, the claim of Oxford to rank as one of the older English Universities?—but his conception of what a University is and of what a University must do remains clear and firm. He is of a generation and tradition which do not axiomatically accept change, or even efficiency, as another name for improvement.

The first chapter contains an admirable brief survey of the Medieval origins and Renaissance growth of Cambridge. The word "college", we are reminded, did not first connote an institution devoted to learning, but meant a "society" of men sharing a common mode of life. That is important, for to the author the college is the essential and vital feature of University life. Loyalty to one's college is the essential loyalty, and participation in its life the true end of a University career. Take away the college and the undergraduate sinks to the level of a student (forbidden word in Cambridge) and the don hardens into a mere academic specialist and lecturer ("Lectures are but a sleep and a forgetting"); but within the college they are lively members of a society, at once imbibing and contributing to its communal store of riches. "The nucleus of College life is the staircase, and it branches out into the boat club, dinner in hall, College chapel, the lecture room, and all sorts of things."

Such is the theme of Dr. Glover's retrospect, and he enlarges it by writing about dons, particularly the dons of his own college, St. John's, in his early days at Cambridge. They had their characteristic limitations—a narrowness of interest, perhaps, and an undue preoccupation with the literal niceties of ancient learning—but remained nevertheless men "who were human in a very large and delightful way." Some of them became a little odd (when our Universities cease to produce dons who are a little odd their days will surely be numbered) and Dr. Glover points their oddities with an excellent humour which springs from understanding and affectionate regard. They were the men, he gratefully records, who educated him through the intimate contacts of mind and personality, "the play of soul on soul, the touch of spirit."

Dr. Glover was himself a notable scholar and for many years as Senior Proctor and then as Public Orator played a distinguished part in the life of the University. He died within a few days of the publication of his *Retrospect* and this last book may well prove a more enduring memorial than his formal essays in scholarship. His death strengthens the reader's impression of being a privileged listener to the voice of one sitting withdrawn, as it were, in the shadows of a firelit room and discoursing sagely and wittily of well-loved scenes and figures from the past. The book is finished and the speaker departs. For Cambridge men of many generations it will be a source of pleasure, evoking continually those nostalgic memories which are the gentlest of sorrows:

> And under dreaming willows
> The river winds and gleams,
> Nor speaks above a whisper
> For fear to break their dreams.

C. L. M. Brown.

THE MAN BORN TO BE KING, by Dorothy L. Sayers. *Gollancz.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

"My object," states Miss Sayers in the introduction to the volume of her broadcast plays, "was *to tell that story* to the best of my ability, within

the medium at my disposal—in short, to make as good a work of art as I could." Since all criticism seems trifling in face of the achievement, it is sufficient to record that this purpose was gained. No one has used the medium of broadcasting for dramatic representation with greater understanding and brilliance that Miss Sayers; no one has told *that story* with more force or with a more lasting impact on the minds of the listeners.

Why was this? It is difficult to speak for others; yet I believe the experience of many was not unlike my own. The central figures in the tragedy had always been clear, for at least as long as memory serves; now they were enriched by a hundred lurking characters who had left the shadows for the open stage. The backcloth had come to life and the result was far more than the painting of a scene, it was a greater understanding of the event. Miss Sayers writes: "This story of the life and murder and resurrection of God-in-Man is not only the symbol and epitome of the relations of God and man throughout time; it is also a series of events that took place at a particular point *in* time. *And the people of that time had not the faintest idea that it was happening.*" That is the achievement. We were listeners, spectators in our minds' eye, not only of the greatest tragedy but of a tragedy that occurred "at a particular point *in* time." We had been taught that this was so before, now we knew. And everyone of us might have been there, unconscious of our part in the tragedy like the men and women of those times, ordinary everyday folk, centurions, pilgrims, hecklers, priests, laughing, eating, swearing, gossiping, jeering, arguing in living medley in Miss Sayers' plays.

It is possible to put our finger on a score of different scenes in the plays which vividly illuminate the fact that the events did take place at a particular point *in* time.

I remind listeners of one. It is Sequence 4 of Scene 2 (In Pilate's Carriage) of the Eighth Play: Royal Progress. It begins with a flash of insight into Pilate's character, and the attitude of Rome

> Claudia: A penny for your thoughts, Caius Pontius.
>
> Pilate: I was thinking, my dear Claudia, that the Jews are a very tiresome people, that their religious festivals are a crashing bore, and that I wish to all the gods we were back in Tyre.

Pilate is hoping for a transfer. What a human ring that has. He is desperately anxious that no incident should affect his career. The noise of an approaching procession reaches them; Claudia wishes to see and the carriage is brought through to the front. There is nothing much to it, four dozen lines perhaps, yet the scene is complete, and another rung added to the ladder of our understanding.

The language presented a difficulty to some listeners. They found it irreverent. Miss Sayers retorts: "Tear off the disguise of the Jacobean idiom, go back to the homely and vigorous Greek of Mark or John, translate it into its current English counterpart, and there every man may see his own face." And it was so. The few could not stomach it; they were the losers.

The plays read well: how well for those who did not hear the broadcasts is for me conjecture; yet I believe they will repay reading again and again. The book adds something to the plays. It provides a long and important introduction by the author in addition to her notes to the producer. There is a production note by Val Gielgud and a Foreword by Dr. J. W. Welch, Director of Religious Broadcasting. The Foreword tells interestingly but I believe unnecessarily the story of the fight to produce the broadcasts against considerable opposition. That fight had to be waged; it was won and may now I think be forgotten. In the volume it strikes a discordant note. So does the price. Inevitable, I suppose, in wartime but regrettable. We must have, as soon as possible, a cheaper edition.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

THE WAY OF THE LAND, by Sir George Stapledon. *Faber & Faber.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Few agricultural scientists are more worthy of honour to-day than Sir George Stapledon, whose latest book, a collection of addresses mainly dating from the years immediately before the present war, arrives most opportunely. Nor has this honour been accorded him ungrudgingly. It is only of recent years that his advocacy of ley-farming, whereby the plough is taken in ordered sequence around the whole farm, has become accepted as a proper basis upon which to build anew our island husbandry. But Sir George Stapledon's followers now include many of the ablest farmers in the country and their faith in his policy has merely been accentuated by the trend agriculture has been compelled to take since the war.

War was still a long year away when Sir George Stapledon, reporting on nutrition to the British Association for Labour Legislation, defended his passionate plea for a system of arable-grass farming on the grounds that "thus, and only thus, can we ensure that degree of flexibility that will render possible a system of farming that on the one hand makes for maximum soil fertility and maximum production, and on the other hand would make it possible for the farmer quickly to obey the changing orders, shall we say, of a Minister of Health, or in an emergency quickly to conform to the agitated dictates of a Minister of Defence." If such a plea, preached over many years and with the backing of much circumstantial evidence, had been listened to, how much simpler would have been the task of the present Minister of Agriculture and how much better might we have fared both with regard to crops and stock. But it needed, apparently, nothing short of a revolution to convince the British people and their rulers that agriculture, even in peacetime, is of prime importance to the national economy —let alone to the national health.

Such a revolution in agriculture the war thrust upon us. Sir George Stapledon's policy has been amply justified. And now it only remains for our post-war planners to build securely upon the foundations he has soundly laid. He says that the only factors to-day which could prevent us from taking our food production to the extreme limits of the acres available are not prejudice and lack of conviction but the supply of tractors and phosphates.

It was in a paper read to the Autumn School of the National Labour Organization, in 1938, that Sir George Stapledon gave as his three main reasons for desiring a "robust, rural Britain": 1.—The necessity for a large and contented rural population; 2.—Abundance of fresh food for our peoples at all times; and 3.—Food security in time of emergency. His conviction has always been that the first care of the State must be "the health, the adequate material position, and the mental and spiritual development of the individual." There is no hope of a sound agriculture until the welfare of the men and women upon whom rests the burden of that agriculture has been fully considered. He says: "unless rural England is provided

with the amenities and facilities necessary rural England and rural psychology are doomed—and then the driving force behind the English character would be lost to our race."

Sir George Stapledon's appeal to us to-day, in fact, rests almost as much upon his stress of human values as it does upon his advocacy of ley-farming. "To think of man in terms of communities necessarily demands consideration of spiritual values—love, mutual help, and self-lessness—virtues which have become obscured and even held of little account in recent years." It does not come unexpectedly, therefore, to find him imploring his agricultural students to read poetry, extolling the necessity of contemplation, or advocating that "we must carry our researches into the realm of things spiritual and seek to develop a technique that will enable us to avail ourselves to the full of our own greatest manifestation of potentiality—imagination."

Never was it more essential that such a man, holding such views, should speak his mind aloud. "The culture of a nation is reflected in, and is largely an outcome of, the manner in which it uses and treats its land-surface." In Agriculture, as in so much else, the future depends entirely upon how we react to our responsibilities at this critical juncture — responsibilities shared by townsman and countryman alike. It is to be hoped, therefore, that Sir George Stapledon's new book, technical though some of it is, will be read not merely by farmers and practitioners generally but by all responsible citizens.

Out of his ripeness a whole man is speaking to us and we shall do well to listen.

C. HENRY WARREN.

WINGS OF DESTINY, by The Marquess of Londonderry. *Macmillan.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

THE LOG OF A MERCHANT AIRMAN, by Captain John Lock and John Creasey. *Paul.* 15*s.*

IS BOMBING DECISIVE?, by Captain F. O. Miksche. *Allen & Unwin.* 5*s.*

The authors of these three books, each in a way peculiar to himself, write on the subject of aviation; its past, its present and, in the sense of military flight, its future. Lord Londonderry's volume depicts the excruciating growing pains of modern British air power since its delayed delivery in the years succeeding the 1914-18 War, and displays the noble Marquess, both in and out of office, as one untiring in his energies to re-establish its strength. He takes us behind the scenes, so far as the Official Secrets Act permits, to show us our statesmen and politicians at their familiar games of jockeying for place and letting the defences of the country languish. It is a sorry tale and, in retrospect, the story of our shufflings and vain endeavours, our blindness to the threat from Germany and our humiliations at Geneva, thus related from an inside point of view, reads like an imagined record of ineptitude. Successive Secretaries of State for Air fought gallant, but unequal, battles for the arm they represented, while year after year the Air Estimates and the Civil Aviation Vote were pinched and pared. The author does not neglect to pay a fitting tribute to the sturdy attitude of the service chiefs at the Air Ministry during these long, dark days of air decline, from Trenchard onwards to the period, in 1935, when a measure of rearmament was decided on. Inspired, as it would undoubtedly appear, by that unbending prop of aviation two main principles of policy, handed on like tokens in a relay race, were rigidly adhered to. No matter what economy dictated with respect to the lessening size of air establishments, consequent on reductions in the Vote, it was determined, firstly, that the training standard should in nowise suffer, and, secondly, that the airframes, aero-engines and all accessories to flight should continue to be the best that manufacture could supply. Lord Londonderry insists with emphasis, and with convincing logic, that our salvation at the time of the Battle of Britain, when the few opposed themselves to many, was a direct outcome of this sturdy resolve. For the rest the book affords us glimpses of the Nazi leaders, not excluding Hitler, whom the author interviewed from time to time, and contains, besides, some interesting pen-portraits of the country's leaders as they stepped into, or receded from, the public eye. It is a personal narrative by a man evidently anxious to put himself on record as far-sighted in his generation. Exculpatory in tone, it is not wholly free from the egoistic tinge which is so often the accompaniment of such a tendency in writing. On the whole we get the impression of the writer as a man of honest impulse, though not, perhaps, of quite first-rate ability, a conscientious and efficient office-holder, who played both a major and a minor part on the pre-war stage of politics and who has produced a not unreadable account of the years eaten by the locusts.

The Lock and Creasy book is pure refreshment after the somewhat Lenten fare provided by the Marquess. It is a gay, picaresque account, written in an unassuming style and richly illustrated, of the life and fortunes of a commercial pilot during the last ten years. Related by Captain Lock, and taken down by Mr. Creasey, it describes with humour, interest and the knowledge of experience the straits to which a man was put, in an unair-minded Britain, to earn a living in the air. But Captain Lock, a pilot evidently of rare ability and untiring in discharge of duty, won through to the coveted position of an Imperial Airways captain, in that responsible situation performing a series of notable flights. It is sad to record that this devoted pioneer of civil aviation, who knew how to play as well as how to work and was popular with all, was captaining the 'Golden Hind' when it crashed not long ago in the River Tagus, and in that disaster lost his life.

Captain Miksche, of the Czechoslovakian Army but now doing duty on the Free French General Staff, propounds a query without much satisfaction to the reader. His book, in effect, consists much more of a slashing attack on Major Seversky's *Victory Through Air Power* than of a closely reasoned answer to his question. As such, it largely loses point, for that particular work, in spite of its wide appreciation in the U.S.A. plainly overstepped the boundaries of reality and had no force of impact on a well-informed opinion. The author, it is true, concludes that bombing is indecisive and offers for examination an improved plan of air co-operation to enforce decision. It is involved and vague, and too facile by half. Moreover, in dealing with such matters the author's credentials are not beyond dispute. There need be no end to volumes of this description if anyone possessed of military knowledge, but not otherwise equipped for the special task in hand, should plunge into the arena of dispute. This one does not form a major contribution to the controversy.

L. E. O. CHARLTON.

WITHIN THE CITY WALL, by Margaret Mann Phillips. *Cambridge University Press.* 6*s.*

J. J. THOMSON, by Lord Rayleigh. *Cambridge University Press.* 18*s.*

One would at a first glance suppose that the Cambridge Press cannot often have published two such dissimilar books as these, but between the charmingly remembered years of Mrs. Phillips's childhood in York and the many years of the profound man of science there is this in common, a most appealing humanity. The heroine of Mrs. Phillips's book, presumably herself, was a girl of twelve in the year 1918; she brings back so vividly the spirit of that time and her vignettes of her family and many other persons in her father's parish are so strikingly portrayed that they become treasured friends of ours. Yet she tells us of her family that:

> she had no idea what they were like. They were the landscape of life. They were a range of mountains on the horizon, familiar yet enigmatic, changing but always there. . . . To think of their existing before she was born was like venturing into a fairy world.

And, later on, talking of fairy matters:

> she little knew how unlikely it was that 'pretending' would not haunt her in one form or another to her life's end, and how much she had taken 'grown-ups' at their face value in imagining that they fabricated no fairy worlds.

One is sorely tempted to quote and do nothing else from this chronicle of a true artist. 'Did anyone,' she wondered as a child, 'ever come to unify reality and dream?' Only very slowly, she tells us, did she realize in the years following that the creative work of the world is done by people who have bridged the gulf. She herself did not lack imagination, which invaded even the prosaic task of washing-up. Her two hands were an old fisherman and his son out of the Arabian Nights, who lived on the seashore and earned a meagre living there. One day they would go down to the sea to fish and spread out their net far and wide (the dish-cloth was the netted kind with a large mesh). And lo! what should they draw up but a gigantic teaspoon, which when melted down would provide the poor fishermen with treasure for the rest of their lives . . . There were endless possibilities of varying the game. No wonder her family found her the slowest of washers-up. The background of York is beautifully reproduced and we are favoured with specimens of the child's literary ambitions, with Edward of York playing his gallant part. Not a word would we have missed; in two lines, for instance, we are told how the child's father sat down in the hall and gave his boots to a tramp, begging him merely not to pawn them.

'The last time I was at Cambridge, probably in the summer of 1938,' wrote a correspondent to Lord Rayleigh, 'I saw him running by the side of the river during the Races Week to be in at the Bumps at the finale of the races.' He was then 82 years of age, so that this most eminent man, the Master of Trinity, Doctor of no less than 23 Universities, holder of the O.M. and of countless other distinctions, did not allow these things to stifle his ardour. One presumes that many readers will prefer to concentrate on the human side of this great man rather than upon his epoch-making labours on gaseous ions, cathode rays and other such matters. When Becquerel, the discoverer of radioactivity, visited Cambridge he was shown by J. J. (as Thomson was called by everyone) his Cavendish Laboratory. Becquerel talked French and J.J., attempting no other reply, said *Oui, Oui,* in a loud voice after each remark. Sometime later an Indian physicist came and was shown round. He said 'Yes, Yes' after everything J.J. said and on the next day Thomson said he could not stand the man's everlasting 'Yes, yes.' We are told of an encounter with the seven-year-old son of an American professor who was not allowed to attend the lectures that J.J. was delivering at Yale. J.J. met him and had a talk with him one afternoon, so that the boy told his mother it was a great shame he had not been permitted to go to the lectures, as he could understand what Professor Thomson said as well as he could anyone else. Thus we have another link with 'Twist,' the heroine of Mrs. Phillips's book.

Of course no one could have been a more competent biographer of J.J. than his friend and fellow-scientist Lord Rayleigh, who has also availed himself of many other sources of information. Widely does he fling his net and more than a silver spoon comes to the surface. For instance it appears that Frazer of *The Golden Bough* offered to resign his fellowship of Trinity because someone had detected a misquotation in his superb book and he insisted, against the wish of the directors, in paying a Railway Company £40 because he found that a bundle of books he had been in the habit of taking with him every day in the train between Edinburgh and Glasgow was above the permissible weight and after a laborious calculation he found that £40 would clear his conscience. It also appears Haldane was not very successful in expounding to Edmund Gosse his idea of a book on Relativity as applied to ethics and politics. Gosse, we are told, remained in a state of arrested development, owing, as he averred, to Haldane having fallen asleep in the midst of his discourse. There is no fear that you will fall asleep while reading this book.

HENRY BAERLEIN.

THE LOST PLANET AND OTHER POEMS, by Dorothy Wellesley. *The Hogarth Press.* 6*s.*

THIRTY-THREE POEMS, by Douglas Gibson. With an Introduction by Herbert Palmer. *King, Littlewood & King, Ltd.* 1*s.*

FORTY POEMS, by John Lehmann. The New Hogarth Library Vol. IX. *The Hogarth Press.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

THESE ARE MY COMRADES, by Alan Rook. *Routledge.* 5*s.*

THIS LIFE THIS DEATH, by T. R. Hodgson. *Routledge.* 5*s.*

A new volume of poems by Miss Dorothy Wellesley should be a literary event, and *The Lost Planet* is the most important book on my list. Those who care for poetry from deep sources will find here, stated with eloquence and in a precise masculine rhythm, the castigation of a generation that has gone astray; also a personal assertion of poetic faith:

> The pride of science stands and the final desolation . . . .
> For the wise are without worth
> On an earth destroyed by fools.

But:

> I believe in the agony, in the sweat of the wise,
> And in the crucifixion of Solomon.

Miss Wellesley turns to religion, transcending the immediate agony, going straight to the universal agony and faith in redemption through suffering. She achieves some of her effects by a biblical repetition of lines. But there is besides much natural beauty in her book, notably in "Graveyard On The Hill" and "Paradise", recalling an earlier manner and, incidentally, Ralph Hodgson's animal poems. This of "a dappled doe in brake":

> Till, coming to the lily lake,
> She'll paddle to her belly,
> Swimming with fawn at break of dawn
> From lily unto lily;
> And turning long and rosy tongue
> Round lightest leaf and lily bud
> Will feed the white child of her blood
> On a morning water lily.

Let us hope that Mr. Palmer is right in hailing Mr. Douglas Gibson as "a poet of Tomorrow." These thirty-three first poems are genuine,

unaffected and "free from obscurity, semi-defeatism and pessimism." They are written with humility and with "reverence, that angel of the world." What if they do revive Georgian pastoralism? The Georgians have been over-abused by their irritable and uneasy successors. If the ordinary, sensitive poetry-lover will read Mr. Gibson, he will discover a modest but authentic talent, perhaps "the divine spark which will help to start the dawn fires of Tomorrow."

> There is genius here, in the delicate hand
> That traced these exquisite pastels
> across the sky . . .

Mr. John Lehmann suffers from not being sufficiently himself. There is internal evidence of intellectual snobbery, of a too close and dangerous association with the poetry racket. His book opens with a good deal of coloured, careful Parnassian work, nostalgic, but lacking in intensity. His ear can be defective:

> Sharply I see, by sudden longing made
> Real, the air to breathe, the foam to
> hear.

He goes on to echo Auden and in "After Fever" to write like Spender and even, in "Evidence of Spring", like the early Rimbaud! There is the dated political poetry, the talk in "Calm As The Moon" and "A Marsh Way" of "signals for departure," "crossing frontiers" and the "magnetic north"—all the clichés of the pylon school. However, his best poems are his latest, the few allegories of the war which close the book. But "Waking From Snow" and "In The Alps" are beautiful and successful poems.

Mr. Alan Rook claims for the poems in *These Are My Comrades* that "they are, as it were, the jottings in an artist's notebook from which the great picture will one day be painted." Certainly they have merit as vigorous jottings. That the things seen in the poetry will be "easily recognizable" is more doubtful, for Mr. Rook's poetic shorthand leads him into strange ways:

> The cannon with a bellyful
> Undoes her scarlet waistcoat.

He sings "the wasteful beauty of war's vision," and such poems as "The Wound" and "Casualty" are effectively grim. His nearest faith may be found in "The Orchard", "Injunction To One Reading" or "Morning In England" and it is of a brave kind:

> In the mould of war this earth we'll move
> One inch nearer to our love.

For the present reviewer much of Flight Lieutenant Hodgson's posthumous volume *This Life This Death* is, regrettably, arid intellectual stuff. Then there is a playing about with print and spacing which fails to startle me into assent. There are Imagist poems such as "Intermezzo" and good short love poems such as "Your Beauty Cries On The Wind," but Richard Aldington has written this kind of poetry as well, if not better. Has not the time come to cease trying to dispense with rhyme and true rhythm? Would that the self-assertion of the new poets, with their undoubted gifts, could be accomplished honestly, simply, euphoniously.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

After Victory—?

Every citizen must read **"Tory Democracy's Better Britain"** by **W. S. Shepherd,** rising politician and business man. Brilliantly interweaves sweeping progress and tradition. A practical, arresting contribution to future government. Booksellers 1/-, or post free PATRIA PRESS Ltd., 168, Regent Street, W.1.

ADVERTISEMENT AND BUSINESS OFFICES: 13 Buckingham Street, LONDON, W.C.2.
PUBLISHED FOR THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, LTD., BY HORACE MARSHALL & SON, LTD., Publishing Department, Temple House, Tallis Street, E.C.4
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GEERINGS OF ASHFORD, LTD., 80, HIGH STREET, ASHFORD, KENT
PUBLISHED IN ENGLAND

THE FORTNIGHTLY

SEPTEMBER, 1943

MADRAS LEGISLATURE 2 FEB 1944

THE REMUNERATION OF LABOUR

BY B. SEEBOHM ROWNTREE

IN an article on the Beveridge plan which appeared in the February issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY I stated that an investigation which I made in 1936 covering every working-class family in York (16,362 in number) revealed the fact that almost exactly a third of the working-class population were living below a very stringent poverty line. One-third of this poverty was due to the fact that although the chief wage-earner was employed, his wages were inadequate to maintain his family above the poverty line.

These conditions may be taken as representing those prevailing just before the war, for there was no significant change in economic conditions in York between 1936 and 1939. I pointed out that had the Beveridge plan been in operation when I made my investigation, and assuming that every person whose wages were interrupted was raised above the poverty line in consequence, seven per cent. of the working class population would still have been in poverty, for those in work received no financial benefit under the plan except the children's allowances. Assuming—as I am satisfied that we may safely do—that conditions in York are not worse than elsewhere, this means that in the country generally nearly two million people would still have been in poverty due to inadequate wages. In considering the question of the remuneration of labour, clearly the first task is to put an end to this state of things.

The lowest-paid workers are found chiefly in industries where labour is ill-organized, and it was to protect workers in such industries that Trade Boards were introduced.* To-day they are operating in 53 industries employing over 1½ million workers, but there are many workers engaged in industries where wages are low and where no Trade Board exists. The first step that should be taken is to appoint Boards in such industries wherever this can be done. But Trade Boards can only fix wages in clearly-defined industries

*Trade Boards are statutory bodies consisting of an equal number of employers and workers, nominated by the Employers' Associations and Trade Unions respectively, and appointed by the Ministry of Labour. In addition to these the Ministry of Labour appoints three members, not connected with the industry, one of whom acts as chairman. They have the right to vote and therefore exercise control when the employers and workers fail to agree.

and even if they were established wherever possible there would still be a large number of low-paid workers engaged in all kinds of miscellaneous occupations left without protection of any kind. These can only be dealt with by means of a national statutory minimum wage. How should this be fixed? I suggest that *the lowest national wage fixed by any Trade Board should become the national statutory wage for the time being.* This would not at first raise all wage earners above the poverty line, but it would go a very long way towards doing so. To attempt more than this all at once would not be in the best interests of wage earners, for it would undoubtedly lead to the dismissal of a number of them. The fullest possible extension of Trade Boards and the fixing of a statutory minimum wage combined with family allowances should however in a comparatively short time substantially abolish poverty due to inadequate wages. But just to abolish absolute want is not enough, for the fact is that, save for those who are highly organized, the standard of living of the great mass of the workers is decidedly lower than is desirable. In the new world we want to see after the war we should look to a scale of wages which will enable the workers to live a fuller life than is possible for the vast majority of them to-day.

We must however realize that we cannot raise the wages of the lower paid workers without making some addition to the wages of those who are more highly paid, for the gradation of wages in a given industry or industrial enterprise is largely a measure of the relative skill or severity of work or responsibility of the workers; those earning more than the minimum have usually fully earned the higher wage. So we must walk warily, and not impose a crippling burden on industry to the great injury of the workers. If there is one thing more than another which the nation demands it is that mass unemployment shall be abolished. In our anxiety to raise wages we must not imperil the chance of stabilizing "full employment".

But the fact that we must walk warily is no excuse for doing nothing. It should only serve as a reminder that we cannot attain our object merely by issuing an edict that more money shall be put into the wage packets. We must know where the extra money is coming from. Bearing this warning in mind let us now consider what steps should be taken to achieve our desired end. In this article I only deal with workers who are ill organized. The others are able to "keep their end up" pretty well and moreover they will, for the reason just stated, benefit indirectly from any action which raises the wages of the low paid workers. It has already been proposed that Trade Boards should be extended to the utmost possible limit

and a statutory minimum wage fixed for the "left overs". I suggest that the Trade Boards, which at present receive no instructions from the Minister of Labour as to the principles on which they should fix wages, should be instructed to fix them at the highest figure which the industry can afford. (I refer to normal peace times). In effect this would mean fixing them at a level which all reasonably efficient firms, even small ones, can afford.

But of course many firms can pay more than the minimum fixed by the Trade Board, and it will be the task of the Trade Unions to induce them to do so. To go from firm to firm is however a slow job, and it is suggested that steps should be taken by the Ministry of Labour to induce all Trade Board industries to adopt a policy which has been in force for 20 years in the Food Industry, namely, to have a Joint Industrial Council as well as a Trade Board. This Council fixes wages and working conditions considerably better than the minimum conditions fixed by the Trade Board. Membership is voluntary, the advantage of joining being that the Trade Unions agree not to negotiate with member firms individually but only with the council as a whole. This saves both employers and Union secretaries a lot of time. If the above proposal was generally adopted the Trade Unions need only concern themselves with those firms which are not members of the Joint Industrial Council but which they have reason to think could afford to pay wages higher than the minimum fixed by the Trade Board.

When a Trade Union official is negotiating with a firm for higher wages, he is heavily handicapped, because he does not know whether or no the firm is in a position to pay the wage asked. This handicap could be simply and speedily removed. If an employer says he cannot pay the wage asked, and is not prepared to make a counter offer which the Trade Union is willing to accept, the Union should have the right to ask the Minister of Labour to appoint a chartered accountant to examine the firm's books and to state whether he considers that the firm can afford to pay the wage asked for or, failing that, whether it could afford to meet the Trade Union demand partially, and if so to what extent. If either party is dissatisfied with the accountant's decision it should have the right to appoint an accountant of its own choosing. If he agrees with the previous decision it should become binding on both parties. If he disagrees the two accountants should choose a third one to arbitrate between them, and his decision will bind both parties. The costs involved by the above process would not be heavy, and should be borne by the loser. If the decision come to is a compromise between the two parties they should share the costs equally.

It may be said that the above proposal amounts to nothing more than giving the parties to a wage dispute the power to have the question at issue settled by arbitration, which right they enjoy now. But an arbitration, whether by a single arbitrator or by a court, often fails to satisfy both parties; they are much more likely to be satisfied if their interests were safeguarded in the way suggested above. Of course the employer would have the right to demand a similar "means test" if a Trade Union refused a request on his part for a reduction of wages. It is doubtful whether, in practice, the machinery suggested would often be set in motion, for if an employer was bluffing when he told the Trade Union that he could not afford to meet their demands, he would give way rather than submit to a means test, and vice versa.

Occasions may arise when the accountant reports that a firm cannot afford to advance wages, and the workers have reason to believe that its inability to do so arises from mismanagement. If shareholders owning a controlling interest in a business consider that their interests are prejudiced by mismanagement they have the right to dismiss the directors and appoint new ones. Admittedly it is difficult to exercise it if the number of shareholders is large, but it exists. It is just as important that workers should have the right to protect their interests in case of mismanagement.

To an increasing degree business management is becoming a science and a new profession of management consultants is growing up. In the U.S.A. some Trade Unions carry management consultants on their staffs, and if an employer says he cannot afford to meet a demand for a wage advance, the Union may ask to be allowed to send its consultant into the factory to see whether he can suggest ways of rendering the business more profitable. This scheme works satisfactorily. It is suggested that when a Trade Union has reason to believe that the inability of a firm to raise low wages is due to mismanagement it shall have the right to demand that the Ministry of Labour shall appoint a qualified management consultant to visit the works and say whether he considers that this is so or not. Even in the case of a large factory a preliminary inspection sufficient to answer this question could be made in a few days. At the present time management consultants offer to make such inspections free of charge, with a view to their services being retained in order to effect the economies which their brief inspection shows to be possible. The cost of this examination should be borne by the State. If the consultant reports that there are evident signs of inefficient management he should report accordingly to the firm and to the Ministry of Labour, stating what those signs are, the

general lines on which the defects could be remedied, and how long it should take to do this. The Ministry of Labour would inform the firm that it would be allowed that time in which to remedy the defects, after which it would have to increase its wages to the level possible to a reasonably efficient firm. If the firm considers it necessary to employ a management consultant to enable it to do this it would have to engage a man in private practice at its own cost and if it is in low water it may not be able to afford this. In such a case the Ministry of Labour should advance the sum required on the understanding that any increased earnings should be divided equally between the workers and the Ministry of Labour until the workers' claims are met, after which all increased earnings would go to the Ministry of Labour till the loan is repaid. It is not unreasonable to expect the Ministry of Labour to accept responsibility for increasing the efficiency of industry and to incur certain costs to that end. It is not only in the interests of the workers that every factory shall be efficiently managed, it is also, and very greatly, to the advantage of the Exchequer that this should be so.

The above proposal will doubtless seem to some to constitute an entirely unwarrantable interference with the right of an employer to manage his business in his own way. But if the standard of living of the workers is to be materially raised inefficiency of management cannot be tolerated. If an employer is conducting his business efficiently he has nothing to fear from the inspection of a management consultant. If his business is *not* efficiently managed it is wrong to allow the consequent injury to the workers to continue. Every factory is subject to inspection by Home Office inspectors whose duty it is to ensure that the conditions are not prejudicial to the health or safety of the workers. Why should there not be inspectors to ensure that the workers' interests are not prejudiced by inefficient management? In this connection it may be pointed out that to-day all farms are periodically inspected by experts and farmers who are not farming efficiently must mend their ways or they are turned out.

So far we have been considering what may be termed administrative means of raising the remuneration of labour—but ability to pay high wages does not depend on such means alone. One of the greatest sources of waste in industry, if indeed not *the* greatest, arises from the lack of full co-operation between "masters and men". In every reasonably well conducted enterprise care is taken to provide good systems of cost accounting and of planning, a good lay-out of the factory, and to ensure that no machine is rendered inefficient through neglect, but it is not generally realized that by

far the most delicate instruments employed are the " human instruments ". Expert engineers are employed to look after the inanimate machinery; it must be carefully oiled and adjusted; it must not be overstrained or put to work for which it is not fitted. But too often the human instruments are handled in the crudest way, by men utterly unfitted for the task. If this deficiency were made good a much higher scale of remuneration of the workers would be rendered possible.

The aim which every industrial executive should set before him should be to create for those working under his control conditions which induce each one of them to work as intelligently and as hard as if he were working on his own account. Such an objective is difficult to attain, especially in large factories—indeed it is seldom fully attained. Some will say that it can never be even approximately attained in industries conducted for private profit, but the fact that a close approach to its attainment is reached in many such industrial enterprises, both large and small, and that there is no evidence to show that it is more fully attained in enterprises conducted by the State or Local Authorities than in those conducted for private profit suggests that the reason for the failure to attain it must be sought elsewhere.

Limits of space prevent any adequate discussion of how the co-operation of the workers can best be secured and I can only deal with the matter in broad outline. First of all I would stress the importance of a fuller realization of the fact that whatever be the motives which induce any individual to engage in industry, its basic purpose is the service of the community, for without industry and commerce the community would starve in a few days. When this is forgotten, industry tends to become a happy hunting ground in which men seek to attain their own ends on the principle of " every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost." But if it be remembered, the adoption of other essential means of attaining co-operation between all engaged in industry will naturally follow. In considering what these should be we must not overlook the fact that the spirit of democracy has developed immensely during the last twenty or thirty years. Class distinctions have grown weaker. The working man no longer believes in a *Herrenvolk*. Jack, to-day, is as good as his master. These are healthy developments and by no means to be regretted but they call for new and democratic methods in the management of industrial enterprises. Let us very briefly consider these.

First there should be a Ministry of Industry, combining with the present functions of the Ministry of Labour some of those now performed by the Board of Trade and Ministry of Health. There

should be a strong Council of Industry consisting of employers, workers, and consumers, which would keep a close and constant watch on all matters concerning the human factor in industry and advise the minister.

In the factories directors and executive officers should not regard themselves as superior beings who are entitled by their office to order workers about, but rather as being, along with all the workers, servants of the public. When they give an order they should recognize that all they are doing is to interpret to the workers the action which a given circumstance demands, just as the guard of a train does when he " orders " the engine driver to start.

Ability and character should be the sole qualifications considered when appointing men to any executive post, either on the board of directors or otherwise. Industry should find no place for nepotism or class distinction. Every worker should " carry a Field Marshal's bâton in his knapsack."

All factory rules should be drawn up jointly by workers and executives. In case of disagreement (which is unlikely if the spirit of the factory is sound) the question should be referred to an independent third party to decide.

Any worker punished for a breach of rules should have the right of appeal to an appeal committee consisting of one of two persons elected by the workers, an equal number appointed by the directors and an agreed chairman who should have a vote. The decision of this committee should be final.

In all establishments above a certain size (say 50 workers) there should be a works council on which both executive officers and rank and file workers should serve. They should be entitled to discuss any matter they wish affecting the welfare of the business except complaints about individuals. Free criticism of the managerial methods should be permitted. The Council should be kept informed on all matters of importance affecting the workers. They should receive information about the financial position of the business at least as full as that given to shareholders. In most matters decisions of the Council should be subject to veto by the directors or the Trade Union, but experience has shown that, as confidence between the management and workers develops, power may be given to the Council to settle certain matters out of hand.

A representative of the workers (who will usually be the shop steward) should be consulted before overlookers or executive officers in the labour department are appointed. On the character and conduct of those officers the happiness of the workers largely depends.

Piece rates for repetitive processes should be agreed between the management and a representative of the workers concerned before being put into operation. No rate should be changed save by mutual consent.

Such, very briefly are some of the ways in which business management may be democratized. These methods, or others more or less like them have been adopted in various factories, and it has been found that they develop the spirit of co-operation, and strengthen discipline rather than weaken it, for the workers have had an equal share with the management in drawing up all disciplinary regulations.

In view of the rapidly growing demand of the workers for an improved status in industry the introduction of such democratic measures is an essential condition of securing their wholehearted co-operation. But it is not only democratic measures that count; all important are the tone and spirit of each establishment. Is it a soulless machine for making money, where democratic measures have been grudgingly introduced as a sop to the workers? or is it pervaded by a spirit of service to the community, and of friendly comradeship between all ranks, where "a man's a man for a' that" whether he be dustman or director? where the workers are made to feel that the management regards each one of them as a co-operator and no single one of them as a "factory hand"? where the directors have a high sense of their duty both to the community and to the workers, as well as to the shareholders?

If such a spirit prevails there need be no fear that the workers will fail to respond to it, and do not let cynics persuade us to the contrary. It is at work in many factories to the great advantage of all concerned. Why not in all? Yes, why not?

A MID-EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION

By Dov Biegun

EVER since the early years of the XIX Century, Central Europe has been thrown into perpetual convulsions by the relentless striving of its peoples towards national unity and self-determination. The unification of Germany and the birth of modern Italy have created an entirely new situation which has eliminated France as a danger to Europe and has formed the basis of the Anglo-French accord. Germany entered the field of world power-politics and pursued her course of aggrandizement and expansion leading to the climax of Hitler. This fact was but dimly recognized in Central Europe before 1914. The small nations there were not only confronted with the wild dreams and power of the Kaiser, but faced Austro-Hungary, Czarist Russia, and feudal Turkey. The hundred million people of the small nations of Central and South-Eastern Europe were dominated by one or more of these four "master nations". After the war of 1914-1918 all these powers ceased to exist for a time as arbiters of the fate of the small nations. Russia was going through her remarkable internal transformation from the Czarist Empire into the Soviet Union; the Habsburgs disappeared overnight; William II was in exile; and Turkey lay prostrate and in the fever of a nationalist revolution and far-reaching reforms. It was in this atmosphere that the "Succession States" of that region came into being. Poland arose as a State of 35 million people following three partitions and a century and a half of revolts, oppression, and endless struggles for the preservation of her national and ethnical identity. After three centuries of foreign rule, Czechoslovakia sprang into being as a state of 15 million people with the inheritance of the armament centres of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, uniting Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, emerged from what was Serbia and some provinces of the realms of the Habsburgs. Thus, for the time being, the Central Powers were submerged, and the only power left on the continent of Europe, which could organize anything resembling a system of security, was France. Poland readily became her ally; Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia formed the Little Entente for mutual defence in collaboration with France. The backbone of the new security system was the principle of "collective security". It soon became clear, however, that the Grand Alliance against the Central Powers had ceased to exist—leaving nothing but the League of Nations, a legalistic body, void of effective power, to take its

place. Tired of war, the world relapsed into an era of irresponsibility in the field of international affairs. The U.S.A. turned away from Europe. Italy was grieved by what she believed to be an insufficient reward for her participation in the war. Japan turned her attention to the Far East and, we know now, towards preparing her aggression on China and the Islands of the Pacific. Britain embarked upon a policy of one-sided disarmament—and limitless faith in the League of Nations. It was France, and France alone, that kept watch-on-the-Rhine through her system of security. She subordinated all her other national interests to the task of holding Germany down. But ineffectively, for France was overtaken in numbers, production and military efficiency by the future aggressors. Thus Europe drifted towards a new catastrophe.

Meanwhile, the small nations in Central and South-Eastern Europe developed steadily. The full national Freedom given to many millions brought hope in that region. Migration on a vast scale began from countryside to town, and from agriculture into industry. The industrialization of this zone proceeded steadily even during the years of the great economic crisis. Many of those states were struggling internally for democracy. Born, as it were, in the flames of war, they were mostly lacking the tradition which makes democracy effective. Some of them half feudal, economically backward and militarily weak, strove to develop a democracy of their own, which, given time, would not have failed to bear the expected fruits of an orderly life. But this was not to be. The efforts of twenty years of reborn nations were trampled over by the caterpillars of Nazi tanks.

At the present stage of the war, with the horizon clearing, and justified hopes for deliverance growing, the small nations in the Allied camp are reviewing their position and the future. Fear and anxiety cloud their minds. They recall the Locarno pact—the last attempt before the present war to organize security in Europe—a clear pointer to Germany that the small nations remaining outside the " Big Four " in Europe were virtually abandoned to their fate. Whilst they admit the imperative necessity of basing the coming peace upon a clear understanding between the new " Big Four "—the U.K., the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and China—they do not conceal their concern about their own future in face of what is being termed in many quarters the new " *World* Locarno Pact ". The now famous articles in *The Times*, suggesting a division of Europe into two respective spheres of influence between Russia and Great Britain, did not serve to dissipate their suspense. Mr. Churchill alone has so far made the most constructive contribution towards these problems. In his speculation about a " Council of Europe " and a " Council of Asia " he spoke for the small nations, who wish to be taken into the confidence of their more powerful partners in a new Europe, and who adhere to the principle of sincere co-operation on the basis of mutual respect between all nations, large and small. Mr. Churchill made it clear that Great Britain will welcome any regional Federation or Confederation between friendly neighbour states.

The failure of the League of Nations, an institution of high moral purpose, has demonstrated that the world was not yet mature enough to uphold the lofty ideals of the League, with the sacrifices that this would entail. Sweeping plans in the international sphere are now bound to meet with scepticism. Particularly in Central and South-Eastern Europe where nationalism is intense and has by no means run its full course, and is still growing. In the face of the prevailing aspirations, jealousies and unburied memories of the past, it is difficult to see at the moment how the solution of a European " Federal Union " can be put into successful practice. It appears that the only course open in that region is a steady advance towards larger territorial units, bound together by ever-strengthening ties of a Regional Confederation of the eight states between the Baltic and the Adriatic: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. This would be a major step towards military and economic collaboration in one of the most disintegrated parts of Europe—a step which may ultimately lead towards a higher form of international co-operation within the " Council of Europe "; and perhaps, in time, towards a Federal Union of Europe. There is no short-cut from international chaos and power-politics which will lead towards full international responsibility. This is a vital and difficult process, which can be completed only if good-will is shown on all sides and if it is accompanied by an intense course of education for the peoples of the world, and Europe in particular, towards such unqualified co-operation. The tragedy of the present war has opened the eyes of all nations towards this vital necessity; but as yet, conditions are not ripe for a full-scale leap into an experiment of Federal Union without a preparatory stage of Regional Confederation.

Our brief survey of Central and South-Eastern European problems and possibilities would be misleading were we to give the impression that a Regional Confederation will meet with no opposition, or that all concerned are at the present moment willing to agree even on the broad principles of such a Confederation. The difficulties in the path of the Confederation are great and many. Russia has by implication expressed her disapproval of any plan of a Federation or Confederation of her neighbour-states. She obviously fears that a powerful belt of states on her door-step would be used as a *cordon-sanitaire* against her. The fear seems to be ill-founded. For the mass of the inhabitants of the Confederation harbour feelings of deep sympathy for Russia, though it is equally true that some of them fear Russian domination. They will, however, never agree to march against Russia. It is obvious that the Confederation can only emerge and survive in close collaboration with Russia based on mutual respect.

The shadow of Russia's present attitude looms also over the Polish-Czechoslovakian agreenment on their avowed aim to establish a Confederation of the two countries. Negotiations on this subject between the two respective governments are, at the moment, still suspended. This Con-

federation, when established, will serve as one of the two corner-stones of the larger Regional Confederation discussed in this article; the other one being the Greek-Yugoslav Confederation which, it seems, is based already on perfect mutual understanding. Further difficulties arise with Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. Whilst Rumania had a tradition of friendly collaboration with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia through the medium of the "Little Entente" before she succumbed to collaboration with Germany, the former two countries are active accomplices of the Axis without any tradition of friendship towards their immediate neighbours. It is nevertheless admissible to point out that their problem has to be viewed with an eye on the dynamic future developments in Hungary and Bulgaria, which are bound to ensue after the war. Bulgaria, ruled by an alien German Dynasty, has twice in a century been driven into war against her Slav neighbours and friends. It is difficult to believe that the United Nations will agree to maintain this Dynasty in Bulgaria against the will of an outraged people. It is reasonable to assume that the Bulgarian people will be given a chance to adhere to a policy of good neighbourly relations, social progress and sincere collaboration within the wider framework of the Balkans in particular and Europe in general. As for Hungary, the old dream of revenge, symbolized in the officially sponsored movement of *nem nem sohá* (no, no, never), and the internal domination of the agrarian mass of the people by a handful of all-mighty feudal landlords, we may hope, will end once and for all. Hungarians have bled by the thousand on the wide Russian steppes, coerced by their aggressive nationalist rulers. The millions of landless and poverty-stricken peasants as well as the enlightened intelligentsia, will eagerly collaborate with a reshaped Central Europe, when internal conditions change, as undoubtedly they must.

The difficulties of the reconstruction of this vital zone of Europe are of no mean order, but the goal is noble and constructive. Upon the Confederation depends in a large measure the peace of Europe and, therefore, of the world.

The Regional Confederation of the states between Russia and Germany and bordered by the Baltic and Adriatic would serve three main purposes:

(a) To concert measures of defence of the confederated states against any future aggressor.

(b) To unite all states into one great economic block.

(c) To further mutual cultural relations.

The man-power potential of the confederation will far exceed that of Germany. The military qualities of the peoples concerned have been proved on many a battlefield in the past. Each of these nations possesses a high degree of military tradition and none is void of military experience. Poles, Greeks, Serbs, Czechs, and many other of the constituent races of the Confederation have shown their mettle in combat against their adversaries. The potential of industrial production of the region is already considerable, though the industrialization of this area must be the first concern of each and all of

the confederated states. It is estimated that Central and South-Eastern Europe produced before the present war nearly 54 million tons of coal, over 30 million tons of lignite, 2.7 million of pig-iron, over 4.5 million tons of steel, over 120,000 tons of zinc, 960,000 tons of bauxite, 29,000 tons of chrome, over 270,000 tons of iron pyrites, 32,000 tons of maganese-ore, etc. These are remarkable figures and they could be vastly increased. The oil from Poland and Rumania, unlimited supplies of timber and the potential of food production would make the Confederation into a formidable factor in Europe. As for the armament industry, the great centres in Czechoslovakia and the skilled engineers would form the nucleus for its armament industry. Poles and Czechs have proved their ability to produce modern designs so indispensable for any modern Army and Air Force. It will be in close collaboration with the Western democracies and Russia that the Confederation will exist. An outlet both to the Mediterranean as well as the Baltic will be vital. The first is secured through the adherence of Greece to the Confederation and the latter will have to be made possible through the restoration and considerable strengthening of Poland's position on the Baltic. Both for military as well as economic reasons, Poland will have to be given a considerably stronger position on the shores of the Baltic than in the past. For her coast-line would serve not only her own trade, but the whole of the Confederation.

The Governments of the respective states in the area discussed have spent in the past an average of 35 per cent. of their annual national income on defence measures. This was done at the expense of the standard of living of the population, and yet it was of no avail in face of the determined aggression of Germany. It is only in concerted action that they can prevail. The Confederation should eliminate many a cause of friction in this region, and deter any future aggressor from a fatal stroke against it. Whilst it is clear that the Confederation will co-operate with any international authority which will be set up by the United Nations for the preservation of Peace, it should be made strong enough at the very outset to be able to stand on its own feet.

It is, however, in the economic field that the Confederation will contribute decisively towards progress and lasting peace. This area is generally known as "Peasant-Europe". Its population is mainly engaged in agriculture. Poland and Rumania have some 70 per cent of their population in agriculture; Yugoslavia and Bulgaria nearly 80 per cent; Hungary some 60 per cent; Greece some 50 per cent and only Czechoslovakia with her highly developed industry has a population some 40 per cent of which is engaged on agriculture. The second predominant feature of the whole region is the very low average standard of living. In these densely populated countries, agriculture is identical with poverty. Colin Clark, in his book *Conditions of Economic Progress*, compares the purchasing power per head of the male population living on agriculture in the great agriculture countries overseas with that of Poland and arrives at the following picture. Calculated in international units of purchasing power, the figures for the respective countries are: 2244 for

New Zealand; 1524 for Australia; 1233 for the Argentine; but only 195 for Poland. It is easy to grasp the reasons behind these startling figures. Not the least of them is the fact that whereas in Canada an area of 44.5 million acres of land cultivated with wheat, rye, oats, barley and potatoes supports an agricultural population of only 3.2 million, there were 23 million rural inhabitants in Poland on an area similarly cultivated of 33.6 million acres. Thus the Polish peasant owned an average of 1.4 acres of land, whereas the Canadian farmer owned an average of 14 acres. A comparison between Poland on the one hand and the Argentine, Australia and New Zealand on the other hand, would bring us to similar results. The same applies to most of the rest of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. It is estimated that whereas in the period 1930-34, there was an average of 21.8 bushels of wheat per annum per each inhabitant of Canada, Australia and the Argentine, the great wheat producing countries of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia had barely 7.2 bushels of wheat per annum per head of their respective populations. The low standard of living and the low rate of purchasing power of the peasant was not compensated in those countries by the purchasing power of the industrial workers. For the industrialization of the region has not progressed in a manner commensurate to the needs of the population. Thus in spite of the poverty of the population, most of these countries had an appreciable surplus of agricultural goods for the world market. Germany was the main consumer of these goods, and used it as a lever for economic and later on political subordination of the whole region. When in 1938 some of the countries concerned decided to form an agricultural block for the purpose of gaining a firmer position in economic negotiations with Germany, the latter refused to deal with this block. It was easier for Schacht to impose the unjust barter-system on each country individually, than to face them jointly. The whole of South-Eastern Europe became Germany's *Lebensraum* before she even sent her planes over Warsaw or Belgrade. The interest of the great western Democracies, however, in the economic fate of these people, was but scanty. During the period of 1924-30, British-American capital invested an average of 9 gold dollars per head of the population per annum in Germany, whereas the corresponding figure for South-Eastern Europe was merely 2.12 gold dollars per annum. Unless these countries are industrialized with the help of a stream of capital from the West, they are bound to remain Germany's *Lebensraum*.

There is no divergence of opinion among the Allies on the vital necessity of effectively disarming Germany after the war and preventing her from plunging the world again into a blood-bath. There is, however, one factor at least which seems to deter the great nations of the world from putting effectively this policy into operation. This deterrent is the fear of crippling Germany as a great economic factor in Europe. This fear would be entirely unfounded, if and when Central and South-Eastern Europe were to be put in a position to take Germany's place in world-economy. An economic block of 100 million

people with the natural resources and the vast opportunities at its disposal would fully compensate for the vacuum which the retreat of Germany from the economic arena as a first-rate factor would necessarily leave. The Confederation would create such economic conditions within the block and decide upon such measures as would make a steady flow of trade within the Confederation possible. The political stability which the Confederation would provide would be a strong stimulus for foreign credits and investments, thus making the industrialization of that region possible.

The third great opportunity of the Confederation would be to foster mutual cultural relations of the confederated states. Here indeed a number of favourable factors are already in existence. The linguistic affinities of the peoples are remarkable. Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenian, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Bulgarians understand each other's tongue with ease. They are all branches of the great Slav tree and are historically and racially related to each other. Cultural life is based here on a variety of elements and is an integral part of the ancient European civilization. There is one element, however, which distinguishes this region, as a whole, from any other one in Europe—it is the cultural awakening of the peasantry. This renaissance is a great source of literary and artistic activities common to all nations of the region. The above elements provide a solid basis for mutual understanding of these peoples. Exchange of students and teachers, literature and contributions to arts and science, organized travel of youth into various parts of the Confederation, travelling exhibitions, collaboration of the universities, the ministries of education and various other important means of cultural cooperation, will deepen the feeling of mutual interdependence, understanding and the desire for peace.

(Until the outbreak of war Dr. Biegun was Foreign Correspondent, working mainly in Central Europe, of Warsaw and Prague newspapers.)

THE LABOUR WAY TO NEW ECONOMICS

By Hector McNeil, M.P.

MY acquaintance with the young men and women who will trade a service number for one on the electoral register convinces me that no party will command their confidence which provides less than peace abroad and, at home, not only security but opportunity. Not much more than that because mankind, if not cynical of politics is certainly critical of political promises. If the Labour Party pledges more than it achieves the impatience of our people may threaten not only our party but the whole system of representative government.

As a party we must pledge ourselves to implement social insurance as a feature of domestic security. I think it unlikely that we shall much improve on what is now called the Beveridge Plan. But there is, it seems to me, a grave danger that the public mind is already confusing Beveridge with scales that are a subsidiary political matter. The importance of Beveridge to the Labour movement and I think to the youth upon whom every Party is going to depend lies in the fact that Sir William Beveridge enunciates not scales of relief but the principle of social insurance within the administrative framework of such insurance. The nightmares of the non-salaried workers associated in their minds with idleness, injury, sickness, old age are thus ended. Politically, within such a scheme, the worker has his energy set free for the major social tasks: his attention is turned as it were from the problems of disease to those of health. No nation can afford to have the energies of a substantial part of its working population dissipated in pondering what is going to happen to them tomorrow. The men of our forces who knocked down the might of Hitler are certainly not going to accept an entry—a relatively small entry too—in a ledger as the explanation of why they and their wives should be destitute.

Dr. Singer, calculating that our national income in 1965 cannot be less than £6,250 million shows that Beveridge would cost us 5 per cent. of our income and on the assumption that unemployment will drop from 14 per cent. to 10 per cent. that therefore the Beveridge scheme would cost us a nett 1 per cent. —that is, 5 per cent less than our pre-war average economic increase.

But more than freedom from destitution is wanted. We have been for so long mouthing slogans about the right to work that we have lost sight of the significance of this axiom. Brooding man is bound to be unhappy; a man satisfied that his energy is being deployed in an essential fashion may be

happy. Additionally, it is plain that the wealth which must be created to provide the administrating services with the luxuries and the preferences of social man can only proceed from work. So the Labour Party must turn its semi-negative claim for the right to work to the positive obligatory conception that everyone must work.

Economic Jonahs remind us that we shall practically have liquidated our foreign investments by 1945 and that therefore we shall not have this income to pay for our imports. In 1938 1,800,000 people were on the average unemployed in this country. In ironical fashion each man of that sad army ought to cheer this disappearance of our foreign balance because subject to certain conditions, all capable of development, the activity of the 1,800,000 is the balance which uncontrolled capitalism could not use and which socialism plans to use to fill the gap in our import-purchasing programme.

Now no one pretends that we can guarantee unbroken employment. What we as a Party do think we can do is to guarantee against gross unemployment. We will do so by three dimensional planning. First must come a statistical attempt to estimate the world's needs. This is no insuperable task. Indeed the Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau set up under Sir Frederick Leith-Ross provides the nucleus organization. We have also the combined boards dealing with shipping, munitions, raw materials and food. Here surely is a substantial machine and a considerable amount of technique available for world wide ascertainment. If we can measure the consumption of the basic commodities for food, the growing of food, fuel, the heavy industries and commercial transport, and substantial agreement as to where and when they will be produced we have gone a long way toward graphing employment. Next, if we have a machine for ironing out the difficulties of world exchange we will at least prevent the growth of involuntary barriers. The likeliest model for this machine is the Keynes Plan or, as Lord Keynes himself has suggested, a synthesis of his and the Morganthau scheme. But of course it must be noted that such a machine functions only so far as the nations or their Governments are willing co-operators. Deliberately created political and fiscal barriers do not come within the competence of a clearing house union. Thirdly, we must continue to control industry not only quantitatively, as a consequence of our ascertainments, but geographically, broadly on the lines suggested by the Barlow Report.

Now so far I have not referred, except by inference, to whether or not Labour should continue within a coalition. I consider that the coalition will break but I hope that when it does so the three major parties will at least make one agreement, that is, that they will not outbid each other on demobilization claims. There is every reason, both national and partisan, why they should reach such agreement. Undoubtedly, the great demand over-riding all others is that men should be permitted to return to civilian life as quickly as possible but unless the return is done in a planned fashion then not only will we have national instability but no Party will be able to implement pledges

or to operate any economic plan upon which it secured the approval of the electorate. A scheme for demobilization is already being worked out by the Coalition as Sir William Jowitt recently told the House of Commons. Let all Parties honour this plan and thus avoid the chaos of 1919-20. It is also desirable for the Parties to agree that there should be neither deflationary nor inflationary bids.

On November 21, 1918, the Government passed an Act enforcing broadly a standstill on minimum wages for six months. If before this Coalition breaks Parliament pushed through a complete standstill for 12 months and pegged food, clothing, fuel prices and rents for the same period it would do well. But I think agreement here unlikely because the Parties will differ not only as to what is meant by inflation and deflation but as to what causes would bring about such effects.

The break up of the Coalition even if agreement is secured on demobilization will come if not on social insurance certainly on the continuation of control and planning. The peacetime controls of banking, industry and commerce will want Government control lifted as quickly as possible. This is already indicated. Labour must oppose this tendency and argue for the continuation of control so that production may supply the ascertained commodities which are most needed and not necessarily those which, in a free market, would yield the greatest returns. Moreover, not even wartime controls are sufficient. They were a compromise and have proved a comparatively good one. What actually has happened however is that where an industry was organized it supplied the organization and the personnel for control. Where it was insufficiently organized the greater firms within the industry provided exactly the same service. But peacetime control must be such that the organization is of a non-commercial kind and its personnel completely free from and above the industry which it set out to control.

Neither unregulated private enterprise nor the regulated monopoly enterprises with which we grew familiar between wars can plan for full employment however much they may hope for it. Unemployment within such schemes had two functions. It marked out the boss and enabled him to regulate wages. Secondly and much more important, it was a principal factor in maintaining trade balance. Obviously depressed wages and a substantial proportion of the population on the dole reduce the consumption of imports. Unemployment was not a sensitive instrument. But time, chance, unemployment and, let us admit, the boldness of the investor and the operator contrived to swing back the economic pendulum in due season. But the fellow from the desert will have little patience with time and less with unemployment. Private enterprise it seems to me so far has produced no substitute for unemployment. The Conservative Party therefore if it is to pursue its traditional defence of private enterprise cannot accept the Socialist solution for unemployment. I cannot therefore believe that we can secure the measure of agreement that makes for coalition on such a programme.

Moreover, as I pointed out earlier, control will not only be quantitative but geographical. The standard work on this subject of course is the Barlow Report. The advantages of planned industry in averting gross unemployment are obvious but the consequences are radical and they cut across Conservative policy. You cannot for example direct one light industry to set itself up among the heavy Clydeside industries with a 400 mile haul to its main market in London and allow its competitor to operate on the greater London perimeter unless you equalize freightage. We may not be able easily to administer equalized freightage throughout the whole community for all commodities on a similar basis as postal charges but certainly if we are in earnest about full employment we can and must have them operating equally throughout each given industry. And this can be done on an actuarial basis.

Neither can you direct one concern to Birmingham and another to Dundee if there is a gross difference in rent and rates. This and the associated difficulties of reconstruction were implicit in the necessity for setting up the Uthwatt Committee. The Socialist Party must in substance be committed to a system removing the disproportion in the prices and rating of land. I doubt even if the Uthwatt Report goes far enough. For ease and speed in replanning blitzed areas public ownership of at least the urban lands is necessary. Sir Charles Bressey has said that an authority without ownership cannot plan effectively. Lord Astor, Mayor of Plymouth, has agreed and he, as Mr. Lewis Silkin pointed out, can hardly be accused of socialist bias.

Further, if you are going to control by license what kind of industry can be operated and where, there is no free market for the investment of capital (it is noteworthy that Lord Keynes in the House of Lords on May 18, without disagreement from the Lord Chancellor, seemed to visualize a machine for controlling the export of capital). If then there is no free market domestically for capital, and export is to be controlled the logical sequence would seem to be that we should have an investment board which, broadly speaking, would allocate all capital offered for investment and would offer standardized rates of interest dependent on the period for which the money was offered.

Now it should be plain that the maintenance and extension of control will also impose many difficulties upon the workers themselves. For example if we are going to have a balanced industry it is a consequence that workers must be directed to where industry is. Labour must become more mobile. Sir William Beveridge, not in his Report but in *Unemployment—A Problem of Industry*, examines the unemployed percentages in certain industries in 1924. The figures in the war-boosted industries such as shipbuilding, engineering, dock and harbour services vary from almost 30 per cent. to 15 per cent. In addition, not only must we have a range of industries in any district but we must also have flexible as well as mobile labour. We are, I think, coming quite close to the point where the diversity of machine tools means that the skill of the craft worker is a limited necessity and that a willing worker could

fit into many industries. But the direction of employment cannot be achieved without the co-operation of the Trade Unions.

The possible standstill agreement in wages is another feature which we cannot expect the Trade Unions and the men returning from the Services easily to accept. This is a tactical problem which the Labour Party must solve and the essence of its solution lies in education within the Trade Union movement now. If the long term benefits could be shown Union support would be assured. There is also the negative argument, easily demonstrated, that it would mean victory for the other side if there were a split between the Trade Union and political wings of the Labour movement such as we saw in France.

I have spent no space in arguing for housing, health and education services because I can hardly believe that any Party dare face its electors without adequate pledges and plans for these. But all three of these subjects have an additional importance to the Labour Party if we are asking Trade Unionists and workers of all kinds to fit themselves into this new industrial pattern. It would surely be satisfactory grounds for resisting a direction if a man could show that he could not house his family in the area, that there were insufficient health services or that the education of his children would suffer by the transfer.

One of the most difficult jobs for all parties will be focussing the attention of young men and women upon constructive foreign policy. Perversely but naturally the men returning from foreign fields will have little interest in it. In addition, my eyes at any rate do not discern clearly what beyond the feeding of Europe will be the problems we shall have to tackle nor the temper and complexion of the Governments with which we shall have to deal.

I am certain, however, that we must base our plans on a firm and continuous understanding with the U.S.S.R. All of us hope that the U.S.A. will continue as at present both politically and economically. Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Wallace and Mr. Sumner Welles are men of the new age. But many of us fear a swing-back internally. If the U.S.A. secedes even temporarily the job of planning internationally and of reconstruction in Europe will be immeasurably greater. If however we have peace in Europe all things are possible and plainly this and the development of an interstate organization in Europe will depend almost completely upon Anglo-Russian agreement. If to this we can add the co-operation of the partners of the Commonwealth we may be nearer an effective international organization for the maintenance of peace than we have ever been, although of course our aim must be a world organization. It is to my mind arguable that if development on the economic plane grows from existing organizations the development of a world organization will be less difficult than formerly.

The United Nations of course are pledged to the disarming of the aggressor nations. I must confess that I am not clear what our tasks in Japan will be but I am certain that the United Nations will have to move into Germany

after a revolution. We must therefore as a Party give food and credit to a German Government prepared immediately to disarm under the supervision of the United Nations and we must re-orientate German industry in terms of European needs and not in terms of German aggressive designs. But as a party we must be prepared not only to punish the war guilty but to oppose the almost inevitable surge of hatred against the German race. We cannot occupy in perpetuity. Neither can we seek to reduce Germany to a feudal economy. Either the United Nations mean to be bound by the Atlantic Charter or they do not. The Socialist Party does. And the Charter must include a disarmed Germany. Apart altogether from the question of international morality it is economically demonstrable that we shall all suffer unless Germany is as quickly re-equipped as the other nations to provide her quota in meeting the hungers and necessities of ravaged Europe.

In the interval of disarmament we must seek agreement on the creation of an international police force and an Air Force is obviously the easiest weapon to forge. The U.S.S.R. and Britain and it is hoped the U.S.A. will lead here. It will be administratively difficult and politically dangerous if we commit ourselves to independent national wings of such a force. I do not pretend that the pattern of the court of which the force is the instrument is plain or its creation simple but the principle on which my party takes its stand is plain. Whatever the difficulties, no matter what aspect of sovereignty be ceded, we are committed to creating a court to which all disputes not resolved by negotiation must be referred. We are also committed to the unpalatable axiom that this international force must be of such weight as to be effective against nations which will not proceed to the court, which act without consent of the court or which refuse to accept the judgment of the court.

What then is our balance sheet? We can offer our young men and women the certainty that at home everyone will have bread before anyone has cake, and abroad, the high probability of peace. We can add that we see clearly how to provide some jam for the bread of all; that we mean in a short term programme of production to meet the domestic, industrial, health and educational needs of the community; that we plan domestically and internationally to assess those needs and we mean to control production to secure these ends.

Does this mean that we consider our socialistic analysis faulty and that we are departing from socialization as our aim? Not at all. We should socialize immediately the machinery of banking and credit, making what is almost *de facto de jure* by extending public ownership and control from the Treasury to the joint stock banks and to the assurance companies who deploy capital and who are the most attractive proposition for socialization in the whole community. We should also quickly complete the process of control in coal and inland transport by bringing them also into public ownership. These are the immediate but not the ultimate aims of socialization.

In addition to the other means of steadying employment we have discussed

we must not leave out of our considerations the need to control the demand for capital goods. Before the war reputable economists had established that the variations in the demand for non-consumable goods were not a symptom but a chief cause of fluctuation in employment. The 120 industrialists in their recently published plan for British industry of course recognized this and argued that the state should arrest recessions by timely investment in non-commercial enterprise. I cannot see why the state should accept this qualification. I can see no reason why a Socialist government when it detects depression should not step into less efficient industries and buy a share of control in such industries on condition that obsolete machinery, lay-out or buildings should be replaced during the threatened depression. Thus the state would use another weapon to stabilize production, to promote efficiency and to socialize. I am, like many of my associates, of open mind in relation to the instrument of socialist control. Sir Stafford Cripps at present makes interesting experiments in the Aircraft Production industry. The Northern Ireland Transport Board also repays study and the London Passenger Transport Board is in many respects model. As a Party we proceed toward socialization not for doctrinaire reasons but to increase and steady production for use.

It will be observed that as a Party we have nothing to offer for nothing. I cannot imagine that our magnificent young men and women would be attracted if we had and I believe we lost greatly when our party parted with its crusading spirit for slogans about easy living. We shall tell them that the machinery of administration must remain in battle-dress for the enemies of progress and the opponents of change are many and strong. We will assure them that the new world is theirs physically as well as theoretically but that it can only be created by work and that non-workers have no title to citizenship. But we must be honest as well as bold in leadership. Essential reconstruction at home and abroad must come before any luxuries. I think they will accept this truth if we also demonstrate that socialism means expansion not only in the production of wealth but in the creation of opportunity.

Lord Keynes discussing the Clearing Union in the House of Lords said:

> So ill did we fare in the years between the wars for lack of such an instrument of international government as this that the resulting waste and dissipation of wealth was scarcely less than the economic cost of wars themselves.

Mr. Colin Clark calculates that between 1930 and 1934 Britain, Germany and U.S.A. lost £22,000 millions by the depression—or approximately the cost for Great Britain of four years of war.

The initial cost in effort, thought and sacrifice in bringing order to economic and ensuring employment, health, education and homes for all will be great. So also will its social dividends be.

(Mr. McNeil is Labour M.P. for the Burgh of Greenock.)

THE RECONQUEST OF BURMA

By General Sir Walter Kirke

THE Burmese live in the valleys of the Irrawaddy and Chindwin and other rivers, which form the main communications. It is true that as a result of British occupation a number of roads and railways have been made, but generally speaking the main traffic is normally carried by light draught paddle steamers, rafts or dugouts. On the banks of these rivers there are often big stretches of grass running as high as eighteen feet and presenting a very considerable obstacle to the movement of anything smaller than the wild elephants which roam these jungles. That is particularly the case where the rivers overflow their banks during the rainy season. The jungle is usually thick on the low ground but thins as the country rises away from the rivers, becoming what is known as "tree jungle", which is easily traversable in dry weather.

In the rainy season one can also move comparatively freely through this tree jungle but both leeches and mosquitoes are very bad, and every stream becomes a major obstacle, frequently flooding the country for miles around.

In the cold weather the climate is perfect. Heavy mists hang over the river valleys until the sun rises into a cloudless sky and disperses them. Up in the hills the air is like champagne. There is no fear of rain apart from a few days about Christmas and again in the Chin Hills in March, but this rain is not sufficient to affect movement. In April and May it becomes very hot, particularly in the dry zone, where water may also be a difficulty, but the heat is not sufficient to stop military operations as was seen during our retreat in 1942, though they place a heavy strain on European troops.

Conditions are very different, however, when the rains break. The South West Monsoon strikes Rangoon usually about the middle of May and by the end of the month has enveloped the whole country with the exception of the "dry zone". Conditions then become extremely trying. The rainfall is very heavy in Rangoon but as it moves North it misses the large patch of country known as the "dry zone", of which Meiktila is about the centre, and here conditions in the rains are very pleasant as there is a cool breeze at night. Further North again the rainfall gradually increases from Mandalay northwards until it more or less exhausts itself in a grand final burst against the Kachin Hills, with only a small slop-over into Yunnan.

As the result of the torrential downpour, the Irrawaddy becomes a vast volume of water overflowing its banks in every direction, and the same applies to the other rivers. This state of affairs continues until the end of October.

During this season unmetalled roads become quagmires, bridges are washed away, vast stretches of low lying country are submerged and roads cut along the hill sides are apt to slip.


Malaria is prevalent, particularly at the foot of hills, the reason no doubt why the Japanese recently launched an attack towards Tiddim in the Chin Hills in order to get as many of their people as possible out of the Chindwin valley before the rains broke. This six months period of inactivity due to the rains has proved a fatal bar to the economic development of many promising projects in connection with the precious metals and jewels in which Burma abounds. It is equally unpropitious for any form of military operation.

A good deal has been written about the hostility of the Burmese and the assistance given by them to the Japanese, and the inference has been drawn therefrom that they have some urge to get rid of British rule.

This is probably quite untrue. The Burman normally lives a life of ease and comfortable sufficiency requiring only a few months work in the year. Outside the big towns there are no rich and no poor, and if by chance a Burman acquires wealth he spends the surplus in erecting one or more pagodas. As there is no struggle for existence the Burman is naturally easy-going, laughter-loving, somewhat irresponsible and always out for sport or amusement of any kind, so one can well understand that the novel excitement of looting abandoned bungalows would be an irresistible attraction. From a military point of view we have never been able to make soldiers of them owing to their strong aversion to anything in the nature of discipline or to performing an unpleasant duty. The so-called Burma Regiments are not recruited from Burmese but from various hill tribes who lead a more austere existence. The Burmese inclination is to take the line of least resistance and their Buddhist religion stresses the merits of the quiet life, so by this time they are probably heartily sick of the Japanese, particularly if the latter have tried to make them do any continuous work. From a military point of view the Burmese are hardly even a minor factor in the problem.

As one leaves the river valleys one also leaves the Burmese and gets into the country of various hill tribes. By far the largest of these is the Shan group; worthy, hard working folk with an ancient civilization but completely devoid of any military traditions or aspirations. They live on rolling plateaus at altitudes of 5,000 to 7,000 feet, presenting little if any obstacle to military movement in the open season, as the Japanese showed when they drove back the Chinese covering the left flank of our troops in Burma.

Of the other tribes shown on the sketch map, the Kareus, Kachins and Chins are enlisted in the Burma regiments. Officers who have trained them are apt to champion the merits of their own particular brand, but in point of fact they all, though possibly in varying degrees, suffer from the same disabilities; absence of natural leaders, a babel of languages which hampers co-operation, and a tradition that encirclement is to be avoided at all costs, and that the correct antidote is dispersal into the jungle.



Their ability to stand up to a serious Japanese attack is very doubtful, but their mastery of the arts of ambush may make them somewhat of a nuisance to the enemy. If however the ejection of the enemy depended in any way on the inhabitants of Burma or its surrounding hills the Japanese might well stay there for ever.

As regards the country it is the Northern and Western frontiers which most affect the military problems.

Starting from Mandalay the railway and the famous Burma Road zig-zag up on to the plateau, and we eventually arrive at the railhead Lashio, from which an off-shoot of the Burma Road brings us to Namkham, the meeting point of many races and tribes, and connected by a good road to the key river port of Bhamo. Namkham lies on the edge of the Kachin Hills which run northwards at ever increasing altitudes till they merge into the main Himalayas. These hills for the most part rise very steeply from the plain to heights of seven thousand feet or more. Their average width is about thirty miles and owing to the system of cultivation, which depends on wood ash as a fertilizer, successive generations have continuously cut down and burnt fresh patches of forest with the result that the hills are covered with dense scrub jungle which has taken the place of the original trees. There are a number of mule tracks across these hills leading to the posts of the Burma Frontier Force and by which in the dry season there was considerable trade on pack animals from Yunnan. Like all the Burma hill tribes, except the Shans, they have no written language except what we and American missionaries have given them, whilst their religion is directed to propitiating the malevolent spirits in which, apparently, their jungles abound.

Leaving the Kachins of the Hukawng valley we come to Nagas and Manipuris, primitive tribesmen of no military value. Then come various tribes of Chins some of whom are enlisted in the Burma Regiments. The country here is extremely rugged and broken and although the jungle is not so dense as on the Kachin Hills it suffers from the same disadvantage that scrub jungle has taken the place of the original trees. The Chin generally speaking is of a low standard of civilization, his chief characteristics being his phenomenal capacity as a porter and as a consumer of home-brewed rice beer.

South of the Chin Hills lie the Arakan Hill Tracts and here there is a strip of unadministered and partially unexplored country. It consists of a tangle of mountains interspersed with deep malarial valleys and it forms an absolute barrier to military operations in any direction. It fades out into the Arakan Yomas which are lower but not much less difficult. On the Indian side of the frontier the main communications are the Brahmaputra and the railways, and it is a reasonable assumption that their capacity would be in excess of that of any roads which might be driven across the frontier to Burma.

This brings us face to face with the main military problem which is how any considerable forces could be supplied from India across one of the most

difficult frontiers in the world, the Northern flank firmly barred by the Himalayas, the Southern flank resting on the sea and the intervening space filled by a tangle of mountains devoid of through roads or supplies; a country across which for reasons of physical geography there has never been any intercourse between India and Burma.

Starting from the North various alternatives have been suggested to deal with the problem, of which the latest and not the least fanciful is to construct a road through Sikkim and Tibet into China. This need hardly be taken seriously, for such a road would take years to build and when built would be closed by the rains in its lower reaches, whilst for much of the open season it would be blocked by snow in the upper levels.

Another proposal was to push a road from Sadiya to the upper Yangste, but as will be seen from the sketch map this would involve crossing the valleys of a number of big rivers—Irrawaddy, Shweli, Salween, Mekong and Yangste, in a country which is still unexplored and rises to great altitudes. As a wartime project it can be ruled out on the time factor alone.

This brings us to the first proposal offering any practical possibilities. A project for connecting India to Myitkyina via the Hukawng valley has been in existence for very many years and the necessary surveys are doubtless in existence. Starting from Lido the route would first have to cross the Pathai Hills by a pass some five thousand feet high before dropping down into the fairly flat country of the Hukawng valley. In the dry weather this latter would probably not present any great obstacles but, the numerous streams which form the Chindwin would render it extremely difficult to keep the route open during the rains. At Myitkyina there is an aerodrome, but apart from this it is more or less of a dead end. In the dry weather the river is open to Bhamo, if any steamers were available which would hardly be the case, whilst the country East of the river is largely open grass land and is a sportsman's paradise, only inhabited by elephant, bison and other wild animals. In the rainy season, however, the various streams coming down from the hills flood large stretches, whilst the hill tracks connecting the frontier posts in the hills above cannot be relied upon. In the rains too the low country is very malarial as is shown by the fact that many years ago parties used to come over from Yunnan in the cold weather in order to wash gold out of one of the small streams which is particularly rich in the metal. One year, however, they stayed too late and a number died of malaria, owing it is said to the displeasure of the local spirits at this foreign intrusion, since when there have been no further visitors. The river is completely closed in the rains by the "Upper Defile" where the pressure of the water is terrific and the only other link, namely the railway, would presumably be useless from want of rolling stock. The only alternative would be to drive a road over the Kachin Hills from Myitkyina to Tengyueh in Yunnan, but this is a major engineering project which would require at least a second cold weather and probably several.

The only remaining line of advance from India would be by the continuation of the road from Imphal to Tamu and thence down to the Chindwin at Kalewa, but the Japanese are in occupation of Kalewa and Kalemyo and of all the former Military Police posts with the exception of Tiddim, so considerable opposition might be expected from the start.

Crossing the river at Kalewa one strikes a fair weather road to Yeu, which may have been improved by the Japanese, from which point onwards the communications are good. The country along this route is not difficult and it was used by our forces retreating from Mandalay.

There is also another fair weather road running down the valley by Tilin from Kalemyo to Pakoko, which may also have been improved, but the absence of stone in Burma makes road construction difficult everywhere.

Either of these lines of advance lead to the west bank of the Irrawaddy which would have to be crossed to reach the Burma Road at Mandalay and the only bridge across this great river near Mandalay has been destroyed. E en if we succeeded in reaching and holding Mandalay, our troops would have three unbridged rivers behind them on their attenuated lines of communication—the Brahmaputra, Chindwin and Irrawaddy, and it is highly improbable that there would be any surplus carrying capacity for the Chinese up the Burma Road after providing for the maintenance of our troops, in view of the vastly superior communications of the Japanese. If our main object was to provide supplies for the Chinese, an increase in the air transport fleet would be an easier and more certain method.

Let us now examine the Japanese situation. When the enemy occupied Rangoon they advanced up the main communications of the country, river, road and rail, and from this central spine they have the unrestricted use of all the lateral communications which we have established during the years of our occupation, and by means of them they have been able to overrun the whole country including the frontier posts, with the possible exception of those in the far North. The roads which we built to defend the Northern frontier of Burma against the Chinese or to control the hill tribes are now available to the Japanese for the same purpose. By these communications they can operate in any direction on interior lines, which was, of course, the precise purpose for which we developed them. It is true that the river flotilla was for the most part sunk by our retreating troops and that the few remaining vessels are a highly prized target for our aircraft, but the railways, though partially interrupted by bombing, and the roads are still at their disposal. Furthermore these land communications lie to the East of the Irrawaddy which forms a second line of defence against any attack from India.

The conclusion which emerges from the above appears to be that the only open flank is the sea and that if we can regain command of it the recapture of Rangoon would be the most useful first step.

Even with command of the sea, however, the operation is one of considerable difficulty. It is axiomatic that no amphibious operation can hope to

succeed unless local command of the air can be maintained and the necessary air umbrella provided, and unfortunately here again our own pre-war preparations have been turned against us. In the course of developing the air route to Australia we established a chain of landing grounds from the Indian frontier right down to Singapore all of which are now in the hands of the Japanese whilst, for the defence of Burma, air fields were also established at strategic points. At Rangoon in particular there are a number of well-developed aerodromes, two more at Moulmain and behind them others in Thailand. The Japanese may have established still more, the object being to give their air forces the utmost strategic mobility to counteract their technical and numerical inferiority; for this is the basic idea of the whole Japanese scheme for defending their far-flung conquests, and keeping us out of bombing range of Japan.

Our situation is very different. The Andaman Islands are too far off to be of much use and the chain of landing grounds up the Arakan coast have still to be recaptured. They perhaps might form stepping stones, but the recent campaign to take the first, Akyab, miscarried for want of the necessary shipping to take the port direct. It was therefore necessary to fight a way forward through most difficult jungle country, whilst the Japanese enjoyed full use of river transport on the Mayu river, by which they could at any time turn the left flank of our forces as they struggled forward. This little campaign is a replica in miniature of the problem of Burma as a whole.

To obtain air superiority it would seem that we should have to have recourse to carrier-borne aircraft, which require proportionately a far greater effort. Nor even with air superiority is the capture of Rangoon from the sea an easy matter. The river itself is navigationally difficult and easily defensible, and it will be remembered that the Japanese, who had complete command of the sea, took it from the land side by advancing from Thailand through Pegu, and forcing our troops to evacuate it to avoid being surrounded.

For us the Bassein creek and the railway to Henzada appear on the map to offer possibilities, but this is more apparent than real, for in actual fact the railway is the only connection and runs through dense jungle. It might perhaps be possible to establish communications across the Southern part of the Arakan Yomas, but this means heavy road making. Given command of the sea we might indeed establish a sea blockade of Rangoon and Moulmain, but it is reasonable to assume that the Japanese have foreseen this possibility, since it has been reported that they are extending the Siamese railway from Bangkok to connect with the Burma system via Moulmain. This project will probably take a considerable time to complete, but when completed will give them direct connection from the sea on the far side of the Malay Peninsula and out of reach of any blockade in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore the task of connecting up the Siamese roads with those in the Shan States is not a difficult one and the Japanese may have already done so, thus giving them alternative lines of supply to Upper Burma independent of

Rangoon. In the extreme North the break of 50 miles or more made by the retreating Chinese in the railway from Hanoi to Kunming does not appear to have been repaired, but presumably it might be, if the effort was considered worthwhile.

To establish any effective blockade of Burma it would apparently be necessary to include the Gulf of Siam and Indo-China, which again indicates that possibly the longest way round may in the end prove to be the quickest way home, that is, that an attack nearer the Japanese home land and the seas which surround it may prove eventually to be the easiest method of forcing a withdrawal from Burma.

The object of this article is not, however, to prove that Burma cannot be reconquered by direct action, but rather to dispel misleading ideas which may be formed from the study of small scale maps on which none of the real difficulties appear. It is a mistake to suppose that because we have a large army in India, and the Japanese a comparatively small one in Burma, the task of ejecting the latter should be an easy one. "War is an affair of the communications," which is another way of saying that only those troops count who can be put into the battle. In this respect the Japanese have advantages which it will not be easy to neutralize.

SICILY AND THE ATLANTIC

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

THE grip of the Allies on the sea lines of communication has been most noticeably increased by the conquest of Sicily and the strengthening of the escorts of the convoys in the Atlantic. We may reasonably expect this grip to be still further hardened and great benefits to flow therefrom, though we cannot as yet regard the control as absolute. We have however reached the position in which we have first been able to carry a large army across the Atlantic and land it in Africa with trifling loss, and to follow that up by the transport of a second army across the Mediterranean and to give it tactical support from the sea flank in spite of submarines, aircraft and the Italian battlefleet. We have been fighting a long uphill struggle made all the more difficult because of the want of sufficient escorting vessels and craft, partly because instead of making the command of the sea the primary object of our strategy we directed a large proportion of our efforts in other directions. The first phase of our struggle was to hold what we possessed, principally in Egypt; our next, to drive the enemy out of the positions in Africa which threatened our sea routes; our third, to drive him out of, and occupy ourselves, the fortress of Sicily, that outpost of the southern front of Europe.

Sicily, throughout the ages, has been of inestimable importance in relation to the command of the Mediterranean and of all that flows from the possession of that command. This importance has been of the same nature, and for the same reason, whether the instruments which fight for the command and exercise the control of the sea were the galleys of the centuries preceding the seventeenth century, the sailing fleets of the later time, the battleships and cruisers, or the swarms of aircraft and small vessels, surface and submarine, which to-day are the dominating elements in the campaign in the centre of the Mediterranean. Lying as Sicily does in the waist of the sea its ports flank, at a short distance, the main east and west route from Gibraltar to Port Said and the north and south routes to the great French and Italian ports in the Gulf of Lions and those in the Adriatic. Such a position must at all times be of supreme strategical importance. It was largely because the terms of the Second Partition Treaty of 1699 accorded Sicily to France, and would thereby have given her bases for her fleet which would have enabled it to dominate the route to the Levant, that that adjustment was unfavourably viewed in England. Nelson's power to hold in check the French fleet in Toulon in 1804 depended on whether the island was in French or British

hands. It was to hold Sicily that an army was sent in 1805; "it being of the utmost importance that Sicily should not fall into the hands of the French, the protection of that island is to be regarded as the principal object of that expedition." All Nelson's dispositions in that year were made with that object. Villeneuvés fleet put to sea in October, 1805, to intercept the Sicilian expedition. It was itself intercepted and destroyed at Trafalgar.

The present capture of Sicily has thus a respectable strategical genealogy. In its execution it has been pleasant for a sailor to see the sea forces of the Allies performing the historic rôle of supporting the army with their gunfire on the North and East coasts. That they have been able to do so is due to the cover they have had from the air against the bombing which wrought such injury in the Cretan campaign, in which that cover was lacking, and to cover from attack by the still formidable naval concentration which has lain inert in Spezia and other bases: whether that curious inactivity has been owing to the threat of the battleship forces of the Allies or to the fear of a repetition of the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, or, as is most probable, to a combination of both, is immaterial; what is important is that there has been such a combination of the arms best adapted to the purpose that a fleet comprising among other units three of the most modern type of battleship of 35,000 tons has not thought it possible to attempt to intervene in the operations of medium and light forces which were taking part in an invasion of Italian territory.

Though the enemy is now deprived of his power of striking at short range from his previous bases in Sicily, he still has other bases and other means with which to inflict injury upon the sea communications in the Mediterranean. Sardinia is in his hands at least until Italy retires from the war, if retire she does. Toulon and the ports and aerodromes on the two Rivieras are available for his bombers and submarines. He is still in Crete. There can be no relaxing therefore of the measures necessary for the defence of the communications. Ample escorts of surface craft and planes will be needed to counter the efforts of the enemy submarines and bombers which will certainly attempt to strike at the sea-borne expeditions which will, presumably, follow the occupation of Sicily. We trust that the mistakes made at an earlier period, of withholding aircraft from the operations at sea in favour of others, will not be repeated. For that mistake cost us many millions of tons of shipping and of cargoes of the highest importance, as well as the lives of the seamen, and unless there is a continuous increase in our defensive forces, and an intelligent anticipation of what the enemy may next do, we shall suffer more. With what truth the claim of the enemy is made to have attacked with success a large convoy off the coast of Spain we shall know in good time; but the fact that the claim is made to have attacked with forty bombers so far from the bases in Sicily and even Sardinia is a reminder that though we may have mastered the great dangers in the Sicilian Channel, the increasing range of aircraft makes it possible to attack the communications of the

armies in the Mediterranean from other bases, and that, with the information of convoy movements which he is able to receive from his observers in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, it is possible for him to know when convoys sail and to calculate with sufficient accuracy where they will be at a given time. At the other end of the Mediterranean he still can strike from his base in Crete; the extent to which information of sailings from the Egyptian or other ports can be obtained by his agents, or from submarines, is the principal factor governing his ability to conduct effective sallies against the convoys. The need for strong aerial formations in the escorting bodies is thus as strong as before. It is not outside the bounds of possibility that that which has happened in the Atlantic may repeat itself in the Mediterranean; in the Atlantic the strength of the escorting forces in the two terminal zones of the route, the thousand-mile approaches to the British and American coasts, made those zones too hot for the submarine, and their activities were transferred to the middle zone where aircraft protection was weaker or non-existent: and there they appear to have done considerable damage until the answer was applied in the shape of V.L.R. (very long range) aircraft of the Coastal Command and small aircraft carriers accompanying the convoys. So here we may see a similar development. Driven from the Sicilian Channel the shore based bombers and submarines may now concentrate their efforts on the parts of the route in the eastern and western basins of the sea. It is our business to anticipate such attacks by having an ample force of the appropriate types of all kinds to meet them: not to wait until we have suffered losses and then make the provision for preventing further ones as we seem so often to have done during this war.

The statement made by Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt on the recent results of the U-boat warfare is distinctly encouraging, though it leaves us without any information of a quantitative nature—information, that is to say, of how much tonnage has been lost in the last three years. It confines itself to making a comparison of the individual effectiveness of the U-boat at different times. We are told that "in the first six months of 1943, the number of ships sunk *per U-boat operating* was only half of that of the last six months of 1942, and only a quarter of that of the first half of 1942." The individual U-boat is thus now making a smaller return, but whether there are more U-boats at sea, or less than there were in those periods we do not know. One definite fact is however given: that not less than ninety U-boats have been sunk in the last three months. This is highly satisfactory. Unless the yards in Germany and elsewhere have been able to reach their promised output of a U-boat a day it should mean that there has been a definite reduction in the U-boat flotilla, and it does not seem over optimistic to assume that the recent heavy attacks on Hamburg and Cologne will have reduced the output to below that figure. But it is to the increased sinkings of these craft that the improvement in the situation is primarily due, and those increased sinkings are due to the greater strength of the escorting forces. The principle upon

which naval opinion has insisted from the first has been that our production of material should be devoted primarily towards destroying the U-boats or other forms of attack actually in service, with their crews; and that the demands of those escorts should take precedence over every other service. The "long term" policy of attempting to destroy the centres of production should have waited upon this, and until production had reached a scale which would enable effective destruction to be effected: which the smaller attacks carried out did not do. The increase in the number of U-boats was not stopped by some hundreds of bombings of Hamburg, Bremen, Emden and elsewhere. The shipyards were launching ships only to be sunk. The number produced did not balance the losses. It is surely plain by now that this was wrong, and that the beginning should have been to provide as quickly as possible the vessels and craft necessary for the direct defence of the convoys against the attackers that were actually at sea. That we must be doing with not only undiminished but increased effort. The Prime Minister and the President warn their peoples against undue optimism. The enemy, they tell us, has still large reserves of U-boats—they might have added of bombers also—completed and under construction, and we must prepare for an intensification of the attack, speeding the general offensive against the enemy. In the Atlantic that general offensive combines all forms of operations against those objectives on which the enemy's campaign demands—the attacking craft on, under and above the surface of the sea, the bases from which they act, and the sources of production: and the first of these is that to which precedence needs to be given. For security at sea is the foundation without which all other operations are impossible.

THE RUSSIAN SITUATION IN RETROSPECT

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

THE complete failure of the Kursk offensive to achieve any of its objects, and the critical situation in which the Germans now find themselves as a result of the Russian victories, raises the questions whether they would not have been wiser to have adopted a definitely defensive policy in Russia and withdrawn to a shorter and more defensible line at the close of the winter campaign; and whether the policy actually adopted was a hesitating compromise resulting from divergences of opinion traceable to the success of the counter-attack which led to the recapture of Kharkov.

By the middle of last February the general war situation had turned so decisively against the Axis that the High Command can have had little hope of retrieving it on land or in the air, unless the battle of the Atlantic could be won by the U-boats to a degree that would paralyse the Allies' war effort, even if it did not bring about the defeat of Britain by starvation. Under the circumstances it might have been expected that the Germans on land would adopt a defensive policy. This would have released a considerable proportion of the *Luftwaffe* to support the U-boat campaign, for defence against air attacks on war industries and, possibly, for reprisal on Britain. It would also have given the *Reichswehr* a comparatively inactive period in which to recuperate and to regain power for a final offensive should that prove necessary.

There can be little doubt that when the winter crisis was at its height and the Germans in the Donbas were threatened with a greater disaster than Stalingrad, that some such policy was contemplated, involving a withdrawal to the Dneiper and from the dangerous Orel and Vyasma salients. In Tunisia withdrawal was the only alternative to a defensive policy, and presumably defence was chosen in spite of the risks involved (probably underestimated) because, by keeping the Mediterranean route closed the effects of the U-boat operations would be enhanced. But the immediate necessity was to halt the Russian drive south of Kharkov, which threatened to cut the only way of escape from the Donbas, and it may be that the counter-offensive which, aided by the exceptionally early thaw, proved so successful was intended originally only to keep the line of retreat open. It will be interesting to learn whether in fact this success, which led to the recovery of Kharkov, induced the Germans to change their plans and inspired the hope that they would be able to launch another offensive in the summer against a Russian army

exhausted by its winter exertions; or, at least, to avoid the necessity of drastic withdrawal. The wonderful Russian recovery from their reverse at Kharkov and their successful defence of the line of the Upper and Middle Donetz, prevented the Germans exploiting their counter-offensive fully, and it is probable that in any case thaw conditions would have limited its range. But it is difficult to understand why the Germans, if they had decided on a renewed offensive, remained inactive during the lull which extended long after the thaw period. Was it due to divergence of opinion or to the extent of the damage which had been inflicted on the *Reichswehr* in the winter? The many tentative and costly attempts during the earlier part of the lull to secure a foothold across the Donetz and to eliminate the bridgeheads which the Russians still held would seem to have been made rather with the object of exploiting the March counter-offensive directly the ground dried, than as a prelude to a major summer offensive. A renewal of the counter-offensive at the earliest opportunity would have found the Russians at the great disadvantage of operating in an area in which railways could not yet have been fully restored, and in which there can only have been very inadequate depots of war material. The Germans, on the other hand, would have had the benefit of a militarized area and a great net-work of railways as their base of operations. Having failed to secure a footing across the Donetz it would seem that belatedly the Germans must have been convinced, by the stubbornness of the Russian defence, that a fully organized attack would be necessary. Yet it is difficult to believe that it would have taken so long to prepare if there had not still been hesitation as to the policy to be followed.

Obviously the counter-offensive had achieved its primary purpose, and all immediate danger to the Army in the Donbas had been removed. It may therefore have been argued by those in favour of a defensive policy that there was a great opportunity for shortening the front with a minimum loss of prestige and without danger of serious interference by the Russians, who would need much time for re-organization of recaptured territory before they could resume their offensive. On the other hand, the success of the counter-offensive may have encouraged those unwilling to yield ground, and who retained hopes that opportunities for offensive action might occur. Possibly the course of action eventually adopted was in the nature of a compromise—an offensive to regain the defensive front of the spring of 1942, which would avoid the relinquishment of Orel, one of its chief bastions, while at the same time inflicting a crippling blow on Russian offensive capacity. That the Russians were preparing to resume the offensive cannot have escaped notice, and a forestalling attack delivered with great speed and force certainly presented attractive possibilities, especially if there was any underestimate of the speed with which the Russians had been able to restore communications and stock the depots essential for an offensive on a maximum scale. I still cannot believe that the Germans intended a far-reaching offensive towards Moscow, and it may be noted that Marshal Stalin, in his message congratulating his troops on their successful defence, spoke only of the German intention to recapture Kursk and to destroy the Russian Army in the Kursk salient. Certainly if that had been achieved Russian offensive power would have been crippled and the Germans might have been confident that they would be able to hold the 1942 spring front, retaining the Donetz Basin.

Whether there actually was a conflict of opinion among Hitler's advisers is of course speculative. It is not even certain whether Dittmar's announcement that a defensive policy had been adopted was merely calculated to mislead or whether it, and the curious tone of German communiqués at the commencement of the offensive, were intended to allay popular disappointment if the offensive proved to have only a limited objective. Nevertheless there undoubtedly had been three courses of action open to the Germans. Either a drastic withdrawal to a shorter front leaving only a light screen against which a Russian attack would be a blow in the air (Ludendorff's withdrawal to the Hindenburg line provided a precedent); or a limited offensive to regain a less irregular and somewhat shorter line while at the same time forestalling and dislocating Russian offensive plans; or a definite attempt to retrieve the general war situation by an all-out offensive in spite of conditions which rendered it a desperate gamble. Which of those courses would have been correct is a matter of opinion, but there seems a prospect that the failure of their offensive, whatever its intention, and the success of the Russian break-through may compel the Germans to fall back on the first course.

The recapture of Kharkov and continued Russian progress makes the situation of the Germans in the Donbas more critical even than it was last winter in view of the advance of the Russian bases and improved communications. The superiority the Red air force has established is also a new source of danger. Summer conditions might make retreat somewhat easier, but unless the Germans are able to mount a counter-attack sufficiently powerful to check the Russian drive it is hard to see how retreat can this time be avoided.

Have the Germans reserves available for a counter-attack on an adequate scale? Last winter a concentration of reserves had been effected on the Dneiper during the progress of the Russian offensive and, with those within the Donbas, provided a counter-attacking force which proved sufficient to drive back the Russian thrust when its communications were paralysed by mud. Now, however, it is improbable that the Germans are at all so favourably placed in the matter of reserves. Such as were immediately available must almost certainly have been used in the offensive and in the subsequent fight for the Orel salient. They have either been expended or are already involved in the defensive battle. In the Donbas itself, in the centre and in the north the Russian attitude is threatening, and it would obviously be unsafe to withdraw reserves in any numbers. In any case distance would make their concentration in the south slow and it would take a considerable time to weld formations brought from different directions into an effective striking force. Piecemeal counter-attacks will no doubt be launched with vigour, but their

effect at the best could only be temporary and they would be likely to prove costly. The truth is that when the initiative is lost to the extent that it has been lost by the Germans it is desperately hard to recover, and they cannot hope that weather will again intervene in their favour.

The winter offensive proved that the Red Army had made remarkable progress in tactical skill, and, even more amazingly, in administrative organization. Generalship was also of the highest order and in particular the timing of the various blows delivered was admirable. There was, therefore, good reason to believe that it would be found that the former superiority of the Germans under summer conditions, due partly to their initial higher standards of equipment and to their experience, had been lost. That superiority had, however, been manifested in the executive conduct of operations rather than in the strategical sphere. German failures in fact had been due largely to strategical blunders and faulty decisions. Up to a point Germany had many competent generals, but there was no outstanding figure even of the class of Ludendorff—Hitler's own influence may have gone far to prevent the emergence of a general of genius. So far as current operations have gone hopes that the Red Army was now quite capable of meeting the Germans on equal terms in a summer campaign have been justified, and there seems little doubt that the Russian victories have resulted from better generalship. The timing of offensive operations and control of reserve power being again an outstanding feature. It remains to be seen whether German executive capacity will enable them to extricate themselves from a highly critical situation. If, as I suggested last month, the Germans may have adopted the expedient of concentrating the best element of their man power in storm troop divisions their situation may be even worse than it appears, for in that case a considerable portion of their picked troops have already suffered severely. The success of the Russian break-through at Bielgorod and its rapid exploitation is certainly difficult to explain, unless the enemy formations overrun were definitely of inferior quality, possibly second class divisions who had relieved picked troops transferred to the Orel sector. Yet even in a watered down German division there will always be a considerable nucleus of determined men who might be expected to put up a stiff fight. One of the defects of the system is, however, that they may be let down and exposed to destruction by their weaker comrades.

At the moment the main question is whether the Germans have sufficient reserves to deal with the situation that has arisen, and obviously any marked lack of uniformity in the quality of formations available would be a serious handicap.

THE TRANSYLVANIAN PROBLEM

By Henry Baerlein

THE problem of Transylvania is by no means a new one; the Rumanians and the Magyars have been discussing it, with considerable acrimony, for many a long year. And we may be sure that in the settlement of Europe after this war the Transylvanian question will not be the least acute. The present state of that beautiful land is due to the Vienna award that was enforced by Ribbentrop and Ciano in 1940; it gave to Hungary about half the province with over a million Rumanians whose presence causes the Magyars a good deal of uneasiness. To say that the Rumanians bitterly resent the award is to put it very mildly.

The Magyars claim that the Rumanians of to-day are a half nomadic and primitive people who, under Turkish pressure south of the Carpathians, penetrated into Transylvania in appreciable numbers from the sixteenth century onwards. And during the Dualist era (1867-1914) the Magyars denied equal political status to the Rumanians in that country because the earlier settlement by their own ancestors gave them, so they were pleased to argue, a superior right. Thus it follows that if the Rumanians can prove that they themselves have occupied the soil since the days of Trajan—and the language is an irrefutable proof of at least predominantly Latin origin—they can make good use of the Magyar argument that he who comes first to a land should be a first-class citizen, while subsequent arrivals must be more modest.

However the Rumanians have no wish to domineer over other people on such a reprehensible ground. No doubt in the period after the last war, when Transylvania came to be administered by the Rumanians, they committed, being human, various faults; but their tolerance was in marked contrast with the former Magyar régime. To take a few examples: the Parliamentary representation of Rumanians in Budapest used to be lamentably insufficient, while in the Bucharest parliament the Magyars of Transylvania had no such complaint. What they did complain of was the Agrarian Reform which deprived them, the landowners, of much of their possessions with a compensation they described as inadequate. They did not mention that this Reform was also applied to Rumanians, not merely landowners but charitable institutions, so that, for instance, the late Patriarch told me that a hospital in which he was deeply interested had much difficulty in making both ends meet, so much of its revenues having been taken from it. It is true that the Magyar landowners in Transylvania were more numerous than those of Rumanian

origin, because the Magyar governments had done their utmost to repress the Rumanians, as they feared this race which Kiepert, the great German ethnologist, declared to be the most numerous in Transylvania; and that appears to be a point as to which there is no dispute. Perhaps two small incidents that came under my personal observation will illustrate the Magyar and the Rumanian ideas on the subject of tolerance. One day before the last war a group of Rumanian village girls came to Cluj, the capital, and they had somewhat rashly adorned their cascades of hair with ribbons of the Rumanian colours. The local police did not remove merely the ribbons but cut off the entire hair of each of the girls. One day, not far from Cluj, I was travelling with a Rumanian prefect after his country had been granted the province and at a cross-road I noticed a crucifix painted in the Hungarian colours. 'Well,' he said, 'there is a Hungarian village at the end of that side-road and if they like to display their national sentiments on that crucifix we let them do it. Live and let live.'

These last words made no appeal to the Magyars when, in the middle of the nineteenth century they were debating a bill that would make Hungarian the official language of the province and when, amid the chorus of opposition, they had to listen to the voice of a member of the privileged Saxon minority, the Lutheran pastor Stephan Ludwig Roth. 'In vain,' he declared, 'do the gentlemen of the Diet pretend to give Transylvania an official language obligatory for us all. In vain they seek to enact a law to that effect under the illusion that they are performing a praiseworthy task. They err, for Transylvania has no use for a language imposed by the will of the Diet. She has always had a language of her own, a language which all her inhabitants understand. It is neither the German nor the Hungarian, but the Rumanian, the only one current all over the country.' Thus spoke an honest man, whose co-religionaries, industrious colonists long settled in Transylvania, form about one-tenth of the population. 'Take heed what you do,' said the pastor, 'and dare not to throw live coals on dry straw, for he who sows a wind will reap a hurricane.' It was at Sighisoara that he died on May 11, 1849, before a firing squad of General Bem's Hungarian troops.

It is true that a law guaranteeing equal rights to all the nationalities of Hungary was passed in 1868; but, as Professor Seton-Watson has pointed out, it remained from the first a dead letter, calculated to mislead benevolent foreign opinion. Until 1918 Transylvania, like other parts of the country, was subject to a violent policy of Magyarization; for example in 1906 the Rumanians at last obtained 14 seats in Parliament, though entitled to between 60 and 70, and in 1910 these were reduced to five. And until the arrival of Hitler the Magyar conception of the *Herrenvolk* was the most thorough-paced in Europe, while with their *numerus clausus*, which prevented more than a certain proportion of Jews from entering the Universities, they were the heralds of Hitlerism.

Not only the Universities but all the schools, and great numbers of new

ones, were thrown open to everyone after 1918. And here, though the motive was admirable, the Rumanian authorities committed the error of over-production of intellectuals, a half-baked proletariat which led to the formation of the ominous Iron Guard. A further mistake was the governing of Transylvania for the first ten years by politicians of the Old Kingdom. The National Transylvanian party, which understood the Magyars and might perhaps have done something to check the friction and reach a working arrangement, was rigidly excluded from all share in office or public life.

It seemed in 1928, when the Transylvanian and the Peasant parties came to power, that a new and happier era was about to dawn. This might have occurred if it had not been for the return of King Carol from abroad and the economic depression of the years that followed. King Carol's totalitarian policy could not brook the parties by whose help he had come back, while over a period of years the two foremost statesmen of Rumania, Maniu of Transylvania and Titulescu, were relegated to the background.

King Carol had made many flamboyant speeches to the effect that not one inch of Rumanian soil would ever be yielded and Carol's Dyke, we were told, would keep out every neighbour by the simple method of putting a match to this oil-filled construction. Then Bessarabia and northern Bukovina were ceded to the Soviet without a blow, Bulgaria obtained southern Dorudja and Hungary demanded Transylvania. Her attitude was so intransigent that negotiations were broken off, but Hitler's Balkan time-table could not put up with indefinite delays, so that the Vienna award to which we have alluded was forced upon the two countries. It was the first time in history that Transylania had been partitioned in this way. The Magyars console themselves with the thought that the Vienna award is a temporary expedient and that if they exercise due patience and restraint Southern Transylvania will ere long follow the other half and be returned to them. Apparently they believe that this may come to pass even if the Axis were to lose the war, for they have been dropping hints of their willingness to conclude a separate peace. If the Allied armies march into the Danube Basin they will encounter, say the Magyar authorities—and notably Count Bethlen, who was for so long the Premier—no opposition from the Magyars, which is most amiable and prudent. But in return for this kindliness the whole of Slovakia and Transylvania are to be handed over to Hungary! Surely they exclaim, no one would demand 'unconditional surrender' from such a chivalrous people as the Magyars.

Of course when Hitler gave half Transylvania to the Magyars he had rendered them a service for which he wanted payment and a Hungarian army had to be sent against Russia, a country upon which the Hungarians had absolutely no territorial demands. The one consolation that they have is that their losses on that front have not been in any way as heavy as those of the Rumanians who naturally wished to take no further part in this grievous campaign after Bessarabia had been won back. But they were told by Hitler

—and as a marginal note a few Rumanian generals who desired to stop at this point were themselves put a stop to by Himmler's assassins—they were told that perhaps Odessa would be given them and that anyhow, unless they continued to bleed for Hitler, they would receive no Bessarabia and probably would lose the rest of Transylvania.

Hungary and Rumania are both of them being threatened by Hitler that if they do not accede to his wishes they will be suitably punished, but he has not been able to make them sign a treaty of non-aggression with each other. They are waiting for the day when, with no German army to take into consideration, they will be able to settle matters by force of arms. In preparation for that day the Magyars have established a new army, after demobilizing the remainder of their Second Army of whose thirteen divisions the Red Army had very effectively 'demobilized' a good two-thirds at Voronezh. The survivors had mutinied at the front and would become a menace to the feudal régime in Hungary if left with weapons in their hands. Therefore a new army had to be set up. 'I ask Prime Minister Kallay—against whom is this army to march? Is it once again,' enquired Jan Masaryk in a broadcast in June of this year, 'against Russia or is it perhaps intended to defend what Hungary has stolen?' Among her thefts are parts of Slovakia and all Ruthenia which belonged to and will assuredly belong again to Masaryk's country.

The Magyars appear to be so certain that after the war they will be confirmed in their possession of half Transylvania, even if the rest of it is not added, that they have made no effort to win over the sympathies of the population with its Rumanian majority. But as such a majority is undesirable they have behaved according to Hitler; during the five days preceding the arrival of Admiral Horthy, the Regent, at Cluj, all legal activities were suspended and each Hungarian was encouraged to administer his own 'justice' as he thought best. On September 23, 1940, thirty-five Rumanians, mostly young men, were hanged at the sports-stadium *Marele Voivod Mihai* in Oradea. The public was allowed to witness the execution, each onlooker being charged an entertainment tax of one pengö (about a pre-war franc). When I was in Oradea, where it seemed to me that there were more Hungarians than Rumanians, no less than four bishops resided there, Catholic, Greek-Orthodox, Lutheran and Uniate. It is regrettable that the three who remained did not prevent the exulting Magyars from removing the Orthodox bishop, Nicholae Popovici, in the most brutal fashion. But, though he was taken in a dirty cattle-truck, his fate was less harsh than that of a number of other priests, such as Traian Costea of the village of Trasnea, district of Salaj, who was shot in the back and wounded while trying to escape from his house which soldiers had set on fire. When he was caught they tied him to a post and stabbed him to death. "Hungary," declared Kallay in a broadcast on June 18, 1942, "is at once an outpost of Latin Christianity and culture and of Germanic civilization. We have been the outflung bastion of all that is creative in this world . . . We are fighting for the Cross, for pure homes, for everything that makes it worth while to be a man."

One is frequently told in Hungary that they have a Magna Carta only a few years less ancient than ours and that the Parliament buildings in Budapest are very similar in design to those of London. In fact the Hungarians are a fine, civilized people quite different from the lesser breeds by which they are surrounded. Some of us have taken for granted that this ancient document is honoured in the observance and that in the Budapest Parliament there is nothing to be ashamed of. As for Hungary's neighbours, would the Magyars have said that '*Tót nem ember*' ('The Slovak is not a man') if in fact the contrary had been the case? Were they not then justified in closing the last three Slovak high schools in 1908, a detail not worth mentioning to the Liberal delegation from Britain that was very hospitably entertained in Budapest at that time?

When the Magyars, for their good services to the Nazi cause—a vast amount of food has had to be sent to Germany—were given more than 3,000 square miles of Slovakia in 1938 with more than a million people, scarcely half of them of Magyar origin, it was not surprising that many of the Czechs and Slovaks fled, for when you have been the free citizen of a democratic Republic it is not pleasant to live in a semi-feudal State. What is illuminating is that many Magyars also fled, while others who remained assumed that the government would not exact vengeance because they had perforce been loyal citizens of the Czechoslovak State for 20 years. They were wrong; in the first three weeks 13,600 fellow Magyars, accused merely of having lived at peace with the authorities and by no means accused of anything else against the Hungarian State, were locked up. "The re-occupation of territories," said Keresztes-Fischer, Minister of the Interior on November 12, 1941, "is one of the reasons for the overcrowding of the internment camps. I am unable to diminish this, though I am constantly doing my best to increase the number of camps."

It will be seen that the United Nations will have no easy task after the war in Transylvania. Count Bethlen's suggestion that the province should be made independent—he may not have meant this very seriously—would not be entertained for a moment by either claimant. One day at Cluj in the house of Vaida-Voevod, then Premier of Rumania, I listened to that gentleman talking to the telephone exchange and as the operator had an insufficient knowledge of Rumanian he addressed her in Hungarian, quite cheerfully. It is not merely on account of such tolerance but because the Rumanians are much in the majority that Transylvania must be, as Professor Seton-Watson points out, restored to them, with a certain revision of frontiers on a basis of exchange of populations. It is all a matter of degree. The problem can and will be solved.

LAST OF OUR YEOMEN

By C. Henry Warren

THE moment I stepped over the threshold of Bangrove Farm, willy-nilly I was compelled to put to-day behind me, with all its stress and strain of war. Strong and virile as blood itself are the memories that invest that tree-shadowed, stone farmhouse under the wolds, dropped by the devil (as the natives say) when he climbed out of the valley with too big a load. Here, last of their name, live Miss Lucy Sexty and her brother William. Here, for generations, the Sextys have proved by word and deed the sterling worth of those yeoman farmers who were once the mainstay of England and are now, alas, almost non-existent.

Miss Lucy stood in the open doorway, where two young sheep-dogs rolled over and over in the sunshine, biting one another with pleasure, and extended a hand in warm welcome. 'Let me look at you,' she said, gazing frankly into my face, in a fashion that could not possibly give offence: 'I want to see if you are anything like I thought you were!' How far reality tallied with fancy she did not say and in any case at that moment her brother came forward out of the shadow of the low, heavily beamed interior. As the last surviving male of this ancient family—he is eighty-nine and she is eighty-six—he gracefully and yet firmly eased his sister into the background. Time and again, later on, I was to notice with what show of gentle breeding the old man, so patently fond of his sister, maintained this prior claim as elder and male.

Mr. William was short and stocky, characteristics that were somehow emphasised by the black-and-white check waistcoat which he wore and by the stubby, grizzled beard that decorated his chin. Whatever signs of age showed in his withered skin, or in the greying hair that covered his extraordinarily round head, or in the way his clothes betrayed his shrunken body beneath, were constantly belied by the gleaming alertness of his eyes. And when his voice, strong and musical, as befits a son of Gloucestershire, lapsed for a moment into the dialect that was as easy to him as his every-day speech, it ranged through a scale of inflexions rare even in artists of the spoken word.

As for Miss Lucy, at eighty-seven she complains that she is growing deaf. I can only say I should not have noticed it. Everything else about her, except her dignity and natural courtesy, belies the date of her birth. She wears her abundant hair piled up from the strong, graceful neck. Her skin still admits few wrinkles; and although this winter she nursed one of her brothers

for thirteen weeks on end, without once taking her clothes off, it is only in the strong glare of sunshine that you can just detect the faint black pencillings of care beneath her lively eyes. As for that dignity of which I spoke, retained from a day when character feared no loss of amplitude by the submission to self-discipline, it was the very hall-mark of her; nor did it need the early photograph which I saw to prove how more than ordinarily beautiful she once had been—beauty informed by a spirit which nothing has diminished.

Sometimes, through her words, there flashed a momentary picture of the days when, with her sister and two favourite girl friends from a neighbouring farmstead, she had danced for joy under the trees in the meadows. 'We sang to the dance,' she said, simply, evocatively: 'it was all the music we wanted.'

Inevitably, such a girl was much sought after; but she never married. And now, looking back over the long years, she has no hesitation in confirming her difficult choice. 'I made my decision,' she said. 'I looked after my brothers and I would not have had it otherwise—no, not for all the fine privileges that were promised me.' So Bangrove Farm, remote under the Cotswolds, has been her only home; but I felt all the time that she would just as effectively have ruled over some favoured London salon, as indeed a certain 'learned gentleman', whose memory has never faded, so ardently wished her to do.

Even to-day, the wide range of her spirit is still one of the most compelling things about her. In her quick, upright, brittle figure she somehow combines the strength and earthiness of a farmer's wife with the delicacy and sophisticated grace of an urban hostess. There seems nothing strange or untoward in the fact, for instance, that one minute she will be telling tales of the rough farm-hands she has ruled in days gone by, and in the next of riding through Cheltenham Spa in her summer silks from Bond Street. With laughing, lively gesture she will suddenly rise from the table to demonstrate how she once gave a lesson in paper-hanging to the decorators who fumbled over the job in the Bangrove drawing-room. 'There,' she said, hanging a strip of imaginary paper and wielding an imaginary brush in descending scrolls: '*that's* the way to do it!' You could see at once how the men would be forced to admit her superior dexterity. And immediately after this she will whisk you upstairs to see a certain cream lace dress, flounce over flounce, that has unaccountably strayed into the conversation, and a great white feather-boa that rests upon her neck lightly as a summer cloud. Farmhouse housewifery, city airs and graces; mares being taken to the stallion, a hundred turkeys being driven down the lane into the stubble (and Miss Lucy following with a red flag): all comes easily, inevitably within her surprising compass. Far afield as her spirit ranges, it can be trusted to find its way home again. She prides herself, for instance, that she is a romantic; and so she is—as many of her tales bore witness; but she is a realist, too.

I said it was her complaint of old age that she was growing deaf: it is also

her complaint that another of the penalties of growing old is the loss of power over words—the former fluency is no longer to command. I never knew Miss Lucy in earlier days, so I cannot tell what diminishing her dramatic powers have suffered; but as long as I remember her, and that will surely be till memory falters to its close, I shall recall an hour when we all sat round the loaded, mahogany tea-table listening to her stories of the ghosts she had encountered in her younger years. Mostly, those ghosts seem to have crossed her path when, with her sister, she was coming home to Bangrove round about midnight from some farmhouse dance or frolic.

There was the money-grubbing cobbler, for example, who walked the lanes in stove-pipe hat and flopping bow-tie and bright, buckled shoes. He swung his alpaca boot-bag at his side as he strode along; and he knew no rest from his rounds because, while he was still alive, he had collected and delivered his boots and shoes on a Sunday rather than waste valuable time during the week. A trite tale, I dare say, when so reduced; but as Miss Lucy told it, with gesticulating finger and glancing eye and far ranging tone, that midnight ghost obliterated the tea-time comfort and walked again for us, there in the solid room.

Or there was the Wait's End Cat which she and her sister had encountered one 'moony, misty night'. They had far to walk and were tired after the party; 'but never mind,' said Lucy's sister, 'we will tell one another of all the things that happened to us this evening and then perhaps the way will not seem so long.' The ruse worked well enough for some time, till suddenly Lucy was aware of a strange butterfly hovering before her. That it was extraordinarily large she did not seem to notice: all she knew was that it was lovely and that it seemed, as it were, to be inviting her to catch it. Eagerly she ran forward; but already it was no longer a butterfly. It was a cat, crouching in the grass, and yet no, it was not a cat either. 'Oh, I *must* stroke it,' she cried, lured irresistibly. 'And I stooped down to it'—so Miss Lucy concluded the tale—'but my hand went through it; *and it was nothing.*'

Throughout the recitation of these simple stories, her brother had sat with us at the table, eager, silent, participating in the pleasant excitement. He must have heard the ghostly tales many times before; but his bright eyes, as he leaned forward on his elbows, showed nothing but willingness to hear them all over again. 'Tell them of that time, Luce, when . . .' he would say, much as countrymen on some festive occasion will call again and again for a well-known song, the merit of which is for them more in its familiarity than in any intrinsic worth. But presently there came a moment when he apparently thought his sister's macabre narrative had gone on long enough. Perhaps he was anxious it should not be protracted beyond the duration proper to its simple art. Perhaps he even grew at last a trifle envious of her success. At any rate, quietly, and very firmly, he took our attention from her.

'Yes,' he said, 'there are ghosts right enough: no doubt of that. When

my brother John was ill last autumn, he lay on that sofa there, under the window. One day I thought he seemed a little better: he noticed things. The cow was taken to the bull that afternoon, for instance; and as she passed through the yard, John asked where she was going. So I went to bed a little easier in my mind that night. But at half-past two something took me by the shoulder and almost shook the life out of me. Then I could hear footsteps hurrying down the stairs: clup-clop, clup-clop. I jumped out of bed; and as I came through the passage, I ran into Luce. 'He's gone, isn't he?' I said: 'I *know* he's gone.' John had died that very minute something had shaken me by the shoulder.'

It needed no such incident, however, to persuade me how close a bond had united this yeoman family. Indeed, from the moment of my arrival, when, with glistening eyes, Miss Lucy told me of the loss they had sustained by their brother's death last autumn, I seemed to be continually aware of the absent third party. In that old house clearly there had never been any break in the continuity of the Sexty life and tradition; and until William and Lucy were themselves gone, and Bangrove Farm with all its contents sold and disposed of, that sense of unbroken family unity would remain. It was the spirit of the place. The furniture, the ornaments about the rooms, the puffed sleeves and the dull gold beads around Miss Sexty's neck—all contributed to the illusion that here was something mortality could never destroy. For centre-piece the laden tea-table boasted an elaborate *epergne*, its many glass trumpets filled with blue-bells and white-bells and rich grape hyacinths. Nothing could have been righter. So it had been, you felt quite sure, when Lucy was a laughing, dancing girl and John was away on the wolds riding to hounds and William was just beginning to establish his reputation as the best breeder of shire stallions in the county. And so, you felt equally sure, it would continue to the end.

But perhaps it was when we all sat round the open fire-place in the great farm-house kitchen that this unageing spirit of yeoman England made itself most manifest. The Spring boughs waved against the stone-mullioned windows, and with the scent of lilac was mingled the scent of logs burning on their mound of ash. The Worcester china on the old double dresser gleamed in the darkling air. A long curved settle shut away the entrance to the scullery and dairy. In fact, there was everything which, in a painting or a drawing, would have given the look of a museum-piece; but here all was so obviously still in use, so much an extension of the personalities of the owners, that anything else was almost unimaginable.

Miss Lucy sat at the clear, scrubbed table pouring into pink-flushed glasses some home-made wine which had been brewed from the rambling old vine at the gable end of the house; and Mr. William leaned against the wall of the open hearth, facing the audience which this time he claimed entirely for himself.

He told of a small farmer who bought himself a more ambitious farm up on

the hills where land prices were higher. His friends chid him, thinking that he had taken on more than his modest finances would allow him to carry through. But with pride the farmer defended himself. 'I've paid the valliation,' he said, 'and I've a hundred pound or so over. I've a faggot to sit on; and my wife, she's got a milking stool. I dare say we s'll manage.' And then, as a final claim to security, and not perhaps without a hint of boastfulness, he added: 'And my boy Johnnie, a's married a lady-thing, a lady-thing, that wears a filly-toe over the poke of her bonnet. . . . .' And as Mr. Sexty told the tale, his voice had all the lilt of a folk-song—'a's married a lady-thing, a lady-thing'—pleasant as music to hear.

So the tales went on, ranging inconsequently over the years, as fickle memory dictated; and sometimes their charm was as much in the sing-song voice that told them as in their substance. But one and all they brought those old days alive and showed me people whom I had never known in the flesh.

There was, for instance, the tale of Babel Blizzard (what a genius they had for nick-names then!). He was a wizard and he could mow through a whole day by whetting his scythe on nothing more substantial than a bent. His dead mongrel, of which he had been so fond and which had been the terror of the neighbourhood, haunted the lane outside his cottage 'like a cold draught' said Mr. Sexty 'round your legs'. And there was old George, in broken bowler hat and dirty smock and buskins, who through a key-hole watched one of the farm-hands trying to hang himself in the barn, while the devil danced round him in a frenzy of encouragement. Or there was John Lane, another farm-hand at Bangrove, an old bachelor and a sturdy individualist. He feared Babel Blizzard but he feared nobody else. He used to declare that the only remedy, if you came under the wizard's spell, was to cut a sod and wear it under your hat. 'Then you're under the turf and above the turf,' he would say, 'and he can't touch you.' He could drink with the best: 'seven pints of cider, as quick as you could draw them,' said Mr. Sexty, pointing to the blue jug hanging on the dresser, as if there was the proof for his words. If John disliked any one man more than another, that man was the local reformer, a teetotaller whose over-weening ambition it was to convert everybody in the district to teetotallers like himself—no mean ambition, surely, when it is remembered that Bangrove stood in the middle of the cider-making villages of West Gloucestershire. He would not let John alone. One day, as he strode along, biting a rosy apple, John came reeling out of the pub. 'There's John Lane again,' he said: 'drunk as usual.' But, drunk as he undoubtedly was, John's ready tongue did not fail him. 'Look here,' he said, 'there's a question I want to ask you, sir.' And he pointed to the half-eaten apple in the reformer's hand. 'Which is worse: to eat the devil or to drink the broth he was boiled in?'

When the memories of those fertile days had petered out at last, and in that quiet kitchen the only sound was of the flames that gently licked the dwindling logs—'Ah well,' said Mr. William, with a sigh, 'it all helped to pass life away!'

Assuredly it was such a man as William Sexty that Richard Jefferies had in mind when he created the memorable figure of Iden in his *Amaryllis at the Fair*: a man who cared above all things for quality—in husbandry, in craftsmanship, in all that appertains to the art of living. Quality he must have; and for it he thought no material sacrifice too great. I remembered how old Iden had known his trees and loved them, how he had despised all shoddy work, and how he savoured even the apples and potatoes from his garden with the palate of a gourmet. And so it had been with Mr. Sexty. The pursuit of quality, in which England has ever excelled, had been as natural to him as the air he breathed; and well for him, I am sure, that he will not be dwelling among us any more when we have thrown quality to the winds.

And if he has worked hard all his days, clearly it has not been at the expense of enjoyment. Proof enough he is that the present anxious pursuit of the cult of leisure is nothing but a will-o'-the-wisp. His work was his enjoyment: it was his life. How else could he be so vital, now, in his eighty-ninth year? How else could he and his sister (for the same holds with Miss Lucy) be so entertaining in their conversation to-day, stored as it is like a granary with good corn? Truly they are people in whom the salt of life has lost nothing of its savour, nor ever will.

They are the last of the Sexty family. Somehow, miraculously, they have contrived to remain immune from the dubious progress that surrounds them; but the wreckage washes closer to their door every day. The cattle stalls in the yard are empty. The lowland arable has reverted to pasture. The old farm implements are heaped under the elms. Only the farm-house, and all the treasures it contains, remains: a last stronghold of a defeated way of life.

Brother and sister must pass and the old home be broken up. That sparkling *epergne* on the dining-room table; the rose and gold damask curtains round Miss Lucy's four-poster, catching the sunset in its royal mesh; Cromwell's cannon-ball from Fifteen Acre Field; the delicate china, ringing like far-off bells at the flip of a finger-nail; the crumbling 'cello in the hall, and the tuneless spinet in the drawing-room—all these, no doubt, will find their way into the auction room and the antique shops. And maybe it is better so; for they belong nowhere but to Bangrove Farm; and their use will pass with the users.

CONSTABLE AT EAST BERGHOLT

By Geoffrey Johnson

THE dip between the two soft-breasted fields
Where scrolls of fallen leaves will ever nestle
Seems a haunt dreamed of in *A Winter's Tale*——
You know the passage——how we graft our skill
On a wild stock of Nature, blend, transform,
And even while transforming, use an art
Which in itself is Nature. Well, this hollow's
Gold line of wizened and time-twisted hazels
Planted by fingers long-forgotten shines
In every detail, knot and gnarl and crack
Of snaky folding, so distinct in lights
Of mellow evenings that we well might cry:
Here Nature's hand has mimicked Art's, and limned
On air for canvas and with light for oils
A landscape in some ancient master's manner,
The very pigment-fissures, darkening tones
Growing more precious-lovely hour by hour.
Where the roots rise and form their little deltas
Of rain, of mossy verdure, of drowned gold
And scarlet, scores of well-cracked hazel shells,
Like elfin goblets cast in hurry aside
Enhance the illusion that the sight beholds
Not substance, but a mirrored picture of it——
Of a fairy feast arrested halfway through,
And in the stillness at the heart of flight
And on the very brink of dissolution
Frozen for ever. The unbroken shells that lie
Perfect with cup and bird's foot length of twig
In russet leaves and brightly peeping grass
Seem painted with as vital vividness
As those yet dangling on the ruinous boughs,
Yet all the harvest, fallen or unfallen,

The blush-rose cloud and shadow travelling with it
Alike look insubstantial as a dream . . . .

And then I always hear soft sylvan laughter——
Oh! it is Shakespeare's, always gentle, most
Gentle, when night was stooping through his soul,
Oh! is it Shakespeare's, or an elfin flute?
"Stoop down, and touch the unbroken hazel-shells
And test Reality, test her counterfeit.
What is Reality? Ask the tree-top squirrel
Who sniffed and left the hazels where they fell.
Ask the plump blackbird rifling bramble-berries,
What is Reality? Blackbird never pecked
For singing's livelihood a painted fruit,
No squirrel ever cracked a hollow hazel."

JOY IS MY NAME

By Richard Church

I HAVE not forgotten, and shall not until death cancels all my memories, of standing one day in a little back room in the Adelphi and holding in my hand the notebook which Shelley kept in 1819. It was heavily stained, and must at one time have been dropped into water. I looked at the stains; I looked at the squiggles and little drawings of heads and leaves in the margins. That is about all I can recall after twenty-four years. The precious book, at that time just a century old, had been loaned by the Shelley family to Roger Ingpen, for use in his editing of the magnificent ten-volume edition of the poet's work. I can see Ingpen standing anxiously beside me, half guilty at allowing the book even for a few seconds out of his keeping. We were both equally frightened and awe-stricken. I was in no condition to examine the manuscript which filled the pages in an untidy profusion. I seem to recollect seeing a rough draft of the *Ode to the West Wind*, and a fair copy of *Love's Philosophy*; but that recollection is not precise. At that moment in 1919 I was not in a condition to store up accurate memories. I remember that I was trembling, and looking at the strange and terrible treasure in my hand, to see only a blurred halo. Nerves have their own mysticism. Out of this quite ordinary matter of handling a poet's notebook, my nerves made a fiery symbolism whose full significance I have still to discover.

That incident has recently been brought back to me most vividly by reading a book by a contemporary poet*. Perhaps the association of ideas arose from the title of Edith Sitwell's book, which she has called "A Poet's Notebook." The words at once captured my imagination, and led me to examine the book, and thence to keep it by me as a bedside companion for a month. Somehow or other the pages of this later poet's notebook are stained too—stained with the waters of life and experience, waters that twist and distort the original dry hieroglyph, and soak and transform the theory. This book is not one which can be criticized as a detached and finished work of art. Such treatment would be impertinent, and would give no idea of the accumulative intensity with which these jottings and quotations, these idle musings and

* *A Poet's Notebook*. Edith Sitwell. (Macmillan, 10s. 6d.)

moments of illumination, gradually reveal an artist engaged on that exhausting and never-ceasing labour of soliloquy within the sanctuary of her own mind. It is a terrifying thing to intrude, unwittingly, upon another person's creative loneliness. Especially is that so if the person happens to be a poet whose work one has not hitherto fully appreciated.

For I have found, in Miss Sitwell's earlier work, a process too rigidly following a theory; and that theory not based upon the fundamental necessities of the art of poetry. I found myself irritated by bizarre images, and congruities that were wilful, strained and garish. Twenty years ago, reviewing a volume of Miss Sitwell's poems, I naughtily referred to her muse as "Woolworthian." In youth one indulges too frequently in ill-mannered little jokes of that kind. But what I had in mind was a hundred thousand trays each displaying articles quite irrelevant to those in the adjoining trays.

I see now that Miss Sitwell's experiments in this way were not a sophisticated game, a quick way to attract attention, but rather the workings of a naive talent. And where there is this naivety, one can always expect to find true, disinterested poetic genius, or any other kind of creative power. One can cover all such personalities by classifying them as beings engaged in an unself-conscious pre-occupation with the work itself. That is the true, the divine naivety. This modern poet's *Notebook*, like Shelley's notebook of 1819, proclaims it. Both are profuse, self-revealing in a way in which a man or woman-of-the-world would never dare to indulge. The effect is of an almost frightening simplicity, as though one were being cheated. But all the key processes of the universe have that same simplicity, and therefore that same sense of cheat, of elusiveness; dawn, for instance, or moonrise over the sea, the last canto of the *Divine Comedy*, the choral passage in Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, or a beloved brother dying in one's arms. Such matters contain the paradox of life, by which extremes meet, agony becoming an introduction to joy, and vague foolishness the prelude to a concentration of knowledge that results in wisdom. Thus all those experiments in verse by which Miss Sitwell has attracted attention (both friendly and adverse) during the past quarter of a century, are summed up in the almost childlike idea expressed in one of the notes in this book. "It is true," she has jotted down, "that where the language of one sense is insufficient, we use that appertaining to another." That insufficiency needs discussion, and it is here that I would finally trace my discontent with so many of Miss Sitwell's experiments. But even with this moral rather than aesthetic reservation, I find that the note sets my mind rolling back to the whole magnificent exploration of the theory of art which Lessing made in his *Laocoon*. And where the simple and the mighty coincide in this way, one may always expect to find truth.

This *insufficiency* of which Miss Sitwell speaks raises the ghosts of all the difficulties which beset the artist, no matter what his medium may be, paint, words or stone, ideas or mathematical emotions. From the days of his apprenticeship to those of his swan-song, the poet is hard pressed by this

problem of insufficiency. He is, of course, never sufficient, never *quite* sufficient. He therefore has to spend his nights and days trying to find out why. Sometimes, in relation to a temporary need raised by one or other piece of work, he succeeds in locating the deficiency. In that glorious moment he squanders all his reserves to fill the gap. The result is a successful poem, followed by an utter emptiness, an emotional and mental bankruptcy. It might almost be stated as a law of art, that after every satisfactory achievement, an artist is broken. His very identity gone, he has to begin the process of re-building himself, in humiliation and defeat, the defeat of success.

Those, however, are the extraordinary moments of his life, the heights and depths. Normally, he is constantly concerned with this less dramatic but more nagging worry of insufficiency. How is it to be conquered? He finds two answers, which contradict each other. By excess, said Blake. And behind him is ranged all the evidence supplied by those who believe in practice rather than precept; the mystics, the romantics, the people who work by rule-of-thumb, the philosophers who discard the crutches of logic. Here is a passage which Miss Sitwell quotes from Schopenhauer. "The inmost kernel of all genuine and actual knowledge is a perception; and every new truth is the profit or gain yielded by a perception . . . . Merely abstract thoughts, which have no kernel of perception, are the cloud-structures, without reality."

All this, Blake with his excess, Schopenhauer with his direct perceptions, Bergson exploring intuition, Rimbaud saying that "a poet makes himself a seer by a long, immense and reasoned unruliness of all his senses," put the emphasis of creative power upon some external agent, called inspiration. Even when Bergson tries to include it within the faculty of self-responsibility, and calls it the sub-conscious, I think that he merely shifts the fulcrum of that power a little, and thereby makes more economical processes of art possible. Neither he, nor other explorers such as Croce and Santayana, throw any more light on the nature of that power.

That shifting of the fulcrum, however, brings it nearer to the processes of responsibility, and further from those of irresponsibility. The result is something approaching a reconciliation between that method of excess (which in his heart every humble artist accepts along with William Blake) and the method of austerity, which is the second method to which I refer above. Here is the alternative answer to Miss Sitwell's question about *insufficiency*. It is the answer given by Aristotle and the classicists, the creatures proud in spirit and controlled by a strong sense of decorum and form. They believe that the moment of creative incandescence is not to be waited for in a mood of humble and mystical faith. It has to be won by a constant scientific labour of conquest, which can be performed only after a sharpening process of self-discipline. Such are the artists who cry "Eliminate! Eliminate!" and practise austerely to subdue colours, to shut the door upon such unexpected arrivals as the adjective and the adverb. "What do you mean by *very*?" Mr. T. S. Eliot once asked a heckler who had cried out in protest against the lecturer's inquisition upon the way in which a poet works: "But surely you believe that inspiration plays a *very* important part?" It is the danger of that 'very' which this second school is afraid of. They see the insufficiency as a direct result of self-indulgence in spontaneous excitement of the senses; of idleness which pretends to be waiting a divine visitation. They claim to be the "unacknowledged legislators" and to have that knowledge "which is in the face of all science," because they have put themselves to a hard school for that purpose.

A poet accepts one or other answer according to his nature. And he follows the regimen, the ritual, of the faith implied in that answer, until the time comes when his inmost self can no longer be contained within any one principle, and he has to break through it, and be born again to explore the other side of the paradoxical life-process. Sooner or later, if he is to fulfil himself, the creature of excess has to be disillusioned of excess, and in despair to turn to the other way of life, the way of discipline, austerity and elimination. And the man who began with discipline, works his way through to the exercise of spontaneity and excess. Both discover joy.

This discovery of joy brings a poet to the final and most searching stages of creative effort. For just as joy is the final condition of the mature mind of man, so the expression of that joy is the crowning achievement of the poet. In reaching that expression, he will have covered the whole field of human tragedy and have shaken off the burden of it, as well as of the material in which he works. He will move as freely and fiercely as light itself; and will be as lucid, as anonymous and as universal as light. His gesture will be that of a saint, and his songs will be immediately accepted as myths, as folk-songs. Few are the poets who reach this stage, for it cannot be mastered by will and ambition, or even by moral force. The poet who commands this final joy, this sad, lonely, unassailable ecstasy, does so by an 'inward and spiritual grace' which may, in the end, commit him to silence. But one must not make too much of a mystery of it, or cite Mozart, Fra Angelico, Blake, Villon and Burns, because while it comes to such people in their simplicity, it comes to others, such as Dante and Milton, to Goethe and Wordsworth, in a way not so easily recognizable through the gigantic structures of thought and morals (what Blake called 'mental strife') beneath which they had buried themselves.

This condition of joy is present throughout Miss Sitwell's "Notebook," and gives it a unity, an illumination, which shines both upon the reader and upon the poet herself. It is that late and slanted light which comes upon the ripe evening of the mind. Its counterpart fills the picture of Samuel Palmer, Blake's most beloved disciple. It glows too in the autumnal days of all religions and civilizations, when their struggles for growth and acceptance are over, and they have become universal and associated with the laws of nature.

All the observations, curiosities and enquiries in this book are bathed in

that light, which presents them to the reader as creatures and ideas moving along a gold-misted horizon, serene and gentle. Some words by Cocteau, which appear in Miss Sitwell's Notes, might well be quoted to illustrate both the mood of her book, and the conditions under which all poets work when they come at last to this inheritance—for it is an inheritance rather than a conquest —of the kingdom of joy. "As you see, we are not far from the religious spirit . . . . The primordial importance that is granted to lyricism by minds like ours, the most capable, one would have thought, of despising it, obliges us to recognize in it a divine essence. This can change the slightest object into an idol, and make it live, for us, in conditions of an astounding silence." And commenting on that note, Miss Sitwell speaks of "simplicity, the stripping away of all superfluities, and the extraordinary, almost terrifying silence by which the idol is surrounded."

This *silence*, as we have to call it, is the temporal equivalent to the colour which we call *white*, the sum of the spectrum. So this silence is the sum of all sound-scales, and takes on the nature of that Platonic Word which St. John stated to have been "in the Beginning." It is a condition of intensity, that sleepy equilibrium in which the child's top hums, and myriads of suns spin. It is reached through the perfect registration of all parts. The human imagination, perhaps, grasps it most tangibly by means of mathematics. I recollect that one of my most intimate glimpses of it came to me one night when I was sitting with Professor G. H. Hardy in his rooms in Trinity, talking about Pascal. The mathematician, with a life's glory of devotion apparent upon him like a garment, was not to be distinguished from an ageing master-poet. The gesture and stoop of the mind under the weight of mental experiences, were the same with him as with the figure moving toward Beatrice in Paradise. I felt, that night, remote from accident and near to essentials. When, later, this master of Number saw me to the gate, there rang in my memory the words of a poem by the French scientist, J. H. Fabre:

> Nombre, regulateur des effets at des causes,
> Qui donne le comment et le pourquoi des choses,
> Que me veux-tu, Nombre Imposant?

Yes, that is the question which Miss Sitwell seems to be pursuing in her Notebook. 'What do you want of me?' is what she asks the Architect of Language. And she asks it after a lifetime of devotion to poetry, in the knowledge that "Poetry is only another of the Divine Names, and each poet, even if his day is but mortal, is part of the great light." It is this pursuit which gives direction and excitement to her discussion of verse-technique. Such a discussion in the hands of a grammarian becomes a corpse, while the poet makes it a symbolism. One of the most valuable of the affiliations which she traces is that between genius and technical conscience. On one page she quotes Blake's words, "mechanical excellence is the only vehicle of genius," and on another those of Coleridge, "No work of true genius dares want its appropriate form, neither indeed is there any danger of this. As it must not,

so genius cannot, be lawless; for it is ever this that constitutes its genius—the power of acting creatively under laws of its own origination."

This infatuation with words, the tools of her vocation, is a lively indication of a poet's vitality and staying-power, for as Shelley said, "every great poet must inevitably innovate upon the example of his predecessors in the exact structure of his peculiar versification." That is what Miss Sitwell has been concerned to do, not only in the detailed enquiry into the nature of vowel and consonant which she undertakes in these Notes, but also in her lifelong practice as a poet struggling to present

> Immortal things in their poor earthly dress.

Many copies of THE FORTNIGHTLY for November, 1942 and April, 1943, were lost at sea. Readers who possess and can spare either or both of these issues are asked to return them to 13, Buckingham Street, London, W.C.2, so that they may be forwarded to Libraries wishing to complete the volumes for binding.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

LAST November there was published *One of Our Pilots is Safe* (Hamish Hamilton, 7s. 6d.), and it described the experiences of its author, Flight-Lieutenant William Simpson, D.F.C., who was shot down on May 10, 1940, on his first experience of air combat, and almost burnt to death. Till October 10, 1941, he was a patient moved from one French hospital to another. The book (which did not come to me in the ordinary way for review) had reached its seventh impression by last June. This is not surprising for Mr. Simpson has two themes of extreme interest; first, what he experienced as an airman, and then as a human being desperately wounded. Second, and this becomes the major subject, what he observed of France in the days of France's defeat. Similar opportunities may have been afforded to others, but in this case they came to a born writer. Mr. Simpson, like all other officers in his squadron, was under twenty-seven, but probably unlike most he was married and happily married. Still more distinguishing was the fact that he had the habit of thinking, as, for instance, in the account of what passed through his mind in the few seconds when it was certain to him that he must burn to death in the blazing plane which he could not release himself because his hands were already crippled by the flame. He was never to recover the use of them. For that terrible loss, for all that he suffered in the many months during which, unexpectedly, he fought his way back to a lasting life (and being, as I have said, a born writer, he gives us terrible detail not only of the pain but of the disgust and the physical humiliations) he is not without a compensating gain. He has been moved to use the gift which but for all this he might never have called into play; and in using it on matters that command such attention, he has acquired an audience to which he will never speak as a stranger. Should there be any doubt in his mind whether the effort to write more is worth making, here are his own words:

Suffering with France

> I had already suffered for the French people, and now I was suffering with them. In the worst moment of France's great history I knew that a link had been forged, binding me to them—the simple, honest people—for ever. I knew also that it was my duty to them, to try and understand them so that later on when, if ever, I reached England again, I could champion their cause and do something towards the rebirth of a new France—as free, but more conscientious, than the old.

He has shown in this book the power to understand, which means the power to appreciate. To put it plainer, he must be ranked with the great company of us who fell in love with France. That is the more to his honour, because at least at Marseilles he was treated in a way that would have excused a prejudice against the nation by whose representative it was inflicted; and he knew France at a time when, as he says, the order of French dislikes was—Britain first, then Italy, and lastly Germany. That was after the shelling of the French fleet at Oran, and the attack on Syria (which few English people remember) both of them wartime necessities for which compensation on

handsome terms must be paid; and Mr. Simpson should be of those who see to this—according to their ability

On the other side of his work, he has made at least one reader realize the vital differences between this war and the last. War-risks are by comparison limited to a few—but those few the élite. Most of us feel a qualm when we hear that after a raid on Germany twenty or perhaps thirty bombers "did not return". That means probably three times as many lives lost; even if not lost there is a savage irony in Mr. Simpson's title *One of Our Pilots is Safe*. Safe! Crippled for life after recovering from unspeakable injuries. Still, in the war in which my generation and I amongst them had a part, nothing would have been thought of sixty to ninety casualties. Yet a far smaller proportion of them would have been fatal. Rightly our imagination is more shocked by the horrors of to-day—and Mr. Simpson does not palliate them. But he does make present to our minds what he calls "the mystical elation" that airmen experience when they climb into their element —which is not ours.

Altogether here is a book worth writing about; and Mr. Simpson may take this from one who has some fifty years of experience; he must not leave it at that. Such a gift is a gift to be used.

* * * * *

In his *Adventures of a Polish Prisoner* (Lindsay Drummond, 10s. 6d.), Mr. Piotrowski writes with skilfully chosen detail of his experiences between July, 1939, when he returned to his job as a Parisian journalist, and December, 1941, which saw him landing in England by plane from Portugal—one of the prisoners who had escaped from a German concentration camp. He belonged to the race which in one sense brought on the European War; when Germany attacked Poland, and Poland did not submit, France and England were pledged to resist this new aggression. We get here a striking study of the atmosphere of that time in Paris—and of the effort to maintain some contact with Warsaw. We get also much detail about the formation of a Polish army in France, to which, of course, Mr. Piotrowski belonged. The story takes us through the months of the *drôle de guerre* in which so little happened, up to the day in June, 1940, when Germany attacked Bulgaria and Holland—and so much happened so quickly. To this Pole and his nearest comrades it brought capture, escape and then capture again—this time definitive. The greater part of the book, and the more interesting, describes Germany seen from prison camps. There may be some wishful thinking; but this trained observer gives us good grounds for thinking that even then, at the top of Germany's success, all was not rosy, even to German eyes—though the war with Russia was only beginning.

Poles in Exile

One thing at least the book does: it increases our admiration and sympathy for Mr. Piotrowski's country and his countrymen.

* * * * *

Year of the Wild Boar, which Peter Davies publishes at 12s. 6d., will, I think, interest anyone whom ordinary intellectual curiosity urges to hear about "An American Woman in Japan." That is the sub-title given to her book by Helen Mears. This lady joined an English friend (spoken of throughout as Dee), also a writer and editor, who had been for several years living in Tokyo. This was a long time

The Japanese God of War

before yesterday—1935, in fact; but already Japan had left the League of Nations and had seized Manchukuo. To discuss these actions, and the like, with any of Dee's Japanese acquaintance proved to be difficult; not unnaturally. In the house which Miss Mears shared with Dee there was a most attractive housekeeper, named Akiku, who from the first instructed the stranger as to what was, or more often was not, according to custom—*Shukan*. But Akiku was no ordinary domestic; her husband, an intellectual, was in prison charged with entertaining "dangerous thoughts". Japan was a place where caution was necessary.

Gradually Helen Mears builds up a picture of the extraordinary society which has resulted from a clash of two civilizations. The Japanese had carried on comfortably enough, shut off from the Western world, and not interfering greatly with the Eastern, yet aware that Western society had much to offer them that could be useful; aware also that a day might come when Western society would use its strength to take by force what it fancied in Japan. The West however was willing to sell to Japan the machinery of force, and the skill which taught how to put it together. As we all know, Japan decided to become a learner; though probably not many know how the nation had been divided between two great cliques, one of which stood for a conciliatory policy and the other for a constant show of force. Almost the last chapter in this book reproduces a sort of lecture given to Miss Mears by a Japanese who had become Americanized; and it was he who explained the cycle of twelve years for each of which stood a sign of the Chinese Zodiac. Of the twelfth year, the sign is the Wild Boar, a dangerous symbol, for the God of War rides on his back. The Americanized Japanese had great fear, in 1935, of what he saw ahead for his country.

This book needs, I think, a patient reader; but it conveyed to me at least powerfully a sense of tragic difficulties, alike for Japan and for those who must try somehow to fit Japan into the modern world. Life appears to be less natural for these people than for the rest of mankind. Can they preserve their "Custom" if there is free contact with other races? Meanwhile we are up against the present condition in which war between Japanese and Europeans means a war in which the killed are an abnormally high proportion in all casualty lists. It is war where savage resentment inspires the action—perhaps of both sides, but certainly of the Japanese.

* * * * *

Frenchman Into Swede

Mr. Simon Dewes who has written *Sergeant Belle Jambe* is a new name to me, but seems likely to be a good deal heard of. It was a sound idea at this time to set out the "Life of Marshal Bernadotte, King of Sweden," which is the sub-title, and Rich & Cowan publishing the book at 12s. 6d. provide it with pictures which show us what the men looked like who in Napoleon's day did the sort of thing that Hitler's myrmidons have been doing. Is there among German army-leaders anyone who even while he carries out a conqueror's instructions, disapproves of the predatory spirit? Mr. Dewes makes it clear that Bernadotte never kept his thoughts to himself, and as a result was constantly in trouble. Yet he remained too valuable to be simply thrown aside; though Napoleon never appreciated what was the essence of his value. Time and again, this Gascon from Pau carried through some desperate military exploit by showing a disregard of danger which forced men to follow him; but others of the Generals could do that, and did it. Where he stood out alone was in his power to keep

victorious troops from plunder and outrage. Wherever he had held the Government even for a few months, France had grateful friends instead of sullen enemies, and their gratitude centred about the Frenchman who had given justice and decent administration when no such things were expected. At last the dream came true that had filled his southern imagination ever since he decided for a bayonet in the ranks instead of a law clerk's quill, and he was offered sovereign rank. Then the Frenchman ceased deliberately to be a Frenchman, and became heart and soul a Swede. That is why his descendants reign in Sweden to-day—the only surviving representatives of that amazing force which Napoleon let loose on Europe. They are also representatives of the only one among Napoleon's group who turned against the Emperor. It says much for Mr. Dewes that he makes us acquit Bernadotte of all disloyalty—or rather, so tells the story that no such accusation forms itself. From the moment when with Napoleon's full approval he was brought to Sweden as Crown Prince, his loyalty belonged to the country that chose him; and he must act in the interests of Sweden as he saw them. If Napoleon could not respect these interests, he must count on being met by all that a great soldier could do to oppose him.

Some day we shall all be reading of the intrigues and jealousies that swarmed round Hitler. We may come to read of some German who chose the interests of Europe rather than those of Germany as Hitler saw them. But as yet, we of the outer world do not even know whether there is in Hitler anything of that personal fascination which even Bernadotte felt whenever he and Napoleon were in personal contact. Still, there must be something; for Hitler has achieved what he did achieve without that prestige of military conquest which surrounded the Corsican.

THE POLITICS OF THE UNPOLITICAL, by Herbert Read. *Routledge. 7s. 6d.*

Mr. Herbert Read is one of the most graceful writers of our time and one of the most suggestive thinkers. His *Annals of Experience and Innocence* showed him as a philosophical romantic, a Bergsonian in metaphysics, a Freudian in psychology and a syndicalist in politics, in brief as very much a man shaped in the decade of the First World War. What has he to contribute constructively in this epoch that may perhaps help avert the Third World War? The present little book tells us; and what it tells us, in the estimate of this reviewer, is of the first importance, not only in content but as a symptom.

Such writers as Professors MacMurray and Mannheim, and Dr. Peter Drucker—and the writers on 'community' such as Mr. Heard—are in the spiritual line of inheritance of the political Pluralists of two decades ago (many of whom have since become orthodox Marxists). Whether in voluntary societies or in local government they are looking for some bulwark against the towering power of the state. Although orthodox socialists have now agreed to put more stress on

public control, and less on state ownership, than in the past, this actual power of the national state proceeds in our days from strength to strength. The problem of liberty and especially spiritual liberty against totalitarian control of opinion—monopoly broadcasting, monopoly films, monopoly publishing, monopoly press—is known to exist; but no remedy has yet been found that is satisfactory in terms that will give the common man both economic security and essential freedom. Mr. Read indulges in no economic discussions in this book (whatever his training under Mr. Arthur Greenwood), but he indicates the lines along which the solution may be found. And the reader will be unwise who is put off because Mr. Read's romanticism leads him to tilt with a spear with pennant bearing the device 'Anarchism'.

Mr. Read is much more a humanist of the type of Julien Benda than an anarchist after the style of Bakunin. Admittedly a man can no more escape from 'politics' than from society. Even Henry Thoreau could not do that. But it is perfectly legitimate to make one's politics those of the active rejection of the party politics of the national sovereign states—it is legitimate; it is intelligent; and all the signs are that it will be the attitude of the 1950's.

Progressivism in that future will be divided between a Marxist communism, bound to the scientific materialism of the last century and to the corpse of Marx, and a humanistic libertarianism (which Mr. Read likes to call anarchism) resting on a basis of secured economic minima and of democratic equalization of non-functional power. Those of the second school will do, as Mr. Read here does, and flatly affirm that the values of the Great Society and of a civilization that has much to do with the daily rhythm of life and very little to do with 'politics', are vastly more important than what governments and politicians bent on power choose to tell us is valuable. Our attitude will become more Chinese and more civilized instead of tribal, fanatical and inhumane. This solution is essentially classical. Nazism and Bakunin's anarchism are both offshoots of the romantic movement, which does not admit with Bossuet that the cult of novelty sprung from boredom is a vice, but chooses to talk of 'dynamism' and 'life'. I distrust Mr. Read's gods and penates — Bergson, Freud, Kierkegaard. I wonder whether when his humanistic hope sees fruition his romanticism, in that great day of a restored Roman Empire, will not be frustrated. However this is a debate for the dialectic of the future.

Mr. Read voices the eternal demand of the poet, and of the poetic and truest spirit in every man. He quotes from Rilke: "Probe the depths from which your life springs up". The highest moral imperative is to repudiate with contempt the endeavour of governments to subordinate all to propaganda and to impose the mass mind. The charge, Mr. Read continues, that the poet makes against the modern world is that it has tried to invade the core of his soul "with insistent policies and totalitarian wars." "The politicians talk boogie-woogie to the public"—not least the politicians of the Left, including supporters of what is now called National Communism. And he says with Tertullian, *quid ecclesia cum imperatori?*: "What have I to do with the power-craze? Let the politicians cure themselves." The people is judge. When a war is produced, like a train crash, let the people hang both politicians—just to be on the safe side—Lord Simple and Signor Neri, from the same tree. That is, in effect, Mr. Read's gospel. To others of the riches of this book, little in size and great in significance, I have no space to do justice. Mr. Read has indeed rallied new forces to the Battle of the Future under the oriflamme of Humanism.

GEORGE CATLIN.

BISMARCK, by Jan Morrow. *Duckworth.* 3*s.*

WAR WITHOUT GUNS, by George Sava. *Faber & Faber.* 6*s.*

On the evening of July 13, 1870, three men sat in gloomy silence in the Prussian Prime Minister's office in the Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin, Bismarck and his two most intimate collaborators, Moltke, Chief of the Prussian General Staff, and Roon, Minister for War. These men had already planned and fought two wars in order to achieve their great national aim: The foundation of a new German Empire under the leadership of Prussia. They were hard men, unsentimental and ruthless—they were Prussians. Now they were waiting for the pretext to start the third, the decisive war—the war against France.

In 1868 Queen Isabella of Spain had abdicated. This was the opportunity the Iron Chancellor had been waiting for since Königsgrätz. Knowing that Napoleon III never would allow a German prince to mount the throne south of the Pyrenees, Bismarck instigated the candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen as successor of Isabella and even persuaded his own sovereign, King William I. to consent to it. But William, an old and modest man, did not want any more wars. He did not want even to become German Emperor. So, when he saw that Napoleon would not hesitate to go to war in order to prevent the candidature of a German prince, he withdrew his consent. Bismarck had suffered a diplomatic and personal defeat. He saw his lifework in jeopardy.

But the French government came to his rescue and the famous "Emser Depesche" was fabricated. It forced Napoleon to do what Bismarck wanted him to do—to draw the sword. Seven months later Bismarck at Versailles proclaimed the King of Prussia German Emperor.

Mr. Morrow knows quite well why he reiterates the story of the "Ems telegram" in his biography of the Iron Chancellor. Nothing shows more convincingly the determination and ruthlessness with which that Prussian *Junker* had set out to form the German Empire anew. He himself, cynic that he was, said once: "Politics corrupt the character." He knew no ethical hindrance, no material obstacle to achieve what he regarded as his historical mission. But his mission, as Mr. Morrow proves in his clear and unbiased way, was not to make the national dreams of the German people come true but to the greater glory, dominion and power of Prussia. His Prussianized Germany was master of the European Continent.

Without Bismarck, Hitler would never have come into being. He continued the work of the Iron Chancellor. In his book *War without Guns* Mr. George Sava, equipped with the whole armour of modern psychology depicts how the German High Command prepared the German people for these wars of Hitler. Mr. Sava very carefully analyses the work of "the making of a Nazi soldier," necessary for that new conception of modernized warfare, the *Blitzkrieg*. The Nazi soldier who won the battles of this *Blitzkrieg*, is

a perfect component of a machine conceived as a whole. Wherein lies the strength but also the weakness of the Nazi technique.

There is a very definite reason why we always speak of the "German war *machine*, whereas we only know of the "British war *effort*." Mr. Sava sets forth the principle on which this effort is to be based, in other words, how a British soldier is to be made. The Germans have evolved an elaborate system not only of physical, but also of psychological tests aiming at elucidating the recruit's personality in its whole complexity. Mr. Sava wants this system adapted for the modern British army—with important differences of course. The British soldier is the son of a democratic country and proud of his being a free man. While the Germans train men whose supreme law is obedience and subordination, the British educate their soldiers to discipline without disregarding innate individualism—a most difficult task which however, as Alamein and Tunisia have proved, has been magnificently fulfilled.

Mr. Sava also wants a thoroughly psychological training of the British people themselves for total war. He suggests the appointment, after the model of the Russian Political Commissars, of Morale Liaison Officers whose duty it would be to keep the government continuously informed of the development of public opinion. This work is to be completed by the system of a ballot on a scientific basis, in order to show the mass reaction to topical questions at any time.

The scope of Mr. Sava's book is far reaching. It offers a total psychological analysis of total war and shows how the psychological war, the war without guns, may be successfully fought.

ERNST KLEIN.

FORWARD FROM VICTORY, by Four Young Conservatives. *Faber & Faber.* 5*s.*

MODERN EUROPE, 1871-1939, by D. C. Somervell, *Methuen.* 6*s.*

Conservatives should by this time be used to being "educated". Bolingbroke initiated the process. Excluded from active participation in affairs by his own folly and the prudence of Sir Robert Walpole, he published a series of quasi-philosophical treatises (circ. 1730-40) designed to wean the Tory party from its erroneous adherence to absolutist dogmas. By his *Patriot King* and other works he not only made a notable contribution to the development of English Prose, but did much to transform the Tory obscurantism of Filmer into the progressive conservatism of the younger Pitt and Peel. Yet perhaps the failure of the Jacobite risings of '15 and '45 did more to eliminate the doctrine of Divine Right than the laborious expositions of Lord Bolingbroke. Then came Peel with his famous Tamworth Manifesto of 1835, begging his party to accept the Reform Act of 1832 and work out a new policy congruous with the conditions which that Act involved. After Peel, Disraeli, who in 1867 'shot Niagara', and in 1874 led the Conservative Party to a victory at the Polls, the first it had achieved since 1841

To Disraeli the four young Conservatives who have written this book have throughout looked for inspiration—to Disraeli who as a Social reformer sought to bridge the gulf between "the two Nations," and as the Neo-Imperialist endeavoured—and not unsuccessfully—to dethrone from its long supremacy in English politics the rather dreary but not entirely ungenerous philosophy and practice of the "Manchester School".

The young Conservatives have written a delightful book. But the epithet which better fits it is "refreshing". To an aged Tory it is, indeed, "refreshing" to observe these young men addressing themselves with almost overwhelming seriousness to a solution of the problems which will (I hope) confront them, and will certainly test the temper of their contemporaries in the post-war world. With refreshing naïveté they produce an infallible remedy for every disease in the body politic. Never for an instant do they waver or hesitate. "We insist", "we demand", no half-hearted suggestion here; "we shall" or "will", no "mays" impede the easy confidence with which they pontificate on every question and dissipate every doubt.

The corner-stone of the new edifice they desire to erect will be found in "the emergence of a revived and revitalized conservatism," with its "belief in the greatness of England," with "its deep love for the English tradition and the English way of life, and with a profound sense of our mission to establish over the face of the world the ideals in which we believe."

In international affairs the young Conservatives realizing the defects of the League of Nations nevertheless want "something in the nature of a League" which, brought into being by the four great victorious Powers, "must not be hampered by a written Constitution," "must be allowed to evolve gradually" and slowly, and keeps its hands off the British colonies. It is on the two English-speaking nations that responsibility will rest of "rebuilding the world", and seemingly at their sole expense, without hope of repayment. "Vast sums" are to be spent by us on 'housing' . . . and "particularly on education" and indeed on all manner of improvements (c.f. pp. 67, 74-5, 81, 89, 91, etc.), without too nice a regard for the source from which the wherewithal is to be drawn. The chapter on Post-war Finance is indeed the least convincing in the book. Nevertheless the authors discuss the highly technical questions of currency, banking, etc. with as much assurance as Archbishop Temple, though with greater wisdom. For the writers are convinced individualists (c.f. e.g. pp. 84, 90, 121, 151, etc.). They are sound also on such matters as Party-Government, Second Chamber Reform, and so forth. Altogether the book must give ageing Conservatives encouragement for a future which they trust may be shaped by men as full of enthusiasm tempered by knowledge and prudence, as these four "Young Conservatives".

Only sufficient space remains to give a few words of welcome to a second edition of Mr. Somervell's little book on modern Europe. Clear and concise, it should prove a useful text book in the hands of a teacher who can use it as a basis for his history lessons. The period 1871-1939 is so crowded that such a book needs to be supplemented by good oral instruction.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

FOOD AND FARMING IN POST-WAR EUROPE, by Mr. P. L. Yates and Mr. D. Warriner.

Oxford University Press. 3*s.* 6*d.*

To write about the agriculture of a county is to challenge the expert knowledge of those farmers who regard comment as a form of trespass; to discuss the food production of a country is to provoke dissent or, at best, a guarded approval, from that country's agricultural highlights. But to pass in review the acts of husbandry of a continent demands not only still wider know-

ledge but complete assurance of the kind that passes from writer to reader, convincing him in subtle fashion that he has found a safe guide in an unknown land. Such gifts belong to the authors of this slim volume. Within the compass of little more than a hundred pages they have packed facts, theories and deductions so tightly that every page has a part to play. Writing men will acknowledge the skill, farming men should welcome a valuable addition to the knowledge of vital problems, while those concerned with the post-war conditions of nearly two hundred million European food producers will overlook this book at their risk and peril. From first to last it grips the reader who approaches with sympathy the question of feeding a vast under-nourished population; indeed the essay might well find a place in every agricultural college and farm institute in the country and be studied closely by all who desire to contribute to an informed public opinion. This is not an exercise in "the noble pleasure of praising," it is a simple statement of fact.

Few people in these islands realize the hard conditions under which food is produced, even in peace-time, in remote Europe, or the handicaps under which the peasants labour—millions lack and suffer hunger, thousands of children die for want of food. The peasant cultivator is handicapped by the custom of strip farming, the *parcellement* against which Denmark has legislated and for which Russia has substituted the collective farm; "it is no exaggeration," say the authors, "to reckon the strip system as the biggest single curse afflicting European farming to-day." We have suffered from it in our time. Over-population and ever-decreasing land for the cultivator, create the conditions pictured in Southern Poland and Yugoslavia. "Each year the people plunge deeper into poverty from which there is no apparent escape. The children suffer from rickets—almost every family has its cripple."

For the many ills set out the authors have remedies to propound, and four sentences scattered among their pages reveal the soundness of the approach. "Europe must be treated as a single unit." "The essence of successful change is gradualness." "Merely to make everybody proficient in pursuing self-interest and profit will not make a happy world." "Fundamentally any attempt to upgrade technical efficiency will fail miserably unless and until the operator, the human material, has been upgraded too."

Emigration is a key to the solution of the problem, and the authors suggest that South America might rescue South-Eastern Europe. Industrialization will have an important part to play, so will the development of communications, the abolition of strip farming, co-operation and the substitution of dairying, where corn-growing cannot support the grower. The peasants must be reconciled to change, led, not driven. Obsolete methods and implements must go and the achievements of Denmark and Russia be understood. At present there are countless small holdings in South-East Europe where men are overworked for half the year, idle through the other half, and undernourished all the time. Scarcity, actual want and perennial uncertainty can be removed from the peasant cultivators of Europe by wise, firm and helpful treatment, say the authors, and they present a strong case for intervention. At present the land, the cultivator and the cultivator's family are being starved, and, while these conditions obtain and persist, there can be no room for the Four Freedoms.

The authors have performed a great public service and were wise in adding a few illustrations and half a dozen maps to their text. They state their case without undue fervour, with a minimum of doctrine and with adequate emphasis.

S. L. BENSUSAN.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A GERMAN PASTOR, by Hans P. Ehrenberg. *Student Christian Movement.* 6*s.*

The Ehrenbergs have a background of persecution. At the end of the Middle Ages, the persecutions in Germany forced them to flee to Poland. Two hundred years later, persecutions in Poland forced them to flee back to Germany. There they eventually settled in the little town of Wolfenbuttel in 1880 where for three generations they were schoolmasters in a Jewish school. The last of the schoolmasters, Dr. Philip Ehrenberg (the author's grandfather), and his two brothers, both university professors, were all born in the Wolfenbuttel schoolhouse, but all went further afield. "In the middle years of the nineteenth century German Jews lived an uncontested 'German' life, but had not fully abandoned the traditions of their fathers." And it was in an atmosphere of liberalism, not fully purged of its racial tensions, that Hans Ehrenberg was brought up. His greatest friend—"a sort of Castor-and-Pollux pair of spiritual seekers"—was Franz Rosenzweig, who eventually "returned to the fold of Judaism" and came to be regarded by the Jews of Europe as a leader and a saint; but Ehrenberg, after lecturing in philosophy at Heidelberg, entered the Lutheran ministry and was ordained at the age of 41—a circumstance which, in the light of Luther's wild anti-Semitism is not without its paradoxical aspect.

Two years after his induction at Bochum he began his struggle against the Nazis (1927); in 1933 he resigned from the staff of Heidelberg University; in 1937, from the ministry (as the only fully non-Aryan pastor in Westphalia)—one would like, incidentally, a translation of his *Seventy-two Theses on the Jewish-Christian Question* which, published in 1933, led to an attack on him—and, from the November of 1938 to the March of 1939 was in a concentration camp near Berlin. He arrived in England in the May of 1939, was interned at Huyton from June to September, 1940, and for the last three years has been responsible for German services at Manchester and other places in North-West England, living quietly with his family in a "delightfully peaceful cottage in the north of Shropshire."

His autobiography takes the form of letters to friends on various aspects of his life and thought and this method is very effective in, as it were, revealing him gradually to the reader as one might come to know him in life. For those interested primarily in the currents of European theological thought, the letters to Bervaeyev, to Niemoller and to Karl Barth are the most important; and the letter to Alec Vidler gives a clear picture of the movements, intellectual and philosophical, in the Germany of this century, which is a model of compression—though one may question his equating, even roughly, the school of Stefan George with that of Wilde, unless it is the Wilde of "The Soul of Man under Socialism"; 'aestheticism' is not 'aristocratism'.

Dr. Ehrenberg's comments contain, as might be expected, a mixture of balanced shrewdness and fanatical naïveté. Of the latter, one might instance: "Hitler is the resurrected magician of the Middle Ages; he is

in league with dark, secret powers; he belongs to them, though for a time he may be able to exercise his power over them"—which one might expect to find only in the cruder type of *Daily Blank* propaganda. On the other hand, he can write:

> The simplification of the fronts of earlier European history, e.g. the straightforward opposition of reactionary autocracy and liberal constitutionalism, have disappeared. We observe instead the spectacle of the most important nations and of the conflicting spiritual armies in the form of a triangle. There is nothing in present-day Europe which cannot be brought under a threefold heading: for example, capitalism, Marxism, fascism; Nazi anti-Christianity, Nazi-oppressed Christianity, Nazi-organized Churches . . . Three Russias confront us to-day, firstly the 'old Christian, holy Russia,' secondly, Bolshevist Russia; and thirdly, a Russia, not holy, not godless but a living earthy Russia . . . To-day we have to see all things in a three-dimensional manner. Every realm, every idea, stands in a two-fold relationship to its opponents, direct and indirect. Everything existing is unwittingly falsified: the West *and* Bolshevism, National Socialism *and* Catholicism.

The author, in this challenge to conventional thought, sees that it leads to the conclusion that "just at the moment when propaganda methods have reached perfection, their effectiveness has declined in value; for propaganda can only work through simple fronts." His clarity of perception in the general makes one hope that he will give us another essay in the particular in which the 'propaganda simplification' will be conspicuous by its absence.

HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON.

THE ARMISTICES OF 1918, by Sir Frederick Maurice. *Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d.*

We are indebted once more to the Royal Institute of International Affairs and on this occasion to Sir Frederick Maurice for a book which fills in an essential page of history in a concise and admirable manner. Much has been written about the Peace Treaties following the last war and the Treaty of Versailles in particular has gained an 'aunt Sally' reputation which is not wholly justified by the facts. In this short book Sir Frederick has helped to redress the balance and to point out the far-reaching importance of Armistice negotiations to a world about to be faced with a situation not dissimilar to that of 1918. This time there seems hardly room to doubt that Britain and America will refrain from suggesting terms that have not already been discussed and agreed between them.

"Unconditional surrender" has been stated as our Armistice terms in this war but unconditional surrender, when it comes, will throw an immediate burden upon the Allies for which they must now be prepared at any moment. In 1918 we were wholly unprepared for the "hell-broth of disturbance and discontent" that the war had left. What that disturbance and discontent can be is the lesson of Sir Frederick's book. It demonstrates beyond argument that the planning of a combined operation for peace is even more important than its counterpart in war.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

ADVERTISEMENT AND BUSINESS OFFICES: 13 Buckingham Street, LONDON, W.C.2
PUBLISHED FOR THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, LTD., BY HORACE MARSHALL & SON, LTD., Publishing Department, Temple House, Tallis Street, E.C.4
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GEERINGS OF ASHFORD, LTD., 80, HIGH STREET, ASHFORD, KENT
PUBLISHED IN ENGLAND

THE FORTNIGHTLY

OCTOBER, 1943

RUSSIA AND EUROPE

BY H. FOSTER ANDERSON

WHEN Peter the Great began to change an eastward-looking oriental Muscovy into a westward-looking Europeanized Russia, Europe had outlived a Medieval Age, had passed beyond the fierce freedom and fierce intolerance of religious wars, and was entering a period, when the material things of life were to be the dominant interest. What little the Russian knew or knows of Europe belongs to that aspect of our civilization, developed since 1700. This age is rapidly nearing its close, if it has not already passed. The European still has in his outlook something more powerful than mere vestiges of the past. Commerce and the machine have tended to make his conscious life appear to consist wholly of practical affairs, yet even in this material realm an occasional reticence or an apparently illogical action reveals other influences at work, which, though understood by the European of three and a half continents, are either overlooked or mis-interpreted by the non-European.

Everyone is aware of some profound change taking place and the change is involving spiritual values. What may emerge, may be a new aspect of civilization, which has already had a Medieval, a Renaissance, a Reformation and an Industrial Age. If this should happen, and if the Russian still identifies the European with one period of our civilization, the Soviet Government may act to protect Russia from a contingence that may never arise and may fail to readjust its policy to meet the new orientation of the European. At present this is a purely hypothetical consideration, since we do not know the form which will result from the change already in operation. Yet it may make for clarity to note certain factors in the last two centuries.

Four features have been present in European civilization since 1700, which were absent in any earlier age of that way of life; the machine as the basis of economic life, colonial expansion as a world-wide enterprise, the potential disorganization of a social order based on limited productive capacity, and three attempts by some one nation to dominate Continental Europe. With the exception of the third, these factors, being mainly of a material nature, could have been understood by any intelligent man of any age. Few

spiritual values were involved. To the onlooker the European appeared to be dominated by the readily understood instinct for acquiring material goods.

Stripped of all ideology, the Russian has seen Europe and the Europe beyond the seas as a mammoth machine with the world in its maw, as worldwide expansion and as a repeated attempt of some one nation to dominate the war-potential of Continental Europe. The Capitalist of the caricature, that blood-sucking, soul-starving octopus, is not for the Russian an isolated product of the Industrial Age. He is the symbol of European civilization. From such a way of life with its high material standards and its low cultural level successive Russian governments have tried to protect the people.

By identifying the European with one special and particularly materialistic period, the Russian may fail to realize the revaluation of values which is taking place to-day. On the other hand, we, in believing that Soviet Russia, by becoming less, and we, by becoming more socialistic, are drawing level, may fail to realize that the Russians, as a people, have never wished to become European. Moreover, we may fail to recognize that they fear the menace to their way of life, which the world-embracing expansion of our civilization implies. Soviet Russia will collaborate to preserve Russia for a Russian way of life, free from foreign spiritual or material influence. It is more than doubtful whether she will collaborate to Europeanize the whole world.

That great historic event of 1939, when the other nations of the British Commonwealth declared war on Germany, has a significance that the Russians have not overlooked. In the geographical sense, the oversea nations of the British Commonwealth are not European yet they felt that essential human values were menaced by the German attack on Poland. Owing to geographical implications we sometimes refer to this standard of human values as Western civilization, though more often than not we regard it as human civilization, thus making its range co-extensive with the human race. But for the Russian it still remains European civilization. He sees its materialism, which he despises, its technique, which he envies, and its expansion, which he fears. Its spiritual values have no meaning for him. He doubts their existence.

His doubts have the substantial basis of being grounded in historical facts. When Europe was inventing machines, it was also creating a greater measure of freedom for larger groups of the population, yet Peter the Great imported only the material products of the West. Catherine the Great in her German ambition to emulate Louis XV. imitated French fashions but rigorously suppressed any infiltration of the great spiritual achievements of the

French. During the last century the Tzars encouraged foreign capital and foreign enterprise but with the help of the secret police strangled, as far as possible, the democratic ideas that were developed in the countries from which they imported money and machines. And the Soviet Government has followed the Russian tradition of taking from the West only its material achievements in the form of technical equipment and scientific knowledge. We know little of the spiritual values of the Russian way of life but in comparison with the Russian appreciation of the spiritual aspect of European civilization, our knowledge is extensive. In our case ignorance has been due mainly to lack of interest in the Russian people for their own sake. In the case of Russia ignorance of the spiritual values of the European way of life has been due to a deliberate policy on the part of the government, Tzarist or Soviet.

It is, however, only when one identifies the European with human civilization that the deliberate policy of successive Russian governments to exclude the spiritual values of the West can be viewed as deplorable. Once it is granted that there are ways of life other than the European, which have the right to full and free expression, and in the case of China we are faced with this fundamental issue, then the deliberate policy of Russian governments to keep the Russian people as far as possible free from foreign spiritual influence becomes intelligible.

This is a cardinal point in any negotiations with the Russians. Do we have in mind a Commonwealth of free nations, animated by the spirit of Anglo-American collaboration which, at present, is the active agent of European civilization, or do we go one stage further and see the future as a Commonwealth of civilizations, each having its own social and political forms? If we have the former idea, then it is the old European expansion impulse in a modern guise. However much we may maintain that such expansion, being merely in the spiritual and not in the material realm, is harmless and peaceful, the Soviet Government will regard it as a menace to the Russian way of life. If, however, we have the vision of a world commonwealth of free civilizations our troubles are not over, since the commonwealth structure of political association has been evolved or created by those very spiritual forces whose existence the Russians doubt.

Of the four features of European civilization since 1700, Russia has taken the machine and its technique and has used even extreme measures to isolate her people from territorial, financial, or spiritual expansion on the part of European civilization. There remains for consideration the remaining two factors, the potential disorganization of a social order based on limited production and

three attempts by some one nation to dominate Continental Europe.

When Lenin turned potential disorganization into actual destruction of a social order based on limited production, a considerable number in various parts of the world of those genuinely interested in the development of mankind watched that great experiment with enthusiasm and hope. It was not long, however, before the same inner logic, which Peter the Great caused to import Western technique but debar Western non-material ideas, made itself felt. To Europeanize Russia yet to prevent the Russians from becoming Europeans in outlook was the problem that Peter the Great attempted to solve. It was the problem of taking from the West only material products, while excluding the way of life which had produced such things. Successive governments were faced with the same problem and the measures they took to exclude Western ideas indicated that the preservation of the Russian way of life from corrupting spiritual influences was a defence problem of the first magnitude. Under the Soviet Government the names were changed but little else. It too found that to take from the West only material products, while excluding the way of life which had produced such things, was a defence problem of the first magnitude. Defence became the primary consideration and production was designed to serve the needs of defence.

The inevitable logic of preserving for the Russian people a Russian way of life was stronger than the imported Communism, which had been developed in Europe by Europeans before the Russians put it into action. This inevitable logic liquidated one by one the leading members of the original Communist Party who were tainted with the corrupting Western ideas inherent in a doctrine made by Europeans. Even in the case of Communism, it may be but a slight exaggeration to say that the Russians took from Europe only the technique of making a revolution. What they did, once the technique proved successful, was purely Russian.

In the three attempts of a nation to dominate Continental Europe, the French under Napoleon, and the German under the Kaiser and under Hitler, Russia has been the ally of England. This alliance on each occasion has been a natural one. Neither England nor Russia would survive as a first-class power, were the war-potential of Continental Europe to be consolidated in one central authority. This natural partnership was and is based on a common will of each to survive intact. Under such an impulse there cannot be irreconcilable points of view. Tzarist despotism was the natural ally of liberalism and Communist Dictatorship is in similar circumstances the natural ally of Anglo-Saxon democracy. When survival has been secured, the alliance between Russia and England must find

a new basis. But survival is not a matter wholly of the years of war. It involves the future. So there is some reason to hope that the alliance will continue but to avoid misunderstanding and misinterpretation on the part of either, it is necessary for both sides to appreciate the point of view of the other. To do this involves the consideration of those very spiritual values which each fails to see in the other.

Once Germany has been rendered innocuous, we shall return to our old ways since survival for us is so taken for granted that not even at the eleventh hour does it become for us a conscious interest. Survival, however, has been the primary and constant preoccupation of the Soviet Government. When we see the impressive strength of the U.S.S.R. and read of the glorious feats of the Red Army, it is rather difficult to grasp that it has been fear and suspicion which has lurked in the minds of the Russian people.

The task is to convince the Soviet Government that the survival of Russia is in no way menaced by European civilization. It is more difficult than it appears at first sight. We regard the present spirit of Germany as animated by the will to destroy European civilization but it is more than probable the Russians see the Germans as the culmination of that materialistic, mechanical, and expansionist, way of life, which for them has represented European civilization. Once Germany is rendered permanently powerless to start a new expansion drive, we imagine that Russia has nothing to fear from an agglomeration of small and disunited nations which goes by the name of Europe. But what the Russians regard as European civilization, we often term, civilization. It is now that the task appears more in its true dimensions. We are to convince the Soviet Government that Russia has nothing to fear from the forces of civilization. Stated in this form, the task is an insolent one. Yet it may help to clear the issue.

The Soviet Government wants to keep Russia clear of a non-Russian attitude to life. It wants technical and scientific knowledge: it wants the material resources of the world to be accessible to Russia but it does not want a standard of values different from that which is current in Russia. In other words, the Soviet Government wants the material world to be a unity, scientific knowledge to be universal, and economics to be world-wide. But with regard to spiritual values, it wants Russia to remain apart from the rest of the world. So what we call our civilization is not a mere matter of words. If we call it civilization, this implies that we believe that our standard of values is supreme for the whole human race. Such an attitude on our part would only increase the sus-

picion of the Soviet Government, since it would imply that we aim at bringing ultimately all human beings within its influence.

The first step towards removing the fear and suspicion of the Soviet Government is for us to admit that our civilization is not world-embracing in its aim but limited so far as Russia is concerned. Even then suspicion will not be allayed since the Russian sees European civilization in the light of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when it certainly was world-embracing in its impulse of expansion. In reality the first step should be the earlier one of convincing the Soviet Government that the European is not the materialist the Russian imagines him to be, and that our way of life has spiritual values which can make us throw material considerations to the wind. The example of Poland and of the Commonwealth of British Nations, when each in its turn stood alone against the might of Germany, is sufficient evidence that either the European from 1700 to 1939 had spiritual forces unknown to the Russian or he has changed from being a complete materialist.

Secure in the brilliant successes of the Red Army and confident of the stamina of the Russian people against the whole weight of the German attack, the Soviet Government may, quite naturally, be inclined to the view that events have proved that it knew how to secure the future survival of Russia without any doubtful advice from others. Russian methods of dealing with potential dangers are not the same as ours. The Soviet Government has not changed them. But such methods that are effective when applied to Russians may not have the same result applied to Europeans.

Our one hope of valuable collaboration with Russia after the war lies in convincing the Soviet Government that release from potential or actual menace to Russia is assured since European or Western civilization is itself undergoing transformation from being dominated by the impulse of expansion to being inspired by the spirit of creative consolidation. Expansion in the social and political world has reached saturation point. To-day, self-willed expansion of the individual, class or nation, can be made only at the cost of others. This means war; economic, class or national, warfare. We Europeans, are having hammered into us, that unless we relinquish that material aspect of the outlook of the European of the last two centuries with its expansion drive to collect for himself whatever lay in his power to acquire, and in its place learn to create a stable society by free service and willing co-operation, we are faced with potential conflict that will readily become active warfare.

This transformation is not due to the weakness of resignation. It is a sign of a virile organism adapting itself to changed conditions. In the same way and for the same reason the British

Empire was transformed into the Commonwealth of British Nations. Some imagined the cause was due to the decadence of England. They have changed their opinions. The rise of small nations to independence after the last war and the strain and struggles of Europe undergoing transformation have also been regarded by some as a sign of a decadent civilization. The Germans, at this moment, are probably complaining that the enslaved peoples of Europe are not so decadent as they ought to be according to German calculations.

The ultimate release of Russia from menace, and this is the dominant interest of the Soviet Government, lies in the new spirit of re-creating social and political life to meet the conditions of a limited world. It is a change from the pioneer mentality to that of the settled community. This is an extremely difficult mental and spiritual process. Large sections of every class and in every nation are still clinging to the hope that the Golden Age of unbridled expansion will again return. During the inter-war period the strain of adjustment to the new conditions of a limited world induced in many persons and some nations a sense of frustration. This feeling is the great war potential. Those in all classes of every nation, who have the vision of the great and glorious work of creating a new form of a stable social and political order, realize the strain involved in the change of outlook. They know, also, that there are numerous elements in society who will do their best to regain the Golden Age of unbridled expansion, while deliberately shutting their eyes to the potentiality of war in their attitude. Any action, which sustains the hope of such elements that the age of self-willed expansion is not over, is, to put it at its minimum, retarding the growth of a new stable order.

The Soviet Government, by its implied aim of expansion in its declared annexation of the Baltic States and of part of Poland, is keeping alive a spirit of expansion, when its own release from menace ultimately depends on the vital nations of the world renouncing the spirit of expansion. If Europe were decadent, annexation of part of it would not have much consequence. If Europe were disintegrated, annexation of some units would not have repercussions. If men were not suffering from a sense of frustration due to the strain of adjustment to new conditions, they would not gladly seize on some simple and false reason of their frustration. But none of these factors is present. In a sense quite contrary to his intentions, Hitler is uniting Europe. By trying to destroy the spiritual basis of European civilization, he has made Europeans realize that they have a common standard of human values for which they are prepared to suffer and to die. Hitler has

linked the people of Belgium to the people of Poland. He may even be the cause of friendship between Lithuanians and Poles since Lithuania refused his 'request' to make a common attack on Poland. And the Danish people have forgotten that the aim of life is to make money. The non-calculating action of the Polish people, the non-calculating decision of the Commonwealth of British Nations, and the non-calculating spirit of the U.S.A. with the Lease-Lend aid, reflect an aspect of European civilization that the materialism of the last two centuries overlaid. Yet it was there, for even in the industrial age European civilization expanded the idea of freedom and justice.

The Russian way of life has a contribution to make to our common humanity and contact with it in the post-war world will be stimulating. Security, at which we are aiming, is not for an isolated part of the globe. We want security for Russia to develop its own way of life so savagely interrupted. In its preoccupation with the security of Russia, the Soviet Government by its declared annexation of the Baltic States and part of Poland may produce the very result to avoid which these measures have been taken. The trend of European civilization is towards creative, constructive consolidation. This trend will make itself felt in Continental Europe. This growing unity of Europe will be peaceful and cooperative, if it springs from an inner spirit of free service and willing collaboration. If Europe in the post-war years unites owing to the fear, imaginary or real, of Russian expansion, consolidation will take place but the spirit of consolidation will be negative and warped. We cannot stop the Soviet Government acting as it thinks fit nor the peoples of Europe reacting as their impulses dictate.

The Russian people during the last two years have vindicated the truth that the deciding factor in the ultimate survival of a way of life is its spiritual values. We can only hope that the Soviet Government may become sufficiently detached in its survey of the political future to realize that this war has shown that the European has spiritual values which can take precedence over material gain or even personal survival. There is one aspect of humanity, confusing or consoling, according to one's outlook on life. The most thoroughly calculated plans often go awry due to that incalculable factor of spiritual resilience. No greater example of this fact can be found than in the German failure to conquer Russia.

(From 1920 until 1941 Mr. Foster Anderson lived in the U.S.S.R.)

PLANNING AND THE NATIONAL TRUST

By G. D. H. Cole

WE are on the eve of a period of consciously planned building and development. There are countless projects for wider measures of urban re-planning and decentralization. Nor is what we have to expect limited to a further spilling out of towns over the countryside, or even to the creation of new towns, based perhaps upon the vast Royal Ordnance Factories and other war establishments. Agriculture and the life of the countryside are also marked out for reconstruction. Some permanence is expected in the increased home production of foodstuffs, and in addition we stand committed to a policy which will raise the amenities of country living, for the mass of the country population and not merely for a few, to a standard conforming to the needs and desires of the times.

Are these great projects of recontruction fuller of hope or of menace to those of us who have placed some portion of our faith in the activities of the National Trust? From the standpoint of 'historic interest' or of 'natural beauty', would we rather see our country let alone as it is, or developed as a consequence of reconstruction policies in which neither 'historic interest' nor 'natural beauty' can be expected to occupy more than a secondary place? If we were to envisage reconstruction after this war as simply a repetition of what occurred after 1918, we should have to look forward with much more fear than hope; for despite the steadily growing activities of the Trust itself and the greater articulateness of public opinion the period between the wars was dreadfully fertile in destruction. It became, perhaps, harder than it had been to pull down an ancient building really remarkable for beauty or historic interest, but, as against this, it became even easier to ruin large stretches of the countryside. The more roads the State built, either because someone wanted them or because they were a fairly simple way of finding work for the unemployed, the more of the countryside was laid open to spoliation. Road construction lowered the costs of the housing speculator by saving him part of the expense of development; and there was so much joy over a building craftsman back in employment that few paused to inquire how much damage he was doing. Higher standards of space for housing aggravated the problem in one way while lessening it in another. It became possible to build better towns and settlements; but this meant that they spread over a greater space and, as they were built usually without even the semblance of a unifying plan, that they spread more widely the devastation of natural

beauty. Aerodrome construction added its quota, particularly at the expense of good agricultural land; and now have been added vast army camps and the square miles of the great war factories. Much of this litter may be removable, though only at heavy expense. Some will be irremovable; and some we shall not be able to wish to remove, because development must proceed somewhere, and it may often be best as well as most economical to let it proceed on sites that have already lost much of their original character, rather than to set about the devastation of new places.

I am not suggesting that we should plant our new after-war towns on the sites of war factories or camps unless these are really the best places for them. But surely some of them are the best places for developments planned to relieve the congestion of older urban centres or to afford space for the construction of up-to-date factories in healthy and pleasant surroundings. These war factories were put where they are for the purpose of employing labour from industrial centres not far away, and can serve this purpose in peace as well as war. The engineer in search of a suitable site for a vast factory or camp is more likely than not to pitch on a site that will be suitable also for a town, except where for security reasons he has to tuck his factory away in some exceptionally remote spot. The Government ought now to be taking a careful census of every big wartime factory, camp and aerodrome, studying the possibilities of each as an after-war centre of industry and population and tourist trade and making plans, here for the restoration of a site to agricultural uses, here for industrial and residential development, and here for use as a holiday centre, a youth camp, a settlement for the health-giving employment of the tuberculous, or some other community purpose. Every such survey should include a study of the surrounding area, with the object of preserving not merely a 'green belt' but also such places of historic interest or natural beauty as should be made, as far as possible, the permanent possession of its inhabitants.

We expect these post-war developments to be, up to a point, *planned*, though we are far yet from knowing to what point the planning is to go. We do not yet know what powers the State will take to control the use of land, or through what regional and local agencies such powers will be exercised. We do not know how far the powers taken will in practice be stultified, as were the powers given to control ribbon development and largely the wider powers of town and country planning, by unworkable provisions for compensation or by inadequate financial aid to the poorer areas. Nor do we know what the State intends to do in the spheres which come closest to the National Trust. Public forestry policy is still unsettled: projects for National Parks have not taken definite shape: National Camps, Camping Sites, and Nature Reserves are still at the stage of talk; and finally we do not know how the law will stand after the war in respect either of the taxes upon land and inheritance or the conditions attaching to 'covenants' of various kinds. In effect, we are not aware whether 'planning' is to include any large element of planning

for beauty and the conservation of tradition enshrined in places of beauty or historic interest.

These obscurities make it difficult to foresee what will be the position and policy of the National Trust after the war. Some will hold that, if the State does what it should do, as the guardian of the public interest and of our national traditions, there should be nothing left for the Trust to do. I should not take this view, even if I thought it likely—as I do not—that on the morrow of the war the land would become public property. Land nationalization would, no doubt, change profoundly the work of the National Trust; for even if it were left, under the State, in possession of its existing properties, there would be no source, except the State, from which it could acquire more land. It would, however, remain open to the State to hand over to its administration land deemed worthy of special preserving care; and, unless the State were to take over the buildings as well as the land, one important part of the Trust's activities would clearly need to go on.

I do not propose, however, to consider this possibility; for a Government which has shown so much hesitation in going to the point recommended in the Uthwatt Report—acquisition of development rights in undeveloped land—is most unlikely to go to a length which the Uthwatt Committee itself regarded as politically impracticable. We have to make our plans on the assumption that most of the land-surface is likely to remain in private ownership, subject to public control over the development for other than agricultural uses of land not yet built over and to a substantial amount of control over building in existing urban areas—including, one may hope, control of what may be demolished as well as of what may be built.

Where, under these conditions, would the National Trust come in? Pretty much where it comes in now; for public acquisition of development rights would not affect land ownership unless and until actual development was proposed: so that the need to protect properties against development would exist exactly as hitherto. The only difference would be that, the State having acquired the development value, the Trust would presumably be able to purchase properties deemed to possess such value at a lower price. Moreover, some landowners, receiving payments for development rights, might be in a better position to hand over properties to the Trust with some endowment for their maintenance. In itself, the adoption of the Uthwatt proposals would facilitate the operations of the National Trust by removing the owner's interest in potential development value and providing him with ready money in return for a potential asset on which, maybe, he had no intention of realizing.

Much more hangs, however, on the future of Town and Country Planning. If there come into existence now real Regional Planning Authorities, with executive powers and adequate financial resources, such bodies will play some part in preservation by constructive as well as preventive measures of places of natural beauty, and perhaps of places of historic interest as well. It will presumably become the duty of regional planning bodies, not merely to

prevent bad development but also to provide positively for the needs of their citizens for open and accessible countryside. They will then do, on a larger scale, a part of the work which the Trust has undertaken; but it is unlikely that their activities will extend, save in a limited way in connection with 'green belts', to buying and protecting properties which are destined, not as parks or open spaces for public use, but for letting out to farmers on conditions which will ensure the maintenance of their natural beauty or traditional character. In practice for some time to come regional and local authorities are likely to have enough on their hands without attempting much of this sort, even if they are allowed by law to attempt anything. There will be need for close co-operation between the National Trust and the regional and local planning bodies, and the Trust will often be in a position to rescue from ill-usage land in the neighbourhood of parks, open spaces, and other reserves acquired by public bodies, as well as to aid local action by acquiring places of historic interest and putting them into order, and also by carrying further its recent policy of arranging with landowners for protective covenants safeguarding rural beauty without any change in the legal ownership.

This problem, of the place of voluntary bodies in relation to public authorities, is already coming up in a wide variety of spheres. It arises in connection with Youth Movements, with Adult Education, with the various agencies concerned with the encouragement of the arts and with social service in all its rapidly changing activities. There are some who maintain that as the range of public action is widened, the range of voluntary action is bound to be narrowed, and that it is the destiny of voluntary movements to give place to compulsory services organized directly by the State or the local authorities. What generally happens as public authorities widen their range of action is that closer co-operation is needed between them and the voluntary bodies. There have been many examples already of fruitful co-operation between the National Trust and the local authorities—in the Manifold Valley, for example, and, more recently, in connection with the use to be made of historic buildings such as Eastbury Manor House. There should be much more co-operation of both these kinds in future—probably with a somewhat changed division of labour and function. Better plans for the acquiring and putting into order of historic houses could be made if the Trust in taking them over could do so with a definite arrangement with a local authority for their future use; and, in the preservation of such areas as Dovedale or Lakeland, the major place could be assumed by the public authorities, with the National Trust coming in to round off the value of the scheme by taking over properties still to be left in private occupation, or acquiring pieces of property which it seemed difficult for the public authority to buy—for example, where a parcel of land essential to a scheme falls within a different planning area.

In so far as acquisition of land in such areas as Dovedale or Lakeland comes to be the business of a national, as distinct from a local or regional authority, the situation will be different. If National Parks are to mean

considerable areas owned and administered by a National Parks Commission there will come into being a branch of the State machine doing, side by side with the National Trust, something which the National Trust has had to do by itself in the past. This will lead to complications. But some of the protagonists of a National Parks Commission appear to have in mind a body that will own no property, but will merely exercise a general supervision over what is done by private owners in certain scheduled areas. I can see little value in bodies of this kind, unless they are empowered to administer as public property considerable tracts of land. A national park must belong to the public, even if certain parts are left in private occupation.

It might be an excellent thing if, in Lakeland or in West Wales or in Norfolk, there were park areas of which some parts were under the National Trust and others under a State Commission. It would be necessary for the two agencies to follow a common policy; but within this general agreement there would be room for considerable differences in method and objective, and such differences could be of positive advantage in a field in which taste and appreciation are bound to count for much. In particular, covenants with private owners, even in areas specially scheduled for preservation, would be more elastically negotiated by the National Trust than by the State.

How, if at all, ought a National Parks Commission to be related to other public or semi-public agencies established for achieving the right use of land under non-profit-making conditions? How should the Forestry Commission, the National Camps Corporation, and any body that may be set up for the creation and control of special Nature Reserves, all with different but related objects, be interconnected one with another and with the National Trust?

Forestry policy raises, of course, issues much too large to be discussed here. Forestry is a business, and with the Forestry Commission business considerations are bound to weigh in the aggregate more heavily than others. Forestry need not be carried on, by the State any more than by the owners of private woodlands, in disregard of beauty or amenity; but it would be unreasonable to expect the Forestry Commission to be the right body to take primary responsibility for anything except its main task, which is big enough in face of the destruction wrought by the war. In addition to greatly enlarged planting operations on public land, it will be necessary in future to pay much more attention to private woodlands, and some considerable system of continuing subsidies under supervision will be needed. At this point as well as in its own planting policy the Forestry Commission will necessarily have a large share of responsibility for the beauty of the countryside; and it would be good sense to have among its members at least one who would make this responsibility largely his own, and would serve as a link between the Commission and the National Trust and other bodies concerned with rural beauty. Of course, in a sense rural beauty depends even more on the right conduct of agriculture than of forestry; and ugly farm-buildings and unkempt fields can disfigure a countryside as much as decaying woodlands or inappropriate plantings. But

the forestry problem is the more compact and manageable, and the link is easier to make between the Forestry Commission, as a public body, and the National Trust than between the Trust and the countless agencies responsible for agricultural practice.

The Forestry Commission touches the question of rural amenities at another point; for it may come to have on its hands much land designed to be planted, if at all, only over a long period. Careful consideration should be given to the future relations between the Forestry Commission, the National Trust, the National Parks Commission, and any national body that may be given charge of camps for schools, for youth, and perhaps for communal forms of holiday-making for the general population. Large tracts of relatively empty country will need to be developed from the points of view of afforestation, preservation and improvement of natural beauty, and use for recreative purposes. Each of these forms of development will need to be mainly under the care of a body which will put its claims first, and in such areas as West Wales, the Lake District, and the Scottish Highlands the plans will not work out aright unless the three types of body act together in close collaboration, with a great deal of give and take. This suggests that the Forestry Commission ought to be neither a quite independent body nor linked up with the Ministry of Agriculture, but rather attached, with the body or bodies in charge of National Parks, National Camps and Camping Sites, and the preservation of places of historic interest and natural beauty, to the Ministry of Town and Country Planning. This would link them with the Ministry which will be responsible for co-ordinating and influencing the town and country plans made under regional or local auspices.

I thus assume that there will remain after the war a large place for the National Trust as a voluntary body standing outside the machine of government. But what are the prospects that such a body will be able to raise any substantial sum of money for continuing and extending its operations under the after-war conditions of taxation and of the distribution of incomes? This is a very real problem. The Trust has hitherto financed its operations, first, by building up a nucleus of revenue from subscription sufficient to meet its administration charges and to enable it to carry out small purchases and improvements out of its own resources. For larger purchases it has relied on public appeals and on subventions to its projects from the local authorities in the neighbourhoods which stand mainly to benefit. In accepting gifts of property involving subsequent cost of upkeep and improvement it has sought, wherever possible, to ensure either that the revenues accruing from the use of the property shall be sufficient to meet these charges or that the gift shall include an adequate endowment fund. These conditions have not always been met; and where they could not be met the Trust has had to rely on legacies from a few notable benefactors—legacies which could be used either in contributing towards the purchase money needed for major schemes, or in making it possible to accept gifts which would otherwise have had to be refused.

Will these methods of financing the Trust's work remain open after the war? The chief doubts are, first, whether many owners will be able to hand over properties accompanied by adequate endowments and, secondly, whether legacies will be forthcoming on the scale necessary to bridge the gap. There may be more owners ready to hand over properties which the Trust would wish to accept if it could see its way clear, but fewer able and willing to endow such properties or to bequeath or give free money on a large scale.

Surely the State ought to go a long way towards filling this gap. I should like to see the State hand over to the Trust, say on a pound for pound basis, money to match all money given from private sources, including the estimated money value of properties given—the State grants to be applied in the first instance to meeting costs of upkeep and improvement, and thereafter to the acquisition of further properties or the improvement of properties already in the hands of the Trust. This method of grant aid would be analogous to what has been done already in giving State aid to the National Council of Social Service and to adult education as well as in connection with the "National Fitness" campaign.

Such grants would enable the Trust to go further than it has been able to go in acquiring by gift houses of architectural beauty or of great historic interest. There should be many chances after the war of acquiring country houses, including small and beautiful manor houses, and there will be need for the Trust to purchase urban buildings threatened with demolition in connection with the replanning of towns regardless of their beauty and historic value. It is utterly unsafe to trust town-planning authorities to pay adequate attention to the preservation of ancient or beautiful buildings. Some such body as the National Trust will be urgently needed to acquire what is best worth keeping, and to fight with all its strength against local influences which are set on making a clean sweep of a beauty that they have no eyes to see.

It is, as the Trust has recognized, of the greatest importance that beautiful or historic buildings taken over by it shall not thereafter be left as empty shells. Such buildings ought to be used—in a few instances as museums, but mainly for men's current affairs. Use generally means capital expense in making the building usable without damage to its architectural quality. Public grants should be available for covering deficits of this kind, both for urban properties and for country houses taken over by the Trust; and there should be collaboration between the National Trust and local or special Trusts which have in their charge particular properties which they are often but poorly equipped to administer.

Often it is objected that it is difficult to find suitable uses for country houses thus acquired. A great new field for the use of such properties will be opening up in the after-war period. Every urban school should have attached to it a school building well away in the country. Every child's education should include a period of boarding education; and it should always be possible to send to school in the country children who need it for reasons of health or

unsatisfactory home conditions. Such attached 'country schools', not being complete schools, need not in most cases be large; and in their grounds could be erected simply designed camps, so that in the summer months a large part of the school's activities could be transferred from town to country. Many a beautiful manor house would serve such a purpose admirably.

It would be a calamity if, in our desire to see the State do directly much more for the preservation of places of natural beauty or historic interest, we were to lean over into the belief that the State can do everything that is needed. There are always limits to what the State can do best, even if these limits are always, in a healthy society, being advanced. Each advance in State action creates new practical possibilities for private action. Voluntary bodies, instead of doing what the State is *not* doing, come to be doing what the State *is* doing, but to do it in a more pioneering and experimental way. With this change goes a change in relations. The private bodies can no longer act apart from the State: they have increasingly to act in collaboration with it. Nor can the State any longer regard the financing of the private bodies as purely a matter for private effort. It has to come to their aid and this can be justified, as soon as the State comes to think of the work of the voluntary bodies not as something purely private, but as essentially a form of communal though not of government, enterprise. This is how the work of the National Trust ought to be regarded and to be fitted in to the after-war pattern of town and country development. This, I believe, is what the founders of the Trust would desire, if they were young now; and voluntary bodies can hope to adapt themselves successfully to new situations only if they take a positive, and not a merely conservative, view of their functions. What we call 'natural beauty' has in fact to be created, as well as conserved. Many of the landscapes which we most admire to-day we owe, not to nature alone, but to the foresight, extending over generations, of the great gardeners and foresters who made the parklands of our country houses, large and small. Our age, like theirs, needs to plan beauty for the future, as well as to preserve that which already exists; and this the National Trust must set out to do in accordance with the standards and values, not of some past period, but of to-day. In order to achieve this, the National Trust and all other bodies which aspire to play a part in this field of social enterprise must be so constituted as to give youth, as well as experience, a prominent place in their counsels. The more the National Trust neeeds to look back, the more should it look forward too. If, in this coming time of change, it allows itself to become only a guardian of the past, it will be swept aside. Its mission is to link the past to the future; and for that it needs the men who are attempting new things as well as those who rightly reverence the beauty of the past.

(This article is the substance of a recent address to the Annual Meeting of the National Trust.)

THE REFORM OF COMPANY LAW

By Alfred Fellows

THE Committee set up to consider the reform of the Companies Acts, probably to be brought about by an amending statute, followed immediately by a consolidating Act incorporating the amendments, will have a responsible and difficult task. The history of company law is chiefly of interest to lawyers, but the need for reform concerns the large investing public generally, and lies of course mainly in relation to limited companies, that is, those of which the shareholders are not responsible for their debts beyond their share capital.

Shareholders have lost certainly hundreds of millions, probably thousands of millions of pounds in investments in limited companies. Their continuance is nevertheless indispensable to commerce. They mark the ideal, or what should be the ideal, wedding of private enterprise and private capital when the owner of the capital does not wish to or cannot take an active part in the enterprise, and is not willing to risk more than a fixed amount of his money.

Enterprise involves risk, and if the risk is fairly placed before the public by the promoters of the venture, the shareholder has to take his chance, and cannot expect the law to guarantee him against loss. If he plays for safety, he can find shares in well-established companies which are almost as safe as Consols. These shares will afford him small but certain dividends on his capital, and the prospect of sale of his shares whenever he wishes at little above or below the price he paid for them.

The main problem for the Legislature is no doubt the prevention of fraud, and the history of company law is mainly that of the protection of the shareholder against unscrupulous persons of sharp wits, who constantly strive to use the law's machinery to line their own pockets with the money of shareholders which ought to be employed for the purposes for which it was subscribed. In respect of the enormous wealth which can be embezzled in this way, a melancholy procession of names may be recalled. For example, there was "Baron" Albert Grant, who built himself a huge palace in South Kensington which he never occupied, because he crashed before he could do so. Then followed Jabez Balfour, apparently a millionaire at his zenith, and like "Baron" Grant, specializing in the attraction of the small investor; Whitaker Wright, Bottomley, G. L. Bevan, the procession extends over a hundred years, and the Legislature has been ceaselessly striving during that period to frustrate such men and their kind. Parliament having learnt some lessons from

the successive crashes, methods available to Albert Grant or Jabez Balfour or Whitaker Wright are now so no longer.

The Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1939 deals with the protection of persons wishing to invest money, the safety of shareholders after their money has been invested being contained in the Consolidation Act of 1929. These safeguards are very elaborate, having been considerably strengthened to meet various evasions of previous Acts, and mainly consist in the filing of documents in Somerset House and at a company's registered office. The Act consists of 385 sections and twelve schedules, and barristers known to specialize in knowledge of it may earn handsome incomes.

Every limited company has two constitutional documents, the "Memorandum of Association" regulating its external relations and "Articles" framing its internal constitution. The latter may be changed by the shareholders after certain formalities but the Memorandum can only be altered by leave of a judge on good reason shown. These documents are filed at Somerset House, and are otherwise accessible to members. Any prospectus offering shares on allotment is also filed and the promoter and original directors are liable to shareholders for false statements in it. A practice grew up of dodging this inconvenient rule by allotting shares and then offering them for sale to the public, but this was circumvented by requiring any such offer of sale to be treated as a prospectus and filed accordingly with the same responsibilities on the person or persons issuing it. Commissions and discounts in respect of shares and debentures must be disclosed, and, a new provision in the 1929 Act, shares may be issued at discount by leave of a judge. Charges on a company's assets must be registered at Somerset House.

Companies must keep registers of the names of their shareholders, open freely to members, and to the public generally on payment of a shilling. They also have to make an annual return of the names of shareholders to Somerset House. Thus, it was conceived, shareholders and the public could tell generally how a company was controlled. So when Mr. Bottomley was going downhill, a company the majority of whose shares were in his name would not have been likely to attract the public.

Every company must keep a register of the names of its directors and they must disclose their total remuneration to their shareholders. Every company is obliged to have at least one annual meeting and to place before its shareholders a balance-sheet vouched by an auditor and also, since 1929, an annual Profit and Loss account. If members holding not less than one tenth of the issued shares require it, the Board of Trade may appoint one or more competent inspectors to investigate the company's affairs with access to all its papers.

Then the shareholder appears to be well safeguarded. The comment is here made that, as safeguards, the list of members and the audit are entirely illusory.

It was suggested above that a company in which Mr. Bottomley was chief registered shareholder might be looked on askance by the investing public. Bottomley may have and probably did have dozens of companies in his pocket at one time or another, but the artless suggestion that he should register all the shares over which he had control in his own name would no doubt have provoked him to derision.

Nearly forty years ago a certain company promoter living as a rich man and in a position to take the most expensive legal advice was prosecuted and sentenced to twelve months imprisonment with hard labour for 'as a director, manager, or public officer of a company' publishing false statements with intent to defraud. He was in fact neither a director nor public officer of the company in question, nor had he been appointed manager. The most rigid investigation of this company's records both at its registered office and at Somerset House would have failed to disclose his name. Nevertheless he owned the vast majority of the shares which presumably he wished to unload on the faith of his false statements, all being in the names or name of nominees and held on trust for him while he dictated the company's policy. The directors were his dummies, holding all their qualification shares in this manner and having executed blank transfers of them and handed the transfers and certificates to him, so that he could dismiss any of them at short notice. In his defence it was submitted that he must be acquitted for he was not technically a 'manager' of the company. The late Mr. Justice A. T. Lawrence, however, disregarded technicalities, and held that, when the Act said 'manager' it meant 'person who managed' and that was the position of the prisoner beyond question. The man appealed on the point of law to the Court of Crown Cases Reserved (the Court of Criminal Appeal not then having been established) but that Court of five judges unanimously confirmed the conviction.

From the above case it is obvious—and the law has not been changed since then in this respect—that the register of shareholders under the present law affords no clue whatever to the persons in real control of a company. It is indeed little less than a misleading mockery, and to make it a reality the Committee which is to consider reform of the law will have possibly its hardest nut to crack. A vast number of settlements include shares in companies, so that it would be out of the question to forbid trusts of shares. Moreover there is nothing inherently wrong in A holding a share in trust for B. Sometimes B may be seeking control of a company to wreck it, but a lawyer who tried to frame a provision to meet such case without precluding innocent trusts would probably find it impossible. Companies can also be holders of the shares of other companies, so the investigator who sought to find the real control of a particular share so held might have to consider the control of the shareholding company when the same problem would face him, perhaps complicated by that company's shares being held by other companies. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent two companies reciprocally holding each

other's shares, though no solution is here offered to the problem of what would happen if each of such companies held all the other's shares. It would be something like two snakes biting and swallowing each other's tails.

The question remains whether the list of shareholders can be made a real safeguard instead of an illusory one. The remedy of disclosing every trust of a share is not feasible for a variety of reasons. Practically all the older companies declared in their Articles that they would take no notice of trusts of shares, but this is now provided by statute. There is a very good reason for this, for, were a company to have formal notice of a trust of a share, it would be the duty of directors to see that transfers of shares were only made in accordance with the trust, which would throw an intolerable burden on them.

A tentative solution to this difficult problem may be suggested here, which perhaps might be put into workable shape by lawyers drafting an amending bill. It is that any share of which the registered holder was not absolute proprietor, should receive a certain mark in the register, but that mark should not impose any new duty on a company or its directors if a transfer of the share was placed before the board. A shareholder does not care who receives the dividends on shares not his own, but the control of the company is important to him, and that control is exercised by votes in general meeting, largely given by proxies. A rule could be made that no proxy of a marked share should be valid unless signed by all persons in a position to dictate the nominee shareholder's vote. No trust of a share in a single name should be recognized unless it was marked as above, a rule which would make the real owner of a share vigilant to see that the mark was in its place, and no proxy of a marked share should be recognized without such disclosure. If to evade the disclosure of his name the real owner sent his nominee shareholders to vote as he directed at the general meeting, they could be challenged to make statutory declarations, not needing a stamp, that their votes were free, with, of course, penalties for false statements. In cases of shares in joint names of two or more the same requirement could be made though if they were trustees of a will or settlement, as would usually be the case, they would generally be in a position to exercise their own discretion in voting. The first named trustee could then vote, and if his colleagues so violently disagreed with him as to invoke a Chancery judge, the matter could be decided on the terms of the will or settlement.

A further difficulty would arise on shares held by another company, the board of which might conceivably be in a wrecker's pocket. It may be suggested that the shareholder in the holding company with the largest number of free shares should receive the proxy, unless, for a stated reason, the board of that company substituted someone else. In a number of cases no doubt boards are dominated by a masterful personality like Bevan, and sign on any dotted line he may prescribe without the legal compulsion of a trust for him, but it may be hoped that, since they can no longer protect themselves by an article excusing them from the consequences of their own negligence (as

did the directors and auditors of the City Equitable Fire Insurance Company, a matter faithfully recorded in over a hundred pages of the Chancery reports), such boards may not be so easily collected as they used to be. Under the old law, which of course was revised after the case, a director protected by such an article might almost have successfully pleaded that he fell asleep at a board meeting, so did not know what was going on. In the absence of such protection a director would now be expected to keep alert at such a meeting to exercise some minimum degree of intelligence. Lord Baldwin indeed once suggested a qualifying examination for directors, but this would be doubtfully feasible. Presumably they would have to satisfy the examiners that they had a smattering of knowledge of company law and finance and business usages. This requirement, however, would exclude, for example, certain persons, usually with exotic names, from the boards of film companies, such persons being hardly able to read or write, but having an extraordinary flair for divining the kind of picture the public will pay to see. The exclusive services of such a person might be worth thousands a year to a company producing films, and, were he not allowed a seat on the board, he might be England's loss and Hollywood's gain. In such case the English shareholder would not thank Lord Baldwin.

Incidentally, a great number of shareholders send their proxies to their boards merely because they are enclosed with the notice of a meeting, obligingly stamped beforehand. These proxies enable any board to smother any shareholder who questions their honesty or ability or wisdom at any meeting. Especially so is this the case if the shareholder reads the director's report: "Your directors are pleased to record another year of prosperous trading . . . the same dividend will be maintained as before." Millions of shareholders of insolvent and moribund companies have read such words and, so reading, have with their proxies helped a dishonest or incompetent board to silence their more vigilant fellow-shareholders.

The average shareholder perhaps glances at the balance-sheet—as often as not he does not trouble to do so—and reads the stereotyped statutory certificate of the auditors that they have obtained all the information and explanations they have required and that in their opinion the balance sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the company's affairs according to the best of their information and the explanations given to them and as shown by the books of the company. Scores of honest, diligent, and competent auditors have so certified innumerable utterly misleading and often utterly fraudulent balance-sheets.

The clue to this anomaly is of course the valuation of assets and liabilities. Auditors do not set up as expert valuers of any goods or property. Indeed, were they to do so, they would have to be universal valuers, for there is hardly any kind of property outside Crown regalia which may not be included in a company's valuable assets. Accordingly they must take the value of an asset from someone deemed competent to give it, and if that someone is a dishonest

managing director, assets may be inflated almost without limit. The late Whitaker Wright by his puppet board issued a balance sheet of a hopelessly insolvent company, showing that its assets exceeded its liabilities by no less a sum than £400,000. His plan was the same as Jabez Balfour's—to juggle with a number of companies and transfer shares of one or more of his insolvent ones to the company whose balance sheet was due to be published and furnish fictitious values of them to the auditors. Subsequent legislation may have made this juggling more difficult, but inflation of value of other assets, which must be taken on trust by the auditors, remains quite easy and, of course, bad debts due to the company can be given their face value. Goodwill can also be inflated or deflated like a bladder. Occasionally very prosperous companies may wish to conceal their prosperity, to build a hidden reserve or for other reasons, and then the reverse process is at work, and assets are written down, but this is not generally a fraud on the shareholders.

In one case decided over forty years ago which is still good law, balance-sheets in a certain company were duly certified by the auditors for a number of years, showing large profits. In fact they relied on certificates, wilfully false, given by the managing director, grossly overstating the value of the company's stock-in-trade. Dividends were paid on the footing of a prosperity apparent from the balance-sheets, but in reality there were no profits. As might have been expected in such circumstances, the company ultimately collapsed, and the fraud came to light. Had the auditors compared the different books and added to the stock-in-trade at the beginning of the year the amounts purchased during the year, and deducted the amounts sold they would have seen that the statement of the stock-in-trade value at the end of the year was so large as to call for an explanation, but they did not take the trouble to do so. Lord, then Mr. Justice, Vaugham Williams decided that they were liable for their negligence in respect of this omission, but it must be recorded that the Court of Appeal over-ruled this sagacious judge. They pointed out that there was nothing to excite suspicion, and that the managing director was a most respectable person, and they held that the auditors were justified in trusting this respectable person.

This decision has certainly not increased the value of an audit. The auditors were not asked to take stock, but to test the figure given to them by a simple computation. If the audit of a fishmonger's business showed that every fish on the slab was worth a hundred pounds, the deduction might be made that something was wrong somewhere.

As to respectability, a cynic might say that the more respectable the person whose conduct of a business was in question appeared to be, the greater care should the auditors exercise. Jabez Balfour, in unctuous piety, began his board meetings in prayer. Bevan was shocked if anyone swore in his presence. Another company promoter who is now living and has suffered at least one term of penal servitude for fraud was a devout Churchman and gave a service of gold communion plate to St. Paul's Cathedral, which had

to be redeemed by a wealthy peer on the former's bankruptcy. Whitaker Wright, clothed in black and without ornament, was ultra-respectable. Even Bottomley, who might be deemed a possible exception, professed a foundation of simple manly piety under his pose of worldly wisdom and bonhomie. If the three elderly gentlemen who reversed Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams had suffered losses from swindlers like Whitaker Wright or Jabez Balfour, they might have dropped the test of respectability—which with all due respect to the then Court of Appeal might almost be called foolish. They laid down that an auditor should be a 'watch-dog, but not a sleuth-hound'. An auditor should be a fraud-hound, and not omit simple tests of figures in reliance on the respectability of directors. Indeed, it would be simpler and cheaper for a company to dispense with an audit, on a certificate by a magistrate or solicitor that the board was composed of extremely respectable persons.

This is not to say that auditors could always detect inflation of assets. If these could be valued by some disinterested outside person and bad debts to the company similarly written off, an audit might really show the position of the company, but in the case of such business as multiple shops and certain others this might be impracticable and involve enormous expense, though such expense might be warranted if it precluded a fictitious balance-sheet. The statute would be strengthened if there was a compulsory list of assets ("stock-in-trade" sufficing for goods on sale) with the statement as to the date or dates of valuation, and whether made by a director or official or an independent person, or taken on the price of purchase, capitalized rateable value, etc.

Apart from fraud honest directors might wish to inflate or deflate assets, possibly to conceal affairs from the spies of rival concerns, duly appearing as shareholders on the register. One remedy would be to obtain the assent of a judge, but the case should be heard in chambers, and perhaps the title concealed, as "In re the X Company Limited." The bankruptcy practice permits "in re X a debtor."

A certain investor approached a stockbroker, and was advised to take shares in a very well-known concern, the proprietors of which had turned it into a public company. Since they had done so, it had gone through some stormy times, and been reconstructed at least twice. In the circumstances the suggestion was made that the investor should take preference shares. He did so and hoped things would go more smoothly, but presently there had to be another reconstruction and the directors propounded a scheme, under which of course the shareholders had to submit to a reduction of capital. This might have been inevitable, but the unfortunate preference shareholder found that, tested by stock exchange values, he would actually lose more of his capital than if he had invested in ordinary stock. He could no doubt have gone to the meeting of preference shareholders held to authorize the scheme, but even had he gone so far as to propose a negative resolution the directors would certainly have overwhelmed him with proxies. In such circumstances a cer-

tain percentage of shareholders of a particular class can appeal to the High Court, but his holding was too small to risk High Court costs and no one else took the step. The suggestion may be made that persons holding any interest in ordinary shares in number of value exceeding their interest in preference shares should be disqualified on a resolution varying preference shareholders' rights, each proxy being deemed a statutory declaration that the shareholder had a greater interest in preference shares than in ordinary. Persons present at the meeting claiming the right to vote could likewise on challenge be made to sign such a declaration.

The ordinary shareholder never goes to Somerset House or even to a general meeting of his company—unless he does so resentfully on a sudden disclosure of unexpected loss. He therefore knows nothing of the filed register of documents, but they may be useful in being open to stockbrokers, bankers, solicitors, and city editors of newspapers who advise the investing public. Their utility, however, would be manifoldly increased if they could disclose the real control of every company and the real financial position. As the law stands, they fail to do so.

(Mr. Fellows, a Chancery barrister of long standing, has written several text-books for his profession and many articles and books advocating legal reforms. He has the satisfaction of knowing that nearly all the reforms he has pressed have been incorporated in various statutes.)

NEW TRENDS IN ANGLO-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS

By Keith Newman

AUSTRALIA'S Dr. Evatt had an excellent Press during his visit to Britain and the atmosphere in both countries, in regard to the other, is much sweeter than it was a year ago. In the interval both sides, after some brief exasperation, made a big effort to understand each other's viewpoint and largely succeeded. It was not easy. The facts which alone could disprove suggestions by one side that it had been let down, and the retort that the complainer was crying "wolf" because of groundless panic, were facts of strategy and production. The facts could not be given: and inevitably prejudice and suspicion got away to a flying start.

The censorship, or most of it, was of course absolutely necessary. But the peoples of both countries should note the lesson of the rapid and dangerous degeneration which came about in a few short months when Mr. Churchill, refusing to produce reports on the Singapore débâcle in the Commons, used not the excuse of military secrecy but the plea that disclosure of post-mortem reports must await the war's end because immediate publication would cause too much dissension within the Empire. This shows that all aspects of present and future relations between Great Britain, Australia, and the other partners of the Commonwealth, should get all the hard thinking, plain speaking and far-sighted planning that it is possible to give them.

One Fleet Street newspaper recently concluded a most generous tribute to Dr. Evatt and his country with the thought that Australia had earned the right to put her own individual viewpoint at the peace table. I wonder if the writer, and the readers, glimpsed all the implications of that paragraph? How many realized that in four at least of the big factors that go to make a stable peace—defence, export trade, foreign policy, finance—Australia has developed very positive ideas of its own, and that much preliminary debate, both publicly between the peoples and between particularly interested sections of them, and privately between the governments, will be needed to blend the many elements into one harmonious Anglo-Australian policy.

Some essential background must be taken into account, too. I think it is fair to say that "the inevitability of gradualness" is a fundamental belief of the average Englishman. That is natural: he and his forbears have lived in a compact, highly developed country for centuries, gradually building up private and public possessions, seeing the country rise steadily to great power and crushing its challengers with a deadly leisureliness.

This mental conditioning holds the danger that Britain and the Dominions, while finding general agreement about the goals we are aiming at, will yet find room for disagreement about the road and the pace by which we are to approach them. There is no point in denying that Australian outlooks on some matters differ in important respects from those of Britain. The national history, and in most cases the family story, of most Australians is one of change, movement and risk. The hazards of golden el Dorados, of opening up great unpeopled spaces, of struggle against flood and fire and drought, have shaped minds as well as bodies. The Australian family farm, business, or factory is, in comparison with Britain, rare. What the owner sees before him he created himself. The roots of Australian national consciousness are many and strong, but they grow in a time layer less than 160 years deep. There *is* an Australian mentality and an Australian tradition, and both differ from their counterparts in more ordered places. They are important, for national mentality and tradition are inevitably reflected in the whole field of national policy and effort.

Urgency enters the Australian consciousness from another source, sometimes making us impatient of British deliberation. This source is Asia. We cannot absorb waves of migration from our neighbours and assimilate them as Britain has done. To get the Australian view of this problem it is necessary only to look at a map of the world, and absorb the significance of two figures. On the map, the distance from Darwin to the western border of India is a bomber's flight. Lay a pencil between the two points and pivot it on Darwin to describe an arc from India to Japan. In this segment, small on the map, live some 1,300,000,000 people—more than three times the population of all Europe, more than half the inhabitants of the whole world. And Australia's population barely exceeds 7,000,000! The ratio of population between these neighbouring groups is almost 200 to 1.

Mr. Wendell Willkie and others are trying to prod the Western world into full realization of how yeasts of war, invasion, industrialization, new awareness of nationalisms, a little education, are leavening that mass. The East senses the latent power which will find reality in some great Asiatic confederation of the future. So do we in the South Seas. The realization has gone deep that kicking the shins of Asia cannot be a one-way business for ever. Sir Bertram Stevens demonstrated his right to the title of Conservative during his marathon Premiership of New South Wales; but during 1941-2 he was in India as Australian representative of the Eastern Group Supply Council, and said on returning home:

> A new order in Asia is inevitable. The East will never return to its old, quiescent, subservient state. We must think of Chinese, Indians, Malayans, Javanese as friends of equal status.

Sir Bertram was succeeded by Labour leader the Hon. W. J. McKell as Premier of New South Wales. They differ widely on many things. But not on Asia, for here is a recent extract from an article by Mr. McKell:

> Many nations are still European-minded. England herself is not guiltless in this respect. But Australia is vitally interested in the Pacific. We should play a leading part in framing a Pacific Charter now, because the native races of the Pacific should feel that at least one nation is concerned with their welfare and with building up peaceable democratic institutions and mutually beneficial trade connections.

My English friends tell me that there is no ground for Anglo-Australian divergence in these sentiments, since a majority of Englishmen subscribe to them. But the history of India, Burma, and Malaya suggests that while there may be agreement on the goal, there is room for difference of opinion about the pace with which it should be pursued. Australia plays no direct part in the administration of these territories and has had little direct responsibility in their defence, and if we attempted to intervene in any way it would be human and reasonable for the British public, at first sight, to tell us to mind our own business. But the British public, if aware of all the revelant factors, will be fair enough to admit that Asia's rapid progression, by peaceful paths, to political and economic independence is a major Australian interest, if not *the* major Australian interest. Pacific policy, ultimately, decides whether Australia lives or dies, and Australia dare not leave the matter entirely to others, however well-intentioned. This was shown by the appointment of Ministers to Washington (1940), Tokio (1940), Chungking (1941) and Moscow (1942)—the Big Four of resident Pacific Powers. It would be disastrous if divergence developed between London and Canberra in their approach to these nations.

In this connection it would be wise to remember that trade can be a fruitful source of divergence in foreign policies—and both Britain and Australia have urgent need of all the foreign trade they can get: Britain to maintain her place as a Great Power, Australia to build up the population and industries without which she cannot survive. Chiding Lancashire cotton-men last year for "defeatist views" on post-war export prospects, Lord Keynes said: "Britain must win trade to survive." That is true. Dr. Evatt, speaking of the Atlantic Charter early this year said that, if the Charter's objective of freedom from want were honestly pursued, ". . . one result for Australia should be expanding markets, not only for primary industries but also for manufactures north of Australia, in south-east Asia, and in the Pacific, where millions of people must be provided with improved living standards." That, too, is true.

I have drawn some indulgent smiles in this country by saying that there is danger of rivalry for export markets between Britain and Australia. It is not realized that another great chapter of Australian history has ended and a new one begun. The chapters of exploration, pioneering, rapid agricultural expansion, have ended. Almost ended is the subsequent chapter, in which Australian industries expanded to the point where they displaced substantial quantities of imported goods (which caused more than enough friction with certain British interests). In the new chapter now being written, these industries attained export status. Before the war Australian steel had begun to

undersell the British and American product in the Far East, but rising armament programmes halted this development before it attracted much attention in Britain. It was, however, a hint of things to come. Australian industries, spurred by the inability of British and American factories to supply most of our war needs, have acquired the plant and skilled workers to manufacture much more than Australia can normally consume. A drive for export markets is inevitably the next step.

This calls for an earnest quest for a formula of joint effort rather than for mirth. I travelled to England with an Englishman who had just completed a two-year survey of cotton market prospects in South Africa and Australia. This man, son of a Manchester mill-owner, knew cotton marketing backwards —and his opinion was that Dominion factories were going to be a worry for Manchester. In Australia he examined the industry meticulously, from the Queensland irrigation settlements where cotton is grown (pre-war acreages, then semi-experimental, have vastly expanded) to the factories which turn it into cloth. My friend said:

> In your factories I saw raw cotton going in at one end and the finished, bleached, printed cloth come out the other. Everything is under one roof, unnecessary handling and transport are eliminated, profit has to be earned only on one capital structure, and there is only one overhead. Come to Manchester and see the difference.

I went to Manchester, and saw scores of small old-fashioned family concerns, each doing only one or two of the many processes that produce the finished article, then passing it on to another factory. A bale of cotton, it seems, is shuttled round and about Lancashire before it becomes bolts of cloth. This unwieldy set-up was handicapped out of the race with Japan. There is no reason to suppose it will fare better with its newer competitors after the war.

My friend and I agreed that the solution was a great Anglo-Australian plan to transfer thousands of workers from England to Australia, some to grow cotton, others to weave it, with Australian factories supplying available markets in and about the Pacific. A pipe dream before a Bolton fireside? We surveyed the tough old vested interests involved (for a lot of outmoded capital equipment would have to be discarded in Lancashire) and agreed that perhaps it was. But the alternative is a trade fight on old fashioned "knock 'em down and drag 'em out" lines, in which geographical proximity to raw material and markets would be only two of the advantages enjoyed by the Australians.

Cotton is but one item from a large list in which Britain, before the war, had a useful trade with Australia and the Far East, and in which Australia is on the verge of becoming an exporter. It might be argued that concerns which have flourished in Australia's extraordinary wartime isolation will wither when peace returns. This might be true if it were not for the preoccupation with the Asiatic mass mentioned earlier. The Japanese have done a lot of things they did not set out to do. Waking China from her ages-long sleep was one; jolting Australia from a briefer but equally sound

slumber was another. Formerly we were Europeans looking to Europe, with Asia only a chilly shiver that sometimes ran down our spines. When it did, we reflected on the might of the Royal and American navies and lost the shiver in a glow of confidence. When actuality came the mighty *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* vanished like a breath on a mirror, the rest of the Royal Navy was tried and beset elsewhere, and the United States navy was largely immobilized by Pearl Harbour. Economists' abstractions will weigh less heavily than the black months of 1941-42 when we strike future balances of the profit and loss of local industrial expansion.

Ex-Prime Minister Menzies, referring to the same clause of the Atlantic Charter as Dr. Evatt (mentioned earlier) but expressing "extreme scepticism" about it, said:

> Expanded Australian industries cannot be abandoned after the war for a gesture of a vague charter. Australian industrial expansion will help to make good conditions to attract people from the Old World. Australia will either double her population in the next few decades or disappear. This is the fundamental case for the expansion of our industries. Secondary industries have proved our salvation during the war.

Thus Dr. Evatt, hoping that the Atlantic Charter will become a reality, sees Australia getting a share of the world's export market as a matter of right. Mr. Menzies, dubious about the Charter becoming a living reality, says we will go out and expand those industries somehow.

Australian newspapers show plainly that Australians, like the Russians, are proud of their new factories, and determined to preserve them. The Press hails every new industrial achievement as another battle won, as indeed it is. These illuminating extracts are from a series by Mr. Clive Turnbull, a noted Australian journalist with first-hand knowledge of Britain and Russia:

> When the Commonwealth Government comes to appoint the people who are to write the story of Australia in this war, it will need an historian of the tremendous industrial transformation of Australia. For that is one of the biggest things that has ever happened to the Commonwealth and its people.
>
> * * *
>
> Look around to-day and you see not only a nation in arms, but a nation in factories. We are making a multitude of things that we have never made before—and that we had never contemplated making before.
>
> * * *
>
> We are making special steel for guns, special steel for tanks, special steel for protection against machine-gun bullets.
>
> * * *
>
> All these steels have been evolved, together with steels for many other special purposes, by the Australian industry. We could no longer depend on the importation of alloys. The Australian steel industry's technologists planned their manufacture here; and made them.
>
> * * *
>
> We have learned to make machine-tools of a complexity and on a scale not before thought of.
>
> * * *
>
> The precision machinery which we should once have looked to Britain or the United

States, Switzerland or Germany for, we now make ourselves. And make with entire success.

He goes on to chronicle the manufacture in Australia of anti-aircraft predictors—" adding machines are simple by comparison "—aero engines and the frames to go with them, and adds that if it proves expedient to make an Australian car it will be child's play to make it with the present background of engineering experience. I have no doubt that it will prove expedient to make Australian cars. Establishment of the industry was a political issue in the immediate pre-war years and the preliminary steps had been taken by manufacturing interests, with whom the Government had concluded an agreement, to secure machine tools and rights from the United States.

Australia never expected to make tanks. Like the bulk of our combat aircraft they were to have come from Britain if needed, but that theory now rusts with the litter of Dunkirk and Singapore. Dismaying difficulties faced the Australian tank designers. They were told they must rule out imported parts, because supply-lines were sagging and might break. They could not import powerful engines and they did not have the machine-tools to make them. No American or British tank model would serve because Australia did not have the machine tools or facilities to make the riveted rolled armour of which every modern tank was made. In their isolation, the technicians did not return to outmoded techniques, but evolved new ones. Three small motors were linked into one power-unit; entire hulls and turrets were cast in huge moulds, then baked and bathed to get the super-hardness required. Both these techniques have since been borrowed by American tank-makers. No wonder the Australian tanks got a great reception from the crowd when they rumbled in parade through Melbourne not long ago.

The staff of the Directorate of Armoured Fighting Vehicles included refugees from France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Germany and Austria, also some Russians and Chinese. Englishmen who know how the trade and commerce of their own islands have been stimulated by the influx of refugees with outstanding skills, like the Huguenots, will appreciate the symbolism contained in that international round-up. The Hitler era has given Australia, as it has given most countries, quotas of fugitives from persecution seeking new outlets for their skills. Before the war they had begun to transform the Australian production scene, and to affect trade balances. They will not all go home after the war and even those who do will have passed on much of their knowledge.

Steel expansion covers the field from warships and merchantmen to surgical instruments. Aluminium repeats the tale. A financial expert recently wrote in a London paper that Chilean nitrate shares are a good buy. The world, as he truly pointed out, must have nitrates for its crops or go hungry. But it is doubtful if Australia will ever again be the old prop of Chilean nitrates—and British tramp shipping. Spurred by the need to maintain food production while minimizing demands on vital tonnage, Australia has created a synthetic

ammonia industry, based upon the fixation of free nitrogen in the atmosphere. Australia's first batch of home-produced phosphorus is soon due. Sulphonamide drugs and vitamin preparations have appeared on a full commercial scale. Ergot, digitalis, hyoscine, chloral hydrate, caffein and phenacetin are in production, and in some there is already a surplus for export. It is the same with optical glass and optical instruments. Canberra has announced a £40,000,000 scheme for post-war expansion of the Australian merchant marine and shipbuilding. Voices are raised for enlarged Australian civil aviation, using locally-built machines.

Enough has been said to make the point that Australia's industrial history has entered a new, vital, challenging phase. Nor is Australia alone in this. New Zealand is widening her productive fields. Canada built half the vehicles for the Eighth Army and claims that her new industrial capacity makes her the fourth-ranking member of the United Nations. The British High Commissioner in South Africa said: " South Africa has made startling progress in the production of base metals, particularly iron and steel. There is no doubt that during the war, and after, South Africa is going to be a great steel producer."

The Dominions, taken together, present a staggering picture of industrial expansion. In partnership with Britain, they have tremendous opportunities of increasing their well-being while faithfully serving all mankind. But if these prospects are to be realized the peoples of the British Commonwealth must take a keen and intelligent interest in the progress and ambitions of their partners. If this interest is absent, it is the task of leadership to awaken it. I think Fleet Street's treatment of the Australian Prime Minister's policy speech on July 26 shows that interest, at the moment, is not as keen as it might be. Six of the nine national dailies did not mention Mr. Curtin's speech at all. An organ of the extreme Right, and another of the Left, gave it quarter columns which were less straight reports than canters for their particular ideological hobby horses. Only *The Times* reported that Mr. Curtin had had this to say on foreign policy:

Australians must take an active part in assuring a future for Australia by the fullest participation in all policies affecting the Pacific and South-West Asia. The Government would concentrate on establishing in peace a system of security as effective in the Pacific and Asiatic zones as elsewhere. Australia must be a Pacific Power for her own security.

Is it symptomatic that *The Times*, usually so impeccable in its reporting, printed " South-West Asia " where Mr. Curtin said " South-East Asia "? There is a great difference, in our view, between Arabia on the one hand and China, Japan and Malaya on the other.

(Mr. Newman was formerly Foreign News Editor of the Sydney Daily Telegraph.)

HAPPINESS IN WARTIME

By Mass-Observation

PEOPLE approach war with pre-conceived attitudes. These are by no means identical, but they do fall roughly into fairly distinct groups. There is, for example, the conviction that it is socially wrong to feel happy in wartime; it would be a betrayal of those who suffered, a lightheartedness out of harmony with events. There is the directly opposing attitude, that when everything conspires to make the individual miserable it is his duty to combat the temptation and force laughter; such an outlook receives social sanction, for a happy people (it is believed) fight and die more willingly than a disillusioned or over-serious one. In between these two extremes are a cluster of other attitudes—happiness is personal, unrelated to external events; true happiness is of eternity not of the moment; and so on.

But these attitudes, whether they be rationalizations or evasions, are part of people's psychological structure, even though they belong to the rind only. And however much they are intellectual reactions rather than instinctive ones, they cannot be estranged from the individual and set aside as of no account. Hence, a man who is normally happy (providing he is secure and is well fed), and reacts instinctively to the wartime environment, is another man when he coats this internal system with a more transparent one of logic and rationalization. Unless subjected to a strain which his new exterior finds unbearable, he will speak from his head rather than from his heart.

The most effective way of approaching people directly on this point was to ask them whether war news generally made much difference to their happiness or not. This question has been asked from time to time, and the following table* gives results selected as representative of the trend:

	Makes Difference			*No Difference*			*No Opinion*		
	M	*F*	*Total*	*M*	*F*	*Total*	*M*	*F*	*Total*
April, 1941	36%	54%	45%	57%	33%	45%	7	13	10
Nov., 1941	22	52	37	64	40	52	14	8	11
May, 1943	34	42	38	63	46	55	3	12	7

These figures must be treated with great caution for reasons already stated. They hint at the trajectory of what people think about their own happiness rather than give an index of its state. On one occasion a similar question was

*In this article the Letters M and F refer to sex (Male and Female); the numeral gives the age to the nearest five years, and the letters A,B,C and D refer to the class: upper, middle, artisan and labouring respectively.

asked about happiness in relation to the weather, and the result implied that more people were affected by it emotionally than by the war news (17 per cent. difference). These things are scarcely susceptible to measurement, and it was decided to approach the subject by a different route. The figures do suggest, however, that female defences against external disturbances are flimsier than men's. Men claim to assimilate the news and remain emotionally undisturbed; women seek a similar state of stability by ignoring the news, as is illustrated by a large number of replies on the following lines:

F30C No, I just take no notice.
F40C No, you're used to it now.
F30D No, we never take no notice of it in our house.
F45C No, I let life carry on in the ordinary way.

The next method that was tried was less direct, and was less hampered by the socially respectable colouring that vitiates direct interviewing. Investigators mingled with people and spoke to them via a different relationship, that of acquaintances (though short ones) rather than strangers. This broke down the barrier of suspicion, but not always that of rationalization. For instance, contacts did not consider it necessary to base statements on what was best for the war effort (often a prime consideration in public) but they continued to satisfy their own consciences and veil their own egos. The method of by-passing this last barrier will be dealt with later.

The extremist attitudes were, of course, still in evidence, for they lie much deeper in the psyche in some cases than in others and may even be congenitally true. But the belief that wartime happiness is a sin is much less frequent than its opposite, the cheerfulness of fatalism. Yet both spring from the same source, the sordidness and hopelessness of this world. Compare the two following:

> Well, I don't see how *anybody* can be happy when there's this dreadful war on, and all the suffering there is everywhere. I think if people can be happy while this war is going on they must be made of iron, they can't have any feelings. That's my view of it. (F55C)

> Well, I was always a cheerful sort—what's the use of being anything else? You may get bombed out to-morrow, but what's the use of worrying about that to-day? No, take things as they come, that's my way—as often as not, the worst never happens. (M40D)

The first is the attitude on which tragedy is based; the second leads to comedy and the picaresque. The first is the second gone sour.

The insistence on extracting the most enjoyment out of life is more widespread than its gloomy opposite. It probably exists (though the evidence is not conclusive) among the poorer sections of the population, those who have less time for introspection, as:

> Oh, I'm happy enough, I never think about it, I'm too busy—that's the best way to be happy—don't think about it. I'll be glad when the war is over, like everybody else, but what's the use of worrying? (F35D)

Even in this case, however, there appears to be more than a smattering of rationalization, while the following reeks of it:

Well, I've never been one of those who thought it did any good to go about pulling a long face just because there's a war on. I think we ought to be as happy as we reasonably can and not let our spirits get down. Even if you look at it from the point of view of the war effort, it's better to be cheerful—people always work better if they don't give way to gloomy feelings.

So far happiness has been treated as an abstract quality—a suit of mail that is put on to help win wars, or an outlook that makes life easier. That is, it has been treated as an instrument rather than as a goal or even unknown quantity that exists in everyone to a greater or lesser degree. When people think in terms of prsonal happiness it becomes more real; its dimensions and characteristics become apparent, and one feels inevitably that at last the individual is speaking rather than the social unit. War is nearly always treated by the press and social critics as a machine that inflicts wounds on an integrated social organism, whereas in effect its first offensive is against the individual. Thus an individual who has not been wounded may regard himself as happy, despite injuries done to others. This is certainly the explanation of the personal happiness confessed to by these people:

Well, in some ways I should say I'm just as happy in wartime as I was in peacetime, but that's only because my husband is in a safe job at home. It would be altogether different if he was overseas. I used to be such a worrier—I'm surprised, now, to think what trifles used to make me gloomy for a whole day. I suppose the more comfortable your conditions are, the more you do fuss about trivialities. But now I've got to a stage when I should be really ashamed to let myself be miserable, when I think of all the real causes for misery that so many others have. I think I'm more consciously thankful that my own conditions are fairly happy ones, on the whole. I was terribly gloomy in the first year or two of the war, but after time has gone on, you begin to look on war rather like the weather, something that just goes on indifferently and that's quite out of your control, and you begin to build up a sort of happiness in spite of it. (F35B)

Oddly enough, I've been thinking a good deal about the subject lately, and I've come to the conclusion that the war makes astonishingly little difference to people's personal happiness, unless it involves them in personal tragedy. If *your* particular family is safe, you can go on quite contentedly. If Woolwich is bombed and you live in Willesden, it has no effect on you unless you happen to have a close relative in Woolwich. If the person you care about is wounded, or a prisoner of war, or in constant danger, or dead, then of course your happiness *is* affected. But I really don't think the actual fact of being at war makes people unhappy. Though it must be very different in an invaded country. (F40B)

The further a stimulus is removed from one's self, the less will be its effect on one. There is an intermediate stage between the complete self and the complete non-self, and this stage is represented by kith and kin, relatives and friends. The husband-wife relationship has already been mentioned in one of the foregoing statements, but an extremely potent one which was brought up time and again is the mother-child relationship. So much of a mother's happiness is bound up in the welfare of her children that they are a major factor in the state of her own happiness. In the first of the three examples that follow the contact referred first to her relationship with her hushand but ended with the remark, "I think it's the kids keep us going."

Well, I must say I often wonder why we did so much grumbling before the war—it seems to me we didn't know when we were well off—we had nothing real to grumble about, and yet we were discontented. I know I was. I've grown much more contented in a lot of ways since the war, though it seems a dreadful thing to say. But I do see how fortunate I am. My husband's a key man, he's in munitions, he's safe not to be called up, and I know how lucky I am not to be worrying about him all the time. And the longer the war goes on the more I feel we ought to be just as happy as we can. Especially when you've got kids. I saw a letter in the papers some time ago, saying people ought not to have children in wartime, it was selfish. I thought it never ought to have been printed. But a lot of people disagreed with it. I think it's the kids keep us going. (F35C)

I think you've simply got to make the effort to keep smiling, if you've got kids; it's bad for them if you give way to worrying and feeling miserable. I'm not saying anything about *happiness*; that's a different story, nobody can make themselves feel happy if they've got real reasons to be unhappy. But I don't think people should give way to their moods too much. 'Course, we've always been a nation of grumblers, everybody knows that, and I think it's a good thing to have a good grouse every now and then and get it out of your system. If your hubby's out in the Middle East, like mine, and you don't know when you'll see him again, you can't be *happy*, it stands to reason. But I think you ought to make the effort to be cheerful, it's better for yourself as well as other people. I made up my mind when he left England that the kids should never see me crying or worrying, and, well, they seem to be growing up happy, the way they should, and that's worth every bit of effort I've made. (F35C)

Well, what I think is, you can't afford to let yourself go, because of other people. I *could* let myself be miserable all the time; my husband's in the R.A.F., and we were very happy together, and of course I miss him terribly all the time. Sometimes I want just to lie down on my bed and have a good cry. But my little boy Michael, he's as quick as a needle—if he sees me with red eyes or if he feels there's something wrong, he just lets go himself, he gets impossible, he yells all the time, the minute there's something wrong with me. So I have to keep going, just to keep him happy and contented. It's a good thing I've got him—I sometimes think this war would have turned me into a regular misery if it hadn't been for him. But he's a different child just as long as I seem to be bright and cheerful, I never have any trouble with him, just as long as I don't let myself get down. (F30C)

The mother-child relationship, like all bi-polar ones, works both ways. When the children are happy the mother has less cause to be unhappy herself; at the same time it is up to her to maintain a façade of happiness so that the children shall not suffer.

Finally, there are a number of intellectualized attitudes towards happiness which may or may not be based on personal experience. These should be distinguished from the automatic response to or revulsion from what is socially expected.

Doesn't it all depend on what you *mean* when you say happiness? I'm sorry to be just like Joad. But it does mean such different things to different people. Some day I'll tell you a lot of the scandalous stories I've been hearing, from the little girls in the N.F.S. and what they do with the Americans. As a well brought up young woman, living with my mother, I've been absolutely *horrified*. Only what I mean is, all these girls, none of them over twenty, think they're happy—they think they're having a *lovely* time. And it may be ten years before they see that what now seems to them a lovely time has just been a lot of stupidities that have spoiled their lives. I think when our own men come

home there'll be shooting. For whether they're married or engaged or what, they're all having affairs with Americans—I've been talking to girls of eighteen and nineteen with a black past as long as your arm. But what I mean is, happiness isn't just having a good time, and nearly all these girls think it is, and so what's the use of talking about happiness when everybody interprets it differently? I think there's an enormous lot of *snatching* at what people think is happiness at present, but I should think there's very little real happiness indeed. I don't think, anyway from what I see in Civil Defence, that there's any feeling that they ought not to be happy in wartime, it's just snatch-and-grab at what you can get. (F20B)

The more happiness is thought about the more elusive the conception becomes. Is happiness a state of mind that constantly appears to be within sight of attainment, but is always flitting just out of reach?

Well, I should say there's on an average just about as much happiness in war as in peace. But it's easy to say that now. I shouldn't have said it in 1940 and '41. In peacetime there's a sense of futility, and people are always pursuing an idea of happiness they never catch up with—they buy a new car, or take a bigger flat, and think they'll be happier, and then they find they aren't and that makes them more discontented than before. In peacetime you assume happiness is just about within your grasp, and you're always finding that you've never quite got it. But in war the general assumption is that you are living under unhappy conditions, you set yourself to endure them, and you suddenly find that you're not really unhappy at all. It's partly that the awful sense of futility has gone; everyone accepts the simple aim of beating Germany and Italy and Japan in war, you can see visible progress to that end, that gives everyone a sense of satisfaction. The fact that ordinary peacetime is aimless in comparison is what accounts for people becoming fairly happy in wartime. (M35B)

Or may there not be different kinds of happiness—the happiness of the moment, of the good-timers, and a wider kind of happiness, philosophical and detached?

Well, I don't know, I think it's the difference between short-term and long-term happiness. There's hardly anybody I can think of that I know, whose life hasn't been altered by the war. They can't make plans for the future, they can't work steadily, they can't look forward to any sort of normal life till the war's over. And that doesn't make for happiness. You have to give up every sort of what I call long-term idea. But when you chuck it all overboard, and only live for the day, then you do get a certain kind of daily happiness you never get in peacetime, a freedom from worry and responsibility. I think there's probably more enjoyment of the passing moment than there was in peacetime. (M35C)

When there is no universally accepted definition of happiness and everyone is free to say what is happiness and what is not, any attempt to determine the extent of happiness becomes impossible, a probing into chaos. Therefore, despite the dangers, more valuable results will be obtained if the investigator, holding no pronounced views of his own on the subject, is allowed to use his own code as a standard by which to judge the happiness of others. This is the anthropological approach. The investigator studies people under certain conditions in as objective a manner as possible. Of all methods it is probably the most satisfactory of its kind. The subjective element is present (the mind of the observer) but it is unitary and once the bias is detected it can be checked to the same extent throughout the resultant report. In the method

we have been discussing up to now the subjective element is composed of many conflicting opinions with no guarantee that they will strike a true mean. The anthropologist also makes use of interviewing methods, but all the parts are woven into the observational structure which is under his control.

For an enquiry into happiness an occasion was chosen when people were expected to enjoy themselves and any inhibitions on happiness and cheerfulness generally were raised or reduced. The occasion was the Christmas Holiday of 1941, spreading from the early preparation for the festival, through the peak periods of Christmas Eve, Christmas Day and Boxing Day, to the accepted close of the holiday on New Year's Eve. The general tone was found to be one of sobriety and lack of enthusiasm, though undertones provided the same pattern of happiness and feelings about the rightness and possibility of happiness in a world at war as have already been revealed by other methods. Different people approached a wartime Christmas in different ways. Some were under the impression that the traditional Christmas could not be observed under wartime conditions, that to attempt to enjoy it in the usual way was sacrilege. These people did not enjoy Christmas and gained no happiness from its celebration. The conception of "happiness" was not brought to their notice during this survey, they were only concerned with an objective fact called "Christmas". Hence there was no temptation to produce theoretical structures on happiness as such; rather the individual's state of happiness and feelings about it emerged unknown to himself and untouched by his own cerebration. Under such circumstances the gloom that informs the following statement can be accepted as a more genuine expression than similar examples that have gone before:

I think it's a mockery celebrating it in a year like this. What place has peace and goodwill in the world at present? It seems to me the bloodier we are the more we are feted. I feel sorry for the children who are growing up in this war, especially those who were just beginning to think for themselves when the war started. They've had no real Christmas yet. They don't know the Message of Christmas and if the war doesn't end soon they never will. I've got two kiddies, both of them affected by the war like that. I make Christmas as best as I can for them. Take them down to Church in the morning and try and make the rest of the day as much like a peacetime Christmas as possible. (M50C)

The conflict in the mind of a person who thinks that the celebration of Christmas is out of place in a world at war but simultaneously believes that the children should not be allowed to suffer, has been mentioned before. It is a continually recurring factor and resolves itself into this compromise: "I have no right to be happy, but I have no right to demand unhappiness of the innocent; therefore I must assume happiness for their sake." It savours of the heroic, the strong man sacrificing himself for the weak. There are many instances:

M35D Rather a farce to keep it up this year apart from the children's point of view.
F40D You must make an effort for the kids. They expect it, don't they?
F55D (In chocolate queue). You must get a bit of something for the kids.

The children are made scapegoats for the parents' guilt feelings, but scapegoats who do not suffer.

It is but a short step from saying that a wartime Christmas is a mockery to saying that there shouldn't be one at all. This is not a majority attitude by any means, for most people welcomed the break, but 5 per cent. of all people questioned held this opinion. One person in eight said that his Christmas had been positively sad. Far more people accepted the fact that circumstances were against the usual high-spirited Christmas, but were determined to make the best of it. This opinion recurred again and again:

> It all depends on different circumstances of different people; some will be happy, some won't, if their folks are away—relatives. The only thing to do is the best you can, make the best as possible. (Young working-class male)
>
> There's the Christmas atmosphere same as in peacetime—people are trying to make the best of it. (F35D)
>
> Oh, we'll take things just as they come. (F65D)
>
> Oh, we'll enjoy it, war or no war. (M35C)
>
> I expect we'll have some fun in spite of everything. (M25B)
>
> I'm looking forward to it, of course. There's no sense in moping. (M40C)

The War coloured everyone's approach to Christmas and therefore the capacity to be happy. The feeling that "war or no war, this *is* Christmas" was dominant, but there was an undercurrent of feeling that it was a fight to make it a real Christmas. Some failed:

> Christmas, 1941, was not exhilarating. We spent it in a hotel in Ryde, because my sister, who works in an Aircraft factory, had only the one day off, and not sufficient time to get home. It was the first Christmas we had spent away from home and possibly we had half made up our minds beforehand that we weren't going to enjoy it. All the same, the atmosphere was 'unChristmassy' enough for nearly everyone to remark at some point, it doesn't seem like Christmas, does it? All day long you were waiting for it to turn into a 'real' Christmas day, but in spite of the fact that there were many of the outward things that make up Christmas—turkey, Christmas pudding, holly, mistletoe, crackers—there was always something missing. This might have been a personal feeling only, but it did seem something more and something wider than that. At any rate, for me, this was the first wartime Christmas. (Young B class woman)

Others succeeded so well that their wartime Christmas surpassed all previous ones in gaiety:

> Throughout Christmas the war was completely forgotten. The abundance of all the usual Christmas delicacies helped to obliterate the war. For two days no one listened to the news (and of course had no papers). There was a curious undercurrent (which was noticeable everywhere) of being determined to enjoy oneself at all costs and to have a good 'Old-time Christmas' as this might be the last opportunity for some time to come. In my house there was one person trying to throw off the thought of military service in the near future and another trying to rid himself of the depression caused by the thought of what is entailed by being C.O. and registering as such. Another lost two brothers at Christmas time in the last war, and was trying desperately not to think about it. Another who suffers periodically from shellshock from the last war was recovering from an attack. Yet the gaiety outwardly and inwardly was unsurpassed in my memory. (Young C class male)

Twenty-two per cent. of the sample had expected "not much" of the coming event, but their fears were dissipated by the occasion. On the whole there was a lack of excitement and enthusiasm about Christmas during the period leading up to Christmas Day, including Christmas Eve.

If we try to generalize about happiness on this particular occasion rather than draw conclusions about the celebration of Christmas itself, we find that the individual is still the most important factor. War does not reduce people to a common level of experience or swamp them in an overall mediocrity, as is often suggested. To the contrary, it frequently draws out in them whatever may have been latent but previously unexpressed, or causes their former habits and attitudes to be expressed in a more extreme form. It is the same with happiness. The pessimist finds a socially respectable excuse for his pessimism, and is more vocal about the sin of wartime happiness; the optimist is faced with bigger obstacles, and increases his effort to find happiness where he can. In general, war conditions act as an agent for the freeing of emotional expression, as compensation for restrictions in other directions. It would be wrong, however, to identify emotional freedom with one pole rather than another—it may spend itself entirely in a way that condemns happiness. Both puritanism and hedonism increase in intensity in wartime, though there is no evidence for a fixed relationship between the two.

(*Mass-Observation is an independent organization engaged in investigating the way in which ordinary people think and behave. Since* 1937 *it has been recording the facts of public and private opinion, social habit and social change, in Britain. It works through a team of full time, trained investigators, and a National Panel of some* 1,500 *voluntary observers living in all parts of the country. Its fieldwork headquarters and the address for any enquiries is* : 21 *Bloomsbury Street, London, W.C.*1.)

THE ITALIAN SURRENDER AND THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

THE command of the Mediterranean may now be said to be securely in the hands of the Allies. Troops and trade can move throughout the sea, adequately protected and without undue delays in spite of the continued presence of the German U and E boats, aircraft and mines. These have still to be dealt with, and they can be dealt with. The first step towards this desirable state of things was the expulsion of the enemy from Africa and then from Sicily, an expulsion rendered possible only because our command of the sea enabled the necessary reinforcements of men and munitions to reach Egypt by way of the Cape of Good Hope, and aircraft and their supplies to reach West Africa across the Atlantic and fly their course by the Lake Chad route. The result of the expulsion was dual. The enemy was deprived of those bases and airfields in Africa and Sicily from which his light craft and aircraft could effectively attack the allied shipping; the Allies obtained the bases needed for their own use, with the possession of which they could give a continuous defence to the convoys throughout the length of the voyage between Gibraltar and Port Said. The second step has been the removal of the threat of the Italian fleet. Inactive as that fleet has been it could not be ignored for it possessed the material capacity seriously to interfere with the military invasions of the Italian coast. If it had determined to oppose a seaborne army the losses which it might suffer from air attacks, even such a loss as that of the *Roma*, might well have been considered worth while if the invasionary army could be crippled, as it would be if two or three or more fast heavy ships were to get among the host of feeble transports. The protection of that vast array of vulnerable craft and the fortunes of the operation on which they were to be engaged could not therefore be confided solely to aircraft, invaluable as they are. Great ships, in squadrons strong enough to meet the Italians with a certainty of being able to defeat any attempt they might make on the expeditionary army were therefore essential.

The removal of this threat to the lines of military communication relieves the heavy ships of this responsibility. Defence against what remains, the U and E boats and aircraft, lies with the allied smaller surface vessels and aircraft, and, in the conditions of our weapons, our experience and our position as regards bases to-day, the prospects of the enemy being able seriously to affect our lines of communication and supply are small, provided always that

there is no relaxation in our readiness to forestall any new schemes which the inventive powers of the enemy may bring into use. The one service which may still be demanded of the heavy ships is that of supporting the land operations with their heavy artillery, as they did on various occasions on the coasts of Africa, Sicily and Calabria. Properly speaking this is not a function of the "ships of the line," but of special bombarding vessels, the bomb ketch in her day and the monitor to-day, and it is to be hoped that these exist in adequate numbers to perform this service without calling on the great ships. This is particularly desirable as we have another campaign in the Far East ahead of us in which the battleships will be needed in the strongest possible force. The strategical needs of an overwhelming superiority in heavy ships over the Japanese fleet far outweighs the tactical needs of the campaign off the Italian or other coasts. It is in the Eastern Seas, where great combined operations will be beginning before long, and in which command of the sea will be the first necessity, that we shall require the whole of our battleships, undiminished. Secondary needs must give way to primary needs at all times.

The elimination of the Italian Navy hastens the arrival of the day when the desired offensive, on a major scale, is begun against Japan. Some time may be required for the despatch of supplies of ammunition, stores, provisions and fuel, and of auxiliary vessels which accompany a fleet, the "train" as the Americans, using an old word, call them. Some time is also probably needed for docking and overhaul before proceeding to the East where those facilities are lacking. But when this reinforcement reaches the eastern seas the allied fleet that will be assembled will be in great material superiority to that of Japan. The damages inflicted at Pearl Harbour have nearly all been made good and a number of new ships have been added to the United States fleet in the Pacific, both cruisers and aircraft carriers. But no superiority can ever be too great, and, though the sum total of the Allied ships may exceed that of the enemy, this does not mean that that superiority will be available at the moment of battle. Ships must be docked periodically, ships need refits and overhaul. A proportion of the fleet must always be counted out as absent for one or another inevitable reason: and, while this affects both navies, the fleet which possesses dockyard facilities close at hand is at an advantage over one that possesses them at a very great distance. Japan has dockyards in her own islands and though these may be at some considerable distance from a theatre of action they are nearer than those of the Allies which lie at the great distances away of Honolulu and Malta; and it is not inconceivable that in these two years the destruction done by us to the establishments at Singapore has been repaired and the facilities of that port are available to the enemy. Besides this, a margin must be allowed for the uncertainties of sea warfare and for the greater risks to which the fleet is exposed which has constantly to be at sea, as that of the Allies will be when operations begin.

It can well be understood that the surrender of Italy has caused disquiet in Japan even though she has those advantages of position to set off against

the allied superiority. The appearance of a superior fleet can only add to the existing uneasiness regarding the shipping situation. Colonel Knox, the United States Secretary of the Navy, recently asserted that Japan began the war with 6,368,000 tons of shipping, had lost 2½ million and built or acquired 1 million tons, making a net loss of 1½ million. Whether she can continue to replace by building as much as she has been able to replace while she still had stocks of imported steel is not known to the present writer, but there seems little chance that she can acquire by capture in the future as she could in the palmy days at the beginning of the war. The rate of sinking should increase as the American submarines increase in numbers and experience; and the extinction of the Italian Navy should enable those British submarines which have been doing such notable service in the Mediterranean to transfer their attention to the shipping in the Far East: for there are now very few lines of seaborne enemy supply—those to Crete, to Rhodes and the Dodecanese are all that remain and should not absorb the whole of the present submarine flotilla in the Mediterranean. It is also worthy of notice that one of the reasons why it has been possible to defeat the submarine in the Atlantic Battle is that the small vessels—the sloops, corvettes, frigates and destroyers—with which we have protected the convoys were not themselves exposed to attack by more powerful ships. The merchantmen and their escorts have crossed the sea under the umbrella of the main fleet of heavy ships in the Northern waters, and it has been possible for that cover to be given without an undue expenditure of effort because of the advantage of position of the Home Fleet, which, lying between the enemy heavy ships in their Norwegian bases and the open waters of the Atlantic and being able to keep an aerial eye on the movements of the German ships, make any move into the Atlantic a risky proceeding. The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* made such a sally without being intercepted on the way out, and did no small damage; but they made one cruise only on the trade routes. The *Bismarck's* attempt as a commerce raider ended before it had done anything. Superior battleship force in a commanding position was the prophylactic to the German heavy attack.

In the Pacific the Japanese shipping and its escorts will not enjoy those two advantages. They will only dispose of an inferior force, not in a commanding position except within a limited area inside the China Sea. If their convoys are to sail, they will need, besides the light craft for dealing with the American and British submarines, heavier ships to meet the heavy ships of the Allies. Certainly a proportion of their traffic may be able to move across the short stretches of sea between the islands they occupy, by night; but that is not the whole of their route from and to their home ports and their armies' bases. And at the same time they will be needing to provide forces to meet those complications which the combined land, sea and air forces under Lord Louis Mountbatten will introduce into the eastern theatre of war. Thus, the surrender of the Italian Navy is bound to produce extensive repercussions in Japan.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

EVENTS, amazing events, have followed each other with such rapidity during the month since I last wrote that it is hard to realize that they have occurred in so short a period. No clearer proof could be given that the initiative has passed decisively to the Allies and, even more encouraging, that they were prepared to use it without hesitation or delay. What has happened in the Mediterranean is the more sensational, but the astonishing progress of the Russian offensive is still of more far-reaching importance. Whether that will continue to be the case when Anglo-American plans are fully developed it is impossible to judge at the time I am writing. On the other hand, in view of the approaching autumn rains and mud it seems hardly probable that Marshal Stalin and General Zkukov will open an offensive on a new front until the winter. For the time being they will presumably concentrate on developing the linked offensives which have already achieved such immense success. Autumn conditions may not bring these offensives to a standstill but they will almost certainly reduce their impetus. Much, however, may be accomplished in a few weeks of dry weather by an army which has displayed such offensive power and mobility. The respite the Germans admittedly hope for may come too late to save them from the disastrous consequences of belated decisions.

It is not clear when the decision to retire from the Dneiper was taken. It seems possible that their original intention was to hold firmly the line of the Kalmius, Stalino and Slavyansk, while maintaining a strong concentration of picked troops to guard its communications with the Dneiper from attack from the north. If so the disaster at Taganrog and the weight of the Russian attack from the east upset the plan, and the strong defence on the Poltava-Kharkov front then became that of a powerful flank guard covering the further retreat. It is more probable, however, that when they failed to restore the situation at Kharkov they intended to hold the Kalmius-Slavyansk line only as an intermediate position to facilitate an orderly withdrawal. Perhaps they hoped to gain time for the concentration of sufficient reserves on the Poltava-Kharkov front to enable them to bring off an effective counter-stroke. In any case it would seem that in their efforts to strengthen this sector they must have denuded the northern Ukraine of reserves, otherwise it is hardly conceivable that the Russian thrust towards Kiev could have made such amazingly rapid progress towards so vital a centre.

The Russian theatre as a whole now presents an extraordinarily interesting strategic picture, and one which must be highly disturbing to the German

General Staff. In the north their armies are tied to the Leningrad region. A withdrawal to a shorter front through difficult country would be a precarious operation while weather conditions favour pursuit and attack. Later on the possession of railway communication might facilitate withdrawal; but any economies effected by shortening the front might be more than counterbalanced by the release for offensive use of the Leningrad garrison and of the Red Army field troops now required to keep open communications with the city. What effect withdrawal from the Leningrad front would have on Finland's attitude can only be surmised, but the fact that Russian naval forces would acquire greater liberty of action might exercise an important influence.

In the centre the Smolensk and Briansk region is becoming an increasingly pronounced salient with an immense perimeter. These two great base centres are so strongly entrenched that there seems little likelihood that the Russians will, for the present at least, make determined attempts to capture them by direct attack; though strong pressure, especially towards their rearward communications is evidently being maintained. This pressure has become so threatening to Briansk that there are indications that the Germans have begun to withdraw from this centre, and that the Russian attack from the east is closing in to prevent an orderly evacuation. Should Briansk be captured it would eliminate the possibility that the Germans might still have sufficient reserves in the centre to attempt a counterstroke southwards against the northern flank of the Russian thrust towards Kiev. This might have been the most effective way of bringing relief to their hard pressed southern armies; although in view of the general shortage of reserves it had hardly seemed practicable.

The German armies in the south are evidently in a desperately precarious position, and it seems evident that Zhukov, having driven a wedge between them and the armies of the centre and north, will employ the weight of his offensive power against them; particularly while the state of the ground favours mobile operations. Obviously to secure his northern flank against a possible German counter-stroke General Zhukov must maintain pressure on Briansk, and it is possible that he might also for a time use the line of the Desna River as a defensive flank to cover his southern operations.

Meanwhile the Germans in the south are not only cut off from direct communication with the armies of the centre but have themselves been split in two by the daring Russian thrust from Krasnoarmeisk towards Dnepropetrovsk. This wedge has been driven so rapidly and has progressed so far that it may seem to invite counter-attack. The danger is not great, for the Germans in the coastal region have already suffered severely and direct pursuit is pressing hard on their heels. Their chief thoughts must be of escape to the Dneiper, and local counter-blows to check pursuit are probably the limit of their offensive power. More danger might threaten from the group that has fought so hard south of Kharkov, for it is composed of picked troops and has a considerable amount of armour. The group however,

has had much heavy fighting and its line of retreat is threatened. The ability of the Germans to make good quickly losses in armour and to stage rapid counter-attacks cannot be ignored; still it would be surprising if, under heavy pressure from the north, they were able to strike effectively against the Russians to the south of them. They may be withdrawn through Poltava to strengthen the defence of Kiev while railway communications remain open.

Encouraging as it is to the Russians to recover great areas of territory and to liberate occupied towns, it would be much more important to cut off and destroy large enemy forces. I am sure that General Zhukov will not be content, in order to reduce casualties and recover territory, merely to manœuvre the enemy out of his positions if he sees an opportunity of bringing him to decisive battle. The elusiveness of modern mechanized armies is, however, a factor and it is not easy to force a retreating enemy into decisive combat.

To revert to the Mediterranean theatre it will be interesting if Badoglio's hesitation to surrender should after all prove to have been to allied advantage. Obviously if he had unhesitatingly decided to throw in his lot with us and had been able to overpower the comparatively small German forces in Italy, that would have been of tremendous advantage to the Allies. But it seems doubtful whether he could have secured the adherence of the Army and have adjusted its dispositions rapidly enough to prevent the Germans forming centres of resistance not easy to eliminate. It might have been difficult for the Allies, still engaged in the Sicilian operations, to have given him the necessary assistance; and had the Fascist elements in Italy rallied to the Germans it might have been impossible to forestall the arrival of German reinforcements. The delay in reaching a decision has of course enabled the Germans to reinforce their troops in Italy and to readjust their dispositions, but they have been left in doubt as to the allied course of action, and it still remains to be seen whether the readjustments made suitably counter the development of the allied plans.

On the other hand, the delay has given the Allies time to complete the Sicilian operations and to readjust the plans made on the assumption of continued Italo-German co-operation. They were therefore in a position to take action in force instantly when Badoglio reached his final decision on plans prearranged with him; and they have been able to strike while the Germans have still to crush Italian opposition. It seems certain that the Allies could not in any case have anticipated the occupation of Lombardy by strong German forces, although they might have secured control of southern and central Italy more easily than is now likely to be the case. The very fact that the Germans seem to intend to fight for central Italy may present opportunities to the Allies which they would not have had if their opponents had reduced to a minimum their Italian liabilities. And after all the greater the area the Germans attempt to retain the more will their resources be diverted from Russia, apart from risks they run of defeat in detail owing to dispersion of their forces.

THE ROAD TO REUNION

By Hugh Ross Williamson

TO the reunion of Christendom, which constitutes the paramount problem in the religious world to-day, the only tolerable approach is, as the Archbishop of Canterbury has said, "with the conviction that the fundamental anomaly is that any two disciples of the Lord should not be in communion with one another." Of that 'fundamental anomaly' the world has long been acidly aware. It has, moreover, tended to doubt the good faith of Churchmen who, while perennially protesting their regret, have apparently found it impossible to translate resolutions into action.

This secular misunderstanding is unfortunate because it leads even the well-disposed to dismiss as excuses what are in fact reasons and to mistake adherence to principle for a mechanical murmuring of shibboleths. Yet much of the blame for it rests with the Church itself. The Church of England, while insisting as against Nonconformity on the necessity of valid Orders and as against Rome on the validity of Anglican Orders, has been singularly reluctant to define authoritatively what she actually means by them. Should the layman who reads this article be impatient of a certain theological technicality about it, I would plead that it is precisely because the laity has ignored the theology—which is not, after all, over-difficult as far as this particular matter is concerned—that reunion has been so long delayed. It is only when the real problem has been seen that a solution can be attempted. And this problem, by its nature, can only be stated in theological terms. As the Rev. Alec Vidler wrote in a recent editorial in *Theology*: "It (the Church of England) has persistently neglected to clear up its own mind on the doctrinal question and has been satisfied with justifying its allegiance to the principle of episcopacy either on historical grounds or on grounds of expediency, though at the same time it has never denied that episcopacy must be maintained on grounds of Scriptural principle. It is just because this question is bound to arise in every proposal for Church union . . . that we must challenge the idea that it is tolerable to go on evading it."

Evasion, from the point of view of ecclesiastical politics, is understandable enough; for, while to one school of Anglican thought the word 'reunion' suggests 'our Nonconformist brethren' brought into communion by the maximum elasticity of interpretation, to another it means insistence on a doctrine no less uncompromising than that usually associated with the name of Rome. Thus attempts at precise definition might, it is felt, result not in reunion but in a new disunion within the Church of England itself.

This danger, which is real enough, is aggravated by the echo of those feuds and fears which constitute the history of attempts at reunion. The spectre of irrational emotions haunts every conference and, even more deadly, weariness overtakes those whose high hopes have been consistently disappointed and persuades them at last to exclaim with Dean Church 'though nations may make peace, Churches are irreconcilable.'

Yet a few months ago a new start was made. In his speech to Convocation from which I have already quoted, Dr. Temple gave, quietly and unostentatiously, a definition of Orders to which all parties in the Church of England could assent, with the principle of which the Vatican could hardly disagree and which rests its claim on those Scriptural practices to which, to the exclusion of tradition, Nonconformity appeals.

The Archbishop said:

> When the Lord's earthly ministry was ended, there was found in the world as its fruit and as means of its continuance this Body, in which the distinction of Ministry and Laity is already established. The Apostles were in no sense ministers of the laity; they were Ministers of Christ to the laity, and to the world waiting to be won. They took steps for the perpetuation of the ministry, and it has descended to ourselves. So when I consecrate a godly and well learned man to the office and work of a Bishop in the Church of God. I do not act as a representative of the Church, if by that is meant the whole number of contemporary Christians; but I do act as the ministerial instrument of Christ in His Body the Church. The authority by which I act is His, transmitted to me through His Apostles and those to whom they committed it; I hold it neither from the Church nor apart from the Church, but from Christ in the Church. I was myself admitted to the episcopate by the two-fold succession—succession in office and succession of consecration. The two streams of succession are different from the point where they converged upon me; but as we trace them back they meet again in Gregory who sent Augustine and in his predecessors even to apostolic times.
>
> This authority to consecrate and to ordain is itself witness to the continuity of the life of the Church in its unceasing dependence on its Head, Jesus Christ, who is the same yesterday and to-day and for ever. Every priest who by virtue of his Ordination celebrates the Holy Communion acts not for the congregation there present, nor for all Christian people then living on the earth, but as the organ of the Body of Christ, the ministerial instrument of Christ active in and through His Body; so that though no more than two or three persons be actually assembled, yet the congregation at that Holy Communion service is the Communion of Saints.

II.

To appreciate fully the significance of this pronouncement, it is necessary to take into account something of the recent history of the discussion on Orders. And at the outset it must be insisted that, on the mere historical plane alone this question of Orders is the vital one. It is palpable nonsense to talk about the reunion of Christendom and implicitly to exclude from consideration what is by far the largest communion, the Roman Catholics. Yet this is too often done and the subject approached as if it were nothing more than the finding of an ambiguous formula to which Nonconformity could assent and whose adoption would result in an undogmatic Pan-Protestantism

that, instead of achieving reunion, would intensify schism. Certainly it is necessary to bind together the differing sects by an accepted cord of episcopal ordination as a preliminary for a single reunited Church in England seeking recognition by the Church of Rome; but that cord must be of no *ersatz* material; it must be the tested product of the Catholic and Apostolic faith.

The fourth point of the 'Lambeth Quadrilateral', published in 1884 and reaffirmed in 1920 asserted that 'the visible unity of the Church will be found to involve the whole-hearted acceptance of a ministry acknowledged by every part of the Church as possessing not only the inward call of the Spirit but also the commission of Christ and the authority of the whole Body.' And what in fact Anglicanism meant by this 'historic episcopate' was defined with some care in the Reply of the English Archbishops to Leo XIII who, in 1896, had declared that 'ordinations performed according to the Anglican rite are utterly invalid and altogether void.'

This *Responsio*, which is insufficiently studied even in ecclesiastical circles, is the classic exposition of the Anglican case. Though it enunciates what many would consider a 'high' doctrine, the Archbishops are careful to make clear that they do not speak merely for the High Church party but that they are expounding 'the intention of our Church, *not merely of a newly formed party in it.*'

They say:

> We acknowledge with the Pope that the laying-on of hands is the matter of ordination; we acknowledge that the form is prayer or blessing appropriate to the ministry to be conferred; we acknowledge that the intention of the Church, as far as it is externally manifested, is to be ascertained, so that we may discover if it agrees with the mind of our Lord and His Apostles and with the statutes of the Universal Church. Thus the intention of our Fathers (i.e. the Anglican Reformers) was to keep and continue those offices which come down to us from the earliest times, and 'reverently to use and esteem them' in the sense of course in which they were received from the Apostles and had been up to that time in use.

The further question then arises as to what exactly is imparted to a man when he is ordained priest. Is he merely given a commission to an office in the Church? Or does his ordination imply the gift of something different *in kind* and not only in degree? This is the crux of the question and it is here that the technical language of theology becomes unavoidable.

The Rev. Eric Mascall has put it as simply as it can be put in his recent pamphlet on Priesthood:

> In Catholic theology, besides the conferring of a commission to minister, ordination is held to impart to the man who is ordained what is technically called *character*, that is to say, a permanent and indelible impression imparted to the soul, in virtue of which the priest is not merely a man who has been given a different sphere of work from that of a layman, but is in a quite unique way a *different kind of man*. This does not, of course, mean that the priest is necessarily more holy or more intelligent than the layman. The difference is not a moral or an intellectual one, but a sacramental one, and there is no exact parallel to it outside the sacramental sphere.

This matter of 'indelible character' is taught explicitly in the Archbishops' Reply, which points out the superior lucidity of the Anglican Rite to the Roman Pontifical in this matter: "Our Fathers employed one matter in *imprinting the character*, viz. the laying-on of hands: one matter in *the commission* to minister publicly and exercise powers over the flock entrusted to each, viz. the delivery of the Bible or Gospels." They comment that "it may not perhaps be idle to explain that these forms are not only verbally but *really* different."

There is, of course, a sense in which it is impossible to make the distinction between 'character' and 'commission' quite as sharp as it appears theoretically in this analysis. Indeed 'character' might even, in one terminology, be defined precisely as 'the bearing of the sacramental commission'. But the emphasis here must be so strongly on the *sacramental*—to the exclusion of any idea of 'Commission' in the sense of appointing somebody from the congregation to act on its behalf—that it is permissible to insist on the distinction. If the overwhelming importance of 'character' is lost sight of, it becomes easy to interpret 'commission' in this wrong (but very popularly held) sense and, in consequence, to misunderstand the nature of the Episcopate.

It is by virtue of the '*character*' that a priest as it were participates in the High Priesthood of Christ and is empowered to administer the Sacraments. Or, to quote Dr. Temple again on this crucial point: "I do not act as a representative of the Church, if by that is meant the whole number of contemporary Christians; but I do act as the ministerial instrument of Christ in His Body the Church. The authority by which I act is His, transmitted to me through His Apostles and those to whom they committed it."

III.

By the reaffirmation of the dogma of indelibility of 'character' the approach to Rome is safeguarded, for reunion with that communion would be for ever impossible on any other theory of Orders. It remains to examine the matter from the side of Nonconformity.

To avoid misunderstanding it must be remembered that the "Letter to All Christian People" which the Lambeth Conference issued in 1920 carefully defines the attitude of Anglicanism to Nonconformity: "It is not that we call in question for a moment the spiritual reality of the ministries of those Communions who do not possess the Episcopate. On the contrary, we thankfully acknowledge that these ministries have been manifestly blessed and owned by the Holy Spirit as effective means of grace."

The Nonconformist ministries are freely recognized as being 'within their several spheres real ministries of the Universal Church.' At the same time Anglicanism finds it impossible to concede that they are *full* ministries since, lacking the Episcopate, they are—or may be—irregular or defective. To quote Dr. Temple again: "We cannot in practice recognize what we must regard as irregular ministries, however effective within their own spheres,

until there is an operative decision to unite in a way that ends the irregularity."

This situation, which appears to many Nonconformists—especially laymen—a mere splitting of ecclesiastical hairs or, as one described it, 'taking away with one hand what is given with the other,' can only be understood by reference to the distinction between 'character' and 'commission'. Nonconformity tends to think exclusively in terms of 'commission'. Moreover it would not be unfair to suggest that, whatever may be their theory, the practice of Nonconformists is to regard the Church as the body of Christians rather than as the Body of Christ. And, from this point of view, the commissioning of a Ministry which is concerned primarily with preaching and administration might just as well be elected on a democratic basis and for utilitarian reasons as in any other way. Consequently Nonconformity is apt to regard the 'historic Episcopate' as at best a method of Church government which has stood the test of time and, at worst, an historic relic which may have some sentimental value to-day but which, whatever its appropriateness to the early and medieval Church, may be superseded by 'modern' methods—under, of course, the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

And, in so far as there is a kind of 'commission' which is separable from 'character', Anglicanism has gone far to meet this view-point by, for instance, such a pronouncement as the "Letter to All Christian People" which recognizes the validity of other ministeries within their own spheres and such actions as the permission for interchange of preachers, except at the service of Holy Communion.

The critical point, however, remains 'character' and of the implications of this Nonconformity shows little awareness. Even the Rev. Daniel Jenkins, a young Congregationalist whose book *The Nature of Catholicity* is an important landmark in the approach to mutual understanding, can write, for example: "The Ministry is only a function in the Church, a means by which all are enabled to hear the true Word of God and live the true Christian life." "It is the servant of the Church's service." And again, in a passage which shows surprising ignorance of Catholic teaching: "The real trouble appears to be that traditional Catholicism will not admit that the Ministry is merely a function of the Church, but is determined to regard the Ministry alone as living the full Christian life and the congregation as doing so only derivatively from it." (!) Thus he can arrive at the conclusion that "the Minister is but the chief of the 'helps' in the Church"—a doctrine which contradicts *in toto* that meaning of the 'character' of the Episcopate which every communion in the Universal Church, Roman, Anglican and Eastern, holds equally.

At this point Dr. Temple's pronouncement is of the greatest value, for in the simplest manner it implies the principle of 'character' in an appeal to the New Testament—which should commend it in particular to the consideration of Nonconformity: "When the Lord's earthly ministry was ended, there was found in the world as its fruit and as means of its continuance this Body, in

which the distinction of ministry and laity is already established. *The Apostles were in no sense ministers of the laity; they were ministers of Christ to the laity.*"

"In no sense ministers of the laity." Once Nonconformity perceives this truth (which is surely inescapable on any interpretation of the New Testament) the road to reunion should be easier to tread, for the great obstacle to understanding will have been removed and the Anglican insistence on the 'historic episcopate' be seen, not as an obscurantist adherence to a particular form of Church government—in which sphere adjustments may legitimately be made—but as obedience to the revelation in Holy Scripture which all followers of Christ alike acknowledge.

Many copies of THE FORTNIGHTLY for November, 1942 and April, 1943, were lost at sea. Readers who possess and can spare either or both of these issues are asked to return them to 13, Buckingham Street, London, W.C.2, so that they may be forwarded to Libraries wishing to complete the volumes for binding.

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

By Dorothy L. Sayers

YES—it's marvellous how they take these photographs—
marvellous—
what does the explanation say?
The white splotches are blast
and the black blobs are craters,
and the little speckly bits
are sunlight shining through windows upon the floor inside,
showing that the roof's off—
yes, quite—
the power-house has been hit,
it doesn't look much of a hole,
but doubtless the bomb exploded and damaged something important
that one can't see;
those things like shadowy safety-pins
are ships sunk in the harbour—
this one is down by the bows
and this by the stern
and that—
(marked H, dear, see what it says)—
Oh! that one's still afloat; well,
I suppose it's all right
but it looks just the same as the others—
yes, of course, *they know*,
but you really have to be an expert
to interpret these things,
naturally they don't mean anything much to the layman,
but of course I am quite convinced
that the destruction was enormous—
absolutely convinced—
absolutely.

What? the papers have come?
Thank-you, thanks;
Now I suppose they will tell us—

Oh, look!
look!
but I *know* this picture—
that's real,
something that means something,
that I can interpret for myself

without any arrows and diagrams,
something that I have seen,
and known from a child,
standing on the Seven Holes Bridge at Earith
looking across the washes
to the Isle of Ely
over the drowned fen stretched out sullen and silent
in the last redness of a level sun.
Nine exclamation marks standing in a row—
those are poplars,
(the same old poplars)
desolate at the road's verge
with their feet in the water
and the wind melancholy in their sighing height;
and there, the thin black ribbon,
the crest of the dyke,
nibbled at the edge, you see—
if you keep your eye on it
there will come a little heave in the grey-silver,
and the line will just shorten quietly,
become fragmentary,
break up into dots,
settle down like a sleeper
drawing the blanket smoothly over a hunched shoulder.
There is the causeway
dipping suddenly into oblivion
from off the chequer-work of the patched fields;
and there—delicate parallels
drawn with a mapping-pen on white paper—
the railroad,
the permanent way,
over which trains must go very softly,
feeling forward,
throwing up a bow-wave like a ship—
softly, you see, because
nobody can tell what is happening
to the embankment
hidden, helpless, under the hungry water
that licks it away, greedy and secretive,
like the tongue of a great cat—
(they will be wiser to hold up all the traffic
or there might be a nasty accident).
Here, where road and rail cross,
there must have been a bridge of some sort . . . . . .

Where has it gone?—I can tell you—
I know where it is—
Here, where I put my finger,
five miles down-river, at the bridge below,
baulks and beams and loose stones battering against the piers,
piling under the blocked arch in the swollen eddy and gurge—
I never saw that at home (though it has happened)
but I have seen the ice come down the Great Ouse
packed and swirling, a-jostle, choking the water-gates,
putting the river in a rage . . . . . .
What is all *what*?
Oh, that?
that is a village, of course,
water-logged over the eaves by the look of it,
twenty foot deep, that means,
or possibly thirty . . . . . .
no, no—it will drain off in a few days,
leaving a curious and characteristic smell,
and mud,
extraordinarily fine and clinging, you'd be surprised . . . . . .
No, I shouldn't think it would do much good
to the insides of dynamos
and machines and things . . . . . .
The land? that's different,
it won't hurt the land
unless, of course, the place is swampy by nature
and the condition becomes permanent,
in which case
they will have the job of reclaiming it all over again—
but injury to the land
was not, one supposes, a primary objective . . . . . .

Well, I must say,
those are wonderful pictures,
I am delighted to have seen them—
let me have the paper back when you have finished with it,
I want to look again,
and go on looking,
because I recognize this,
because I know what it means, and understand it,
because I can see exactly what we have done—
we have blown up the dams,
burst the sluices,
unshackled the waters.

THE BICENTENARY OF SIR JOSEPH BANKS

By The Bishop of Truro

IF it had not been for the war more would have been heard of the bicentenary of Sir Joseph Banks, one of the most notable public figures of the eighteenth century. He introduced hundreds of plants to Kew, was President of the Royal Society longer than any other man, and by Australian writers he has been affectionately called "the Father of Australia."

Banks was born on February 13, 1743, sent to Harrow at nine and transferred to Eton at thirteen. He was fond of the open air, and had no taste for the rigorous study of the classics which was then in vogue. One fine summer evening after he had been about a year at Eton he lingered bathing in the Thames and found that all the other boys had gone. He walked back leisurely along a lane the sides of which were covered with flowers, and was so struck with their beauty that he determined to take up botany. Next holidays, to his great delight, he found a tattered copy of Gerard's *Herball* at home. This gave not only descriptions but engravings of the plants he had met with.

In December, 1760, Banks was entered as a gentleman commoner at Christchurch, Oxford. As there were no lectures given in the University on botany, he went by stage-coach to Cambridge and brought back a botanist of the name of Israel Lyons, who was also something of an astronomer. In 1764, he came of age and found himself in possession of the family estate, his father having died three years previously. In May, 1766, he was elected Fellow of the Royal Society, his qualification being his attainments in Natural History. That summer he went on a plant-collecting expedition to Newfoundland, and one of the plants he discovered was the charming little Kalmia (*Kalmia glauca*), still not as well-known in this country as it should be, for it is quite hardy.

Shortly after this Banks met Dr. Daniel Solander, then one of the assistant librarians at the British Museum, and formerly a pupil of the great Swedish botanist Linnaeus. In 1768 he obtained permission to accompany Captain Cook's expedition in the *Endeavour*, and to take with him (at his own expense) Dr. Solander, two draughtsmen and two attendants.

His journal is entertaining reading. After touching at Terra del Fuego, the ship proceeded to Tahiti, where a temporary fort was built ashore, and the transit of Venus successfully observed on June 3, 1769, although the natives at one point stole the quadrant and it fell to Banks to recover it. The next six months the *Endeavour* spent in exploring the coast of New Zealand. Here Banks made a number of discoveries, including, for example, *Sophora tetraptera*, with its pendulous golden yellow flowers, attractive foliage, and remarkable necklace-like pods—a specimen from the Cambridge Botanic

Garden was, appropriately enough, given the Award of Merit by the Royal Horticultural Society this year (1943); and *Clianthus puniceus*, in the *Botanical Magazine* (3584) given the curious name of Crimson Glory-Pea, now commonly called Lobster-Claw, from the shape of its crimson flowers. Noteworthy also are Banks's descriptions of *Metrosideros robusta*, a tree with "a very conspicuous scarlet flower," glorious in the Isles of Scilly in June-July; *Podocarpus dacrydioides*, the New Zealand white pine, and *Phormium tenax*, the New Zealand flax, whose leaves yield one of the finest fibres known.

Leaving New Zealand, the *Endeavour* came to anchor on April 28, 1770, in an inlet in what proved to be the great continent of Australia—an inlet to which the name of Botany Bay was given because of the number of new plants it yielded to Banks and his collectors. The genus *Banksia* may be mentioned as an example of these discoveries. *Banksia ericaefolia* is the first example described in the *Botanical Magazine* (1804, t. 738). This is a handsome shrub closely allied to *Protea*. The name was given later in honour, of course, of Banks himself.

In sailing on from Botany Bay the ship ran on a coral reef and sprang a dangerous leak. Happily the crew managed to beach her on the shore of what was afterwards called the Endeavour River. Here it was that on June 25, 1770, Banks first saw a kangaroo, and a few days later he described the chase of two: "We walked many miles over the flats and saw four of the animals, two of which my greyhound fairly chased. But they beat him owing to the length and thickness of the grass, which prevented him from running, while they at every bound leaped over the tops of it. We observed, much to our surprise, that instead of going upon all fours, this animal went only upon two legs, making vast bounds just as the jerboa does."

At last the *Endeavour* sailed out through the Great Barrier Reef, and, after calling at New Guinea, reached Batavia in October to refit. Here almost all the crew went down with fever, and a number died. Others died on the voyage to the Cape of Good Hope, whence the *Endeavour* sailed for home, touching at St. Helena on the way, where Banks was disgusted at the lack of initiative displayed by the English settlers as compared with that of the Dutch at the Cape. The Lizard was sighted on the morning of June 10, 1771, and Banks landed at Deal at 3 p.m. on the 12th.

This, as Professor E. N. Andrade said in his very interesting broadcast in February, was the great adventure of Banks's life, and at once he found himself famous. He became a close friend of King George III.—"Farmer George"—and was appointed honorary Director of the King's Garden at Kew, which he strove to make "the first botanic garden in Europe." The superintendent of the garden at the time was William Aiton, who compiled the first *Hortus Kewensis* (1789). He was succeeded by his son W. T. Aiton, who brought out an enlarged edition of the *Hortus* in five volumes (1811-1813). In these volumes I have counted between 450 and 500 plants, the introduction of which is attributed to Banks. Among them are such well-known plants as

the following: the handsomest of evergreen privets, *Ligustrum lucidum*; *Cydonia japonica*, one of the best known of hardy shrubs, now sent out in numerous varieties by the nurserymen; the gorgeous Tree Paeony, P. *Moutan*, introduced from China; *Rhododendron Rhodora*, deciduous, hardy and early-flowering, a native of Eastern N. America; and *Magnolia conspicua*, from China, with its striking flower buds, one of the most fragrant of evergreens. I must add the plant of *Hydrangea hortensis* which had already begun to flower in the Custom House, and Banks exhibited it in his house, 32, Soho Square, where botanists puzzled over its green petals. It was afterwards removed to Kew, and became the parent of a numerous progeny spread all over Europe.

It was at the instigation of Banks that Kew began to send plant-collectors abroad, the first of them being Francis Masson who went to the Cape of Good Hope (1772). Of the other botanists who collected for Banks it must suffice here to mention two: Archibald Menzies, surgeon and botanist to Captain Vancouver's expedition to the North West coast of America, and Allan Cunningham, who travelled first in South America, and then very extensively, and with rich results, in Australia.

In 1778 Banks was elected President of the Royal Society, and continued in that office for forty-two years, till his death. As President he spared no pains to further the work of the Society and to advance its prestige. He personally leaned rather to studies connected with natural history than the more strictly mathematical, and he modestly called himself a botanizer rather than a botanist; But he was regarded as the principal patron of science in England, and was consulted on all sorts of subjects. He was a great letter-writer, and in the possession of the Natural History Museum at South Kensington there are twenty-one M.S. volumes of Banksian correspondence.

In 1781 Banks was created a baronet, and in 1795 he was invested with the Order of the Bath, the insignia of which he constantly wore on public occasions. He was the first honorary member of the Linnean Society (1788), one of the founders of the Royal Institution (1799), and one of the persons named in the Charter of the Horticultural Society in 1809. The Society established the Banksian Medal shortly after his death.

Banks was "a great European,"* and fully recognized the international fellowship of Scientists. In 1802 he was elected a member of the National Institute of France. When collections made by French naturalists were captured by British cruisers Banks made a rule of sending them back intact. He would not, he said, "steal a single botanic idea from those who had gone in peril of their lives to get them." Ten times such parcels were addressed to the Royal Gardens in Paris.† It is not surprising that Napoleon himself testified to Banks's popularity in France.

"In Australian history," writes the recent biographer of Admiral Arthur Phillip, "Cook the discoverer will ever stand first, with Banks second."‡

* J. D. G. Davies in *Nature*. Feb. 13, 1943. pp. 181-183.
† J. H. Maiden, *Sir Joseph Banks, the Father of Australia*. p. 222.
‡ George Mackaness, *Admiral Arthur Phillip* (1738-1814). p. x (1937).

Two capes, a mountain, a peninsula, a group of islands, and a suburb of Sydney bear his name. He corresponded continuously with all the Governors of New South Wales, and as the only man of eminence in England who had personally visited the colony, he became a kind of general adviser on matters connected with it. He was always optimistic as to its future. The following paragraphs from his letters to Governor Hunter may be quoted in illustration—written at a time of grave national anxiety:

> Your colony is already a most valuable appendage to Great Britain, and I flatter myself we shall before long see her Ministers made sensible of its real value. Rest assured in the meantime that no opportunity will be lost by me of impressing them with just ideas of the probable importance to which it is likely before long to attain, and to urge them to pay to it that degree of attention which it clearly deserves at their hands.*
>
> I see the future prospect of empire and dominion which now cannot be disappointed. Who knows but England may revive in New South Wales when it has sunk in Europe?†

Perhaps that gorgeous and striking flower, *Strelitzia Reginae*, which Banks introduced into Kew in 1773, may be taken as a symbol of his own splendid patronage of Natural Science. It was Banks himself who named this plant in honour of Queen Charlotte, and he had coloured engravings made of it which he presented to his particular friends. At all events the flower may be taken as a token of Banks's munificence where scientific interests were concerned. He maintained a lavish hospitality in Revesby Abbey, his country house in Lincolnshire in the summer, in his town house, 32, Soho Square, in the winter, and at Spring Grove at Heston in Middlesex in the Spring.

It was at Spring Grove that the specimen of the Banksian Rose figured in the *Botanical Magazine* (t. 1954, vol. 45, 1818) was grown. "This rose without a thorn," says this polite journal, "has been appropriately named in honour of Lady Banks." In a later number the editor records that Spring Grove had passed to Mr. Pears, "the energetic purveyor of soap."

For more than thirty years of his life, Banks was troubled with gout and latterly he quite lost the use of his limbs. He bore the affliction with fortitude and buoyancy. On June 19, 1820, at the age of seventy-seven, he died, leaving a widow but no children. In his will he expressly desired that his body should be buried in the simplest manner in the church or churchyard of the parish in which he should happen to die, that his dear relatives would spare themselves the affliction of attending the funeral, and that they would not erect any monument to his memory.

This wish was all too literally fulfilled at Heston. I made a pilgrimage to the church on a sunny afternoon in June. The churchyard was bright with flowers, and on the North wall of the church after some search I found the small slab of marble recording his death. He had never spoken or written much about religion, and had avoided religious controversy as carefully as political. But he was content to live and die a member of the Church of England. Two of his greatest friends latterly were William Buckland (afterwards Dean of Westminster and William Conybeare (afterwards Dean of Llandaff), both of them Fellows of the Royal Society. Banks's own sympathies were broad, and he had to a marked degree a reverent and a thankful mind.

* February, 1799.
† March, 1797.

"We are never tired," he writes in his Journal in January, 1769, "of wondering at the infinite variety of creation, and admiring the infinite care with which Providence has multiplied her productions, suiting them no doubt to the various climates for which they were designed."

In a letter dated April 19, 1805, John Leslie, Professor of Mathematics at Edinburgh, who had been attacked for saying a good word for David Hume, Banks wrote: "Surely a man may fulfil his duty to his Creator without assenting unconditionally to every undigested tenet which our half-informed predecessors have left behind as a legacy to their more enlightened posterity. If it has pleased God to permit his creatures to increase in wisdom, He will not condemn them for assenting to new opinions which their reason demonstrates to be just . . ."*

The following extracts from his Journal shows that on his famous voyage Banks made an attempt at a little missionary work himself. The entry refers to Tahiti, and is dated May 14, 1769:

> It being Sunday, Captain Cook proposed that divine service should be celebrated, but before the time most of our Indian friends had gone home to eat. I was resolved, however, that some should be present that they might see our behaviour, and we might if possible explain to them (in some degree at least) the reason of it. I went, therefore, over the river, and brought back Tubourai and Tamio, and having seated them in the tent, placed myself between them. During the whole service they imitated my motions, standing, sitting, or kneeling as they saw me do; and so much understood that we were about something very serious, that they called to the Indians without the fort to be silent. Notwithstanding this they did not, when the service was over, ask any questions, nor would they attend at all to any explanation we attempted to give them. We have not yet seen the least traces of religion among these people, maybe they are entirely without it.

For a variety of reasons I am grateful for this opportunity of calling further attention to the Banks bicentenary this year—and for two in particular. The first is that it is fitting, now that there is a dead-set against private fortunes, to keep in remembrance such an outstanding instance of a private fortune being used in the general interest of the community. And the second is this: Banks represents the attitude of scientific men before the unfortunate post-Darwinian estrangement between science and religion. Happily that estrangement has never been more than partial, and there are many signs that it is now fast abating. The only gainer from its continuance would be obsolete science.†

* Quoted in E. Smith, *The Life of Sir Joseph Banks*. p. 163.
† c.f. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan*. p. 4.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

LAST August an artist died in Dublin who had been from the first outstanding in the group that centred about Yeats, Douglas Hyde and A. E. Miss Sarah Purser was older by at least ten years than any of the rest, and so far as age went might have been Yeats's mother; but we all thought of her as our contemporary; even at ninety-three she had never ceased to be her old self.

A Great Dubliner

John and Lewis Purser, her brothers, were of high rank in the hierarchy of Trinity College, but she was far better known than either; since Mahaffy, there has not been so notable a Dublin character. For a lady born about 1850 there could be no question of a college career; but she found the freest of all universities when she went to study painting in the Latin Quarter. Through all her days France meant more to her than England; but since first I knew her (some sixty years ago) her life was centred in Ireland. She never pretended to belong to a Gaelic-speaking people, but any man who like Douglas Hyde (one of her special friends) could get poetry out of the Gaelic literature had her special welcome.

She knew Yeats since he was in his teens, if not earlier; he was always Willy to her at a time when Christian names were not at all so much in use as now-a-days. His delightful father, the portrait-painter, was often in her studio. Her work there never appealed to me as painting; but the great array of portraits which she has left will preserve a vivid interpretation of many personalities, though never inspired by any sensuous charm. Yet she brought from France a lively interest in dress; and among her chosen friends was Maud Gonne, than whom none of us ever saw anyone more beautiful.

Never at any time the needy artist, Sarah Purser was in the end a rich woman; but she paraded an almost niggardly economy—keeping secret her lapses into a very large generosity. I knew her best when she had her studio in Harcourt Terrace near the canal; but for these last many years Mespil House, a beautiful old Georgian mansion, was her home; and every month she held an afternoon gathering there. August's was fixed, I am told, for the day which saw her funeral; the end had come with merciful swiftness—a stroke and then a week's ebbing away. Irish folk are great at funerals, and they had good right to go to hers. I think that even the most orthodox Gaels would have permitted themselves to be proud of her. She had, in the course of two generations, become a centre about which friendships of all ages gathered. My daughter, fifty years her junior, wrote to me that Dublin would feel a lonesome place without her.

* * * * *

Messrs. Hachette have published (at the price of 3s. 6d.) what may or may not be called a book, for it has only 38 pages between paper covers, and every page is taken up with photographs on which, or among which, are inset a few lines of commentary. Book or not, *Paris d'Hier et d'Aujourd'hui* is a thing of heart-breaking beauty. London had always a far stronger hold on my affections than England (it is so with many Irishmen); but France meant, and still means, to me much more than Paris. Yet nothing that I have seen or read did so much as this publication to make me realize why people talked of the "*Ville Lumière*"—or what the loss is when that light is blacked out. M. André Sidobre's name is unfamiliar to me; but he can do conjuring tricks with sentences of half-a-dozen lines—sometimes of scarcely so many words. As to the photographs, they are selected from the work of several different studios and I should hardly know how to choose among them: one has a glorious vision of Notre Dame by night; yet there is almost as much of Paris in the picture which shows the Quai-aux-Fleurs and two robust peasant women (none the less Parisian for that) in charge of their tulips.

La Ville Lumiere

There is another group of pictures that do not concern themselves with beauty; Lloyds' Bank with the *emblème crochu* over its door and the Place de la Concorde having no traffic but an old growler and two or three cyclists. Still, the last page shows what can be shown only by anticipation—a *Quatorze Juillet*, with the old colours over men marching in the morning, and over festive tables outside a café at night. In the name of Europe's civilization, so let it be!

* * * * *

Mrs. Whitney gave us a notable study of Elizabeth Fry: now she matches that portrait of a Quakeress with one of *John Woolman, Quaker*. The book, published by Harrap, costs a guinea but the purchaser gets a deal for his money: illustration is lavish and admirable, specially perhaps the chapter headings, which are the work of Mrs. Whitney's husband, art master at a Pennsylvania school. But above all it is a fully detailed picture of Quakers in New Jersey just at the period when "the English" over there began to think of themselves as "Americans". However the question of separation did not concern John Woolman; born in 1720 he died in 1772. Yet, like many another modest pacifist, he was a fosterer of revolt. Nothing could have induced him to accept the "duty of military service": and any tax raised to pay for war would have been passively resisted, wherever his influence reached. Being one of those who feel it urgent on them to alter whatever they think morally amiss, he was through his life a preacher and teacher both by speech and writing; but by a singular grace of nature this disposition went with most unusual tact. He could do without offence things that might have been infuriating. Mrs. Whitney is to be congratulated on having made us feel that one who might have been regarded as a crank was in truth not only a great Christian but a most lovable gentleman. He practised austerities for himself but with the purpose of extending for others the enjoyment of what he held to be necessary and decent comfort; he valued life's pleasures but would not take them from a contaminated source. It shocked him specially that Friends of his own community should own and buy and sell slaves. Everywhere he made his protest by word and deed against hardheartedness. In the last adventure of his life, when he went to England to make contact with the Quaker com-

A Gentle Revolutionary

munity there who could further his purposes, he refused to travel by stage coach and walked his journeys, because he had realized that the horses were overdriven, and that the postillion boys were almost perishing from cold and wet. In his desire not to use the products of slavery he insisted on dressing in clothes made almost on his own farm; and when he first entered a Council of the London Friends, with half the greatest bankers of the city there in their most orthodox attire, the first impulse was to refuse him a hearing. Yet within half an hour his presence and his speech had won him no ordinary welcome. This eccentric austerity was only for himself; the wife and daughter whom he adored wore what clothes they liked—and he liked to see them beautified.

He had the courage of a perfectly brave man who refuses to kill but will take extreme risks; as was shown when he journeyed into Indian territory in the hope to get better relations, even when he knew that a scalping raid was imminent. He was bred on a farm and had always the countryman's attitude; but he left the farming life to be apprenticed to a tailor; this led to his keeping shop where his business ability threatened to make him so rich that he feared that temptation and went back to work with the needle cross-legged. Then came marriage and settlement on a little farm—from which at intervals he went out in the name of his own Quaker community to visit others —journeys of many hundred miles. These are fully described from the Journals which he kept, and which have been published; each and all of them full of matter, illustrating this very remarkable man and the transition period that he lived in. Had the book been only concerned with Woolman, a good deal might have been retrenched; but the background is not less significant; and one reader at least found his interest maintained to the last chapter—perhaps the most interesting of all. Earlier in the book, considerable skipping is to be recommended.

* * * * *

Gallant and Gifted

Mr. Bernard Newman has written a charming pamphlet on *The People of Poland* which is issued by the Polish Publications Committee. Great part of its thirty-two pages is given up to illustrations which help out the author's desire to give a vivid picture. Yet on the balance they tend to weaken the impression which he seeks to produce—that Poland is in the main a country of country folk where reaping is still mainly done with the scythe—which of course is possible where the holdings are very small. However it is no harm to see that Poland had fine towns; and it does all the good in the world to be confronted on the first page with four heads which naturally command allegiance. Mr. Racskiewicz, President of the Polish Republic, looks fit to hold his place beside Paderewski, Pilsudski and Sikorski, with whom he appears; and that is much to say of any man.

Poland has bitter need of all we can give; but at least it seems to me that the more we know of the Poles the more willing givers we shall be; Mr. Newman does a service to Europe in spreading the appeal to cordial sympathy which the qualities of this gallant and gifted people command. But at the same time, by setting out the consequences which follow from Poland's geographical position, from the mixture of races on her soil, and above all from her unhappy history, he prepares us for difficulties after victory—difficulties which Poland will help to create. A long diet of grievances is not good for any nation's disposition (we know that in Ireland) and if the Poles

acted with perfect reasonableness, they would be more or less than human. Even apart from the feelings which have been created by German brutalities and bestialities, such as Mr. Newman very briefly mentions, there are problems to face for which it is not easy to see a solution. He talks almost lightheartedly about transfers of population from one side of the border to the other; but such changes can scarcely be effected except where there is a strong central authority to give the order and a population used to obedience. Now Poland is the country which once had a parliament so constituted that any single member could put a veto on any proposal of which he disapproved. However it is time to bid the devil good-morrow when you meet him; and the first thing is to get Poland back freedom for the Poles. Their volunteers in our Air Force and other fields of action are doing more than their part.

* * * * *

Librarian's Choice

The National Book Council sends us their publication *An English Library* which they describe as "an annotated Guide to 1300 Classics" (to be had for two shillings). It is compiled by Mr. Seymour Smith and certainly there is a deal of information in this list which fills 73 pages, followed by no fewer than 13 more of index. The grouping is well done, and to each group Mr. Seymour Smith prefaces a page or two of pleasant comment; here and there also he allows himself a short appreciation of some individual author—as, for example, of that humour-some critic, George Saintsbury. In short the book is so well done that it is amazing to find any author omitted who has a right to be there. (All living authors are on principle excluded.) When I say a right, I imply this test—can his work give the pleasure which any reader has experienced from the universally admitted best? Now, two poets of my generation stand out by the importance and variety of their work—Yeats and Stephen Phillips. I knew both well and Yeats was incomparably the more impressive figure. He has stamped himself on the mind of our time. Phillips was far too much of a bohemian, careless of himself and of others, to acquire or aim at leadership: yet of the two men he gives me more of the pleasure to which I have referred. And he succeeded where Yeats failed, in winning for contemporary poetry a full hearing on the stage. His work was produced at two great London theatres and the actor managers who produced it, Tree and Alexander, were men who knew what dramatic poetry meant. Indeed, his success, was so outstanding that many vulgarly believed it was acquired by vulgar means or qualities; and now it has vulgarly gone out of fashion. In part Phillips was to blame, he was less than what an artist should be and did not escape what he has described in "A Poet's Prayer"—the dangers which attend on inspiration. They do not come in the moments when possession operates.

> Not then I need Thee; for delight is wise;
> I err not in the freedom of the skies . . . .
> But when Thy power is spent, comes in the test,
> To front the l[illegible] that lingers after zest . . . .
> Uphold me in that hour with Thy left hand,
> And help me, when I cease to soar, to stand . . . .
> Else shall Thy dreadful gift but people hell
> And men not measure from what height I fell.

Even these detached couplets will suggest what he utters fully in some fifty ilnes. They will also justify my saying that by the omission of his name, Mr. Seymour Smith and the National Book Council have gravely discredited their authority.

THE MAKING OF THE INDIAN PRINCES, by Edward Thompson. *Oxford University Press.* 20*s.*

INDIAN CRISIS, by John S. Hoyland. *George Allen & Unwin.* 6*s.*

The inclusion of Princely India in an All-India constitution is one of the major issues in Indian politics to-day. Those interested in the question will welcome Dr. Thompson's book, representing as it does a careful and well-documented study of the origin of the Indian States, at least of the larger States.

The Indian Congress proclaims that the Princes are the creation of British imperialism, now utilized as a barrier to Indian independence. Dr. Thompson does not support the theory thus baldly stated, but he inclines to the view that the Princes owe their status to British policy initiated at the beginning of the nineteenth century and subsequently developed. What he tries to show is that the Maratha war-lords who ultimately settled down as rulers of Baroda, Gwalior, Indore, for example, were originally feudatories of the Mughal empire at Delhi, and not sovereign rulers; the British after humbling them on the battlefield conferred on them the status of semi-sovereignty under the suzerainty of the British Crown.

The theory is hardly supported by the facts. The Marathas, a hardy peasant nation in the central peninsula, under able leadership, rose against Mughal oppression at the end of the seventeenth century. A powerful confederacy was evolved which many Hindus to-day regard as an empire; any association it had with the decrepit empire of Delhi was of a shadowy description. The emperor himself was a pensioner of the Maratha Sindhia; the forcible levy by the Peshwa, head of the confederacy of one fourth of the revenue of Hyderabad, in theory a province of Delhi, hardly suggests the relation of subject and suzerain.

Whatever view we may take of the evolution of Princely India the fact remains that there is a powerful group of Princes in India to-day loyal to the British Crown and by treaty entitled to British military protection. Dr. Thompson evades the thorny question of absorbing them into a federation of a self-governing India. He does not entirely condemn the 1818 settlement with the Marathas. Indeed he is generous with his praise of the brilliant galaxy of Englishmen, Metcalfe, Malcolm, Elphinstone, Munro, who carried it out. All might have been well, had their successors lived up to the ideals underlying the system they took over, of fitting Indians for self-government. Far from doing so they thought their duty ended with efficient administration; they showed no sympathy with Indian aspirations. In fact, in Dr. Thompson's phrase, "no alien rule was ever more uniformly consistent with the rulers' own sense of justice; but no alien rule, set over a people far advanced in civilization, ever so reluctantly, and by such maddeningly calculated instalments, relinquished its absolute authority." That sums up Dr. Thompson's attitude towards British rule in India.

Mr. Hoyland attempts to solve the problem Dr. Thompson has avoided. His Majesty's Government should, he thinks, ignore the treaties with the Princes and insist on their introducing democratic institutions which would fit them to play their part in a self governing India. He would not sweep them aside, as would Pandit Nehru and other Hindu extremists. He is candid enough to admit that there is much that is worth preserving in the States as the true India and in the State tradition of art culture, administration and statesmanship.

Mr. Hoyland paints on a broader canvas than Dr. Thompson. His book generally is an unbalanced indictment of British rule, with a strong Hindu bias. British policy is responsible, he tells us, for the poverty of India; British power rests on an alliance with grasping landlords, money-lenders and grain-dealers, who despoil the peasantry. Yet he would hand over India to Congress under Gandhi's leadership, oblivious of the fact that it is these very people who finance Congress and hold it in the hollow of their hand.

It is not correct that the Muslim Kingdoms of the Deccan were feudatories of the Mughals; they were independent till conquered by Aurangzeb. Does Mr. Hoyland really believe that Gandhi's fast in 1932, which ended in depriving the Outcasts of their separate electorates, was really for their benefit? The Outcasts should know better than he, and they implore Britain not to leave them to the tender mercies of the caste Hindu and at least to restore the privilege they lost.

Pro-Congress as he is, Mr. Hoyland still has to admit that there is no chance of social justice being done in India on a scale adequate to deal with Indian poverty until people as a whole cease to believe in the doctrine of Return. Yet he would put in power the people who profit most by that article of faith. Congress might almost exclaim, 'save us from our friends!'

WILLIAM P. BARTON.

METTERNICH, by Algernon Cecil. *Eyre & Spottiswoode.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

One of the most prominent historians of modern England, H. A. L. Fisher, said of this work when it was first published ten years ago: "a book finely conceived and finely executed." At the same time an apparently very critically minded reviewer described it "as being in the nature of a challenge." These two judgments fit excellently together. As the author himself states in that no less finely conceived and finely executed introduction which he has added to the last edition just published, his book might "be termed a challenge" because its historical outlook is in general contradiction to the views and valuations, moral and political, in contemporary use; or because the inescapable background of the Habsburg Empire is unacceptable to modern sentiment; or finally, because the work and personality of Metternich, are paradoxically praised.

"Paradoxically" is the very word which expresses the courage of the author in drawing quite another picture of Metternich and that Empire the policy of which he directed for so long a period, than the one in general use in this country. The Liberalism of the nineteenth century together with the Nationalism born in the storms of the French Revolution put Metternich up as the "policeman of Europe" and his sovereign, Emperor Francis I. of Austria as the model type of an obstinate reactionary. But even Mr. A. J. P. Taylor who, in his study *The Habsburg Monarchy 1815-1918*, shows not much sympathy for the subject of his researches has to admit that, "those who have seen in contemporary Europe the workings of a really repressive régime will look in vain in the Austria of Francis (II) for the concentration camp and the executioner, for the organized brutality and the propaganda of barbarism." The most critical reproaches were directed against his policy in regard to the nationalist movements that in Italy as in Germany were striving to throw off the Old Order. The Liberalism of the nineteenth century saw in Nationalism the herald of the New Order.

Mazzini was then its prophet as Masaryk was a century later. Mr. Cecil refuses to join in the chorus exalting the heroic achievements of Nationalism. He quotes another Englishman:

> Nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the state. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind.

It was no less a man than Acton who wrote these words which, read to-day, have a prophetic vision.

Metternich, the man of the every-day practice of politics, saw still sharper than the more idealistic historian. He had no illusions about the fate the Europe of his century was heading for. The few lines he wrote to Nesselrode in 1830 have become historic:

> . . . the old Europe has come to the beginning of the end. Resolved to perish with it, I shall know how to do my duty . . . From another point of view the new Europe is not yet begun; between the end and the beginning there lies chaos.

He did his duty—to the last. He did it not as a reactionary, not as the mere champion of the *Ancien Régime*. He saw farther. As Mr. Cecil proves in his absolutely unbiased manner (against which the most fervent allegations heaped upon Metternich by the champions of Liberalism and Nationalism, cannot prevail) he fought against revolution as a man who believed in evolution. He fought against Nationalism, as a true European. Not for nothing did he tell Wellington after 1815: "For a long while Europe has had for me the value of a country." He worked as the Premier of Europe. As long as he could do this, he held a Europe, seething with national unrest from one end to the other, in relative peace and order. When, to quote Mr. Cecil, "after having for fifty years dodged the storm he was caught in a cloud-burst," he fell; Europe had not long to wait for Napoleon III. and for Bismarck.

Mr. Cecil is right when he prophesies at the end of his introduction that England cannot reasonably hope to save the Europe of to-day, unless Europe itself, in exchange for some Wellington still to be found, should give her a Metternich.

ERNST KLEIN.

LORD MILNER AND SOUTH AFRICA, by E. A. Walker. *Oxford University Press.* 2*s.*

DOWNING STREET AND THE COLONIES. A report submitted to the Fabian Colonial Bureau. *Allen & Unwin.* 2*s.*

WEALTH FOR WELFARE, by H. V. Foster and E. V. Bacon. *Macmillan.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

These three books roughly represent three important stages in British thinking about the Empire. Professor Walker's clear and succinct monograph on Lord Milner is a reminder of the short life of the Union of South Africa and of how closely it links us to the nineteenth century days of Empire. It represents the spacious "Liberal Empire" days. The Fabian booklet is a competent examination of the machinery of the Colonial Empire dealing with the Colonial Office, the Colonial Services and the relationship of Parliament to the Colonies. It represents the "Voluntary Movement" period in Empire thinking. Out of the Voluntary Movement period including, of course, the Missionary Societies, has come an enormous amount of good for Colonial peoples generally. Governments have been persuaded and bullied into doing much they would never have done without external pressure. In the Fabian booklet for instance there

are no less than thirty-five excellent recommendations for improving the Colonial Office and the Colonial Services. The most important are those which deal with "opening the doors to Colonial peoples" in the Government of their own territories.

The third book represents the new "planning period" in Empire thinking. The authors have realized one leading weakness in the British genius for government. We have thought that as long as the various Colonial territories were slowly stumbling towards some kind of self-government with all the outward show of voting and parliaments we were fulfilling our trusteeship. Our political genius must now be given a new twist. We must realize that colonies are places to live in; where families are brought up and money earned. In other words we have to think of them as "modern states" or, as many of them really are, "depressed areas." The authors of *Wealth for Welfare* do not believe that the various Colonial Governments can manage this economic renaissance for themselves however magnificently backed by money from Whitehall. Their master-key to the situation is an Imperial Development Authority which would take "depressed areas" in the Colonies, and also in Britain, and by using all modern resources in information, economic technique and marketing turn them into areas fruitful for man's life. Only such an Authority will be able to plan for long range schemes and see them through with enthusiasm and energy. The book takes certain Colonial areas as demonstration areas and describes the Authority at work, including schemes in the Nile region, the Euphrates-Tigris region and large areas of Africa. The home country example is the Highlands of Scotland.

Whether the next great step in Empire life is the way the authors of *Wealth for Welfare* see, or whether it lies in a renaissance of the general as well as economic life in the Colonies is a matter for great debate. The writers have done a useful service in offering this contribution. Their careful statements and human judgments provide an informative background, and they are not daunted by past failures in the Colonial field. They have made this point clear too—that the "good life" of culture and education in the Colonies does depend on a well ordered economic life. There must be subsistence first, then some exports and thirdly those "attractive" secondary industries (the "arts and crafts") which add interest and variety to local life.

This valuable book comes at a time when fresh ways in life and government are needed and in no

1843-1943

FROM their original premises in High Holborn (where Bradley Thomas Batsford first established himself on completing his apprenticeship in 1843) the firm of Batsford have brought to their headquarters in North Audley Street the great tradition of the English bookseller-publisher, selling only the books they believe in and publishing only such volumes as they are proud should bear their imprint.

B. T. BATSFORD LTD
15 North Audley Street
London, W.1

places more than the Colonies. It draws the British reader's attention to a "great estate" which needs organization and cultivation as much as any farm. And for the time being a great responsibility still rests upon the British people to see that it gets them.

CECIL NORTHCOTT.

CHRISTIANITY IN THE MARKET PLACE, by Michael de la Bedoyere. *Dakers.* 6*s.*

THE REVELATION OF THE WORD, by H. G. England. *Murray.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION: A statement by Nuffield College Social Reconstruction Survey. *Oxford University Press.* 6*d.*

No one could tackle a more worn theme than Mr. de la Bedoyere, but he has done what one would have thought to be impossible: he has put that freshness into it which makes a reader want to go to his knees, murmuring *Mea Culpa*: *Mea Maxima Culpa.* His theme is simply the separation between religion and life, and the degree to which this disaster is the fault of the several churches. Nothing could be staler, but here it is all made fresh and vivid. The laity are of course the key to unlock the gate of this dungeon of dilemma, and this sentence is perhaps the heart of Mr. de la Bedoyere's book: "The Church's shame in this sphere of simple courage is too often to be found among the laity, whose cowardice is often such that they actually prefer not to be known publicly as Catholics lest their companions think the less of them or dub them 'pious'." He has positive proposals to make: mostly they have been suggested to him by his experience as editor of the *Catholic Herald.* This book ought to be read by all of us, not only by Roman Catholics. It is really fresh and stimulating; and it does not, like so many others of its kind, leave the Vicar and wardens of the parish of Nether Backwash thinking that the issues are so huge and so complex that it really doesn't matter if they do their job well or ill. They (that is, all of us) are shown convincingly that their particular job is crucial to the whole situation, and all turns on how they do it.

Canon England rather loudly claims that he sets forth a "new doctrine, a new and revolutionary interpretation of the Logos." It is largely inspired by the desire to claim for Man a higher status in the scheme of things than many Christian thinkers have been willing to grant. The higher nature of Jesus "was not so restricted to Jesus alone as to make it inconceivable for other human souls to attain to something of the same nature, if not the same degree, after regeneration." This is a claim for a degree of divinity; and in this Canon England is in line with Mr. de la Bedoyere, who also is emphatic in his refusal to regard the world (even the world of 1943) as wholly evil. Any answer to the question, "What is Man?" is now immensely relevant. The Canon's book is so very compacted that it is not easy to read. For any judgment to be fair and scrupulous, it must have much more space to be set out than is here possible. The book emphatically deserves study, but judgment is suspended.

And all these things turn on religious education. The report of a Commission of Nuffield College, signed by names as influential as Sir Richard Livingstone and the Master of Balliol, is a plainly important document. It recommends the ending of the Dual System, but also the thorough and systematic teaching of the Christian Faith in every school, with such safeguards as will ensure that this is done, consistently and faithfully.

ROGER LLOYD.

COUNTY OF LONDON PLAN, 1943, prepared for the London County Council by J. H. Forshaw and Patrick Abercrombie. *Macmillan.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

The Plan is the outcome of a request made to the L.C.C. by Lord Reith when he was Minister of Works and the task of preparing it was entrusted to the Architect's Department of the Council led by Mr. J. H. Forshaw with Professor Abercrombie called in as consultant. Their proposals are presented to the public in this book, and the authors are to be congratulated on an admirable production. The lay reader, with the aid of the many maps, plans and other illustrations which the book contains will certainly be able to master the outlines of what is proposed.

London is conceived as suffering from four major defects—traffic congestion, depressed housing, lack of or maldistribution of open spaces and a general tendency towards indeterminate zoning. A fifth defect might be added—the unregulated sprawl of London as a whole—but this is mainly outside the L.C.C. area.

To deal with the growing volume of traffic of all kinds a revised road plan has been prepared. Traffic is diverted from the residential areas, directed into proper channels and then canalized into carefully selected routes to segregate local from fast long-distance traffic.

The drabness of many of the housing areas in London, particularly in the East End, is diagnosed as being due not so much to high density but to the absence of any grouping around local community centres. London consists of a collection of communities fused together and although their boundaries may have been lost their centres are often clearly marked. "It should be one of the first objectives of the planner to disengage these communities." Each community is then replanned from the basis of neighbourhood units of 6,000—10,000 people. There are some attractive drawings of schemes for the reconstruction of definite areas on these lines in the East End.

In spite of large areas like Hyde Park and Regent's Park, the amount of existing open space averages at only two acres per 1,000 persons and moreover it is very unevenly distributed. A co-ordinated plan is suggested to give better overall distribution and to bring the total area up to a reasonable figure of 4 acres per 1,000. There is systematic provision for all age groups, for strenuous exercise and retired leisure. A considerable amount of the new open space can be secured at once through bomb damage.

The fourth of these major defects is the haphazard mixing up of industry and housing, more particularly in the East End. The main proposals here are the regrouping of the larger industries, especially those which occupy great areas of river frontage but have no direct connection with or dependence on the river, and the formation of small estates of tenant factories to take the multiplicity of workshops now scattered about residential areas.

The L.C.C. Plan shows every respect for London as it is and at the same time reconstructs in a bold and imaginative way. Few will quarrel with this method of approach, but the Plan as it is now presented suffers from two obvious defects, neither of which is the fault of the authors. Firstly the area of the City of London has been omitted

from the scheme—the City Corporation is preparing its own plan. Secondly the L.C.C. area covers only a fraction of the total built-up area of Greater London. Professor Abercrombie however, is preparing a plan for the London Region and when this is published it will be possible to realize his aims for the London Region as a whole and his recommendations on the fifth major defect—the London Sprawl.

The authors state in their introduction that they conceived their instructions "in the widest terms, assuming that new legislation and financial assistance would be forthcoming." Persuasive planning on this great scale can only be successful if there is a Central Planning Authority with powers to put into effect the proposals of its advisers. This Plan is in no sense final or official and now goes to the Minister of Town and Country Planning and to the various Local Bodies concerned. It rests with the Government to take advantage of the war-time pause in the development of London and to bestow on the Ministry the necessary powers to implement the Plan in full.

ARTHUR M. FOYLE.

ODDITIES OF NATURAL HISTORY, by Eric Parker. *Seeley Service*. 12*s*. 6*d*.

Mr. Eric Parker, a former editor of the *Field*, has extracted from notes and letters published in that periodical some very odd incidents of natural history, of which the oddest (though authenticated only at second-hand) is an account of a fox seen collecting sheep's wool from hedges and then backing into a pond with a bunch of wool in his mouth, until all but the tip of his nose was immersed; staying under for half-a-minute, he then dropped the wool and came out. On subsequent examination the bunch of wool was found to be a seething mass of fleas! A characteristically astute act (and one corroborated by Swiss keepers) of an animal as intelligent as the fox who, when hunting for her cubs, ties up her catches of mice or small rabbits in neat parcels with dead grass or their own intestines!

There was much good material of this kind for a book in eighty or ninety years of notes and letters in the *Field* and, oddities apart, Mr. Parker has unearthed some curious phenomena worthy of profound reflection by any student of animal behaviour. With the advantages of a considerable first-hand knowledge of natural history to guide him in selection, and many years of experience as editor and author, he has been able to put his material together skilfully and readably, in some 200 pages on a variety of British animals from adders to wrynecks (there are eight adequate photographs by Phyllis Kelway). As his material is arranged in a simple alphabetical order of animals, this reader, at any rate, found it possible to read straight through the book with interest and pleasure, though the author's intention was perhaps that the reader should dip into the book at whatever beast, bird, reptile or insect he might have in mind—with two clear indexes to help him. Moreover, in reading, I found an unexpected sense of relaxation stealing over my mind, as I perused one after another of these notes from scores of country houses all over the British Isles, recording the curious experiences with wild life of those, from gamekeepers to anglers, who have been abroad in quiet places at all hours of the day and night.

A point that occurred to me again and again in this book was that some of the oddest incidents were the kind that tend to get left out of more scientific works, although—or perhaps *because*—they raise awkward questions as to the upper limits of animal intelligence. There is, for instance, one remarkable account of a hen blackbird apparently deliberately attempting by voice and action to draw the attention first of a dog and then of a man to her mate caught by his leg in a tree-crack. Of course it is the most difficult thing in the world, when studying the mentality of wild animals, and especially birds, to exclude all personal and humanistic wishful-thinking, and it is often possible to mistake for a rational act what is merely a complex nervous reaction: but I must confess that this act of a blackbird and one or two other incidents recorded herein are difficult to account for in any other terms but that of rational intelligence.

It is striking how many unsolved or unsatisfactorily solved problems are presented by English natural history, despite the mass of detailed watching (mammals excepted) that has been done of late years—do adders swallow their young in moments of danger, for instance? Where do frogs hibernate during the winter? Do goldcrests migrate across the North Sea on the backs of bigger birds? Do hedgehogs milk cows? What is the maximum length of a mole-run? Why do rooks desert their rookeries? How many queens normally exist in a wasp's nest? You may think that all these questions have long been satisfactorily answered or banished to the realm of folk-lore; but reading these *Oddities* it is evident that this is far from being the case and that some very awkward evidence confronts those who believe, for instance, hedgehogs sucking cows or adders swallowing their young to be fables; and if you read this book for yourself you will be both fascinated and astonished at how little we really know of the intimate lives of the animals of the homely countryside—yet there are those who would have us believe that there is no more work to be done by a field naturalist in these Islands!

RICHARD PERRY.

A WELL FULL OF LEAVES, by Elizabeth Myers. *Chapman & Hall*. 8*s*. 6*d*.

ALVINA FOSTER, by Josephine Bell. *Longmans*. 8*s*. 6*d*.

Both these stories start in the summer of 1920 and each is concerned with the doings of a miserably poor family. The four parents are either materially or mentally feckless: at Mrs. Foster's "beds were never made until their owners wanted to sleep in them," and of Mrs. Valley it is said: "With the grimmest virtue our mother used to say that she had never read a book in her life." Mr. Foster, a stoker in a river tug, dulled by the work probably and bewildered by an ailing wife, suffers from too little imagination, while Mr. Valley, who possibly has too much, is a part-time barman married to a cold-hearted termagent and devoted to betting and drink. All of them share a vast ignorance of the physical, mental and spiritual needs of a child. The Fosters' whereabouts are disclosed in the first sentence — Deptford Creek, which "opens into the Thames on the south bank a little above Greenwich"; but the Valleys are discovered much later on living in a big town skirting Cheshire. The Foster children speak unashamed Cockney, each harsh syllable falling relentlessly on the reader's shrinking ear. The Valleys just as relentlessly use a language that is full of colour and gusto, often lyrical, with rounded, flowing sentences, in an accent which, though never admitted or even hinted, must surely be Irish.

In certain obvious ways therefore

the Foster children are much more true than the Valleys to the life that springs from such a background as theirs. The picture of Alvina however soon becomes blurred and perhaps the initial difficulty of believing in her rheumatism and what it does to her body makes it hard to accept her grown up character and career. The people who then gather about her fare no better. Her sister Nelly is much more certain as a milliner in the local hat shop, the atmosphere of which is exceedingly well conveyed. This is really Nelly's book —a tribute to her self-sacrificing devotion to the family, her pitiful strivings to have things "nice", and the bitterness and futility of her estrangement from Fred.

Miss Bell, as an established writer, will forgive the observation that *A Well full of Leaves* is the more important of these books. Hailed on the dust-cover as a near genius, a proceeding which arouses prejudice, Miss Myers makes her bow as a novelist. The story is told by Laura "who only thinks of being alive" and who leaves the business of being somebody to her brothers and sister. The slums have so well equipped them that they become "an historian of the first rank," a world-famous actor and a countess respectively. It says much for the magic of Miss Myers that the thirteen-year old Laura's recipe for mitigating trouble fits quite credibly into the scheme of the book:

> You've got to grow up to become as a child again. You've got to unlearn by learning: you've got to imagine, not to know.

So does this philosophy in action:

> I began to pick up handfuls of a mysterious deposit of silver sand at the bole of a tree, letting the glittering stuff speed through my fingers, and trying in the touch and the look of it to forget what I had seen—and forgetting in that heavenly diffused sensation that comes when you allow yourself to pour into the element you are contemplating . . . . these things were ever so many little *admittances* to a place where sorrow and anger melted right away.

There may well be one jewel on the rubbish heap but Laura endows all the children with the same godlike powers of escape—in imagination and in deed. The result is that as people she obliterates them—they are so many megaphones through which she blares the secret of her success with life. The fact is that Miss Myers is at the mercy of her own powers of description (everything reminds her of something else) and of her own intoxication with words. As perhaps is to be expected in a first novel so full of riches, they spill over. Unfortunately, it is the reader who gets the indigestion which follows overindulgence.

When, near the end of the book, Laura falls a victim to disease the clue to her personality stands clearly revealed. It is a commonplace that tuberculous people are prone to a beautiful and excited optimism, their perceptions are heightened and the tendency is to spend their resources extravagantly. The feverish light that plays over this book is typical of their moods and Miss Myers has caught and held the glow very cleverly. If she learns to discriminate not between good and bad but between better and best, her next book should be a triumph.

GEA MORRIS.

Tory Democracy's Better Britain

By W. S. Shepherd

Press and public acclaim this contribution to Post-War Policy. Brilliantly interweaves tradition and sweeping progress. Stimulating, provocative, yet practical. Booksellers or post free 1/-, PATRIA PRESS Ltd., 168, Regent Street, W.1.

ADVERTISEMENT AND BUSINESS OFFICES: 13 Buckingham Street, LONDON, W.C.2
PUBLISHED FOR THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW LTD., BY HORACE MARSHALL & SON, LTD., Publishing Department, Temple House, Tallis Street, E.C.4
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GEERINGS OF ASHFORD, LTD., 80, HIGH STREET, ASHFORD, KENT
PUBLISHED IN ENGLAND

THE FORTNIGHTLY

NOVEMBER, 1943

LIBRARY
2 FEB 1944
MADRAS LEGISLATURE

THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY

BY JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

WE really think, said Goethe, only when we cannot think out what we are thinking. It is a profound dictum, and a consoling one. We need its consolation, when we try to make sense of what is happening in the world to-day.

The human mind, or at least the active part of it, has become accustomed in the last hundred years to the vast vistas of prehistory. In that perspective we can "place" and identify the tremendous event in which we are involved. It is nothing less than the process of adjustment of the human race to an increase of its productive powers which has no precedent in history. The only precedent with which the advent of power-production can be compared is the invention of agriculture itself, whereby man was enabled to forsake an animal and nomadic existence and settle to the slow foundation of a human society. But that precedent obscures as much as it illuminates. For the invention of agriculture took thousands of years to communicate itself through the world. A whole long sequence of distinct and isolated civilizations, each following its own pattern of growth and dissolution, was built upon it. But the invention of power-production brought with it, as part of its own essence, the unification of the world. Communication is inherent in power-production.

The consequence is that the tempo of history has been revolutionized. It has passed into an entirely new and unfamiliar dimension of speed. The wheels of the chariot of human progress began to quicken, perceptibly, at the time of the Reformation. Ever since then they have been accelerating. With every decade of the last hundred years their speed has at least doubled. Now the sheer pace is sickening.

But, alas, though we must regard the process as one of adjustment of the human race to the revolutionary change in the very basis of its living caused by power-production, we cannot comfortably conclude that the new speed of historical change is simply a speed of adjustment. Adjustment is much too reassuring a word to be used in this context, unless with the clear understanding that it is used in a cold, scientific and inhuman sense. The adjustment of the human race to power-production is a process that may well be

experienced, in millions of human lives, as sheer catastrophe. When some few of the race of fishes, frenziedly escaping from imminent disaster, scrabbled their way to continued life on the slimy bank of some primeval sea, and so forced their fins to become legs, the race of fishes had adjusted itself to the new conditions of living; but millions of fishes were left behind to die. The adjustment of the human race may be as costly as that.

Nevertheless the adjustment of the human race to power-production is, probably, in the long run inevitable. A race of men, a new human society, will (I think) undoubtedly arise which will be capable of using power-production to the full for purposes other than mutual devastation. Nor do I think this colossal change in the actual (as distinct from the theoretical) morality of men belongs to the dim and distant future. It will happen relatively soon: quite possibly before the end of the 20th century. That is, measured by mere years, but a moment in the history of man: but the possibilities of human catastrophe, of massive suffering, are incalculable. It is conceivable that only a remnant of mankind will be saved to pass into the new world.

The fact that the present world-war is an integral part of this process of adjustment should stifle any easy optimism. It followed, at an interval of 20 years, the first world-war. The positive evidences of any conscious and concerted movement of humanity to avoid being plunged into a third world-war are so few that, if they alone are to be taken into the reckoning, the chances are heavy that the third world war will be upon us within 10 years of the end of the second. It may even be that the whole conception of an "end" to this world-war is a hang-over from an obsolete habit of thought: because we have it fixed in our minds that wars do end in a reasonable time. But it does not require a superhuman effort of thought to see that there is a real sense in which the first world-war may be said not to have ended at all. When the new burst of production stimulated by the need to repair the destruction which it caused had come to an end, say in 1929, the only way left for the machine-societies to keep functioning was to prepare for the second world-war. If that pattern of history is to be repeated—and the only evidence of the determination not to repeat it is still words, without deeds—then we may be sure that it will repeat itself with immensely greater speed. The illusion of pseudo-peace is now become impossible for nations to entertain. If total war remains a possibility, it will be necessary to prepare for it; and no potential belligerent can now afford to lose a moment's time.

That brings us down from the large perspectives of history to the concrete and immediate issues of world-policy. The big pro-

position is unchallengeable: this war will end in organized world-peace, or it will not really end. Until world-peace is organized, the war will merely continue, with apparent lulls and changing constellations of power, about which it would be indiscreet to prophesy. But here again, world-peace, like adjustment before, carries no comforting idealistic connotation. World-peace, in this context, means simply the absence of war. Any group of great powers which is able to hold together effectively for the purpose of suppressing war will be organizing world-peace within the meaning of the act. Their organization of world-peace may incur the condemnation of liberal-minded men as "empire", or even as "tyranny"; but, provided it can do the job of preventing war, it will have filled the bill. It will have staved off disaster from the human race, and given it a breathing space in which to make the positive adjustment of its morality and its behaviour to the new system of power-production.

At that level the problem appears simple enough. But can we practically conceive any group of great powers holding together for this purpose? Immediately, we enter a realm of thought where Goethe's aphorism applies. If we begin really to think about it, we realize that we cannot think out this problem. No matter where we begin, we are quickly lost in a tangle of unknown or variable factors. The great powers united for the organization of world-peace must be, by hypothesis, in control of a predominance of power-production; equally, they must be prepared to undertake the effective supervision of the production of the rest of the world; further, they must either be able to trust one another implicitly—a fantastic supposition in the case of great powers to-day—or they must themselves become an effective economic and political unity. Without that, their organization of world-peace will be a façade behind which they will prepare for the eventuality of war against one another. The most solemn treaties are meaningless to-day. Nothing will avail except the genuine unity of a group of powers who between them control the major part of the power-production of the world.

Between Britain and the U.S.A. such a politico-economic unification seems conceivable. But the U.S.A. and Britain together hardly control the requisite power-production. And even between them, it is much easier to play with the idea of effective unity than to think the reality of it. At the present moment the opportunity of illusion in the matter of Anglo-American unity is particularly great: because both are capitalist countries in the full euphoria of production for war. Their economies are booming. But what when the industries of the U.S.A. and Britain seek to resume "normal" production? Are they to compete for whatever remains

of the world-market? If so, it is self-delusion to imagine them co-operating to organize world-peace. If not, are they to combine to supply the world-market at a profit? That, plus the organization of world-peace, means only an attempt at a new Anglo-American imperialism. Anyhow, such a combination is only conceivable on the basis of a political amalgamation. What kind of economy will the enlarged United States possess? Unless it is a socialized economy, Britain will either become a distressed area herself, or a low-wage area which will create distressed areas in the U.S.A. An interim solution of the problem might be found if the new United States were to prepare for the new war. Permanent Lease-Lend might then carry the combination over till World War III.

At the bottom of the whole nightmarish situation is the fact that preparation for war is now the only means of keeping a great capitalist industrial society functioning fully. If the U.S.A. and Britain combine for that purpose, capitalism will gain a new brief lease of life. But what a life! We may deceive ourselves about it for a little while by assuring ourselves it is the war-preparation necessary to enforce peace. But if it were to succeed in its purpose and war were to be prevented, the peace itself would have revolutionary consequences. Great nations cannot go on preparing for total war indefinitely. Ten years is probably now the limit, within which they must either begin fighting, or begin to cease preparing to fight. For the intense organization required for total war needs a potential enemy to stimulate the psychological condition in which war-regimentation is acceptable to the masses. If the two great capitalist nations begin to cease preparing for war, they will be confronted with the necessity of social revolution, for which war-preparation is the only alternative.

There is, indeed, only one final way out of the impasse into which the world is feverishly forcing itself: it is universal social revolution. That is what the adjustment of which we spoke at the beginning really involves. For only by social revolution can the impediments be removed which prevent power-production being fully used for other purposes than war. To increase the demand for goods so that the production of modern industry can be absorbed in peace, whether by the citizens of the producing country, or other peoples, means the end of the acquisitive society. For nothing is more certain than that if wealth, competitively and individually acquired, is still to constitute the overriding claim on power-produced goods, production must languish and mass-unemployment ensue; for which the only remedy is that the State should finance production for the one purpose which, by its inherent uselessness, does not disturb the existing rights of property. So long as

modern productivity can be wasted in war, so long can the property-rights of capitalist society remain relatively undisturbed. But so soon as modern productivity has to be used creatively, to the positive enhancement of human welfare, the mechanism jams. And it will go on jamming, until it is liberated by a revolutionary change in the relations of production: a change which means the acceptance of a new social morality.

The grim paradox is that the waging of total war itself blinds men to the necessity of the social revolution without which peace is now impossible. The one major weakness in Mr. Harold Laski's otherwise admirable *Reflections on the Revolution in Our Time** is that he gives less than its true weight to this deceptiveness of total war: the almost diabolic illusion it creates, by the full release of productivity, that no radical change in the relations of production is required. One of the main threads in Mr. Laski's well-woven argument is that the sense of unity and common purpose which pervades Britain at this time, and still more in the jeopardy of 1940, gives a unique opportunity for bold and creative political action by consent, which, in the nature of things, cannot recur when the war is over. Unless the bases of the new society—new by virtue of the adoption of the economics of expansion—are laid now by general agreement, Mr. Laski argues, the chances are remote that Britain will pass "by peaceful and legal means" through the necessary minimum of social revolution required to maintain political democracy alive. That we believe to be true. But, unfortunately, there is much less truth in Mr. Laski's prior contention: that the sense of unity and common purpose which accompanies the war gives the psychological opportunity for social revolution by consent.

The contrary is nearer the truth. For war is essentially an evasion of the economic impasse. It releases productivity without changing the relations of production. It is equally an evasion of the psychological impasse, because it deflects the spiritual energies of the nation from the creative end towards which they should be striving. However necessary the utter defeat of the enemy may appear to be, it is in reality only a secondary end. The fact that, in the strained emotional atmosphere of total war, the defeat of the enemy becomes the primary end for the vast majority of the citizens of democracy, is nothing less than tragic: because it may well involve the suicide of democracy. For, in the atmosphere in which the defeat of the enemy becomes the primary end, the true functioning of democracy is easily suspended. The mental fight between opposed philosophies, which is the essential life of democracy, can-

* Allen & Unwin, 15s.

not maintain itself against the demand—seemingly reasonable, but in fact quite specious—for unity for victory. One of the chief reasons why the mental fight cannot maintain itself against this specious demand for political unity is that the economic tensions which translate themselves into " the severe contentions of friendship " are suspended by the release of full productivity in war.

Moreover, as though by some sinister conspiracy of destiny, the demand that the whole mental as well as physical energies of the democratic nation should be concentrated on the defeat of the enemy appears quite valid. Nazi Germany is deliberately anti-democratic in a way no previous enemy of Britain has been. Hohenzollern Germany was undemocratic; but its most violent British opponent could not impute to the Kaiser the deliberate design of extirpating democracy abroad. But Naziism is an ideological crusade against democracy. How then can it not be true that the aim of utterly defeating Germany must have the primacy over every other end in a democratic nation?

Indeed, at this level the question is unanswerable. But that is because the level is superficial. No doubt Naziism is a deliberately anti-democratic movement. But if it were only that, its menace would have been easy to meet. It would be truly reactionary; nor would it have succeeded in massing the great majority of Germans behind it. More important than the fact that Naziism is anti-democratic is the fact that it is post-democratic. It springs from the failure of German democracy to achieve the social revolution by consent which Britain likewise has so far failed to achieve. Naziism is historically the product of the failure of the German democracy to eliminate the disease of mass-unemployment; it is the desperate choice of a great industrial nation *in extremis*, when confronted by the dilemma: Either capitalism or democracy must go. Even that is less than the truth, for that implies that if democracy goes, capitalism can remain. But the capitalism that remains when democracy goes is no longer capitalism but Naziism.

Britain, and still more America, is quite unprepared for the crucial dissociation of ideas which is necessary if capitalism and democracy are to be understood as having now become antithetical. Democracy, for the average Briton, and still more for the average American, is by hypothesis the concomitant of capitalism; it is the political obverse of the medal whose reverse is capitalism. They have grown up together like Siamese twins. How can they be opposed to one another? And now that the war has enabled both countries to evade the recognition of the growing antithesis between democracy and capitalism, and presented them with an enemy who

is, as it were, the anti-Christ of democracy, it would seem that Satan himself could not more subtly have confused the issue.

Mr. Laski has manfully made what is perhaps the best attempt on record to straighten it. But since his book is, at the best, hard reading, it is unlikely to produce much impression where the impression is most needed—upon the citizens of British democracy. Even the simplest of the conceptions which he uses to unravel the tangle—that Naziism is the " counter-revolution "—is one beyond the range of the political thinking of the average Englishman. It would be clear enough to the Russian, who knows by grim experience that the economic achievement of the U.S.S.R. is the main object of Nazi attack. But Russia has had her revolution, and Britain has not. That Nazi Germany represents the " counter-revolution " explains the bitterness of the struggle between Germany and Russia; but it throws only an ambiguous light on that between Britain and Germany. In that struggle the ideological issue is quite different: it is between democracy and anti-democracy. And though it is perfectly true, as Mr. Laski insists, that the " counter-revolution " must destroy democracy, it seems equally true that revolution also destroys democracy. Explain as we will the peculiar circumstances of Russia, both in pre-revolutionary times and in her dangerous post-revolutionary isolation, which have led to the establishment of the present semi-Byzantine autocracy, the fact remains that her political system is hardly less opposed than Naziism to that of democracy.

That extant democracy is largely obsolete we do not doubt. But whether it can endure the radical transformation necessary if democratic practice is not in fact to become the grave of the idea of equality which is at the heart of the democratic idea, is quite uncertain. To carry through that transformation without disrupting the democratic system itself, calls for a kind of understanding of the present world-revolution which is possessed only by a tiny minority of the citizens of democracy. Yet, without a widespread understanding of the necessities which require this radical change in the content of democracy, there is practically no chance of its being achieved by democratic means. Since, as we have seen, total war steadily exacerbates the underlying tensions of capitalist democracy, and simultaneously conceals them from consciousness; since, moreover, the ideological justification of the present war as a defence of existing democracy against anti-democracy is one which hides from consciousness the necessity of the radical change in democracy, whereby it can transcend itself, and drop its dead sheath as the society of individualism to emerge as the society of individuality; the main hope that British democracy

can be illuminated with the understanding and inspired with the courage to undertake this self-transformation, must be set upon the chosen leader of democracy.

In this great duty Mr. Churchill has signally failed: not for lack of courage—no one would deny that he possesses that in abundance—but, apparently from sheer lack of understanding of the essential nature of the world-revolution, in the most crucial phase of which he was chosen, by acclaim, to lead the British people. Not a word has ever been said by him, since he became the national leader, which indicates that he sees the world-situation and Britain's part in it as other than a repetition of the war against Napoleon, or his own function, at the head of a mass-democracy, as different from that of the younger Pitt at the head of the tiny oligarchy of 1800. One hundred and forty years of history which have revolutionized the very substance of the world seem to have passed Mr. Churchill by, while he snored in the Seven Sleepers' Den, dreaming of wars, waiting for wars, waiting (I think) pre-eminently for a new Napoleonic war, in which he could emerge in full splendour as the last and greatest of the aristocratic war-leaders of Britain. Perhaps he is the greatest of them. He has made sure that he is the last. For, instead of making the democracy that he leads conscious of its own predicament and inspiring it with the resolve to save what can be saved of democracy, and to lead the world by the example of its own self-transformation, he has fixed its eyes on the pattern of the past, and thereby, in all probability, made it incapable of adjusting itself to the new conditions except at the price of a violent upheaval.

THE SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPE

By G. W. Keeton

THE steady progress of the Russian offensive, coupled with plain signs of Nazi exhaustion, the collapse of Italy, and the probability of further Anglo-American invasions of the European mainland, warrant the hope that by the early summer of 1944, much of occupied Europe will have regained its freedom. The completion of the task of liberation will provoke one of the most perplexing political problems of modern times. What sort of a Europe will emerge? What will be the boundaries of the recreated States? What will be their relations with one another? What kind of governments will they establish?

These, and many allied problems, will prove difficult to solve wherever they arise in liberated Europe. They are especially intricate in Eastern Europe, where national boundaries have always been fluid, where deep-rooted local animosities still linger, where democratic ways have failed to establish themselves firmly, and where the policies of the three major members of the United Nations—The Soviet, Great Britain, and the U.S.A.—may be expected to exhibit important variations. Unless these three can reach some agreement upon general principles before Germany collapses, the opportunities for future misunderstanding are practically unlimited. Such a situation might possibly tempt Germany to a third effort to secure the mastery of Europe.

In these circumstances, it can scarcely be challenged that recent developments in Anglo-American relations with Russia are productive of deep anxiety. The departure of MM. Litvinov and Maisky, the non-participation of the Soviet in the Quebec Conference, the increasingly critical tone of *War and the Working Class* as far as Britain and America are concerned, and the emergence of "Free-Polish" and "Free-German" organizations in Russia may each be capable of explanation when considered separately, but taken together they can only imply an absence of that full collaboration which it was hoped would emerge from the common sacrifices in the present struggle. When German military power is destroyed, what will then remain, beyond the memory of former comradeship in arms?

No one who considers the present position carefully could wish to make the situation more difficult by partizan argument. The alternative, however, is not to pretend that the situation is completely satisfactory. The present time is probably the last opportunity we shall have to consider our relations with the Soviet in even a relatively detached fashion. Once occupied Europe

is being liberated, decisions will have to be taken by the liberators. Such decisions will have political repercussions, and there will be the possibility of frequent misunderstandings. If prior discussion could avert some of them, then there should be the very fullest prior discussion. North Africa and Italy have already furnished evidence of the draw-backs of political improvization, contrasting rather sharply with the most complete and brilliant military preparations.

It may therefore be found useful to set out briefly some of the main points which will arise in considering the future status of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe:

(1) Traditionally, this is not a main sphere either of British or of American activity. The pre-war trade of Great Britain and the U.S.A. with all the smaller states of Eastern Europe was very limited. In the case of Greece, for example, where a strongly pro-British people could have been encouraged by acceptance of greater quantities of currants, without creating serious problems for this country, nothing effective was done. At the conclusion of the war, both Great Britain and the United States will probably enter more extensively into the trade of Eastern Europe than they have done before, for it will be impossible for many years for the Soviet to supply these areas with more than a limited quantity of the manufactures which they need, and the possibility of Germany being able to do so is remote, even if that were desirable.

(2) In all the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (from which Austria and Czechoslovakia must be excluded) there is an urgent need to develop more balanced economies, by the encouragement of industry. In this way the general standard of living can be improved, and these countries can be made less dependent upon the export of primary products, of which the chief are timber, grain, tobacco, dairy produce and cattle. Such a development would lead to the creation of a larger middle class, which is conspicuously weak throughout this area. The rise of such an urban middle class would involve a diminution in the power of a few great ruling families, whose cadets and dependents are to be found abundantly in the professional classes. It is the lack of contact between the semi-feudal aristocracy and the backward peasantry which has been one of the main sources of the political instability of this area in the recent past.

(3) In the inter-war period Great Britain and the United States alike were content to leave to France the main share in foiling German and Italian economic and political aspirations in this area. After the collapse of France, this is no longer possible. They will have to work out East European policies of their own. Such policies must avoid arousing Soviet distrust, whilst preventing any renewed German effort to make the economic penetration of Eastern Europe a prelude to political domination.

(4) During the war of 1914-18, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was no part of the war aims of the Allied Powers. The progress of

the war, however, gave great impetus to separatist movements, and the inclusion of "national self-determination" amongst President Wilson's Fourteen Points settled the fate of the Austrian Empire. In the political sphere, the work of the peace conference in Eastern Europe could scarcely have been improved, if the principle of nationality was to be taken as the primary criterion whilst weight was given to strategic frontiers, access to the sea and similar considerations. The experience of the inter-war years, however, showed the necessity of some form of closer association between the States of the Danube valley, not only for economic reasons, but also because without that association, national minority problems in this area are insoluble unless an extensive migration of populations is contemplated. Even if this should take place, there would still be unsatisfied territorial claims, based on memories of former empires, or upon strategic or economic grounds. It is precisely at this point that difficulties begin. The nuclei of wider associations already exist in permanent agreements negotiated between the exiled governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and of Greece and Yugoslavia. Whether these agreements will survive internal political strains in the post-war years is not clear. It is to be hoped that they will, for they are possible starting points of bigger things. They could be given a new significance, for example, by a further agreement covering these four States, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The achievement of closer association between these States would nevertheless be far from easy. There are deep-rooted antagonisms, exacerbated by the events of the present war. There are wide diversities of race, unsolved conflicting claims to specific territories, wide variations in religion, and differing stages of economic and social development. More important still, the marked cleavage between Western and Eastern Europe, which can be felt rather than defined, runs through these States. Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia are Western European. The rest belong to that area which was civilized from Byzantium. Faced with a cleavage of this type, it is not surprising that there are strong advocates of an Austrian-Czechoslovak-Hungarian federation. This would be a State of some thirty odd millions of people, capable of considerable economic development, and powerful enough to challenge a renewed threat of German economic domination of Eastern Europe. But for the Czechs to pursue such proposals further, it would be necessary for them to be dissociated from any hint of a restoration of the Habsburgs.

At the other extreme, we have proposals, primarily sponsored by some elements of Polish opinion, for the creation of a federation of all the States lying between Germany and the Soviet, and including the Danubian and Balkan States. Such an area would include East Prussia as a Polish dependency as well as the Polish territories acquired by Russia in 1929, and it would have a total population of between 120 and 130 millions. Such a State, its advocates urge, would give stability to East Europe in the political sphere, and would afford a guarantee of the economic development of this great area.

Analyzed objectively, the interests which unite the Latvians or Esthonians to those of the Albanians and the Greeks seem rather slight. The federation would include over a score of races and languages, and would possess two extremely long land frontiers, most of it very difficult to defend. These are not arguments against such a federation if it is otherwise possible. They are merely hints of the type of difficulty which would have to be faced in achieving it. After all, if Europe as a whole is ever to unite, problems at least as great will have to be solved. Moreover, the fact remains that without closer association amongst some or all of these East European States, minority, economic and other problems are practically insoluble, and it may always be possible for an aggressive Germany to overawe these States one at a time, as she did in the years before 1939. One serious danger, however, would seem to be that other States might be deceived by the area and population of such an association of States into attributing to it greater strength and coherence than it would possess for some considerable time.

The gravest criticism of proposals of this type, however, is that they are viewed with the deepest suspicion by the Soviet. Any European settlement will have to be guaranteed by the victors, otherwise a daring aggressor will be able to overthrow it. The present war has shown that both Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. are essential for the preservation of European order. If they are at variance, another European war is always a real contingency. It is axiomatic, therefore, that a settlement, more especially in Eastern Europe, which is uncongenial to Russian policy, will be in the highest degree precarious; and the Soviet's memories of the *cordon sanitaire* are too recent for her to regard these proposals with benevolence.

On the other hand, it is possible to recognize this Soviet attitude whilst preserving a very real sympathy for Polish aspirations. Security is just as much the ultimate objective of Polish foreign policy as it is of the Soviet's, more especially if her history during the last two centuries is remembered, and it seems clear that Poland would feel more secure (whether in fact she were more secure or not) if she were part of some larger federation, the members of which had a common foreign policy. It is probable, moreover, that Poland would now agree that for her national existence to be assured her foreign policy should look to support from the Anglo-Soviet Alliance, rather than to any individual activities of her own.

(5) It has been indicated that the ultimate objective of Soviet foreign policy, as of other foreign policies, is the achievement of security. What does the Soviet regard this as implying, so far as Eastern Europe is concerned? So far, there have been few binding pronouncements, but there are indications from the progress of events. The Anglo-Soviet Alliance and the disbandment of the Comintern may be regarded as an abandonment of the hypothesis that the Soviet might one day be faced with a hostile coalition of capitalist States. In the future, therefore, the Soviet will seek to obtain security in the same way as other major Powers, and it may be that in the U.S.S.R. after the war there

will be an interesting struggle between advocates of isolationism and advocates of a collective system, recalling that which complicated American foreign policy in the inter-war years. Further, it is already clear that whilst the Soviet will show no mercy to Nazis and their willing tools, it will seek to establish close relations with the working classes of Germany and of the occupied areas. This inevitably prompts two further enquiries: (a) Will the Soviet seek to push its frontiers further west in Europe? (b) Alternatively, will the Soviet seek to establish a chain of Communist States in Eastern and Central Europe?

The answer to the first of these questions depends largely upon the post-war world which will emerge. If there were no clear understanding between the three major Powers of the United Nations it might be that the Soviet would seek security by incorporating some of the border areas into the U.S.S.R. To-day however there are other ways of achieving security, without the annexation of considerable additional territory. The United States has acquired bases in a number of British possessions. This was in the interests of American security, and not in pursuance of a policy of expansion. It may be necessary for this country, either alone or with other members of the United Nations, to obtain access to bases on the European mainland with the same object. It may be that the Soviet has similar intentions, for in the past Russia has been exposed to extensive German activity in the border States. Much clear thinking will be necessary on these points, but it must be emphasized that the question of bases for the preservation of order is quite a distinct one from that, for example, of the future status of what constituted the Polish Ukraine, and the Eastern provinces of Poland in 1939. It is idle to deny that there are very thorny problems here, and whatever happens in this area, one and possibly both parties may feel dissatisfied. It is not a problem in which Great Britain can be disinterested, for beside the fact of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance stands the fact that Great Britain went to war in defence of Poland in September, 1939. If the Soviet claim to the disputed border region prevails, then the Polish claim to compensation elsewhere would be very powerful indeed. This is not a question of land-hunger on the part of Poland. In pre-war years, the population of Poland was rising rapidly. Moreover, the experience of the inter-war years has shown that Poland's access to the sea should be placed on a firmer basis that it was in 1939.

It would be possible to pursue these frontier problems a good deal further into their geographic, historical and economic implications, but at the conclusion there would still be two points of view, and between them an accord must somehow be reached. Nor is the answer to the second of the questions set out above a great deal easier. M. Stalin has declared that the Soviet wishes the peoples of Eastern Europe to be free, and to choose their own forms of government. That, too, is explicitly stated in the Atlantic Charter, to which the Soviet has adhered. But who are "the people", and how do they choose their government after the Nazis have been driven out? We have

69453

already had a foretaste of this problem in North Africa and Sicily. May it not be that peoples in liberated areas acquire political "colour" from their liberators? Is it, in fact, unnatural that they should? How does this affect the question of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that much of this area will be freed by the Red Armies? Most people feel that this kind of problem is not one to which some kind of knock-for-knock agreement between Great Britain and the Soviet would be applicable, but if this is so what principles are to replace it?

So far, the survival of the German menace has made the undue agitation of these problems inappropriate. Failure to give full attention to them now, however, may spell disaster to Europe in the post-war years. The honeymoon between Great Britain and the Soviet is over. We are now in the difficult period when we must accustom ourselves to one another's angularities. For that reason, the public anxiety which was felt over the non-inclusion of the Soviet in the Quebec Conference was a sound one, even though it may be conceded that the Anglo-American talks there included the Pacific war, and even though it is plain that every Anglo-American discussion is not an international conference. There are two ways of looking at the Anglo-Soviet Alliance. It may be a precise definition of a fair bargain, or it may be the beginning of a full partnership in international affairs, one of the principal functions of which is to secure the maintenance of peace in Europe. It would be disastrous if the willingness previously demonstrated on both sides to give the alliance the second interpretation were to be frustrated for lack of a full exchange of views on both sides, at the moment when the policies of both will shortly find expression in their attitude towards liberated Europe.

ARE AMERICANS FOREIGNERS?

By George Catlin

IN a single issue recently of a well-known London evening newspaper refe ence was made twice to the "American" language. There is, of course sense in which one can appropriately refer to the Yorkshire language, t British brogue, the Scottish language (not Gaelic), the Cockney languag There are more differences of speech between two English counties th between Massachusetts and California. Actually, the stage has developed accentless English of educated people which holds good from Cape Town San Francisco. There are a few English archaisms in America which might well revive, such as "gotten"; a few pointless differences in ne technical words, such as "aluminium" (a metal not produced in Britain which a much needed broadcasting co-ordination committee under Messr Shaw, Ogden and Hogben would remove; and a few lively embellishments the language by Mr. Runyon which Fleet Street will certainly copy. For th rest, there is one English language, common to British (not only English and American, as the Premier insisted in his Harvard speech. And its unit as *lingua franca* is of immense spiritual importance. If it did not exist it woul have, like modern Erse, to be made as the vehicle of a spirit, whether Sir Joh Squire liked it or not. United peoples are built—and this not only in the case of the Gaelic League or the Czechs—on common language.

The obvious route here is not only to use Basic English, or some variant as an elementary course towards the new *lingua franca* as vehicle of our ideas and trade. It is far more urgent to revise the ludicrous and forbidding spelling of the language, as both the Germans and Russians (who boast of at least as many good philologists as we) did with their languages long ago. There is no case for a language which spells "quay" with no single letter as pronounced, or where, by compounding the "gh" in "enough", the "o" in "women" and the "ti" in station, the lettering "ghoti" could spell "fish". In Turkey, "since the complicated Arabic script was a stumbling block, Mustafa Kemal substituted the Latin alphabet; and when conservative minded scholars made difficulties about transliteration, he tackled the problem himself, and evolved a workable system overnight." We need an Ataturk here to deal with our local savants in Kemalese. We also need—but it is a different story—twenty-five pennies in the florin, and a metric system.

Harping upon the theme of difference of brogue is only one aspect of a passion for atomism and isolationism which temperamentally infects the minds of some people. Having demolished the unity of language they then begin

to chisel away the unity of culture and tradition. Soon the British Commonwealth itself lies in fragments. Nothing is easier than to stress the difference between the New World and Old World expressions of a culture, whether English or Spanish. Unhappily for the argument, it proves too much, since the culture and civilization of most of the Commonwealth is emphatically New World, not Old Country. The Speaker of the Ontario Legislature has even advocated a Canadian-American political union on this latter basis, following the old policy of Goldwin Smith. The atomizers, however, are not to be deterred in their unpatriotic follies. Few Englishmen know that the son of a Polish immigrant into the United States will not be taught Polish history as a background to that American history which is a major agency of fusion in "the melting pot." He is taught, as background, British history and English literature. But the atomizers are always reminding us of the partizan treatment of the Revolutionary War in the American text books, omitting to add that, in many of the States, the recommended text books have been revised on this issue and compare favourably for impartiality, in their treatment of George III. and his German mercenaries, with those used here. Or they take the Statute of Westminster as the final delivery of British political wisdom, rather than as the logical conclusion of a nineteenth century process in history. To the confusion of these pedants arose Messrs. Curtis and Curtin.

The little pamphlet *Britain*, issued officially by the U.S. War Department to all American troops coming to this country, says, very wisely: "The most evident truth of all is that in their major ways of life the British and American people are much alike . . . But each has minor national characteristics which differ. It is by causing misunderstanding over these minor differences that Hitler hopes to make his propaganda effective." It is, to say the least, unfortunate that, in contrast to this American publication, the pamphlet on the U.S.A., written by Mr. Harold Marks and issued by the Workers' Education Association to wide British worker circles, anxious for new light in their darkness, says by way of preamble: "Anglo-American relations would be easier if the two countries looked on each other as foreign countries, which they are." Just like that . . . Unhappily this attitude is repeated in entirely official publications, which stress the fact that a good deal less than half of the Americans are of British extraction. An eminent speaker said with assurance the other day that two-thirds were foreign.

In this post-Freudian age, we have been trained to believe that when men persist in a view, even despite of the facts, this arises, not from accident, but from some underlying motive which predisposes them. It is well to look at the facts. Between 10 per cent. and 11 per cent. of the population of the U.S.A. is of negro stock. There are about 9 millions of Irishmen and to this 7.5 per cent. of the U.S.A. population must be added about 1 per cent. from the Dominions and 40.4 per cent. of British extraction (not from Ireland or the Dominions). This gives a total of 55 per cent. of British extraction of the entire white population of the country.

It is more significant that the effective government of the United States has in fact lain in the hands of certain elements in the population. The list of Presidents, with a few old Dutch exceptions such as van Buren and the Roosevelts, have been English, Scots, Irish or (with Jefferson) Welsh. Again, with a few Spanish or Viennese Jews excepted, the justices of the Supreme Court have been on the whole of the same composition. I should hesitate to overemphasize this argument. Slowly the old social order changes; the "upper crust" breaks; and the old wealthy families yield place. Mr. Frankfurter is certainly a far better judge than many who have sat on the Supreme Court bench. However, when someone emerges from the "sidewalks of New York" his name may be Alfred Smith. And thanks to the new immigration quota imposed after the First World War and based on the national percentages of the census of 1890, the United States is to-day becoming a more Anglo-Saxon nation than it was tending to become in the last decade of the past century. The South Eastern human "pipe-line" has stopped. On the other hand Canada in fifty years, at the present rate of population increase, will be more French than British and, biologically speaking, Montcalm will have won. The United States occupies in the English-speaking world a middle position in population make-up.

If, despite the names of Roosevelt (one of the older colonial families), Frankfurter, Stettinius, Laguardia, the section of the United States which has governed America and guided its enterprise has been primarily Anglo-Saxon (by which I do not of course mean pro-British-government), the tradition which moulds American life has been emphatically such. And this is the heart of the matter. For the American "melting-pot" is the school; and the school is the vehicle of the tradition. And the spiritual significance of the tradition, as Mr. Churchill sees, is immeasurable. Again, to avoid all chance of misunderstanding, let me say that the tradition also is in no sense to be understood as pro-British-government, any more than the descendants of the Parliamentarians can be expected to be pro-Cavalier. In a very real sense, 1776 was the Third English Civil War. But this time the Whigs, victorious in New England, were over-weighted by North and the Hanoverians in old England. Indeed, I will emphasize the point by saying that, quantitatively and in quality, the United States, not Great Britain, is the major Anglo-Saxon country, uncorrupted by progressive Europeanization of mind. The Anglo-Saxon Tradition is, by this reasoning, primarily the American tradition. Geopolitically, it is significant that the British Commonwealth is in a half-moon around the United States. The political significance of this linguistic-cultural unity was (as the Premier pointed out at Harvard) remarked by Bismarck long ago. Hitler returns to the theme in *Mein Kampf*. "We are apt to forget the true nature of the Anglo-Saxon world in its relation to the British Empire. If only on account of her community of language and culture with the American Union, England cannot be compared with any other state in Europe." *Fas est ab hostibus discere.*

II.

One does not have to be a believer in primitive magic in order to recognize that the word creates the fact. A unity that has no common name to most simple people is no articulate unity. As Renan said, in one of the wisest definitions of a nation, these constitute a nation who, in terms of past glories and of will for the future, believe themselves to be such– *un plébiscite de tous les jours*. It is an act of vision and faith, but yet an act based upon experience of facts and upon clear recognition of purpose. These facts I have endeavoured to enumerate and to that recognition of unity I have given a name—Anglo-Saxony. It would be absurd, however, to suppose that, in so mighty an undertaking, this is more than a beginning of difficulties. Many ideal goals are possible, among which there is as yet no agreed priority; and the facts are patient of many different interpretations.

It is worthy of note that, thanks to the activities of Mr. Humber, the State of North Carolina passed in its legislation on March 13, 1943, a resolution to the effect that, "whereas it is necessary at the present juncture of human affairs to enlarge the basis of organized society by establishing a government for the community of nations, in order to preserve civilization and enable mankind to live in peace and be free . . . There is no alternative to the federation of all nations except endless war." Since this date, three other States have passed this identical resolution, and nine States resolutions in this general sense, demanding examination of the project, to wit, the States of Maryland, Rhode Island, Alabama, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Montana and Florida. In the case of Massachusetts, a 3 to 1 plebiscite favoured the original resolution, and the electorate showed itself to be more emphatic in its opinion than the politicians of the legislation. The net formal result to date at Washington has been the passage of the Fullbright resolution, although carefully hedged by the amendment which insisted on "due constitutional procedure", that is, senatorial action. In some ways perhaps, more significant was the title and purpose of Mr. Wendell Willkie's book—*One World*. It will not be forgotten that Mr. Willkie has already declared himself in favour of a social and economic union, with free migration, of the United States and the British Commonwealth.

Unreserved internationalization on the trade and economic plane has always been the thesis of that great Free Trader, born out of due time, Mr. Cordell Hull; and its influence is noticeable in the Atlantic Charter. Indeed, world organization on the technical and economic planes can almost be said now to be the official policy of the United Nations, although Professor E. H. Carr's thesis has unfortunately not yet been accepted in anything like its entirety. The hope is so to entrench certain technical positions that the isolationists, when they rise to influence again, cannot overthrow them—and no one as yet knows how isolationist and preoccupied exclusively with its own reconstruction a great self-sufficient Power, such as for example the U.S.S.R., is going to prove. Unfortunately, however, for this policy, as adequate alone, economic agreements are reached by States controlled by rulers or legislatures whose decisions will most certainly be political, guided by considerations of prestige and power. Hence the political issues, excluding those of sovereignty, cannot in the last resort be avoided. The "technicians", although probably excellent tacticians for the moment, take evasive action when this issue of principle is raised. They hope for the best. As for the simpler sentimentalists, they trust to the warm glow of an era of good feeling and hope, despite George Washington's dictum, that the wind of good public opinion may prove as reliable as the walls of common institutions. I confess that I am too much a pessimist about the relations of sovereign states, after these twenty years, to put my trust in any such romanticism.

It may be, as Professor Gilbert Murray has urged, that erosions of full sovereignty will only be permitted in fact among nations that feel themselves so like-minded as to form one community. That argument, although with reluctance, I accept in the present historical framework. But anyhow, the nettle of sovereignty must be grasped.

The principle which may contribute to the solution of these problems—and, as at the Congress of Vienna, so now, a principle we need—is that of Functionalism. I note that Professor Mctrany, although in a different context, has made the same suggestion. When the functions under consideration are postal communications or perhaps air-transport, the function itself indicates the appropriate area—a world area. Where the function is education in the spirit of a people or in the local mother tongue, then again the area is indicated —an area as local as Wales or Slovakia or Ticino or Quebec. The essential spiritual values of the "little nation" are thus preserved. For other functions, a regional area is indicated. For the moment, although the federation of the world is the ideal framework, so far as actual social union with common citizenship is concerned, an area—such as the West—with common traditions and approximately a common standard of living is alone practicable, *if anything is to be done at all*. Common citizenship, for example, is not at the moment a practicable proposition on a world scale from China to Peru. As Mr. Morrison has recently said: "In any land which is to form a free society there must be an underlying substratum of unity." You cannot have assured common action where there is no community. And this community must have some kind of explicit public and juristic recognition. I am sufficiently pessimistic or "realistic" to believe that, in the alternative, the so-called self-interest of nations will exercise itself in the skin-game of competitive power, called "national interest". If we never begin with this union of people in the likely quarters, although non-exclusive ones, we shall never arrive at our goal. We shall end in talk, the fact of untrammelled sovereignty, and the next war. The question is that of the appropriate regions. What are to be the more intimate circles to be organized within the great circle of world

organization, possibly with a world court, world air-force and world High Command? (By whom would such a world air-force be controlled?)

The issue then becomes one, not of principles (since regions are agreed to), but of the functions of the regions and of their specific areas. Is one region to be a united Europe, sponsored by the Great Powers? Or, as Miss Hilda Monte, in the *Unity of Europe* urges, is it to be a Europe including the U.S.S.R. and possibly including Britain, but not the Commonwealth? Or shall we have a union of Western Europe and shall the Americans be foreigners? How would the Canadians and Australians view such a project?

As the *News Chronicle* correspondent, Mr. Robert Waithman, writes with great frankness:

> It is a curious and interesting fact that the beginnings of arguments which might well turn out to be destructive to the idea of Anglo-American collaboration after the war show signs of coming, respectively, from the far left and from the far right. The disposition on the left seems, in some cases, to be to object to such an alliance because it is a concept arrived at without reference to an inclusion of Russia and China. It is thus suspect on the ground that it might resolve itself into a "return to the balance of power system" which would inevitably "create an opposing alliance" and so lay the ground-work for another war." [This was the German argument against "encirclement" on which "appeasement" was based.] On the other hand, on the right in this country, suspicion of America emanates from extreme nationalism which will not abate a jot of sovereignty; from upper class distrust of American democracy; from fear of economic domination; and from the resolve of certain sections of Big Business to fight back with a streamlined and neo-fascist efficiency the international anarchy, rather than be planned or dominated. A temporary combination of extreme left and extreme right against Anglo-Saxon integration is dangerous and not at all out of the question.

It would be a great mistake to concern ourselves at the present time, in undertaking the task of Anglo-American integration, with any elaborate Siéyès-like constitution-making. We must start, from the ground up, of popular will directed towards the establishment of a community. We want to mix up peoples and abolish frontiers. The American people usually likes neither the word "military" nor the word "alliance" and, in advocating a "military alliance", I am not sure whether Governor Dewey has "rung the bell". It may well be that this must rather be regarded as the logical defence aspect, and first insurance, in something wider, more "peaceful" and more "constructive", namely the juristic recognition of the intimate association at least of the West, not only for war, but for peace—perhaps that "social union" of which Mr. Willkie spoke. That union is likely to come as between the British Commonwealth taken as a whole and the United States taken as a balancing whole, although some would advocate a more atomic state aggregation, counting for instance each province of Canada and each State of the United States as one. Such a union or *Zollverein* would fill the void left in Western leadership by the fall of France, with its historic rôle. That union can come with Russia, in this constructive world movement of citizenship, so soon as ever the Russians want it.

In his great Harvard speech the Premier, coming direct from the White

House said: "The gift of a common tongue . . . may well some day become the foundation of a common citizenship. I like to think of British and Americans moving about . . . with hardly a sense of being foreigners." Perhaps during this war, when the gates of opportunity are open, a reciprocal citizenship, at least honorary to those who have served in the wars and dwelt with us, is as far as we can get. Let us then take speedy action to arrive there.

Lord Cranborne, speaking to the English-speaking Union recently, quoted Lord Balfour as rightly saying:

> I am one of those who believe that civilization is to be ministered to by permitting nations of different genius each to develop that genius in their own way, each, therefore, to contribute intellectual and moral pleasure of mankind, and I therefore do not wish to see all the world moulded into one form of culture.

One could of course say the same thing of Anglo-Scottish relations; and I often think that these relations—or the philosophy of Mazzini at once nationalist and internationalist, and always cultural—supply our best guide in Anglo-American relations. Lord Balfour, however, in the same speech, which Lord Cranborne emphasized, continued:

> while there are and, doubtless will always be, differences of outlook between the various branches of the English speaking peoples . . . Granting all that, there is, I believe, such a thing as the English speaking method of looking at the great affairs of mankind, and that outlook is of infinite value to the freedom and progress of the world.

We can overdo the glib slogan of "understanding America"—or Scotland or Ireland—"by appreciating our differences", although neither American nor, for that matter, Russian relations should be made to depend on a glossing of facts which ultimately destroys understanding. What is required is the faith, such as we saw at Harvard, which makes new facts by will and courage and vision. We must not leave these high issues to small-gauge men whose eyes can never see over the nearest objection and whose temperament leaves them without the will to do so.

FEEDING EUROPE

By Sir William Beach Thomas

WHEN the war against Germany ends the better part of Europe will be on the edge of starvation and *for a long period* will be quite unable by its own efforts to keep the enemy at bay, to become self-sufficient and to feed itself. When this war started, Germany, which had been wholly unravaged and had taken pains to maintain stock and fertility, had not yet made good her losses on the land: stock were fewer and worse, fields less fertile in 1939 than in 1913. An observer in 1886 pointed out that the land workers near Smolensk were still suffering from Napoleon's campaign in 1812. To-day almost every country on the Continent has been emptied and starved as never before both by the direct acts of war and by the deliberate and thorough robberies of the conquerors. It is no wonder that one of our greatest scientific agriculturists now engaged in the vast, beneficent work of organizing means and methods for the feeding of Europe estimates, as he told me, that the work in hand must last a minimum of sixteen years. It is virtually impossible to restore the quality and quantity of stock within a shorter period.

What is being done to make defence against the lean years that lie ahead? Starvation has already killed tens of thousands and would have killed more if the Allies had not sent in food to some of the conquered countries and brought food to those liberated. The grain sent to Greece and the milk brought to North Africa by the Americans are salient examples. The first step must be to supply each country as it is liberated with stores of food accumulated for the purpose; but that is a partial and temporary measure. A much bigger and more complex duty remains: to provide the would-be producers in each country with the means of producing food. This has been fully realized by the Allies; and a great organization is now at work, at an English Headquarters. England must for geographic reasons, if for no others, remain the chief base of operations through several years of peace as it has been in the long years of war. About the work very little has been said or written; but the right and proper anxiety of very many thoughtful people demands that the problem should be stated and some of the preparations to solve it made public. The scale is large enough to touch the dullest imagination; and nothing similar either in quality or scale is to be found in history.

After the last war, though many peoples were on the edge of starvation the re-establishment of production in Europe was left to private energy and the

total sum of effort was small. The Society of Friends did a good deal. The Royal Agricultural Society showed their generosity by giving stock to the Belgian farmers. By far the most pictorial and novel agricultural show I ever attended centred about a group of English cattle, exhibited before distribution in the midst of the ruins of Ypres. Among details I remember vividly the astonishment of the Belgian smallholder at the sight of an East-Anglian red-poll. He had never before seen or heard of a cow without horns!

After this war such private efforts could not touch the fringe of Europe's needs. The Germans have not only sent all the food they could lay hands on into Germany; they have stolen or destroyed many of the essential weapons of production; and their zeal for theft and destruction is likely to be increased immensely at the hour of final retreat. The farmers will have few machines or tools, few standing crops, next to no seed or fertilizers, and little stock of any sort for the supply of meat, milk or eggs. Even many of the fruit trees have been and will be demolished. How thorough the Germans are at this sort of work, I saw in the last war. They cut down methodically even little espalier trees against the walls of humble cottages. A great many farmers will not even possess homesteads.

The problem of restoring production throughout the length and breadth of Europe is going to be colossal, and a colossal effort is under way. The body of experts who are taking in hand this long-range, practical and yet highly imaginative work have terms of reference which suggest that their scope is without boundary. Their title tells the tale: "The Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau" which is under the generalship of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross. Separate divisions of activity have been formed and put under the direction of men whose knowledge of the particular job has been tested by experience. One example may be given. Agriculture as such and according to the derivation of the word is under the guidance of Sir John Russell, who after nearly a generation of fruitful work as Director of Rothamsted (oldest and best agricultural station in the world) has resigned in the year of Rothamsted's centenary. Now this station has an international reputation and I found it accepted as a leader in the communal farms in Palestine and in many parts of Canada and Australia. Students have hailed from almost all European countries, not least Russia. Indeed one member of the staff is a Russian princess! These students have kept in touch with their Alma Mater; and so Sir John starts work not only with a close personal knowledge of many countries, again including Russia, and with his own skill in agricultural science, but also is in touch with a multitude of local observers. Already formal requests from many countries, including the Balkans, have been received, asking that Britain should give them leadership in the supply of scientific advice. In consequence a bureau is to be set up—on which Rothamsted will be represented—at a headquarters in the Near East to survey and give advice over an area, including North Africa, rather bigger than Europe.

Now the first necessity is a survey, and a survey of a particular sort. The

subject must be studied with reference to what the biologists call ecology, which may be described as the study of habitat habits. Climate, situation and custom have given each locality its bent. The people, probably for good reason, prefer to grow particular crops and keep particular animals; sugar-beet here, rye there. Pigs, poultry, sheep, goats and cattle are the master stock in various localities. More than this: it has been thought wise to take note even of the varieties (not only the species) of grain and stock that suit this place and that, or are especially desired. Even particular machines—and a special committee is dealing with machinery—will be needed for different districts. The Ford tractor has as proper an affinity for lighter soils as yellow-legged poultry for heavy soils or sugar-beet for deep soils. The material for such detailed and intricate surveys has been accumulated in many references and in regard to particular countries and districts.

Now the German thieves, who have studied the details of agricultural robbery as thoroughly as the removal of urban wealth, will have denuded all countries of their stock. There will be no good bulls, rams or boars left outside Germany; and inside Germany the majority will have become beef, mutton or pork. The needful number can scarcely be imported. A good bull for example, may weigh a ton and is not always amenable. How well I remember the wild chase of a milch cow on Calais platform in the last war. It had been sent over by Lord Raleigh in response to an urgent telegram begging for milk for the hospital! To meet this difficulty one of the latest practices of science is to be followed: the stock of the Continent will be multiplied and graded up by artificial insemination. The method was first studied and recommended in Russia. Just before the outbreak of war I found considerable zeal for the practice in Denmark, which has the right to be considered an expert pioneer in the breeding of good commercial classes of stock. Hostility to a device that is regarded as contrary to the laws of nature is widespread in England, but not so, I fancy, on the Continent; and its practical success has been abundantly proved in many countries. In the dreadful pass to which Europe has been brought—and the worst is not yet—it would enable the Requirements Bureau to get over one of their difficulties.

All the committees have a double task before them. First they must rush supplies of food, of fertilizers, of feeding stuffs and of machines to the Continent to meet the risk of immediate starvation to man, stock and tilth. Second, they feel it to be their duty to organize a long-term policy by which the stripped and starving countries may be enabled in the years to come to restore, and indeed enhance, the old peace-time fertility. This will not be easy. It is reckoned for example, that if and supposing each district could be instantly supplied with suitable seed for the next season's crops, the starving people would be tempted beyond that they were able; and would convert the seed into flour, perhaps also convert stock into meat. So arises a political issue, of which, it is to be hoped, the meaning will be realized by those politically-minded English and Americans who see threats to their favourite

creed in the most benevolent acts. Just as the Red Cross, in its international sphere, must see to it that food parcels sent to prisoners of war are not consumed by their captors, so some sort of general organization must remain in control of these necessary supplies from abroad to the primary producers in Europe. Something after the nature of a civilian Amgot, however differently directed, will have to come into being if the really splendid work now being organized is to bear its full fruits. The nature of this directive power cannot of course be decided by these altruistic caterers and vicarious husbandmen. They can only in this regard make suggestions and posit the problem; but the stress put by Mr. Churchill in his more recent pronouncements on the need of British and American collaboration after the war should apply as essentially to the feeding of the Continent as to its political constitution. The very first article in the creed of security is proper feeding and clothing. On the map this island of ours looks almost like a jockey, riding with the hunched seat of a Tod Sloane, on the back of an animal of most eccentric shape; and the jockey will in many respects be forced by its position in the saddle to direct the course of continental restoration; but this need not imply that the larger part of the work is British rather than American. The Americans have had a good deal of experience in feeding Europe and some in promoting its agriculture. Thousands of Belgians owed health and indeed life to President Hoover and other generous distributors of food from overseas. The rapid advance in scientific agriculture, especially in the department of mechanics, was due in the years immediately preceding the war to the engagement of large numbers of young American engineers, who had to wrestle with much psychological obstruction. Some of the peasants were not wholly convinced that the tractor was not an engine of the devil. They had to fight against direct sabotage as well as passive resistance due both to ignorance and a desire to remain ignorant. Some American machines, such as the Ford tractor, have an even wider international connection than the Rothamsted pamphlets and students.

All this experience should add invaluable knowledge to the committees, both in making their surveys of needs and soils and climate and in providing the seeds, machines, tools and animals that are most urgently required. More than this: a very large proportion of the stuff to be ready waiting when peace is declared must be supplied from North America. We cannot produce in England any considerable excess of food, of feeding stuffs or of seed, and seed may be stretched to include potatoes. We import a great deal of seed for market garden crops—and they are of course much more intensive than grain crops—from the Continent. Cauliflower seed, for example, must be imported from Italy or companion districts. We have bought a good deal of wheat seed from French agricultural syndicates and from Sweden, though we have also exported; and in general while the movement of food is general from South to North, the South has a preference (as in English reliance on Scotch seed potatoes) for seed from the North. In the early part of the war

our stock was in some danger of starving for want of such imported feeding stuffs as linseed cake. Some of our seed merchants are the best in the world; and even the United States have endeavoured to buy our reserve of such seed as the invaluable white clover. Nevertheless the escape of Europe from a state of starvation or semi-starvation—and already tuberculosis has risen nearly 20 per cent. through underfeeding—will largely depend both in the short term policy and the long on reserves of food and fodder and machines from North America; and this, I think, is well understood in the United States and throughout the Prairie provinces of Canada; and the idealism, sometimes it must be confessed more sentimental than real, that informs the American public, has never been more finely brought to issue than in the provision of the necessities of life to other less happier lands threatened by near starvation. I shall never forget seeing during the last war in the office of the Minister of Agriculture (as we should call him) an immense pile of letters from provinces and townships pledging themselves to eat maize (which is not to our taste a very pleasant food) in lieu of wheat, because they had been instructed that wheat travelled much better than maize in the body of the ship. That was practical idealism in being, a significant predecessor to lend-lease.

The general work of feeding the Continent is enlarged and complicated by the growing deficiency of many foods in the neutral as well as the conquered countries. Sweden, Spain, even India and now Italy, as well as some districts of North Africa are very near the edge, are beginning to tighten their belts; and though something is being done even during the war to satisfy immediate needs in some conquered countries also, the longer the war lasts the more extravagant becomes the scale of organization and operation for the peace-time campaign. This means that reserves must if possible be secured in whatever region there is chance of a surplus, such as Syria; and it may mean the direct exchange of special foods. Even such arid countries as Palestine have surplus enough of citrus fruit to save the life and health of thousands of European children. All such questions and very many more in minute detail known only to the organizers themselves, must come under the consideration of the Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau. It has already been proved in Sicily that a census of production is necessary. Starvation may be due both to hoarding (as happened in salient examples during the occupation of the Ruhr after the last war) or to faulty distribution, as recently in Bengal, where both causes operated. However the immediate feeding of liberated populations is comparatively simple, though costly, compared with the prompt restoration of agriculture. Recent discoveries in nutrition already facilitate the job. If we had known as much about scientific nutrition when the South Polar expedition was organized as we know to-day, there would in all probability have been no final tragedy.

During a short absence from the front in the last war, I made a short dash to the United States and visited Detroit with a small business committee.

Incidentally Mr. Ford turned out a Fordson tractor—his first love—in 27 minutes! The tractor is likely to play a big part in restoring fertility to Europe; but over wide areas the farmers are not mechanics enough to use them and in others the surface of the land is not suitable. The shortage of horses will be almost universal and the absence of stock will compel the use of artificial fertilizers, which will be difficult to secure in adequate measure. An endless number of small things will be deficient, such for example as binder twine which even in peace was an English export to the Balkans. An army of helpers will be needed, for a huge proportion of Continental small farmers are slaves in Germany, and a good many are dead.

It will be apparent to the most casual observer how vast and how complicated a problem faces the Allies in the field of production as in the field of politics. The quality of the British and American agriculturists, who more over got to work in good time, should give doubters a reasonable assurance that the advice at any rate, the sum of ready-made knowledge will be of the best. The schemes for the supply of seeds, fertilizers, machines and the rest will cover the whole field. There will be bureaux of advice in the Middle East as well as in England. It may also be confidently expected that the supply of volunteers and specially enrolled helpers will be sufficient. It is my own experience that great numbers of young women, chiefly from the Land Army, are anxious to go to the Continent after the war and lend a hand in this work. The executive side of the work, the practical application of the scheme on the spot is another question. Political criticism of Amgot is already multiplying. The more sensitive democrats seem to fear that the establishment of such a rule, even at the beginning of the years of transition, shows the cloven foot of dictatorial régime, that it will illegitimately and against all our professions of faith interfere with the internal political affairs of other countries, that our New Order may smell a little of Hitler's New Order. Speaking entirely from my own inferences, from what few facts are within my knowledge, I cannot escape from the fear that a good part of the value of the thorough-going expert work which is being put into the schemes for restoring the fertility, the health of the land in those parts of the Continent ravaged and robbed of their men and their apparatus, in the largest sense of the word—I cannot but fear that in these regards the blindness of self-constituted politicians may half ruin the work of the experts. All the political critics should realize that the immediate problem, when the war ends, is the conquest of want. Starvation or half starvation is the enemy and will remain the enemy for five or perhaps six years. Just as an organization has been found necessary on an international scale for ensuring an even supply of raw materials to the suffering nations of the world, whether in the ranks of the vanquished, the victors or the neutrals, so a strong body with executive powers will be necessary for implementing the wise and far-reaching plans that Allied agriculturists are perfecting. The best-laid, and wholly altruistic plans may "gang aft agley", if sinister politicians prefer their

abstract ideas before the duty of filling the bellies of the hungry and restoring mother earth to the full use of her maternal service. International peace cannot be founded on empty stomachs any more than an army can march where the Quartermaster fails. The sooner the land is properly equipped and agriculture gets into its stride, the sooner political freedom will be possible in the world. It is only owing to Amgot, whatever its deficiencies in practice or in theory, that both typhoid and phthisis can be arrested in the countries liberated. Some of us hold that the failure of the League of Nations was due in essence to its failure to put such primal needs as health and nutrition in the forefront of its influence. Political concerns ruined its prospects of a general beneficence. However such things may be, an Allied League of direction in agricultural concerns to endure for several years seems to many of those who have the widest knowledge of the devastated condition of Europe to be an urgent vital necessity. To give the plainest and simplest example from history, at the worst period of famine in Russia after the last war a good deal of priceless grain was used for the manufacture of alcohol; and seed was almost unattainable. There are of course other dangers in respect of the ill-use of grain meant for seed and stock meant for breeding. Some of these have been much advertized in Bengal. In any case and however conscientiously the imported products are used the nutrition of the population of Europe will remain an acute problem for a number of years after peace is proclaimed. A long transition period of control must be accepted as a condition precedent to the restoration of the farms of Europe. The soil has been denuded not by the cutting of trees (though most orchards are likely to be deliberately destroyed, as in the last war) or by the ravages of goats, which (it has been argued) destroyed two Mediterranean civilizations, not even by the incidence of war, though this of course is deadly, but by the direct and highly organized brigandage of German thieves, destroyers and slave-masters. All countries, so dragooned through years of misery, will demand and get political liberty; but it is difficult to be free on an empty stomach. The soil needs liberty as well as the people, and this cannot very well be restored without some control by those who are preparing to provide the means for a progressive restoration of fertility. The machines, the fuel, the fertilizers, the breeding stock, the seed must be used to the best advantage, if the thin years are not to extend indefinitely, as they have extended in the past. Many

> Old unhappy far-off things
> And battles long ago

are still remembered through the poverty of those who seek a livelihood on the else forgotten battlefields.

THE HALF-PATRIOT

By LO

I.

THE moon which bathes the Curragh of Kildare
When Liffey ebbs will flood the fogbound quays,
To the sad sobbing ship hold out a flare
Guiding her Dublinwards from war to ease.
Old Sackville Street will shine in that night hour,
And the high dome which Gandon nobly planned,
Look elsewhere for our ancient Irish dower,
These are but fabrics of a tyrant's hand.
I drew in hatred at my mother's breast,
Learnt the long record of my country's shame,
Flung into manhood in a dark unrest,
Answered the Easter call with heart aflame
And fought for Ireland. Much is best forgot.
The Sherwood Foresters came swinging free
Into my fore-sight and my gun grew hot,
And boys killed boys because it had to be.
Raise high our flag,—the Orange, White and Green!
That other anthem echoes through my brain.
There was a pride of England. I have seen
Her pride cast down never to rise again,
The redcoat swagger on the Castle hill,
The surge of Empire on the City Quay,
All vanished, all her emblems marred. Yet still
What Moriarty said comes back to me,
"*Once a Great People crossed the Irish Sea.*"

II.

Scan the wide prospect from high Galtee Mor,
Trace how a river skirts the screened demesnes,
Ascendancy her silken raiment wore
While sullen peasants sank beneath their chains.
Know the true sign and token of the Gael,
Sing "Croppy Boy" or speak of Ninety Eight,
Tell and re-tell the Famine's oft-told tale,—
Our pulses quicken to an inborn hate.
Who can the justice or the wrong appraise?

God willed it so. Men played their tragic parts,
And many gently born had gentle ways,
Hard laws can make hard cases, not hard hearts.
With us they shared delight in horse and hounds
But served a cause we hate, a flag we scorn.
Milady's lackeys on her gracious rounds
Saw Captain Moonlight's shadow on the lawn.
High over household regiments of trees
The turret window flashed an evening ray,
Loud roared the flames upon the midnight breeze,
I saw the Vale of Brosna clear as day.
Cromwell, that night a reckoning we made!
We burned the house to set the cabin free,
Yet when I walk in Brosna's mournful glade
What Moriarty said comes back to me,
" *Once a Great People crossed the Irish Sea.*"

III.

I was a soldier,—rebel—better so;
For rebels may be shrived a midnight deed—
A fleck of foam swept in a torrent flow,
A seedling at the ripening of the seed.
From rotting hulk, from cell and scaffold tomb
Dead heroes bade me follow where they led,
The saints of God had joy of England's doom,
She could not fight the living and the dead.
Freedom is won! Yet faint the harp that once
Woke fuller echoes over Tara's stage,
Colder the hands which welcomed Ireland's sons
To wider prospects and an ampler page.
Though on our kindred world a Fury breaks
Fame writes no Irish name on freedom's scroll:
'Twere better had Saint Patrick spared the snakes
And sealed the springs of venom in our soul.
An England worthier than we knew stands guard
On the white headlands of her Kentish shore,
Aloft her squadrons wheel and battle-scarred
She turns to die, or live for evermore.
Hush! 'Tis the fateful chiming of Big Ben,
Now Churchill grips our hearts in Innisfree,
Half shamed we hear the tramp of marching men,
What Moriarty said comes back to me,
" *Once a Great People crossed the Irish Sea.*"

THE RESURRECTION OF AUSTRIA

By Ernst Klein

LONG before Hitler had " saved " Austria and taken over the " protection " of Czechoslovakia, there was an increasing desire among the Danubian States to find a basis of mutual understanding for the establishment of a new community. It was realized in Prague, in Belgrade and in Bucharest, the three capitals of the Little Entente, that their alliance, founded on negative aims, did not possess enough internal strength to resist the attack of so powerful a foe as Nazi-Germany. The army of 175 divisions which the Little Entente was supposed to hurl against the aggressor of one of its members, proved in the hour of need to be a myth. There was hope, after the outbreak of the war, that the Danubian States would show signs of having learned the bitter lesson given by such a convincing preceptor as Hitler. More than once their representatives in Britain came together in official meetings to try to eliminate the errors of the past. Dr. Benes, before the war one of the most ardent propagators of the " absolute sovereignty " of each of the Central European States, declared in a lecture in November, 1941, at Aberdeen University:

> It is true that the absolute sovereignty of each of them (the Central European States) was a burden on the economic life of the territory and facilitated the interference by Germany and Italy with the economic policy of certain Central European States. Post-war planned economy will best develop within the framework of wider territories than those represented by small states.

It was clear from the tenor of his speech that the Czech statesman included Austria in his conception of " Central European States "—a fact which was highly appreciated in Austrian political circles everywhere.

The attitude of the Czechs towards the Socialist Sudeten Germans, exiled in England, also seemed to take a turn for the better. Dr. Benes conceived a plan of enlarging the advisory body of his government, the Czechoslovak Council, by offering six seats to the Sudeten Socialists. Negotiations began, but were abortive. The explanation of this deplorable fact must be sought in the reactions of the Czechs in this country to the sufferings of their people at home. It is the Sudeten Nazis who, as the fanatical helpers of the German Nazis, are responsible for the deterioration in the relation between Czechs and Sudeten Germans in exile. In a speech made here last June, Mr. Slavik, Minister for the Interior of the Czech government, threw the Sudeten Socialists into the same pot as the Sudeten Nazis, by referring to them as a " group outside the anti-Fascist Unity."

The Czechs returned also to their traditional suspicion against Austria. For example the Czech airmen and soldiers serving in the British forces were

informed—I do not know whether officially or unofficially—that if they married Austrian girls their wives would be excluded from the benefit of any allowances or pensions.

The situation between Austria and Yugoslavia is as bad. Yugoslavia has from the beginning pursued a hostile policy towards Austria. No change for the better could be registered as the internal difficulties of Yugoslavia grew. In Yugoslav circles in Great Britain the groups advocating a determined centralistic policy succeeded in breaking up the unity between Serbia and the other members of their state which—it is true—was never very strong. The present Yugoslav Government under Mr. Trifunovic is nothing but a poor compromise. No solution is in sight, and although promised again and again, an unequivocal statement of policy on a democratic basis, giving equal rights to Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Mohammedan Bosnians has not been forthcoming. The Croats are keeping themselves aloof from the new Yugoslav Government and radical nationalist Serbian politicians are putting the blame on the centuries-old sympathies of the Croats for Austria. The Serbs have also concluded a rather vague alliance with Greece, a sign that they are definitely turning away from any thought of combining with the western Danubian countries.

In fact it is the same old miserable state of affairs as before the war. It is therefore understandable that the Governments of Great Britain and the United States refrain from any commitments in regard to the future of the Danube Basin. They are ready apparently to leave it to the Soviet Union to establish a new order in what is to them a most troublesome part of Europe.

On March 23 this year *The Times* wrote:

> . . . and while the organization of security in Eastern Europe, as throughout the world, will remain a matter of common and world-wide concern, the nucleus of military and economic power, which is the only effective instrument of security, must in that region, within the general framework, be provided primarily by Russia—the sole country east of Germany possessing industrial resources and development on a scale in any way equal to the task. This is a hard fact which cannot be overcome by wishful thinking or overlooked without dire peril. It is a fact of which the British and American peoples have increasingly become aware in recent months. Recognition of its implications and consequences is a condition of the establishment of relations of lasting confidence with Russia and must form an essential part both of British and of American policy.

It is true, before administering this bitter pill to the peoples of Central and South Eastern Europe, *The Times* sweetens it with a bit of political honey:

> This argument, cogent as it is, may lead, and has sometimes led, to misconceptions which it is necessary to remove. It does not invite Russia to ride roughshod over the interests and aspirations of smaller nations; on the contrary, it suggests the conditions in which a good neighbour policy, based on a sense of security and of assurance against external intervention, may become a reality in Eastern Europe.

Yet with all due respects to a great journal, do not these phrases express a thinking just as wishful as that to which *The Times* refers a few lines back?

It is wishful thinking, surely, to expect Soviet Russia to burden herself

with the cumbersome duties of a policeman in Central and Eastern Europe, without furthering her own interests. In policy, especially in world policy, there is no such thing as noble unselfishness. One cannot expect Russia, after making such sacrifices during the war, to go on doing so during peace. For proof one has only to watch Russia's preparations for the task which *The Times* allots her. The preparations are four-fold:

(1) In Moscow a "Free German Committee" has been founded. Its various duties are already very clearly defined.

(2) A "Soviet Government of Poland" has been founded with its seat in Moscow.

(3) With the utmost psychological care the German, Austrian, Hungarian, Slovak, Rumanian and Croat prisoners of war in Russian hands are being educated into good and reliable Communists. Of Hungarians alone there are 80,000 men in Russian prison camps. Their teacher is said to be no other than Belà Kun, the leader of the Hungarian Soviet Republic after the first World War.

(4) Russian propaganda is at work even in countries where the German Gestapo is still holding its sway. It is at work in Slovakia where a few weeks ago no less than 15,000 soldiers mutinied. In Bulgaria even the peasants are Communists. The Yugoslav partizans under the leadership of the mysterious Tito, are Communists. They are directed and armed by Moscow. Each effort to unite them with the guerrillas of General Mihailovitch, who represents the *bourgeois* element in the patriotic struggle against the German oppressors, has failed.

Russia is certainly preparing herself for the task of establishing order and peace in the most troublesome part of Europe. She is doing it in her own way. It is only a question of how far Marshal Stalin intends to extend his beat as European policeman. Another very important question is, will he do what Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia do not want to do? Will he include the centre of Central Europe, Austria, in the territory over which he is going to watch? It has to be remembered in this vital connection that Austria, after the first World War, although socialist and sandwiched between the Soviet Republic of Belà Kun in Budapest and that of Kurt Eisner in Munich, never turned Bolshevist. Austria, industrialized though she is in many parts, is on the whole a peasants' country, clerical and conservative.

It is therefore difficult to understand why Poland, the very power in Central Europe which feels herself most threatened by Russian preparations and intentions, feels towards Austria the same coldness as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Poland foresees the difficulties which are bound to arise at the Peace Conference, between her national ambitions and the political aims of Soviet Russia. She therefore seeks to erect a solid barrier against the westward advance of Russia by the foundation of a Confederation of all the countries she considers as the Central States of Europe. A few months ago a rather astonishing pamphlet *Central Union* appeared. It expounded the

organization of a Confederation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, Greece, Bulgaria and Albania. Lithuania appeared on the map of this "Central Union" not as an independent state, but as part of Greater Poland. The two remaining Baltic States, Esthonia and Latvia, are invited to join this Union. The pamphlet is written by two Englishmen, George Harrison and Peter Jordan, yet it is clearly done in the interests of Poland. In it Poland, together with Lithuania, is called the "keystone of the arch" and the capital of the future Union is to be Lomnica, a little town in that territory of the Carpathians which is claimed by Poland.

The pamphlet excludes Austria from this Confederation. Austria is supposed to be a danger, not only politically, but also *culturally*. It is true that the authors of the pamphlet do not express the same hostile sentiments of the Czechs or the Serbs against Austria. They even admit

> that the Habsburg rule, almost as harsh as the Prussian in the beginning of the XIXth century, was gradually relaxed during the long reign of Francis Joseph (1848-1916) and eventually became relatively benevolent and mild. Most of the different nationalities included in the Dual Monarchy enjoyed a degree of autonomy and they could use their own language. Nations other than Austria and Hungary and their members were occasionally included in the Cabinet . . . Nevertheless the Habsburg tradition although deserving respect in the economic sphere and to some extent in internal administration should be abandoned . . . the Austrians are a German people. The Central Union must be *non-German* in its composition. It should include all the lands of the Dual Monarchy, with the exception of Austria itself.

But this is not all—the full truth why for instance Albania is to be included in the Central Union and Austria not, comes out in the following sentence: "***Vienna is a fascinating city and it has always fascinated the people of Central Europe.*** It cannot be allowed to become the capital of the Union, for it would be a centre of German influence."

There we have the real reason why the Slav States of Central Europe want to close their doors to Austria: the fear of the "tradition of the Dual Monarchy." It is still in existence, because none of the Successor States has been able to replace it by one of its own. Even Budapest, although more cosmopolitan than Prague could not supersede Vienna in its traditional position as cultural capital of Central Europe. This is confirmed by a man whom nobody could accuse of a special predilection for Austria, Count Carlo Sforza, last Foreign Minister of Italy before Mussolini's arrival at power. In his small but interesting treatise *The Totalitarian War and After* he writes:

> Those who have really lived in Central Europe will know that, in spite of architectural or linguistic differences, there is more resemblance of customs, of traditions, of feelings between a Pole from Warsaw, a German from Vienna, a Rumanian from Bucharest, than between Ligurians from Italy, Provençals from France, and Catalans from Spain, although they may understand each other and live and trade on the same sea shores, from Genoa to Barcelona. In Central Europe they understand one another better because they live in a common eighteenth-century atmosphere, all with an identical agricultural civilization and with no literary particularisms—not at least, to the degree existing in Italy, England, and even Russia.

This statement comes from a man who at least has the same authority on European affairs as the Czech, Polish and Yugoslav statesmen who even to-day have not been able to free themselves from the narrowness of that exaggerated nationalism which is responsible for their countries' present plight.

If for this nationalist reason the Slav Central States do not want Austria to take part in their future union, Austria will remain on her own. She has already given ample proof that, even as the mutilated country left over from the old Dual Monarchy, she has the political and economic as well as cultural strength to maintain her independence. There are good reasons:

First, Austria has, compared to other European Central States, one great advantage. She knows nothing of internal national rifts. She is among the Central European States the only one which has a compact national population. There are only in the extreme south of the Austrian province of Carinthia a few thousand Slovenes who however in a plebiscite held after the peace of St. Germain voted not for Yugoslavia, but for Austria.

The fundamental importance of this national homogeneity is demonstrated by the contrast presented by the Danube States, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. The Czechs had a state in which they were not an absolute majority themselves: 7½ million Czechs against more than 3 million Sudeten Germans alone to whom had to be added about another three million Slovaks, Ruthenes, Magyars, Poles and Jews—with the exception of the Jews enemies of the Czechoslovakian Republic. The Serbs were no better off. Originally a small people of not more than 2½ millions they emerged from the first world war as the S.H.S. (*Serb Hrvat Slovene*) kingdom with a population of nearly 14 millions, among them 2 millions of Croats, 600,000 Germans and 500,000 Magyars whom the Serbs could scarcely regard as friends of their state. Rumania, the third member of the Little Entente, had no more than 12 millions of Rumanians against 6 millions of other, mostly hostile nationalities. In the pamphlet *Central Union* Poland appears as a state of 40 million inhabitants. The authors should know that the Poles there number no more than 16 millions.

That is the great and fateful error made by all these small and smaller nations: they believe that strength lies in numbers. They bluff themselves. As the present situation shows, they have to pay dearly for this error. The real internal strength of a country does not lie in the number of its population, but in the national compactness of this population. Switzerland is an exception. But none of these Successor States possessed the tradition or the political maturity of the Helvetian Republic. Therefore they were bound to become an easy prey to the external attacker.

Secondly, economic conditions furnish a no less convincing proof of Austria's ability to be independent. The *Heimkehr ins Reich*, the return into the *Reich*, was nothing but a figment of Nazi propaganda in order to camouflage Germany's designs on the natural resources of Austria. She needed

them for her war preparations. Austria has iron-ore deposits of a total of 220,000,000 tons with an iron content of about 80,000,000 tons. At the time of the "liberation" the output totalled some 1,800,000 annually. One can be certain the Germans have increased it at least by 50 per cent: The steel output which was in 1938 about 600,000 tons has also been increased.

Before the war Austria supplied about one-half of the world demand of magnesite and produced about 2,500,000 tons of lignite. The Germans will have increased the output to the level of their needs. They have increased the output of the oil which Austria possesses in the Marchfeld, a deposit which yielded before the war 30,000 tons per annum, by no less than 600 per cent. Of the greatest importance however are the timber riches of Austria. More than one-third of the country is afforested. In the year 1935 Germany alone imported timber from Austria for 7,700,000 Reichsmark. The figure ought to be much higher now. Finally Austria's water-power has to be taken into consideration. It is estimated as high as 1,700,000 H.P. of which before 1938 only one million was put into use.

To this wealth of natural economic resources must be added the importance of Austria's geographic situation. Vienna is the gateway to Eastern Europe from the West. After the first world war the Czechs, supported by France, tried to direct through Prague the Orient Express which connects London and Paris with Constantinople and Bucharest as well as with Athens and which had passed since its foundation through Vienna. But the Czech experiment failed. After a short time the Orient Express again thundered over the Austrian railway. The Romans, the founders of Vienna, knew very well why they erected one of their strongest colonies just at this point where the Danube emerges from the Alps into the vast Hungarian plain. Hitler too knew why he began his march of conquest with the march on Vienna. There was in this country one man too who realized the geographic and economic importance of Austria for Central and Southern Europe: that man was Mr. Winston Churchill. During the debate in the House of Commons on the rape of Austria, he declared that the mastery of Vienna had given to Germany economic control of the communications of South-Eastern Europe by road, river and rail. He predicted that Czechoslovakia would be isolated and the normal trade channels of the other Danube countries so obstructed as to cause serious disturbances. As a matter of fact this obstruction became Hitler's main instrument in reducing all the Danubian countries.

This fundamental truth, seen by Mr. Churchill, is still unrecognized by the Slav States of Central Europe. Instead of opening their doors as wide as possible to Austria, they prefer her to remain within the German *Reich*. They are not so much afraid of the political and economic importance of Vienna as of its "attractiveness for the peoples of Central Europe."

It is the *tradition of Austria* which, as Count Sforza points out, forms the fundamental premise for the cultural homogeneity of the Central and Southern European countries. It is, also in my opinion, the strongest argument in

favour of the independence of Austria. Tradition gave Austria, saddled by peace with burdens which would have crushed a far larger country, not only an indefatigable power of resistance, but also of resurrection. It was in Salzburg, in Mozart's town, where this miracle of resurrection was started. There a Catholic priest, Prince Bishop Waitz, and a Jewish producer, Max Reinhardt, joined forces with one of the greatest of all living artists, the Italian Toscanini, and made of the old bishops town a centre where every year the cultural world used to meet in a setting unique in the world, the wonderful Domplatz. These Salzburg Festivals provided Austria not only with fame reaching into the four corners of the world, but also with an income of more than 7 million schillings a year.

Lastly, one of the slogans with which the Nazis did their best to make the rape of Austria palatable to the world was that they had to save "this starving and poverty-stricken country." A few figures will suffice to nail this Nazi lie.

Germany's booty in the "starving and poverty-stricken" Austria was 220 million marks in gold which had been the security for the Austrian currency and was stocked in the Austrian National Bank in Vienna; 53 million marks in gold, deposited at the Bank of England as guarantee for the payment of the interests for the divers Austrian loans; 100 million marks in outstanding sums payable on Austrian clearing and trade agreements; 55 million schillings, property of the Austrian trade unions which were confiscated by the Nazi Labour Front; 1,600 million marks in gold, foreign currency and foreign shares which the Austrian public had to deliver to the German authorities; the enormous value consisting of the property of the Austrian State, the inestimable treasures of the museums, picture galleries and the former Imperial Treasury in Vienna. At the time when Hitler marched into Vienna to save "starving" Austria, Germany had in her possession just 76 million marks. No more figures are needed.

If the Central and Southern States of Europe cannot overcome the narrowness of their nationalism and insist on founding a Slav Union with the exclusion of the *non Slav*, but also *non-German* Austria, Austria will wish nothing more but to regain her full independence. She never will remain the *Ostmark* with Germany. She will become Austria again. Nothing else. She has not only all the political, economic, financial and above all cultural conditions but she has the right based on the Atlantic Charter and on the declaration which Mr. Winston Churchill as Prime Minister of Great Britain made in November, 1940, stating "that Austria was one of the countries for whom we have drawn the sword and for whom our victory would supply liberation."

(Mr. Klein has had long and varied experience in German and Austrian journalism and prior to the outbreak of war was Foreign Correspondent of the "Basler Nachrichten.")

THE FUTURE OF THE B.B.C.

By Maurice Petherick, M.P.

An altogether novel instrument for creating unity of thought and emotion between scattered individuals has been evolved by broadcasting.

THESE words are to be found in the introduction to the British Broadcasting Corporation's Annual for 1936. They referred to the broadcast on the occasion of the death of King George V. and to the way in which the B.B.C. had united the Empire in a loving tribute to a great monarch. The words were thus intended to be self-congratulatory in character rather than to serve as a stern warning against the misuse to which broadcasting might be put.

Few would now deny the immensity of the power for good or evil of this invention. In the right hands it may be of great advantage to the human race, but, in the wrong, may be used as a weapon to fashion the thoughts and minds of men into one great, homogeneous, lethal mass. In the years before the war the control in the hands of the Nazi government of this most potent part of the propaganda machine had more influence than any other in first making the German people ready for war and then inciting them to it. Hysterical appeals, half truths, bullying, distortions and lies, all these were used and are still being used, by the German broadcasting service. It is not enough to say that their methods will recoil in the end upon the originators, because the damage will have been done in the meantime. Nemesis may overtake the murderer, but she cannot restore the slain to life.

An American judge once remarked that " the test of the truth is its ability to make itself felt in the competition of the market." Over a period of time, indeed, truth will triumph and no force is so deadly as a weapon of propaganda. And moreover, apart from the ethical merits of truth-telling, it pays. People no doubt tend to have short memories, particularly the German people, and it may be possible over a comparatively short period to deceive them, but, when once their eyes are opened, their disillusionment and despair have double force. It can fairly be claimed on behalf of the B.B.C. that during its life it has both acknowledged and endeavoured to follow the ancient maxim of *Magna est veritas et prevalebit.*

Most systems of broadcasting in the various countries, with the notable exception of the United States of America, were, even before the war, state owned or state controlled in a greater or lesser degree. There are those who decry the principle, if it can be called a principle, of nationality and who yearn

for an international brotherhood of man, for a world in which all peoples, great and small, black, yellow, brown and white, shall speak the same language, think the same thoughts and eat the same cultural and spiritual food. A world, in fact, in which a good though somewhat dull time will be had by all. But, whether they like it or not, these differences of race, language, habits and outlook which go to constitute diverse nationalities do in fact exist. And nowhere in the several branches of a nation's activity are these differences more evident than in its broadcasting, whether it be carried out by the State, by a controlled corporation, or by a privately owned company or companies.

This, it may be claimed, is by no means undesirable. Indeed, so long as nationality exists, a beneficent internationalism, that is an understanding on the part of the people of one nation of those of another, is fostered and encouraged by national self-revelation in language, music, culture and news, by means of the wireless. Thus broadcasting, if properly conducted, far from doing harm, should do the more good if it is, in each country, truly national. The art of oratory is to convince, to show to listeners the speaker's mind, thoughts and views. So should a nation's broadcasting be, as it were, a super-orator and portray to the world the very soul of that nation.

The first programme broadcast from London took place on November 14, 1922, and was emitted by the old British Broadcasting Company, Limited, to which the Corporation is heir and successor in business. The B.B.C. can thus reasonably claim to be twenty-one years old this month, an occasion ordinarily demanding an ebullition of felicitations, more or less sincere, depending on the person or institution which attains his or its majority, together with some examination of the past record and future prospects of the victim.

It is worth reminding the hypercritical that broadcasting is an entirely new and modern invention, that these twenty-one years have been largely experimental and that it is too much to expect of such an institution a perfection, an epitome of the wisdom of the ages, which the most sanguine do not dare to hope for in the government of their country. The mistakes of the B.B.C. are obvious and often remembered, its successes less apparent and soon forgotten. You remember the trains you have missed but not the ones you have caught.

Viewed in this agreeably but justifiably tolerant light, the B.B.C. may fairly be said to have carried out its difficult task well and honourably. This claim is borne out by the large increase in the number of customers who presumably would not pay their licence fees, even in war time, unless they thought the cost of them and that of buying and maintaining their wireless sets was justified. Furthermore, during the course of its existence, although a number of Committees have sat on the B.B.C., none have done so very heavily and a general measure of reserved commendation has been customary.

It is well to remember that the B.B.C., contrary to the hardily sustained belief of many people at home and abroad, is not and never has been a government Department. It is, as its name implies, an independent corporation constituted by, and operating under, a Royal Charter. It took over in 1927 the

functions and assets of the five year old British Broadcasting Company which was itself an amalgamation of a number of smaller privately owned concerns. The charter under which it operates came into force on January 1, 1927, and ran for ten years, at the end of which time it was renewed with certain modifications for a further decade.

In addition to its charter the Corporation has an agreement with the Postmaster General which empowers it to maintain stations and gives him the right to take over all those stations in case of need, a right which, in spite of the war, it has never been found necessary to exercise. Though independent in constitution, its relations with the Government machine particularly in war time, are close, and indeed Departments of State have a right to require it to issue any statements they may consider necessary.

The B.B.C. is governed by a Council of seven members, though for a time during the war the number was reduced to two in order to secure rapidity of decision. Under the Council is a Director-General who is, as it were, the Permanent Under Secretary, to use the analogy of a Government Department, or in the position of a manager, under the board, of a public company.

In addition to its headquarters and different war-time off-shoots therefrom the B.B.C. has six regional organizations, each under a regional director. In normal times each of these provides a special programme of its own to suit the area, but now the programmes are centralized with additions from the different regions which have, so to speak, to take pot luck at the worst, or fight their way into the programmes by merit at the best.

Only probably the regular wireless "fan" in the general public would realize the great variety of programmes which are, or may be, presented during an average week. There is news, music of all kinds, variety, plays, opera, religion, politics, literature, sport, the children's hour and a score of other subjects. All these are intended primarily for our own people at home and abroad. But in 1938 a service was started in a modest way in foreign languages which grew rapidly as a result of the war until now broadcasts are being made in nearly fifty different tongues almost all round the clock. These are under the complete control and direction of the Government. The Minister of Information proudly admits, indeed claims, responsibility for them, while passing the buck about every other matter connected with the B.B.C.

The finance of the corporation is of interest not only to those who are on its pay roll, but also to others who are in a genteel and dispassionate way concerned about its future. Compared with some present day balance sheets, which combine the attractions of the Fourth Form, Alice in Wonderland and the Old Bailey, it is almost deadeningly respectable, except that, having an income but no capital, it is able quite honestly and correctly to unite the two in a manner which is not only understandable but illuminating.

Up till the war the B.B.C. had two main sources of income, its share (about 75 per cent.) of the net licence fees paid by listeners which amounted in 1938 to some four million pounds and the net return which it received from the sale

of its publications. Out of this income the money had to be found not only for running expenses but also for capital expenditure.

After the outbreak of war a great additional burden was thrown upon these resources owing to the foreign broadcasts and propaganda services carried out at the direction of the Government. Clearly, therefore, the previous income was insufficient and the outlay has latterly been covered by a grant from the Treasury amounting at present to some £10,000,000 a year, though the Government now retains the income from licence fees.

This briefly is the general history and organization of the B.B.C. at the time of its twenty-first birthday. As the period set to its present charter is also nearing its end, the time appears suitable for considering its future.

There is no doubt that the general conduct of a national broadcasting institution must be a highly difficult one. Apart from the multitudinous and intricate technical troubles, of which continued exactitude of timing seems to the layman to be perhaps the most acute, there is the perpetual problem of trying to please as many people, and displease as few, as possible. Unlike a politician who ought to possess principles and be willing to declare and uphold them honestly and frankly regardless of popularity, it is the duty of the B.B.C. not to have fixed and dogmatic opinions about anything except technical perfection and public decency. It should rather endeavour, as a microcosm of the nation, to portray in its own particular medium that nation at its best.

Criticism does the B.B.C. no harm provided it is sane and balanced. Indeed it is doubtful whether it gets enough. It has been known to claim quite seriously that it receives very little hostile and very much appreciative and adulatory criticism. It should beware of being led astray by that. If a listener wants to hear more George Robey he will write off to Broadcasting House and ask for it. If he wants to hear less Priestley he will, unless he feels deeply moved, not bother to write a letter, but will just switch him off.

There has been perennial discussion about the musical and other programmes of the B.B.C. since its inception and it is indeed healthy that it should continue. Within the organization itself it is understood that those responsible are by no means complacent about their quality and the general public can hardly be said to be generally convinced that they could not be vastly improved.

But perhaps most controversy has raged round the political side of the B.B.C. which in theory of course has no politics. The Right is apt at frequent intervals to lash itself into a near frenzy because someone of naughty tendencies has "put over a quick one." At times Conservatives complain that the B.B.C. elevates some facile nonentity of Leftist, or even a person of subversive views, with a "micromanner", into a national figure and that it then turns round and says we must have him on the air because he *is* a national figure. At other times too much prominence seems to be given to reports of Liberal or Labour conferences or personages, whereas those of the Right appear to be neglected. But at the same time there is a low but continuing

rumble from the Left that, whatever may be the individual evidences to the contrary, the general tendency of our broadcasting is in the direction of a steady, *bourgeois*, yes, and even Conservative respectability.

The truth probably is that the B.B.C. does honestly try to steer a steady middle course, while endeavouring to give all sides substantial justice and all views within reason fair treatment, but that, human nature being what it is, individual political or other predilections do sometimes make themselves felt, thus causing gnashings of teeth without, and embarrassment within Broadcasting House.

It would be pleasant in this article to give rein to the passions and indulge in a few cracks about crooners (T'row dat baby to de wolves: can't you hear dem howlin'?) but boys cannot invariably be boys and there is ahead the more serious work of discussing the future of the B.B.C. now that it is approaching the end of its hitherto allotted span.

It is impossible for a body, human or otherwise, to operate satisfactorily over a period of time, unless its constitution be sound. In common with many other British institutions the B.B.C. was started in order to fulfil a want. Not overmuch time was wasted on theory and it was gradually built up by trial and error to its present status. It is, however, now necessary to take stock, and a little examination should show that the existing constitution is not satisfactory.

To begin with, being a statutory corporation carrying on a great public service, it is not under a Minister of the Crown and consequently not in peace-time subject in the ordinary way to Parliamentary challenge and scrutiny. It is true that, presumably owing to its agreement with the Postmaster General, that Minister can be questioned in the House on B.B.C. policy, but the (previous) Speaker of the House of Commons has ruled that this does not extend to questions about administration. The Minister of Information on the other hand has repeatedly stated that he is responsible only for foreign broadcasts. It is true that the conduct of the Corporation can occasionally be debated, but nothing specific on this point is laid down.

Now in the case of an ancient institution of proved and known powers an amorphous constitution may be a positive advantage, but a new organization, particularly one so much in the public eye, should operate within clearly defined rules. And it can be strongly maintained that it is intolerable under our Parliamentary system that any great public service should be allowed, particularly if it is a monoply, to remain, as some would declare, responsible to no one, or perhaps at the best to be doubtfully challengeable on occasional intervals in Parliament.

It is clear, therefore, that a change in the constitution of the B.B.C. is required and the question arises what should be done. There seem to be three courses which might be followed unless, which is undesirable, it should be left as it is.

1. Broadcasting might be handed over to be run by private enterprise, as it is in the U.S.A., subject to a slight degree of government control.

The advantages of this course are that, by competition between the various companies, a higher standard of programme might be secured. Against this there is the grave risk, amounting almost to certainty, that there would be an ugly scramble between various competing interests to obtain control for purely sectional objects of one or more of the companies, with resultant intrigue, graft and possibly even large-scale blackmail.

2. It might be nationalized completely. This would carry with it immense dangers. In the hands of an unscrupulous government, such as the German, it has already been shown how powerful an instrument for evil broadcasting can become. It would be almost as dangerous as nationalizing the press.

3. A sounder solution would be to keep the B.B.C. broadly as it is at the present time, but to make it directly subject to public control.

This last suggestion, which is by far the most attractive of the three, is not revolutionary in theory nor should it be difficult in practice. Who, it may be asked (on the analogy of a public limited company), are the shareholders, as well as the beneficiaries, of the B.B.C.? The answer is clearly the British public. Consequently the public should have control over its company. But it is obviously impossible for forty-five millions of people to exercise direct control or to attend shareholders meetings. They can, however, do so by proxy. It seems, therefore, reasonable that for this purpose the House of Commons should be considered as holding the proxies of the British people, as it does in effect for other matters.

Further amendments also appear to be desirable, notably in the case of the Council. The Council of the B.B.C. now consists of seven members who are appointed by the Prime Minister for a period of five years and who can be, and sometimes have been, reappointed for a further term. They are the Board of Directors of the Corporation and might conveniently be subjected to rules similar to those of an ordinary public company.

A reasonable plan of reform would be to leave the appointment of the Board to the Prime Minister of the day, but to raise the number of members of it to eight of whom one quarter would retire each year, thus combining the introduction of fresh blood with a reasonable degree of continuity. Then, in order to give the British public, acting through Parliament, a strong measure of control, the B.B.C. should be obliged to present to Parliament an annual report in a prescribed form showing its working during the preceding year. Within, say, two months of the presentation of the report, Parliament would under the new suggested constitution, be obliged to devote adequate time (two whole days would seem to be advisable) to the consideration of two motions which could be debated together. The first would be to approve the appointment of two new directors and the second to adopt the annual report.

These suggestions do not, it must be admitted, solve the problem of day to day control, whether for instance, in addition, questions about the B.B.C.

ought to be allowed to be asked in Parliament and, if so, to whom they should be addressed. There are strong arguments for giving the B.B.C., subject to the broad but absolute public control suggested above, the maximum of diurnal independence and for protecting it from daily attack in the form of Parliamentary questions, though perhaps the general feeling would be against such an immunity.

But all these and other matters can and should be resolved by the most careful and painstaking discussions. It is not too early now to begin thinking out the best course to be adopted. Certainly as soon as the war is over another committee should be set up—a joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament is perhaps the most suitable—to examine the record and make recommendations for the future of the Corporation.

The B.B.C. has on balance deserved well of the nation in the twenty-one years of its existence, though undoubtedly those who work in it are well alive to its imperfections and as anxious as the general public to improve it in every way possible. But, not only in order to help to bring these improvements about, but also on the broadest possible grounds of public policy, it is important that the British Broadcasting Corporation should have its constitutional relations more clearly laid down and its status more plainly defined.

(Mr. Petherick is Conservative M.P. for Penryn and Falmouth.)

COUNTING HEADS

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

ACCURATE knowledge of the enemy's strength and of the extent of his resources is of course of vital importance in framing strategical policy; and accurate knowledge, especially of the reserves he possesses, or can accumulate during the course of a war, is not easy to acquire. The tendency in the earlier stages of a war is undoubtedly to under-estimate the enemy's reserve power. On the other hand, perhaps, as a result of earlier fallacious calculations, the tendency when a war is prolonged is to over-estimate the enemy's residual strength; and this may dictate an over-cautious policy with a resulting loss of opportunities. In September, 1918, quite a number of very highly placed British officers assured me that it was certain that operations would soon close down for the winter and that the chief task before us was intensive training and reorganization in readiness for the campaign of 1919. They pointed to the number of divisions the Germans still possessed and the fact that they still had a year's class of young recruits which had not yet been drawn on. The more pessimistic even suggested that this potential reinforcement might suddenly appear and be utilized in a late autumn counter-stroke. Fortunately, as we know, Haig and Foch were determined to give a weakening opponent no respite, and the Army as a whole eagerly responded to the calls made on it.

I suggest that in a prolonged war statistical estimates of the enemy's strength become unreliable, and that the quality rather than numerical strength of his forces should increasingly be taken into consideration. The standards by which his numerical strength are normally estimated, tend to become deceptive. For instance, he may, and probably will, for convenience in exercising command and to avoid upsetting his organization, refuse as long as possible to reduce the number of divisions and other formations he maintains. But as his reserve power dwindles he will be forced either to reduce their establishments or/and to draft into them men of inferior quality. It is not till it is ascertained that he has been compelled to disband complete formations that the statistical test again becomes really reliable.

Recently the American public, clearly with the intention of convincing it that the war was not yet won, were given figures of Germany's strength, which accurate as they probably are may be unduly discouraging. That Germany is still immensely strong there is of course no denying, but we may be over-cautious if her strength is exaggerated and signs of weakening are not

recognized. A bald statement that Germany has now 300 divisions as opposed to the 100 or so she mobilized in 1939, that the *Luftwaffe* is much stronger than it was then and that her U-boats are more numerous than ever, is obviously misleading if no account is taken of the immense increase of German commitments or of the relative strength of the forces Germany and her opponents now possess. Furthermore the comparison is not valid unless it is recognized that, in addition to the forces she mobilized in 1939 Germany had then immense reserves with which to develop her full power. What matters now is that in the effort to develop her maximum strength and to replace losses she has almost exhausted those reserves. Signs of that are not wanting. The demands made on the satellite and occupied countries for labour are evidently made not merely to increase production but to replace German reserves drafted from industry into the fighting services. The appearance of non-German elements in German units is a further proof of exhaustion of reserves. So far it would not appear that Germany has been compelled to reduce the number of divisions by which her strength is usually estimated, or even as far as is known to cut down their normal establishments. But such a complete absorption of reserves is bound to entail the introduction of much inferior material into fighting units and to add immensely to the difficulty of maintaining them at their establishment strength; and this must inevitably lead to deterioration in their quality which statistics would not reveal. That individual, possibly picked, German units still fight with their former efficiency and determination is evident, but there have recently been reports of formations which displayed inferior qualities. One suspects there may have been some of these at Nevel, for this important and strongly fortified centre had previously successfully resisted determined Russian attacks. Moreover, the troops holding it were not those exhausted in a long retreat and there was no question of their being merely a rearguard covering a deliberate withdrawal. Yet the place was this time taken after two or three days' violent attack.

Marshals Stalin and Zhukov certainly seem not to be unduly impressed by Germany's numerical strength. The continuance of their great offensive, undaunted by the formidable obstacle of the Dneiper or by unfavourable weather conditions, is sufficient proof that they felt they had a weakening opponent and were determined to give him no respite. The immediate capture of bridgeheads across the Dneiper in the face of an enemy who had established a well merited reputation for capacity to deliver rapid, violent counter-attacks, was an audacious stroke entailing acceptance of risks only justified by a correct appreciation of the condition of the opposing army. The decision to continue the offensive without an appreciable pause was all the more remarkable because undoubtedly the German retreat had on the whole been very successfully conducted. It had shown that whatever the blunders of the German High Command might have been, the commanders and staffs of armies and lower formations had maintained the high standard of executive efficiency always credited to them. No doubt the possession of adequate

railway communications and the elusive qualities of modern mechanized armies in favourable conditions of ground had facilitated their task, but even with those advantages the maintenance of an essentially unbroken front during the retreat seemed to indicate an army against which it might be dangerous to take risks. It would be interesting to know whether there were more indications of deterioration in the fighting qualities of the troops than there was in control of their movements.

Whatever the condition and residual qualities of the German armies may be, there can be no doubt of the amazing qualities the Russians have developed. The courage of Russian soldiers has never been questioned, but a new standard of tactical skill and initiative has obviously been attained. More impressive still to the professional observer is the administrative capacity displayed in maintaining the momentum of the offensive in circumstances under which it seemed certain to be lost. If the Russians can be credited with greater numerical strength than their opponents the feat of bringing that numerical superiority to bear is none the less amazing.

On the whole I am convinced that the defeat of the Germans in Russia this summer has been due much less to numerical inferiority than to the steady, increasing efficiency of the Red Army, especially in offensive operations, and to a marked deterioration of the fighting qualities of German troops. Deterioration is probably not yet general and may still be confined to particular formations—but the strength of a chain is that of its weakest links. There has however been more evidence of it in the most recent phases of the Russian offensive, in which the Germans have been compelled to fight hard in order to secure a respite. The test of fighting qualities has been higher than when evasion was the main object; and no doubt when troops are exhausted and partly demoralized by a long retreat the weak links tend to show up. Under continued strain they may fail altogether.

It may be a premature conclusion but I feel that in Russia the Germans are near the cracking point than they ever have been, even during their winter disasters. If they are forced to resume their retreat, without having gained the hoped-for autumn respite, we may witness a collapse far more complete than seems conceivable on purely numerical grounds. In that connection the part taken by guerrillas in the Dneiper crossings is worth noting. It gives indications of well organized action and of direct co-operation with the efforts of the regular troops. Guerrilla bands may have even greater opportunities soon. Already the Germans have admitted that they have become more than a nuisance and are seriously hampering movement of reserves and supplies. To troops demoralized by retreat they may become a nightmare and difficulty of dealing with them increases when conditions of ground and long nights limit counter measures.

If the counting of heads may be misleading in Russia it would seem to have misled the Allies to some extent in the Mediterranean theatre. Over-estimate of Italian powers of resistance based on numerical strength has no

doubt contributed to the comparatively slow and deliberate development of allied plans. That estimate, while Italy was still an opponent, had of course to be based mainly on numbers; but, it would seem, that when she surrendered not sufficient consideration was given to the quality of the troops which she could oppose to German reactions—quality not likely to be high, especially in the period immediately following a change of side and when loyalties had not been fully canalized. The regrettable incident of Cos, and it is to be hoped it will prove not to stand in a higher category, was apparently due to the expectation that the 30,000 Italians in Rhodes, and the 3,000 in Cos with a stiffening of British troops, were a sufficient guarantee that the situation in the Dodecanese justified taking risks. Presumably political as well as purely military considerations dictated the measures taken, and it would be unfair, certainly in the present state of our knowledge, to hold General Sir Maitland Wilson responsible for them. It was a situation in which he could hardly have been left without directions from higher authority, and many factors still unknown may have affected the methods employed in carrying them out. The speed of the German reactions was characteristic and no doubt the comparatively, and unavoidably, cumbrous machinery of allied higher direction of the war militated against prompter and more decisive action; but stirring a wasp's nest with a walking stick is always likely to have unpleasant results.

THE WAR AT SEA

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

EVENTS have moved in many of the theatres of the war at sea during the last month. Italy has become a co-belligerent, the Germans have resumed their submarine activity in the Atlantic after a long time of quiescence and rearming with their new forms of bomb, the battleship *Tirpitz* has been hit, and we hope disabled for a time, by a force of "midget" submarines, the Portuguese government has extended facilities for our shipping protection in the Azores, and several very severe blows have been struck at the Japanese bases, shipping, aircraft and small craft in the Solomons and New Guinea. This is a considerable record of activity.

Italy's status as a co-belligerent brings a reinforcement of five battleships, some 6in. and smaller cruisers, and an uncertain number of destroyers, torpedo boats, corvettes and motor torpedo boats to the allied fleets. In what manner they will be employed remains to be seen but there is always plenty of work within the Mediterranean for the light cruisers and for all the flotilla craft. The Germans have submarine bases in southern France, northern Italy, on the coast of the Adriatic and in the Aegean sea; and they have as yet no lack of submarines. As the campaign in Italy proceeds, and if another campaign develops in the Aegean, there will be a need for every small vessel capable of performing the tasks of escorting convoys and hunting submarines; and as the Italians have had some practice in this work, and have some heavy scores to pay their late allies, we may not unreasonably expect their light craft to be a useful addition to the forces in the Mediterranean. It is less clear how their heavier ships will be employed. It depends upon the view taken by the present Italian government as to their object in the war: whether it is confined to the expulsion of the enemy from their own country or whether it extends to a whole-hearted prosecution of the war to a finish. In any case it is wise to depend only on our existing resources and to treat whatever may be forthcoming from our new partner in the nature of a bonus; that is, not as something which enables us to undertake tasks we could not undertake earlier but as an additional security in the tasks we already have in hand. New undertakings, moreover, depend upon the possession of shipping. Shipping is the bottleneck which sets a limit on what we can do. Sea power, one cannot too often repeat, is not merely the possession of fighting ships. It is incomplete without the two other elements; bases, without which the fighting ships are unable to operate, and shipping, without which it can only

exercise a fraction of its strength. The fighting ship or vessel sweeps the ocean, drives the enemy off the water and closes the sea roads to his traffic; but without the merchant shipping to carry the goods and the troops, and make use of the command the fighting ships have established, the task is uncompleted. Those who talk so glibly about Second Fronts now appear to be unaware of this very simple fact, and that troops and their millions of tons of requirements cannot be broadcast about the world unless there is the tonnage necessary for their transport and landing and the fighting vessels of all kinds necessary for the protection of the transport throughout the operation.

The return of the submarines to their attack in the Atlantic was heralded by a massed attack on a west-bound convoy in which some shipping and some of the escorting vessels were lost, and was reported by the enemy with the exaggerations to which we are well accustomed. Exaggerated though the claims were the fact has to be recognized that a new campaign is opening, conducted by an undiminished number of submarines, armed, it would appear, with new weapons in the shape of a glider directed by wireless. The convoy war is now a compound of numbers of craft, scientific apparatus and a highly skilled body of men. The developments of science have indeed introduced a new feature in this branch of warfare. Hitherto there has been a constant competition between the attacker and the attacked as to which should forestall the other in the strength of the forces engaged; in the last war the escorts, which at first consisted of one or two destroyers or torpedo boats, grew to complete squadrons of battleships, cruisers and flotilla craft; and in this war the attacker increased his force from single submarines to groups numbering as many as fifteen or more and the defender his escorts from a comparatively few destroyers to a force consisting of destroyers, frigates, and ship-carried aircraft, backed by shore based aircraft. Science now joins in the contest. Means are perfected—they were in use before the war—for detecting the presence of the submarine, and locating its position, and these are answered by means of neutralizing the detecting apparatus and of obtaining earlier warning of the approach of aircraft. There is no finality in this. No end to this competition is to be expected. New instruments, new processes and new weapons will continue to develop, and the winner for the moment is he who is one step ahead, in his scientific apparatus as well as in his numbers and types of vessels and craft, of his opponent. The destruction of the submarines on the building slips, of the building slips themselves and of the factories producing engines and equipment, is a valuable accessory to the efforts at sea; but it is on the sea itself that the decision will lie.

The Portugese grant of facilities in the Azores is a valuable contribution to the campaign. We have seen in the Mediterranean how decisive a part the possession of bases played in the restoration of command in that sea. A base some 1,300 miles from the mouth of the Channel will most markedly improve the situation in the Atlantic. Surface craft will be able to extend their protection over a longer distance and shore based aircraft to stretch

over very nearly the whole of the route across the Atlantic. This is not the first time that Portugal has acted in this friendly manner. When Napoleon invaded Portugal and thereby deprived us of the use of Lisbon, the then Government of Portugal permitted us to occupy Madeira, where we established a garrison and, at the end of the war, removed it as we shall remove the present garrison. The indignation expressed by those sticklers for the rights and duties of neutrals, the leaders in Berlin and Tokyo, is not only amusing: it indicates how clearly they understand the advantages that have accrued to the allied efforts by the act.

While the acquisition of the oceanic base strengthens the defence of the Atlantic communications, the blow struck by the "midget" submarines at the battleship *Tirpitz* in her Norwegian base eases, at least for a time until she can again be made seaworthy, the threat she constitutes to both the Atlantic and the Arctic routes. There still remain however some heavy armoured ships capable of doing serious injury if they could evade the watch on their movements and make a sally into the ocean—the two battle cruisers and the two remaining "pocket battleships"; and though all of these are probably not in a seagoing condition, the possibility that one or more might get loose is one that has to be provided for until all of them are disposed of; and that is a consummation greatly to be desired but one that is not likely to be fulfilled. They act as an effectual containing force, obliging us to maintain a force of heavy ships in Home waters which otherwise would be available for service in the Far East. The continued existence of the High Sea Fleet in the time of the submarine campaign of the last war had a similar containing effect, forcing us to keep a considerable flotilla force with the Grand Fleet which would otherwise have been available for convoy work. This is an old experience of ours. A comparatively small force of battleships at Brest obliged us, after Trafalgar, to keep a strong fleet watching them, and led to an intensive inshore campaign of small craft with the object of depriving the arsenal of the heavy naval stores needed for the upkeep of the squadron. To-day, this situation repeats itself. Whether the injury done to the German ship is sufficient to need the services of a dock we do not know, but the interception of the means of repair is one of the ways of lengthening the *Tirpitz's* period of repose, and an unremitting activity on the sea and in the air along the coastal route of Norway will be continued.

In the Pacific the great victory over the Japanese assemblage of ships and aircraft at Rabaul is an event of the highest importance. The loss of so much shipping, aircraft and resources, all of which are becoming increasingly difficult not only to replace but also to transport to the distant base is serious; and when to that loss is joined the prospect that, with strong surface forces and aircraft carriers released from the Mediterranean, Rabaul itself may be isolated as Singapore was isolated, the outlook can hardly be pleasant so far as the fortunes of the Japanese adventure in this theatre are concerned.

THE COUNTRYSIDE: YESTERDAY, TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW

By S. L. Bensusan

"SOME people maintain that an Englishman's house is his castle. That's Gammon." So said Mr. Grummer, that elderly gentleman in top boots, when intruding upon the privacy of Mr. Pickwick more than a hundred years ago, and to-day his judgment is completely vindicated.

If you approached one of the stately homes of England when the century was young, you must needs pass through the filter of one or more lodge gates before the holy of holies could be reached. Old folk who had laboured in or round the big house for many years and were no longer fit for hard work could at least lock and unlock, scrutinize and enquire; they also served who only stood and waited—for the sound of wheels. You might drive past fallow deer and by immemorial oaks, the Church might be in the park complete with footpath from the village for the *hoi polloi*. They would be expected to be in their places before the family reached its pew and to stay in them until the elect had passed the porch. On certain days in the year the gardens might be opened, at other times their solitude could be almost depressing, particularly in months when the gardeners left them to their winter sleep.

Week-end parties were popular, after King Edward had set the seal of his approval on them, and, of course, there were shooting days when the hand-reared birds that had come to the keepers' call found that their friends had become their enemies, and that they were falling not singly but in battues. The head-keeper maintained a skilled balance between the needs of the guns and the claims of the Hunt. He would be a man of great personal dignity to be tipped with gold or a note.

Then came the Great War, and the stately homes, or many of them, became military headquarters, or hospitals, or service centres. The glory departed, national needs were many, flunkeys went into khaki, food regulations were felt by all classes. The old folk could not understand the change. "But, my dear," said an aged peer, whose stomach was of the first importance, talking to his daughter, who had explained the conditions that led to a limited menu, "these restrictions you tell me about, could never have been meant for us." And he went to his grave disconsolate and angry, or perhaps merely annoyed and hungry.

But the Great War, for all dangers and difficulties, wrought no appreciable damage to England. It left ugly wounds to the Greater War through which we are passing. There was no evacuation from town to country, there were no inland home defences of the kind that cannot take account of privacy; above all, there were few aerodromes, and the demand for timber had not reached the present alarming proportions. If the country gentleman's home was not his castle any longer, at least it was not the happy hunting-ground of Tom, Dick and Harry. To-day no man knows whence the claim will come, the only certainty is that it is coming. By any post the Military Authority may notify him that it proposes to set up a searchlight station and will require so much land round it. One station I know well is on the edge of a wood; the military authorities do not allow the men the fuel they need, and trees are handy. All Englishmen have a sporting instinct, rabbits are reasonably plentiful, and a dog or two appears to be part of the up-to-date military equipment.

In the meantime the Ministry of Supply notifies owners of timber that the country requires wood of all kinds, and that a graceful surrender is the better way. The Air Ministry is equally determined that trees shall no longer spoil the prospect. Flying men are said to regard woods with a certain suspicion; no decisions to spare them are final. To a friend, an officer remarked in the course of an explanatory conversation: "The C.O. does not think that Howlet's Wood offers any obstruction. He has been flying round and this is his considered opinion; but it is well to remember that in a few months he will go elsewhere, and the man who takes his place may think the wood should not be there. If he does, it will have to come down." "Should the war last long enough," he concluded, cheerfully, "we'll have aerodromes instead of woods, all over England."

Any landowner may receive, and many do, a notice that the Air Ministry is going to lay overhead or underground cables, put up light-bearing poles, cut down trees round them, and generally substitute utility for beauty, while the sacrifice of good farm land has stirred many a County Agricultural Committee to protests that despite their validity, must go unheeded just now.

In the long run, all these developments, though unpleasant, are salutary, "they feelingly persuade us what we are." The earlier generation that cantered on a high horse along prosperity road from the cradle to the grave has passed beyond the reach of shock; life held no greater threat than death duties; indeed Time spared the men and women of a serener day all the disturbances, minor and major, reserved for the twentieth century. How wisely they chose their hour, or how happily it was chosen for them. Some may say with the Preacher: "Wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead more than the living which are yet alive." Doubtless the people of those early years could, and did, do their duty as they saw it, even though the larger part of that duty was to themselves; their successors will accept

change as they have accepted danger and inconvenience; *noblesse oblige* Those who try to maintain earlier conditions will be the awkward intermediate class to whom the easy ways of life do not properly appertain. Only a few of those whose right to railings is hereditary have kept them standing to-day; the spirit of exclusiveness no longer soars, it creeps.

If the stately homes of England and many that lack all stateliness have felt the impact of war, so, too has the village street. Just as space has been commandeered in the manor, it has been taken in the cottage; the voluntary system has sufficed in most cases, for the country-woman has never lacked sympathy with those whose homes in crowded centres have been destroyed. Contemplating the state and the habits of so many of the evacuees, she has understood, perhaps for the first time, the advantages of country life; she knows that her ways are the cleaner and healthier. In a village fifty miles or so from London there were children who had never sat to table or used a plate, and these were the most mentionable of their shortcomings. Some of the mothers could not suffer the shock of new ideas and returned to their old haunts as soon as possible; they read into the strange ways of decent-living folk a reproach not to be endured; but there are thousands of children who hope to live in the country in spite of winter and the absence of the fish and chips and cinemas, defects whose cure may well be found among the first goals of post-war rural enterprise.

A change worth noting is the passing of the old and often gratifying sense of privacy. The idea of the uninvited guest had not occurred to any householder. He sported his oak when he shut his front door; to some lovers of solitude the telephone was an unwelcome though inevitable intruder, the postman a necessary evil. Hitler, who demolished so many of our slums, has abolished many of our prejudices, lighting up dark places to bring us a New Order that he cannot control. It may be that there is a soul of goodness in things evil, and that when Naziism and Fascism are dead as well as damned, certain changes in our attitude, a certain awareness, due to a suffering in which all have had a part, will be placed to their credit.

How far this awareness of change will spread to the countryside let none seek to say positively. The life of the village is not what it should be, there are many obstacles in the way of self-expression. Perhaps one of the most serious is ignorance, and the urban exodus cannot touch this. The farm-worker knows nothing of his rights as a citizen, the small shopkeeper may not air independent views. Local Government as expressed by Parish and District Councils is feeble and ineffective. The main purpose of Councillors is to keep the rates down and to fight what they call Socialism, though it is seldom that. They will bring the *vis inertiae* to check progress and feel they are doing their duty. To the blending of urban and rural outlook they oppose many obstacles. Will the men of the services be able to resist when they come back to civil life and so turn the passing of privilege to good account? They

made some progress after the Great War, but the repeal of the Corn Production Act threw the land out of gear and robbed the countryside of employment and opportunity. At present we hear much about the future of Agriculture, some of us will remember hearing the like when the nation was last in trouble. But big business declared that the country could only be saved by the surrender of its fields and fertility and then went according to plan. Unhappily, the country was not saved. Will history repeat itself?

If it does, the war years will have done more than ripple the surface of the rural areas, and the earlier conditions in which country life was regarded as a background for shootin' and huntin' will reassert themselves. Happily there is at least a chance that progressive forces may prevail and the rightful claims of the land receive acknowledgment; the attractions of the life have never been more widely known than they are to-day. Asking questions and noting answers carefully, it is soon clear that the land-girls from the towns find in the open-air better health than they have ever known, and they will be a big post-war factor in the choice of homes. This is not surprising when you learn that many were working in factories, or shops, or behind counters, and seldom saw the sun, or ate fresh fruit and vegetables. The old conditions of service in the dark places of industry may prove hard to maintain. Light and air have come into many slums for the first time; the barriers between town and country have been lowered if not removed.

Before the Great War, town and country were as east and west; it was safe to add "and never the twain shall meet." But country lads came home trained and sophisticated; they sought jobs in towns because the wage they could earn on the land at twenty-one was the wage they would be receiving at forty-two or sixty-three. Promotion on the farm was almost impossible, and in 1914 a skilled man's labour was not worth twenty-five shillings a week. The exodus that followed the repeal of the Corn Production Act brought country and town into touch, and to-day the reproach of dullness has been removed from rural areas by the radio, to say nothing of the Women's Institutes and Village Clubs. Electric light and a water supply are other comparatively new additions to the attractions that will help to draw men and women from the cities. At the same time the intercourse due to air-raids will have taught many for the first time that town and country together make up England.

But the greatest force in bringing change about is the knowledge that, in season of crisis, no man has individual rights that can be opposed to State needs. The owner of the historic estate and the owner of the cottage-holding make like obeisance to necessity. If the park of the one is wanted for timber and the cottage of the other stands in the fair-way of a bomber's run, both will be cleared away; if the mansion is required to house soldiers or airmen, it will be taken, and underneath the sacrifice, those who dig deep enough, may find all manner of hidden virtues with brotherhood, patriotism, self-sacrifice

among them. This, one and all may say, is a part of England, the homeland threatened by a mob of adventurers from whom Genghis Khan, Timour the Tartar and Attila might well have held aloof. Everything belongs to the State, it may and must claim lives, possessions, capacity—for the duration.

Would it be well if that duration could be extended? I have asked this question, and certain prosperous friends have answered that lack all statelinesuggestion is dangerous as well as bad. They [illegible] the village street. Just [illegible]ne servant and must never be the master of ent[illegible] has been [illegible] soon as the starving are fed, and no later, the sufferings of [illegible] taxpayer must make due appeal to the sympathy of humanity. Already several societies are in being to see that these sufferings are properly presented. Those who support this view desire, quite frankly, to see the *status quo ante* restored as speedily as possible, the ancient privacies respected, a working balance of unemployed for industry to call on, a limit to the inroads of democracy upon well-established ways of life, an assurance of ample material reward for industry and enterprise. They believe that only along these lines can we regain our commercial supremacy and increase national prosperity. "Mere goodwill is useless as a substitute for hard work," said a thriving friend, "and no man will strive if he is denied proper reward. As patriotic citizens we have met every claim, but victory should set a time limit to sacrifice." "And the Englishman's home will become his castle again?" I queried. "It always has been," he replied, "but he has lent it to the nation for the term of the war." Clearly he had forgotten his Pickwick.

Should this view prevail, old conditions will return and if not wholly, yet in part, the countryside will resume the status of a pleasure ground for the fortunate minorities. The breaches through which one class flowed into another will be closed and the strange happenings noted in some detail will be regarded as an unfortunate incident that troubled leisure for a time towards the middle of the twentieth century. But the chances are that the future of Britain will not remain in the hands of a few. Come what may the countryside is constant, Nature's appointed storehouse, to be directed and controlled by obedience to Nature's decrees. This war has shown that we had neglected our best source of home supply in deference to an economic system and a social convenience. We have set the crooked straight. For how long?

I have set out alternatives without assuming the rôle of advocate and without emphasizing what that great Premier, the late Marquis of Salisbury once called the essence of statecraft—compromise. Yet compromise may well be the deciding factor in the question of the land and its fortunes. In all probability the country-side of the future will be one in which all claimants will get a part of what they strive for and none will win all. British earth may no longer be the landlords' and the fullness thereof, but this does not involve the abolition of private ownership. Claims of foxhunters and pursuers of wild life generally may be curtailed but they will not be entirely disallowed;

given oats for hunters and cartridges for shot-guns, sport will return to a lessening place in the national life. Perhaps the otter, the red deer and the badger may find protection but, for all our virtues, a varied taste in cakes and ale must needs be satisfied while a highly cultivated countryside reduces many old-time activities to reasonable limits without friction.

To draw t[illegible]s and fertility and [illegible]e reformer and the crank, between the man who desires [illegible]aved. Will history repeat[illegible]an who seeks to take away the other fellow's privileges and will [illegible] done [illegible]e a hard task. Few will envy those called upon to carry it through, but all will be interested in the outcome.

Many copies of THE FORTNIGHTLY for November, 1942 and April, 1943, were lost at sea. Readers who possess and can spare either or both of these issues are asked to return them to 13, Buckingham Street, London, W.C.2, so that they may be forwarded to Libraries wishing to complete the volumes for binding.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

The World in Seven Weeks

UNLESS a very old reader has been completely misled, Mr. Wendell Willkie's book *One World* (published by Cassell at 7s. 6d.) brings a live contribution to the shaping of world history. One who has run for President of the United States is not just the ordinary political speculator; Mr. Willkie writes like one convinced that what he says to-day America will be saying to-morrow. His contention is that unless you know what you are fighting for, victory won't give it to you. If we, the Allies, are to see peace stabilized, we cannot be indifferent to what is happening, and is going to happen, anywhere. The world, he holds, is one, and nothing is very far off. Going to see what he could of it, he flew round the globe, starting from New York, and landing forty-nine days later in Minneapolis after a journey of 31,000 miles. But out of the forty-nine days less than a full week was spent in actual flying: he had time enough to be for several days the guest of M. Joseph Stalin, and for several more of General Chiang Kai Shek; time enough also to get a vivid impression of the Turkish Republic, where he met fully qualified women lawyers practising without comment from anybody.

It is clear to him that no settlement can be durable unless the Russians and the Chinese leaders have fully helped to make it; and that none will be worth while unless it give to other peoples in the Near East the reality of freedom which, so far as Mr. Willkie could see, Turkey was alone in enjoying. No settlement will stand which does not concern itself with East as much as with West; America (and he speaks and thinks always for America) will not gain its ends by fighting to secure an Atlantic Charter; the Pacific is just as important. Methods of the British Colonial system need to be replaced everywhere by the principles of the British Commonwealth. "We must cease to perpetuate control by manipulation of native forces, by playing off one against the other for our own ends." By special request, he did not look in on British India, and the Near East, which came first in his survey, filled him with disquiet. Egypt, Persia and Palestine all seemed to be governed by old taboos, beliefs that no one gladly believed in; while everywhere he sensed "a growing spirit of fervid nationalism," which wanted to ensure for these old countries full leave to undertake whatever in the new, was making life worth while. He found, not the official representatives of America, but individual Americans, spreading what one may call the American light; the President of the American University of Beirut, or the very old lady who, after a life's work in Palestine, felt that the Jews must have a national homeland, and that it could only be there; that divisions between Jew and Arab must be reconciled, and could be—if outside interference were removed. It is only when he comes to the nations which are under the most terrible pressure from enemies superior in equipment that his tale leaps into cheerfulness.

It tells us a few things—but how well chosen!—about what Russia has done, and they go far to explain why Russia is winning; he tells us in the same way a few things about China and they let us know why China has not been defeated—and must not be. Perhaps nothing else in the book so completely justifies its title as the account given by this ultra-Western mind of the friendship that so quickly formed itself between him and his host in China—yes, and his hostess. In the ultimate East this friendly Western was easily at home.

* * * * *

A Soldier Statesman

The South African Dutch produced two outstanding examples of the disposition to rise above hate—and who, as a consequence, played a conspicuous part in great events fortunately for South Africa, fortunately for England, and fortunately for the world. Mr. R. H. Kiernan publishes a study of *General Smuts*, who happily has survived his comrade Louis Botha by nearly five-and-twenty years, though in them he has gone through every kind of danger, difficulty and affliction. This little book (from Harrap at 5s.) tells a great deal that is curious as well as interesting; for instance that this man of affairs who has been through life almost pedantically bookish, could not read or write till he was twelve. Yet having learnt to read in several languages, he acquired a scholarship which took him to Christ's at Cambridge, and so to brilliant successes in the law school; he might have stayed on in England as a teacher but South Africa called him. There he was a native neither of the Transvaal nor of the Orange Free State—independent Dutch Republics—but of the Cape, a self-governing British colony; no one yet spoke of Dominions. So to the Cape he returned, was called to the Bar in Capetown, and "became an enthusiastic disciple" of Cecil Rhodes, the Englishman who, after making a vast fortune in South Africa, then aimed at uniting South Africa in one vast territory. But Rhodes was a man in a hurry, under threat of early death; and in 1895 he launched an expedition to overthrow the Transvaal Government. It was easily dealt with—but it shocked many, including the young Smuts, who left the Cape for the Transvaal to practise as a lawyer in Johannesburg. Here in a short time he became State Attorney. War was brewing and it came in 1899. At first Smuts was a propagandist and organising official; but before long he was distinguishing himself as a guerrilla leader. Mr. Kiernan tells the story of his exploits well and closes skilfully on this quotation from the British Official History. "Animosity towards his country's enemies was ennobled by a species of soldiership or chivalry." When surrender came to be considered, Smuts was of those who stood against hopeless resistance, which might wipe out the Boer race. Under the period of semi-military administration which followed, he refused all office until it could come by free choice. With Botha he started a party to demand self government, and in 1905 when Liberals came into power, he was sent to London to press for it. Campbell-Bannerman was the leader, but Lloyd George already counted for much—and during the Boer War he had come to be considered a kind of traitor to the Empire. (Up to 1918 good Tories were never sure that this was not a correct diagnosis). However C.-B. and company gave to the Transvaal and to the Orange Free State what we should call now Dominion status. Botha headed the new State with Smuts for his second-in-command. No other dominion had comparable difficulties: the colour question was urgent in all shades. Chinese labour they contrived to get rid of; but Indians flooded Natal, were refused the franchise, and demanded it. Meantime there was present every-

where the coloured African, outnumbering white men by four to one. All these problems had to be dealt with by three separate governments until in 1910, largely through the work of Smuts, there was established the Union of South Africa.

Then came trouble—in its acutest form; the discovery of diamonds and gold had flooded the old pastoral communities with a working-class drawn from many countries—a Uitlander proletariat, even more dangerous than the Uitlander capitalists. Smuts had to fight strikers of the most formidable kind. But a deeper trouble lay in the attitude of those Boers to whom England was always the enemy. They found a leader in Hertzog, who for years acted with Botha and Smuts; but in 1914 when Britain was at war, South Africa also was threatened, and Smuts with Botha was for armed resistance. Hertzog was for neutrality. Others went further, as far as to armed rebellion; but Smuts and Botha soon put down this movement, though it had for it men famous in the war against England. Then the troops which had crushed it invaded and conquered German South-West Africa; after which followed a desert campaign in German East with Smuts in command against a brilliant German Lettow-Vorbeck. From this he was sent to represent South Africa at an Imperial Conference in London, and Lloyd George with characteristic boldness called the colonial soldier-statesman into the Imperial War Cabinet. From that day to this, General Smuts, officially or unofficially, whether in office at home or out of office, has been a trusted and influential adviser of the British Government—more trusted, more influential, the more dangerous the times. This book tells a story which cannot be too widely known—and tells it clearly without unfair or undue emphasis.

* * * * *

What the R.A.F. is doing

Mr. John Pudney, like Mr. Willkie, has enjoyed unusual facilities for seeing the world in wartime, and may indeed have followed the same route from Nigeria to Egypt. But unlike the American he found time in *Who Only England Knows* (Lane, 8s. 6d., very justly "recommended by the Book Society") to give a singularly vivid picture of Kano, a great Hausa city about which I have been reading these many years. Also, in Egypt he notes at Omdurman that "the Arabs are beginning to run schemes themselves—the excellent policy of the Government has been to let them take more responsibility" and power—yet what impressed Mr. Willkie in the Nile Valley was "a cultural sterility"—which he attributed in part to the fact that culture and education "are dominated by non-Egyptians." Mr. Pudney, of course, had more time to see—and he came as one of a casual crowd, tightly packed when they travelled. Speed was in fact the only luxury in which he rivalled Mr. Willkie. What exactly Mr. Pudney was doing for the R.A.F., of which he is an ardent member, does not appear. Perhaps he was sent precisely to write a book which would tell the world what the R.A.F. is doing and how it lives while doing it. At least we do know that when the Force was about to celebrate its twenty-fifth birthday, he was wired to for a "commemorative poem" to be wired back, and sent it. The product, we are told, is one of three books of verse by this author, hitherto unknown to me, who appears that unlikely thing, a new poet whom the older generation could probably enjoy. At all events, this book abounds with examples of a poet's prose—a very likable poet, with a taste for all manner of enjoyments.

* * * * *

A Typical Victorian

"The whirligig of time brings in it revenges" someone says in Shakespeare, and the revenges may be revaluations. When Charlotte Yonge died, near eighty years old, at the turn of the century, the *Daily Telegraph* said that her works must seem lacking in psychological insight "to those who have been trained in the school of George Egerton and Iota." Yet these ornaments of the *Yellow Book* have been it is to be feared, quite forgotten, while *The Heir of Redclyffe* and *The Daisy Chain* are still household words, and if Miss Georgina Battiscombe is right, no bookseller has any difficulty in disposing of any works by their author. It certainly is an odd sign of the times that this new Life of so typical a Victorian shouid appear in the height of the second European War; and Messrs. Constable, who bring it out very handsomely for fifteen shillings, have no cause to complain of its reception. I turn to it with much curiosity, having grown up in a household where Miss Yonge was read by everybody; The head of the house, a very able and distinguished scholar and divine, once gave proofs of his astounding memory by setting down accurately and in their proper order the names of Dr. May's eleven children. None of them is clear before my recollection to-day, but the untidy clever Ethel is something more than a name, and I agree with Miss Battiscombe that they all were living characters. Charlotte Yonge could create people for herself; and she had the gift of story-telling that holds readers. Among these, it seems, was no less a person than Tennyson, who took one of her novels in his knapsack when he and Palgrave were on a walking tour. And Tennyson was not easy to please. And Charles Kingsley wrote that *Heartsease* (which followed *The Heir of Redclyffe*) was "the most delightful and wholesome novel" he ever read; "the delicate touches of character" in it were "wonderful". Now Charles Kingsley was a fine writer, a very valiant gentleman, certainly no disciple of the Anglo-Catholic school—of which Miss Yonge was a devotee. Looking at her record, we see that she has left us a picture of typical middle-class English ladies and gentlemen in the early Victorian period; genteel folk certainly; and Miss Battiscombe permits herself in one place to say that Charlotte Yonge was a snob. Well, I read her a great deal without finding that out; but perhaps we were all snobs too—though I don't think so; "snob" is the wrong word here. The essential thing to note is that Charlotte was not merely the devoted daughter of her father but his intimate companion; and that father had been one of Wellington's soldiers, entitled to wear clasps commemorating his part in four of the greatest Peninsular battles. His daughter always loved a soldier, though the word "loved" in regard to her must always be used with special care. It is a surprise to see from the picture reproduced on the cover of this book that she had even then no small share of beauty. But it is admitted that she never took ordinary pains to make herself attractive by means of dress. Miss Battiscombe is a candid biographer; but she and her publishers will enable readers of every generation to become well acquainted with one of the writers by whom the character of the Victorian period is best preserved. Best and most likably; I defy anyone not to be attracted by Ethel May and that excellent country gentleman, her father the doctor. The "Daisies" as Charlotte called them, are the top of her achievement. "I believe I enjoyed them most," she wrote, "which is the best way to make a thing prosper. I am afraid the moral is not good but I have always found that what one likes best one does best." In short, this so virtuous lady was an artist in spite of herself.

THIS AGE OF FABLE, by Gustav Stolper. *Harrap.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

SOCIAL SECURITY. Edited by W. A. Robson. Published for the Fabian Society by *Allen & Unwin.* 15*s.*

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION, by J. R. Bellerby. Vol. I. National, Industrial and Regional Planning. *Macmillan.* 21*s.*

These three important books are characteristic, though in different ways, of a new phase in thinking about world problems and post-war reconstruction. Blue-print schemes and world constructions have been swept away by sobering experience. Plans and studies now published are more restrained, critical and concrete.

Dr. Stolper's book has the widest sweep. The treatment is throughout clear, definite and the style brilliant. As an economist, the author devotes much attention to economic questions, such as the problems of inflation and deflation, of gold, of poverty among plenty. But some of the best chapters deal with wider questions, such as the nonsense of "have" and "have-not" nations, the myth of the economic causation of war, of the decadence of democracy and the efficiency of dictatorship. If Dr. Stolper believes, however, that he himself views the world as a dispassionate, purely "scientific" observer, he is himself the victim of a fable, the fable of "objective" analysis. For the author's own constructive contribution we shall have to wait for a promised further book. But his beliefs are clear. He is an advocate of not quite uncontrolled private enterprise, a bitter critic of socialist planning, and a believer in the cautious evolutionary way. His almost unmitigated admiration for British democracy and government at home and in the Empire will serve as a useful antidote to many distortions current in the U.S.A., but the two relevant chapters, while containing much truth, are full of sweeping statements. The outstanding example of very special pleading instead of critical analysis is the chapter on Soviet planning. The book, as a whole, would gain by attempting not quite so much in 300 pages.

The two other books are concerned with more concrete problems of reconstruction, and are, each in its sphere, of outstanding value. The compilation for the editing of which Dr. Robson is responsible, is the result of a group study undertaken on behalf of the Fabian Society, commenced in the early months of 1941. It enabled the Fabian Society to give detailed evidence before the Beveridge Committee (published as an appendix to the present book). In all matters of principle, and in many details, the conclusions reached by the Fabian Committee accord with the Beveridge Report. The major part of the book deals, in 11 chapters by individual contributors, with the present state of social services, and as a standard of reference, these deserve close study. The second part looks to the future. A brilliant chapter on "The Beveridge Report and after" by R. W. B. Clarke rightly lays stress on the importance of the wider assumptions on which the Report and social policy must rest: the size of the national income of a more fully producing community, a full employment policy and the prospects of Britain's economic environment in the post-war world,with the alternatives of a number of more or less self-sufficient entities or an international development policy.

It is with this problem of a full employment policy and its implications that Mr. Bellerby's admirable study is concerned. This book which is as concrete as any study can be that must work on the assumption of alternative post-war policies has the great merit that the author is fully conscious of the need to relate all detailed plans clearly to the underlying assumptions and principles. The alternatives are, of course, private enterprise and State ownership, and the author, in the last chapter, gives a detailed comparison of how a proposed four-year plan would operate and develop in a private enterprise and a state ownership system. In some respects the difference may seem one of degree, but no desire to find a middle way, as exemplified by the recent publications of Lever Bros, Nuffield College and *The Times*, can detract from this cardinal choice. Mr. Bellerby does not plead for the one or the other, but is conscious of alternative assumptions and their implications. The book is unbalanced only to the extent that much the greater part is worked out on the assumption of Private Enterprise. This part contains a detailed survey of Industrial Planning, based on a careful study of existing conditions, in particular in the Western Scottish industrial belt, which also forms the basis for a further chapter on regional planning. We have every reason to look forward to the second volume which will deal with the vital problem of International Planning.

W. FRIEDMANN.

FORTY YEARS IN CHINA, by Sir Meyrick Hewlett. *Macmillan.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

THE TWENTY YEARS TRUCE, 1919-1939, by Robert M. Rayner. *Longmans.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

EAST PRUSSIA, by Robert Machray. *Allen & Unwin.* 6*s.*

RUSSIA THROUGH THE CENTURIES, by M. Phillips Price. *Allen & Unwin.* 5*s.*

None of these books can claim outstanding achievement. Sir Meyrick Hewlett, after a lifetime spent in the Consular Service in China, states frankly that his original intention was to record his memories as a souvenir for his son. Some of these memories are trivial enough and the sentimental approach of Sir Meyrick does not always add to their value. Yet, almost in spite of itself, the book amply rewards the reader. Beginning with the Boxer Rebellion, which Sir Meyrick saw from inside the besieged Legation Quarter in Peking, the book records personal experiences of momentous happenings. That is always interesting but as a register of events the book would hardly be memorable.

Sir Meyrick was known as "Old Father". It is an important fact. He loved the Chinese and they responded with affection. He blended what at times appears as an astonishing naivety with a sagacity which saw him round the tightest corners. He was trusting and trusted. A humanitarian, he nevertheless made friends with those whose deeds revolted him. He understood to a nicety the importance of "face". In some ways an annoying book, it has nevertheless much valuable information to impart and I, for one, am glad to have had the opportunity of reading it.

Had Mr. Rayner been first in the field with his book on the twenty years between the wars, there would have been no difficulty in praising it. It is a competent and at times a lively performance. He puts his points well, builds a good picture and comments not without wisdom. What is lacking is originality in approach. The job has now been done several times and Mr. Rayner's book, with all its virtues, is just one more. Like others he sees the twenty years, as his title suggests, as one sequence. Personally I do not. Perhaps the next historian who feels compelled to discuss this

period will try dividing the story into two parts, the one telling of Europe's stumbling yet positive efforts for peace, the other recording its failure to admit disillusionment.

With Mr. Machray I quarrel. He has been a faithful friend of Poland for many years and that is good. Yet friendship should not be blind to faults nor see virtue where in fact it does not exist. Many of us share Mr. Machray's sympathy with Poland, wish her well, and hope that her future may be strong and happy. It does not follow that we can wholeheartedly admire her past actions or agree with Mr. Machray's version of recent history as recorded on pages 50-52 of his book. If the war has taught us anything it should surely be a lesson in humility. What Poland, like others, has to do is to face a complicated situation with fortitude and wisdom, knowing as she must that appeals to her friends for this and that will not be heard unless they show an appreciation of difficulties as well as an expression of desires. Mr. Machray has made a good case for Poland in regard to East Prussia but the fact remains that Poland is suffering from a surfeit of propaganda and more of it will do her harm not good.

Mr. Phillips Price has, I think, attempted the impossible. Russian history cannot, with advantage, be compressed into so small a volume and the impression left is not understanding but bewilderment. Nor do I really believe that good Anglo-Russian relations are dependent upon a sound knowledge of so much past history. The people of this country do not know their own history and care very little for any information prior to 1900. Mr. Phillips Price would have done better to limit his narrative to the events of the past fifty years.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

THE HUGUENOTS, by Otto Zoff. *Allen & Unwin.* 16*s.*

AS WE SAW IT IN PRAGUE, by Dr. O. Lechner. *Allen & Unwin.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

I SAW THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES, by Colonel Romulo. *Harrap.* 9*s.*

NEW WRITING AND DAYLIGHT, edited by John Lehmann. *The Hogarth Press.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

There is much in this interesting book on the Huguenots that is topical to-day or would be if precautions were not being taken; and we have been assured by Professor Saurat of the Institut Français in London that there will certainly be no civil war in France. When Henri IV summoned the refractory members of the *parlement*, receiving them quite unceremoniously in his houserobe, he reminded them of the horrors of civil war and as for the differences between Catholics and Protestants he did not question them, but they were all Frenchmen. When Laval and such folk have been dealt with—perhaps much in the same fashion as Ravaillac dealt with the good King Henri—there will be no reason why sorely stricken France should not see to the healing of her wounds. She cannot afford to have again at this juncture so many of her best citizens migrating as did the Huguenots, of whom some 60,000 came to England; and although James II. was no friend of theirs they soon flocked to the armies of William of Orange. No less than 100,000 went to the Netherlands, where not only the Jews but also the Catholics collected money for them and, with a generosity unequalled in the history of mankind, retirement pensions were paid by the Dutch to these French noblemen, officers and pastors. In this book we are given an excellent account of the whole movement and of course of such leading personalities as Condé, Coligny, the Duc de Guise and Maria de'Medici.

The causes of a migration in our own day are laid bare in Dr. Lechner's book which, in the form of conversations between a small group of Czechoslovak citizens, brings before the reader in a very vivid fashion the state of things prevailing in that country before and during the Nazi invasion. If it is no good crying over spilled milk we can at any rate see to it that no more of that kind is lost. 'I never shall understand,' says one of the speakers, 'why the Entente did not protest against Hindenburg's election. It was so easy for them; they had sufficient power to prevent the man who had commanded an army against them from coming into power again.' Let this be a lesson for the period after this war. It is well known by students of foreign affairs that Dr. Benes was willing after the last war to give up certain parts of Bohemia where the German-speaking population predominated, but France insisted on the old historic frontiers being retained, France which in 1938 declared through the lips of her Foreign Minister Bonnet that she had no intention of honouring her plighted word and coming to the assistance of the Czechoslovak Republic. And here we are reminded how Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna came to the moral assistance of Hitler, the foe of the Catholic Church. On the very morning after the invasion of Austria Innitzer called upon Hitler and said: 'By the quick and bloodless success you have achieved' [he had forgotten the murder of Dolfuss and many others]. 'it can be seen that God is on your side.'

We have been told that He is always on the side of the strong battalions and for a time it was so in the Philippines, where the forces at the disposal of the Japanese were far greater than those under General MacArthur. The author of this book is a profound admirer of the General and of Manuel Quezon, the Philippine President, both of whom are obviously most admirable men, but it is much to be regretted that Colonel Romulo in the course of a hasty journey through British and Dutch possessions in the East collected and hands on to his readers, with evident appreciation, the views of disgruntled natives according to whom the rule of the Japanese over them is to be preferred to that of the Europeans. Elsewhere Colonel Romulo, who was editor of a Manila paper before he was given military rank, describes the barbarous behaviour of the Japanese in such detail that one hopes he will feel impelled to send copies of this book to those misguided persons in Burma and the Dutch East Indies.

1843-1943

HUMANITY progresses book in hand. During the years of reconstruction to which we are looking forward, our need of books will grow steadily greater and greater—if we are to think clearly, plan wisely and build efficiently. During the last hundred years Batsfords have published and sold a vast range of books on a large variety of subjects, historical, critical and technical. Every Batsford book is presented on its own merits—as a work that deserves the attention of the thoughtful modern reader.

B. T. BATSFORD LTD
15 North Audley Street
London, W.1

And then we sail into the non-controversial waters of Mr. Lehmann's latest collection of prose and verse, non-controversial at any rate with regard to politics. Here we are concerned with the qualities of literary work and some of the specimens laid before us make for our delight. Mr. Raymond Mortimer, as you would expect, is extremely informative, understanding and sardonic in his article on French writers to-day. 'While the prospects of the Allies,' he says, 'become more cheerful, we can look forward with some confidence, I think, to the support of M. Maurois.' Some of Mr. Lehmann's team try to be cleverer than Mr. Mortimer; let them read Mr. B. L. Coombes' excellent account of the miners who were given facilities to bathe at the pit-head. 'Now,' he says, 'we see one another as human beings, not as black objects in heavy boots, strapped trousers and mufflers.'

HENRY BAERLEIN.

THE STRUCTURE OF MORALE, by J. T. MacCurdy. *Cambridge University Press.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

Founded on lectures given at Cambridge to officers of the Army and the A.T.S., Dr. MacCurdy's book is written for the general reader in the sense that though highly controversial matters are discussed the author does not bother the reader with references to the arguments of fellow specialists. The colloquial style of lectures is retained and could indeed have done with some polish in the interests of clarity. For instance the reader is told that:

> None but wilful traitors—assuming the public servant to have a certain minimum of intelligence—could be a pure departmentalist any more than a brigand could be loyal to his band without knowing that he was breaking the law.

Sentences like that are by no means rare; but on the whole the book is racy and easy to read.

Dr. MacCurdy begins with a description of passive and active adaptation to fear. The former he describes as a "conditional reaction" similar to those produced by Pavlov when experimenting with animals. The unsophisticated reader will probably find this comparison extremely unconvincing, though he will enjoy the account of how the populations of bombed cities became adapted to their experiences. Man is not however "a purely passive agent." "Danger is a powerful stimulant to action and what he does is likely to affect the appearance or absence of fear." "Fear results from thoughts of ineffective measures to meet danger." The reader will probably be prepared to agree that much fear does arise in this way, and the account of how military training exploits these mechanisms is one of the most interesting parts of the book. The section ends with an account of how Officers and N.C.O's. can help men with special difficulties. The reader might be glad to hear more of this but the author now passes on to his main theme, the social factor in morale.

Psychoanalytic theory has no attractions for Dr. MacCurdy and he seeks a biological foundation for group life.

> Morale is bound up with the compulsion of herd animals to orient their lives to activities serving group rather than individual needs . . . It is the group which must be preserved, the individual lives in it and for it, having no separate existence.

The individual has his day and is gone but the group is immortal, and "the patriot . . . can . . . achieve this immortality enjoyed by the nation, or even of all nations that subscribe to a common cause."

It is one of the mysteries of life that apparently purposive action long precedes any consciousness of it. Material aims and ideals are unconscious.

> The subject himself cannot account for his apparent preferences . . . The material to study is not what the person or the people say or think of themselves, but history, history of the individual and history of the state.

Dr. MacCurdy illustrates his argument by a careful examination of the morales and national scales of value of the different nations engaged in the present war.

With the understanding thus gained, he passes to the consideration of some problems of organization, for faith in your organization is of the essence of morale. The reader may find it calming and astringent to be forced to look in this detached manner at subjects on which most of us feel so strongly that we are unable to think or speak coherently about them. What part does class stratification play in our society and red tape in our offices?

The tendencies," Dr. MacCurdy says, "are inevitable . . . As always, the major improvement will result where there is insight into the disease so that men of goodwill can fight it."

This belief in insight inspires the whole book. "The superiority of our culture rests on our having a group—not a large one—of specialists who are trained in controlled experiment and have some notion of statistical method." The reader, having reached this remark at an early stage of the book, may feel that the statement is arrogant. But by the end he may well agree that it is a just claim.

P. M. ALLEN.

STONE AND FLOWER, Poems 1935-43, by Kathleen Raine, with drawings by Barbara Hepworth. *Nicholson & Watson.* 6*s.*

LEGACY TO LOVE, Selected Poems 1931-1941, by John Gawsworth. *Collins.* 5*s.*

SELECTED POEMS OF FEDERICO GARCIA LORCA, Translated by J. L. Gili and Stephen Spender. The New Hogarth Library. Vol. XI. *The Hogarth Press.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

SELECTED POEMS HERMAN MELVILLE, Edited by William Plomer. The New Hogarth Library. Vol. X. *The Hogarth Press.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

THE EVE OF ST. MARK, a Play in two acts by Maxwell Anderson. *John Lane, The Bodley Head.* 5*s.*

Nothwithstanding certain esoteric and coterie poems such as "Cattle Dream," "Maternal Grief," and a few others like "Invocation" which are tinged with a personal affectation, *Stone and Flower* is by far the most interesting first volume that has come my way for a long time. For here at last are many poems which are "simple, sensuous and passionate" and others which strike a genuine religious note, too long absent. In the intensity of her lyrical feeling and vision Miss Raine recalls Katherine Mansfield; she is as personal and feminine, but here the resemblance ends. For Miss Raine is essentially the poet, and her nature mysticism is more akin to Wordsworth's preoccupation with "rocks and stones and trees" rather than with men and women.

> And see the peaceful trees extend
> their myriad leaves in leisured dance—
> they bear the weight of sky and cloud
> upon the fountain of their veins.

Tory Democracy's Better Britain

By W. S. Shepherd

Press and public acclaim this contribution to Post-War Policy. Brilliantly interweaves tradition and sweeping progress. Stimulating, provocative, yet practical.

Booksellers or post free 1/-,

PATRIA PRESS Ltd., 168, Regent St, W.1.

And if Wordsworth and the lakes have helped to mould the beauty of this new voice, so too have Donne and the metaphysicals. The love poems, the religious poems offer many riches:

Your love comes from the creation of the world,
From those paternal fingers, streaming through the clouds
That break with light the surface of the sea.

And from "Prayer":

Or teach me, flower or angel, how with compassion
In time, in pain, this humble joy of living
May be the golden sowing of heaven's harvest,
The texture of a song, the exaltation
Of Christ most high, whose love is greatest.

But perhaps the core of Miss Raine's approach to life and poetry is given in "Whitsuntide 1942" which I must quote in full:

Shut to eternity with the sky's eyelid, blue distance, and piled centuries of cloud,
engraved upon my retina the world
of stone and flower that compels my thought;
my eyes are pools where the heart's tiger drinks,
and my breasts feed the seagull and the storm.

made one with my infinity and closed within myself, contoured upon dark night
what nerve have I, beloved Lord, what sense
to know the holy presence of my God?

This poetry should be possessed by all who need poetry. The drawings for one reader seem unnecessary and out of place.

The selection from John Gawsworth's poetry is less compelling, and *Legacy to Love* is pitched in a lower key. It is, however, poetry as it has always been, true, and exhibits skilful workmanship. Some of the author's preoccupations are those of Shakespeare's sonnets, love, death, time, and country matters. There is a vivid sense of history, and of the past in "Roman Headstone," a beautiful poem. Of Naiads he writes:

Who knows what lovely noise they made,
What light explosions of gold laughter?

And in "Conjuration":

Charm and beauty fade and die;
Music into silence goes:
And at this moment who am I
To resurrect their rose?

Unfortunately, I have only space to commend most warmly the latest two volumes in *The New Hogarth Library*. Lorca's poems are charged with Spanish warmth, colour and poignancy; and, while I am not competent to judge the translation, a poem such as "The Faithless Wife" is excellent in English. Herman Melville's poetry has considerable intrinsic merit and is, at any rate, a commentary on the prose. He is at his best when nostalgic; but he can also be prophetic, and there is much in the book for to-day:

You are but drilling the new Hun
Whose growl even now can some dismay;
Vindictive in his heart of hearts,
He schools him in your mines and marts—
A skilled destroyer.

Man fell from Eden, fell from Athens, too.

Lastly, let me recommend as good reading, *The Eve of St. Mark*, a new play by the author of *Winterset* and *The Wingless Victory*. I hope that before long this play may be seen in London. It deals with the impact of the war on a group of people in America, and contains some fine characterization. It is true, tender, and deeply moving.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

ADVERTISEMENT AND BUSINESS OFFICES: 13 Buckingham Street, LONDON, W.C.2
PUBLISHED FOR THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, LTD., BY HORACE MARSHALL & SON, LTD., Publishing Department, Temple House, Tallis Street, E.C.4
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GEERINGS OF ASHFORD, LTD., 80, HIGH STREET, ASHFORD, KENT
PUBLISHED IN ENGLAND

THE FORTNIGHTLY

DECEMBER, 1943

BELLIGERENT POWER

BY AIR-COMMODORE L. E. O. CHARLTON

ON October 1 the London *Times* published a lengthy statement on its leader-page which bore the title 'Belligerent Power', together with the further caption 'An Authoritative Statement'. The signatories to this pronouncement, five in all, would certainly appear to be well-qualified to issue a compendium on such a subject, for they are without exception men who have, within the last decade, either held the highest office of responsibility in their respective services, or who have, as in the cases of Lord Hankey and Lord Winster, been closely associated with ruling deliberations on the problems of imperial defence and kindred subjects of research. It is fair, however, to observe that the above-mentioned sub-heading, as in the case also of the title, was an editorial product and not the fancy of the authors.

It is an apt title, none the less, and sincerely descriptive of the statement's sum and substance, which place before the readers of this highly influential organ of the press, in terms well chosen for the purpose and with felicitous expression, all that need be known by the laity at large about the science of waging total war. That section of the public which has ready access to *The Times*, and, having ready access, devours its pages, is now sufficiently informed, if not enlightened, on the subject, and can speak in turn with some authority of the inter-relationship of the three fighting services in the field of their endeavour, as also of the civilian-manned home front without whose effort the strategic plan would come to nought. It is not to be expected that this definitive pronouncement will exercise an influence, either soon or later, on the conduct of the war, for it has itself been called forth by a study of the world hostilities and merely formulates the observed results of action and reaction, largely of an experimental kind, which are the unfortunate characteristics of each succeeding national appeal to arms. Had it been produced at the outset of the war or, better still, while our loins were being girded for the fray, it might have done much to educate the public mind, impress on the country the nature of the task before her, and spur the workers of all categories unremittingly to apply their toil. It might even have restrained the impetus of those who assisted the War Cabinet to a conclusion on the advis-

ability of wresting Norway from its captors, or of holding back th Nazi tide in Greece, both of which projects were undertaken wit inadequate means at hand. As it is, the statement falls rather fla regarded as a manifesto or as an incentive to the national resolv though it possesses undoubted academic value as a prefator chapter to a manual of modern war, which may have been its motiv after all.

It is open to fair criticism on other grounds as well. The whol trend of the argument, for instance, and, at the same time, the rea measure of the statement, is of the oneness and indivisibility of sea air and land power. Here are some excerpts:—'It is not possibl in modern war to judge the strength of a nation by the individua strengths of its armed forces. Capacity for making war, i.e. bellig erent power, is greater than the sum of all three.' And again:— 'Each component varies in relative effectiveness and seeming im portance. Sometimes one and sometimes another will occupy th centre of the stage, but all the time they are essentially of equal an prime importance.' Or this:—'The three fighting services com prise in reality one service.'

Having gone as far as that it seems strange that the signatorie to the memorandum did not go a little further, the whole hog i fact, and strongly recommend the adoption of a scheme of centrali zation for the fusion of the three arms under a single head with combined staff, to which the creation of a Ministry of Defence woul have been a natural corollary. That they did not do so may possi bly be ascribed to the nature of the document, which, like all suc products issuing from a multiple of pens, cannot escape the mark of compromise.

There are other obvious lacunae in the statement, among whic may be noted the omission of all reference to vital statistics, a sub ject that surely pervades the very breath of total war. The ingredi ents of belligerent power, service and civilian alike, are solely derivable from the man-power of a nation, and it matters not how closely they may be compounded, or how effectually woven into a integrated whole, if reproductive energy be permitted visibly t decline. Total war, by hypothesis, involves the enrolment on th various fronts, real and theoretical, of all except the immature, aged and sick, and if this assumption should be carried to a logical con clusion, pre-supposing also that the countries at each other' throats are reasonably on an equal footing as regards inventive power and a scientific capacity to kill, then weight of numbers i the end must tell. It is true, the statement deals with generalities and would not bear extension to embrace a treatise on the subject of the upkeep of the population, but some mention of a matter s

important, the base on which the pillar of belligerent power must needs be elevated, would at least have been appropriate.

Another striking omission is an absence of all mention of priority, or choice, of weapons. Having neglected the logical recommendation of a unified supreme command, the authors of the statement, it should be remembered, have left each fighting service to its own particular offensive power. The Navy, on this assumption, may think, and press the point, that battleships will win the war; the Army may be equally convinced that victory turns on tanks; and the Air Force with an offensive spirit uppermost, might pin its faith exclusively on bombers. All, of course, are wanted; but in due proportion, and a parochial propensity might easily result in an ill-balance of armament within each fighting service detrimental to the united effort of them all. Safeguards of a sort exist to prevent lopsided or top-heavy growth of the kind, but the service voice is strong, enthusiasms can be misdirected, and woods are occasionally obscured by the trees. There is yet another danger in the existent situation. Priority committees, and other machinery for the better ordering of our disposable belligerent effects, can ensure the distribution of material, raw or manufactured, according to the dictate of necessity; but what, or who, is there to overlook the highest strategy of all, the preservation of a correct balance in the application of power by sea, land and air, or, in the words of the statement, to extract that extra capacity for waging war which is over and above the sum of all three fighting services combined.

The principle of integration, whereby the utmost effect of fighting power can solely be attained and which the statement delineates in outline only, has, it is true, been established in the Italian campaign, in the South-West Pacific and, more recently, against Japan. In all three cases combined staffs, presided over by a chief with sole responsibility, are conducting operations in separate large theatres of the war. But at home, as yet, there is no such combination, nor sign of it, although it will be from Britain's shores, we are being led to believe, that our supreme invasion effort is to be launched.

The main significance, however, of this agreed, authoritative statement undoubtedly lies in the overbearing importance ascribed by its authors to the weapon of the air. In the case of the two ex-Chiefs of Staff, Field-Marshal Lord Milne and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Salmond, both of whom relinquished office in 1933, no less was to be expected, for the military mind has long conceded to the air a rôle in war on land of influence second only to the army, and a Marshal of the Air, who himself assisted greatly the development of air power, was hardly likely to abate his claims on its behalf. But the attitude of an ex-First Sea Lord, in this case

Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, is not so easy of comprehension, for the naval mind, although not slow to grasp the value of aircraft for its own domestic purposes, has in the past been loath to accord to air power a decided, much less decisive, influence on sea-going affairs.

The authoritative statement is, however, quite committed to this point of view. Here are some few extracted observations on the subject:—'Even in their respective spheres the fighting services have always been incomplete, and now they are often individually impotent. To-day all operations are combined operations.' 'Sea power is primarily the responsibility of the Navy, but can no longer be considered as merely an affair of warships, with aircraft employed as ancillaries. Operations in the Pacific have shown that aircraft may be a primary instrument of sea power.' 'The experiences of the war have proved that a squadron of torpedo-bomber aircraft can in certain circumstances have a greater influence on sea power than a flotilla of destroyers or even larger warships. A score or two of aircraft, particularly if shore-based, can at times outmatch a powerful battleship escorted by cruisers and smaller craft.'

And here are some further extracts which refer to other features of air power:—'It is now axiomatic that land power depends on air power for its effectiveness. The campaigns in France, Norway, Greece, Crete, the Far East, Libya, Tunisia and Sicily have shown that aircraft are often not an ancillary but a prime instrument of land operations.' 'Air power, after industrial production the most ubiquitous component of belligerent power, must in increasing degree be measured not only by ability to strike but also by ability to maintain a service of air transport in the skies.' 'So far as possible the call for air co-operation should be foreseen and built in to the plan for the operation. To allow of this the Navy and Army must be prepared, on occasion, to forgo some of their requirements, including shipping space.' Finally, this revealing sentence: 'Air power is the spearhead of belligerent power, able to strike swiftly, sometimes even decisively, in pursuit of a common strategy of total war.'

In spite of a certain artlessness about these several admissions, which have been open truths ever since the experiences, both sweet and bitter, which eventually called them forth, the words expressing them are gravely couched and do reveal a thorough, if somewhat delayed, understanding of the towering importance of the air. Such expressions of opinion, emanating from a source so well- informed, would have been hard pills for naval throats to swallow a few short years ago, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that one, at least, among the co-signatories of the statement must have had to work

his epiglottis energetically to get them down. There is, in fact, a sign of hesitancy in the sentence appended to the more forthright of the excerpts which have been given above, wherein we read as follows:—'It must be remembered, however, that navies readapt themselves in the light of experience and the danger to warships from air attack may diminish.' The adaptability of naval thought may, or may not, be a matter which has been placed satisfactorily on record outside naval circles, but the re-adaptation herein hinted at can only have to do with an increase of anti-aircraft fire power. When, however, it is considered that allied bombers, setting out from bases in this country by day and night, succeed in penetrating to their targets, and in bombing them with remarkable results, in the face of battery concentrations to which the fire power of a whole fleet of battleships would be as minute-guns, it is not easy to see force or reason in the argument of re-adaptation.

In point of fact the self-protective theory of battleships, and warships of every description for that matter, in the face of determined air attack, was shattered as long ago as 1921 when certain remarkable experiments were carried out in United States waters with a view to finding out the truth. On that occasion, and for the second time in history, America fired, so to speak, a shot that went around the world, though the world, in this instance, was deaf, or at any rate that small and oligarchic part of it which resided in Admiralty Row.

It is worth while, perhaps, very briefly to recall the highly interesting results of those experiments. General Mitchell of the U.S. Army Air Service, a doughty advocate of air power, had dared the U.S. Navy to prove him in the wrong; in consequence of which certain surrendered German warships, a destroyer, the cruiser *Frankfurt*, and the battleship *Ostfriesland*, reputed to be unsinkable, were placed reluctantly at his disposal, but with confidence, to batter to the depths with bombs. It was of course a thoroughly unwarlike situation, with stationary targets, an entire absence of defensive fire power, and no embargo on low altitude attack. In the event, however, the U.S. Navy nerves were subjected to a most severe strain, for complete success rewarded General Mitchell's bold defiance. The destroyer, hit amidships, broke in two; the cruiser *Frankfurt* sank under the impact of a single 600-pound bomb; the unsinkable *Ostfriesland*, a veteran of Jutland, slowly sank from view, not from direct hits, but owing to near misses by four ton-weight bombs which were dropped alongside, two abeam and one on either quarter.

Later that year the U.S. naval authorities, no doubt inwardly disturbed, supplied the obsolescent battleship *Alabama* for the pur-

pose of ascertaining, on this occasion, how quickly a well-armoured warship could be sunk, for previously the experiments had been interrupted step by step to permit of inspection. The *Alabama*, which was moored in thirty-five feet of water, was directly hit by one 2,000-lb. bomb and went down in less than a minute. Further tests were carried out in the two ensuing years, in which the obsolescent battleships *Virginia* and *New Jersey* were selected for experiment. The *Virginia* was attacked by bombs of medium size and soon became a stack of twisted steel, eventually sinking after an 1,100-pounder had been dropped alongside. The *New Jersey* shared a similar fate, turning over slowly on its back and sinking swiftly after the impact of a single large-sized bomb. It is worthy of note that the then commander of the U.S. Army Air Service, commenting on the results of these experiments, used the words that follow:—'The Air Service does not for a moment assume to say that battleships, or any other component parts of a naval establishment, are obsolete. We merely rest on the conclusions of the Joint Board that under proper conditions we can put out of commission, or sink, any naval craft that floats.' Nothing could have been fairer than this summed up conclusion, which was both restrained and modest, and no other words could have conveyed a fairer warning to the navies of the world.

Our own Admiralty, under the pressure of opinion in Press an Parliament, itself conducted, tentatively, some tests of the effect o ships-of-war of bombs, though not of an exhaustive nature, no on the same full-scale plan of the American experiments. Uneasi ness was not allayed; Lord Rothermere leapt into action and severa thoughtful writers, full of concern at the official apathy displayed committed their opinions to paper. But Sir Samuel Hoare, Firs Lord of the Admiralty from 1935-1937, voiced his view of the matte by declaring in a public speech that he, for one, would be sorry fo the aircraft which should be sent up against a British battleship

In spite of this reassuring pronouncement, the voices of thos who feared that the Navy might not prove itself adaptive to th menace of the air began to gain in weight and vigour, as a long-las result of which a bomb-versus-battleship inquiry was instituted i the spring of 1936. It took the form of a sub-committee of th Committee of Imperial Defence and was presided over by Lor Caldecott, then Sir Thomas Inskip and Minister for the Co ordination of Defence, who was supported by Lords Halifax an Runciman as coadjutors, with the First Sea Lord, Lord Chatfield and the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir E. L. Ellington, as the necessar service makeweight. The evidence of witnesses called before thi tribunal was never published, and probably never will be now, no

were their names disclosed. But a finding was issued in due course which, amidst much verbiage, held that in highly favourable circumstances, and in the case of air attack driven home by a powerful force, the most heavily armoured ship-of-war could no doubt be destroyed, or at least seriously crippled; to this very patent truth being added words to the effect that capital ships, in any case, were essential to our national security.

Here at last was an admission, however halting in its nature, that those who saw the writing on the wall had not been playing bugaboo, for no one seriously questioned the necessity of a strong and well-armed Navy, and signs of re-adaptation were eagerly awaited. But the only immediate evidence of a disposition to face the facts occurred in the July of that same year, at the time of our strained relationship with Italy, when the Mediterranean Fleet, instead of harbouring at Malta on the conclusion of its cruise in the Aegean Sea, was sent to Alexandria.

However disguised the intention underlying that precautionary move might be, plain commonsense informed the thinking world outside that it had been prompted by the near presence of Mussolini's bombers. It conveyed much more than this besides. It announced the fact that deck anti-aircraft armament was not entirely to be trusted, even in a naval estimation, to defeat attack by air, and it brought into immediate prominence the logical conclusion that the antidote to danger from that source could only be the successful outcome of combat overhead. It was clearly now a case of aircraft versus aircraft, the bomber or torpedo-bomber on the one hand as attacker, and the fighter, either shore or sea-based, to bring it down or turn it back on the other, while the ships-of-war supinely lay below.

Since then the war arrived to overwhelm the world and, for the first time, the British Navy had to address itself to the task of asserting an old time sea superiority beneath a fearful menace from above. It cannot be said that those who ordered military operations in the earlier stages of the war were keenly alive to the significance of air superiority in all its bearings. We set an expeditionary force ashore in Norway without any overhead defence, except of a forlorn description. We did much the same in Greece, though our course of action there had much, politically, to recommend it. Crete was wrested from us owing to the enemy's mastery of the air. Our failure in Malaya, however understandable the circumstances, was due largely to the same reason. Alternatively, our cause flourished, as in Libya, Tunisia, Sicily and, latterly, in the south-west Pacific, wherever we ourselves were able to assert

air mastery, though even as recently as Salerno the lesson was momentarily allowed to lapse.

But the Navy had a still harder road to travel. Although it never ceased to behave intrepidly on each and every occasion of the sort, over and over again, lacking a sufficiency of air support, it was forced to bow to the hard circumstance of determined air attack and withdraw from the infested neighbourhood, lest worse befall. Here are Mr. Churchill's own words as First Lord of the Admiralty, spoken in the House of Commons, May 8, 1940, on the reason for the withdrawal of our naval forces in the Kattegat and Skagerrak, where they were vainly attempting to prevent the conveyance of German supplies and reinforcements to Norway:

> Our present naval preponderance, it is said, ought to make it feasible for us to dominate the Skagerrak with surface ships and thus cut the communications with Oslo from the first moment and continuously. But the immense enemy air strength which can be brought to bear upon our patrolling craft has made this method far too costly to be adopted. It could only be enforced by maintaining a standing surface patrol, and a patrol, mark you, not of destroyers, because it is close to the enemy air bases and it is also close to their cruisers and battle cruisers of which they still retain two. Consequently, very important forces would have to be employed in order to maintain a steady surface patrol, and the losses which would be inflicted upon that patrol from the air would, undoubtedly, very soon constitute a naval disaster.

It is also known, and well-remembered, that our ships-of-war were forced to withdraw from the Aegean Sea for an exactly similar reason at the time of the air invasion of Crete, Germany's shore-based bombers, taking off from mainland airfields but a little distance off, causing losses which would soon have become insupportable to bear. And then there is the tragedy of the *Repulse* and the *Prince of Wales* in the South China Sea, a disaster which, however gently referred to, was unmistakably due to an unlearnt lesson of the air. Two of our cruisers, subsequent to that tragic occurrence, were similarly lost to Japanese shore- or ship-based aircraft while on a reconnoitring cruise in the Bay of Bengal.

But the lesson has been learnt at last, and in the exercise of our belligerent power on sea or land it is now unthinkable that a sufficiency of overhead protection should not be simultaneously available. Adaptation is the order of the day. In that respect the statement has conveyed a real assurance, and if in substance it amounts to little more than a dotting of the 'I's' and a crossing of the 'T's' it is none the less a wholesome clearing up of the entangled past.

MINERS AND THE FUTURE

By Will Lawther

WE have left behind us that day in which Lord Bolingbroke thus described the lot of those who then worked in the Mining Industry:—

> These unhappy wretches scarce ever see the light of the sun, they are buried in the bowels of the earth, where they work at a severe and dismal task without the least prospect of being delivered from it. They subsist upon the coarsest and worst of fare. They have their health miserably impaired and their lives cut short by being perpetually confined in the close vapour of these malignant minerals."

Those were the days when women and children of tender years worked underground. Women no longer go down into the mines of Britain, yet in certain districts of Scotland, Cumberland and Lancashire they still work upon the surface. Although they do a man's job they do not receive a man's wage. Boys in this country commence work underground at the age of 14, whereas in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. they do not begin until they are 18 years of age. Many of the Miners' Officials of to-day who are over 50 years of age began work long before they were 14. I myself began at 12½ years of age.

In the history of the mining industry practically every reform in every sphere has had to be the subject of advocacy from the workmen's side. Few have been the occasions when anyone else, either in the industry or outside, has devoted any time to alleviate the terrible conditions which are the real source of all the trouble in the coalfield. It is too cheap and ultimately too costly to discuss grievances as if they were the result of agitation; to do so is to reverse the connection between the two. The grievances are the cause of the agitation.

There ought not to be any question as to what is wrong with the industry. No other trade has been so much and for so long the subject of enquiry and investigation by Royal Commission after Royal Commission as mining, and it is because there still appears to be some doubt in the public mind as to what is wrong that we wish to place on record the point of view of those who are now recognized as essential workers both in war and peace.

One of the most urgent needs of this industry, as in many others under war circumstances, is man power. Men are required to replace the wastage of man power through old age, illness and accident. It is one of the unfortunate features of the coal mining industry that both in war and peace the workmen suffer more accidents than in any other industry. To-day there are more aged persons working in the pits than ever before. Even the most bitter

opponent of the miners—and we have some even in 1943—have to confess against their prejudices, that the elderly men are doing more than a man's job. Indeed one has heard these workmen described as " the salt of the earth."

The appeals for new entrants to the mining industry have for all practical purposes utterly failed to produce the results expected by those who made the appeals. Circumstances will, we have no doubt, compel the Government to adopt direction. This is, under the circumstances, inevitable, because the Government has not accepted the suggestion tendered by miners that to get the numbers required it would, in our opinion, have been better to release from the Armed Forces miners who were underground workers. That would have given the industry an immediate access to the trained man power it so badly needs to-day.

The work of the Miners' Welfare Commission has been the one bright spot between the two world wars. In every coalfield, in every village, either in the form of recreation, education or safety measures—not to mention pit-head baths with to-day's canteens—the work is there to be seen. The miners are determined that whatever may be the nature of the changes either required from or imposed upon the industry, the work of the Miners' Welfare Commission shall continue. We are glad to put on record that the Minister of Fuel and Power, Major Lloyd George, agrees with this view, and will help with a bill to put right the error made by Parliament in 1939.

We are glad that there are some public spirited individuals outside our ranks who have called attention to immediate and urgent problems. It is unfortunate that more outsiders have not read and understood the Annual Report of the Welfare Commission. They would have gleaned from its pages information of the changes made, contemplated and undertaken at the cost of no more than one penny per ton. We trust, however, that Parliament will not waste many more seconds with the measure extending the life of the " penny levy " than it did extending its own life.

The old adage " Take care of the pence . . . . " has been demonstrated by the Miners' Welfare Movement. Its latest undertaking—Rehabilitation Centres—brings to this accident-prone industry a much needed up-to-date service which will be of great value to the industry and all concerned. There was an article in *The Times* of October 2 by Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes, M.P., who, as Chairman of the Miners' Welfare Commission for nearly ten years, has had an opportunity, given to very few outsiders, to study the industry. I take the opportunity of quoting the following passage from this article:

> A National campaign ought to be put in hand to raise the whole status of the mining industry in the esteem of boys, parents and the public. Ministry of Information and other films, the wireless and the Press, should ensure a clear realization of the part played by coal in the prosperity of the country . . . .

The miners would welcome such a step.

Practically all the recommendations enumerated by Sir Frederick Sykes are matters which ought to be dealt with immediately. Some of them are having attention now and are to adopted in relation to those who either " opt " for the industry or will be directed into coalmining. They disclose what has been radically wrong with the industry over a number of years in relation to boys entering the mines. The facts ought to be public knowledge, and it is lamentable that this huge industry which means so much should be so little understood, or, as in many cases, so much misunderstood.

The whole nation will loyally accept the direction which will enlist in the service of this war-winning industry men who for the first time will learn something of its amazing peculiarities. These new recruits will bring into hundreds of homes the direct, vivid, personal realization of the great gap between the heroism of the mining community and the public recognition of that heroism. People who have no connection with the industry—except in a profit-making capacity—sometimes indulge in vituperation and direct their abuse against the very meagre percentage of miners who do not always accept or stand up to the task which is thought to be best for the nation. These silly critics display an attitude of mind which is most provocative and, far from helping the situation, provide in some cases plausible excuses for actions which merit the very strongest condemnation. I refer particularly to the question of absenteeism—which is not uncommon in high administrative circles; indeed, the Mother of Parliaments would be the worst example for the miners to emulate—and mining possesses as high and as honourable a record of attendance as any industry or professional administrative circle.

Then there is the pet theme that disputes are caused by the professional agitator or advocate. No single industry has ever had more straightforward talk to those inside it than has the mining industry. We have never hesitated or doubted as to what was our duty to the nation in condemning unconstitutional action, but we know that there is very little—if any—condemnation of the actions which are often the cause of the dispute and, as we are often appealed to on the score that there are two sides to every story, so we would say that there are two sides to every dispute. I am not allowed to divulge proof, but at this moment as I write I have figures in my possession to show that there were more days lost through lack of transport facilities in a given week than there were by disputes, and that there was 150 per cent. more time lost through stoppages due to Mother Nature in the mines. It would be folly for the miners to attribute these days lost, through falls, breakage of machinery and other factors, as being due to bad management. We would never be guilty of such foolishness, but it would be nearly as sensible as some of the tactics adopted by the gentlemen already referred to. We prefer to face facts, rather than to theorize over facts and the problems and difficulties of the men are too tragic to be ignored even by those contemptible irresponsibles who have no other objective in life than to belittle the efforts of men who have faced—and must face—death in the mining of coal.

The Mineworkers' Federation, which is the body entitled to speak on behalf of those organized in the industry, is as concerned, like all right thinking and conscientious individuals, with the desire to wipe out Naziism and all its stands for at the earliest possible moment, as any other organized or unorganized body of brave citizens. We know too well from what the miners have suffered under the Hitler régime to have any hesitation or doubt as to what is required of us.

The Federation has always pressed the position that coal was of vital national importance both in peace and war. Therefore, what the miners put forward through their representatives is their considered judgment of what they conceive to be essential in the national interest. They are convinced that it is bad national policy to dodge the adoption of measures which will revitalize an industry that has been neglected and nearly forgotten in the years between the two wars.

High hopes were held by the miners when the Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir John Foster was established. The Federation presented evidence to that Committee and pleaded for a " Pit Boys' Charter " and urged, among other things, the following:—

(a) A greater margin of safety and health in mining operations.
(b) A higher standard of wages and improved conditions of employment.
(c) Regularity of employment.
(d) Assurance for future work and retirement with adequate allowances.
(e) Facilities for re-employment of displaced miners.

There were some 26 recommendations made by Sir John Foster and his colleagues. It is obviously not possible to quote these recommendations in full, but the ones dealing with boys can be summarized as follows:—

(a) Special training of all juvenile entrants to the coal mining industry.
(b) National Minimum Rates of wages should be established for juvenile workers.
(c) There should be a medical examination of all boys entering the industry to be followed by periodical examinations.
(d) Further consideration of the desirability of limiting the age at which boys may work underground.
(e) An acceleration of the existing programme for pit-head baths and associated canteens.
(f) The principle of the guaranteed week, with suitable safeguards, should be continued.

Dealing with the very acute problems that the industry has to face to-day because of the objection of youths to entering it Sir Frederick Sykes said in his *Times* article: " Another very important point is security of tenure. Insecurity in the past has left bitter memories behind it. Whatever may be the result of the demand for the nationalization of the mines, if young men are to be persuaded to go into mining they must be assured of reasonable wages in the present, and that they will not be liable to be thrown on the dole whenever a passing slump reduces the demand for labour."

How often in our industry has it happened that the Governments have refused to recognize that there were injustices which ought to be remedied, grievances attended to and steps taken to provide the foundations of security

for the future. No industry has suffered more than ours in this respect, and there never was a more opportune moment, when the miners are prepared to consider and work out proposals to give them the security of which Sir Frederick Sykes has spoken, than to-day. Miners, by their very calling, face danger day by day; when they leave home for their work they never know whether they will return secure and healthy and therefore cowardice is not in their make-up. No display of strength or brandishing of swords will deter them from demanding and establishing a status in keeping with their great work and their high courage. This courage has been freely acknowledged in this war in the splendid tributes to the County Regiments in whose ranks serve the miners. It is the same sort of men out of uniform who are to-day putting forward their plea for conditions which will give them security, freedom from want and the fear which insecurity has given them over the years. It is the duty of public men and women to help to bring about this change.

It was the Government who first of all put forward suggestions to the miners in order to obtain the coal the nation needs with the request that the miners should say what was wrong with the proposals. There was no enthusiasm in mining communities with the Government proposal for extra Sunday and weekend work, either by the men themselves or by the coalowners, because they knew from their own experience that the pits were working practically every hour of the clock seven days per week. If coal was not being produced every second that was because there were essential repair and preparatory work being done in order that coal drawing might continue.

The Mineworkers' Federation of Great Britain are confident that the proposals which they have put before the Ministry of Fuel and Power could help to secure the much desired changes; they conceive them to be a way out. As a federation they are no more political than any other section of the community, but the public must remember that the miners were the first amongst organized labour to send their own representatives to the House of Commons in the middle of the 19th century in order to look after the affairs of the men who toiled in the industry. To-day miners in the House of Commons are continuing that work with their added knowledge and experience of the mines. All of them have followed this calling, often thrust upon them by poverty, the district they were born in having no other calling to offer. They live mostly amongst their fellows, meet and discuss their grievances, and have ever before them the haunting knowledge of their past. They desire the future well-being of those in an industry to which many are called, but few outside of the miners' ranks respond.

(Mr. Lawther is the President of the Mineworkers' Federation of Great Britain and a Member of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress.)

JAPAN: VICTORY OR DEFEAT

By Sir Robert H. Clive

ON December 8, Japan enters on the third year of war against Great Britain and the United States of America. At a first glance it might appear that she is still in the almost impregnable position which she occupied a year ago. No doubt she has lost ground in the Solomon Islands including the important air base of Guadalcanal. She has been driven from Lae and Salamana in New Guinea and has suffered considerable losses in aircraft and shipping, but she still retains more than a foothold both in New Guinea and the Solomons and in spite of repeated bombings a firm hold on Rabaul, the all important harbour in New Britain. The outer ring of her defences has been dented in places but not broken. Japan's strategic position in the Pacific is still immensely strong. Apart from air raids, it has not yet been possible to attack either by land or sea the vast territories she seized in the first few months of 1942—Burma, Malaya, The Philippines and all the Dutch Indies—and the Japanese soldier may still think that what he has been taught is true, that Japan is invincible—a country that has never known defeat in war and never can be beaten.

Let us pause to consider for a moment on what does this vaunted Japanese strength depend? As I see it it rests on two things:—

1. The belief taught in the schools of Japan's divine origin, her superiority to other races and divine mission to rule the world—Japan's new order.
2. Military competence combined with supreme self-confidence in victory and disregard of death.

In an article in The Fortnightly of December, 1941, I wrote: "The Japanese race we are told is descended through their first Emperor from the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, and has a special mission on this earth. They claim in fact to be the chosen race whose mission it is one day to dominate the world. General Araki had already proclaimed the doctrine of "Kodo" or the way of the Emperor. It is the duty of the Emperor's country he said to oppose with determination the actions of any Power however strong if they are not in accordance with Kodo. It is the Imperial House round which we centre.. His Majesty *is* Japanese morality and to assist in promoting the prosperity of the Imperial House and the spread of Japanese morality is the basic principle of our existence." In the year 1940, the year before Japan declared war on us great celebrations were held in Tokyo to commemorate the 2600th anniversary of Jimmu Tenno the legendary first Emperor supposed to have been born in

660 B.C. and from whom the present Emperor claims direct descent. Jimmu Tenno is however a purely mythical figure and there is not a shred of trustworthy evidence to show that such a person ever existed. But this fiction has been maintained since the days when a Japanese civilization which owed its early beginnings entirely to Chinese and Korean influence first began to develop about the 7th century. To quote a Japanese historian: "From time immemorial the military authority has been regarded as an imperial prerogative but as time went on this authority was entirely delegated to a succession of powerful families" and so it has always been. The policy of the War Lords who controlled the Emperor was to keep up the fiction of the divine origin of His Imperial Majesty. It is no less the policy of General Tojo to-day.

It has been said with much truth that patriotism is the sole ideal of the Japanese race and this patriotism which has grown into a nationalism even more rigid than that of the Germans has developed out of two things, loyalty to the family and loyalty to the Emperor, ideals first laid down by Confucius The family has always been more important than the individual. The Emperor was divine. This is the basis of the cult which has often been wrongly described as the religion of Japan—Shinto, meaning the way of the Gods. It is not a religion. It is a mixture of ancestor and nature worship combined with reverence towards the throne. It is the foundation of the belief of the divine ancestry of the Emperor and is not classed as a religion by the Japanese Government, for that would put it on a par with Buddhism, Christianity and the other religions of the world. "No foreign idea," wrote a Japanese professor a few years ago, "such as Buddhism, Christianity or Democracy, may survive in Japan unless it subordinates itself to that undefinable but all pervasive soul element of the Japanese which is symbolized in the person and tradition of His Imperial Majesty. For deep in our race is rooted a reverence for the Emperor as the descendant of the Gods to whom we owe our being."

On the restoration of the Emperor in 1868 after nearly 700 years of a continuous regency by a succession of Shoguns (Shogun means generalissimo) Buddhism which had been the religion of Japan for 1300 years was disestablished and Shinto was revived in order to induce unity and patriotism and spread the idea of the superiority of the Japanese to the foreign barbarian. Japanese mentality has always been and remains tribal. This cult of Shinto is nothing more than the natural expression of their tribalism. To them there is no universal God. Japan has its own superior God—the Emperor.

Now though educated Japanese who have travelled abroad and seen the world can hardly be expected to believe this, the farmers and peasants from whom the bulk of recruits for the army are drawn have neither the education or knowledge of the world to disbelieve it. It is not their business to question what they are taught in the schools. "Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do or die." Uuder the Shogunate every individual owed slavish obedience to those who were above him and in turn exacted the same claims to absolute authority over those below him. The peculiar loyalty and patriotism of the

Japanese is hard to understand, but they have inherited characteristics from their forefathers, who acquired them during that extraordinary period of seclusion from the world when the Tokugawa Shoguns ruled Japan from 1602-1868.

The Japanese soldier is credulous, highly disciplined and fanatically brave. It is an honour to die for the Emperor, a source of pride to die for the family. In the Japanese army surrender under any condition is held to be cowardice. Rather than surrender commit suicide, for suicide is an honourable way of ending life in Japan. Everyone has remarked on the fact that almost no prisoners of war have been taken, and an unsuccessful general would rather take his own life than face the stigma of failure on returning to his country. But discipline and bravery alone are not sufficient to create a first-class army. A good deal more is needed and no general staff in the world—not even the German—has studied the art of war in all its phases with greater diligence than the Japanese. They are no amateurs, they are most highly trained professionals who have been no less successful than the Russians in concealing their real strength and deceiving their enemies. In *Traveller from Tokyo* Mr. John Morris relates how at an exhibition of aircraft most of the great nations had sent, if not their latest designs at least models of fairly up-to-date machines. Before the exhibition the Japanese held a meeting to consider what were the most obsolete models that could be shown without arousing suspicion; and I well remember after the Japanese manœuvres in 1936 all the Military Attachés returning with stories of the out-of-dateness of the Japanese guns, tanks, aeroplanes and other equipment. Practising deceit is part of Japanese military training. We now know that the incredible ease and skill with which the Japanese drove our forces down the whole length of Malaya was due to intensive training in that special kind of warfare in the jungles of Indo-China. The Japanese are supremely confident that there is nothing a foreigner can do that they cannot do equally well themselves. Their spies have penetrated to the uttermost parts of the earth to learn our secrets and pick up anything of value which might be of use to them. And the general staff pieced it all together in drawing up their plans for the conquest of Asia and the Pacific. No one can deny that militarily the Japanese have always shown the highest competence, for they are not only a warlike but a military race.

Where however as time goes on they may find themselves in a position of inferiority is in armament. The Japanese are remarkable imitators and great adapters but they are not inventors, and cannot hope to compete with the vast scientific and technical equipment of the British and American peoples, while the immense quantity of ships, aircraft and munitions of all sorts which the English speaking countries can produce in ever-increasing numbers will in the end overwhelm them. They still can count on German help and the advice of German technicians of whom there are a considerable number in Japan, but the Japanese don't like the Germans any more than the Germans

like the Japanese. And it is here no less than in inferiority of armaments that I see the Achilles heel.

When Japan declared war on us she made the same fundamental error as Mussolini in June, 1940. It was not just an odds on chance that she counted on. She was banking on an absolute certainty. She knew our weakness in the Far East; she had the fullest information of American unpreparedness. She was allied to the greatest military power in the world. The "Divine wind" which had scattered the armada of Kublai Khan in 1282 was blowing in the right quarter. The moment had come to drive the barbarians from Eastern waters and the great heritage of world conquest would fall into the lap of Japan. So argued General Tojo, and the generals and the admirals all agreed.

Now history is said to repeat itself, but Japanese history would appear to be an exception to the general rule. In 1739 under the Tokugawa Shogunate Japan deliberately isolated herself from the world and for 215 years until the coming of Commodore Perry with his American ships she enjoyed the longest period of unbroken peace which has fallen to the lot of any country. But some fifty years later at the beginning of the present century Japan had come to realize the danger to a country in the modern world of isolation. So she first tried to ally herself with Russia and when that failed she set to work to obtain Great Britain as an ally. In that she succeeded beyond her hopes. But twenty years later the Anglo-Japanese alliance came to an end and Japan had to be content (which she never was) with the Nine Power Treaty concluded at Washington. She never for one moment intended to abide by it, though it was not till nine years later when she invaded and seized Manchuria in 1931 that she deliberately tore it up. This act of aggression antagonized all her partners in the Treaty and Japan found that she was isolated and without a friend. There were, however, two great Powers outside the ring, the Soviet Union and Germany, and it was not long before the Army leaders made their choice and decided to make up to Germany, the country they had always admired for its military prowess and ruthless efficiency. The result was seen in December, 1936, with the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the forerunner of the Axis treaty of September, 1940. The Anti-Comintern Pact saved Japan from isolation as had the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. She was no longer without a friend—in fact she had exchanged her former democratic ally for a totalitarian friend whose ideals were far more in accordance with her own, for Japan had been a totalitarian state for 750 years. And when Italy joined the pact and satellite states like Hungary had been gathered into the net all seemed for the best in the best of all possible worlds. And so we come to Pearl Harbour and the all victorious spring of 1942, with Germany in solid control of the continent of Europe and of a large part or Russia, and German and Italian forces at the gates of Egypt. The prospect was indeed rosy. The Axis was invincible. War paid. Yes, the policy of the Japanese War Lords had justified itself and the white intruder, the foreign

barbarian would soon be ejected from the Pacific, and Hideyoshi's dream of Asiatic conquest would at length come true.

But to-day, eighteen months later, is the outlook quite so rosy? The Tokyo communiqués don't seem quite so confident and one hears authentic stories of an increasing shortage of food. But what is the reaction of Tojo and his generals to the pricking of the German bubble in Russia—Germany the all powerful military ally, the country that Japan never liked but always admired? And what is the feeling towards Russia, the old hereditary enemy who is now beating Germany at her own game? Russia, the country of which General Araki, a former war minister, said to me that her whole organization would break down in three months or less of war.

When the unexpected happens, Japanese generals go into a huddle, as the Americans might say, and talk and talk and talk. For what now looms on the Japanese horizon is the possibility that her last remaining ally may be beaten and that Japan will then be left alone to face a world in arms. The Japanese rulers will need to do a lot of thinking, for the predicament that Japan has since the beginning of the century gone to such pains to escape, the predicament of isolation, now looms before her as an impending probability.

"No state," wrote Walter Lippman in his recent book on American foreign policy, "can achieve its purpose unless it avoids being isolated by a combination of other great Powers. To be isolated is for any state the worst of all predicaments." Was it not partly to escape from "splendid isolation" that we contracted the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902? The splendour of isolation was very short-lived and in the eyes of the Japanese there is to-day nothing splendid about it.

We may expect therefore that if Germany is beaten and Japan is isolated she will look around for a possible ally or at least a friend in need. There is only one direction in which she can look and that is to Soviet Russia, with whom she has a neutrality pact concluded by Matsuoka in the Spring of 1941. This pact was for five years and ends in 1946. It will be seen then that the U.S.S.R. though not at war with Japan and pledged to neutrality for another two and a half years holds the key to the Far East. To-day Japan dare not attack the Russians. On the contrary she is likely to go out of her way to maintain correct relations with the Soviet Government. With a friendly Russia Japan might hope to hold her own against the United Nations for a very long time, but can we believe that Russia has any interest in boosting Japan and seeing the war prolonged indefinitely in Eastern Asia and the Pacific? I cannot believe it. With a neutral Russia, Japan still remains friendless and isolated, for the dice are loaded against her and fanatical bravery and patriotism are not enough to withstand indefinitely the combined force of Britain, the United States and China. But a hostile Russia must inevitably hasten the day of Japanese defeat, for no country can hope to defy the whole world and yet, as Mr. Morris says in his book *Traveller from Tokyo*: "The Japanese will never give in, they will go on lowering their standard of living,

if necessary until the daily ration is barely sufficient to support life, but the people will not crack. It is only by complete physical destruction of their men and their resources that they can be defeated, and until we are in a position to bring this about any talk of Japanese collapse is merely a dangerous form of wishful thinking."

I agree with Mr. Morris with this reservation. The Japanese system of Government has been designed, since they adopted a constitution, for safety first. It is not the Prime Minister speaking in the name of the Cabinet who has the last word in tendering advice to the sovereign in times of crisis. For besides the Cabinet there is the Privy Council. And behind both until recently the Elder Statesmen. To-day there are no so-called Elder Statesmen, but there are some five or six ex-Prime Ministers whose combined wisdom would certainly be invoked. I am not so sure therefore that if Germany is knocked out, no new friend found in Russia, and Japan faces the certain prospect of ultimate defeat, that it is true to say that she will never give in. No one can predict the future but I am inclined to think that when it dawns on the people that it is the military hierarchy who have let them down and brought them to the verge of capitulation a way may be found under the leadership of experienced men with a knowledge of the world like Prince Konoye and Mr. Shigemitsu to accept the terms which the Allied Governments may see fit to exact, *provided the Emperor is treated with every respect.*

The so-called Meiji restoration of 1868 really left the Emperor as completely powerless as before, a mere figurehead.

If the King of Italy is blamed for always yielding to Mussolini and never asserting himself there is much to support this, but it was inconceivable that the Emperor of Japan should ever hold a view, far less maintain one, at variance with that of his advisers. His Majesty cannot therefore be held responsible in the same way as King Victor Emanuel.

On the other hand it is essential to break down the military hierarchy which through the ages has dictated Japanese policy and leave to the people the hope of a more liberal government with their Emperor as a constitutional sovereign.

In that way the face of His Majesty might be saved and some prospect held out of peace in the Far East in place of the fantastic New Order for Greater East Asia.

(*Sir Robert Clive was British Ambassador to Japan* 1934-1937.)

SOVIET PATRIOTISM AND THE WAR

By Walter J. Kolarz

WHICH is the Russia fighting in the present war? The revolutionary State campaigning for ideological reasons or simply the country Russia defending its national existence against attack. Even in the early days of Soviet Russia it was clear that a war involving the whole nation could not be waged in the name of class ideology alone. In 1920, when Polish armies were approaching Kiev, the international communist, Karl Radek, proclaimed at a meeting of the All-Russian Congress of Workers' and Peasants' Delegates: "This war is a national war, this has to be openly admitted." At the same meeting Trotzky, then War-Commissar, read a letter written by Brussilov, the former Tzarist general and Commander-in-Chief of the Kerensky Government, offering his help in the struggle against the Polish invasion. The offer was loudly cheered and accepted by all Worker and Peasant delegates. Trotzky said: "We welcome the open and gallant offer of General Brussilov."

But Trotzky's "patriotism", which was but a temporary manœuvre, can not be compared with Stalin's Soviet Patriotism which had taken shape long before the outbreak of war. It was in the second half of the 'thirties that Stalin carried out his ideological revolution and brought about a reconciliation between old and new Russia. The social and economic basis of the Soviet State remained unchanged, but the general outlook of the Soviet society was nevertheless new. The year 1917 was no longer an abrupt beginning to the Soviet State denying any inheritance from the Russian past. The break-down of the Communist party in Germany, which had been very popular in Moscow, was the cause of great disillusionment in the Soviet State and then followed a decline of internationalist feeling in the U.S.S.R. together with an increase in Russian self-confidence and national pride. The collaboration of the intelligentzia in the industrial reconstruction of the Soviet State, advocated by Stalin himself, made certain concessions to old Russian tradition necessary. A purely proletarian culture, which some Bolshevists tried to build up during the 'twenties, turned out to be without any real artistic value. It was officially condemned and the "Union of Proletarian Writers" was dissolved in 1933 in favour of a Soviet culture and literature which was the logical continuation of Russian culture and literature, inspired by the great leaders of the past. Finally when war threatened, the cultivation of patriotic sentiments seemed of no less importance than the increase of war-production.

As early as 1935 the term *rodina* (Motherland) appeared again in Soviet

newspapers and became an integral part of the Soviet language. In 1937 the film *Peter the Great* paid tribute to the greatest Russian Tzar. Again in the same year Shestakov's new school-history book was published. This gave, on one hand, an account of the revolutionary movements throughout Russian history, and on the other, a general survey which had lately been neglected. There were also some words of appreciation for Peter the Great, Alexander Nevsky and famous Russian generals. This caused a sensation when the book was published, for at that time it was not yet evident that it was the product of a period of transition. Shestakov's book was a compromise between the old Bolshevist conception of history, now pushed aside as "economic materialism" and the new patriotic outlook. Shestakov's half-hearted attitude towards the Russian past soon had to give way to a far more outspoken patriotic concept of history. The leaders of the Cossack and peasant uprisings Bulavin, Rasin and Pugachov, once idolized, as the 17th and 18th century forerunners of Bolshevism were replaced by the official representatives of State authority. Shestakov, whose book sold ten million copies, disappeared again from the stage and Professor Tarlé, a former inmate of Soviet prisons and an exile in Central Asia as a "class enemy on the historical front," became the leading authority on patriotic Russian history. He delivered an interesting address to the sub-committee for history of the "Soviet Writers' Union Committee for Children's Literature" in which he criticized the various publications concerning Rasin and Pugachov, because—as he said—these men were not statesmanlike figures and their movements attracted the lawless elements in society. Then he went on to what in his view children's literature should be:

> Our children are witnesses of the dreadful conflagration which is enveloping the capitalist world. They are Soviet Patriots and they know that our country must keep fully prepared for mobilization. It is quite natural that their imagination is captured by the figures of Suvorov and Kutusov, and it is therefore vitally necessary to satisfy our children's interest in the military history of our native land.

His speech was delivered on October 3, 1940, and published on the front page of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on October 6.

But it was not only the children who were provided with patriotic literature in the months preceding Russia's invasion by Hitler's armies. In April, 1941, Stalin personally recommended three books to the Soviet people and awarded prizes to their authors. These three books—Alexey Tolstoy's *Peter the Great*, Mikhail Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows the Don* and Sergeyev Tsensky's *Sevastopol's Time of Trial*—glorified the Russian past and showed a deep love for the Russian soil. Tsensky's book deals with Sevastopol's heroic defence during the Crimean War and pays tribute not only to the men but also to the commanders of the fortress who withstood the enemy onslaught for eleven months. It was the first book to describe the Crimean War as a "just war of national defence."

Even this was not the culmination of the new patriotic conception of history. Official Soviet records now proudly proclaim that during the first world-war

the Russian armies saved France from being crushed on the Marne in 1914 and Italy from being decisively beaten by the Austrians in 1916. France and Britain are even reproved for having considered Tzarist Russia "not as a full-fledged Ally but as a Vassal" which had to face the bulk of the armed forces of the Central Powers.* It is no longer recalled that the Russian Revolution of October, 1917, was "for immediate peace", a slogan which produced the Brest-Litovsk Treaty as a logical consequence. To-day the October Revolution is interpreted as a patriotic reaction against an unpopular government. The second volume of the official history of the civil war, published under the patronage of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Zhdanov in January, 1943, reproaches the Kerensky Government with having treacherously surrendered Riga and the two islands of Osel and Dagoe to the Germans and even with having prepared the abandonment of Petrograd. Those regiments, however, in which Bolshevist influence predominated are represented as having fought against the Germans with greater courage than all the others.

Alexey Tolstoy goes a step further. He recalls the phrase, "the 200 or 250 years of German rule in Russia," once dear to the Russian nationalists of the old régime and explains the whole revolution as a reaction of the Russian people against German domination. "For two and a half centuries," Tolstoy writes, "Germans interfered relentlessly and systematically with life in Russia but Russia to their great regret remained Russian .. And suddenly, when Russia seemed to be already in the German pocket the October Revolution energetically and for ever shook off the German parasites from Russia. Therefore the fascist hatred of the Soviet Union as well as the delirious dreams of Adolf Hitler about the crusade against Soviet Russia are comprehensible."

Such utterances lead right up to "the great patriotic war," as it is officially called. This denomination is not a Bolshevist invention; the Soviets simply borrowed the expression from Russian history, for the defence against the Napoleonic invasion was also called in Russia "the patriotic war." An "Order of the Patriotic War" has been created which unlike the "Order of the Red Banner" or the "Order of Lenin" appeals to every son of the Russian Motherland because of its patriotic meaning. The self-denying gallantry of a whole nation is the direct result of Stalin's appeal to the patriotic feeling of every man and woman of the country. "For many, for very many," says the leading literary paper of the Soviet Union, "'Motherland' means simply their own village, a small river where they had spent many happy hours."† The Soviet radio and the Soviet press express a deep love of the Motherland, of each of its regions, of each of its towns and villages, and the pride of belonging to the glorious Russian nation. Ideas like "holy soil of the Motherland", "Little Mother Moscow", "golden Ukrainian land", "glory of our forefathers", and "immortal Russia" are replacing the monotony of dogmatic

*Butkevich's article in *Istorichesky Zhurnal*, vol. 7, 1942, pp. 45/46.

†*Literatura i Iskusstvo*, 1942.

political language. Even if some of the slogans, characteristic of the present stage of Soviet patriotic development, should not be in accordance with the true feeling of some of the Soviet leaders they become true when interpreted by the masses of the Russian peoples.

The love of Russia, not of the Soviet régime alone, is the main subject of contemporary Russian poetry. Gusev, to whom the Stalin-prize for poetry was awarded, gives the following profession of faith:

> I am a Russian man, Moscow's son, the heir of Russian glory. Russian snow lay on my hair. Russian songs I can never forget, not in all eternity, their melody is so majestic, so fascinating . . . Motherland Russia is immortal. Immortal are the endless Russian fields which have seen storms and misfortune. Immortal are the towers of the Kremlin. Immortal is the force of the Russian nation.

These lines were published in a newspaper primarily meant for the Russian manual workers.* Another poet, Dolmatovsky, in the midst of the Stalingrad battle wrote: "There is no softer word than Russia." Finally the great woman-writer Anna Akhmatova, wrote in *Znamya*: "And we shall save thee, O Russian tongue, we shall save the greatness of the Russian word, free and pure shall we bring it through the trial, liberate it from the bonds for ever and hand it over to our grandsons."

Since the day on which Marshal Stalin, in his speech on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution, praised the great Russian patriots Dimitry Donskoy, Alexander Nevsky, Minin, Pozharsky, Suvorov and Kutusov, the whole country echoes these names as never before. By poetry and fiction, by cinema and theatre their historical importance is shown to the Soviet people. Soviet painters who after 1917 painted Lenin in all possible surroundings are now fully occupied in carrying out all demands for medieval battle scenes and portraits of the national heroes of both Old Russia and the Soviet Union.

The revival of Russian tradition also includes more and more the remote historical past. When the denomination "guard" was reintroduced into the Russian army it was recalled that the guards had played a great rôle in modern Russia in checking German influence in the "time of favourites" after Peter the Great and that the first Russian State of Kiev possessed the guard institution in the *druzhina*, picked armed units at the disposal of the ruler. At present the personality of John the Dread (Ivan Grozny) is an object of historical reconsideration. Alexey Tolstoy wrote a play and Eisenstein produced a film both dealing with the great Moscovian ruler. Eisenstein rejected the view of the first great Russian historian Karamsin, who compared Ivan with Caligula; he argued that most of Ivan's atrocities were inventions or exaggerations by his enemies inside and outside Russia. In producing the film he was guided by the idea that Ivan Grozny, "founder of a united and strong Russian State and of a regular Russian army" was a realist. In an interview given to the newspaper *Trud* Eisenstein pointed out that his film

* *Trud*, the organ of the Soviet trade-unions, 1942.

would give a true historical picture of Ivan Grozny " who was one of the most enlightened and most progressive spirits of his time." It should not be overlooked however that in Russia Ivan Grozny, as the conqueror of Kazan and Astrakhan, was always a glorious personality in Russian history.

The new Soviet Patriotism is not one-sided. In the second half of the 'thirties when literary classicism again found official approval and when the works of Pushkin, Tolstoy and Gorky penetrated to the most remote corners of the vast Soviet country, the Ukrainian Shevchenko, the White-Russian Kupala, the medieval Georgian poet Rustaveli and the Ossetian Hetagurov were likewise lifted to the status of " national poets of the Soviet Union." Nor is one part of the country honoured more than another. If the new patriotic conception emphasizes the " battle on the ice " waged by Alexander Nevsky against the German Knights (1242) as a particularly fine example of early Russian gallantry, it is not forgotten that about the same time Danilo, ruler of the Westukrainian State, drove back the Hungarian invaders in the battle of Yaroslavl. Also the great Cossack-Hetman. Khmelnitsky, the Armenian military leader Daniël-Beck and the Mongolian revolutionist Sukhe Bator are heroes of recent Soviet films.

Moreover, the young Soviet people are now being taught to see the history of all countries from a patriotic point of view. New instructions for school-teachers, given during the war, emphasize Jeanne d'Arc as the " most striking expression of a patriotic rising." British history is to be treated in a particularly friendly way: " Whilst considering the history of England it is essential to pay attention to the development of traditions of political freedom." " Already in the Middle Ages political institutions were appearing which safeguarded freedom, though at first only for a limited number of people." As to Prussia and Germany, " German aggressions in the East between the 12th and the 15th centuries have to be denounced " and it has to be underlined by the teacher that " Hitler links up his plans of *Drang nach Osten* with an old tradition."*

The patriotic propaganda is of the greatest importance for the front and seems to exercise a direct influence on the attitude of the Red Army soldiers. When the Soviet newspapers address the soldiers they use a simple patriotic language, they appeal to the patriotic feeling as the primary one. The more critical the situation on the front during the summer campaign of 1942, the more outspoken and urgent this appeal became. On July 13 when the first battle for Voronezh reached its climax *Pravda* published a leading article entitled " Lift up higher the banner of our fighting traditions! " This said:

> It is the holy tradition of our nation to defend the Motherland stubbornly and without considering one's own life. Soldiers, knowing about battles of the past, glorious traditions and military deeds are without fear in the battles of to-day. The heroic actions of our fathers and forefathers give us the spiritual force essential for the battlefield.

* *Istorichesky Zhurnal*, 1942.

And instead of giving a list of the achievements of Bolshevism and of all the gigantic buildings to which previous propaganda had referred so often, *Pravda* published a list of great battles and victorious naval engagements of Russian history, which, in the hours of danger, seemed to be more inspiring than anything else. Two months later, on September 17, when the battle of Stalingrad began, *Pravda* renewed this appeal. Under the headline " Fighting traditions of the Soviet warriors " the paper stated:

> The fighting traditions of the Russian people have been inherited by the men of the Red Army, they inspire them to new feats, teach them to defend their native land and to love their Motherland ardently, with all the might of great and honest hearts and to hate its enemies.

The objection could be raised that newspaper articles are written too often under the pressure of passing events and cannot for that reason be considered as typical of the ideological trend, but these articles merely confirm the tendencies which manifest themselves in all branches of Soviet cultural life. Everywhere in Russia one meets the avowal to Russian continuity. The Soviet general Ignatiev, who had been a Tzarist military attaché in Paris and had belonged to the family of the Counts Ignatiev, says in his memoirs, published in 1941, " that also in the old world which has died away, there were positive types, people loving their nation more than their lives, people who died a brave death for the honour of their Motherland." A few years ago such words would never have been printed in Soviet Russia. They would have been considered as a dangerous aberration from the party line. A Soviet writer Novikov-Priboi expresses the same idea in his pamphlet " Fighting Traditions of Russian Sailors " (1942) when he says that the force of these traditions above all consists of the "typical Russian contempt of death" shown throughout the ages and admired by the foreigners.

The achievements of the young Red Army in the days of the civil war however, have not entirely lost their meaning for the present generation. The Soviet defenders of Stalingrad were told day by day how the town was defended during the revolution when its name was still Tsaritsyn while the people of Leningrad were told that they were defending " the cradle of the proletarian revolution." Yet writing of Sevastopol *Pravda* admitted on July 13, 1942, that every defender of this fortress had the first Sevastopol defence of 1854-55 engraved on his heart and that the Bolshevists, in the army and the navy, had done their utmost in order to acquaint everybody " with these glorious and holy traditions." Without being entirely eclipsed by the resurrection of the old heroes the civil war lost the unique and exclusive place it had occupied in the official Soviet conception of history, a new formula had been found reconciling Russian past and revolution: " We are grandsons of Suvorov and sons of Chapayev "—as it is put by one of the most recent Soviet rhymes.

The new patriotic literature still quotes Marx and Engels and the Russian forerunners of Socialist ideas like Chernishevsky, Herzen and Belinsky, but

the quotations have changed in content. Engels is mainly quoted for military problems. The utopian Russian socialist Chernishevsky whom the Soviet Encyclopedia knows only as "a great Russian revolutionist", is nowadays called "a great patriot and faithful son of the Motherland," and he is quoted as having said that Peter the Great is the ideal for every Russian patriot. Little attention is paid to Herzen's social and political works but some of his anti-German observations are being rescued from oblivion. In going through the various literary journals published in the Soviet Union one gets the impression that not only general history but also the history of arts and literature is being rewritten; there is no distinguished personality in Russia's cultural past, whose works are not being reconsidered from the point of view of patriotism. One great Russian novelist, Dostoyevsky, was unpopular because he described a negative, rotten type of Russian which, the Soviets used to say, is a type no longer existing. It was also not forgotten that Dostoyevsky, in his later life, had been the upholder of pan-Slav imperialistic ideas. But now the outlook on Dostoyevsky has changed. In the theoretical organ of the Bolshevist party such an important personality as Yaroslavsky writes an article: "Fedor Mikhailovieh Dostoyevsky against the Germans" and *Literatura i Iskusstvo* opposes Dostoyevsky's writing to the German *Herrenmoral* and says "Dostoyevsky's truth is our Russian truth."

Since the all-Slav conception has been included into Soviet political propaganda there can be only small objection to Dostoyevsky's political ideas. The Slav Committee, organized in Moscow after Russia joined in the war, revived the idea of Slav brotherhood, which, however, is far away from the race fanaticism of an old-fashioned pan-Slavism and of narrow-minded jingoism. Despite the publicity given to the two meetings the Committee held in the late autumn of 1941 and in the spring of 1942 the importance of the new movement should not be overrated. Russia is a country of 180 peoples, among them many belonging to the Tartar, Finnish and Mongolian groups, and racialism can therefore never be the exclusive ideology of the U.S.S.R. as a State. A pan-Slavism too loudly propagated would automatically give birth to the idea of pan-Turkism and pan-Mongolism, which was one of the prime tasks of Soviet policy on nationalities to overcome. The call to the Slavs outside Russia may also lose its importance when the further development of military and political events will render appeals necessary to the non-Slav peoples as well. There are hardly any well-known party-communists among the Russian members of the all-Slav Committee but mainly outsiders like Alexey Tolstoy, who in the civil war had fought with the ".Whites", or Professor Derzhavin, one of the vice-presidents of the Committee, who like M. Tolstoy, is a descendant of a Russian noble family. He was professor for Slavonic history at Petrograd University before 1917 and in his numerous works no indication can be found of his being a Bolshevist.

The last consequence of the present patriotic trend in Soviet-Russia necessarily involves a changed outlook in the religious question as well. There is

no doubt that the militant Godless movement declined in the second five-year plan period. The leading communists as well as the rank and file were devoting all their efforts to the construction of a socialist economy. In any case the public showed a complete lack of interest in the newspaper *Bezbozhnik* (The Godless) and all other publications of the Godless Union. Moreover, high dignitaries of the Orthodox Church openly manifested their allegiance to the Soviet régime. Finally, Soviet Patriotism itself contained an appeal in favour of greater toleration. Among the national heroes restored by the Soviets there are two Saints of the Orthodox Church, Alexander Nevsky and Dimitry Donskoy, and the introduction of Christianity to Russia in 988 has become a date every schoolboy is obliged to know. During the war, the Church has revealed itself as a considerable patriotic force, which is not overlooked by the régime. The numerous telegrams and letters of thanks Stalin has sent to Russian Bishops and Archbishops for their messages of sympathy and for their gifts in kind and money should not be considered as propaganda but as striking documents of a Russian continuity and synthesis or, at least, as supplementary evidence of the patriotic character of a war uniting Bolshevists and orthodox Christians in one front. It will never again be possible to describe the Orthodox as an enemy of the régime and as an ally of foreign intervention, particularly after Metropolitan Nikolay's appointment as a member of the Commission which is to investigate the damage done by the Germans to the Russian civil population.

One may ask whether, owing to all these facts, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is not losing a great deal of its spiritual and also its political leadership. This would be the case if the Communist Party had remained what it was at the outset, a rigid dogmatic body directed by orthodox internationalists of the old school. But all those of the old guard who showed an almost exclusive interest in world-revolution, and little comprehension for Russian reality, were eliminated a long time ago and only the Soviet patriots among the old Bolshevists remained. To-day over 80 per cent. of the highest party officials and more than 93 per cent. of nearly 11,000 secretaries of the local and district branches of the Communist Party became party members in and after 1924, the great majority of them being composed of young people under forty years of ago. They did not take an active part in the revolution and the civil war and are without personal experiences of the period prior to the Stalinian epoch. For them Soviet Patriotism is not an alternative but the ideology of the Soviet State. As to the structure of he Communist Party we also have to consider that conditions of admission were entirely changed by the eighteenth party congress in March, 1939, which abolished purges and a too long preparatory stage and gave manual workers and intellectuals an equal chance of becoming party members doing away with the four categories of candidates for party-membership which had existed before. During the war other steps were taken which transformed the Bolshevist party more and more into the party of the entire Soviet people, into a party which accord-

ing to a *Pravda* editorial "holds its doors open for those who devote their efforts to the defence of the Soviet land." The Central Committee of the Communist Party also decided to admit service-men who had distinguished themselves in battle as full members after only three months of probationary membership. Hereupon the number of party members increased as never before. The Moscow party secretary, Shcherbakov, declared in a meeting on the occasion of commemoration of the 19th anniversary of Lenin's death on January 21, 1943, that 1,340,000 people had joined the Communist Party in 1942. These new members were allowed to enter the party not because they were perfect communists, nor for having successfully passed an examination on Marxist-Leninist theory, but for being excellent guerrilla-fighters, gallant sailors and airmen. These new members will one day become party secretaries, members of the local and national Soviets and Peoples' Commissars. They will be popular because they will not only be party-members but glorious veterans of the Patriotic War, the heroes of Stalingrad, Voronezh, Rostov and Kharkov. These men will always be more patriots and Russians than they are communists.

When the Ukas of November 8, 1942, abolished the institution of Political Commissars the official explanation was given that political leadership and the Red Army were so identical that there was no longer any need for Political Commissars. The identity of views however was not achieved therefrom by the Red Army becoming Marxist but by the recent ideological development in the Communist Party, by the change of its structure and by many measures which deepened the patriotic feeling of the whole country and contributed at the same time to the reinforcement of the prestige of the army.

Some sceptics, however, may anticipate a change after the war. It is, of course, difficult to forecast future developments but we have seen that patriotism is not a product of the German invasion; it came into existence prior to the war. Patriotism also is not a slogan which can be exchanged for another one; patriotism means the whole Russian tradition; past glory and the present life and struggle of the Russian people. Patriotism was a mighty sentiment even when the Soviet régime did not recognize it. Since it became the official ideology, patriotism is a source of strength and energy within the Soviet boundaries and of increased prestige abroad. It seems probable that the reality of being the true homeland of 180 peoples united by common history and fate will prove to be stronger than the fiction of an abstract "homeland of the world-proletariat."

(Mr. Kolarz is a Czech, a former foreign correspondent of Prague newspapers, who holds a London University diploma in Russian studies. His book, STALIN AND ETERNAL RUSSIA, *will be published by Lindsay Drummond in the New Year.)*

SIAM IN THIS WAR AND THE LAST

By H.R.H. PRINCE CHULA CHAKRABONGSE OF SIAM, G.C.V.O.

IN contrast with her declaration of war in January, 1942, on Britain and the United States alongside Japan, despite the fact that Japan had attacked her and Pearl Harbour at the same time, Siam in the last war from September, 1917, was one of the Allies. Siam's action then, although welcomed at the time, has often since been ridiculed by Siamese and foreigners alike, on the ground that King Vajiravudh, then the reigning and absolute monarch, had only done so to be on the winning side. The King's sincere belief in the righteousness of the Allies' cause was ignored as much as the fact that in July, 1917, the Allies had by no means passed their dark days, when the "U" boat menace was at its height and the big German advance of March, 1918, had yet to come.

Vajiravudh, born in 1881, was the eldest son of King Chulalongkorn and Queen Soawabha, and when he succeeded his father in October, 1910—after the latter's record reign of 42 years—he can be said to have received the best heritage in the eight hundred years of Siamese monarchy. The country was quiet within and without. All frontier adjustments or disputes with Great Britain or France had been settled. Internally the modern form of administration as well as the modern armed forces, all initiated by King Chulalongkorn, have been established firmly and the people were happy and loyal.

Like most Siamese of his generation and class, Vajiravudh had been educated in Europe, and he had passed twelve happy and impressionable years in England, as an undergraduate at Oxford, a cadet at Sandhurst and as a subaltern attached to the Durham Light Infantry. He came into contact with members of the British Royal Family and received the G.C.V.O. when he represented his father at the coronation of Edward VII. The most important result of his English education, as far as Siam was concerned, was that it made him a lifelong Anglophile.

His own coronation in 1911 was attended by what was probably the biggest gathering of European royalty in Asia, and King George V. sent him the G.C.B. Yet despite its happy augury, his reign cannot be called a successful one so far as internal administration was concerned, for although he followed his father's policy of progressive reforms in every branch of the administration, he made himself unpopular by many things which he personally initiated. Impressed with the English pattern, he formed a Territorial Army which he called the Wild Tigers' Corps—an ancient Siamese name for guerrilla

local defenders—but his enthusiasm soon ran away with him. He took a close personal interest in the Corps, showing it so many favours that it became extremely disliked by the Regular Army which felt itself slighted. He made football into a national game, giving cups for different competitions and personally attending matches in Bangkok, but treated certain teams with such partiality that the whole spirit of the game was spoilt by bad feelings on the part of the other teams and of the public at large. Although vastly generous in his support of hospitals and other good works he was extravagant in his Court expenses, and his favourites received such great riches as to cause much resentment against them and himself. As a bachelor during the first ten years of his reign, he lived in seclusion entirely in the company of men, being shut off from his family and the rest of his officials except on state occasions. This seclusion was generally unpopular, although it actually made possible his immense output of literary works whose merits will undoubtedly be fully appreciated in the future.

For his literary work and his conduct of foreign affairs during the critical years of the first world war Siam owes him a great debt. Being both a confirmed Anglophile as well as a sincere Buddhist who naturally abhorred aggression he was pro-Britain and pro-Allies from the first, but he knew that if he then entered war on their side he would not carry the people with him. After many years of frontier disputes in the 19th century the French were still widely disliked, while the Germans, who were known to the Siamese only as peaceful traders, were popular. King Vajiravudh had first of all to educate his people to be pro-Allies, and he did this in many ingenious ways. Under different assumed names he wrote articles which, though they purported to be impartial surveys of the war on land and sea, were really in praise of the Allies and more particularly the British Navy and Army. To the same end he even wrote pro-German articles under one name, only to refute them under another and thereby further enhance the Allies' cause. With the excuse that he had been in the regiment he gave generous donations to the benevolent funds of the Durham Light Infantry, as he did to the Allies' Red Cross societies.

It was when the United States after entering the war had circularized all the neutrals to fight Germany that King Vajiravudh realized his opportunity had come and, being supported and encouraged by his younger brother and heir-presumptive, Prince Chakrabongse, he declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary. A token Siamese force of airmen and a motor transport corps served in France and in the occupation of Germany. Also King Vajiravudh had the satisfaction of knowing that a contingent of his troops took part in the victory marches in Paris, London, and Brussels. The participation in the war did not only benefit him—he was made a British General and an honorary Colonel in the Durham Light Infantry—but Siam also gained by being one of the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles and a founder-member of the League of Nations.

A bachelor for ten years, King Vajiravudh, after the death of his mother in 1919 and that of his heir-presumptive, Prince Chakrabongse, in 1920, decided to get married. He was, as in many other acts of his domestic policy, unfortunate. First he had to break off his engagement and afterwards deposed two consorts. At last his third queen gave him a daughter who was born in November, 1925, only one day before his tragic death at the age of 44.

He was succeeded by his last surviving full brother, Prajadhipok, whose home policy was one largely of financial reconstruction after the private extravagances of his elder brother had nearly put the national finances into the direst straits. There was a general reaction against King Vajiravudh's policy of taking the commoners into his confidence and the new King went to the opposite extreme of placing almost only princes in important positions. In foreign policy King Prajadhipok followed his elder brother and reaped full benefit when the great powers revised their treaties giving to Siam a more equitable relationship with them, and assuring her of complete independence. It was not his fault that Siam was eventually hard hit by the world economic crisis for which he and his pro-princes policy were unjustly blamed. The ultimate result was the bloodless revolution of 1932 which, although it re-established him for a time as a constitutional monarch, was only to be followed by his abdication in 1935.

King Prajadhipok was succeeded by his heir-presumptive, Ananta Mahidol, according to the Law of Succession of 1924 which was incorporated into the Constitution of 1932, who was then a schoolboy of ten living with his mother in Switzerland, and a Council of Regency of three was set up. The Government was democratic in theory, there being one freely elected representative assembly, but as half of the members were nominated, according to the Constitution for the so-called transitional period between 1932 and 1942, the final decision always rested with the Government which was actually responsible for the nominations by the King. The Government was for a long time under the leadership of a senior army officer, Phya Bahol, who was strangely enough a contemporary of Göring at the German Military College before the last war. An amusing story was told of him by Queen Rambhai. Before leaving for Europe in 1934 the Queen was sitting next to Phya Bahol at a palace banquet and the latter said that when the King and Queen went to Germany they would no doubt meet General Göring. He remarked that he was surprised to find that Göring had gone so far, for as a military cadet he had seemed just a silly, fat, easy-going fool. Queen Rambhai was eventually to sit next to Göring at a dinner in Germany and the Nazi general said that he was astounded to hear of his old school-fellow, Phya Bahol, becoming Prime Minister as he had seemed just a silly, fat, easy-going fool. Yet as Premier, Phya Bahol did succeed, among members of the People's Party which had inaugurated the constitutional régime, in keeping a fine balance between the military faction headed by Luang Pibul and the civil section under the leadership of Luang Pradit, with the result that a moderate policy was maintained, both in foreign and home policies.

No pro-Japanese tendencies had ever been hinted at in connection with the absolute monarchy of the Chakri Dynasty, despite King Prajadhipok's private visit to the Japanese Emperor on his way to the United States in 1931 when he was received with a great display of friendliness. From the very beginning of the change of régime in 1932, however, charges of a pro-Japanese policy on the part of Siam began to appear in the press of Britain, France, and the United States. On closer investigation these did not appear to have been substantiated. After having been on such excellent terms with the House of Chakri in the 20th century, the Western Powers seemed to have received the new régime with cool reserve, whereas the Japanese were warm in their congratulations and much pleased the new leaders, particularly the military. It was their gratitude for Japanese good wishes which was mistaken for actively pro-Japanese feelings. These charges once begun never again died down, and amongst the more favoured was the story that Siam was going to allow the Japanese to cut a canal through the Kra Ismuth, thus by-passing Singapore, which was then generally believed to be an impregnable fortress.

When the present writer returned to Siam in 1937 particular steps were taken to discover whether there was a pro-Japanese feeling or not, and after talk with every kind of person including the Premier and other leaders of the new régime, both military and civil, no pro-Japanese tendencies or sentiments could be found. The suggestion that Japan was arming Siam appeared to have been unfounded for, although some warships were bought from Japan, others were also bought from Italy, while guns came from Sweden and aircraft from the U.S.A. There was no truth whatever in the story that there were Japanese officers helping to train the Army. In fact, in carrying out the rearmament programme it was continually emphasized that the only aim was to maintain strict neutrality should there be a future conflict between Japan and the British Empire. There was no reason at the time to make one doubt the sincerity of such a statement.

Although there was no change of foreign policy, which continued to be neutral, there was nevertheless a big change in the internal situation. The People's Party had been doing well so long as Phya Bahol was keeping the balance of power between the military and civil sections but his prestige was badly shaken by the Land Scandal in 1937 when several of the leaders, most of whom belonged to the military faction, were found to have bought certain lands belonging to the Crown at absurdly low prices. The Regents, who were heavily condemned for agreeing to the sale, had to resign and Phya Bahol gallantly shared the blame and resigned also. It seemed to presage a triumph for the civilians led by Luang Pradit, but Luang Pibul acted quickly and vigorously. By threatening to use force he succeeded in putting the Regents and Bahol back in their places. This success only heralded Bahol's ultimate fall which logically followed in January, 1938, after the boy King's brief visit, when Luang Pibul succeeded him as Premier and Commander-in-Chief.

With an attempted revolt as an excuse, he soon eliminated from the Army all the senior officers who had opposed him, and with the armed forces being firmly held by him the civilians were now silenced. From then on Siam's foreign policy was completely in his hands.

Nevertheless it still seemed clear that this policy was to be one of neutrality and no pro-Japanese tendency could be found. Moreover, when the present war broke out, and Pibul sent a good-will mission to the British Empire in Asia and Australia, as well as another to Japan, there was still no reason to suppose that he was insincere. The subsequent changes in his policy may, I think, be traced to the fact that Pibul himself had begun to change once he had become sure of his power. When he was still struggling amongst different rivals, his views had been the same as those of other leaders of the People's Party, namely, strict economy and simplicity in everything. Once he was in sole charge of the country, however, he seemed to have reverted to the worst side of King Vajiravudh. The new Army had prided itself on having no generals and in wearing simple uniforms, but Pibul now gave it thirty or more generals besides himself and uniforms were made more elaborate and gorgeous. The People's Party had turned its back on giving decorations, but these were now brought out galore and for the King's birthday in September, 1941, no less than 8,000 people figured on the honours list. As King Vajiravudh had once made Siamese women grow long hair, so Pibul now saw fit to decree that they had to wear hats! He even went so far as to contemplate the creation of hereditary titles, a thing unknown in all the centuries of Siamese history; but the mere suggestion of it was so badly received by the Press and the public alike that he quickly disclaimed any responsibility for its suggestion. As King Vajiravudh had used the Press for propounding his ideas, so did Pibul, only he employed others to write for him. It was quite clear by 1940 that he was more powerful in Siam than anyone had been since King Chulalongkorn.

Even before his premiership one of Luang Pibul's favourites was Luang Vichitra, a half-Chinese, a historian and head of the Department of Fine Arts and the National Museum, whose idea was nationalism in the most aggressive form. He had been largely responsible for the anti-Chinese movement, based on the Nazis' anti-Semitism, but it was difficult to convince the kind and peace-loving Siamese. More successful was Vichitra's preaching of pan-Thai nationalism and the idea of getting back all the territories lost to the French and British in the 19th century. Although he disclaimed it as a part of his foreign policy, which continued to be peaceful, Pibul supported it for home consumption as it helped to justify his re-armament programme. This policy ended in the clashes with the French in Indo-China after the fall of France, when a minor war was fought which was only stopped at the behest of Japan who offered her mediation. This little effort at playing with fire proved to be the beginning of the end.

The Siamese, particularly the Army, were able to console themselves for a

time after their empty " victory " with a splendid triumphal march in Bangkok, the wholesale promotion of officers including Pibul himself as Field-Marshal, and the general distribution of decorations and medals, and finally with the advancement of the Japanese and Siamese envoys at Bangkok and Tokyo to the rank of ambassador; all of which appealed to the average Siamese, although the more serious-minded ones must have realized that a door had been opened to Japan. Still outwardly neutral, the Siamese Government were now under an obligation to Japan who had helped to clear up their trouble with the French, and demands for all kinds of financial and economic co-operation were beginning to be made incessantly while Japanese nationals began to pour into Siam as officials, traders and tourists. Pibul still maintained that he aimed at complete independence of action but he struck a serious note in warning the people of the imminence of a conflict in Asia, when Siam was going to have a hard time in maintaining her neutrality. This was the signal for his underlings to proclaim dramatically that the Siamese would fight to the last drop of their blood, or that they would turn the whole country into a cemetery, to preserve their neutrality. As they did not do this subsequently they have not only been much derided but their sincerity itself was doubted. The present writer believes that they were perfectly sincere, particularly as the bulk of the Siamese people had been lulled into the belief that their armed forces were adequate for the purpose and especially after the recent " victory " over the French in Indo-China. As for the military leaders themselves, it has been well said that they were behaving like a frightened child who thought if he could go on shouting loud and long enough that he was not afraid the danger would pass.

The fact that the Siamese public were not pro-Japanese was proved beyond all doubt when rumours spread, as late as towards the end of 1941, that a certain high official was in the pay of the Japanese, and there was a public outcry so strong that the Government had to institute an enquiry. Although the enquiry " vindicated " the official in question, yet the necessity of holding such an enquiry at all also vindicated the Siamese people from the charge that they were pro-Japanese. In fact public feelings were becoming so strained against the arrogance of the growing number of Japanese residents in Siam that the Japanese Ambassador himself felt obliged to issue an appeal to the Japanese in Siam to be more polite to the Siamese. This gesture was somewhat sarcastically commended by the Siamese papers which took advantage of the occasion to remind the Japanese people of the neutral attitude of Siam, and of the fact that although we were willing to be friendly and polite to everyone, we expected the same treatment in return. Pibul must have well realized how stunned the people were when he announced their capitulation, for all those who knew him could hardly recognize his nervous and embarrassed voice when he declared the policy to the people over the wireless, and he was heard vaguely to repeat the same sentences over and over again.

Since then the restless and non-co-operative attitude of the Siamese people

as a whole has been shown by the countless severe measures which the Government has had to bring out against them. The man who barely ten years ago had been one of those who had led the People's Party to obtain freedom from the King, now actually told the same people that they must not think at all, and should only follow the Government blindly. Had the Siamese people been pro-Japanese such an order would not have been necessary. The return to Siam by the Japanese of three provinces of Malaya, which Siam had ceded to Britain by treaty in 1904, was one of the signs that the Siamese Government must have been hard put to it to show the Siamese people any advantage from the Japanese alliance; and the Government must have convinced the Japanese of the necessity of giving some proof of their goodwill.

The capitulation had been necessary owing to the inadequacy of the armed forces and also because as Field-Marshal Smuts told the joint-meeting of the British Parliament in October, 1942, " Vichy (had) opened the door to Japan in Indo-China, and through that unexpected opening the flood (had) poured into Siam, Malaya, and Burma." The subsequent declaration of war in January, 1942, on Britain and the United States, however, looked as though Pibul had once again copied the policy of King Vajiravudh, yet this time it seemed that he was following one of his good policies without understanding its true merits. He obviously thought that King Vajiravudh had joined the Allies in 1917 only in order to be on the winning side and he himself was clearly cynical of the sincerity of the monarch in believing that he was joining the righteous side. After Pearl Harbour and the early Japanese successes against the British Pibul no doubt believed that Japan was now the winning side. Yet in mistaking the true meaning of King Vajiravudh's action in 1917 he has probably put back, for fifty years or more, Siam's gradual progress towards full independent autonomy which had auspiciously begun in the reign of King Chulalongkorn and which, we all thought, had reached its happy culmination in 1937.

MORALE AND THE WAR WORKER

By John Armitage

MAN'S relationship to the machine which he once worked and now largely minds has been a fruitful field of enquiry for a number of years. Yet, for so long as fear of unemployment was the controlling factor in a worker's life he was unlikely to refuse or relinquish a job on the grounds that it was monotonous or dull. The pressure of war and the resulting large-scale introduction of women into munition works threw the problem into a more vivid light. It was now necessary to sustain morale. How was this to be done? There was some difference of opinion but as a rule the main result of deliberations was an increase in material welfare. A few suggested that although ten minute breaks, music-while-you-work and similar innovations were valuable as palliatives to tedium they were in fact useless as an attack on work which was spiritually unsatisfying. These few were unwilling to accept the work as inherently monotonous and were determined to prove that once the nature and the value of the operation had been fully explained and as fully understood, the operator would find a new and lasting interest in the work. Miss Dorothy L. Sayers, for instance. in a book* which may without exaggeration be described as brilliant, went so far as to say in a postscript chapter:

> Whether it is possible for a machine-worker to feel creatively about his routine job I do not know; but I suspect that it is, provided and so long as the worker eagerly desires that before all things else the work shall be done. What else causes the armaments worker to labour passionately when he knows that the existence of his country is threatened, but that his heart travels along the endless band with the machine parts and that his imagination beholds the fulfilment of the work in terms, not of money, but of the blazing gun itself, charged with his love and fear.

A comparison between this statement and the most timely volume, *War Factory*,† recently produced by Mass-Observation leads us to the most dismal conclusions. The work is dull, the labour is not passionate, the motive is still compulsion and as this book states 'endurance' is the key-word not 'zeal' or 'enthusiasm'. The management knew it, deplored it and worried over it, without apparently getting anywhere. Mass-Observation comments:

> The trouble there is not that the girls do not realize that their work is important to the war, but that the majority of them are so little *interested in the war that they do not care whether their work is important to it or not.* As in so many country places, to the women at least, the war is simply a thing that happens, like a thunderstorm or an earthquake, and victory is similarly a thing that will happen. All that can be done is to hope that it will happen soon, as one hopes for fine weather. The idea that anything one does or doesn't do oneself can possibly have any bearing on it all, comes very slowly.

* The Mind of the Maker. *Methuen.* 1941.

† War Factory by Mass-Observation. *Gollancz.* 4s. 6d.

And set before this passage appears the ominous sentence: "But not only do most of the machine-shop girls not understand what they are making, but most of them have not the faintest desire to understand."

The fact seems to be that although there are some who still feel that there is a spiritual importance to be attached to work, a compromise has already been arranged by the workers with their jobs. They are prepared in normal times to perform dull routine jobs because they are already convinced that modern industrial conditions demand it. They require in return a guarantee of good wages, healthy and bright working conditions, and short hours. How short it is difficult to say but probably a five-day week of 35 hours would be regarded by many as ideal. They then propose, with a sufficiency of money in their pockets, to find their spiritual outlet—the need for which is not altogether denied—in their leisure hours. Whether they would find it possible to enjoy a creative leisure under these conditions is at best questionable but there can be no doubt that this is the popular view.

Support for the view that dull routine jobs can at least be enjoyable for very short periods comes from the observer of Mass-Observation.

> I was particularly interested to find what it *does* feel like to be employed thus for hours at a stretch. To my surprise, I found that the boredom is far less than people imagine. In fact, for at any rate the first couple of hours, the work is definitely pleasant, rather like knitting in a fairly plain pattern.

However, concentration on the job is only achieved during the early part of the day and clock-watching and 'lavatory-mongering' soon takes its place. "One begins to make idiotic bargains with oneself: if I drill a hundred of these holes without looking up, then by the time I do look up five minutes will have passed." I found myself that in a dull routine job of another order, filling in endless forms with the same information, it was better to compete with the clock, laying a bet with oneself that so many forms would be done in so many minutes. Whatever the method, the clock is the enemy to be overcome in some way by make-believe.

War Factory is concerned largely with women who have been conscripted for factory work and evacuated from their town homes to a country district. As a result there was a good deal to grumble about, yet the conversation was very similar to that experienced in any workshop where women work together. Such conversation is most disheartening for those who believe that the country is composed of politically and socially conscious beings, actively striving towards a given end. Horoscopes, clothes and cosmetics, men, film-stars, and apparent injustices are regular topics. "It's unfair," is always on somebody's lips and a girl will turn to the horoscope each morning as quickly as a man with the *Daily Mirror* will turn to "Jane". *War Factory* confirms part of this at least and although men, no doubt through long conditioning, are

able to show more interest even in routine jobs, there does appear to be a positive connection to be made between a man or woman's work and his or her state of mind. Some years ago it might well have been argued that the dull minds were to be found behind the dull jobs; unfortunately as we strive through better education to improve the quality of the minds, we condemn more and more people to work which makes little use of minds at all. The question then becomes, for what do we advocate a better educational system. Not for work since large numbers are as well off without it, but for leisure; yet in any sample one may take it is rare to find an exception to the rule that the man who has a creative job has also a creative leisure, while the man whose work is dull wants in leisure not creativeness but the stimulus of a more exciting and romantic world for which the cinema obligingly provides.

What the Works Manager of *War Factory* is directly concerned about is not the minds of his factory girls but their war-time morale. He adds his opinion in notes to many comments made by Mass-Observation. He says:

> It must be confessed that as Manager of this somewhat isolated factory, I was almost as isolated from what was happening in the rest of the country and in other factories, as the workers themselves, and tended to feel that what I termed (for want of a better word) "lack of morale", was peculiar to my own organization. The realization that this was not so, but that it formed part of a much wider and National problem, while bringing some slight measure of relief from the purely personal angle, only transferred the problem to a different plane; the factory was still part of the National War Effort, and hence something still had to be done about it.

He has not much to say in favour of "Pep Talks" or visits to warships or aircraft, believing them to be donors of quick but not lasting returns. He gives as his opinion that "lack of consistency in Government propaganda" is the prime cause of the failure to create a National consciousness that each is part of a greater whole, and he inclines to agree with the opinion of Mr. Tom Harrisson, expressed in another book* that "the private ownership of industry makes it very difficult for the worker to take that direct War-time viewpoint and feel himself actually part of the War machine."

What he has failed to understand, I think, is that girls, much more than men, are practically incapable of grasping an abstract idea of morale but need to have it presented to them in personal terms. He might have learned a good deal from their comments on the Ensa shows. As the observer puts it: "It was clear from this talk that most of the girls were more interested in the performers as persons than they were in the actual show."

This being the case we can rid our minds of any idea of sustaining morale by preaching and exhortation. Events such as Dunkirk have a certain effect as does an immediate and common danger. It is of little value for that reason pointing to Russia as an example to be followed. Russia has been faced by a common danger and by the occupation of a great part of her country; England for a few months stood in danger of imminent invasion and morale was correspondingly high. When the threat was removed, or partially removed, the war once again became remote and for home forces as well as evacuated civil servants and factory workers, the general feeling was one of resignation and a longing for the 'day' when it would all be over and everyone allowed to go home. Morale was again high when victories, for the first time, were being won but this stimulus soon wore off and the longing returned.

* People in Production. *The Advertising Service Guild.*

There is little comfort for the Works Manager, and others like him, in this argument yet I think he might have managed very much better if he had tried reaching his workers from a more personal approach. The Government propaganda on the home front may well have been faulty and Mr. Harrisson's argument has some force if one thinks of it in relationship with the mines or some of our heavy industries. Yet the Works Manager deceives himself if he believes that these causes lie at the bottom of his workers' lack of morale. Somewhere in *War Factory* there is the statement that the girls do not look upon their factory life as 'real' life at all but only as a horrid interlude. The Works Manager should seize upon this fact and try to create as much of the 'real' life as he can into the factory environment. He will find that to do this he must make the personal approach; that he must avoid thinking of girls in the mass and as one problem, but as individuals and many problems. If possible he must get away from segregation of the sexes both in workshops and in the hostel. Personally I still feel that something could be done to the Social Centre, set up by the Management in the town, to make it attractive and I find the observer's comment, "I can think of no changes in the organization or programme of the Social Centre which could have any effect on it at all," almost incomprehensible. I have known many types of Social Centres, serving different purposes, including evacuated workers. I have known many bad ones and just as many good ones. Without direct knowledge it is impossible to offer suggestions, yet I feel that the improvement of this social centre must be practicable. Certainly there must have been a serious error in tactics at the start.

The Works Manager also mentions the value of education as an aid to morale. He quotes a remark of Mr. Stephen Spender, stressing the growing demand for education of all kinds. This is true and probably it is true to say that one of the most remarkable achievements of this war has been the success of the discussion group method of education among the Forces. Yet most of those who have personal experience in leading discussion groups agree that it is far more difficult to lead a group of women than a group of men. Again they have no desire to discuss abstract problems of war or reconstruction; again the group is only successful if a personal approach is made and the argument is developed from the familiar to the unfamiliar, and even so a very little of the unfamiliar goes a very long way. In the Forces much good use is made of news or information rooms, bright and comfortable rooms festooned with pictorial displays, illustrated magazines and only snippets of

hard news. The description of the notice-boards set up in every work room of *War Factory* is sufficient illustration of what should not be done.

> Among these are a number of would-be stimulating notices, exhorting workers to make more effort. Some of these are simply copies of articles in the press about e.g. how hard they work in Russian factories; these are too long to be read by a large proportion of girls. Others are definitely threatening and ill-natured in tone—spiteful little cuttings from the papers about how some worker was fined £10 for being late for work or how some girl was compelled to return to her job when she left it without permission.

Small wonder that their effect is to lower and not to heighten morale.

What is needed here is the wall-newspaper which will attract the eye, say the minimum in letterpress and the maximum in pictures. If exhortation is needed, it should be done not by threats but by humorous drawings similar to "Billy Brown of London Town" who does the job admirably for London Transport. The aim should be to make the whole factory laugh at the same joke and at the same time see the point. Local talent should be engaged upon the job, exchanging fact for rumour, and poking fun at the grumbler and the defeatist. It is little use starting from the management's opinion of what the worker ought to want and ought to think. The job is to discover what the worker does think and what the worker is interested in. A good lesson can be learned by studying the technique of successful daily newspapers. The *Daily Express* and the *Daily Mirror* are as good guides as any of what the public wants to read and how it likes its news and features presented. In the first place it will be found that the emphasis is on people not on things. The Works Manager might start from there.

Experiments along these lines would, I believe, help to make life more 'real' for the girls in spite of excessively long hours, which leave little time for recreation. Yet they would help hardly at all in creating an active interest in the work; they would merely succeed in establishing a more corporate attitude which in turn would make the work more agreeable. Is this the best that can be done? I am reluctant to agree that it is. It is true that for all jobs, even the dullest, there can always be found some workers who find pleasure and contentment in doing them. Yet hope that it might be possible, by good management, always to fit the right worker into the right job, is vain. There are far too many dull jobs in modern industry and far too few people who like doing them. Moreover, the single process job and the intelligence of the general worker tend to increase, and the two are incompatible. How often is one told: "You are lucky to be doing a job you like." Thus one is forced to accept the Works Manager's statement that "there is no escape from the inevitable conclusion that it behoves factory managements to do everything in their power to remove complaints, make conditions as comfortable as possible, and provide for their workers as congenial a background for hard work as can possibly be devised."

THE DNIEPER BATTLES

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

I DOUBT whether the extent of the Russian achievement in forcing the line of the Dnieper and isolating the Crimea has been fully appreciated, although the results obtained are of course too obvious not to be fully recognized. The achievement would of course have been impossible if the Red Army soldiers had not shown indomitable courage, ingenuity and initiative in effecting the actual crossings of the river and in breaking through the immensely strong defences of the Melitopol line. The commanders of units and formations must also have displayed high qualities of leadership, drive and initiative in exploiting every initial success. It is, however, the higher direction of the whole complicated series of operations which is especially impressive and encouraging. The breadth and daring of conception in the planning, and the timing and co-ordination of the successive blows delivered, were outstanding features; but the speed with which preparations were made for each phase of the operations in spite of the handicap of long and imperfect lines of communication, argues administrative ability equally remarkable. It should not be forgotten that it was generally expected that the impetus of the offensive was bound to be largely reduced owing to administrative difficulties and the distances that had been covered; and that in any case it was certain to prove insufficient to break through any of the much vaunted Todt defence positions on which it might suit German strategy to fight with determination. It is worth recalling the sequence of the various attacks and their significance.

It is still doubtful whether the Germans had decided to stand on the Dnieper and to retain their hold on the Crimea for the winter; or whether they intended to hold it only for a time to cover a further withdrawal; and, possibly, in the hopes that the Russians might give them an opportunity for delivering a crippling counter-stroke. There can, however, be no question that they were determined and had made every preparation to offer battle on the line they had taken up. It was no mere rearguard position. It seemed hardly believable that the Russians would attempt to cross the river in force, not only on account of the obstacle it presented and its defences, but because of the danger that any bridgehead established would be wiped out by counter-attacks. The approach of the autumn rains and length and indifferent nature of their communications in any case appeared to prohibit an attempt to cross the river till it froze, unless there were indications that the Germans were continuing their retreat. It seemed probable, however, that if weather conditions and

the condition of their troops and communications justified it, that the Russians would attempt to break through the Melitopol position and isolate the Crimea before the Germans had time to recover from the demoralizing and disorganizing effects of retreat and their defeat on the Mius position. It is not unlikely that that is how the Germans actually appreciated the situation, for they seem to have held the Melitopol line in great strength and to have kept a number of their panzer and motorized divisions in reserve west of the Dnieper as their main instrument for counter-attack should the Russians attempt a crossing. Presumably these reserves were stationed in groups, each large enough to deliver a formidable counter-attack quickly, but separated by distances which would make a major concentration a matter of some days. No doubt the group at Kiev was particularly strong because the Russians might attempt the capture of the city, of such importance politically and strategically, as a localized operation.

By the end of September the Russians had reached the east bank of the Dnieper from the Pripet marshes to Zaporozhe, and were in contact with and probing the Melitopol line. Kremenchug, the only large town on the east bank except Zaporozhe, had been captured as well as the suburbs of Kiev on the east bank. During the first fortnight of October attacks on the Melitopol line were intensified, but achieved no marked success, and the few footholds gained across the Dnieper were not on a scale to cause the Germans serious alarm. On the whole it looked as if the Russian southern offensive had been brought to a standstill, and the capture of Nevel seemed to indicate that greater dangers might threaten in the north. German communiqués left no doubt that the High Command believed that von Manstein had secured his hoped-for respite. It was not till the middle of October that the Russians gained a substantial foothold in Melitopol and captured Zaporozhe which, situated on the east bank of the Dnieper, formed the northern bastion of the Melitopol position. Even then the position organized in depth was unbroken and it was announced that there was no question of evacuating the Crimea. In fact as the Russian pressure increased Field Army Divisions were brought from the Crimea to reinforce the Melitopol position. So far Russian plans seemed to be following the expected course, and though bridgeheads had been secured north and south of Kiev and heavy fighting was taking place there, the Germans seemed to have the situation fairly well in hand. Little attention was paid to the bridgehead the Russians had established near Kremenchug, though it apparently had been enlarged. The break-through and its rapid exploitation on October 16 seems to have been totally unexpected. At once the whole situation changed and became fluid. If the thrust could be promptly and strongly supported it would make the position of the Germans holding the Dnieper Bend untenable, and it was obviously directed on Krivoi Rog the nodal point on their lines of communications and lateral movements of reserves. It was a supremely daring manœuvre to exploit the obvious weakness of the salient formed by the river, but the risk that it would be met by

counter-attacks in force before it could be supported was all the greater because of the bottleneck of the Dnieper crossing in its rear. Moreover the time that had been available for organizing the passage, re-grouping of the Army and consolidating its long lines of communication had been astonishingly short. The thrust almost reached Krivoi Rog, but before the town could be captured von Manstein had begun to react with all the speed and executive skill to be expected from the German Staff and Commanders. No doubt he hoped to be able to repeat the manœuvre which led up to the recapture of Kharkov in the spring and to drive the Russians right back to the Dnieper. This time, however, the situation was so immediately critical that he seems to have been forced to counter-attack before he had assembled such a strong, compact force as he had had on the former occasion. The right flank of the Russian wedge was heavily attacked but it stood firm, and as reinforcements arrived they were used to widen rather than deepen the wedge. On the north flank a confused and violent tank battle developed, apparently somewhat similar to that in the Kursk salient following the German abortive offensive. At first the Germans claimed successes but made no marked progress. With each side throwing in reserves as they became available the battle continued for nearly a week, till both had temporarily fought themselves to exhaustion; Krivoi Rog being left in German hands but closely threatened.

To stage his counter-attacks von Manstein may have weakened his defensive fronts, confident in their ability to resist attack. For it was his defensive fronts that now began successively to give way. The Melitopol line was the first to collapse when on October 23 the Russians completed the occupation of the town and started the great *blitzkrieg* break-through which shattered the 6th Army, isolated the Crimea and cleared practically all the left bank of the lower Dnieper in little over a week. Whether von Manstein had withdrawn armoured reserves from this front to the Krivoi Rog battle we do not know, but inability to check the spead of the Russian devastating pursuit seems to argue a lack of mobile reserves.

On the other side of the Dnieper while the Krivoi Rog battle was still at its height, the left of the Russian wedge was extending steadily towards Dnepropetrovsk, and, following amazing surprise crossings of the Dnieper in the vicinity of the town, the Germans beat a hurried and somewhat disorderly retreat from it. Reinforced by reserves they were, however, able to rally on a line covering Nikopol and Krivoi Rog-Zaporozhe railway, and, with the Krivoi Rog battle still undecided, the Russians were unable to do more than maintain pressure on this sector of the front. The Germans had for the time being at least succeeded in stabilizing the front of the Russian wedge, relieving the precarious situation of their troops remaining in the loop of the Dnieper and on its lower reaches. In particular they covered Nikopol to which part of the 6th Army had retreated, and which was of great importance to both sides as a major source of manganese ore supplies. But

this partial success must have made heavy calls on von Manstein's reserves.

It was this dislocation of his reserve power that probably gave Vatutin the opportunity to complete the disruption of the Dnieper defences, and we may hope of achieving even more decisive results. After two days violent fighting Kiev was captured and this time the speed and disorder of the German retreat leaves little doubt that von Manstein had again been surprised and with his reserves wrongly disposed. The Russian exploitation of success was as prompt and rapid as at Melitopol, and it is difficult to see how von Manstein can retrieve the situation. His dilemma is obvious. He can have little hope of assistance from the north and he cannot transfer troops from the Krivoi Rog front without dangerously weakening his position, even if they could arrive in time to protect his northern flank.

It can hardly be supposed that the evolution of the Russian plans was deliberately planned and followed a foreseen course in its entirety. But I think it is evident that each stage was designed, if successfully carried through, to present opportunities for further developments, and that preparations were made to seize opportunities as they might occur. I have always held that it is the hall-mark of good generalship to play for opportunities; they may not arise, but the unforgivable sin is to be caught unprepared to take advantage of an unforeseeable degree of success. Absolute results can seldom be counted on in war, but tendencies may be created and anticipated.

River lines are notoriously difficult to hold, but the Dnieper on account of its width, its dominating right bank and its elaborate defence works seemed exceptionally free from tactical weakness. The great bend of the river constituted of course a strategical danger but this was largely discounted by the Melitopol position, which, with its flanks secure could be made very strong. Moreover it formed a bridgehead across the river of a size which would provide a base for a powerful counter-offensive. Von Manstein, it may be assumed was out-numbered but if his troops were of uniform quality he certainly had adequate forces to hold his line; his panzer divisions and Luftwaffe in particular gave him highly mobile reserves. Possibly, over confident he had secured a respite he may have weakened his forward defences by withdrawing too large a proportion of his mauled divisions to refit; but if so his opponents took full advantage of the facts and it in no way detracts from the brilliance of the Russian achievement.

THE FAR EAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

WITH Lord Louis Mountbatten's arrival in the Far East and his conferences at Delhi and Chungking, the Pacific theatre attracts an increased measure of attention; and though it is well realized that no major campaign, one that is to say aiming at a decision, can be launched in those waters until the end, or the approach to the end, of the war in Europe, the decision as to the main form of the intended strategy must be made now. Preparations take a long time and a year or even more is none too long for thinking out what is to be done and providing the means and getting them to the place where they will be required. One thing is clear. The foundation of whatever is going to be undertaken is command of the sea, the power, that is to say, of moving troops and shipping across the sea in the face of whatever opposition the enemy may be capable of making in the air or on the sea. It is idle and misleading to talk of sea power and air power as two separate forms of power. What is to be attained is security for the movements of traffic of all kinds across the water spaces that divide the land theatres, and that which gives that security is correctly described as 'seapower' and is exercised by all the types of fighting instruments that are capable of driving the opponent from the lines of passage of the armies and the shipping which supports the national and the military efforts.

The Japanese successes, obtained because of their practically undisputed command of the sea, have put Japan in a very strong position in relation to one of the elements of sea power, bases. She now holds all that ring of islands which surrounds the China Sea, the ports of Malaya, the Andaman and the Nicobar islands. The most advanced position held by the Allies is Ceylon and Ceylon is too far from the coming theatre of war to serve as a base of operations. How that defect, the absence of a base where it is needed, is to be remedied is necessarily the first of the considerations which must receive the attention of those responsible for the strategy. In another element of sea power, shipping, Japan is not so happily placed. She has lost a respectable amount of her tonnage, though as yet not a crippling amount and the problem of how to supply her fighting forces, spread as they are over a wide area and at great distances from home bases as well as to transport to Japan all that wealth of raw materials which is in her hands in her conquered territories and is of little use to her till it can reach her factories, is bound to be exercising her thoughts. Submarines have taken their toll on the sea

routes and air craft and surface craft on the coastal routes round New Guinea and the Solomons. One thing therefore is to add to her difficulties by increasing the danger to her lines of supply and to impose greater strains upon her defending forces. It is not unreasonable to hope that it will be possible before long to make the very effective contribution of heavy ship attack by battleships, cruiser and aircraft carrier squadrons, the form of attack to guard against which we have been, and still are, constrained to retain a number of our heavy ships in home waters. What heavy forces Japan now possesses are not known: she is reported to have lost four cruisers and ten destroyers sunk in the month of November and to have had between thirteen and sixteen more cruisers damaged, but what additions she may have made to both her battleship and cruiser strength since she abjured the League of Nations are not known though there would seem to be some probability that her losses have exceeded her building. The combined fleet of the Allies which should shortly be available for service in the China Sea and Pacific will in any case be superior and should be able to make its weight felt even before the war in Europe ends. Much however depends on whether and to what extent the Germans have been or may be expected to be able to refloat and refit the French heavy ships scuttled at Toulon and the unfinished battleship in the Adriatic and what can be done, if needed to hamper or defeat such attempts on their part.

In the southern Pacfic, the position of the Japanese has steadily deteriorated, difficult and slow as the process of ejection must be. The landing on Bougainville has obviously disturbed them, judging by the great effort they have made to reinforce the island. The distance from Bougainville to Rabaul is little more than 150 miles and already some damaging attacks have been made on the squadrons and shipping, and the shore installations at that base. If the operations proceed successfully these attacks will multiply in weight and frequency though whether the base can be rendered untenable is open to doubt; but they can prepare the way for another combined expedition which, if decisive, would jeopardize the position of all the dependent forces in New Guinea and might even have the effect of bringing the Fleet down from Truk to save the situation. Nothing less than the strongest fleet would be needed in that juncture and therefore the sooner a transfer of heavy forces can be effected the better.

In the Mediterranean we have suffered some unpleasant set-backs at Cos Leros and Samos. Why this has happened cannot be said till full information is forthcoming but the losses cannot fail to give rise to some misgivings concerning our higher strategy. Some fatality seems permanently to overhang our proceedings in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean. The old and well tried doctrine which dictates that the primary object of the combined fighting forces should be to obtain the command of the sea seems to have been treated as inapplicable to the present war by those in whose hands the conduct of strategy lies. Command of the sea results from the action of sea power and

two of the essential elements of that power are fighting instruments and their bases. When, through Italy's attack on Greece, Crete became available as a base for our sea and air forces, we failed to take the steps necessary to secure it against attack though seven months elapsed before the invasion was launched. The excuse that there were other demands upon our resources in aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery merely implied that the importance of the command of the Mediterranean was rated lower than some other needs, or that the significance and relation of Crete to the command was not appreciated. So we lost the island. So too Rhodes was a most desirable acquisition —how desirable we can plainly see in the present rebuff we have suffered: but though we had commando forces, fully equipped and available, as Lord Keyes has pointed out, they were not employed but were dispersed and unused. Those two sins of omission in Crete and Rhodes lie at the bottom of to-day's mischances.

The surrender of Italy opened up possibilities of obtaining possession of a chain of bases through the waters of the Dodecanese leading towards the Macedonian coast and essential to any operations which it might be desired to undertake in that part; essential because no advance of a seaborne force through those waters is possible without continuous air cover against attacks from the enemy-held position in Crete and Greece. Two fortresses flanked the entrance to the Aegean Sea, Crete and Rhodes, the former now strongly held by the enemy, who in spite of the many demands made on his resources was able to spare what was needed for the defence, the latter in Italian hands. To enter this area without the possession of at least one of these guardian fortresses would be to expose the communications of the garrisons to attack from the flank without the power to maintain the necessary fighter aircraft cover, and to deprive the shipping and the fighting ships of the continuous support of one of the elements of a naval force of to-day. In spite of the pitiful performances of the Italian fighting forces it might certainly have been expected that a garrison of 30,000 men in Rhodes would be capable of holding its own against the 7,000 or so Germans who had been introduced into the island. That expectation, if it was entertained as it may well have been, was, unhappily, disappointed. Either through the pusillanimity of the Italian commander, or his indolence, or his deliberate action in favour of the enemy, the island passed without a struggle into the German hands. It was, it is to be presumed, in the confidence that this essential fortress and stepping stone would be held, from which air support could be given to the expeditions on their way and to the forces at sea and on land defending the occupied islands, that British forces were sent to reinforce the Italian islands and to occupy Samos. Naturally, too, there could be no delay in despatching the forces concerned. Heavy German attacks were developed within a fortnight on Cos and in its defence the British naval forces suffered severe losses: the German communiqué states that nine destroyers were sunk, a cruiser badly damaged, and a number of other auxiliary craft destroyed or disabled; for

they lacked that air component which every operation of this kind throughout the war has shown to be necessary. Cos fell within two days, after a crushing bombardment and other islands followed suit. Finally, after further heavy attacks from the air bases in Rhodes, Crete and Greece, to which no fighter opposition was possible owing to the distance from Cyprus, the nearest British base, Leros and Samos have suffered the same fate, isolated as they were.

The losses of positions, of men, of ships and—possibly even more far reaching and more difficult to recover, of prestige in the Near East, are considerable. The key point in the situation was Rhodes. With Rhodes in our hands support to Cos would have been available at a distance of some sixty miles while the enemy would have had no nearer bases than in Crete at over twice that distance. The obvious criticism is that when Rhodes was lost it was impossible to continue the designed movement and that the proper course to pursue was to abandon the attempt from which the foundation had been removed. To what extent that course was then possible we cannot say; but there seems to be certain inelasticity in our machinery of direction which makes rapid changes difficult to execute. The result, to whatever causes the rebuff may be due, is singularly deplorable at the present moment, affording as it does a gratification in Berlin where some success has been greatly needed to keep up the spirits of the somewhat disillusioned dupes of Hitler.

JOHN PYM

Died: December 8, 1643.

By S. Reed Brett

This day one of the great Champions of our Religion, Lawes, Lives, and Liberties, Master *Pym* deceased; He was a member of the House of Commons, but such a member as almost the whole body of them was to be found in him; the excellent speeches that he made, indefatigable care that he took to support these sick and bleeding Kingdoms: shall speak his truest Epitaph and be his best Memorialls.

IN these terms a contemporary pamphlet recorded the death of John Pym. They expressed the exact truth. Pym was more than a figure-head of a faction or even of a generation. He sat in every House of Commons from 1621 until his death twenty-two years later. He was the personification of Parliamentary Government as distinct from autocracy. A modern historian has summarized this fact by saying that "Pym was unquestionably the man who impressed upon the House of Commons its modern aspect, and who went far to define its party system and its methods of procedure," and as "the first and perhaps the greatest Parliamentary leader whom this country has produced."

The three centuries that have elapsed since Pym's death have continuously vindicated the principles which his relentless logic expounded. His political ideas and methods are still accepted as the axioms of democracy.

Pym was the first man, so far as is known, to conduct a political election-campaign. A contemporary account of events preceding the opening of the Long Parliament in November, 1640, relates that Pym "rode about the country to promote elections of the Puritanical brethren to serve in Parliament, wasted his body much in carrying on the cause, and was himself elected a burgess."

After the Parliament had been elected, Pym is believed to have exerted his influence on the masses outside. When the Bill of Attainder against Strafford had passed through all its stages in the Commons, and while the Lords were still hesitating about their attitude, a London mob 2,000 strong surged round the Parliament-House bearing a petition with 20,000 signatures, demanding that Strafford should be executed. Again, towards the close of 1641, when the political temperature was rising, and when the Bishops' votes in the Lords were being steadily cast in the King's interest, a mob intimidated the Bishops as they arrived in the Parliamentary precincts and shouted: "No Bishops! No Papist Lords!" Pym has been generally regarded as the organ-

izer of the London mob in these demonstrations, though tangible proof is hard to come by, and certainly he cannot be held responsible for the mob of women who, when peace-proposals were being mooted in August, 1643, brought a peace-petition to the Commons in favour of the proposals and clamoured loudly for "that dog Pym."

Even more significant, as contributions to Parliamentary democracy and as characteristic of Pym's own political position, were three other principles which Pym consistently expounded.

The first was that of the responsibility of ministers to Parliament. The idea had been implicit in certain parliamentary proceedings before Pym rose to leadership in the Commons, notably in the impeachment of the Duke of Buckingham in 1625-6. But Pym was the first man to recognize the significance of such proceedings and to express it in uncompromisingly logical terms. At the time of the Irish rising in 1641, Pym led the majority of the Commons in passing resolutions which included the following declaration:

> We shall be forced . . . to resolve upon one such way of defending Ireland from the rebels, as may concur to the securing of ourselves from such mischievous counsels and designs, as have lately been, and still are, in practice and agitation against us, as we have just cause to believe; and to commend those aids and contributions which this great necessity shall require, to the custody and disposing of such persons of honour and fidelity as we have cause to confide in.

This was an unmistakable enunciation of the principle that ministers of the Crown should hold office only so long as they commanded the confidence of Parliament.

Pym's second distinctive principle was that national institutions must combine traditional foundations with adaptability to the changing conditions of successive generations. This principle he summarized in the course of a speech delivered as early as June, 1628. Said he:

> Those commonwealths have been most durable and perpetual, which have often reformed and recomposed themselves according to their first institution and ordinance; for by this means they repair the breaches and counterwork the ordinary and natural effects of time.

This was the principle which animated Pym in opposing royal encroachments upon what he regarded as Parliament's and People's customary privileges. In the same 1628 speech he declared:

> The law of England, whereby the subject was exempted from taxes and loans, not granted by common consent of Parliament, was not introduced by any statutes, or by any charter or sanction of princes, but was the ancient and fundamental law issuing from the first frame and constitution of the kingdom.

The third of Pym's principles was his insistence upon the supremacy of Commons over Lords in the working of government. Certain of his utterances on the relationship between the two Houses have a curiously modern ring. A resolution whose passage he secured in the Commons and which he then carried to the Lords in December, 1641, relating to Bills passed by the

Commons but rejected by the Lords, might have been equally appropriately delivered in support of the Parliament Act of 1911:

> That this House being the Representative Body of the whole Kingdom, and their Lordships being but as particular Persons, and coming to Parliament in a particular Capacity, that if they should not be pleased to consent to the Passing of those Acts, and others, necessary to the Preservation and Safety of the Kingdom, that then this House, together with such of the Lords as are more sensible of the Safety of the Kingdom, may join together, and represent the same to his Majesty.

A few weeks later he used to the Lords even more ominous words:

> The Commons will be glad to have your helpe and concurrence in saving of the Kingdome; but if they should faile of it, it should not discourage them in doing their dutie. And whether the Kingdome be lost or saved (as through God's blessing I hope it will be) they shall be sorry that the story of this present Parliament should tell Posteritie, that in so great a Danger and Extremitie, the house of Peeres should have no part in the preservation of it, you having so great an Interest in the good successe of those endeavours, in respect of your Estates, and high degrees of Nobilitie.

II

An item of Pym's career all too little known is his work as a colonizing pioneer. During the "Eleven Years' Tyranny" of 1629-40, when Charles I ruled without calling a parliament, Pym's restless energy was expended in directing the operations of the "Governor and Company of Adventurers for the Plantation of the Islands of Providence, Henrietta and the adjacent islands." In October, 1629, a preliminary expedition to colonize the Island of Old Providence, which lies off the Central American Mosquito coast, was sent out by a group of men headed by the Earl of Warwick. In November, 1630, a meeting of the Adventurers appointed John Pym as Treasurer; and in December of the same year a patent was granted to give the Company formal existence. The records show clearly that Pym's office as Treasurer involved responsibility not only for recording financial transactions but also for shaping the Company's policy and seeing that the policy was carried out. During at least a decade, Pym was the driving force behind all the Company's activities. Yet not all Pym's energies could defeat the disruptive influences to which the colony was subject. Sharp and deep religious divergences among the colonists would have been sufficient of themselves to ruin any chance of the colony's firm establishment or prosperity. Few of the settlers were prepared for the hard, relentless work essential in any pioneering enterprise. Moreover, Providence lay geographically near the heart of Spanish maritime activities and far removed from any effective help that England could bring. Enfeebled by internal divisions, and constantly threatened by external attack, the colony could have but one end. Spanish assaults began as early as 1635; and finally in May, 1641, a large expedition from Cartagena overwhelmed the Islanders' resistance and brought the Company's activities on Old Providence to an end.

Though the project thus failed, it had had profound effects upon the career

of Pym. First, his experience in organization and leadership was to bear rich fruit in the years ahead. Second, Pym was one of the first English politicians to understand the possibilities of colonization both as a field for English trade and as a political outlet. Third, the political reaction of Pym's colonizing experience is indicated by the personnel of his fellow-Adventurers. Nearly all of them were Puritans who were to be associated with Pym in his subsequent leadership of the Parliamentary majority against Charles I's arbitrary government. The names of the Earl of Warwick, Lord Saye, and John Hampden—all of whom in 1637 refused to pay Ship Money as demanded by royal Writ—on the records of the Adventurers are sufficient evidence of the intimate connection between the Providence Company and the Long Parliament opposition to the King. The core of that opposition consisted of members of the Company.

By May, 1641, when Old Providence fell into Spanish hands, the Short Parliament had been summoned and dissolved and the Long Parliament had been in session for six months. Two streams of experience thus flowed together to make the full river of Pym's work in the Long Parliament: his parliamentary apprenticeship of 1621-29; and his colonizing activities and contacts of 1629-40.

III

It was Pym's Long Parliament leadership, during the three remaining years of his life (November, 1640-December, 1643) which demonstrated his combination of unshakable political principle with the insight to apply the principle variously to varying circumstances and entitled him to be considered not merely an astute politician but a consummate statesman. Such a man has significance not only for his own generation but for succeeding generations even three centuries after his death.

It is not too much to say that neglect of Pym's second principle has contributed materially to the world's present condition. During the century and a half beginning with the French Revolution, nation after nation adopted the outward form of Parliamentary Democracy copied, with variations, from the English model. In England this democracy was the result of a slow, continuous growth dating back to Simon de Montfort and to Edward I in the thirteenth century. Even the republican Commonwealth of the seventeenth century was not so much an interruption of this process as a proof of its inevitability. This is the fundamental reason why the English parliamentary system works in spite of its theoretical anomalies and limitations. Its taproot runs deep into the people's traditional heritage. But the other countries where the English political system was adopted had had no such heritage. Parliamentary democracy was not with them a growth from the inside but was only a veneer applied to the outside. In Pym's words, it was not "according to their first institution and ordinance." As a result, the prediction given in his 1628 speech has been exactly fulfilled:

> Whilst one part seeks to uphold the old form of government, and the other part to introduce a new, they will miserably consume and devour one another. Histories are full of the calamities of whole states and nations in such cases.

Outside the British Isles there appear to be three areas only where Democracy has flourished. The first two are the Dominions of the British Empire and the United States of America, both of which have the same political heritage as has England herself. The third is Russia which has been wise enough not to copy anyone's system slavishly but to evolve a system of her own. The past quarter of a century should have taught us that however well-suited the English parliamentary system may be to England, it may not be equally suited to other countries with other histories and traditions. The moral of this present-day application of Pym's principle is one that the framers of peace-treaties might well heed.

The principle is equally applicable to domestic reforms, particularly to the reform of our electoral system. Changed conditions of national life are rendering necessary some corresponding changes in national institutions. There is now general agreement that some way of rendering Parliament more exactly representative of the will of the nation as a whole is an urgent necessity if parliamentary government is not to be altogether discredited. In Pym's phrase, there is evident need to "repair the breaches and counterwork the ordinary and natural effects of time." The danger is that in our zeal for reforms we should introduce elements that are foreign to the traditional nature of our representative system. For example, the method of referendum has its advocates as providing an undistorted reflection of the nation's views on a particular subject. Whether in fact the reflection is as true as would appear is a matter for argument. What is beyond argument is that, since the population is too numerous and too widespread to express directly its views upon matters of government, it chooses a relatively small body of men (and women) to govern in its name. These representatives are not delegates sent to register their respective electors' will on specified issues only: they have to exercise their judgment upon every matter of State that may arise during their parliamentary lifetime. Whatever the electoral reforms suggested to meet new conditions, that is, to repair "the ordinary and natural effects of time"—whether proportional representation, the alternative vote, or what not—if the commonwealth is to be "durable and perpetual", the repair must conform to the commonwealth's "first institution and ordinance."

Of few men in English history could it be more aptly said than of John Pym that "he being dead yet speaketh."

(John Murray published Mr. S. Reed Brett's biography of John Pym in 1940, a 5s. edition of which appeared this year.)

RECENT BATSFORD BOOKS

The Face of Britain Series.

THE HOME COUNTIES

Middlesex, Surrey, Kent, Herts and Essex

by S. P. B. MAIS

Containing 136 pages of text and 130 illustrations from photographs and drawings, together with five plates in colour. **10*s.* 6*d.* *net***

In this attractive volume Mr. Mais, one of the most versatile and prolific of English topographical writers, has provided a comprehensive review of the salient character and features of the five Home Counties. Like other volumes in its series the book is lavishly illustrated.

Uniform with the Author's *Streets of London and English Night Life,*

TRAVEL IN ENGLAND

From Pilgrim and Pack-horse to Light Car and Plane

by THOMAS BURKE

Containing 120 pages of text and upwards of 100 illustrations and 2 plates in colour. **10*s.* 6*d.* *net***

Mr. Burke leads the reader right through this fascinating subject from early times to the present day, in a series of chapters which review Prehistoric Tracks, Roman Roads, Mediaeval Travel, Stuart and Georgian journeys, the great coaching days of the early nineteenth century, the rise of the railways and of mechanical transport, and in our own time the revival of the road with the development of motoring. It is a story packed with incident and anecdote. In addition the book is crammed with pictures reproduced in the Batsford manner.

THE POTTERY and PORCELAIN of SWANSEA and NANTGARW

by E. MORTON NANCE, M.A.

With a Foreword by R. L. Hobson, C.B., B.A.

Assuredly no branch of Ceramic Art has ever before received such lavish description and illustration as is devoted to it in this magnificent book, which contains nearly 600 pages of text, together with no fewer than 1,700 illustrations of individual pieces.

The edition is very limited and it would seem certain that the stock will be exhausted in the near future. If, therefore, it is desired to secure one of the copies now available, a reservation order should be placed without delay.

The volume is in quarto format (size 10 by 7½ ins.), bound in cloth gilt. **£7 7*s.* *net***

BATSFORD, Publishers, 15, North Audley St., LONDON, W.1.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

The Enjoyment of Poetry

À TOUT Seigneur, tout honneur. Since the Archbishop of Canterbury consented to give last May the first Annual Lecture of the National Book Council, and his discourse on The Resources and Influence of English Literature is now published by the Council (at 2s.), it seems proper to begin with this out of a rather numerous batch of volumes. Dr. Temple tells us that when he was headmaster of Repton it was his usage to assemble the senior boys in his own study, and read Browning with them. That was somewhere between 1910 and 1914; I am not sure that the "New Poetry" of to-day had then begun to be written. At all events it was still considered that Browning needed some tackling, but was worth it. In the days when I read him most ardently, I was always aware that Tennyson's "Ulysses", for instance, had at least as much depth of thought as anything of equal length in Browning, though the thought was considerably less difficult to follow. But no doubt one enjoyed getting over the difficulty. Any headmaster who should do to-day what Dr. Temple did, would only too easily find something craggy for his pupils to break their minds on. About "the younger poets and the modern poets generally" he says that he "has read not very much, but a certain amount", and clearly has not been captivated. He avows that even great poetic genius does not necessarily give him pleasure—Milton being an instance. In short, he reads poetry for enjoyment and can only enjoy when the poet's personality is sympathetic. Perhaps that is the way with most of us. At all events, having liked (and reviewed here) a book in prose by Mr. John Pudney, I thought to myself that his work offered for me a favourable approach to modern verse; and the Bodley Head has sent me no less than three attractive little volumes. Each costs half-a-crown, and all are about an airman's experiences. *Dispersal Point, Beyond this Disregard*, and *South of Forty*; I have gone through them, and gone through them again, sadly aware that poetry now is speaking a new language not to me understandable. Yet what should be strange in that? War is nothing new; even seamanship in its modern forms remains recognizable; but flight, and flight with battle purpose, marks so great an innovation that even poetry can hardly bridge the gulf between Mr. Pudney's generation and what is left of mine. Here and there, as in the dozen lines called "Missing", (which comes in *Beyond This Disregard*), or in the much longer "Ballad under the Atlas", in *South of Forty*, he can reach me with the thrill of pity and of wonder. I must only find for myself a special meaning in the last lines of the concluding poem:

> We will fly away one day,
> And get us back to our homes and to the grace
> Of tenderness, the sap which moves in the wood,
> The balance of the head upon the daffodil . . . .
> In our own fashion
> We will be at peace and be still. . . .
> We will fly away one day with no need to kill.

When that day comes—and it does not look so far off—perhaps Mr. Pudney may find the call to write poetry which will have an appeal not only to his own comrades but the men of his grandfather's generation, who loved poetry before his father was born. And I would beg him never to forget that poetry is written to be read and to be enjoyed and not to be puzzled out like a cross-word.

* * * * *

Greek Resistance

There is no poetry in the grim record to which "Symmachos" gives the title, *Greece Fights On.* (Mr. Lindsay Drummond publishes it, fully illustrated, at 6s.). Yet tragedy is there, on every page, and the heroic resistance of a people worthy even of Europe's most illustrious ancestry. It should be read by all who value education; perhaps nothing in it is more likely to raise lasting anger than the fact that Germany tried to bribe Greece into submission by offering special rations at schools where a German education should be given. Yet here is the central fact. This small nation lost 30,000 soldiers fighting against Italy, 10,000 against German forces. They lost 70,000 civilians massacred by Nazis or Bulgarians in Crete and Thrace. But the civilians who died of hunger during the war were 300,000. And yet, Greece resists. An American was able to record how, after British forces were withdrawn, the people protected many British soldiers left behind, for whom Germany offered high rewards. In Crete the people destroyed their olive trees rather than let the enemy have the crop—and an olive tree needs fifteen years to reach full bearing. The olive means more to the Greeks than the vines do to Burgundy. An appeal from the Greek women to women all over the world is magnificent. As to the men, a photograph of two among those serving with British armies in North Africa shows what the race can produce, if fairly fed. Soldiers like these have every mark about them of active minds in hardy bodies; and they have the gaiety that should be theirs of right.

* * * * *

Mr. Baerlein's Paradise

There is another small nation under German oppression to which Great Britain is bound by many ties, and Mr. Henry Baerlein who writes of the Danes in *Baltic Paradise* (Muller, 10s. 6d.), makes it plain that, come well, come ill, they, on their part, hold fast to this allegiance of friendship. His book begins with some twenty-five pages which treat of "The Danes in the War"—an admirable recalling of much that is too easily forgotten in all this welter. Is it too much to hope that his concluding passage will be laid to heart? For he stresses the truth that, if Denmark and also Poland, are to enjoy anything like security, Germany must for all time be denied that control of the Baltic which even after the last war she succeeded in retaining or regaining. It would, he says, be necessary that Denmark should grant the necessary strongholds in her territory to Powers capable of maintaining Europe's security; as a counter-weight, Schleswig-Holstein should go back to Denmark.

All this excellent good sense belongs to a different order of ideas from the account which Mr. Baerlein wrote for his amusement and ours, of a visit to the island of Bornholm, some years before the war. This favourite hunting-ground of Scandinavian tourists appears to be about 50 kilometres long by some 30 broad and has a population of not less than thirty thousand. But the traveller extended his excursion to the neighbouring island of

Important Hutchinson Books

Everybody's Choice for Christmas

THE SATURDAY BOOK 3

edited by

LEONARD RUSSELL

This is the best book for Christmas sales that we have published for a long time. It is superbly written and beautifully illustrated and many famous authors have written specially for it. Among them are—Julian Huxley, Sean O'Casey, A. A. Milne, Francis Iles, Dilys Powell, Alexander Werth, Bernard Darwin, Anthony Berkeley. 12/6

Author of "Ronald Curtland"

BARBARA CARTLAND'S

autobiographical story of the

ISTHMUS YEARS

Miss Cartland gives us a vivid picture of social history during the 'Careless Twenties' and the 'Threadbare Thirties'—We believe it will prove to be not only a useful if exciting reference book, but also an inspiration to those who read it. 12/6

The Saga of a Territorial Regiment

Lieut.-Colonel GRAHAM BROOKS, M.C.

GRAND PARTY

Cavalcade: "As an authentic story of the B.E.F. in 1939 and 1940 this narrative takes an important place among the documentaries of the war." *The Star*: "A forceful thrilling account." *Illustrated.* 6/-

Author of "The Fall of Italian East Africa" etc.

ERIC ROSENTHAL

FORTRESS ON SAND

An authentic and dramatic account of the famous siege of Tobruk, in which the author describes the fighting of the beleaguered troops, not only against Rommel but against boredom. *Illustrated.* 7/6

A vivid record of a fascinating South American journey

TOM CLARKE

THE WORD of an ENGLISHMAN

Robert Lynd: "A lively and instructive record of travel." *Daily Mail*: "The inside story of South America told by an English newspaper man." *Illustrated.* 15/-

250 days of heroic resistance

SEVASTOPOL

This book, an official compilation of articles by Soviet Generals, Admirals, front-line correspondents and well-known writers, tells for the first time the full story of the heroic defence of Sevastopol. *Illustrated.* 2/6

The epic story of

STALINGRAD

This book consists of a series of articles and first-hand reportage sketches by Soviet War Correspondents and military experts. *Illustrated with dramatic photographs.* 2/6

Author of that memorable book "Dorothy Thompson's English Journey"

JAMES WEDGWOOD DRAWBELL

ALL CHANGE HERE

This is a book about people—famous people and humble people, named and unnamed—and all this is happening to them and to their lives in one of the most momentous phases of our history. 16 *illustrations.* 10/6

HUTCHINSON

& Co. (Publishers) Ltd.

Largest of Book Publishers

Christiansö, whose dimensions he prefers to give in feet—a thousand long, by four hundred broad—which would make a good-sized field. Yet it has its doctor, its post office, and its industries—most of which are concerned with herrings. The harbour is convenient, and was found so in old times by pirates. To-day the modern kind of pirate would hardly be able to establish a runway there; and its singularly peaceful way of life is likely to be undisturbed. It is difficult to convey the discreet atmosphere of amusement with which Mr. Baerlein narrates his adventures on these islands. In each of them he seems to have owed instruction chiefly to a barber, but a very lettered practitioner of that art. We hear a great deal of what he drank—though it was always the same, "acquavit" (in our vulgar tongue whisky) of local distillation; with libations of lager to sunder each glass from the next. But "there is no monotony in Denmark's menus. Those lamentable people who are not impressed by any food would be well advised to keep away from Denmark." Where else do you get "pickled goose with vegetables," beef-marrow on toasted rye bread, as well as lobster, crab and salmon done in various ways? Those are only a few of the items which may be offered you at lunch on the steamer which will take you to the *Baltic Paradise* where Mr. Baerlein saw so many old round churches, and collected so many entertaining stories.

* * * * *

The Batsford Centenary

Only last month a review signed by me expressed delight with the skill of production which Messrs. Batsford had displayed in a couple of volumes. If I had then read *A Batsford Centenary*, which is "the record of a Hundred Years of Publishing and Bookselling," edited by Mr. Hector Bolitho (and published as "a Batsford Book" at 10s. 6d.) I should have felt almost bound to say that nothing less could have been expected from a firm with such a history. Yet now that I have read this commemorative volume, one thing confronts me—my lack of acquaintance with the literature of architecture, to which the Batsfords have been specially devoted. Very few of the books they published, very few of the writers who worked for them, have become known to me in these fifty years during which my concern has been greatly with print! All the more wholeheartedly I can praise what breathes from every page in this volume—a devotion not merely to literature but to the art of book-making. The long record is very largely a family one; a special competence transmitted itself, and almost ended by becoming a passion. But the service to literature took more forms than that of publishing; the Batsfords were book-sellers before they were publishers; and the day they were both together, one of them became author as well. And, naturally, with the evolution of the times, it was not possible that they should continue to prosper as book-sellers of works connected with architecture or as publishers, even of work so popular as "The Face of Britain", Series. England went to war, and went to war again; the Batsfords not only found their men drawn into the Services, but acquired a new flair for books that caught the very breath of battle. Also, to make sure that such books could come out, secondary premises were found in a place more secure than anything in London. Yet North Audley Street has escaped so far. May its safety continue!



"But it's only just published!"

QUITE TRUE—BUT UNFORTUNATELY, OWING TO THE SCARCITY OF PAPER (*remember, publishers are only using* 40% *of their pre-war consumption*) it is impossible always to print sufficiently large editions to meet the ever-increasing demand for books of all kinds.

Be patient—your book may be available shortly. Meanwhile, choose another one from your bookseller's shelves. *Please* don't hold up the exchange of your Book Tokens because a particular book is out of stock. A book in the hand is worth two in the press!

An English Library—a 2/- guide to 1,300 Classics—will make Book Token exchanging prompt and easy. "It may well remain the standard reference book on English literature."—HOWARD SPRING in *Country Life*.



Book Tokens Ltd.

"BOOKS THAT MATTER"

Ask your bookseller to shew you the publications of

George Allen & Unwin Ltd

which include, for example, Hogben's "Mathematics for the Million" of which copies will be available in January

"A war of ideas can no more be won without books than a naval war can be won without ships."
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, by Walter Lippmann. *Hamish Hamilton.* 6*s.*

Mr. Walter Lippmann, one of the most influential journalists in America, has produced a masterly little survey of American Foreign Policy, past and present, in a little more than one hundred pages. It used to be a cliché that the foreign policy of America was to have no foreign policy. This attitude, however, of political *laissez faire*—resulting in a bad foreign policy of weak interference—always depended on an illusion of the Isolationist Pharisees encouraged, first by the remoteness and, later on, by the economic strength of the United States. That the sales of Mr. Lippmann's book have, in America, topped the million mark shows that there is interest enough in foreign policy at the present time. The historical material was covered more amply and in the same sense by Mr. Forrest Davis, in his *Atlantic System.* Mr. Lippmann's book is less academic and more of a tract for the times. The thesis of both books is that the United States has always had a foreign policy, far less isolationist than is popularly supposed even in America; and that this policy has been intimately linked with the foreign and naval policy of Great Britain as part of one Atlantic Community.

The War of Independence was part of a global war. What became the Monroe Doctrine very nearly emerged in history as a joint Anglo-American Declaration. Even in its unilateral form, it was announced with full consciousness that its effectiveness depended upon the parallel action of the British Navy of the day, of which the American Navy is the present co-heir. All this, Mr. Lippmann has no difficulty in showing. What is more controversial is when he points out, logically enough, that America has been committed to concern in world affairs and in the foreign policies of other nations, in her own-self-defence, from the day when she embarked on the Spanish-American War. The major premise is that the empire or sphere of influence in the Pacific, then acquired, cannot be abandoned—is a "self-evident American interest". And since political individualism is not political realism, alliances, or at least 'associations', with other Powers follow inevitably.

Such a doyen among American historians as Professor Beard has here made the criticism that precisely the thing about which the American people has never been satisfied is that these Pacific commitments—or 'dollar imperialisms', for that matter—are worth while. English readers will do well to assume that Professor Beard, on the point, represents the basic prejudices of the American nation, and of the necessary one-third of the Senate, more accurately than the wide-ranging mind of Mr. Lippmann. So far as we can judge, Governor Dewey was directly influenced by Mr. Lippmann, when the Governor came out in favour of an Anglo-American military alliance; and he has sunk his ship as a Presidential candidate by doing this. I suspect that the American people like neither the word 'military' nor the word 'alliance'. A proposal of a positive and constructive nature, planned in terms of 'one world' but able to include both defence and police arrangements and also Atlantic regional integration within its ambit, is likely, as a matter of political realism, to be received with more favour by the Beard school of interpreters of American history and to have more prospect of concrete success. Within this framework the Anglo-Russian formal alliance

FABER NEW BOOKS FOR XMAS

Alberoni, or The Spanish Conspiracy — **SIMON HARCOURT-SMITH**
A brilliant biography of the great Spanish dictator of the eighteenth century, set against a background of one of the most extraordinary and interesting epochs in modern history. *Illustrated.* 15/-

The Motherly and Auspicious — **MAURICE COLLIS**
The amazing career of the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi, in play form. *Illustrated.* 12/6

Built Before the Flood — **H. S. BELLAMY**
A solution to the riddle of the Tiahuanaco ruins, one of the world's greatest archaeological problems. *With drawings and plans, some in colour.* 12/6

Armies and the Art of Revolution — **K. CHORLEY**
A study of the part armies have played in revolutions in the past. 12/6

Disraeli and the New Age — **SIR GEORGE STAPLEDON**
The author of *The Land* is convinced that the land is the mainspring of the qualities of the English people and co-opts Disraeli's views to develop his theme 12/6

England Herself — **ROLF GARDINER**
Ventures in rural restoration: farming, afforestation, agricultural education, rural industry, music and community life, Church and countryside. *Illustrated.* 8/6

The Command of the Air — **GIULIO DOUHET**
The most important book ever written on the use of air power. 15/-

Russia Triumphant — **GEORGE SAVA**
A history of Russia which sweeps the reader along. 15/-

The World We Mean to Make — **MAXWELL GARNETT**
A searching and widely ranging study of education in the post-war world. 10/6

Splendours and Miseries — **SACHEVERELL SITWELL**
Mr. Sitwell's new and important book. *Illustrated.* 18/-

Grig in Retirement — **H. B. CRESWELL**
A worthy successor to *Grig.* 7/6

Sting-Fish and Seafarer — **H. MUIR EVANS**
This interesting book is concerned with poisonous fish, both here and in foreign waters. *Illustrated.* 12/6

Sickert — **Edited by LILLIAN BROWSE**
A monograph devoted to Sickert's painting. *Illustrated.* 15/-

Collected Rhymes and Verses — **WALTER DE LA MARE**
A collected volume of Mr. de la Mare's children's verse. 12/6

24 RUSSELL SQUARE, LONDON, W.C.1

might be widened to include the United States.

Mr. Lippmann, however, like that brilliant but pessimistic scholar-journalist, the late Frank Simonds, does not believe that modern sovereign states will be prepared to abrogate any measure of their sovereignty. They remain rolling about, entities as sharply separate as cannon balls. They only understand cannon law. This situation is "given and unalterable". What matters is not 'peace', but 'security'. (The classic theme of political philosophy is that the prime function of the secular state is to maintain peace, international and domestic. Mr. Lippmann's deviation seems to me infinitely dangerous). This security is to be found along with the British Commonwealth and probably Russia. By the suppositions, therefore, of his own logic, Mr. Lippmann is compelled to find no way out except in terms of a 'nuclear', or Triple, Alliance formed "under the compulsion of their common enemies." I would here recall the teaching of Mr. Lippmann's own tutor and advisor, Graham Wallas, on the subject of the Great Society. The better route would seem to be one of casting the net wider than 'foreign policy' in the older sense; embracing the economic and technical; breaching the walls of sovereignty by 'mixing up peoples'; and (despite Mr. Hoover) moving towards reciprocal citizenship, free migration and interlocking fisc with common defence.

Publishers seem to think that Mme. Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Lippmann have to be introduced to the British public as if they were unknown barbarians (or perhaps it is the British who are the barbarians). I begin to wonder who will write introducing Mr. Roosevelt to the British public. However, Dr. Brogan, having been given the Lippmann assignment, with the author's singularly modest little preface, accomplishes the embarrassing task with his customary wit and aplomb.

GEORGE CATLIN.

FRONT PAGE EUROPE, by Denis Weaver. *The Cresset Press.* 9*s.* 6*d.*

THE LAST PEACE AND THE NEXT, by Sir Geoffrey Knox. *Hutchinson.* 1*s.*

NEED GERMANY SURVIVE? by Julius Braunthal. *Gollancz.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Mr. Weaver's *Front Page Europe* has the right title for the book of a journalist whose job is not to wait at his desk for the news to come to him, but to go out after it. The modern special correspondent chases history on the express train and the aeroplane and Mr. Weaver of the London *News Chronicle* has always been on the spot. He relates events in a breathless tempo to match them and with a charm that is his own. He does not dig into the depths of causes and connections. for he has no time. To-day he is in Cologne to see the triumphal entry of Hitler's troops into the Rhinelands. To-morrow he is arrested by republicans in Spain and thrown into prison, not knowing whether he will be shot at dawn or at dusk. Next he is talking to a bemonocled monarchist in Vienna. He stands in the moonlit ruins of the Colosseum in Rome and listens to a young Fascist who assures him that the modern world is too soft and gentle, that it needs the barbaric strength of ancient Rome. Appeasement drives him to Berlin, to Prague, to Helsinki. On September 1, 1939, Mr. Weaver is back in London. Hitler starts his "Blitzkrieg" and Britain its "Sitzkrieg". The battle of Britain is fought and won. Hitler has to replenish the empty tanks of his *Luftwaffe* and pounces upon

THESE IMPORTANT AND OUTSTANDING NEW BOOKS PUBLISHED BY HODDER AND STOUGHTON

THE FRONTIERS ARE GREEN
By RICHARD DIMBLEBY
A story of the men who fought their way to Europe, through the deserts, the mountains and the valleys of fourteen countries.
12/6 net

THE LITTLE SHIPS
By GORDON HOLMAN
Author of "Commando Attack"
The magnificent story of the men and the ships who 'drum the enemy up the Channel.' Illustrated. 7/6 net

IN QUEST OF A KINGDOM
By LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD
An examination of Jesus' teaching on the Kingdom of God with special relation to the projected new world after the war. 7/6 net

UPON THAT MOUNTAIN
By ERIC SHIPTON
The famous mountaineer gives his own account of the ascent of Mount Kenya and the great Everest and Nanda Devi expeditions which followed. Superb illustrations. 12/6 net

ALL BRITISH EAGLE
By CAPTAIN C. W. R. KNIGHT
The war-time adventures of the famous golden eagle. 'There can never be another Mr. Ramshaw, what a personality, what poise, what dignity.' Illustrated. 10/6 net

HODDER & STOUGHTON LTD

Russia. Mr. Weaver is catapulted to Stockholm to "do" the war in Russia from Hitler's doorstep.

Thus this book becomes, as the author says "a rough digest of events during a vital period of world history. It is the reporter's task to report rather than to counsel and to prophesy. Too much explanation obscures data." "It is for the reader to draw his own conclusions." Mr. Weaver gives his reader little rest or respite but manages to show him the right way to arrive at the right conclusions.

The other two books also deal with the events leading from the first to the second world war. *The Last Peace And The Next* is written by a professional diplomat, Sir Geoffrey Knox, and is an accusation. *Need Germany Survive?* has for its author a professional politician, Julius Braunthal, a Viennese Socialist, and is an apology. It is very useful to read them together.

Sir Geoffrey Knox, who distinguished himself in his job as High Commissioner in the Saar Territory, had opportunity to study there the overground and the underground ways in which Naziism worked for the achievement of its aims. Later he was British Minister to Budapest and stood face to face not only with Teutonic Naziism, but also with the special brand of Magyar Naziism, just as brutal and repulsive. Like Lord Vansittart, the British diplomat is an unyielding enemy of the crooked cross and all that it stands for and does not acknowledge that there is "another Germany". But clear-sighted and logical as most of Sir Geoffrey's arguments are, in one point he commits the same error as so many of the Western statesmen who are responsible for the "last peace" and the development of European affairs afterwards—he misunderstands Stresemann. For him Stresemann, foreign minister of Weimar, was nothing but an orthodox Prussian who saw the task of his life in the preparation of German revenge. Later generations will be more just to Stresemann. Certainly, he was a Prussian and a conscious one at that. But he was one of the few among his fellow-countrymen who thought in European ideas. Had he received the necessary help to rebuild a Germany able to take its place in the community of European nations, Hitler would never have come and nobody would have to devise plans for the next—and better peace.

Mr. Braunthal's book presents a very courageous answer to the bitter accusations of Sir Geoffrey Knox. The author of *Need Germany Survive?* is a former Austrian Socialist journalist with a good record as an international Marxist. He addresses himself mainly to the school of thought represented by Lord Vansittart and Mr. Rohan D'O. Butler who are convinced that "National Socialism is . . naturally German." Mr. Braunthal's arguments, supported by impressive material, would however carry much more weight if the author had not concentrated his efforts as counsel for defence on German and Austrian Social Democracy. For him the main culprit responsible for the first world war is the government of his own country. It is true Mr. Braunthal tries to be fair and goes so far as to criticize the attitude of the British as well as of the French Socialists who did nothing or not enough to prevent the war. He does his best to prove that there is "another Germany", but this Germany appears to the unbiased reader more as a political party than a country. Even the excellent preface with which Professor Harold Laski introduces the Austrian author to the British public cannot free us from the impression that Mr. Braunthal pleads for the survival of a party, not of a people.

ERNST KLEIN.

FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT WAVELL

Allenby in Egypt

BEING VOLUME II OF "ALLENBY: A STUDY IN GREATNESS"

Volume I was highly praised on all sides as "a model biography," a "sound and attractive study, "etc. This new volume is the record of Allenby's administration in Egypt, after his Palestine victories. It was a period of unrest and misunderstanding. Egypt acquired her independence and Allenby's efforts secured British interests as well as giving the Egyptians an acceptable Constitution. The narrative tells the inner history of these vital six years and contains many facts never before published.

15 half-tone plates *Ready December* 10/6 *net*

Mr Roosevelt COMPTON MACKENZIE

A life-story of Franklin D. Roosevelt that shows his development against the background of Family and Politics. The author sees in this modern champion of democracy an affinity with the great Pericles of Athens. There are 24 plates in colour and 82 illustrations in monochrome. 17/6 *net*

Three Against Rommel

ALEXANDER CLIFFORD

A first-class narrative of events in North Africa, 1940-43. The Three are Wavell, Auchinleck, and Alexander, representing the young, the growing and the developed victorious Eighth Army. The account of the second Libyan advance has been told in his earlier volume. '*Crusader*' much of which is incorporated in this new work. *Three Against Rommel* is a definite contribution to the history of the war. 12/6 *net*

The Shoemaker's Son

C. BUEL BURNETT

A beautifully told life story of Hans Andersen that follows as a central theme his own story of *The Ugly Duckling*.

"Hans Andersen's own life was the stuff of his fairy tales, and his own life was as wonderful as any of his tales . . . (the Author) tells the story with a moving simplicity."—*Times Lit. Supp.*

Line drawings and end-papers from paper cut-outs by Hans Andersen

Look up Your Atlas

BRIDGES and ALNWICK

A new approach to the study of this earth, written with a light touch for adults who find that the war communiques reveal the nebulous nature of their geographical knowledge. An original and fascinating book that they can share with their growing sons and daughters; a book with amusing illustrations and 11 pages in colour. 6/- *net*

HARRAP BOOKS

E5

GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM, 1918-1939, by W. M. Jordan. *Oxford University Press.* 15*s.*

This study of Anglo-French relations and the German problem in the making of the Versailles settlement, undertaken at the request of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1940, embodies the results of the author's earlier researches into the problem of French security at the Paris Peace Conference. It makes, in the words of Professor C. K. Webster's Foreword, "painful but salutary reading"; for it tells in outline the story of the processes whereby the sacrifices made by the Allies in the war of 1914-1918 came to be frustrated in all but their immediate object, and it relates how the greater object, the maintenance of peace, was consistently subordinated to lesser interests. Its fundamental lesson, for a Europe in which the factors of power are almost certain to be constituted differently than they were in the past, is that a common purpose is of itself of little value without definite and specific agreement on the methods by which it is to be carried out; whilst by implication the book indicts, in devastating fashion, the obstinate parochialism of British public opinion, demonstrated in its complete failure, until too late, to appreciate the most elementary lesson of 1914, namely that there could be no security in Western Europe without stability in Eastern Europe. "The British people," as Lloyd George told Briand in 1921, "were not very much interested in what happened on the eastern frontier of Germany"; and on this unsure foundation was erected the imposing structure of the guarantees of the Locarno Treaty.

The object of the book as stated by the author is "not to narrate the history of Anglo-French relations, but to elucidate the problems encountered in the making and maintenance of the Versailles settlement." Its method is to trace the formulation of war aims and the subsequent emergence of the varied, and frequently conflicting, points of view on the parts of the leading powers and personalities among the Allies, and in later chapters to show how the handling of specific problems, such as treaty enforcement, reparations, disarmament, and security, was affected, and only too often vitiated, by these differences.

"The Treaty was distinguished by lack of balance between the obligations imposed on Germany and the guarantees instituted to ensure their observance." This lack of balance arose, so Mr. Jordan's argument runs, from the difference between the French emphasis on coercion and the British emphasis on consent as the bases of peace. Two attitudes of mind had developed during the war: "the one looking forward towards reconciliation with a Germany purged of autocratic rule within the framework of an all-embracing League, the other seeking the assurance of peace in safeguards against the revival of European power." "The real cleavage between France and Great Britain," it is said elsewhere, "centred on the question whether Europeon peace should continue to rest on the sanction of preponderant force," Great Britain seeking to substitute as the basis "a community of relatively disarmed states, the peace of which should be assured by the mutual confidence of each in the intentions of all." Hence arose the essential difference in the approach to the reparation question that, whereas British policy aimed at the economic restoration of Germany in order to create the European pros-

Now reprinting

H. J. Massingham's

important book

THE TREE OF LIFE

8*s.* 6*d. net*

"Mr. Massingham is one of those who believes that man once enjoyed a golden age. It was an age when the essential philosophy could be summed up in the words God, Man and Earth. Man then co-operated with the earth under the guidance of God. Hobbes and Descartes between them killed that philosophy and put forward that of mechanism and necessity. God took a back seat, co-operation gave way to a harsher word, and from that moment, in Mr. Massingham's view, we have gone steadily, and even more rapidly, down hill.

He has written one of the most valuable and most sincere books of the century."—BRIAN VESEY-FITZGERALD (Editor of *The Field*).

Early December

will see the second edition of

Percy V. Bradshaw's

genial autobiography

DRAWN FROM MEMORY

Illustrated. 15*s. net*

"An ingenuous book, written with boyish gusto, and profusely illustrated."
—*Daily Telegraph.*

"I can recommend as a good deal more than merely readable Bradshaw's guide to the stage, to music, to literature, and to all that is best in Bohemia."
—*Daily Mail.*

The Ideal Christmas Present

THEY MAKE US SMILE

by Percy V. Bradshaw

7*s.* 6*d. net*

"A lively set of brief biographies of the cartoonists as they are known to Mr. Bradshaw. The word pictures are all excellently illustrated by the works of the artists themselves."—*Time and Tide.*

CHAPMAN & HALL LTD.

perity which—educated by Lord Keynes and others—British opinion rightly regarded as a condition of peace, French policy was directed towards filling a dangerously empty Treasury and preventing German industry from reorganizing itself as the basis of a renewed German war effort. Equally in the handling of the twin problems of disarmament and security, the British tended to stress the danger of arms causing mutual fear and distrust, the French to emphasize that the concentration of armed power in the hands of the peace-loving nations was the only way of saving the peace.

This analysis is, of course, not new. The value of the book lies in its thorough elucidation of the causes underlying the respective divergences of view and of the extent to which they affected the treatment of all the main problems confronting the Western Powers. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the fundamental causes of the breakdown of peace were the optimistic and superficial Anglo-Saxon view of what was necessary to create an international community, and our failure to appreciate the Al Capone mentality common alike to the Hindenburgs and the Hugenbergs. The latter mistake we are unlikely to be allowed to repeat; it is important that we still remember that though coercion is a necessary characteristic of all organized human society, consent must remain its foundation.

W. T. WELLS.

THE HOME COUNTIES, by S. P. B. Mais. *Batsford.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

THE BATTLE OF THE LAND, by N. Gangulee. *Lindsay Drummond.* 6*s.*

Two excellently produced and beautifully illustrated books on English farming and topography. Mr. Mais's very detailed work belongs to the "Face of Britain" series, which in this volume, at any rate, appears to have lost its sense of perspective: for it is patent that no chronicler can describe in 130 closely-printed pages, the churches, castles, mansions (exteriors and interiors), towns, villages, hamlets, geology, topography, legends, and literary and historical associations of five counties—Essex, Hertfordshire, Middlesex, Surrey, Kent (with excursions into Beds, Berks, Bucks and Hants)—and not produce a confusing and over-weighty text. Mr. Mais's method has been to make nineteen excursions through various districts of this area, as for instance from Romney Marsh to Canterbury and Dover, or from Berkhamsted to Bishop's Stortford, and note in passing the chief topographical features and antiquities, with references to their literary and historical associations. But a production of this kind, with its numerous splendid photographs, black and white drawings, and colour-plates, should have been associated with a general, and not detailed, impressionist text; but, even so, it is doubtful if the 5,000 square miles of five such historical counties could be adequately dealt with in a single slender volume.

Professor Gangulee, in a little book of less than 50,000 words, has sketched an interesting, though rapid, survey of the entire field of English war-time farming, noting particularly such aspects of it as the ploughing-up campaign, farm-surveys, mechanization, reclamation, chemical manures, wages and housing, extension of crop production, livestock, milk production, and such war-time by-products as voluntary labour and the Land Army, allotments, and the Ministry of Food. Such a survey will perhaps be of more interest to Allied than

Christmas ambassadors of friendship—CAMBRIDGE BOOKS

G. G. Coulton's history of himself

Fourscore Years

The story of a lifelong passion for the hidden truth of common history. It is marked by the usual calm honesty and is balanced by that humour which is any author's best guarantee of impartiality. It is a story that includes bad luck as well as good luck, and it is as much concerned with other men encountered as with the author of it.
11 *plates* 21/- *net*

Thomas Barnes of "The Times"

Derek Hudson

has had all facilities at his disposal at *The Times* Office, and his book traces Barnes's career through Christ's Hospital, Cambridge, the literary circle of Lamb and Leigh Hunt, and his work for *The Times*. The selection from Barnes' own writings, included in the book, is edited by

Harold Child

8 *plates* 10/6 *net*

Landmarks

By G. Rostrevor Hamilton and John Arlott

This anthology presents a picture of England and Wales—in the particular town, village, landscape—seen through the eyes of many writers of English verse. One hundred and eighty poets are quoted, ranging in date from Chaucer to the present day. 8/6 *net*

Spanish Labyrinth

by Gerald Brenan

An account of the social and political background of the Civil War.
"Here is the essence of Spain."
Manchester Guardian. 21/- *net*

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

SIGNATURE TUNE

by SVEN AURÉN

Chief London correspondent of the well-known Swedish paper "Svenska Dagbladet," the author tells of his visits to eight belligerent European countries. Here is a first-hand account of Poland under the Nazis and of visits to Paris under the German occupation. A calm, balanced work which deserves serious attention. 8/6

★

30 SECONDS OVER TOKYO

by CAPT. TED LAWSON

Edited by BOB CONSIDINE

One of the pilots who participated in the Doolittle raid tells the whole story of the bombing of Japan and of his subsequent crash in China. Aided by Chinese guerillas he subsequently returns to the U.S.A. An epic of high adventure. 8/6

★

THIS IS RUSSIA

by HUBERT GRIFFITH

The author of "R.A.F. in Russia" follows up his runaway success with a revealing book about our Russian ally. Here are straightforward answers to the questions everyone is asking about Russia by one well-qualified to deal with them. 5/-

★

THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME

by HUGH MASSINGHAM

This is the story of a young R.A.F. officer and his wife, in their search for living accommodation in the neighbourhood of his unit. Lively and humorous. 5/-

HAMMOND, HAMMOND & COMPANY LTD.

(*Established* 1909

36, Great Russell Street, W.C.1

English readers—the author suggests as much in his preface—and it must be emphasized that the latter is a 'visitor' to English farming, and has not, I imagine, either farmed in this country himself or made any prolonged study of its agriculture and workers at first-hand. Thus, while he is strictly impartial throughout the book, this account of one aspect of the war, as it affects England, is compiled mainly from information acquired by visits to farms and interviews with farmers and workers (I may be wrong, but I think the average 60/- a week farm-worker would be surprised to learn that during haysel and harvest he receives extra pay and a mid-day meal); from the available statistics (illustrated herein by simple diagrams and maps); and from statements of Cabinet Ministers and farming authorities (one is astonished to learn that no less a person than Sir George Stapledon advocates a seven-day week for farm-workers). The final result will perhaps suggest too placid and smooth a picture of our war-time farming developments to the outsider.

If I read him aright, Professor Gangulee has not considered it proper in a survey of this nature to enter upon any profound discussion of some of the important points it raises; but one is glad to find that on one of the few occasions when he does express a personal opinion—and it is difficult to tie him down to many definite statements—he writes:

> But one thing is clear. The principle of buying in the cheapest markets *regardless of other consequences* is one that must be abandoned if British agriculture is to be restored to a stable position in the national economy. And, owing to the restricted field of foreign trade, Britain's industrial production may have to be adjusted to the diminished possibilities of exports.

These words have been said before, but they cannot be said too often again.

The professor also appears to approve of Mr. H. J. Massingham's more profound truth:

> It is the small-farmer, who alone can restore the concept of the family to its prime significance in the life of man and can reserve individual responsibility from its drift to the grave. It counters the evils of mass-production and revives an intimacy with the soil which it sees as a living thing rather than as mere ground to be run like a factory and exploited to its utmost extent of productivity.

He might also have set forth Mr. Massingham's condemnation of the National Loaf, as a counter to the several favourable opinions he quotes—though possibly this was not available at the time of going to press—and I think any honest farm-labourer would have told him that the National Loaf was not, in the proper sense of the word, either palatable, digestible or sustaining, and that whereas, formerly, a man could work in the fields with a full belly all day on a loaf of *wheaten* bread, an hour at a time is as long as the National Loaf satisfies him.

RICHARD PERRY.

VAN LOON'S LIVES, written and illustrated by Hendrik Willem van Loon. *Harrap.* 18*s.*

For many years the name of van Loon has been familiar as that of the author of best selling works with an immense popular appeal. Their titles imply that they have a global significance. *The Home of Mankind, The Story of Mankind, The Arts of Mankind,* and *The Liberation of Mankind* have all achieved a gratifyingly large circulation. Indeed so wide has been the demand for the ordinary editions that they have also been issued in dermatoid and leather bindings. Mr. van Loon is a sage with a following. He is also a spirited if sketchy illustrator of his

HERBERT JENKINS

Officially approved

Bombers Fly East
By Bruce Sanders
This topical account of the European Air-Front, obtained from air-crews' own reports, shows how the men who fly East with loaded bomb racks are day and night winning victory. 8/6 *net*

Corner Doctor
By George Wonson Vandegrift, M.D.
"The portrait is of an original, a man of exuberant temperament . . . Most humanly described."—Howard Spring (*Country Life*). „A stimulating and attractive portrait."—*Yorkshire Evening Post.* "Breezy and amusing."—*Sunday Times.* 15/- *net*

Insides Out
By John Mason Brown
Illustrated by Hirschfield. 7/6 *net*
The most witty and exhilarating history of an eminent dramatic critic's remarkably intimate sojourn amongst the doctors. A tonic for everyone.

Leonora Starr
Colonel's Lady
"Leonora Starr writes well of the daily life of an officer's wife in India. Her pen pictures have a basis in accurate observation, she has a fine sense of humour and tells some excellent stories."—*The Times Literary Supplement.* 7/6 *net*

The Wedding of the Jackal
By Peter Traill
Illustrated by Joyce Dennys
Peter Traill's witty new book is distinguished by brilliant conversations and deft satire. 7/6 *net*

HERBERT JENKINS LTD

Stepping-Stones to Peace
FELIX LANGER
A refugee author, resident in Berlin from 1919—1933, discusses in the frankest detail the German character and the psychological aspect of the peace which must be imposed on Germany.
Just published. 10*s.* 6*d.*

Towards the New Italy
T. L. GARDINI
Preface by H. G. WELLS
A well-known anti-fascist writer gives the first complete account of the conditions in Italy which caused the downfall of Fascism and of the events which followed. The third part of the book discusses the Italy of the future. *Illustrated* 9*s.* 6*d.*

The Redwoods
R. ST. BARBE BAKER
The author of "Trees" and "Africa Drums" gives a complete account, based on personal observation and knowledge of the Californian Redwoods, 'the supreme achievement of tree growth in the world to-day.' 30 *magnificent plates.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

The Way Birds Live
EDWARD A. ARMSTRONG
author of *Birds of the Grey Wind,* etc.
This fascinating book tells the budding ornithologist all he wants to know about bird behaviour. 40 *line drawings in the text and* 16 *pages of half-tones.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Inventors' Cavalcade
EGON LARSEN
The fascinating story, both of the great inventions of the world and of the inventors themselves, told from a new angle, and appealing both to the child and the adult. 24 *pages of illustrations.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

Raiders Overhead
BARBARA NIXON
The unvarnished and courageous story of one of London's women wardens during the Blitz and after. Line drawings by the author. 6*s.*

Complete list sent free on application

LINDSAY DRUMMOND LTD.
6/7, Buckingham Street, W.C.2.

work, and when he employs colour he displays a fine recklessness in the use of his paints. *Van Loon's Lives* is an astonishing performance. Only an American could have written it. It runs to six hundred and forty-six pages, and to quote the blurb it "tells the story of the lives, the backgrounds, the achievements, and the personal philosophies of nearly fifty of the great men and women of the past, from Plato and Confucius to Fridtjof Nansen and Thomas Jefferson." It is the author's "first major work in more than five years," and if one may apply to it the terminology of the stud book it might be described as "By 'Imaginary Conversations' out of 'Encyclopædia Britannica'." Mrs. Beeton seems to have acted as midwife at this illustrious birth.

The author and his wife took a sixteenth century house at Veere, a small town in the province of Zeeland, a few miles from Middelburg. This pleasant Dutch backwater provides the setting for the book. The author, for the purposes of his plan, claims to have discovered a means for evoking the great ones of the past; and in a series of gastronomic sessions to the music of 'period' gramophone records, carefully selected Brains Trusts meet, eat, and talk. Punctually at midnight the intellectual Cinderellas vanish, leaving not even a crystal gleam of wit behind them, but, in order that they may not be forgotten, Mr. van Loon thoughtfully gives us a short and not always well-proportioned biographical sketch of each one.

The permutations and combinations of the great have been chosen with great ingenuity. Erasmus, who remains throughout as a kind of presiding genius, first encounters

The House of Macmillan
by CHARLES MORGAN

"*The House of Macmillan* celebrates the centenary of a very great firm of English publishers. Charles Morgan has made of the story a memorable chapter in the history not only of English publishing, but of English literature.... A proud record."—ROBERT LYND in the *News Chronicle*. "It may well be doubted if in the century that has passed since Daniel Macmillan and Alexander, his brother, issued their first volume, any publishers in any country have brought under their aegis a succession of authors so numerous, so varied and so distinguished."—WILSON HARRIS in the *Spectator*. "A most attractive survey of a hundred years in which the House of Macmillan grew from small beginnings to grandeur. . . . A record that is everywhere illuminating."—FRANK SWINNERTON in the *Manchester Guardian*. "It is not often that the history of a business is written with the distinction given it here, and Mr. Charles Morgan must be congratulated on a really admirable piece of work."—*Sunday Times*.

8/6

Macmillan & Company, Ltd.
St. Martin's Street, London, W.C.2

Darkness over Germany
E. AMY BULLER

Miss Buller, who knew Germany intimately between the two wars, believes there is a deeper reason for the Nazi Revolution. In this book she allows the Germans to speak for themselves. It is packed with essentials & the photographs are unique and revealing. 10/6 net

A Student's View of the University
BRIAN SIMON

"His analysis is a concrete and valuable aid to clear thinking about them. The book is essential reading for the layman who is interested in education."—*New Statesman*. 5/- net

Seven Winters
Memories of a Dublin Childhood
ELIZABETH BOWEN

"A wide circle of readers will be able to enjoy these delicate chapters of early biography."—*Time and Tide*. 3/6 net

Letters of Evelyn Underhill
Introduction by CHARLES WILLIAMS

The letters—vivid, witty and intimate—give a picture of her everyday life in London, her work and friends, and contain many charming, lively descriptions of holidays abroad. 10/6 net

The Greater Victory
R. SELBY WRIGHT

The latest collection of the Radio Padre's Broadcast talks. They are as good to read as they were to hear. 3/6 net

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO. LTD.

Ready Shortly

THE BEAUTIES OF SCENERY
A Geographical Survey by
VAUGHAN CORNISH, D.Sc.

A geographical manual of scenery with the addition of a chapter on Architectural Interiors, apart from which the subject of æsthetic geography cannot be regarded as complete **6s.**

VOICE OF CIVILISATION
An Enquiry into Advertising
DENYS THOMPSON

"An interesting book . . . . well worth reading."—*Punch*
"A cool well-documented enquiry."—*V. S. Pritchett, in a Broadcast*. **7s. 6d.**

A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS IN THE U.S.A.
JÜRGEN KUCRYNSKI

The second in a series of seven volumes dealing with labour conditions throughout the world. **10s. 6d.**

OFF THE RECORD
THE COUNTESS OF OXFORD AND ASQUITH

Lady Oxford now gives us revealing glimpses of the galaxy of eminent politicians and other prominent men with whom she has conversed. **7s. 6d.**

ESSAYS IN RUSSET
HERBERT FURST
with Woodcut Illustrations by
AGNES MILLER PARKER

A delightfully written collection of essays, on various subjects, mostly connected with the countryside. The author has that quiet, easy style that makes it a pleasure to read him, whatever the subject he writes on; each subject has, however, its one intrinsic interest, which is enlarged and developed by the author's art. **10s. 6d.**

FREDERICK MULLER LTD.

William the Silent and George Washington. Next, Sir Thomas More is invited. There is a lively interlude of Bachs and Breughels, followed by the simultaneous appearance of Cervantes, Shakespeare, and Molière. The unseemly intrusion of The Greatest Inventor of All Time very nearly ends the whole ambitious programme, but in spite of a destruction of crockery and utensils worthy of a Marx Brothers film the author and his family show a stiff upper lip and the show goes on with the able help of such stars of the past as Plato, Emily Dickinson, Chopin, Beethoven, Montaigne, Leonardo, Nansen, Surgeon De Veer, and Thomas Jefferson. With him the colossal, all-technicolour cavalcade ends and the dizzy and dazzled reader rises stiffly from his seat.

Mr. van Loon has attempted the impossible with tremendous energy and resolution in this book. That he has failed in this ungrateful task is not his fault, and I shall be surprised if countless editions of his "Lives" are not called for, not only in the ordinary binding, but also, if it be possible in wartime, in dermatoid and leather.

ERIC GILLETT.

Tory Democracy's Better Britain

By W. S. Shepherd

Press and public acclaim this contribution to Post-War Policy. Brilliantly interweaves tradition and sweeping progress. Stimulating provocative, yet practical.

Booksellers or post free 1/-,

PATRIA PRESS Ltd., 168, Regent St, W.1.

LOVE, by Walter de la Mare. *Faber & Faber.* 25*s.*

Speaking for mankind at large Shakespeare asked "What is Love?" Mr. de la Mare has set out to find an answer. Here it is, in as odd, entrancing, and beautiful volume as any reader could demand, even the reader-addicted to Mr. de la Mare's last essay in this manner, his volume enquiring into the nature of Dreams. The two books together make up something unique in English literature, at least in modern literature, for they are not mere anthologies. That word is too academic to define them. Each of these books is a unit, offered rather tentatively by the author, who has left the mark of his thumb upon every page. That is to say, he has already *used* these books before passing them on. Their margins are, spiritually, scribbled over with notes, in the Coleridgean manner. Imagine each page to be a green lawn, rich with worms and songbirds tugging at them. Round the border de la Mare sets his wild venture of flowers, which multiply and cross-breed under the spell of the magic sun of his nature.

If in this description I become too involved, it is because I have caught something of the timeless and experimental habit of Mr. de la Mare. As a speculator, a *wonderer*, he is the most reckless person in English letters. One knows what happens when he looks in a mirror. He passes through the terrifying gate of anonymity and becomes ancestral, turning time backwards and reliving history. Mr. de la Mare is a man who hardly dare go outside his room, because his personality is such that if he venture out, some round pebble, or clot of clay, will come to life before his eyes and begin to question him about the ways of the universe, and put him into such a teleological predicament that the very foundations of time and space will begin to rock, and set him staggering with his hands over his eyes, and make him cry out.

That cry recurs on every page of these two books, not only in the long Introductions (that in *Love* is 144 pages) but also in the anthology: for he has the knack of juxtaposing pieces of verse and prose in such a way that *their* significance becomes *his* significance, and with a difference! The introduction beginning this enquiry into Love, like that which prefaces *Behold this Dreamer*, takes one back to quite unscientific, almost pre-inductional forms of enquiry. But he has a science. It is that of the primeval Laughing Philosophers, in the morning-time of wonder and curiosity, whose five senses were their only laboratory. And for method Mr. de la Mare may perhaps be compared with Burton the Anatomist, and the many seventeenth century pamphleteers such as Nicholas Breton, Dekker and the rest. For he knows the world as they did, and is no vague recluse. He has the swift eye of a journalist. But he can also see in the dark; he is a nocturnalist as well and writes for strange editors in Sluggard Street, where he takes his time, as men dare not in Fleet Street.

And what marvellous things he reports on this assignment, the enquiry into *Love*. One fact starts another, and the whole process begins to gather momentum, until reporter and reported, like Hamelin and the children, go dancing and piping on out of town, out of the usual, into the hills and the wild places, with rocks opening and closing, and superb and terrible things happening, and music in the air and death and horror at their feet, and something, *something* forever beckoning them on. As he says,

> if this love thus really and indeed involves everything that we are and have, and has so deep and enduring an influence upon us, surely, it might be as-

Dent Books

The Farming Front

FRED KITCHEN

The author of *Brother to the Ox* here tells of the tremendous and inspiring struggle of Britain's farm workers. The 37 photographs are of Kitchen's own district specially taken by Harold Burdekin. 12*s.* 6*d. net*

Good Intentions

OGDEN NASH

A collection of the latest verses by Ogden Nash, humorist, storyteller, philosopher, author of *The Face is Familiar.* 7*s.* 6*d. net*

America & Britain

A Mutual Introduction

MAURICE COLBOURNE

'Here is a really constructive attempt to "do something about" the problem of Anglo-American friendship.'—*Western Mail.* 5*s. net*

The Jewish National Home

Editor: PAUL GOODMAN

An account of the origins, growth, problems, and future of the Jewish National Home in Palestine by 20 leading British & American writers on the subject. Foreword by Viscount Cecil. 7*s.* 6*d. net*

For Children

Long Ears

PATRICIA LYNCH

The little grey donkey is here again, and we renew acquaintance with Seamus and Eileen, turf-cutters and tinkers, and Patricia Lynch's own magical Irish fairyland. Illustrations by Joan Kiddell-Monroe. 7*s.* 6*d. net*

J. M. DENT & SONS LTD.

sumed, its progression must be very gradual and its crisis long delayed. It should begin with the little and blossom into the much; from a mere acquaintance and interest, through liking and affection, to its ultimate apex and intimacy. That process would be a rational and reasonable one; safe also and assuring. But no; on the contrary: like most things in life whose source is within ourselves and which profoundly affect us—our enthusiasms and concepts of the imagination—love usually springs into being swiftly and silently as a rainbow, or as a meteor out of the darkness of the night.

Note from that balanced paragraph how subtly he shapes, or perhaps plants, a few odd thoughts, so that they grow at the end of it into a single emotional consciousness, a rhythm, very beauty itself. As the good gardener has the green thumb, so Mr. de la Mare has the Merli thumb. The range of his collectio is enormous; ancient and moderr sankey and moody, are gathere here, the most unlikely and the mos familiar, and they have all become harmony whose chromatic consist of a myriad strains of reverie. It i an autumnal music, as rich as woods changing from the green monochrome of summer to the multitudinous incarnadine of that last analysis which comes before winter closes down on all the agony of questioning. The reader can come again and again to listen, adding his thumbmarks gradually to those of the author.

RICHARD CHURCH.

69453

CASSELL

We have pleasure in announcing the publication of

THE WORLD OF YESTERDAY

The Autobiography of

STEFAN ZWEIG

5 *Illustrations*

Demy 8vo 15*s. net*

Second Edition Printing

NEW BOOKS

Enormous Selection of New and Second-hand Volumes

AT 40% OFF PUBLISHERS PRICES

FICTION
ECONOMICS
HISTORY
LITERATURE
SCIENCE
BIOGRAPHY
POLITICS
TRAVEL

GIFTS

Books are the only tax-free gifts. Give pleasure to your friends by choosing from our large selection of books suitable for gift purposes. A visit of inspection is recommended.

SEND FOR LATEST LISTS

GASTON'S

76 STRAND, LONDON, W.C.2

Tel..... TEM. 304

ADVERTISEMENT AND BUSINESS OFFICES: 13 Buckingham Street, LONDON, W.C.2
PUBLISHED FOR THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, LTD., BY HORACE MARSHALL & SON, LTD., Publishing Department, Temple House, Tallis Street, E.C.4
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GEERINGS OF ASHFORD, LTD., 80, HIGH STREET, ASHFORD, KENT
PUBLISHED IN ENGLAND