

INDIA AND THE WEST

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A STUDY IN CO-OPERATION

BY

F. S. MARVIN

Author of The Living Past, Progress and History, etc.

'This holy mystery I declare unto you:
There is nothing nobler than humanity.'

The Mahabharata.


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To
The only I
of my Journey
and
First Companion in it
KENNETH J. SAUNDERS
of
Berkeley, California.

Made in Great Britain

PREFACE

A LONG winter journey in India, extending from the end of October, 1925, to the beginning of the following May, full as it was both of activities and fresh and unforgettable experience, can yet give no one the right to speak with any confidence on the multitude of problems touched on in this book. Any one of them may well demand, and often has demanded, the study and devotion of a life-time. But though without the right conferred by such deep study, I could not resist the desire to consider what I saw and heard, in connexion with the subjects on which I had before thought and written,—questions arising from the growing unification of the world, the intercourse of culture and the progress of mankind.

Opportunity was given of meeting men of various schools of thought by the lectures I was invited to deliver in most of the universities, and more popular audiences, mostly of the student and young lawyer type, were attracted by the exhibition of a film illustrating the history of the League of Nations with which I had been entrusted by the Union in England. This must have been shown to some fifty or sixty thousand

people, both in Ceylon and all over India. The mental attitude of these audiences, their keen intellectual curiosity, their readiness to speak and question, their personal courtesy and their invariable nationalist fervour, were perhaps the most striking social impressions of my tour.

Everything which I encountered in India itself confirmed the opinions I had formed from the study of the subject in books, that India is the critical testing-ground for the current ideas of the unity of peoples, the place of science in industry and education, the possibility of a general democratic government. These problems have become urgent to us in England because the date for the revision of the Reforms of 1919 is near at hand. From this point of view they appeal not only to every student of history and world-affairs, but specially to the British statesman and the British electorate: it is in this spirit that they are discussed in the following essays.

WELWYN GARDEN CITY,
August, 1927.

F. S. M.

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I

THE PROBLEM

MEN have disputed for generations, and still dispute, as to the meaning of a 'nation,' and whether any given aggregate of men is entitled to the designation. There is also constant ambiguity in speaking of the 'East.' Some writers, after encouraging us to think that they would take a world point of view, do not extend it beyond the Tigris and Euphrates ; and others, with more show of reason, maintain that the whole distinction between 'East' and 'West,' in the human sense, is artificial and temporary and that all mankind is one, common in its origin and similar in its characteristics and evolution, though varying indefinitely in detail and the rate of its changes.

It is not proposed, at least at present, to go further into these general questions, but to start our discussion with a few simple facts of common knowledge and acceptance. There are in the 'East,' i.e. the 'Far East,' as generally understood, three great national aggregates, very differently constituted internally, and standing in a marked difference of relation to Europe and the rest of the world. These are India, China and Japan. However we may define the 'East,' these communities come within it, and few would question that they form collectively both the greatest

and the most important part of the whole. Numerically, indeed, they amount to not much less than a half of the human race. They possess, no doubt, many features in common which we are accustomed to connect with the fact of their being 'Eastern,' but for our present purpose we are rather concerned to consider the difference of their relation to what, by another recent convention of speech, is known as the 'West.'

The 'West' in this sense describes that part of mankind which traces its civilization directly, through the Roman Empire and Greece, back to the men of Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Eastern Mediterranean whose work, some five or six millenia ago, is now becoming fairly well known to us, and to which we can refer our art, our writing and our habits of life and thought. Some of this influence doubtless went also to the East, but, mainly through the Greeks, its main stream turned westwards, and since the Roman Empire it has developed more and more distinctly as the common system of the nations surrounding, and to the North of, the Mediterranean, and of the various offshoots of these nations who have settled in the Americas and elsewhere in the last few centuries. Such is the 'West,' and the 'East' is principally focussed in India, China and Japan. The great mass of Russia, divided between the two, has suffered most grievously from having two directions, two poles in its life.

The present state of the world in which the West has imposed itself, partly by its ideas, partly by its personal presence and energy, on all the rest, began to take shape after the end of

the fifteenth century. We shall consider the phenomenon and its causes more in detail in a later chapter. But the broad fact is clear, written across the page of modern history, that by the nineteenth century the West was the leading and dominant human factor in the world.

The three great Eastern communities which we have mentioned reacted differently to this advance. Japan, the most compact and best organized, having excluded Western influence most successfully, suddenly, at the end of the century, opened her doors and her mind, and became in form and in purpose a Western Power. She now shares the counsels of Europe and takes her place in defending and carrying out the decisions of the civilized world. China, a huge and ill-organized mass, a continent in herself, is in the throes of internal discord, aggravated by the ferment of Western ideas as yet undigested. We see her torn, seething and uneasy, and no man can foresee the issue. India, the nearest to Europe, came, by a series of historical coincidences which we are to trace, under the close control of the strongest of the European Powers, the Power which, possessing naval supremacy, was able to invade the Indian peninsula by sea and exclude all rivals. Having attained that position in face of Europe, England proceeded in the nineteenth century to organize and indoctrinate India with Western methods and ideas; we are standing now at the point of history when the success of this effort will be put to the test. It is a world-problem in the fullest sense, because, while India is the key-position in the relation of East and West, it is

also the scene internally of the greatest experiment ever tried in applying democratic ideas of government and education to a vast and inexperienced population, living for the most part on a scale of comfort and capacity far below that of countries in which such ideas are familiar.

In the midst of this experiment, and just as India was waking up to a consciousness of her potential strength and the depth of her spiritual past, came the Great War, which shook the nerves and the confidence of mankind, precipitated some necessary reforms and put back some good causes from want of men, money or quietness of mind to achieve them. It destroyed more empires and rearranged more states than Napoleon, laid bare the evils and passions of the world, and showed how wide and fundamental is the difficulty of building up the future. But above all it evoked fresh stores of strength and idealism, not only to fight, but to make good the losses and march on to a further height.

The East, and especially India, took its share in the war and felt its general effects. But it is difficult to estimate, and easy to exaggerate, the results. To some observers it would seem that India, with Eastern conservatism, will only look up to 'hear the legions thunder past and plunge in thought again.' To others, new and passionate movements, pervading the whole country, appear to promise speedy transformation and wide upheavals. It is best therefore, and indeed necessary, to confine one's self to large known facts, which are themselves often—at least superficially—contradictory. This impossibility of clear-cut

conclusions is part of the price of dealing as one whole with a vast territory—a 'sub-continent'—containing over three hundred million people, innumerable divided by race, caste, language, religion and social habits. But the Government of India has to do this, responsible in the last resort to the Parliament, i.e. the people, of Great Britain. It is this task between the two countries, its various aspects and reactions, especially its bearing on the welfare of the world, that this book proposes to discuss.

The Great War did not have on India the direct and immediate effect which the enemies of England looked and hoped for. Over a million Indians fought on the Allied side, and there was no sign either of a desire to use the opportunity for an uprising, or of any preference for German rather than British rule.

The effects of the war came later and were indirect. Two only need be specified in a general survey. The first was sectional and is passing rapidly away; the second is general and serious, but can only doubtfully and in part be connected with the war.

We were thrown, not so much by our own will as by the force of circumstance, into opposition to the Turks. The Turks, being the only independent Mohammedan power in the world, and having at that time the Caliph as their Sultan, carried with them the sympathies of a large part of the Mohammedans of India, who are seventy out of the three hundred million inhabitants. When in the first treaty, that of Sèvres in 1920, the most stringent terms were proposed, and it

was seen that in any case the old Turkish Empire would be shorn of all its out-lying parts, Moslem feeling was strongly excited in India, and Moham-medans opposed the Government as they never had before. Later events have largely allayed this feeling. The final Treaty of Lausanne, after the Turkish revival, was almost a triumph for the new and smaller Turkey, and when the new Turks abolished both the Caliph and the fez, the Moslems of India lost their old respect.

The second, and greater, change in India, partly connected with the war, goes much deeper and is fundamental to our theme. The end of the war was seized by the British Government as a fitting moment to carry out the largest step which had ever been attempted, in extending to India the system of representative and responsible government which prevails in England. The offer was made in fulfilment of a promise and as part of a plan. If accepted and worked in this spirit, more was to follow; control and responsibility were to pass more and more fully into Indian hands. The offer was made in Parliament in 1917 and the Bills were passed in 1919.

Unfortunately the time was more marked in India by extreme agitation and a certain amount of seditious crime than by any willingness to accept or apply reforms. The proffered boon which would have been welcomed by the earlier generation of Indian nationalists, was spurned by their successors, and a movement of 'non-co-operation' set in, which has not yet quite spent its force. A lull but not a hearty peace is the present note. The meaning of this and how to

convert it into harmony, is one, perhaps the greatest, of the problems of the age.

Two things are essential to remember about this alienation, the apparent hostility of Indians to the presence and influence of Englishmen in their country. The first is as to the nature of the fact itself, the second, as to its cause and especially as to its connexion with the war.

We ourselves are just as capable as our enemies before the war, of seeing the case much blacker than it is, of imagining all India seething with discontent and eager to throw off a hated yoke. The facts are of course much more varied and complicated. From this point of view one might divide the population of India into three classes. The mass of the people, though they have innumerable troubles, grievances and divisions of their own, have no settled view and very little knowledge about the government of the country as a whole. Then comes a smaller, but still large, class of more or less educated men, who, inspired by ideas like those of the Risorgimento in Italy, desire national emancipation in some form or other, though their practical ideas differ widely; they are firmly united however in the opinion that an armed rising is out of the question. A third, and smallest section, largely, but not wholly, connected with the government, are honestly convinced that the British connexion is for the advantage of the country, though they wish to alter or ameliorate its incidence in a variety of ways.

Such would probably be accepted as a broadly true picture of Indian opinion at the present

time by anyone fairly well acquainted with the facts. It will suggest many reflections to the student of the great problem of East and West. Perhaps the most important is one which no inquiring visitor to India can miss. How varied and changing are the views and combinations of the educated and political minority, how deep and immovable the conservatism of the mass! It is a kaleidoscope playing over the surface of a stagnant pool.

Clearly this state of mind does not date only from the Great War. The war was a searcher of hearts and shaker of opinion. It stimulated in India as elsewhere the desire for self-government which has given the world new states in Europe and budding nationalities in the old Turkish Empire. As we helped all these to birth, and regard them as a principal part of the assets of Versailles, we cannot refuse to count also on the credit side the awakening of India, and her desire, *mutatis mutandis*, to make another nation and manage her own affairs.

But the war was only a contributory influence in the case. Later chapters will attempt an analysis of the reaction of English and Western thought on India. The present phase set in, not after the war, but towards the end of the last century. Up to that time a sincere and eager study of English and European languages and thought had accompanied and supported our rule. The change which led to the present phase came on two independent lines. The first and most obvious result of studying European, and especially English, history, was to stir the young

Indian to similar deeds of self-realization by political action. But another and subtler stream of influence came in as a reaction against the Western bias. A renaissance of the ancient books and thought of India took place and many curious and stimulating things appeared.

It was found that in ancient times some excellent ideas and institutions were in force in India, which modern reformers would be glad to revive in other forms. There was a village organization, vigorous and effective within its area. There were seats of learning comparable to the mediaeval universities of Europe, and widespread, popular education of a simple and probably mainly religious kind. Above all, the books of ancient wisdom contained thoughts and speculations on matters which have been exercising the minds of men ever since, and very often on lines closely similar to those of their successors in the West. All this was fuel to the fire of national revolt, but tended to make the nationalist aspirations vague and out of touch with the times. Was the ideal to be a reversion to a golden age in the past, or a pressing forward to a new age of a modern Western type? And if reversion was to be the note, how could the country be torn away from the courses on which a foreign, industrial and organizing Power had thrust it? What were the conditions of this golden age in the past, and when did it occur? If, on the other hand, the right ideal is pressing forward to a modern state, with the help of science, of organization and representative government, how is this to be secured without a violent breach with the

ruling Power, and is it to be aimed at for India as a whole, or for a collection of independent Indian communities or states? Such are a few of the bewildering cross-currents of the day.

It will be seen at once that the situation thus created is very far from that of a simple and unanimous revolt of three hundred millions against the domination of a few score thousand who could be swept into the sea. That element exists, but there is much more than that; there is a spiritual revolt and upheaval, a searching of hearts. What was India in the past and where is she now? What is the right direction in which to press for a better and stronger India in the future? Such questions fill the minds not only of thoughtful and forward-looking Indian reformers, but many Englishmen also consider them quite disinterestedly, though from a different angle.

England comes in as a leading factor in the problem, but it would falsify the case to lay too much stress on the relation of conqueror and conquered in the past. Her position in India was due historically, in the first place to trade, and then to warfare carried on for the most part against European rivals, especially France, whom the British found facing them on Indian soil. England is there as the survivor and successful representative of an expanding Europe, which from the fifteenth century onwards has been spreading the links of commerce, science and organization round the world. To those in revolt the links are fetters, and those who have forged them have too often given good cause to think them such. But a higher standpoint, if we all—

Indians and British alike—can attain it, gives quite another view. Whatever the misdeeds or wrongful use of force in the past may have been, if, in the present, a state of co-operation is accepted and felt to yield clear benefits to all, then the relation of conqueror and conquered has disappeared. It is absorbed in a new ideal, just as the relation of father and son in private life may give place to a partnership on different terms.

There is, however, a wider aspect of the Indian problem which must take precedence of all sectional interests, whether of Indian or of British. The Indian nation—at whatever stage of her nationhood we may judge she has now arrived—has already been called upon to take her place in the League of Nations. This is a symbol of a change of status and must have a profound and increasing effect on the political and humanitarian education of the country. It is true that her admission to the League has taken place under British guidance and that her deliberations are not yet so free as those of other nations or of other Dominions of the Empire. But this will grow. The League, and India's place in it, are a public recognition of the greater interests to which both Indian Nationalism and the British Empire are ultimately subordinate. And in admitting the supremacy of the world-problem—i.e. the peace and progress of a united mankind—we admit another and final standard for deciding the right relations of India and Great Britain. How far does the internal peace of the peninsula, the unified and orderly administration of the whole country by one authority, subserve the

good relations of East and West and ultimately of the world? This must be the final test, nor is it incompatible with the ideal of 'India for the Indians,' or the growth of a fresh national future out of a great historic past.

It is proposed in the following chapters to trace the convergence of British influence to Indian nationalism in the various aspects of political, social and intellectual life, bearing always in mind the wider ideal of the service owed by every nation to the community of mankind. India will prove the testing-place of such ideals. It is the central portion of all the civilization in the world that is not Western, the typical East, the greatest storehouse of all the thoughts and ways of life that the West has least affected. In this environment the strongest representative of Western change and expansion has been for over two centuries firmly encamped, the nation also most responsible for the spread of political freedom and self-government. In the sub-continent south of the Himalayas these two forces, each the most powerful of its kind, are evolving some common issue and we are witnesses of its most critical stage.

In another generation, perhaps even in another decade, men will be able to judge with some certainty what is to be the harvest of the great experiment.

II

ENGLAND

IT may seem absurd in beginning the discussion of a great problem to assume a large, perhaps the largest, part of the conclusion. Yet in this case it must be so for very clear and sufficient reasons. This discussion assumes that Great Britain will and should remain in a position of power in India for at least a considerable time. The conditions and qualifications will appear as we proceed, but as to the main point there can be no equivocation, because there is no doubt: every serious person, Indian or British, agrees so far, differing only when we come to particulars, the time of the staying, the methods of co-operation, the general outlook, the ultimate ideal.

If then the English are staying in India, it becomes of the highest interest to both parties to understand one another—for Indians to know what England stands for, how she has been able to establish herself in their country and what she has done there. For the English it is at least as necessary, and far more difficult, to understand India, for besides being a much larger country it contains a far greater variety of racial types, social customs and religious beliefs. This book, however, makes no pretence of satisfying this need on either side. It aims at considering the

problem of the co-operation of Indians and English, and will only attempt such a preliminary sketch of the two parties to the compact as may enable the later discussion to be intelligible.

There are books, written both by Indians and English, which treat the conquest of India by Great Britain as a divine dispensation, designed to put in power the one people on earth who were best qualified to rule the other. Another school, less optimistic, have treated the event as mainly an accident, exploited by lucky adventurers for their own selfish and aggressive ends.

History, the only safe guide, will have nothing to say to either solution. The first is a high-flown and in any case unprovable hypothesis, the second is cynical prejudice. But the event itself—a handful of people from a second-sized island entrencing themselves in a vast sub-continent, and finally subduing the second largest human community on the globe—was bound to excite the liveliest interest, if not the admiration, of mankind. History, based on geography, can give some answer.

England as a colonizer is not much more than three hundred years old, but she owes her strength and success in colonizing to a national evolution which we can trace with certainty for at least half a millennium earlier. How far can we discern in the obscure beginnings of the island story the causes of its amazing achievements in later times?

Its geographical position—an island close to, but sufficiently detached from, the mainland of Europe—accounts for much in the independent

character and early nationhood of the English people. No trace of a distinctive life appears until the isle of Britain has water flowing between it and the mainland. Then for many ages a fluctuating process went on which sometimes linked up England with the continental states and sometimes threw it into violent opposition. At last a clearly marked and conscious national being appears in the conflict with France during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Chaucer comes in the middle of the Hundred Years' War—the first poetic voice of the rising English nation—and at the end of the war there was a self-conscious England never again to be merged in the continent. By that time her past contained also the solid foundation of a political structure which gave her strength for the expansion of the future.

England's geographical position, near Europe but not in it, was decisive in the earlier stages of her national evolution. When the final severance from France had taken place, and a united nation began to look round the world in the sixteenth century, it was found that the island had other geographical advantages. It was the centre of the land masses of the globe, and so its seamen, trained and hardy through centuries of navigation, struck out at once East and West, and the same age witnessed the foundation of the British Empire both in India and America. Thus the expansion of Britain began, and it has continued, uninterrupted except by the secession of the United States, until our own time. Geography, race and political solidarity were the chief factors in the process, which pursued its course through

centuries of rivalry with other nations, Spanish, Dutch, French and German, until, as one hopes, a reconciling basis has been found in the League of Nations.

We put race next to geography in the list of causes, but it is much more difficult to speak definitely about it. Two things, however, stand out clearly. One is that the British stock is highly mixed; the other that it is mainly of northern origin, coming from lands not only temperate in climate but full of change and hardship and all near the sea. Jutes, Angles, Saxons, Danes and Northmen, all who have ever taken a decisive part in moulding the British state and character, have had experience of an amphibious life. The human stock we know vaguely, though we are conscious of it in ourselves and others: the historian is on firmer ground in tracing, from the time of Alfred onwards, the growth of a solid and efficient nation, politically united and with expanding political freedom, ready to act and to support and continue its action, proud of its past and intent on making its past engender a still better future.

Such qualities belong in varying degrees to all nations, and are of the essence of nationhood. It was the special fortune of Great Britain to become, not the pioneer, but the ultimate and effective leader of the West in its contacts with other continents and especially with India. She owes this primacy, among the other causes, to the fact that she was the first European country to become a nation. She came of age by the beginning of the fourteenth century, in time to attack France

in the Hundred Years' War. France, the next in time, attained her majority during the struggle and was a nation at the end of it.

It is interesting to note how all the nations, certainly of the West, stand in the same order of world-strength and world-expansion as they do in the order of becoming nations. The United States, which now stand so high and may seem an exception to the rule, owe their position largely to their inheritance of English law and English political ideas and organization.

Who can doubt that the glories of the Elizabethan age were made possible by the social and political welding which had gone on in England with increasing speed for seven hundred years? William the Conqueror and his concentrated form of feudalism were an important step at the end of the eleventh century, but he had come to a country already endowed with a large sense of unity and a respect for law, and he acknowledged in his conquest the consent of the conquered. Two hundred years later these principles had been enlarged, and the future of England made more certain, by the collective action of the great nobles in wresting Magna Charta from King John and by the successive actions of Simon de Montfort and Edward I in calling representative Parliaments. To that great king and to his predecessor, Henry II, was due the other equally important boon of a common system of law administered locally by royal judges directed from one centre. Parliaments, therefore—the means of expressing the national will—and a uniform system of law, were at work in England at a time

when the other nations of the West were still divided and weakened by feudal privilege; and, when in the fifteenth century they all began to try their wings in flights abroad, England, though so much smaller both in territory and population, had within her sources of energy and tenacity which her rivals did not possess.

She was not the first of the rising Powers in the colonial and exploring field, nor had she led in the revival of science which was to form the cement of modern civilization. In each case others sowed the seed, while she improved the methods of cultivation and spread them over a wider area. Italy was the pioneer in science; Spain, Portugal and Holland anticipated us in settlements beyond the seas. The English contribution, in these and many other matters, was rather the practical power of taking in new ideas and fitting them to old conditions. It was this aptitude that enabled her to make and popularize a steam-engine which actually worked, and so, aided by handy supplies of coal and iron, to become the leader in the Industrial Revolution. The same power was shown, and developed, in dealing with the successive inrush of competing settlers in one small island. Union and mutual accommodation were imposed by stern necessity, and William's feudalism, Henry's Judges and Edward I's Parliament were all expedients, drawn from previous experience, and extended to make the new and vigorous nation more united and more efficient.

In the sixteenth century, with Shakespeare, Elizabeth and Drake, England became proudly

conscious of herself and began to play a part in world-affairs. It was one of the most fortunate accidents in English history which placed on the throne at this moment for the first time a truly national dynasty, loving and understanding their people, and able to put a seal upon their national birthright. The Empire is always and rightly dated from the reign of Queen Elizabeth, but the work of the Elizabethans would have been impossible but for the thrift and reconciling activities of Henry VII and the naval improvements and personal assertiveness of Henry VIII.

The time was ripe to challenge the superiority of the richer and more populous monarchies of Europe, and in the first place of Spain and France. There were two parallel lines of advance, one political, laid down by Henry VII and Wolsey, the other naval and commercial, laid down by the seamen and traders who swept the seas. The political line of action, which has been known later as the Balance of Power, was to play off one Great Power against the other and grow strong between them. It was a necessary and not immoral policy in the perils of the times, if we believe that it was right for England to seek to play a part in world affairs. The seamen and traders, however, represented more truly the national bent, and it was they who had in each case to terminate the long and desperate struggle, first with Spain and then with France, before England stood out in the nineteenth century as the undisputed chief of Western colonization.

The fight with Spain was largely complicated by religion, for England fought in the Armada

primarily to save herself and the New World from Catholic domination. The fight with France, beginning with national and colonial rivalry, had its two great episodes of a war for freedom, against Louis XIV and Napoleon. The fights with Holland were for trade alone. And from it all the least revolutionary, the most practical and compromising of the Western Powers emerged in possession of three-quarters of the colonial field.

Three centuries have passed since England set out on her voyage round the world, a short span in the history of mankind, yet long enough in this case to have effected the most complete transformation that history records. The England of Elizabeth, with its eager life, its joy in expansion and adventure, its reckless seamen and its abundant poets, is really more remote from our ordered and highly organized life than it is from the Vikings. They were all discoverers and pioneers; we are carrying out plans, working on a system, arranging compromises, applying principles. The eighteenth century was the turning point. At the end of it the spontaneous and ill-regulated struggle was over, and England had won. The time had come to survey and stabilize our possessions and to examine the principles on which we meant to hold and develop them. The conquest of Bengal and its attendant scandals provided the occasion and the trial of Warren Hastings was the forum of debate.

But the end of the eighteenth century was also an epoch in general history, and it is of the first importance to remember, all through this discussion, that England, although she had been

fighting the other Western Powers, and especially France, for her position in the East, was really there as representing the West as a whole. The question ultimately at issue was not the balance of power between France and England—that was a matter comparatively easy to adjust—but the greatest problem in the world, viz. how to accommodate the Predominant West, armed with science, to the rest of the world unarmed and at its mercy. The end of the eighteenth century made the problem clear, for at that time, side by side, two steps were taken by the most advanced nations of the West which virtually determined the later development of humanity. One was the Industrial Revolution and the other the Abolition of Slavery; and in each case the importance lay in the implications rather than in the mere fact itself.

England, who had through the mouth of Burke, first proclaimed in the trial of Hastings the principle of trusteeship in dealing with dependent peoples, was also a protagonist in the two greater changes. It is essential to understand what these momentous changes implied if we are to approach our proper problem with any hope of light. The Industrial Revolution was signalized to the physical eye by the substitution of the factory for the domestic workshop, by large scale production and cultivation instead of small, by cities instead of villages. Essentially, however, it was the application of science to the work and needs of life, and science is a collective thing both in its origin and in its use. The Industrial Revolution has no necessary connexion with either fac-

tories or slums, but it does involve the use of man's organized knowledge in exploiting the earth and improving his own lot upon it. To follow this process to its logical conclusion would lead to abolishing the slum and beautifying the factory, but not to a revival of isolated and self-sufficient individuals or communities. It has already led to a knitting up of the world, both as a whole and within each nation, by a network of relationships, intellectual, economic, political and social, quite unexampled in history. This unified society is a new thing, made by the power of thought.

England did not do this, but more than any other nation she grasped the opportunities offered and spread the process round the globe. We shall see later its effects in India; in England itself it produced the prosperity, the gulf between riches and poverty, the social reforms, the trend to democracy, of the nineteenth century.

But the other great movement at the end of the eighteenth century has an even closer bearing on democracy and the Eastern problem. The Abolition of Slavery has also its limited and external aspect. It meant in the first place the suppression of a trade, in which, up to within a hundred years before, England had fought for her share with the other nations of the West. It meant in the second place the alteration of the legal status of millions of human beings, held as chattels, not only by men of Western race, but all over the world where stronger peoples had laid their hand on weaker. Abolition in this sense is even now not completed in several places. But, looking again beneath the surface, one easily

perceives that the anti-slavery passion meant much more than either the abolition of the trade or the alteration of legal status. It involved the acceptance, as a first principle, of a valuation of human life, not new in essence, of course, but new as thought out and generalized by the philosophers of the eighteenth century. Those who accept it renounce for ever the idea which the genius and authority of Aristotle had endorsed for Christians as well as Greeks, that any human being could be rightly treated or regarded as an instrument for the ends of others, independently of his own. That every man must be regarded as having ends in himself, ends of self-development as well as of merely physical and domestic satisfaction, was a doctrine destined to carry society much further than the abolition of slavery. It inspired the active spirits of the French Revolution as well as the philosophy of Kant; it is the true element, perverted, in the Communist Revolution of Russia.

Of this principle England can claim even less of a monopoly than of any other, but Englishmen had been working quietly in that direction since the seventeenth century. The Quakers as a body had always sympathized with it, and William Penn in his colonies in North America made the first effort to apply it.

The history of Penn's settlements, first at New Jersey and then in Pennsylvania, is an admirable illustration of the mixed motives in the origin of English colonization and the slow emergence of the higher ideal. First we have the purely business transaction in the acquisition of New Jersey by the five Quaker proprietors. But at

once steps are taken to make the constitution 'as near as may be to the primitive, ancient and fundamental laws of the nation of England,' with improvements in the direction of greater religious freedom and more democracy in the government. Then followed the grant of Pennsylvania in 1681, and the treaty on terms of equality and friendship with the 'Indians.' The German town settlers in Philadelphia are noted as the first to have declared that it was wrong for Christian people to hold slaves. In 1696 the Philadelphian Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends passed a resolution declaring slavery 'contrary to the first principles of the gospel,' but Penn was unable to get his assembly to think of emancipation or even to agree to any general scheme for the education or elevation of the negroes in the social scale. So slow a thing is it for the light to spread even after the breaking of the dawn. But for the understanding of history it is more important to see the light and trace it to its source than to note the fluctuations and periods of gloom. In the next century the torch-bearers were swallowed up in the army of those who demanded freedom and brotherhood as human rights. Then came the nineteenth century, when men, especially in England, began to grant and organize these rights as part of the accepted system of things.

This is ultimately the reason why England became the chief organ of the West in spreading the new ideas and powers of mankind which are transforming the world. She does not as a rule move quickly, nor make the first discoveries of new truths or methods, but she assimilates and

works them into her established practice, and when they are once there, they remain.

Now in dealing with India, Great Britain had to face difficulties far greater, many of them quite other, than those her settlers had met with on the banks of the Delaware. The Eastern continent is much more remote, and settlers never went there in bands united by religious or political fervour. Straggling traders went, who finally had behind them the support and direction of a wealthy corporation making profits and in the end conducting wars and administering governments. The climate was such that they never dreamt of making India their home, but always looked forward to making money, at least enough to retire fairly early and resume their life in England better off, if possible, than those whom they had left behind them when they started. All this produced quite a different atmosphere in Eastern and Western settlements; but still greater was the contrast between the two societies—both, by the accidents of geographical discovery, to be known as 'Indians'—with which the intruders in East and West were to come in contact. The tribes in America, fine men physically, high-spirited and courageous, had not attained a settled state of civilization, and were thinly scattered over the country. In India a vast population had been for ages settled under an ancient system of laws, customs and religion which had allowed wave after wave of invasion to roll over it with little change and was destined to resist the most penetrating of all.

In the early stages of the contact, the traders

went steadily on doing their business and making their money—Portuguese, Dutch, French and English—with an amused and curious glance now and then at the strange habits of the people with whom they had to deal. The Portuguese, who added more religious propaganda to their trading, and the Dutch, who were the most exclusively devoted to making money, were finally distanced by the stronger and more expansive power of England and France. Then in the eighteenth century came the break up of the Mogul Empire, leaving India a prey to the Western invader. Divided among themselves the Indian states were bound to fall: they often invited the French or the English to come in and help them against their native rivals. Fighting France at the same time in Europe, we naturally extended the field of conflict to the country where the French were doing their best to seize our trade and drive our countrymen into the sea. War, like trade, was already becoming world-wide, and self-preservation as well as private profit drove us on, quite apart from any ambition to govern the East. The desire of ruling other people never seems to have been a primary motive in British expansion, as it certainly was with would be world-conquerors, such as Alexander or Napoleon or William II. In the course of trading and adventure power fell into the hands of the earlier pioneers, and having gained it they were compelled to study the ways and the thoughts of the conquered.

The turning-point came in the career of Warren Hastings which occupied the second half of the eighteenth century. In 1750 he first landed at

Calcutta as a writer in the East India Company's service: in 1795 he was acquitted by the House of Lords of all the charges laid against him during his administration as Governor-General. These are the critical years in the establishment of the British raj. They cover the victories of Clive, which brought Bengal and ultimately all the dominions of the Moguls under the British crown. They cover too the change from the corrupt and self-seeking spirit which Warren Hastings found prevalent in the Bengal Council in the '60's, and which he combated steadily throughout. In 1772, as President of the Council, and in 1774, as Governor-General, he began to build up a reformed system of administration with its centre in Calcutta which he said was to become the first city in Asia. In 1785 he left India for a long, and finally triumphant, wrestle with his enemies at home: but before he left he had installed as President of the Bengal Asiatic Society which he founded, Sir William Jones, the pioneer in the other and equally needed side of English activity in the East, the study of ancient Hindu literature and thought.

It is one of the tragedies of history that Hastings, who more than any man is responsible for the system on which our administration ever since has been based, became himself the chief object of an attack inspired by kindred high ideals, but carried out with great personal injustice and with no recognition of the difficulties with which he had to cope and which occasioned most of the high-handed acts for which he was indicted. For he was noted, among all our Governors, for his

study and understanding of the Indian character, and he was devoted to Indian interests : and this is the root of that principle of 'trusteeship' for which Burke became the first public spokesman. Personal jealousy and spite were infused into the case mainly by Philip Francis, who as member of the Governor's Council had made the early years of Hastings' administration largely unfruitful and almost unbearable to his enemy. As an intimate of Burke's, he was able, on Hastings' retirement, to influence the trial, and cloud for a time the career and reputation of the greatest of Governor-Generals. But now that the true figure of Hastings has emerged at last, it is pleasant to think of him as he must have appeared in that last year of his service for India, handing over the presidency of the new Bengal Asiatic Society to the greatest Orientalist of the time. Hastings himself left India surrounded by the love and gratitude of all who knew him or his work, Indians and British alike. Sir William Jones, then judge in the High Court at Calcutta, stayed on to die in India in 1794. He was not only the first to open up to European scholars the whole field of Sanskrit learning, but he was a conspicuous figure in the forward movements of his day, having opposed the slave-trade and taken the right line on the American War during the parliamentary election for Oxford in 1780.

Of such varied material was the early British colony in India composed, with veins of pure gold running always through the seam. In the end the good prevailed, perhaps without the brilliancy of the first great examples. The nine-

teenth century saw the work developed which these men had founded, though with fluctuations on many of the principles which were at issue in the stupendous problem which faced the British as they became more and more dominant throughout the peninsula. Our forefathers, like ourselves, were always wavering between the policy of pressing on and imposing our own or Western rule and methods on the Indians, and standing aside and leaving them, while keeping the peace, to work out their own evolution. Thus Bentinck was all for leaving Native States alone ; Ellenborough and Dalhousie for annexation. Sometimes we seized the opportunities of annexation on the failure of legitimate heirs ; at others we were anxious to leave the succession to any native successor who would be accepted. And on the most fundamental question the divergence has always been most acute. Were we to educate the Indian as far as possible on English and Western lines or to encourage him to evolve a new culture from the remains and memories of an Indian past ? Hastings and the early administrators would have followed the second course ; but two causes, one general and the other personal, operated strongly in the direction of the first. As the area of British rule extended rapidly in the first part of the nineteenth century, it was imperative to train an increasing staff of young Indians capable of carrying out the orders of their superiors. Hence from the first the bent of higher education in India was literary and clerical, and higher education of this type took precedence of the general primary education needed by the masses.

In the 'thirties of the last century, with Macaulay in India, the decision was taken to make English the medium of all higher instruction, and his brilliant pen put the case for Western studies about which so much controversy has raged ever since. We shall consider the limitations and see the other side of the question in a later chapter. A movement in Macaulay's direction was inevitable at first. Western studies, whether traced from the Greeks downwards on general European lines, or on English lines of literature and constitutional history, contained so much that was effective and dazzling, such continuity of development, such richness of imagination and perfection of form. It was the intellectual fruit of the power whose energy and organizing skill had achieved command.

A reaction set in towards the end of the nineteenth century. Young men, educated in Western ideas, had imbibed the spirit of political freedom at its great source in England, and sought to apply it in the strange atmosphere of India. The triumphant Westernization of Japan was an added stimulus, though the revival of India's spirit took a very different form. Just at the time that Japan was stretching forward in keen rivalry with the West, India began to turn back wistfully to the glories and learning of her past. Western scholars had themselves contributed largely to the study of the ancient literature: soon an idea gained currency that in her own resources of philosophy as well as of social and religious institutions—India could find all that she needed for her regeneration. In the 'seventies

of the last century the leading group of thinkers in Calcutta was scientific and Western. Forty years later the corresponding class, often including the sons of men who had been studying Comte and Spencer, were finding the root of all wisdom in the Vedas.

Meanwhile the British system was becoming more efficient, more specialized, more closed to general ideas, and the present chasm was formed, so difficult to bridge, so dangerous to leave open.

An Englishman is tempted to think that a nation which surmounted the loss of the United States and built up another empire, may face any problem of government. But while self-confidence is good in any case, it is essential also to realize that there are in India factors of a profound and complex kind not to be met with elsewhere in the Commonwealth. In India it is not a national, but a world-wide, issue which is at stake, and, if we succeed, it will be not in working out on a larger scale a task similar to that accomplished at home or in colonies of British blood, but by developing other faculties and taking a fresh point of view. Co-operation must be the keynote and not domination, co-operation based on sympathy and insight, and guided by a purpose subordinated to a world-ideal. If we remain in India, we must remain because we are honestly convinced that it is good for India and, even above that, good for the peace and progress of the world.

An Englishman has one great qualification for this work, accompanied by its natural drawback. He has, much above the average, the habit of

mixing easily with others without regard to their religious or political opinions. The spirit which leads to Hindu and Moslem riots in Calcutta or Catholic and Orange in Belfast is happily extinct in Britain. Everywhere locally, and even in Parliament below the surface, there is a ready recognition of mutual rights and common needs. We fight for what we want, and to gain it make common cause with any man, whatever his views about other matters. If we lose, we make the best of it, and shake down with our late opponents as comfortably as may be. No vendettas, no senseless opposition, no fighting for the sake of fighting. A short memory, perhaps, but also a short animosity and a dominant conviction, always recurrent, that we have to live somehow together, whether in a family or an industry or a town-council or on the country-side.

The other side of the medal is a prevalent lack of interest in abstract questions and a tendency to brush aside those who dwell too much upon them. The difference strikes every one who comes to England, not only from educated circles in India, but from the factories of Germany or the colleges of Italy. 'We all want to argue things out,' they say, 'you only seem to care about getting on with the business or winning the game.'

For perfect co-operation with the Indians we need to add to our hard-headedness a larger measure of the open mind, to be ready to discuss anything, and admit the tenability of views which may seem at first sight to be based on nothing and to lead nowhere. Other Europeans, inferior to ourselves in the capital qualities of

administration, find a readier access to the heart of thinking Indians by approaching them with sympathy and understanding on the intellectual side. The late Dr. Duessen was a conspicuous example among Germans, and Professor Formici, who has lately been touring India with credentials from Signor Mussolini, did similar work for the Italians.

It is good for the world that other cultivated nations should take this interest in our partner in the East, for the problem is not essentially, nor in the long run, one between Great Britain and India, but between great types of civilization, which, whatever their common elements in the past, have developed in historic times profound and tenacious difference. To attain unity, without oppression or obliteration of difference, is the supreme political and educational task of the twentieth century. England has shown her bent by building up the greatest union of free nations that the world has seen, and by throwing her force into the support of the League of Nations. Between these two guiding stars lies the direction in which British India and its Native States may come safely into port.

III

INDIA

INDIA, like England, has won her way through centuries to a growing sense of unity based on substantial facts, of geography, history and the actual conditions of life and thought. She too has been the scene of successive waves of invasion and the mingling of language and of race. There is the primitive stock in India as in Britain, overrun by a later Aryan race. There are the extremities of both countries less touched by the invaders than the parts nearer the Continent. There is the strong hand of the Normans descending upon England just at the time that the Moslems were building up an empire in Hindustan.

But how vastly greater are the points of difference!

Britain is less than a twelfth of the size of India, and is an island. She is near enough to Europe to receive decisive cultural influences, through Rome, through feudalism and through the Catholic Church, and yet, being an island, she has been able to defend and seclude herself for the best part of a thousand years and graft these cultural influences on a strong national stock.

India is a sub-continent once divided up far

more than at present by mountain ranges and tracts of forest. It has at the moment over two hundred distinct languages, some of them spoken by tens of millions of people and quite unintelligible to the rest. Its unity, therefore, will be a thing of much slower growth, and its nationhood, about which men commonly dispute, will be in any case of a different type. But differences do not exclude unity and no two nations are of the same class.

Before her contact with Great Britain the main features of her national psychology—if we may speak in this qualified sense of a ‘nation’—had been already set. Vast and diverse as the peninsula is, it yet has geographical features which mark it out as one. These alone have made possible the partial political unity achieved by the Moguls, and the much more complete organization of recent times. It is enclosed by a high mountain range flanked by the lower waters of two great rivers. The original and proper India was the ancient plateau south of the Gangetic basin. But in late geologic times the intervening space between the plateau and the mountains was filled up with alluvial soil and the teeming population attracted to the plains became quite early in history, not only an integral part, but politically the dominant factor in the peninsula.

Until the British and other Europeans arrived by sea in modern times, the invasion of this alluvial plain through the mountains of the north-west was the chief source of external influence on the peninsula. The first and most notable was the inroad of men of a fairer skin and

Aryan speech to whose intermingling with the original Dravidian population the social and religious system of Hinduism is mainly due. Through the same passage various Greek and Hellenistic conquerors and travellers arrived, and the far more numerous and dominating followers of Mohammed. The Greeks who first came with Alexander, seem to have left little or no trace behind, but later settlers, especially from the Hellenistic kingdom of Bactria, made a sensible impression on Indian art in the earlier period of Buddhism.

The Moslem invasions from the ninth century onward culminated in the Mogul Empire which was at its height in the time of Elizabeth and the early Stuarts. Then came the British, displacing rival European traders and gaining the most permanent power, because they rested on the sea, which brought them supplies and linked up the strong places on the coast.

The Aryan invasion was pre-historic. It had taken place some time before the last millennium B.C. when their earliest literature was being composed. The student of world-history will note with interest the coincidence in date between the efflorescence of this, the Eastern, branch of Aryan literature and that of the Western in the Greeks of Homer. The coincidence becomes still more striking when we add to it that of the Hebrews who had at the same time established themselves and their first records at Jerusalem. But Greeks and Hebrews have fared better at the hands of posterity, for they preserved their records and founded between them the articulated historic

consciousness of mankind. The Indian has lived in a vague though pious memory of his past, which cannot be dated with any confidence or accuracy until the contact with the Greeks in the fourth century B.C.

Yet the Aryan invasion is the fundamental fact in Indian history. These fairer-skinned men, of a race nearer to our own, who poured in from the north-west in the second millennium B.C., gave India, by their fusion with the aboriginal inhabitants, the broad foundations of the civilization which still persists. Its two most striking features—religion and caste—are both clearly of long and composite growth. The amalgam is Hinduism, and the two later invasions—the Moslem and the British—have never yet been able to enter fully into the texture of the nation. In the case of the latter the aloofness and the opposition are the most marked. Speaking broadly, one may say that there is a Brahmin system and a British system face to face, and the supreme task of the future is to weld them into one.

The traditional religious system of India is a polytheism, similar in its higher ranges to that of the Aryans, many of whose deities can be identified with those of the Persians, Greeks and Romans. But going into India it took to itself a multitude of the fetiches and nature-gods it found on the soil. Nor did it ever issue in one clearly articulated system such as the Stoicism or Christianity of the West. Buddha's attempt in the fifth century B.C. failed, so far as India is concerned, because it did not offer a new doctrine to supersede the old polytheism, and while on the

side of doctrine it was too vague, on the side of morality it was too passive.

Vishnu and Shiva allied themselves with the primitive deities and superstitions which still fill the mind of popular India as they did centuries ago. The religious man of philosophic bent makes a system for himself from his own thought, working on the ancient thinkers, and treasures the secret for himself and the few, while paying outward respect to the practices of his fellows. The religion of the recent rulers of the country has made but little way, partly because they have on the whole deliberately stood aside from spiritual interference, partly because of the unexampled strength of the caste system.

The system of caste is the other main issue of the contact between Aryan invaders and the aboriginal peoples. The chief element doubtless was the difference and the preservation of race. In conquerors and conquered one has the first elements of a distinction of blood and customs, and to this must be added that hereditary transmission of functions which is a common feature in early societies. Such a system of strict succession by birth and the observance of exclusive rites is calculated to give the highest degree of stability and conservatism to any society where it holds sway, and it has been for ages the dominant factor in Indian society. The Brahmans, as the recognized expounders of religion, have done most to maintain it and gained most by the process. They are the highest caste and one can gain some idea of their position if one were to suppose that the mediaeval priesthood, instead

of being celibate and recruited from all classes, had been married and exclusive, and if the temporal power, instead of becoming supreme, as it did in Europe in the sixteenth century, had remained dispersed and anarchic, as political power usually was in India, except for a brief space under the Moguls and now under the British.

But Brahmans, though retaining their place as priests and religious guides, are now also engaged in all sorts of occupations, while a host of other castes have sprung up, numbered at over two thousand in the last census. The complexity of the system forbids any attempt at description, but it must be noted as the main social fact in Hinduism, derived from that first invasion and bound up intimately with the predominance of the Brahmans as the highest caste. To break down the excessive power and exclusiveness of the Brahmans, and to elevate and incorporate the mass of the 'Untouchables,' or outcasts, at the other end of the social scale, seem to many people, especially among the Indians themselves, perhaps the most important objects of reforming zeal.

Alexander's invasion, again from the northwest, had but a limited influence in India itself, but it gave the first contact with the West, and is the beginning of the definite history of the peninsula.

Hindu civilization, with Brahmanical rites and teaching, was firmly established when he crossed the Indus in 326 B.C. Buddha had been dead for over two hundred years. The first place

beyond the Indus at which the Greek army tarried, was Taxila, where they found a friendly king who supplied a contingent of five thousand men for the further advance. Taxila was then the leading seat of Hindu learning, and princes and Brahmins sent their sons there at the age of sixteen to complete their education. Medicine and other sciences were taught as well as religion. One can stand there now amid the excavations of recent years and try to reconstruct the scene. It is a wide rolling country with mountains in the distance, and scattered about, at intervals of a few miles, low hills with Buddhist enclosures containing many Buddhist sculptures. All these, with the Greek city of rather rough workmanship, date from post-Alexandrian times, but earlier remains will doubtless be uncovered when Sir John Marshall returns to the site. It has yielded already evidence of that union between the Indian meditative spirit and Greek pictorial art which produced the first images of Buddha. How far this influence went, and whether the works we see at Taxila and in the museum at Lahore are due to Greek hands or Indian, is still a matter of dispute; but there can be no doubt at all of the fact of union. The Greek and the Indian mind, at a time just before and just after the Christian era, came together in that north-west corner of the country, and the union led to artistic work due neither to Greek or Indian inspiration alone, but leaning on the artistic side much more to Greek. In the fields of knowledge and of commerce the invasion had other effects of further reach. The West began

to know of the strange life and deep thought of the Indians, and the mutual interaction has never entirely ceased since then. For lines of commerce were set up, in the north by way of the Persian Gulf and further south direct from the east coast of Africa. And in the heyday of the Roman Empire ships would go, using the Nile-Red-Sea Canal which Trajan improved, across the Indian Ocean even to China. With the fall of the Western Empire this trade fell also, and then for a thousand years the intercourse of West and East returned to the old land routes which Alexander had followed.

Between Alexander and the Mohammedan invasion comes the period of Asoka and the Gupta kings, which is justly regarded as the golden age of Hinduism. It would be foreign to our purpose here to attempt a picture of the wars and dynasties or the administration of this millennium. But two or three general points stand out significant of all Indian history and character. Chandragupta, the founder of the Mauryan dynasty to which Asoka belonged, defeated Seleucus, the Syrian successor of Alexander, and took back the provinces neighbouring India. He ruled with severity over a wide area from his capital of Pataliputra near the modern Patna. Asoka was his grandson, and in his reign of thirty years we have a shining example of the power of sentiment and human brotherhood, linked with the instability of all native Indian politics. His system hardly outlasted his life, but it was glorious in its art, noble in its kingly devotion, lofty in its spiritual and moral fervour.

It covered a larger area than any other Indian monarchy, except, for short intervals, that of the Moguls. The king's impulse was Buddhism, to which he had become an ardent convert, and at his instance missions went out to Ceylon and Burma, as well as to the further north and east. The civilization of Ceylon and Burma is largely built on Buddhism, and it was Mahinda, the son of Asoka, who took it to Ceylon and with it many other of the arts of peace. But it passed away in India, and with its passing the Brahmanical system reasserted itself, and the social and spiritual conservatism and the political incapacity of India were made plain again.

The third incursion, or series of incursions, from the north-west made more impression on the life of India than either the Greeks or Buddha. These were the Moslems who included many races—Arabs, Afghans, Turks and Tartars—and began their inroads in the century after the Prophet's death. The Arabs, who were the earliest invaders under this flag, did not advance beyond the lower valley of the Indus, but in the eleventh and twelfth centuries Afghans and Turks began to found a Mohammedan power in the north-west, which under Baber and Akbar blossomed into the Empire of the Great Mogul. They were pouring down from the mountains just as the Normans were conquering England, and their zenith came in the Tudor age.

The Moslems now number seventy millions in India, nearly a quarter of the population, and British rule arose on the ruins of theirs, incorporating many of their institutions. Socially

democratic, monotheistic in religion, free from caste and with much less superstition, the Moslem would seem the natural link between polytheistic and caste-bound India and the West. But at the moment the hostility between Hindu and Mohammedan is perhaps the greatest obstacle to her peaceful progress to nationhood. The causes are historic. The invasion of the Mohammedans was from the first for conquest and not like the British for trade. Empire was forced on us and sought by them; and though there are blots of greed and cruelty on the British record, our penetration has been peaceful and our advent welcomed, compared with the fire and slaughter which gave the Moslems their place. And at the height of their splendour, beneath the stately palaces and lovely mosques of the Moguls, there was a hideous foundation of neglected misery and ruthless exaction. Inhuman torture was an accepted exercise of authority, and widespread and indescribable famines, frequent incident of their administration.

These things breed long memories. The Mohammedans, once dominant and ruthless, always appear as potential dominators in the future, nor has the recent superior education of the Hindu lessened the friction. The Hindu, always more given to a literary and clerical life than the Moslem, has up to the present made far more use of the opportunities offered by the Government for his intellectual advance. The Mohammedan Colleges, including the splendid foundation at Aligarh, are of recent origin, and this separation, in education as well as religion, tends to per-

petuate the division. One must hope patiently for the spread of a wider sense of civic duty based on a more comprehensive conception of philosophy and religion.

The Mogul power began to break after the death of Aurungzeb in 1707, and it was in full decay before the struggle at the end of the century between England and France which decided the political fate of India. India politically weak and her central co-ordinating power in abeyance; England and France, the leaders of the West, at issue in Europe on general grounds: these were the two conditions which coming together gave England her place in India at least for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The Portuguese, following up Vasco da Gama's voyage of 1498, were the first Europeans to establish themselves on the coast. They came frankly to conquer and make converts to Christianity, as well as to trade, and it was not till about a hundred years later that, first the Dutch, and then the English, set to work to break down their monopoly. But they too inclined to monopoly in the trading sense, and in the last year of the sixteenth century raised the price of their pepper which they obtained from the Spice Islands, from three shillings to eight shillings a pound. This was the goad which the merchants of London needed, and in the last day of the century the East India Company was incorporated by Queen Elizabeth. In August, 1858, it handed over the government of an Empire to Queen Victoria.

The Company was founded in the heyday of

the Mogul dynasty with Akbar on the throne. Before its decay Great Britain had already, in the hands of the Company, obtained her three strongest footholds in the peninsula. But they had been acquired for trading purposes only and not for empire. Madras was the first of them, being founded in 1640, following on Masulipatam in 1611. A rent was paid for Madras, first to the local rulers and later to the representatives of the Mogul Empire when it had overthrown the southern kingdoms. There were trading stations on the Hugli dating from the same time, and these were transferred to Calcutta as the best centre for defence by Job Charnock in 1690. Here too a rent was paid to the Great Mogul or his viceroy. Bombay was the first place of India to be acquired by the Company in full rights. There had been an early trading settlement at Surat near by, of about the same date as Masulipatam, and for this the usual rent was paid to the Emperor. Then in 1668 Charles II, who had received Bombay as part of the dowry of his Portuguese wife, handed it over to the East India Company. It was the beginning of their ruling powers, and it still remains the gateway to India by which every English viceroy approaches his task.

Such was the disposition of the British settlements in India when the Great Anarchy of the eighteenth century began. Its crisis came between Plassey and Buxar, the two battles which founded the English political power in the North and thus ultimately over the whole of India. At the crisis the two conditions which we mentioned above,

exactly coincided and a man of exceptional military and practical genius arose from the ranks of the servants of the Company. Clive became the Julius Cæsar of the British Empire in India as Warren Hastings was to be its Augustus.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century the Emperors at Delhi were impotent figureheads and, when not actually obstructive, simply dependent on their nominal subordinates. It was with the Nawab of Bengal that Clive had to deal, and just as the whole Mogul Empire was in dissolution, so in its separate parts anarchy and corruption reigned supreme. Clive came into action in rescuing Calcutta from the assaults of the then Nawab, Suraja Dowlah. In doing this he overthrew the French who were disposed to make common cause with the Nawab, while he supported Mir Jaafar, the paymaster of the forces. Military genius, aided by treachery, won the day, and with the downfall of Suraja Dowlah the last chance of French supremacy in Bengal disappeared. The battle of Buxar seven years later, in 1764, completed the work. In this case the emperor himself was involved, with his Wazir, the Nawab of Oudh. The English victory was followed by the solemn transference of the Diwani or collection and administration of the revenues, to the Company. This gave them the practical sovereignty of Bengal and the neighbouring provinces, though they continued for some years to pay formal respect to the emperor and guarded his person.

The subsequent stages in the enlargement of the British raj followed much the same course, and it is unnecessary to go through them in detail.

Clive was the great and typical example. Wellesley, in dealing with the Marathas at the beginning of the nineteenth century, had a more serious military task, for they were the one actively aggressive force built up on the ruins of the Delhi empire, and made peaceful acceptance of British supremacy by the other states impossible. The task was carried out with difficulty and reluctance by the end of the nineteenth century; but long before this British rule was an accomplished fact, and Parliament had asserted its political control of the East India Company. The Regulating Act, which is the basis of this control, and which appointed Warren Hastings as the first Governor-General, was passed in 1773. It ended the Great Anarchy in the only way then possible. Pitt's Act, of eleven years later, developed the same principle by constituting a permanent Board of Control, from which the present India Office and the Secretary of State for India are descended.

The link between India and Great Britain was thus securely forged before the end of the eighteenth century, and later years have been spent in making the relations more extensive and more orderly. In our own age a fresh aspect has come over the problem by the desire to assimilate the position of Indians in their own country to that which the British democracy has won for itself in the nineteenth century.

There are thus two parallel and connected movements going on in East and West, first in the eighteenth and then in the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth, being at war with France in Europe and elsewhere, England, by beating France,

was able to acquire an Indian Empire. In the nineteenth and twentieth, while elaborating a democratic constitution at home, she attempts more slowly and with greater difficulty to extend the same principles in the East. Both cases are striking examples of the unity of history.

But what was the state of India when this later and organizing process set in? The answer to this question discloses the most serious difficulties we have had to face. When the Mogul power crumbled, it left behind it no solid structure of nationality, art, religion or education. It was an imposing façade with no secure and comfortable habitations within which the spirits of its subjects could rest and grow. The old Indian polity and philosophy were stagnant or in decay and the Mohammedan invaders, though their administration, based on land revenue, largely survived, left no active political or cultured spirit to build up a nation. It was as if the Tudor or Bourbon monarchies in England and France had not carried out their work, and had disappeared, leaving some magnificent architecture and a memory of imperial splendour on the throne, but no national organization, no educational institutions, no outburst of literature, science, or art. We should then have had in Western Europe, what so often strikes the student in India, a mass of mediaeval practices and belief untouched by the modern spirit and without the vitality to grow and adapt themselves to the future.

The people were impoverished; there were no places of higher education to spread the new knowledge which was beginning to flood the

West; Mogul art was decadent, and of political incapacity the historical record is evidence enough. The great task had still to be accomplished and the want of a Renaissance, added to the vastness and complexity of the country, made it infinitely greater. India lay open and undefended against foreign influence, but there was far in the background the memory and relics of a greater and more spiritual past, while, in the life of every day, Brahmans, caste and old religious observances continued to flourish as before.

IV

THE WEST AT THE JUNCTION

WE saw in the last two chapters how England came to establish herself in India at the end of the eighteenth century and noted that she was there as representing the expanding and victorious West. Full acknowledgment was made of her special qualities, as well as her exceptional advantages and good fortune. But, with all allowance for these, the honest student of world affairs must perceive that it is the common gifts and characteristics of Western civilization that enabled England, in the first place, to plant herself in the peninsula and, still more, have formed the substance of her power ever since. Other Western nations have done the same thing, on a smaller scale and with many differences of detail, elsewhere. And the junction came at the end of the eighteenth century, when Western civilization in its typical modern form of scientific industry was beginning to overspread and transform the world. The question, therefore, is fundamental; in what does this Western civilization consist which has enabled it to do these things? It is a question not of panegyric nor of denunciation, but of fact, the facts of history.

If we go back far enough in history, the distinction between East and West disappears. No one

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dreams of it in prehistoric times, or in the age of the Pyramids or the star-temples of Babylonia. When does it begin? Undoubtedly with the Greeks, the beginners of all modern things. Western civilization began when the Greek cities on the Mediterranean coast of Asia Minor withstood the Persians, and in that resistance lay the germs of the subsequent development. The scene was to be the Mediterranean, with all the geographical advantages that easy communication, seclusion and a warm, temperate climate could afford. Here Greece and Rome were to join hands and create the nursery of the West.

Intellectually, the Greeks stood for the independence of self-governing communities, the city-states of which Rome herself was one, the mother of modern nations. Their revolt against Persia implied the repudiation of despotic, irresponsible rule, which was never accepted by Roman theory until the East gained the upper hand in the decline of the Empire. At the back of the whole movement as the Greeks first launched it, was the free use of man's speculative powers. Inquiring into the causes of things around him, in nature as well as in society, he came to draw general conclusions from the particulars of his experience and to indulge in predictions as to the future. Sometimes he was wrong, more often he was right, and this was the beginning and the essence of science.

A leap of two hundred and fifty years takes us to the conjuncture of Alexander the Great and Aristotle, which is one of the most important events in history and cemented the structure of

Western civilization. The two men, on different sides, did more to create the human world in which we live than any other couple who could be mentioned, and both were links with the East. Alexander, gathering up all the force of Greek ideas and man-power in his time, hurled it against the East, and on his way there incorporated into the Western world the Middle East, where he left Greek settlements and Greek cities which, at the coming of the new religion from the East, were destined to turn it westward and add another decisive element to the making of Western civilization. And he was the pioneer of Roman incorporation: the Romans, coming after him, with the backing of a much stronger political constitution, were able to do from their vantage-point in Italy what he had hastily improvised from his far less favourable ground in Macedonia.

The weight of Aristotle in the realm of abstract thought is even greater, and less open to dispute. He summed up all that had been thought and known in philosophy and science by the Greeks up to his time, adding to it much of his own, especially in biology and logic. Like his master and pupil, he became also in the sequel a powerful link between East and West, for, in the decadence of science in the Dark Ages, the Arabs made him their own and handed him back to Western thinkers to rekindle the flame of thought in the thirteenth century.

Greek ideas spread and the ancient empires of Persia and Egypt were broken up as the result of Alexander's conquests, but it fell to Rome to consolidate the West and give it the unity which

it has never entirely lost. This work was continued, strengthened and extended by the spread of Christianity, which was taken up by the West just as Rome was completing the work of Alexander and the Greeks. Alexander and Aristotle, Rome and Christianity, the two couples in their sequence of three or four centuries give us the most important stages in the building of Western civilization.

But the problem of world-organization was not yet ripe nor had East and West yet compared themselves and measured their powers. This was to come after the Roman and Catholic world had broken into independent and competing nations, and after the birth of modern science had put into the hands of Europe an incomparable weapon for conquering both man and nature. Before this took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the East, at the time of the Crusades, had been able to take a partial revenge for its defeats by the Greeks and the Romans. In the decadence of Rome and the abeyance of Greek science the East was for a time intellectually in advance. Christianity was the link of the West, and under its stimulus new forces were being developed in Western society; but actually when the forces of East and West met in the twelfth century in their most acute antagonism, the West had much to learn from its opponents.

The appearance of Mohammed and the fervour of his new religion had given at that juncture a spear-point to the fighting forces of the East. But it would be a grave mistake to class Mohammedanism definitely among the factors of civiliza-

tion which we usually call 'Eastern.' 'Eastern' is of course itself only a fluctuating and temporary term; but Mohammedanism at any time partakes quite as much of 'Western' as of 'Eastern' characteristics. Mohammedanism was in its origin a revolt against idolatry, and as a pure monotheism represents a higher stage of thought than the pantheon of the Aryans. It showed during the Middle Ages its affinity to abstract thought by its pursuit of the sciences and by its study of Aristotle. Socially, too, it is more advanced than traditional Hinduism by its freedom from caste and its democratic spirit. It was the combination of these qualities and the enthusiasm of a new faith which enabled it for a time to hold the 'West' in check. But the West had within it reserves of strength and growing powers which in the sixteenth century definitely turned the scale. Then began the characteristic evolution of Western civilization which has given it the primacy of the world in thought and collective action.

At the time when the West thus began definitely to take the lead, it was marked by a pre-eminence in three or four qualities and possessions, none of which were peculiarly its own in origin, but which by the converging influences of history and geography had come to be concentrated in Western Europe by the fifteenth century A.D. One, perhaps the most potent of all, was an exceptional vigour and adventuresomeness of character. There were more energetic and fearless spirits in those lands, and especially in England, than anywhere else, and Western seamen began to discover and circumnavigate the globe just as

Western men of science were beginning to explore the universe and measure the atom. Another source of strength was their religion. In spite of the breach at the Reformation, the adventuring nations had all a stimulating religion, common in its main features, and to all its professors both comforting in trouble and fortifying to action. Jesuits and Puritans alike were stronger men for being Christians. So too with the newly growing and often hostile nations. Out of the great commonwealth which Roman genius and Christianity had formed, nations arose, also alike in the main features of their culture, but with added force from their national ties and aspirations. The point is an important one, both in those days of budding nations and in our own age of a more self-conscious internationalism. At both times it is right to notice the evils due to aggressive and competing nationalities, but wrong to overlook the vigour poured into the world by the union and ambition of youthful states. As now under the Treaty of Versailles, so then in the ferment of the Renaissance, work could be done by men held together and inspired by nationhood, which never occurred to the unorganized masses who covered the largest part of the land-surface of the globe.

Any form of union gives strength, and France and England, the first and most strongly organized of Western peoples, have through this cause left the widest and deepest impression on the world. But France and England, and all the other nations of the West in varying degree, were carriers also of a more far-reaching principle of organization

in scientific method and its results. Here we have the modern and most potent differentia of West and East, or rather of the West from the remainder of mankind which did not take the crucial step represented by the work of Galileo and Newton in the seventeenth century. In its origins science was universally diffused, though the Greeks sharpened the previous raw material into a cutting edge. In its final applications and diffusion science will be equally world-wide, but the intermediate stage was elaborated by men in Western Europe and the work has given them their actual dominance. Even as we think and write about these things, that 'dominance' is passing away, or rather it is being transformed into something different, an 'influence,' in which conviction counts for more than force and mutual good for more than selfish gain.

Just as the application of science to industry, with its fruit in the factory system, anticipated the outburst of humanitarianism in the eighteenth century, so the contact of the West, as represented by Great Britain, and India, the typical 'Eastern' country, came before men realized what it involved or what should be the right ideals. Their consciences were smitten by the scandals of the early days, as the evils of the later Roman Republic roused Cæsar, and the cry of the children produced the factory acts. In each case much has to be altered and much lived down.

The difficulties are manifold, often acute and always profound. There is the difficulty of adjustment and mutual understanding between

two civilizations, or stages of civilization, each strongly rooted in the past and each with a thousand ramifications in the present, frequently invisible to those who are studying it from the other camp. Yet mutual understanding is essential, and our study in this book starts from the premise that the contact is necessary, and that civilizations, though differing in detail and in stage of development, are in fundamentals the same and are destined to complete their diversity by a growing unity both of action and of sentiment. Those in India who actually come in contact, are often struck by what appear to them essential differences in character and outlook. Thus the Englishman will speak of communalism or nepotism or corruption as ingrained and ineradicable features of the Indian, while the Indian thinks of certain habits of food, or pleasure or pride of place, as if they belonged by a law of nature to the Briton. It will generally be found that these things which bulk so large in everyday life, are superficial or dependent on much deeper causes of which the stage of development of the society is one of the most frequent and influential. Communalism, nepotism, corruption—to mention points recently prominent in descriptions of Indian society—are all features well known in every part of the world. What communalism was ever stronger or more destructive than that of the Huguenots and the League in France at the end of the sixteenth century? It was surmounted by the higher national ideal embodied in the policy of Henry of Navarre, the greatest representative in France of the spirit of national unity

which carried on the West from the break up of the mediaeval system to the new unity of modern industrialism and the League of Nations. Elizabeth performed the same task for us, and where her hand had least sway—in Ireland and the Highlands of Scotland—communalism flourished unabated for generations later. Had Akbar had the same opportunity—he was contemporary to Queen Elizabeth—national unity would have triumphed over communalism in India in his time. His ideas were similar, but the area and the population with which he dealt were too vast. India lacked also that impulse to new life and organization which modern science was beginning to offer to the West, and which was independent of political party, race or creed.

So too with nepotism and corruption. It is obvious that these are peculiar to no race or clime, but will abound wherever the ideal of public service is not supreme over personal and family interests. This is a commonplace of moral teaching, both in East and West, and if we are at the moment superior to the East in this matter, it is because our history and the resulting social order have been more favourable to the enforcement of principles which we all profess.

We seem, then, at each point to come back to history as the explanation of the differences between the West and India when they come into close contact in the eighteenth century; and we mean by history the course of social evolution which has followed broadly similar lines all over the world. On these lines we can mark various nations as being more advanced than others,

though the 'advancement' is not in itself a claim to superiority, still less to domination. The Elizabethans were in many points superior to us, but we do not hesitate to regard our present social order as much more highly developed, more advanced than theirs in qualities and factors demonstrably good. In this sense Indian society when we met it nearly two hundred years ago, was less advanced than our own, and the contact took place when English and Western civilization were in a state of the most rapid change. This one historical fact is probably the most important to a right understanding of our problem. It is also the most difficult to grasp and raises the largest swarm of contentious questions.

We have traced in outline the evolution of Western civilization round the Mediterranean until the time when it began to overflow the globe in the sixteenth century. We saw how the Greeks were the most formative and moving force in that evolution from the time when they set their quick wits to work on the wisdom of the East and of Egypt, and gave the world the city-state and the beginnings of exact science. We saw the lapse or diversion of this work in the decadence of Rome and during the Middle Ages. Then came the revival and with it the Expansion of the West over the world.

The essential point of the revival of science in the West in the sixteenth century, and its rapid development since, is the return to Nature, the study of how things around us actually work instead of the repetition of other men's ideas or the spinning of theories about reality from our

inner consciousness. The Greeks had looked outwards with the utmost zest and curiosity, but many of their first guesses at an explanation were necessarily crude, and they suffered most of all from the want of handy and accurate apparatus for record, measurement and calculation. When calculation had been made easier by the Arabs, and records were kept and handed on from observer to observer and from generation to generation, the work of science began to grow apace; and the results were soon applied to the transformation of industry and life owing to the closer union between thinkers and mechanical labour which is a marked feature of the modern world as compared either with the ancients or with the caste system as we know it in India. That union between *Homo Sapiens* and *Homo Faber*, which is best exemplified in the genesis of Watt's steam-engine, is alien to the speculative and dignified thinking either of the Greek philosopher or the Brahman. It is the life-blood of the modern system. When it was fully consummated in the eighteenth century, modern industrialism leapt ahead. That was the moment when our decisive contact with India took place, with an India in a state of political dissolution, but with the social and intellectual bonds of caste and religion in full vigour. Hence the contrasts were as sharp, and adjustment and mutual understanding as difficult as it was possible to make them.

When Europeans first invaded India under Alexander, the rival leaders could understand one another and make friends, and the works of art

and architecture that remain in the North-West express a spirit so closely blended that it is difficult to disentangle the Greek from the Indian elements. When the Europeans came the second time, with harnessed steam and scientific machinery, they did their work as an alien force and India has not yet been able to accept it as its own.

It will be clear from what has gone before that the process of fusion, or of co-operation, between the two great forces which history has brought together, must be a slow and difficult one. Yet it cannot be avoided if humanity is to grow together and advance as a whole. The world is one, and the most striking, general result of the recent development of science by the West is the tightening of the links which form that unity. Of all the knots which bind together its diverse portions England has tied the strongest and most important by her occupation of India. It must last long, and, in order to make it peaceful and beneficial, it is essential to understand the forces with which we have to deal. We, as representing the West, are the mouthpiece and agent of organized ideas which can be traced back some four millenniums through the Greeks to those old empires of Egypt and Babylonia which lay between the parts of the world which we now call East and West. They drew their strength from both sides, but the stream has now returned to inundate the world with a vigour drawn for the most part from the lands around and to the north of the Mediterranean Sea. There is a danger in regarding these human problems from an abstract point of

view: we seem to be treating the human agents themselves as counters and to overlook their personal qualities. Yet there are general forces outside the individual to which he must conform and we cannot fail here to perceive the main, general characteristics if we follow the historical evolution.

Vigour, reason, progressive change for the general good are the forces which consciously or unconsciously impel the typical agent of Western civilization as it has emerged from the long, forging process which we have sketched. And it is faced in other parts of the world by populations not necessarily hostile, often superior personally in many ways, but collectively inferior or less highly developed in those points which have given the West its present place. With them, as one sees in India, tradition, custom and authority bulk far larger than the constant effort to adapt one's actions to fresh and consciously chosen ends. Change governed by reason was the principle which the Greeks first made current in the world, and the Western spirit of to-day is struggling to subordinate this change to the other ideal, of a general good in which every human being will be recognized as an end in himself.

It will be seen at once how these motives and principles differ, and may conflict with the practices and beliefs of a religious and conservative society of the old type such as India. We shall study this in detail in later chapters, but religion, caste and authority stand out as rocks against which the waves of Western progress

and rationalism make but a slow advance. The impact of a differing attitude makes understanding difficult and hostility natural. Take religion first, on which of all sides of Indian life least impression has so far been made by Western contact. In one sense India, as is so often said, is the most religious country in the world. In another sense Man, as Comte remarked, becomes more and more religious as he progresses, and hence the most advanced nations of the West, in that sense, are the most religious. Yet how to correlate the worship of Durga and Kali with the Modernism of Europe or the ethical religions which stand outside the churches?

It is the advance of reason on the one side which has created the gulf. Less than three millenniums ago the ancestors of Western nations, akin to, if not the same as, those of the fairer population of India, were worshipping in a similar Pantheon. With us a rationalizing mind has played upon those deities, destroyed their personal peculiarities and reduced their number. Law, goodness and beauty now stand out as the salient qualities of the divine. Kali, Durga, and the rest, have divine elements as well as baser. Can they be sublimated and used to convey a growing and higher ideal for humanity, or must we become iconoclasts and raze old temples to the ground to make way for new?

Next to religion, and indeed a part of it, comes caste, an ancient and inveterate rock in Indian life which in the West has yielded almost entirely to the solvent action of reason and changing society.

We saw in the last chapter how caste arose in the superimposition of conquerors over conquered of a different race. To this was added the universal custom of the hereditary craftsman, when everyone followed the vocation of his father and learnt his business by the most effective 'personal training'. It had in this an early justification, and the special rigidity of the system in India came later with Brahman influence. The priestly caste, holding the first rank on religious grounds, was able to keep itself select and infect all other sects and classes with the same spirit of ceremonial exclusiveness. In the West, as society and thought have grown wider and more mobile since the Middle Ages, the vestiges of caste have been more and more obliterated. Wealth and personal merit in varying proportions now classify our society, and there is no bar, except opportunity, in the way of any person doing any work for which he is fit. Nor have we in the West those taboos on touching, intermarrying with, or eating with other persons of whatever class, which are so troublesome and to us such irrational features of Indian society. In this caste system and in religion we have the two most serious social and intellectual differences between ourselves and our partners in the East, which, however they may be ultimately adjusted, will require long and patient efforts for their solution.

The position of women might almost be added to the examples of caste, so different is it from that which is now generally current in the West. In no part of India is the equality of women in education or social and political status yet accepted,

though a movement may be detected in this as in the other matters we have mentioned. In the vast majority of cases the girl is still required, and expects, to marry and bear children at the earliest age at which she is physically capable. This is a religious duty and is still maintained at a time when the West, partly through their criticism of religion, partly through their new ideas of human personality and rights, have advanced to the conception of feminine equality.

The question of women, as it touches at one end on religion, so at the other brings us face to face with the last great achievement of Western thought in social and political theory. It passes under the name of democracy, but is not well so described, for democracy should mean a particular form of government and we are here thinking of a much larger thing, the place of the individual in the social order, his claim to full development and enjoyment of the best means of attaining these ends. The view on this question, which we in common with other Western nations are now engaged in working out, can be quite definitely fixed at the latter part of the eighteenth century, and Kant gave it the most pointed expression. Every man—and woman—was to be an end in himself, and not to be regarded as an instrument for the profit and enjoyment of others. How great an advance this implies may be realized when we remember that Aristotle, the most philosophic and influential of Greek thinkers, regarded slaves as by nature the 'living implements' of their masters, and the same view would have been applied in varying

degree to women and other classes. Christianity had done much to infuse a new spirit, and the Revolution of the eighteenth century completed the change from another point of view. This had just taken place before we began to set our stamp on Indian life, and echoes of the great argument are heard in the trial of Warren Hastings.

How difficult it is to work out the new ideal we know well at home, where we tend to chafe at all forms of service which seem to involve inequality. But how much greater is the difficulty in applying the idea in a society organized for ages on the basis of the natural subordination of certain orders of men to others, where one is born to hew wood and draw water, and another to command and enjoy his service. Some of the results will appear in later chapters and they give ground for thinking that the inoculation of a democratic virus may produce, at least at first, divisions rather than equality.

But no forward step taken in one part of the world can be stayed there or turned back. The doctrine of individual development and individual rights, proclaimed in the West, will pass round the world and possess all humanity in turn. As the West first conceived it and are its carriers elsewhere, it is for them to study its application and limitations in the various surroundings where it takes root. The application must be by mutual sympathy and the understanding of the antecedents and conditions of each society. The limitation is the general good. At its first outburst, through which we have not yet passed, the doctrine of individual rights and freedom had

a destructive side, and was too little regardful either of continuity with the past or of subordination to the good of others. The struggle to enforce these, as supreme now divides the mind of the West with that other great pre-occupation of individual growth. In the East to hold the balance true, even to envisage the two sides of conduct and of policy as equally important, demands still greater insight and patience. Freedom is not enough, nationality is not enough; we must seek through the fields of government, education, economics, philosophy and religion for reconciling principles which may transcend our present conflicts and divisions and point the way to a united advance.

V

GOVERNMENT

IT is not intended in these few pages to discuss the details of the present political situation in India or the best lines on which to work or modify the new Reforms. The strife of parties, the details and personalities of politics, are so absorbing at the moment in Indian writing and thinking, that one should rather try to divert the public mind from these matters and gain some attention for the fundamental issues on which ultimately the peace and progress of India—and the rest of the world—will be based. It would relieve the tension, and promote progress even in the political field, if a deeper interest could be fostered, shared by Indians and British alike, in other causes, things such as history, art, philosophy and religion, of international concern, which tend just now to be obscured by national politics and the machinery of government.

Yet it would be absurd to ignore the obsession or its causes: England herself is responsible for most of them. We are ourselves the most politically-minded people in the world and put politics above philosophy, science, art or religion in the hierarchy of our interests. We have governed India autocratically for a hundred and fifty years, teaching them at the same time our own history,

of freedom widening down the centuries and won by strife. Then at the end we say, 'We are now going to give you of our own freewill the boon of self-government which we had always intended, but only a half at present, and that under strict control.' No wonder that politics run riot and that a confusion of counsels prevails.

It will be best here to set down first some of the main facts of the situation, looked at from the social and historical point of view, then to indicate in outline what has been established by the last Reform Act, and to leave the moral, and all suggestions for the future, in that melting-pot of opinion which the promised Commission will have to explore not later than 1929.

In the first place India is not democratic in spirit and has had no experience of the sort of self-government to which we are accustomed, and of which a large instalment was created for her in the recent reforms.

There was in earlier days a system of village government in India which had many admirable features and might, *mutatis mutandis*, do good service again. But it must be remembered that this dealt purely with village business and that the government of the state or empire was always autocratic. Hence our old official system of a fatherly 'collector,' or Commissioner, himself little hampered by superior orders, suited the Indian character and tradition as well as anything we could have done at the time. He visited his people as often as he could, dealt with them personally and settled minor legal and other business on the spot. One hears everywhere

appreciation and gratitude for work thus done and generally expressions of affection for those who did it. But the autonomy of the village and the autocracy of the Collector—or of his Indian prototype—have been destroyed by the march of organization. A railway system, a provincial educational and medical service have come in, and no one can imagine these, or large works of irrigation or land-assessment, being conducted by village councils. They might do much, and everyone would wish them to, but the village has now, on any system of modern government, to be fitted into a larger system of life and organization.

As the old system—apart from the village councils—was autocratic, it follows that the Indian peoples have had no experience in representative government and no knowledge of general politics. As the recent Reform scheme introduced the franchise for large areas and did not attempt to build up self-government from smaller units, the actual working of the political machine fell necessarily into the hands of a small number of professional politicians, mostly lawyers. It would seem, therefore, that a more solid foundation for representative government in the larger areas would have been laid, if smaller units with definite duties had been first constituted, and if the scheme for the popular government of India as a whole had been accompanied by some breaking up, at least of the larger and more amorphous of the provinces.

This point arises also in connexion with the next great fundamental fact in political India, the existence of the 'Native States,' and the

increasing differences which they present to 'British India' with its developing system of self-government. These Native States cover a third of India, and their population is seventy-seven of the three hundred and twenty millions in the whole country. They are of the greatest variety in size, from Hyderabad and Kashmir, which are about as large as the peninsula of Italy, to many tiny principalities containing one or two villages. But the average size is, of course, far smaller than that of the British Province, and they all agree in retaining the autocracy which we are in course of superseding in British India. In some a representative assembly has lately been set up which meets occasionally, and discusses and gives advice, but nowhere is there any attempt or intention to supersede the monarch.

If, therefore, we are ever to attain a federation of Indian states and provinces with any unity or hope of coherence, something must be done in the way of assimilating the two types of government. It is a question much discussed in India, and the general opinion seemed to be that the Paramount Power has in recent decades been taking too conservative a line towards the Native States. Two recent cases, however—Indore and Hyderabad—brought again into prominence principles which would probably have been asserted, if necessary, by the Indian Foreign Department, at any time during the last forty years.

Another, perhaps even larger matter, occupies at the moment more space in the public eye. This is the question of communal feeling and divisions, which some hold to be so serious that

no immediate further advance can be made on the path of self-government to which we are committed. The recent elections were fought more on a communal basis than any other, and fierce outbreaks constantly take place between Hindu and Moslem or Sikhs and Akalis which task all the powers and patience of the civil authorities to appease. The Reform scheme itself seems to have offered a fresh field for the manifestation of these passions and differences, though it was felt at the time of its introduction that no other method than communal representation could have induced a common consent to their trial. The predominant case is of course the representation of the Mohammedans which overshadows the North, while in the South the division between Brahmans and non-Brahmans is almost as serious, though it does not proceed to bloodshed.

The immediate practical bearing of these facts is not here the point, but the grave obstacle which they present to the attainment of a civic system consonant with the Western ideal. It is essential to remember that these communal differences are bound up with the whole social and religious life of the people, and their prominence is public proof of the depth and tenacity of the religion which has produced them. For the average Indian the religious point of view is as naturally and inevitably the first consideration as with us the political, and to bridge so wide a cleavage will demand many methods and long-continued efforts. But we may gain some light and rays of hope from historical parallels. To

surmount the divisions of race and religion we need in the first place that spirit which was known to the French at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries as 'politique.' The men who professed it, like Henry of Navarre or Queen Elizabeth, held that there were common interests in every community which overrode the dictates of conflicting religions. Their task was to impose these common interests as higher, for the whole community, than any obligation which an individual or section might consider unquestionable for himself. It is a difficult problem and involves questions on which there will always be a difference of opinion even among those who are honestly trying to do right. We saw it in another case among the conscientious objectors during the war. But in the West the principles of the 'politiques' decisively prevailed, and Catholics and Protestants do not question the supremacy of the law and work together, amicably for the most part, in promoting the common weal. They have learned to do it, and the learning is one of the most important aspects of education.

These divisions which are known as 'communal,' are close akin to that amazing stratification of Indian society which forms the system of caste, and is the greatest barrier to the common working of social and government institutions which democracy demands. We considered caste in an earlier chapter, and saw both how it arose, how it was justified and how it had become inveterate and perverted in Indian history. Looking at it with modern eyes and seeing in it the gravest

obstacle to social co-operation, one may be easily inclined to echo Sir Henry Maine and call it 'the most disastrous and blighting of human institutions.' Many Indians so regard it, and all agree that the changes which are needed can come but slowly, and will only come as the result of an education, wide, practical, common and universal.

The Reform scheme which we have briefly to sketch, and which was introduced under the Indian Reforms Bill of 1919, was not accompanied by any measure for extending primary education in India and this still lags dangerously behind, although recent years have seen a remarkable outburst of new Universities and the secondary schools which feed them. Of this we shall speak in the next chapter. The reforms themselves which are on their trial, are an instalment of the policy announced in Parliament in August, 1917, by Mr. E. S. Montagu, then Secretary of State for India. He declared that the British Government which was then in the hands of a Coalition, intended to proceed in the direction of the 'progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.'

Such was the pledge and such the new ideal. But it had been approached by several smaller steps in earlier years. Election of representatives had been tacitly introduced under an Act of 1892, and in 1909 Lord Morley, with Lord Minto as Viceroy, had established direct and formal election with some power of legislation for the elected Councils; but Morley had no idea of parliamentary institutions or responsible govern-

ment. Then came the war and India, which had fought like the rest, was now to be set on its way to Dominion status.

The Montagu-Chelmsford plan is what is called 'dyarchy' or government by two. The term seems first to have been used by Mommsen in describing the system introduced into Rome by Augustus. Then, however, the Princeps was restoring in form the old Senatorial government previously in force. In present-day India the Paramount Power is setting up piecemeal a new organization which is ultimately to supersede it.

The Government of India as a whole, under the Act of 1919, may be regarded as containing four great divisions. There is, first, the Central Government itself which, supposing India ever attained a position comparable to that of the United States of America, would correspond to the President, Cabinet, Congress and Senate of the Union. These positions are at present filled by the Governor-General, or Viceroy, who, acting under 'all such orders as he may receive from the Secretary of State' at home, is in India supreme. He has his Cabinet of chief officials and a two-chambered Legislature, the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State. These are, as to a majority, elected, but there is no attempt here to introduce responsible government. The second main division consists of the nine major Provinces where dyarchy is in force. These are the three old and ill-compacted Presidencies of Madras, Bengal and Bombay, with the six Provinces of the Punjab, the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, the Central Provinces, Bihar and

Orissa, Assam and Burma. In each of these there is a Governor, with an Executive Council and a Legislature with an elected majority. In these the system of dyarchy is carried out by dividing the administration into two distinct spheres called the 'transferred' and the 'reserved' subjects. The 'transferred' subjects are under the control of 'responsible' Ministers who are chosen by the Governor as leading men of the dominant party in the Legislature, which in the Provinces is a single-chamber, called the Legislative Council. The 'reserved' subjects are in the hands of Executive Councillors, responsible only to the Governor. 'Transferred' subjects are education, local self-government, medical relief, sanitation and agriculture. The 'reserved' are law and order, finance, police, jails and labour. The Act does not provide for the joint deliberation of the two halves of the Government and the difficulties of working so complicated a system may easily be imagined. The Minister of Agriculture finds irrigation a 'reserved' subject, and so on through the gamut.

It should be added that the population of some of these provinces exceeds that of Great Britain as a whole, and the electorate was in 1919 something over six millions.

The third main division consists of the six smaller Provinces, the North-West, Baluchistan, Coorg, Delhi, Ajmere-Merwara and the Andamans. These are directly administered by the Central Government, acting through a Chief Commissioner.

The fourth division is the Native States to

which we referred above, of all sizes and quality, controlled, so far as they are at all controlled, by the Governor-General himself, who has also the official supremacy of all armed forces. The Paramount Power in the background is typified in many such cases by a military cantonment in the heart of the State, e.g. Bangalore in Mysore and Secunderabad close to the capital of the Nizam.

Clearly, if we are ever to attain the ideal of a united, or federated India, consisting of self-governing units bound together by some sort of central and universally recognized authority, these various categories of political arrangement will have to be brought into a state of tolerable similarity. The last type, especially, of native and autocratic states must be modified to the extent of avoiding flagrant and dangerous contrasts. It is often said, for instance, that in such or such Native State the present regime is only supported by British bayonets. We ourselves, says the reforming Indian, would make a quick clearance of many things that you in your tolerant conservatism allow to persist. The alternative, of course, is not necessarily a forced uniformity, but agreement and assimilation. The North American Union contains more than one type of constituent state.

The Reforms introduced by the Act of 1919 are due to be examined and, if necessary, revised not later than the year 1929. It would be quite foreign to the scope of this book to attempt any detailed consideration of the scheme or of the various modifications suggested or required. There

is a multitude of counsellors and some, probably considerable, changes will no doubt be called for. We are dwelling here only on main outlines and the most serious difficulties. When we pass on to other aspects of the problem, in Education, Religion and Economics, fresh points will emerge which have an intimate bearing on Government also. But the true direction of any fruitful inquiry begins already to appear.

The position of Great Britain in India involves the close juxtaposition and interaction of two civilizations, on our side, Western in general and English politically, on the Indian, Eastern generally and of a specially religious, conservative and caste-bound type. No one can dream of a complete transformation or the substitution of a new and alien civilization for the old. What we must hope and seek for, is beneficent interaction, the elimination of evil and the substitution of stronger points for weaker where the need is clear. In the political sphere which we have taken first, British rulers have missed some vital truths and made some grave mistakes. The neglect of the village, and over-centralization in large and artificial areas, are two unquestionable cases. But, on the other hand, the West, and especially England, has certain essentials to convey or to train, in Indian soil without which useful and stable self-government is impossible.

We have thus to meet the charge of 'Westernization' and avoid its evils by discriminating. The task is difficult but not impossible. Such discrimination is fundamental, and we can approach it most easily in the sphere of government. It

becomes progressively more difficult in education and religion. In government we are on the firmest ground, the ground which English feet have trodden longest and with most success of all the nations who make up for India that doubtful, aggressive and intoxicating thing called 'Western civilization.'

In any government in which the mass of the governed are themselves to take part, there must be a civic spirit, over-riding the demands of family or church when these conflict with the general good. Taxes must be paid, even if, as so often happens in the East, all one's needy relatives come to live with us and share the new-won prosperity as a family possession. And the public peace must be kept, with equal rights before the law, even if my religion teaches that the infidel is an accursed thing, fit only for the sword. The West has learnt these lessons since the Middle Ages, and they now seem obvious. That they were once as hard to master in Europe as they now are in many parts of India, every student of history is well aware.

The other side of the civic spirit is civic honesty. If in carrying out a public function, we make a private profit not recognized or intended by the community who employ us, we defraud our neighbours as certainly as if we picked their pockets. This lesson too takes long to learn and has been but imperfectly learnt in many places; but here also the West generally, and England in particular, has something to teach which it is essential for good government should be learnt.

We shall see in the concluding chapters the part

which India may play in world-politics, especially in the settlement of the East, if only her own house is first put in order. The process must be long and difficult, for nowhere else in the world is there a population of over three hundred million people, in one area but infinitely varied grades of development, being held together in a single political organization. China, which could once compare in size and unity, gives signs of irremediable disruption. But whatever may be the issue there, India stands firmly one, in supreme direction, and she has now to make the instincts of political order and self-government habitual and let them permeate the whole population. To achieve this would be the greatest triumph in political history.

The process is bound up with education to which we turn in the next chapter; it is, in fact, one great page in the book of education, but of education thought of more broadly than in most schools or colleges, an education in self-control, and in dealing with one's fellows as partners in the same all-embracing enterprise of common good and infinite possibility.

VI

EDUCATION

IN the last chapter the attempt was begun to analyse that process of 'Westernization' in India of which in recent years we have heard so much, mostly by way of denunciation or regret. The more one thinks about it, the clearer it becomes that any such wholesale method, whether we praise or denounce, must miss the mark. In some respects 'Westernization' is harmful or impossible; in others it is wholesome and necessary, and the true problem is to think thoroughly, with the fullest knowledge of the facts, and, as far as possible, without *parti pris*, and then to build up again from the bottom, at least an ideal, with nothing in view except the greatest good of all and the progressive harmony of mankind.

In the sphere of government, which came first, the outlines of the picture are easiest to determine. The weaknesses and difficulties are obvious, and also the points where British or Western influence might be expected to do good. There is on the Indian side their immemorial loyalty to superiors, the regularity of their service, their readiness to suffer. From all these the West has much to learn. But we saw that learning from the West was also needed and we dealt mainly with that, for the sphere of government is that in which Great Britain can be of most assistance.

The problem of education is much more difficult to submit to the same analysis, though something similar must be attempted. Given the presence of a strong English and Western influence already well entrenched in a land of alien culture, what good may it do, what are its limits, above all how may it best serve the interests of a united mankind? A detailed account of the present Indian system would be unsuitable to our purpose, and the less necessary in view of the admirable book, philosophical as well as descriptive, which has just appeared by an author intimately versed in it for many years.*

Speaking broadly, the British intervention in Indian education has followed the same course as that in government, but more slowly and with more mistakes. Education followed government, largely by necessity and piecemeal, by forced steps and without a previous well-thought-out plan.

The course has been a zigzag, swerving backwards and forwards, and trying to correct an excess made in one direction by a tardy lunge to the opposite. As in the political so in the educational sphere, we found India in the eighteenth century in a state of decadence from an old and venerated system which lacked the fresh life which science and a new philosophy and new politics were beginning to pour into the education of the West. They too had their mediaeval schools and universities, but no Galileo to recall them to the truths of nature and no Rousseau to preach the truths of the developing mind. And

* Mr. Arthur Mayhew. 'Education in India.' Faber & Gwyer.

their old seats of learning had languished even more than our ancient universities and grammar schools at the beginning of the century. When we had established ourselves in Bengal after Clive's victories, we had no conception of introducing a general education, either for the whole population or for the élite. But two things occurred which tended ultimately in that direction. In the first place a certain number of the East India Company's servants, being men of culture and intelligence, found an interest in Oriental studies and encouraged it among the Indian public both by money and example. Warren Hastings was the most distinguished of this class, and founded a college himself in Calcutta for Islamic studies, while another college for Sanskrit was founded shortly after at Benares by another servant of the Company. The Court of Directors, moved by Wilberforce's repeated protests in Parliament, voted a lakh of rupees for 'the encouragement of literature and science among the natives.' This was in 1813, at the time when a group of oriental scholars, inspired by Sir William Jones, were studying the classical literature of the land and dreaming of a union of Hindu and European learning.

The other impulse came from the necessities of government and this naturally won the day. As the Company's sphere of government extended, they needed more and more Indian subordinates qualified to carry out the directions of English chiefs. Government service was thus the first cause of Indian secondary education and remains so to this day. Clearly, for the purposes of Indian

subordinates, directed by English chiefs, a knowledge of English was the most useful acquisition, and a knowledge of the English language soon brought in its train some knowledge of English literature and history. To this natural evolution was added the force of Macaulay's vigour and unbalanced championship of English against Hindu and Western against Eastern learning. Sir Charles Trevelyan, who was in India when Macaulay went out and became Governor of Madras in 1859, gave the Westernizing movement his full support. A false historical parallel—always a dangerous thing—was invoked by the Westerners. England was doing a similar work in India to that of Rome in Europe. India would absorb the English language and institutions as Italy, Spain and Gaul had absorbed the Roman. But the very difference of the effect of Rome on different parts of Europe might have opened the eyes of these advocates to the shallowness of their reasoning. In Britain neither the language nor the institutions of Rome were adopted; still less were they in the north of Europe; and our position in India was, and is, much closer to that of Rome in Britain than in Italy or Gaul. Moreover, in India we are face to face with an ancient culture or cultures, and not with semi-savage tribes, destitute of literature and philosophy.

However, the wrong cause won, wrong on the whole, but yet with so much truth in it as to make it arguable. It was true that English was necessary as the common medium of government and of fully educated intercourse throughout the country. It is true also that English literature is

richer, more varied and much more modern and living than any of the current literatures of India, and that India needed above all else the results and the training of scientific thought. But these substantial truths were outweighed in their effects by the two errors in policy which were involved. The first was an error in educational method. Because the circumstances of India imposed English as the language of government and the intercourse of educated persons, just as Latin was the common medium of mediaeval Europe, it did not follow that English should be the medium of instruction, even in higher schools. Better results would have been obtained had instruction in other subjects been carried on in the vernacular of the province and attempts are now being tried, as with Urdu in Hyderabad, to regain the time and territory which have thus been lost. The broad fact is that so much effort is spent on linguistic difficulties that the subject-matter of other branches of education, such as science and history, which are of the first importance to the rising youth of India, has lagged far behind the needed standard.

But the other error was graver still and much more difficult to repair. The spirit of Macaulay's minute and the action which followed from it till the end of the century, were naturally taken as a deliberate outlawry of the ancient culture of India, both Hindu and Moslem. The science of the West and the literature and history of England were set before the youth of India as the crown and summit of human achievement to the exclusion of their own learning and traditions on which

the civilization of the country had been built. This was untrue in fact and highly dangerous in its consequences. It contained all the pitfalls of impassioned partiality. Both in Sanskrit and Arabic there were depths of philosophic speculation undreamt of by their contemporaries in the West, and also much solid matter which was later worked into the fabric of Western thought. Hence, when these writings became generally known towards the end of the century—largely no doubt owing to Western efforts—a reaction set in which spread far beyond the bounds of education. The culture which had been despised and rejected by the masters of the country, was now exalted as the headstone of the corner. This was now seen to be the true spirit and glory of India; everything worth having could be derived from this, and everything else should be rejected. Such is in brief the contemporary mind of young India, and another partiality and prejudice have been created more difficult to deal with and more remote from the truth than the first.

It will have been noticed that we have spoken hitherto of an education suited only to the few, an education which was prompted in the first instance by the necessities of government and which has found its expression in the large and increasing number of high schools and universities through which almost as large a proportion of the boys and young men of India now pass annually as that of the corresponding class in Great Britain. We must now retrace our steps and consider the educational problem from the bottom upwards, in view of the vast mass of the

population for which no effective school education at present exists. Of the male population at the last census only just over 13 per cent were found to be literate, of the women far less. Many on inquiry by the census officers would attempt to conceal their literacy. School education, with the bulk of the rural population, is intensely unpopular and any attempt to extend it meets generally with opposition, especially to the additional taxation which must be paid by someone if there are to be more schools.

These are the bald facts, which are now admitted by all, and with genuine concern and regret by those in authority. They cover that field in India in which there is the greatest need for public progress, and explain the interest now taken in the once-flourishing but long-decayed system of village schools. The reality of this and the responsibility for its disappearance are useful matters for historical research and furnish frequent topics for political orators. But the urgencies of the future are now different and experts are thinking out the most effective steps for the advance. The solution seems to lie, as with other problems, in a judicious blend of East and West, Western organization and training, Eastern sympathy and language, with a touch of Eastern autocracy in the compulsion.

We can only summarize here the conclusions which have been reached by those who know the facts best and have thought most deeply about them.

The last point mentioned—that of compulsion—comes first in the order of political importance.

All those engaged in organizing education in India agree that it is necessary. It would make the grouping and the staffing of the schools easier and more economical and is quite in keeping with the traditions of authoritative government. Baroda, a Native State under an enlightened ruler, has applied it with increasing success. But when one says 'compulsion' it will be understood that this does not mean immediate compulsory education over the whole of British India at once. It would be applied gradually, in carefully selected areas with the best chance of success.

The success would depend mainly on the teachers. More would be wanted and they should work in a different spirit from what has usually prevailed in schools aided and inspected by the government in the past. Let the school be made a centre of social work for the welfare of the community. The teacher must be appropriate to his surroundings, and if possible selected by the community where he is to serve. The kinds of service which he might render, beside the regular school teaching, are so varied that one would need a vigorous and happy man to make much of them, and he must not be harrassed by too exacting educational requirements. Co-operative societies are beginning to flourish in India. He could help in those and in agricultural teaching, or make himself the centre of village culture by reading and story-telling from books the people love, or by giving, and discussing with them, the news of the day.

The teachers suited for such work must as a rule be men. The social conditions of India, and

especially the present position of women, necessitate that. But work must steadily proceed for educating the girls and thus gradually altering the status of the women. For this women teachers work best at present in institutions, and it is in this sphere that the missionary bodies may do most good. They have the community spirit and they are largely made up of women who understand far better than men the right approach to the little child and what Western psychology and educational practice have to teach.

Every addition to the ranks, either of girl-scholars or women teachers in India, is to be welcomed and striven for even more than that of the males. The deficiency here, as we shall see in a later chapter, is at the root of most social evils in the country. But the remedy will be slow and is hedged round with difficulties. In all the respectable castes the marriage of girl-children at the earliest age is still prescribed by religion and enforced by an unbroken tradition. The employment of the multitude of young widows or of women from the 'untouchable' classes would be resented by many, and in any case they have first to be persuaded and trained. The field seems most open to Christian women who are actually performing it in increasing numbers. But in their case their Christian charity and spirit must be free from direct proselytizing efforts or their work will be prejudiced in the eyes of the Hindus from another angle. Long and toilsome indeed will be the ascent to educated womanhood for the people of India, but great the reward when they attain it.

It is easier to say what should be the substance of the education offered in primary schools, but difficult to make it effective unless the attend at school and the sympathy of the parents are largely increased. It must, of course, be simple, practical and interesting, and given in the vernacular understood by the majority. 'Practical' implies more handwork, nature-study illustrated in the school-garden, and plenty of pictures and maps. All these things, obvious as they are to the Western educator, mean really a revolution from the system which one may see any day in the old-fashioned mosque or Hindu school, where the scholars are squatting round in a circle with their book in hand while the pedagogue goes from group to group with a little stick, ready to point the place or chastise the idler as the case may be. In this matter of educational method there is no difference of opinion. Nationalist or Briton, Hindu or Moslem, when he comes to deal with the child in the child's own interest, will follow the path of Pestalozzi and Froebel. Wrong 'Westernization' begins, when travelling beyond the spirit and the science which Western educators have given to the world, the teacher in the East goes on to introduce English and unintelligible matter into his lessons, while the riches of Indian nature and Indian folk-lore lie close to hand. The instance is typical of much that has to be said of the right union of East and West.

Village schools and central schools have still to be built up throughout most of India, and unfortunately Bengal, where we have been longest in power and which is most critical for the general

peace of the country, is most backward in elementary education. Colleges and High schools abound there and the University of Calcutta is far the largest in the Empire, ten times as big as Oxford. The problems in that sphere of education have been thrashed out more fully than any others, perhaps in the whole world, and it now remains only to select and apply the advice which has been given. Only a few points stand out for mention here as bearing on our general theme. These are, the connexion of the central Government of India with education, the classification of the schools—including the proportion of scholars in the High schools and the type of work done by them, and, among the subjects of instruction, the place and importance of science and history.

It was noted in the last chapter that education was one of the transferred subjects under the Act of 1919. Hence the Government of India has no direct control of education so far as the reforms are satisfactorily working, and recruitment for the Indian Educational Service has ceased. The Provincial Governments, local managers and so forth will henceforth make all the ordinary appointments. This part of the scheme was strongly criticized, and one can well understand the opposition, though we are not concerned with it here.

It was decided that of all matters on which Indian opinion should be supreme, education, by which the Indian spirit might be regained and fortified, should be left in the hands of Indian Ministers. Leaving that as it is, one may plead that it is essential to keep some central link by

which the various governments and universities may be connected, a channel through which information may be collected and distributed, and advice offered if desired. Such an organ exists in embryo in the office of the Commissioner for Education with the Government of India, and it would be well to strengthen and not curtail its utility and its personnel.

Such common standards and ideas will be the more necessary when the organization of primary education begins in earnest, and the governments have to face the question of central schools and their relation with high schools and universities. There seems no doubt but that many scholars now in high schools and colleges would more profitably be following a practical and less academic and clerical type of education. It is for such that central or higher elementary schools are needed, and this provision would relieve the pressure on the other class of schools and enable them to do their proper work more easily and at a level comparable to that of such places in the West. At present the academic standard is low, though the eagerness for knowledge among the young is strong and widespread and their ability to learn, especially on the lines of a prescribed task, is very great.

In many places the same object would be attained by developing fresh 'sides' in existing schools.

The cause no doubt is rather different, but the disease is much the same, as that from which our own schools were suffering less than a hundred years ago, a lack of science, a contempt for trade

and industry, a craving for a 'gentlemanly' job.

Science has been the solvent with us and it is beginning to play the same part in India. With us science had won the battle outside the schools and was transforming the world apace before it made its way into the curriculum. In India the need was greater for there had been no rebirth of science in the sixteenth century, and the people had always been accustomed to await the dictate of an Emperor or the ruling of a Brahman for their guidance in life and thought. Hence it was for us, who had seized the reins of government, to impart the new knowledge and stir the new life. And we delayed so long because the government needed in the first place clerical and legal assistance, and because our administrators were in early days, almost to a man, literary and not scientific in their outlook.

What was most needed in the intellectual sphere by India at the time of her junction with the West is fairly certain. It was, first and most obviously, some acquaintance with the results of modern science and still more the acquisition of scientific method, the critical and truth-seeking spirit in dealing with every subject of thought. In the second place—really a section or sequence of the first—a critical spirit in studying their own history and traditions.

A few words on these points in this order must conclude.

The Indian mind lapsed for a time, after its great creative days, into a state of repetition and introspection. It had always tended in that direction, but in the early centuries of our era

there had been strong minds in India grappling with scientific problems, questions, i.e. in which some verifiable contact could be set up between the mind of the thinker and the world around him, which is what science in any branch implies. In this way solid contributions were made by Indian thinkers even before the Arabs to many lines of thought and especially to mathematics. This work had found its way into the West by means of the Arabs. But at the time when Europe was building afresh on the old foundations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, India was intellectually stagnant. Her Dark Ages were longer and later than ours and the revival from them did not come from her own sons, but from without. Her Renaissance, like ours, took both a literary and a scientific form, but in neither case did it spring from her own soil, and in each case it was confused by the standards and the wishes of alien invaders. We have seen what the early British administrators did for the revival of Eastern learning. Unhappily they did not at the same time set on foot a provision for scientific teaching which has only lately been introduced, mainly at the instance and largely at the cost of some of the great manufacturers who have arisen. It was not introduced as a necessary part of a sound, modern education, but to increase the supply of competent technicians and to correct the bias in education which was at last observed to be exercising a baleful influence on the social and intellectual life of the country. Hence the excellent Institute of Science at Bangalore, due to the munificence of the Tata firm which has the largest steel and

iron works in India at Jamshedpur. Hence also the encouragement by Government of scientific and technical departments in new universities and colleges.

The movement, late though it comes, is to be specially welcomed for many reasons. Two of these are conspicuous; the third is more elusive, but at least as weighty from the educational standpoint. India needs science for her economic development; her soil and her mineral and other natural resources are capable of much more extended use, both for the good of her own people and of the rest of the world. This is the first and most cogent reason. Then comes the argument from cultural unity; India must acquire the results of science and pass through the stage of scientific thinking if she is to take her place in the comity of nations who have all accepted the same discipline. Japan saw this for herself half a century ago, and China, in the midst of her political confusion, is struggling ardently to the same end. India, with her political order secured, might do it more easily and in a more human spirit than either of her greatest Eastern neighbours.

The third and more strictly educational reason for science must strike every visitor to a laboratory or workshop in India. The young Indian is keen at this kind of work, and does well at it as soon as he is started. Subjects like physics and chemistry, which are most akin to mathematics, and involve most measurement, are specially congenial to him, and the whole realm of physical science lies outside the linguistic pitfalls and difficulties which have hampered him in the

humanities and produced those travesties of education which have been trumpeted abroad and used unfairly to discredit the Indian intellect. In mathematics and physical science the modern Indian has renewed the glory of his ancient lineage, as many names of high distinction would testify; even the most famous researches of any Indian scientist, those of Sir Jagadis Bose on plant life, illustrate the same quality of fine and accurate measurement.

It remains to say a word about History, the other urgent need in Indian education. Here the problem is far more difficult than in physical science because we are dealing with matters which involve prejudice and passion, and though it is easy to say 'Things happened thus and not otherwise both for Indian and Briton,' yet the capacity and the will to see them are hard to train, above all the choice as to which of all the innumerable happenings in history we intend to look at. The subject is too vast for adequate treatment here and yet one cannot omit it. If the general principle on which this book is founded, finds acceptance, i.e. that co-operation between Indian and English in India is the method, and the harmony of all nations in the League of Nations is the goal, then the history which should mainly be studied will follow those lines. In India, as elsewhere, the common evolution of mankind must be the containing framework. Within that, India should wish to know, in the first place, her own history as part of the Eastern world, and, in the second, the history of the British Commonwealth, the partnership into which

she has been drawn with us by the forces of history.

So far the Indian mind, profound and subtle in many ways, has not excelled in the study or exposition of history, even of the history of India itself. This may at first sight seem strange, considering the strength of tradition in India and her present tendency to dwell on the glories of her past. But it is an uncriticized and unanalysed past, a golden mist, contrasting sharply with the atmosphere of accuracy and criticism which came into the world with the Greeks. To Greeks, Jews, and Romans, we owe the foundation of solid history, and it is a very significant, but quite undoubted, fact that the same nations have been the most powerful in influencing others and building up the civilization of mankind. We count for more in moulding the future just in so far as we are ourselves firmly based upon the past. As this truth is now becoming understood, all nations are striving to inform the consciousness of the rising generation with the essential knowledge, and those who care most for the unity of mankind are anxious to make this historical background not only national but human. In India both points of view still need development, and they are complementary to one another. The structure must be raised on an Indian basis and the work done mainly by Indian hands. But, like education as a whole, it is a leading case of the supreme necessity of personal contact, of Englishmen working in Indian schools and Indians studying and working here.

VII

ECONOMIC LIFE

THE method we have followed in the last two chapters, of analysing the right and wrong elements in 'Westernization,' seems to yield some guidance. The policy suggested by some thinkers, appalled by the difficulties of the problem and struck rather by the evils than the possibilities of good from interference, is ruled out by the necessities of the case if by no other reason. They sometimes say, as Mr. Meredith Townsend practically said in his brilliant *Asia and Europe*, 'Leave the East alone. Their ways are not as our ways. If they need to change them, it is better that they should find it out and do it for themselves.' This cannot be put into practice, for the West is already there, in close embrace with one at least of the two most inveterate of Eastern civilizations. But also it should not be said on principle, because the West, if it acts wisely, has much to teach, and if it preserves an open and sympathetic mind, has much to learn. It has to teach the way of thinking which has led in the last three centuries to deeper and further-reaching knowledge of Nature and Man's own life than had been acquired in all the centuries before, and the way of acting which has applied this knowledge and built up a firm social structure in the midst of accelerating intellectual change.

The dangers of contact are those of any great force acting precipitately in strange surroundings. It strikes down more than it impels to common motion. The problem is to transfer the energy without destruction, to quicken the processes of another system without impeding its natural growth.

In the economic sphere, as in that of education, it is not impossible to discern the lines on which a wise and sound interaction may proceed. In economics India is still in the main a country of small village communities, living much as the whole world lived before the advent of large machinery and organization. The last few decades have brought into this quiet and stationary life several important novelties which we shall mention later. But the industrialization which has converted the West, and especially England and the United States, into communities of teeming cities, has not yet taken place in India; many, probably most, observers hope that it may never come. Nine-tenths of the population still live in villages, and for the most part in the same manner as their fathers before them. All other industries besides agriculture put together only account for a tenth of the people, and even of this tenth many are living in the villages. The large towns—say over two hundred thousand in population—are all due to special external causes, except Benares, which is the religious capital of Hinduism. Great Britain has created four large maritime ports, and previous ruling powers are responsible for four other large towns now provincial capitals. And that is all. In England a quarter of the population

is to be found in large towns of that size and only a tenth in the villages. The proportions are almost exactly reversed. But we and all other Western nations, were once country people as Indians still are ; and to some of us it now seems a golden dream. The village was then, as it still is in India, mainly self-supporting, making its own food and cloths and tools, with every family handing on its own land and occupations from generation to generation. In India the villagers are poor, very poor according to our present standards ; they are isolated and ignorant, but not as a rule unhappy. It is calculated that there is on the average two-thirds of an acre to support each human being in the agricultural population. As this is small enough and the population is rapidly growing, the keenness to acquire land grows still more rapidly. This land hunger and the huge indebtedness to the bania, or local money-lender, are accounted by many observers as the most serious of the general evils which afflict the country, and one meets people who hold that the increase of population, fostered by improved sanitary measures and unbalanced by other checks, will prove in the end rather a curse than a blessing.

At once, therefore, we see how the invasion of Western methods in one respect necessitates their employment in others. Medical science and sanitation, applied by a pervasive, modern administration, keeps down the death-rate and the recurrent and sweeping famines of earlier days have now become, through the provision of good roads and railways, a thing of the past. What will become

of this swollen host ? Above all, how in these conditions can they be led to a higher standard of life ?

Three methods only seem possible. Either the increase of population must be checked, as it is being checked in Western lands, or the surplus people must be removed by emigration, either to towns or to other countries, or the productivity of the soil and of other village industries must be increased. Actually, something of all three processes is going on and a belief in the essential common sense and stability of the human race will not let us despair. In each case it must be noted that Western science and organization come into play, though in each case also it is quite possible to abuse them.

It may clear the way to a later discussion of possible right methods if we point out at once the types of ' Westernization ' which would seem undesirable or even worse in India. One would be the wholesale migration of the country people into the big towns which would reproduce in India the slums of the industrial West with added horrors. Plenty of this may be seen at present in Bombay, Calcutta or Colombo, and no one could face calmly the extension of such a process. Besides, with the still existent vast spaces unoccupied and the possibilities of electric power, why, in any form of industrial organization, should we crowd unwieldy numbers on to one spot ?

Another form of harmful organization which might easily spread, would be the giving out of work to be done at home, by capitalist entrepreneurs living at a distance. We have had

ample experience of this among ourselves, and the Indian would be still more likely to become the slave of his debt and his distant master. The co-operative system which has lately spread with so much advantage on the Indian and Irish countryside, gives us a much better model for co-operative production and selling, at least for certain kinds of work. Co-operation, which has been found hard to apply to production in any part of the world and especially among peasants, is working with marked success to the improvement of credit. The Indian peasant has suffered in the past more perhaps from his indebtedness than from any other cause. The agriculturist needs credit everywhere; he needs it most of all in India, where the ordinary causes are aggravated by the acute land-hunger and the inveterate habit of incurring large expenses for purposes of display and above all for the marriage of daughters. Every good Hindu must have his daughters married off as soon as they are marriageable or sooner. The buying of a husband has impoverished more men than acquiring land, and this process continues but little altered. The government has applied itself wisely and with vigour in recent years to breaking the power of the local money-lender, both by stiffening the law as to usury and still more hopefully by setting up village co-operative banks. It is a long and delicate process, calling for the patient work of skilled and sympathetic people; but it can be done, and, as we saw in the last chapter, may very well be linked on the functions of a 'community' school. The spread of mutual confidence and the use of

organization to help the individual to greater freedom and self-help; these are trite sayings everywhere, but they have a peculiar appropriateness in a land honeycombed with divisions, personal, caste and religious. It is the application on a small scale of the function of a strong and impartial government in bringing together races, parties and provinces in the country at large.

The destruction of village industries, such as spinning, weaving, pottery and metal work by the flood of cheap machine-made goods is the charge most frequently and with most justice brought against the Western capitalist. The Western capitalist has in this matter now been followed by his Indian rival, and the mills of Bombay, Calcutta and Ahmedabad claim their own as part of the whole fabric of Indian prosperity, competing with those of China and, still more, of Japan. Yet India is far from being industrialized in the Western sense, and there is much that may be done to stave off the evils and prevent the consummation of the process. Many students of the facts, like Lord Ronaldshay in his recent trilogy, are convinced that industrialization in the Western sense can never be carried out in Indian conditions. This one question alone is infinitely complex, and requires careful definition before we can safely say anything about it. Do we mean the transference to India of the system, with all its methods and attendant horrors, which we have seen growing up in the West for the last one hundred and fifty years and are now in process of regulating and making more human? In this sense there is no necessity, and,

as Lord Ronaldshay shows us, very little prospect. But if we mean the wider application of science to industry, involving more co-operation between all engaged in the work and more organization, with the State in the background to intervene when necessary, then undoubtedly industrialization will proceed in India and throughout the world.

One point which often emerges in the debate deserves a moment's thought, and a moment will suffice. Gandhi and the opponents of Western industrialization often denounce 'machinery' as the arch-enemy, the special device of the Evil One for the enslavement of the poor. But what then is a 'machine,' and who first devised it and with what intent?

A machine is something which extends man's physical powers in dealing with nature, enables him to put more brains into longer and defter fingers and indefinitely strengthened muscles. Anyone who opposes this in principle, opposes the upward march of our species, nor can he draw even an intelligible line and say so far it was right for man to strengthen himself but no further. Is it to be at the motor-plough or at the first and simplest stick for scratching the ground, at the steel mechanical reaper or the stone-man's flint axe? There is no difference except of perfection and power. The real objections are to something quite different, the industrial town, the factory system and what is called 'wage-slavery.' But these are social arrangements, modifiable at will, and in no necessary way bound up with our extended power over nature.

A few years back a few enlightened men in Madras, Indian as well as British, founded an organization for improving the country looms. It was found that the hand-loom weavers, of whom there are several million in India, were gravely hampered by the imperfection of the looms. Far better work and more of it could be produced on newer types of machine, without in any way upsetting the domestic system. This is the line of sound conservative advance, which fits in well with the accustomed rural and social life of the country, for the Indian lady still has her beautiful 'saris' woven by men she knows, and will get one type or colour from one place and another from elsewhere, all over India. These things we should encourage and maintain without denouncing railways or talking as if all forms of Western influence were a curse.

The same thing is no doubt true of many other trades, including the manufacture of natural indigo instead of the chemical synthetic product. One has in India a strong tradition and inexhaustible man-power. A wise government could do nothing better than strengthen the national will, where it falters, and enlighten it to work on its own broad lines by more effective methods.

But of course the critic is thinking, and quite rightly, of larger changes than are involved in improving the looms of hand-weavers or restoring the natural production of indigo. Those who deplore and oppose the industrialization of the East, have in mind the whole system of aggregation, inter-communication and organization of men and machinery which the industrial revolu-

tion has established in the West. The steam-engine is its symbol, railways and telegraphs are its network of nerves, the factory its habitation. Are these to cover the world, and if so what effects will they have on India, and how can we ensure that these effects will be as free from evil and as full of advantage as possible for all concerned?

There is one grave *contra*, but, on the other hand, one strong *pro* in this argument, which it will be well to set out before examining the details.

The *contra*, the additional danger, or evil, which may be feared from industrializing an Eastern country such as India, as compared with the same process in the West, is that the people being less prepared for it and having less physical or moral strength, will succumb more easily to the strain. Of this one has abundant evidence at present. Trade unions are much more difficult to form or make effective. Very few Indians rise to posts of responsibility or authority with the workers. Foremen and managers are still mainly imported from the West. All this tends to depress both the moral and material outlook. And, physically, the transfer of a population used to a low, or simple, way of living in the country, to one-roomed tenements in a town is the most damaging form of human migration. It is similar, but far worse, than the Irish settlement in Liverpool, Glasgow, or New York.

But there is a strong *pro* on the other side of the balance-sheet.

The Industrial Revolution comes later to the

East than it did to Europe. We have seen its incidental evils as well as its essential necessity and its many boons. It should be possible, by foresight and goodwill in supervising the process, to ensure that the factory system, where it is advantageous, should be introduced into India in a sanitary, pleasant and civilizing form and with the necessary accommodations to their special needs. One fears that this has not been done generally up to the present, though there are many enlightened people working in the right direction. It may be useful, as we are standing at the cross-roads, to look at a deplorable example to the contrary.

Bombay, which is on the whole a splendid, generous and progressive place—the most completely Westernized of Indian cities, has had labour troubles. The housing was notorious and the wages very low. Within the last two years there have been serious strikes. In order to meet the need of housing for the work-people, a few years back, a huge contract or concession was allowed by the Bombay government to a person or persons who have erected acres of hideous blocks of tenements, costly to the tax payer, an eyesore to the lover of the town, and so repulsive to those for whom they were intended that they stand there practically unoccupied, a colossal monument of want of judgment, or worse, while the workers remain huddled in their ancient haunts.

Yet the main fact holds true. In India we may still deal with the great problem of industrialism as a whole, with Western experience behind us,

and the vast population almost untouched. In this respect at least it is in a better state than Japan which rushed headlong into the alluring prospects of factory production and is paying the penalty in a terrible degradation of social life.

Let us come back to the main thesis and try in this matter also to apply the analysing test which was used in the chapters on government and education. What part of 'Westernization' is good and applicable to Indian conditions? How can we discriminate, and how confine it to its proper limits?

The tests must be reason, respect for ancient human things that have worked well, above all the supremacy of the general good—what are called, in the current parlance, the higher values. To put the last point briefly in a concrete form, if we could show that by covering India with factories, and working them on the latest American speeding plans, the wealth both of capitalist and workers would be enormously increased, that should not decide the question against the loss of freedom and love of home and nature or the cultivation of beautiful traditional arts. Whenever we can set the balance true between material and spiritual, there should be no hesitation and no attempt to trim the scales.

Most of the facts are capable of a clear decision.

Railways and good roads come first into the mind, the former being a sequence and higher development of the latter. There can surely be no question of any improper 'Westernization' here. The provision of good communications has always been a test, and even a condition, of any

good government. The Roman Empire was built upon its roads, and the best rulers of India, like the great Akbar, have all done the same in their degree. Great Britain has most clearly shown her superiority in organizing skill by linking up all parts of India by an excellent railway system which, after a period of discontent due to the supposed 'drain' on India in the form of dividends, has now become a source of revenue. In the last budget the surplus due to this made possible not only a reduction of the fares, but also some remission of taxation to the provinces. It is the case *par excellence* where the resources of Western science come in to second the power of efficient organization. It is enjoyed to the full by all the population and is the most effective means by which education in the wide sense—improvement in industrial methods and the spread of a larger citizenship—may reach the masses. Last, but not least, it has banished completely the spectre of 'famine' in the old and devastating form.

Another great department of organization and science to which it would seem that no just objection can be raised, is that which aims at increasing the productivity of the soil. Here again the modern man takes up, with his force multiplied by science and social union, the tasks attempted since civilization began. The old village communities dug their tank and enlightened rulers carried out the same works on a larger scale. The modern engineer builds colossal dams across the rivers, diverts their course through mountain tunnels and turns arid wastes into

fertile plains. The whole Punjab is becoming a brilliant example of this, and the barrages being now completed across the Cauvery in Mysore and in other parts, especially at Sukkur in Sind, will rank among the greatest works of the kind in the world. Can anyone question the rightness of this, except on the problematic ground that those who do it are artificially maintaining a larger population than the country can normally support? But what is this norm? Is not mankind now all over the world thus making his habitation artificial, that is to say, compelling nature to support him in the way and to the standard which he thinks fit? And is there any just reason why our fellow-subjects in India should not be placed in the same attitude of greater freedom and power in the face of nature which we have attained and claim for ourselves?

The same question arises in another form in the development of plantations, the growing of tea, rubber, and other commercial products, on a large scale and mostly under Western supervision. When one considers the small wages—from a Western standpoint—that are paid to the coolies for this work, the relatively large salaries enjoyed by their managers and the profits transmitted to distant shareholders, one is inclined to think that the human instrument, as well as the soil, is being 'exploited.' 'Exploitation' indeed there may be, of a bad kind, and in certain cases; better no doubt if the native worker can gradually learn to conduct the whole process himself, including the raising of capital, the laying out of the estate and the chemical treatment and market-

ing of the product. But if we agree to this, it by no means follows that Western 'exploitation'—in the harmless sense of the term—is to be condemned as a preparation. One must judge the thing as it stands, and as a stage in training and development, both of the soil and of the worker, and not by a standard drawn from industrial and social conditions of another stage. The initial step would not be taken unless capital, enterprise and trained skill came in at first from the West; and that the conditions of wages and life are not unattractive or demoralizing to the coolies, is clear to anyone visiting a well-managed estate. For this work labour is abundant, and one may choose; while the rural surroundings, with decent housing, and a school, church, and medical treatment, are poles asunder from a slum in Calcutta or Bombay.

Mankind—in this case the stronger and more highly trained man—has a double duty, if not a 'dual mandate' as Sir Frederick Lugard has taught us;—to train and care for the human being, but also to put the natural resources of the earth to the best use.

When one turns to that other department of economic life in India which approximates most closely to Western conditions—the factory, the crowded town, and foreign trade—one cannot feel the same ease in a decision or the same general satisfaction with 'Westernization.' Organized industry, i.e. work in places containing ten to twenty workpeople as a minimum, only employs one per cent of the population: yet India has become one of the largest industrial countries in

the world. The cotton trade is the most important, centring in Bombay as jute does in Calcutta. A recent and thoroughly scientific effort has been made to establish steel works at Jamshedpur in Bengal while about a quarter of a million persons are engaged in mining.

It would seem that organized industry of the Western type, being relatively so small a part of the life of the country, might be well supervised and conducted on model lines. This indeed would be the moral we should draw from our general survey, and from the study of the best way in which to control the contact of East and West in India; not to expect or encourage the widespread industrialization of the country, to help it to improve on its own lines of village and agricultural life, but, where the factory system comes in, to see that it is above reproach and suited as far as possible to the needs of the people. Unfortunately one cannot assert that this has hitherto been the rule, and when one reads accounts of an infant mortality of often more than 600 per thousand, reaching in Bombay, in 1921, actually 828, one's blood runs cold. The employers, be they British or Indian—and the latter are increasing—are responsible for the welfare of the employed, and the State should hold them strictly to account. They enjoy the labour of these people at a rate far lower than that of the Western worker; the workers have not acquired the same power of protecting themselves by combination; they should therefore be protected by those who employ them.

In theory, there is no reason why the factory

in India should not be as wholesome and attractive as the best that we are now putting up in Garden Cities in England. In practice they run a grave risk of degrading the physical and moral level of the people.

It should be noted that an Act encouraging Trade Unions by registration was passed last year (1926) at Delhi, and steps are being taken, largely at the instance of the Labour Office at Geneva, to reduce the hours, raise the age for employment, and exclude altogether women and children from working underground in mines.

The thing is thus running the course with which we are familiar in Europe. But it need not have done so. A stronger government and more foresight would have seen to it that the evils of the system which we have known only too well at home, were provided against beforehand in this alien and virgin soil. The evil however is still limited; the vast mass of the country is unaffected, and many of the workers who come in from their fields to earn a little more at the factory, insist on returning to their rural occupations for a large part of each year. For the rest, the organized industry of India, like its international trade, now takes its place in a world-order of which the League of Nations and its sister International Labour Office are becoming the recognized guardians.

VIII

SOCIAL LIFE

FROM Government to Religion we pass in these chapters from a maximum to a minimum of external influence. The West and Great Britain count for less in the economic than in the political sphere, and we have now to see that they count for less in social than in economic life. In religion the influence is at its lowest, and, so far as it acts at all, acts much more slowly.

It has been so in the past of India, and the causes, which are fairly obvious, might be paralleled from other countries and other times. The effect of Mohammedanism is perhaps the most striking example. They have no system of caste, and at times made violent and ruthless efforts to uproot the religion of their Indian subjects. Yet Hinduism remains unshaken, and caste, though now in some points yielding to indirect pressure, was rather strengthened than impaired by Moslem contact.

In the same way it might seem at first sight that Britain, so far from transfusing the ancient order, has only added another discordant element to it, and brought another caste to the great storehouse. And this is true in a sense, though only a small part of the truth.

The Englishman—or European—marries among

his own people ; he eats and drinks certain food ; he observes—or neglects—certain religious rites. These are precisely the external tests of caste which the skill and self-interest of the Brahmans have fostered for ages and made the backbone of Indian society.

From this point of view the British occupation is the last in the series of social strata which have been deposited in the land south of the Himalayas during three or four thousand years. Each stage has increased the complexity of the system, and we are now—British and Indians alike—trying to think and work it out into an order which will be both juster to the mass of the inhabitants, more united as a national whole and more consistent with the general peace and progress of the world.

Caste, which is the keynote of Indian society, has become in India one of the most obscure and yet fascinating subjects of research. But the main outlines of its origin and development are clear enough, and were touched on briefly in Chapter III. The hereditary transmission of functions was common enough, if not universal, in primitive society. In India the early conquests gave the sharper divisions and the order of hereditary functions was added to them. What were spoken of in the Vedas—the earliest Hindu writings—as the natural orders of mankind became, through these special causes and the steady pressure of the Brahmans, the most rigid and immutable of human institutions. In the end caste law became more than obligatory ; it was inconceivable to transgress ; you could not, and for the most part even

now cannot, imagine yourself not doing what the laws of your caste prescribed.

The four original and natural orders from which the castes have been developed were: (1) the learned or priestly order, the Brahmins, who succeeded, after Vedic times, in establishing themselves as supreme even after their special function had disappeared; (2) the fighting and governing class, Kshatriyas or Rajanyas; (3) the trading and agricultural folk, Vaisyas; (4) the serving folk, or Sudras. This is obviously a rough natural division which became precise and elaborate in the process of time.

The earliest stage, conquest leading to the degradation of the conquered, may be compared with the relations of patricians and plebeians in Rome; the difference being that in India no subsequent movement took place by which the lower and higher orders became amalgamated. In the same way the emergence of a priestly order, side by side with the fighters and rulers, is common enough elsewhere. What is unique in India is the success of the priestly and learned caste, which was post-conquest, in establishing and maintaining a permanent pre-eminence. The reason for this must be sought in the changing and unstable character of the political power, combined with the stronger religious attachments of the people. One sees in the Western world, in ancient Greece and Rome and still more in modern Europe, the priestly functions, and those who exercise them, gradually losing their practical importance and drifting off into another sphere. This is a conspicuous, perhaps the leading, feature

of the close of the mediaeval period in the West. In India a stable political power, representative of the whole nation, never succeeded in establishing itself, as did the personal monarchies of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and, with alien Moslems on the imperial throne and Hindu rulers in constant flux and peril, the Brahman was able to maintain and extend his influence. He was the repository of true and ancient Hinduism, the guide and teacher of the people as well as the indispensable secretary and man of letters to Moslem and Hindu rulers alike. The position of the Irish priest in the days of the Protestant ascendancy may give us a faint analogy, but we must think of a married priesthood, sending its members to fill other posts besides that of serving the altars, and preserving its purity of race by the strictest rules as to marriage and ways of life.

The same strictness of caste law spread downwards from the Brahman caste, and became the unquestioned practice of all the others. But the very multiplicity of the existing system contains within it the seeds of its own dissolution. When one has thousands of castes, a caste for almost every occupation, with millions of persons unclassified altogether, and plainly appealing for the simplest rights and sympathy of mankind, it is obvious that a change is near at hand. The change is, in fact, now taking place, and it proceeds from both ends of the caste scale simultaneously. At the top Brahman rule or influence is challenged by British: at the bottom the contempt and degradation of the outcaste, the untouchables, is

challenged by the sentiment of humanity which finds many echoes in old Indian religion, but comes in with a flood from the democratic West.

In both fields—the higher, which touches on privilege, and the lower, which deals with human rights—though the chief impulse has come from the West through England, it must not be supposed that we are dealing with a racial or international conflict. Though it is true that in each case Western sympathy would be on one side, and purely Indian tradition and influence on the other, yet in each case also a strong and growing force in favour of advance comes from the best elements in India itself. This is so clearly the case that many reforming Indians will claim that the main impulse comes from India, and that Indians by themselves would have made, and would still make, more rapid advance than in British tutelage. Who can pronounce on hypothetical history? But one may say with certainty that Mr. Edwyn Bevan's image of a steel framework, repeated by Mr. Lloyd George and often quoted in India, is not a complete account of British influence nor indeed very happy, as others have interpreted it. The British raj has done much more than bring the country together and keep the peace. But when one comes to distinguishing and weighing various influences in producing changes, themselves often subtle and slow, who can decide? Did Indian sentiment or British authority finally abolish suttee? Both contributed, but Bentinck's was the deciding mind and the executive hand.

In the social changes of the present and the future it may well be that British influence is a

diminishing quantity. It should be so, if a sound education takes root, for what is defective in Indian conditions can only be permanently cured by an enlightened opinion springing from the people themselves. But while British organizing and political dominance remains, it must always count on the side of modifying caste, and might often, one would think, be used more actively than it is in that direction.

The change in caste will come, is now coming, mainly by a twofold movement from above and from below. So education spread in England, and it is the natural process of reform. Humanitarian motives, which founded 'Ragged schools' with us, operate most freely in the lowest strata; intellectual changes, such as the Reform of Universities, pass from above downwards. The mass in the middle strata take the longest to affect. It is a similar process that one sees going on to-day in India. The lowest classes, 'untouchables' and those who have no caste, among whom one must include the majority of Christian converts, are beginning to receive education and recognition. They are bound therefore to rise. The highest class, including the Brahmans, come in increasing numbers to Europe, and are modifying, though more slowly, their manner of life. Many a cultivated Indian will tell you that his father would not allow him to cross the 'black water,' but that he would have no objection and that his father himself has since changed his mind. The change in domestic habits is less marked, and there has been recently a revival on nationalist grounds of many older customs and dress. But it

is not impossible to see at one Indian table three different grades or types of living, the college-bred son with his full-blown Western meal, the father with a spoon and metal platter, and the mother with her broad leaf as a dish and her own nimble fingers as fork and spoon.

Travel is the greatest educator, and for Indians who do not leave their own continent, the railway train at home has brought many classes together and destroyed some irrational caste taboos. Here again the women are far more conservative than the men. They travel much less and when they do, take far more pains to preserve their privacy and avoid contact. Until they are converted the change will be slow and painful.

Converted to what? the fair-minded reader, whether Indian or British, may ask, desiring only the greatest good for the country.

It is impossible to give an answer at once general and precise, though the question is a fair and necessary one, and exercises the minds of many good Indian families, placed in such a position as the double or triple *menage* which we have described. There must be such difficulties in any transitional society, especially where two or more well-organized cultures come into contact, as they have done so intimately in many cases in India. Some changes must be effected and a compromise worked out; the best efforts of all parties should be applied to making it as amicable as possible, preserving the best features of both systems.

The method employed in previous chapters

may throw some light here also, though the facts become more and more subtle and yet stubborn, as we approach the roots of conduct in religion and immemorial tradition.

It is clear, in the first place, that there must be some readiness to change, and this in itself is more than half of the battle. Now changes take place in social practice partly by necessity and the imitation of others, and partly by reflexion on the reasons of what we do. The first two causes act automatically, and need not disturb our argument here: our whole endeavour must be to get the thinking done—our own thinking, and that of as many more as maybe—on right premisses and towards the right end.

What are the only admissible canons by which to reason in all such cases? A certain practice, habit or belief has always prevailed. Is that by itself enough to justify its persistence? Clearly not, if the question is one as to the truth of a belief. In this case if the untruth is evident, antiquity of the belief has no weight whatever. If it is a practice or habit, prescription has still considerable value even against a certain advantage in making a change; for one acts more easily and efficiently in following a long-accustomed course. But prescription cannot hold as against a great and obvious advantage from a change; and a certain value, too, must be allowed for the freshening effect of making a move.

Granted then that social habits may legitimately come under the review of reason, at least within a large part of the domain; how are we to judge the direction of advance; what, in fact, is our

ideal of conduct? Are we compelled to assume a different standard for East and West, does the decalogue or any other canon alter with the lines of latitude?

This great question was one of those propounded at the last International Moral Education Congress held in Rome in 1926, and clearly transcends our present space. We can only give briefly a general conclusion to help us here.

If the ideal is stated in sufficiently general terms, it is of universal validity, and these terms, for all mankind in every country or latitude, are, the making and enjoying of as much beauty, the attainment of as much truth, and the spread of as much happiness, for the individual, but through the society, as possible in each case: or, if one desires a still more summary statement, the making of more perfect men by the co-operation of all mankind. Beauty, truth and happiness, these three, and a greater than either, love, the attachments of men to one another and to the world around them—these are the various aspects of one ideal, universal for all mankind.

That a multitude of present facts and actions, both East and West, offend this standard, needs no demonstration. But it would be the greatest immediate gain imaginable if all the critics, both East and West, would accept it and make their criticisms and recommendations accordingly. We shall return in the next chapter to the standard of truth, as realizable under the forms of Indian religion. The canons of beauty and happiness are more readily applicable to what we see, either in India or in England, at the present moment.

Dress, furniture, architecture, the fine arts and music, give ample scope for the expression and the enjoyment of beauty, and in this sphere India has much to give as well as to learn. It is perhaps of all spheres that in which direct transference is least to be desired. The Indian woman's dress stands out in pleasing contrast to that of her Western sister, in its simplicity, its grace and its almost unfailing charm of colour. Here would be a disastrous field for Westernizing experiments.

The earlier contact of India with the West, after the invasion of Alexander, was fruitful for art; the Greek spirit of ideal humanity was still alive, and produced, in conjunction with Indian workmanship, the first images of the Buddha and other sculpture in the north-west. The European influence, too, which came through with the Moguls was in the direction of refined, if not vigorous, beauty. But the final contact, which came when Mogul art was decadent, and English art was at its lowest ebb, has been far less beneficial than either, and, in the judgment of many, an unmixed evil. The architecture and furniture of the British period, until the recent revival due to Lord Curzon, are almost always deplorable. A new movement for the building up of a school of Indian art is a welcome feature of our own time, in which the Tagores are taking a leading and honourable part as they have in poetry and learning. But it cannot yet be said that the new school is very firmly rooted or vigorous in its originality. It has a dreamy charm and seems always to be striving for something outside the world of sense, and one can trace the foreign influence, on which

it leans, sometimes from the West, perhaps still oftener from the East.

The third and greatest test or object of the good social life is the calm and happiness which come from peaceful co-operation with our fellows. Such calm and harmony are needed for any widespread and permanent new growth in art; but for India we must desire it most of all as the final solvent of caste restrictions, the only true healer of communal strife. The lesson is of universal application and was once needed in the lanes of England as it seems now to be in the streets of Calcutta. One reads in *Shirley* a lively picture of how the Wesleyans at Whitsun would regularly meet the Church of England procession in a lane, chosen by both, which was so narrow that they could not pass without a fight. Now they probably march arm in arm; for in the end it does not increase the happiness of either party to break heads over religion. Nor can the satisfaction be lasting, or very great at any time, in keeping the members of a lower caste from eating with us, or walking within thirty feet of our person.

The process of social amalgamation may be a slow one, but it is sure, and there can be no reason why it should not operate in India, as it has operated elsewhere, with patience and political stability. Meanwhile one may see going on quite rapidly the incorporation of the highest and the lowest strata of Indian society. The former by increasing travel and education are becoming imbued with the common ideas of world-civilization—the forward look, the scientific training, the desire for free development. The latter are being

elevated in India itself to a recognized place in the body politic. In both cases, and especially in the former, women have a large part to play, and their education must be the first thought of the true reformer.

It is good therefore to know, not only that women's schools and colleges are on the increase, but that more Indian women students come every year to English and other Western universities. In England they are still not 5 per cent of the men, but the men in London have shown their goodwill by assigning to women students a free club room in their own quarters. They intend to encourage the movement with all their force and in their own interests they are wise. As future husbands, as builders of a new and united nation, they need the women and cannot succeed without them.

To gain the best from Europe and the United States, it is well that the travelling Indian student is now extending his sphere more than in the past and going to Germany and the United States as well as to Great Britain. The growing tendency to do this, and the growth of universities in India, make it certain that the intellectual élite will continue to increase; what is not so clear is that this by itself will strengthen the unity of India as a whole. The more the well-to-do travel and become Westernized, with two and often three languages besides their mother tongue, the more the gulf is widened between the cultivated and the peasants and workpeople at home. From this point of view the need of popular education becomes still stronger, for ominous memories come to mind of the cultivated bilingual minority

in the Roman Empire and the mass of poor and slaves beneath, or the fashionable and travelled society of the eighteenth century who were to bow their heads or lose them in the Revolution. This is a far larger question than the social relations of British and Indians about which so much ink has been spilt. The social relations of Indians to one another far transcend this, and the best thing that the young Indian could take back to India from the West, if he can transplant it, is the completely socialized spirit of some of the smaller European states, Switzerland and Scandinavia, for instance, or the approximations to it in the larger countries. 'I love to get back sometimes,' said a good Jesuit father from one of the smaller European countries, who had been working for some years in India, 'to a land where everyone lets you know that he is as good as you are.'

This is where social India is most unlike the West as it has been settling down since the French Revolution. Pity they have in plenty, and an accustomed charity which we have lost; but of social equality, or of the sense that the welfare of every individual is the concern of all, there is little trace. The habitual beggars, of whom there are millions, become a caste like the rest. To absorb and incorporate them in the body of self-reliant and self-respecting workers, is a task that has not yet dawned even upon the mind of the reforming Indian. And how without it can we expect the attainment of a healthy social unity based on the consciousness that all are performing a useful function, and that in consequence all are entitled to a voice in determining the com-

mon good? It is calculated that there are considerably more than half a million lepers in India, certainly no consequence of British rule. Would not a strong social passion, shared alike by Indians and British, see to it that this, like other social pests, was extirpated there as it has long been extirpated in the West?

IX

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

ON no aspect of Indian life is it more difficult and yet more necessary to speak than on religion, for in one, perhaps the commonest, use of the word, India is the most religious country in the world. But before entering on this discussion, slight though it must be within the limits of a chapter, a preliminary remark is necessary on the word itself.

If we accept this description of India as the 'most religious country,' are we thereby condemning Europe or ourselves to a state of comparative irreligion?

When we thus speak of India we have in mind the scrupulous observance of prescribed and traditional acts, the doing, or not doing, of certain things at certain times, offering sacrifices to a god and so forth; and we mean that this type of obligation seems to the average Indian more binding than any other. It involves some notion of a power or system of powers behind phenomena to which man owes homage and which may do him good or harm, and in this we may find a common point between the most superstitious form of religion and the highest, between the grovelling rites of a demon-worshipper and the sublime synthesis and spiritual submission of

the philosopher. It would take us too far to probe the matter further, and both types have been present in abundance in India. But, in the ordinary description quoted above, it is clear that the external and formal aspect of religion is most prominent. In the same sense one would speak of a 'decay of religion' in England, if one considered the observance of Sunday or the number of communicants, without regard to the persons who were living, in the deeper sense, a religious life in the daily presence of a supreme ideal.

We can only attempt here the briefest sketch of the multifarious religious life of India, and then suggest the lines of actual and possible reaction between East and West in this matter. As in other subjects, here too the approach must be historical, and it is clear at once, that in religion as in caste, the present state is the result of a stratification in the past. One set of deities and ideas has followed, and been superimposed, upon another, and the amalgamation or transmutation has been less completely carried out than in the West. One might almost say that the mixture in the East is mechanical and chemical in the West. What is performing and may perform a greater fusion we will inquire in conclusion.

The lowest Indian religious stratum is what is now commonly called 'animism.' This is the original system or attitude of the Dravidian population who occupied the peninsula before the Aryans appeared from the north-west. It is a form of belief and religious practice common throughout the world, and is closely interwoven

with the later and greater 'nature-gods' who form the bulk of the Vedic and Brahmanical pantheon. In fact, the process was continuous from one form of belief to the other. The earlier thinkers and worshippers saw gods everywhere and had not arranged, classified and humanized them as the reflective mind at once began to do. Such a foundation of simple spirit-worship—spirits of natural objects and spirits of the dead—what is often called fetichism, is universal to mankind; it was the original religion of India and has survived there in larger measure than elsewhere through being incorporated in the higher religion which supervened.

So far as one can tell in so obscure and complicated a matter, the greater gods and the organization of the celestial world came in with the Aryan invaders from the north-west. Their pantheon belongs to a later stage in theologic thought, and closely resembles the theism of other branches of the same Indo-European family with whom they are connected in speech if not nearly in blood. Their Varuna is the Ouranus of the Greeks, the god of the all-embracing Heaven, Surya is the sun-god, and Indra the god of light and thunder.

This Vedic religion largely disappeared, or rather was transformed by mixtures with the earlier cults which it met with in the penetration of India by the invaders.

Before the time of Buddha the system which thus resulted and is known as Hinduism, covered the greater part of the peninsula, taking up from below much of the older and more superstitious beliefs and imposing from above the organization,

the system of caste, above all, the authority of the Brahmins which developed as it went.

But side by side with this popular religion, there developed at the other end of the scale a system of religious philosophy, which, with many shades of dialectical difference, remains substantially one, and is the spiritual kernel of Hinduism. It is based on intense concentration and the identification of man's spirit with the spirit of the universe. The soul of man is part of the heavenly Power, and everything else is also a part of it. This universal being, or *brahma*, is in me as my ego or spirit and after death I shall, if I have attained knowledge, return and be absorbed in it.

This philosophy, with its infinite varieties, had been already developed before the fifth century B.C. when Buddhism appeared, a heresy springing from its own bosom, which lasted as a rival system, of a more directly moral and humanitarian inspiration, for a thousand years in India, and then yielded there to a transformed and triumphant Brahmanism to become one of the three greatest world-religions in the wider East.

The appearance of Buddha in North India coincides with the flowering of the Greek genius at Athens, and with the later Hebrew prophets in Judea: it seems to denote some deeper unities in human evolution than we have fathomed as yet. And the sequel of the three movements is singularly alike. They all died out from the lands of their birth to gain a wider influence elsewhere.

The Greek poets and philosophers inspired the

further West, while their original home returned to barbarism. The Hebrew prophets were absorbed into another religion, while their own country fell under the heel of the infidel; and though Buddhism exercised a deep influence in India, especially through the apostleship of Aśoka, its final home was China, Burma, Tibet and Ceylon, and the more formal system expelled the later Buddhists and retained its sway.

Buddhism, though not originally or formally antagonistic to Brahmanism, contained within it at least three vital differences which prevented its absorption in the older system and led finally to its disappearance in India. In the first place it sprang, not from the Brahman but the warrior caste. Buddha was the son of a ruling chief, and, though never a democrat, he never accepted the supremacy of the Brahman order, and in the end Buddhism lost all trace of caste. In the second place, it was originally as sharply distinguished from the surrounding idolatry as the religion of Mohammed from the worship of the 'Black Stone.' Most potent of all, the guiding principle was a moral one, face to face with a popular religion which rested on formal external observances. Many have thought the fall of Buddhism and the victory of the more formal system the greatest tragedy in the history of India; yet there were ample reasons, perhaps even some justification for the loss.

Like the Friars in the West, the later Buddhists lost their religious fervour and became an opulent corporation, more and more separated from the people. Its professors lived in monas-

teries and discoursed as subtly on discipline and metaphysics as the Brahmans whom they might have superseded. They had long ceased to go out simply among the people preaching a doctrine of purity and love. They began by casting off idolatry and ended by worshipping the Buddha himself. But there were also in the original doctrine two roots of weakness and decay which were bound to prove it insufficient in the long run, even if purely and simply preached. One is the self-centring spirit from which it sprang, and the other the conviction, connected with this, that the world in which we have to live is essentially evil, and that all our endeavours and all our virtue must be bent on securing a release.

Pessimism, the inevitable result of self-concentration, is its final condemnation, and must cause it ultimately to take on a fresh spirit or entirely to disappear.

It may be said that in this vein of pessimism Buddhism is at one with Christianity and even Judaism, which both have taught at various times and places that 'all is vanity and vexation of spirit' and that 'to die is gain.' And no doubt there will always be a strain of deep sadness and a mood of doubt in the religious mind which contemplates the evils and uncertainties of life. But it must be remembered—and the distinction is fundamental—that the first Christians and Jews, and that third great Eastern religion of Zoroaster, looked for the triumph of righteousness and good for their believers in this world or in a world continuous with and resembling this. For the Jews a Messiah was soon to come; for Christians

the Messiah had already come and was to reappear in this very world personally and sweep his followers up with him into the heavens above. In the Dark Ages the date was firmly fixed for A.D. 1000, and, when that passed, the same conception was gradually replaced by a Kingdom of Heaven to be achieved on earth, a New Jerusalem, as we all now sing, in our own green and pleasant land. Always, to Christian, Jew, and Zoroastrian alike, religion spoke of hope, and looked to a future of fulfilment and not of release.

The history of Hinduism is full of the formation of sects of thinkers of whom Buddha was the most distinguished and successful. He offered the world a character as well as a doctrine of release, and, though the doctrine was confused and pessimistic, the character was lovable and self-denying, and, as such, attracted the millions, first of India, and then of the poor and passive, but mostly affectionate and often brooding, masses of the East. The sect of Buddha, which thus became one of the three great world-religions, was one of many which bear witness to the persistent speculative bent of the Hindu sage. From Buddha's day down to the sixteenth century these schools of religious speculation continued to appear, and those who care to trace the similarities in human development, will remember that the same period covers the classic age, both of the scholastic philosophy and the great heresies of mediaeval Europe. Then, just as this form of speculation was giving way in Europe before the advance of objective thinking based on the world around us, it decayed also in India; but in India

there was no rising modern science to fill the void.

Hence comes a period of intellectual stagnation, side by side with the political disorganization which we have described. Now again in our own day speculation and sect-forming have revived, and we see, both in philosophic thought and in the spirit of the reforming sects, such as the Arya and the Brahmo Samaj, the influence of Western moral and religious ideas.

But these reformers are few and do not seem to be increasing. The mass of Indians stand in religion where they stood centuries ago, with a growing volume of intellectual and moral scepticism fostered by a college education devoid of any elements calculated to correct it. It is on this side that our subject here connects with the educational problem of Chapter VI. It would be extremely valuable and interesting, if one could compare the total effect, moral and intellectual, of the training at the great Christian colleges, which are to be found in all the leading towns, with that of the State, and strictly non-religious, colleges which often compete in a friendly way with them. Would the Heads there be able to tell us, with hand on heart, that in their considered opinion, based on the observation of many years, the religious element which they represent, has proved a useful leaven and lifted their pupils to a higher level? It is to be sincerely hoped they may.

But in this brief survey one has to return constantly to the mass, and judge of that; and, in the mass, the Hindu people remain the confused animists and polytheists that they have been so

long, acknowledging a multitude of gods and offering worship or sacrifice to the favoured local one, or any other who might assist in special need. Above these socially—for caste and religion are close allied—come the 'twice-born' men who wear the sacred thread and worship the gods with traditional rites, though they have some religious philosophy besides.

Side by side with these, a smaller number, are those who follow a distinct sect with its one Supreme God, thought out by an earlier thinker and identified with Brahma, the supreme being of the later classics. Other minorities are furnished by the seventy million Moslems, the Sikhs, the Jains and many others too numerous and comparatively too minute to call for reckoning here.

Can we comprise these in any common formula, see any common features in Indian religion and contemplate any distinctive action of the West upon it, action which could be analysed for good or evil as in the other spheres of life? And on the other hand, what influence may be traced, and might be welcomed, from Indian thinkers and religious men on Western thought? The latter aspect of the co-operation may well be taken first; it has been dwelt on largely by contemporary writers; it appeals strongly to the mystic and the theosophist; it plays a leading and suggestive part in the recent travel musings of Count Hermann Keyserling, who gives us a new setting of Western vigour and advance in an atmosphere of Eastern contemplation and spiritual realization of the best.

• The Count's ideal rendering has a high purpose like that of his kindred spirit, Rabindranath Tagore, but both fail to satisfy us completely by dwelling too much on the ideal of one side, and seeing the other, rather as it falls short of this ideal than where it is strong on its own. Assuming that both have something to confer, where may we find the strength of the Indian position?

In the first place in its true and noble exaltation of the speculative faculties above the practical, of thought above action. In this they continue the tradition of the first and greatest of systematic thinkers, of the tutor of the first European who entered India as a conqueror. What Aristotle taught as to the primacy of the theoretic life, and from him was treasured for a thousand years in the West, has passed from us, but is still professed by Indian thinkers, the only large body of thinkers in the world who would profess it. This, in spite of its sorry trappings of sham devotion and begging 'sanyasis,' is a great possession, and one must pray that no invasion of Western vigour and scientific organization will drive out the lively spirit of inquiry, the interest in abstract questions, the contempt for material conditions of time and space which distinguish so large a section of intellectual India, the students at the universities and the pilgrims on their march alike. It is the good side of that tendency which we, as pragmatists, are apt entirely to condemn, the neglect of the external, the failure to modify the world to suit our needs, the resting in the self. That these are evil should not blind us to the truth that in the exercise of his mind, apart

altogether from practical results, man is achieving his supreme greatness, the quality which puts him above all other animate things. The West has recognized this in many individual utterances ; Indian sages profess it as a religion.

Closely connected with this is the unbounded respect paid by the Hindus to any man who exemplifies in a consistent life the principle that devotion to a spiritual ideal is higher than any worldly success. This is the true foundation of Gandhi's greatness, the motive of the multitudes who followed to the grave the body of the murdered Swami Shraddhandha, the founder of the Arya Samaj college at Gurukul.*

The possibility and the supremacy of sainthood are inspiring beliefs, and their persistence in India is an object lesson of the highest value to the world which once accorded the same position to a St. Bernard or a Peter the Hermit, but now thinks in other terms. The present reality of these things to the Hindu forms a link for him with an ideal past ; he adores in the present as he adored in the past, where the figure seems to possess these super-human qualities of spirit. In this case criticism is stilled, and all that might be said of evil or failure falls out of sight ; the worshipper lives in the blinding glory of an apotheosis.

We have noticed before, when speaking of education, the prejudicial effects of this blinding process on the study of history. It is equally important to remember its advantages. The failure of hero-worship in Western countries is

* Died December, 1926,

in itself a weakening of vital force, even though the intellect may be better balanced and knowledge more adequate to the facts. The moral stimulus of a romance of Scott's is far greater than that of a modern novel, where one meets no one to whom one could bow the knee and where most of the characters are worse than one feels oneself to be. The belief in heroes, whether saints or not, tends to breed heroes ; and saints rather tend to be extinguished in an atmosphere of useful activity and material comfort. The world would be spiritually poorer if all the genuine 'sanyasis,' men like Kim's old guide and friend, went to their last home and were forgotten.

But vigorous efforts are being made, both in East and West, to preserve and strengthen the best features in the old Hindu religious discipline, and adapt them to the conditions of modern life. Of these none is more admirable than the practice of Yoga, or concentration with a view of obtaining greater clearness and force of mind. We need not commit ourselves to any belief in the possibility of direct intuition of absolute truths, to agree with Mrs. Besant as to the value of strict and regular concentration as a means of strengthening the mental powers. This is a special characteristic of Indian thinkers and the results achieved in modern times as well as ancient, by men whose works may be read and admired, seem to open the door to unlimited possibilities, if the science of a Kant could be combined with the simple life and physical endurance of the greatest of Eastern sages.

A last, perhaps the greatest, point remains to

place on the credit side in India's account before we pass to consider those aspects of religion and philosophy on which the West has most to teach. This is the strong and universal stress on the unity of things. In striking contrast to the bewildering diversity of popular deities and the harmful antagonism of castes and creeds, the tendency of the thinkers has always been towards an ideal unity of thought. The two processes, in fact, seem in history to have been parallel and complementary. Just as the ignorant and superstitious crowd were adding constantly to their million gods, the philosophers were striving more and more to see all things as one. A spiritual pantheism was, and is, the religion of the élite, while polytheism of a low type continued to dominate the masses. The fact suggests again the need of greater social unity; religions that have moved the world have all sprung from communities of men, containing all social elements, and where the member, whatever his difference in wealth or social status, was in the religious aspect equal. So it was with primitive Christianity and St. Francis, and Christianity in modern times is gaining strength by a return to the same inspiration. So it was notably with the Moslems, nor did Buddha begin to convert the world until he had taken all castes into one fold. The scission in Hinduism between the intellectually enlightened and the degraded turned the former more and more towards self-sufficient contemplation, while the low caste and outcaste went on practising their superstitions and multiplying their gods. The passion for unity is a noble and character-

istically human trait, and the world which needs it so sorely will turn with sympathy to the speculations of Indian thinkers which tell us that all is one and may be grasped by concentration of mind. But the path to the needed goal, whether in philosophy or in the social order, is not so simple as even the supreme effort of concentrating one's self. It lies through the multiplicity of external phenomena and the still more wayward play of human passion, and can be gained only by social thinking, by a mind which has been made by the thought of others. This mind grows by the converging efforts of all, by including and not secluding ourselves, for integration and not isolation is the word of advance.

We have been drawn unconsciously on to the other side of our balance sheet by following the argument where it led us. But it is far more difficult to estimate the effect of Western contact on Indian religion and philosophy than to give even a faint notion of the strength and weaknesses of the Indian position. At each point one is faced by the problem not only of what is actually going on, but what one desires should take place. Does one really wish to see the old fetichism of trees and fountains quite die out? Is it a reformed Hinduism which should some day emerge from the transformation or must India become Christian? How far and in what form is she likely to do this?

These, and many more, are fascinating and some of them burning questions which we shall not attempt to answer directly. They all have a dictionary meaning, but are mostly too vague

as well as verbal, and all of them too hypothetical to be dealt with here. All that can be said will be in line with what has been attempted in earlier chapters on other sides of our main problem. It must necessarily be general, but need not be vague: above all, it will avoid the snares and controversies which dog all words which end in 'ism.'

In the first place, it will be noted that much which has been said on other topics, especially on education and social life, is also relevant when we come to speak of religion and philosophy, which are the most comprehensive terms, and must, so far as they are real, be connected with our whole being. In the second place, it will be allowed that, as we have given weight to Indian ideals and endeavoured to appreciate the strong points of their religious philosophy, so it will be right to consider the West in its strength also, and ask what it has done, and may still do, to correct and supplement the weaker side of Indian thinking. If we hold that truth is one for all mankind, and that philosophy and religion are avenues of approach to truth, there can be no final contradiction, given only a good will and a readiness to receive the truth from whatever quarter it may come.

In the most recent phase the Indian tendency to introspection and intuition has gained much ground in the West. Many, besides theosophists, are bending their minds inwards and seeking a spiritual light which may transfuse the data of sense. So far this is a movement in the right direction, towards a common point of view, and

a confession by Western thinkers that the material has played too large a part in framing the modern outlook. In such a matter, as the history of philosophy and religious speculation amply prove, there will always be an ebb and flow, a balance first on one side and then on the other. The Indian example will always stand out, it may be hoped, as a beacon of spiritual force. But the West has not been wanting in great examples of this in the past, and, looking at the question broadly, above the claims of any definite religion or philosophic school, it seems clear that the West has still much to confer on India in the way of objective thinking, of making the mental outlook adequate to the world and of permeating the whole social structure with this spirit of reality.

We are apt to be misled in our judgment on the working of the greatest and permanent forces in the world by sectional interests and sudden but often temporary perturbations, and in no sphere of thought is this more likely to happen than in religion, and in no region more than in the East, where vast and ignorant masses may be carried away by the passions of a moment. The World War produced such disturbances, first in Russia, then in India and last in China, according to their nearness to the active centre. In India the crisis passed with less convulsion than elsewhere owing to the stable political order established by the British. Serious though the problems of the future may be, the danger of general disorder has passed there, as it is passing in Russia and will pass in China; and we are free to think of the steady influences which have been at work

for generations, and will now work more rapidly in the calmer air. It is to this general mental change that we must look, and not to the statistics of the conversions to any church, if we are to gain light as to the future of religion or the influence of the West upon the East. The most obvious change is the turning of the mind outwards, the grappling with the facts of life in a reasonable spirit, what we would gladly call the 'spread of science' had not even 'science' itself acquired a controversial taint, a flavour of materialism in recent debates between East and West. Put into concrete and unimpeachable language, the cruel, obstructive, or absurd, features of the ancient religion must give way, and practices and beliefs once thought to have a positive validity, remain, so far as they remain at all, as picturesque and happy memories, so far as they are picturesque and make for happiness. We can all now laugh at the rat temple-hospital in Kutch, where five thousand rats were supported by taxes levied on the town, and we all shudder at the horrors of 'suttee.' The time will come when all animal sacrifice will arouse like feelings, and girls will go to the spring to scatter flowers, not as a propitiation of the god or demon, but as a graceful act of rejoicing in the beauty of the earth.

Such a gradual change implies perhaps even more in the way of social amalgamation than it does in the personal enlightenment of those who change. To bridge the intellectual gulf between the highest and the lowest in India is as much needed a task as the modification of caste. And here the West also has as much to teach as in the realm of

science. Nothing has given the German nation more solidity, or enabled it better to surmount its varied trials, than its attachment to the language, based on Luther's version, of the Bible. And the vitality of the book, the intimate and passionate attachment of the people, were due largely to the fact that Luther, when composing it, during his seclusion in the Wurtburg, took pains to see that he was writing so that every German, man, woman and child could understand. He would sometimes take weeks to discover the right word he wanted by asking questions from mothers, children or labourers on his way. A religious work thus founded is at the same time a social tie, with which no esoteric learning can compare.

On one last broad aspect the West may hope to strengthen the religious outlook of India, if the transfusion can be effected without too grave a dislocation of the quiet habits of the past, the good, in short, transferred without the evil. We have glanced at the point before in speaking of Buddha, but it needs a fuller mention here to complete the picture. The religion of the West, however we may now define it, came from the East, with a strong admixture of Greek logic and Roman organizing power. It had in it from the first that element of hope which was described above as a 'forward look,' the belief that better times were coming, that the good would prevail, and that it was the duty of the faithful to assist this process. In course of time the triumphs of science added vigour to this hope, but changed its direction. Men came to think that the millennium could be realized on earth, whatever might be the

fate of individual souls in another world after death. This too became a religion, even for those who denied all the doctrines of the older faith : and Europe was in this confusion of mind just at the time when contact was being set up with Indian life and thought.

But though religious thought was then, and still remains, confused, and though the sense in which we could now speak of large parts of the West as ' Christian ' is difficult to define, yet it is clear that in one point at least the West remains substantially solid, and in this may still give a lead to mankind, and especially to India.

This is the forward look as a religious principle, that living for the future which we tend constantly to identify with the triumph of those forms of good in which we are ourselves most deeply interested. This is the ' belief in progress ' in its living form, and, despite the multitude of pessimists and critics, the belief in progress not only holds its sway, but gains fresh ground.

In India for the moment this forward look is concentrated almost exclusively on politics. The New Jerusalem on which young India like the rest has based its hopes, takes just now the form of ' complete self-government.' It is divorced from religion in the wider sense. The West, which has produced this passion, has now to see to it that the immediate object is pursued with the least danger and loss that may be, but, still more, that the ideal itself should become more comprehensive and permeate the whole religious attitude. For this ideal, of a life in the future which all may share in greater happiness and

concord, Hinduism and Islam may both find elements in their tradition which would gain fresh meaning, as Christianity has been re-inspired by positive science and humanitarian zeal. There is abundant material in the classics of both which might thus be purified and revived by a new spirit pressing to a wider goal. And when this takes place, those who are marching under their own banners with an old device, will turn round and see beside them bands of rivals, once thought alien and inveterate foes, moving steadily on the same broad way.

X

INDIA AS A NATION

THE question of Indian nationality is often linked with that of Hinduism as a religion, and one recent Indian writer has summed up his conclusions on the subject by saying that, 'The corner-stone of the new Indian nation, as it was of the old Hindu race, must be this supreme consciousness of the Self . . . this peculiar Hindu spirit-consciousness, involving the unity of all life in the identity of God and Man.' It is not proposed in this chapter to discuss, either this doctrine, which was alluded to in the last, or its identification with the national consciousness of India. The problem, which is one of the stock controversies of the moment, is better approached from another point of view, though religion necessarily plays a large part in it. Every nation is unique; and the new Indian nation will no doubt be unique also; but there is no reason to assume *à priori* that this uniqueness will consist in its identification with one profound philosophic doctrine, even though it summed up all Hinduism or all truth.

There can be no sound approach to the question except by way of comparative history. What has been meant by a 'nation' in other cases? What qualities and circumstances have made

them such? How far does India resemble or differ from them? The answer to these questions affords a convenient opportunity for reviewing from another point of view—that of 'India at home'—the conclusions of earlier chapters on the separate aspects of Indian life. It is time to try and see them together, and consider how far the co-operation of England with India has contributed to the building up of that united being which we call a nation: or has it hindered it?

Discussions as to the nature of nationality have been almost as numerous as those on the nature of the soul, and they have a good many points in common. But one historical difference is worth noting, as history is to be our guide. The Greeks began the discussion as to the soul, but the debate as to 'What is a nation?' is a modern one. It is subsequent to the Roman Empire, and the word, with all its derivative, is Latin, while Psyche, psychology and the rest, are all Greek. The Greeks gave us the 'polis,' or city-state, and abstract words connected with the science of government, but they did not transmit a word for a nation, because they never achieved the thing. They had the community spirit in a thousand centres and race pride unparalleled except perhaps by the Jews, but they never succeeded in so sinking their local differences and combining their efforts as to create that social being, with a distinct character and a home on earth of sufficient size, which forms our accepted idea of a nation. This the Romans did, and because they had first done it in the heart of Italy, they were able afterwards to spread the thing

abroad, when the Empire which they had conquered, and which was not a nation, dissolved later on into its natural component parts.

What happened then seems more and more significant as we reflect upon it, and it touches the Indian problem at several points. The Romans first made a nation in Italy, and then, largely inspired by Greek thought, organized a world. This world was the first attempt on earth to realize the conception of a Human Community embracing all. The earlier empires certainly did not conceive it, and even to Alexander the Great his conquests appeared, not as a means of comprehending mankind in a common civilization, but of extending his own power and Hellenic habits as far as possible. But the Romans at their best, having absorbed Greek thought by the first century after Christ, deliberately planned a World at Peace. It was their noblest achievement.

The nations which arose in the Middle Ages from the débris of Rome, bear clearly upon them the marks of their origin, and these marks are of universal application, because both Greek and Roman thought had this universal quality. Arguing from these examples, and any others in so far as they fit the case, the essentials of a nation would seem to be, first, that it belonged to a larger whole, second, that it have a soul of its own, and freedom to develop it, with a common history and common interests and aspirations, and thirdly, that it have a local habitation on earth.

Most of those who argue and fight for nationality fail of complete success and disfigure their efforts, by taking too narrow a view of the second essential

and entirely omitting the first. But the greatest of such combatants, Mazzini and Garibaldi, or the heroes of the German 'War of Liberation' were not so limited. While struggling for the freedom of their own country, they thought also of mankind; the new Italy or Germany was to be a support and example to the world.

But the question is not one of duty or special heroism, but of simple fact. Every nation implies some kind of community of nations, as clearly as the individual implies a society and cannot exist without it. Nations arose in the Western world not only because of their internal coherence and local strength, but also because the Roman Empire had furnished the first sketch of the community of which they were to be members. The East has been labouring for centuries to produce a nation, and Japan is at present the only offspring of which we can say that, though imperfect like the rest of us, it has attained nationhood.

The Eastern evolution of nations which interests us here, illustrates admirably the three or four main points which we have mentioned. These Eastern nations will be all unique, differing widely one from another, but they will all conform to the general type in having a local habitation to which they are strongly attached, a spiritual unity based on a common history and a common purpose, and, above all and containing them all, a larger community. Japan, which is the most advanced, could be called completely a nation, when after modernizing herself, she took her place in the concert of Western nations. India and China are

advancing on other lines, but the goal must be the same, if the general precedents of history are to hold good. China is the most doubtful case, and we may well leave her for the moment out of the picture. India, puzzling as she is, seems clear by comparison, and, judged by any known standards drawn from the past, must be considered further on her way to nationhood.

It is essential to the calm study of this question for both the chief contestants to lay aside their dearest prepossession, and, only if they can, will speedy progress of a co-operative kind be achieved. The two most sharply opposing views are, on the one hand, of the thorough-going nationalists who assert that British domination should disappear completely as soon as possible, that India would be a nation already, if we only relieved her from foreign interference, that her nationhood and her true greatness were achieved in the past, and that it is only by a direct return to this ancient, pre-foreign tradition that nationhood will be restored. The other opposing view is, that India owes such nationhood as she possesses and her other greatest goods to the English influence entirely, that she is predestined to be a permanent member of the British Empire and that nothing should be done to lessen or jeopardize this connexion.

Both these views must be abandoned. The nationalist must come to see that his picture of a united Indian nation in some golden age of the past is unhistorical, that the British connexion, by its common administration in three-fifths of the country and its protection of the rest, by its

common language and by its introduction of India to the comity of nations, has done more than any other force or government to build up an Indian nation. The imperialist must recognize that the main stream of Hindu life and thought is native to the soil, that though the British have given solidity to the social structure and stability to the government, yet in the end India must preserve these things herself, and that it is a possible, though not a likely or desirable event, that ultimately, as a fully self-governing nation, India, while remaining in the comity of nations, might prefer not to belong to the British Commonwealth. We contemplate such freedom of choice for any part of our system; India, when equal in freedom and status with the rest, will have this freedom also.

These things are distant and speculative; but it is within our scope to consider how far the British and Western connexion has promoted Indian nationhood, how matters now stand and what they promise for the nearer future; and we must help ourselves at every step by any relevant analogies in the past.

The analogy of the Roman Empire was suggested above, but like all analogies it has pitfalls as well as limitations. The most vigorous nations which arose from the ruins of Rome were not those where she was in contact with old civilizations as we are in India. They were France, England, Spain, and later Germany and Italy, where the vigour of the new nation came mainly from new barbarian blood. Those parts of the Empire where Rome imposed herself on an old

system and culture, as in Greece or Egypt, were not revived by the contact. New blood was needed, as well as the form of the provinces which the Romans had created and the idea of a community of nations, which survived, and in some ways became even stronger, in the Catholic Church. All these elements counted in the final result, and so in India the new nation or nations will sum up all its past and be a fresh and unique member of the human commonwealth. The nationalists cannot abolish or exclude what has been contributed by England; the imperialists cannot destroy the main stream of Hindu tradition or confine the future of India to membership of an empire, even though that empire embrace between a third and a quarter of mankind.

No doubt the philosophic and impartial view will command general assent when the historian of a hundred years ahead comes to review the past which we are now making, just as we now calmly appreciate the work of the Romans whom our Teutonic ancestors opposed. Should it not be possible, with our fuller knowledge and the keener historic insight of the present day, to antedate this process and even now come to some agreed judgment which living parties could accept? Nothing would more surely promote the cause of Indian nationality than such an agreement.

In analysing the constituents of any nation the land and its people must come first; the attachment of the native-born to the land of their birth is the fundamental fact, and as the migrations of people have slackened in a more settled world, the geographical basis of nationality becomes

stronger and clearer. From the people of each land, those who regard it as their home, the nation must arise. In India the geographical boundaries are flung wide, but they are clearly marked, the massive mountain barrier round the north and the sea to East and West. Within this great area local differences both of race and climate are abundant, and nature herself has only in comparatively recent geologic time made the country one. Originally the plateau of the peninsula was separated from the mountain barrier by the sea, and the lands which now connect them are the alluvial deposit of the northern rivers. As nature has been thus tardy in making India one, we need not be surprised that social combination is also later than in other more easily united territories. All Europe, from this point of view, offered a more favourable field for the birth of national communities. It has several well-marked areas especially in the West, and though marked off, they are not isolated from one another and have thus been able to attain that state of unity in difference which is the ideal of a commonwealth of nations.

In India the first social amalgamation which arose, as we have seen, from the penetration of an original and lower Dravidian population by Aryan invaders of higher culture and greater strength, had taken place before the time which we know as the 'Middle Ages' in Europe. The state of India was at that in many respects like mediaeval Europe, and the greatest differences between East and West have arisen since. Europe had Rome in the background and all that Rome

stood for. Modern nations arose in their natural divisions from her débris and in her framework. But India had not received either the same political drilling or an equally powerful and widespread, intellectual discipline. Two further attempts at unification were made, from above and by outsiders, but the internal preparation and the strong local units were both wanting.

To-day, side by side with the nationalist movement which claims complete self-government for India as a whole, another movement is going on which has at the moment more reality and more hope of immediate success because it is nearer to the facts. This is the movement for local autonomy in linguistic areas, which is best known in Bengal, but has already wrested an Andhra university from the Legislature of Madras, inspires the Urdu of Hyderabad and is making itself heard for several groups in the Presidency of Bombay. When Dr. Tagore preaches in Bengali at his weekly service at Santiniketan, he is not understood by a considerable section of his Indian audience, but he touches deep chords in the minds of those who do understand him: to them Bengali is an intimate and sacred thing as their native speech is to the patriots of Wales or Ireland. English as the common language for all India, and some five or six other tongues preserved in their strongest areas, this now seems plainly indicated as the linguistic future of the peninsula, and all analogies lead us to expect that language will carry with it other attachments and form part of the basis of local areas of government, as it did in the recent resettlement of Europe.

One notes all these facts and is confident that they will continue; they will form elements in the new India which is growing steadily from the old. But in what precise political outlines it will emerge, it is not our purpose here to discuss, even were prediction possible. The details of this, as of most political problems, are not insuperable, if the main facts and the general goal are recognized, and there is the will to reach it. Nor need we labour the point whether Bengal or India is the truer nation. Such questions are settled automatically by the convenience and the consent of the groups who demand the distinction and the rest of mankind who grant it. The League of Nations will by its title and position have most to say on the matter. India became an original member of the League as one; this by itself is a formal answer, absurd though it may seem for India to be one member and Hayti another, while Ceylon, larger than several States Members, has no voice of her own at all. But the attempt to apply absolute or mathematical measurement to human affairs is mischievous and impossible, most mischievous of all with those larger and most complex units to which 'nations' belong.

So it is with the factors which have contributed to the nationhood; we cannot exactly evaluate them. In the case of India, apart from geography and the mixing of races, one sees quite clearly two sources and streams of influence which have both gone to build up the population of the peninsula into a nation, one is Hinduism, and the other the work of the British. If we

added a third it would be the work of the Moham-medans, and especially of the Moguls ; but most would agree that this must rank in importance far behind either of the other two. This is the historic sense in which it was said in an earlier chapter that the two rival powers now in presence are Brahman and British. But with the emergence of a nation, such rivalries change their complexion ; in fact, it is one of the surest tests of nationhood that rival influences and forces then begin to be appreciated as serving a common and higher aim.

So it was with Catholics and Protestants in England when facing the Armada, or with the Teutonic and Roman elements of the French nation in the historic retrospect. So it must inevitably be with India as she takes her place in the family of nations.

Only in some form of federation can the two aspects of Indian nationality which we have mentioned, find permanent reconciliation—the greater nationality due mainly to Hinduism and British organization, and the smaller due to language and local patriotism. If federation was the natural solution for the problems of the United States, it will appear even more necessary to secure both an active local interest, and the new national harmony of the three hundred millions of India. The population is three times larger than that of the United States, but the problems of federation would not seem much more difficult and are in some respects singularly alike those presented by the greatest of republics. In America also one has a great diversity of language and race, and a whole

section of the population—those of ex-slave descent—who must be incorporated in the civic body and yet are treated by the majority of the citizens in somewhat the same spirit as the ‘ out-castes ’ of Indian society. In another point a partial analogy may be traced between the Native States of India and the Territories of the United States. The latter are gradually received into the Union as they fulfil certain conditions of population and capacity for State government. The same method, with the necessary difference, would have to be pursued towards the Native States, if British India adopted a federal system. Place would be found for them in the federation as soon as they showed themselves both capable and desirous of becoming members.

In this work of federation the British element would be of the utmost value, and would be doubtless claimed as indispensable even by the most active opponents of empire in the past. It has indeed been held by many close observers of Indian feeling that in proportion as British dominance was not insisted on, so British help would be more eagerly sought and duly valued. In every department of government and education such co-operation is essential, and as it becomes fuller and more intimate, so the problems in social life and religion which we have sketched, will find their natural solution.

The Hindu background and main stream of life need lose nothing of its strength by Western irrigation, the making of fresh channels, the breaking down of obstructions, the dredging of depths which a too sluggish flow has encumbered

with deposits and is not swift enough to stir:

No one can now conceive the completion of India's nationhood except by such co-operation of all the main force working within it, and among them all of the two most potent, Hinduism which speaks for the most highly treasured past; Great Britain for the science and organization of the modern world. Union of these two—the past and the present—is everywhere essential, and nowhere else is it so difficult to accomplish completely, and with a firm front to the future, as in India. We shall consider in the concluding chapter the place which India, thus fortified and united, is beginning to play in the world of nations; great now, its future scope is unbounded and crucial for the whole East, i.e. for the majority of mankind. But strength without depends on strength within, and a living nation, like every other living body, grows strong only by using all its resources and using them in harmony.

XI

INDIA AND THE WORLD

THE name of India and the entry of India into the consciousness of the world are due to the Greeks. India was then nearer to the centre of world-culture which developed about three thousand years B.C. in the Middle East. Greece, which was the chief agent in its diffusion, built on the foundations laid in Egypt and Babylonia, and in the fourth century B.C. carried some of the results under the leadership of Alexander the Great into North-West India. The Romans later on continued the contact in a spasmodic way by sea, and the Arabs followed them in the earlier Middle Ages. Hence India figured continuously in the thought of the West and much more largely than China which lay further afield and remained always more compact and isolated from the rest of the world. Hence it came about that, when in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the nations of Europe began that rapid process of exploration and world-unification which has brought us today to the League of Nations, while China remained a world in itself regarding the rest of mankind as outer barbarians, India was already bound to the West by many ties both of culture and commerce. There were Christian Churches dating, it was believed, from apostolic times;

Indian sages and Indian learning were proverbial, and the wealth of all the Indies was a golden dream, being gradually realized by the bands of traders settling round the coast.

How England became the agent of a closer union with the West we have seen in earlier chapters. It is well always to remember also that this last episode is historically only the clinching of previous contacts. India on her way to nationhood was bound by geographical and social facts to take a path which differed widely from those of her two great sister powers in the East—China and Japan. She was nearer to the centre, more open to settlement and attack, and inhabited by a more mixed and divided population.

The sequel seems hard and unnatural, even a tragedy, to some Indian patriots, but one who considers the matter dispassionately and with an eye to the future, will see much to modify this view. Granting that a period of stability and unification was necessary for the growth of a nation, granting also that nations, to gain full good for themselves and to do their duty to others, must belong to a community of nations, can we imagine that these two objects at least would have been better done otherwise than by the British connexion? It is an idle, though sometimes an amusing exercise to rewrite history, and we shall spend little time on it here. It can hardly be thought of, that India, in her political decay in the seventeenth century, could have withstood conquest by some stronger power. The alternatives to England were France and Russia. Is there any reason to think that either of these

would have done the work mentioned more speedily, more effectually, or more disinterestedly?

But the sane man, while studying the past, keeps a firm grasp on the present; and it is to the present with its bearings on the future that we propose in concluding to turn our attention. India is now well on the way to become a nation; she has a vast and growing population and stores still untapped, both of natural resources and of human intelligence; she is the central power in the East and, in conjunction with and under the guidance of Great Britain, she has entered as an original member into the League of Nations. What bearing and promise have these facts of to-day on the welfare of mankind?

The first thing that strikes the eye in the East at the present moment is a popular agitation among masses of people who had been normally quiet and acquiescent in their conditions before. It is easy to magnify this, but the fact is undoubted and we have all been scanning the signs anxiously in India, China and Russia. There are two distinct streams in the revolutionary movement though they tend to merge. One was most prominent in India, another in Russia, while the Chinese disorder partakes of both, but is more specially internal than either of the others. The Indian intellectual and political revolt has been noticed before in these pages and exhaustively studied elsewhere. In the opinion of most observers it has passed its zenith, and the new Viceroy takes over with admirable calm a situation which had been already ameliorated by the firmness of his predecessor. For India herself

then we may well augur a quieter passage, while China is tossing in the billows and Russia still refuses to make an honest peace with the 'capitalist' world.

The last phrase expresses the other side of the movement which gained a temporary triumph in Russia and finds an echo in all the communist societies of the West. The revolt in Russia and among the communists generally is not against a foreign invader, but against the power and the ownership of land, wealth, and means of production by any persons except the manual workers themselves. In China it was found possible to combine the two objects of attack, for foreigners had business concessions secured to them by treaty, and it was represented that these were the centres of an imperialist campaign.

There are profound and interesting differences between the three cases which tend to show how far more stable India is, owing to her intimate connexion with the West, and how this connexion renders her more apt for international relationship.

In Russia, owing to the backwardness of her people and the badness of the previous régime, a complete revolution in the system of government has taken place, and the country is ruled by a small group of men inspired by the communist gospel and determined to propagate it throughout the world by antagonizing everywhere the older, settled but progressive, system which they call 'capitalism' and which has its strongest world-support in the British Empire. Being thus fundamentally opposed to the general principles and the order which prevail among the great majority

of nations who form the League of Nations, Russia remains outside the League: China is in quite another case. Her old imperial system has broken down, much as the Mogul Empire disappeared in India between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but the Western nations having now learnt another policy and duty towards the world than that which they pursued in the days of Clive, there is no scramble for domination or a partition of territory, and they are all waiting for the restoration of order and endeavouring during the disorder to preserve the property and rights which they had previously acquired. Meanwhile the young intellectuals of China are swept by a wave of new ideas from the West—not in themselves either anti-foreign or anti-capitalist—which have no settled channels to run in and inspire unsettled minds to acts of violence. These take place both against one another in civil war also against the outposts of foreign influence in missions, concessions, treaties and the like, which seem to conflict with the ideal of a nation mistress in her own house. Clearly here a settled government, recognized and assisted by the other nations, or by the League of Nations as representing them, is the first requisite for a stable advance. And the difficulties, though great, are in one respect less menacing to the world than those of Russia, for China has from the first been a member of the League of Nations, and has endeavoured, in her unorganized and inefficient way, to use the concert of nations both at Geneva and Washington for her defence against foreign aggression. At Washington indeed, thanks to the combined

and skilful diplomacy of Great Britain and the United States, the chief aggression which impended over her from Japan was almost completely averted.

How then does India stand, flanked by two great storm-centres to north and east, and with Japan, not politically hostile, but pressing her hard industrially by a factory system based on lower conditions for the workers than we have now established in our dominions?

In India the unrest is intellectual and political. Though trading was the original object of British settlers, and though trade still occupies the majority of those of British blood in India, the revolt, such as it is, has never taken an anti-capitalist form. The communist party is at present negligible. One hears abundant criticism of capitalist civilization and aggression, but it is of the same type with which one is familiar at home in socialist circles, expressing a general dissatisfaction with an order of things which seems selfish and materialistic, but not aiming at violent destruction or confiscation. Gandhi and Non-Co-operation have been the occasion of many acts of violence, but substantially and in principle they are poles asunder from Lenin and the Soviet Republic. China stands between, though in herself far nearer to the Indian temper. Hence the supreme importance of a contented and prosperous India, realizing what she thinks best for herself without revolution, at peace with all men and with a growing understanding of her great place in the world.

Indian thinkers and writers have not been

backward in urging the importance of India to the world, but rather from another and more limited point of view. They would have us study Indian philosophy, the Hindu view of life, as being a thing peculiar to the Hindu race,* the 'corner-stone of the Indian nation.' The writer quoted in Chapter X described this as a form of spirit-consciousness which finds the unity of all life in the identity of God and man, realized in concentrated reflexion. That this is an important, philosophic method, now receiving more weight in the development of thought than fifty years ago, is well known to all students of the subject. But two remarks have to be made about it to explain the difference between what such writers have in mind and what is aimed at in the present chapter. The first is that, in the realm of abstract thought dealing with the highest generalities, all thinkers will come to approximately the same conclusion, if they start from the same premises and follow the same methods. Descartes and Spinoza meditating in solitude on the nature of God and the soul will agree with Indian thinkers, or differ from them, according to the argument, and not according to race or climate.

It is true that Indian thinkers tend as a whole more in one direction, e.g. that of introspection, than those of the West, but the philosophy itself, the general truths reached, cannot be treated as a national differentia. The national difference is one of temper and not of truth, a greater tendency to inward thinking, to meditation rather than experiment, to calm

**The Hindu View of Life*. Prof. Radha Krishnan, Allen & Unwin.

rather than activity. On all this side the Indian example has already affected the West in many quarters and it would with advantage do still far more, were intellectual intercourse more frequent and mutual understanding more complete.

The weight of a nation in the councils of the world is a much larger and more complex thing than the teachings of its philosophers, however numerous or profound. This teaching is one element, no doubt, and will bear traces of the national history and character, but the nation itself has land and people, action and suffering, achievement and aspiration to its account. It is concrete and not abstract, many-sided and not a sharpened edge.

In this aspect India presents herself to us as a great steadying force in the East, by virtue of her intense conservatism, her vast potential wealth and her connexion with Great Britain whose presence so far from upsetting her ancient order has preserved it in many points less altered than it would have been under native rule. For this must be the first principle of any alien power exercising sway at a long distance from its base, and surrounded by difficulties and dangers of every kind—to avoid a disturbance and keep the peace. For their success in doing this, more than all else that the English have accomplished, the mass of Indians tolerate if they do not love them. How faithfully it has been followed, those understand best who have studied the anxious care with which the Government of India explores the effects of every change, however necessary, before enforcing it. In introducing, therefore, Western

methods to India, England has been the most conservative agent in modernizing the most conservative of peoples.

It may be said that the new Reforms introduced by the Act of 1919 were a long leap in the dark, that Indians were not accustomed to responsible government, and that the new system is alien to their traditions and training. The question was touched on in Chapter V, and it was pointed out that the Reforms were avowedly experimental and generally admitted to be defective. But granting that Great Britain was bound to carry out her promise of extending self-government, it would be difficult to think of a plan better safeguarded or more conservative. The governmental areas were not changed, the ultimate powers of the executive responsible to Parliament were maintained, and in allotting departments to the new ministries, with all the difficulties involved, care was taken to keep in the hands of the supreme authority those departments of government on which the financial and political stability of the country primarily depend. From January, 1927 onwards, after the second elections under the reform system, a fair attempt is being made in all provinces to carry it out. The result is a testimony alike to British stability and patience and to the reasonableness of our Indian partners in the experiment, when the responsibility is seen to be real and important.

If we may augur the best from recent events, the world-status of India is thereby advanced, for every proof that the people themselves are associated with their government gives it more

weight. The various foreign attacks on India, since the British occupation, whether actual or projected, Napoleon's, the Russians', the Germans' in the Great War, were all inspired by the idea that the Indians were seething with revolt and longing to throw off the British yoke, whatever might be put on their necks instead. The loyalty and fighting zeal of the whole country were evidence enough to the contrary on the last occasion. The next trial, if unhappily it arrives, might be more dangerous and insidious. It might be necessary to fight for a progressive Western civilization against a revolutionary communism based on the millions of the East. It is possible, though, one hopes, improbable. In that case, as in the spiritual development of philosophy and religion, one sees again the capital importance of India.

It may be hoped that it is clear from the whole tenor of this book that the writer puts first the interests of civilization generally, and not the maintenance of either British, or Western, dominance. From this the argument started and to this it returns, after three centuries of Western contact and half that time of British power. In the hideous and unlikely event which has just been glanced at, Great Britain, standing beside or behind, the Indian nation would again represent the energy and organizing mind of the West as her early traders did in another spirit three hundred years ago. Whether Indian or British it is our bounden duty to understand, and put fairly, the truth that, though faults of aggrandizement and race-prejudice and cruelty have darkened the story, yet on the whole Western expansion has advantaged the

world immeasurably, and that, in a new spirit of sympathy and conciliation which is more and more evident, the civilization which has thus been built up must be maintained. The West has made the League of Nations, and oddly enough one may hear the fact referred to, both in India and elsewhere, as rather a blot on the League than a boon from the West. This is criticism run mad. Who else could have started a League of Nations, with any chance of permanence and success, except the strongest and best-organized nations? Has it not, since its constitution eight years ago,—the same date as the Indian Reforms—been uniformly successful within the limits of its power in promoting the objects for which it was founded, viz.: the preservation of world-peace and the promotion of the welfare of all nations, irrespective of their size, race, or position on the globe? Although started by the victorious allies in the Great War, has it shown any partiality for the great or lessened in the smallest degree the rights or freedom of the smaller states? The answer to all these questions is obvious to anyone who has given the matter a moment's serious attention. They are only mentioned here as arising from the common clap-trap of criticism based on prejudice without knowledge, which one may hear in revolutionary circles, alike in nationalist India or among communists elsewhere. The facts, in so far as they relate to India, though open to certain criticism, are of different complexion and deserve some little study; for India, as she becomes stronger as a nation, will show

her strength by increasing interest, activity and weight in the League of Nations.

India, at the instance of Mr. Montagu, then Secretary of State, was an original member of the League and has been represented at each of its seven Assemblies by a delegation of at least three representatives with their substitutes and secretarial staffs. Nothing but satisfaction has ever been expressed in India that she should take her place in the council of nations, though, necessarily at this stage in her development, under the tutelage of Great Britain. Indian criticism has rather been directed to gaining a more popular and fully representative delegation and making the voice and needs of India more audible to the world. This line of criticism is helpful and natural, and it should be found possible in future assemblies to include some of the elected representatives of the Indian public.

*At the last—the Seventh—Assembly of the League, the Indian delegation took a considerable part. Both the chief British and the chief Indian delegates spoke frequently and made serious contributions to the decisions on the opium trade and on slavery. The Maharaja of Kapurthala, who was the senior Indian representative, made, on an early day in the Assembly, a speech which admirably expressed the present constitutional position of India, its hopes as a nation, and its sympathy with international work, especially in the East. India was now awakening to the spirit of nationalism, and, with the guidance and assistance of the British Government, would,

*See Interim Report of the Indian Delegation

in the not far distant future, become a united nation as fully self-governing as any other country in the British Dominions. She had already taken a large share in the League's activities and shown the utmost readiness to forward the humane designs, both of the League and of the International Labour Office. This was the case both with regard to amendments of the Penal Code in respect of sexual crime, and to the ratification of the conventions relating to the cultivation and export of opium and the reform of industrial life. In these matters India, in association with Great Britain, was in advance of other countries in the East.

On another question the Indian speaker probably determined the attitude of the League. A Health bureau has been established for over a year at Singapore, for studying and disseminating facts as to epidemic diseases peculiar to the East. The original foundation was due to American money, but further support was necessary for its maintenance. The Japanese delegate promised his government's support, and Sir Ramaswami Ayyar, in following him, carried the Committee, on the grounds of the world-wide interests of the League and the necessity of making it clear to the East that the League cared as much for health and welfare on one side as on the other of the Suez Canal.

There have been discussions, though not on this occasion, of a possible League of Nations for the East, which might correspond to the Pan-American Conference organized by the United States in the New World. Indian opinion, as

shown in these cases, would not favour such separate action which is contrary to the fundamental idea of the League. Sub-divisions there may be for special purposes, but above these there must be a common body if the interests of the whole world are to be treated as one. India, by her double aspect East and West, is the essential link between the League and Asia, just as the United States should be, and will be, between the League and America.

We come back then at the end to the world-problem from which we started in the first chapter. It was seen there how on all sides we are surrounded in the twentieth century by pressing questions which have their roots in the past, but are facing us now with an unwonted urgency and are seen now to be various aspects of one great problem, the right relation of the individual man to society, and of the individual nations to one another and to the whole. Taking a question of the latter class, probably the most complex and critical in the world, we have followed the evolution of the problem from its historic beginnings down to the present, when the difficulties of the case have been explored and there is a real and general desire to settle them in a conciliatory way for the good of all.

Great as are the difficulties, and imperfect the understanding between India and Great Britain, the road has become much smoother in recent days and the prospect of an agreed solution, though still distant, is brighter than it was. To become a nation, with the support and assistance of England, and, as a nation, to take a leading part in the

pacification and progress of other nations, especially in the East—this now appears as the ideal on which British efforts and organization and Indian aspirations may converge. The first part of the programme involves more social unity within the country and better general education; the second appeals strongly to Indian brotherhood, the noblest elements in their religious past, and finds its present realization in the League of Nations. On both sides of the process the British connexion is still needed, but on both it will become less compelling and more advisory as internal strength is developed.

It is fascinating to watch the growth of any living thing, and one great Indian scientist has shown us the life-process of a plant as it has never been seen before. Still more wonderful is the development of a new and permanent association of human beings, bringing from the remotest past their ways of thought and habits of life and learning to give them a fresh direction and a common purpose. This has happened in the course of centuries to every group of men which we now call a 'nation,' and the Indian nation, when full grown, will have had a more amazing history than any other. In no other case have human elements, so low in the social scale, entered into communion with minds so subtle and profound. In no other case has an alien Power deliberately co-operated with a conquered people to produce a vast self-governing community, the second in numbers in the world.

If we probe the phenomenon a little further, it is the international ideal which has prevailed and

is now working the transformation. The British Empire or Commonwealth of Nations could not have subsisted except by the free co-operation of its members. Each would be a nation and yet retain the advantages and sentiment of union. India is far the largest and most diverse part, and hence the most difficult to treat on a common level. But in the end, through the League of Nations, she will find a wider range of affinities than the Dominions of purely British or Western training. The League will thus complete her incorporation as a nation which was begun by the first Aryan invaders, furthered by her religious discipline and the gospel of Buddha, hammered at by the Mohammedans, and rivetted by the British.

When at last fully conscious of nationhood, a community becomes a nation, and in that consciousness the thought of other nations must always enter, of the greater whole to which even the most populous and powerful must be subordinate. It will be subordinate, but elevated and not debased by the subordination, for only as a factor in humanity has any nation either meaning or hope.

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A NOTE ON BOOKS

A list of a few popular books, capable of giving a background to the study of the Indian problem, may be of use to the general reader.

The Oxford History of India, by Vincent Smith, published by the Clarendon Press, together with the work on *Indian Art* by the same author.

Lord Ronaldshay's Trilogy, published by Constable,
India: A Bird's Eye View,
The Heart of Aryavarta,
Lands of the Thunderbolt.

These are the most sympathetic and attractive account of India, especially on its spiritual side, ever written by one who had held high official position.

India's Past, Macdonell, published by the Oxford Press.

Peoples and Problems of India, Holderness, a short, but sound account of the position as seen by an able civil servant. Home University Library.

The Making of India, published by Constable, and *India and Europe*, published by Drane. Both by an able Mohammedan writer, Yusuf Ali, but not confined to the Moslem side.

The Economic Transition in India, by Theodore Morison. Short, interesting and broadminded.

Education in India, Arthur Mayhew, published by Faber and Gwyer. An excellent piece of work in a thoroughly philosophic spirit.

Indian View of Life. The most complete and recent account of Indian Philosophy by Professor Rada-krishnan.

Mr. Banerji's Autobiography on *A Nation in the Making*, and the Labour Publishing Company's booklet on the *Problem of India* put certain facts and a certain point of view which would not be found in the other works.

To these should be added, on the side of recent political history, Professor Dodwell's *Sketch of the History of India, 1858-1918*, Thakore's *Indian Administration to the Dawn of Responsible Government*, and the *Montagu-Chelmsford Report*.

Mother India, Katharine Mayo (Cape), though giving far too gloomy a general view, states, for the first time frankly, terrible facts which Indian reformers cannot ignore.

