

History of India

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A NEWLY DISCOVERED MANUSCRIPT OF INYATULLAH'S AHKAM-I-ALAMGIRI

S. H. ASKARI

Patna College, Patna

THE TWO collections of official correspondence entitled *Kalimat-i-Tayyibat* and *Ahkam-i-Alamgiri*, containing royal notes and brief instructions on letters of princes, nobles and officials, *Shuqqas*, *Parwanas*, *Farmans*, *Hasbul Hukm* or royal orders and replies sent through their subsequent compiler, Inayatullah Khan Kashmiri¹, the Chief Diwan and the favourite Secretary of the Emperor, are among the primary sources of information for the last decade of Aurangzeb's reign. Sir J. N. Sarkar, the doyen of Indian historians and the greatest authority on Aurangzeb, says that "good manuscripts of *Kalimat* are often met with" but "of *Ahkam-i-Alamgiri* only two manuscripts are known to exist" one of Rampur and the other of the Oriental Public Library, Patna. As Inayatullah's *Ahkam* was "unknown to the outer world" he thought it necessary to give² a list of the personages to whom the letters were addressed. Recently another complete copy of this precious manuscript was discovered among the valuable collections of Professor Masud Hasan Razvi of Lucknow and it was also exhibited³ at the last session of the All India Oriental Conference held there. The writer's friend M. Fasihuddin Balkhi, has procured a transcribed copy of this manuscript for the Patna University Library. Even a cursory glance over the contents of the two manuscripts, now at Patna, will enable one to realise the wealth of authentic, and sometimes new, information they contain. The newly discovered manuscript is well worth a careful and detailed study which will add to our existing knowledge of the events and the activities and character of the men of the closing years of Aurangzeb's reign. An attempt has been made in the following pages to collate the transcribed copy of the Lucknow Manuscript in the Patna University Library with that of the Oriental Public Library, to note some of the glaring divergences and also draw the reader's attention to such of the contents and rare references as have not received the attention that is due to them.

¹ Belonged to a Persian family long settled in Kashmir ; appointed Court chronicler, 28th year ; enrolled as Khan, 35th year ; *Diwan-i-Tan* and also of Khalsa, 1691, 1701 ; Offg. Sadr Sadur, 1698 ; *Haft Hazari* under Muhammad Shah ; died 1727. (*Maasir-ul-Umra*, Irvine's *Later Mughals*).

² *Studies in Aurangzeb's Reign*, p. 295.

³ It was named as '*Aruiz-i-Ahkam*'



The Lucknow Manuscript is very old but undated and rather difficult to read, but the transcribed copy is legibly written on 463 pages of foolscap size with 22 lines to a page. The names of the addressees are not given in rubric in it, as in the Oriental Public Library Manuscript, but some names which do not occur in the latter are specifically mentioned in it. These addressees are Muhammad Beg Khan, Naib Subadar of Ahmadnagar (335), Ibrahim Khan, Governor of Kashmir (338), Shaikh Abdul Baqi⁴ (421), Maqsud Khan⁵ (425), Sidi Ashraff, Kotwal of Delhi (426), Mir Mohammad Ishaq of Kashmir (432), Abu Nasr, son of Shaista Khan and Subadar of Oudh in 49th year (432), Jalaluddin Khan (434), Jan Nisar Khan⁶ (436), Mullah Muhammad Ashraff, Diwan of Kashmir (425), Abu Muhammad Khan adopted son of Maatabar Khan (425), Ahmad Sayeed Khan (428), Muhammad Ikramuddin, the Sadr, (437), and the Diwan of Khujistabuniad Aurangzeb (451). Sir J. N. Sarkar's list has left out Mirza Asadullah Khan, Qiladar of Orissa, Hakim Muhammad Taqi Shiraz, Qazi Muhammad Haider, Muhammad Baqar, the Foujdar of Gwalior, the Mufti of Surat, the Diwan of Allahabad, and Ziaullah Khan, Diwan of Akbarabad, as 'minor officials'. 'Muhammad Azam' on F. 1166 of the Oriental Public Library Manuscript has been rightly corrected as "Azim-us-Shan". The eleven letters addressed to "Amjad Khan (pp. 360-64) are indicated in the Oriental Public Library Manuscript as written to Syed Ahmad Khan (246 b). "Abdul Majid" mentioned in several places in the Oriental Public Library Manuscript is perhaps correctly named as "Abdul Hamid". Some of the letters in the Oriental Public Library Manuscript appear to have been wrongly ascribed to others. The six letters on ff. 201-205 were actually addressed to Ibrahim Khan (pp. 336-40). Ahsan Khan and not Ahmad Sayeed is said to be the addressee (f. 283; p. 428). There is a similar conflict between the names of Nijabat Khan and Jalaluddin Khan (f. 286; p. 434). There are other such cases also. Though the beginning and the end of both the Manuscripts show the same abruptness and the same contents, and in both some of the letters are found repeated, the order and arrangement of the letters in them do not always tally⁷.

Lack of space does not allow a consideration of these and other divergences and discrepancies and, therefore, one may leave this comparison here and point out what may be taken as the most distinctive features of the newly discovered Manuscript. It is fuller-

⁴ Different from his name-sake, the commandant of Agra.

⁵ One Maqsud Beg 'Daroga-i-Topkhana' is referred to in the *Ahkam*.

⁶ For a biographical account of him and of many others, see *Maasir-ul-Umra* and Irvine's *Storia* and *Later Mughals*.

⁷ The Rampur Manuscript said to have belonged to the Delhi Palace, may help us in settling many of the difficulties.

and more complete than the Oriental Public Library Manuscript noticed by Sir J. N. Sarkar; while it contains all that is found, with minor⁸ changes, in the latter, it furnishes us with some new letters which have an importance of their own. There are only two letters addressed to P. Muizzuddin (116a) in the Oriental Public Library Manuscript while there are as many as 22 in the Patna University Manuscript copy (pp. 154-163). The letters on pp. 100-3, 128, 129, 143, 181, 190-1, 234, 402, 437, 460 are not to be found in the Oriental Public Library Manuscript.

On a comparison of the *Kalimat*, an incomplete copy of which is available in the Oriental Public Library, Patna, with the *Ahkam*, one naturally finds much common ground. The notes and instructions in the *Kalimat* transcribed from the Emperor's autographs and addressed to the favourite Secretary and expanded by the latter, are very often found copied verbatim⁹ in the *Ahkam*. There is neither a preface nor the date of compilation like that of *Kalimat*¹⁰ in *Ahkam* and the letters in the latter are also without dates except the mention of days and months here and there. One of them, however, refers to the 50th year, another to 1117 A.H. or 1705 A.D. (p. 419) while two almost identically worded letters addressed to P. Bedar Bukht and to G. K. Firuz Jung refer to the 25 years struggle against the Mahrattas since the Emperor set out from Ajmer in 1681 (pp. 120, 245). Then the letters mentioning the capture of Wagingerah in 1705 (H. 206, 421), the additional grant of Dewani of Bihar Subah to Murshid Quli Khan in place of Abul Qasim, in the 48th year¹¹ or 1704, and the Emperor's sanction for renaming Patna city as Azimabad after the princely addressee and the Subadar (pp. 163-4) can be definitely dated. Many notable events and cases of transfers, appointments, dismissals etc. of provincial officials and the nobles help us to fix the dates of the letters.

As regards the contents of the *Ahkam*, they cover a very wide field and throw a flood of light on the character and policy of the Emperor, puritanical in outlook and academic in pursuits¹², and on his attitude towards the various classes of Hindus. Mahrattas, Rajputs, Jats, Sikhs, Poligars and even Kols¹³ and Bheels, and on his

⁸ E.g. p. 155 and f. 116a; p. 298 & 226a; besides verbal variants in many places.

⁹ E.g. the notes regarding the European pirates and Arabs of Muscut, etc.

¹⁰ The quatrain of a poet of which the last line "Lauh-i-Kalimat, Tayyabat-i-Quds ast" is a chronogram yielding 1121 A.H. or 1708 A.D.

¹¹ *Akhbarat-i-darbar-i-Mualla*, Sarkar's Ms.

¹² E.g. frequent references to books and libraries and to copies of the Quran and of books on grammar like *Alfiah* made in his own hand by the Emperor and sent as presents to Mecca.

¹³ See pp. 40, 57, 78, 88, 125, 129, 186, 200 and 406-8.

relations with European¹⁴ traders and pirates in western waters, including the Angrias¹⁵. The Afghan allies¹⁶ of the Hindus in Malwa, the turbulent people in the north west, Ismail Bohras, etc. have also come in for consideration. Besides the evidence of narrowness of outlook, religious¹⁷ intolerance or discrimination, superstitious¹⁸ beliefs, the Emperor's anxiety to check official bribery, laxity in administration, oppressive measures, his sense and methods of justice, his charity—sometimes secret—and the great concern that he felt for the safe journey of the pilgrims to Mecca, are also reflected in the letters. Even the most capable and favourite officials were not spared if reports were received against them: Murshid Quli Khan of Bengal and Orissa who was so regular in remitting the Bengal treasure which finds so frequent mention and which in one year amounted to 16,848 Ashrafis, 2,36,64,553 Rs. and 300 "Huns" (p. 332) was once reported against on the ground of farmers or renters within his jurisdiction oppressing the weak by a variety of expedients and causing ruination of the Parganah, and also because of the confusion in the affairs of the flotilla and arrears of pay of the men of the artillery establishment. The Secretary wrote, among other things, on order:—"The sincerity of aim and intention of His Sacred Majesty is bent on making the territories well peopled and prosperous and on seeing that the weak are safe and protected from the strong and injustice is practised to none nor favour shown to others. You, the exalted one, realising that God the most glorious is ever present should always make it your objective and have in full view of your conscience the necessity of keeping the *Mahals* fully inhabited and well-peopled and allowing people quiet and tranquillity. Moreover, it involves the increase of wealth. You should abstain from all that injures the creatures and adopt remedial measures regarding the disordered condition of the flotilla and the demand for arrears of salaries and accounts of artillery establishment" (p. 328). P. Muizzuddin was also taken to task for neglecting his duties. "How could you of exalted stock become the axis of such oppression and tyranny?" (p. 159). A high official was reprimanded "Why are you dragging down the name of your ancestors?". The Emperor's solicitude for the peaceful pursuits of the traders and the grain dealers or Banjaras and for the protection of the interests of the peasantry, for the strict observance of the regulations concerning public morals, for the repair of old mausoleums and religious

¹⁴ pp. 7, 17, 18, 23, 119, 156, 241, 368, 371-5, 378-81, 395-99, 401-5 in view of their importance these 35 letters deserve a separate treatment.

¹⁵ Kanhoji of Konon, p. 373.

¹⁶ Janullah and Faqirullah.

¹⁷ Demolition of temples and question of cow slaughter 125, 139, 140, 204, 205, 227, 236, converts favoured 343, 290, Muslim heretics 76, 429, 431.

Talismanic effects of stones 264, 258 Tawiz ; prayers in effecting cure.

buildings, for the effective news-service, and prompt measures to put the Qazis, the censors, and the provincial chiefs on the correct path, and many other matters, are of great interest to a student of the Mughal administration.

Considerable space is covered in the *Ahkam* by the Mughal-Mahratta struggle. There are interesting references to Raja Sahu in more than a dozen of letters, to his monthly allowances¹⁹, his expenses, his custody and the infructuous negotiations for his release. Tara Bai, Dhannaji Jadav, Nimaji Sindhi, Keshava Malher and many others are frequently mentioned. The various sections of the Rajputs, the Rathors and the Bundellas more than the Kachchawahas and Sisodias, figure in the letters. Some of the references to Sawai Jai Singh of Amber, Durgadas Rathor of Marwar, and Dhir²⁰ Ujjaynia of Shahabad, Bihar, wrongly reported to be killed, deserve more than a passing notice. Raja Chhatarsal, the Jat Chiefs and the Sanyasi affair also frequently attracted the attention of the Emperor.

When P. Bedar Bukht, Governor of Malwa, proposed the grant of a Kettledrum and of a certain Parganah to Jai Singh on condition of keeping a suitable contingent for service, the cryptic answer was "Khurdsal wa Qaim Beghair" or "(he is) young (and) without firmness and stability" (p. 37). When the princely patron persisted and proposed to leave Jai Singh as his Deputy in Malwa, it was not accepted and Khan-i-Alam or any other person was suggested (p. 95). A province of such strategic importance, predominantly Hindu in population and over-run and disturbed so often by the Rajputs and the Mahrattas could not be entrusted by the shrewd and suspicious Emperor to one so young and undependable. We are told:—"I, the child of a slave was ordered to send the copy of the sheets containing the occurrences of Malwa to your beneficent self and submit that in view of these despicable actions the Rajputs are not to be granted *Subadari* or *Foujdari* by the imperial threshold of heaven-like dignity. At any rate, you of exalted power should write to Raja Jai Singh that he may not have an elevated *Musnad* or cushion to recline, but if he wishes he can use an ornamented carpet ('*Suzni*') spread on the ground, and that he should adopt a worthy and agreeable way of living with the royal servants²¹" (p. 101).

¹⁹ 2,560 Rs. for suit of cloths, house expenses (Buyutat) and house rental zulfikar was agreeable to 2,000 Rs.

²⁰ See Irvine's *Later Mughals*, Vol. II. Prince Azim was misinformed when he reported his death to the Emperor. The author of *Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim* whose father joined Abdullah Khan of Ghazipur fame in defeating and killing Dhir of Baraon during the Subadari of Surbuland Khan is more reliable. (Oriental Public Library Manuscript).

²¹ The whole passage has been given here for the first time. It is not fair to make a general statement on the basis of a line torn from its context.

Ajit Singh, considered as "Jaali" or impostor (p. 18) and his guardian, Durga Das who "was to be sent to the imperial camp, otherwise finished on the spot so that he might not lead Ajit and the Rathor astray", and also Khem Karan, the brother of Durga and his 'mad' Diwan to whom "worthless Akbar"²² had written a letter which had been seized and forwarded by P. Muizzuddin (p. 6) also find mention in many places. We find reference to a letter of the hero of Marwar addressed to the Secretary which was submitted to the Emperor and a copy whereof was forwarded for a suitable reply to P. Azam Shah, Governor of Gujarat (pp. 33, 31). The reported alliance between Durga and Abdul Hamid Khan, the latter conveying secret news to his Vakil, was disbelieved for the Khan was a 'Hafiz', a 'Haji', a Musulman and born of a Muslim (p. 125). P. Azam Shah was told that Durga Das Rathor had been granted exemption from cattle provision for two years. The period having expired and there being no Vakil of his at the Court to settle it, the addressee was ordered to send his Vakil, his son and brother and his followers again to the victorious camp (p. 5). The Prince's proposal to send Durga to the royal presence after the arrival of the mace-bearers and *Sazawals* (land stewards) was approved (p. 6). Numan Khan, the *Bakshi* and *Waqai-Nigar* of Ahmedabad was informed that "Durgadas Rathor also had been ordered about the protection of the city, chastisement of the infidels and keeping 'Sehbandi' or an establishment of peons" (364). He and "the intrepid Durgadas Rathor" were directed, according to royal orders, that "relying upon God, the great Helper, they should sally out to chastise the group of infidels" (p. 366). Amanat Khan, the Foudar of Baroda, was also ordered to join with the brave Rathor Chief in repelling the Mahrattas and not to rely on hearsay rumours. To the said Rathor was also written "according to orders" (377); Najabet Khan, the Naib Subadar of Ahmedabad, was reminded of the Wazir's letter sent to him, and orders were issued about "pacifying Durgadas Rathor, restoring to him the *Mansab* and the jobs as held before, and keeping him pleased with himself". The Secretary wrote further, according to orders—"As the said Rathor had represented his condition of distress and destitution" the addressee was to contact him and make his proposals so that they might be sanctioned by his Imperial Majesty²³ (p. 413).

No less rare and interesting are the references to Guru Gobind Singh and his virile followers. Prince Muazzam, Governor of Kabul, was informed that Khawaja Mubarak had reported "the assembling

of 5,000 Hindus who call themselves Khalsa of Gobind, the worshippers of Nanak, their march to village Arakzai(?) under the escort of the Yusufzai Afghans who, however, being joined by others, fell on them near the blue waters leading to a number of them being deservedly killed or drowned". The princely Governor was ordered "to put the wicked ones under arrest and expel them from those regions" (p. 3). There is a reference to the siege of Chamkaur in a letter to Wazir Khan, the Subadar of Sarhind "Your communication regarding the descent of Gobind, the worshipper of Nanak, to a place within twelve kos of Sarhind, the despatch of a body of 700 horse well-equipped with artillery, and the disturbing fellow being besieged in the *haveli* of the zamindar of Chamkaur and about his two sons and other followers being killed and one son and his mother being taken captive and other matters, has been received" (p. 393). Another letter to Wazir Khan says, among other things, that Muhammad Aulia of Buriya in Parganah Khirzabad of Sarkar-i-Sarhind, had reported that the addressee had, "according to the exalted orders, and in agreement with the Qazi, demolished the idol temple (?) of worshippers of Nanak in the Qasba, erected a mosque there, and appointed a Darwesh, Syed Muzaffar, to perform the daily prayers, in that mosque, and that the said body of people destroyed that mosque, killed the said Darwesh, and after enquiry confessed that they had killed him" (p. 394). As regards the Guru himself, a letter to Munim Khan, Diwan of Shah Alam and Deputy Governor of the Punjab, says "Gobind had submitted an *Arzdasht* signifying his intention to kiss the exalted thresh-hold and he had sent a request through a Vakil for the despatch of grace-manifesting "Manshoor". The Emperor was gracious enough to send the "royal mandate obligatory of obedience" through Mohd. Beg, the mace-bearer and Sh. Yar Muhammad, a Mansabdar. They had to convey the "Farman" to the addressee who would forward it to its recipient. He was also enjoined upon to soothe and comfort him, summon him to his presence, and after the receipt of letters patent, arrange to send him to the royal presence with a trustworthy person, acquainted with the routes, and the said mace-bearer and the Mansabdar (p. 324). A similar letter to Wazir Khan also refers to the receipt of the *Arzdasht* of Gobind, the Chief of Nanak worshippers, relating to his intention to request for the despatch of the light emanating sacred "Manshoor". It also refers to the despatch of a 'Farman' through the said personages to Munim Khan with directions to comfort and console the Guru, summon him to his presence, and send him to the imperial camp. The Secretary adds in this letter:—"As soon as the said Gobind arrives in the vicinity of Sarhind city, you, the exalted one, should provide him with an escort to take him beyond your frontier. In case, behind or in presence, he expresses imaginary fears, reassure him, and if he wants the expenses of the

²² The rebellious son of Aurangzeb who had joined the Rajputs and had sent Durga-Das to represent him during negotiations with Sambhaji.

²³ These revealing references which had remained previously unnoticed have got an importance of their own.

journey he should be provided with what is needed out of his goods seized by you" (p. 391).

As regards the European traders and the piracy in the western waters and the Emperor's policy towards them, only a few letters can be noticed here: (1) The Goan Chief complained against the misbehaviour of the English and the Dutch who for the last 20 years had obstructed the route of trade and of pilgrimage to Mecca and also against the oppressive activities, on land and sea, in Konkan, of Kanho Angria, and offered to do the needful, if a specified aid was given to him. (2) Failure of Itimad Khan in preventing grain and other necessities reaching the Dutch and deputation of Yakut and others for the purpose. (3) Effective action by Amanat Khan against the Mahratta pirates, and the captain of Daman, and his seizure of a cannon of the enemy. His proposal for the reduction of 700 popular villages dependent on Daman. Reply sent that before accession, on the instigation of inexperienced men, the reduction of the fort of Daman had been aimed at, but the difficulty of taking the forts of the Feringis was realized. These people could be subjugated only by fighting them in unmanly fields. (4) The seizure by the English pirates of two ships of Abdul Ghafur and Qasim of Surat, one of them boarded by Ali Naqi, the daughter's son of the ex-king of Iran, and the explanation called from Itbar Khan who had imprisoned, tortured and mulcted the English brokers, Keshav and Vithal, who had an acquaintance deed. (5) Arrival of seven Dutch ships and capture and detention of Nurul Haque and Fakhrul Islam for whose release the Emperor was very anxious. (6) Realization of 5,48,000 Rupees and 9 lacks as compensation for the plundered goods. (7) On M. Abdul Ghafur and other traders representing through Najabat Khan that if the trade of hat-wearers was stopped they would yield in a year or two and the traffic would be opened, and on a requisition being made for 2,000 foot and 1,000 horse for the reduction of Daman and Bassein of the Portuguese, the reply was sent that it was foolish to think that the forts could be suddenly captured. To fight against all the four—English, French, Dutch and Portuguese—was to invite disorders on the seas. There was the anxiety about the ships of the past year and the present, still on voyage. Everything should be kept secret till their return. As regards the suppression of the Feringhis and favourable decision on claims of other traders against them and grant of bonds of exemption for the opening of the sea traffic, matters should be kept in abeyance for some time. (8) On permission being sought to send Sh. Nurullah on deputation to Thatha and to Arabia to induce the ruler of Muscat, superior to the hatwearers, to fight against them, Prince Muizzuddin was ordered to send some one to Muscat, sanctioning 1,000 Rupees for him, so that he should go in the guise of a trader

and court his friendship. He should be instructed to suggest that aid would be given to him against the ruler of Iran contemplating to send an army against Muscat.

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN ASSAM IN THE DAYS OF THE COMPANY

H. K. BARPUJARI

Department of Education, Assam Government

IN A LETTER addressed to Captain Jenkins, the Agent to the Governor General, North East Frontier, dated 18 June 1834, Adam White, the Political Agent, Upper Assam, writes. "The usual range of school education in Assam is limited to the perusal of the translation of the Bhagavat Gita, Ramayana and the commentaries, treatises on medicine, arithmetic and astronomy. A few pandits have studied the original Sanskrit and their attainments were considered respectable by Mr. Lidden, formerly translator to Mr. Scott and now Professor of Sanskrit in the King's College London. Among the Ahoms, a few still continue to study their ancient literature but it contains anything but dry record of the deeds of their ancestors. At the period of our conquest the provision for educating people had been most diminished, owing to the disturbed state of society which has prevailed in Assam for the last forty or fifty years and the want of encouragement arising from the constant change of rulers. This falling off in point of means had not been counteracted by any increased patronage from the nobility among whom the same feeling prevailed as that which characterised the European aristocracy in the Middle Ages, the art of writing being esteemed ignoble and generally neglected or if attained at all, it rarely extended beyond attaching their signature to a document¹."

The above passage gives a picture of the system of education that prevailed in Assam during the pre-British days. With a view to encourage the indigenous system of education by assignment of lands, in October 1826, David Scott, the Agent to the Governor General, North East Frontier, obtained sanction of the Government of India and accordingly eleven schools were set up in Lower Assam². Learning was then confined mostly to the Brahmins and Kayasthas and in the words of a contemporary, "the only language taught is Sanskrit and matter shaster". "With a view to improve the general

¹ Commonwealth Relations Office, (India Office) Political Consultations Bengal, 10 July 1834, no. 211.

² Political Consultations Bengal, 26 October 1826, nos. 21-22.

scale of education" Adam White reported "I succeeded in combination with Mr. Roe and Other European gentlemen at Gauhati in establishing a school where all the Bengalee translation from Elementary European works of science were studied and the scriptures were used as class book". Speaking of the attitude of the people to this new system, he further says "Raja Poorandar Singha (the then ruler of Upper Assam) has evinced every disposition to promote the diffusion of knowledge.....he had agreed to establish a school in each Khel,³ which if carried into execution would give about one school to every 200 of the population. That he is not indifferent to European learning I am perfectly aware nor all the intelligent portion of his people.....the prejudices of the nobility in regard to learning were rapidly disappearing and were desirous that their children should study.....The press too, had begun to operate on the minds of the more intelligent portion of the community, there being four or five subscribers to the Calcutta native Newspapers⁴."

The activities of the Government were mainly limited to making certain grants of land or petty sums of money and in general, education was left to private enterprise. In June 1834, Captain Jenkins, the Agent to the Governor General and Commissioner of Assam, felt that in a backward province like Assam education should be a state responsibility. "To leave the matter to the people" he pointed out to the Government of India "would be to commit a duty incumbent in my opinion upon us to those who are, mostly incapable of judging for themselves and who from universal poverty caused perhaps greatly by our mismanagement are unable from want of means and intelligence to accomplish any progress that would satisfy us. To trust the diffusion of knowledge in this province to native hands alone would be to protract for centuries what with our aid may be performed in a brief period. To leave the matter alone would approach nearly to parental neglect of children⁵."

Doubtless, the Commissioner was, inspired by a "Political-cum-administrative objective"—to win over the confidence of the official aristocracy of the former Government who lost their political influence through British conquest and for whom, he thought Government must provide employment. He reported: "These few in their present uneducated state do not suffice to carry on the duties of our courts, the offices in which are mostly filled by natives of Sylhet and Rungpore; so that the old families of Assam are still losing influence in their own native province from being barred those situations which lead to power or decent maintenance. This state of

³ Under the Ahoms, who ruled Assam before the British, the whole population was divided into 'Khels' or clans according to their occupation; viz., clan of Gold Washers, Braziers.

⁴ Political Consultations Bengal, 10 July 1834, no. 11; White to Jenkins, 18 June.

⁵ Political Consultations Bengal, 10 July 1834, no. 2.

things appears to me pregnant with evil and I know no other method by which it could be remedied than by the Government taking some active measures to provide instruction for the Assamese Youths".⁶

The General Committee of Public Instruction, on the suggestions of Jenkins, recommended in early 1835 an English School at Gauhati and the following years saw the rise of a number of branch schools near about. To cater to the growing demand, particularly of the remote parganas where on account of poverty and prejudice and no less of affection, many guardians disliked to send their wards away from home, James Matthie, the Collector of Gauhati, proposed in February 1838, to set up an Anglo-Vernacular school for imparting a perfect knowledge of vernacular besides instruction in English and also a number of "Village Schools" to teach the masses the Three Rs.⁷ In spite of the eloquent support of the educationists like Adams, Elphinstone and Munro, the attitude of the General Committee of Public Instruction to the education of the masses was one of total indifference. "That its present system and plans" the Secretary of the Committee pointed out to Jenkins "embrace neither the superintendence nor the support of this class of Schools". "When originally constituted", he added "the General Committee with the sanction of the Government resolved not to interfere with such schools, not only that its means and enquiries might not be exhausted by too wide an expansion, but from an apprehension that its interference might divert the private resources which supported this class of schools". On the other hand "it appears to the General Committee more prudent (as it is certainly more suited to its limited means) for the present to concentrate its efforts and to aim rather at the establishment of a simple well regulated institution than the diffusion of many schools of an inferior grade".⁸

Fortunately, however, Matthie's proposal received strong support from the Supreme Government. In the opinion of Mr. Ross, the then President of the Council "the Scheme deserved encouragement" and as an "experimental measure" sanction was accorded to, with provision that its continuance in future would be determined on its results.⁹

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Revenue Consultations, Bengal, 14 August 1838, no. 65; Matthie to Jenkins, 13 February 1838.

⁸ Revenue Consultations, Bengal, 18 August 1838, no. 65; Secretary, G. C. P. I. to Capt. Jenkins, 18 April 1838.

⁹ Revenue Consultations, Bengal, 1 August 1838, no. 66.

EXCLUSION OF HIGH CASTE HINDUS FROM OUDH POLICE AFTER THE MUTINY

NANDA LAL CHATTERJI

University of Lucknow

I HAVE discovered among the old English records of Lucknow at present in the custody of the local Deputy Commissioner some extremely interesting post-Mutiny circulars, memoranda etc. relating to the recruitment and organisation of the Oudh Police Force. These papers are of historical importance, for they throw a flood of light on the inner springs of British policy in connection with the maintenance of law and order in India.

A study of these papers reveals that after the Mutiny the British Government deliberately excluded from the Police force Hindus of higher castes, and sought to make it a close preserve for Muslims and Hindu Kayasthas alone. These official papers conclusively prove that the preponderance of Muslims or of Kayasthas in the Police was no accident, and was the result of a systematic plan based on imperialist considerations. The exclusion of high caste Hindus was obviously inspired by political motives. The Mutiny of 1857 in which the upper caste Hindu sepoys from Northern India had played a prominent role appears to have been the cause of the change of policy in respect of Police recruitment. The British bureaucracy must have considered it unsafe as well as impolitic to allow a preponderance of Brahmins, Chhatris or Thakurs in the Police personnel. That accounts for the studied exclusion of these higher castes from the Police in the years following the Mutiny.

From the periodical returns furnished to the provincial Inspector General of Police, it appears that by 1872 the upper ranks of constabulary in Oudh were almost entirely composed of either Muslims, or the Kayasthas from amongst the Hindus. For example, a secret Memo (No. 50 of 1872) reveals the very significant fact that "out of the 53 Divisional Head Constables in the Police Force, no less than 27 are Mussulman, and 20 are Kayasthas (Kaiths)." This means that only a handful of these important posts were filled by men of other castes and communities. A list of chief constables likewise shows that a large majority of them were Muslims and Kayasthas. Even among the second grade constables, the same communal preponderance was admitted in another circular. One Memo contains a candid avowal of this fact in these words, ".....the tendency of late

has been to promote from Mussulman and this caste (i.e., Kayasthas), the result of such action must be that the upper ranks of the Police will before long be filled with Mussulman and Moonshees".

The records show that the authorities had evolved an interesting theory in justification of the planned exclusion of particular castes and communities and the preferential treatment shown to Muslim and Kayasthas. Lt. Col. D. S. Barrow, offg. Inspector General, Oudh Police, wrote in the course of a memorandum (Dated Lucknow, the 18th June, 1872)..... "Mussulman and Kaithas are generally speaking the best and sharpest men.....". No commentary is needed on an explanation like this.

Another confidential circular directs the District Superintendents of Police to consider invariably "the caste of the man recommended in the recommendation Roll of Officers for promotion". This would serve to show that upper grade vacancies were in fact intended to be filled up as far as possible from the favoured sections of the population.

It is indeed a paradox that one high British officer raised his voice of protest against this policy and urged that it seemed to him "very unwise that we should have such a large number of any two castes holding the most important posts in the force". Apparently, this gentleman was not conversant with the ways of the British bureaucracy in India, and so his comment went unheeded. Probably, it was to answer such criticisms that the convenient theory about "the best and sharpest men" was propounded.

AN OLD VILLAGE SURVEY REPORT

K. K. DATTA

Patna College, Patna

THE OLD survey reports like those of Major James Rennel and Francis Hamilton Buchanan contain plenty of important information relating to the history of India, in its different aspects, during the last three decades of the eighteenth century and the first two decades of the nineteenth century respectively. They can be supplemented by additional information from the old reports of the village surveys, which the English East India Company's Government had to conduct in the course of land settlements of various kinds. Recently I obtained one such report in Persian, dated 1825, from the Record Office of the Divisional Commissioner at Patna, through a Research Assistant of mine, Mr. F. Balkhi.

This Report, included in the *Proceedings of the Court of the Collector of Shahabad, dated 12 September 1825*, relates to the survey of village Kaithi in tappa Bharki of pargana Sasaram in Bihar. Besides mentioning the usual modes of settlement survey and discussing the reasons for undertaking it, the Report traces the history of this village, and also contains highly interesting facts relating to the social and economic conditions of the time, such as the different castes and their professions, the prices of commodities, the agricultural produce, the conditions of labourers and slaves, the population census figures etc. It further shows that the village was a self-sufficient unit for its practical needs.

Nothing is mentioned about the early history of this village. But the Qanungoes ascertained through enquiries from well-informed persons and from memoirs of some of them that the Kharwars got possession of it in the early medieval period. They had to submit subsequently to the authority of the Surs. During the reign of Aurangzeb the village came into the possession of Dhanpal Rai and Chandra Bhan Rai of Kurmi caste. After the partition of property between them, this village fell to the share of Chandra Bhan Rai. In the eighteenth century before the establishment of the English East India Company's authority in this area, Pahalwan Singh and Loher Singh, Rajput Taluqdars of a neighbouring village called Nokha, took possession of it. After some years it became the property of Dev Rai, descendant of the above-mentioned Dhanpal Rai and Chandra Bhan Rai. Ultimately the descendants of Dev Rai and

Sita Rai inherited it. But chiefly because of their refusal to accept the proposed amount of *Jama* fixed by the Decennial Settlement of 1789-90, it was for some years settled with revenue farmers on short-term contracts. On the expiry of such a contract in 1821, it was settled in this manner for another year, but remained incorporated in Government Khas Mahal from 1823 to 1825. To avoid loss of revenue due to changing settlements, the Government thought it necessary in 1825 to effect a permanent settlement and for this purpose the survey was undertaken.

Certain important facts revealed by the Survey Report are as follows:—

A. Professional Castes

Forced Labour—No particular caste in this village was required to perform "*Begary*" or forced work. But persons belonging to the lower castes were engaged in menial works of different kinds. They received in return $3\frac{1}{2}$ seers of grain. Those engaged in agricultural works got $3\frac{1}{2}$ seers of grain daily for ploughing and one big bundle as well as a small bushel a day for cutting the crop.

Slavery—No slaves were sold in the village but some of the Rajputs settled there maintained 10 to 12 male or female slaves.

Priest—The Brahman priest (*Purohit*) of the village was named Jagannath Dubey. All the residents contributed their share of grain to a common stock out of which the priest got two-thirds and the *Gorait* (who assisted the Patwaris) one-third. At the time of harvest each cultivator gave one small bushel of grain to him. In addition to all this, on the occasion of marriages or funerals the villagers gave him cash and clothings according to their respective sources of income.

Barber—His name was Sheo Barat. He was paid per family each year $7\frac{1}{2}$ seers of grain excluding rice and one bushel of grain at the time of harvest. Out of what he earned at marriages or other ceremonies he kept $1/3$ rd for himself and the remainder was given to the priest.

Washermen—They were Gur Dayal and Ram Nath by name. Their remuneration was at the rate of 10 seers of grain excluding rice per family each year. They also got from each family one bushel of grain at the time of cutting the crop and also one bushel when crops were brought to the *Khalians* (agricultural farms).

Blacksmith—His name was Suphal. He made and repaired agricultural implements of the cultivators. He got each year from each cultivator 3 seers of grain and one bushel more for each plough.

B. MARKET RATES OF GRAINS FROM 1822 TO 1825 A.D.
(Rate per Rupee)

Year	Matar	Til	Kurthi	Arhar	Turi	Teesi (Linseed)	Jao (Barley)	Wheat	Nakhod (Bout grams)	Masur	Mong	Mash	Marua
	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.
1822	2 10 0	1 10 0	2 20 0	2 10 0	1 10 0	1 20 0	3 20 0	2 0 0	3 0 0	3 5 0	1 10 0	1 10 0	3 20 0
1823	1 35 0	0 30 0	...	1 20 0	0 32 0	0 35 0	2 0 0	1 5 0	1 30 0	1 35 0	1 10 0	1 0 0	2 5 0
1824	1 25 0	0 30 0	1 20 0	1 10 0	0 35 0	1 0 0	1 25 0	1 0 0	1 20 0	1 25 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 30 0
1825	...	0 30 0	1 30 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1 0 0	1 5 0	2 0 0
GRAND TOTAL	6 30 0	3 20 0	5 30 0	5 0 0	2 37 0	3 15 0	7 5 0	4 5 0	6 10 0	6 25 0	4 20 0	4 15 0	9 15 0
Yearly average	2 10 0	0 35 0	1 36 10	1 10 0	0 29 0	1 5 0	2 15 0	1 15 0	2 3 6	2 8 6	1 5 0	1 3 12	2 13 12

M=Maunds.
S=Seers.
C=Chataks.

C. STATEMENT ABOUT AGRICULTURAL LANDS, NUMBER OF HOUSES AND CENSUS
OF INHABITANTS

1. Area according to old papers of Patwaris	900 bighas. B. C. Dh.
2. Area according to survey of 1231-32 Fasli	1146 13 9
3. Area excluded from settlement	177 14 13
4. Area not cultivable i.e. Homestead	174 14 13
5. Number of Houses	37
6. Number of Ploughs	28
7. Number of inhabitants	199
Rajputs	34
Brahmans	5
Kayasthas	7
Kurmis	44
Koeris	29
Lohars	7
Barbers	4
Washermen	12
Tantis (Weevers)	20
Muslim weavers	5
Banias	5
Kahars	4
Telis	6
Pasban or Watchmen	6
Gowalas	8
Kandoos	3
	199

Number of Trees.

Mahua	165
Mango	14

Name of Chowkidar	Rajrup Pasban.
Name of Gorait	Raghu Bansi Pasban.
Name of Patwari	Gouri Das.

SALT MONOPOLY IN ORISSA AND ITS EFFECTS DURING THE EARLY BRITISH RULE

Sushil Chandra De

Orissa State Archives, Bhuvaneswar

THE YEAR 1803 constitutes a landmark in the history of Orissa. It witnessed the end of the short Maratha rule and the foundation of that of the British. With the establishment of the British regime, a new administrative machinery was set up, rather too quickly for the people of the province to get used to it. The British authorities, who came possessed of their ideas and experiences relating to their administration in Bengal, started working them out at once in the newly conquered province without ever stopping to consider the general character of the people, their history, traditions, or religious susceptibilities. They proceeded forthwith with their administrative arrangements without a suitable background to popularise or stabilise them. The natural outcome of such hasty arrangements was the discontent among the people who were hardly given any opportunity to adjust themselves to the new situation and it manifested itself even in armed revolts against the new government.

The salt monopoly introduced in Orissa was one of many grievances of the people. A lot of correspondence passed between the authorities on the subject with a view to ascertain how far the grievances of the people in this matter were genuine. The object of this paper is to briefly discuss the effects of the salt monopoly on the people of Orissa in the first two decades of the British rule in the light of the facts recorded in the official records of the period.

Orissa, being on the sea-board, had salt manufacture as one of its most flourishing industries. Orissa salt was of very fine quality, and it found a ready market in the neighbouring States, like Bengal and Madhya Pradesh. In the words of Stirling, "In this wild inhospitable tract however the finest salt of all India is manufactured,....."¹. During the Maratha rule, there was no restriction on its manufacture and trade in this commodity. The State income from this source consisted of land revenue assessed on the salt lands and the *sair* duty collected on salt in transit. Naturally, salt was quite cheap in Orissa, and it constituted one of the chief commercial commodities exported from Orissa. During this period, salt could

¹ Stirling, *An account of Orissa Proper or Cuttack*, p. 5.

be purchased for 3 to 4 annas per maund at the place of manufacture². In the market it sold at a rate not exceeding 14 annas per maund, rate during the last four years of the Maratha rule being 8 to 9 annas per Calcutta maund of salt. Colonel Harcourt, who was appointed as one of the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack after the conquest of Orissa, observed in 1804, "the price of salt in Cuttack seldom exceeded 14 annas the Calcutta maund"³. Mr. Melville, who was appointed as Joint Commissioner with Col. Harcourt, thought that price of salt never exceeded 5 annas per maund in Orissa under the Maratha Government⁴. The price of salt, one of the essential commodities of food, was much less than what it was in the British period, the rate of salt in the market in 1817 being Rs. 3-4-0 per maund. The salt manufacture being free and unrestricted under Maratha Government, it was not only procurable at a very cheap rate and in sufficient quantity, but was exported to neighbouring territories, especially to Nagpur, in large quantities. Motte noted in 1766 that a village, probably Contillo, in Khandpara was a rendezvous of traders from the Coastal regions of Orissa and those from Central India in the months from January to April, where the traders from Orissa exchanged salt for cotton goods. So, brisk trade in salt was carried on in the Maratha period.

The English with their keen commercial outlook and vast experience in the line were at once impressed with the possibilities and bright prospects of salt industry in Orissa. So they wasted no time in introducing the salt monopoly in the Northern Division of Cuttack, that is, the portion of Orissa lying to the north of the river Mahanadi. At first, it appears, R. Ker, Collector of Balasore, acted as Superintendent of Salt. In 1806, a Salt Agency for Northern Division of Cuttack was created, and James King was appointed as the Salt Agent and was placed under the control of the Salt Department of the Board of Trade, Fort William. In the year 1814, the salt monopoly was extended to the Southern Division. Three years after this extension came the crisis of 1817 which necessitated a thorough investigation into the causes of the grievances of the people of Orissa, one of which was about the enhancement of the price of salt and its scarcity.

In his report of 3 May 1817 pertaining to the complaints of the people relating to salt, Mr. Trower, Collector of Cuttack, wrote to the Secretary, Board of Revenue, that the cry for salt was general; it could not be purchased by the poor people owing to its high price; the rich could not procure it on account of scarcity and that

². *Selections from the correspondence on the settlement of Khoordah estate in the District of Pooree*, Vol. I (printed, Bengal Secretariat Press, 1879), p. 46.

³. *Ibid*, p. 47.

⁴. *Ibid*.

ibid.

merchants sold salt at much higher rate than that fixed by the Government. Though he could not give his opinion as to how far complaints were founded on real facts, he stated that he could procure with the greatest difficulty sufficient salt for the daily consumption of his camp⁵. If the Collector of the District could procure his requirement of salt with "the greatest difficulty", there can be hardly any room for doubt that the complaint of the people relating to the scarcity of salt was real and not exaggerated or imaginary, as the Salt Agent sought to explain it away.

The Governor General in Council called for a report from the Board of Trade on the grievances of the people relating to the scarcity and the enhanced price of salt. The Board, in their turn, wanted a report from C. Becher, Salt Agent, Cuttack. Mr. Becher submitted a report on the subject in his letter⁶, dated 8 May 1817, addressed to T. Plowden, Secretary, Board of Trade. He sought to impress upon the Board that the complaints relating to salt were without foundation. In support of this contention, he put forth the following facts and arguments.

(1) The average sale of salt in Orissa in the last three years amounted to 1,51,035 mds. which provided for 5,37,013 souls at half a chhatack per annum. The average retail price of salt in the district was Rs. 3-4-0 per maund, and at that rate, the annual expenditure of an individual would amount to 14 annas and 7 pies. So, he could not believe that there was any scarcity, or there could be any grievance on account of high price.

(2) The real grievance, in his opinion, was due to discontent among the village headmen, who formerly monopolised the salt trade and lost heavily on account of the salt monopoly of the Government.

(3) The price of salt current in Orissa was almost half of that prevailing in Bengal. In view of this, the grievance of the people could not be considered a real one, unless the current rate was compared with that prevailing prior to extension of monopoly.

These were the main arguments of Mr. Becher by which he tried to cover a genuine and very distressing grievance of the people. The Board of Trade too in their report, dated 27 May 1817, to the Governor General in Council on the matter⁷ did not make any intelligent comment on the views of the Salt Agent. They concurred with the

⁵. Ms. Volume (Judicial Department), No. 15-A, pp. 233-34.

⁶. *Ibid*, pp. 127-38.

⁷. *Ibid*, pp. 121-26.

Agent's opinion that the insurrection in Cuttack could not be attributed to the price of salt, or difficulty of obtaining it. They, however, could not appreciate the argument of the Salt Agent, that since the price of salt in Orissa was almost half of that prevailing in Bengal, the people of Orissa could have no cause for complaint in regard to its enhanced price.

H. Mackenzie, Secretary to the Government, in his letter of 30 August 1817 conveyed the observations of the Vice-President in Council on the above reports to the Board of Trade⁹. Though the Vice-President was disposed to agree with the opinion expressed by the Board that the causes of the insurrection in the District of Cuttack were, in all probability, wholly unconnected with the high price of salt and the difficulty of procuring that article, he however observed that the report of the Salt Agent was not sufficient or detailed to enable the Government to form a clear judgement in regard to the degree in which the operations of the Salt Department might have calculated to curtail the comforts of the people. As regards population of the District he remarked that the estimate of the Salt Agent was too low. Mr. Richardson, one of the late Commissioners, had estimated the population of Orissa at 15,00,000 souls. Even after making sufficient allowance for over-estimate, Mr. Becher's estimate would appear too low. Regarding Mr. Becher's opinion that half a chhatack of salt per day was sufficient for a man's daily consumption, the Vice-President remarked that in Bengal it was a little more than the quantity estimated by Mr. Becher. The quantity of food ordinarily in use among the inhabitants of Orissa was such as to render necessary the consumption of more than usual quantity of salt. From this point of view he considered Mr. Becher's estimate as rather low. The Vice-President did not accept the view of Mr. Becher that the salt monopoly only hit hard the village headmen who had monopolised salt trade before the British rule. He believed that the price of salt, prior to the introduction of the monopoly, was extremely low, hence, people might be supposed to have suffered from the effects of the monopoly. He thought that the price of salt in Orissa was too rapidly raised; a sudden increase in price of an essential commodity of food like salt could scarcely fail to create considerable distress to the people. The enhanced price of salt, the Vice-President was of opinion, was due to the intermediate agencies through which the commodity passed before it reached the consumer. As a remedy against this defect, he suggested that steps should be taken to increase the number of sales depots so that the consumer might obtain without difficulty his supplies from the public stores; that would considerably bring down the price. He further observed

⁹. *Ibid.*, pp. 155-67.

that too rigid enforcement of rules to prevent illicit traffic in salt would prove vexatious to the people with little advantage to the public revenue.

The Vice-President's observations were very practical and designed to alleviate the rigour of the system of salt monopoly. He rightly pointed out that Mr. Becher's estimate of the population of Orissa at a rough figure of five and a half lakhs was too low. It was, at least, twelve lakhs, if not fifteen lakhs, as estimated by Mr. Richardson. Mr. Ewer, after a detailed calculation, estimated the population of the Mughalbandi area of Orissa to be 11 lakhs excluding the area of Ali, Kujang and Kanika¹⁰. Besides, about a lakh of pilgrims on an average came to Puri each year. Taking these facts into consideration the population of Orissa, according to Ewer, would be more than 12 lakhs. Calculating the consumption of salt at the rate of half a chhatack per day per head, the quantity of salt required for Orissa would amount to at least 3½ lakhs of maunds a year¹¹. If a little more than half a chhatack is allotted per head per day, as suggested by the Vice-President, the quantity required for internal consumption each year would amount roughly to about 4,00,000 maunds. The sale of salt in Orissa during the years 1811 to 1816 amounted approximately to 1,35,457 maunds on the average per year¹². So, there was a shortage of more than 2½ lakhs of maunds of salt required for the consumption of the people of Orissa. When salt was not provided for about 2/3 of the population, it was quite natural for the people of Orissa to grumble about the scarcity of salt, and there can be no doubt about the fact that their complaint was real.

It would be interesting to note that annual average sale of salt during the years 1814, 1815 and 1816 amounted to 1,50,914 maunds, and export to Salkia during the same period amounted to 3,83,107 maunds¹³. So when the people of Orissa were going without salt, his most essential commodity of food was exported to Bengal. It was because export to Bengal was more lucrative than internal sale. The exported salt was sold at Rs. 350 per 100 maunds, that is, Rs. 3-8-0 per maund¹⁴; in Orissa the price of salt was fixed at Rs. 2 per maund. It cost Government twelve annas only for manufacture of one maund of salt¹⁵ in Orissa. Thus the Government got only Rs. 1-4-0 per

¹⁰. *Selections from the correspondence on the settlement of the Khoordah estate in the District of Pooree*, Vol. No. I, pp. 50-51.

¹¹. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹². Ms. Volume No. 15-A, p. 127.

¹³. Ms. Volume (Salt Department), No. 46, p. 53.

¹⁴. *Ibid.*

¹⁵. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

maund in Orissa while they received Rs. 2-12-0 on each maund of exported salt. Allowing sufficient margin for wastage and cost of transportation, external trade in salt seemed more profitable than internal sale. Since the Salt Agent himself was receiving a commission on the amount of sale in addition to his pay, the export of salt from Orissa was both in the interest of the Company and the Salt Agent, though it was painfully distressing to the people of Orissa.

From what has been said, it would appear clear that the introduction of the salt monopoly in Orissa was highly detrimental to the interests of the people of Orissa, especially of the poor classes. The price of salt abnormally shot up to about eight times that prevailing under the Marathas, and over and above, it became scarce in the market owing to impudence of the authorities who looked more to their own interest than to those of the people under their rule. In the circumstances, it is no wonder that the people of Orissa should vehemently agitate against the system that was so distressing and oppressive to them.

Lastly, the facts stated above go to show how hastily the English administration was established in Orissa without proper study of the back-ground as observed at the outset, and how Government interests only were cared for, at the cost of the public comfort and peace.

MAHARAJA RAJBALLABH, RAY RAYAN OF THE KHALSA : HIS FAMILY AND ESTATES*

HARI RANJAN GHOSAL

L. S. College, Muzaffarpur

OUR DISTRICT record rooms are often inexhaustible mines of historical information; and it frequently happens with the worker at these mines that he comes across quite unexpected materials. Recently, while going through the English records in the archives of Muzaffarpur Collectorate, I found a fairly considerable number of documents relating to Maharaja Rajballabh, a notable Bengali administrator of the late eighteenth century. To the student of modern Indian history these will be very useful, because they afford a lot of hitherto unknown information about the Maharaja, his family and estates.

Rajballabh was the eldest son of Maharaja Durlabhram, the well-known Rai Durlabh who played a leading part in the Revolution of 1757. He was a Kayastha by caste, his surname being 'Som'. Rajballabh had a good family tradition, for his ancestors had been well-versed in revenue administration and accounts¹. One of them, Krishnaballabh, from whom he was fifth in descent, had served under the Muslim governors of Orissa and received the title of 'Sarkar'². Durlabhram, who was appointed Diwan and invested with the title of 'Maharaja' by Mir Jafar in 1757³, had a chequered career. In or about 1766 he was, on Clive's recommendation, further honoured with the title 'Mahindra Bahadur' and received a jagir of pargana Naubatpur in Patna district⁴. He died at the end of May or the beginning of June 1770. On receiving the news of his death Governor Cartier wrote to Rajballabh on the 16th June that he was "greatly concerned to learn of the death of his father Maharaja Mahindra. As the latter was a faithful servant of the Company, the English sardars will help and protect not only the addressee but all the members of the bereaved

*The writer is indebted to Dr. S. N. Sen, Vice-Chancellor, Delhi University, for some helpful information on Maharaja Rajballabh.

¹ K. K. Datta, *Durlabhram Som and his Family*, pp. 2-3.

² *Ibid*, p. 3.

³ *Siyar-ul-Mutakharin*, ii, p. 23.

⁴ K. K. Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

family"⁵. Prior to that Vansittart, Carnac and Warren Hastings had vowed on behalf of the Company that "until the family of Roy Durlabh should live on earth we should take due care of their honour, support, dignity, etc., generation after generation"⁶.

The exact date of Rajballabh's birth is not known. Warren Hastings stated in his reply to the minute of Clavering, Monson and Francis of 18 October 1775, that the Maharaja was then "31 years of age"⁷. If that be so, he was born some time in or about 1745. In 1769 Rajballabh was, according to the wishes of the Governor Verelst, appointed Dewān of the Nizamat and Peishkar of the Khalsa Sherif. And on the 9th December, 1769, he wrote to the Governor that he was "unremitting in his attention to the management of the treasury"⁸. His appointment as Ray Rayan by the Company in 1772 was but a formal confirmation; for he had already been acting in that capacity⁹. However, the appointment proved quite lucrative, because in addition to the salary attached to the office, the Ray Rayan was granted the jagir of Dewanganj in Rangpur. Maharaja Nanda Kumar questioned in a letter to the Governor-General in Council of 11 March, 1775, why Rajballabh enjoyed a salary of 5,000 rupees a month, "exclusive of the district of Dewan Gunge", although 25,000 rupees was "the stated annual salary of the Mutsaddee of the Khalsa sherif"¹⁰. Rajballabh was particularly in the favour of Warren Hastings. That was the reason why by a resolution of the majority in the Governor-General's Council he was suddenly dismissed from his office late in 1775¹¹ to make room for Raja Gurudas, whom the Court of Directors, under a mistaken impression, recommended to be removed from the office of Ray Rayan and appointed in another post. As a matter of fact Rajballabh, not Gurudas, was holding that office. But the Council, bent upon dismissing the Governor-General's favourite, took the plea that he was young and inexperienced and that the Court's real intention was that Raja Gurudas should be appointed Ray Rayan. Later on Hastings was able to reinstate Maharaja Rajballabh. In 1784 Rajballabh was granted jagirdari rights in lands which had been held by his immediate ancestors in Rangpur, Dinajpur and Tirhut¹². After some years he retired from his position as Ray Rayan, but was allowed to retain the jagirs for his lifetime. The last few years of his life were unhappy years. His only son Mukundaballabh died in 1795,

⁵ *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, iii, p. 86.

⁶ K. K. Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁷ Forest, *Selections from the Letters, Despatches and other State papers*, etc., ii, p. 452.

⁸ K. K. Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁹ Forest, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 452.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 301.

¹¹ Proceedings of Secret Select Committee (Forest, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 43436).

¹² *Vide infra*.

leaving a childless widow behind¹³. Maharaja Rajballabh's death occurred not in 1797, as some writers have supposed¹⁴, but on 26 Asarh 1205 B.S. (11 July, 1798)¹⁵.

The first available document on the subject in Muzaffarpur Collectorate is a letter from J. Duncan to G. F. Grand, Collector of Tirhut, dated 30 January, 1783, wherein the Collector was asked if he had any objection to some of the Maharaja's *mahals* in Tirhut being transferred to Patna. In the English version of the Maharaja's petition to the Government it is stated as follows: "The revenue of Ojhaun¹⁶ and.....Talooks and Ca in Bahar had long been paid at Patna, but was lately transferred to the Collector of Tirhoot, by which the reits are inconvenienced; I requested a letter be sent to Mr. Brooke¹⁷ authorizing him to take the collection at Patna agreeable to former custom". From a letter of the Revenue Committee to Mr. Grand, of 17 April, 1783, it is evident that the request was granted. It was further stated in that letter, as also in another addressed to R. Bathurst, Mr. Grand's successor, dated 19 April, 1783, that one Brijraj, who held a fourth part of pargana Saraisa¹⁸ and owed 20,000 rupees to Maharaja Rajballabh, be asked if he had any objection to his share being delivered over to the Maharaja.

More important than the above documents is the copy of a *sanad* bearing the seal of the English East India Company and the date "5 July, 1784", which will give a clear idea of Maharaja Rajballabh's jagir in Bengal proper. Extracts from the document are quoted below.

"Be it known to the Chowdries, Canongoes, Mukunddums, Ryets and ca, the inhabitants of Kismut pergunnahs Putlada¹⁹ and ca in Sircar Gorah Gaut (Goraghat) within the province of Bengal thatthe sum of Rupees 7,291-10, the produce of the Kismut of the above pergunnahs successively transmitted down from the time of the Roy Royan Umeed Ram, has from.....the year 1171 Bengal stile (*sic*), according to the Indorsement, been granted as a Jagheer on Maharaja Raje Bullub Bahadur, Paishcar of the Khalsa Shereefa. It is required of you to put the Gomastahs of the Maharajah in possession of the Jagheer, to pay them the revenue and the dewanny dues and to perform the duties thereof with fidelity according to the

¹³ K. K. Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Petition of Bahurani and Jagannath Prasad enclosed in the letter of Sub-Secretary, Revenue Board, to Collector of Tirhut, 9 April, 1799.

¹⁶ Ojan—in the Sadar sub-division of Darbhanga district.

¹⁷ Revenue Chief of Patna.

¹⁸ In Darbhanga district.

¹⁹ Patalda—in Dinajpur district.

established custom and let the conduct of the above-mentioned Gomastahs be such that the ryets, being satisfied with his (sic) behaviour towards them, may labour for an increase of cultivation and produce.....

Total Rupees—17,500-0-0.

Total produce of five months—7,291-10-10.

Particulars of this sum.

Pergunnahs Putladah—3,411-9.

Peirabund²⁰—2,888-11.

Serhuttah—996-6-10.

Total as above—7,291-10-10".

Shortly before his death Rajballabh, on the request of Mr. Graham, Acting Collector of Tirhut, had given a lease of two mahals, appertaining to his jagir in Tirhut, for the purpose of the Company's stud at Pusa. These were the mauzas of Malinagar²¹ and Ikhtiarpur²², "well calculated for the growth of grass and English grain for the horses as well as pasture land"²³. In his reply to Mr. Graham's letter Rajballabh wrote: "The promotion of the interests of Government I consider as the greatest happiness and honour to myself"²⁴.

Immediately on receiving the news of Maharaja Rajballabh's death on 11 July, 1798, the Revenue Board wrote to the Collector of Tirhut desiring him to "attach such parts of the Jagheers which were held by him as are situated in your district". The same day Bahurani, the deceased's daughter-in-law, and his other heirs made a joint petition to the Board praying that the jagirs which had been held by the Maharaja might be continued to them. The other heirs were the nephews (sister's sons) of Rajballabh. Another petition was submitted by Bahurani and Roy Jagannath Prasad, one of the nephews of the Maharaja, on 11 September, 1798, reiterating their former prayer. On 23 October, 1798, the Revenue Board, while submitting an account of the computed gross produce of Rajballabh's jagir in Tirhut, expressed their opinion that it would be advisable for the Collector to hold the lands khas "during the current Fusselly year" pending the Government's final decision on them. Very soon it was decided to resume the jagir, and the resumption proceedings were started within six months of the Maharaja's death. While the pro-

²⁰ Bahirband according to W. W. Hunter. *Vide Bengal Ms. Records*, iii, p. 89.

²¹ A village on the Darbhanga—Pusa road.

²² Also called Bakhtiarpur; in the vicinity of Malinagar.

²³ Muzaffarpur Collectorate records.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

ceedings were going on, Bahurani and Roy Jagannath Prasad submitted a fresh petition regarding a small part of the jagir which they claimed as not liable to resumption.

"We have received your orders of the 23rd November informing us that the Collector of Tirhoot had stated in reply to the reference made to him regarding our former petition that the late Raja Rajebullub was not proprietor of pergunnah Cund²⁵ and Ca but only mokurrerydar and further directing us to produce whatever vouchers we might have to prove our right to the lands. Gentlemen, the true state of the case is as follows—

Pergunnah Cund and Ca has been in the possession of our family for about sixty years. The proprietor of the lands gave them up together with all the right he had in them to the late Rajah's grand father. On his death they were held by Maharajah Mahinder, since when Rajah Rajebullub has held them to this time so that they may surely be now considered as his talook. I beg leave to lay before the Board the sunnud for the mokurrery Jummah granted by the Patna Council together with a correspondent sunnud of the aumil of Tirhoot. The lands have been held by the Rajah's family as their own property for three generations and they have enjoyed the malikanah, no person has ever laid claim to the proprietary (sic) right to the lands. Considering therefore the length of time which has elapsed since the lands were originally given to the Rajah's Grand Father and the uninterrupted possession of the family with what labour of justice can any one at this period stand forward to claim the lands from him?.....

We therefore pray that they may be continued to us as formerly at the mokurrery Jummah."

There are several other documents on the subject of Maharajah Rajballabh's jagir in Muzaffarpur Collectorate into the details of which we need not enter. In one of these it is stated that the Collector of Tirhut "be directed to acquaint the Board why he has concluded it for five years instead of making a permanent settlement" of the lands formerly included in the Maharaja's jagir. What is really important to note is the fate of Rajballabh's extensive property after his death. The statement given below from a subsequent document reveals the exact state of affairs²⁶:

²⁵ Band according to Hunter. *Vide op. cit.*, IV, p. 127.

²⁶ Letter from H. Stainforth to Commissioner of Bhagalpur, 30 June 1834.

"The Jageer of Maharaja Mahender Bahadur, father of Rajah Rajebullabh appears to have consisted at the time of the grant of 127 *mauzas* and 8 *kunwas*.....

Synopsis.		
	Mauzas	Kunwas
The original Jageer	127	8
Absorbed somewhere or lost sight of about 1194 Fussilee	1	0
	126	8
Deduct being assessed in 1207 on the death of Rajebullabh in 1205	102	4
Remainder	24	4
Deduct as held under <i>mourrere</i> tenure	6	12
Remainder Lakhiraj	17	8
Deduct one lost by diluvion	1	0
Remainder	16	8
Deduct being confirmed regularly as <i>surshikun</i> tenures	3	0
Remainder	13	8
Deduct as resumed	6	8
Remainder	7	0

Out of the original 127½ *mauzas*, 108½ *mauzas* were resumed by the Government and settled partly with Rajah Madhu Singh of Darbhanga and partly with certain other zemindars. A fragment of the original jagir continued in the hands of the family of Rajballabh for some time. In 1801 Bahurani Jnanamayi Dasi adopted a son of Krishnamohan Som who was renamed Gourballabh²⁷. But the family of Rajballabh had already fallen on evil days. The unfortunate daughter-in-law of the Ray Rayan was hard pressed for money which compelled her to mortgage his house at Patna to one Shib Chandra Bose to defray the expenses of litigation²⁸. Nevertheless she held an honoured position in Calcutta society as long as she lived. Her name appears in the list of "the Native Inhabitants of Calcutta" who

²⁷ K. K. Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

²⁸ *Prabhati* (Patna), *Asvin*, 1347 B.S., p. 176.

presented an address on 29 October, 1806, to Sir Henry Russel on his appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court²⁹.

In some records of Muzaffarpur Collectorate of the years 1834-35 Gourballabh figures prominently as being involved in litigation regarding his family property in Tirhut. It appears that a part of the property was sold by him to Messrs. Colvin and Co. under a deed executed on 4 September, 1828³⁰. Another part became the subject matter of a suit instituted by Maharaja Chhatter Singh³¹ of Darbhanga in the Zilla Court of Tirhut. In a letter to the Commissioner of Bhagalpur, dated 20 July, 1835, the Sadar Board of Revenue asked the opinion of the Collector of Tirhut on the question whether the talook should be formed out or temporarily settled with Raja Gourballabh pending the final decision of the suit. Thus gradually the family of Maharaja Rajballabh lost practically all the property he had owned in Tirhut. The same fate befell the family in regard to the jagir in North Bengal³². The solemn vows of Vansittart, Carnac, Verelst and Warren Hastings to protect the honour, dignity and interests of the house of Rai Durlabh "generation after generation" were forgotten by their successors in office in their over-zealousness to resume jagirs and revenue-free *mahals*. Inscrutable destiny proved no respecter of lineage.

²⁹ *Bengal Past and Present*, Oct.-Dec., 1925, p. 182.

³⁰ Letter from E. Macnaghten to C. Hamilton, 20 July, 1834 (Muzaffarpur Collectorate Records).

³¹ Son of Raja Madhu Singh; he was the first of the Darbhanga rajas to receive the title of Maharaja.

³² W. W. Hunter, *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 222, 259 and 268; IV pp. 66 and 78.

⁷² D.G. Arch.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH AND THE HOME

AUTHORITIES 1843-44

S. GOPAL

National Archives of India

THE 750 volumes of the Gladstone Papers in the British Museum have hardly been used for a study of India policy in the nineteenth century. On the death of Lord Fitzgerald in 1843 Lord Ripon succeeded him as President of the Board of Control and Mr. Gladstone entered the Cabinet for the first time in May 1843 as President of the Board of Trade. Lord Ellenborough was then Governor-General, and his arrogance and over-activity had led to strained relations with both the Board of Control and the Court of Directors. We gain a great deal of new information concerning later developments from Mr. Gladstone's memoranda of Cabinet meetings, on which this article is based.

In March 1843 Ellenborough had annexed Sind without troubling to secure the assent of either the Cabinet or the Directors. He knew that there would be dissatisfaction but was confident that the annexation could hardly be revoked¹. Events proved him right. In February the Duke of Wellington had, with gentle acidity, expressed to the Governor-General the Cabinet's dissatisfaction over his leaving the question of war and peace in Sind so entirely to Napier and its desire that British relations with the Amirs should be improved by peaceful methods². But while the Cabinet would never have permitted annexation, cancellation was a different matter. In July the Cabinet expressed to Ellenborough their disapproval, but did not order revocation³. At a meeting of the Cabinet on 3 August, Ripon read a letter from the Chairs stating that the Secret Court of Directors were unanimously of opinion that the proceedings towards the Amirs could not be justified and wishing for authority to apprise the Secret Court that the Government had disapproved of them and was anxious as far as possible to repair the injustice. The Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel expressed his apprehension that the Court were about to move decisively against the Governor-General and exercise their power of recall. He sketched a reply stating that on

¹ *Vide* A. H. Imlah : Lord Ellenborough (Harvard 1939) page 141 ff.

² 4 February 1843. *Vide* Lord Colchester (ed.) *History of the Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough* (London 1874) Page 344 ff.

³ Imlah, *op. cit.*, page 216.

account of the state of Sind and the fact that no imperative categorical instructions had been sent out but only a recommendation to deal as favourably as might be with the Amirs, the Government deemed it premature to disclose to the Court the nature of the instructions⁴. Thus the Cabinet sheltered Ellenborough; but it was only on 22 November 1843 that the Cabinet determined to acquiesce in the annexation, not as satisfactory but as having no other alternative. Nor was Peel satisfied with the treatment of the deposed Amir Mir Rustum⁵.

Then in 1844 came news of Ellenborough's intervention in Gwalior and Sir Henry Gough's victory at Maharajpur in December 1843. British losses were heavy. Wellington told the Cabinet that he had looked into the details of the action and it appeared to him there was no ground for impeaching the General's conduct. Peel was indisposed to sponsor a vote of thanks by Parliament to Gough but on Wellington's authority decided to do so⁶.

But now fell the blow evaded in 1843. The Governor-General dismissed many officials in Saugur and refused to communicate his reasons to the Court. The Court retorted that they could not sanction proceedings for which reasons were withheld, and Ellenborough replied angrily and offensively that he would at all times act upon his own convictions irrespective of their censure. The Directors thereupon decided to recall him and the Cabinet met on 2 April 1844 to consider this decision. Ripon said he had tried to dissuade the Directors. Wellington thought that Ellenborough had been very wrong but the Directors also would be very wrong to recall him. Their proper mode of proceeding would be to procure the administration of an adequate rebuke: if the Governor-General should resent it and resign, the responsibility would lie with him. Peel and Gladstone felt that Ripon seemed to have led Ellenborough to believe that he did not approve of the Court's refusal to sanction Ellenborough's proceedings, for he had written privately that he had expunged much from their despatch and had pushed them as far as he could, but they would not withdraw from what remained. Ripon replied that he considered himself fully responsible for what remained, the more so because he had refused assent to other matters. Peel said Ellenborough's head was turned and advised Ripon in writing to the Governor-General to hold a firm tone and not to humour him. But Peel suggested that the Government should deprecate recall, point out the great evils attending such a step, refer to the present

⁴ Gladstone's memorandum 3 August 1843. Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 44777 folio 95.

⁵ Gladstone's memorandum 22 November 1843. Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 44777 folios 108 and 109.

⁶ Gladstone's memorandum 16 March 1844. Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 44777 folios 149 and 150.

state of the army and of India compared to that in which Ellenborough had found them, and entirely decline any participation in the responsibility for recall by even entering into preliminary communications upon a choice of a successor. He thought that such a course of action would lead the Court to rescind their decision, but Gladstone and Ripon did not think they would be so pliable⁷.

In fact, the Directors adhered to their decision. Peel thought the crisis most serious. The right course would be to apply to Parliament to abrogate the Court's power of recall, but it would be impossible to secure a majority for Ellenborough in the House of Commons. The next best course was steadily to maintain the tone which had been assumed towards the Court. Wellington was greatly excited and said that in all his recollection of public life he never knew a transaction so outrageous to pass between one set of gentlemen engaged in the service of the State and another. He added that on Ellenborough's withdrawal there would be insurrections all over India. Peel observed that Ellenborough with extraordinary abilities had not the art of managing men and that the great art of government was to work by such instruments as the world supplies, controlling and overruling their humours⁸. Finally, to avoid a desperate struggle before the country between the Crown and the Court which could only lower the prestige of the Crown, Peel with his usual tact and sagacity reached an amicable arrangement with the Court by selecting Sir Henry Hardinge as Ellenborough's successor⁹.

Gladstone's memoranda giving a detailed account of the developments of these twelve months from May 1843 to May 1844 lead us, therefore, to fresh conclusions. It is not true, as Ellenborough believed¹⁰, that it was Ripon who had failed to support him. The whole Cabinet was critical of his actions. Even Wellington, his most loyal friend, said on reading one of his despatches in 1843 that "he ought to have his nose rubbed in it"; and later when Ellenborough in a private letter referred contemptuously to the Court's authority as a "Parliamentary fiction", Wellington remarked, "that which he calls a Parliamentary fiction is *the law*"¹¹. There was indeed no one in English public life except the Queen who was unqualifiedly on

the side of Ellenborough; and it was this which enabled the Court of Directors to score their most resounding triumph over the Board of Control. A Governor-General chosen by the Government had been dismissed by the Company; and Peel, who at the start was not even prepared to consider a successor, finally, when he found the Directors adamant, acquiesced in the dismissal of Ellenborough and evaded public controversy by choosing a successor who was acceptable to the Company. Had Ellenborough been recalled for obeying the Cabinet's instructions, Peel would never have surrendered so tamely. As it was, the Cabinet could question the Court's methods, but not their reasons. For the abrupt end of his Governor-Generalship, Ellenborough could blame no one but himself; and in dragging himself down he exposed the Cabinet to a severe rebuff.

⁷ Gladstone's memorandum. Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 44777 folio 168.

⁸ Gladstone's two memoranda of 29 April 1844. Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 44777 folios 172 and 173.

⁹ Gladstone's memorandum 16 May 1844. Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 44777 folio 184. Also letter of Hardinge to Ellenborough 6 May 1844. A. Law. : India under Lord Ellenborough (London 1926) page 157 ff.

¹⁰ *Vide* his letter to Wellington 26 May 1844. Colchester, op. cit., page 439 ff.

¹¹ Gladstone's memorandum 29 April 1844. Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 44777 folio 173.

THE REBELLION OF MAN SINGH RAO PATANKAR

HIRA LAL GUPTA

Saugor University

THE REBELLION of Man Singh Rao Patankar is an important incident that occurred in the far-flung part of the Maratha State of Gwalior during the last years of Daulat Rao Sindhia. Hitherto this incident has been unknown to history. Not even a reference of it is found in any book on the history of Gwalior. In 1942 I came across a number of letters in the Imperial Record Department (now National Archives of India) relating to this interesting incident which gives an insight into the British policy towards the Indian states and throws a side-light on the important question of succession before and after the demise of the Sindhia who had neither a male heir nor an adopted son to succeed him¹.

Man Singh Rao Patankar, a servant and a subordinate jagirdar of the state of Gwalior and a near relative of its Maharaja, Daulat Rao Sindhia, was in charge of the district of Powagarh and Panch Mahal in the state of Gwalior on the Gujarat frontier, contiguous to the British territories in the Bombay Presidency and the territories of the Gækwad and the Holkar². His son, Appa Sahib, was the son-in-law of his master³. This new status in relation to his master, the weakness of the Sindhia's authority, his failing health and the prospects of a disputed succession after the death of the Sindhia made Man Singh Rao Patankar uneasy, restive and ambitious. By nature and temperament he was strong, obstinate and unyielding. Daulat Rao Sindhia regarded him as a man of vicious and turbulent character who had once conducted himself in a contumacious and insubordinate manner and had wished to assume the management of the Maharaja's affairs for which he was totally unfit⁴.

Being a close observer of the events in India and of the state of affairs during and after the political settlement in Malwa, Rajputana and the Maratha states of Gwalior, Indore, Baroda and others, Man

Singh Rao Patankar took advantage of insubordination and mutiny in the Sindhia's army⁵ and held out a confident hope to assert his independence without any interference on the part of the British Government in support of his master's authority⁶. His conduct became rebellious and defiant⁷. He disobeyed the authority of the Sindhia, refused to submit the accounts, recruited the Arab and the Mekrani tribes in his army, strengthened his armed might and took other measures to make himself strong and powerful so as to be able to play a dominant role in a disputed succession as a close relation of the Sindhia. Many refractory, adventurous and ambitious people flocked under his banner. Thus Man Singh Rao Patankar became virtually independent of the Sindhia's authority and control and began to administer his jagir in accordance with his own wishes. By this incident breach of peace was seriously apprehended in the British districts contiguous to Powagarh and in the states of Baroda and Gwalior⁸. Consequently, the governments of the East India Company and of the states of Gwalior and Baroda were seriously alarmed.

Daulat Rao Sindhia disliked and hated the turbulent jagirdar and proclaimed him as his enemy⁹. He issued orders for his dismissal and appointed Hira Khan in his place¹⁰. But in the state of affairs then existing in Gwalior it seemed difficult for the Maharaja to dislodge the rebel from his vantage position without any effective aid from the British Government. He, therefore, evinced his desire to the Resident, Maj. Close, that the British Government should assist him in effecting the removal of the rebel chief¹¹. At first the Resident regarded this matter as purely domestic concern of the Maharaja of Gwalior and abstained from any interference in the affair. This conduct of the Resident was appreciated by the Governor-General-in-Council as most judicious but the Sindhia was disappointed by it¹². However, after a thorough appraisal of the situation and taking every possible gain into consideration, help to the Sindhia against his tumultuous chief was deemed politically expedient¹³. This change of attitude was not without deep significance.

⁵ P. C. 12 September 1823, No. 22.

⁶ P. C. 24 October 1823, No. 52.

⁷ P. C. 24 October 1823, No. 51.

⁸ P. C. 5 March 1824, No. 98.

⁹ P. C. 12 May 1826, No. 22.

¹⁰ P. C. 24 October 1823, No. 51.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² P. C. 24 October 1823, No. 52 ; 12 May 1826, No. 23.

¹³ P. C. 5 March 1824, No. 103.

¹ Political Consultation, 27 January 1826, No. 48.

² P. C. 24 October 1823, No. 51 ; 5 March 1824, Nos. 98 and 103 ; 25 June 1824, No. 54.

³ P. C. 15 October 1824, No. 17.

⁴ P. C. 25 March 1825, No. 33.

As a general principle non-interference in domestic concerns of the Indian states remained the declared policy of the British Government under Lord Amherst. But, in fact, expediency and prospects of material advantages and not the fixed principles guided the British policy and action in this case¹⁴ and throughout the course of the history of the East India Company in India. Principles were very often used for show like the two beautiful tusks of an elephant while the spring of action was largely determined by larger considerations of economic and political gain. Hence, the instructions issued to Maj. R. Close at this moment were significant as they contained considerations involved in the declared policy in respect of British interference in the domestic concerns of the Maharaja of Gwalior¹⁵.

After the general principles of policy were enunciated on 24 October 1823¹⁶, this particular question was considered in all its bearings¹⁷. As a result of it, fear was entertained that the help to Daulat Rao Sindhia on that occasion might make the British government a principal party to the dispute and that the Sindhia might use British anxiety for a reform in the government of his western districts into an instrument for executing his plans of revenge against an obnoxious individual whom he was long anxious to deprive of office¹⁸. In this way the authority of the Maharaja over his officers, who seemed to count upon the forbearance or inactivity of the British government to disregard his order, would be strengthened¹⁹. But this fear was successfully combated and overcome by the prospects of advantages to be gained from the Sindhia by rendering him assistance, overcoming his suspicions about the British attitude and by enabling him to repose greater faith in the British promises and goodwill. At last, weighing fully the advantages likely to be accrued to the British government from coercing Man Singh Rao Patankar in compliance with the Sindhia's wishes²⁰, Lord Amherst authorised the Resident to assure Daulat Rao Sindhia of the disposition of the British government to gratify his wishes in the affair of his rebel jagirdar²¹.

This decision to help the Sindhia was swayed by a number of considerations of which the most important ones were:—

1. The adjustment of the Sindhia's claims on the British government with respect to Mewar and Udaipur which had accepted British paramountcy and were no longer the tributaries of the Sindhia²².

¹⁴ P. C. 24 October 1823, No. 52.

¹⁵, ¹⁶, & ¹⁷ *Ibid*.

¹⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁹ P. C. 5 March 1824, No. 98.

²⁰ P. C. 5 March 1824, No. 103

²¹ *Ibid*.

²² P. C. 5 March 1824, No. 116.

2. The settlement of the disputed question of eighty-nine villages of the Deccan in possession of the Sindhia²³.

3. The acquisition of the districts of Nimar, Ratgarh and Deori to British management in perpetuity²⁴.

4. The problem of stopping illicit traffic in opium through his territories to the western coast of India²⁵.

5. The maintenance of good relations with him when war against Burma was imminent.

6. The desire to obtain his cooperation for the suppression of Sheikh Dalla, a Pindari chief who was at large till then²⁶.

For the attainment of these objects good-will of the Sindhia was an indispensable necessity. On his part, the Sindhia had already shown good disposition towards the British government by the transfer of Nimar to it by the treaty of 10 November 1823²⁷. He had also shown inclination not to hinder British efforts to seize opium passing through his territory²⁸. Under the direction of Lt. Blacker 180 maunds of opium were actually seized on their transit through his territory²⁹. In view of this friendly attitude of Daulat Rao Sindhia occasional help to him in the management of his affairs was not considered as a violation of the principle of British policy towards the Indian states. Hence it was decided to reduce the refractory chief under his suzerainty to submission. But owing to the approach of the rainy season the execution of the plan was deferred to some favourable time after the rains when military operations could be undertaken without any risk to the health of the British troops³⁰ and Man Singh Rao Patankar could be compelled to relinquish the state of Gwalior³¹.

Once the British policy was decided upon, Lt. Blacker, the Acting Resident at Gwalior, addressed a letter to Man Singh Rao Patankar in which he pointed out the impropriety of his conduct and urged him to give up the fort and district of Powagarh to Daulat Rao Sindhia in obedience to his orders³². To this advice he gave an evasive reply and did not improve his conduct³³. Therefore, on 29 May 1824, Captain Stewart informed him about the resolve of the British government to enforce the orders of the Maharaja of

²³ & ²⁴ *Ibid*.

²⁵ P. C. 9 April 1824, No. 85.

²⁶ P. C. 15 October 1824, No. 21.

²⁷ P. C. 5 March 1824, No. 107.

²⁸ P. C. 9 April 1824, No. 85.

²⁹ P. C. 9 April 1824, No. 86.

³⁰ P. C. 25 June 1824, No. 54.

³¹ P. C. 25 June 1824, No. 59.

³² P. C. 25 June 1824, No. 60.

³³ *Ibid*.

Gwalior and to make him subservient to his master by directing British troops to march against him and to bring him to his sense of duty³⁴. A frank advice was once again given to him to deliver up his post to the person appointed to replace him and to repair to the presence of the Sindhia if he wanted to avoid dire consequences of continuing to remain a rebel to his master and hence an enemy of the British government³⁵. At the same time he was asked to note that the Resident's letter to him was not an idle threat but a friendly warning and that failure to act upon it would not be without grave peril and inevitable ruin to himself and his family³⁶.

On the same date Capt. Stewart wrote to Capt. Fielding, the Assistant Resident, about the entire state of affairs and the resolve of the British government to start military operations after the rainy season. On 9 June 1824 directions were given to execute the intention of the Government by marching with the whole of the British force at his disposal into the jagir of Man Singh Rao Patankar for the purpose of expelling him from his position³⁷. But the immediate preliminary measure to be taken was to cut off all communications between Powagarh and the surrounding country and to place that fortified town in a state of complete blockade. If the contingent at his disposal was not considered sufficient he was asked to take the help of the Gækwad of Baroda. After that, the first step to be taken was to show the orders of the Sindhia to his rebel chief for the relinquishment of his post to offer him security for his person, family and property and a safe conduct to Gwalior in case he agreed to deliver the fort and the town of Powagarh without any opposition³⁸. On the failure of his advice and threat the British troops were to move to Powagarh in a favourable season after the rains³⁹.

In accordance with these instructions Capt. Fielding blockaded the fort of Powagarh with the aid of the troops from Baroda⁴¹ and completely cut off the supplies of the garrison there with a view to starving out the rebel officer and his followers and compelling them to surrender. As the fort had provisions for not more than three months, surrender of it was considered to be a natural and inevitable outcome of the blockade⁴². More stringent measures involving active warfare were avoided because the Sindhia was very anxious for the safety of the life of his son-in-law and was averse to more vigorous

action. At last, according to the expectations entertained, surrender was effected and a seven-point agreement was signed between Capt. Fielding and Man Singh Rao Patankar on 13 September 1824⁴³. By this agreement the fort and the jagir were to be handed over to Udaji Rao Khatkia and Gangadhar Baji Rao; safety of the person of Man Singh Rao Patankar and his property was to be guaranteed; his son Appa Sahib, was to proceed to Gwalior; Rs. 50,000 were to be paid to him for the expenses of his journey to Gwalior; and until some arrangement could be made for him he was to be allowed the same amount per year for his private expenses. During this period Man Singh Rao Patankar was to remain in Powagarh under British protection without any army and power to molest or oppress anybody. After this treaty the employment of military force for the reduction of Powagarh became unnecessary⁴⁴. The Arab mercenary troops in the service of Man Singh Rao were disbanded⁴⁵ and Daulat Rao Sindhia's authority was firmly established in that part of his state.

After the suppression of the power of Man Singh Rao Patankar, Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia reciprocated very amicably to the British Resident and his demands. In token of his sense of gratefulness to him he organised a grand entertainment and the Maharani Baiza Bai gave him a valuable present worth about Rs. 40,000⁴⁶. The Sindhia also signed the sanad for the transfer of Deori⁴⁷ and Ratgarh⁴⁸ to the management of the British government for which the latter paid him about Rs. 2,50,000 annually⁴⁹. Moreover, he agreed to prevent the transit of the Malwa opium through his state if he was compensated for the loss of revenue involved in it⁵⁰. Besides all this, he offered cooperation in suppressing Sheikh Dalla and other disturbers of peace who had escaped arrest and punishment during Lord Hastings's time and were busy in their depredations and plundering expeditions in Malwa and Khandesh. For this he issued parwanas on 2 September 1824 to various officers of the district of Ecdalabad and other parts of the state instructing them to render all possible assistance to the British government in their efforts to hunt out criminals and notorious characters⁵¹. Nunhi Pandit, the jagirdar of Parasan, who had attacked the fort of Kalpi, was caught by the Sindhia's troops and was handed over to the British Government⁵². On the advice of the Resident the Sindhia

³⁴ A letter from Capt. Stewart to Man Singh Rao 29 May 1824.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ A letter from Capt. Stewart to Capt. Fielding 9 June 1824.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ P. C. 15 October 1824, No. 15.

⁴² P. C. 15 October 1824, No. 17.

⁴³ P. C. 15 October 1824, No. 19.

⁴⁴ P. C. 15 October 1824, No. 12.

⁴⁵ P. C. 15 October 1824, No. 4.

⁴⁶ P. C. 24 December 1824, No. 78.

⁴⁷ P. C. 7 January 1825, No. 36.

⁴⁸ P. C. 28 March 1825, Nos. 30 & 31; 26 November 1824, No. 12.

⁴⁹ P. C. 10 November 1826, No. 51.

⁵⁰ P. C. 30 July 1824, No. 24.

⁵¹ P. C. 13 September 1824, No. 21.

⁵² P. C. 28 January 1825, No. 33.

improved the police and military systems of that region⁵³ and stationed an army of 500 soldiers permanently at Burhanpur for watching the activities of Yasoda Bai⁵⁴, the widow of the late Peshwa Madho Rao, and her agent Ganpat Rao and an ex-Maratha chief named Suryaji Rao Nimbalkar⁵⁵. For making all these arrangements the Sindhia was allowed to purchase 50,000 musket flints⁵⁶. On the question of the villages of the Sindhia in the Deccan and his claims on Mewar and Udaipur, negotiations continued between Mr. Chaplin, the British Commissioner in the Deccan, and the government of Gwalior⁵⁷ but no amicable adjustment could be effected, and ultimately when the Sindhia fell ill and the impending question of succession engulfed the attention of everybody, the negotiations were suspended and thus the disputed question could not be decided during the life-time of Daulat Rao Sindhia⁵⁸.

The measures against Man Singh Rao Patankar strained the relations between Daulat Rao Sindhia and his son-in-law. Out of the considerations for his daughter the Sindhia invited him to Gwalior to effect readjustment with him and to wean him away from the influence of his rebel father but he refused to go to Gwalior without his father and even with his father until all the demands of his father were conceded⁵⁹. In fact, Man Singh Rao Patankar wanted to use his son's relation with the Sindhia for extorting some jagir and command of an army and also other advantages which the Sindhia seemed determined not to concede⁶⁰. Nevertheless reconciliation with his son-in-law remained the principal anxiety of Daulat Rao Sindhia till his death⁶¹. When he fell dangerously ill Man Singh Rao Patankar and his son came to Gwalior but they did not meet the Maharaja⁶². Their presence and their activities in the capital made the Maharaja apprehensive of some violence in the palace and breach of peace in the capital at the instigation of Man Singh Rao Patankar. Hence he made formidable defence preparations, kept a strict watch on their movements and obtained promise of British support against them if they proved dangerous⁶³. However, attempts at reconciliation between the father-in-law and the son-in-law were not slackened. But when success seemed impossible the Sindhia

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ She died in 1811. After her death a pretender impersonating that lady appeared in northern India between 1821-1824. Sardesai *A new History of the Marathas*, Vol. II, p. 370.

⁵⁵ P. C. 28 January 1825, Nos. 3 & 18.

⁵⁶ P. C. 21 January 1825, No. 7 & 8.

⁵⁷ P. C. 26 November 1824, No. 2.

⁵⁸ P. C. 28 March 1826, No. 31; 17 August 1827, No. 19.

⁵⁹ P. C. 25 March 1825, No. 33.

⁶⁰ P. C. 28 March 1826, No. 33.

⁶¹ P. C. 12 May 1826, No. 22.

⁶² P. C. 28 March 1826, No. 33.

⁶³ P. C. 12 May 1826, No. 22.

requested the Resident to come to his help⁶⁴. Thereupon Capt. Fielding tried to effect mediation between them⁶⁵. But Man Singh Rao's demands remained exorbitant which the Sindhia refused to accede⁶⁶. To ward off any possible danger to peace of his state the Sindhia requested Capt. Fielding to expel the rebel chief from Gwalior⁶⁷.

However, Capt. Fielding continued negotiations and prevailed upon the Sindhia to give Man Singh Rao Patankar Rs. 2,50,000 as a concession and to bring the dispute to an amicable settlement⁶⁸. But the latter refused to accept this concession and continued to be refractory. He showed his determination to compel the Sindhia to consent to his demands or to die there in an attempt to get them⁶⁹. In these circumstances he was asked to leave Gwalior. But he refused to comply and his followers created disturbances and committed outrages⁷⁰. Capt. Fielding, therefore, instructed Capt. Stubbs to carry out the resolution of the Maharaja to expel Man Singh Rao from Gwalior by a resort to military operations if necessary⁷¹. Accordingly, as a measure preliminary to war, protection offered to him was withdrawn⁷².

Atmosphere in Gwalior became tense and situation went on worsening. Man Singh Rao Patankar remained undaunted by any fear or threat. At his instigation disturbances occurred in Gwalior on 18 June 1826. In the affray about eighty people of the Sindhia and twelve of the rebel were killed⁷³. Consequently, Man Singh Rao Patankar's house was blockaded and his movements were restricted and watched⁷⁴. In August 1826 when Daulat Rao Sindhia again fell ill it was apprehended that the claims of Rukma Bai, his senior but neglected wife, to regency might be advanced on his demise with the cooperation of Man Singh Rao who was hostile to Baiza Bai, the talented and the favourite wife of the Maharaja⁷⁵.

Daulat Rao Sindhia's policy towards Man Singh Rao Patankar remained weak, feeble, unworthy, vacillating and fruitless. He endeavoured to buy over his adherents and to spin out negotiations until he had exhausted the whole of his treasure⁷⁶. But this policy proved to be a long drawn process uncertain of its results and Gwalior

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ P. C. 7 July 1826, No. 39.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ & ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ P. C. 7 July 1826, No. 41.

⁷² P. C. 7 July 1826, No. 42.

⁷³ P. C. 21 July 1826, No. 24.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ P. C. 15 September 1826, No. 7.

⁷⁶ P. C. 6 October 1826, No. 39.

remained for a long time a magazine of combustibles⁷⁷. Man Singh Rao's presence in the capital inspired intrigues and created hostile groups in the state⁷⁸. After the death of Daulat Rao Sindhia the British Government recognized Baiza Bai's right to adopt a son and her claims to regency and watched with active interest the proceedings and reactions in Gwalior. Man Singh Rao and his son Appa Sahib opposed her claims and showed highly unbecoming conduct in 1827⁷⁹. Their followers pulled down houses, killed persons, seized their property and became a source of trouble for the state⁸⁰. Consequently, Baiza Bai ordered them to quit the state and Capt. Fielding made vigorous attempts to force them to comply with the order⁸¹. At last, realizing the danger to which they were likely to be placed, they proceeded to the Deccan peacefully with their 350 armed followers⁸². A provision of Rs. 6,00,000 was made for them. Baiza Bai heaved a sigh of relief and rewarded Capt. Fielding and Stubbs and other English officers suitably⁸³. However, the departure of the opponents of Baiza Bai from Gwalior did not ensure complete peace in the state. The succession controversy still dragged on and tense atmosphere continued.

⁷⁷ P. C. 10 November 1826, No. 47.

⁷⁸ P. C. 6 October 1826, No. 39.

⁷⁹ Secret Consultation 2 November 1827, No. 6.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ S. C. 11 January 1828, No. 1.

⁸² S. C. 11 January 1828, No. 4.

⁸³ S. C. 11 January 1828, No. 6.

THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY BETWEEN BHOPAL AND THE ENGLISH IN 1818

S. C. GUPTA

National Archives of India

THE TREATY between Bhopal and the British was concluded on 26 February 1818 and ratified ten days later. This was the natural culmination of the friendly relationship that had subsisted between the Nawab of Bhopal and the British ever since their coming into contact. Proposals for such a treaty were set on foot and discussed more than once before but those failed to materialise. The initiative was taken by the Nawab in each case, but the ardour with which it was followed up depended on the continuance of the necessity which provoked it. On the part of the British, the degree of the encouragement varied with the benefit anticipated from such an alliance.

The state of Bhopal, wedged as it was between the territories of the Sindhia and of the Bhonsla, was considered a proper object of Maratha encroachment and depredation and the ruler of that principality had to take recourse to all sorts of devices to retain his independence,—promising tribute, or surrendering some territory or calling the Pindaris and Pathan freebooters of Malwa to his assistance. It was not unnatural, therefore, that when faced with an imminent prospect of annihilation by superior forces, or exhausted by a never-ending struggle for existence, the Nawab would turn to the only power which had the ability to offer him protection and security and which had, under Lord Wellesley, given a convincing demonstration of its military prowess.

Contact between the British and Bhopal was first established in 1778 during the Anglo-Maratha conflict. A force from Bengal had been sent by Warren Hastings to support the Bombay Government in its policy of upholding the claims of Raghunath Rao to the Peshwaship. Col. Goddard who assumed command of the force in October 1778, proceeded by way of Bhilsa, Khemlasa, Bhopal and Hoshangabad. During his march through Bhopal territory he was given all assistance. Though under no treaty obligations towards the British, Nawab Hayat Muhammad Khan (1777-1808) remained true to his promise of friendship in spite of Maratha threats—"a spontaneous act

of generosity never to be forgotten"¹. Col. Muir testified to "the active assistance and consideration displayed at the time of Colonel Goddard's march through your district"².

The first attempt to form a treaty with the British took place in 1811 when Wazir Muhammad Khan, the *de facto* ruler of Bhopal, who was then engaged in warfare with the Nagpur chief, deputed Inayet Masih, a Christian of French descent, to Mr. Jenkins, Resident at Nagpur, to obtain the assistance and mediation of the British Government. This attempt was unsuccessful because of the fact "that he had not only consorted with professed plunderers such as Amir Khan, but that his country was at that moment one of their asylums." Though there was no doubt "that it was with a view to self-preservation alone that he had contracted friendship with the Pindarry leaders and Amir Khan", he was considered to have so much identified himself with these freebooters that Col. Sir Barry Close, commander of the British forces which were operating against Amir Khan, in co-operation with the Raja of Nagpur, had "discretionary orders to attack Bhopal". Wazir Muhammad Khan sent an agent to Col. Close, pointing out that the necessity of self-preservation alone had forced him to join the Pindaris and urging the claims of the family for the aid formerly given to Col. Goddard and finally stating his readiness to accept any terms which Col. Close might dictate. He eagerly pressed the claim of Bhopal to British protection, "but an apprehension that interference in its concerns would involve much embarrassment and carry government beyond the limit they wished, led to the rejection of all the propositions which he then made"³.

In 1812 the British Government opened negotiations with Raghuji Bhonsla, the Nagpur Raja, for a treaty of alliance. This alliance, whereby the whole of the most 'exposed frontier', viz., the line from Bundelkhand to Cuttack, would be skirted by the dominion of an ally, would guard the British possessions and those of their allies against the predatory hordes of Pathans and Pindaris. While these negotiations were in progress, the rulers of Gwalior and Nagpur commenced combined operations for the destruction of the Bhopal State which they had secretly determined on. The town was besieged but the heroic defence made by Wazir Muhammad during the four months it lasted prevented its fall. The siege was raised but it was only for a time, as Sindhia, determined to humble the pride of Bhopal, despatched Jean Baptiste Filose and Jaswant Rao Bhau in March 1813 with a fresh force. These two however fell out and fought between themselves. "This postponed hostilities, but the attack would have been ultimately delivered, had not political developments caused Sindhia to withdraw his army"⁴.

¹ Luard, *Bhopal State Gazetteer*, p. 8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³ Malcolm, *Central India*, Vol. I, 2nd ed. p. 395.

⁴ Luard, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

Viewing the renewal of the Sindhia's attack with apprehension Wazir Muhammad made another attempt to secure British protection. In October 1814 taking advantage of a visit to Delhi on private business by Hakim Nizamuddin, Wazir sent to Metcalfe, the British Resident, overtures for an alliance with the British. The moment chanced to be opportune as Lord Moira the Governor General had also decided that it would be proper to form a treaty with Bhopal. His principal object was to save that state from destruction and thus prevent the union of interests between the Sindhia and the Bhonsla. The advantage of the connexion as a defensive arrangement against the Pindaris was also not overlooked by him. Mr. Wauchope, Superintendent of Political Affairs in Bundelkhand, was entrusted with the task of carrying on negotiations with the Nawab. Mr. Wauchope addressed a letter to the Nawab informing him of the conditions on which the British Government would take his territory under their protection. Wazir Muhammad professed his willingness to form a treaty and agreed to all the conditions except two which required surrender of a fort and payment of a portion of the expenses for the maintenance of a British force. Mr. Strachey, the Resident at Sindhia's Court, being informed of this, considered rather prematurely that the treaty was practically concluded and apprised the Sindhia of the fact. Daulat Rao Sindhia at once objected on the basis that Bhopal was a dependency of Gwalior and refused to recall the troops as desired. The Nagpur Raja, however, recalled his general Sadiq Ali.

In the meantime the Governor General had already set troops in motion in case of eventuality. The Nawab also let it be generally known that he was under British protection. Sindhia though protesting, thought it advisable to recall his army, seizing the quarrel between Jean Baptiste and Jaswant Rao Bhau as a pretext. The Nawab, once the threat was gone, did not evince the same ardour for a treaty as formerly. Obviously he could not reconcile himself to the curtailment of his political independence and to the surrender of a fort as desired. His excuses for delaying the sending of an agent to Banda to conclude a treaty, together with some of his questionable proceedings, convinced the Governor General that the Nawab was not sincere in his desire for an alliance. He therefore ordered that the negotiations should be broken off and accordingly the Nawab's agent when he arrived in April 1815 was dismissed. The Nawab gave detailed explanations in extenuation of his conduct but these were not considered satisfactory. The Nawab was, however, informed that "no ill-will was harboured against him and that it was merely because his conduct had shown that he had not a proper sense of the value of the connection offered to him or of the spirit in which it ought to have been received that the British Government for the

present withdrew from the discussion of it".⁵ The affair however did not result in a rupture and Wazir continued his friendly communications with British officers.

Wazir died on 17 March 1816 and was succeeded by his second son Nazar Muhammad Khan who was a man of different metal. Though not devoid of personal courage, he preferred security to the hazards of perpetual warfare against the surrounding powers and particularly the Pindaris who were plundering his territories. He therefore immediately began to work for the treaty which had so very nearly been accomplished a short while ago. He commenced a very friendly correspondence with the British officers and did nothing which might be construed in any way opposed to the wishes of the British. The time was however not yet ripe for a re-opening of the negotiations. For one thing, after the death of Raghuji Bhonsla on 22 March 1816, the chances of a connection with Nagpur appeared promising and this was accordingly given priority. Moreover, the authorities at home were not favourably inclined towards any measure which would bring the state under British protection. In their letter, dated 29 September 1815, the Secret Committee positively prohibited the Government of India from forming an alliance with Bhopal, "it being regarded at home as a measure calculated to embroil us with Sindhia and other Marhatta states and as offering no advantages, even supposing those chiefs to be reconciled to it, sufficient to counterbalance the future embarrassments which such engagements are supposed to have a tendency to produce"⁶. So when Captain Close, Resident at Sindhia's court, communicated the likelihood of Sindhia's attacking Bhopal, immediately after the death of Wazir Muhammad Khan, the Governor General was constrained to despatch immediate instructions to Captain Close, informing him that the British Government could not support Bhopal against Sindhia⁷. The Resident was however warned not to "gratuitously make profession of our intention not to interfere. Because that would operate as an invitation to Scindia to undertake the conquest of Bhopal, an occurrence which I should regard as a very serious deterioration of our political and military position"⁸.

Mr. Wauchope adopted a similar line of action in his correspondence with the new Nawab. In his letter dated 1 May 1816, transmitting copies of letters written to him on 29 April by the Nawab and Inayet Masih, his confidential agent, who had been concerned in the late negotiations between Mr. Wauchope and Wazir Muhammad Khan, he informed Mr. John Adam, Secretary to the Government in the Political Department, of his having "confined my answer to the usual expressions of condolence and avoided giving any appearance

⁵ Prinsep, *Transactions in India*, Vol. I, p. 256.

⁶ G. G. Minute, N. A. I. Secret Cons. 9 November 1816, No. 12.

⁷ Secret, cons. 6 April 1816, No. 13.

⁸ *Ibid.* Lord Moira's Minute, dated 5 April 1816.

of encouragement to the belief that we had any particular desire to renew the negotiation"⁹.

The Nawab, in spite of his having received no encouragement to his advances, continued his friendly correspondence with the British agents at Bundelkhand and Nagpur which was full of confidences. He scrupulously avoided giving any offence and sought their advice on all affairs of any importance. All his letters almost invariably contained a request for British support and protection. One such letter¹⁰ brought the question of alliance with Bhopal again to the consideration of the Council at Fort William. The Governor General had no doubts in his mind as to its desirability. But the Secret Committee's interdict of 29 September 1815 was still operative. He thought however that the question had assumed a new aspect in the meantime. The negotiation in 1814/15 was contemporaneous with an arduous war with Nepal which demanded "nearly the whole of our disposable infantry and artillery". Any struggle with the Marathas on the issue of an alliance with Bhopal at that time would have caused the Government much anxiety.

That situation had undergone a change for the better. There was peace with Nepal. The Marathas were not in a position to take up arms against the British. Sindhia, who was most vehement in his opposition to the proposed alliance, "has dropped his views on Bhopal, as may fairly be inferred from his having neglected to avail himself of the favourable opportunity offered by the death of Vizier Mahomed". Nagpur was also in alliance with the British. The Governor General accordingly held the view that "in the present political situation an alliance with Bhopal would not excite the slightest movement of opposition". He also refuted the Secret Committee's apprehensions of future embarrassments. "I do not consider the formation of an alliance with Bhopal as necessarily leading to any ulterior expansion of our political relations, though it would be a great step gained towards the establishment of tranquillity in Central India."

The Governor General pointed out some further arguments in favour of the alliance. The British alliance with Nagpur "renders the extension of our protection to that country (Bhopal) an object of no less early accomplishment than desirable attainment.....The command which it would give us of both banks of the Nerbudda through a considerable extent must be regarded as a great improvement in our military position in that quarter". Rejection of the alliance, he apprehended, would force Bhopal into connections unpalatable to it. "Alone, it stands in too much hazard. It must seek

⁹ Secret Cons. 18 May 1816, No. 21.

¹⁰ Transmitted with Wauchope's Despatch dated 16 July 1816.

support elsewhere if we decline to afford it and may thence become opposed to us instead of strengthening us with its aid". Besides, such an alliance "would contract the limits of the Pindaris and curtail their resources, while it extraordinarily improved our means of obstructing or intercepting their expeditions, by shortening our line of defence".¹¹

On the above considerations the Governor General hoped that the Secret Committee, when apprised of the new situation, would withdraw their ban. He therefore proposed that the question in its new aspect be submitted to the Secret Committee. He however made it clear that if any emergency arose which would make it undesirable, in the interest of his employers, to wait for the Committee's instructions, he would act according to his best judgement.

Pending the receipt of these new advices, the Nawab's hopes for a protective alliance were to remain unfulfilled. Mr. Wauchope was accordingly informed that "the Governor General is not prepared to accede to the solicitations of the Nawab". The repulse to the Nawab's advance was however not to be so decided "as to lead the Nawab to suppose that he can in no case expect the benefit of our protection. Circumstances may, and probably will soon, occur to enable the Government to reconcile the formation of an intimate connection with Bhopal with its political views and plans".¹²

The rebuff came as a great disappointment to Nazar Muhammad Khan. In his letter dated 24 December 1816 addressed to Wauchope, he regretted that his character was misunderstood with the result that the "negotiations for adjusting my affairs were broken off by you and I was thereby exposed to the outrages of the freebooters". Thinking that his conduct had perhaps not been found satisfactory, he pointed out that "although I had been in the habit of frequent correspondence with the chieftains of the country agreeably to the usages of states, I have now discarded all these connections".

Mr. Wauchope, in forwarding this letter to Mr. Adam endorsed the sincerity of these sentiments. He had "made particular enquiry into what footing the Nabob at present stands towards the Pindarees and from the result and from the degree in which his country has lately suffered from their depredations" he had no hesitation in saying "that he maintains no understanding whatever with any of the leaders at the present moment".¹³

In January 1817, the Nawab found another opportunity of pressing his claims to British protection. He had earlier been involved in a dispute with the Rajah of Berar. The latter had charged the Nawab

¹¹ Secret Cons. 9 November 1816, No. 12.

¹² Secret Cons. 9 November 1816, No. 16.

¹³ Secret Cons. 11 January 1817, No. 10.

with having connived at the depredations of the Pindaris and Raghuji Bhonsla had passed across the Bhopal frontiers under a pretext of correcting the Pindaris. The Nawab had naturally protested against this and Sadiq Ali wanted this affair to be discussed in a meeting with him. The Nawab sought Mr. Wauchope's advice who referred him to Mr. Jenkins. The latter "neither encouraged nor discouraged" the Nawab's proposal to send his agent to Nagpur for settlement of the dispute. Undeterred by this cold reply, the Nawab sent Inayet Masih who arrived at Nagpur in the beginning of December 1816. Inayet saw Mr. Jenkins on 20 January 1817 and impressed upon him that Nazar Muhammad was "even more devoted to the object of securing our protection" than the late Wazir Muhammad Khan. Mr. Jenkins in his conversation with the agent attributed the breaking off the negotiation with the Nawab "rather to general political considerations than to the fault of the Nabob, which we assigned as the cause".¹⁴ In a second interview Inayet Masih again stressed his master's wish to have the general protection of the British. On being asked by Mr. Jenkins to put his proposals in writing for being submitted to the Governor General he drafted one with his own seal affixed to it. These proposals, dated 22 January 1817, were based on the terms offered to the late Nawab by Mr. Wauchope in 1814. The proposals were contained in six articles as follows:

"Article 1st. The Fort of Nuzergurh commonly called Seerman or Goolgaon which is situated near Bhilsa shall be delivered over to the British Government as a permanent cantonment and depot for grain etc.

2nd. We will use our utmost endeavours to assist in the collection of supplies of cattle, grain, and all other necessary articles for the use of the British troops, at the market prices.

3rd. Agreeable to the orders of the British Government, we will also abstain from all intercourse and correspondence with the Pindaris and the plundering Afghans of Hindustan.

4th. After we are taken under the protection of the Company we shall have no occasion to enter into engagements or correspondence with the other chiefs and Rajas of Hindustan but in trifling affairs relating to the administration of the Government it will be continually necessary to correspond with the neighbouring zemindars and chiefs in which cases as a previous reference to the British authorities and the obtaining permission might occasion delay, after having concluded any petty transactions of this kind, we will communicate the same to the nearest British authority.

¹⁴ Secret Cons. 22 February 1817, No. 1 Jenkins to Adam dated 25 January 1817.

5th. After being taken under the protection of the Company, we will submit to the British Government all our claims and pretensions on other Rajahs and chiefs, in order that the Company may effect a favourable settlement of the same, or even should we suffer a little loss in this way, we will, out of respect to the British Government, quietly submit to it.

6th. With regard to money stipulations for the payment of the British troops the case is this, that for the last two years the revenues realized by us from our country have not exceeded one lack and 25,000 rupees, on which we have with difficulty subsisted. How therefore can we contribute any sum towards the payment of the British troops—Let the Company excuse us on this point. But the fort of Nuzergarh with some villages dependent on it, some of which are flourishing and the others deserted, shall be delivered into the hands of the Company and when by the assistance of the British Government we shall attain our wishes, we shall never be found deficient in rendering any service in this respect in our power".¹⁵

While these negotiations were going on, the Nawab's conduct supplied further proofs of the sincerity of his disposition. In his letter to Mr. Wauchope, dated 25 January 1817, he expressed his desire "to co-operate to the utmost of my power, with zeal and obedience" for the "extermination of the marauders".¹⁶

In another letter, dated 24 February 1817¹⁷ he informed Mr. Wauchope of the fact of his having expelled some horsemen whom he had allowed to reside in his territories, from Raisen for having joined the Pindaris. He further indicated the location of the troops of Namdar Khan, Chitoo Khan and Wasil Muhammad who were stationed round Bhopal and who, since the Nawab refused "their applications for shelter and protection", intended to plunder his territories.

The Nawab's proposals as put into writing by Inayet Masih were communicated to the Governor General. The moment appeared to be propitious. The long intended operations against the Pindaris had been finally decided upon and an alliance with Bhopal assumed added value. It was now considered "expedient and proper to decide on the course to be pursued and the relation to be established with the Nawab of Bhopal". The consistency of the Nawab's attachment was now to bear fruit. Mr. Adam communicated the decision of the Government to Mr. Jenkins on 30 September 1817¹⁸. His professed and approved attachment to the British cause "which has entailed on

him the peculiar enmity of the Pindaries, renders him deserving of every assistance and support while the local position of his territories, the bravery of his troops and the energy of his personal character enable him to become a most useful and efficient auxiliary in the approaching crisis and an important branch of the system to be established for preventing the revival of predatory associations". He would be "an useful auxiliary to us" and "the throwing his weight into the opposite scale would be detrimental to our cause". The Government were at the same time conscious that in return for his services the Nawab had a legitimate claim to a corresponding benefit. He would appreciate "protection against his enemies, and the restoration of such part of the former territories of his family as the operations of the war may place at our disposal. Our own interest will in fact be promoted by the consolidation of the resources and strength of this little Mussulman state, which surrounded by Marhatta neighbours, must necessarily lean on the aid of a powerful protector and will be faithful to us from interest and inclination."

With regard to the conditions to be required from the Nawab, the British Government required, in addition to those specified in Inayet Masih's proposals, an "engagement to give us the services of his troops". On the question of payment of expenses it was admitted that "in the present condition of his territory and resources, the Nawab is certainly unable to contribute to the expenses of the troops but after the reannexation to his possessions of the tracts that are occupied by the Pindaries and eventually others, accompanied by the improvement which the restoration of tranquility may be expected to effect in his resources, it will be equitable he should contribute in a fair proportion to the charge."

Mr. Jenkins was directed to communicate the assent of the British Government by a letter transmitted through Col. Adams with whom the Nawab had established a friendly intercourse. "This letter, and the Nawab's reply may be considered as an engagement sufficiently binding and supersede the necessity for a formal treaty. If however the Nawab should express a desire to have the conditions reduced to that form, his wish should be complied with."

Communicating acceptance of Inayet Masih's proposals Mr. Jenkins, in his letter, dated 31 October, 1817¹⁹, mentioned the additional stipulations which were that "you will zealously co-operate with your troops against the Pindaries and their abettors, that you will admit the British troops at all times into your territory, that all articles of supply for them shall be purchased and passed through your territories free of duty". Regarding payment of expenses the Nawab

¹⁵ Secret Cons. 22 February 1817, No. 3.

¹⁶ Secret Cons. 22 February 1817, No. 5.

¹⁷ Secret Cons. 22 March 1817, No. 7.

¹⁸ Secret Cons. 28 October 1817, No. 10.

¹⁹ Secret Cons. 21 November 1817, No. 26.

was informed as advised in Mr. Adam's letter. He was also told that "your assent to the conditions will render you atonce our ally and entitle you to the immediate and permanent protection of the British power."

The moment the Nawab received the communication from Mr. Jenkins he sent one of his most confidential officers Shazad Masih, the son of Inayet Masih, to Hoshangabad to see Col. Adams and Brig. Genl. Sir John Malcolm, the Governor General's agent, to concert the proper reply to the Resident at Nagpur. It was decided that he would write to Mr. Jenkins, signifying his full assent to all the propositions contained in his letter, "stating however his hope that the last, which referred to his contributing in future a proportion to the expenses of the English Government, would be always exercised with moderation and with a view to his actual condition."

Shazad Masih expressed the Nawab's great anxiety to have a regular treaty with the Company. Malcolm told him there was not the slightest objection to such a measure, but that "to save time which was at present of great importance the Nawab had better sign the proposed letter and transmit it to Mr. Jenkins with a request that conditions stated in it might receive the form of a treaty". This was gladly accepted by Shazad Masih.

The Nawab was very anxious to have some smaller points introduced into the treaty. The first related to the orderly conduct of the English troops passing through his country—the second to the English Government never interfering in his family concerns and not giving protection and encouragement to any of his discontented or disaffected relations or adherents. The third point and one upon which Shazad Masih represented the Nabob to have the most serious anxiety was an engagement to maintain his dignity and authority and not to alter the present system of administering justice in Bhopal. He was told that there would not be the slightest difficulty in this matter. At his request Malcolm wrote a letter to the Nawab to that effect.

The Nawab wrote a letter to Mr. Jenkins in the terms prescribed. He however showed some anxiety on the question of expenses and in his letter to Malcolm, dated 27 October 1817, he hoped that "in consideration of my ancient friendship and the promises formerly received I shall be looked upon with a more favourable eye than others".²⁰

Both the parties to the agreement regarded this exchange of letters as the virtual conclusion of the treaty. The Nawab immediately

²⁰ Secret Cons. 5 December 1817, No. 15.

"entered heartily into the cause, sending his contingents wheresoever directed, in aid of the operations against the Pindarees, and rendering very important service on several trying occasions".²¹

The Governor General in his letter to the Nawab, dated 23 December 1817²², expressed his appreciation of the measures taken by the Nawab in execution of the terms settled, and conveyed his "unqualified confirmation of the assurances you have received from Brigadier General Sir John Malcolm and Mr. Jenkins". He assured him further that "a regular treaty shall be hereafter prepared and duly exchanged and ratified but in the meanwhile I request you to consider this as having the full force of such an instrument".

The Government of India had indeed been willing to "gratify the Nabob by an immediate conclusion of the affair"²³ but disturbances at Nagpur intervened. The formal treaty was concluded at Bhopal on 26 February 1818 and ratified by the Governor General on 8 March. The treaty in its final form exempted the Nawab, in view of the substantial services rendered by him, from payment of any tribute in return for the protection afforded. The contingent which he was required to furnish for the service of the British Government was fixed at a moderate figure of six hundred horse and four hundred foot only as a special favour. Moreover, since a military force was stationed at Sagur following its occupation, Bhopal was relieved from its treaty obligation of furnishing a fort to serve as a depot for a British detachment.

²¹ Prinsep, *Transactions in India*, Vol. II, p. 338.

²² Secret Cons. 16 January 1818, No. 11.

²³ Secret Cons. 21 November 1817, No. 28.

FOOD SCARCITY IN BOMBAY ISLAND, 1737-1739 : A SIDE ISSUE OF THE MARATHA CAMPAIGN AGAINST BASSEIN

P. M. JOSHI

Secretariat Record Office, Bombay

DETAILED ACCOUNTS of Maratha activities in Salsette and their conquest of Bassein have been given by Dr. V. G. Dighe in his *Peshwa Baji Rao I and Maratha Expansion*, by Mr. Y. N. Kelkar in his Marathi book on the Bassein Campaign and in the source material which both writers have used. It is not my intention to add anything to this. The idea behind this short paper is made clear in its title.

When the Portuguese learnt of the Maratha plans against them they naturally looked to their friends, the British, in Bombay for help. But in helping the Portuguese, the British drew on themselves the wrath of the Marathas who stopped the supply of food grains to Bombay island. The Maratha invasion of Salsette island, as a preliminary to the siege of Bassein, began with the occupation of Thana after which the invaders quickly spread all over the island occupying one point after another. Many people from Salsette island sought refuge under the British flag in Bombay and added to the anxiety of the administration of the island with regard to the adequacy of food-grains. Governor Horne took the extreme step of issuing a proclamation requiring refugees to quit the island and declared that any inhabitant of the island harbouring refugees would be considered to have violated the law. All inhabitants of the island were also required to communicate to the heads of their respective castes the quantity of rice and other food grains in their possession. Attempts were made to import rice into Bombay from Mangalore, Surat and Bengal and an envoy was sent to Chimaji Appa to negotiate in this behalf. I give below relevant extracts from the Consultations of the Bombay Council dealing with this emergency. It is perhaps pertinent to add that these extracts give one aspect of the background of Inchbird's embassy to Chimaji.

(1)

Bombay Castle, Tuesday, 3rd May 1737

Being very Apprehensive there will be a want of Grain for our Inhabitants (through the Prohibition of bringing it hither from the Moratas Country) and great Numbers of useless People having

56

57

resorted hither since the late Invasion of the Portuguese Territorys, who will expend the Provisions in the Place without being of any service IT IS AGREED THAT the Publication be issued requiring all Strangers who have complied hither since the beginning of those Troubles to depart the island in Seven Days and forbidding any of the Inhabitants to entertain or Conceal them after that time.

(2)

Bombay Castle, Tuesday, 3rd May 1737

Finding the Morattas refuse to permit Grain being brought to this Island, and apprehending them be a want of it for our Inhabitants before the next fair season. It is thought necessary to have a true account of the (grain) at present on the island. For which purpose IT IS AGREED THAT a publication be issued, requiring every Inhabitant to give an exact account to the Heads of their respective (Castes) Batty Rice or other Grain in their Possession under (penalty) of forfeiting such as shall be found and not contained in that Account, and such farther Punishment as the Board shall think fit to inflict, And IT IS AGREED That half the Grain attempted to be concealed shall be given to the informer which we think will be a sufficient Encouragement to make Discoverys.

Directed that the Heads of the respective Castes deliver the Accounts of the Grain found upon the island to the Custom Masters of Bombay and Mahim in order to be laid before the Board.

(3)

Bombay Castle, Saturday, 21st May 1737

...We don't want Pretexsts for breaking with them as they have not only refused to permit Provisions being brought to this island from any part of their country, but have actually seized and detained several Boats belonging to this island, some of whom were sent with money to procure Batty from other parts.

A proposal is then made for sending over a person to Chimnajee, the Commanding Officer of the Morattas at Tannah, to Demand the Restitution of the boats they have taken and the Free Trade of the Rivers as formerly; To desire to know how far he is resolved to Proceed against the Portugueze, whether to make an entire conquest of their country, If not what Terms He will accept from them, and to Hint to Chimnajee that according to his Answer we shall frame our future Conduct.

As we think no ill Consequences can attend this step It is Unanimously Agreed to, and Debating whether to send an Englishman or a Native, We think the former might look like too great a Condescension, nor cou'd We depend upon their not Detaining Him, IT IS THEREFORE RESOLVED That Ramjee Purvoo¹, a Person of Capacity & Experience be appointed on this service.

(4)

Bombay Castle, Friday, 24th June 1737

The President acquaints the Board that he has reced a letter from Chimmajee the Commanding Officer of the Morattas at Tannah, in answer to the Demand made for the timber stopt there coming from Bassein belonging to the Hon. Company (as taken Notice of in our Consultation of the 3d. Instt.) but he does not give the least hope that he will restore it.

Read a letter from Capt. Thomas Stoneham Purser Marine (as entred hereafter) setting forth that thro. the great scarcity of all kinds of Provision, he cannot possibly furnish Beef, Pork & Wood at the stated prices, they actually standing him in Fifty p. cent more, & upwards: The consideration of the same is deferred till we can more particularly inform ourselves of the prices of the several articles of provision.

Honble Sir & Sirs,

Provisions & other Necessaries being at present much dearer than usual, have made an Estimate of their prices, which are as follows—

"Billett wood bought since March last exclusive of servants, wastage etc. cost		2-0-0 p. Mill. *
A Hog weighg. about 60 lb.	cost..... 3-2-0	} Pork amounts to seven pice p. pound exclusive of servants & other charges.
Feeding Do. to prevent it giving the people the flux, being otherwise full of Oyl	1-2-0	
Cooly Hire.....	50	
Rupees:		5-0-50 *
A Bullock weighg. about ... 130 lb. cost. 9-0-0 straw 6 bundles p. is for a month 180—bundles @ 16 Rups. p. Mill amots. to.. 2-3-50.		} Beef amots. to pice 7 1/3 p. pound exclusive of servants etc &ca.
Rups.		

¹ Prabhu, Purbhoo, commonly but corruptly called Purvoo (Marathi प्रभु, परभु a chief). The name of the writer caste in the West of the peninsula or of an individual of that caste. *Wilson's Glossary*. Paibus of the Portuguese. See also *Hobson-Jobson*, Parvoo.

² Billet Wood being thick piece of fire-wood it seems that the price is for 1,000 pieces and not by weight or bundles.

³ Accounts in Bombay at this time were kept in rupees, quarters and reas, 400 reas going to a rupee.

If the Beef & Pork are salted it costs half a pice p. pound & during the rains (that is to say in the months, June, July, August and Septr.) the cattle ought to be fed with a little Grain besides straw, to keep them in any tolerable meat, which cannot be done for less than one pice p. pound.

But for this last commodity here is at present not any to be had, therefore I hope you'll please to consider of a convenient place, in order to send a Cooper, Casks & ca, & likewise if you think proper shall very readily go myself, that there may be a sufficient quantity procured against the Cruizers are to sail.

I am

Hon. Sir & Sirs,

Your most obedt. Humble servt.

THOMAS STONEHAM.

BOMBAY

June 24th 1737.

(5)

Bombay Castle, Monday, 19th September 1737

IT is then observed that it is greatly to be feared we shall be in want of rice the ensuing season, not only thro. the prospect of a bad crop, but the certainty of a prohibition of bringing us grain from the Morattas country if they find they can thereby distress us. The President therefore proposes, if the Rose arrives in time from Surat, that she be sent with the above vessels to proceed to Mangulore, & load with rice, & as sundry of our inhabitants are preparing to send boats thither on the like service, the having a convoy in their return may be an encouragement to others, & we don't apprehend any danger of the Rose coming up alone, as our other fleet will be lying off Gereah⁴. It is accordingly agreed that she be employed in this manner.

(6)

Bombay Castle, Monday, 3rd October 1737

The President acquaints the Board that he had desired this meeting to consider how to prevent the evils we are threatened with, thro. the present great want of grain for the use of our inhabitants. Observing that we can expect none from the Morattas, who have prohibited any being brought hither, unless we consent to supply them with warlikewise stores, which wou'd be too dangerous an

⁴ Gheria, Vijayadurg, 16°33, 'N 73°20, 'E.

expedient, & by letters lately received from the General of the North we are disappointed in our hopes of being furnished from the Portuguese, as he tells the President that he cannot spare any untill he has laid in a sufficient stock for the King's Forts & garrisons and he is dubious from the badness of the present crop that they shall have little more than enough for this service. From the Northern ports we may indeed about a month hence hope to receive grain, which however is uncertain and our greatest dependance for rice is on Mangalore and as the Rose (whom we proposed to send for a convoy to the boat bound thither, and to countenance them while there) is not yet arrived from Surat, the President desires the opinion of the Board for preventing any disappointment in the supply of rice we hope to procure at Mangalore.

When It is observed that it is absolutely necessary constantly to block up the enemys ports and if we order any of the cruizers in harbour for a convoy to Mangalore, they cannot return hither to clean, and take in wood and water time eno. to be sent to relieve the vessels. Whereupon Commodore Massey moves, whether it be not possible for his ship to proceed to Mangalore and convoy back the rice vessels time enough for him to make his passage to Gombroon, and return with the wool before the ships bound for England, in January may be sailed.

The Board considering hereupon it is computed that the fleet may get down to Mangalore in seven days, and as the rice they may be now able to get is all in readiness (being the remains of last year's crop) fifteen days is the longest term they need stay at that port and in all probability they may be up here again by the 15th November and we shall not need to detain her above two or three days after her arrival to dispatch her for Gombroon, and allowing twenty days for the passage thither, as many in her return, and that she will be detained there at the most five days, the wool will be here according to their way of reckoning by the 5th Janry at farthest. But to save time the President observes that the timber for Gombroon may be now put on board the Wilmington and that after she has convoy'd the vessels to Mangalore and seen them up safe as high as Rajahporee, she may then stand away for the Gulph^s, whereby her return with the wool will be very much expedited. And to be at the greater certainty it will be necessary limit her departure from Mangalore to the last of October, but if the boats should be loaded before that time or Captain Massey finds no rice is to be got in the place that he comes away so much the sooner as he is able.

By the prosecution of this design we hope to perform all the most material services at present requisite vz. the blocking up Angria,

^s The Persian Gulf.

procuring a supply of grain so absolutely necessary for the island and bringing the wool from Persia, which he shall be in great want of to complete the loadings of the ships on hand and we hope will prove an acceptable article to our Hon. Masters.

It is therefore agreed that the Wilmington be ordered to Mangalore to convoy and protect the vessels sent for rice, and after seeing them safe as high as Rajahporee that she make the best of her way to Gombroon.

(7)

Bombay Castle, Tuesday, 11th October 1737

Read & Approved our last Consultation.

The President acquaints the Board that having reced advice that fifteen of Sambajee's galivats^e and fourteen of Monajee's were cruizing to the Northwards and had intercepted some boats bound to this island with grain and being apprehensive they wou'd prevent our receiving the expected supply he had ordered the Britannia frigate to cruize between Damaun and Bassein in order to protect the vessels bound hither and now communicates to the Board his instructions to the Commander which are approved.

He then observed that it is now necessary to think of making a provision of grain for our inhabitants till the end of next rains, which he apprehends it will not be possible to do from the parts about us thro. the prohibition of exporting it from the Morattas country & the extreme badness of the crop, nor can we expect a sufficient supply from the Northward or even Mangalore since we are assured the general scarcity in these parts will oblige the Portuguese & Sambajee Angria to have recourse to the latter port, where the large demand of others will probably prevent our getting the quantity we may want. The President hereupon proposes to desire the President & Council of Bengall to supply us with twelve or fifteen thousand bags, sending part thereof on any of our Hon. Masters ships bound this way and to contract with any merchants of the place on the best terms they can to deliver us the remainder at a certain rate. The Board considering the present great scarcity the little prospect of supplying ourselves sufficiently from the parts on this side of India & the dreadful evils to be apprehended from the want of grain does unanimously agree to the above proposal & IT IS DIRECTED that a letter be got in readiness & dispatched by express Pattamar⁷.

^e Galley or war-boat with oars. *Hobson-Jobson*, Gallevat.

⁷ A swift sailing vessel with one to three masts. *Hobson-Jobson*, Pattamar.

Bombay Castle, Friday, 6th January 1738

Captn. Richard Peiarce had brought from Scindy⁸ about five Hundred Candys of Rice of the Growth of that country the president acquaints the Board that having considered we are disappointed in the quantity we expected from Bengall & that we are not certain of receiving as much as we expected from Mangulore. It is probable there may be a want before the end of the rains. He had therefore talk'd with Captn. Peiarce for buying his rice on the Honble Comps. Accot. & had brought him to accept of two Rupees & a Quarter p. Parah⁹ which the Board esteems a reasonable price & for reasons before given it is agreed to take it at that risk & directed that the amot. be paid out of the treasury.

Bombay Castle, Monday, 10th April 1738

As we are yet apprehensive of a want of Grain & the Gentlemen at Surat acquainting us it will be difficult if not impossible to secure any more Batty¹⁰ agreed that we direct them to buy what rice may come on the Bengall shipping as cheap as they can provided they learn that the Presidt. & Council have not supplied us with any on our Honble Masters Account.

Bombay Castle, Thursday, 18th January 1739

The President representing to the Board the insufficiency of our supplies of grain for the demand of the year and the obstacles to the obtaining it from the Moratta country and Mangulore, AGREED, that a letter be immediately prepared to the Chief and Factors at Surat directing their purchase of a quantity of batty from one thousand to fifteen hundred morahs¹¹ and that if they cannot procure conveyance to send it down on convenient terms that..... for our supplying them from.....hence.

⁸ Sind, *Index to the Press Lists of the Public Department Records, 1748-1800* (Imperial Record Department, 1924) Also *Hobson-Jobson*, Sind, Scinde.

⁹ Phara (Marathi फरा). A grain measure of Bombay consisting of sixteen paylis Prinsep, *Useful Tables* (Calcutta, 1834), p. 81.

¹⁰ From Kannada, Batta (or Marathi Bhat) rice before it is husked, paddy. Also used for corn in general. *Wilson's Glossary*.

See also *Hobson-Jobson*, Paddy. For "batty ground" in Bombay in the early eighteenth century see "*Bombay in the days of Queen Anne*" (Hakluyt Society, 1933), pp. 60-61.

¹¹ Morah, Mura, Muda, a grain measure equal to twenty-five pharas.

Bombay Castle, Tuesday, 23rd January 1739

The President acquaints the Board that this consultation is expressly held to determine on the best method for providing a quantity of rice for the urgent occasions of the island, as it may be of the worst consequence to the place itself should it be unprovided of grain for the immediate support of the inhabitants the labouring part of which chiefly depends on the Government for even their daily supplys. The extraction of rice from Mangulore and the Moratta countrys being impracticable and the provision lately order'd from Surat the success of which depending on Nunsaree, Gundavie' other parts in possession of the Ghenims, being too precarious to trust entirely too, the President proposes to the Board as one expedient to write to Mr. Chas. Boddham residing at Scindy on an employ from the Gentn, at Bengall to purchase from one thousand to fifteen hundred carwalls¹² of red rice on accot of the Hon. Company directing him to advise us of the time he may expect it to be in-readyness. That we may send up a vessel to convoy it down and what quantity of tonnage he can procure there for bringing it down that we may take measures to supply him with the rest wanted from hence and the Board agreeing thereto order'd that a letter be instantly framed to the foregoing purpose and recommended to the Chief and Factors at Surat to be forwarded to said Charles Boddham by the safest and speediest means.

¹² Caravet ?

2 D.G. Arch.

THE RAJENDRAS OF GANGAKHED AND THEIR RECORDS

R. M. JOSHI -

Central Records Office, Hyderabad

THE PRATAPWANTS, the Rai Rayans and the Rajendras are the three outstanding Maratha Brahmin families which played a significant role during the Asaf Jahi period, after Nizam-ul-Mulk Asafjah I who passed away on 21 May 1748. Vithal Sundar was the trusted lieutenant of Nawab Nizam Ali Khan (1761-1803), who had installed him as the first Prime Minister of his reign endowing him with the title of Raja Pratapwant. All the three families were extremely loyal to their masters and have shown their mettle in the sphere of diplomacy as well as on the battle fields. It is proposed to deal with the family of the Rajendras in this paper.

On the basis of the extant records the origin of the family can be traced from a very old ancestor by name Balajeepant who served under the Nawab of Kurnool; but it was Haibat Rao Gopal who first came into prominence. Haibat Rao Gopal must have joined the service of Nizam Ali Khan with the support of the Rai Rayan brothers, Dhondajee Shankar (1728-1783) and Nanajee Shankar (1730-1785). When Madhav Rao Narayan was declared Peshwa on the 40th day of his life i.e. on 28 May 1774, Nizam Ali Khan, his royal neighbour, did not fail to congratulate him by sending robes of honour, through a delegation led by Nanajee Shankar. Haibat Rao must have accompanied Nanajee Shankar to Purandar, where he was posted to work as *Akhbarnavis*. This fact has been clearly stated at the close of the *Sanpuri Bakhar*, a historical chronicle giving the account of both the Marathas and the Nizams from the point of view of a loyal citizen of the Nizam's State¹.

One more item of recorded evidence is found in *Savai Madhav Rao's Diary* (Vol. I; page 296), which shows that Kesu Rao Haibat, a younger son of Haibat Rao, was present with Mahmood Yar Jung while giving robes of honour to the Peshwa on the occasion of his nuptial ceremony on 19 February 1789.

¹ This Marathi Bakhar was published by the Central Records Office in 1950.

Though the designation of Haibat Rao seems to be modest, he with his personal efficiency and circumspect outlook, successfully made inroads into the duties of a diplomat. The news-letters despatched by him from the headquarters of the Peshwa afford ample testimony to believe that Haibat Rao had a breadth of vision and a sharpness of acumen in political matters rarely possessed by men of those days. His reports from Poona are extremely elaborate describing events from day to day and *prahar* to *prahar*. From them one can easily visualize a vivid picture of Poona and breathe in refreshing breezes from an atmosphere vibrant with vigorous political activities. Though the reports are only from Poona, Haibat Rao is meticulous in obtaining news of affairs in the North and the South. The conflicts of Mahadaji Sindhia with Muir, the negotiations of Haider Ali's and Tipu's envoys, Narasing Rao and Nur-ud-din Khan, with the Maratha Government, the arrivals and departures of the English and French agents like Upon Mostyn and St. Lubin, are all carefully reported. Poona was then the radiating centre of political activities, to which news from all places came. Haibat Rao Gopal kept close watch on the Shanwarwada palace of the Peshwa and the Budhwarwada mansion of Nana Phadnis. The reports reveal how the young Peshwa was being carefully brought up and educated and trained in manly exercises and in his official duties. Nana's ceaseless endeavours to direct and control all the affairs of the State, his interviews with the political personages and State officials, his visits to the Belbagh and Parwati and ceremonial functions, the presents exchanged on such occasions, have all been narrated by Haibat Rao Gopal with remarkable thoroughness. As a perfect diplomat and statesman, Nana Phadnis's every action was actuated by the desire to raise the dignity of the Maratha State, to eradicate all forces of evil and to extend and strengthen the Maratha empire. Haibat Rao seems to catch the sound of every heart beat of Nana; for his reports display his anxiety to convey a correct picture of these affairs to his master. I am not giving here excerpts from these papers to support my remarks because these *Akhbars* are being shortly published by the Central Records Office of Hyderabad State.

In the Poona *Akhbars* Haibat Rao Gopal often refers to his eldest son Raghottam Rao who was generally at Hyderabad as the person who would be able to give further advice or detailed information on important subjects dealt with in the *Akhbars*. This shows that Raghottam Rao possessed detailed knowledge of conditions at the court of Poona and could be depended upon to give sound guidance on all current affairs. Obviously, this ability developed in him on account of his close association with the day-to-day happenings at the Nizam's court and his frequent visits to Poona. His political sagacity was recognised when he was appointed as the Nizam's

Vakil at Poona. We have in our collection the letter of his appointment to this post in the following terms:—

(Free translation).

SUBJECT.—Appointment of Raja Raghottam Rao as Vakil at Poona;
Dated 1791.

“Your appointment is subject to the conscientious discharge of duties of Vakil entrusted to you. You shall carry out functions in such a way as to win the confidence and appreciation of Srimant Nana (Farnavis). You will be paid a monthly salary of Rs. 50.”

The Central Records Office, Hyderabad, has recently acquired a large and varied collection of papers from the family archives of Raja Raghottam Rao. This collection is made up of a mass of Marathi and Persian papers, some Hindi scrolls and a few English documents. The Marathi and Persian papers consist of political letters, memoranda, treaties, engagements, covenants, sanads, dastaks, diaries, news-letters, military despatches, chronicles etc. Though they are heterogenous, they are bound to shed abundant light on contemporary history when carefully studied. They are generally linked with the period immediately following the death of Madhav Rao II and the relations of the Nizam and the Marathas with the English during the period of the Third Mysore War. Raghottam Rao appears to have virtually held charge of the foreign affairs of the Nizam's court at this period and to have carefully preserved all the records of this period. What is more, he seems to have made special efforts to keep in his *Daftar* copies of several important political papers which had general importance during the period for fuller information or for the purposes of reference. Thus we find in his collection carefully prepared official copies of the Treaty of Purandar, the Treaty of Salbai, of important news-letters of an earlier period from the North and of chronicles of kings and dynasties.

There are other records in the collection which speak highly for the versatile interests cultivated by the scions of the Rajendra family. Thus there are a number of scrolls connected with some astrological charts, some Sanskrit manuscripts like the *Brahma Sutras*, a collection of Marathi songs, poems, etc.

Raghottam Rao's devotion to the Vaishnava cult is revealed by papers connected with various religious observances and letters which show that the Vaishnava Maths and their pontiffs were held in great reverence by the family and received sigular homage from time to time. Raghottam Rao built a massive family mansion at Gangakhed, the headquarters of his Jagir. He renamed the town

which was only Khed as Gangakhed and beautified it by constructing a stone-built-ghat on the Godavri studded with many temples, and made this town a centre of religious activities so much so that it came to be known as “Dakshina Kashi” (the Banaras of the South).

He was made Peshkar and given the title of Rajendra in recognition of his services in obtaining the release of Azim-ul-Omra from Poona in 1796. He was held in close confidence by Azim-ul-Omra. The following extract from the *Poona Residency Correspondence* Vol. VI, letter No. 10 from Uthoff to Sir John Shore shows his position at this time.

“.....Azim-ul-Omra had at present confidence in Raghottam Rao whose fidelity and exertions he had endeavoured to secure by the most honourable and lucrative marks of attention one of which was the appointment of Mustofer-kul, an office possessing, I understand, a general control over all the accounts of State.”

In Volume IV of the same series there are three references to Raghottam Rao in letters Nos. 54, 107, and 145, all of which cast a doubt on his integrity but these cannot be taken at their face value. The student of history knows full well that conflicting interests and party politics undermined the political solidarity of the Nizam's State. The English were bound to cherish biased views regarding all such persons as did not align themselves with them. Raghottam Rao, it may be added, fell in their estimation, as he sided with Azim-ul-Omra, who was zealous to guard the independence of his master. The following extract is significant in this context.

“.....Raghottam Rao of whose integrity M.A. (Meer Alam) has unreservedly expressed his distrust; but the last, surely not least, the grand danger presents itself in those evident marks of dissatisfaction and distrust that have shown themselves between A. C. (Azim-ul-Omra) and M.A. In a word what good can be expected from an assemblage that has not a single atom of concord in its whole composition?”²

Raja Raghottam Rao Rajendra died in 1821. There are published Urdu books in which it is stated that Raghottam Rao was a great scholar both in Persian and Sanskrit and knew English well. He was a great conversationalist and a speaker. He had profound interest in astronomy and astrology.

² *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. IV, Letter no. 107, p. 148.

His grandson Raja Gopal Rao seems to have been an erudite scholar in Persian and Sanskrit and was respected by all for his simplicity and nobility of character which won for him among other honours the tutorship of the late Nizam Mir Mahboob Ali Khan Bahadur (1869-1977). He was well-versed in astronomy and was a poet of no mean attainments. We have in our collection his poetical composition in Hindi depicting the early life of Lord Sri Krishna.

RECORDS OF A GHATPANDE FAMILY OF JUNNAR (POONA)

G. H. KHARE

Bharata Itihasa Samshodhaka Māndala, Poona

NEARLY TWO years ago, Mr. Krishna Gopal Ghatpande of Junnar brought to the Bharata Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandala a bundle of old records for examination. It consisted of 176 Persian, 2 Perso-Kannada, 18 Perso-Marathi and 48 Marathi documents. For the sake of convenience I have grouped Persian and Perso-Kannada together (P) and Perso-Marathi and Marathi together (M) and numbered them separately.

Pande means an accountant (of a village) and Deshpande means an accountant of a country (or a group of villages). Similarly Ghatpande means a person who keeps accounts of a pass or passes. In old days bullocks, camels, etc. were mostly employed for carrying mercantile commodities from place to place and passes had to be guarded against robbers and dacoits. The passers through them whether human beings or beasts were charged for traversing the passes according to both the quality and the quantity of loads they carried. The collector and the keeper of the accounts of this charge was called a Ghatpande.

Though the owner of the records bears at present the surname Ghatpande, his ancestors were, it seems, only Deshpandes, in the first half of the 17th century; for document M1, which is dated the 14th of Rajab Shuhur year 1039 (11 November 1638 A.D.) definitely addresses one of them as Shivaji Govinda Deshpande. It would seem that after the conferment of the Ghatpandeship, the subsequent ancestors of the owner gradually began to be called Ghatpandes. Except very early documents like the one just mentioned, almost all the records whether Persian or Marathi refer to the members of this family by this latter surname. Besides the two duties of Deshpandeship and Ghatpandeship, the members of this family also served as Joshis or village priests.

Document M18 which is dated the 9th of Muharram Shuhur year 1120 (11 November 1719 A.D.) shows that the ancestors of the family were Ghatpandes of 12 passes and 27 *mahals* (or centres of toll-collection). Their lists show that these were spread over the tract lying roughly between the Nira and the Pravara rivers (Poona and Ahmadnagar districts).

The documents from this collection generally refer to either the administration of the passes and toll-collection centres or *mahals* mentioned above or the *vatans*, *inams*, etc. of the family and are useful for the study of the economic and administrative aspect of the age to which they belong. But some documents among them are important for the study of political history of the age and I have dealt with them here.

The earliest document from the collection is P5 and is dated the 10th of Rajab 932 A.H. (22 April 1526 A.D.). It is a genuine document as it bears seven different seals and three endorsements. As its language is intermixed with Turki words and phrases, I am inclined to term it an Adilshahi document; for it is in the early Adilshahi period that documents usually contained Turki words. The next document worth noting is an Adilshahi *farman* (P4) dated the 1st of Jumada II 1053 A.H. (7 August 1643 A.D.) to the effect that the *miras* of Sarnadgaudki of the *simta* of Nandasingi included in the *muamila* of Bankapur (Dharwar) once granted to Karim Muhammad Sharza should be continued in his favour despite any irregularities.

I wish to describe here three more documents which are very important for the later life of Shahaji Bhosale and the early life of his son Shivaji, the Great. On the evidence of three Adilshahi *farmans* acquired from three independent sources, I have pointed out elsewhere that between the 15th of Safar and the 29th of Rabi I of 1067 A.H. (22 November 1656 and 5 January 1657 A.D.) Shivaji, the Great, himself or his army had carried an expedition as far south as Masur on the northern border of the present Mysore State. But his forces had to return as they were defeated in this expedition¹. On the evidence of an Adilshahi document issued by the well-known Afzalkhan, it can also be proved that Shivaji had raided as far as Terdal (Bijapur) in the early part of 1659 A.D.²; but he had to return on account of the grand expedition of Afzalkhan sent against him by the Sultan of Bijapur. Now with the help of three unpublished Adilshahi *farmans* from this collection and an Adilshahi *farman* and a Marathi document published long ago, a new expedition of Shivaji into the Karnatak between the expeditions of 1656-57 and 1659 A.D. can be traced.

In 1939, I had published an Adilshahi *farman* that I acquired from the present descendant of the Desais of Gadag (Dharwar). It is dated the 19th of Jumada 1068 A.H. (12 February 1658 A.D.), was issued by Ali Adilshah II and is addressed to the then Desai of the *pargana* of Gadag. In it the Desai is asked to join with his contin-

¹ *Persian Sources of Indian History*, Vol. III, pp. 116-18 ; *Karnataka Historical Review* Vol. V, Part II, pp. 1-3.

² *Shivacharitrpradipa*, p. 83.

gent and serve faithfully Afzalkhan Muhammadshahi who was appointed to the *subahdari* of.....and sent thither with a force. The *farman* being damaged the words denoting the name of the province of which Afzalkhan was given the *subahdari* or the venue of the expedition which he led have remained unknown to us³.

Document P2 from the Ghatpande Collection is a bilingual (Persian and Kannada) *farman* issued by Ali Adilshah II and is addressed to a Nayaka whose name it is rather difficult to make out from the Persian portion owing to the defective Persian script, but which is clearly Koneti Nayaka in the Kannada portion. This *farman* is dated the 22nd of Shahban 1068 A.H. (16 May 1658 A.D.) and orders Koneti Nayaka to proceed to the part of the country where Afzalkhan Muhammadshahi was already ordered to proceed with his force and in which part of the country Maharaja Farzand Shahaji Bhosale had already been posted. Here though Afzalkhan's expedition together with Shahaji's stationing has been mentioned, the *farman* is silent about the place of the expedition and furnishes no information about the person against whom it was directed. P3 is also a bilingual (Persian-Kannada) *farman* similar to P2, bears the same date and is to the same effect; but it is addressed to Narasaraji Maisurkar. Here Kanthirava Narasa Odeyar of Mysore is obviously referred to and as his last known date is 1659 A.D., there is no contradiction here. This *farman* definitely states that Afzalkhan was ordered to lead an expedition into the Karnataka. Thus we at least know the place of the expedition from this *farman*. Now P1 is also a *farman* issued by Ali Adilshah II and bears the same date as P2 and P3. In it Mirza Murad Ali Beg has been asked to remain quite loyal and both he and Maharaja Farzand Shahaji Bhosale in concert with each other serve the kingdom faithfully. No more information about the Mirza is available and it is rather difficult to interpret this *farman* singly. I shall however try to do it later. There is still another *farman* the gist of which I have already published⁴. It was issued by Ali Adilshah II to Maharaja Farzand Shahaji Bhosale and is dated the 4th of Ramzan 1068 A.H. (27 May 1658 A.D.) i.e. it was sent to him only 11 days after the foregoing three *farmans*. Shahaji seems to have expressed restlessness and fear that he would be held responsible for Shivaji's treason, arrogance etc. He is, therefore, assured in this *farman* that Shivaji's activities and intentions had already become manifest to the Court and he (Shahaji) in no way be blamed for Shivaji's crimes. In recognition of his loyalty, the whole of his former *jagir* was again bestowed upon him and the *Manewars* of Bangalur have been

³ *Persian Sources of Indian History*, Vol. III, p. 92, No. 79.

⁴ *Sqhyadri*, a Marathi monthl y, Vol. XXI, p. 298, *farman* No. 12.

ordered to contact him alone. Anyone reporting against him would be accused. We must also interpret this *farman* which I shall do later with the foregoing one.

Now there is a Marathi document published long ago;⁵ but which remains uninterpreted still. It is an order dated the 13th of Muharram, Shuhur year 1059 (1 October 1658 A.D.) and was issued from the fort of Purandhar in the name of Shivaji, but in his absence. In those days deputies and specially appointed officers were allowed to issue such orders in the name of the chief personality and were even authorised to use the seal of the personality. Thus there is nothing irregular in the document. There was a suit in which after some enquiry a decision to settle it by ordeal was arrived at in the presence of Shivaji. But the party that was ordered to perform the ordeal somehow or other evaded its performance. The other party, therefore, approached Shivaji's officers and lodged a complaint to the above effect. In reply, the officers told the complainant that nothing could be done in the matter unless the Maharaja (Shivaji, the Great) returned home from his Karnataka campaign. From the date of this letter it is obvious that in the beginning of October 1658 A.D. Shivaji was still in the Karnataka on his expedition. Assuming that he passed the rainy season of 1658 A.D. in the Karnataka, he must have started on his expedition at least in the month of May 1658 A.D. if not earlier.

The Ghatpande *farmans* point out that Afzalkhan was appointed to lead the Karnataka expedition in the month of May 1658 A.D. The Gadag Desai *farman* (if, as I believe, it refers to this very expedition) points out that Afzalkhan was appointed to the post even three months earlier. I wish to place the Marathi document with the five Persian *farmans* mentioned above and conclude that Afzalkhan's expedition was aimed against Shivaji. Shivaji, it seems, must have sent his men ahead into the Karnataka early in 1658 A.D. and he might have followed them later, though he has not been specifically mentioned in the *farmans*.

And now on this basis we can interpret the two *farmans* properly. Afzalkhan was sent to the Karnataka to oppose Shivaji and Shahaji was asked to participate in the task. He was obviously to oppose his own son and fight with him if required. Shahaji must have been naturally quite reluctant to perform this unpleasant duty. The Bijapur Sultan therefore, tried to soothe him by issuing the two *farmans*.

⁵ Report of the 4th annual gathering of the Bharata Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandala, Poona, p. 79.

TIME SIGNAL, FORT WILLIAM

R. H. PHILLIMORE

I HAVE always been fascinated by the punctual drop of the Time Ball on its mast at the south ramparts of Fort William, and on my last visit to Calcutta, made a point of taking a walk in the neighbourhood of Prinsep's Ghat at one o'clock, the time of the signal. The big black ball glides smoothly to the top of its mast a few minutes before the hour, and then drops smartly so that all who are on the look-out may set their watches, clocks, or chronometers.

The mid-day gun-fire signal is now a thing of the past, killed by war time economy. The dip of the electric light at nine in the evening is no longer required. The time signal from B.B.C. or All-India-Radio gives us true radio time throughout the day. How long will the Fort William time signal survive?

How did the Fort William signal start? The story is gathered from correspondence taken from original records of the General and Military Departments of the Bengal Government, and of the Surveyor General's Department. In a letter dated 17th October 1834, Captain Alfred Chapman, "late a commander in the Hon. E. I. Company's service", asked Mr. H. T. Prinsep, Secretary to Government, to lay before the Vice President in Council the following suggestion

That in some suitable place the exact mean time may be shewn, so that all the ships about Calcutta may compare their chronometers with the mean time exhibited, and thereby ascertain the daily rate.The rates which are obtained by taking the chronometers ashore differ in many cases from the rates on board.....This same reason has induced the Home authorities to order that exact mean time at noon to be shewn by a signal at the Observatory at Greenwich.

There is a preparatory signal hoisted about five minutes before noon, and at the exact noon the signal is made..... Similar arrangements are made.....both at Madras and Port Louis (Mauritius).....

This.....will tend very materially to the safety of navigation in the Indian seas.....A notice stating the particulars should accompany the Regulations of the Port,..... which each Commander receives from the Pilot when he first arrives.*1

Prinsep replied that

it appears on enquiry that means exist for shewing mean time at Noon in the office of the Surveyor General, but as that office is at present at some distance from the river, and there may be difficulty in making the signal so as to be seen from all the ships in port, I am desired to ask your opinion and that of any other commanders of vessels whom you may be able to consult, whether the purpose in view would be answered by causing to be published weekly in the official Gazette of Calcutta the exact time of the flash of the evening gun, which, it is conceived can easily be watched from the river.*2

Chapman, was decidedly of opinion

that it would be better to have the exact mean time shown, if it was only once a week, than to depend upon a calculation which must necessarily be made, and which would require great accuracy. The Commander is very seldom on board in Harbour, and this must devolve frequently on an inexperienced officer.

I conceive that a person may be found in the Surveyor General's Office who might convey the exact time by a good watch to the flagstaff at Fort William, and at five minutes before noon a Ball might be hoisted as a preparatory signal within six feet of the mast head, and at the exact mean noon, it should be hoisted chock up. If this could be done twice in a week, it would be a great practical benefit to all persons navigating the Indian seas.*3

A small observatory had been built at the Surveyor General's Office, No. 37 Park Street, in 1825, so that regular astronomical and meteorological observations could be taken. A Swiss gentleman, Mr. Vincent Rees, had been engaged to take charge of the observations and their computations and these included daily observations for time taken from sun and stars.

Chapman's proposals were passed through the Military Department to the Surveyor General's office, and Mr. Joshua De Penning,

*1 Progs. of VP. in Council, Gen. Dept., of 20-10-34.

*2 Gen. Dept. 21-11-34.

*3 Chapman's Letter of 28-11-34, Mil. Dept. 2-12-34.

the very capable Chief Computer, who held charge of the office whilst his chief, the great George Everest, was on survey up country, replied on 12th December, that the plan proposed by Captain Chapman of conveying a chronometer to the Fort to show mean time be easily effected. The expense would be palankeen hire, and a small remuneration to the individual employed on that duty.

But I think that the exact mean time could be shown by a signal at the Observatory, to be repeated at the Flagstaff in the Fort for the shipping in the river. This promises greater exactness, and would ultimately be attended with less expense. I would respectfully suggest that after the preparatory signal is made with the ball, it should be allowed to fall freely at the exact Mean Noon, instead of being hoisted chock-up, as proposed by Captain Chapman. The effort required to overcome the resistance of a body from a state of repose to one of motion would occasion a loss of time⁴.

The Town Major was now briefed:

The preferable method of showing mean time will be by suspending a ball, or making some other signal, from the Telegraph Tower, so as not to interfere with the flagstaff, and that the exact time should.....be brought daily from the Surveyor General's Office..... His Lordship accordingly desires that you will take the orders of the Governor of the Fort as to the manner of showing the Ball, or other signal, easily visible from the shipping in the river at the precise moment that will be indicated, and that when the arrangement shall be complete, you will give notice in the Gazette of the date from which the signal will be made⁵.

Everything was put in hand, and the signals were started on 28th January 1835, De Penning reporting to the Surveyor General

that in obedience to the orders of Government a signal staff has been erected on the top of the Surveyor General's office, and that the signals for showing Mean Time commenced on the 28th January last, and have been continued every day since, Sundays excepted.

The signals are made by hoisting a Black Ball to the top of the staff on the office 5 minutes before Noon, and as a preparatory signal to be followed up immediately at the Semaphore. Then at the exact Mean Noon, as indicated by the Clock and Chronometer, the Ball is dropped down instantaneously, while the same is done at the Semaphore under the management of a Non-Commissioned Officer.

⁴ Progs. S. G's Dept. 297 (19-20).

⁵ Gen. Dept. 22-12-34.

I have hitherto devoted a great deal of my time to this business in taking observations for the rate of the clock and chronometer, and making signals for Time, but as it interfered too much with my other duties, I have assigned that duty to Mr. Rees appointing Baboo Nil Comul Ghose to assist⁶.

Nil Comul Ghose was one of the eight students recruited from the Hindu College at the end of 1831. to be trained as computers. He resigned in 1838 for a post as Deputy Collector under the Revenue Department.

Six months after its start the service was discontinued owing to the move of the Surveyor General's office from Park Street to No. 21 Chowringhee, which involved the dismantlement of the old wooden observatory. The new building had been recently vacated by the "Sudder Dewany Adawlat and Nizam Adawlat", which had been moved to Alipore. It now had to be shared with the Sadr Board of Revenue, and as that office was steadily expanding the Surveyor General's Office was again moved, and this time the opportunity was taken to erect a new observatory "a good substantial pukka building". Time Signals were resumed on 10th May 1837, "from which date", writes De Penning, "the duty has been entrusted to Mr. Rees and two of the Hindoo computers". There was difficulty later, after the resignation of the batch of computers recruited in 1831, for the new batch recruited in 1838 declined to work in the observatory on holidays. The Deputy Surveyor General writes, 14th November 1840, pointing out

the probable inconvenience which may arise from Mean Time not being shewn from the Observatory as heretofore on the Hindoo Holidays. It adds twenty-eight days to those on which the Ball was not hitherto dropped. As the objection was then only understood to refer to the Doorga Pooja Holidays only (during which but few vessels perhaps are despatched), it was not deemed of sufficient importance to call for official reference.

It now appears, however, that not only all the Hindoo Holidays do the computers decline to assist in the Observatory, but Mr. Rees.....has no longer their aid on those occasional night observations which become requisite when no observation can be made during the day.

If it be deemed of sufficient importance to secure the Ball being dropped as heretofore, and Government would be pleased to sanction an Assistant for the Observatory on

⁶ S. G's Dept. 343 (515, 12-3-35), the time shewn was Local Calcutta Time.

60 rupees per mensem, his spare time might be available for.....astronomical calculations.

Government firmly refused to sanction an extra assistant; "His Lordship in Council being of opinion that the persons who have hitherto performed the duties during Holidays would be required to do so still⁷.

Signals could not always be exactly punctual, as was advertized in the *Gazette* from time to time;

This day, Wednesday the 20th November 1839, the ball in the Fort dropped 33½ seconds after mean noon. The ball at the Surveyor General's Office was dropped correctly⁸.

It is not known when the time of the signal was changed from midday to one O'clock after noon. In 1858 a new time ball was installed at Fort William, operated from the Surveyor General's office by electricity. Responsibility was later transferred to the Telegraph Department, till in 1935 it was taken over by the Meteorological Office at Alipore. As in many other branches of science, the Surveyor General's Department had taken the lead.

⁷ Mil. Dept. 25-11-40.

⁸ DDn. 355 (141).

INSHAI - NAURANG

SHEIKH ABDUR RASHID

Muslim University, Aligarh

A FZALUL-ULEMA Dr. Abdul Huq, Member Public Service Commission, Madras, has kindly lent me a Persian manuscript, entitled "*Inshai-Naurang*". This is a collection of miscellaneous letters in Persian. The manuscript was purchased in 1256 A.H. for Rs. 2/8 by one Qadir Hussain from Mohiuddin Badshah the eldest son of one Abdul Razzaq. The name of the compiler or the date or purpose of compilation is nowhere given, nor the date of the transcription of this manuscript.

Inshai-Naurang covers 173 pages. The size of the page is $9\frac{1}{2}'' \times 5\frac{1}{2}''$ with 14 lines to a page and it is written in *Shikasta* on old hand made paper. There are 102 letters in this collection, an extract relating to the sack of Muhammadpur in 1782 by the ruler of Mysore and another extract from Khafi Khan's famous History relating to a letter written by Shah Jahan in the early days of his captivity to Mahabat Khan who was then the governor of Kabul.

Letters contained in this collection may be classified as under.

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Letters from Mr. Vansittart to Mir Mohd. Jafar Khan | Nos. 1,2,3,4. |
| 2. Letters from Mir Mohd. Qasim Ali Khan to Mr. Vansittart. | Nos. 5,6,7,8,9,10,13,14
15,16,17,18,19,21
22,23,24,25,26,27,
28,29,30. |
| 3. Letter from Shah Alam to Mir Qasim. | No. 11 |
| 4. Letters of the Nawab Wazir to Mir Qasim. | Nos. 12,36. |
| 5. Letter of Kishen Rai to Mir Qasim. | No. 20. |
| 6. Letters of Mir Jafar to Mr. Vansittart. | Nos. 31,32,38,39,40,41,
42. |
| 7. Letters of Shitab Rai to Mr. Vansittart. | Nos. 33,34,48,49,50. |
| 8. Letters of Shah Alam to Mr. Vansittart. | Nos. 35,52,54. |
| 9. Letter of the son of Jagat Seth to Vansittart. | No. 56. |
| 10. Letter from the Shah of Iran to Haidar Ali Khan. | No. 102. |
| 11. Miscellaneous. | Nos. 43,44,45,46,47,51,
53,55,57,58,59,60,
61,101. |

Some of the letters in this collection are to be found in the *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. 1 (1750-1767). The letters to private individuals and English officers throw important light on the social, economic and political conditions of Bengal after the Battle of Plassey, and these are not to be traced in the *Calendar*.

I have translated two letters as a specimen. One of these letters appears to be letter No. 1476 of the *Persian Calendar* Vol. 1, of which only an abstract is available in the National Archives of India. The second letter I have not been able to trace in this publication.

I propose at a later date to publish an abridged translation of the more important letters in this collection.

(1)

Letter¹ of Nawab Qasim Ali Khan Bahadur to Mr. Vansittart

May the kind and the benevolent Nawab of high status and dignity, patron of brothers and well-wishers—be well.

After giving expression to the desire for receiving your letter which is an epitome of my desires, it is being submitted to your enlightened and kind self that your kind letters dated Rajab² 26, brought happiness to one who was anxious to know about your welfare, by apprizing him of your health. Your sympathetic pen had written that the object in view in besieging Cuttack³ was to benefit this humble self and not the gain of the Company. Previously you had written to me that the expenses of the army of the Company shall be paid by my humble self. It now appears from your sincere letter that you think that this humble person is not interested in the project and so, considering it as vain and improper (on my part), you have given up the idea of sending an army to Cuttack. This humble one will put his heart into the campaign and whatever the British army will require of him he will readily comply with the demands. It is now long since the province of Cuttack has gone out from the jurisdiction of my *Nizamat* and has passed under the domination of the Marhattas. At present laying siege to it would be incurring a new expenditure. Whatever the expenses shall be, this humble self will meet them and whatever has been received from the territory under *Nizamat* shall be considered as written against this contract. The contract between us is that within the dependen-

¹ The year is not given but it relates to 1762 A.D. This letter was in reply to Vansittart's letter of 2 March 1762. *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. I, (Calcutta 1911), No. 1463.

² Mir Qasim wrote a letter on 18 March to Vansittart asking him about the expenses involved in attacking Cuttack, *Ibid*, No. 1476.

On 2 April 1762 Vansittart wrote to Mr. Qasim about the expenses, *Ibid*, No. 1482.

³ Vansittart wrote to Mir Qasim on 16 January 1762. ".....if Cuttack is in His Excellency's possession, the Mahrattas will not find it easy to make excursions into Bengal." *Ibid*, No. 1425.

On 16 February 1762 Mir Qasim wrote to Vansittart about "the necessity of humbling the Mahrattas in Cuttack and the probable advantages that would accrue from capturing that place." *Ibid*, No. 1446.

cies of the *Sarkar*, wherever the Zamindars or other miscreants shall raise their heads, the forces of the Company will help in chastizing them. My kind patron! when has this humble self from the beginning to this day, either written with the pen or uttered from his lips that your good self has done things only for the benefit of the Company and not for my humble self, that you should write like this? God knows that from the very beginning I think that every step that has been taken by you and every thing that you have done has been for my benefit. With reference to what you have written about my lack of interest in the matter, the fact is that the lack of initiative and dash of the Indian army is too well known to you. From the time of the kings of the old to the days of the preceding Nazims they have never obeyed anybody properly. They pay no heed to their master's interests as they should. Besides, knowing the income from and expenditure on the Cuttack expedition and the fact that it would entail an expenditure of 5 to 6 lac rupees, which would have to be met from my personal income, I had some hesitation in undertaking this enterprise. When was the whole of the province of Bengal under the Nazim that your honour should write that Cuttack is outside the jurisdiction of *Nizamat*? Nawab Mir Mohd. Jafar Khan gave to the enemy the area stretching from the district of Birbhum, etc., to 5 *karohs* of Murshidabad and had about two crores of rupees to pay to the army. The laxity of administration and the indiscipline and confusion that he had created, is not unknown to you and when my humble self had accepted the duties of *Nizamat*, I thought that something would come into my hand, it was not expected then that but for 40,000 rupees nothing would be found in the house of Nawab Jafar Ali Khan. It was on the strength of your support and interest that I expelled the enemy from Birbhum etc. and had interfered in the affairs of the province of Bengal and Azimabad. All this is due to your kindness and not to the support of the Indian forces, for these were available to Mir Mohd. Jafar also⁴. The many ways in which your honour has helped me with the English forces cannot be expressed. My heart alone, however, appreciates that. If your honour had not been so kind to me this discipline and improvement in the condition of the affairs (of Bengal) would not have been achieved. Nay it would have definitely deteriorated from what it had been under Mir Mohd. Jafar Khan. The humble self is highly perplexed at finding that the former corrupt *Mutasaddis* and bankers who in the time of the former Nazims paid 10 to 20 lacs, at this time do not like to pay even 2 lacs. Besides, it is incumbent on me to send the treasures to your honour and to pay the salaries and allowances of

⁴ For references to Zamindars, economic problems etc. see *Mir Qasim* by Nanda Lal Chatterji (Allahabad, 1935), pp. 42, 45, 48.

the soldiers. Under such circumstances the cause of my anxiety cannot be expressed. The Wakil of Janoji Mahratta was given a reply. What expenses would be incurred in sending troops to Cuttack? Please write to me. If I can I shall act in the matter as I have written. What more should I write?

(2)

Letter of Nawab Qasim Ali Khan Bahadur to Mr. Vansittart

May the kind and the benevolent Nawab—of high status and dignity, patron of brothers and well-wishers—be safe.

After expressing the desire for receiving your letter which is the epitome of my desires, it is being submitted that the account of the mischief and malice of Shitab Rai⁵ has been intimated to you before this. From that account my views which are inclined towards friendship, will be clear. How long should the seditious activities of the above-mentioned person be pointed out and explained to you? The friendship and sincerity which Major Carnac Bahadur and others showed towards this humble self was not due to fear of your anger; but that spiteful and jealous person, in league with Raja Ram Narain and others, got into their confidence and establishing contact with the officers sought to create dissensions and effect an estrangement between the Emperor and my humble self and the English and strove to put an end to the sincere friendship and alliance that existed between us. Through the grace of God and the blessing of your kind attention which I enjoyed then and still enjoy, his fraudulent machinations did not succeed. And during these six or seven months that this humble self is in this province, what deceit and fraud has he not practised? Enormous sums of money are in danger of being lost and he has put great financial burden on us in connection with military expenses. On the occasion of the Emperor's visit to Azimabad, your demand for 15 lacs was to be decided but as the above-mentioned person had accepted 60 lacs for the *subadari* of Bengal in the name of others, the matter of this humble self could not be settled for less than 40 lacs. Keeping in mind the losses that I have suffered, your kind self should take into consideration the mischief of that person (Shitab Rai) and punish him.

During the *Nizamat* of Mir Mohd. Jafar Khan Bahadur had written twice to Raja Ram Narain that Shitab Rai and others should not be

⁵ Shitab Rai is styled "Luccha" (rascal) by Mir Qasim in a letter to Vansittart in this collection.

See Vansittart's letter to Mir Qasim, *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. I, No 1315.

Vansittart's letter dated 5 October 1762 to Mir Qasim: "Has sent his Excellency a copy of Shitab Rai's....." *Ibid*, 1340.

given control over Jagir lands and the administration of the *Nizam* should be carefully watched. The above-mentioned one secured from the said Raja, through misrepresentation and flattery, the Jagirs and realised revenues therefrom and sent no money to the *Ahl-e-Jagir* and appropriated the money himself. At present he wants money from me. Your kind self is one of the wisest of the age. Please think over the fact that in spite of the orders of restraint, he has taken over the administration of the Jagirs in his own hands and is spending the money. Placed as I am what is the sense in asking for money from me? How can I pay money to him?

Therefore, whatever sums stand against the name of the above-mentioned (Shitab Rai) would be found in the English list which is being enclosed herewith.

I pray that after its perusal you will relieve this humble self of the demand of payment. What more should be written? May the days of your happiness and prosperity be prolonged.

AZAM - UL - AKHBAR

K. SAJAN LAL

Osmania University, Hyderabad

18 YEARS ago I wrote a small paper based on a study of a few issues of *Azam-ul-Akhbar* and *Tiasir-ul-Akhbar* of Madras of the pre-Mutiny period¹. Since then I have acquired a few issues and volumes of *Azam-ul-Akhbar* of 1849, 1850, 1851 & 1852.

Azam-ul-Akbar (the Great Newspaper), the earliest Urdu newspaper of Madras, was first published in 1848. It was lithographed on ordinary white paper and was published every Thursday. It contained ordinarily eight pages (12" x 7-6") and whenever Court Martial cases or proceedings were reported, it had ten, and at times twelve pages. Each page was divided into three columns. The title and the design of the title page vary.

In 1849, its issues were published by Haji Sayyid Rustam, son of Mir Saeeduddin and were published in the Mathba-i-Azam, Gulam Murtaza Vakil Lane, Madras. Later the press was shifted to Wallajah Road, Trimulkheri (Triplicane), Madras.

In September 1850 Sayyid Mohammed became its editor and continued as such till his death on 25 October 1852. But four months before he took over charge of the paper as the editor, i.e., on 4 June, he became the Secretary of the General Body Meeting of the Muslims which found the Madras Muslim Public Library of which we shall hear more in the course of this narrative.

This paper devoted special attention to the cultural activities of Madras.

On 5 February 1850, at about 6-30 p.m. a meeting was held in the College building when Henry Pottinger, the Governor of Madras, Chambers, the Chief Justice, the Commander-in-Chief and other high officials took part in the Annual Meeting of the Library whose chairman was Chambers, while Edward Balfour was the President of its Managing Committee. This Library possessed one lakh books². Its

¹ "Two Urdu Newspapers of Madras in Pre-Mutiny Days", *Islamic Culture*—July 1914, pp. 313-322. In this paper I said that the newspaper was called *Azam-ul-Akhbar* after "Azam" the Takhlus or pen-name of Nawab Ghaus Md. Khan of Arcot. But in the issue of *Azam-ul-Akhbar* dated 18 July 1850, the editor has clearly stated that it was named after "Ghaus-i-Azam Dastagir".

² *Azam-ul-Akhbar*, 7 February 1850.

details and accounts also appear³. The paper also mentions other Libraries such as the Fort Library, the Vepery Library, the Mount Road Library, the Medical School Library and pays tribute to their useful work.

Another important news item relates to the founding of the Madras Muslim Public Library as suggested by Edward Balfour. It was on Tuesday, 22 Rajab, 1266 A.H. (4 June 1850), that a general body meeting of the Muslims of Madras was held at 11-30 a.m. in the premises of the Polytechnic Institution to establish a library to cater to the needs of the Muslims. It was summoned by Sayyid Md. who acted as its Secretary.

Indeed this is a memorable event in the annals of Madras when we find 99 persons, including the elite of the city, taking part in the deliberations of the meeting.

Madarul Omra, the Diwan of the Nawab of Arcot⁴, proposed that Qazi-ul-Quzzat Md. Irtaza Ali Khan⁵ should take the Chair. His proposal was accepted with acclamations.

Munshi Mahmud Ali Khan Mushir-ud-Daulah proposed that suitable rules and regulations be framed for the Library (25 rules and regulations were framed). Aziz-ul-Mulk proposed that there should be patrons of the Library and added that the Governor of Madras, the Nawab of Arcot and Prince Azeem Jah be requested to honour them as patrons.

Munshi-ul-Mulk Dabir-ud-Daulah proposed that Nawab Ibrat Jung, Aziz-ul-Mulk and Amir-ud-Daulah be appointed as delegates to wait upon the Governor, the Nawab of Arcot and Prince Azeem Jah and to request them to be patrons of the Library.

Amir-ud-Daulah proposed that Qazi-ul-Quzzat Md. Irtaza Ali Khan be elected as the President of the Managing Committee of the Library.

It was also proposed that Madarul Omra, Md. Najaf Ali Khan, Maulvi Shahabuddin, Aziz-ul-Mulk, Saiful-Mulk, and Amir-ud-Daulah, should be elected Vice-Presidents.

* <i>Ibid</i> , 14 February 1850—Annual Income :	Rs. 7,719
Expenses, purchase of books, staff pay, etc. :	Rs. 6,912
Savings	Rs. 807

⁴ Madar-ul-Omrah was the title of Abdul Wahab Khan who was the son of Md. Ghaus Sharful-Mulk the Diwan of Carnatic. Abdul Wahab Khan was born in Madras in 1793 and died in 1868. He was a very learned person and was the Diwan of the Nawab of Arcot.

⁵ Irtaza Ali Khan "Khushnud" was the son of Mustafa Ali Khan "Khushdih" Mustafa Ali Khan was holding the post of Qazi-ul-Quzzat under the E. I. C. His son Irtaza Ali was born in Madras in 1873 and became Qazi-ul-Quzzat in 1828. While returning from Haj he died at Jeddha in 1853. An obituary notice with two Chronograms appear in the issues of *Jama-i-ul-Akhbar* of Madras, dated 3 July, 1854. One chronogram is composed by Sahib -i-Shireen Zaban, and the other by Md. Nizamuddin Khan, son of Sarlashkar Khan. Professor Farooqi and Prof. Mohd. Ahmad Osmani, Controller of Examinations, Osmania University are his descendants.

Ibrat Jung proposed that Md. Mehdi, Nadeemullah Khan, Dr. Edward Balfour, Mirza Abdul Baqi Khan, Mir Mohib-i Ali Khan, Agha Md. Baqir Nemazee, Haidar Jung, Hafiz Sadrul Islam, Miran Mohiuddin, Sultan Mahmud, Gulam Md. Khan and Asaf Jung be elected as Members of the Managing Committee.

It was resolved to publish the proceedings of the general body meeting in the local newspapers and to send a certified copy of the same to the Governor of Madras and his Council Members and the Nawab of Arcot⁶.

This paper gave explanations in Urdu of legal, military and other technical phrases and terms of the Company's Courts, for the benefit of professional men, from lawyers to recruiting officers, who had to learn English. In addition to educating the people, especially Indian sepoys of the army, it took great interest in publishing Court Martial cases and army circulars for their benefit⁷.

This paper evinced great interest in the Native States of India. As a sample of news reporting, we shall confine ourselves to Gwalior and Oudh.

GWALIOR: It reported that on 27th October, 1849, Tarabai left the palace and moved to the Residency on the wrong advice of her Courtiers although Mama Sahib, the Muqtar-i-Riyasat (Regent), the Maharaja and the Assistant Agent dissuaded her from taking such a hasty action. Tarabai, said the paper, had committed a blunder, ill-advised as she was by her two Courtiers. The paper also said that still there were chances of amicable settlement without the loss of prestige to either side. The Agent had advised the expulsion of her advisers from the State. In case she moved out of the State, she would be entitled to Rs. 3 lakhs a year befitting her status⁸.

On the 19th November, a durbar was held and the Assistant Agent brought the *Kharita* addressed to the Maharaja, Tarabai and Mama Sahib. In the durbar he said that the wicked advisers of Tarabai should be expelled and if Tarabai insisted on having her own way then she must be prepared to stay in a tent pitched in Phool Bag and be satisfied with the arrangements made for her maintenance. On hearing this Tarabai was grieved very much and said that she would not leave the palace unless she was removed by force.

⁶ *Azam-ul-Akhbar* dated 6 June 1850 has devoted 7 pages of its issue in giving the certified copy of the proceedings of this Library.

⁷ The Court Martial cases of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Mhow, Peshawar, Trichinopoly, Aurangabad, Jallundur, Dinapur, are reported and they cover the years of 1849—1851.

⁸ 20 December 1849.

On the 21st November, a *Kharita* addressed to the Maharaja was received. It stated that the Maharaja in his State Seal should replace the words "Fidwi-i-Shah Alam" by "Fidwi-i-Shah-i-Inglistan".

It was reported that due to the insolent behaviour of Mama Sahib Tarabai's relations with the State had become very much strained. Tarabai with a few personal attendants left the city and was staying outside the city. As soon as the Assistant Agent, Major Shakespeare arrived from Agra, said the paper, Tarabai's case would be taken up⁹.

Tarabai, disregarding the order of the British Government, had left her palace. Orders had been received that she should stay at Burhanpur. Thus the paper continued reporting the news from Gwalior¹⁰.

LUCKNOW: A description of a hoax which was played on Nawab Wajid Ali Shah of Oudh, covers more than one full page of its issue. When some of the nobles of the Nawab of Oudh found that they were losing the confidence of the Nawab, they employed a queer method to regain his favour. Wahid-ud-Daulah, Razi-ud-Daulah, Tahsin-ud-Daulah and others got secretly constructed a small room and a secret passage to the Nawab's chamber. At night when merry parties were over and Nawab Wajid Ali Shah was left all alone, he used to hear some devilish voices. The Nawab made enquiries about it from his *domes* (professional singers). They said that it was the voice of 'Shah Gin'. The Nawab found this queer phenomenon occurring every night and was greatly worried. One day girding up courage he asked the invisible Gin who he was and what he wanted. The Gin replied that he was the 'Shah Gin' and had come to tender some advice to the Nawab. When asked what he had to say to him, the 'Shah Gin' said that as long as Razi-ud-Daulah, Wahid-ud-Daulah, and Sabit-ud-Daulah were respected the State was safe. The 'Shah Gin' praised the character and integrity of these nobles and threatened Wajid Ali with dire consequences if he spoke to any one about this strange phenomenon. The Nawab, just to appease the 'Shah Gin' used to keep Ashrafi near the wall. Strangely enough they used to disappear and he was surprised to find written on the wall that his *nazrana* was graciously accepted. In all the Nawab offered Ashrafi to the value of Rs. 14,000 to the 'Shah Gin'.

The Nawab began brooding over the mysterious happenings and dared not divulge the activities of 'Shah Gin' to his Prime Minister, Ali Naqi. But shrewd as he was Ali Naqi was informed of the cause

⁹ 27 December 1849.

¹⁰ 17 January 1850.

of the Nawab's brooding by his spies. It was revealed that the four nobles had employed two *domes* and these *domes* had made Sadiq Ali Khan (a servant of the Nawab's establishment) their tool. When the *domes* informed him that Nawab Wajid Ali Shah was alone, Sadiq Ali used to play the role of 'Shah Gin'.

Sadiq Ali when produced before the Nawab confessed everything and said that he had received only Rs. 500 out of Rs. 14,000. The Nawab pardoned him for telling the truth and increased his salary. Then he took action against the culprit nobles¹¹.

The visit of the Maharaja Gaikwad to Bombay—his arrival at 4 O'clock on Saturday the 26th January, 1850 and his reception at the Town Hall, and the arrival of Dalhousie on the 27th January and his durbar on the 28th are reported in the issues of this paper¹².

The paper gives facts and figures about the arms recovered after the fall of the Punjab as detailed¹³.—

Swords	...	2,117
Guns	...	1,535
Spears	...	2,702
Arrows	...	6
Shields	...	28
Bows	...	551
Knives	...	19
Daggers	...	4
Jazal	...	10
Spurious guns	...	121

Besides these, the Government recovered within five months, i.e., from 1st January to 5th April, 1850, 2,821 arms from the suburbs of Jhelum and Rawalpindi. Some more arms were recovered, numbering 10,721. The total number of arms recovered from Pak Patan and Jhelum was 1,40,728. All these were to be melted to make handcuffs¹⁴.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² 7 February 1850.

¹³ 25 July 1850.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

A COURT BULLETIN OF PRINCE JAHANDAR SHAH

G. N. SALETORÉ

Central Record Office, Allahabad

RECENTLY an interesting Persian document was acquired by the U.P. Regional Records Survey Committee from an old mohalla of Lucknow¹. Long neglected, the 14 sheets of this *Tomar* were perishing at the touch. But on accessioning, the document has been duly renovated.

The opening title of this fragmentary document is "*Akhbar Deorhi Nawab Asafud-Daulah Bahadur*" (i.e. Court Bulletin or News-sheet of the portals of Nawab Asafud-Daulah²). The narratives appertaining to the above are contained in 3 entries (nos. 1, 29 and 30), while entry no. 28 is about Prince Jahandar Shah. In all these, conspicuous mention is made especially of Asafud-Daulah's audience with Jahandar Shah, the presentations which he made and the pastimes which he offered to the Prince at Lucknow and elsewhere. But the central figure of the news reports is Prince Jahandar Shah himself. Moreover there are 3 entries (nos. 2, 31 and 44) exclusively devoted to the Imperial Court (*Darbar-i-mualla*). Then again there are various items of news relating to other persons. The above-mentioned are called '*Akhbars*'. All these reports were doubtless of a general interest to Asafud-Daulah, although he had nothing to do with most of the events. But to Prince Jahandar Shah, the dealings in his father's dominions were certainly of special concern. The practice of maintaining news reporters in the camps of the absent Mughal Princes was also in vogue. In view of this, it is possible that this document is a Court Bulletin of Prince Jahandar Shah, rather than that of Asafud-Daulah.

¹ No. 182 of 1951-1952. The following abbreviations are used—*Calendar of Persian Correspondence*—C. P. C.; *Historical papers relating to Mahadaji Sindhia* (ed. G. S. Sardesai, 1937)—H. P. M. S.; *Poona Residency Correspondence*—P. R. C.

² According to Sir J. N. Sarkar the news-sheets changed their character from 1750 onwards, first by giving detailed accounts and selected news; and secondly, by combining in one report the news of several days. They also changed their name being no longer called *Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-mualla*, but simply *Akhbar*, *Sawanih*, *Parcha-i-akhtar* or *Ahwal-i-taza*. See *Historical records relating to Northern India 1700-1817*, in I. H. R. C. Progs. VII, pp. 29-30. For an office called the *Deorhi* in some North Indian States see also Sri D. K. Kaul's illuminating article in I. H. R. C. Progs. II, p. 34. But it is not known if the Nawabs of Oudh had such an office.

In all there are 55 "selected" entries relating to Asafud-Daulah, Prince Jahandar Shah, the Imperial Court, Mahadaji Shinde, Ambaji Ingle, Najaf Quli Khan, Afrasiab Khan's army, Nawazish Ali Khan, Faizullah Khan, Raja Jagan Nath, Maharaja Surat Singh, Ghulam Qadir Khan, Bala Rao, Eltimas Ali Khan, Sikh invasions and the affairs of Akbarabad, Allahabad, Benares, Etawah, Farrukhabad, Muradabad, Shahjahanpur, etc.

The available dates range from 27 Muharram A.H. 1199 (Friday 10 December, 1784) to 30 Jamadal 1, A.H. 1199 (Sunday 10 April, 1785), with a date in May the details of which are lost.

Mention is made (entry nos. 1, 28 to 30) of Khud-ba Daulat and Mursidzada-i-Afaq. The courtiers (e.g. Fazl Asim, Raja Jhau Lal, Hasan Riza Khan etc.) and localities of Lucknow (entry no. 30), as well as the distinguishing appellation of the Ms. indicate that this Khud-ba Daulat is to be identified with Nawab Asafud-Daulah Mirza Amani. Again, Mursidzada-i-Afaq interchanged his turban and coat with Khud-ba Daulat. As will be seen presently, Prince Jahandar Shah also exchanged turbans with Asafud-Daulah and reported the incident to his sister, Bahu Begum, at Delhi. This establishes the identity of Mursidzada with Shahzada Jawan Bakht Jahandar Shah, who resided in Lucknow from May 1784 till July 1785 (and a little later)³.

A few items arranged subjectwise are reproduced below.

ASAFUD-DAULAH

10 December, 1784:—

Khud-ba Daulat woke up. Maulavi Fazl Asim, Raja Jhau Lal and Hasan Riza Khan came to greet. Raja Puranchand forwarded a packet of news. 2 *Gharis*⁴ later Major Palmer with Taffazul Husain Khan arrived and the latter repeatedly offered presents. Then Khud-ba Daulat with Maj. Palmer went to pay respects to Mursidzada-i-Afaq and presented him 21 *Asrafis* and a tray of fruits. "Mursidzada-i-Afaq removed the turban from the head and coat

³ With British connivance, the Prince escaped from Delhi Fort on 14 April, 1784. He was received by Governor Hastings and Asafud-Daulah on 9 May at Mohan (18 miles from Lucknow). The British allotted to him the revenues of the Khalsa mahals of Kara, Korah and Prayag (H. P. M. S.; 310, 318 & 330). However they gave him no military aid, while Mahadaji Shinde desired to provide him with his own guard. In this predicament the Prince sojourned at Lucknow. He visited Salar Masud Ghazi's shrine (Bahraich) on 1 December, joined the Vazir's hunts and enjoyed his hospitality. In July 1785, he was still at Lucknow (H. P. M. S.; 410). After the fall of Aligarh, his relations with Asafud-Daulah became strained and he departed to Benares, where he died on 1 June 1788. See Hoey W.—*History of Asafud-Daulah* (1885 ed) p. 80; Franklin W.—*History of the reign of Shah Aulum* (1798 ed) pp. 154-162; Abdul Ali, A. F. M. *Jahandar Shah Jawan Bakht* in I. H. R. C. Progs. XIV, p. 138 ff.

⁴ Time is reckoned in the Ms. in '*Gharis*' etc. after sunrise and before sunset.

from the shoulders of Khud-ba Daulat and exchanged his used turban and coat with those of Khud-ba Daulat"⁵. 5 *Gharis* later, Khud-ba Daulat attended a feast given by Mirza Haidar Beg Khan, who bowed and presented him with 5 Asrafis as 'Door alms'; 21 Asrafis as 'Seat alms'; 23 chests of clothing; Rs. 5,000 in a jewelled tray and Rs. 500 for *Tassaduk*. Remained there for a long while (specified) and then went to Macchi Bhawan. The bearer of the royal dinner sent by the Khan was presented a shawl and a horse. Dined and had siesta. 6 *Gharis* (evening) visited the tent of Nawab Salar Jang, whose wife presented 2 chests of clothes and 4 Acharis full of Achar and Chutney. Accepting, rode up to Raj Mahal for reviewing the horses. At sunset departed to Macchi Bhawan and the *Mujrais* (dancers and musicians) came out. (No. 1.)

3 February, 1785:—

In the morning Khud-ba Daulat departed after obeisance⁶. Mursidzada refreshed and entered his tent (*Khema*). At 4 *Gharis* (sunset) he visited Khud-ba Daulat's tent and was presented with 11 Asrafis. Entertained by the *Mujrais*, Mursidzada returned to his camp at 6 p.m. Khud-ba Daulat came later with the 'royal tray' for Mursidzada (No. 28).

3 February, 1785:—

As usual Khud-ba Daulat awoke in the morning, bathed, changed dress and took tea⁷. Followed the customary greetings of courtiers (including Salar Jang and Madarud-Daulah). Ismail Beg Khan, *Faujdar* of Gorakhpur, presented one mare, a lion's cub and 5 Asrafis. Raja Jhau Lal confirmed that the Khan had remitted the instalment..... A shawl and an ear-ring were presented to the Khan.

Khud-ba Daulat then called on Mursidzada. Both rode 2 *Kroh*, got refreshed and returned to their tents. In the afternoon Khud-ba Daulat ordered the banks of the Baghera to be illuminated. On Mursidzada's arrival, at 4 *Gharis* to (sunset), Khud-ba Daulat presented him 13 Asrafis. At 6 p.m. Mursidzada departed. Khud-ba

⁵ On 21 Muharram (4 December, 1784) Prince Jahandar Shan wrote to the Governor General enclosing two letters of his mother Taj Mahal Begum. In these letters Taj Mahal Begum informed him that she "was much pleased to learn from his letter addressed to his sister, Bahu Begum, that he has changed turbans with Nawab Asafud-Daulah, and that he has awarded *Khilats* and shawls to the Nawab's men" (C. P. C. VI, 1519). This reveals that the incident occurred before 4 December 1784, when the prince was encamped at Fatehpur and was thus incorporated later in the entry under the date 10 December.

⁶ Asafud-Daulah undertook annually two regular tours. One, after the rains and in extreme cold, to Almora or Butwal; and the second, to Bahraich, for about 6 weeks, at the height of the hot season (Hoey, *History of Asafud-Daulah* pp. 45, 48 & 74).

⁷ In one of Asafud-Daulah's tours to Bahraich during 1779-80, Abu Tarlib elates the following "As the Wazir indulges in opium, he sleeps until very late in the morning; and then eats breakfast and starts on his march after a full watch of the day has passed" (Hoey, *op. cit.* p. 48).

Daulat ordered the vanguard to march 5 *Kroh* towards Fyzabad, permitting the beating of the drum (No. 29).

10 March, 1785:—

Got up in the morning and entered the 'Hamam' of Sheesh Mahal. After bath and change of dress, Khud-ba Daulat took *Ab-Chai* (i.e., water and tea or breakfast). The courtiers (named earlier) came. Puranchand submitted a news scroll. Khud-ba Daulat then rode to salute Mursidzada. On the way Haidar Beg Khan and Tikait Ray waited on him, spoke something and left. Then he left with Mursidzada and in his presence presented shawls to Bhawani, Sewak Ram and Murad Khan, *Jamatdar* (s) of the Camel Corps. Attended at noon, along with Mursidzada, a function in the Isaganj gardens. (Here follows the decision of a complaint by the local Banias). Arrangements were completed for Mursidzada's harem. Khud-ba Daulat then bowed and went to Macchi Bhawan. The royal meal was sent to Mursidzada. Khud-ba Daulat also dined, reclined, dressed up in the afternoon and went to Aishbagh. Mursidzada had already arrived. They refreshed themselves in the.....lake. At 3 *Gharis* (sunset) along with the royal party, they reached the Bara Dari of Chowk. Gave Rs. 100.....for pigeons and fighting cocks. At bed time Khud-ba Daulat escorted Mursidzada to the royal camp and himself retired to Macchi Bhawan. The *Mujrais* entertained. He came out (No. 30).

DARBAR-I-MUALLA

6 January, 1785:—

This morning the clerks assembled and rode from village Bisari. Major Browne, *Bakshi* Bird, Rainy (?) and Bird (Jr.) passed. The military arrayed and saluted..... The Emperor entered his tent (time given). Ordered Munawar Ali Khan to the next encampment. Then the *Mujrais* came (for his pastime). Munawar Ali Khan's son Rustom Ali announced (afternoon) Rambagh, 2 *Kroh* from Dekia, as the next stop. (No. 2.)

6 April, 1785:—

To-day the ladies were sent to the city at 1 *Ghari* (sunrise). The Emperor also proceeded riding on an elephant with Bairam Khan, in *Kursi*. En route Raja Deshmukh, Major Browne, *Bakshi* Bird and Bird (Jr) accompanied. Offered them 2 cakes each and they paid respects. 8 *Gharis* (sunrise) the Emperor approached the camp and entered the palace sitting on a *takht*. Dined and went to Aish Mahal. Rustom Ali announced Bhadawar, 2 *Kroh* from Daj (?) and 7 from Sikandra, as the next halt. Entered palace at sunset. At 3 *Gharis* of the night, signed the petition of drum beating, with orders for halting (No. 31).

9 April, 1785:--

To-day the Emperor entered Aish Mahal. Ordered Murad Ali Khan to dispatch the vanguard 2½ *Kroh* away.....The news-letter of Shahjahanabad was put up to him. After perusing it, he said: "Ambaji is coming to this place. What is the matter?" Later (specified) entered the palace and dined. Had siesta. At 5 *Gharis* (sunset) Murad Ali announced that the vanguard was stationed at Aurangabad (?). 3 *Gharis* (sunset), Mahadaji Shinde, Madhav Rao (Gangadhar?), Raja Deshmukh, Rana Khan Bhai, Mirza Rahim Beg etc. were given audience. Mahadaji presented to the Emperor 12 trays of royal robes, 5 swords, 4 shields, 1 Nalki and 1 *Jharledar* Palki and introduced Ladoji. The latter presented 11 Ashrafis to the Emperor and 7 to the Princes. Then the Emperor made a gift of a royal robe of 5 clothings and a bejewelled spear to Ladoji for his services as Fort-Keeper of Akbarabad; a royal robe of 5 clothings and a bejewelled spear to Mian Sarfaraz Khoja Sarai stationed at Akbarabad with 400/500 infantry; and a royal robe of 5 clothings to Rana Khan Bhai.....They all gratefully acknowledged. A royal robe of 7 clothings to Shaikh....., a pearl necklace, a jewelled sword and a spear.....for Mirza Jahandar Shah; a royal robe of 7 clothings, a bejewelled spear, a sword and a *jeegha* (turban) with feather-hold for Nawab Asafud-Daulah Bahadur, Peshwaji and Nizam Ali Khan, were all reserved in the *Tushak Khana* (Royal Store). The Nalki and Palki presented by Peshwaji were given to Mahadaji Shinde. At 1 *Ghari* to sunset Mahadaji departed and the Emperor (*Hazrat*) entered the palace (No. 44). Cf. also No. 45 below.

MAHADAJI SHINDE .

1 January, 1785:—

Last night Khoja Muhammad Sadiq brought the royal seal. He was rewarded with a shawl and an ear-ring. To-day Raja Himmat Bahadur came. They were closeted for 2 *Gharis*. Himmat Bahadur proposed that the late Afrasiab's son should be introduced to the Emperor (*Hazrat*) and awarded a robe of mourning⁸. Started with Himmat Bahadur in the morning (specified time). Encamped at Jewther, (4 *Kroh* from Dekia) at 4 *Gharis* (evening). Wartan Singh Diwan and Rao Macheriwala presented themselves. (Here follows a statement which seems to imply the settlement of pargana paota(?) and terms for the redemption of property worth 8 lakhs) (no. 3).

⁸ Ambaji, Himmat Bahadur, Narayan Das and Ibrahim Beg conferred and decided among other things, that Mahadaji should write a letter of condolence on Afrasiab Khan's assassination (C. P. C. VI, 1494). Himmat Bahadur and Narayan Das represented to Mahadaji about 25 (?) December, that he should send for Khadim Husain Khan, son of the late Afrasiab Khan, and obtain for him a *Khilat* from the Emperor, as also reinstatement in his father's place, and the Niabat be given to Himmat Bahadur. (*ibid*, 1550). They sent for Khadim Husain Khan who left by 21 December and was expected to reach the Emperor's presence shortly (*ibid*, 1 no. 1541).

1 February, 1785:—

Mahadaji Shinde took counsel from (Vi?) Nayak Khare, wakil of the late Zabita Khan and dictated a reply to Ghulam Qadir Khan. Went to the camp of Gulabji Shinde (after-noon) and 1 *Ghari* later entered the tent. Appa Khanderao, promoted Bishan Singh Sitambarwala as a sawar (no. 15).

4 April, 1785:—

Last night Mahadaji Shinde sent to Shujadil Khan the message: "The *Tushak Khana* of Afrasiab Khan is with you." The Khan replied: "Whoever has informed you.....let him be sent to me so that..... then do whatever you deem fit." Then Raja Himmat Bahadur said that he had been to Brindavan. They said Brindavan will also be searched. Thus he (?) was detained. Today Ladoji and Raja Chait Singh Banaraswala took permission to see the fort. Mahadaji bathed and attended office. Shah Habibullah came. Various problems were discussed. Mahadaji entered camp Jaretha, near Sikandra at 1 *Pahar* (sunrise) (no. 32).

9 April, 1785:—

Mahadaji told Nizamud-Din (Shah) that Ambaji was coming from Shahjahanabad on 7 April when facts would be confirmed. As desired Khadim Husain Khan came.....3 *Gharis* (sunset), Mahadaji, accompanied by companions, interviewed the Emperor and presented him trays of robes. The Emperor gave a robe to Ladoji for keeping the fort of Akbarabad and a robe of 4 clothings to Mian Sarfaraz Khoja Sarai commanding an infantry of 400/500. The Fort-Keeper of Aligarh fixed the stipends of 2 platoons encamped in the gardens of Koil-Mirza Rahim Beg's brother (Anwar Beg) was on the way (no. 45).

GHULAM QADIR KHAN

1 April, 1785:—

Ghulam Qadir Khan, *Chobdar* of Ghausgarh.....will start for Rampur tomorrow (from Ghausgarh). He dispatched Tafazzul Khan to Ambaji giving him one shawl and Rs. 2,000 (no. 37).

7 April, 1785:—

Ghulam Qadir Khan went this A.M. to the Royal Threshold, interviewed the Emperor, prayed for him, presented Rs. 100 and obtained in return a turban as *Tabassuk*. Next visited Maulayi Ghulam Rasul and entered the fort. Was shown the petitions of Karam Singh Tribella Shahabadwala, Diwan Singh.....Sikandra-wala and Phag Singh qasba Poorbawala. Read and gave them to Mir Abdullah. Dismissed gunner.....Qutub-Din and appointed instead Baber Singh. A petition for the Royal Presence and a letter to Mahadaji Shinde were dispatched (no. 52).

AFRASIAB KHAN'S ARMY

1 January, 1785:—

Yesterday Narayan Das informed Himmat Bahadur that Patel Saheb was pressing for the treasure..... They said: "You have sent it after informing..... Ali Khan." Then the Sahebzada's mother replied: "I have come here with my son as desired, but not brought the treasure. Send Munshi Bhawani Prasad and Lacchman Das Diwan to Afrasiab Khan's second wife, the daughter of Shujadil Khan, to obtain it. To tell me anything about it is indeed useless....." (no. 4)*.

2 February, 1785:—

Ambaji wrote to Himmat Bahadur that the Mughals are inducing (?)..... Has stayed in Faridabad and sent Rao Pratap Singh (Macheriwala) with other officers. To-day was fixed for the meeting. Himmat Bahadur showed the letter to Patel Saheb. Bajid Khan's artillerymen have revolted¹⁰. Bajid Khan conferred with Narayan Das. 4 Gharis (sunset), the latter paid Rs. 4,000 to him saying that it was sent by Patel Saheb as disbursement to the gunners and everything they desired would be done on deciding Shujadil Khan's case (No. 16).

9 February, 1785:—

Yesterday Haidar Ali Khan sent a message to Khadim Husain Khan's mother that Jahangir Khan had gone to visit the British¹¹..... She informed Patel Saheb as follows: "It is 6 months since you have promised a jagir. Now permit me to go to Fatehpur and sit on the grave of the late Nawab"¹². In reply, the Patel Saheb consoled her. To-day Khadim Husain Khan rode to Shah Habib and presented 1 Asrafi and Rs. 5. He then went to Patel Saheb's camp. The latter seated him by his side and offered him *Ittar* and Pan, after which he gave him leave..... (No. 46.)

NAJAF QULI KHAN

1 February, 1785:—

Yesterday Appaji, Dharmaji Pawar and Imamud-Din, Vakils of Ambaji, Sadiq Beg Khan and Murad Beg Khan interviewed Najaf

* Afrasiab had 3 wives. The eldest was the mother of Khadim Husain Khan a child of 4 (*Chauvarshanchen mula*). When Mahadaji summoned him, his mother escorted. The second wife possessed the forts and Afrasiab's fabulous treasure. Himmat Bahadur and Narayan Das desired to seize the forts and treasure and settle the family on a jagir of 9 lakhs. But this proposition was not acceptable to Shujadil Khan (H. P. M. S., 363 P. R. C. I. 10).

¹⁰ Shujadil Khan had 3 brothers—Bajid Khan, Mehrban Khan and Jahangir Khan (H. P. M. S. nos. 363 & 432).

¹¹ The fort of Ramgarh (named Aligarh by Afrasiab Khan) was under Jahangir Khan and Afrasiab's second wife. They proclaimed thus "2 or 3 times" and then made secret overtures to the British at Anupshahr. (*ibid*, 363 & 373).

¹² Afrasiab Khan was assassinated at Fatehpur (Franklin, *op.cit.*, pp. 129-30).

Quli Khan and presented gifts. They disclosed Mahadaji Shinde's terms for a muafi grant (specified) to be conferred on him if, among other things, he kept himself "ready for the royal duties whole heartedly" and also that Ambaji was his well-wisher. The Khan administered an oath that he would co-operate. He then made a gift of shawls to Appaji, Immamud-Din, Dharmaji Pawar, Thirpat the treasurer etc. He sent to the Vakils Rs. 100 for a feast, informing that he would start on the morrow after the interview. To-day he held secret talks with Jai Sukh Rai and sent him to Ambaji and Nawab Nazir. Ambaji encamped on the other side of Neelamgarh and was expected to approach Sarai Khoja (no. 17).

2 April, 1785:—

To-day Najaf Quli Khan was informed that Ambaji was meeting Gurdit Singh. The Khan visited Ambaji, went to the city (Bakhtawarpur?) and sent Hoshyar Khan and Jai Sukh Rai to bring Gurdit Singh. Gurdit Singh and Rai Singh arrived. A conference took place. Najaf Quli Khan took leave..... (No. 33).

AMBAJI

2 April, 1785:—

To-day the Sikh delegation came and announced that Saheb Singh, Chief of the Sikhs, and "Bohra Guru" are proceeding to Shahjahanabad to visit the Emperor. Then Ambaji sent Darbarimal, and also his own representative Shankar Pandit, to see Thakel Singh. Gurdit Singh proposed that he desired to meet Ambaji. So Ambaji, Rao Macheriwala and Najaf Quli Khan rode away.. Najaf Quli Khan dispatched in advance Jai Sukh Rai and Hoshyar Khan to convey Gurdit Singh. Then Gurdit Singh, Ari Singh and Mehr Singh came from the other side and met in conference (at Bakhtawarpur?). Gurdit Singh presented 4 bows to Ambaji and disclosed the affairs of.....Thakel Singh. Ambaji brought the 3 Sikh sardars to his own camp and said: "Only that will be done, as will please you". Then he presented 8 chests of clothing and 2 horses. But they took one horse and 2 shawls and took leave. Darbari Mal, Ram Dayal (?) and Shankar Pandit returned from Thakel Singh. But the gist of their talks is not known. An agreement was concluded yesterday. The vakils of Thakel Singh took it to Jai Sukh Rai after getting it sealed by Ambaji. The vakils of Thakel Singh and Gurdit Singh were dismissed by Ambaji with 6 shawls¹³ (no. 34).

¹³ For a treaty between Ambaji and the Khalsa Sardars effected by Rao Macheriwala on 31 March, 1785, see C. P. C. VII, 212. The Sikh chiefs were Baghel Singh, Karam Singh, Dulcha Singh, Bhag Singh, Diwan Singh, Gonar Singh etc.

BALA RAO

2 April, 1785:—

Balarao heard that Saheb Singh Ambalawala with 200 horsemen and "Bohra Guru" (of the vicinity of Bara Mula) were visiting the Emperor and staying with Nagar Seth Birbal Kodia. As directed by Ambaji, he sent provisions for a feast to Saheb Singh (no. 35).

AKBARABAD

3 February, 1785:—

Shujadil Khan directed Parmanand contractor to establish in the fort 5 shops (specified) and store in the granaries, Jwar & Bajra worth Rs. 3,000 purchased from villages. Ordered Brij Lal Diwan to issue the fortnightly rations..... The Maratha Commander had reached 12 Kroh from Akbarabad. A *Harkarah* assured the Mewati officers that grain for the 2nd fortnight was being distributed next week and enjoined them to be alert. It was resolved that if any one came from the fort the Imperial Court had all powers. Otherwise there would be no capitulation, without adequate remuneration (No. 18)¹⁴.

3 April, 1785:—

To-day Babu Rao Deshmukh, Mirza Rahim Beg Khan, Raja Chait Singh and Mirza Madoo (Mader?) inspected the fort till 4 *Gharis* (sunset) and then left. Raoji Patel stayed at the *Hawaili* of Bahadurkhan due to indisposition (no. 36).

9 April, 1785:—

Yesterday Raoji Patel had a tent pitched in Qandhari Bagh and entered it to-day. Mirza Jangli proceeded towards Patel Saheb's army. Raoji Patel proposed to Dhan (?) Sukh Rai to repair the damaged fort, as to-day is auspicious. The work has commenced. Bansi Dhar revealed that the gunners were removing the arms out of the fort and collecting them in the Chowk (no. 49).

SIKH INVASIONS

1 January, 1785:—

Manyar Singh, *Kumedan* of Badawa, reported that the Sikh Sardar Dewan Singh moved towards Jasui (6 Kroh from Ghausgarh). 200 Cavalrymen under Sorab Singh, encamped in a field outside Qadirgarh (no. 8).

¹⁴ Akbarabad surrendered on 27 March 1785. The Emperor immediately conferred the *Subahdari* of the Province on Mirza Akbar Shah and the Deputyship on Ladoji Shitole Deshmukh, son-in-law of Mahadaji Shinde. But Mahadaji appointed a relation, Rajji Patel to its Government (P. R. C. I. 12).

1 February, 1785:—

Ghulam Qadir Khan consulted Nawab Afzal Khan on hearing that the Sikhs had reached Qadar (Pargana Mangalore). They intended raiding the interior (No. 19).

2 February, 1785:—

Dolja Singh arrived from the side of Ghausgarh with 5,000 cavalry and infantry and joined the forces of Khamba Singh. They raided Nasirpur north of Ghausgarh (No. 20)¹⁵.

8 April, 1785:—

Sada Singh with 300 horsemen encamped on the other side of Daranagar. Another party emerged at Ghat Shairpur. Rai (?), Moti Ram Gujar and Kunwar Bhaban Singh watched the movements (no. 53).

The Court Bulletin also records bits of information about many other contemporary events. There cannot be any doubt, therefore, of its historical value.

¹⁵ "On 21 February 1785, Dulcha Singh and Rai Singh arrived from the vicinity of Ghausgarh and encamped 4 or 5 miles away from the Sikh army of Baghel Singh and Jassa Singh (C. P. C. ; VII, 41).

SAMBHAJI ANGRIA—A PRETENDER TO THE GADI OF KOLABA

Upendra Nath Sarkar

National Archives of India

SOME AMOUNT of mystery always surrounds the activities of pretenders to thrones and invariably they are harrassed by fate. Such is the story of Sambhaji Angria, son of Mouji, who laid claims to the chiefship of Kolaba ever since the death of his uncle Babu Rao Angria. There are interesting documents in the National Archives of India, New Delhi, which show that systematic efforts were made by Sambhaji to secure for himself the State of Kolaba. His pretension was that he was the only surviving representative of the legitimate branch of the Angria family through his grandfather Yesaji Angria, a son of Kanhoji I, the founder of the dynasty. According to him, Yesaji was the legitimate son of Kanhoji by his second wife "Koumtah Baiee, the daughter of Khusuajee Angria Urjunwallah"¹. He firmly believed that he failed to secure the chiefship mainly through the machinations of Venayak Rao Parushram, Dewanji (Minister) of Kolaba, who persuaded Peshwa Baji Rao II to reinstate Manaji II after Babu Rao's death, for his personal gain. He maintained that the Peshwa set aside his just claims for his personal aggrandisement. Failing to obtain justice from the Peshwa, Sambhaji hoped to get it from the British, who succeeded to the paramount rights after Baji Rao's fall.

He reiterated his claim for the Kolaba *gadi* on every suitable occasion. Sambhaji made several representations to the Bombay Government and to the Governor-General-in-Council to consider his claims.

Manaji, the eldest illegitimate son of Kanhoji I, occupied the *gadi* of Kolaba after the death of Sekhoji, second son of Kanhoji. He died on 23 September 1758 and was succeeded by his natural son Raghuji². Raghuji left two sons Manaji and Kanhoji and a natural son Jaising Rao. Raghuji was succeeded by his eldest son Manaji II³. About 1797/98, Babu Rao with the help of his nephew Daulat Rao Sindhia, attacked and captured Kolaba, and put Manaji and his

brother Kanhoji into prison. Baji Rao under the pressure of Daulat Rao Sindhia had to acquiesce in this usurpation⁴, as he accepted Babu Rao as the Chief of Kolaba. Curiously enough, in justification for his claim to the *gadi*, Sambhaji Angria gave a different interpretation to this incident. In his memorandum, dated 18 September 1840 to the Bombay Government he asserted that, "Manaji Angria, VI succeeded his father Raghoji V. After being in possession of the state a Period of three years and seven months, a war broke out between the Peshwa and Nezam's Government, the former directed the cooperation of Sindhia who was then at Poona. He immediately assented to the Peshwa's orders, on condition that the Peshwa would reinstate the legitimate branch of Kanaji Angria I, the founder of the sovereignty of the state of Colaba. This was agreed to, and notwithstanding that the great changes that took place about this time viz., the death of Maharaj Madhaji Sindia and the prosecution of the war by Dowlutrow Sindia, his successor, the death of the Peshwa Mahadhawarao Narayin, who agreed to the condition of reinstating the legitimate branch of the Colaba Family to that Estate and of the succession of the Peshwa Bajirao Raghunath. Notwithstanding all these changes, the condition agreed to by Madhawrao Narayan Peshwa was confirmed by his successor; and Baboorao Angria No. VII, was put into possession of his ancestral state, which belonged to him as being then the sole legitimate representative of the original founder of that state"⁵. Jaising Rao, the natural brother of Raghuji, gave some opposition to Babu Rao. He attacked Kolaba with a large army and Babu Rao could repulse the attack with the help of the naval force sent by the Bombay Government and the land forces by the Peshwa. In this help Sambhaji saw the moral support of the British authorities for Babu Rao's cause. He said in the same memorandum that "in A.D. 1806, a body of two thousand men was sent by an illegitimate Grandson of Ragoji V to take possession of the estate—they landed and took Alibag, but by the assistance of the British by water, and a land force sent by the Peshwa, this body was reduced and their leader hanged, thus was Baboorao's (No. VII) right and enjoyment, not only respected, but enforced both by the Honorable Company's Government and by the Peshwa"⁶.

⁴. Grant Duff, *A History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II p. 233; Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. III, p. 331; Sen, S. N., A Man of Mystery—Apaji Angria, *Calcutta Review*, November, 1937; *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, p. 369.

⁵. K.W. to Pol. Cons. 14 June 1843, No. 954. This memorandum, was accompanied by a 'Genealogical Table, which is a faithful and true representation of the family' with the following 'Explanations':—

"The Chain Link denotes Legitimate Issue. The dotted Link denotes Illegitimate Issue. The Roman Numbers I, II, III, &c show the Persons who succeeded to the state and retained possession in that successive order. The Roman Letters A, B, C, &c are references shown in the accompanying memorandums." The genealogical table has not been reproduced in the article.

⁶. *Ibid*.

¹. K. W. to Pol. Cons. 14 June 1843, No. 954.

². Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. II, p. 352.

³. Grant Duff, *A History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, p. 233 (Ed. Edwards).

'On Baboorao's death Manajee was restored to his Government by the Peishwah's aid, on which occasion he ceded to that Prince the island of Kennerly 18 of the Do Turafa villages and 2 of his own.'

Babu Rao died in 1814, and Sambhaji hoped to succeed him, but that was not to be. Describing to the Bombay Government how luck betrayed him, Sambhaji said "The lapse of Baboorao Angria VII was no sooner announced to me than I (marked E), repaired to Poona to assert my right to the Inheritance of my fore-father; Whilst prosecuting such right through the means of the Resident the Honorable Mr. Elphinstone, Venayak Pursuram, the Dewan and his father, made overtures, with the Peshwa to relinquish the Island of Kanderi and territory yielding a revenue of Ten thousand Rupees per annum to his Highness, if he would confirm the state of Colaba to Manaji Angria VI—the bribe influenced his highness and he accordingly invested Manaji Angria, now VI and VIII, with the title and possession. I remonstrated with Mr. Elphinstone against this injustice, but he was pleased to state that he could not then interfere that he had made known the circumstances of the case and of my right to succeed to the Colaba state, to the Governor-General of India". This assertion of Sambhaji is substantially corroborated by W. Edwards, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, in his note dated 17 March 1843 on the 'Colaba Affairs'. He remarked "After Baboo Row Angria's death the Peshwa hesitated for some time whether to recognise the Baboo's nephew and heir *Sumbhajee* as chief or to restore *Manajee* the rightful owner to the gudee. The readiness, however, evinced by Manajee to accede to the implied wish of the Peshwa and cede to him the fort of Kannery and its dependent territory in value about 10,000 Rs. per annum, and the refusal of Sumbhajee and his adherents to give up these lands voluntarily determined the Peshwa to recognize the claims of Manajee and he was accordingly installed in the chiefship". Thus Sambhaji lost his real chance to secure the Kolaba *gadi*. Manaji II died in 1818, and was succeeded by his only son Raghuji II. On 15 January 1822, Kasi Bai, the widow of Babu Rao, sent a petition to the Bombay Government for her claims on the Kolaba State but it was negatived on the ground "that the claims of Babooraw's branch of the Angria family having long since been set aside by the Peishwa, the widow of that chief can have no pretensions to the Govt. of Colaba. Indeed, if the claims of that Branch were admitted they would be vested in Babooraw's nephew now in Sindhia's Camp"⁷.

⁷. Pol. Cons. 3 July 1839, No. 26.

⁸. K. W. to Pol. Cons. 14 June 1843, No. 954.

⁹. *Ibid.*

¹⁰. K. W. to Pol. Cons. 14 June 1843, No. 954.

Sambhaji was also not free from other worries. In 1822 a rival claimant appeared on the scene styling himself "Futteh Singh Angria". He claimed to be a son of Babu Rao by Kasi Bai. To Sambhaji's great relief, the Bombay Government refused to have anything to do with that impostor¹¹.

On the death of Raghuji on 22 December 1838 without any legitimate issue, Sambhaji assumed the hereditary title of *Sarkhel* and *Wazarat-Maab*, used the great seal of the State, and asked Venayak Rao to carry on the Government in his name and requested the Bombay Government to recognize his rights¹². Yesodha Bai, the second wife of Raghuji, was at this time expecting a child. As a safeguard against possible fraud at the time of the birth of the child, the Bombay Government posted William Courtney on special duty at Kolaba. Venayak Rao saw real danger in Sambhaji's move and in his letter dated 2 February 1839 appealed to the Bombay Government through Mr. Courtney "to put a stop to his making the use of the seal of the state which he has fabricated and affixed to his letter", and in the same letter informed that "there are now two men of the family of Manajee and Raghojee living whilst Sambhaji is a descendant of an unequal marriage"¹³.

Sambhaji's hopes were, however, frustrated by the birth of a posthumous son to Raghuji, on 29 January 1839, and the infant was recognized as Kanhoji II, the Chief of Kolaba. On the death of Kanhoji on 9 April 1840, the Kolaba state again fell vacant and Sambhaji though much advanced in years came forward once again to assert his rights. Raghuji left two natural sons Gunputtee and Chimnaje, who were minors. As a safeguard against all possible exigencies, the Bombay Government deputed on 23 April 1840, I. M. Davies on special duty to Kolaba to look to 'Government Interest'¹⁴.

Sambhaji was destined to have a rough sailing. Kamala Bai, the senior wife of Raghuji, appealed on 8 May 1840 to the Bombay Government through Mr. Davies seeking permission for an adoption from among the illegitimate members of the family 'according to the usages of former times'¹⁵. She wrote 'although unfortunate in legitimate male issue, there are no less than thirteen (13) male descendants now living, lineal heirs of the body (not by the female line) of the first Manajee Angria.'¹⁶

¹¹. Pol. Cons. 31 August 1840, No. 11.


¹². Pol. Cons. 3 July 1839, No. 26.

¹³. Pol. Cons. 3 July 1839, No. 26.

¹⁴. Pol. Cons. 31 August 1840, No. 11.

¹⁵. *Ibid.*

¹⁶. *Ibid.*



As soon as this news reached Sambhaji, he lodged a strong protest with the Bombay Government against the proposed adoption 'without any kind of investigation' and requested that the 'Estate may remain under sequestration'. It was also reported that 'he has a son to succeed him'¹⁷. In his memorial dated 18 September 1840 to the Bombay Government, Sambhaji appealed that the Dewanji "actually supported the Interests of the Illegitimate branch.....and possessed himself of all the records &ca. of the legitimate line on the death of Baboorow Angria VII, and from the absence of these, I am unable to bring any documentary record forward. It is not to the Interests of the present Dewanjee that I should succeed..... Between father and son they have held Management of the Santhan a Period of upwards of forty years"¹⁸. His brother Sekhoji died in 1839. In his letter dated 28 April 1840 to the Bombay Government, Sambhaji refused to abide by the decision of that Government dated 19 February 1839, intimating that he had 'no pretension to the Government of Colaba—the claims of Baboorow's branch of the Angria family having been long since set aside by the Peshwa' and asserted that after Kanhoji's death 'there is no heir to the Colaba State other than myself'¹⁹. Sambhaji's activities created a lot of uneasiness for the Dewanji. It is intriguing to find an entry as 'Hush-money to Sumbhaje Angria (upon Manajee's accession).....Rs. 30,000'²⁰. Shrewd as the Kolaba Minister was, he tried to buy Sambhaji's silence.

In his Minute dated 29 May 1840, I. R. Carnac, Governor of Bombay, forwarded his case to the Government of India with the remarks "that we consider Sumbhojee's claims to be inadmissible, not only because they were set aside by the Ex-Peshwa but also because he is an illegitimate member of Angria's family, more remote than the children of the late chief's father"²¹. The Bombay Government came to this conclusion after mature deliberations and a proper scrutiny of his case. They gave much weight to the genealogical table²² which accompanied the report on Kolaba dated 17 January 1839 by Courtney, and they were also guided by the views of such authorities on Maratha history as Grant Duff²³.

¹⁷. Pol. Cons. 31 August 1840, No. 12.

¹⁸. K. W. to Pol. Cons. 14 June 1843, No. 954.

¹⁹. Pol. Cons. 31 August 1840, No. 11.

²⁰. Pol. Cons. 31 August 1840, No. 12 (Entry No. 6 in the 'Abstract of the expenses incurred in the State of Colaba from the death of Baboorao Angria & accession of Munajee Angria down to the present time (Appendix No. 6) submitted by I. M. Davies, dated 28 May 1840 to L. R. Reid, Chief Secretary to Bombay Government).

²¹. Pol. Cons. 31 August 1840, No. 11.

²². Pol. Cons. 3 July 1839, Nos. 25-27.

²³. K. W. to Pol. Cons. 14 June 1843, No. 954. Grant Duff : Vol. I p. 386; see also Sarkar, J. N. "Note on the Genealogy of the Angrias", *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XXVII. No. 2, June 1951.

Sambhaji also tried without success to press his demands through the British Residents at Gwalior. In spite of so many refusals from the Bombay Government Sambhaji did not lose heart and finally appealed to Lord Auckland on 15 July 1840. In this appeal, Sambhaji protested against the efforts of 'the widow mother of the late Kanoji Angria to secure to herself or to the illegitimate Branch (in opposition to the right of the lawful heir) the possession of the musnud'. He also reiterated that 'he has not sprung from an illegitimate Branch of the Family of the first Canojee Angria as has been wrongly and falsely shewn in the genealogical table of the Angria family', and expressed his mortification 'in the event of the late Raghujee Angray being allowed to adopt an illegitimate son, whilst a proper heir to the state as Sambhaje Angray who has descended from legitimate family is surviving'²⁴. Courtney in the 2nd paragraph of his letter dated 17 January 1839 reported that Yesaji was an illegitimate son of Kanhoji.

Lord Auckland in his Minute dated 3 August 1840 thus observed. "But Sumbajee is asserted to be of illegitimate descent. His claim was put aside, though perhaps not expressly on this ground, by the Peshwa, and he can therefore have no right, supposing the charge of illegitimate origin to be well founded. It seems nevertheless that in 1838, Colonel Sutherland was of opinion that the claim of this person had more substance than the Bombay Government was disposed to admit.—We have no evidence but the assertion of Sumbajee himself that his descent was legitimate, but the reverse is assumed so much as a matter of notoriety in the papers before us, that though we may refer to former correspondence upon the subject, and might attempt, if necessary to obtain further information, I would, for the present, abide by the former decision upon the case of this claimant"²⁵.

In the Political Department letter No. 617 dated Agra 18 April 1843, Sambhaji was informed "that the Governor-General cannot recognise the claim of Sambhaje Angria to the Colaba State and has accordingly issued orders for its resumption and annexation to the British territories"²⁶, although the succession to the Colaba State has not regularly descended from father to son or has been confined to the legitimate line²⁷.

Thus ended the Sambhaji episode in the long drawn Kolaba succession case. Sambhaji's name was not included in the list of pensions provided for the members of the Angria family²⁸.

²⁴ Pol. Cons. 31 August 1840, No. 13.

²⁵ Pol. Cons. 31 August 1840, No. 16.

²⁶ Pol. Cons. 31 August 1840, No. 11.

²⁷ K. W. to Pol. Cons. 14 June 1843, No. 954.

²⁸ Pol. Cons. 23 November 1844, Nos. 148/64.

Though the Bombay Governor I. R. Carnac in his Minute dated, 21 May 1840, considered it 'not to be good policy . to disturb the independence of small Native States around²⁹ us', yet it is evident from the Minutes of Mr. Farish, dated 28 May 1840, and of Mr. Anderson dated 30 May, 1840, members of the Bombay Council, that considerations other than the legitimacy or otherwise of the members of the Angria family weighed heavily with the Bombay Government in shaping their policy towards the Kolaba State. Its proximity to the Bombay harbour 'independently of its Revenue amounting to about four lacs of Rupees per annum'³⁰ decided the issue.

WARREN HASTINGS AND CHAPMAN'S MISSION TO THE EASTERN SEAS (1778)

S. K. SAXENA

National Archives of India

BY THE latter half of the eighteenth century the British were not only well established in India but were also the principal European power trading with Canton, in South China. The articles of commerce with China were woollens and lead from England¹, broad cloth from Madras, raw cotton from Bombay, opium from Bengal and the produce of the Spice Islands in the southern seas in exchange for tea, silk and cotton cloth (*nankeens* were then an article of export from China to the West), the adverse balance being liquidated by silver² payments secured either from India or England or private British firms who gave silver derived from their trade in Asia to supercargoes at Canton taking in return bills drawn by the latter in their favour on the Court of Directors in London.

Thus the problem of a one-sided commerce which had troubled previous generations in relation to India now arose with regard to China. In order to obviate these cash transfers, the East India Company resolved in 1773 to build up an export trade in opium³ to the Eastern Islands and China. Opium had been for centuries cultivated at Patna and Benares. When those provinces passed into British hands in the eighteenth century, the cultivation of this drug was steadily increased and a monopoly created by forcing growers to sell the entire crop to the Company. At first the Company's ships carried it, but they soon abandoned the practice, because, the drug being contraband, they feared that their normal trading rights in China might be affected. Moreover, the conditions under which the British carried on trade with China were far from satisfactory. A way therefore had to be found of selling opium in China which would give the authorities no cause of complaint against the Company. There existed British agencies⁴ competent and willing to

¹. In December 1778, the Company proposed to export to China the cargo consisting of "Broad Cloth 730 bales, Long Ells 1250 bales of 20 pieces each and 16 bales of camblets and lead 250 tons". National Archives of India, Home Public Letter from Court, 23 December 1778.

². "In the 1780's the average annual value of the silver transported in the company's ships to China was £700,000", Vincent T. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire* (1952), Vol. I, p. 63.

³. J.C. Sinha, *Economic Annals of Bengal*, pp. 189—90.

⁴. British country firms, which included Parsee firms of Bombay and the Captains of the "Country Ships", under licence from the Company, handled trade inside Asia.

assume the whole risk involved in the illicit trade, but the Directors in England desired to secure an intermediary station⁵ between India and China which could be a centre of exchange for the articles of Europe and India with the products of the Eastern Archipelago suitable for the Canton market, and also be "a port of refreshment and repair for the king's, the Company's and the country ships"⁶. But this was not the sole object, there was also a consideration of naval strategy⁷.

The first definite step by the East India Company to acquire the much needed base was taken in 1763 when the Madras Council sent Mr. Kinloch to Achin to endeavour to persuade the Sultan of that independent kingdom to permit the establishment of an English settlement. This mission failed. Then Captain Forrest, who appears to have held a roving commission from the Company and landed at Achin in 1762, revisited it two years later, but he also received short shrift from the Sultan⁸. In 1766, efforts were then made to gain a foothold to the south of the Straits of Sunda, but by about 1770 it was decided that the enterprise was hopeless. The Government of India again turned its attention to the possibility of finding the desired position in the Straits of Malacca. The Company's officials at Bencoolen scouted the idea as preposterous because of the remoteness of the Straits from their settlement, but the Directors instructed the Madras Council in 1771 to despatch a mission to the Court of Achin with a view to obtain permission from the Sultan to establish a factory there. In the meanwhile the Government received a favourable account about Kedah, and, therefore, the Madras Council despatched, in February 1772, two missions, one to Achin and another to Kedah headed respectively by Charles Des Voeux and Edward Monckton, both of whom were young officials of the Company. The Achin venture, like those of 1762 and 1764,

⁵. The most frequently-used route to the factory at Canton lay through the Straits of Malacca, if the course were from India, or Banka, if from Europe. Between Calcutta and Canton, there was not a single British port except the isolated station of Perccelen. Vessels in need of supplies or disabled by storm had to seek shelter either at Malacca or Batavia, the most conveniently situated Dutch ports. Even in times of peace the relations between the two Companies were none too friendly and the charges imposed by the Dutch were ruinously high.

⁶. National Archives of India, Straits Settlement Home O.C., 22 January 1787, No. 11.

⁷. During the days of sailing ships, meteorological conditions to a great extent controlled the Company's policy in founding a harbour in the East. From April to August when South East monsoons prevailed, the ships could safely remain in the Bay of Bengal and carry out repairs but with the setting in of North East monsoons which lasted from October to March, it was dangerous for ships to remain in the Bay. They were forced either to seek shelter at Bombay, involving great expense and at the same time exposing the settlements to enemy's attack or to proceed eastwards and anchor either at Malay or at a Dutch port.

⁸. H.P. Clodd, *Malaya's First British Pioneer*, (London, 1948), p. 2 and Arnold Wright and Thomas Reid, *Malaya Peninsula* (London, 1912), p. 51.

ended in failure⁹, since the agreement signed by the Company with the Sultan had not the backing of the people of the country. In Kedah the failure was due to a different cause, the firm refusal of the Company to become involved in the quarrels of the Malay rulers.

During the next six years little was heard of the project of establishing a new settlement. This period and the six years following it were a very critical era in the history of the Company, and Warren Hastings was busy organizing the Government in India and defending British possessions against foreign and Indian powers. Yet these political and military pre-occupations did not prevent the great administrator from availing himself of every opportunity to open friendly commercial and political intercourse with other Asian nations.

On 12 February 1778, David Killican reported¹⁰ to the Governor General the unexpected arrival in Calcutta of two Cochin-Chinese Mandarins of considerable rank. He explained that in course of a trading voyage from Canton, his ship, the *Rumbold*, had put in at the Bay of Turon on the Annam coast. Here a Jesuit missionary, one Senhor Loureiro, sought for and obtained a passage for himself and the Mandarins to a Cambodian port. Stress of weather, however, had driven the *Rumbold* far to the south and the captain decided to make straight for Calcutta. On the morning after their arrival, the visitors were presented to Warren Hastings, who, with the approval of the Board, agreed to provide the Mandarins "for the credit of the Company.....a house with a suitable establishment"¹¹. In the meanwhile "the novelty of the circumstance" under which they were brought to Calcutta not only "excited the curiosity of the whole settlement" but induced "the French chief of Chandernagore (Governor J. B. Chevalier), sensible of the importance of these people" to make an offer of a vessel for them to return to their country. Hastings, therefore, thought it "both prudent and politic to seize the present occasion" to "frustrate the intrigues" carried on by Chevalier with the Cochin-Chinese Mandarins through Senhor Loureiro, the Jesuit, and also to revive the project of founding a settlement to the eastward by forming "some kind of commercial alliance with the ruling power of that country (Cochin-China), calculated to secure to the English superior privileges to the French or others"¹².

⁹. Frederick Charles Danvers, *Report on the Records of the India Office*, Vol. 1, Pt. I. (London, 1887), p. 76.

¹⁰. Public Cons. 12 February 1778, No. 1.

¹¹. Public Body Sheet, 12 February, 1778.

¹². Public Cons. 30 March 1778, No. 18.

In order to prevent expansion of French influence¹³ in Cochin-China and also to create a good impression about the Company, Hastings planned to send back the Mandarins more honourably than was intended by the merchant owners (Croftes and Killican) on the vessel, *Rumbold*. With this end in view, on 30 March, he laid before the Board a minute which summarised the advantages of a commerce between India and Cochin-China and proposed "that a person be sent, in a public capacity, with the Mandarins, to investigate the real state of their country, its sources for trade, and to discover what connection can be made with it advantageous to Bengal and that he be likewise vested with powers, should he find the state of things answer the expectations formed of them, and agree with the accounts which have been given, to form a treaty of commerce on the part of this Government with that of Cochin-China". The Supreme Council having "no objection to the experiment being made"¹⁴ to forge an intimate connection with Cochin-China, approved the same day the choice of Charles Chapman for the leadership of the proposed mission.

The envoy-designate to the Court of Annam was a young Bengal Civil servant and a son of Colonel Charles Chapman, former Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army. His social position and attachment "to Hastings with an affection that bordered to idolatry", coupled with his official employment as an Assistant in the Persian Translator's Office of the Public Department, perhaps enabled him, on behalf of the Bengal Government, to act as host to the Mandarins during their two months' sojourn in the city. While Chapman was on this service, Croftes and Killican, who had brought the visitors there, had been opening their minds to Chapman, urging the benefits of establishing a trade with Cochin-China and the opportunity which chance had now provided for it. This inculcated in Chapman a keen interest in Cochin-Chinese affairs and he wrote in his

¹³. In those days the British were suffering from Franco-phobia as is illustrated by Hastings' attitude towards the French mission sent to the Court of the Peshwa at Poona in November 1776. "I think it appears proved beyond a doubt that the French Agent there is entrusted with a plan which has for its object the subversion of the British influence in India" observed Hastings, a couple of weeks before the arrival of the Cochin-Chinese Mandarins in Calcutta. As the Supreme Council was entrusted with "the Maintenance of the peace and policy of the Company's settlements in India" he did not like "to remain longer in this state of supineness and indecision" in view of "the extraordinary countenance afforded by the Ministers to the Chevalier St. Lubin, and Mr. Bolts, the former an Agent of the Crown of France, the latter declared Representative of the House of Austria". These agents as he had noticed have been both received with marks of distinction which have been never shewn to our Resident, and have been admitted to secret conferences, the former has even obtained the dangerous grant of a port of trade in the neighbourhood of Bombay and if credit may be given to universal report written engagements have been interchanged between him and the Ministers, the object of which whatever it be, must if attained prove destructive to the trade of the English East India Company". Secret Cons. 26 January 1778 No. 4.

¹⁴. Public Body Sheet, 30 March 1778.

Narrative¹⁵ that "Ever possessed with a spirit of enterprise, and allured by the hopes of distinguishing myself, I declared that I would readily undertake the voyage if the Supreme Council should think it proper to send me in a public capacity" and to that end he approached the members of the Council and the Governor General himself.

On 9 April, the Governor-General-in-Council approved the Secretary's draft instructions¹⁶ based on Hastings' minute of 30 March, and ordered them to be delivered to Charles Chapman. Therein he was informed that the Company's ship, the *Amazon*, was being prepared to take the Mandarins back to Cochin-China.

On 16 April, the mission¹⁸ with the principal Mandarin set sail on the *Amazon*, the other having left earlier on the *Jenny*¹⁹, which was first made ready by Messrs Croftes and Killican to carry them back. They reached Malacca on 29 May and Tringano on 12 June, where the local potentate offered Chapman exclusive trading privileges and permission to establish a factory in return for the Company's support and protection against his enemies. But Chapman declined the offer, due to the port being unsuitable for commerce during the North East monsoons. In company of the *Jenny* which

¹⁵. Charles Chapman on his return from the mission submitted to the Board a graphic report chronicling the political, commercial and strategic state of the country and this report formed a part of the Bengal Home Public Department Proceedings of 4 October 1779. Unfortunately neither the original consultation nor the proceedings of that date are available in the National Archives of India. A copy was, however, sent to the Court of Directors under Bengal Home Public Letter of 14 January, 1780, and is available in the Commonwealth Relations Office, London, *Factory Records, China*, No. 18 (vide William Foster, *A Guide to the India Office Records*, 1600—1858, p. 94) a portion of it was used in Sir George Staunton's book, *An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China* (London, 1797). A copy of the narrative was also supplied by the Board to the Bengal Royal Asiatic Society on 13 April, 1784, at the request of Sir William Jones, but even this manuscript is missing from the Society's archives. For the first time the narrative came in print in 1802 in the *Asiatic Annual Register* of 1801 and subsequently it was published in 1817 in the *Asiatic Journal*, London, Vol. III, pp. 229—31, 322—25, 421—24, 542—45, Vol. IV, pp. 14—18, 121—26, 234—40, 339—43 and also in *The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia*, for May and June 1852, edited by J.R. Logan, Singapore, Vol. VI, pp. 290—320, 349—68.

¹⁶. Public Cons. 9 April 1778, no. 3.

¹⁷. Although Philip Francis had no objection to the mission being sent to Cochin-China he had something to say as usual against Hastings' proposal on the despatch of the *Amazon*:

"I have no objection to the experiments being made and I agree with the Governor in thinking that the civilities we have already shewn to these Mandarines and even our paying the expence of their return might be productive of good effect, but as the *Amazon* is the only armed vessel we have in the river, and as many occasions may possibly arise in which her service may be wanted I am unwilling to send her on this expedition. I think it would be better to make use of the vessel already fitted out by the Gentlemen in whose Ship the Mandarines came hither, and to make them a compensation for the expence of the voyage." (Public Body Sheet 30 March 1778).

¹⁸. The principal companions of Chapman were Writer Bayard, Assistant Surgeon Totty, Captain Macleannan of the *Amazon* and Captain Hutton of the *Jenny*.

¹⁹. Hastings reported that it was "of 120 tons burthen and has no accommodation for passengers" but the *Narrative* puts it between "seventy and eighty burthen".

had reached Malacca earlier, the *Amazon* proceeded on her way to Cochin-China.

The ships arrived at the mouth of the western branch of the Mekong on 25 June, where Chapman found the whole region in the hands of Nguyen Van-Nhac²⁰, the rebel king. The legitimate king had been murdered, and all the friends of the Mandarins who accompanied Chapman from Bengal were either dead or in hiding. This intelligence gave the principal Mandarin²¹ the greatest fright and he tried to dissuade Chapman from landing on enemy occupied territory. Chapman thought that, if he were to avoid every place in possession of the rebels, he was virtually to abandon his commission and return to Calcutta, but he did not wish to leave Cochin-China, almost as totally uninformed as when he left Bengal. On 13 July, he dropped anchor in the Bay of Qui-Nhon and a few days later met Nguyen Van-Nhac, who informed him "that the fame of the English exploits had reached him, and that he had heard they exceeded all other nations in the number of their ships, and excelled in the management of them; but they had made an ill use of the advantage, for he had also been informed that they indiscriminately attacked and plundered whatsoever vessels they met with, that he was very willing to permit the English to trade to his ports" and afterwards asked Chapman on what terms he would agree to assist him with the vessels to fight his enemies. Chapman made it clear that he was not authorized to take part in the disputes that were raging in the country. At a private audience, Nguyen Van-Nhac desired that the Governor General should send him a capable person for instructing his people in the art of war. He explained to Chapman his future designs which were no less than to subdue the kingdom of Cambodia, with the whole peninsula as far as Siam and that part of Cochin-China then in the hands of the Tonquinese. In order to realise his ambition, he wished to obtain the assistance of some English vessels and in return promised a cession of territory. Chapman agreed to refer his conversation to the Governor General and, on 28 July, sailed towards the north.

Reaching the Bay of Turon on 2 August, Chapman dis-embarked at the village of Turon to make enquiries about "the dispute which

²⁰. Nguyen Van-Nhac was the eldest of three brothers Tay-Son, who, as the rival of the Nguyen of Hue from 1771, became the master of Middle and Lower Annam and proclaimed himself Emperor. The word Tay-Son was translated by John Crawford as "mountaineers of the West", the native country of the insurgents being the mountains of the province of Quinhone, lying west of the capital.

²¹. The other died soon after leaving Malacca. His death caused Chapman much disappointment for he was a sensible, steady and well-behaved man and on him Chapman had relied greatly for assistance amongst his countrymen.

had arisen (in 1777) between some of his (Nguyen Van-Nhac's) people and those of an English ship (the *Rumbold*)" and to sell the cargo brought from Bengal but "could not find any body capable of purchasing". On the invitation of the Mandarin, he set out on the 13th for the partially-destroyed city of Faifo and returning on the 15th, sailed on the *Jenny* on the 18th, the *Amazon* being unable to proceed up the river Hue due to the waters being shallow.

At Hue, Chapman had a mixed reception, the Viceroy being favourably disposed in contrast to the Commander-in-Chief's indifference. However, he continued to point out to the Mandarins the advantages which the Company and the Tonquinese could derive if a trade link were established between them. He also supplied them with a list of the *Jenny's* cargo and sold "iron, copper, lead, hardware, glass, Bengal and Madras cloths" on credit, the local practice then being to settle the accounts at the time of departure of the ships.

Here again the mission failed to achieve its object. From the beginning, the Tonquinese looked with suspicion²² on and doubted the sincerity of the mission because they thought that under the guise of commerce, the ultimate aim of the English was to secure political control over the country. The arrival of the *Amazon* at the mouth of the river in September, to land Captain Maclellan who was dangerously ill for the "benefit of a change of air" further appears to have strengthened their doubts. Added to this was the hostility of the Chinese residents who "finding my (Chapman's) views bent on the establishment of a commerce they were afraid would be rather detrimental to (their trade).....represented to the Mandarines that the English were come to deprive them of the country" and even represented Chapman's visit to the burial ground as "a pretence of attending the funeral of Captain Maclellan²³, that I might have an opportunity to examine the country and the gold mines, said to be situate near the place he was interred at" (a distance of seven or eight hours journey into the interior).

Ultimately Chapman and his colleagues were drawn into actual hostilities with the Tonquinese and narrowly escaped having their vessel seized. On the night of 29 November, the *Jenny* succeeded in crossing the bar of the Hue river and rejoined the *Amazon* the next day. Chapman intended to call at Qui-Nhon to see Nguyen Van-Nhac

²². Ong-an-hai, who was the offspring of a Chinese by marriage with a Tonquinese woman, in the course of his conversations with Chapman "took an occasion to abuse the Government he was a member of; and hinted if the English thought it an object, how easy it would be for them to become masters of the country. The hook (proceeds Chapman) was too unskillfully covered for the bait to allure, I utterly and entirely disclaimed any such intention."

²³. He died at Hue on 2 October 1778.

and subsequently to proceed to Donai but the weather then being unfavourable, he gave up all hopes of going to the coast. On 23 December, the *Amazon* went past Pulo Condor and on 1 January 1779, anchored in the Malacca roads, sailed from there on the 8th and arrived²⁴ in Calcutta on 16 February 1779.

On 17 September Chapman submitted to the Governor-General-in-Council a narrative of his transactions in Cochin-China and pointed out that failure²⁵ "did not arise from any misconduct or want of exertion on my part, but from the distracted state of the country, and the total suppression of the party I relied on for support²⁶". Although his experience was far from happy, yet his account is not totally discouraging. He was firmly convinced that once normal conditions were restored Cochin-China, with its abundant resources, could be easily developed into the base for a new policy of expansion of British commerce in the Far East.

Chapman in his narrative points out the commercial, strategic and political advantages which the Company could have over other European nations should they found a settlement in Cochin-China.

Firstly he enumerates the articles of Cochin-Chinese commerce which could be exchanged with those of India and England for the Company's investment in the China trade. He further brings out the restrictions under which the English had to carry on trade at Canton and continues that "It is an opinion latterly grown current that the Chinese are desirous of totally excluding all Europeans from their country.....Were such an event to happen; the want of a settlement to the eastward would be severely felt. The Chinese would export their own commodities, and Java or the Philippines, as the nearest ports, would become the marts for them. As there is no reason to suppose that our inability to procure them from the first hand would hinder their consumption, we must buy them either from the Dutch or from the Spaniards" (which factor would repeat the old difficulties the Company faced in the seventeenth century with

²⁴. Professor Harlow mentions in his book "*Second British Empire*", on p. 100 that "Reaching Calcutta in September, 1779, Chapman reported his ill success to the Supreme Council", presuming the date (17 September, 1779) of submission of the report as the date of Chapman's arrival in Calcutta, whereas on his arrival from Cochin-China, Chapman was for sometime (29 March 1779) in charge of the "records and old papers". Public Cons. 19 April 1779, No. 31.

²⁵. John Barrow, in *A Voyage to Cochin China*, (London 1806) observed that the character of merchant is here (Cochin China), as well as in China, held in very low esteem, and if the government is equally jealous of admitting an indiscriminate introduction of foreigners into its ports..... there is something in a commercial intercourse which is inconsistent with diplomatic agency...(Chapman's) mission.....having called at different ports on the coast of Cochin-China, and traded with different parties then struggling for the government of the country, they were suspected by all of them."

²⁶. Home Public Vol. 41 for 1778-79 containing copies obtained from the India Office, p. 436.

regard to the spice trade.) "A settlement in Cochin-China" he proceeds "will give us a superior advantage to either, both as its situation is nearer, and the Chinese are more accustomed to resort thither; in all event there is reason to suppose it will enable us to procure the commodities of China at a much more reasonable rate than now purchased by our factors at Canton, and certainly on less humiliating terms to the nation. Large colonies of Chinese have from time to time emigrated from the parent country and fixed their abode in different parts of Cochin-China; these have their correspondents in every sea port of the empire; through their means, teas, chinaware and the various other articles, the objects of our commerce with China might be imported in junks to our own settlements, equally good in quality, and cheaper, as the Chinese are exempted from the exorbitant duties levied on foreigners. Some of the best workers might be encouraged to settle in Cochin-China, and under their direction manufactories carried to as great a degree of perfection as in China itself.

"The intercourse between Japan and Cochin-China might be renewed, and we might participate in a trade, for many years monopolized by the Dutch.

"An advantageous trade might be carried on with the Philippine Islands, and Madras and Bengal goods introduced amongst them by means of the junks for the consumption of Spanish America.

"The Siamese and Cambodians, would bring the produce of their respective countries and barter or sell them for such articles as they wanted from Cochin-China. Amongst them it is probable a vent might be found for quantities of Bengal cloths.....

"The demand for opium, already in some measure become a necessary of life to the Chinese, would increase in proportion to the facility of procuring it. The importation of it no longer confined to Canton, but carried by the junks in every sea port in the country, would spread the demand of this drug to the remotest parts of the empire."

He further adds that he had taken advantage of the occasion to inform himself of the production of gold in Cochin-China and had learnt that ore was exceptionally rich and could be obtained without much labour in the mines of the provinces situated at the north of Hue.

From the commercial advantages, he proceeds to emphasize the strategic aspect. A British occupation of the Bay of Turon on the Annam Coast would provide "a secure retreat to our Indiamen in case of their losing their passage to China but from thence we might

also intercept the fleets of any hostile power either going to, or returning from that country", and thus the English would "become formidable neighbours to the Dutch and to the Spaniards, and in the event of a war with either of them, attack with advantage their most valuable settlements. In short all the arguments²⁷ in favour of a settlement at Balambangan may with much more propriety be urged for one in Cochin-China."

Finally, Chapman was strongly in favour of immediate action. He wrote that "should any thing that has been said, appear sufficiently well-grounded to induce the Company to form a settlement in Cochin-China, it may be effected on principle strictly just and at a small expense. Several of the royal family, besides the Mandarins who were in Bengal, with many officers of the late Government urged me to use my endeavours with the Government of Bengal to induce it to afford them assistance, promising a powerful support whenever we should heartily engage in their cause; to restore²⁸ their lawful sovereign to the throne, would be now a measure so popular, that the sincerity of their offers cannot be doubted. To relieve an unhappy people groaning under the weight of the most cruel oppression would be an act worthy the humanity of the British nation. Fifty²⁹ European infantry, half that number of artillery and two hundred sepoys would be sufficient for this and every other purpose...

"While Cochin-China remains in its present distracted state, a favourable opening is presented to the first European nation that may attempt to obtain a footing in the country. Three years ago, the French sent a frigate to Turon Bay, and from the pains taken to be informed of the produce and political state of the country, there is strong reason to conclude some such design was in agitation..... added to the loss of all their settlements in India, will most probably induce them to resume it. If they do not, some other power may adopt the scheme. Should the Company, therefore, entertain a

²⁷. "The objects of which were stated to be, (1) to divert the Chinese trade into this channel, (2) to draw the produce of adjoining countries hither, and (3) to form a port for the introduction of spices, & c., by the Bugis, and for the vent of Indian commodities." Danvers, *Records of the India Office*, p. 103.

²⁸. John Crawford, who visited Cochin-China in 1822, reported "that the bulk of the people were by no means so anxious for the restoration of the legitimate kings..... nor the Government of the Taysons so odious and unpopular. I was, in fact, assured by Chinese merchants with whom I conversed at Hue, and who had lived in the country during the rule of both, that the Taysons governed the country with more equity and moderation than either the present king or his father." John Crawford, *Journal of an Embassy..... to the Court of Siam and Cochin China*, (London, 1828). Here it may be stated that Crawford did not succeed in his mission, though he was able to collect more information of those countries than any other European traveller before him.

²⁹. Governor Chevalier, whose conduct we noted earlier, recommended to his superiors "two hundred Europeans with a good artillery and two hundred to three hundred soldiers". Quoted in C.B. Maybon, *Histoire Naturelle du Pays d'Annam*, p. 180.

design of making an establishment in Cochin-China, no time should be lost in carrying it into execution."

The Supreme Council were "pleased with his conduct in this troublesome and perilous service, and recommend (ed) his narrative of it and the observation which follow(ed) it, as deserving of your (Court of Directors) attention"³⁰ but both Calcutta and London hesitated to carry out his designs in Cochin-China presumably for the following reasons.

If founding a settlement in Cochin-China was primarily for commerce, the Company could not hope to succeed in their objects as the countryside according to Chapman was in a devastated condition and in the grip of civil war. Trade could only develop in those areas where there was settled government and peace prevailed.

To depend upon the local Chinese population in Cochin-China for facilitating the Company's trade with China was out of the question for they were obviously hostile to Chapman fearing that the Company's influence in the settlement would ruin their means of livelihood.

If a settlement in the east were to be established as a counter-balance to the East India Empire of the Dutch and to keep open the Company's trade route to China, an establishment in Cochin-China could serve no useful purpose without a base³¹ in the Straits of Malacca or of Sunda. Geographically, it was situated as disadvantageously as China. In the event of war with the Portuguese or the Dutch, they could still cut the line of communication to those areas as the Dutch were predominantly entrenched in the Straits of Malacca and the Eastern Islands and the Portuguese at Macao and either could intercept the Company's trade with China and Cochin-China.

The Court of Directors did not encourage entanglement in native politics, leading as it did to participation in native wars, for the Company's interests in those regions then were purely commercial. Consequently the Governments of Madras and Bengal, time and again, declined to accept the territorial cessions offered by the unfortunate

³⁰. Public Letter Cour, 14 January, 17 1780, para. 48.

³¹ Chapman's *Narrative* was sent to the Directors under a letter dated 14 January 1780, by the *Ganges* and the *Talbot*, which reached Crookhaven in Ireland on 9 January 1781. The Secret Committee of the Court of Directors might have perused the narrative before they issued "the following urgent and pointed orders" to Hastings for a settlement east of the Bay of Bangal. The orders run thus "But a more considerable object which claims Our attention is a settlement at Acheen, and the Importance of an Establishment at Acheen would be greatly increased by small settlements upon the Nicobar and Andaman Islands. Our present Idea is that a Tract of country be procured from the King of Acheen sufficient to prevent all Erections towards the Sea except our own, that as may be enlarged if we become popular there." Secret Letter from Court dated 8 December 1781, Vol. I, Pt. I, pp. 375-78; Public Cons. 19 January 1784, nos. 3 & 4.

Eastern princes in exchange for protection against their enemies or assistance if they were to conduct aggressive wars. The missions sent to the Malay Peninsula between 1762 and 1772 failed to achieve their objects because the Company declined to conclude offensive and defensive alliances with those potentates. The rebel Annamese King did promise to cede territory for an English factory in Cochin-China but the offer carried with it the price of political alliance for waging aggressive wars at the expense of neighbouring potentates.

Those were the days of experiments and explorations³² and presumably the Bengal Government did not wish to invest money on any doubtful enterprise (establishment of an harbour on the coast of Annam in the Bay of Turon). Moreover they had not abandoned till 1789 the idea of founding a suitable harbour for receiving "the King's, the Company's and the country ships" on the Indian side of the Bay of Bengal³³.

Even if the Bengal Government were to agree to open a settlement in Cochin-China, they were then unable to spare³⁴ men and money on a similar project in 1780, in view of hostilities against France, who in later years supported by Spain and the Netherlands waged war against the British.

It was the force of prevailing circumstances which induced the Bengal Government to send Chapman, whose apparent object was to frustrate the designs of the French in Cochin-China. During the years to come, the Company did try to establish connections with the Annamese, always trying to "permanently exclude the French"³⁵ from Cochin-China, and commerce was definitely a subservient factor in their endeavours for their energies were directed against the Spaniards in the Philippines and the Dutch in the Moluccas. As earlier stated, the Company could no more afford to see the key bases retained by the Dutch in the East in the grasp of the French, who then dominated the Netherlands in Europe.

In short, Chapman's mission was one of a series of experiments carried out by the Company to secure a line of independent bases (to link England, India and China) to guard the sea passage across the Bay of Bengal and through the Straits of Malacca, which operation concluded successfully with the occupation of Penang³⁶ in 1786 and Singapore in 1819.

³². Public Cons. 22 December 1783, No. 2.

³³. Public Cons. 13 January 1789, No. 13.

³⁴. Straits Settlement Home Cons. 27 July 1787, No. 2, Arnold Wright and Thomas H. Reid, *The Malay Peninsula*, p. 60.

³⁵. Secret Cons. 16 June 1804, No. 16.

³⁶. The Sultan of Kedah ceded Penang under the implicit belief that the Company would protect him from the Siamese and other surrounding powers, but the Company repudiated the commitments made by Francis Light with the Sultan, taking advantage of Pitt's India Act of 1784. To the Company it was an imperial necessity in contrast to Cochin-China as the former guarded the entrance to the Straits of Malacca.

A LETTER OF NAWAB NIZAM ALI KHAN ON HOLLAND'S MISSION, 1779

SAYYID MOHIUDDIN

Central Records Office, Hyderabad

THE CENTRAL Records Office, Hyderabad, is a repository of old records of the administration of the State, ranging back to 1719 A.D., preserved in the several *daftars* or offices. Among the records of *Daftar-i-Darul-Insha*, a letter addressed to Mubarizul-Mulk Bahadur¹ by Nawab Nizam Ali Khan has been found. This is written on five sheets of paper, 15"×5", and is dated 12th Jamadi II 1193 A.H. (27 June 1779 A.D.). This communication, written after the arrival of John Holland as an envoy of the Madras Government at the Nizam's court, throws considerable light on the relations that subsisted between the English Company and Hyderabad.

The story of Holland's mission, its failure and the dismissal of Thomas Rumbold, Governor of Madras, on account of the differences between the Supreme Government at Fort William and the Governor and Council of Madras, have been fully narrated in modern works on Hyderabad. The records among the Secret Proceedings of the Fort William Government, now in the National Archives of India, furnish a full account of the mission from the point of view of the English authorities in India. So far hardly any records containing the views of the Nizam on the mission and his relations with the Company have been published. After the agreement which the Madras Government concluded with Basalat Jung in January, 1779, regarding the cession of Guntoor, independently of the Nizam, the latter was naturally suspicious about the intentions of the Company and resented their actions. The letter of which a free translation is given below contains the views of the Nizam pertaining to Holland's mission and the former's apprehension of an outbreak of war with the Company. The letter closes with a proposed plan for the defence of the State.

The contents of the letter are:

"Prior to this, information has already been communicated to you regarding Mr. Holland's visit to our gracious presence; details

1. Nawab Mubarizul-Mulk Bahadur, known as Ibrahim Beg Khan Dhensa, who was first attached to Nawab Wala Jah Bahadur of Madras, came to Hyderabad accompanied by Nawab Ruknud-Daula Bahadur, the Diwan, after the treaty of 1768. The Nizam was graciously pleased to honour him with the titles of Zabita Jarg, Zafarud-Daula, Mubtarizul-Mulk Bahadur and to grant him the districts of Warangal, Khammam and Elgarol, e.c., for the maintenance of troops.

have already been furnished about his supplication and the despatch of a letter to the Governor of Chinnapatan (Madras) to which a reply was being awaited; and that we had promised to write to you as soon as a reply was received. Yesterday, 11th Jamadi II 1193 A.H. (26th June 1779 A.C.) Mr. Holland had the honour of waiting upon us and submitting the letter received in reply from the Governor of Chinnapatan (Madras). Although no replies to the point stressed on Mr. Holland during two or three audiences granted to him, were given, there were one or two paragraphs which relate to the French, as would be apparent from the enclosed copy. When we had ascertained anything about the points referred to in the letter addressed to him, Mr. Holland replied in the negative, except for the request which the Company had made to us for remission of the arrears in respect of Northern Circars then and in future recoverable, as the Company had sustained a loss consequent on the invasion of Phulcherry (Pondicherry) and on account of a fall in the revenues of the territories of Northern Circars, namely Rajahmundry, etc. On hearing this, we were highly agitated. We frankly told him that the Company had, we understand, resolved to violate the terms of the treaty otherwise such a request would not have been made. The terms of the treaty should be referred to: the Company could, under the provisions of the treaty, if any, avail of remission; we would readily grant it. As regards a fall in revenue, the Company should have acquired the districts after thorough examination of pros and cons. As such, the request made for the remission could not be granted as this would be a breach of the treaty. We further stated that no delay should be made in the preparations of war and challenged the Company to come forward to wage war in spite of the rainy season. The sinews of war were not, by the grace of God, lacking. As cordial relations were existing between the parties, we had, in view of the agreement, refrained from taking steps against the Company in spite of instances of violation of the terms of the agreements, such as protection given to Raghonath Rao by the Company. God be thanked that the Company had taken the initiative as we wished. It was not proper to utter words of pride but we were sure that the result of the message sent by the Company would adversely affect them. It should not be presumed that the same result as that had, due to the inexperience of the officers incharge occurred at Tirnamali, would betide. We had since been earnestly praying God to take revenge but we refrained from taking any action keeping in view the agreements between the parties. Since the Company had, on its accord, taken the initiative to commit breach, we were also ready for war without any delay. Hyder Naik had bitter animosity against the Company and was keen on taking revenge with our alliance. Poona Authorities were also determined. But both the parties were hesitating

because the Company had friendly relations with us. Now, as the Company, on their own accord, wished to create a discord and commit a breach of the treaty, let it be so. From their recent movements and behaviour it appeared that the English had lost their sense and were doomed to face misery and indignity in the near future. Although the Governor of Bombay had been actually repulsed by the Poona Forces, they still cherished vain pride in their brains. No matter; there would surely be a fight between us and the English, and the result would depend upon the strength and weakness of the parties. Expressing such sentiments, we asked Mr. Holland if he would depart and place the facts personally or would communicate and obtain the reply from the Governor of Chinnapatan (Madras). Mr. Holland replied that he would write in detail and obtain a reply as directed. Whereupon we told him that no delay should be made as before and that the reply should come in a fortnight, to which Mr. Holland agreed and departed. We are giving a full account of the meeting. As previously indicated in the war plan, Prince A'li Jah Bahadur (May he live long!) was posted to Raghupathipet and Sharfud-daula Bahadur, with other Officers, was stationed in the vicinity of Kodal and Amarabad, and a few thousand *Sair* troops were despatched towards Nalgonda and Devarkonda. But now we feel that Prince A'li Jah Bahadur should remain at Raghupathipet and Sharfud-daula, with officers, under him, i.e. Hashmat Jang Bahadur, Muhammad Salabat Khan Bahadur, Muhammad Bahlul Khan Bahadur, Sarbaland Khan Bahadur, Muhammad Ghouse Khan Bahadur, Chalpathi Rao, Kalyan Rao, and the contingent of Rajah Maharaja Bahadur, Govind Rao and Mukat Rao, should proceed to the Devarkonda and Nalgonda districts and stay there to inspire awe and reverence. For the well being of the State and in view of the expediency of the times, whatever may be considered good should at once be communicated to us in detail. An early reply is awaited. Brook no delay; nothing more to write about."

THE DIPLOMATIC INTRIGUES OF CHEVALIER, GOVERNOR OF CHANDERNAGORE (1767—1778)

S. P. SEN

University of Calcutta

ALTHOUGH the Seven Years' War dealt a severe blow to the French political ambitions in India, hopes for a revival of the lost position persisted for thirty years more and were not finally abandoned till about the end of the 18th century. All through that period numerous diplomatic and military projects for the destruction of the English power in India were submitted to the Ministry in Paris by Frenchmen in India, including Governors and other officials as well as private adventurers in the service of the Indian Princes. One of the most important among them was Jean Baptiste Chevalier, Governor of Chandernagore from 1767 to 1778. Chevalier was a most colourful personality with an unlimited optimism and a blind patriotism which on occasions brought on him ridicule even from his compatriots. He kept himself in constant touch with the Princes of north India and with the French military adventurers scattered all over the sub-continent, intrigued at every Darbar, and never doubted for a moment that it was possible for France even at that late hour to drive the English out of Bengal with the help of some of the Indian Princes. At an earlier period, when the English had not yet become firmly entrenched in Bengal, an energetic man like Chevalier might have done much in furthering French political influence in north India. But unfortunately for him and for his country, he came ten years too late, when the English had already established their firm grip on Bengal, Bihar and Oudh, and France had fallen into a strange state of lethargy in colonial matters as a result of the frustration of her earlier efforts. Under the circumstances all that Chevalier could do was to carry on secret pourparlers with the north Indian Princes for an alliance with France and a combined attack on Bengal, just an alluring mirage, and to write frantic letters to the Government in Paris to send immediate and large-scale military assistance to these shadowy allies,—letters which down to the death of Louis XV did not receive even the scantiest attention in Paris and remained for the most part unanswered. As a consequence Chevalier had to suffer the disappointment of ending his career as a mere intriguer, and although the English in Bengal considered him as their most dangerous enemy,

to his own countrymen he remained a ridiculous figure who put forward fantastic and chimerical projects.

For some time after assuming charge of the French possessions in Bengal Chevalier tried to secure his national interests by a policy of friendly and amicable relations with the English. He was a pleasing and genial host, and his palace at Goreffty, near Chandernagore, was the rendezvous of most of the Calcutta celebrities of the time, including the Governor. For a time the policy of personal contact succeeded, but in 1769 there was a sudden setback and the English grew increasingly jealous of the economic recovery of the French possessions in Bengal. They used their political power in the province to stop all French trade and commerce despite the provisions of the treaty of 1763. When repeated protests to Calcutta failed to secure respect for treaty provisions, Chevalier turned as a last resort to the north Indian Princes and tried to foment an anti-English coalition strengthened by French troops.

A connected account of Chevalier's diplomatic intrigues in the different north Indian Darbars and the policy he wanted France to pursue in order to drive the English out of Bengal may be gathered from the large mass of letters he wrote to the Minister in Paris from 1769 to 1778¹. We may discern three distinct periods in his ideas about French intervention in Indian politics,—the first from 1769 to the installation of Shah Alam on the Imperial throne at Delhi in 1772; the second from 1772 to the broaching of the Tatta project in 1775; and the third from 1775 to 1778, when all diplomatic projects were cut short by the sudden outbreak of war and the prompt capture of Chandernagore by the English. In the first period Chevalier's policy was rather vague and not based on any definite line of action. He thought in a general way that the rapid expansion of English power had so much antagonised the north Indian Princes that it was quite an easy task to combine all of them in a joint attack on Bengal, provided they were assured of French military and naval assistance. In the second period Chevalier's policy took a more definite and concrete shape. He dropped the idea of a number of heterogeneous allies and concentrated on a solid alliance with the Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam, now installed at Delhi. He advocated a policy of strengthening the hands of the Emperor and enabling him to assert his authority over his former vassals, who had assumed virtual independence, by lending him 5,000 French troops and organising a large sepoy force trained and armed in the European fashion. In that case the mere extension of the Emperor's authority would mean an extension of French political influence in north India, and when the opportune moment would come there could

be launched a joint attack on Bengal by land and naval forces. In the third period Chevalier changed his plan to obviate the difficulty of English opposition. The new plan was based on a solid alliance with the Emperor and the cession of the province of Tatta or Sind to the French. The latter were to keep a large garrison in Tatta and lend a small corps of troops to the Emperor. In case of necessity the whole body of French troops stationed in the newly acquired territory could move on to Delhi, effect a junction with the Imperial forces and swoop down on Bengal. The advantage of this plan over the previous one was that since Tatta was situated far away from the English possessions in India the English were not likely to oppose the landing of French troops there with the same vehemence with which they would oppose the sending of 5,000 French troops direct to Delhi. Let us now see in more details the diplomatic projects of Chevalier in their three distinct phases from his own letters to the Minister in Paris.

The first time that Chevalier drew the attention of the French Government to the political situation in north India and held out the prospect of an anti-English coalition was in a letter to the Minister, Duc de Praslin, dated 10th January 1769.² After complaining about the tyranny and constant vexation of the English in Bengal, Chevalier stated that the Nawab was so completely under their control that all the letters he wrote to Murshidabad, the capital of Bengal, were sent to Calcutta where the replies were drafted. But at the same time Chevalier felt that at heart the Nawab was friendly towards the French and was willing to secure their alliance to rid himself of the yoke of the English. "If there remain any credit and authority with him he would soon give us the most convincing proofs of his goodwill. Even the Emperor does not speak of the French except with respect and admiration. He regards them as being destined to be his liberators from captivity, and all the Princes of Indoustan have the same sentiment. There is not one among them who is not ready to employ his forces and his money in our favour as soon as he finds us declare against the English". Chevalier then suggested that if France ever thought of intervention in India, the best means of combining the Indian Princes against the English was to send an expeditionary force to Bengal. "It is at Chatigan that our troops should land; there would be no reason to fear the opposition of the English, who would be sufficiently occupied in defending their frontiers against the Marathas and other Princes who could be induced by us to draw them there and keep them engaged".

² Bibliothèque Nationale, MS. Fr. N. A. 9366, pp.1-9.

In a letter dated 15th March 1769³, Chevalier gave a more detailed plan of operations in Bengal and showed the ease with which allies could be procured against the English. "The Muslim Government at Dacca is without force and is animated by hatred against the English. Therefore, far from offering any resistance it will willingly surrender to us, specially if we take care to declare ourselves as liberators". Once the French had captured Dacca, Chevalier recommended that they should liberate the descendants of Sarfaraz Khan, the old Nawab of Bengal. The house of Sarfaraz Khan was very popular, and although the Princes of the family could not render any material help Chevalier believed that "it would be sufficient to put forward their names, and we shall draw from this phantom all the advantages that we may be in need of. We shall summon the Nawab of Moxoudabad to place himself on our side.....The beginning would be made by proclaiming at Dacca the eldest son of Safrescan, named Aga Baba..... He would then be recognised in all the parts of the province lying to the east of the Ganges.....We would not leave at peace the part lying to the west unless the Nawab of Moxoudabad allies himself with us. From that moment the war would be finished quickly, and we shall suddenly find ourselves having reached our goal.....The Nawab would help us not with forces because he does not have any, but with money, credit and influence..... We can count on Sojadaolah.....who is only waiting for the favourable moment to declare himself on our side.....We can equally count on the deposed Emperor; he does not have any troops, but his name would always be of great weight in facilitating all our intrigues and our policies". Chevalier then referred to the friendly overtures he had received from the Maratha Chief of Berar and Cuttack. "The Chief of the Marathas of Katek, sworn enemies of the English, had made overtures to me in writing and had proposed to leave us half of Bengal or an equivalent annual revenue if I would furnish him men and munitions for the conquest of Bengal. I have eluded the request by honest pretexts".

Writing to the Controller-General of Finance on 24th February 1770⁴, Chevalier reiterated his view that the Princes of India were ready to combine together and join with the French in an attempt to drive the English out of Bengal. "Fear restrains them and none has the courage to be the first to raise the standard of liberty. They content themselves with sighs for the French and desire to see them declare themselves openly in order to rally round their standard at once.....If ever we carry the war to this country we shall find here as many allies as there are Princes".

³ Bibliothèque Nationale, N. A. 9366, pp.10-24.

⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 25-29.

In a letter dated 6th January 1771⁵, addressed to the Minister of Marine, Chevalier again referred to the overtures he had received from the Marathas, Mir Kasim and the Emperor and recommended the despatch of 4,000 troops from the Isle of France to be lent to these Powers. That would enable the French to fight as auxiliaries of the Indian Princes, although legally France and England remained at peace in Europe. The English could not object to this policy as they themselves had followed it in the past. "The Marathas know the superiority of Europeans to their own troops, and for that reason desire to have a certain number of Europeans to oppose the English. As a result Janoji, one of the principal Maratha Princes, with whom I have always been in contact and whose territories border on Bengal has written to me to sound my intentions and to know if I would like to furnish him a corps of seven to eight hundred men with arms and artillery while offering to advance me all the expenses. This request has again been supported by three other Chiefs who command all the forces camped near Delhi, numbering 200,000 cavalry, and I have been assured that the Emperor himself would write to me to persuade me to agree to the request and to join our forces to his by a treaty. He is not unaware of the large number of troops that we have in the Isle of France and seems to have based his expectations on that". To these overtures Chevalier had replied in an evasive manner, but in order to maintain close relations with the Powers for use in future he thought it necessary to send French agents to the various Darbars. Visage, a surgeon by profession and later to enter the service of Shuja-ud-Daulah, was sent to Janoji and was further entrusted with letters for the other Maratha Chiefs as also for Mir Kasim. Another person, Du Jarday, formerly an employee of the French East India Company at Pondicherry, was sent to Delhi in the guise of a Muslim. He was to meet the Emperor and the three Maratha Chiefs there and was to send information regarding their projects.

In the second period, after the restoration of Shah Alam at Delhi, Chevalier's policy took a more definite and concrete shape. An alliance with the Emperor and strengthening his authority by placing a body of French troops at his service became the corner-stone of his diplomacy. An alliance with the Emperor was all the more useful to France since he was supported by the Marathas, the strongest power in India and the only one likely to have the courage to attack the English position in Bengal. So from the beginning of 1772 Chevalier made pressing representation to the Government in Paris to conclude an alliance with the Emperor and send five thousand troops to his assistance. At the same time he also made frantic

⁵ Bibliothèque Nationale, N. A. 9366, pp. 77-104.

efforts to rally round the Emperor all the French military adventurers scattered in different parts of India. While he failed in the case of those who were in the service of Shuja-ud-Daulah and Basalat Jang, he succeeded in persuading Madec to give up the service of the Jat Raja and join the Emperor even at a great personal loss. It is interesting to notice that while in his letters to the Minister Chevalier repeatedly stated that it was the Emperor who was asking for French military assistance, in his letters to Madec persuading him to join the Imperial service he wrote that his main purpose was that once in the confidence of the Emperor Madec could induce him to take in his service a body of French troops⁶.

The first time that Chevalier definitely proposed the sending of French troops to the assistance of the Emperor was in a letter to the Minister dated 30th August 1772⁷. After stating the change in the Indian political situation brought about by the restoration of the Emperor at Delhi with the help of the Marathas, Chevalier wrote that the Emperor had asked him if he could procure a body of 5,000 French troops for his service. The attitude of the Minister was extremely discouraging. He was entirely opposed to giving any provocation to the English by forming alliances with the country Powers. In a letter dated 29th September 1772, Chevalier expressed great surprise and resentment at this attitude and recommended that the best course for the French was to quit India completely rather than show their humiliation and impotence to the country Powers⁸. In spite of the rebuff, however, Chevalier did not remain inactive but pursued his old policy of forming diplomatic alliances with some of the country Powers in the hope of ultimately being able to bring the French Government to his point of view. Through the efforts of his agent at Delhi, Du Jarday, terms of alliance with the Maratha Chief Mahadaji Sindhia were drawn up, which were communicated by Chevalier to the Minister in his letter dated 10th February 1773⁹. The terms in substance were: (1) in case of a war between the French and the English, Sindhia was to declare himself an ally of France; (2) if there arrived a French expeditionary force in India Sindhia would join it with his forces; (3) the Marathas would conduct the French army if it landed on the Orissa or Gujarat coast and would supply free of cost provisions and animals for transport; (4) if the English were driven out of Bengal the Peshwa was to get back all that legitimately belonged to him; (5) the two parties would remain permanently allied; (6) the treaty must be ratified by their respective sovereigns.

⁶ Emile Barbé-Le Nabob René Madec, pp. 61-83.

⁷ Bibliothèque Nationale, N. A. 9366, p. 133.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁹ Bibliothèque Nationale, N. A. 9366, p. 137.

On 28th February 1773, Chevalier wrote a long letter to the Minister, de Boynes, giving details of the political situation at Delhi and the results of his negotiations, and reiterated once more his demand for a body of French troops for the assistance of the Emperor¹⁰. In the next letter, dated 15th April 1773¹¹, Chevalier informed the Minister that he had received an envoy from the Emperor and the Marathas with solicitations to join the common cause. The envoy had also brought the treaty proposed by the Marathas, the terms of which appeared to Chevalier quite advantageous from the French point of view. The French would not be put to any expense for the 5,000 troops to be supplied, and in addition they would be granted complete freedom of trade throughout Hindustan. If they joined the coalition as auxiliaries they might be given possession of Bengal in the same way as the English held it, provided they paid 30 lakhs of rupees annually to the Emperor and 25 lakhs to the Marathas. In short, Chevalier considered the treaty to be a satisfactory basis for effecting a political revolution in north India. But the crux of the difficulty lay, as Chevalier should have understood, in the financial distress of the Emperor; and in a letter dated 3rd October 1773¹², Chevalier complained that while the Emperor repeatedly asked for French troops he made no move at all to advance money for the purpose. The political calculations of Chevalier were totally upset by the sudden outbreak of dissensions at Poona, and in a letter dated 2nd February 1774¹³, he informed the Minister that the Maratha Chiefs had hurriedly returned to their capital, leaving the Emperor alone. Another loss to the French was the death of Janoji, but Chevalier maintained close relations with his successor, Mudaji.

The correspondence of Chevalier became less frequent during 1774-1775, no doubt because of the repeated disappointments he received from the Government in Paris since the first representations he made in 1769 for the despatch of French troops to the assistance of the Indian Princes. In a letter dated 23rd January 1775, Chevalier expressed his regret that the inactivity of the French had allowed the English to gain increasing predominance in the different Darbars, and if things continued like that in a few years time the French would be turned out completely and England would rule over India like a despot. He then proposed that if nothing was going to be done to stop the progress of English power in India it was better for the French to leave India at once without exposing themselves to further humiliation¹⁴.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 138-147.

¹¹ *Ibid*, pp. 148-157.

¹² *Ibid*, pp. 158-166.

¹³ *Ibid*, pp. 192-196.

¹⁴ Bibliothèque Nationale, N. A. 9366, pp. 233-236.

It was towards the end of 1775 that Madec put forward his project for an alliance with the Mughal Emperor on the basis of the cession of the province of Tatta or Sind to France. For the next two and a half years the Tatta project held the attention of the French Government and of other persons who were interested in the matter of restoring French influence in India. There were two reasons for the Tatta project to have received more consideration from the Government than the earlier plan of Chevalier. The first was the change of administration, lethargic de Boynes being succeeded by the more enterprising de Sartine at the Ministry of Marine and Colonies. The second was that the Tatta project was an improvement on Chevalier's earlier plan and was less likely to rouse the susceptibilities of the English since Tatta lay far off from the existing English possessions in India. It is not a little surprising that while making repeated representations to Paris for an alliance with the Emperor and for the despatch of a body of French troops to his assistance, an astute person like Chevalier did not think of a means by which the opposition of the English could be eliminated and conceded to Madec the credit of a project which in essence was the same as his with one important improvement, namely a territorial cession to France in an area lying far off from English possessions. Anyway, although Madec was the originator of the project, it was at once accepted by Chevalier with enthusiasm, and in fact without Chevalier's support Madec's plan would not have received any consideration in France.

The basis of the project was the cession of the province of Tatta to France by the Mughal Emperor in return for a solid alliance. That would give the French an opportunity to maintain a large body of troops in the ceded territory and a small corps in the direct service of the Emperor to help him in establishing his authority over the recalcitrant vassals. When the opportune moment arrived the entire body of French troops maintained in Tatta could be moved on to Delhi, where they would be joined by the Imperial troops and the combined forces could make a sudden attack on Bengal. In order to keep the matter a close secret the Emperor asked Madec to write to the French Government direct without going through the official channel of Chevalier, but Madec realised that he did not have sufficient standing for carrying on negotiations independently. So from the beginning he approached Chevalier for his active support, and in fact it was the representations of Chevalier which were responsible for the serious consideration given to the Tatta project in France. But things moved very slowly, and for the whole of 1776 and the early part of 1777 Chevalier did not receive any response from France. In a letter dated 11th August 72 D.G. Arch.

1776, he urged the immediate necessity of accepting the Tatta proposal and warned the Government that the Emperor was losing courage and patience¹⁵. It was only about the middle of 1777 that Chevalier received the first favourable response from Paris, and in a letter to the Minister dated 31st August, he wrote that as soon as he received definite orders he would send des Blottières on a reconnoitring voyage to Tatta¹⁶. But there was again a prolonged silence. Even as late as 18th February 1778, we find Chevalier regretting in a letter to the Minister the dilatory policy of the Government and warning him that unless steps were taken promptly the French would be totally expelled from the country¹⁷.

The thing was that after long deliberations the French Government decided at the end of 1777 to send out Col. Montigny to India to report on the feasibility of the Tatta project. But by the time he arrived two essential factors for the successful execution of the project were removed: the first by the departure of Madec from north India in 1777 in sore disappointment at the lack of response to his proposal; and the second by the sudden outbreak of war between France and England and the prompt capture of Chandernagore on 10th July 1778. Lt. Col. Dow, who was sent from Calcutta to seize the French settlement, was greatly disappointed at not being able to capture Chevalier, regarded by the English as their most dangerous enemy, who escaped from his house through the help of his wife. Three weeks later, however, Chevalier was arrested at Cuttack and handed over by the Maratha Governor of the place, Raja Ram Pandit, to the English envoy Alexander Elliot, who was then on his way to Nagpur on a special diplomatic mission. It was an irony of fate that Chevalier was betrayed by the agent of an Indian Prince on whom he had counted so much in his diplomatic intrigues. He was later released on parole and permitted to return to Europe¹⁸. Back in France at the end of 1779 Chevalier tried once more to persuade the Government to accept his views about the plan of military operations in India, but by that time he had fallen into political disgrace and lost all credit in Government circles. All his plans regarding diplomatic alliances and military operations in

India were treated with contempt, and in spite of his long experience in India and his intimate knowledge of the Indian political situation he was not even consulted when the French Government decided to send out an expeditionary force under Bussy in 1781¹⁹. One thing that may be said in conclusion about Chevalier is that whatever discredit he might have earned by his unrealistic approach to the Indian political situation, there cannot be any doubt about the sincerity of his patriotic fervour; and therefore the political disgrace into which he fell after his return to France had everything tragic about it.

¹⁹ Bibl. Nat., 9366, pp. 305-309.

¹⁵ Bibliothèque Nationale, N. A. 9366, pp. 275-279.

¹⁶ Archives du Ministère des Colonies, Serie Noire, Vol. 34.

¹⁷ Bibl. Nat., 9366, pp. 289-290.

¹⁸ For the French version of the capture of Chandernagore and flight of Chevalier see the report by Hocquart, commandant of the force at Chandernagore—Bibl. Nat., 9266 pp. 291-300. For the English version see Forrest—*Selections from Letters, Despatches etc.*, Foreign Dept., Govt. of India, Vol. III pp. 639-653.

About the arrest of Chevalier see Elliot's letter to Hastings and the Calcutta Council in *Bengal, Past and Present*, Vol. II, Part II, pp. 412-413; see also Vol. IV for exchange of letters between Chevalier and the Calcutta Council.

NEWSPAPERS AS A SOURCE OF MODERN INDIAN HISTORY

SRI RAM SHARMA

D. A. V. College, Sholapur

NEWSPAPERS in their selection of facts reflect the contemporary taste for news. In their comments on public events they mirror the contemporary public opinion or at least the opinion of their own circle of readers. They are a valuable source of information for public events which they may in some cases be reporting on first hand information gathered by their own staff of reporters.

The earliest newspapers to appear in India were published in English. They were read by the small number of Englishmen stationed in various parts of India as civil or military officers. Newspapers in Indian languages, however, followed in due course. One of the earliest of these was the *Gnan Prakash* of Poona which started publication as a weekly on 12 February 1849. A disastrous fire about thirty years ago destroyed the early records of the paper. Recently I was able to examine a bound volume which includes all the issues for the first and the second year of publication, except one. The first volume runs to 376 pages, the second volume for the year 1850 covers 418 pages of the quarto size. The paper was lithographed at the Gnan Prakash Press, Poona, by Krishnaji Traymbak Ranade.

The two volumes make a very interesting reading supplying useful information about contemporary events at Poona and elsewhere and shedding a good deal of light on matters of contemporary interest. Its references to political events elsewhere in India may not form an original source of information thereon but its accounts of the Second Sikh War or of extinction of the Bhonsla rule in Satara tell us what passed currently as public information about these events. There are several references to the Sikh War scattered in the entire first volume (pages 13, 15, 27, 37, 44, 53, 54, 62, 74, 75, 78, 80, 85, 111, 119, 191, 232). They range in content from a description of the Sikhs to a map of the country to illustrate the events that were taking place and include an account of the trial of Mulraj as well. Reference to Satara first occurs on page 34 in the issue for 12 March where the story is unfolded.

But apart from these references to public events these two issues contain valuable information about other matters. The issue for 5 March gives bazar rates for wheat, rice, gram, millet, sugar, gur, ghee and oil which may make a reader sigh for those good old days when one could buy $3\frac{1}{2}$ seers of ghee or 10 seers of gur for a rupee. It is curious to learn that wheat was cheaper than millet. This information about bazar rates is repeated again in the issue for 30 April 1849 when the price of ghee seems to have gone up to $2\frac{1}{4}$ seers a rupee though gur had become cheaper, 12 seers for a rupee.

On page 92 is reproduced a statement for the years 1844-46 of convictions for various types of crimes in the district of Poona such as one finds even today in the office of the district superintendents of police in the state of Bombay. It provides an interesting commentary on British rule in Maharashtra and is an eloquent testimony to the success which had attended British efforts to preserve law and order. According to the editorial comment the details were published as they were useful in determining what crimes were on the increase. From their study efforts could be made to check such crimes as were becoming more common.

Pages 178 to 183 of the first volume contain a detailed description of contemporary Poona. It starts with a list of administrators, beginning with a judge on the judicial side and mentioning the assistant judge, principal sadar amin, and sadar amin and munsifs at Poona, another sadar amin at Baramati and munsifs in four other towns in the district. The Collector-Magistrate, we are told, had three assistants and a number of mamalatdars and mahalakaris in the district. The district had an engineer. The police was under a Fojdar. Hereditary Maratha officials of nine types are mentioned elsewhere (page 203) including Zakatai-patki, Naikvadi, Petkari, Chaudhri, Chaugula and Tral. Army was stationed in the district in six places including Poona city. Poona had at that time a Government English school, a Christian school, a Sanskrit Pathshala and four Marathi schools. It could boast of two libraries, one in the camp and another 'native' library in the city where it still continues. Poona had one hospital but two churches for the cure of souls.

"Business in Poona is at an end" bewails the writer. There is only one monied-man in the city, Dayaram Atmaram.

"According to the Shruti there are four castes but in Poona they are differentiated in many ways." Forty-four sub-castes of Brahmans are enumerated. Kshatriyas are divided into five classes only. The mercantile community is classified into twenty classes including Madrasis, Khatris, Marwaris and Aggarvals. Komthis figure both as Kshatriyas and Vaishyas. Ninety-three groups of

Shudras are enumerated. Among the non-Hindus, Musalmans, Momons, Vohras, Mughals, Iranis, Kisabs, Christians, Sikhs and the Chinese are also mentioned.

An interesting controversy on the limitations of the British rule to do good to the inhabitants of Maharashtra was carried on without any inhibition. Another debate covering the editorial and correspondence columns took place about the complaints of the students of Sanskrit Pathshala of lack of state patronage. A fruitful topic for discussion was drinking and gambling and their effects on Europeans and Indians. The dismissal of European officers for getting too deeply into debt on account of these two evils usually became a fit occasion for such comments, editorial or otherwise.

It is interesting to read that the publisher was threatened with excommunication for his daring to publish articles—always in correspondence columns—which were not liked by the orthodox. A dialogue between an old man of 'the old times' and a young man of 'new age' (volume II, pages 77 to 80) forms an interesting record of this eternal debate between the two generations. The danger to orthodoxy from English education was voiced in letters to the editor published in the second volume and some very interesting proposals seem to have been made to avert it. Several religious controversies also find reflections in its pages. The celebration of Id in 1849 occasioned friction between Moulvis and some sections of the Muslims of Poona. A voluminous correspondence on Shankaracharya's philosophy also finds a place in the paper.

The paper noted all local postings and transfers as also appointments of public servants in various parts of Maharashtra. It referred to all cases of officials convicted for corruption. Some of the famous, or infamous cases which drew public attention are also mentioned. It makes several references to the attempts being then made to lay down railway lines near Bombay and wrote editorially on the benefits expected therefrom. The outbreak of plague in Poona and Hyderabad finds its place in the chronicle of events. The 'goings on' among the Maratha sardars are mentioned regularly, sometimes with a relish for scandal in high places.

The publisher was also engaged in printing useful literature in Marathi, several such books are advertised for sale in Volume II, Number 25.

I have no desire to lengthen this paper by summarizing the contents of the two volumes. I have referred to their contents in order to illustrate the thesis that much useful information could be secured from this class of material for the study of modern Indian history.

MINTO AND GOA

SHILENDRA K. SINGH

Agra University

THE STORY of the First Earl of Minto's dealings with Goa has never before been told either by the historians of British India or by the authorities on Portuguese India.

Wellesley, scheming always to keep British India in the utmost security against any possible French attack, as early as 1799, persuaded the then Portuguese Viceroy, Francisco Antonio da Veiga Cabral, to garrison Goa with English troops. The feebleness of the Portuguese Government in India and Goa's vicinity to Bombay were strong temptations for the French to attempt to secure it and equally strong reasons for the British to appoint one of their most experienced soldiers in India, Colonel Sir William Clarke, at the head of the British garrison there¹.

On receiving the information of the Treaty of Badajoz, of 6 June 1801, by which Portugal undertook to close her ports against the English², Wellesley in January 1802 decided upon the occupation of Goa³. Due to reasons and circumstances, which lie beyond the scope of this article, the measure was not carried out.

Col. Clarke carried out in Goa the duties both of the British Envoy and the commandant of the English detachment. He was succeeded in this post by Col. Colman. When Colman left, the temporary charge of the political duties was given to Captain Courtland Schuyler, whose military rank was, however, not sufficiently high to entitle him to assume the command of the British troops at Goa. This latter duty fell to Lieut. Col. Alexander Adam. No permanent appointment to the Envoy's post was made because the Government expected Clarke to return from England, when he would be reappointed to his old post. But instead Clarke took up the command of the Mysore subsidiary Force and died there soon after⁴. In the meanwhile Capt. Schuyler continued as officiating Envoy to Goa; and relations between him and Col. Adam were very cordial⁵.

1. Danvers, Frederick Charles, *Portuguese in India*, Vol. II, 1894, pp. 8, 453.

2. *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. IX, p. 72.

3. Martin, M. *Dispatches of Lord Wellesley*, Vol. II, 1836, pp. 615-16.

4. *N. A. I. For. Dept. Sec. and Sep. Br. Proceedings*, 18 July 1808, Governor General's Observations.

5. *For. Dept. Sec. and Sep. Br. Cons.*, 17 June 1808, no 3.

Late in 1807, Napoleon was seeking to perfect his Continental system and finding the Regent of Portugal lukewarm in the matter, occupied the country⁶. News of the expected French attack on Portugal, and the speculation that soon Portugal would lose her independence started trickling into India, *via* Bushire, Bagdad and Turkey, as early as January 1808⁷. On the basis of these rumours, Capt. Schuyler and Colonel Adam decided that the time had come to plan and effect the occupation of Goa and other Portuguese settlements in India. They drew up a very detailed plan for effecting the occupation, and the terms of capitulation to be offered to the Viceroy of Goa; and forwarded it to the Supreme Government⁸. The plan was to surround Goa suddenly and make the Portuguese surrender even before they could be aware of what was going on⁹.

Minto's instructions in reply to this were characteristic. He praised the spirit of public zeal evinced by Messrs. Schuyler and Adam, but remarked that the agitation of the question was 'premature'. The prosecution of any such measure was forbidden in unqualified terms. He was not prepared to allow a British occupation of Goa unless he was convinced of the existence of a definite rupture between Portugal and England. In brief he refused to "delegate the power of deciding a question of such national importance to any subordinate authority whatever". Schuyler was asked to exercise all caution¹⁰.

But now various minor but unpleasant incidents occurred. One Portuguese ship was detained at Colombo and another at Tellicherry. The suspicious sensitiveness of the authorities on both sides increased. The suggestion of Col. Adam, previously approved by the higher authorities, for improved signals communication between the ports of Cobo and Agunda, was now dropped for the time being¹¹.

On 23 April 1808 official orders from the Secret Committee were received at Fort William that Goa was to be occupied by the English troops, because the Prince Regent had closed his ports to English ships. The same mail, however, brought news of the Portuguese Royal Family having left under British protection for Brazil. It was known also that *en route* the Prince Regent had touched at Madeira Island and ordered its being placed under British protection. The orders of the home authorities regarding the occupation of Goa had, however, been passed while they were ignorant of this latter event. Minto, therefore, with his acute legal mind, reasoned that Portugal

6. *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. IX. pp. 301-4.

7. *For. Dept. Sec. and Sep. Br. Cons.*, 22 February 1808, no 6.

8. *Ibid.*, 22 February 1808, nos 6,7,8.

9. *Ibid.*, 22 February 1808, no 7.

10. *Ibid.*, 22 February 1808, no 9.

11. *Ibid.* 25 April 1808, nos 25, 26, 27, 28.

under these conditions could not be considered an enemy, and so, hostile measures against her settlements in India could not be taken. His view was that the departure of the Prince Regent for Brazil was "a striking and memorable event which evinces the determination of the sovereign to withdraw that kingdom from the foreign usurped authority, under the coercion of which the proclamation referred to had been issued, and which appears to me to involve a clear and satisfactory disavowal of that hostile act"¹². He felt that he had no right to occupy Goa but that he ought merely to provide for its adequate defence and security. He felt also that by not being guided by the letter of the Secret Committee's orders he was doing what justice and political wisdom demanded and that by arranging to take Goa under complete protection (not occupation) he was perhaps following the lead given by the Prince Regent himself, who had already placed Madeira Island under British protection.

He wished to make it plain that the British had no intentions of aggrandisement at the expense of the Portuguese, and that the Portuguese structure of local administration would be kept intact. The only thing he wanted to do was to make provision for the effectual defence of the place, and for achieving this end he wished to give untrammelled authority to the Commandant of the British troops in Goa to make any military dispositions for its security. He wished to provide not only against a foreign attack but also against eventual disaffection amongst the Portuguese forces. For the rest the British authority at Goa, *vis a vis* the Portuguese authority, was to remain as before.

Minto presumed the Portuguese Viceroy would have to acquiesce in all these measures if only through a realisation of his greatly inferior force. In what he considered to be an almost impossible probability, that of resistance by the Viceroy, Minto was prepared to authorise forcible occupation of Goa. This arrangement he proposed for all Portuguese settlements in India, Goa, Daman and Diu¹³.

It was not sheer generosity or goodness that prompted Minto to make these arrangements. It was practical politics. He knew that the arrangement he had prescribed "obviates all those embarrassments, difficulties and individual distresses which are the necessary consequences of the cessation of the functions of the actual Government of a foreign possession, and the transfer of its authority to another power in the form of conquest. It obviates also an additional burthen upon the public finances, which in my judgment must be

12. *Ibid.*, 25 April 1808, no 47.

(I have seen the original minute of the Governor General. The whole of it is in the Secretary's handwriting. The portion quoted here, however, is in Minto's own writing. It is a part of additions made by him).

13. *Ibid.*

occasioned, by the occupation of these settlements, of which the revenue is inconsiderable"¹⁴. As the balance between the revenues and expenses of Goa was just 47,270 Xeraphines of Goa currency (Rs. 23,635, one Xeraphine being worth about half a rupee)¹⁵, annexation was hardly worthwhile.

The instructions and dispatches Minto sent on 25 April, to Captain Schuyler, the Bombay Government, the Viceroy of Goa and Rear Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, C.-in-C. of H.M.'s Navy in Indian waters, were based upon these considerations. Schuyler was asked to be respectful to the Viceroy, to excite no suspicions of the British intentions, but in case of a refusal from the Viceroy he was asked to send word to Adam, even before leaving the Viceroy's presence. Adam was, in such a case, to take measures to surround the whole place and to occupy Goa by a *coup de main*. Much, however, was left to the Envoy's discretion¹⁶.

Little did Minto know that the official information regarding Portugal's anti-British proclamations had reached Admiral Pellew at Bombay as early as on 16 April. The Admiral, however, was unaware of the flight of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil and other later events. Neither had he received by then a copy of the Secret Committee's orders for the forcible occupation of Goa. Admiral Pellew lost no time in coming to the conclusion that the Portuguese Settlements in India should be immediately occupied. He was so sure of the rectitude of his decision that he felt it was useless to wait for the Supreme Government's instructions on the point, because, they would, of necessity, be the same as his own decision. He contacted the Bombay Government the same day, putting forth his suggestions and expressing his eagerness to co-operate in the operation of occupying Goa¹⁷. The same day the Governor of Bombay replied, declining to take any initiative in the matter, as he felt that the Supreme Government's instructions to Capt. Schuyler (of which he had cognizance) were positive in forbidding him to take any step regarding Goa, without their prior sanction¹⁸. But Pellew felt it was a grave emergency, and sent on 16 and 17 April respectively, two of His Majesty's larger ships in Bombay—the *Dedaigneuse* (Captain Bastard) and the *Albion* (Captain Ferrier). These were meant to provide for the eventual seizure of

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, 15 August 1808, no 75.

16. *Ibid.*, 25 April 1808, no 50.

17. *Ibid.*, 8 May 1808, no 2.

18. *Ibid.*, no

shipping and commerce in Goa Roads, and for preventing the departure of any ships from there. The Captains were instructed to co-operate with Schuyler in the occupation of Goa ".....under my authority ready to assume the responsibility of the measure as an act of national policy"¹⁹. In his letter to Captain Schuyler he said, in effect, that the Bombay Government had failed to understand the gravity of the situation and rise to the occasion. He expected, however, that Schuyler would feel free to agree with his views, in spite of the Bombay Government's attitude, especially as Schuyler's discretionary powers were solely under the control of the Supreme Government and entirely independent of the Bombay Government. He also expressed himself "perfectly ready to contribute my share of the responsibility upon a juncture so important"²⁰. All this he did in the first flush of excitement. His instructions to Captain Ferrier of the *Albion*, a day later were, however, more cautious and directing him to take no extreme measures, but to do things of a general and unexceptional nature²¹. From his writings and moves on this occasion it is clear that Admiral Pellew was an enthusiastic but impatient person, and sometimes deficient in coherent thinking. Repetitions and ambiguous sentences in his letters abound.

When the news of Pellew's hasty action reached Minto, he was not greatly disturbed. He had already sent his instructions, which we have referred to earlier, to Captain Schuyler. He wished no alteration to be effected in that plan. He was clear in his instructions to his Envoy that even if the task of occupying Goa had been carried out, it was to be undone immediately, and the Governor General's previous instructions carried out without the least variation "in the same manner, as if the occupation of Goa had not taken place"²².

His letter to Pellew had no trace of annoyance or disapprobation but rather commended his zeal in the public service and admired his promptitude. Minto suavely added that the Supreme Government was better informed than he was and so had thought fit to make certain arrangements different to those in which Pellew's actions would have resulted²³. He wrote in this strain partly because Pellew was under the direct orders of the Admiralty, and partly because he had plans regarding Macao which could only be carried out with Pellew's active support and co-operation. Quarrelling with the Admiral would have been both impolitic and fruitless. Minto's Vice-President in Council

19. *Ibid.*, no 5.

20. *Ibid.*, no 7.

21. *Ibid.*, no 6.

22. *Ibid.*, no 12.

23. *Ibid.*, no 13.

and C-in-C of the Company's army in India, Lt. General Sir George Hewett was, however, very irritated. He refused to associate himself with Minto's mild and uncritical letter to Pellew and wrote an official minute of dissent which concluded ".....although in my private opinion the transaction (Pellew's interference) is very censurable, I mean no more by what I have said than to object to the praise lavished on it"²⁴.

By April 25 Pellew received also the Admiralty orders of 11 December 1807²⁵, based on the Secret Committee's orders to the Supreme Government²⁶, to co-operate with the Indian land forces in the operation of occupying Goa. Even now the Admiral knew nothing about the escape of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil, under British protection. So he renewed his demands on the Bombay Government for co-operation in his previously suggested plan. The language he used in this communication was not only strong but also mocking. This letter, he said, was ".....notwithstanding your former indecision"²⁷. The Bombay Government replied that they had finally decided not to act in the matter, without Minto's orders. Their letter had a strength of conviction born out of their knowledge of the escape to Brazil of the Portuguese royal family²⁸.

Captain Schuyler and Colonel Adam, eager from the outset to occupy Goa, yet not daring to flout the Supreme Government's old and most emphatic orders, sent a long list of reasons why the occupation at this time would be advisable and why it would be better not to await the Supreme Government's instructions, and wrote several notes to Bombay Government, begging for their advice and suggestions²⁹. At one time the Bombay Government were unsure of themselves and said that the two officers could make their own decisions, guided by local conditions as much as by the Supreme Government's old instructions³⁰. Schuyler, however, dared not take any decisive step, as he felt bound by the old instructions. He got no clue from the Bombay Government and just awaited fresh and definite instructions from Fort William.

In the meanwhile there was a slight panic in Goa due to the fact that Captain Ferrier had on 21 April stopped a Portuguese ship, the *Robust*, from entering and unloading at Goa. When the Portuguese Viceroy wished Schuyler to interpose, he refused on the ground

24. *Ibid*, no 14.

25. *Ibid*, 16 May 1808, no 12.

26. *Ibid*.

27. *Ibid*, 23 May 1808, no 2.

28. *Ibid*.

29. *Ibid*, nos 19, 20.

30. *Ibid*, 16 May 1808, no 10.

that Ferrier was under the orders of Admiral Pellew and not responsible to Fort William³¹. So the Portuguese Viceroy on 30 April quietly moved a large number of his troops from other places into the island of Goa itself. These were all kept scattered in villages. Schuyler, Ferrier and Adam prepared for the worst and then demanded an explanation from the Viceroy. Seeing the writing on the wall, the Viceroy immediately gave way and ordered withdrawal of his troops to their accustomed stations. At this juncture, though entirely independently of any considerations connected with this affair, Ferrier decided to release the ship *Robust*, on the assurance of the Viceroy that it would not be used to further the French cause³².

Schuyler was very suspicious of the Portuguese authorities at this period—perhaps unnecessarily³³. We cannot, however, blame him for this, as, in state-craft it is a greater mistake to be over-confident than to be over-cautious. He sent alarming reports to Fort William about French officers from Mauritius infiltrating into India *via* Goa, with the connivance and active aid of the Portuguese authorities³⁴. Naturally Minto felt concerned and on 30 May gave Schuyler discretionary powers for the occupation of Goa, in case of an emergency, at the same time reminding him that this was not to be exercised without 'manifest and urgent necessity'³⁵.

The necessity of using this discretionary power never arose, because when on 25 May, Schuyler presented to the Viceroy, Minto's letter of 25 April, suggesting the assumption by British troops of complete responsibility for the protection of Goa, and the grant of necessary concessions, the Viceroy agreed with a remarkably good grace. He was, however, not prepared to sign that he would cede completely, when required by the British power, the civil and military administration of Goa. This, he pleaded, was against the oath he had taken to guard this dominion of his sovereign³⁶. Schuyler and Adam felt that the objection was purely sentimental and that even if he did not agree to this clause formally, it would hardly make any difference, bereft of any means of defending himself as he was. And so they conceded this point to him³⁷. To Marmagom, Fort El Reis, Anjedive Island and all other strategic points British troops were admitted and the Viceroy issued very strong letters to the Governors of Daman and Diu to allow the same arrangements, in those places,

31. *Ibid*, 23 May 1808, nos 4, 6, 8.

32. *Ibid*, 30 May 1808, no 38.

33. *Ibid*, 13 June 1808, no 9.

34. *Ibid*, 30 May 1808, no 39.

35. *Ibid*, no 40.

36. *Ibid*, 4 July 1808, no 16.

37. *Ibid*, 17 June 1808, no 3.

which he had allowed for Goa³⁸. All formalities, expected to be observed between friends, were observed³⁹. The brevet rank of Colonel in the Portuguese army coupled with the command of the Grenadier Battalion was, by proclamation, conferred by the Viceroy on Lt. Col. Adam⁴⁰. He also issued a general proclamation to the people of Portuguese Indies, asking them to help the British in all ways in the task of making Goa secure⁴¹.

The letters of Schuyler, of this period, show that notwithstanding his deep-rooted suspicion of Conde de Sarzedas' (the Viceroy's) character⁴², he was now prepared to acknowledge that in these transactions he had been very co-operative⁴³.

The Supreme Government were naturally pleased; and as a reward for his good work in Goa Schuyler was confirmed as permanent Envoy to Goa. Till now his had only been an officiating charge⁴⁴. To the Viceroy also flattering letters were sent full of praise of his "acknowledged character for wisdom, patriotism and knowledge of the true interests of your country and your august Sovereign"⁴⁵ and telling him that since he was pleased with Schuyler, it had been deemed proper to appoint him their permanent Envoy at Goa⁴⁶.

By now the Secret Committee's instructions revoking their previous orders for the occupation of Goa were also received. Minto had been expecting them and had not acted on the previous instructions at all. The British protection of Goa was thereafter described as 'a combined system of defensive measures'⁴⁷. As in every other place where Minto had his diplomatic officers so also here he wanted full reports on Goa and her affairs, her requirements to perfect security arrangements and such other matters⁴⁸. These were duly submitted to him⁴⁹. The British garrison continued to remain in Goa, with full protective strength till 1815⁵⁰.

Soon after his permanent appointment to Goa, it seems that Schuyler was cured of his short-lived admiration of the Portuguese Viceroy, Conde de Sarzedas. The cause may have been mutual incompatibility as well as the fact that there was authentic information that Sarzedas belonged to a family which had strongly Francophil

leanings. Moreover in Col. Conea, Adjutant General to the Viceroy, Schuyler found a personal devotee of his and an admirer of the British nation. This man naturally was recommended by Schuyler as worthy of mention in Minto's letters home, so that he might get a reward from the Portuguese Prince Regent. In an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and antipathy sometimes molehills can be made into mountains. Schuyler spoke, in his letters to Minto, of the levity and weakness of the Viceroy's conduct and did not hesitate to speak of him as a man of mean abilities and unfit for the situation he holds⁵¹! Minto, in reply, advised Schuyler to be more watchful, but did nothing more⁵².

Thus as time went on things gradually settled down and nothing remarkable happened in Goa, during the rest of Minto's stay in India.

51. N.A.I. For. Dept. Sec. & Sep. Br. O.C. 13 March 1809, no 13. (Refer to the loud protests of Schuyler merely because on receipt of the first news of British successes in Portugal, the Viceroy did not order an immediate Te deum to be sung, but rather wished to await confirmation of the news).

52. *Ibid*, 13 March 1809, no 14.

38. *Ibid*.

39. *Ibid*, 18 July 1808, no 1. (On June 4, 1808 King George III's birthday, the viceroy dined with British Officers and himself got a birthday salute fired).

40. *Ibid*, no 10.

41. *Ibid*, no 2.

42. *Ibid*, 13 June 1808, no 9.

43. *Ibid*, 18 July 1808, no 1.

44. *Ibid*, no 4.

45. *Ibid*, 4 July 1808, no 17.

46. *Ibid*, 18 July 1808, no 5.

47. *Ibid*, 4 July 1808, no 17.

48. *Ibid*, 17 June 1808, no 7.

49. *Ibid*, 15 August 1808, nos 73, 74, 75.

50. Danvers, F. C.; *Portuguese in India*, Vol. II. 1894, p. 454.

AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ASAF-UD-DAULAH OF AWADH AND MUZAFFAR JANG OF FARRUKHABAD, December 27, 1775

A. L. SRIVASTAVA

Agra College, Agra

THE BANGASH Estate with its capital Farrukhabad, was founded in 1714 A.D. by Muhammad Khan Bangash¹, an Afghan of the Kanghazai Karlai clan from Eastern Afghanistan, and named after the Emperor Farrukhsiyar (1713-1719). On the founder's death in 1743 his eldest son Qasim Khan became Nawab of Farrukhabad. Early in 1750 Safdar Jang, Nawab of Awadh and Allahabad and Wazir of the Empire, seized the Estate for himself, leaving the town of Farrukhabad and twelve villages for the maintenance of the Bangash family. The Afghan followers of the family revolted against this outrage, defeated the Wazir on 13 September 1750, and ravaged his provinces of Awadh and Allahabad. But Safdar Jang soon recovered strength and in April 1751 defeated with Maratha and Jat assistance the Bangash and his Ruhela ally, and drove them to the hills of Kumaun. The Wazir was, however, obliged on account of an invasion of the Punjab by Ahmad Shah Abdali of Kabul, to make peace with them in April 1752 by which half of the Farrukhabad Estate, then under Ahmad Khan Bangash, a younger son of Muhammad Khan, was transferred to the Marathas in lieu of Safdar Jang's debt to them, the Wazir keeping a few places for himself and leaving Farrukhabad and a few *parganas* for the maintenance of the Bangash family². Soon after the third battle of Panipat (January 1761) Ahmad Khan Bangash drove away the Marathas and recovered practically the whole of his dominion³. He died on 17 April 1771; and was succeeded by his son Muzaffar Jang who was confirmed as Nawab of Farrukhabad by Emperor Shah Alam II in consideration of a payment of six lakhs of rupees⁴.

Muzaffar Jang was a weak and timid ruler and could not long maintain his independence. Safdar Jang's son Shuja-ud-Daulah

remembering that his father had twice reduced Farrukhabad to submission, compelled Muzaffar Jang in November 1773 by diplomacy and show of force to accept the position of a vassal to Awadh. As Muzaffar Jang was being harassed by the Marathas who were endeavouring to retrieve their position in northern India after their disaster at Panipat, he was not in a position to resist and acquiesced. Shuja-ud-Daulah promised to deliver to him his ancestral territory when he (Shuja) had conquered the Doab from the Marathas, and advanced to him a loan of two lakhs of rupees as a mark of his friendship. His main object was to detach⁵ Muzaffar Jang from his natural allies, the Ruhelas, in his impending campaign against the latter, and he never really wanted to fulfil his promise. After Shuja-ud-Daulah had conquered the Doab, he put off the restoration of Muzaffar Jang's *parganas*⁶ on one pretext or another.

On his accession in January 1775, Asaf-ud-Daulah (1775-1797) decided to follow his ancestral policy towards Farrukhabad and to annex it to Awadh. A letter, dated 21 January 1776, preserved in the Secret Proceedings of Fort William Government now in the National Archives of India, New Delhi, throws fresh light on the relations between him and Muzaffar Jang, and supplements the information furnished by contemporary Persian chronicles, such as, *Siyar-ul-muta'herin*, *Bayan-i-waqia* and *Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi*. This document informs us that Asaf-ud-Daulah demanded the payment of two lakhs lent by his father to Muzaffar Jang, and wanted a *nazrana* besides. Muzaffar had to agree and Manik Ram and a few other men were sent to Farrukhabad at different times to collect the money. Being a timid man Muzaffar Jang allowed these *sazawals* (supervisors) to interfere with his administration, displace his old servants and to oppress his people. As Muzaffar Jang could not protect himself, it became necessary for Asaf-ud-Daulah to send a battalion of his troops to be stationed at Farrukhabad. Even then matters did not improve. Sher Ali, commander of these troops, aided and abetted all sorts of oppressions, and Maharban Khan, a creature of some of Asaf-ud-Daulah's courtiers, placed himself in the position of the sole manager of Muzaffar Jang's affairs. He was entrusted with the latter's seal and used it at his pleasure. He reduced Muzaffar Jang to a cypher and peculated large sums of money on the pretence of paying it to Asaf-ud-Daulah. Maharban Khan was charged with murdering Beni Ram, Mir Yar Ali and twelve other notable persons, in order to free himself from rivals; and he caused confusion and terror in the country⁷.

¹. For Muhammad Khan Bangash's early career see the present writer's "First Two Nawabs of Oudh", pp. 142-143 and also *Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal* (1878), pp. 340-346.

². *First Two Nawabs of Oudh*, p. 189; Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, (2nd ed.), pp. 212-231.

³. *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 232.

⁴. *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II (2nd. ed), p. 407.

⁵. Author's *Shuja-ud-Daulah*. Vol. II, p. 235.

⁶. John Bristow to Bengal Board, 21 January 1776; George Forster, *A Journey*, etc. (1799), p. 168.

⁷. Bristow to Bengal Board, 21 January 1776.

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Asaf-ud-Daulah wanted to dispossess Muzaffar Jang and annex Farrukhabad outright; but on the advice of John Bristow, British Resident at his court, he allowed the government of Farrukhabad to remain in Muzaffar Jang's hands and to post a battalion of his troops for the latter's protection. Accordingly he proceeded to Farrukhabad, and imposed a fresh agreement on Muzaffar Jang by which the latter promised to pay him one and a half lakhs of rupees on account of arrears and four and a half lakhs of rupees annually on account of the subsidy for a battalion of troops to be stationed at Farrukhabad. Rahmat Khan was appointed minister and Sher Ali was arrested and imprisoned to answer for his misdemeanour. Maharban Khan and other officials responsible for the mal-administration were delivered up into the hands of Muzaffar Jang.

An agreement embodying the following terms was drawn up and signed by the parties on 27 December 1775:—

1. Asaf-ud-Daulah "engages that he will in every instance preserve the honour and credit of the Nabob Muzaffar Jang Bahadur and that he will assist the said Nabob with any number of troops which may at any time be necessary for the defence of his territories".
2. Asaf-ud-Daulah promised to post one battalion of sepoys permanently at Farrukhabad for the protection and defence of Muzaffar Jang and that whenever it was necessary for the regulation of the latter's territory that force would march without delay or excuse.
3. He bound himself not to make any further demand on Muzaffar Jang 'on any pretence whatever' except the sum which the latter engaged to pay by this agreement and on account of a 'nazrana'.
4. Asaf-ud-Daulah promised to deliver up Muzaffar Jang's servants and dependents, then in confinement with him, and as for the future, the Bangash Nawab would be master of his servants and dependents.
5. Muzaffar Jang "engages that he will in every instance adhere to the rights of friendship and alliance and that except with the said Nabob and the English Chiefs he will form no connection with any one, nor keep any forces on foot and that he will not unite with any of the Nabob's enemies".
6. Muzaffar Jang further "engages that in consideration of the aid and support of the troops to be stationed in his country by the Nabob Asaf-ud-Daulah he will pay to the said Nabob four and a half lakhs of rupees per annum at the spring and autumn seasons in ten qists agreeable to the annexed list".
7. As far the current (*Fasli*) year, its six months having been passed, Muzaffar Jang would pay two lakhs and seventy thousand rupees in six instalments.

8. Muzaffar Jang bound himself to comply with and execute "whatever *dustaks* and *parwanahs* Nabob Asaf-ud-Daulah shall send into my country".

9. The friends and enemies of the parties were to be common.

A memorandum was attached to the above agreement whereby Muzaffar Jang promised to pay one lakh and a half rupees to Asaf-ud-Daulah on account of 'nazrana' and arrears, etc., in six instalments⁸.

⁸. John Bristow to the Bengal Secret Board, Camp near E'awah, dated 21 January 1776.

RAJAB ALI MANUSCRIPTS IN THE PUNJAB GOVERNMENT RECORD OFFICE

V. S. SURI

The Punjab Government Record Office, Simla

THE PUNJAB Government Record Office which was established at Simla in 1948 has in its custody a large number of valuable historical manuscripts salvaged from the properties of the Muslim evacuees after the partition of the province. The officials of the new Record Office and the members of the State's Regional Records Survey Committee took timely action and saved from destruction valuable collections of historical materials. They undertook a systematic survey of evacuee properties to collect books and manuscripts and as a result of their sustained efforts it was possible to house them properly in the Government Record Office.

In this paper it is proposed to describe some old and unpublished historical manuscripts which formed part of a fairly large collection of Syed Moulvi Rajab Ali of Jagraon, in Ludhiana District. Rajab Ali came from an old and well known Syed family of northern India; his ancestry dated back to Syed Mahmud, a celebrated theologian, who migrated in 1502 A.D. from his home in Multan and attached himself to Sikandar Lodhi of Delhi. Fifty years later, in Akbar's time, the Syed was granted a jagir at Batala to which additions were made later by Emperor Jahangir. During the reign of Muhammad Shah one of the descendants of the family was granted twelve villages in Ludhiana District. They continued to flourish until the beginning of the nineteenth century when Dewan Mul Chand, representative of Maharaja Ranjit Singh at Jullundur, seized the jagir and reduced its holders to poverty.

To Moulvi Rajab Ali belonged the privilege of restoring the fortunes of the family. He started his career in 1826, as a teacher at the Delhi Madrasa on a salary of Rs. 10 p.m. For this post he was especially selected by Joseph Henry Taylor on account of his intellectual attainments. After one year's service at the Madrasa, Rajab Ali moved to the south in search of more lucrative employment. He stayed for a short time at Bharatpur, Akbarabad and Gwalior and was for some time engaged by John Reef Ouseley at Hoshangabad. Thereafter he took up service as *Amin* in Bhopal State. Later he secured a post in the office of the Political Agent at Ambala and soon rose to the position of Head Reader (*Mir Munshi*). In this capacity

he was transferred in 1839, to Ludhiana to serve under Mr. Robinson. Later on he accompanied Henry Lawrence to Lahore where he gained the confidence of the Punjab Chiefs and gentlemen with whom his work brought him into close contact. The late Sir Herbert Edwardes held Rajab Ali in the highest esteem. In 1848 he wrote of him: "I believe his judgment on questions of policy to be valuable and that he has always proved to Sir Henry Lawrence a trust-worthy depository of most secret information. I hope also to be able to testify that the Moulvi, though a '*Sahib-i-Kalam*', is by no means afraid of the gleam of a '*shamshir*'. He behaved with great coolness and bravery in the Cow Riot in Lahore in 1846". This opinion was endorsed by Currie, Clerk, Melvill, Barnes, Montgomery and Temple, all of whom knew the Moulvi well and had ample opportunities of studying his character. Sir Henry Lawrence wrote in 1853: "During the Lahore troubles I hardly know what we should have done without Rajab Ali; and he has ever since been of the greatest use to me in all political arrangements and negotiations". In conferring on him jagir assignments valued at Rs. 2,696 per annum in Aligarh and both Talwandis (Tehsil Jagraon, Ludhiana District), the Governor-General, John Lawrence, remarked in 1868 that it was "in consideration of most valuable services rendered to the state at the time of negotiations with the Ruler of the Panjab to obtain permission for the British Force to cross the Sikh Frontier and proceed to Afghanistan, in the campaigns which led to the annexation of the Panjab and during the siege of Delhi in 1857". During the Mutiny the Moulvi's services were placed at the disposal of the Quarter Master General for the purpose of assisting Hodson at Delhi in organising and working the intelligence service and he was thoroughly successful in the discharge of these important duties. He received a cash reward of Rs. 10,000 in recognition of his services during the siege.

Moulvi Rajab Ali was given the title of Khan Bahadur in 1846 and that of Arastu Jah (Great as Aristotle) in 1858. He died in 1869.

The family library of Rajab Ali at Jagraon was believed to contain some three thousand old and rare manuscripts in Persian and Arabic. Some of the most outstanding original historical materials out of the collection, now available in the State's Record Office, are described below in order to assess their value and importance for the study of the period to which they pertain. Judged from their nature and contents the manuscripts can be classed as:—

I(a) *Darbar Akhbarat (Court Chronicles) of Maharaja Ranjit Singh.*

(i) Vols. I—II, covering the period from the 7th Phagan, 1894 B.E. to 13th Besakh, 1895 B.E. (corresponding to February-April, 1838 A.D.), pp. 1-248; 11. 22; size 10"×6"; written in free *shikasta* style;

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(ii) Vols. III and IV, covering the period from the 17th Besakh to 6th Asuj, 1895 B.E. (corresponding to April-September 1838 A.D.), ff. 1-427; 11. 14-18; size 10"×6"; written in free *shikasta* style.

(b) *Darbar Akhbarat* (Court Chronicles) of Maharaja Sher Singh.

Vols. I—II, covering the period from the 11th Chet to 31st Sawan, 1898 B.E. (corresponding to March-July 1841 A.D.), Vol. I, ff. 1-180; Vol. II, ff. 1-191; 11. 16-18; size 10"×6"; written in free *shikasta* style.

These *Akhbarat* relating in part to the reigns of Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1799-1839) and Maharaja Sher Singh (1841-1843) describe in the form of daily news-letters the activities and events at the courts of the two sovereigns. All the happenings that filled the day of the ruler from daybreak until he retired to his private chambers and all the business transacted and the persons who visited him during the day, their representations and orders thereon, are recorded in minute detail. Though the name of the author is not traceable, the *Akhbarat* were written by a Vakil who was attached to the court of the two rulers and was called upon to report its proceedings. As authentic, contemporary and eye-witness accounts of the events at the Court of Lahore, the historical value of these manuscript sources, untapped and unpublished heretofore, can hardly be overrated. A note in the beginning of one of the volumes in the hand of the great grandson of Moulvi Rajab Ali indicates that the *Akhbarat* were presented to him by the author. It was customary with the principal chiefs or the neighbouring rulers to appoint accredited Vakil (Political Agents) at the Sikh Court through whom detailed reports of the events were obtained by their constituents.

II—*Muraslajat* (or copies of official communications and despatches).

Vol. I, 1839-1843 A.D.; ff. 1-64.

Vol. II, 1847 A.D.; pp. 1-326.

Vol. III, 3rd January—30th December, 1848 A.D.; ff. 1-190.

Size 12"×10.5"; 11-17; written in *shikasta* style; each letter is separated from the other by a straight line.

The *Muraslajat* are collections of copies of official communications addressed to notable chiefs and personages on behalf of the British Government through their agents dealing with political affairs of the North Western regions. The names of the addressees are generally given in the margin and occasionally the subject is also noted along with them. The date and place from where the communication was sent are given at the end. The despatches deal with a variety of subjects on which diplomatic correspondence was carried on between the British government and the Lahore Darbar and its important

functionaries. These documents furnish detailed information about the relations of the East India Company with the notable personages of northern India in general and the Lahore Darbar in particular.

Vol. I (1839-43) contains letters addressed to Maharaja Ranjit Singh and his successors Maharaja Kharak Singh and Maharaja Sher Singh. Besides usual exchanges of felicitations, condolences and profound feelings of goodwill and amity they contain the views of the British Government on certain important matters of common concern to both the governments. A large number of communications relate to the implementation of the Tripartite Treaty and developments in Afghanistan.

Vol. II comprises of letters addressed to various functionaries of the Lahore Darbar, feudatory chiefs and Maharani Jindan, mother of Maharaja Dalip Singh and *Parwanas* issued to *Thanadars* and *Kardars* on sundry administrative subjects. While the bulk of the despatches are in Persian the letters sent to Maharani Jindan are written in Urdu and relate to routine correspondence between the British Resident and the Maharani.

Vol. III, covering the period following the First Anglo-Sikh War (1846) and events leading to Second Sikh War (1848), including the Multan revolt, comprises of letters sent to members of the Regency Council, principal *Sardars*, neighbouring rulers, and a host of functionaries of the Lahore Darbar. There are also in this volume a fairly large number of letters addressed to Maharaja Gulab Singh who was made the ruler of the newly created state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The *Muraslajat* were most probably written in the hand of Moulvi Rajab Ali who was not only *Mir Munshi* to the Political Agent to the Governor-General but also played an important role in the political developments at Lahore. The communications contained in Vols. II and III were issued almost invariably from "Dera Anarkali, Lahore" which had become the headquarters of the British Resident at the seat of the Sikh government after the First Sikh War. The documents are indeed invaluable for the study of Anglo-Sikh relations immediately before the annexation of the Punjab.

III—*Siyahat-i-Kashmir* by Lala Ganeshi Lal, *Tehsildar* of Ludhiana dated April, 1847; ff. 48 (ff. 2-5 missing); ff. 15; size 10"×6"; written in *shikasta* hand.

This volume is a stage-wise record of a journey from Ludhiana to Srinagar and back, undertaken by a party of prominent officers of the East India Company—Charles Stewart Hardinge (eldest son of Sir Henry Hardinge) who was private secretary to his father, Captain Hardwicke Hardinge, the Governor-General's second son, Lord John Elphinstone, Governor of Madras (1837-42) and of Bombay (1853-60),

Doctor James Thomas Walker of Bombay Engineers and of the Punjab Campaigns of 1848-49 and Edward Lake, the Political Assistant at Ludhiana. The author was required by the English officers to accompany them on this historic tour and write in detail about the people and places of interest on the way. The itinerary covered the period from 28th March to 11th June, 1846. The route followed by them was through Philaur, Gantal, Sujanpur, Kathua (the way across the river Ravi in Jammu province), Khanpur, Sambha, Jammu, Nagrota, Udhampur and across Bannihal pass into Kashmir valley. The journey was made over the difficult hilly tracks on horse, elephant or by boat. The trip was in the main a holiday; but it was also intended to attempt a social, political and economic survey of the region. Accordingly the author, a keen observer, has described in considerable detail the resources of the areas traversed by the party. The genealogical tables of the principal ruling houses give a clear picture of the political set-up of the region. In particular comprehensive information is given about the State of Jammu and Kashmir which had shortly before been assigned to Maharaja Gulab Singh. The composition of the population in terms of occupations, the sources of income and the principal articles of export and import are described in minute detail. A list of *Mahals* and *Parganas* into which the State was divided for administrative purposes along with the income under various heads for 1846 is also included.

The manuscript initially meant to be a traveller's guide, actually reads like a gazetteer of Jammu and Kashmir and the neighbouring areas. As a contemporary and eye-witness account of the State, immediately after the transfer of its control to Maharaja Gulab Singh, the record possesses rare historical value. Special interest attaches to the journey in view of the fact that the route followed by the visitors to the Kashmir valley, the only one open to the British before the annexation of the Punjab, is more or less the same as has lately assumed great importance owing to the link up of Kashmir with the Punjab (I) following the political and constitutional changes of 1947.

IV—*Roznamchajat* (or *Diaries*).

Vol. I, 30th October, 1848—6th October, 1853 A.D.

Vol. II, 7th October, 1854—31st July, 1859 A.D.

Vol. IV, 11th June, 1864—13th April, 1869 A.D.

Vol. V, 14th April, 1869—26th May, 1875 A.D.

The *Roznamchajat* are evidently daily records of transactions. On every page the corresponding Hijra and Christian dates as also the days of the week are noted and the particulars about the happenings and doings during each day are recorded against successive dates

The journals appear to have been maintained by a private secretary or manager of the household of Moulvi Rajab Ali. The writer, who has not mentioned his name, was in close personal touch with his master and he kept an account of the activities of the Moulvi, both official and private, such as his meetings with British officers, tours to different places, correspondence carried on with friends and relations and even minor occurrences of indisposition or the application of black dye to his hair. The author has also recorded the business transacted and errands performed by him on behalf of Rajab Ali. These *Roznamchajat*, kept almost continuously for over a quarter of a century, furnish detailed information about the life and work of the Moulvi.

V—*Zabat-ut-Tawarikh* (Tables of corresponding Hijra, Bikrami and Christian dates).

Vol. I, 28th March, 1808—23rd September, 1843.

Vol. II, 24th September, 1843—22nd April, 1854.

The tables seem to have been drawn as ready reckoners of the corresponding dates of the three calendars which were in vogue during this period in northern India. The importance of the '*Jantries*' as a handy aid for finding the day of the week, month and year of the respective eras is too obvious for those who had to conduct correspondence with different parties resorting to one or other calendar. But their distinguishing feature is that in the columns for remarks references are made to certain important events which took place on particular dates. The importance of the tables is thus considerably enhanced as valuable corroborative evidence for ascertaining broad facts of the history of northern India during the period. A few examples of these historical notes are given below:

19th Feb., 1844; King Shah Zaman arrived at Ludhiana; 11th December, 1844; Prince Peshora Singh crossed the Sutlej, reached Ferozpur and met the "Principal Sahib"; 10th Sept., 1845; King Shah Zaman died at Ludhiana and at 3-00 P.M. his bier was sent to Sirhind; 21st Sept., 1845; Sardar Jawahar Singh, *Mukhtar* of Lahore, killed by the army and Raja Lal Singh appointed Wazir; and 28th Jan., 1845; Governor-General along with Major Lawrence crossed Harike and assumed command at Sohraon. On the same date the Sikhs were defeated and 21 guns were fired in the camp of the Governor-General to celebrate the defeat of the Sikhs in the neighbourhood of Bhundri.

VI—*Mukatabat* (or *Letters*).

One bound volume and over two thousand loose letters addressed by or to Moulvi Rajab Ali form a valuable source of information on

a variety of subjects. As a man of great literary eminence and political influence, Rajab Ali carried on prolific correspondence with a large number of people all over India and abroad. His letters bear ample testimony to his wide interests and contacts. Among his correspondents are to be found prominent chiefs, literary figures and several friends and relations seeking his good offices for one thing or the other from Kabul to South India. The *Mukatabat* are of special biographical and historical interest.

This note on Rajab Ali's collection of manuscripts is intended to introduce research students to this hitherto unknown source material on the history of the Punjab in the first half of the nineteenth century. The papers have suffered some damage through neglect and mishandling during the period of upheaval, but they are still in a good state of preservation. The Record Office has taken steps to repair and rehabilitate them as best as possible. In order to enable research students outside the Punjab to have access to these materials it is also proposed to prepare microfilm copies. This rare and valuable acquisition by the State Record Office is expected to stimulate interest in a fresh appraisal of the contribution of Moulvi Rajab Ali and the main events of the period in which he lived.

SOIROBA NAIG

K. D. SWAMINATHAN,

*Department of Indian History and Archaeology
University of Madras*

DURING THE early years of the nineteenth century, the political residents of the East India Company spotted out some talented Indians associated with the administration of the country. Among such Indians Soiroba Naig of Tanjore deserves mention. His integrity and high character are well borne out by the great regard and esteem Sir William Blackburn, Political Resident at Tanjore between 1810 and 1823, had for him.

We know little about the early career and activities of Soiroba Naig. It appears that he was in the service of the Raja of Tanjore (Sarfoji II) until 1814. For some unknown reason he was removed from service by the Raja and thereafter he was denied even access to the palace. Sir William Blackburn, who was a keen judge of men and things, was very much impressed with the character and ability of Soiroba Naig and wanted to provide him with a suitable position in the administration of Pudukkottai over which he had control.

On the death of Vijaya Raghunatha Tondaiman, the Raja of Pudukkottai, in 1807, his minor son Vijaya Raghunatha Raya Tondaiman succeeded to the *gadi*. It was the responsibility of Sir William Blackburn to make arrangements for the proper administration of the State. The officers appointed by the Resident neglected public business on account of their mutual animosities. They failed to take necessary steps to clear the debts left by the previous ruler to the tune of 60,400 *pagodas* and did not make any effort to discharge their responsibilities in spite of repeated warnings¹. Hence the Madras Government appointed one Anantayya as agent with wide powers to work under the superintendence of the Resident. Anantayya took undue advantage of the powers given to him, collected unauthorised levies and bestowed favours on a few. Sir William Blackburn was displeased with him also. In 1814 the administration of the State was, therefore, placed under a Council of three persons who were first called Managers and then Counsellors. Soiroba Naig figures as the chief among them. Thus we know of Soiroba Naig, as holding a political appointment for the first time in 1814.

¹ C. S. Srinivasachari *Commemoration Volume*, p. 133; Sir William Blackburn—*An ideal Political Resident*, by Dr. T. V. Mahalingam.

Sir William Blackburn could not reconcile himself to the fact that a servant of the calibre of Soiroba Naig, should have been discharged from the Tanjore court, without any proper reason whatsoever. He endeavoured to reinstate Soiroba Naig in the service of the Tanjore Raja between the years 1814 and 1822. The Resident's communication to the Raja, dated 21 April 1817, runs as follows:—"It is highly displeasing that Soiroba Naig, the worthy head servant of the Office, as well as other principal servants are disallowed in the palace on public business"². Again he wrote on a subsequent occasion "The Resident requests the Raja to state the reason for his objection to allowing Soiroba Naig in the palace"³. In another letter, dated 30 April 1817, the Resident said that "he will persist in his protest against the Raja's determination to exclude Soiroba Naig from the palace which is unjust unless proofs of his guilt are offered and established"⁴. The Tanjore Raja Sarfoji II wanted to employ John Staellier, a French writer to convey all the oral messages between the Resident and himself. Sir William Blackburn could not approve of such an idea and threatened the Raja that his desire would be disapproved by the Government⁵. Apparently Sir Blackburn wanted that Soiroba Naig should be appointed to that position of trust in the Tanjore court, rather than a Frenchman.

Sir William Blackburn was so very favourably disposed towards Soiroba Naig that he resented with scorn any false allegations against Soiroba. It appears that a certain Kailasa Pillai, a native of Pudukkottai brought some charges against Naig. The letter of the Resident's Sarishtadar, dated 21 August 1819, orders a strict enquiry into the charges brought against Soiroba Naig, by Kailasa Pillai⁶. Unfortunately we do not have more details about this case.

The head of the administration in the Pudukkottai State was originally known as *Karyakarta*. Towards the end of the eighteenth century his designation was changed into *Sirkil*. It was the highest and the most dignified position in the State. Sir William Blackburn considered Soiroba Naig, sufficiently qualified to occupy the place. From 1814 to 1822, the *Sirkilship* was kept vacant, though the Raja had attained majority in 1817, for want of a suitable person to occupy it. In 1822, however, Soiroba Naig was appointed as the *Sirkil* or the First Minister of Pudukkottai. In communicating the appointment the Resident wrote to the Raja of Pudukkottai as follows: "So much of your comfort and so entirely your independence will depend on

². *Guide to the Records of Tanjore District* Vol. . III, No. 8. *Resident's correspondence with the Raja*, Vol. 3421/210-215.

³. *Ibid* Vol. 3421/217-20.

⁴. *Ibid* Vol. 3421/228-30.

⁵. *Ibid* Vol. 3421/210-215.

⁶. *Guide to the Records of Tanjore District*, Vol. IV, 3437/242-3.

the manner in which your unavoidable intercourse with the public officers of the British Government is carried on, that it is necessary that your principal officers should be intimately acquainted with the character, views, and feelings of our public officers in general, their modes of transacting business and other particulars which can only be attained by long and close observation, and communication with them. Your Principal Manager Soiroba Naig, possesses in an eminent degree all the qualifications for the discharge of the important duties of your first minister and I should have resigned him entirely to your service long ago, if his situation in my office, had not enabled him to be as useful to you as if he had constantly resided at Poodocottah. His abilities are considerable, his experience and knowledge of business are great. His integrity, as you know, is unimpeachable. During your minority I did not fill up the place of the late *Sirkeel* with a view to recommend to you Soiroba Naig for it"⁷. From the foregoing extract, it is clear that though Soiroba Naig was the principal Manager of Pudukkottai he continued to be with the Political Resident at Tanjore, but visiting the State now and then to inspect affairs of administration.

The elevation of Soiroba Naig to the *Sirkilship* was very much resented by the Raja of Tanjore, Sarfoji. He raised the question whether the Raja of Pudukkottai was entitled to have a *Sirkil* and refused to pay the usual compliments due to a *Sirkil*. This happened on the eve of the visit of Soiroba Naig to Sir William Blackburn at Tanjore on 1 January 1823, obviously to convey his New year greetings personally to the Resident. It was rather surprising to Sir William Blackburn that this issue should be raised on the eve of the visit of the new *Sirkil*, particularly because the Raja of Tanjore did not have any objection to pay compliments to previous *Sirkils* of Pudukkottai. Therefore the Resident wrote to him a spirited letter in 1822 clearly explaining the position. "The Raja Behauder's Sirkeels and Fouzdars have been received with compliments requested from your Highness whenever they have visited British Stations and it is indeed a matter of much surprise as concern to me to receive this refusal from your Highness"⁸.

In 1823 Sir William Blackburn resigned his position as Resident of Tanjore for reasons of health and left for England. Prior to his departure, he wrote to Raja Vijaya Raghunatha Tondaiman of Pudukkottai asking him, "Cherish the excellent and well tried servants you possess, Soiroba Naig (*Sirkil* or First Minister), Tana Pillai (Minister in charge of Finances), Tyagaraze (English Tutor)

⁷. See Radhakrishna Iyer—*General History of the Pudukkottai State* p. 370.

⁸. Letter of the Resident to the Raja of Tanjore dated 31 December 1822. See *Translations, copies and extracts of several letters relating to Pudukkottai State* (Published by T. Rungasamy Naidoo in 1874) p. 124.

and you will never fail to go on well"⁹. Soiroba Naig continued to be the *Sirkil* till 1839. In that year Raja Raghunatha Tondaiman died and Raya Ramachandra Tondaiman, a minor succeeded to the throne. The administration was conducted by a Council of Regency consisting of the *Sirkil* (Soiroba Naig), Fouzdar and other officers in communication with the Rani. Col. MacLean, the Resident at that time wrote to the *Sirkil* and the Fouzdar—"while the management of the affairs remains with the Ranee and yourselves, I can have no fear for the result"¹⁰, though the *Sirkil* was too diffident a man to assert himself.

After 1844, the Regency Council was dissolved and Soiroba Naig was again appointed *Sirkil*, which office he held with distinction till 1853, when probably he died and was succeeded by his son Gopal Naig, who was Deputy *Sirkil* from 1851.

⁹. Letter of the Resident to Raja dated 3 March 1823 from Madras—*Translation copies and extracts of several letters relating to Pudukkottai State* (Published by T. Rungasamy Naidoo) p. 125.

¹⁰. See K. R. Venkatrama Iyer—*A Manual of the Pudukkottai State*, Vol. II. part I, pp. 844-45.

SOME UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS ON THE DEATH OF THE RANI OF JHANSI AND THE MUTINY IN CENTRAL INDIA

M. H. R. TAIMURI

Central Records Office, Bhopal

The re-examination of Persian records undertaken recently in the Central Records Office, Bhopal, has revealed the existence of some valuable *muraslajat* (letters) which throw fresh light on the circumstances of the death of Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi and other events connected with the Mutiny in Central India. These communications, six in number, were all addressed to Nawab Sikandar Begum of Bhopal, from 18 June to 4 July 1858, by Munshi Bhawani Prasad, the Begum's representative with the Political Agent to the Governor General in Central India. Bhawani Prasad was in the regular employment of the State and because of the trust reposed in him by the ruler of Bhopal was given this important assignment. He regularly communicated to the Begum reports containing information about the Mutiny and the operations undertaken by the British forces to suppress the rebellion in Malwa. The fact that the reporter was very close to the scene of action against the mutineers lend certain amount of authority to the reports furnished by him. Bhawani Prasad certainly conveyed to his employer complete information about the happenings as it was available to him.

From a study of these documents it appears that they were after a careful perusal transferred to Lala Menu Lal, Keeper of the *Daftar-i-Insha*. Incidentally it may be noted that there was a regular system of keeping these records in the safe custody of the Keeper of Records which office was one of trust and responsibility in the State. These letters of Bhawani Prasad have been thus in possession of the Record Office for about a century and they are of unquestionable authenticity.

The main contents of the documents are as follows:

1. Dated, Morar Cantonment, 6 1274 Ziqaidh *Hijri* corresponding to Friday, 18 June 1858. Relating to the death of Rani of Jhansi—wounding of the Nawab of Banda and meeting of the Maharaja of Gwalior

- with the Resident in Central India.
2. Dated, Morar Cantonment, 10 Ziqaidh 1274 *Hijri* corresponding to Tuesday 22 June 1858. Relating to the burning of the Morar Cantonment and looting of the grain stocks.
 3. Dated, Re-het, 13 Ziqaidh 1274 *Hijri* corresponding to Friday 25 June 1858. Relating to Munshi Bhawani Prasad's departure for Sehore (Bhopal Agency) along with the Political Agent and leaving behind the clerk of the Vakil (local representative) in Lashkar (Gwalior) by permission of the Resident in Central India.
 4. Dated, Morar Cantonment, 16 Ziqaidh 1274 *Hijri* corresponding to Monday 28 June 1858. Relating to his (Bhawani Prasad's) arrival at the village and the miseries of travel and destruction of cattle due to heavy rains.
 5. Dated, Bhadravas, 20 Ziqaidh 1274 *Hijri* corresponding to Friday 2 July 1858. Relating to the arrival of the reporter and the Resident at the village of Bhadravas.
 6. Dated, Guna, 22 Ziqaidh 1274 *Hijri* corresponding to Sunday 4 July 1858. Relating to the departure of the Agent to the Governor General in Central India and General Rose and the conditions in Lashkar (Gwalior).

It will appear that the first of these reports sent by Bhawani Prasad on 18 June 1858 from Morar Cantonment is the most important as it gives information regarding the circumstances of the death of the Rani of Jhansi which is a matter of controversy among historians and Sir Hugh Rose's campaign for the restoration of British authority in Gwalior. The letter reads:

"Yesterday, the Rani of Jhansi and the Nawab of Banda both present at the entrenchment were personally directing the bombardment against Major R. (Hugh Rose's?) position. During the engagement that ensued one shell from Major R's(?) battery blew off an arm of the Nawab of Banda and another one went off bruising the Rani's breast which resulted in her death. The mutineers, therefore, cremated the said Rani's body with Sandal wood. It is also correct that at night the rebels numbering

about 3,000 made away with the treasury and 13 mountain guns from Maharaja Scindia's artillery towards Karauli. It is also understood that Tantia Tope has ordered the mutineers accompanying him that when all of them with their equipment had crossed the Gwalior territory then they should get away by way of Karauli, but a small number of them should be ready at their entrenchments to give fight. Major R.(?), on the other hand has sent a small contingent for the punishment of the mutineers and the deserters. Maharaja Scindia came and met the Agent to the Governor General in Central India at 8 A.M. today. On his arrival a salute of 19 guns was fired in his honour. Hardly anybody had gone to receive him, the Maharaja Scindia himself entered the bungalow of the Agent to the Governor General in Central India. The Maharaja was accompanied by two Government Sikh squadrons from Akbarabad. Constant bombardment continues from Major R's entrenchment. It is certain that Gwalior will soon be captured and the Maharaja Scindia will be installed on the Gadi. Rupees sixty lacs in cash in Gangajali (Treasury) were captured by the rebels which either they spent by themselves or took away with them. They did not loot the property of the subjects. Rest is all well.

Submitted for information.

It is again submitted that Karauli is situated on the north of Gwalior and borders the territories of Jaipur, Bharatpur and Ajmer.

May you live long to rule."

The foregoing paragraphs just form an attempt to show how valuable historical materials are to be found among the records of Bhopal and it is expected that scholars of modern Indian history will give proper attention for making use of them.

MICROFILMING : IMMENSE POSSIBILITIES OF ITS USE IN INDIA

M. C. TRIVEDI

Government Photo Registry Office, Poona

DURING the last twenty years, and especially since the World War II, microfilming as a useful means of copying in facsimile has held a place of its own. Developed originally as one of the methods of photocopying which proved to be much cheaper and required much less space for storage and transport than other photographic methods of facsimile copying then in existence like the Photostat and the Rectigraph, it soon developed, in war years, as a very suitable method of carrying in small space and at a very cheap cost the great volume of traffic. To save space, aerograph became a regular mail service in war years. Letters were micro-filmed at the place of origin; and their film, instead of original letters, was flown to the place of destination. At the other end the contents of the film were read through the help of a reader or enlarged on a photographic paper and delivered to the addressee. World War II thus gave a great fillip to microfilming, and various machines and apparatus to do this work, were developed.

After the War, these were utilised for peace time work. Good many departments of government, and of private commercial houses, in Europe and America, have begun to make a regular use of it for their manifold needs; such as for saving in space for which, for instance, the newspaper publishing houses are in greatest need; for the necessity for records being copied out in facsimile for which the commercial houses are ever very much in need for preserving copies of their bills of lading, cheques, etc; and for preserving their ever increasing but valuable old records for which government departments are required to provide.

In India, there is one of the activities of the government which requires adequate provision to be made in the sphere of copying. Registration of public transactions is undertaken by the government in India, unlike that in western countries. In the case of the latter, this is done by firms of solicitors or notary public. In India, Government have undertaken this work, and the procedure thereof is statutorily prescribed in an Act of Government called the Indian Registration Act. This Act is an all India Act and it regulates the

procedure of registration in all the States of India. To give effect to the provisions of the Act, Government of each State has opened a net work of offices called Sub-Registry Offices, one in each Taluka town, before whom the registrants register their documents. According to Section 70 of the Act, Government are required to have a copy made for record of each document that is presented for registration, after it is accepted by the Sub-Registrar, (as the officer in charge of each Sub-Registry is called), before the document registered is returned to the parties.

Here then is an immense field for photocopying for all the States. So far, in all the States except Bombay, this copying is done in hand in big volumes provided for the purpose. This, however, is not exact copying. The distinguishing part of each document—the signatures of parties, witnesses etc., cannot be copied. While copying the contents there is also a great possibility of mistakes—unintentional or even intentional—being committed, and even after copying there is a chance of fraudulent additions and alterations at any time. The hand-copying method results in but one copy and if it is destroyed by fire, flood or theft, there is nothing to take its place; instances of this kind have taken place in Bombay State in the past. Again, as the work of copying is voluminous, it entails at times abnormal delays to parties in the return of their documents.

These are the disadvantages of hand-copying of registered documents; and all States and their Registration Departments are aware of them. In the absence, however, of a better alternative method of copying, it has been tolerated in spite of its defects. In this matter Bombay State, however, took a lead as far back as 1920 and adopted a system of photo-registry.

In 1920, the then Inspector General of Registration, Mr. F.G.H. Anderson, I.C.S. conceived the idea of preparing a photographic copy of each document that was presented for registration, instead of the manuscript copy so far in vogue in all States of India. At first, for the first six or seven years, blue print copies such as those taken for engineer's drawings were taken, by what was called the wetplate photographic process. This was, however, not quite successful as a method of copying registered documents, which invariably contained photographically heterogeneous details, from a faint rubber stamp impression to thick black writing of the text, often on one and the same page, which required different photographic exposures. As the negatives were prepared on glass, it did not allow negatives to be preserved for all time. With the experience gained a new photographic method was evolved, after experiments which lasted for two years, which satisfied all the exacting

requirements of the Act and the needs of the Registration Department. This was the microfilm sulphide print process. It was introduced in 1927 and is working since that time.

The essence of the process is that documents are first photographed on 35 mm cellulose acetate (safety base) film; and after this an enlarged print $7\frac{1}{4}'' \times 4\frac{1}{2}''$ is taken from the microfilm image. Larger sizes of prints are also given $10'' \times 6''$, $12'' \times 7\frac{1}{2}''$, $13\frac{1}{2}'' \times 8\frac{1}{2}''$ if the parties desire. For purposes of government record $7\frac{1}{2}'' \times 4\frac{1}{2}''$ size is considered to be suitable enough. At present, about 3,000 sides are daily microfilmed and printed by enlargement on paper on an average, with number increasing to 4,000 sides per day in busy months i.e., from April to June. This number is likely to increase shortly from 8,000 to 10,000 sides per day on an average and 12,000 sides per day in busy months, with the arrears of the work of the Department which was held over due to the War and abnormal conditions prevailing thereafter, being taken over. The film negatives are preserved at the Central Office at Poona known as the Government Photo Registry Office where this work is done. The enlarged photo-copies together with the original documents are returned, after they are certified to be true copies of the original documents, to the Sub-Registry Offices concerned—the photo-copies for record there and the documents for return to the parties. As the film negatives and photo-copies are to be permanent, various expedients, safeguards, apparatus etc., are devised to ensure this, which is difficult when work is done and is required to be turned out on such a large scale and so expeditiously. Almost all the apparatus and machines are devised and constructed locally; as at the time the process was introduced, in 1927, the idea of microfilming had not made much headway even in Europe and America. The cost of production for the negative and print ($7\frac{1}{4}'' \times 4\frac{1}{2}''$) comes to about five annas per side, which is about the same as for hand-copying. In the same cost therefore, two facsimile records are obtained.

The system has been working in Bombay State for the last 25 years. It was hoped other States would follow suit. Madras actually introduced the microfilm sulphide print process in 1930 on the lines of the Bombay province and worked it for 12 years. In 1942, however, on account of the difficulties felt in supplies of materials due to war conditions it was abandoned. Other States like the Punjab, Bengal, Bihar also made detailed enquiries, but they have not so far adopted the system.

In this direction it appears that the Central Government may be able to give a useful lead. The Indian Registration Act is an all

India Act. The provisions of this Act had to be modified, in so far as they were applicable to the State of Bombay, in order to bring them in line with the introduction of the photo-copying system. Section 70 of the Act had to be modified and a whole chapter, part XI A, had to be introduced. A bill was introduced in the Legislative Assembly to amend the Act and legalise the photo-copying system in 1930, 1933 and again in 1938. If the Indian Registration Act is amended on these lines, all the States would automatically come under the photo system of copying, and it would give a great and much needed fillip to microfilming, in addition to substituting a modern scientific method in place of an old and obsolete one. This can, it is understood, be suitably undertaken by the Centre. A comprehensive scheme based on the amended Act can then be worked out for all the States in India; and this will be in keeping with the initiative that was taken 25 years ago when the idea of microfilming had not advanced far even in Europe and America, due to which we are acknowledged by foreign experts as pioneers in microfilming.

Another direction in which the Centre can help for the promotion of microfilming is in introducing it for the manifold needs of the Education Department, libraries, records repositories, museums, etc. In consultation with the Department of Education a scheme can be worked out for this also.

The copying of very old historical and religious manuscripts which are lying scattered in large numbers all over India and which are now, with the lapse of time, deteriorating with the risk of losing them for all time to come, should also engage the attention of the Centre, especially of the Historical Records Commission. A comprehensive scheme on an all India basis, to microfilm these valuable records according to a well laid out programme can be evolved by the Centre in close collaboration with the Departments of Archives of the various States.

What is thus required is an urge—well planned, organised and directed from the Centre,—to make the fullest use of this modern scientific method of copying and preservation of all kinds of records and relics.

SOME PROMINENT PARSIS IN THE 18TH CENTURY

B. A. SALETORÉ

National Archives of India

THERE ARE a few documents in the National Archives which refer to some prominent Parsis of Bombay, who were responsible for the maritime prosperity of that city. Of these five were exclusively Master Builders, one was a wealthy merchant, and the seventh was a citizen who, for want of a better designation, could be merely put down as a prominent inhabitant of Bombay. These records which are eight in number, range from 1782 till 1800.

The earliest is dated 28th September, 1782, and was addressed by the Surat Factors William Lewis, Daniel Crockatt, D. Seton, and F. Warden to Governor General Warren Hastings at Fort William. In this letter the Factors wrote that they had accepted all the 14 bills of exchange which accompanied the Governor General's letter "of the 5th past, (i.e. 5th August, evidently).....except two Bills, to the Amount of Rupees 12000-0-0 on Dunjeeshaw Munjeeshaw, who being at Bombay, his Son and Agent desire Time to refer to him, for the Acceptance of these Bills, as they have no Orders regarding them¹". Another letter also from Surat, and dated the 24th November, 1782, and obviously by the same Factors, addressed to Mr. Warren Hastings, confirmed the statement made in the previous letter, and stated that "The above mentioned Bills have all been duly honored except those drawn on Dunjeeshaw Munjeeshaw and we therefore now return the first of those Bills protested for non-payment²". It cannot be made out what happened to these dealings afterwards. Neither can we make out the exact status of Dunjeeshaw Munjeeshaw. In all likelihood he was a member of the famous Wadia family which had risen into prominence under the first Master Builder of Surat, Lowji Nasarwanji Wadia, who had served the English Factory from 1735 till 1773, and who may be said to have founded the reputation of the Dockyard at Bombay³.

In 1790 figures Burjerjee Dorabjee. The letter referring to him dated 28th April, 1790, at Bombay Castle, was signed by Robt. Abercromby, D. Carnegie, and George Dick, and was addressed

obviously to Mr. Warren Hastings. This is an interesting letter in which we have details concerning the observations made by the Master Builders of Bombay referring to His Majesty's ship *Crown*, and in which we are informed that "yesterday" (i.e. 27th April), the Bombay Factors drew on the Governor General a bill for Rs. 14,000 in favour of Burjerjee Dorabjee, "which being for an indispensable military purpose we are to request your Lordship will honour when due."⁴

Although chronologically there figure two other Parsis in these records, about whom I shall presently mention a few details, yet for the sake of the completion of the history of the Master Builders of Bombay, I might pass on to three more Parsi Master Builders, who were Framjee Manakjee, Jamshedjee Bomanjee and Dorabjee Bairamjee. Framjee Manakjee and Jamshedjee Bomanjee (written in the record as Fronjie Monakje and Junsetjee Bomonjee) gave a certificate at Bombay on the 21st March 1800, which was countersigned by Roebuck Abbott and Co. The certificate by itself makes interesting reading:

"We the undersigned the Master Builders in the Hon'ble Companys Dock Yard in Bombay, do hereby certify to whom it may concern, that the Danish ship Helsingore Captain Irvine, was hauled into Dock here, on the 12th of January 1797 that her whole bottom was stripped examined Caulked new, and leak sheathed, and new Coppered, that such Planks in her Top sides and Decks, as were found to be bad or decayed were stripped, that that lower Masts were taken out and examined, in consequence of supposed Injury from Shot, and such of the fishes as were found to be wounded thereby were replaced, by New and good ones, and we do further Certify, that she was hauled out of Dock on the 27th Day of January, above mentioned completely repaired to the best of our judgment⁵."

Of the two above mentioned Master Builders, the second was the same Jamshedjee Bomonjee, who was the most distinguished member of the Wadia family. He is reputed to have built for the British Navy several lines of battleship and frigates, remarkable for their strength and sea-worthiness⁶. It is interesting to observe here that the Wadia family from 1736 to 1863, built for the East India Co., 170 war vessels and other crafts, 34 war-ships for the Royal Navy, 87 merchant vessels for private firms and 3 vessels for the Imam of Muscat⁷. This is a proud record of a most enterprising family which was responsible for the prosperity of both of the city of Bombay and of the East

1. Public Consultation, 20 January 1783, No. 11.

2. *Ibid*, 23 January 1783, No. 1.

3. *Gazetteer of Bombay City & Island*, Bombay, 1910, III, p. 272.

4. Public Consultation, 28 April 1790, No. 4.

5. Public Consultation, 3 July 1800, No. 3.

6. *Gazetteer of Bombay City & Island*, III, p. 272. See *ibid*, n (2) for Bombay ships built in 1828 and 1844 still being in service in 1910.

7. *Ibid*, p. 273.

India Co., in India. Jamshedjee Bomanjee again figures in another letter dated 13th September, 1800 at Bombay, which is signed by himself. It certifies that the ship "*Santa Cruz* commanded by John Collie was built at Bombay Marine yard, and launched under the Name of Griffin in the year of our Lord 1770⁸". A good deal of correspondence rests with ship *Santa Cruz* which is outside our purpose⁹. We have to pass on to the last name in the present list of Master Builders and that was that of Dorabjee Bairamjee (written Beramjee) which is mentioned in a letter from Calcutta dated May the 22nd, 1800, and addressed to Mr. C. R. Crommelin, Secretary to the Government in the Public Department, Dorabjee Bairamjee solicited the permission of the Governor General in Council for disposing of the Ship *Rebecca* to one "Mr. John William Bronaugh, an American, who lost his own Ship the *Louis*, by Capture, on the 4th Januay last, and is therefore, under the Necessity, of purchasing another at this Place, to take the property he has here to America¹⁰". This letter shows that a member of the famous Parsi family of Master Builders of Bombay and Surat, was at Calcutta in the year 1800, evidently carrying on the profession of the building and selling of ships associated with his family. As a point of information we might mention that the last Master Builder of the Wadia Family was Khan Bahadur Jamshedjee Dhanjibhoy who retired in 1885¹¹.

Now we may mention a few details about a prominent Parsi merchant, Jamshedjee Kokajee figuring in a record dated the 25th November, 1795. In this letter written by Charles Christkuer, Attorney at Law for Jamshedjee Kokajee (written Cocajee) and addressed to Mr. Edward Hay, Secretary to Government we are informed that "An action having been brought by a Man named Jamsetjee Cocajee against Captain. John Reid for the recovery of certain Goods shipped on board the Ship *Hampshire* of which he was then Commander and which sailed from this Port (which is not mentioned) early in the month of April 1793, and it being necessary for Jamsetjee Cocajee, in order to make good his Claim to prove the Voyage Captain. Reid held out he was going when he took the Goods on freight", Mr. Christkuer requested Mr. Hay to inform him "what particular Voyage Captain Reid in his application to Government for a passport specified he was bound for". If Mr. Hay was not in a position to give this information, it was requested that the Governor-General might kindly be addressed, so that the necessary information when obtained would "tend to the attainment of Justice or be the means of preventing an Expensive Litigation between the Parties¹²".

8. Public Consultation, 3 November 1800, No. 16.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Public Consultation, 22 May 1800, No. 5.

11. *Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island* op. cit. 273.

12. Public Consultation, 30 November 1795, No. 39.

