

*HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION
HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No.*

J A P A N

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EDITORIAL NOTE

IN the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty ; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference ; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense ; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

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General Editor and formerly

Director of the Historical Section.

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I. EARLY HISTORY

BEFORE the sixth century, legend and history in Japan are indistinguishable. After that date we are on more solid ground. There is evidence from the writings of early Chinese travellers that Chinese culture began to trickle into Japan long before then; and the introduction of Chinese ideographs—the Japanese having no writing of their own—is supposed to have occurred in the fifth century. But it was not until Buddhism reached Japan about the middle of the next century that Chinese civilization, following on religion; took

firm root in Japan. Calendars were then introduced, and the writing of books commenced. In the eighth century the first historical records were compiled, and it was in the same century that the Japanese elaborated a written language of their own, consisting of two different scripts, the characters of which were adapted from Chinese hieroglyphics. Since then Japan has enjoyed the doubtful blessing of two spoken and two written languages, which are used both separately and in combination. To this duality of language there was added a duality of religion; for Shinto, the ancient creed of Japan, continued to exist side by side, though often blended, with the Buddhism introduced from China through Korea.

The wave of Chinese culture which swept over Japan during this epoch reached its highest point in the year 645, when the so-called Great Reform, copied from the changes made under the T'ang dynasty in China, took place. This—an important landmark in Japanese history—was at first simply a movement in favour of the Court and centralized authority, in opposition to the separatist tendencies, encouraged by the Soga family, which had prevailed before. But the influence of the Chinese ideas which came in with the Great Reform did not stop at the mere basis of administration. It permeated every part of the national fabric, remodelling local and communal government, reorganizing social and economic systems, and laying the foundations of law, education, and art. From this early Chinese atmosphere Japan has never completely freed herself.

And here it may be well to point out that in the development of Japan two alternating tendencies are noticeable: imitation from abroad, and reaction in favour of native ideas. In these the duality of language and religion above referred to has played an important part. Imitation from abroad, or, in other words, the invasion of foreign ideas, which resulted in a wholesale adoption of alien customs and institutions, came at two widely separated intervals of time—the seventh

and the nineteenth centuries; firstly from China, secondly from the West.¹ On the first occasion the effects were gradual, revealing themselves slowly in the course of more than a century. On the second the impulse was more sudden, and its operation quicker. In neither case was the reaction, when it came, of a permanent nature. The result each time was a prolonged, though far from strenuous, antagonism between the old and the new ideas, each alternately gaining the upper hand, while the patriotism of the people was equally vigorous, whether the spirit of change or conservatism was in the ascendant. This ebb and flow of tendency goes on to-day. A remarkable and persistent feature, too, in the evolution of Japan is the devotion of the people to the idea of sovereignty as personified in the occupant of the throne—a feeling strengthened by the association of the native religion with the Imperial dynasty, for which divine origin is claimed. The sovereign, indeed, in spite of his semi-divine character, was never anything more than a convenient figure-head; the authority of the Crown never more than a name. But in that name all authority was exercised, whatever the seat of ruling power might be. The Crown has always been the centre round which everything has in theory revolved, the rivet which has held the State together; and loyalty to the throne is still one of the marked characteristics of the people.

The intervention in favour of direct Imperial rule effected by the Great Reform was short-lived. The Government passed into the hands of another influential family, the House of Fujiwara, which had played the chief part in the Restoration movement, and the personal rule of the sovereign, though continued in name, ceased to be a material factor in State affairs until its resuscitation in 1868–9.² But the borrowed

¹ The Japanese have adopted the phraseology of East and West as used in England and America. Asia is to them the East, while Europe and America represent the West.

² This restoration of personal rule was more nominal than real; see p. 35.

Chinese basis of administration survived, and when, during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the feudal system was evolved out of the long struggle between the Taira and Minamoto families, the new form of government retained much of the centralized and bureaucratic character given to it by the Great Reform.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF FEUDALISM AND DYARCHY

This new form of government dates from the final overthrow of the Taira family in the sea-battle of Dan-no-Ura in A. D. 1155. Yoritomo, the Minamoto chief, then rose to supreme power, receiving from the Court at Kyoto the title of Shogun (or General), a contraction of the fuller appellation *Sei-i-Tai Shogun*, which may be rendered 'Barbarian-quelling generalissimo'. This term had until then been applied in its correct meaning to generals employed from time to time in fighting the Ainu aborigines, who were gradually driven from the main island into the northern island of Yezo. With the assumption of this title by Yoritomo the term itself developed a new meaning. The title indeed indicated clearly enough the military character of the government established, but it was not as the general of an army that he henceforth figured, but as the virtual ruler of Japan. His advent to power marks the inception of the dual system of government which lasted, except for a short period in the sixteenth century when two military dictators held rule, until modern times. The first line of Shoguns is known as the Kamakura dynasty, because Kamakura, now a village near the town of Yokohama, was the seat of government. Owing to the weakness of Yoritomo's descendants this line of Shoguns did not long retain the substance of power. The real authority was exercised in their name by regents (*Shikkô*) of the Hojo family, originally retainers of the Shogun, whose rule (A. D. 1205-1334) was, in its relation to the governing dynasty, a reproduction of the relations

between the Mikado and the Shogun—in fact an extension of the system of figure-head government. It was during the rule of the Hojo regents that the two Mongol invasions undertaken by Kublai Khan in 1275 and 1281, which for the Japanese take the place of the Spanish Armada in English history, were signally defeated. These were the only two occasions in historical times when Japan was invaded.

The Kamakura Shoguns were succeeded by the Ashikaga dynasty, whose seat of government was divided between Kyoto, the capital, and Kamakura. This dynasty ruled from A. D. 1335 until the latter half of the sixteenth century, when its power gradually crumbled to pieces, and the country fell into a condition of anarchy. At this juncture of affairs the sequence of Shogun, or regent, dynasties was interrupted by the rule in succession (A. D. 1568-98) of two military dictators, Nobunaga and Hidéyoshi, by whom order was restored, but neither of whom founded a dynasty, or bore the title of Shogun. The last and most powerful line of Shoguns, and the only one which exercised undisputed sway over the whole country, was that of the Tokugawa family. Established in the beginning of the seventeenth century, after Hidéyoshi's death in 1598, its rule lasted until 1868-9, and its period of power is gratefully remembered by the nation as the era of 'Great Peace'. Apart from the prohibition of the Christian religion, and the practical closing of Japan to foreign intercourse, the rule of the Tokugawa Shoguns is chiefly remarkable for the fact that it confirmed and perpetuated, in addition to the duality of language and religion already noted, the system of duality of government.

In the course of these seven centuries of feudalism the fiction of direct Imperial rule was sedulously maintained, even in the interval of fifty-six years (A. D. 1336-92), during the Ashikaga administration, when two rival Emperors, representing what were called the 'Northern and Southern Courts', claimed the allegiance of the nation. The sovereign remained always in

exhausted; long-continued hostilities had weakened the fighting power and resources of turbulent feudal chiefs, and much of the work of pacification had been accomplished by his immediate predecessors. He belonged, moreover, to the powerful Minamoto family, which had played a notable part in Japanese history, and had given the nation its first Shogun.

The number of feudal nobles, or, to use the Japanese term, *daimios*, and the extent of their fiefs, had in the past varied considerably from time to time. Feudal territories were enlarged or reduced, and both fiefs and their owners disappeared altogether, as one side or the other prevailed in the constant wars which were carried on in periods of general disturbance, while in more settled times local conflicts were attended by the same results. Periodically too, the appearance of a new Shogun, or other ruler, led to a general distribution of fiefs, from which few parts of the country were exempt. If, moreover, a *daimio* misgoverned his territory, or in any other way incurred the Shogun's displeasure, his fief was confiscated, or he was transferred to another part of the country, and such exchanges of fiefs might occur for no other reason than the caprice of the Shogun. The map of feudal Japan was, therefore, constantly changing. Nor in the alterations introduced from time to time was any consideration paid to natural boundaries. A *daimio's* fief, or, in other words, the territories of a clan, might thus consist of the whole, or only part, of a province, of portions of two or three provinces, or of several whole provinces. Iyeyasu, before he became Shogun, was lord of eight provinces, and in the sixteenth century the fief of Mori, the *daimio* of Choshu, included no less than ten.

The use of the word 'clan' in the preceding paragraph calls for some explanation. The Japanese word *Han*, the usual English rendering of which is 'clan', does not in its feudal sense refer to the territory included in a feudal area, but to the people inhabiting it. The truth is that although Japanese feudalism, in its general features, resembled the feudal systems

which prevailed in the continental countries of Europe, in one respect—the position of the population inhabiting the fiefs—it had a close affinity to the clan basis of Scottish feudalism: with this important distinction, however, that whereas the Scottish clan was a family organization, the basis of the Japanese clan was purely territorial, the clansmen being held together by no family link. Nor, as has already been stated, was this territorial basis of the Japanese clan always even strictly provincial. The territories of a clan were simply those composing the fief of the *daimio* who was its chief. The area of a fief in earlier unsettled times was, as we have seen, subject to constant changes, expanding or contracting according to the military fortunes of the *daimio* concerned, and in those days the word *Han* (clan) was not much used, the personality of the *daimio* of the fief being the chief consideration. When, however, under the centralized administration of the Tokugawa Shoguns, conditions became more settled, the boundaries of fiefs became more fixed and permanent; the result being that the personality of a *daimio* counted for less, and the term *Han* gradually came to be more commonly employed to express the idea of a distinct feudal community united solely by territorial associations, which acted in a way similar to provincial ties in all countries. Naturally, in cases where the provincial and feudal boundaries corresponded, the tie uniting the inhabitants of a fief was stronger than elsewhere. A knowledge of what the clan really was in Japan is necessary in order to understand what seems a paradox to many people—namely, how it was that clan spirit should have survived the abolition of the feudal system, and how it is that Japan to-day, more than half a century after the disappearance of feudalism, should be ruled by what the Japanese themselves speak of as a clan Government.

The new Shogun in establishing his rule followed the example of his predecessors. Maps which give the distribution of feudal territories before and after the year 1600, and again after the fall of Osaka in 1615,

show the sweeping character of the changes he effected on both occasions. They furnish also a clue to the reasons inspiring his policy in the rearrangement of fiefs; these were the aggrandizement of his family, and the convenience and security of his administration.

Before the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate the feudal nobles, or daimios, were divided into three classes, namely, *Kokushiu*, lords of provinces, 18 in number; *Ryoshu*, lords of territories, of whom there were 32; and *Joshu*, lords of castle-towns, who numbered in all 212. These, together with the large body of retainers attached to each daimio, constituted the *samurai*,¹ or military class, which alone had the privilege of wearing two swords. The retainers served as soldiers in times of war, and in times of peace followed no occupation or calling, receiving, whether on active duty or not, regular salaries, calculated in rice. Outside of this military class were the *Kugé*, or Court nobles, descendants of ancient families which had governed Japan in bygone days, who were attached to the Imperial Court at Kyoto, and had no landed possessions; and, lower down in the social scale, the farmer, the artisan, and the merchant, or tradesman.

The revenue of a daimio was derived from a tax, payable in kind, levied on the cultivators of the land composing the fief. The tax took the form of a definite proportion of the assessed yield of the land, as determined by the authorities from time to time. This proportion varied in different parts of the country, the farmer in some fiefs receiving only three-tenths of the

¹ The two terms for the military class in common use were *samurai* and *bushi*, the former being a pure Japanese word, the latter belonging to the Chinese side of the language. There was a distinction in their employment. Both daimios and *samurai* spoke of themselves as *bushi*, but though the two terms were synonymous, and, strictly speaking, all daimios were *samurai*—the Shogun himself being one—a daimio never spoke of himself as such. Moreover, the word *samurai* was usually employed in a loose way to denote the large body of feudal retainers who constituted the fighting force of a clan. Wherever the word occurs in these pages it must be understood as used in this secondary meaning.

assessed yield, the rest of which went to the feudal lord, while in other places the conditions were exactly reversed. The Japanese custom, in speaking or writing of a daimio, of mentioning the total rice-assessment of his fief has given rise to misunderstanding, the assessed yield of the land being frequently mistaken for the actual revenue of the daimio.

In the organization of the feudal nobility, as remodelled by Iyeyasu, the old division of three classes was retained; but he created the three princely Houses of Owari, Kishiu, and Mito, called collectively the *Gosanké*, and placed them at the head of the new order of precedence.¹ It was from the two senior Houses of the *Gosanké*—those of Owari and Kishiu—together with the *Gosankiō*, a family group of later institution, that, failing a direct heir, subsequent Tokugawa rulers were chosen. To the representative of the third House—that of Mito—the position of Adviser to the Shogunate was assigned; and, when there was no direct heir, he was supposed to have a determining voice in the selection of a new Shogun. Another important change was the separation of the feudal nobility into two broad classes: the *Fudai* daimios, or hereditary vassals, who had submitted to the new ruler before the fall of Osaka in 1615; and the *Tozama* daimios, who had acknowledged his supremacy later. The former class alone had the privilege of being employed in the Council of State and the higher posts of the administration. Iyeyasu also created two new feudal classes: the *Hatamoto*, or Bannermen, whose fiefs in some cases rivalled in extent those of the lesser daimios; and the *Gokénin*, a sort of landed gentry.

Full use, too, was made by the new ruler of the custom of retaining hostages from the feudatories as a guarantee of loyalty, a practice expanded under the second and third Shoguns into the system known as *San-kin-*

¹ Another and perhaps more correct view is that the Mito family was a later creation. In that case the term *Gosanké*, which means the Three Honourable Families, would not have been applied till later.

Kō-tai. This provided for the residence of daimios in alternate years at Yedo and in their fiefs, some members of their families being permanently detained in the Tokugawa capital. A system of what was called 'State services', *kokuyeki*, was also introduced. These, which were levied on the feudal nobility from time to time, were originally contributions in labour, material, or money, exacted from them in proportion to their revenues, for such purposes as the repair of the Imperial Palace at Kyoto, and of the Shogun's castles; but in course of time they were extended into requisitions of money for any object which the Government might indicate, thus resembling to some extent the 'benevolences' of the Middle Ages in Europe. From these contributions the two senior Houses of the *Gosanké* were exempted. By these two expedients the feudal nobles were kept in strict subjection. The expenses entailed by their constant state journeys to and from the capital alone constituted a severe tax on their resources, and were the main cause of the financial distress which existed at a later date in many of the daimiates.

The seat of the Tokugawa Government was established in Yedo (now Tokyo), then a rising town, which owed its selection to its favourable location for commerce at the head of the bay of the same name. In his dealings with the Imperial Court at Kyoto the new Shogun was content, so far as outward formalities were concerned, to follow the example of previous administrations, introducing, nevertheless, under cover of conformity with ancient usage, many important changes. The empty dignities of the Court were maintained with some increase of ceremonial etiquette, though without the lavish display which had reconciled the throne to the rule of his predecessor. In this latter respect, indeed, Iyēyasu's treatment of the Emperor and his puppet Court was niggardly in the extreme, the Imperial household being often in want of daily necessities. He was at the same time careful to curtail whatever vestiges of Imperial authority still

remained.¹ The measures taken by him for this purpose included the appointment of a Resident (*Shoshidai*) in Kyoto, and a Governor (*Jodai*) in Osaka; the confinement of the reigning Emperor and cloistered ex-monarchs¹ to their palaces, and the cessation of Imperial progresses; the isolation of the Court by the interdict placed on the visits of feudal nobles to the ancient capital, even sight-seeing being only permitted to them within certain specified limits, and then only by special permission from Yedo; the isolation of the *Kugé*, or Court nobility, by the prohibition of marriages and all monetary transactions between them and the feudal nobility; and the reorganization of the official establishment of the Court so as to bring it more completely under the control of the Shogunate. Iyēyasu also arranged the betrothal of his granddaughter to the Crown Prince, an alliance not without precedent in the past, and he enforced a stricter supervision over the Imperial household, the movements of Court ladies, and the daily routine of the palace. His attitude, and that of his immediate successors, towards the throne, and indeed the general policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate, are disclosed by the Law of the Imperial Court, the Law of the Court and Shogunate, and the 'Hundred Articles', all of which date, or purport to date, from about the same time, the year 1615.

The main features of Tokugawa administration as established by Iyēyasu remained unchanged until the 'Restoration' two hundred and fifty-three years later. The general direction of affairs was in the hands of an upper and a lower Council of State, controlled by an inner circle of statesmen, the members of which were chosen from the ranks of the *Fudai*² daimios and the *Hatamoto* (Bannermen). Decisions on grave matters of state were referred, when necessary, to the *Gosanké* and other leading daimios, whose participation

¹ There were often two ex-monarchs in retirement besides the reigning Emperor.

² See above, p. 13.

in these deliberations was, however, more often nominal than real. With regard to what may be termed provincial government, there were two different systems of administration. Japan was divided into what were known as the Shogun's domains, and feudal territories. The former were administered by Governors (*Daikwan*) appointed by the Shogunate. This system prevailed also in some of the *Fudai* daimiates and in certain coast towns, the number of which increased towards the end of the Tokugawa regime with the extension—small as it was—of foreign intercourse. The latter, with the exception named, were governed by the clan rulers, but were subject to the general supervision of a special class of Tokugawa officials called *Metsuké*. Their varied functions comprised those of travelling inspectors and circuit judges, and they were frequently employed as deputies, or assistants, to governors, delegates, and commissioners, when their task was to watch and report on the conduct of their superiors. Hence the frequent description of them as spies by foreign writers on Japan. The management of local matters was entrusted to mayors and other district officials very much as it is now.

Though nothing of the substance of power was left to the Crown, the mere fact that all authority was exercised in its name led to much friction, and created an atmosphere of make-believe in which everything moved, the absence of real influence being atoned for by an increase of ceremonial. As the Crown still retained the sole power of conferring the much-coveted Court titles, and its nominal approval was essential to the investiture of a new Shogun, and to other important measures of State, while it also claimed the right to be consulted, nominally at least, in regard to many matters, especially those relating to ceremonial observances of all kinds, to questions of marriage, adoption, abdication and succession, a voluminous correspondence was carried on between the Imperial Ministers of the phantom Court at Kyoto and the Government at Yedo. But the presence of the Shogun's

Resident at Kyoto, whose intervention at any moment was to be feared, deprived these official relations of much of the importance they might otherwise have possessed. The history of these relations as chronicled in Tokugawa records is a record of constant, though fruitless, attempts on the part of the Court dignitaries in Kyoto to encroach on the administrative prerogatives of the Shogun, which usually ended in the exile of the offenders.

It only remains to add that more than half of the country was administered more or less directly by the Government in Yedo. In many of the lesser *Fudai*¹ daimiates little latitude was left to the territorial authorities, even when the Governors were not Shogunate officials; while in the case of the *Tozama*² daimiates the degree of dependence on Yedo varied according to the situation and importance of the fief.

It should be borne in mind in considering the question of the Tokugawa Government that the Shogun did not personally rule any more than the Mikado. What for want of a better term may be called the figure-head system of government is noticeable throughout the whole course of Japanese history. Real and nominal powers are rarely seen combined either socially or politically. The family, which is the unit of society, and not, as with us, the individual, is nominally controlled by the person who is its head. But practically the latter is in most cases a figure-head, the real power being exercised by the group of relatives who form the family council. And so it was in feudal times with the territorial nobility. As we have seen, by no means all the daimios had even the nominal right to administer their fiefs. Those who had, with a few exceptions, did not exercise the privilege. Owing to the tendency above explained, and to habits of luxury and effeminacy copied from Court circles, the actual administration of the fiefs was surrendered to a group of retainers of superior position known as *Karo*, who

¹ See above, p. 13.

² See above, p. 13.

held office hereditarily.¹ It was the same with the *Hatamoto* (Bannermen). In the case of the *Karo*, again, the authority was more nominal than real, the direction of affairs being left as a rule to the more active intelligence of retainers of inferior rank, whose more humble position and emoluments did not encourage indulgence in effeminate and dissipated tastes. Similarly, the Shogun was as often as not a mere puppet in the hands of his Upper and Lower Councils, while these in turn were controlled by subordinate office-holders.

Thus the position of the Mikado in his enforced retirement was simply a reproduction in a different form of what existed in each sphere of the social and political organization. With the establishment of a new line of Shoguns or daimios, or the advent to power in any rank of life of an individual of exceptional force of character, there might be for a time a reversion to personal rule. But this authority was seldom bequeathed to a successor. The custom of abdication,² common to all classes of the people, lent its weight in the same direction. Just as the burgher of the towns and the farmer in the country, at an age when his faculties were still unimpaired, retired into private life in order to avoid the burden of social ceremonies, so in higher circles advantage was taken of the same means of escape from the cares of public life. In cases where the sovereign or princes of the blood were concerned, the process was facilitated by the Buddhist usage of retirement into the priesthood, and by political considerations. The system of figure-head rule, moreover, gained additional strength from the fact that, in many cases where the person abdicating had exercised real authority in the family or

¹ For an instance of the influence exercised by the *Karo* (who in their turn were secretly directed by the *samurai* in their confidence, see the account of the Osaka negotiations (1865) given by Sir Francis Adams in his *History of Japan*, vol. ii, p. 23.

² What is said here refers chiefly to voluntary abdication. Instances, however, of compulsory abdication, both of sovereign and feudal nobles, frequently occur in Japanese history.

in public life, his activities were strangely enough increased rather than diminished by abdication. One of the most striking instances of the innate attachment of the Japanese people to the system of ruling by proxy, of the prevalence of abdication, and of the fact that it by no means necessarily meant the relinquishment of personal power, is furnished by the life of the founder of the Tokugawa line of Shoguns. A statesman of conspicuous ability, a successful general, and the strongest ruler in Japanese history, he abdicated only two years after his rule was established, but continued to govern the country by proxy until his death many years later.

The natural tendency of this system was to hinder the development of administrative capacity, and to keep the Government shrouded in an atmosphere of impersonality reflected in the language of the people. The student of Japanese history is at once struck by the obscurity in which personalities move. This is no mere accident, but the working of a system which the Japanese regard as natural, and in the circumstances correct. In one direction the system had practical and beneficial results. The weakness or incompetence of rulers produced no violent convulsions, nor did it endanger the continuity of the dynasty. The machinery of government worked smoothly, unaffected by the personality of those theoretically responsible for its control. And, as time went by, the tendency of office to divorce itself from the discharge of the duties nominally associated with it increased, with the result that in the last days of the Shogunate all administrative action was in reality inspired at the seat of government by subordinate officials, and in the clans by *samurai* of inferior standing.

IV. EARLY FOREIGN INTERCOURSE

Christian Persecution and Closure of Japan.—Early intercourse between Europe and Japan dates from the middle of the sixteenth century. Its character

corresponded closely with the power of the European nations which conducted it. The fortunes of Spain and Portugal were then at their zenith. The Armada had not yet been defeated and Eastern commerce was still in the hands of those two Powers. By the Bulls issued on April 3 and 4, 1493, by Pope Alexander VI, which divided, for purposes of exploitation, the newly-discovered regions in America and Asia between the two, those in Asia had fallen to the share of Portugal. Though this arrangement was not long respected by the Spaniards, the result was that the first Europeans to arrive in Japan were Portuguese adventurers. They landed, so reports state, in 1542 on an island midway between Kiushiu (the southernmost of the group of islands then constituting Japan) and Loochoo. It was from them that the Japanese learned the use of fire-arms. Their visit led to the establishment of commercial relations between Portugal and Japan. But this early development of trade, which was conducted chiefly at Nagasaki by Chinese as well as Portuguese traders, was quickly overshadowed in importance by the spread of Christianity, which was introduced by the Portuguese missionary, Francisco de Xavier, seven years later. The Christian propaganda in Japan was for several years very successful. Amongst the causes which contributed to this success were the unsettled state of the country; the semi-independence of some of the larger daimios; the hostility of Nobunaga, the ruler of Japan (1568-82), to the Buddhist priesthood, whose power he crippled; the connexion between foreign trade and the new religion, of which both daimios and missionaries were quick to take advantage; the resemblance of the moral teaching and ceremonial of Christianity to those of Buddhism; and the love of novelty inherent in the Japanese people. Christianity reached its highest point of influence about the year 1587. The number of converts was then little short of a million, and two missions had been despatched by Christian daimios to Rome.

In that year, however, a new ruler, Hidéyoshi,

being in power, the first edict against Christianity appeared, and persecution began. This change in the attitude of the Government was brought about by the over-zeal of the missionaries, the quarrels which arose between the religious orders, and their intrigues with the feudal nobility and with the Court at Kyoto. After the death of Hidéyoshi and the creation by Iyéyasu in 1600 of a strong centralized government which favoured Buddhism, anti-Christian edicts increased in frequency, and the persecution became more general and vigorous, while the troubles produced by these measures assumed in places a political character. The expulsion of all missionaries was decreed in 1614 and again ten years later, and in 1636 there appeared the famous edict of the Shogun Iyémitu virtually closing the country to foreigners, and forbidding Japanese to go abroad, which was not formally repealed until 1865. The persecution continued with relentless severity after the expulsion of all Spaniards and Portuguese. Its closing episode was the Shimabara insurrection, which broke out in the peninsula of that name in the province of Hizen, the largest Christian centre. The rising, due, according to some accounts, to local misgovernment as much as to religious causes, was put down with much bloodshed, and with its suppression (1638) the curtain falls on the early history of Christianity in Japan.

Relations with Foreigners.—Meanwhile, shortly after the Christian persecution had begun, Dutch traders had established themselves in the island of Hirado, which lies off the north-west coast of Kiushiu. Early in Japanese history this island had served as the place through which communications with China had been conducted, and it had continued ever since to serve as one of the channels of foreign intercourse. The first Dutch vessel came in 1600, the year which saw the establishment of Tokugawa rule. It was navigated by an English master-pilot, Will Adams, who on account of his skill in ship-building was detained by the Japanese when they released the

Dutch crew. It was through his good offices at the Shogun's Court that the Dutch were allowed to set up a trading factory in Hirado in 1609—an example followed by the English, with the same assistance, four years later. Captain John Saris, to whom the trading privileges were granted, had arrived in Japan the year before, after a voyage beset with difficulties placed in his way by the Dutch. The latter had by that time disposed of Spanish and Portuguese pretensions to exclusive trading rights¹ in Asia, and the chief power in Eastern waters, together with the possession of the famous Spice Islands—the Moluccas—had passed into the hands of Holland. In Japan, as elsewhere, the Dutch looked upon the English as intruders, and their hostility led to the withdrawal of the English factory after a few years of unsuccessful trading.

When in 1636 Japan was closed to foreigners, an exception was made in favour of the Chinese and the Dutch, who, for reasons similar to those which led the Chinese in the same century to discriminate between the subjects of Protestant States such as England, Denmark, and Holland, and those of Roman Catholic countries, were either not regarded as Christians, or looked upon as a harmless kind. But in 1641 the Dutch were removed from Hirado, and interned in Deshima, an island-quarter of the town of Nagasaki; and fifty years later (in 1688) the Chinese, who had from the first traded at that port in comparative liberty, were confined in an enclosure close to the Dutch settlement. Here, paying dearly as State prisoners for the commercial privileges they enjoyed, the traders of both nationalities carried on a precarious and gradually dwindling commerce, of little benefit to themselves or the Japanese, until Japan was opened for the second time to foreign intercourse in the middle of the nineteenth century.

¹ See above, p. 20.

² The Japanese indeed were sufferers by the exportation of gold, of the relative value of which to silver and copper they were at that time ignorant.

For Japan's early seclusion from the world her geographical position was responsible, though the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century were doubtless a contributory cause. The subsequent closing of Japan by official decree in the seventeenth century was the direct result of the troubles arising out of the Christian propaganda, and the general distrust of foreigners thereby produced. Here again, however, another influence may have operated indirectly. This was the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592. Though at first successful, it ended, after a struggle of nearly seven years, in the withdrawal of the invaders. Japan was left with crippled resources, and the doubtful advantage of a small trading post in the south-west corner of the peninsula. The memory of this disastrous war may have had some influence in stimulating anti-foreign feeling, and confirming the Japanese Government in its decision to close the country.

V. RENEWAL OF FOREIGN INTERCOURSE AND CONCLUSION OF TREATIES

For more than two centuries Japan's deliberate seclusion remained undisturbed. Japanese writers, indeed, speak of an English attempt to resume trade late in the seventeenth century, and from time to time at rare intervals news of foreign vessels being cast away on the Japanese coasts reached Europe through the Dutch. With these exceptions the veil of seclusion which shrouded Japan was not lifted. With the opening of the nineteenth century, however, new conditions came into existence. During the last fifty years of Dutch trade at Nagasaki, which corresponded with the first half of the nineteenth century, changes full of meaning for Japan were taking place in the world, and the visits of foreign vessels occurred more often. A new neighbour, Russia, had made her appearance in eastern Asia, where she was extending her boundaries to meet Japan; the growth of a young and vigorous State in North America had led to the develop-

ment of whale fisheries in the Sea of Okhotsk, and to the opening of a new route between East and West which skirted the shores of Japan; and British and French enterprise was fast demolishing the barriers of conservative prejudice behind which China had entrenched herself. To these causes, and to the introduction of steam navigation, were due these visits of foreign vessels. Beginning at the close of the eighteenth century, they gradually increased in frequency, causing amongst the Japanese much uneasiness, which the warnings received from the Dutch at Nagasaki did not tend to allay.

In picturesqueness of incident the visits of Russian ships take the first place; in practical importance those of American vessels. The newly discovered whale fisheries brought the crews of American whalers into contact with the Japanese, whose inhospitality was the cause of much resentment. The duty of protecting American ships in the conduct of their fishing operations, and enabling them to get fresh provisions and water, and the need of ports of call in Japanese waters for American steamers engaged in the China trade, caused the American Government to take steps to establish friendly relations with Japan. The first attempt (made by Commodore Biddle in 1845) was not successful. But eight years later, undeterred by previous failure, the United States despatched a naval squadron of four vessels to Japan under Commodore Perry. He brought a letter from President Phillipmore, for which he demanded a receipt, promising to return for an answer in the following year. When Perry returned in the spring of 1854 he came with a larger squadron. Before so formidable a show of force Japanese resistance broke down, and the first treaty between Japan and a foreign Power was negotiated. With the resumption of foreign intercourse—this time on a treaty basis, and 'in opposition to the honourable country's law', as was stated in the receipt given for the President's letter—the modern history of Japan may be said to commence.

It may be well to summarize briefly the condition of Japan when Perry arrived. He found a highly-organized community excelling in arts, industries, and agriculture, wedded to ceremonial, permeated by Chinese ideas, and enjoying a system of government cumbrous, obscure, and quite unique of its kind. The nation was divided into several distinct classes: the Court nobility without wealth or influence; the dominant military or *samurai* class, which included the feudal aristocracy; the farmers; the artisans; and at the bottom of the social scale the merchants and trades-people. The central authority was nominally vested in a shadowy personage in Yedo, whose exact relationship to a still more shadowy personage in Kyoto it was not easy to determine. There was a feudal system under which the daimios ruled their own territories, or, subject to Shogunate supervision, those of their neighbours; certain districts, including what were known as the Shogun's domains, as well as some towns, being reserved for the direct administration of the Yedo Government. The central authority, exercised by means of Councils of State and a vast assemblage of executive and judicial officers, was weak and growing weaker. An uneasy feeling was abroad, and the first signs of the troubles which culminated in the downfall of the Shogunate were beginning to show themselves. Clan jealousies and feudal restrictions hindered national progress in many directions; there was much distress and discontent; and the currency of the country was in a state of great confusion. Foreign intercourse was confined to the Chinese and Dutch traders visiting Nagasaki, and, when it was not Chinese, Dutch was the medium of communication with the outside world.

The example set by America was followed in the same year by Great Britain, who through Admiral Stirling negotiated a treaty at Nagasaki. Neither of these instruments was a regular commercial treaty. Perry's treaty simply opened to American vessels the ports of Hakodaté and Shimoda, neither of which offered

any substantial facilities for trade; but it provided for treatment different from that accorded to the Dutch and Chinese. The British treaty merely opened to British vessels, for the purpose of supplies and refitting, the ports of Hakodaté and Nagasaki, the latter of which, in spite of its favourable situation, Perry had thought it prudent to overlook, owing to the difficulty of accepting for Americans the humiliating conditions of residence and trade to which the Dutch had submitted. The British Admiral was not concerned with trade at all.¹ The primary reason for the negotiation of the treaty with which his name is associated lay in considerations arising out of the Crimean War, which made it desirable for British forces operating on the Kamschatkan coast to be within reach of a friendly port. His treaty, indeed, while stipulating generally for most-favoured-nation treatment, expressly excepted 'the advantages accruing to the Dutch and Chinese from their existing relations with Japan'. In the same year, also, a Russian Admiral signed a treaty at Shimoda. By this the three ports of Hakodaté, Nagasaki, and Shimoda were opened to Russian vessels. Subsidiary arrangements subsequently extended, or defined, the scope of these early treaties.

It was not till four years later (1858) that a real treaty of commerce and friendship was concluded. This was the treaty with America negotiated by Mr. Harris, the first duly accredited representative of a foreign Power. This treaty served as a model for all later Conventions. Lord Elgin's treaty dates from the same year. In the course of the next few years similar treaties were concluded with fifteen other countries. The new features of these treaties were

¹ The difference in the points of view from which the British and American negotiators regarded the position of the Dutch at Nagasaki is very striking. The one looked upon trade as a very minor consideration. The other was determined to establish commercial relations free from the humiliating conditions imposed upon the Dutch. But as a demand for the opening of Nagasaki on this basis would have raised unpleasant questions, he decided to overlook Nagasaki altogether.

the opening of additional ports, the establishment of a tariff, and the introduction of tonnage dues; the concession of the right of travel anywhere in Japan to diplomatic agents and consuls-general; the obligation, on the side of foreigners, to refrain from erecting fortifications, or places of strength, and, on the Japanese side, to refrain from enclosing the foreign residential areas; a slight modification of the unilateral character which distinguished the previous treaties; and an understanding in regard to revision. In other respects they merely confirmed, or amplified, the provisions of earlier arrangements. Thus, to quote a few instances, the right of appointing a consular agent at a particular port was expanded into general diplomatic and consular privileges, including the right to appoint a minister at Yedo; for the port regulations of previous arrangements general trade regulations were substituted; the limited privilege in regard to religious matters given in 1857 to the Dutch became a right to the free exercise of religion and the erection of places of worship; the concession of ex-territoriality was more explicitly defined, and was made to apply to civil as well as criminal jurisdiction; and the prohibition of the importation of opium, mentioned in previous Dutch and Russian conventions, was confirmed.

The last treaty to be concluded with one of the Great Powers was the Austro-Hungarian Treaty of 1869, the English version of which was made the 'original'¹ or authoritative, text. By virtue of the most-favoured-nation clause, which figured in all the conventions, and provided for the unconditional extension to the Government or subjects of the foreign contracting party in question of any privileges, immunities, or advantages granted before or after by Japan to the Government or subjects of any other country, the Austro-Hungarian Treaty governed the relations of Japan with foreign countries until the new Revised Treaties came into force in 1899.

¹ *Original* is the word used in the treaty (Art. XXIII).

This series of treaties, concluded by Japan as Japanese statesmen have always complained—and so recently as 1917—in ignorance of the principles regulating international relations, besides conceding ex-territoriality to foreigners, fixed a low scale of tariff duties. Moreover, no period of duration being named in any of the treaties, their revision was subject to the consent of all the signatories, though practically only to that of the leading Powers concerned. The irritation caused by these onerous, and in Japanese opinion humiliating, conditions led soon after the Restoration to an agitation for Treaty Revision, which did much to embitter Japanese feeling towards foreigners, and continued until the revision by Great Britain of her treaty in 1894. Nevertheless, this injustice, as the Japanese regarded it, was a blessing in disguise. On the admission of the Japanese themselves¹ it served as a powerful stimulus to progress on the lines of Western civilization.

A point of some interest remains to be noticed in connexion with the treaties concluded after the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse, namely, the ignorance of foreign Governments as to the true position of the Shogun. They were unaware—and it is singular that this ignorance should have extended to the Dutch—of the existence of an Emperor who resided in Kyoto. The Shogun was regarded as the Emperor, and so designated—with the addition generally of the title Tycoon²—in the foreign texts of all

¹ See statement of Marquis Okuma in *Fifty Years of New Japan*, and Viscount Kato's article in *Chūwō Kōron* of June 1917; also p. 68.

² More correctly written *Taikun*. This term, which signifies Great Prince, was first used by the Japanese in the course of negotiations with Korea early in the eighteenth century, the object being to conceal from the Koreans the fact that the Shogun was not the sovereign. The precedent was too convenient not to be used in similar circumstances a century and a half later. The last treaty in which the word occurs is the Danish Treaty of January 1867. When the treaties with the North German Confederation and Austria-Hungary were concluded in 1869, the Shogunate was no longer in existence. The last use of the word in a State paper occurs in the Memorandum giving the reasons for the Shogun's resignation

the treaties, with two exceptions, signed before 1869. Strange to say, the first treaty, Perry's, formed one of these exceptions. In this there is no mention of the Shogun, the term used being 'the sovereign of Japan'. The explanation of this discrepancy is that, although the nominal sanction reserved to the Crown in certain matters of State never extended to foreign affairs, the weak Government of the day was so embarrassed by the emergency created by Perry's demands that they revived for the occasion an authority which had not existed for some centuries. The other exception is the Tariff Convention of 1866. In this case the reason for the use of the term 'the Government of Japan' in place of the word 'Tycoon' may be that some at least of the foreign representatives had become aware of the existence of an Emperor, and of a dual system of government, and preferred to employ a paraphrase which avoided a difficulty.¹

The fifteen years of treaty-making which followed Perry's arrival, and during which the laws proscribing Christianity and forbidding Japanese to go abroad remained unrepealed, were in some respects the most stormy that Japan had known since the establishment of the Tokugawa rule. The weakness of the Government, and the complications attending the renewal of foreign intercourse on a novel basis, furnished the Imperial Court at Kyoto with an opportunity of reviving pretensions to a share in administration which it had long since abandoned. The same conditions favoured intrigue against the Shogunate with the powerful daimios in the west and south, who were anxious to throw off a yoke they had never willingly accepted.

In these revived pretensions and active intrigues the Court gained a powerful ally in the Prince of which was presented to the foreign representatives in November 1867 by Ogasawara Iki no Kami, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs.

¹ This is the more probable in view of the action taken by the foreign representatives the year before—in 1865—in visiting Osaka, and obtaining the Emperor's sanction to the treaties negotiated in 1858 and succeeding years.

Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki, who, in his double capacity as representative of one of the *Gosanké*¹ and hereditary adviser to the Shogun, had an influential voice in State affairs. The Mito branch of the Tokugawa family had long wavered in its loyalty to the Shogun. When, at the close of the seventeenth century, the movement known as The Revival of Pure Shinto arose, the then Prince of Mito placed himself at its head. In its inception it was a purely literary movement, having for its object historical research, and favouring the study of native as distinguished from Chinese literature. But owing to the duality of language and religion already noted, to the connexion between the native language and the native religion (Shinto), and to the association of the latter with the Imperial dynasty, the movement acquired in the course of time both a religious and a political character, tinged with Chauvinism and anti-foreign prejudice. Buddhism and Confucianism were decried because of their foreign origin, the study of Chinese literature was denounced for the same reason, while the Shogunate was secretly blamed for its usurpation of the heaven-sent rule of the Mikados. It was not surprising that a feudal prince nurtured in these traditions should take the side of the Court at a moment when it was giving proofs of renewed vitality.

There was, however, another reason for the Prince of Mito's conduct. The ruling Shogun, Iyésada, who was childless, became in 1858 seriously ill, and there was no hope of his recovery. In the struggle which took place for the nomination of his successor, the rival factions were led, respectively, by the anti-foreign Prince of Mito, who favoured the selection of his seventh son² (afterwards the Shogun Keiki), and by Ii Kamon no Kami, the daimio of Hikone, who at the moment was the dominating personality in the Shogun's Government. The struggle ended in the victory of

¹ See above, p. 13.

² Having been adopted into the Hitotsubashi family, one of the *Gosankiō* (see above, p. 13), he was eligible for the position of Shogun

Ii Kamon no Kami. The Prince of Kishiu, Tokugawa Iyémochi, whose candidature he supported, was nominated heir, and on the death of Iyésada a few days later (in August 1858) became Shogun. The new Shogun being still a minor, Ii Kamon no Kami was appointed to the office of Minister-Regent. His first act in his new capacity was to force the Prince of Mito to abdicate his position as head of the Mito clan in favour of his eldest son, and to imprison him in the Mito palace in Yedo, where on suspicion of entertaining anti-Shogunate views he had been confined some years before.

The Minister-Regent did not enjoy his triumph long. In the spring of 1860 he was assassinated by Mito clansmen while on his way from his residence to the Shogun's palace. In him the Shogunate lost its strongest prop, and the country its most liberal statesmen. His death gave increased vigour to the anti-foreign crusade preached by the Court party, which showed itself in the murder of the Secretary of the Dutch Legation in Yedo in 1861, and in the attacks made on the British Legation in the same year and the year following. This hostile attitude towards foreigners culminated in the year 1863 in two grave incidents: the firing upon foreign vessels in the Straits of Shimonoseki by forts manned by retainers of the daimio of Choshu, and the murder of Mr. Richardson, a British subject, on the high road near Yokohama by the bodyguard of a Satsuma noble, who was on his way to the Shogun's Court in Yedo. In retaliation for these outrages the forts were destroyed by a foreign squadron, while Kagoshima, the Satsuma capital, was bombarded and partly destroyed by British men-of-war. In each case, moreover, an indemnity was exacted. These prompt reprisals had a good effect so far as foreigners were concerned, though the indemnities were paid by the Shogunate and not by the offending clans; but the condition of the country grew more and more disturbed, and political assassinations more frequent. The Choshu clan at length rose in open rebellion.

This clan, which had from the first taken the chief part in espousing the cause of the Court at Kyoto against the Shogun, had in the summer of 1864 made a raid on the old capital with the object of gaining possession of the person of the Emperor, and raising the Imperial standard. The attempt was unsuccessful, and a punitive expedition conducted by the Tokugawa Government against the clan resulted in the suppression of the rising. The success of these punitive measures was due, however, not to the military strength of the Government but to the co-operation of neighbouring clans, especially that of Satsuma, whom it had summoned to its assistance. And when, shortly afterwards, the rebellion broke out again in a more formidable shape, and the neighbouring clans, instead of co-operating with the Government forces as before, secretly aided the insurgents, the campaign directed against the Choshu clan under the immediate superintendence of the Shogun was a complete failure. The Tokugawa Government realized its powerlessness. It accepted a compromise by which a pardon was granted to the chief of the rebellious clan, and by the end of the year 1866 hostilities had ceased.

VI. THE RESTORATION (1868-9)

With the crumbling of Tokugawa prestige brought about by this signal defeat, the influence of the anti-foreign Court party increased until a state of complete political confusion was reached. The 'Imperialists', as they now came to be called, clamoured loudly for 'the expulsion of the foreign barbarians'—a cry borrowed from China—while the Shogun's Ministers wrestled with an impossible task, simulating acquiescence in the anti-foreign policy of the Court, while endeavouring at the same time to fulfil treaty obligations. A climax was reached in 1867. In January of that year the Emperor Kōmei died, being succeeded by the Emperor Mutsuhito. In the same month the boy Shogun, appointed nine years before, also

died. The new Shogun was Hitotsubashi Keiki, the unsuccessful candidate in 1858. Unfitted in character for such heavy responsibilities, he tendered his resignation in the autumn of the same year, but remained in Kyoto, where his presence, like that of his predecessor, had been called for in connexion with the Choshu campaign. For a time there was some prospect of a peaceful solution of the crisis; but this suited neither the ambition of the Court nobles nor the set purpose of the hostile clans. In January 1868 the threatening attitude of the Court party compelled the Shogun to withdraw to Osaka, whence, after a half-hearted effort to reassert his authority by force of arms, he returned to Yedo. All hope of a peaceful settlement then disappeared, and civil war ensued. Hostilities were of short duration. Except in the north-eastern provinces, where a gallant stand was made by troops of the Aizu clan round the historic castles of Wakamatsu, Nihommatsu, and Yonézawa, and in the northern island of Yezo, where a small remnant of the ex-Shogun's adherents held out until the following year, little resistance was encountered by the Imperial forces; and by the spring of 1869 peace was everywhere re-established.

The Restoration,¹ as the revolution of 1868-9 is usually called by English writers, though the Japanese term for it means simply renovation, was the work of the military class in four² 'Western clans', to use the Japanese expression, aided by sympathizers in other parts of the country, and encouraged by the Court at Kyoto. Its seeds had been sown in the course of the two previous centuries of Tokugawa rule. The dual system of government was, as we have seen, complicated

¹ The word 'Restoration' is not used in its strict sense, the restoration of a dynasty of sovereigns. It means the restoration of the direct rule of the Emperor, which had, as the Imperialists maintained, been usurped by the Shogun. The use of the term may be misleading, but it is not easy to find a better word, and it has the advantage of having been used by both Japanese and foreign writers for many years.

² i. e. Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen and Tosa.

by duality of language and religion. There were thus two conflicting currents of political feeling, one favouring the native language and religion, and consequently identified with the Imperial House; the other, with which the Shogunate was from the first in sympathy, inclined towards Buddhism, Chinese literature, and Confucianism—all of foreign origin. From the literary, religious, and political revival of the eighteenth century, already described, the sentiment in favour of the native language and religion derived increased vitality, and ranged itself definitely on the side of the Court, the authority of the Shogunate being at the same time weakened by the defection of the Mito branch of the Tokugawa family. Early in the nineteenth century the study of Western learning, through the medium of Dutch books and by association with foreigners attached to the Dutch factory at Nagasaki, had produced a spirit of unrest, which was stimulated by news, received through the Dutch, of the proceedings of the English and French in China.

Other disturbing influences were popular excitement caused by the advent of foreigners demanding peremptorily the renewal of foreign intercourse on a novel basis; economic distress; and the discontent and disorganization inseparable from the decay of feudal institutions. Many causes, it will be seen, were working together to encourage hostility to the Tokugawa regime, and favour vague aspirations for political changes which might give fuller and more practical expression to the principle of Imperial rule. Before the Restoration took place there was much divergence of opinion amongst its promoters. The Satsuma 'Federalists', as they are called by the author of *The Awakening of Japan*, wished to reorganize the feudal system much on the lines existing in the half-century that preceded the Tokugawa domination. The Choshu leaders, who were in close association with the Court nobility, sought their ideal farther back, and were in favour of the restoration of the Imperial bureaucracy as it existed in pre-feudal days. There was a third party, consisting

of a small group of men of progressive ideas in various clans who advocated administrative reform on Western lines.

When civil war broke out, all differences appeared to have been merged for the time being in a common programme of Imperialism on a feudal basis. But, as soon as the triumph of the Restoration movement was assured, a complete change of attitude in regard to foreign intercourse occurred. The Imperialists came into power with the cry of 'Expel the foreign barbarians'. It was the creed of the Court; the memory of the fighting with foreign ships at Shimonoseki and Kagoshima was still fresh in people's minds, and the belief of the bulk of the military class was that the downfall of the Shogunate would carry with it the withdrawal of foreigners. To the bewilderment of their followers, however, the leaders of the movement not only acquiesced in the continuance of foreign intercourse, but encouraged the adoption of Western culture, and appeared in the rôle of reformers. The explanation of this startling *volte-face* is probably to be sought in the fact that anti-foreign feeling had been used by all concerned as a convenient weapon against the Shogunate, and that as soon as its downfall was accomplished the leaders changed their policy, having the wit to perceive that it was not in Japan's power to put an end to relations with foreign Powers. It is possible also that foreign ideas may have struck deeper roots in the country than was at first realized.

However this may be, it should be noted that the avowed aim of the Imperialists—the restoration of the direct rule of the Mikado—was, in its literal sense, never accomplished. What the revolution really effected was the downfall of the Shogunate. The dual system of administration and the principle of figure-head government were too deeply rooted to be destroyed. The Shogunate was replaced by a Government first of four and afterwards of two clans, and the figure-head method of rule worked on as before. Nor in the public life—the formal activities—of the sovereign did the

change wrought by the Restoration extend far below the surface of things. The youthful Emperor emerged indeed from the rigid seclusion of centuries, but he remained entrenched behind a less rigid but more ceremonious barrier of palace etiquette. The veil which had for so long shrouded the sovereign's person and movements was only partially lifted, not wholly removed.

VII. NEW GOVERNMENT (1868)

Formation of New Government.—The new Government formed in the spring of 1868 was in many respects a patchwork administration in which a confusion of ideas and an endeavour to reconcile conflicting views are apparent. The form chosen (see p. 34) was that of the pre-feudal bureaucratic system, which had little in common with the feudalism that still survived, while it was burdened with other incongruous elements copied from foreign institutions.

The chief feature in the new administration was its division into eight bureaux, or departments, of State. The first was the bureau of Supreme Administration; the second had control of matters concerning the native religion. Of the other six, one had charge of legislation, while the remaining five corresponded in a general way with similar departments in Western countries. Feudal interests were represented by the creation of a special class of councillors with deliberative functions chosen from all the clans, seven only being excluded for political reasons. This body was subsequently expanded into a clan deliberative assembly; but the experiment, made in an atmosphere of feudalism, with a vague idea of realizing the aspirations indicated in the Imperial oath, was a failure. Two months later the administration was reorganized, a Council of State replacing the bureau of Supreme Administration, and a regrouping of departments took place. Into the details of these and other changes introduced in the course of the next few years it is unnecessary to enter.

Personnel of the Government.—The personality, so

to speak, of the new Government claims some attention, for the direction of affairs remained in the same hands until seventeen years later, when a final reorganization of the administration on Western lines was effected. The chief place in the new administration was given to Prince Arisugawa, a member of the Imperial House, who was appointed President of the Council of State, two leading Court nobles, Sanjo (who became president in 1874) and Iwakura, being associated with him as vice-presidents. Two other Imperial princes and five Court nobles presided over other departments of State, in which room was found for three representatives of the feudal nobility. In this group of notabilities the only outstanding figure was Iwakura, who at once took a leading place in the direction of affairs. The rest took no active part in the administration. They were simply convenient figure-heads, giving stability and prestige to the new order of things. Among those who held office in minor capacities were the feudal retainers, inspired with ideas of reform, who pulled the strings from behind the scenes. Foremost of these, to mention only three in a long list of names which have become historical, were Okubo of Satsuma, Kido of Choshu, and Goto of Tosa, who, together with Iwakura, were the moving spirits in the first years of the new administration.

While the civil war was still going on, the ports of Kobe and Niigata had been opened to foreign shipping, and the cities of Yedo and Osaka to foreign residence (1868-69); and as soon as order was restored the young Emperor received the foreign representatives in audience, Yedo, renamed Tokyo, becoming the new capital.

VIII. ABOLITION OF FEUDAL SYSTEM (1871)

The abolition of the feudal system in August 1871 was the most notable act of the new Government. It paved the way for all later reforms, serving as the starting-point for the whole course of Japanese progress.

Two years earlier, in March 1869, the first step had been taken in this direction by the presentation of memorials from the daimios of the four clans¹ which had taken the chief part in the Restoration asking for permission to surrender their fiefs to the Crown. Their example was followed by others, and by the end of the year, out of 276 feudal nobles, only 17 held aloof from the movement, these being daimios of eastern districts who had taken the Shogun's side in the civil war. The question raised by these memorials was referred by the Government to the experimental deliberative assembly already mentioned, and to a special council of daimios convened in Tokyo. As a preliminary measure the administration of the clans was remodelled, and the daimios summoned to Tokyo for consultation returned to their fiefs in the capacity of temporary governors. A further step in the same direction was taken by the amalgamation of the Court and feudal nobility into one class, to which the name of *Kwazoku* (nobles) was given. These and other dispositions having been made, a decree, singular in its brevity, was issued. 'The clans', so it ran, 'are abolished, and prefectures are established in their place.'

The ex-daimios received one-tenth of their former revenues (see p. 12), pensions, subject to commutation later on, being also granted to the general body of feudal retainers, except those of certain rebel clans. Similar measures were taken in the case of those members of the military class (the *Hatamoto* and *Gokénin*) who formed the hereditary personal following of the Tokugawa Shoguns. The gross revenue which came into the Crown's possession by the disappearance of the Shogunate and the feudal system may be estimated at about £35,000,000. From this sum, however had to be deducted, in addition to the pensions of the military class, the portion of the yield of the land, varying according to the locality, which was due to the peasant cultivators. Unlike the feudal retainers, who were the fighting force of the clans, the peasant was

¹ Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen.

a gainer by the change. His position under feudalism, while full of anomalies, had in no two places been quite the same. But, even where the peasant had been little better than a serf, and had been subject to grave disabilities and restrictions in the cultivation and disposal of his land, fixity of tenure had been virtually assured to him. In this respect his position was confirmed under the new order of things. Though no single decree affecting the broad issue raised for the farming class by the disappearance of the feudal landlords was promulgated, the various restrictions which had curtailed the rights of the cultivator were one by one removed, until by the year 1873 it became clear that, while retaining the theory that the former feudal ownership of all land became vested, as of old, in the Crown, it was intended that, subject to the obligation of paying land-tax, the farmer should become virtually the proprietor of his land.

The surrender of the fiefs forced upon the immediate attention of the Government a question much wider and more difficult than the change in the position of the farmer. This was the question of the area, the class, and the taxation of the land he cultivated. The land-tax had from early times been the principal source of revenue. This was still the case under feudalism; and, in order to deal with the question in a thorough and equitable manner, it was decided, after feudalism was abolished, not only to revise the whole system of land taxation, but to carry out a survey and valuation of all land in the country. This survey and valuation, commenced in 1871, was not completed until ten years later. Meanwhile, however, the land tax was revised and rendered uniform throughout the country, being made payable in money, and not, as formerly, in kind. It was based on the value,¹ and not, as before, on the yield, of the land. The rate was fixed at 3 per cent. of the value of land, and was reduced in 1877 to 2½ per cent.

¹ But this value was arrived at by ascertaining the value of the average yield of land in each district for a period of five years.

The suddenness of the abolition of feudalism, and the dramatic character imparted to it by the surrender of their fiefs by the feudal nobility, have caused some misapprehension both among Japanese and foreign writers. The truth is that, long before the 'Restoration' took place, the government of the fiefs had passed out of the hands of the nominal rulers, both daimios and *karo* being relegated, like the Shogun, to the position of nonentities. The increasing number of clanless *samurai*, known as *rōnin*, bore witness to the general decadence of clan authority, while matters were made worse by the existence in several clans, notably those of Satsuma, Choshu, and Mito, of rival parties, whose hostility to each other had all the bitterness of family quarrels. Much that seems strange and unaccountable in the sweeping away of feudalism by the stroke of a pen, as it were, disappears on closer examination. One is apt to forget that the Shogunate was the core of the feudal system in its later development, that both were in an advanced stage of decay, and that the downfall of the one was in the natural sequence of events bound to lead to the disappearance of the other. It must also be remembered that the spirit of the Imperialist movement was anti-feudal as well as anti-Shogunal, and by a curious and double contradiction was at one and the same time working in association with feudal prejudices and progressive ideas.

In circumstances such as these little opposition was to be looked for on the part of the daimios. Brought up in traditions of seclusion analogous to those which characterized the tenure of the throne and the Shogunate, and exposed to the same effeminating influences, denied by custom all share in the management of clan affairs, the daimios had no reason to object to the abolition of feudalism. It involved no sacrifice on their part. Their material interests remained unaffected, nor was there any authority to be relinquished save in name. As a matter of State policy it was beyond their control, and it is no exaggeration to say that, with a few brilliant exceptions, they were through-

out all the negotiations for the surrender of their fiefs only dimly conscious of the meaning of what was going on.

The case of the *samurai* was different. It was only natural for them to view with reluctance the abolition of a system, centuries old, under which they occupied a position of superiority in the social order. But a wave of Imperialist sentiment had swept over the nation, of which the reforming statesmen took full advantage. It must also be borne in mind that, in spite of the effete character of clan administration, there was everywhere a strong undercurrent of feudal loyalty, still active after the disappearance of the clans, which showed itself in implicit obedience to the wishes of the feudal lord, no matter through what channel they might be conveyed. Discontent, too, was rampant, induced by the impoverished condition of the *samurai* and of the daimios on whom they depended for support. Then, again, the spirit of change was abroad, and a desire for novelty not unnatural in a nation shut off for so long from contact with the outside world. And, finally, there was the influence of the reformers who realized that the continuance of feudalism, no less than that of the Shogunate, was incompatible with the new extension given to foreign relations. Considerations of this kind, and perhaps also the fact that they now received pensions, may account for the acquiescence of the *samurai*, as a class, in a measure from which they had seemingly everything to lose and nothing to gain.

With the disappearance of feudalism and the amalgamation of the Court and the feudal nobility the social organization was simplified. In place of the former elaborate feudal classification the nation was grouped into three new classes: nobles, gentry, and common people.

IX. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1868-73)

The work of reform on Western lines proceeded with bewildering rapidity. The changes introduced in the first few years included the establishment of conscrip-

tion on European lines; the creation of a postal system and the opening of a mint; the construction of the first railways, telegraphs, lighthouses, and dock-yards; the reduction of Shinto from the position of a State religion, to which it had been raised at the Restoration, to the status of the religion of the Court; the suppression of anti-Christian edicts and the cessation of religious persecution; the adoption of the Gregorian Calendar; the establishment of treaty relations with China; the creation of the Tokyo University; and a reconstruction of the Ministry which strengthened the position of the leading reformers and the influence of the clans¹ they represented. The despatch of the Iwakura Mission to Europe (1871) also calls for notice. This mission was unsuccessful in its immediate object, which was to obtain the consent of foreign Governments to a revision of the 1858 treaties, in accordance with a stipulation providing for a revision by mutual consent. But its members, amongst whom were some of the most talented Japanese of the day, were able during an absence of two years to collect information of the greatest value to the Government.

X. SATSUMA REBELLION (1877-8)

Ministerial Dissensions.—In 1873, shortly after the return of the Iwakura Mission, the work of reconstruction was interrupted by dissensions in the Government, which resulted in the retirement from the Ministry of two of the Satsuma leaders and of the representatives of the Hizen and Tosa clans. These dissensions arose ostensibly over the questions of war with China in connexion with Loochoo, which acknowledged a double allegiance to China and Japan, and with Korea, which had refused to enter into treaty relations with Japan. But other reasons lay behind. Amongst these were personal differences between leading men; jealousy of the Choshu clan owing to its ascendancy in State councils, and its close alliance with the Imperial Court; and

¹ See above, p. 36.

resentment occasioned by the compulsory commutation of pensions, and the prohibition of the practice of wearing swords.

There was discontent, too, in Satsuma, where it was thought that the services of the clan in the Restoration had been insufficiently rewarded. The Satsuma garrison in Tokyo had for this reason been withdrawn; and, although an Imperial messenger had been sent to the province with complimentary presents, the clan's resentment remained unappeased. Affairs in Satsuma were complicated by the existence of three different parties: a small anti-foreign section represented by Shimadzu Saburo, who was connected with the Richardson affair; a conservative but not anti-foreign section led by Saigo Takamori, a prominent figure in the Restoration, and a popular idol in his province and elsewhere; and a progressive section, which looked for guidance to clan reformers such as Okubo, Terashima, Kawamura, and the younger Saigo. There was also much dissatisfaction in the clans which had been foremost in espousing the Imperial cause at what was regarded as the too liberal treatment accorded to the adherents of the Shogunate, at the abolition of the feudal system, at the introduction of conscription, which was regarded as dangerous to the military prestige of the leading clans, and at the progressive tendencies of the statesmen in power. The triumph of the peace party in the Government produced much unrest in the country, especially in the south-west, and led first to abortive insurrectionary movements in Hizen, Choshu, and Higo (1874-6), and finally to the formidable Satsuma rebellion of 1877. So great was the popularity of the chief leader of the rebellion, Saigo Takamori, that, if he had crossed over to the main island at once, the success of the movement might have been assured. But he stopped to invest the castle of Kumamoto, which lay in his way. This gave the Government time to rally its forces, and in the autumn of the following year the rebellion was crushed.

The Government in this struggle was in the fortunate position of having the Crown on its side, always an important point in Japanese civil wars. It had the further and singular advantage of being able to rely on the co-operation in military and civil administration of the picked men, intellectually speaking, of the rebel clan. These had thrown in their lot with the Government they had helped to establish, and knew the resources of the clan better than the rebels themselves. In these considerations lies the explanation of two striking results of the rebellion—the fact that the Government emerged from the struggle stronger and more compact than before,¹ and the further fact that the Satsuma influence in the administration remained unimpaired. From that moment, instead of being, as after the Restoration, a ‘Government of the leading clans’, as it was popularly termed, it became a Government of the two clans of Satsuma and Choshu—a character it retains to-day.

The suppression of the rebellion, during the course of which the Government lost by death the services of two of its ablest ministers, Kido and Okubo, was more than a victory for the Government. It meant the triumph of the spirit of modern progress over the mediaevalism of Old Japan. The war was a heavy drain on the national exchequer. An official statement of its cost, made in 1893, placed it as high as £82,000,000; but this estimate seems excessive. There were, however, some compensations for the expenditure in blood

¹ One reason of the success of the new Government, which also supplies in some measure the secret of Japan's rapid rise to the position of a Great Power, lies in the generosity displayed by the victors to the vanquished in the civil troubles which marked the course of the country's modern progress. Witness the liberal treatment—in the main—of the ex-Shogun and his adherents in 1869, and the conduct of the Government after the Satsuma rebellion. In the latter case no stigma subsequently attached to the men who had fought for the Satsuma clan. The temple dedicated to those who had fallen in the war was erected in the common memory of all, both loyalists and rebels.

and treasure. The reactionary and disturbing elements in the country had been taught once for all that the new order of things must be accepted. The new conscript army had dispelled all doubts of its efficiency. It had demonstrated, to the surprise of everybody, that the fighting spirit was not the heritage solely of the former military class, but that an army recruited from all classes of the people was an institution on which the State could safely rely. Moreover, the administrative organization having successfully passed the severest test to which it could have been subjected, the Government had the satisfaction of feeling that it had acquired the confidence of the nation, and also of foreign Powers, to a degree hitherto unknown.

XI. PROGRESS OF RECONSTRUCTION (1874–81)

Administrative Reform.—During the period of civil commotion, which ended with the suppression of the Satsuma rebellion, the work of reconstruction did not stop altogether. To this period belong the birth of the first Japanese Steamship Company; the issue of regulations which were the first step in the reorganization of local administration in towns and villages; the creation of a High Court of Justice (*Daishinin*), and of a Legislative Chamber,¹ or Senate (*Genroin*), composed of officials, which continued in existence till 1890; the establishment of treaty relations with Korea; and the arrangement with Russia by which the southern half of Sakhalin was ceded by Japan in exchange for the Kurile Islands. Progress, too, was made with the revision of the land-tax and the re-survey and valuation of land. With the restoration of order the work of reconstruction proceeded rapidly. A Stock Exchange and a Chamber of Commerce were established in the capital, where also the first National Industrial Exhibition was held. In

¹ In some respects its duties were more those of an advisory council. It had no power to initiate legislation, nor to give it final effect. But it facilitated the work of government by drafting new laws, and by discussing and suggesting alterations in any measures submitted for its consideration.

1879 Loochoo was annexed. The tacit but never fully recognized *condominium* of China and Japan over this group of islands had nearly led to war a few years before. Japan's action called forth a strong protest from China, but the question was eventually allowed to drop.

The years 1880 and 1881 were remarkable for the promulgation of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, both of which came into operation in 1882, and signaled the completion of the first legal reforms, a task in which the assistance of foreign jurists had been obtained; for decrees which paved the way for the establishment of prefectural assemblies, and the reorganization of urban and rural administration, measures which involved a large concession of local autonomy; and for an even more noteworthy step in the direction of popular government—the issue of a decree promising a Parliament in 1890. The Imperial message delivered at the opening of the Senate in 1878 had announced the Emperor's wish to establish constitutional government by degrees. The decree was a fulfilment of this promise. These liberal measures were, however, counterbalanced to some extent by the enactment of stringent regulations regarding public meetings which restricted freedom of speech.

XII. INCREASED AGITATION FOR POPULAR REFORMS (1882-5)

At this moment disagreement with his colleagues of Satsuma and Choshu on various questions led to the withdrawal from the Ministry of Mr. (now Marquis) Okuma, the leading Hizen representative in the Government. His retirement gave a fresh impetus to the agitation for immediate popular reforms which had been going on for some years. The movement had its origin and chief centre in Tosa and Hizen, and developed into a long constitutional struggle which, though modified in character since the establishment of parliamentary institutions, is not yet ended. It must not be supposed that the Government, although driven to take repressive measures from time to time,

was wholly out of sympathy with the movement. There was no great difference of principle between progressive politicians in the Government and those outside; but for several years the bulk of official opinion was conservative, a fact with which the progressive members of the Government had to reckon. Later on the difference between the two parties resolved itself largely into a question of time, the more eager spirits wishing to move faster than was considered safe by the statesmen in power. The latter were undoubtedly right. In the aims of the early agitators there was much that was vague, crude, and impractical, defects for which the channels through which constitutional ideas first reached Japan were responsible.

The political creeds of these advanced reformers were shaped to a great extent by the foreign influences which affected Japan in the initial stages of her new development. From the books chiefly studied, the *Social Contract*, the *Age of Reason*, and the *Rights of Man*, only abstract conceptions regarding independence, liberty, and equality were obtainable; and, when practical guidance was sought as to the best mode of giving effect to the principles therein expounded, by the accident of geographical situation the inquirers were referred to the Declaration of Independence, the American Constitution, and the institutions of the various federal states. It was certainly unfortunate for Japan that her nearest western neighbour, who had taken the leading part in re-establishing foreign intercourse, and whose influence had for these reasons ever since been the most powerful, should be the one country least fitted by the character of its institutions, and the general tendency of its civilization, to fill the rôle of tutor. The widespread diffusion of republican ideas in a community newly emerged from feudalism was attended with embarrassing results; and the difficulties thus created may well have been one of the causes which impelled Japanese statesmen later to look to Europe rather than America for the models to be adopted in administrative reconstruction.

The services of the Japanese press, which made its first appearance in the capital, in modern form, in 1872, though ephemeral news-sheets had existed before, were enlisted in aid of the crusade for immediate popular reforms. There was no lack of writers possessed of what passed for education at that time; for the Restoration and the abolition of feudalism had thrown on their own resources large numbers of the former military class, which was also the educated class of the country. The political articles then written were not of the quality of those to be read to-day. They consisted chiefly of quotations from European writers on the subject of equality and the rights of man, interspersed with phrases from the Chinese Classics, which were the stock-in-trade of all journalists; and, strange as was the contrast presented by materials culled from sources so different, they were quite effective for the purpose in view, which was to denounce what was described as the tyrannical policy of the Government. Political lecturers also, drawn from the same class as the writers, declaimed to excited audiences on similar topics. Much of this public speaking and writing was undoubtedly mischievous. It is, therefore, not surprising that the authorities should have taken severe measures for the suppression of this form of agitation. The right of free public meeting and discussion was withheld, and the young press, which had signalized its birth by championing the cause of the people, was muzzled by rigorous press laws. To such lengths was interference with the press carried that at one time there was not a single Tokyo paper some member of whose staff was not under arrest, and a class of dummy-editors (popularly called 'prison-editors') was evolved, whose duty it was to be the 'whipping-boys' of the journals they represented, and serve the sentences of imprisonment imposed.

Educational influences of a more direct kind lent force to the agitation. The fusion of classes which was one of the first results of the Restoration had the effect of opening, with few exceptions, public and private schools

alike to all classes of the people, thus bringing within the reach of every one the education which before had been the privilege only of the military class and Buddhist clergy. Through the efforts of teachers in these schools, and of educationalists writing for the express purpose of disseminating western knowledge and modern ideas of all kinds, the work of educating the nation proceeded apace. Political societies, too, out of which grew the political parties which are now a conspicuous feature of Japanese public life, were formed, and a vigorous propaganda was conducted in support of the advanced programme put forward by the agitators. Up to the time of the issue of the decree promising a Parliament¹ the movement, the course of which ebbed and flowed in response to official measures of repression and conciliation, was in its first stage. Hitherto the situation had been this. The Government was, as we have seen, a government of two clans. The ranks of the party in favour of immediate reform were, on the other hand, recruited from the rest of the country. It was composed chiefly of three elements: genuine reformers of very advanced ideas, the result of ill-digested reading of European and American literature; those who, actuated by a survival of clan feeling, viewed with impatience the power wielded by the two governing clans; and disappointed politicians. For all these elements the demand for popular rights was a convenient rallying cry. To the opposition thus formed—which gradually grew more compact—the retirement of Okuma from the Ministry meant the accession of a powerful ally.

With the promise, however, of a Parliament at a definite date the situation had radically changed. It was no longer a question whether, or even when, there was to be a Parliament, but simply what sort of Parliament the one to be established in 1890 should

¹ October 12, 1881. The actual date is interesting, as at the ceremony of promulgation the text of the preamble of the Constitution read by the Emperor gave the date wrongly as October 14. Ito at once tendered his resignation, which was refused.

be. On this point there was no intention of consulting the nation. The decree had expressly stated that the form and powers of the Parliament would be settled by the Emperor. This meant that they would depend on the provisions of the Constitution; and as a first step in the framing of this Constitution a special mission, at the head of which was Mr. (afterwards Prince) Ito, was sent to Europe to study the political systems of the West.


XIII. FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES (1882-85)

The ground was thus cut from under the feet of the agitators. Their chief grievance had disappeared. It became necessary for them to prepare for the time when the opening of a Parliament would furnish them with a field for their activities. At the same time the Government and its supporters realized the necessity for similar action, if it wished to hold its own in the parliamentary arena. The effect of the decree was, therefore, to hasten the formation of political parties of a more developed kind than the earlier political clubs to which reference has already been made. The *Jiyuto*, or Liberal Party, was the first of these to be formed. It came into existence in 1882 under the leadership of Mr. (afterwards Count) Itagaki. Its declared object was to work for the extension of popular rights and liberties and the improvement of social conditions. A second party, called the Party of Constitutional Reform (*Rikken-Kaishinto*), was established by Mr. (now Marquis) Okuma a few weeks later. Its programme was of a more definite character. Besides the usual stock phrases about upholding the dignity of the throne and promoting the happiness of the people, it advocated internal reforms, local autonomy, and financial readjustment. The third party which made its appearance at this time was called the Party of Constitutional Imperialism (*Rikken-Teiseito*). Its *raison d'être* was support of the Government, which the other two parties opposed. It,

therefore, came to be known as the Government Party. Some of the items of its elaborate programme were sufficient indication of its official sympathies. It approved, for instance, of the date fixed for the opening of the first Parliament, and of the form of the Constitution being left to the Emperor's decision. But liberal tendencies showed themselves in regard to other points, such as the desirability of separating the army and navy from politics; the independence of judges; freedom within legal limits of public meetings, public speech, and the press; and financial reform.

The same reasons which led to the formation of these three political parties in the capital inspired the birth of many more in the provinces. More than forty sprang into existence with startling rapidity, the political confusion which resulted being increased by the rule which made it necessary for each to be registered as a separate association, though its name and political programme might indicate with sufficient clearness its connexion with the parent organization in the capital. All these political parties had, it should be noted, one common feature—shown in most cases by the word *constitutional* which appeared in their names—the recognition of the fact that they were formed for parliamentary purposes in view of the forthcoming Constitution.

Little was accomplished by this first attempt to organize political parties. At the end of two or three years two of the parent organizations had melted away altogether, while of the third—the Party of Constitutional Reform—only a leaderless remnant was left. A similar fate befell the provincial branches. The failure of the movement may be traced to a variety of causes. One was the rigorous legislation upon which the Government, in accordance with its policy of alternate repression and conciliation, embarked as soon as the concession of a Constitution had been made; another lay in the absence, at this early stage of political development, of any concrete or well-defined issues upon which politicians could concentrate. One reason



alone, however, in the absence of any others, would probably have sufficed to render futile this first experiment of party-making for parliamentary purposes. There was no Parliament, and no one knew what sort of Parliament there would be. In these circumstances the proceedings of political parties lacked reality.

For the measures of repression to which the Government had resort in dealing with the new form of political agitation there was the same justification as there had been for similar action taken in the earlier days of the Meiji era. The *ex-samurai* still formed a class which was a constant source of political trouble, because with the largest share of intelligence and education it was at the same time idle and impoverished. Some time must necessarily elapse before members of this class could be absorbed in the rest of the population. Meanwhile, these relics of the feudal system lay like a blight upon the land; and, after the compulsory commutation of pensions, which left them in the end worse off than before, they caused increasing embarrassment to the authorities. For a time their restless energies found occupation in the formation of political parties. With the failure of this movement their attention was turned to other channels of political activity, and no less than three separate outbreaks, following one another at short intervals (1883-85), testified to the serious mischief to be apprehended from this unruly class. Even in pre-Restoration times the *samurai* had given trouble to the clan authorities. The *rōnin*, or clanless *samurai* of feudal days, who for any reason left, or was forced to leave, his clan, was but the precursor of the man who, after the new Government was formed, was ready to become successively a rebel, an agitator, or eventually a political rowdy (*Sōshi*), as changing conditions might dictate. In justice to all parties, however, it is well not to overlook the fact that one reason for the political opposition with which the Government has always had to contend is to be found in the concentration of power ever since

the Restoration in the hands of men of the two clans of Satsuma and Chōshū. Even when, in later years, under parliamentary government, Radical Ministries have been formed, the political parties in power for the time being have invariably been excluded from the control of the departments of War and the Navy.¹

XV. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1889

Framing of the Constitution.—On the return from Europe of the Ito Mission the task of framing a Constitution was commenced. The mission had spent most of its time in Germany, attracted thither partly by the personality of Prince Bismarck, but chiefly by the conviction that German models in constitutional as well as other administrative matters were those best suited to Japan's requirements. The bureaucratic basis of administration in that country was what Japan was herself engaged in consolidating; the conservative bias of the aristocratic classes in Germany found sympathizers in a nation which had just emerged from feudalism; and the German Constitution, under which the sovereign and his ministers were independent of Parliament, appealed with special force to statesmen who wished to retain as much power as possible in the hands of the Crown. The head of the mission, Mr. (afterwards Prince) Ito, became Minister of the Imperial Household, and a 'Bureau for the Examination of Laws' was formed in that department. To this bureau was given the task of drawing up the Constitution under the direction of Ito. The choice of the Imperial Household for this purpose was determined by political considerations. It was desired to impress upon the people the position of the Emperor as the source of all authority. The arrangement had also the advantage of disarming criticism, while the privacy necessarily associated with the proceedings of a department attached to the Court eliminated all possibility of outside interference or agitation. The

¹ The present *Seiyūkai* Ministry is the latest instance.

author of the *Political Development of Japan* has suggested that the conditions under which the framing of the Constitution took place gave undue opportunity to reactionary influence. There is something, however, to be said for the view that the precautions taken were on the whole wise. The language of the opposition journals of that time, and the speeches made on public platforms by Radical politicians, were not of a nature to inspire any confidence in the political wisdom of the public in general, and the course of Japan's political development since the Constitution came into operation tends to show that the prudent conservatism which characterized the policy of the Government at that time was in the best interests of Japan.

Creation of New Order of Nobility (1884).—Soon after the return of the Ito Mission a new order of nobility was created, the model adopted being that of the continent of Europe. With the abolition of feudalism had disappeared all feudal designations, and also the empty Court titles of ancient origin, the official bestowal of which had been one of the few prerogatives left to the Crown. The disappearance of these various distinctive titles had been viewed with regret in many quarters, especially in cases where the titles were hereditary, and the decision to replace them by others was welcomed by all classes. There was another reason for taking this step. The Constitution was in course of preparation. A House of Peers was to be one of its leading features; and it was essential to create an order of nobility before the Constitution came into operation. There were three classes of recipients of these titles: the ex-*kugé*, or Court nobles; the ex-daimios, or territorial nobility; and the ex-*samurai*, who had rendered eminent service to the State at the time of the Restoration, and were still in office. The lion's share of honours given to the last-mentioned class fell naturally to Satsuma and Choshu clansmen.

Reorganization of Ministry.—An administrative measure of even greater importance, which took place in the following year, 1885, was the reorganization

of the ministerial system. In this, as in the matter of titles, the hand of the new Minister of the Imperial Household could be seen. Under the archaic system of administration revived at the Restoration, which, in spite of frequent modifications, had still preserved its main outlines, the Chief Minister of State—or *Daijo Daijin* as he was called—held no portfolio; and, though all important decrees were issued in his name, he had little control over the various departmental ministers, who were all independent of one another. The effect of the alteration now introduced, in imitation of the German Cabinet system, was to give increased importance and authority to the post of Chief Minister, or Premier, who received the new designation of Minister President of the Cabinet. It had also another and deeper signification. It meant the final triumph of Western ideas, and at the same time the replacement of the previous figure-head administrators by the men who (in association with others no longer in office) had up to that point directed the Government from behind the scenes.

Progressive Tendencies and Resumption of Specie Payments.—The progressive tendencies of the Government were also shown about this time by the adoption of English as a subject in school curricula (1884), and by the introduction of a system of competitive examinations for employment in the civil service (1885); while its financial stability was strengthened by the resumption of specie payments in 1886. Before the Restoration the paper currency of Japan had been in a condition of hopeless confusion, most of the feudal territories having their own paper notes of various kinds, which circulated outside, at par, at a premium, or at a discount, as the case might be. The financial difficulties encountered by the Government in remedying this state of things, and in meeting the expenditure involved in the work of reconstruction, rendered it impossible for a long time to place the paper currency of the country on a sound footing; and the experiment of establishing National Banks empowered to issue bank-notes in

proportion to their capital was a failure. For many years, therefore, the finances of the State were embarrassed by an inconvertible paper currency. Eventually, however, arrangements were completed for the withdrawal of the National Bank Note issues, and in 1886 the resumption of specie payments was carried into effect on a silver basis, the present gold standard not being adopted until eleven years later.

Establishment of Privy Council.—In 1888 the Privy Council was established. This measure had a close connexion with the Constitution in process of elaboration. Prompt use was made of the services of the new body. Within a fortnight of its institution the new Privy Councillors were discussing the draft of the Constitution with the Cabinet—now strengthened by the return to office of Okuma—at the first of a series of meetings over which the Emperor presided.

Revival of Political Agitation.—In the meantime a revival of political agitation, to which an anti-foreign colour was given by the failure of the Tokyo Conference of 1886–87 to agree on a basis for the revision of the Treaties between Japan and foreign Powers, continued to occupy the serious attention of the Government. To some extent this agitation was a protest against the pro-foreign tendencies of the Ministry, which had, it was thought, been carried too far. A feature in this movement was the formation of an association composed of men representing all shades of political views who were united only by hostility to the Government. A new class of political rowdies, called *Sōshi*, came into existence; public tranquillity—especially in the capital—was threatened by the creation of secret societies and the recurrence of political crime; and it again became necessary for ministers to be attended by guards, as in former years. The condition of affairs at length became so alarming that the Government of 1887 took the strongest repressive measures adopted since the Restoration, and issued the so-called Peace Preservation Regulations. These, besides prohibiting both secret meetings and

public demonstrations of any kind, empowered the authorities to expel from the capital for a term of years any persons suspected of an intention to disturb the public peace.

Promulgation of Constitution.—The years 1889 and 1890 are remarkable for two important events in the modern development of Japan: the promulgation and coming into force of the long-promised Constitution, and the reorganization of local government.

The Imperial Decree (Feb. 11, 1889) promulgating the Constitution provided that the Diet should be convoked for the first time in 1890, and that the date of the opening of the first session should be that on which the Constitution should come into operation. The ceremony of promulgation took place in the newly-built palace in Tokyo, the function being attended by all State dignitaries and many officials. Seats outside the Court circle were arranged according to the new rules of precedence, the first place being given to Prince Shimadzu, the ex-daimio of Satsuma, the second to Prince Mori, the ex-daimio of Choshu, and the third to Prince Iyēsato Tokugawa, the new head of the Tokugawa family,¹ who replaced the ex-Shogun in that capacity. The ceremony in a sense symbolized the new spirit which had come over Japan; for the participation of both the Emperor and Empress in the proceedings was contrary to all Japanese traditional ideas regarding the privacy of the throne and of the Imperial Consort.

As has already been explained, the Constitution in its leading features resembles that of Germany, the chief Ministers of State being made independent of the Diet, and responsible only to the Emperor. The seven chapters into which it is divided deal with the position and prerogatives of the Sovereign, the rights and duties of the people, the functions of the Diet, and other kindred matters; and one of the supplementary rules attached to it provides for its revision. Various accessory laws concerning the Imperial House, the

¹ He was the adopted son of Tokugawa Keiki, the ex-Shogun.

organization of the Diet, the election of members, and finance, were enacted simultaneously.

The Diet, or Parliament,¹ which came into being as a result of this legislation, comprises two Chambers: an Upper Chamber (or House of Peers), whose members fall into two categories, one composed of non-elective life members, the other of elective members of two kinds who are chosen for seven years; and a Lower Chamber (or House of Representatives), whose members, numbering 379,² are elected by voters of 25 years of age and upwards paying direct national taxes amounting to not less than 10 yen (about £1) *per annum*. Since the amendment of the Law of Election in 1900 there has been no property qualification for membership, the only conditions being the attainment of thirty years of age, and the possession of civil rights. The dissolution of Parliament, the natural term of which is four years, is one of the Imperial prerogatives. When the Lower House is dissolved, the Upper House is prorogued.

Before leaving this subject it may be well to call attention to the fact that in Japan a Parliament and a Constitution were simultaneous creations. Other countries, such as France, for instance, have either enjoyed parliamentary rights of various kinds before they have been endowed with Constitutions; or, as in England and Spain, the process has been reversed. In Japan the two came together. The nation had, therefore, no knowledge whatever of the working of parliamentary institutions, and no experience of national or local assemblies. This may partly account for the stormy character of parliamentary government. It may be well also to mention another point which has an important bearing on the practical working of the Japanese parliamentary system, namely, the control exercised by the Diet over the Budget. Although

¹ Japanese writers use both terms when writing in English.

² Originally 300. The number was increased in 1900. Urban electoral districts return 75 members, the remainder coming from rural districts.

under the Constitution the Ministers of State are independent of the Diet, the latter, by withholding supplies, may force a dissolution, in which case by the terms of the Constitution the Government is obliged to substitute, in place of the rejected Budget, the Budget of the previous financial year passed in the preceding session. Any new financial programme, therefore, to which the Government may have committed itself in the rejected Budget is consequently held up, and cannot be proceeded with until a fresh Budget has been passed in a subsequent extraordinary session of Parliament. This means a delay of, at least, several months. The weakness of parliamentary opposition parties in Japan, as compared, for instance, with similar parties in Great Britain, is thus, to some extent, remedied by the powers which the Diet possesses in regard to the Budget. On the other hand, however, the Government has frequently profited financially by dissolutions of the Diet arising out of conflicts over the Budget, since, as the author of *Fifty Years of New Japan* explains, the effect of these has usually been to reduce expenditure rather than revenue.

The first parliamentary elections were held in the summer of 1890, the first session of the Diet taking place in the following autumn.

Reorganization of Local Government.—The system of local administration in force when the Restoration took place was based on groups of five households, or families, the so-called *Gonin-gumi*, each under the direction of a headman, and was the development of an earlier form¹ of tribal or patriarchal government, introduced from China at the time of the Great Reform in the seventh century. The headman of each group of five households was subject in towns to the control of the senior alderman of the ward, and in villages to that of the mayor. Appointment to these posts was governed partly by election and partly by

¹ In this earlier form the unit of administration was larger, each group governed by its own headman being composed of five sets of households or families.

the custom of hereditary succession. The duties of these local office-holders were to make known the orders of the Central Government, or direct feudal authorities, to administer justice, and to collect taxes. The general interests of the townspeople, or villagers, as the case might be, were also in their charge. These were, speaking roughly, the broad lines on which local administration was conducted under the feudal system.

With the disappearance of feudalism in 1873¹ this system of local government was no longer workable. The task of substituting in its place something more in keeping with the new order of things had occupied the attention of the Government for several years; and the course pursued in carrying out the changes proposed indicated that the authorities regarded the reform of local administration as part of the whole scheme of representative institutions which came into operation in 1890. A beginning had, as we have seen, already been made by the issue in 1878 of regulations regarding rural districts, or counties (*Gun*), urban districts (*Ku*), towns (*Chō*), and villages (*Son*), which provided for the establishment of local assemblies in each of these administrative areas. These came into force two years later, when similar provision was made for the establishment of prefectural assemblies. The arrangements then introduced were altered in various respects in subsequent years, being finally revised in 1890, when the Law of Cities (*Shi*), Towns (*Chō*), and Villages (*Son*) came into operation. Since that day further modifications, affecting points of detail, have been made from time to time.²

The basis of the revised system now in force is the separation of local government into two main branches, urban and rural. The system is in operation in 45

¹ The decree abolishing feudalism was issued in 1871. Its full effects were not seen until 1873.

² For instance, it is only since 1908 that the Law of Cities, Towns, and Villages has been made applicable in all respects to the three leading cities, Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka. For many years the administration of these three cities was a subject of dispute between the Diet and the Government.

out of 46 prefectures into which Japan Proper is divided, the exception being Loochoo (Okinawa prefecture). Each of these, three of which are the city or urban prefectures¹ of Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka, is divided into urban districts or cities (*Shi*), and rural districts or counties (*Gun*). A rural district or county (*Gun*) is again subdivided into 'towns' (*Chō*) and villages (*Son*). The classification of a town as an urban district or city (*Shi*), or a 'town' (*Chō*), depends on its population. Unless otherwise determined by the Minister of the Interior, with whom the final decision rests, all towns of over 25,000 inhabitants have the status of cities (*Shi*), and enjoy as such a somewhat larger measure of self-government than those not in this category. The 45 prefectures in which the system is in operation comprise 637 rural districts or counties (*Gun*), 67 cities (*Shi*), 1,220 'towns' (*Chō*), and 11,093 villages (*Son*). In each prefecture there is a prefectural assembly (*Kenkwai* or *Fukwai*),² and an executive council (*Sanjikkwai*). Similar assemblies and executive councils exist in each rural district (*Gun*) and city (*Shi*), but 'towns' (*Chō*) and villages (*Son*), though they are provided with assemblies, have no executive councils, the duties of these latter bodies being entrusted to the mayors.

The system of election to assemblies and executive councils (where the latter exist) is *mutatis mutandis* the same in each administrative unit. In prefectures where the population does not exceed 700,000, an assembly is composed of 30 members. In those which have a larger population, another member is provided for each additional 50,000 inhabitants. The property qualification for electors in the case of prefectural assemblies is the payment of 3 yen (about 6s.) annually as national³ taxes, and for those eligible for election

¹ Called *Fu* to distinguish them from the ordinary prefectures (*Ken*).

² According as it is a city prefecture (*Fu*), or an ordinary prefecture (*Ken*).

³ Namely, Imperial, not local, taxation.

as members the payment of 10 yen (about £1) annually as national taxes. The age qualification is 25 years, and the possession of civil rights is essential. Voting is by secret ballot. City assemblies are larger, the number of members varying according to the population from 30 to 60, the latter number being the maximum. Electors in cities are divided into three classes according to the proportionate amount of direct municipal taxes paid by them, the method of classification being somewhat complicated. Each class of electors chooses separate representatives in the city assembly, but a member thus chosen need not necessarily belong to the class of electors which he represents.

The *Sanjikkwai*, or executive council, of a prefecture consists of 10 councillors, and is presided over *ex officio* by the prefect, who is assisted by two prefectural officials. The councillors are chosen by the assembly from amongst its members. In rural districts (*Gun*) the presiding official is the *Guncho*, or district administrator, who, like the governor of a prefecture, is appointed by the Home Office. In cities the mayor of the city presides, being assisted by one, two, or three deputy-mayors,¹ as the case may be.

The assembly in each administrative unit votes supplies and discusses matters connected with the general business of administration. Chief amongst these is the question of taxation. In this the *corvée*, an institution which dates back to the time of the Great Reform, occupies a prominent place, though—except in cases of emergency—substitutes may be furnished or money payments made in commutation.

XV. FURTHER LEGAL REFORMS (1890)

The same year (1890) which saw the Constitution and the parliamentary institutions created under it come into operation, and the establishment of a revised

¹ In Tokyo there are three; in Kyoto and Osaka two each; in other cities one.

local administration on self-governing lines, witnessed fresh stages of progress in the work of legal reform. The Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, which had been in force since 1882, appeared in a revised form, together with the law of the organization of Judicial Courts. The Code of Civil Procedure and the Commercial Code were also promulgated. The former came into operation at once, the latter not till eight years later, after having undergone complete revision.

XVI. CONTINUED POLITICAL AGITATION AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE (1890-1)

Neither the establishment of parliamentary institutions, nor the other progressive measures taken by the Government, had any calming effect on the disturbed political situation, both in the capital and provinces, to which reference has already been made. On the very morning of the promulgation of the Constitution, the Minister of Education—whose advanced pro-foreign views had caused much irritation in reactionary circles—was murdered in the presence of his guards by a Shinto priest; in the autumn of the same year the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Okuma, who had reopened negotiations for the revision of the treaties, was forced to resign owing to severe injuries from the explosion of a bomb thrown by a political fanatic, a native of his own province of Hizen; while in the spring of 1891 the late Tsar, Nicholas II, who was on a visit to Japan, had a narrow escape from injury at the hands of a policeman on duty, who attacked him with a sword. A curious feature, already noted in the political agitation of this period—which continued for some time after parliamentary institutions had been in full operation—was that the agitators belonged to many different parties, and included reactionaries who enforced their views by recourse to the violent methods of pre-Restoration days, as well as

advanced Radicals, whose chief quarrel with the Government was that it did not move faster in the adoption of Western ideas.

XVII. TREATY REVISION (1882-94)

The question of the revision of the treaties with foreign Powers, which was the avowed cause of the above-mentioned attack on the Foreign Minister, was a favourite grievance with political agitators; and it was only natural that the Government should, for many reasons, endeavour to remedy a state of things which offended the susceptibilities of the nation. It may be well, therefore, to give a brief account of the negotiations for the revision of these treaties which were undertaken from time to time in the course of the 28 years that elapsed from the despatch of the Iwakura Mission to Europe in 1871 to the coming into operation of the revised treaties in 1899.

The treaties which governed the relations of Japan with foreign Powers belonged to the series concluded between the years 1858 and 1869, the latest being that with Austria-Hungary.¹ As has already been explained, they provided for ex-territoriality for foreigners in Japan, and fixed a low scale of customs duties, while the term of operation was indefinite, revision being subject in each case to the consent of both parties. The despatch of the Iwakura Mission so soon after the Restoration testified to the importance which the Japanese Government attached to this matter. This first attempt on the part of Japan to obtain a revision of the treaties met with no encouragement, the Powers approached declining to enter upon any discussion of the question. The next attempt resulted in the negotiation of a new treaty with the United States in the year 1876; but this treaty remained a dead letter owing to the inclusion of a clause providing that it should come into operation only when similar treaties were concluded with other Powers. Nothing further was done until 1882. In the autumn of that year a preliminary

¹ See p. 27.

conference of the representatives of Japan and the leading Treaty Powers was held at Tokyo. No definite result was then reached, but the ground was cleared for further negotiations, which took place four years later. At this second conference in Tokyo, which lasted from May 1886 to June 1887, definite progress was made; but finally negotiations were abruptly broken off by the Japanese delegates in consequence, as was understood at the time, of popular dissatisfaction at the proposed employment of foreign judges in Japanese Courts of First Instance and Courts of Appeal in cases where foreigners were defendants—a measure regarded as derogatory to the national dignity. In 1889 negotiations were reopened in Tokyo. The proposals then submitted by Count Okuma, as Foreign Minister, were accepted by the American and Russian Governments; but public feeling in Japan again showed itself hostile to the appointment of foreign judges, even on the reduced scale contemplated by the new proposals, and negotiations were interrupted by the attempt on Okuma's life, to which reference has already been made. The injuries he received caused his retirement from the Ministry, and arrangements were made for the cancellation of the two treaties which had been concluded.

In the following year Lord Salisbury presented to the Japanese Government in Tokyo proposals for treaty revision which were based on the results achieved during the second Conference. These British proposals conceded the principles of territorial jurisdiction on the condition that all the new Japanese Codes of Law should be in operation before the revised treaty came into force, and offered an increase of 3 per cent. in the Customs Import Tariff. The duration of the proposed treaty and tariff was to be twelve years, at the end of which time Japan would recover complete tariff autonomy. The proposed treaty further provided for the opening of the whole of Japan to British trade and intercourse, and for her adhesion to the International Conventions for the Protection of Industrial Property and Copyright. There was reason to think that the

Japanese Government would welcome proposals so liberal. Again, however, popular agitation interfered with a settlement of the question. Objection was raised to the ownership of land in Japan by foreigners, a point which had figured in all previous schemes of treaty revision, and the matter was quietly shelved without ever reaching the stage of negotiations. Public opposition to this and other schemes of treaty revision was probably encouraged by jealousy in political circles, which made it difficult for any single statesman or party to gain the credit of having settled this long pending question. And, as regards the British scheme of revision, it may have been felt that it was desirable for the country's prestige that the proposals which should furnish the basis of the new treaties should emanate from Japan.

In 1894 negotiations were resumed by the Japanese Government in England, the Japanese Minister in Berlin, Viscount Aoki, being sent to London for this purpose. The proposals then submitted to the British Government were practically the same, both in form and substance, as the previous British proposals, the chief difference lying in the substitution of a right of lease only in place of the right of ownership of land by British subjects. The negotiations ended in the signature on July 16 of the same year of a new treaty and protocol, some minor matters being regulated by an exchange of Notes. By the new treaty arrangements consular jurisdiction was abolished; the whole of Japan was opened to British trade and intercourse; and Japan undertook to join the International Conventions for the Protection of Industrial Property and Copyright, and to bring the new Japanese codes into force before the revised treaty came into operation. In order, moreover, to allow time for the negotiation of similar treaties with other foreign Powers it was provided that the new treaty should not come into force before the expiry of five years from the date of signature.¹

¹ The Japanese Government had reason to regret this substitution of tenure by lease for ownership, since it led to the controversy

The new treaty was received with a chorus of disapproval by British merchants in China and Japan; in the latter because of the surrender of ex-territoriality, which was regarded as necessary to the existence of British trade in Asiatic countries; in the former from the fear of creating dangerous precedents in the Far East. But it is obvious that the time was ripe for a concession of this kind. To the objection, moreover, that the treaty was one-sided in respect of the advantage derived from it, one party, Great Britain, giving more than she received, an answer was supplied by the fact that the circumstances of the case precluded the idea of anything in the nature of an ordinary bargain. In return for what Japan gained, to wit, the abolition of Consular Jurisdiction, and an increased tariff, with tariff autonomy to follow, what had she to offer? Very little. The opening of the whole country—already made accessible to travellers through a passport system—was of no real advantage to British trade, the channels and outlets for foreign commerce being already fixed and settled, and therefore unlikely to be affected by it; nor could the benefit to be expected from the adhesion of Japan to the International Conventions concerning Industrial Property and Copyright be considered a very valuable *quid pro quo*. Other considerations, however, weighed in the scale—considerations quite apart from direct material advantage. By being the first to revise her treaty on terms similar to those she had herself offered two years before Great Britain acquired a certain moral prestige. She also retained her position as the leading Western Power in the Far East, and she gained the goodwill of Japan, thus preparing the way for the future Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Subsequent events, as well as the testimony of prominent Japanese statesmen,¹ have established the wisdom of the policy pursued.

which was referred to the Hague Tribunal in 1905, and decided against Japan.

¹ One of the latest references to the subject was made by the present Japanese Ambassador, Viscount Chinda, in his speech at

XVIII. WAR WITH CHINA (1894-5)

Meanwhile, before the successful termination of the Treaty Revision negotiations in London, serious difficulties had arisen between China and Japan over the question of Korea. Since the end of the sixteenth century, when the Manchu armies had turned back the tide of Japanese conquest, and forced Japan to withdraw her forces from Korea, China had always claimed a sort of protectorate over that country similar to that exercised by her in Loochoo until its annexation by Japan. This Chinese suzerainty was not recognized by Japan, who had already in 1876 concluded a treaty with Korea on a footing of equality. China, nevertheless, had never abandoned her pretensions, and the

Sheffield University on June 29, 1918 (see *Times* of July 2, 1918). On this occasion Viscount Chinda, after referring to the enthusiasm of the welcome given to Prince Arthur in Japan, said :—

‘I wish to invite your attention to three conspicuous events which have been the important factors in fostering and moulding these sentiments. They are the revision of the Treaty in 1894, the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, and the espousal of a common cause in the present world war.

‘Perhaps no one except a Japanese will be able to appreciate truly and fully the great importance attached to the question of Treaty revision. For the Japanese, however, the question was a matter of paramount importance, connoting as it did nothing less than a national emancipation. The first treaties of Japan with foreign Powers were signed while the nation was still in a state of torpor from a long slumber of seclusion, and in the circumstances amounted almost to duress. No wonder, then, that they should have been very defective in safeguarding the vital interests of the country. So defective indeed were these treaties that Japan was in effect deprived of the two essential attributes of a sovereign State. The redemption of her judicial and fiscal autonomy became henceforth the dream of Japanese national aspiration, and her policies, both foreign and domestic, were shaped principally with this one supreme end in view. Innovation after innovation, often involving sacrifices of traditional sentiments, were introduced for the purpose of assimilating the country and its institutions to the standard of Western civilization.

‘In these circumstances the British Government, with their characteristic sense of discernment and justice, gave a whole-hearted recognition to the claims of Japan by revising the old Treaty, and thus set the example for all other Powers to follow.’

title of Resident, and not Minister, given to her representative in Seoul was, in effect, an assertion of her claim. The immediate cause of the crisis which now arose was an insurrection which broke out in the south of Korea in the summer of 1894. Both China and Japan sent troops to the scene of the revolt, Asan, to restore order. The two forces came into collision at Asan with the result that the Chinese troops were defeated, and were withdrawn to China. A week before a Chinese transport carrying troops to Korea had been sunk by a Japanese man-of-war. Hostilities had, therefore commenced on land and sea before the simultaneous declaration of war by both Governments on August 1. The war which ensued was disastrous for China. On land her armies, without discipline or proper equipment, were no match for the well-trained and highly disciplined Japanese forces, organized on the basis of national service, and led by officers who had studied the art of war under the guidance of foreign instructors. And, though at sea the superiority seemed to be clearly on the side of China, the Chinese fleet in northern waters being stronger numerically than the Japanese fleet, and having also the advantage of possessing one or two ships of a more powerful class than any Japanese vessel, it showed early in the war that it had little stomach for fighting. The Chinese in the south had no interest in what they called Li Hung-chang's war, and the southern contingent of the navy took no part in it. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the war was soon over.

After their success in the fighting at Asan the Japanese increased the number of their troops in the Korean capital, which they had already occupied at the commencement of hostilities. Using Chemulpo, the port of Seoul, for the landing of reinforcements, the Japanese commanders moved north, and on September 17 after two days' fighting drove the Chinese troops from the important town of Pingyan, situated some sixty miles from the Yalu river, which forms for some

distance the frontier between Korea and China. On the same day the Chinese northern fleet was beaten in the only important naval action of the war. Towards the end of October the two Japanese divisions, operating in Korea on parallel lines, crossed the Yalu and Aiho rivers, and forced the Chinese army to evacuate all Korean territory. The main Japanese army under Marshal Oyama landed at the same time above Ta-lien Wan, which lies at the neck of the Kwangtung peninsula. The Chinese at once evacuated Ta-lien Wan, the Chinese northern fleet, which had collected there after its defeat in the action of September 17, taking refuge in Weihaiwei. Thence it never again emerged, leaving to the Japanese for their further operations the undisputed command of the sea. In these operations the Japanese armies encountered no formidable resistance. On November 21 Port Arthur was stormed, and early in December the Japanese divisions operating from Korea, assisted by a third division detached for the purpose by Marshal Oyama, occupied Kaiping and Haicheng. In the course of February and March the Chinese were defeated in three successive engagements in this neighbourhood, losing Newchwang, and being pushed farther north along the course of the Liao river. Meanwhile an expeditionary force despatched from Ta-lien Wan in January 1895 had landed in Yung-chêng bay to the east of Weihaiwei, and laid siege to that place, acting in co-operation with the Japanese fleet. On March 16 the fortress surrendered after a gallant defence by Admiral Ting. The fall of Weihaiwei and the preparations made by Marshal Oyama to attack Peking convinced the Chinese Government of the hopelessness of further resistance. An armistice was accordingly concluded on March 30, and the negotiations which followed resulted in the signature of the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17.

The main provisions of this treaty, the negotiation of which was interrupted by an attack made on the Chinese delegate, Li Hung-chang, by a Japanese

fanatic, were the recognition by China of Korea's independence; the cession to Japan of the southern portion of the province of Fêng-t'ien¹—it being left to a Joint Commission of Delimitation to determine the exact boundaries of this ceded territory²—Formosa and the Pescadores; the payment by China of an indemnity of two hundred million Kuping taels, and the opening of four new places in China—namely, Shasi, Chungking, Soochow, and Hangchow—to foreign trade. The treaty also established the right of foreigners to engage in manufacturing enterprises in China, and provided for the conclusion of a Convention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade, and of a Commercial Convention between the two Powers on the lines of China's treaties with Western Powers conceding ex-territorial privileges for Japanese subjects in China, though not for Chinese subjects in Japan. Finally, it arranged for the occupation of Weihaiwei by Japan until the indemnity had been paid.³ Three months later—on July 21—the Commercial Treaty thus provided for was concluded at Peking; and in October of the same year it was supplemented by a Protocol of four Articles.

XIX. INTERVENTION OF RUSSIA, FRANCE, AND GERMANY, AND RETROCESSION OF MANCHURIAN TERRITORY

The cession of the southern portion of the province of Fêng-t'ien was at once opposed by Russia, France, and Germany on the ground that 'the possession by Japan of the Liaotung peninsula⁴ would be a menace to

¹ Also known as Shêngking, and sometimes as Moukden, though Moukden is really the name of its chief town.

² The new line of frontier ran roughly from Yingkow on the River Liao to the Yalu river and included the towns of Fenghwangcheng and Haicheng.

³ But it was provided that if the indemnity was all paid within three years of the exchange of ratification—i. e. May 8, 1898—no interest would be charged.

⁴ This is the first time we hear of 'the Liaotung peninsula'.

Peking and render illusory the independence of Korea'. In consequence of the protest made by these three Powers the Japanese Government consented to relinquish this portion of Chinese territory, receiving in return for its retrocession an additional indemnity of thirty million Kuping taels. This was to be paid on or before November 16, 1895, and within three months after its payment the retroceded territory was to be evacuated. A Convention giving effect to this arrangement was signed at Peking on November 8, 1895. The Convention also cancelled Art. III of the Shimonoseki Treaty, which provided for the delimitation of boundaries, as well as the stipulation in Art. VI relating to the conclusion of a Convention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade, the retrocession of territory rendering these provisions no longer necessary. Before the signature of this Convention Russia had already, in July of that year, arranged for the issue of a Chinese loan of £15,000,000 in Paris under her guarantee, thus establishing a further claim on China's goodwill.

The intervention of the three Powers had far-reaching consequences, each of the associates looking

Both this and the term 'Liaotung Gulf', given to the bay into which the river Liao runs, are apparently of foreign origin. The Chinese originally used the term Liaotung, which means 'East of the River Liao', in a vague way to signify the territory in the province of Fêng-t'ien (known also as Shengking), which lies on the left of that river. This name was probably applied by foreign geographers to the bay into which the River Liao flows in ignorance of the meaning of the term, a glance of the map showing that the position of the bay cannot be described as being east of the river. In the Shimonoseki Treaty the ceded territory in question is called 'the southern portion of the province of Fêng-t'ien'. When, however, the intervention of the three Powers took place, it was probably thought more convenient to make use in the *Note Identique* of a term already given in foreign atlases to the bay which forms the western boundary of the territory in question. When the Russo-Chinese Agreement for the lease of Port Arthur, &c., was made in 1898, this term was again employed. It occurs also in the additional Russo-Chinese Agreement of May 7, 1898, and in the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905, and seems to have passed into general use.

for some return for the services rendered. France was the first to be recompensed, receiving an instalment of her reward in the prompt settlement of certain outstanding questions relating to frontier rectification and other matters.¹

The Russian Government, which had in November 1892, after the execution of comprehensive surveys, finally decided upon the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway from Chilibinsk in the Ural Mountains, *via* Lake Baikal and the Amur river, to Vladivostok, with the double object of developing Siberia and linking up the eastern and western extremities of the Empire, seized the opportunity to gain a footing in Manchuria. In May 1896 a secret treaty was signed at St. Petersburg by Prince Lobanoff, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Li Hung-chang, Viceroy of Chihli, who had been sent to Russia as China's representative at the coronation of the late Tsar Nicholas II. By this treaty, the full text of which has never been published, Russia promised to protect China against Japan, and obtained in return the privilege of using, in time of war, the harbours of Ta-lien Wan and Kiaochow as bases for her fleet.

On August 27 a secret Railway Agreement was signed at St. Petersburg by Li Hung-chang and the representatives of the Russo-Chinese Bank, an institution which had been created at the end of the previous year (1895), and half the capital of which was French. By this Agreement China conceded to Russia the right to carry the eastern section of the Trans-Siberian Railway connecting Lake Baikal with Vladivostok through northern Manchuria *via* Hailar, Tsitsihar, and Kharbin, thus shortening the distance by more than 300 miles, and greatly diminishing both the period and the cost of construction. The Railway Agreement was ratified in Peking on September 18,

¹ Settlement effected in January, 1896. The questions were:—

- i. Rectification of Tonkin frontier.
- ii. Railway and mining concessions in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung.

both it and the treaty coming into force on that date.¹ Later in the same year the Statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which were in effect an elaboration of the details of the Agreement, were drawn up, and were confirmed by the Emperor of Russia on December 4.

Germany had apparently experienced some difficulty in making up her mind what concession to ask for in return for her share in the intervention, though she seems to have had an eye on some point on the north-east coast of China which would combine other advantages with such measure of remoteness from rival centres of enterprise as would ensure her sufficient elbow room for the execution of her projects. The murder of two German missionaries in Shantung hastened her decision and provided her with an additional pretext. In November 1897 she landed troops and guns at Kiaochow in that province, and on March 6 in the following year she obtained from China the lease of that port and a considerable stretch of 'hinterland' for a period of ninety-nine years. The treaty giving effect to this arrangement granted also to Germany certain rights of railway construction in the province in question.

Russia lost no time in following Germany's example, the celerity of her proceedings suggesting, indeed, the probability that an understanding on the subject had been reached beforehand, even if concerted action had not

¹ The authority followed in this account of the secret negotiations between China and Russia in 1896 is Gérard, *Ma Mission en Chine*. He points out that a large portion of the capital of the Russo-Chinese Bank was supplied by a French syndicate, and that, in consequence of French capital being so largely involved, the French Government insisted on definite information being given to them regarding the negotiations in question. Gérard's statement regarding the French financial interest in the Russo-Chinese Bank is, moreover, confirmed by Chéradame in *La Guerre Russo-Japonaise*, and by Débidour in *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe*. Gérard also explains that Count Cassini's stay in Peking while the two Agreements were being negotiated in Russia—which led to the belief that both treaties were negotiated by him—was due to the fact that his presence there was thought to be necessary until the ratification of the Railway Agreement by the Chinese Government.

been agreed upon.¹ In the January following the occupation of Kiaochow by Germany Russian men-of-war anchored in Port Arthur. The British Government were persuaded to withdraw the British cruisers which had followed them to that port, and on March 27, three weeks after the negotiation of the Kiaochow Agreement, an Agreement—the text of which has never been published by the Russian Government—was signed at Peking by Li Hung-chang and the Russian chargé d'affaires providing for the lease to Russia of Port Arthur, Ta-lien Wan, and adjacent waters for a period of twenty-five years, renewable by arrangement on expiration. The Agreement further stipulated that the principle of the permission given in 1896 to the 'Manchurian Railway Company'² for the construction of a railway across northern Manchuria should be extended to the construction of branch lines from a point on the main line to Ta-lien Wan and other places in the Liaotung peninsula; it provided for a subsequent definition of the boundaries of the leased area and of a neutral strip of territory which was to separate the Chinese and Russian spheres; and it declared Port Arthur to be a naval port, and, as such, closed to all vessels excepting those of the two contracting parties. An additional Agreement signed at St. Petersburg on May 7 defined the boundaries, left open by the previous Convention, and arranged for their delimitation.

The claim of France to a share in territorial concessions was also recognized. By a Convention signed at Peking on May 27, 1898, she received a ninety-nine years' lease, for the purpose of a naval station and coaling depot, of the bay of Kwangchowwan and adjacent territory in the peninsula of Leichow in the province of Kwangsi, which bordered on her Tonkin colony.

Though Great Britain, having taken no part in the

¹ In his *Deutschland's Auswärtige Politik* Reventlow states that a secret agreement existed between the Kaiser and the Tsar.

² The Chinese Eastern Railway Company, as it was called in the Agreement of 1896.

intervention, had nothing to look for from China, she shared in this scramble for territory. By a Convention similar to that negotiated by France, and signed at Peking a fortnight later (June 9, 1898), she obtained an extension of territory at Hongkong under lease for the same period of ninety-nine years—the reason assigned being that such extension was necessary for the proper protection and defence of the colony; and three weeks later, on July 1, 1898, by a further Convention signed at Peking, the Chinese Government, 'in order to provide Great Britain with a suitable naval harbour, and for the better protection of British commerce in the neighbouring seas, agreed to lease to Great Britain Weihaiwei and the adjacent waters for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia'. The territory thus leased comprised 'the island of Liu-Kung and all other islands in the Bay of Weihaiwei'.

This was for China an embarrassing sequel to the intervention of the three Powers made on April 23, 1896, with the avowed object of ensuring the integrity of Chinese territory. Nor did its consequences end there. There is little doubt that these successive filchings of territory under the guise of leases made it easy for the Peking Government to divert against foreigners the fanatic Boxer movement when it had assumed large proportions in North China. This action of the Chinese authorities in its turn brought about the occupation of Manchuria by Russia, and so led to the Russo-Japanese War.

XX. ADOPTION OF GOLD STANDARD BY JAPAN (1897)

The adoption of a gold standard in 1897 put an end to the fluctuations of Japan's position in the matter of monetary standards. In the days of the Shogunate the monetary system was bimetallic, though gold was rarely seen. In 1871, when the Osaka Mint was first established under British superintendence, the new

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system then introduced was nominally one of gold monometallism, but it was never strictly enforced, the bimetallic basis remaining practically in operation until 1879. During the next seven years, owing to financial difficulties, due partly to over-issues of notes by the National Banks, the monetary affairs of the country were conducted virtually on the basis of an inconvertible paper currency. In 1886 specie resumption was effected on a silver basis, and eleven years later, arrangements having been previously made with China for the payment of the war indemnity due under the Shimonoseki Treaty to Japan in sterling, a gold standard was adopted.

XXI. COMING INTO OPERATION OF REVISED TREATIES (1899)

By the revised British Treaty signed in London in July 1894 it had been arranged that it should not come into force until five years after the date of signature. In the course of the period named similar treaties had been concluded by Japan with the other Powers concerned, and the new Revised Treaties accordingly came into force in the summer of 1899.

When the Revised Treaty with Great Britain was signed, the Earl of Kimberley observed in a Note addressed to the Japanese negotiator that

the Treaty opened a new era in Japan's foreign relations, as it proclaimed for the first time her full and legitimate reception into the fellowship of nations.

The conclusion of this treaty by England, who had succeeded in retaining in a large measure throughout the ebb and flow of protracted negotiations the controlling voice in the question of Treaty Revision due to her preponderating interests in the Far East and in the East generally, certainly justified the view that the barrier which had stood in the way of the realization of Japan's wishes would shortly disappear. But the remark may with even greater correctness be

applied to the period when all the Revised Treaties came into operation. By that time the administration in all its branches had been remodelled on Western—mainly European—lines; the Constitution and parliamentary institutions were in full working order; new Codes of Law, challenging comparison with those of the most advanced types, were in force; the same steady progress was observable in every aspect of national life; and a successful war had disclosed a degree of naval and military efficiency which had surprised the world. From this moment Japanese history falls into line with the modern history of the world.

XXII. DECLARATIONS REGARDING SPHERES OF INTEREST

Prior to and concurrently with the conclusion of Agreements for the leases of Kiaochow, Port Arthur, Kwangchowwan, and Weihaiwei, other negotiations had been conducted by certain Powers with the Chinese Government for the purpose of obtaining Declarations regarding the non-alienation by China of certain territories, which were regarded by the Powers concerned as coming within their special spheres of interest. There were in all four of these Declarations: those made to France on March 15, 1897, regarding the island of Hainan, and on April 10, 1898, regarding the three Chinese provinces¹ bordering on Tonkin; that made to Great Britain on Feb. 9, 1898, regarding the Yangtse region; and that made to Japan on April 26, 1898, regarding the province of Fukien.

Great Britain, moreover, on April 19, 1898, made a Declaration to Germany, binding herself not to construct any railroad communication from Weihaiwei and the district leased therewith into the interior of the province of Shantung. And on April 28, 1899, by an exchange of Notes at St. Petersburg the British and Russian Governments agreed to regard, for the purpose of railway concessions, the basin of the Yang-

¹ Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung.

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tse and the region north of the Great Wall as the special spheres of interest of Great Britain and Russia respectively, and also came to an understanding in regard to the railway between Shanhaikwan and Newchang.

These leases, and the ear-marking of other Chinese territories by special Agreements between the Powers concerned and China, or between the Powers themselves, caused uneasiness in the United States. In the autumn of the year 1899¹ Mr. John Hay, the American Secretary of State, addressed Circular Notes to Germany, Great Britain, and Russia, inviting them to make formal declarations of an 'open-door' or 'equal treatment' policy in the territories held by them in China. Other Circular Notes were sent to France,² Italy, and Japan, asking them to join in these formal declarations of policy. Favourable replies were received from all the Powers consulted, each, however, with the exception of Italy,³ stipulating that all the Powers interested must participate in the declarations.

The inclusion of Japan in the list of countries consulted by the United States Government on this occasion is the first public recognition of the position of power and influence which she had attained in the Far East.

XXIII. THE BOXER RISING (1900)

In the spring of the following year, what is known as the Boxer Rising occurred. Beginning in the southern portion of the province of Shantung, it spread rapidly. In June the German Minister in Peking and the Chancellor of the Japanese Legation were murdered, and the Foreign Legations were besieged. The movement, which everywhere assumed an anti-foreign

¹ The Revised Treaties between Japan and Foreign Powers had come into operation in the summer of that year.

² It will be noticed that France, though her situation in regard to the occupation of Chinese territory was very similar to that of Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, was treated differently.

³ Italy had endeavoured to obtain a lease of territory from China, but the demand was refused.

character, extended to Manchuria. Portions of the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway, then under construction, which was to connect Kharbin with Port Arthur, were damaged, Russia being thus given the opportunity she desired for the military occupation of Manchuria. An international expedition for the relief of the besieged Legations was quickly organized. Little resistance was encountered by the allied forces in their march on the capital, which they entered on August 14, the Empress Dowager taking flight with the Court to Sianfu, the ancient capital in the province of Shensi. The negotiations between the foreign Governments and China for the settlement of the various issues raised by the Boxer Rising resulted in two preliminary exchanges of Notes, dated respectively December 22, 1900, and January 16, 1901, embodying the conditions for the re-establishment of normal relations with China, and the signature of a Final Protocol on September 7, 1901. The chief conditions imposed on China by these arrangements were the payment of an indemnity of £67,500,000,¹ the permanent occupation of certain places—including Tientsin and Shanhaikwan—for the purpose of preserving free communication between Peking and the sea, and the stationing of permanent foreign guards for the protection of the Legations in Peking. Her proximity to China enabled Japan to co-operate very effectively in the military measures which put an end to the Boxer movement. The discipline and general efficiency of the contingent of troops furnished by her on this occasion won high praise from those best qualified to judge.

XXIV. ANGLO-GERMAN CONVENTION REGARDING CHINA (1900)

On October 16, 1900, while the negotiations for the re-establishment of friendly relations with China were still proceeding, an Anglo-German Agreement was

¹ 450,000,000 Haikwan taels, the rate of exchange fixed being three shillings to the tael.

signed in London. By this Agreement, which was of a self-denying character, Great Britain and Germany undertook to support the principles of (1) 'freedom of trade and every other legitimate form of economic activity for the nationals of all countries without distinction' in China, and (2) abstention from making use of the existing troubles in China to secure territorial advantages; they agreed to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in the case of another Power trying to obtain such advantages under existing conditions; and they signified their intention to communicate the Agreement to other interested Powers, including Japan, and 'invite them to accept the principles recorded in it'. The Powers addressed returned more or less favourable replies, the Japanese Government stating that, having received assurances from the contracting Powers to the effect that in adhering to the Agreement in question they would be placed in relation to such Agreement 'in the same position they would have occupied if they had been a signatory instead of an adhering State', they had no hesitation in formally declaring that they adhered to the said Agreement, and accepted the principles embodied therein.

XXV. ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE (1902)

On January 30, 1902, an Agreement was signed in London by the Marquess of Lansdowne and the Japanese Ambassador. By this Agreement, which came into effect immediately after signature, and was terminable after five years' duration at one year's notice, the Contracting Parties recognized the independence of China and Korea, and the special interests therein of Great Britain and Japan respectively; and bound themselves to maintain strict neutrality in the event of either of them being involved in war, and to come to one another's assistance in the event of either of them being confronted by the opposition of more than one hostile Power.

The Marquess of Lansdowne, in his despatch to the British Minister in Tokyo notifying its signature, stated that the Agreement might be regarded as the outcome of the events which had taken place during the last two years in the Far East, and of the part taken by Great Britain and Japan in dealing with them.

XXVI. FRANCO-RUSSIAN DECLARATION (1902)

The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance called forth a Franco-Russian Declaration signed at St. Petersburg on March 3, 1902, approving of the fundamental principles affirmed in the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, but reserving to France and Russia the right to consult each other, if necessary, regarding the protection of their interests. This Declaration drew from the author of *Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japonaise* the comment: 'Opposée au traité anglo-japonais la valeur de la déclaration franco-russe était à peu près nulle.'

XXVII. RUSSO-CHINESE AGREEMENT FOR EVACUATION OF MANCHURIA (1902)

The Final Protocol signed in September 1901 did not affect the Russian occupation of Manchuria, which was one of the gravest results of the Boxer outbreak. Russia made several attempts to give a permanent character to this occupation, one being the signature at Port Arthur on January 30, 1901¹ (subject to confirmation by the Peking Government, by Admiral Alexeieff, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian naval and military forces in the Pacific, and by the Tartar General, Tseng Chi), of an arrangement by which, according to the author of *Fifty Years of New Japan*, the province of Moukden (or Shengking) would have become a Russian protectorate. These attempts miscarried owing to the vigilance of Japan, Great Britain, and the United States; and Russia at length on March 26/April 8, 1902, concluded an Agreement at

¹ See Rockhill's *Treaties and Conventions*, p. 201.

Peking with the Chinese Government for the evacuation of Manchuria. This Agreement was to 'have legal force from the day of its signature'. It provided that the withdrawal should take place in three stages, extending over a period of eighteen months, Russia having first proposed a term of three years. Within six months from the date of signature Russia undertook to clear the south-western portion of the province of Moukden, namely the district to the west of the River Liao, of Russian troops, and to hand over the railways¹ to China. Within a further six months she undertook to clear the remainder of the province of Moukden and the province of Shengking of Russian troops; and within the six months following all Russian troops were to be withdrawn from the northern province of Heilungkiang. Article II, however, which recorded this arrangement, and confirmed the stipulations of the Agreement with the Russo-Chinese Bank of August 27, 1896, contained the proviso that the withdrawal was subject to the condition that no disturbance arose, and that it should not be prevented by the action of other Powers. It is important to note that, although Article IV stipulated that the exchange of ratifications should take place in St. Petersburg within three months of the date of signature, the agreement was never ratified.

The Russian Government appears to have carried out the first of the three stages of evacuation by the date fixed (September 26/October 8, 1902), withdrawing her troops from the west of the Liao river, and handing over the railways in that district to China. The date fixed for the completion of the next stage of evacuation was March 26/April 8, 1903. Before this date arrived, however, the Russian Government formulated seven new conditions for evacuation, the first being that no treaty ports should be opened in the evacuated territory. As it was known that the new negotiations for a commercial treaty with China, in which Japan and America were at that time engaged, contemplated the opening

¹ Namely the Shanhaikwan-Newchang-Sinmintun lines.

of new places¹ for foreign residence and trade in Manchuria, this condition alone was evidence of Russia's unwillingness to fulfil the agreement; and any doubt as to her intentions was set at rest when her troops not only stayed where they were after the date fixed for the completion of the second stage of evacuation, but filtered back to districts west of the Liao river, whence they had been previously withdrawn.² This open violation of the agreement was followed by the issue in July of the same year of an Imperial ukase appointing Alexeieff Viceroy of the Amur and Kwangtung³ territories. Two points may here be noted: (1) that by the time Russia refused to evacuate Manchuria the Chinese Eastern Railway had been completed, communication between Moscow and Port Arthur *via* Kharbin having been established on January 13, 1903; and (2) that in the course of conversation with the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg in June 1904—while the Russo-Japanese War was in progress—M. Witte, then Finance Minister, explained that Russia, when she concluded the agreement, had no intention of observing it.

XXVIII. RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904-5)

In her resistance to the new Russian demands China was supported by Great Britain, America, and Japan, whose protests, however, produced no effect. To Japan Russia's action was the more displeasing because her interests in Korea were threatened at the same time. When China, after her defeat in the war with Japan, withdrew her pretensions to suzerainty and ceased from active assertion of her influence in Korea, her

¹ Moukden, Tatungkow, and Antung.

These treaties were both signed on October 8, 1903, but the exchange of ratifications was delayed by China through fear of displeasing Russia.

² One of Russia's excuses for reoccupying Shengking was that China had failed to develop the resources of the province.

³ The name of the small peninsula at the southern end of the Liaotung peninsula in which Port Arthur is situated.

place was taken by Russia, who at once challenged the strong position acquired by Japan in that country, her efforts being assisted by the implication of the Japanese Envoy in Seoul in the murder of the Queen. Three separate agreements, the Yamagata-Lobanoff Convention of 1896, the Komura-Weber Arrangement of the same year, and the Nishi-Rosen Protocol of 1898, failed to establish a good understanding between the two Powers, and the tension was increased by the provocative policy pursued by the Russians in respect of timber concessions and other enterprises. To the Korean difficulty was now added the acute question raised by the Russian refusal to carry out the agreement of 1902 regarding Manchuria. About the time of Alexeieff's appointment as Viceroy of the Russian Far Eastern territories the Japanese Government came to the conclusion that they could no longer safely delay the opening of direct negotiations with Russia in regard to the situation in both Manchuria and Korea. The Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg was accordingly instructed by telegraph on July 28, 1903, to present a verbal Note calling attention to the growing difficulty of relations between the two countries in the Far East, and intimating the desire of the Japanese Government to arrive at an understanding.

The negotiations were conducted by Japan throughout in a conciliatory spirit which met with no response from Russia, who declined the Japanese proposal that she should have a free hand in Manchuria on the condition of not interfering with Japan in Korea. They continued until early in the following year, when they were terminated by Japan. In the two Notes of February 5, 1904, announcing this decision, which were presented by the Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg, the Japanese Government stated that it had resolved to break off diplomatic relations, reserving to itself the right to take what independent action might seem best for defending its threatened position, rights, and interests. The Japanese Government at the same time sent a circular despatch to the same

effect to its diplomatic representatives abroad for the information of the Governments to which they were accredited.

War was declared by Japan on February 10, but hostilities were commenced two days earlier by the Japanese fleet at Port Arthur and in Chemulpo. On February 23 a Protocol was signed at Seoul by the Japanese Minister and the Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Japan guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Korea, who on her part consented to what amounted to the free use of Korean territory by Japan for military purposes. The war, the chief incidents of which are well known, lasted until the autumn of 1905. It ended in the defeat of Russia, though the military position and the condition of the belligerents at the close of hostilities gave some colour to the idea that the contest had ended in a stalemate.

XXIX. THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

Treaty of Portsmouth.—The Treaty of Portsmouth (September 5, 1905), though it contained no provision for the payment of an indemnity, acknowledged the preponderating interests of Japan in Korea, and transferred to her the larger and more valuable portion of the rights acquired by Russia from China in connexion with the lease of Port Arthur in 1898. It only remains to be noted that China, in whose territory the hostilities were almost entirely conducted, maintained neutrality throughout the war. On February 10, 1904—the date of Japan's declaration of war—Mr. Hay, American Secretary of State, addressed a circular despatch to China, Japan, and Russia, expressing the desire of the American Government that the neutrality and integrity of China should be respected by both belligerents, and that the area of hostilities should be localized as far as possible. His despatch drew from Japan the reply that she had already advised China to remain neutral; and

from China the statement that she intended to observe neutrality, though she might not be in a position to ensure its observance in Manchuria, her sovereign rights in which she was resolved to maintain whatever the issue of the war might be.

Renewal and Extension of Anglo-Japanese Alliance.—On August 12, 1905, while the negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Portsmouth were proceeding, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed and extended, though the original agreement had been made for five years. The duration of the new agreement was fixed at ten years, its scope was extended so as to include India, and its character was strengthened by the provision for mutual assistance in the case of either party being attacked by another Power.

Great Britain's Retention of Weihaiwei.—The first clause of the agreement of July 1, 1898, between Great Britain and China for the lease of Weihaiwei and adjacent waters stipulated that the lease should be for so long a period as Port Arthur remained in the occupation of Russia. By Articles V and VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia transferred to Japan, subject to the consent of China, the lease of Port Arthur and Ta-lien Wan and adjacent territories and waters, as well as the section of the Chinese Eastern Railway between Port Arthur and Changchun. This arrangement between Japan and Russia raised the question of Great Britain's position in Weihaiwei. In October 1905 the Marquess of Lansdowne, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, having been approached on the subject by the China Association, which strongly deprecated Great Britain's withdrawal from Weihaiwei, asked the British representatives in Tokyo and China for their opinions on the point. The replies from both were in favour of the continuance of the British occupation. On February 22, 1906, in answer to a question asked in the House of Commons, the Government stated that it was not considered that the transfer of the Russian lease of Port Arthur to Japan had made any change in the status of Weihaiwei, and that no action

was for the present contemplated with regard to the lease. In October 1906 the Chinese Minister in London, in an interview with Sir Edward Grey, raised the question of Great Britain's withdrawal from Weihaiwei, intimating that the port was required for Chinese naval purposes. Other communications in the same sense were subsequently received from the Chinese Minister. Meanwhile the Admiralty and War Office had strongly recommended the retention of Weihaiwei, and the Japanese Government had expressed the same view. In January 1907 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the Chinese Minister in a note that His Majesty's Government had decided to reserve the question of Great Britain's occupation of Weihaiwei for future discussion.

Establishment of Japanese Protectorate in Korea (1905).—The conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth was quickly followed by the establishment of a Japanese protectorate in Korea. A Convention for this purpose was signed in the Korean capital on November 17, 1905.

Treaty between China and Japan to confirm Arrangements in Treaty of Portsmouth (1905).—The provisions of Articles V and VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, by which the cession by Russia to Japan of the lease of Port Arthur, and the transfer of the South Manchurian Railway, were made subject to China's consent, rendered it necessary for Japan to come to an agreement with the Chinese Government on this subject. This was done by a treaty signed in Peking on December 22, 1905, which recorded the formal consent of the Chinese Government to the arrangements in question.

House Tax Question.—The dispute concerning the liability to the house tax, and other local rates based on that tax, of land and buildings held by foreigners in Japan under the old system of perpetual leases had formed the subject of a long correspondence between the Government of Japan and other Governments. In May 1905 the matter was referred for arbitration

to the Hague Tribunal. The decision was unfavourable to Japan, the Court ruling that such property was exempt from all imposts other than those expressly stipulated in the leases in question.

Establishment of (1) South Manchurian Railway Company and (2) Kwangtung Administration.—On June 8, 1906, an Imperial Ordinance was issued in Japan establishing the South Manchurian Railway Company, by which, thenceforth, the administration of the line between Port Arthur and Changchun, and of the strip of land through which it passed, was conducted.

On September 1 of the same year another Imperial Ordinance was issued establishing a separate administration for the Kwangtung peninsula.

XXX. RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH FOREIGN POWERS

School Question in California.—In the autumn of 1906 the relations between Japan and America were troubled by what is known as the School Question in California. The devastation caused in the city of San Francisco by the earthquake which occurred in that year had created a dearth of school accommodation, and the Board of Education issued an order excluding Japanese children from the ordinary public schools which they had attended before, and providing for their education in the common Asiatic school established in the Chinese quarter. The origin of the trouble was the desire of the Labour Unions in San Francisco and other places on the Pacific Coast to exclude Japanese as well as Chinese labour, for the purpose of maintaining a high rate of wages, and restrictions on output; in order to achieve their object the Labour leaders did not hesitate to stir up race feeling, always strong amongst Americans. The incident gave rise to considerable excitement in Japan; and the ill-feeling evoked by the action of the San Francisco authorities was aggravated by the misunderstanding of the question by the public and press of both countries. Eventually, however, the question

was settled by the readmission of Japanese children to the city schools.

Japanese Emigration to Canada.—The outbreak of anti-Japanese agitation in British Columbia in connexion with Japanese labour emigration led to the dispatch of a Canadian Mission to Japan in November 1907. The object of the mission, which was to restrict this emigration within what were described as proper limits, and thus avert any renewal of the disturbances which had occurred, was satisfactorily attained by an Exchange of Notes in Tokyo, on December 23, between Mr. Lemieux, Canadian Minister of Labour, the head of the mission, and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. By the arrangement arrived at the Japanese Government undertook, of its own accord, to adopt effective measures for the limitation of this emigration.

Diplomatic Activity.—During 1907 and succeeding years Japan, in her new position as a leading Power, was as busily engaged in making treaties and agreements of various kinds with other Powers as she had been during the fifteen years which followed the signature of Perry's treaty.

In April 1907 she concluded with China an Agreement regarding the Sinmintun, Moukden, and Kirin Railway; in June of the same year she concluded with France an Agreement for safeguarding peace in the Far East; in the following July she concluded with Russia (1) a similar Agreement for safeguarding peace in the Far East, (2) a Commercial Treaty with Exchange of Notes, (3) a Fisheries Treaty and Protocol, and (4) a Protocol regarding the establishment of new consulates; and in August she strengthened her position in Korea—already, since 1905, a Japanese protectorate—by a treaty which placed all administrative authority in the hands of Prince Ito, the Japanese Resident-General. These arrangements were followed (1) by an Arbitration Treaty concluded with the United States on September 12, 1908, (2) by an Exchange of Notes with the same Power on November 30

of that year regarding the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of China, and the maintenance of the principle of equal opportunity for all, and (3) by an Agreement regarding the Moukden-Antung Railway and other matters, concluded with China on August 19, 1909.

America's Proposal for Neutralization of Manchurian Railways.—In November 1909 the American Government approached the Powers with a proposal for the neutralization of the Manchurian Railways. The proposal was made while negotiations were being carried on at Peking for the construction, by an Anglo-American Syndicate supported by the American Government, of a railway from Chinchow to Aigun. The idea underlying the proposal was to develop the principle of 'equal opportunity for all', which was affirmed in the Hay Circular Note of 1899 to the Powers and recorded nine years later (November, 1908) in the Exchange of Notes between Japan and America already mentioned; and, though Mr. Knox's scheme applied only to railways, the ultimate aim in view was to make the whole of Manchuria a neutral area for economic enterprise. Both Japan and Russia at once declined the proposal, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Marquis Komura) stating in a speech made at the time in the Diet that 'in the regions affected in South Manchuria' there had grown up numerous undertakings which had been promoted in the belief that the railway would remain in Japan's possession, and that the Government could not agree to abandon it. The attitude adopted by these two Powers in regard to this question was confirmed in the course of the year by the conclusion at St. Petersburg on July 4, 1910, of an Agreement by which each undertook to maintain the *status quo* in Manchuria, and, in the event of its being menaced, to take in concert whatever steps might be necessary.

Denunciation of Revised Treaties and Conclusion of New Treaties.—The period of the Revised Treaties which came into force in July 1899 was twelve years, subject to twelve months' notice of intention to terminate. This

notice was given by Japan to all the Treaty Powers on July 17, 1910. Negotiations for the conclusion of new treaties, by which Japan came into the exercise of tariff autonomy, were undertaken in the course of that year and 1911. The first to be concluded was the treaty with the United States (signed February 21 and ratified April 4, 1911); the second, that with Great Britain, was signed April 3 and ratified May 5, 1911. By this priority of date America regained the position she had occupied from the time of Perry's treaty (1854) to the signature of the first Revised Treaty—that with Great Britain—on July 4, 1894. The new treaties came into force on July 17, 1911, the period of operation being twelve years.

Annexation of Korea.—On August 23, 1910, the treaty annexing Korea to Japan was signed in Seoul by the Japanese Resident-General and the Korean Minister-President. By Article I the Emperor of Korea ceded all rights of sovereignty to the Emperor of Japan, and by Article II the latter accepted the cession. The Declaration issued by the Japanese Government in connexion with the Annexation stated (1) that, in lieu of the treaties with foreign Powers hitherto in force, the treaties between those Powers and Japan would be applied in so far as they were applicable; (2) that jurisdiction in cases pending in foreign Consular Courts would continue until final decision; (3) that for a term of ten years the existing Customs Tariff and Tonnage Dues would continue to be applied to the trade between Korea and foreign countries, and between Korea and Japan; (4) that for the same period vessels under the flags of Powers having treaties with Japan would be permitted to engage in the coasting trade between the open ports of Korea, and between those ports and the open ports of Japan; and (5) that the existing open ports of Korea, with the exception of Masanpho, would be continued as open ports, a new port, Shin Wiju, being also opened. Four years later (April 1, 1914) the foreign settlements in Korea were abolished by arrangement with the Powers concerned.

Other Conventions.—Amongst other engagements entered into by Japan about this time were the ratification (September 8, 1910) of the International Copyright Convention signed at Berlin in 1908; the conclusion of Agreements (1) with France for the Mutual Protection of Patents, &c., in China (May 18, 1911), and (2) with Russia for the Mutual Recognition of Companies (June 30, 1911); the negotiation of an Extradition Treaty with Russia (September 13, 1911); and the recognition on the same date of the Portuguese Republic.

XXXI. THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE (1911)

Revision of Agreement of 1905.—On July 13, 1911, the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Japan of April 12, 1905, made for ten years, was revised during the term of its operation at the desire of Great Britain. Article IV of the new Agreement, which provided that nothing in this Agreement should entail upon either Contracting Party the obligation to go to war with a Power with whom a treaty of general arbitration was in force, made it impossible for Great Britain to be drawn by her engagements with Japan into a war with the United States. Other minor alterations were made at the same time, Article IV of the earlier Agreement, which referred to India, being omitted. The term of the new Agreement was ten years, and it came into effect immediately after the date of its signature.

XXXII. FOREIGN RELATIONS (1911-14).

Anti-Japanese Legislation in California.—In January 1913 difficulties were created between Japan and America by the introduction in the Californian Legislature—amongst other anti-Japanese measures—of what is known as the Webb Bill. This Bill, which virtually, though not in form, prohibited the ownership of real property by Japanese, was introduced on May 3, and, in spite of strong protests on the part of Japan, was passed by the Legislature,

and became law on the 19th of that month. In the course of the diplomatic correspondence which passed between the two Governments on this occasion it was pointed out by Japan that the law in question discriminated unfairly against Japanese subjects, and was opposed to treaty provisions; the American Government defended the action of the Californian Legislature on the grounds that it was a result of economic competition, and that every nation had the right to determine for itself such questions as the one in dispute in order to preserve internal peace and avoid contentions which were likely to disturb the harmony of international relations. The correspondence came to an end without a settlement of the difficulty being reached. What really offended the Japanese people in the action of the Californian Legislature was, as was explained two years later by the Japanese Foreign Minister, the discrimination established between them and other aliens who, unlike them, were eligible for naturalization as American citizens.

Relations with China. Recognition of Chinese Republic, &c.—On October 6, 1913, the establishment of the Chinese Republic, with Yüan Shih-K'ai as President, was recognized by Japan. On the following day the difficulty which had arisen between China and Japan in connexion with what is known as the Nanking Affair (an anti-Japanese riot) was settled by the payment of an indemnity of £64,000.

In the course of the same month a further Agreement regarding railway concessions in Manchuria was concluded with China. By this Agreement Japan obtained the right to build four new lines in South Manchuria.

On May 23, 1914, the Treaty of Arbitration between Japan and the United States concluded in September 1908 was renewed.

Declaration of War against Germany.—On August 15, 1914, Japan delivered an ultimatum to Germany, and eight days later she declared war.

II. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) RELIGIOUS

Shinto and Buddhism.—The two chief religions of Japan are Shinto, the native religion, and Buddhism. Of the latter there are many sects, mostly introduced at various times directly or indirectly from China. Originally a form of nature-worship, Shinto at an early date came, though the influence of Buddhism and Confucianism, to include ancestor-worship; the cult of natural deities being gradually extended in the process of its development so as to embrace deified heroes, deceased emperors, and finally reigning sovereigns of the Imperial line by virtue of their Divine descent. Shinto ritual consists chiefly of formulas of prayer to natural deities, and ceremonials connected with purification for wrongdoing, or for defilement by contact with the dead. Until the Restoration there were no authorized funeral rites nor were there any Shinto cemeteries. Religious office is usually hereditary, but there is no celibate priesthood. Shinto has no sacred book, no dogma, no moral code. These, like funeral rites, it was left to other religions, chiefly Buddhism, to supply. From the partial fusion between the two religions which took place after the introduction of Buddhism, what may almost be called a third religion, known as *Ryobu-Shinto* (Two-sided Shinto) sprang up. This, in spite of its name, was more Buddhist than Shinto. It was the work of Buddhist priests of the mystical Shingon sect, who received the Shinto deities into the Buddhist pantheon as avatars of ancient Buddhas. As a result of this fusion many Shinto shrines became Buddhist temples, where Shinto gods were worshipped in their Buddhist forms. In most of these temples

Buddhist priests alone officiated, but in a few cases such temples had separate establishments of Shinto and Buddhist clergy, who conducted services alternately in the same buildings. It is correct to say, though the statement must not be applied too literally, that during the whole period of Tokugawa rule (A. D. 1603-1868-9) the Shogunate had pro-Buddhist leanings, while the Imperial Court favoured Shinto. This, however, the Court had not always done. Until the advent to power of the military ruler Nobunaga, in the middle of the sixteenth century, Buddhism had for several centuries been the dominating religion. The Jesuit propaganda then introduced found it at the high tide of its prosperity. At the Imperial Court, and everywhere throughout the country, it exercised a supreme influence, Shinto being relegated to the background. Its military power, too, like that of the militant bishops of the Middle Ages in Europe, was formidable, the large number of monasteries garrisoned by fighting monks constituting a serious menace to executive authority. This state of things was ended by the ruler in question, whose ruthless campaign dealt a blow to the militant priesthood from which it never recovered.

Confucianism and Taoism.—Two other religious beliefs remain to be noted, Confucianism and Taoism, both of which came to Japan with the adoption of the written language of China. Though a Confucian temple has long existed in Tokyo, neither of the two ever attained quite the status of a separate religion. The influence exercised by each was brought to bear indirectly through Buddhism and Shinto. The study by the military class of Chinese literature and of the doctrines of the *Zen* sect of Buddhists encouraged Confucianism, by far the stronger of the two religions. To some extent the place of religion was taken by *Bushido*—the cult of the Japanese spirit (*Yamato-Damashii*), or, as it has also been called, the religion of the *samurai*. Such was the situation as regards religion when the Restoration took place. Except in the case of

Christianity, which was proscribed, the attitude of the Government was one of tolerance towards all beliefs.

The effect of the Restoration on religion in Japan was mainly political. Its avowed object being the restoration of direct Imperial rule, it is not surprising that one of the first acts of the new Government should have been the rehabilitation of Shinto as the recognized Court and State religion. The ancient Jingi-kwan, or Council of Shinto affairs, was re-established and given precedence over all other State departments; the Shinto shrines, which by reason of the Ryo-bu fusion had been converted into Buddhist temples, were restored to Shinto worship; the estates of the Buddhist Church were, with a few exceptions, either confiscated or greatly reduced; and the practice of retirement into the Buddhist priesthood, which was a source of wealth and prestige to that Church, was abolished. This extreme reactionary fervour was, however, short-lived. In 1871 the Jingi-kwan was reduced to the rank of a department, and in the following year its place was filled by a new department of religion, which professed to make no distinction between the two religions. Later on this department of State became a mere bureau in the Home Department, and, as a result of the tolerant policy thenceforth adopted in religious matters, a considerable portion of its former land revenues was restored to the Buddhist Church. The Constitution promulgated in 1889 expressly affirms the principle of religious toleration. Appointments in the public service are subject to no discrimination whatever in this respect. Nevertheless, the principle of State policy regarding Shinto survives. It is still *par excellence* the Court religion, though the fact that on the accession of a new Emperor his robes are blessed at a certain Buddhist temple in Kyoto shows that Buddhism has still a recognized position at Court. There is a Shinto bureau in the Imperial Household Department, and a Shinto shrine in the palace. The services in the palace shrine, at which the Emperor personally officiates, and the worship performed by

members of the Imperial family or their proxies on fixed occasions at the chief shrines throughout the country, secure for the Shinto faith the first place in public esteem; while the erection in the capital, since the Restoration, of a national shrine to the memory of all, loyalist or rebel, who have died fighting at home or abroad, has established a new centre of Shinto worship, where the native religion is directly associated with military and patriotic sentiment. Marriage, too, which has hitherto been a civil ceremony unconnected with religion of any kind, is now for the first time being celebrated with Shinto rites; and a Shinto shrine is in course of erection in the capital of Korea.

Christianity.—The reintroduction of Christianity after the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse in 1853 added another to the list of Japanese religions. Much difference of opinion exists as to the future of Christianity in Japan. Its progress so far has been slow as compared with that of the Jesuit propaganda in the sixteenth century; but just as it was then encouraged for the sake of the trade which came with it, so, on its later reintroduction, was it welcomed as a means of learning English. The number of Japanese Christians of all denominations is given in official statistics for 1913 as under 200,000. The same statistics give the distribution of the population, according to the two chief religions, as Buddhists 26,000,000, and Shinto 19,000,000.

The Japanese nation, says Marquis Okuma in his book, *Fifty Years of New Japan*, has always been free from sectarian prejudice. Whatever may have been the case in the past, there is certainly little trace of religious bigotry to-day. The Japanese people, in whose character there is a strain of levity, worship indifferently at the shrines of the two chief religions, as the presence of Buddhist and Shinto altars in every Japanese household sufficiently attests.

The Restoration, which gave fresh strength to the native religion, also encouraged Bushido, it being felt in many quarters, and for various reasons, that some-

thing more was needed at this crisis of national affairs than existing religious influences could supply. Bushido has been made the subject of many abstruse treatises, which are little more to the point than similar works would be if written to explain the meaning of the term 'gentleman'; but, although much of what has been written on the subject in a popular form for foreign consumption is far-fetched, the simple precepts of Bushido have undoubtedly served a useful purpose in stimulating patriotism, loyalty, and self-sacrifice in all classes of the people. Its extreme development in association with Shinto under official patronage into a creed of State-worship, similar to that which has been evolved in Germany, was a few years ago criticized somewhat harshly and unfairly in a magazine article entitled 'The Invention of a New Religion'.

In concluding this brief sketch of Japanese religions it only remains to draw attention to the important part played in Japanese life by pilgrimages and religious festivals of all kinds. A flower fair takes place in the capital on every evening of the year in connexion with a local shrine in some quarter of the city. These pilgrimages and festivals, which also serve an educational purpose, besides supplying economic needs, are not due entirely to religious sentiment. They appeal to the love of ceremonies and the passion for holiday-making and sight-seeing which are among the most marked characteristics of the nation.

(2) POLITICAL

The Restoration of 1868-69 was avowedly the restoration, not of a dynasty, but of the direct or personal rule of the Mikado. But as the Mikados had never really ruled, the actual aim of the Restoration was the abolition of the Shogunate. If amongst the more ardent reformers there were any who wished the Emperor to assume at once after the Restoration the rôle of a European monarch, their hopes were speedily disappointed. For a time indeed it may have looked as if the revival of an ancient form of government would

lead to a more intimate association of the sovereign with the work of administration, and his closer intercourse with his subjects. But this possibility soon disappeared. The men who made the revolution occupied, first secretly and then openly, the place of the defunct Shogunate; and the Emperor to-day, apart from his appearance at State functions, is seen very little by his people, and has no more voice in the government than he and his predecessors had before the Restoration. His position and surroundings, however, have greatly changed. His Civil List is in keeping with the revenue of the country; his palaces in the capital and Kyoto are sumptuously decorated and furnished; he is surrounded by much pomp and ceremony; and Court etiquette, a blend of Eastern and Western formalities, is strictly observed.

Before parliamentary institutions were established the control of affairs was, except for the first few years, entirely in the hands of the group of revolutionary leaders belonging mainly to the two clans of Satsuma and Choshu. By the time the Constitution came into force the leaders who survived had come to be known as the *Genro*, or Elder Statesmen. Though the operation of the Constitution, by which a Parliament and Privy Council were created, has widened the basis of government, and the growth of political parties, as well as the development of a large and influential press, mainly Radical in its views, has done much to spread democratic ideas, the spirit of administration is nevertheless autocratic, Ministers of State, by a provision in the Constitution copied from Germany, being responsible only to the Sovereign. The Satsuma and Choshu clans, moreover, still retain their influence in the Government, exercised chiefly through their control of the Army and Navy, but there are indications that this influence is declining; and, as the group of Elder Statesmen, whose authority has so long been supreme, is now on the point of dying out, there is reason to think that in the future a more liberal character will be given to the Government. This is the more probable in view

of the encouragement given to democratic and Socialist principles by the revolutions now taking place in Europe.

(3) EDUCATION

Japanese culture begins with the introduction of the Chinese written language, Confucianism, and Buddhism between the fourth and the seventh century A.D.; and Japanese education consisted mainly of the study of Chinese literature. The State devoted little attention to education. It was left to each feudal prince to regulate this matter as he desired, and the system of literary examinations, which lay like a heavy burden on the Chinese people from time immemorial till its abolition in 1903, was, therefore, never adopted. Under the Tokugawa Shogunate the number of schools and colleges slowly increased; but the Government only catered for the sons of the aristocracy, and the curriculum gave a prominent place to military training and martial exercises, both as a preparation for war and as an aid to courage and discipline. Such education as the children of the common people obtained was provided mainly by Buddhist priests in the temple buildings, and consisted of reading, writing, and arithmetic, supplemented by ethical teaching based on a mixture of Confucianism and Buddhism.

The Revolution, or Restoration, of 1868 abolished feudalism at a stroke, but left the deeper currents of religious and moral life untouched. The new era, however, was sharply distinguished from the old by the recognition of education as one of the primary responsibilities of the State. No time was lost; for in the year following the restoration of the Mikado's power a comprehensive Ordinance was issued dealing with University, secondary, and elementary education. In 1871 a Department of Education was established, and in 1872 the first Code was issued. The traditional notion that learning was the privilege of the *samurai* was replaced by the belief that it was the birthright of every male citizen. The country was mapped out into

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eight University districts, each of which was to possess thirty-two middle schools and an elementary school for every 600 inhabitants. This ambitious scheme went far beyond the resources of the State, and in 1879 and 1886 new codes were drawn up on a more modest scale. An advance was, however, registered in the establishment of normal schools for teachers and the introduction of military drill and gymnastics. The system as established by the legislation of 1886 is in its main features in force to-day. Among later changes may be mentioned the establishment of technical schools and of high schools for girls. For the few who can take advantage of it in all its length and breadth there is now available a complete system of State-supported education, in which the student spends six years in the elementary school, which is alone compulsory for children between the ages of 6 and 12, two in the higher elementary, and five in the middle school. At nineteen the youth has completed his general education; and if he goes farther he must specialize, passing either to a technical college or to a higher school, where he spends three years preparing for his migration to the university. Facilities for women's education, which was totally neglected before 1868, are gradually increasing, and one of the four universities admits them to its courses and its degrees. There are two colleges in the capital where boys and girls of the nobility receive secondary education.

Before 1853 the only foreign influences which penetrated Japan were such as came through the medium of the Dutch traders at Nagasaki; but with the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse conditions were abruptly changed. The country was quickly flooded with the literature, science, and philosophy of Europe, while modern languages gradually came to take a place in all but the elementary schools. In the middle schools English is now compulsory, while in the higher schools English, French, or German must be learned according

to the branch of study selected. After the first inrush of European ideas a reaction was inevitable; and the value of the historic foundations of the national life was solemnly reaffirmed in the Imperial Decree of 1890, which reiterated in familiar Confucian terminology the duties of the young to their sovereign, to their State, and to their fellow-citizens. There is no State religion in Japan, and no religious instruction is permitted in the schools; but since 1890 moral instruction has played a greater part in the curriculum than in any other country. The first hour of the day is devoted to a lesson, usually given by the head master, designed to foster filial piety, love of country, and reverence for its rulers. Thus the elementary school remains essentially Japanese and is virtually untouched by Western influences. In the middle school foreign influences and methods make their appearance; and in the higher schools, the technical colleges and the universities, their supremacy is unchallenged. Thus Old and New Japan alike find their allotted place in the educational system.

(4) FINANCE AND TAXATION

Prior to the Restoration there was no national system of finance. The revenue of the Tokugawa Government was derived from taxes collected in the Shogun's domains and in the territories administered by the Shogunate, from contributions or benevolences imposed from time to time on the feudal nobility, and from tolls levied on the small foreign commerce conducted under official supervision. Nor, though the framework was more or less the same, was there any uniform system of taxation common to the whole country. Taxes varied according to the locality in which they were levied, being payable, as a rule, in kind and not in money. Towards the end of the Tokugawa rule the finances of the State were in a very embarrassed condition, and economic distress prevailed everywhere. In fact both the Shogunate and feudal Governments were bankrupt.

Although the new Government set to work energetically to reorganize the national finances on a basis borrowed to some extent from the West, difficulties arising, firstly, out of friction between Imperial and feudal authorities, and, secondly, out of the abolition of the feudal system, which saddled the country with a liability for clan debts alone of over £3,000,000, made it impossible for this work to proceed very rapidly. In consequence of the financial confusion which still existed, statistics of revenue and expenditure for several years after the Restoration are not very reliable. Nor indeed for various reasons—amongst which may be mentioned the fact that the paper yen was at a discount until 1886, the adoption in 1897 of the gold standard and the consequent readjustment of the value of the yen, and the complicated character of Japanese Treasury Accounts¹—are exact statistics of revenue and expenditure for even later years available. It will be sufficient for the present purpose to give a few approximate figures showing the growth of the Budget in the period of 34 years beginning with the financial year 1880–1. The first of these years is a convenient starting-point, because by that time political conditions generally had become more stable, and the great task of resurveying and revaluing the land—the tax on which was then the chief source of revenue—was approaching completion. For reasons already mentioned it will be best to give the figures in yen, and not in £ sterling.

The approximate statistics available² show that in the financial year 1880–1 the total revenue, ordinary and extraordinary, amounted to about yen 63,000,000. Ten years later (1890–1) the figures were yen 106,000,000. In the financial year 1895–6 the revenue had increased to yen 118,000,000. At the end of another five years

¹ In the *Japan Year-Book* for 1914 a detailed reference to this point will be found.

² The authorities for the figures given are *Fifty Years of New Japan*, the *Japan Year-Book*, and Financial Reports compiled in the British (Legation and) Embassy, Tokyo.

(1900–1) the figures had risen to yen 296,000,000. In the financial year 1907–8 the total revenue had increased to about yen 620,000,000, the highest point yet attained. The budget for the following year (1908–9) showed the same total, parliamentary difficulties having necessitated the adoption of the previous year's estimates. From this latter year a decline in the figures is noticeable; the revenue for the financial year 1914–15—which, owing to the fall of the Yamamoto Ministry, was the same as that of the previous year—amounting to yen 577,000,000.

The chief sources of ordinary revenue in recent years, as they figure in the budgets, are taxation, revenue-stamp receipts, customs, and what comes under the heading of Government undertakings and property, which includes posts and telegraphs and Government monopolies, &c.

In the budget for the financial year 1914–15—in which the total revenue was about £58,000,000—the estimated revenue from taxation amounted to about £32,000,000, the principal items being land tax £7,000,000, and liquor tax £9,000,000. The estimated revenue from revenue-stamps was £3,500,000. Customs duties figured at £4,000,000; while the estimated receipts from Government undertakings, &c., amounted to about £15,000,000, the principal items being posts and telegraphs, &c., £6,000,000, and Government monopolies (tobacco, salt, and camphor) £7,000,000.

The sources of extraordinary revenue vary with each budget. In that for the financial year 1914–15 the chief item consisted of funds transferred from special accounts, which amounted to £1,000,000.

The figures of expenditure in the different years of the period (1880–1914) selected for comparison are practically identical with those of revenue; but, as Marquis Okuma explains in his book, *Fifty Years of New Japan*, one effect of the constant conflicts in the Diet between Opposition parties and the Government, which have been a normal feature of parliamentary life since the opening of the first Diet in 1890, has been

the reduction of expenditure in almost every budget. The revenue estimates remaining each time unaffected, large surpluses have been placed at the disposal of the Government. The total surpluses produced by this cause during the period in question have probably amounted to not less than yen 70,000,000 (about £7,000,000).

In any conclusions drawn from the growth of the budget in Japan, as revealed by statistics, due allowance must be made for the circumstances under which it has occurred. In the years preceding 1880 Japan passed through the throes of a revolution, which resulted in the abolition of the feudal system and the reconstruction of the whole administrative and social fabric of the country. In the course of that time her finances were subjected to a great strain. During the period examined, which begins with that year, Japan was called upon to meet the heavy expenditure entailed by two wars, the war with China in 1894-5 and that with Russia ten years later, and also the cost of her participation in the Boxer campaign (1900). On the other hand the national exchequer profited by the Chinese war indemnity of 230,000,000 Kuping taels, by the large sum received from Russia for the cost of maintenance of Russian prisoners of war,¹ and by the Boxer indemnity.² What portions of these sums have been included in annual budgets it is not possible to ascertain.

The national debt of Japan, domestic and foreign, amounted in May 1914 to about £253,000,000. Of this total £104,000,000 represents domestic debt, and £149,000,000 foreign debt.

(5) SOCIAL .

(a) *Labour Legislation and Organization*

The labour question in Japan is still in its infancy. Trade Unionism does not exist, all attempts to form

¹ Stated by Mr. R. P. Porter (in *Japan: the Rise of a Modern Power*) to have been £4,000,000.

² A large portion of this still remains unpaid.

such unions having failed owing to the fact that the right of workmen to combine, for the protection of their interests is as yet unrecognized by law. The present condition of things is well illustrated by the fact that the Factory Law enacted in 1911 is not yet in operation. Despite, however, the primitive state of labour organization and the absence of trade unionism, there is as much opposition in Japan as in any country to the introduction of foreign labour. The Japanese, who complain of American and Canadian legislation against Japanese labour, have never in the past hesitated to exclude Chinese and Korean labour; and the continued exclusion of the latter, in spite of the annexation of Korea, has raised an awkward issue which is now occupying the attention of the Japanese press.


(b) *Insurance Laws*

In the economic development which has been perhaps the most remarkable feature of Japanese progress insurance legislation has played its part. Insurance statistics under the three chief heads of Fire, Life, and Marine Insurance, show that the capital of companies engaged in this business for the year 1913-14 amounted to over £3,000,000. Until 1913 a large insurance business was done in Japan by foreign companies; but the heavy disabilities imposed on them by the Insurance Law which came into force in February of that year have greatly restricted their operations.

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