

CHARITY AND SOCIAL LIFE

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CHARITY AND SOCIAL LIFE

A SHORT STUDY OF RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL
THOUGHT IN RELATION TO CHARITABLE
METHODS AND INSTITUTIONS



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
B.A., HON. LL.D. ST. ANDREWS; HON. D.C.L. OXFORD

Les choses ne changent guère. Seules
les idées qu'on s'en fait peuvent changer
beaucoup. C'est sur ces idées-là qu'il faut
savoir agir.—GUSTAVE LE BON.



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TO
MY FRIENDS IN CHARITY ORGANIZATION
LIVING OR PASSED FROM LIFE

PREFACE

THIS book does not claim to be more than a study—or notes for a study—of charity in relation to the thoughts with which it is most closely associated, and some of the methods to which it has given force and vitality. As such it may perhaps be of service to fellow students.

To many authors I am indebted—to some a very great deal. The references show how great is my indebtedness.

The book is for the most part a reprint of an article on “Charity and Charities” which was first published in 1902 in the supplementary volumes of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*: and I have to thank the proprietors of the *Encyclopaedia* for their kind permission to publish the article. I have added chapters on charity in relation to the growth of religious thought, and I have added a chapter on some of the questions raised by the recent Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress.

I have used the word "charity" in the title and frequently in the text. To many it may seem out-worn. It has suffered from constant circulation and hard usage. One would wish that it might be re-minted and re-issued, for there are many supremely noble associations imprinted on it, and it is the verbal abstract of a long history, in which religion, philosophy, social thought, administration, and personal endeavour have their place. It is expressive also of a conjunction of instincts, sentiments, and efforts which is well-nigh indispensable to social progress. For such a word there should still be room in the world of thought.

I have not tried to write a book on recent charitable schemes and proposals. I have desired rather to follow out the growth of the conception of charity, and its expression in social life, and the principles which these suggest with regard to social service and obligation.

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CHAPTER I.

SOME DEFINITIONS.

THE word 'charity,' or love, represents the principle of the good life. It stands for a mood or habit of mind and an endeavour. From it, as a habit of mind, springs the social and personal endeavour which in the widest sense we may call charity. The two correspond. Where the habit of mind has not been gained, the endeavour fluctuates and is relatively purposeless. In so far as it has been gained, the endeavour is founded on an intelligent scrutiny of social conditions and guided by a definite purpose. In the one case it is realized that some social theory must be found by us, if our action is to be right and consistent; in the other case no need of such a theory is felt.

The following chapters are based on the assumption that there are principles in charity or charitable work, and that these can be

ascertained by a study of the development of social conditions and their relation to prevalent social aims and religious or philosophic conceptions. It is assumed also that the charity of the religious life, if rightly understood, cannot be inconsistent with that of the social life.

Perhaps some closer definition of charity is necessary. The words that signify goodwill towards the community and its members are primarily words expressive of the affections of family life in the relations existing between parents, and between parent and child. As will be seen, the analogies underlying such phrases as 'God the Father,' 'Children of God,' 'brethren,' have played a great part in the development of charitable thought in pre-Christian, as well as in Christian days. The germ, if we may say so, of the words *philia*, *agapē*, *amor*, love, and *amicitia*, friendship, is the sexual or the parental relation. With the realization of the larger life in man the meaning of the word expands. *Caritas*, or charity, strikes another note—high price, and thus dearness. It is charity, indeed, expressed in mercantile metaphor; and it would seem that it was associated in thought with the word *charis*, which has also a commercial meaning, but signifies as well favour, gratitude, grace,

kindness. Partly thus, perhaps, it assumed and suggested a nobler conception; and sometimes, as, for instance, in English ecclesiastical documents, it was spelt *charitas*.

Agapē, which in the Authorised Version of the Bible is translated charity, was used by St. Paul as a translation of the Hebrew word *chesed*, which in the Old Testament is in the same version translated 'mercy'—as in Hosea vi. 6, "I desired mercy, and not sacrifice." This word represents the charity of kindness and goodness, as distinguished from almsgiving. Almsgiving, *zedakah*, is translated by the word *eleemosyna* in the Septuagint, and in the Authorised Version by the word 'righteousness.' It represents the deed or the gift which is due—done or made, not spontaneously, but under a sense of religious obligation. In the earlier Christian period the word almsgiving has this meaning, and was in that sense applied to a wide range of actions and contracts, from a gift to a beggar at a church door to a grant and a tenure of land. It also, in the word almoner, represented the fulfilment of the religious obligation with the aid of an agent or delegate. The words charity or love (*caritas* or *agapē*), on the other hand, without losing the tone with which the thought of parental

or family love inspires them, assume a higher meaning. In religious thought they imply an ideal life, as represented by such expressions as 'love (*agapē*) of God.' This on the one side; and on the other an ideal social relation, in such words as 'love of man.'

Thus in the word 'charity' religious and social associations meet; and thus regarded the word means a disciplined and habitual mood in which the mind is considerate of the welfare of others individually and generally, and devises what is for their real good, and in which the intelligence and the will strive to fulfil the mind's purpose. Charity thus has no necessary relation to relief or alms. To give a lecture, or to nurse a sick man who is not in want or 'poor,' may be equally a deed of charity; though in fact charity concerns itself largely with the classes usually called the 'poor,' and with problems of distress and relief. Relief, however, is not an essential part of charity or charitable work. It is one of many means at its disposal. If the world were so poor that no one could make a gift, or so wealthy that no one needed it, charity—the charity of life and of deeds—would remain.

CHAPTER II.

THE OUTLINES OF STUDY.

THE history of charity is a history of many social and religious theories, influences, and endeavours, that have left their mark alike upon the popular and the cultivated thought of the present day. The inconsistencies of charitable effort and argument may thus in part be accounted for. Therefore to understand the problem of charity we have

1. To consider the stages of charitable thought—the primitive, pagan, Greek and Roman, Jewish and Christian elements, that make up the modern consciousness in regard to charity, and also the growth of the habit of 'charity' as representing a gradually educated social instinct.

2. We have also to consider in their relation to charity the results of recent investigations of the conditions of social life.

3. At each stage we have to note the

corresponding stage of practical administration in public relief and private effort—for the division between public or 'poor-law' relief and charity which now prevails in England is, comparatively speaking, a novelty. For the most part the work of charity can hardly be appreciated or understood if it be considered without reference to public relief.

4. As to the present day, we have to consider practical suggestions in regard to such subjects as charity and economic thought, charity organization, friendly visiting and almonership, co-operation with the poor-law, charity and thrift, parochial management, hospitals and medical relief, exceptional distress and the 'unemployed,' the utilization of endowments and their supervision, and their adaptation to new needs and emergencies.

5. We have also throughout to consider charitable help in relation to classes of dependents, who appear early in the history of the question—widows and orphans, the sick and the aged, vagrants and wayfarers.

First in the series come the charities of the family and of hospitality; then the wider charities of religion, the charities of the community, of individual donors and of mutual help. These gradually assume importance in

communities which consist originally of self-supporting classes, within which widows and orphans, for instance, would be rather provided for, in accordance with recognized class obligations, than relieved. Then come habitual almsgiving, the charitable endowment, and the modern charitable institution and association. But throughout the test of progress or decadence appears to be the condition of the family. The family is the source, the home and the hearth of charity. It has been created but slowly, and there is naturally a constant tendency to break away from its obligations and to ignore and depreciate its utility. Yet the family, as we now have it, is itself the outcome of infinite thought working through social instinct, and has at each stage of its development indicated a general advance. To it, therefore, constant reference must be made.

CHAPTER III.

PRIMITIVE CHARITY.

THE study of early communities has brought to light the history of the development of the family. "Marriage in its lowest phases is by no means a matter of affection or companionship"; and only very slowly has the position of both parents been recognized as implying different but correlative responsibilities towards their child. Only very slowly, also, has the morality necessary to the making of the family been won. Charity at earlier stages is hardly recognized as a virtue, nor infanticide as an evil. Hospitality—the beginning of a larger social life—is non-existent. The self-support of the community is secured by marriage, and when relations fail marriage becomes a provision against poverty. Then by the tribal system is created another safeguard against want. But apart also from these methods of social maintenance, at a very early

stage there is charitable relief. The festivals of the solstices and equinoxes, and of the seasons, are the occasions for sacrifice and relief; and, as Christmas customs prove, the instinct to give help or alms at such festival periods still remains. Charity is concerned primarily with certain elemental forces of social life: the relation between these primitive instincts and impulses that still influence charity should not, therefore, be overlooked. The basis of social life is also the basis of charitable thought and action.

The savage is the civilized man in the rough. "The lowest races have," Lord Avebury writes, "no institution of marriage." Many have no word for 'dear' or 'beloved.' The child belongs to the tribe rather than to the parent. In these circumstances a problem of charity such as the following may arise: "Am I to starve, while my sister has children whom she can sell?" a question asked of Burton by a negro. From the point of view of the tribe, an able-bodied man would be more valuable than dependent children, and the relationship of the larger family of brothers and sisters would be a truer claim to help than that of mother and child. Subsequently the child is recognized as related, not to the father, but to the mother, and there is "a kind of bond which lasts for life

between mother and child, although the father is a stranger to it." Slowly only is the relative position of both parents, with different but correlative responsibilities, acknowledged. The first two steps of charity have then been made: the social value of the bond between the mother, and then between the father, and the child has been recognized. Until this point is reached the morality necessary to the making of the family is wanting, and for a long time afterwards it is hardly won. The virtue of chastity—the condition precedent to the higher family life—is unrecognized. Indeed, the set of such religious thought as there may be is against it. Abstract conceptions, even in the nobler races, are lacking. The religion of life is vaguely struggling with its animality, and that which it at last learns to rule it at first worships. In these circumstances there is little charity for the child and little for the stranger. "There is," Dr. Schweinfurth wrote in his *Heart of Africa*, "an utter want of wholesome intercourse between race and race. For any member of a tribe that speaks one dialect to cross the borders of a tribe that speaks another is to make a venture at the hazard of his life." The religious obligations that fostered and sanctified family life among the Greeks and

Romans and Jews are unknown. Much later in development comes charity for the child, with the abhorrence of infanticide—against which the Jewish-Christian charity of 2000 years ago uttered its most vigorous protests. If the child belonged primarily to the tribe or state, its maintenance or destruction was a common concern. This motive influenced the Greeks, who are historically nearer the earlier forms of social life than ourselves. For the common good they exposed the deformed child; but also "where there were too many, for in our state population has a limit," as Aristotle says, "the babe or unborn child was destroyed." And so, to lighten their own responsibilities, parents were wont to do in the slow years of the degradation of the Roman Empire, though the interest of the state then required a contrary policy. The transition to our present feeling of responsibility for child-life has been very gradual and uncertain, through the Middle Ages and even till the eighteenth century. Strictly it may be said that all penitentiaries and other similar institutions are concrete protests on behalf of a better family life. The movement for the care of children in the eighteenth century naturally and instinctively allied itself with the penitentiary movement. The want of regard for

child-life, when the rearing of children becomes a source of economic pressure, suggests why in earlier stages of civilization all that charitable apparatus which we now think necessary for the assistance of children is wanting, even if the need, so far as it does arise, is not adequately met by the recognized obligations of the clan-family or brotherhood.

In the case of barbarous races charity and self-support may be considered from some other points of view. Self-support is secured in two ways—by marriage and by slavery. "For a man or woman to be unmarried after the age of thirty is unheard of" (T. H. Lewin, *Wild Races of South-East India*). On the other hand, if any one is without a father, mother, or other relative, and destitute of the necessities of life, he may sell himself and become a slave. Thus slavery becomes a provision for poverty when relations fail. The clan-family may serve the same purpose. David Livingstone describes the formation of the clan-family among the Bakuena. "Each man, by virtue of paternity, is chief of his own children. They build huts round his. . . . Near the centre of each circle of huts is a spot called a 'kotla,' with a fire-place; here they work, eat, etc. A poor man attaches himself to the 'kotla' of a rich one,

and is considered a child of the latter." Thus the clan-family is also a poor-relief association.

Studies in religion indicate a gradual movement towards larger conceptions of the religious life, and of charitable obligation. Studies in folk-lore bring to light many relations between the charity of the old world and that of our own day.

In regard to the charity of the early community, following the main lines of our inquiry, we may take the eighth century B.C. as the point of departure. The vast field of a yet larger inquiry which would include Oriental charity we do not touch. The *Odyssey* (about 800 B.C.) and Hesiod (about 700 B.C.) are roughly parallel with Amos (816-775), and represent two streams of thought that meet in the early Christian period. The period covered by the *Odyssey* seems to merge into that of Hesiod. We take the former first, dealing with the clan-family and the phratry, which are together the self-maintaining unit of society, with the general relief of the poor, with hospitality, and with vagrancy. In Hesiod we find the customary law of charity in the earlier community definitely stated, and also indications of the normal methods of neighbourly help which were in force in country districts.

First of the family and brotherhood, or phratry. The family (*Od.* viii. 582) included alike the wife's father and the daughter's husband. It was thus a clan-like family. Out of this was developed the phratry or brotherhood, in which were included alike noble families, peasants, and craftsmen, united by a common worship and responsibilities and a common customary law (*themis*). Zeus, the god of social life, was worshipped by the phratry. He was the father of the law (*themis*). He was god of host and guest. Society was thus based on law, the brotherhood, and the family. The irresponsible man, the man worthy of no respect or consideration, was one who belonged to no brotherhood, was subject to no customary law, and had no hearth or family. The phratry was, and became afterwards still more, 'a natural guild.' Outside the self-sustaining phratry was the stranger, including the wayfarer and the vagrant; and partly merged in these classes was the beggar, the recognized recipient of the alms of the community. To change one's abode and to travel was assumed to be a cause of reproach (*Il.* ix. 648).¹ The 'land-louper' was

¹ The Earliest Homer is now considered to belong to the eleventh century B.C. The Second Homer to the ninth century. (See Bury: *History of Greece*, 1908.)

naturally suspected. On the other hand a stranger's first thought in a new country was whether the inhabitants were wild or social (*dikaioi*), hospitable and God-fearing (*Od.* xiii. 201). Hospitality thus became the first public charity; Zeus sent all strangers and beggars, and it was against all law (*themis*) to slight them. Out of this feeling—a kind of glorified almsgiving—grew up the system of hospitality in Greek states and also in the Roman world. The host greeted the stranger (or the suppliant). An oath of friendship was taken by the stranger, who was then received with the greeting, Welcome (*Chaire*), and water was provided for ablution, and food and shelter. In the larger house he was a guest at a guests' table. In the hut he shared the peasant's meal. The custom bound alike the rich and the poor. On parting presents were given, usually food for the onward journey, sometimes costly gifts. The obligation was mutual, that the host should give hospitality, and that the guest should not abuse it. From early times tallies were exchanged between them as evidence of this formal relationship, which each could claim again of the other by the production of the token. And further, the relationship on either side became hereditary. Thus individuals and families and tribes remained

linked in friendship and in the interchange of hospitalities.

Under the same patronage of Zeus and the same laws of hospitality were vagrants and beggars. The vagrant and loafer are sketched in the *Odyssey*—the vagrant who lies glibly that he may get entertainment, and the loafer who prefers begging to work on a farm. These and the winter idlers, whom Hesiod pictures—a group known to modern life—prefer at that season to spend their time in the warmth of the village smithy, or at a house of common resort (*leschē*)—a common lodging-house, we might say—where they would pass the night. Apparently, as in modern times, the vagrants had organized their own system of entertainment, and, supported by the public, were a class for whom it was worth while to cater. The local or public beggars formed a still more definite class. Their begging was a recognized means of maintenance; it was a part of the method of poor relief. Thus of Penelope it was said that, if Ulysses' tale were true, she would give him better clothes, and then he might beg his bread throughout the countryside. Feasts too and almsgiving were nearly allied, and feasts have always been one resource for the relief of the poor. Thus naturally the

beggars frequented feasts, and were apparently a recognized and yet inevitable nuisance. They wore, as part of their dress, scrips or wallets in which they carried away the food they received, as later the Roman clients carried away portions of food in baskets (*sportulæ*) from their patrons' dinners. Ulysses, when he dresses up as a beggar, puts on a wallet as part of his costume. Thus we find a system of voluntary relief in force based on a recognition of the duty of almsgiving as complete and peremptory as that which we shall notice later among the Jews and the early Christians. We are concerned here with country districts, and not with towns, and, as social conditions that are similar produce similar methods of administration, so we find here a general plan of relief similar to that which was in vogue in Scotland till the Scottish Poor Law Act of 1845.

In Hesiod the fundamental conceptions of social religion and charity are more clearly expressed. He has, if not his ten, at least his four commandments, for disobedience to which Zeus will punish the offender. They are: Thou shalt do no evil to suppliant or guest; thou shalt not dishonour any woman of the family; thou shalt not sin against the

orphan; thou shalt not be unkind to aged parents.

The laws of social life are thus duty to one's guest and duty to one's family; and chastity has its true place in that relation, as the later Greeks, who so often quote Hesiod (cf. the so-called *Economics* of Aristotle), fully realized. Also the charities of the family which are due to the orphan, whose lot is deplored in the *Iliad* (xxii. 490), and to the aged are now clearly enunciated. But there is also in Hesiod the duty to one's neighbour, not according to the 'perfection' of 'Cristes lore,' but according to a law of honourable reciprocity in act and intent. "Love him who loves thee, and cleave to him who cleaveth to thee: to him who would have given, give; to him who would not have given, give not." The ground-work of Hesiod's charity outside the family is neighbourly help (such as formed no small part of old Scottish charity in the country districts); and he put his argument thus: Competition, which is a kind of strife, "lies in the roots of the world and in men." It is good, and rouses the idle 'handless' man to work. On one side are social duty (*dikē*) and work, done briskly at the right season of the year, which bring a full barn. On the other side are

unthrift and hunger, and relief with the disgrace of begging; and the relief, when the family can do no more, must come from neighbours, to whose house the beggar has to go with his wife and children to ask for victual. Once they may be helped, or twice, and then they will be refused. Better is it, Hesiod tells his brother, to work and so pay off his debts and avoid hunger (see *Erga*, 391, etc., and elsewhere). Here indeed is a problem of to-day as it appeared to an early Greek. The alternatives before the idler—so far as his own community is concerned—are labour with neighbourly help to a limited extent, or hunger.

Hesiod was a farmer in Boeotia. Some 530 years afterwards a pupil of Aristotle thus describes the district and its community of farmers. "They are," he says, "well to do, but simple in their way of life. They practise justice, good faith, and hospitality. To needy townsmen and vagabonds they give freely of their substance; for meanness and covetousness are unknown to them." (Fraser's *Pausanias*, p. xliii.) The charitable method of Homeric and Hesiodic days still continued.

CHAPTER IV.

CHARITY AMONG THE GREEKS.

SOCIETY in a Greek state was divided into two parts, citizens and slaves. The citizens required leisure for education, war, and government. The slaves were their ministers, craftsmen, and servants to enable them to secure this leisure. We have therefore to consider, on the one hand, the position of the family and the clan-family, and the maintenance of the citizen from public funds and by public and private charities; and on the other hand, the condition of the slaves, and the relation between slavery and charity.

The slaves formed the larger part of the population. The census of Attica made between 317 and 307 B.C. gives their numbers at 400,000 out of a population of about 500,000; and even if this be considered excessive, the proportion of slaves to citizens must certainly have been very large. The citizens with their wives and children

formed some 12 per cent. of the community. Thus, apart from the resident aliens, returned in the census at 10,000, and their wives and children, we have two divisions of society: the citizens, with their own organization of relief and charities; and the slaves, permanently maintained by reason of their dependence on individual members of the civic class. Thus, the only poverty is that of the poor citizens. Poverty is limited to them. The slaves—that is to say, the bulk of the labouring population—are provided for.

From times relatively near to Hesiod's we may trace the growth and influence of the clan-family as the centre of customary charity within the community, the gradual increase of a class of poor either outside the clan-family or eventually independent of it, and the development of a new organization of relief introduced by the state to meet newer demands.

We picture the early state as a group of families, each of which tends to form in time a separate group or clan. At each expansion from the family to the clan the members of the clan retain rights and have to fulfil duties which are the same as, or similar to, those which prevailed in the family. Thus, in Attica the clan-families (*genē*) and the brotherhoods

(*phratrai*) were "the only basis of legal rights and obligations over and above the natural family." The clan-family was 'a natural guild,' consisting of rich and poor members—the well-born or noble and the craftsman alike; and originally it would seem that the land was divided among the families of the clan by lot and was inalienable. Thus with the family was combined the means of supporting the family. On the other hand, every youth was registered in his phratry, and the phratry remained till the reforms of Cleisthenes (509 B.C.) a political, and even after that time a social, organization of importance.

Again, first, as to the family—the mother and wife, and the father. Already before the age of Plato and Xenophon (450-350 B.C.) we find that the family has suffered a slow decline. The wife, according to later Greek usage, was married as a child, hardly educated, and confined to the house, except at some festival or funeral. But with the decline came criticism and a nobler conception of family life. "First, then, come laws regarding the wife," writes the author of the *Economics*, and the law, "thou shalt do no wrong; for, if we do no wrong, we shall not be wronged." This is the 'common law,' as the Pythagoreans say,

"and it implies that we must not wrong the wife in the least, but treat her with the reverence due to a suppliant, or one taken from the altar." The sanctity of marriage is thus placed among the 'commandments' of Hesiod, besides the duty towards the stranger and the orphan. These and other references to the Pythagoreans suggest that they, possibly in common with other mystics, preached the higher religion of marriage and social life, and thus inspired a deeper social feeling, which eventually allied itself with the Christian movement.¹

Next, as to parents and children: the son was under an obligation to support his father, subject, after Solon's time, to the condition that he had taught him a trade; and after Solon's time the father had no claim for support from an illegitimate son. "The possession of children," it was said (Arist. *Econ.*) "is not by nature for the public good only, but also for private advantage. For what the strong may

¹"There was no such thing as a marriage in the presence of priests or the representatives of the State" (Tucker: *Life in Ancient Athens* (440-330 B.C.) p. 105). But later, custom would appear to have changed. In Plutarch's time, 50 A.D. (*Conjugal Precepts*, Introd.), it seems to have been usual. "The customary marriage rites," he says, "by which the Priestess of Demeter has united you together."

gain by their toil for the weak, the weak in their old age receive from the strong. . . . Thus is the nature of each, the man and the woman, prearranged by the Divine Being for a life in common." Honour to parents is "the first and greatest and oldest of all debts" (Plato, *Laws*, 717). The child has to care for the parent in his old age. "Nemesis, the minister of justice (*dike*), is appointed to watch over all these things." And "if a man fail to adorn the sepulchre of his dead parents, the magistrates take note of it and inquire" (Xen. *Mem.* ii. 14). The heightened conception of marriage implies a fuller interpretation of the mutual relations of parent and child as well; both are and become more sacred.

Then the orphans. Before Solon's time (594 B.C.) the property of any member of the clan-family who died without children went to the clan; and after his time, when citizens were permitted to leave their property by will, the property of an intestate fell to the clan. This arrangement carried with it corresponding duties. Through the clan-family provision was made for orphans. Any member of the clan had the legal right to claim an orphan member in marriage; and, if the nearest agnate did not marry her, he had to give her a dowry

proportionate to the amount of his own property. Later, there is evidence of a growing sense of responsibility in regard to orphans. Hippodamus (about 443 B.C.), in his scheme of the perfected state (Arist. *Pol.* 1268), suggested that there should be public magistrates to deal with the affairs of orphans (and strangers); and Plato, his contemporary, writes of the duty of the state and of the guardian towards them very fully. Orphans, he proposes (*Laws*, 927), should be placed under the care of public guardians. "Men should have a fear of the loneliness of orphans . . . and of the souls of the departed, who by nature take a special care of their own children. . . . A man should love the unfortunate orphan (boy or girl) of whom he is guardian as if he were his own child; he should be as careful and diligent in the management of the orphan's property as of his own—or even more careful still."

But, further, to relieve the poverty of citizens and to preserve the citizenship were objects of public policy and of charity. In Crete and Sparta the citizens were wholly supported out of the public resources. In Attica the system was different. The citizens were aided in various ways, in which, as often happens, legal

or official and voluntary or private methods worked on parallel lines. The means were (1) legal enactment for release of debts; (2) emigration; (3) the supply of corn; (4) poor relief for the infirm, and relief for the children of those fallen in war; (5) emoluments; (6) voluntary public service, separate gifts and liberality; (7) loan societies.

1. In 594 B.C. the labouring class in Attica were overwhelmed with debts and mortgages, and their persons pledged as security. Only by a sharp reform was it possible to preserve them from slavery. This Solon effected. He annulled their obligations, abolished the pledge of the person, and gave the labourers the franchise. And, in addition to this, besides the laws above mentioned, he gave power to the Areopagus to inquire from what sources each man obtained the necessaries of life, and to punish those who did not work. His action and that of his successor, Peisistratus (560 B.C.), suggests that the class of poor (*aporoî*) was increasing, and that by the efforts of these two men the social decline of the people was avoided or at least postponed. Peisistratus lent the poor money that they might maintain themselves in husbandry. He wished, it is said (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* xvi.), to enable them to earn

a moderate living, that they might be occupied with their own affairs, instead of spending their time in the city or neglecting their work in order to visit it. As rent for their land they paid a tenth of the produce.

2. Akin to this policy was that of emigration. Athenians, selected in some instances from the two lowest political classes, emigrated, though still retaining their rights of citizenship. In 570-565 B.C. Salamis was annexed and divided into lots and settled; and later Pericles settled more than 2750 citizens in the Chersonese and elsewhere—practically a considerable section of the whole body of citizens. "By this means," says Plutarch, "he relieved the state of numerous idle agitators and assisted the necessitous." In other states this expedient was frequently adopted.

3. A third method was the supply of corn at reduced rates—a method similar to that adopted, as we shall see, at Rome, Constantinople, and elsewhere. The maintenance of the mass of the people depended on the corn fleets. There were public granaries, where large stores were laid up at the public expense. A portion of all cargoes of corn was retained at Athens, and in other ways importation was promoted. Exportation was forbidden. Public

donations and distributions of corn were frequent, and in times of scarcity rich citizens made large contributions with that object. The distributions were made to adult citizens of eighteen years of age and upwards whose names were on the registers.

4. In addition to this there was a system of public relief for those who were unable to earn a livelihood on account of bodily defects and infirmities. The qualification was a property test. The property of the applicant had to be shown to be of a value of not more than three minae (say £12). Socrates, it may be noted, adopts the same method of estimating his comparative poverty (Xen. *Econ.* ii. 6), saying that his goods would realize about five minae (or about twenty guineas). The senate examined the case, and the ecclesia awarded the bounty, which consisted of one or two obols a day, rather more than 1½d. or 3d.—out-door relief, as we might say, amounting at most to about 1s. 9d. a week. There was also a fund for the maintenance of the children of those who had fallen in war, up to the age of eighteen.

5. But the main source of support was the receipt of emoluments for various public services. This was not relief, though it produced in the course of time the effect of relief. It

was rather the Athenian method of supporting a governing class of citizens.

The inner political history of Athens is the history of the extension of the franchise to the lower classes of citizens, with the privileges of holding office and receiving emoluments.

About 650 B.C., at a time when trade was increasing, the citizens were classified on the basis of property. The rich retained the franchise and the right of holding office; the middle classes obtained the franchise; the fourth or labouring class gained neither. By the reforms of Cleisthenes (509 B.C.) the clan-family and the phratry were set aside for the *deme* or parish, a geographical division superseding the social. Finally, about 478 B.C., when all had acquired the franchise, the right to hold office also was obtained by the fourth class. These changes coincided with a period of economic progress. The rate of interest was high, usually 12 per cent.; and in trading and bottomry the returns were much higher. A small capital at this interest soon produced comparative wealth; and simultaneously prices were falling. Then came the reaction. "After the Peloponnesian war" (432 to 404 B.C.), writes Professor Jebb, "the wealth of the country ceased to grow, as population had ceased to

grow about 50 years sooner. The rich went on accumulating; the poor, having no means of enriching themselves by enterprise, were for the most part occupied in watching for some chance of snatching a larger share of the stationary total." Thus the poorer classes in a time of prosperity had won the power which they were able to turn to their own account afterwards.

A period of economic pressure followed, coupled with a decline in the population; no return to the land was feasible, nor was emigration; the people had become townfolk inadapted to new uses; decreasing vitality and energy were marked by a new temper, the 'pauper' temper, unsettled, idle, and grasping, and political power was utilized to obtain relief; and though the relief was forthcoming, it was of no avail to stop the general decline. The state, it might almost be said, in giving scope to the assertion of the spirit of dependence, had ruined the self-regarding energy on which both family and state alike depended.

The emoluments were diverse. The number of citizens was not large; the functions in which citizens could take part were numerous; and when payment was forthcoming the poorer citizens pressed in to exercise their rights (cf.

Arist. *Pol.* 1293A). All Athenian citizens could attend the public assembly or *ecclesia*. Probably the attendance at it varied from a few hundred to 5000 persons. In 395 B.C. the payment for attendance was fixed at 3 obols, or little more than 4½d. a day—for the system of payment had probably been introduced a few years before (cf. Daremberg, *Dict. des Antiq.*). A juror or *dikast* would receive the same sum for attendance, and the courts or juries often consisted of 500 persons. If the estimate (Böckh., *Public Economy of Athens*, Eng. trans. pp. 109, 117) holds good that in the age of Demosthenes (384-323 B.C.) the member of a poor family of four free persons could live (including rent) on about 3·3d. or between 2 and 3 obols a day, the pay of the citizen attending the assembly or the court would at least cover the expenses of subsistence. On the other hand, it would be less than the pay of a day labourer, which was probably about 4 obols or 6d. a day. In any case many citizens—they numbered in all about 20,000—in return for their participation in political duties would receive considerable pecuniary assistance. Attending a great public festival also, the citizen would receive 2 obols or 3d. a day during the festival days; and there were

besides frequent public sacrifices, with the meal or feast which accompanied them.

But besides this there were confiscations of private property, which produced a surplus revenue divisible among the poorer citizens. (Some hold that there were confiscations in other Greek states, but not in Athens.) In these circumstances it is not to be wondered that men like Isocrates should regret that the influence of the Areopagus, the old court of morals and justice in Athens, had disappeared, for it "maintained a sort of censorial police over the lives and habits of the citizens; and it professed to enforce a tutelary and paternal discipline, beyond that which the strict letter of the law could mark out, over the indolent, the prodigal, the undutiful, and the deserters of old rite and custom."

6. In addition to public emoluments and relief there was much private liberality and charity. Many expensive public services were undertaken honorarily by the citizens under a kind of civic compulsion. Thus in a trial about 425 B.C. (Lysias, *Or.* 19. 57) a citizen submitted evidence that his father expended more than £2000 during his life in paying the expenses of choruses at festivals, fitting out seven triremes for the navy, and meeting

levies of income-tax to provide for emergencies. Besides this he had helped poor citizens by portioning their daughters and sisters, had ransomed some, and paid the funeral expenses of others (cf. for other instances Plutarch's *Cimon*, Theophrastus' *Charactères*, and Xenophon's *Econ.*).

7. There were also mutual help societies (*eranoi*). Those for relief would appear to have been loan societies (cf. Theoph. *Charact.*), one of whose members would beat up contributions to help a friend, who would afterwards repay the advance.

The criticisms of Aristotle (384-321 B.C.) suggest the direction to which he looked for social reform. He (*Pol.* 1320A) passes a very unfavourable judgment on the distribution of public money to the poorer citizens. The demagogues (he does not speak of Athens particularly) distributed the surplus revenues to the poor, who received them all at the same time; and then they were in want again. It was only, he argued, like pouring water through a sieve. It were better to see to it that the greater number were not so entirely destitute, for the depravity of a democratic government was due to this. The problem was to contrive how plenty (*euporia*, not poverty, *aporia*) should become permanent.

His proposals are adequate aid and voluntary charity. Public relief should, he urges, be given in large amounts so as to help people to acquire small farms or start in business, and the well-to-do (*euporoi*) should in the meantime subscribe to pay the poor for their attendance at the public assemblies. This proves, indeed, how the payments had become poor relief. He mentions also how the Carthaginian notables divided the destitute amongst them and gave them the means of setting to work, and the Tarentines (*koina poiountes*) shared their property with the poor. The Rhodians also may be mentioned (Strabo, xiv. c. 652), amongst whom the well-to-do undertook the relief of the poor voluntarily. The later word for charitable distribution was a sharing (*koinōnia*, Ep. Rom. xv. 26). To this we shall return. But the chief service rendered by Aristotle—a service which covered indeed the whole ground of social progress—was to show that unless the purpose of civil and social life was carefully considered and clearly understood by those who desired to improve its conditions, no change for the better could result from individual or associated action.

CHAPTER V.

CITY LIFE AND ITS PROBLEMS IN GREECE.

WE should, however, consider the question further in its relation to Greek thought.

Aristotle stated the problem of city life to be how plenty rather than poverty should be made permanent. In the time of Plato the supremacy of Athens had passed away. The conditions of social life seemed to call for inquiry, for some reform and revival of effort. He analyses the subject in the *Republic* and in the *Laws*, and the analysis bears closely on our modern questions. We would take from these two books some thoughts and suggestions which touch on social development, and make some comments. The city comes into being by reason of the economic wants of its inhabitants: but it cannot flourish by the mere satisfaction of these wants. Social

decline will set in. Extravagance and effeminacy will take the place of simplicity. The easy satisfaction of wants will serve no moral end, and have in itself no finality. There is a class of men who are wholly absorbed in the pursuit of wealth, attending to nothing but their daily gains, who care for knowledge only in so far as it will equip them to attain that purpose. There is the factious and unsettled element in society of which account must be taken. But there is also the large poor population: they are a population within the population; they form a city within the city.

What is the remedy? There are several to be considered and applied together and not separately. There must be an education of body and soul. The education of the soul is achieved first by its invigoration by a courage that is more than animal courage, that will not melt away in the face of temptation or obloquy any more than in the midst of physical dangers. With this, and akin to it, is Temperance, the mood of the balanced, self-restraining mind, the mood in which the measure of things is rightly taken. Then Justice—to do one's duty—to take one's place in life and fulfil its duties. Justice fits the parts together

in a true whole—makes of the courageous and the temperate man a doer of the word, and makes of the State an ordered unit. For what is the characteristic of the individual members becomes the characteristic of the community. We may apply to this a modern illustration. The lower impulses of the individuals that compose what Fielding calls 'the mob' dominate it. The mob or crowd is more excitable than the individual, more quickly touched by what is trivial and transient, more partisan, if roused, and more cruel. According to the quality of the crowd so is the nature of its excitement. If the crowd be an assembly of brave and temperate men accustomed to the ordered life of justice what they are individually it will reveal in its gathered force. It will respond to the higher appeal, and instead of the laudations of partisanship it will accept with approval the call to fulfil new obligations. Servility will annoy it; the incitement to a closer fellowship and a harder duty will move it.

And who shall rule? The rule must be in conformity with Wisdom, with the science of guardianship. The guardians are a selection of the competent, tried by the hardest tasks and not found wanting. They have no interest of

their own to serve. They form a class apart, sharing all things, and possessing no personal property. Their sole interest is the community. These are the characteristics of honourable rulers—moral and intellectual ability, and freedom from regard to personal ends. Somehow the method of government must evolve them, and set them upon its high places.

Then education: Plato would have similar training for boy and girl. In general they should learn beforehand in play the art or accomplishments with which they will afterwards have to be occupied in life. It is the earliest stage of education—when the child is being reared, that counts for most. In his play his soul should be led to love that kind of practical excellence of which he will stand in need as a grown man. The future carpenter should learn to measure and apply the line in play; and the future warrior should learn riding or some other exercise for amusement. Till the age of six boys and girls should play together. Then "they must begin to learn—the boys going to teachers of horsemanship and the use of the bow, the javelin, and the sling; and if they do not object let women go too to learn if not to practise; above all they ought to know the use of arms, for these are matters

which are almost entirely misunderstood at present" (*The Laws*, vii. sec. 794 (Jowett's trans.)). The "education has two branches, one of gymnastic, which is concerned with the body, and the other of music, which is designed for the improvement of the soul." Body and soul are each considered. Gymnastic consists of wrestling and dancing. A free habit of body, "health, agility, and beauty in the limbs and parts of the person," these are its objects. Music expresses the feeling that should accompany life, the sense of inner harmony, the expression of thought in terms so touching and mysterious that language fails to convey them. It is a language of the soul. Therefore the object of this education is strength, adaptability, and fineness of spirit. It is an education for the *élite*, some may say. To Plato it was an education that would rear a strong race and make the people good. Such a race and people could both support itself and defend itself. This is the ground work. With it come lessons. "A fair time for a boy of ten years old to spend in letters is three years"; and other studies follow.

Perhaps in that revision of our elementary and secondary education that is so urgently required, these thoughts of Plato's might be

re-considered and re-applied with great advantage to our own race.

The question of the human breed he has also in his mind. "We will say to him"—the younger man: "O my son, he who is born of good parents ought to make such a marriage as sensible people approve . . . They would advise you neither to avoid a poor marriage, nor specially to desire a rich one; but if other things are equal to honour persons of an inferior rank, and with them to form connexions. This will lead to the good of the city and of the families that are united." Marriage should be of opposites. So one tendency in excess will counteract another in the race. "Let there be one word about all marriages: Every marriage should be settled according to what is beneficial to the city, not according to what is most pleasant to oneself"; and to this end in the *Laws* many minute regulations are suggested.

In this comes to light a defect quite modern in its nature; of the very virtues themselves there seems to be a latent distrust. Neither the individual nor the State can fulfil their purpose unless they be ruled by courage, temperance, and justice; they, and not the minutiae of superintendence, are the necessary condition

of social life. If they be there, the right is done in the spontaneity of the good will. If they are not there, minute legislation can hardly be effective. The complexity of life must always defeat those who try to control it in its innermost recesses by a complexity of statutes. To a point they can go, the point at which inspection can be made as complete as the regulation is detailed; but except perhaps in a very small community such as that of 5040 persons which Plato makes his measure of population, the details of enactment may easily outrun the possibilities of inspection, and so become valueless. A great evil may then result. The supreme morality of self-guidance may be weakened or lost. 'Instructions' may take the place of intelligence. Initiative may grow less. After all, reliance must be placed not on the minutiae of legislative instructions, but on education, on the spread of information, and on the effect of the general polity of the State on the development of the people.

The economic aim of the State which Plato explains in the *Laws*, is a relatively fixed condition of resources. A taint of injustice adheres to the rich man. According to Plato's idea he cannot be rich except by dishonourable means. "Very rich and very good at the same time

the citizen cannot be, not at least in the sense that the many speak of riches. For they describe by the term 'rich' a few who have the most valuable possessions, although the owner of them be a rogue." "He who spends on noble objects, and acquires wealth by just means only, can hardly be remarkable for riches any more than he can be very poor." This community accordingly foregoes money-making. It is to trust to the produce of agriculture "and only so much of this as will not compel us in pursuing it to neglect that for the sake of which riches exist—I mean soul and body which, without gymnastics and without education, will never be worth anything; and therefore, as we have said, not once, but many times, the care of riches should have a last place in one's thoughts" (sec. 743).

The fixed condition is to be obtained by a registration of all property (sec. 754) and by the restriction of it in the first class of citizens to four minae, or £16 5s. 0d.; in the second class to three minae, or £12 3s. 9d.; and in the third class to one minae, or £4 1s. 3d. And to the population, in tribal fashion, are assigned lots of land, a lot for each family; and the lots remain by adjustment ever the same in number, and ever possessed by the same number of

families. The limit of poverty is the value of the lot, which is inalienable. The population remains the same. Families are limited. There is, if considered necessary, the exposure of infants. There is emigration.

The recognition of the evils of town life, here and elsewhere, suggest reaction, a reversion to an earlier state, to tribal conditions or to those of the yeoman farmer. But the reaction is a sign of sentiment, of an intellectual and possibly physical weakness. The life in the city in general unfits for the life in the country. Practical experience in many cases proves this. Philanthropic ruralism can effect very little. The line of progress is not backwards or outwards—to the past or to the country life. It is forwards: how to make the citizen more competent as a citizen—living in the city with a parsimony that a labourer in the country is bound to practise, and with a greater ingenuity and carefulness in safeguarding his life and the life of his family. If this is not possible, one may almost say nothing is possible. A life of greater or less dependence in the city is the only alternative: and that is only another name for failure.

In the desire for unity and fixity Plato hankers after the fulfilment of the Pythagorean motto:

"The goods of friends are common."¹ That seems to him to imply a primal unity of thought and feeling which is the perfection of the life of a community. His Guardians in the Republic adopt it. For his citizens in the Colony in the *Laws* he provides, as we have seen, what is in his judgment the inferior method of the equal and unchanging plots of land. But in spite of this permanent provision against destitution a city may according to his phrase have to be purified. "When best the purification is painful, like similar cures in medicine, involving righteous punishment and inflicting death and exile in the last resort (sec. 735). For in this way we commonly dispose of great sinners who are incurable and are the greatest injury to the whole State. But the milder purification is as follows: when men who have nothing show a disposition to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the rich—these, who are the natural plague of the State, are sent away by the legislator in a friendly spirit, as far as he is able, and this dismissal of them is euphemistically termed a Colony. And every legislator should contrive to do this at once."

Then he deals with the question of poverty

¹ The complete saying is: "The things of friends are common, and one's friend is another self."

and mendicancy. "A man," he says (sec. 936) is not to be pitied who suffers hunger or anything of that kind; but we should pity a temperate man or one who has some goodness or some particle of goodness, if, having this character, he suffers misfortune. It would accordingly be very strange if a man of this kind were entirely uncared for, so that he came to utter beggary, whether he were a slave or a freeman in even a poorly managed city or commonwealth. Therefore the legislator may safely make a law applicable to cases of this kind in such terms as these: in our city-state let there be no beggar, but if any one attempts to beg, and to make a living by endless petitions, let the wardens of the Agora turn him out of the Agora, and the Office of the wardens of the city turn him out of the city, and let the wardens in the country send him on from there to beyond the boundary, so that the place may be clear of such a creature altogether."

This process of clearing away and sending on the beggars is quite in accordance with early English legislation, though, unless it were Scotland, there was no alien land adjacent to our border into which the beggars could be finally driven. They were sent back to their parish. For the rest the argument is of general

interest. No Poor Law is suggested, because in the case of persons who ought to be assisted, private charity will certainly suffice. The disorderly person who has no part of goodness in him should be cleared away as if he were a polluted thing from which the city should be cleansed, as in the rites of purification. No argument is pressed, such as illogically affects our modern sentiment, that if we refuse to allow begging we must make a public provision for the beggar, as an alternative to the livelihood he may gain by begging. The thing is wrong and to be punished out of existence, like any other wrong-doing. No substitute for it is to be considered. A reversion to an ordered life is the only alternative that is conceivable as against expulsion. But if there were in truth that possibility, then the beggar would have some goodness left in him or some particle of goodness sufficient for that object. Thus the position is taken that there is a condition of life, entirely disordered or wrecked, which admits of no revival. That Plato recognizes, and so must anyone who has tried to help men of this class with sufficient knowledge and persistence. In effect in modern times when there remains no place to which to expel this class, this is an argument for some colony such as Merxplas in Belgium—a colony

of the ill-controlled and intemperate, where they are made as useful as may be.

We have thus a community of landholders, with relatively small and fixed means, closely supervised and almost ascetic, working with the aid of slaves and hirelings, living in friendship and good cheer, educated to think and to enjoy; by a fixity of possessions avoiding destitution and ensuring security of maintenance; by the avoidance of strangers, subjected to no disturbance from alien thoughts and unsound doctrines; by good habits and careful marriages enabled to prevent social decline. The picture is that of a community of the good in an island seclusion. In its very security there is a limitation of sympathy. The recalcitrant is evicted, and the slave, though kindly treated, remains outside the body of citizens. Progress reaches finality, and thus progress itself in its isolation becomes impossible. One fears lest joy should vanish in routine, and love in a finely poised superiority, lest economic social life should be hardened into the trammels of caste, on the one side the elect, on the other the sinful and the servile.

But this is hardly a complete judgment. Every society or association has, for the sake of its own preservation, laws for the expulsion

of those who according to its standard of thought or purpose are disorderly. This is true of churches and the State, of clubs and of societies. Expulsion may be in part punishment. In part it may be considered reformatory. But in effect the ban of a church or the sentence of death are expulsion pure and simple, the one mortal spiritually, the other mortal bodily. We must in some measure, according to the purpose of our social life, accept this principle. Amelioration has its limits: and men and women who are themselves proven and manifest sources of evil to the community it is but just to withdraw from it, at least till their power for evil be neutralized.

On the other hand, the basis of social life and social reform remain as they are here clearly and, one may say, finally enunciated. No society can reform itself unless within its membership courage, temperance and justice with a kind of wisdom predominate. Later on this is the argument of Cicero and Epictetus, and later still it becomes the moral creed of Christianity. The civilization of a people implies its moralization. Unless it can make itself moral according to a higher standard, it cannot reform itself to a higher standard, let laws and inspection be what they may.

CHAPTER VI.

PROVISION AMONG THE GREEKS FOR THE STRANGER AND THE SICK.

We return to charity among the Greeks, two forms of which we have still to mention: charity to the stranger and to the sick. It will be convenient to consider both in relation to the whole classical period.

With the growth of towns the administration of hospitality was elaborated.

There was hospitality between members of families bound by the rites of host and guest. The guest received as a right only shelter and fire. Usually he dined with the host the first day, and if afterwards he was fed, provisions were supplied to him. There were large guest chambers (*xenōna*) or small guest houses, completely isolated on the right or left of the principal house; and here the guest was lodged. There were also, *e.g.* at Hieropolis (Prof. W. M. Ramsay's *Phrygia*, ii. 97), brotherhoods of

hospitality (*xenoi tekmoreioi*, bearers of the sign), which made hospitality a duty, and had a common chest and Apollo as their tutelary god. There were inns or resting-places (*katagögia*) for strangers at temples (Thuc. iii. 68; Plato, *Laws*, 953A) and places of resort (*leschai*) at or near the temples for the entertainment of strangers—as for instance, at a temple of Asklepios at Epidauros (Pausanias, iii. 240). The evidence at present is not perhaps sufficiently complete, but, so far as it goes, it tends to the conclusion that in pre-Christian times hospitality was provided to passers-by and strangers in the temple buildings, as later it was furnished in the monasteries and churches.

There were also in towns houses for strangers (*xenöna*) provided at the public cost. This was so at Megara; and in Crete strangers had a place at the public meals and a dormitory. Xenophon suggested that it would be profitable for the Athenian state to establish inns for traders (*katagögia demosia*) at Athens. Thus, apart from the official hospitality of the proxenus or 'consul,' who had charge of the affairs of foreigners, and the hospitality which was shown to persons of distinction by states or private individuals, there was in Greece a large provision for strangers, wayfarers, and

vagrants based on the charitable sentiment of hospitality. Among the Romans similar customs of private and public hospitality prevailed; and throughout the empire the older system was altered, probably very slowly. In Christian times (cf. Ramsay above) Pagan temples were (about A.D. 408) utilized for special purposes, including that of hospitality to strangers.

Round the temples, at first probably village temples, the organization of medical relief grew up. Primitive medicine is connected with dreams, worship, and liturgical 'pollution,' punishment and penitence, and an experimental practice. Finally, systematic observation and science (with no knowledge of chemistry and little of physiology) assert themselves, and a secular administration is created by the side of the older religious organization.

Sickness among primitive races is conceived to be a material substance to be extracted, or an evil spirit to be driven away by incantation. Religion and medicine are thus at the beginning almost one and the same thing. In Anatolia, in the groups of villages (cf. Ramsay as above, i. 101) under the theocratic government of a central *hierön* or temple, the god, Men Karou, was the physician and saviour (*sötër* and *sözön*) of his people. Priests, prophets and physicians

were his ministers. He punished wrongdoing by diseases which he taught the penitent to cure. So elsewhere pollution, physical or moral, was chastened by disease and loss of property or children, and further ills were avoided by sacrifice and expiation and public warning.

In the temple and out of this phase of thought grew up schools of medicine, in the practice of which dreams and religious ritual retained a place. The newer gods, Asklepios and Apollo, succeeded the older local divinities; and the 'sons' of Asklepios became a profession, and the temple with its adjacent buildings a kind of hospital. There were many temples of Asklepios in Greece and elsewhere, placed generally in high and salubrious positions. After ablution the patient offered sacrifices, repeating himself the words of the hymn that was chanted. Then, when night came on, he slept in the temple. In the early dawn he was to dream 'the heavenly dream' which would suggest his cure; but if he did not dream, relations and others—officials at the temple—might dream for him. At dawn the priests or sons of Asklepios came into the temple and visited the sick, so that, in a kind of drama, where reality and appearance seemed to meet, the patients believed that

they saw the god himself. The next morning the prescription and treatment were settled. At hand in the inn or guest chambers of the temple the patient could remain, sleeping again in the temple, if necessary, and carrying out the required regimen. In the temple were votive tablets of cases, popular and awe-inspiring, and records and prescriptions, which later found their way into the medical works of Galen and others. At the temple of Asklepios at Epidaurus was an inn (*katagögion*) for visitors to the temple and patients, with four courts and colonnades, and in all 160 rooms. (Cf. Pausanias, ii. 171; and *Report, Archaeol. in Greece*, R. C. Bosanquet, 1899, 1900.)

At three centres more particularly, Rhodes, Knidos, and Cos, were the medical schools of the Asklepiads. If one may judge from an inscription at Athens, priests of Asklepios attended the poor gratuitously. And years afterwards, in the 11th century, when there was a revival of medicine, we find (Ch. Daremberg, *La Médecine: Histoire et Doctrines*) at Salerno the Christian priest as doctor, a simple and less palatable pharmacy for the poor than for the rich, and gratuitous medical relief.

Besides the temple schools and hospitals there

was a secular organization of medical aid and relief. States appointed trained medical men as physicians, and provided for them medical establishments (*iatreia*, "large houses with large doors full of light") for the reception of the sick; and for operations there were provided beds, instruments, medicines, etc. At these places also pupils were taught. A lower degree of medical establishment was to be found at the barbers' shops. Out-patients were seen at the *iatreia*. They were also visited at home. There were doctors' assistants and slave doctors. The latter, apparently, attended only slaves (Plato, *Leg.* iv. 720); they do "a great service to the master of the house, who in this manner is relieved of the care of his slaves." It was a precept of Hippocrates, that if a physician came to a town where there were sick poor, he should make it his first duty to attend to them; and the state physician attended gratuitously any one who applied to him. There were also travelling physicians going rounds to heal children and the poor. These methods continued, probably all of them, to Christian times.

It has been argued that medical practice was introduced into Italy by the Greeks. But the evidence seems to show that there was a

quite independent Latin tradition and school of medicine (René Brian, "Médecine dans le Latium et à Rome," *Rev. Archéol.*, 1885). In Rome there were consulting-rooms and dispensaries, and houses in which the sick were received. Hospitals are mentioned by Roman writers in the first century A.D. There were infirmaries—detached buildings—for sick slaves; and in Rome, as at Athens, there were slaves skilled in medicine. In Rome also for each *regio* there was a chief physician who attended to the poorer people.

CHAPTER VII.

THE LEAVEN OF RELIGION.

THE conditions of thought which prevailed among the people, and under which these charities were practised, are not at once understood, nor is the relation of charity to religion appreciated, unless the growth of religious thought be taken into consideration. The old world of religion in Greek and Roman times is like a changing sea. The waves of feeling and imagination are endless. Their colours and forms shift rapidly, as it seems, in constant and ineffectual movement. Then sometimes in the midst of this wide expanse of indeterminate changefulness there come at intervals great movements of innovating thought that like leap tides sweep the reaches of the sea and recast its coast lines. Some God, for instance, there may be who is but little known. He is accredited with power. His influence spreads. He ousts other and older Gods. He links his

name to theirs and shares or takes their place. The mind of the worshippers is ever ready to find for him new imaginative affinities, and to assume new identifications. There is no unnaturalness in this. The whole God-atmosphere is what to us would seem abnormal. The personalities of the Gods are vague and unfixed, as vague and variable as the aspirations of the worshippers. As there is no consistency in the one, there is no unity or order in the other. Theology is still theogony. A series of monstrous births of elemental forces, regarded as personal beings, or of immortalized man-like creatures, makes out of earth the heaven of a confused adoration. The growing reason, the growing morality and civility of man are in fact, however, perpetually adapting, and re-adapting the material of the Universe to consistency with the necessities and standards of human thought. What the soul imagines and what it sees with ever clearer eyes in the world outside itself, it turns continually to new account for its own, higher purposes, and for its progress. It moulds these sights and imaginations both into its ways of living and into its ways of worship. Thus ritual, oblation, and prayer find their counterpart in religious contentment and social security.

At first the mere recognition of what is strange suffices for an elemental regard or reverence. A hill or stone is strange in shape. Therefore it in some way impresses the mind. A story is made of it; or it merely remains a thing of power by reason of its oddity, owing to the feeling that the exceptional is the potent. It becomes a fetish. But even this is a step in the religious consciousness. There is a new idea dimly connected with it. It represents something apart from ourselves which stands over against us and our life. It is hill or stone, but it is also something more. If it goes we are uncomfortable. There is a feeling that something is amiss. We associate our prosperity or failure with it. Like the friendly old-world Lares in the Roman house we may treat our stone as the responsible offender if things go amiss; but yet though we treat it so ignominiously as our creature, it remains a recognition of our belief in a power outside us, in a universe with which we would be in harmony or which we would bring into harmony with us. Our recognition of the stone is indeed a recognition of a higher or different standard than ours. It reacts on our social life and on our morality. It creates by degrees new fears and new duties.

At this stage we are far from the coming of

the Olympian Gods, the Gods associated with a life in high or heavenly places. Hesiod's Gods are Olympian. There are earlier spirits or deities, Pelasgian, not Achæan, of the earth and under the earth, not heavenly. Some, the most primitive, are "Keres," unseen and blight-like things that corrupt, and for the expulsion of which there are ceremonies of riddance (*Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*: J. E. Harrison, 33). In the religious imagination these developed into many sister forms: and there were Fates, Erinnyes and Harpies, and others.

In the Anthesteria at Athens, the festival of the re-vocation, as the word is now interpreted, we find an All Souls Day. The Keres are the ghostlike outcome of the burial cists. The first day of the feast they come: on the last they are ridded away after "ceremonies of placation and purgation." The offering is primitive, like the worship—grain and seeds—not even wine. In the offering the worshipper did not partake. He fasted and he chewed a purgative plant, branches of which were fastened to the door of his house. The body and the home were purified. Then the world was, as it were, purged of the evil, and the spirits were bidden to leave. The cry was raised "Out of the doors,

ye Keres: it is no longer Anthesteria": and the gloom of purgation was over. The Lupercalia is the corresponding Roman feast, occurring in the month of purging—februarius—February, the month corresponding to the Anthesterion in the Greek Calendar. The thought and the ceremonial in many forms are world-wide. Of the Olympic worship, Miss Harrison says, the theory is, *do ut des*: of this primitive service it is *do ut abeas*—I give that thou mayest go away.

In touch with the deep feeling of the need of annual purification is the long-lingering human sacrifice, even "in civilized Athens of the fifth century" (Harrison, 96). The community was cleansed by the expulsion from it of the Pharmakos, the medicine-man or magic-man, man or woman, or both man and woman. These in later days were criminals reserved for the purpose, and were counted as infected members of society. On them by a theory of substitution was centred on behalf of the community all that fatal contamination of evil and impurity that would otherwise infect the whole body, and bring to it plagues and famines.

A woman's feast, that of the Thesmophoria, is of another type (Harrison, 120). It is an autumn feast of fertility, held in October or

November. What is done by woman's hand is fertile, according to folk-lore; and women are agriculturists early. It was a three days' feast: one day was that of down-going and uprising, the next of fasting, and the third of fair birth. On the first day the women went down to hollow places in the earth and underground caves and brought up from below rotting portions of swine's flesh that had been placed there before. The next day the women sat fasting on the ground. "The strictness of the fast made it proverbial. On this day prisoners were released, the law courts were closed, the Boulë could not meet." The last day the women strewed the rotten flesh on the fields.

The festivals are agricultural and correspond to the seasons. They are a solemn recognition of the larger cosmic life on which the lesser life of human beings depends. But the thought goes further. What is so akin to man is imagined into human forms; for, to take one of the well known and widely spread myths, the world with its season of fruitage and its season of ploughing and sowing, becomes the myth of the mother and the maid, of Demeter and Persephone. There is thus a new union of nature and man. The worship is one of sympathetic magic. What nature does, the

worshippers do. What the Gods do is what nature is doing. From this springs a large and apprehensive sympathy between the man and nature. Their oneness is realized. Demeter is the mother of the Spelt (Harrison, 272.) She is the yellow-haired lady of the corn. The offering to her is a peasant's dish, a cup of thin porridge of barley-meal and water, made tasty with the penny-royal or mint that one might find by any ditch or swampy corner of the cornfield. If she does not come, there is hunger and want. And when she is cut down and gone, there is blank winter time, for, as the maid, she passes underground, when the ploughings are done, and the seed is sown. Or we may think of her, not as one deity in two persons, but as mother of the corn, with Persephone, the death-bearer, as her daughter. For the sowing is death; and the mother is disconsolate and wanders the world over (Callimachus: *Hymn to Demeter*, 14), out to the West, to the black races of Africa, and "where the golden apples are," then thrice across Achelous and the rivers of Greece, and thrice to the earth's centre, Henna in Sicily. Beside Callichorus, the spring of beautiful dances, near Eleusis, athirst, yet without quenching her thirst, thrice she sat on the ground; and she neither ate

nor performed ablutions. She is the mother of sorrows and toil and expectation, suffering a long fast. Then her daughter comes up to her again in the springing corn. And she has, as her civil counterpart in the world, a wise hero-king in whom she implants the love of farming—Triptolemus the thrice plougher, who ploughs in winter, spring and summer (p. 275). So at last Demeter after sorrow is made perfect in joy at the festivals of harvest: but her daughter becomes to the imagination the maid of death, the inscrutable death which is not death, but which as a witness of revival at springtime pushes green and tender blades of corn into an upper world. "It is not surprising that a religion like Orphism which concerned itself with the abnegation of this world and the life of the soul hereafter, laid hold rather of the figure of the underworld Korë (maid), and left the prosperous, genial, corn-mother to make her way alone into Olympus"—to become from an earth spirit a deity in the respectable world of blissful Olympus. And at last the sweet heart of the tale becomes lost. It passes away from the common people and becomes formalized.

Two elements then we have that make for the growth of religious thought and for charity—purification and sympathy. The puri-

fication is ritual purification, but by implication in it lies the moral also; and in the course of time alms-deeds are regarded as a kind of ritual offering which will like an oblation purify the life. There is also the sympathy with sorrow. In the worship of Isis later we find it again. And the sympathy of man increases its circle, as we shall see, prompted step by step by a clearer conception of religious obligation.

The later, the Achæan element, is anthropomorphic. The Gods, it is felt, are not forces merely, like darkness and winter and death, and sunlight, and spring, and life. In some way they are like-minded with ourselves—and we imagine them alike in body; but they transcend us, and are all-powerful. The hero is God-like, and may become a God. The sacrifice to these Gods is that of a common meal. There is an understanding that if the right offerings are made the worshipper will be considered and may share the sacrifice. The offering is of flesh. The oblation of fruits no longer suffices for the God, as it no longer suffices for the man; and the sacrifices may be accessory to a dinner or a feast or a distribution of food. Public sacrifices are constant. The sacrifice—worship—and the meal

are associated. Where there is a feast the beggars come.

Out of this religion—on the Olympian level—comes Zeus, the paramount God, and by a process of logical elucidation ultimately the one and only God: and, as typically Greek, we may take Apollo as the best example of a great but subordinate God. Apollo renders to man the services of which man in social life most stands in need. He is the son of Zeus. He is the light bringer, the Sun. "The beginning of all things and the end he comprehends, and for the shining plectrum of his lyre he has the sunlight" (*Plutarch on the Pythian Oracles*, 402). He is good and chaste.¹ He is the inspirer of good and beautiful thoughts. He leads the Muses. He is a God of healing. He wards off evil. He is the counsellor. His oracles guide states and men in their perplexities. He is a Lord of quick and far-reaching justice. He is brave. He is the slayer of the Python, the snake worshipped in the old earth religion. His wisdom is practical as the wisdom of Ulysses, but he is without guile or intrigue. He is the God of harmony, of the lyre and the stately dance; and he is beautiful. He is the good and supremely gifted Greek glorified and made immortal.

¹ *Plutarch on the E at Delphi*: 20.

So does the Olympian worship serve in the process of growth. It strikes a higher, a more intellectual, note. It brings the Gods into a friendly partnership. It leads ultimately to that great reform in the thought of humanity—the realization that God is one. This came through the philosophers, or in part through them. It was a moralizing of all things. There can be in God no variableness, no shadow of turning. He must be at one with himself. To be God-like is to be perfect. In him are realized the endeavours of morality. A new conception of the son-ship of God appears on the world's horizon like a figure in a dream.

It is hardly too much to say that, till this thought of the oneness of God became dominant, charity in its fullest sense could hardly be. With it there came a standard of judgment now first applicable to social life. With the unity of God came the thought that all men are spiritually of one kith and kin. This is the groundwork of charity.

But the leaven of the older worships still worked among the people at large. They were not philosophers, they felt their way by symbolism and by emotion. They found the expression of part of their thought in two religious movements that associate themselves with the older

conceptions—with “a reading of earth”—as George Meredith would have said. There is the worship of Dionysos and the worship of the grape. The grape has come as a new invention. Demeter refuses the cup of the “red, red wine” that her hostess Metaneira first offers her. She is of an earlier date. Her peasants did not offer her wine, any more than they sacrificed to her sheep or oxen. Now the Wine God has come. He has at first no share in the family-state of the Olympian Gods in their serene sky-land above the mountain tops. He is the God of intoxication (Harrison, 447), wild inspirations, excitement, and rhapsody. His worshippers, possessed by him, exult in the beauty and joy of the mere life of woods and mountains and wild animals, or like wild animals are tossed about and lose themselves in brutal frenzy, and tear and rend creatures wild like themselves. As human beings they may become disordered, violent, uncontrolled in their passions, degraded. A brutal sacrificial rite, afterwards explained and so in a manner made reasonable by the story of Zagreus, was the culmination of this worship, the tearing and eating of the raw flesh of a bull. The bull consecrated represents, is identified with, Dionysos or Bacchos. Dionysos takes the form of a bull. Then Orpheus appears to come

as a reformer (pp. 475, 476, 502, etc.). He is not a being of the imagination, but a man. Symbolism in his hands elevates the ceremonial and cloaks its brutality. The worshippers eating the raw flesh do not share merely in an offered sacrifice, but they partake of the life of the God himself. The worshipper himself became Bacchos (p. 433). Thus, by a strange conversion of thought, there is wrought into this savage ceremony the twofold conception of an inspired life. The physical intoxication was thought to pass away in a spiritual fervour, and the feast of flesh to resolve itself into a participation in the life of the God.

The Orphic element assumes many forms and influences the worship of many deities. At Athens they called Dionysos Iacchus. He was the celebrant God of the Eleusinian mysteries, the mysteries of Demeter. He was the Son-God. He was Dionysos as the babe at the breast, the ever-new yearly entrant into life. He represented "just so much of the religion of Dionysos as the imaginative Athenian could face" (p. 544). The mysteries of Demeter at Eleusis retained their old character as a harvest festival. The initiated confessed to having fulfilled a certain harvest ritual. The "fresh ear of grain was reaped," and there was, it would seem, a mimetic

marriage, and a sacred child (pp. 550-552), the ear of corn in the harvesting world of the fruits, the child in the harvesting world of life. Each was holy. It was a confession that the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof. The tale was told in drama or mystery play. Iacchus, the mystic child, was the celebrant. Orphic reforms went far, even, it would appear, to an abandonment of the animal sacrifice itself.

Orpheus is the sweet singer of a reformed religion. The people were charmed by his hymns. "Nor shall anyone in our City State"—Plato wrote in his *Laws*—"dare to sing a song which has not been approved by the judgment of the guardians of the laws, not even if his strain be sweeter than the songs of Thamyras and of Orpheus" (*Laws*, 829). Plato recognizes the sweetness of the song, even while he looks for safeguards against its having an unlicensed run in his Colony. And there is (*Laws*, 782) this other suggestive comment: "We hear of other human beings who do not even venture to taste the flesh of a cow and have no animal sacrifices, but only cakes and fruit soaked in honey and similar pure offerings, but no flesh or animals; from these they abstain, under the idea that they ought not to eat them, and may not stain the altars of the Gods with blood. In

those days men are said to have lived a sort of Orphic life, having the use of all lifeless things, but abstaining from all living things." So the Dionysian worship changes. The intoxication is now of music. The sacrifice of the bull passes away. Its place is taken by the bloodless sacrifice. Quietness or order are to prevail in the mysteries (Harrison, 476). The worshipper is to be temperate, ascetic even. Orpheus' doctrine is monotheist; it includes a belief in an after-life, in which, except for the 'holy,' there have to be cycles of delay and purgation before the creature "becomes God instead of mortal." Orpheus is the cherisher (p. 595) of the young and delicate, of nurslings, of lambs; and on the vases he is drawn with a lamb on his shoulders. To the Christians he seemed another "Good Shepherd." He met with death, as the story goes, at the hands of the wild followers of Dionysos, the Maenads. They tore him to pieces, the intruding reformer and innovator, and the hearts of his worshippers are moved to grief at the tale of his sorrowful death. This new phase of religion also finds its expression in sympathy with suffering.

With this change the sympathies of man to man are enlarged. There is a finer charity, and religion, instead of being non-moral or licentious,

now, schools men in moderation and personal morality. There is what we call a sense of sin. The after-world becomes a place not of imprisonment but of purgation—during cycles of after-existence. But the 'pure' soul may pass into the bliss of the 'circle desired' at once. In part this is a ritual purity, but in part it is moral purity also, purity of soul. The need of a fulfilment of duty in all relations of life is recognized. Of a kindred religious mysticism in the worship of Osiris and Isis is the Egyptian Book of the Dead to which we refer later.

But the Orphic worship has yet another significant feature. Dr. Gomperz (*Greek Thinkers*, i. 135) points out that "the religious crisis" which it represents "was clearly the reflex of a social crisis. It was the accompaniment of the battle of the classes which filled the seventh century and part of the sixth in the towns throughout the Greek world." Orphicism took its rise among the middle-classes, and not among the nobles. A prominent trait in the creed of its adherents was their horror of bloodshed, and this moral idea points to a class of society which neither yearned for warlike renown nor was famous for its prowess in arms. The reaction from endless civic feuds would be found in a new regard for peace. As in the *Aeneid*, after more than a

century of pitiless personal warfare and faction in the Roman world, the misery of bloodshed and destruction was realised afresh, and sadness, it was felt, waited upon the glory of victory; so here strife and conflict led to a religion of peace.

Another feature too there is. Pythagoras (born probably about 582 B.C.) is Orphic. He was a philosopher who found his satisfaction in a religion which became associated with his name. He is not a critic of religion merely, but equally philosopher and worshipper. He appears, like several other sages, as the travelling scholar of an inquisitive age. He visited Egypt, and may have come into touch with India and Buddhism. He had for students and friends parable sayings, which he used to test their quickness and insight. There are some sixteen of them left. Two are: "Do not bear the image of a God on a ring," which may perhaps be interpreted: bear the image within. And "Do not cherish swallows under your roof": have friends that will not fly from you. These were called his 'symbols.' He had a majestic bearing, like that of a god. He seemed like an Apollo. He was of the large heroic build. He was musician and man of science. He discovered "the dependence of the pitch of sound on the length of the vibrating chord." He discovered that the square

of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle was equal to the squares on the sides containing the right angles; and he offered up, so it is said, a hecatomb to the Gods in honour of his discovery. He mastered man. He was initiated, it was said, in all the sacred mysteries of Greeks and barbarians.

He had a great capacity for friendship. The saying is his: "The things of friends are common; and friendship is equality." If he heard of any one who had used one of his symbols, straightway he made a companion of him and made him a friend. His sayings seem to have had a vogue in his life-time, and to have passed round the world. He founded a social brotherhood on the basis of friendship. His disciples used to "lay up all their property in store and use it in common" (Diogenes, *Laertes*, viii. 8). They had a five years' course of study during which they listened to addresses and kept silence. Till they were approved they did not see Pythagoras.

The following notes are marks of his teaching, teaching that was evidently interfused with religion. He did not allow prayers for oneself, for one did not know what was good for one (Diogenes, *Laertes*, viii. 6, 19). Strong drink, he said, the mind in its flower calls ruin. He disapproved of all excess, for no one should exceed a due

proportion in toil or in food. He counselled self-restraint and chastity. He counselled the introspective life. When they returned home his disciples were to ask themselves: "In what have I transgressed: what have I done: what that I ought to have done have I not accomplished." These are some of his sayings: "Honour Gods more than daimons, heroes more than men; and of men honour our parents above all. Associate with one another not in order to make friends into enemies, but to make enemies friends. Count nothing your own. Be the auxiliaries of law: make war against lawlessness. Modesty and discretion is—not to be overwhelmed with laughter nor yet to be of a sad countenance. Flee excess in flesh. In your wayfaring let rest succeed effort. Cultivate the memory. In anger say naught and do naught. Honour all prophecy. Use songs set to the lyre. With a hymn to Gods and good men give your reasonable thanks."

And of offerings he said: "Cease to offer up victims to the Gods; worship only at a bloodless altar. Nor swear by the Gods, but be disciplined and show yourself to be worthy of credence (without an oath)." "At Delos Pythagoras worshipped only at the altar of Apollo the Father, because wheat and barley and cakes were offered there, and no victim had ever been slain there."

Thus we have seen the springs of friendship and charity. Charity grows as religion develops. We pass from the ritual of the banning and banishing of unclean things to a religion of sympathy with nature and not a mere dread of her. Religion makes room for sorrow; and amongst other forms which the ritual of the worshippers takes is that of a kind of nature-acting, in which there is sorrow and joy—made personal in a divine being—the mother and maid. Then the Olympians conquer a place in the old world of spirits and shapeless unpersonified deities; and from their victory eventually there emerges a single paramount God, who is a God of justice. But the undergrowth of the Earth Gods continues, and religion—the inner religion of the common people—is humanized by degrees. The wildness of Bacchic orgies disappears. Intoxication is superseded by inspiration. Music orders all things, and the Maenads are succeeded by the Muses. Orpheus rules instead of Dionysos. The claim of duty becomes clearer, and of the good and the initiated a large spirit of charity is expected, and deeds worthy of the spirit. The religion retains what is indeed but a necessary part of it, its tragic story, whether of Demeter, or Dionysos, or Orpheus, or Isis. All objects of religious reverence must pass into our human

world and bear their sorrows there, and so share our sympathy and give us their aid. Apollo even must work as a farm servant for Admetus. Pythagoras touches religion with philosophy. Orphic becomes Pythagorean. Religion becomes more expressly a kind of life. The bloody sacrifices are superseded by the old earth offerings of wheat and barley and cakes; and in social life the reformer would build society out of friendship and turn enemies to friends. From a new quarter come words like "Love thy neighbour as thyself": "Friends, things are in common: to love one's friends is to love oneself."

CHAPTER VIII.

CHARITY AND SLAVERY.

SLAVERY was so large a factor in pre-Christian and early Christian society that a word should be said on its relation to charity. Indirectly it was a cause of poverty and social degradation. Thus in the case of Athens, with the achievement of maritime supremacy the number of slaves increased greatly. Manual arts were despised as unbecoming to a citizen, and the slaves carried on the larger part of the agricultural and industrial work of the community; and for a time—until after the Peloponnesian war (404 B.C.)—slavery was an economic success. But by degrees the slave, it would seem, dispossessed the citizen and rendered him unfit for competition. The position of the free artisan thus became akin to that of the slave (Arist. *Pol.* 1260A, etc.), and slavery became the industrial method of the country. Though

Greeks, Romans, Jews, and Christians spent money in ransoming individual slaves, and also enfranchised many, no general abolition of slavery was possible. By degrees, here earlier, there later, through economic changes slavery or serfdom was superseded in agriculture by the status of the *coloni*, who were attached to the soil, but paid as rent part of the produce of the land they tilled. Household slavery lasted long. (Cf. Article on Slavery, *Brit. Encycl.* 1887.)

In Greece the feeling towards the slave became constantly more humane. Real slavery, Aristotle said, was a cast of mind, not a condition of life. The slave was not to be ordered about, but to be commanded and persuaded like a child. The master was under the strongest obligation to promote his welfare. In Rome, on the other hand, slavery continued to the end a massive, brutal, industrial force—a standing danger to the state. But alike in Greece and Rome the influence of slavery on the family was in the main pernicious. The pompous array of domestic slaves, the transfer of motherly duties to slave nurses, the loss of that homely education which for most people comes only from the practical details of life—all this prevented the permanent invigoration

and reform of family life which in the later empire Jewish and Christian influences might otherwise have produced.¹

¹ Cf. Wallon, *Hist. de l'esclavage dans l'antiquité*; and *Social Life at Rome in the Age of Cicero*: W. Warde Fowler, p. 204.

CHAPTER IX.

CHARITY IN ROMAN TIMES.

THE words that suggest most clearly the Roman attitude towards what we call charity are *liberalitas*, *beneficentia*, and *pietas*. The two former are almost synonymous (Cic. *de Offic.* i. 7, 14). Liberality lays stress on the mood—that of the *liber*, the freeborn, and so in a sense the independent and superior; beneficence on the deed and its purpose (Seneca, *de Benef.* vi. 10). The conditions laid down by Cicero, following Panoetius the Stoic (185-112 B.C.) are three: not to do harm to him whom one would benefit, not to exceed one's means, and to have regard to merit. The character of the person whom we would benefit should be considered, his feelings towards us, the interest of the community, our social relations in life, and services rendered in the past. The utility of the deed or gift, graded according to social relationship and estimated

in some degree from the point of view of its advantage to the doer or donor, has its place in the argument of the book, though (cf. Arist. *Eth.* viii. 3) the idea culminates in the completeness of friendship where 'all things are in common.' *Pietas* has the religious note which the other words lack, loving dutifulness to gods, home, and country. Not 'piety' only but 'pity' derive from it: thus it comes near to our 'charity.' This by way of introduction. To the great philosophic and literary movement that aimed at the preservation of the strength and responsibility of Roman social life we refer later.

As from the point of view of charity the well-being of the community depends upon the vigour of the deep-laid elemental life within it, so in passing to Roman times we consider the family first. The Roman family was unique in its completeness. The father alone had independent authority (*sui juris*), and so long as he lived all who were under his power—his wife, his sons, and their wives and children, and his unmarried daughters—could not acquire any property of their own. Failing father or husband, the unmarried daughters were placed under the guardianship

of the nearest male members of the family. Thus the family, in the narrower sense in which we commonly use the word, as meaning descendants of a common father or grandfather, was, as it were, a single point of growth in a larger organism, the *gens*, which consisted of all those who shared a common ancestry.

The wife, though in law the property of her husband, held a position of honour and influence higher than that of the Greek wife, at least in historic times. She seems to come nearer to the ideal of Xenophon: "the goodwife should be the mistress of everything within the house." "A house of his own and the blessing of children appeared to the Roman citizen as the end and essence of life" (Mommsen, *Hist. Rome*). The obligation of the father to the sons was strongly felt. The family, past, present, and future, was conceived as one and indivisible. Each succeeding generation had a right to the care of its predecessor in mind, body, and estate. The training of the sons was distinctively a home and not a school training. Brought up by the father and constantly at his side, they learnt spontaneously the habits and traditions of the family. The home was their school. By their father they were introduced into public life, and though

still remaining under his power during his lifetime, they became citizens, and their relation to the state was direct. The nation was a nation of yeomen. Only agriculture and warfare were considered honourable employments. The father and sons worked outdoors on the farm, employing little or no slave labour; the wife and daughters indoors at spinning and weaving. The drudgery of the household was done by domestic slaves. The father was the working head of a toiling household. Their chief gods were the same as those of early Greece—Zeus-Diovis and Hestia-Vesta, the goddess of the hearth and home. Out of this solid, compact family Roman society was built, and so long as the family was strong attachment to the service of the state was intense. The *res publica*, the common weal, the phrase and the thought, meet one at every turn; and never were citizens more patient and tenacious combatants on their country's behalf. The men were soldiers in an unpaid militia and were constantly engaged in wars with the rivals of Rome, leaving home and family for their campaigns and returning to them in the winter. With a hardness and closeness inconsistent with—indeed, opposed to—the charitable spirit, they combined the

strength of character and sense of justice without which charity becomes sentimental and unsocial. In the development of the family, and thus, indirectly, in the development of the good life, they stand for settled obligation and unrelenting duty.

Under the protection of the head of the family 'in dependent freedom' lived the clients. They were in a middle position between the freemen and the slaves. The relation between patron and client lasted for several generations; and there were many clients. Their number increased as state after state was conquered, and they formed the *plebs*, in Rome the *plebs urbana*, the lower orders of the city.

In relation to our subject the important factors are the family, the *plebs*, and slavery.

Two processes were at work from an early date, before the first agrarian law (486 B.C.): the impoverishment of the *plebs*, and the increase of slavery. The former led to the *annona civica*, or the supply of corn to the citizens, and to the *sportula*, or the organized food-supply for poor clients, and ultimately to the *alimentarii pueri*, the maintenance of children of citizens by voluntary and imperial bounty. The latter—slavery—was the standing witness that, as self-support was undermined, the task of relief

became hopeless, and the impoverished citizen, as the generations passed, became in turn dependent, beggar, pauper, and slave.

The great patrician families—'an oligarchy of warriors and slaveholders'—did not themselves engage in trade, but, entering on large speculations, employed as their agents their clients, *libertini* or freedmen, and, later, their slaves. The constant wars, for which the soldiers of a local militia were eventually retained in permanent service, broke up the yeomanry and very greatly reduced their number. Whole families of citizens became impoverished, and their lands were in consequence sold to the great patrician families, members of which had acquired lucrative posts, or prospered in their speculations, and assumed possession of the larger part of the land, the *ager publicus*, acquired by the state through conquest. The city had always been the centre of the patrician families, the patrons of the trading *libertini* and other dependents. To it now flocked as well the *metoeci*, the resident aliens from the conquered states, and the poorer citizens, landless and unable for social reasons to turn to trade. There was thus in Rome a growing multitude of aliens, dispossessed yeomen, and dependent clients. As the population increased the poorer

classes came to live in large ill-built tenement-houses, and all the conditions of need and struggle in an overcrowded city came into existence, qualified, however, by good drainage, a good supply of water, and baths and good pavements. Simultaneously slavery increased very largely after the second Punic war (202 B.C.). Every conquest brought slaves into the market, for whom ready purchasers were found. The slaves took the place of the freemen upon many old family estates, and in many large districts the free country people became extinct. Husbandry gave place to shepherding. The estates were thrown into large domains (*latifundia*), managed by bailiffs and worked by slaves, often fettered or bound by chains, lodged in cells in houses of labour (*ergastula*), and sometimes cared for when ill in infirmaries (*valetudinaria*). In Crete and Sparta the slaves toiled that the mass of citizens might have means and leisure. In Rome the slave class was organized for private and not for common ends. In Athens the citizens were paid for their services; at Rome there were no paid offices. Thus the citizen at Rome was, one might almost say, forced into a dependence on the public corn, for as the large properties swallowed up the smaller, and the slave dispossessed the citizen, a population

grew up unfit for rural toil, disinclined to live by methods that pride considered sordid, unstable and pleasure-loving, and yet a serious political factor, as dependent on the rich for their enjoyments, as they were on their patrons or the prefect of the corn in the city for their food.

In the year 5 A.D. Augustus distributed a largess to the *plebs urbana*, who were then, according to the Ancyrean monument, stated to number 320,000 : but who exactly were included in that term, and whether they included only the *plebs* in the old city or that also in the suburbs, we do not know. (Cf. *Die Übervölkerung der antiken Grossstädte*, Pöhlmann, p. 22.) But this at least they represent, the number of persons whom in round numbers the authorities entered under the name of *plebs urbana* as recipients of a largess : and in that sense they give us some idea of the number of dependent persons in Rome.

The population of Rome we may picture as consisting of patrician families and wealthy or money-making men of the Equestrian Order ministered to by a very large number of slaves, and a populace of needy citizens, in whose ranks it was profitable for an outsider to find a place in order that he might participate in the advantages of state maintenance.

CHAPTER X.

THE ANNONA CIVICA.

IN Rome the clan-family became the dominant political factor. As in England and elsewhere in the Middle Ages, and even in later times, the family in these circumstances assumes an influence which is out of harmony with the common good. The social advantage of the family lies in its self-maintenance, its home charities, and its moral and educational force, but if its separate interests are made supreme, it becomes uncharitable and unsocial. In Rome this was the line of development. The stronger clan-families crushed the weaker, and became the 'oligarchy of warriors and slaveholders.' In the same spirit they possessed themselves of the *ager publicus*. The land obtained by the Romans by right of conquest was public. It belonged to the state, and to a yeoman state it was the most valuable acquisition. At first part of it was sold and part was distributed

to citizens without property and destitute (cf. Plutarch, *Tib. Gracchus*). At a very early date, however (493 B.C.), the patrician families acquired possession of much of it and held it at a low rental, and thus the natural outlet for a conquering farmer race was monopolized by one class, the richer clan-families. This injustice was in part remedied by the establishment of colonies, in which the emigrant citizens received sufficient portions of land. But these colonies were comparatively few, and after each conquest the rich families made large purchases, while the smaller proprietors, whose services as soldiers were constantly required, were unable to attend to their lands or to retain possession of them. To prevent this (367 B.C.) the Licinian law was passed, by which public occupations of land were limited to 500 *jugera*, about 312 acres. This law was ignored, however, and more than two centuries later the evil, the double evil of the dispossession of the citizen farmer and of slavery, reached a crisis. The slave war broke out (134 B.C.), and (133 B.C.) Tiberius Gracchus made his attempt to re-endow the Roman citizens with the lands which they had acquired by conquest.

The circumstances were in many ways exceptional. After the fall of Carthage there was

apparently a long period of impoverishment and depression. This may have been due in part to the destruction of capital and of human lives in a long and continuous war, and to the stoppage of the demand for war supplies on a large scale. It has been argued that it was due to foreign competition in corn, which the policy of the Gracchi in instituting a regular corn service and selling it to the people at a reduced rate fostered. But, on the other hand, it is stated apparently on good grounds (G. Ferrero, *Grandeur et Décadence de Rome*, French ed. i. 45, etc.; ii. 405) that there was little or no spontaneous economic importation of corn in ancient times (see the arrangements at Athens, *ante*), and that in the case of all large cities it had to be imported by some kind of special service or under some special regulations. The facilities of modern commerce were unknown. Transit was costly, and corn, under normal circumstances, was not, compared with other merchandise, a lucrative import. It is suggested therefore that the impoverishment was due, in part at least, to the rise in the demand for more luxury, and more expensive food, and for more pleasure, out of proportion to the general resources of the country and the resources of individuals. This is a reasonable supposition. A similar change

in England at the present time affects the problem of poverty very greatly. New wants which seem indispensable may very easily outstrip new resources; and thus a poverty may arise and be deeply felt which to a previous generation would have appeared factitious.

In circumstances such as these Tiberius Gracchus undertook what was essentially a charitable or philanthropic movement, which was set on foot too late. He had passed through Tuscany, and seen with resentment and pity the deserted country where the foreign slaves and barbarians were now the only shepherds and cultivators. He had been brought up under the influence of Greek Stoical thought, with which, almost in spite of itself, there was always associated an element of pity. The problem which he desired to solve differed from that with which Solon and Peisistratus had dealt successfully. They had to deal with small landowners who were hopelessly encumbered with debt, and to reorganize the conditions of land tenure. He had to bring back to the private use of one class land of which another class had in the course of years constantly deprived it. His was the harder task. The close of the Punic War brought back to Italy large numbers of soldiers who had been accus-

tomed to years of campaigning. Many of them would naturally pass into the city, and thus a yet larger mass of idle or ill-employed labour would be congested there. Many of them might settle in the country. But apart from this there was also a demand from other citizens for settlement; and it seemed right that if possible citizens and free men should supersede slaves in the cultivation of the land. But the land, however, had in large part been occupied by the wealthy families, and the available supply of it had become limited. At bottom the issue lay between private property, considered as the basis of family life for the great bulk of the community, with personal independence, and pauperism, with the *annona*, or slavery. In 133 B.C. Tiberius Gracchus became tribune. To expand society on the lines of private property, he proposed the enforcement of 'the Licinian Rogations'; the rich were to give up all beyond their rightful 312 acres, and the remainder was to be distributed amongst the poor (*penes*). The measure was carried by the use of arbitrary powers, and followed by the death of Tiberius at the hands of the patricians, the dominant clan-families. The law was put in operation, and "the number of landowning citizens on the census roll rose rapidly in the next ten

years" (cf. *History of Rome*, J. L. Myres, pp. 325, etc.), but it was practically too late. The occupation of the property had become for the most part settled. It had exchanged hands. For the most part it could not be resettled, even at the cost of much contention and of what amounted to a renewal of injustice. For present justice could not remodel the past without measures that were themselves unjust to the intervening generations. In 123 B.C. Caius Gracchus, the brother of Tiberius, was elected a Tribune, and as part of a large scheme of political and social reform, he proposed measures for emigration and for relief. The scheme in part was carried, but whether to the ultimate advantage of the City State may well be considered doubtful. The measures for relief may have had for their object to bring into quietness the unstable and irresponsible *plebs* of the city. They may have been suggested by the contemporary conditions of great states, where citizens were in part supported from public funds. Perhaps in proposing them there was some element of commiseration, like that which affected Tiberius Gracchus when he saw "the deserted state of the country, and that the cultivators and shepherds were foreign slaves and barbarians." But, however this may be, the relief measures were

apparently acceptable to all parties, and they continued in force long after C. Gracchus had been slain (121 B.C.). Already at times there had been sales of corn at cheap prices. Now by the *lex frumentaria* he gave the citizens—those who had the Roman franchise—the right to purchase corn every month from the public stores at rather more than half-price, $6\frac{1}{3}$ *asses*, or about 3·3d., the peck. This fatal measure was accepted, and henceforth for the lower classes, the urban *plebs*, there was no possibility of a reversion to better social conditions.

The provisioning of Rome was, like that of Athens, a public service. There were public granaries (267 B.C.), and there was a quaestor to supervise the transit of the corn from Sicily and, later, from Spain and Africa, and an elaborate administration for collecting and conveying it. The *lex frumentaria* of Caius was followed by the *lex Octavia*, restricting the monthly sale to citizens settled in Rome, and to 5 *modii* ($1\frac{1}{4}$ bushels). According to Polybius, the amount required for the maintenance of a slave was 5 *modii* a month, and of a soldier 4. Hence the allowance, if continued at this rate, was practically a maintenance. The *lex Clodia* (58 B.C.) made the corn gratuitous to the *plebs urbana*.

Julius Caesar (5 B.C.) found the number of recipients to be 320,000, and reduced them to 150,000. In Augustus's time they rose to 200,000. There seems, however, to be some confusion as to the numbers. From the *Ancyranum Monumentum* it appears that the *plebs urbana* who received Augustus's dole of 60 *denarii* (37s. 6d.) in his eighth consulship numbered 320,000. And (Suet. *Caes.* 41) it seems likely that in Caesar's time the lists of the recipients were settled by lot; further, probably only those who were of a lower status than that of the *equites*, those whose property was worth less than 400,000 *sesterces* (£3540) were placed on the lists. It is probable, therefore, that 320,000 represents a maximum, reduced for purposes of administration to a smaller number (*a*) by a property test, and (*b*) by some kind of scrutiny. The names of those certified to receive the corn were exposed on bronze tablets. They were thus called *aerarii*. They had tickets (*tesserae*) for purposes of identification, and they received the corn or bread in the time of the republic at the temple of Ceres, and afterwards at steps in the several (14) regions or wards of Rome. Hence the bread was called *panis gradilis*. In the middle of the second century there were state bakeries, and wheaten

loaves were baked for the people perhaps two or three times a week. In Aurelian's time (A.D. 270) the flour was of the best, and the weight of the loaf (one *uncia*) was doubled. To the gifts of bread were added pork, oil, and possibly wine; clothes also—white tunics with long sleeves—were distributed. In the period after Constantine (d. 337, cf. Theod. *Code*, xiv. 15) three classes received the bread—the palace people (*palatini*), soldiers (*militares*), and the populace (*populares*). No distribution was permitted except at the steps. Each class had its own steps in the several wards. The bread at one step could not be transferred to another step. Each class had its own supply. There were arrangements for the exchange of stale loaves. Against misappropriation there were (law of Valentinian and Valens) severe penalties. If a public prosecutor (*actor*), a collector of the revenue (*procurator*), or the slave of a senator obtained bread with the cognizance of the clerk, or by bribery, the slave, if his master was not a party to the offence, had to serve in the state bakehouse in chains. If the master were involved, his house was confiscated. If others who had not the right obtained the bread, they and their property were placed at the service of the bakery (*pistrini exercitio*

subjugari). If they were poor (*pauperes*) they were enslaved, and, if the delinquent was a client, he was to be put to death.

The right to relief was dependent on the right of citizenship. Hence it became hereditary and passed from father to son. It was thus in the nature of a continuous endowed charity, like the well-known family charity of Smith, for instance, in which a large property was left to the testator's descendants, of whom it was said that as a result no Smith of that family could fail to be poor. But the *annona civica* was an endowed charity, affecting not a single family, but the whole population. Later, when Constantinople was founded, the right to relief was attached to new houses as a premium on building operations. Thus it belonged not to persons only, but also to houses, and became a species of 'immovable' property, passing to the purchaser of the house or property, as would the adscript slaves. The bread followed the house (*aedes sequantur annonae*). If, on the transfer of a house, bread claims were lost owing to the absence of claimants, they were transferred to the treasury (*fisci viribus vindicentur*). But the savage law of Valentinian, referred to above, shows to what lengths such a system was pushed. Early in

its history the *annona civica* attracted many to Rome in the hope of living there without working. For the 400 years since the *lex Clodia* was enacted constant injury had been done by it, and now (A.D. 364) people had to be kept off the civic bounty as if they were birds of prey, and the very poor man (*pau-perrimus*) who had no civic title to the food, if he obtained it by fraud, was enslaved. Thus, in spite of the abundant state relief, there had grown up a class of the very poor, the Gentiles of the state, who were outside the sphere of its ministrations. The *annona civica* was introduced not only into Constantinople, but also into Alexandria, with baleful results, and into Antioch. When Constantinople was founded the corn-ships of Africa sailed there instead of to Rome. On charitable relief, as we shall see, the *annona* has had a long-continued and fatal influence.

The method suggests these considerations:

1. If the Government holds itself responsible for provisioning the people it must fix the price of necessities, and to meet distress or popular clamour it will lower the price. It becomes thus a large relief society for the supply of corn. In a time of distress, when the corn laws were a matter of moment in England, a

similar system was adopted in the well-known Speenhamland scale (1795), by which a larger or lesser allowance was given to a family according to its size and the prevailing price of corn. A maintenance was thus provided for the able-bodied and their families, at least in part, without any equivalent in labour; though in England labour was demanded of the applicant, and work was done more or less perfunctorily. In amount the Roman dole seems to have been equivalent to the allowance provided for a slave, but the citizen received it without having to do any labour task. He received it as a statutory right. There could hardly be a more effective method for degrading his manhood and denaturalizing his family. He was also a voter, and the alms appealed to his weakness and indolence; and the fear of displeasing him and losing his vote kept him, socially, master of the situation, to his own ruin. If in England now relief were given to able-bodied persons who retained their votes, this evil would also attach to it.

2. The system obliged the hardworking to maintain the idlers, while it continually increased their number. The needy teacher in Juvenal, instead of a fee, is put off with a *tessera*, to which, not being a citizen, he has no right.

"The foreign reapers," it was said, "filled Rome's belly and left Rome free for the stage and the circus." The freeman had become a slave—"stupid and drowsy, to whom days of ease had become habitual, the games, the circus, the theatre, dice, eating-houses, and brothels." Here are all the marks of a degraded pauperism.


3. The system led the way to an ever more extensive slavery. The man who could not live on his dole and other scrapings had the alternative of becoming a slave. "Better have a good master than live so distressfully"; and "If I were free I should live at my own risk; now I live at yours," are expressions suggestive of the natural temptations of slavery in these conditions. The escaped slaves returned to 'their manger.' The *annona* did not prevent destitution. It was a half-way house to slavery.

4. Conquest was a way of obtaining food for the people. To open out the granaries of conquered lands was to ensure the supply of food for the urban populations of the large cities. Still, so far as the home supplies of corn went, or might have been extended, the effect on agriculture, and proportionally on commerce generally, must have been very injurious, if not ruinous. The largest corn-market, Rome, was withdrawn

from the trade—the market to which all the necessities of life would naturally have gravitated; and the supply of corn was placed in the hands of producers at a few centres where it could be grown most cheaply—Sicily, Spain, and Africa. The Italian farmer had to turn his attention to other produce—the cultivation of the olive and the vine, and cattle and pig rearing. The greater the extension of the system the more impossible was the regeneration of Rome.

5. The method was the outcome of distress and political hopelessness. Yet the rich also adopted it in distributing their private largess. Cicero (*de Off.* ii. 16) writes as though he recognized its evil; but though he expresses his disapprobation of the popular shows upon which the *aediles* spent large sums, he argues that something must be done, "if the people demand it, and if good men, though they do not wish it, assent to it." Thus in a guarded manner he approves a distribution of food—a free breakfast in the streets of Rome. One bad result of the *annona* was that it encouraged a special and ruinous form of charitable munificence.

A note of one or two references to occurrences during the rule of the earlier emperors throws light on the difficulties of administration.



Suetonius writes of Augustus: "Once at the time of a great failure of crops, when it was difficult to provide relief, Augustus ordered the expulsion from the city of slaves who were exposed for sale, of schools of fencing masters, and of all foreign residents, except physicians and teachers, and, above all, of domestic slaves, so that at last the supply of corn became cheaper. At that time he wrote that he was inclined to abolish for ever the public distribution of corn, for the people had come to rely upon it and ceased to till the fields; but he had not proceeded further in the matter because he was sure that, from a desire to please the people, it would be revived at one time or another. After that time he managed so that as much consideration was given to farmers and traders as to the multitude" (Suet. *Augustus*, 42).

Tiberius (14-37 A.D.), as the people complained of the cruel dearth of corn, fixed the price for grain to be paid by the purchaser, promising himself to add two *sesterces* (4d.) on every peck for the traders (Tacitus, *Annals*, ii. 87, cf. xv. 18; Church and Brodribb's trans.).

Caligula (37-41 A.D.) twice distributed to the people 300 *sesterces* (50s.) a man (Suet. *Caligula*, 17). Claudius (41-54 A.D.) was mobbed

in the forum during a time of long-continued scarcity, assailed with abuse and pelted with pieces of bread, and could hardly escape by a back-door to his palace. This led to his adopting every contrivance to ensure the importation of supplies even in the winter-time; and accordingly he agreed to indemnify any merchants in the corn trade who suffered owing to storms, and to bear the loss himself; and he undertook, according to the circumstances of each, to grant important advantages to those who built trading vessels (Suet. *Claudius*, 18, 21). He often distributed largesses of corn and money. So of Vespasian (69-79 A.D.) it is said that his liberality to all ranks of people was extreme (Suet. *Vespasian*, 17, 18). Public employment was apparently then (and at other times) in part a means of relief. Vespasian would not adopt a mechanical contrivance for carrying some immense columns into the Capitol at a small expense. He rewarded the inventor but refused his services, explaining that he took it upon himself to maintain the rabble.

Thus in spite of the *annona* there was perpetual difficulty in providing for the people, and measures of all kinds were adopted to prevent destitution.

CHAPTER XI.

THE SPORTULA: THE COLLEGIA AND THEIR
ENSLAVEMENT; THE PUERI ALIMENTARII.

THE *sportula* was a form of charity corresponding to the *annona civica*. Charity and poor relief run on parallel lines, and when the one is administered without discrimination, little discrimination will usually be exercised in the other. It was the charity of the patron—of the chiefs of the clan-families to their clients. Between them it was natural that a relation, partly hospitable, partly charitable, should grow up. The clients who attended the patron at his house were invited to dine at his table. The patron, as Juvenal describes him, dined luxuriously and in solitary grandeur, while the guests put up with what they could get; or, as was usual under the empire, instead of the dinner (*caena recta*) a present of food was given at the outer vestibule of the house to clients who brought with them baskets (*sportulæ*) to

carry off their food, or even charcoal stoves to keep it warm. There was endless trickery. The patron (or the almoner who acted for him) tried to identify the applicant, fearing lest he might get the dole under a false name; and at each mansion was kept a list of persons, male and female, entitled to receive the allowance. “The pilferer grabs the dole” (*sportulam furunculus captat*) was a proverb. The *sportula* was a charity sufficiently important for state regulation. Nero (A.D. 54) reduced it to a payment in money (100 *quadrantes*, about 1s.). Domitian (A.D. 81) restored the custom of giving food. Subsequently both practices—gifts in money and in food—appear to have been continued.

In these conditions the Roman family steadily decayed. Its ‘old discipline’ was neglected; and Tacitus (A.D. 75), in his dialogue on Oratory, wrote (c. xxviii.) what might be called its epitaph. Of the general decline the laws of Caesar and Augustus to encourage marriage and to reward the parents of large families are sufficient evidence.

The destruction of the working-class family must have been finally achieved by the imperial control of the *collegia*.

In old Rome there were corporations of

craftsmen for common worship and for the maintenance of the traditions of the craft. These corporations were ruined by slave labour, and becoming secret societies, in the time of Augustus were suppressed. Subsequently they were reorganized, and gave scope for much friendliness. They often existed in connexion with some great house, whose chief was their patron and whose household gods they worshipped. The guilds of the poor, or rather of the lower orders (*collegia tenuiorum*), consisted of artisans and others, and slaves also, who paid monthly contributions to a common fund to meet the expenses of worship, common meals, and funerals. They were not in Italy, it would seem (J. P. Waltzing, *Études Histor. sur les Corporations Professionnelles chez les Romains* i. 145, 300), though they may have been in Asia Minor and elsewhere, societies for mutual help generally. They were chiefly funeral benefit societies. Under Severus (A.D. 192) the *collegia* were extended, and more closely organized as industrial bodies. They were protected and controlled, as in England in the 15th century the municipalities affected the cause of the craft guilds and ended by controlling them. Industrial disorder was thus prevented; the Government were able to pro-

vide the supplies required in Rome and the large cities with less risk and uncertainty; and the workmen employed in trade, especially the carrying trade, became almost slaves. They became indeed the industrial staff of an administrative department of the Government. In the second century, and until the invasions, there were three groups of *collegia*: (1) those engaged in various state manufactures; (2) those engaged in the provision trade; and (3) the free trades, which gradually lapsed into a kind of slavery. If the members of these guilds fled they were brought back by force. Parents had to keep to the trade to which they belonged; their children had to succeed them in it. A slave caste indeed had been formed of the once free workmen.

As a charitable protest against the destruction of children, in the midst of a broken family life, and increasing dependence and poverty, a special institution was founded (to use the Scottish word) for the 'alimentation' of the children of citizens, at first by voluntary charity and afterwards by imperial bounty.

Nerva and Trajan adopted the plan. Pliny (*Ep.* vii. 18) refers to it. There was a desire to give more lasting and certain help than an allotment of food to parents. A list of children,

whose names were on the relief tables at Rome, was accordingly drawn up, and a special service for their maintenance established. Two instances are recorded in inscriptions—one at Veleia, one at Beneventum. The emperor lent money for the purpose at a low percentage— $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 5 per cent. as against the usual 10 or 12. At Veleia the loan amounted to 1,044,000 *sesterces*—about £8156, and 51 of the local landed proprietors mortgaged land, valued at 13 or 14 million *sesterces*, as security for the debt. The interest on the Emperor's money at 5 per cent. was paid into the municipal treasury, and out of it the children were relieved. The figures seem small; at Veleia 300 children were assisted, of whom 36 were girls. The annual interest at 5 per cent. amounted to nearly £408, which divided among 300 gives about 27s. a head. The figures suggest that the money served as a charitable supplementation of the citizens' relief in direct aid of the children. Apparently the scheme was widely adopted. Curators of high position were the patrons; procurators acted as inspectors over large areas; and *quaestores alimentarii* undertook the local management. Antoninus Pius (A.D. 138), and Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 160), and subsequently Severus (A.D. 192) established

these bursaries for children in the names of their wives. In the third century the system fell into disorder. There were large arrears of payments, and in the military anarchy that ensued it came to an end. It is of special interest, as indicating a new feeling of responsibility towards children akin to the humane Stoicism of the Antonines, and an attempt to found, apart from temples or *collegia*, what was in the nature of a public endowed charity.

CHAPTER XII.

THE LEAVEN OF PHILOSOPHY.

BEFORE proceeding to consider the next stage in the development of thought in relation to social effort and charity it is well to take count of the forces which strove against decadence. We have referred to the leaven of religion. We have now to refer to the leaven of philosophy and that of religion at the later pre-Christian period.

The conquest of Carthage was the climacteric of Roman greatness. After it the trade of the world was open to Rome with hardly a competitor. Riches came and slaves and a new speculative commercialism with luxury and vice; the temper of the people was changing. The old religion was losing its hold; and the 'social problem,' as we have seen, was pressing for some solution. The grave import of the question was acknowledged. A new spirit and new tendencies had, if possible, to be controlled and directed. The Roman had to be preserved in character and

ability true Roman. In this difficulty one suggestion was to save Rome by the philosophy of Greece. So would self-restraint be won, and the Roman be made strong enough to withstand the temptations which his victories brought him. To what else could men turn? Rome had a noble tradition of duty, of great men known and unknown to fame, men who would rather die than let their country suffer. If their own tradition failed them and their strength was wasted in the mere pugnacity of the race, in deadly partisan and personal conflicts, what remained, unless it were some controlling philosophy, religious in tone, that had within it elements consistent with the old tradition and could give to the soul a new discipline and a truer courage? Stoicism might bring to Romans a substitute for the custom-controlled temper of mind which they were losing, and might replace a tradition of masterdom by a philosophy of masterdom. This was to rally against the endless ambitions and desires of classes and persons a new protestant and subjugating force, which could conquer only if it were supported by the noble self-regard and the administrative talent of the nation. If, in fact, ambition and desire were too strong, and the self of the nation too weak, still the struggle left behind it some great achievements.

There followed from this rally much propaganda, and in due course we find Cicero, when the decadence had grown much greater, trying to guide and reform his country even at the final struggle, when at last the principedom of a disguised monarchy was taking the place of the republic. We may touch on this episode in more detail, and on the philosophy and ideals that were manifest in it.

In 54 B.C. Cicero published his *Commonwealth*, which had a very wide circulation. The year before Pompey and Crassus had been Consuls. In 54 B.C. Crassus, the millionaire General, waged his disastrous war with the Parthian, and Rome was in a state of anarchy. In the *Commonwealth* Scipio, the younger Africanus, is introduced into the dialogue as the exponent of a new constitution. He, the destroyer of Carthage (148 B.C.), is fitly made the founder of a new Commonwealth, for times are bad. His adoptive nephew, Tiberius Gracchus, is represented as having opened the floodgates of strife. "His death, and even before, his whole conduct of the Tribuneship (133 B.C.) had divided the one people into two parties" (*de Republica*, i. 19). He had at least wrought popular opposition to the highest pitch, and had tried to give the people a preponderating political position. Of

his policy and tactics his uncle Scipio had never approved; and Cicero's great fear is Scipio's fear, only in its most aggravated form—the collapse of all government in the entire lack of unity in the State. Now, as a climax of demagoguery, the people had been controlled and 'worked' by Clodius systematically in the interest of Caesar. Yet still "there should be a united Senate and people. That can be brought about, and grievous it will be, if it is not."

In the *Commonwealth* it is argued that a mixed government is even then possible, and that Roman precedents confirm this view. There might be a ruler like Numa (ii. 2. 13 Yonge's trans.), a peace-loving statesman, whose supremacy, like the kingship of Numa, might be "the mother of law and religion." "As the steward knows the nature of the field and the scribe knows penmanship," so would he be a master of jurisprudence and legislation, and through them seek as his purpose practical utility. He should employ himself in the actual administration of government and become a kind of steward of it. He would make the science of politics subservient to the actual interests of philanthropy and patriotism. By the force of public opinion, the wise director of a government would strengthen the natural instinct of shame

with which nature has endowed men, which is nothing else than a fear of deserved censure, and he would perfect this instinct by education and manners. He would be the "royal and pre-eminent chief" (i. 45, ii. 29). "Another portion of the power should be deposited in the hands of the aristocracy, and certain things should be reserved to the judgment and wish of the multitude." Thus there would be a combination of forces and stability.

Then (iii. 12, etc.¹) the hero of the day, the Sulla or Lucullus, Pompey or Caesar, is sketched. "Whoever has overthrown cities, subdued nations, and by these means filled the treasury with money, taken lands, and enriched his fellow citizens, such a man is extolled to the skies; is believed to be endowed with consummate and perfect virtue; and into this mistake have fallen not only the populace and the ignorant, but the philosophers, who have even given rules for injustice, lest folly and wickedness should lack the warrant of learning." The philosophers were philosophizing falsely. And Cicero pleads for justice against them. The antithesis which he puts into the mouth of a disputant is the old one, that of justice against the "wisdom," falsely so called, of political ambition and personal

¹ Cicero's Writings. Ed. Tuebner, Part iv., vol. ii.

egotism. "Justice," he urges, "commands us to have mercy on all men, to consult the interests of the whole human race, to give to everyone his due, and to injure no sacred, or public, or foreign rights, and to forbear touching what does not belong to us." "But if you obey the dictates of 'wisdom,' riches, public offices, large resources, public honours, the command of provinces, the rule of kingdoms will accrue to all, to individuals and to nations alike." The issue is that of the temptation in the Christ story. The so-called "wisdom" had in it no finality, and was socially destructive. In justice lay the art of government and social progress.

It is with this conception of social life that the "Dream of Scipio" which follows is in harmony. The elder Africanus appears to his adopted son.

Man is endowed with a soul, he says, a soul which is the portion of the eternal fires, which you call stars and constellations. "It is your duty, and that of all who have any veneration for the Gods, to preserve the wonderful union of soul and body; nor without the express command of him who gave you a soul, should the least thought be entertained of quitting human life, lest you seem to desert the post assigned you by God himself. But rather follow the

examples of your grandfather here, and of me, your father, in paying a strict regard to justice and piety, which is due in a great degree to parents and relations, but most of all to our country. Such a life as this is the true way to heaven, and to the company of those, who, after having lived on earth and having escaped from the body, inhabit the place which you now behold. . . . Nothing on earth is more agreeable to God (iii. 13), the supreme governor of the Universe, than the assemblies and societies of men united together by laws, which are called States. It is from heaven their rulers and preservers came, and thither they return. . . . It is not your outward form which constitutes your being, but your mind, not that substance which is palpable to the senses, but your spiritual nature. Know then that you are a God—for a God it must be which is full of activity, and feels, and recollects, and foresees, and governs, regulates and moves the body over which it is set, as the supreme Ruler does the world subject to him. For as the Eternal Being moves whatever is mortal in this world, so the immortal mind of men moves the frail body with which it is connected."

This may be, as is said, a vision compounded out of Cicero's multifarious knowledge and

not in a sense original. But so to think of it is to conceive it wrongly. It may be drawn from Greek sources, but it bears a Roman stamp. It holds together and completes a consistent series of thoughts, a mixed and established government, a steward kingship, patriotism, the infinite reward of public duty, the new and catholic liberty and humanity of justice, a whole-hearted acceptance of duty towards parents, friends and neighbours, and finally a recognition of the God-like nature of man, towards which in other ways and in other classes, the new popular religions, as we have seen, were working. Clearly in the spirit of charity and in the conception of social duty a great advance has been made. They have, for the Roman world, been once more linked to religion, and they have been associated with an after life.

The *de Officiis* of Cicero,¹ his book on moral obligation, states once more the social problem as Cicero finally saw it in the restless anxious days that followed the murder of Caesar. It too may be taken as a compilation from Greek authors; but, if it be that in part, it must none

¹Cf. Cicero's letters, 792 and 796, and the *de Officiis* itself, iii. 2, 3, 7. In the first two books Cicero based his argument on Panoetius. The third book he compiled, he writes, "with no help, but, as it is said, with my own forces." Throughout he has regard to Roman history and Roman examples.

the less he read in relation to its time. Cicero as he writes has Rome constantly in his thoughts.

The number of effective competitors for the chief power in the State was dwindling. Pompey was defeated at Pharsalia by Caesar (B.C. 48), and murdered as he stepped on shore in Egypt. Caesar was assassinated (44 B.C.) in the Senate House. Lepidus, Marc Antony and Augustus remained in the field. They placed Cicero's name on the list of the proscribed, and a little later (B.C. 43) Cicero was murdered. The book was written in B.C. 44, after the death of Caesar and before Cicero's own death the next year. It had a very wide circulation.

Cicero had realized how absolute and invincible for the time was the supremacy of the able, strong, and unscrupulous partisan leaders, who in turn dominated Rome. They ruled in their own interest. They wasted the wealth of the country by war and by a profuse expenditure. Their civil wars were as destructive of life as famine or pestilence. They spoilt the temper of the people and broke its spirit both in the higher ranks and in the lower. And the result was that when Augustus remained the sole survivor and became the single ruler of the empire, he took charge of a country which was disordered by

revolutions, unable to manage its representatives in its dependencies, provided with no proper administrative control over its exchequer, short of troops and hampered by want of means, whose citizens had lost their ambition for the duties and responsibilities of office, whose people had become restless and weak and nervous, full of vainglorious hopes and expectations, a people to be treated like spoilt children, pleased and pacified, not like citizens worthy of the great traditions of Rome. This climax was reached after Cicero's death. In the feeling that the cause of the republic was virtually lost, and that no effectual combination of political allies was any longer possible, he wrote his book as a consolation while he lived in anxious retirement in the country.

The book thus written is distinctive (cf. *Grandeur et Décadence de Rome*; Ferrero, p. 135, vol. ii.). It is in part a philosophical treatise, in part a political tractate, in part a manual on manners. It is addressed to his son, and it is an Epistle to the Romans, especially to the younger Romans. It set before them in outline a very different society to that in which Cicero himself had lived, a society to be guided by other hopes and by other ideals. It was also in the nature of a religious manifesto, if stoicism

be considered not merely as a series of philosophical dicta, but as it became more completely perhaps, later on, almost a religious rule of life. It was a forerunner of the puritan revival in Rome, which renewed in a younger generation the lustre of old Roman heroes, of old rites, of the old simplicity, and of the old singleness of mind, that would trample underfoot the vice and effeminacy of the towns, their luxury and their vanity, that would bring back the souls of a new generation to a new reality of life, that would find in the very Hades of Virgil how justice was just, and ruled all the world, here above, if we divined the truth, there below, if we knew the end.¹ Thus Cicero passes on to younger generations his doctrines which were, in great part, those of stoicism. Stoicism was already an influential force in Rome, and it was widespread. In Pauline thought we probably find the influence of it. It is an important link in the development of thought from what people call 'paganism' to Christianity. Naturally, then, in this epistle to his son, we find a Roman Credo built in part out of Greek thought, and, in relation to charity, some note of the works that come of that faith.

There are some leading conceptions, which we

¹ Cf. Professor Glover's *Studies in Virgil*.

must revive if we are to follow in our imagination the thoughts and illustrations of the writer.

First there is Nature; and Nature is law working in us and in the world. The appeal to Nature as a guide and justification, is an appeal to Nature as gradually developing to a higher and more complete standard. It is not an appeal to Nature as a mass of mere unregulated impulses; for these, the stronger instincts, it is felt, are not Nature but elements in Nature. Nature is larger and more complete. It is the whole and sums the whole. Justice is the single word for the ordered social life: the appeal to Nature is an appeal to the justice without the man, in support of the reason and faith of the justice, for which he is striving in his inner life, the justice within him. And society or social life is itself natural, an organic part of the whole, and thus it too is established in justice.

One word, the counterpart of a Greek word, defines the good life, the word *honestus*, honourable. It associates itself with the goodness that is akin to responsible care and duty. It represents the state of mind that is to be desired—the thing that we, that every man at arms, would wish to be—the moral goal to which we would aspire. It is the outcome of four qualities in our being, brought into accord and raised into

a kind of supremacy. The first is the perception and intelligent appreciation of what is true—a power of insight, observation, and reconsideration, in a word the power of thinking well and truly. The second quality is that of safeguarding social life—by granting to each his due, and—as Cicero may have been tempted to add in view of his experiences of life—by the observance of contracts. The third quality is the greatness and strength of a high and unconquerable soul. The fourth quality is order and measure in all that is done or said—for in that lies moderation and temperance.

The safeguarding of social life depends on the domination of two thoughts or habits of mind—one of which is called justice, the other beneficence. Justice requires that no man injure another; but if he be stirred to it by suffering wrong, justice steps in to stay his anger and to guide his reason; and justice protects property, the property of the State, and the property of the private individual—another question of surpassing importance when the goods of defeated citizens were sold by auction and it was a kind of generosity to give to one the property taken from another. It insists that faith be kept. And, says Cicero, with a feeling of commiseration and a hatred for the brutality of war, “I am

not certain whether it is not sufficient for the person who has injured you to repent of the wrong done, so that he may never be guilty of the like in future, and that others may not be so forward to offend in the same manner.” An old Roman law is pressed into his service—that “no war is just unless it is undertaken to reclaim property, or unless it is solemnly denounced and proclaimed beforehand.” The spirit is new and pleads for civilizing measures. The spirit which it opposes is that of the restless military chiefs of his own generation; and he quotes the saying of M. Crassus, that no man who wanted to have a direction in the government had money enough, unless on the interest of it he could maintain an army.

For the safeguarding of social life, there is besides justice, beneficence. Beneficence stands for all kinds of good doing outside the sphere of justice—or definite interdependent obligations. “Justice is due even to the lowest of mankind; and nothing can be lower than the condition and fortune of a slave. And yet those prescribe wisely who enjoin us to put them upon the same footing as hired labourers, obliging them to do their work, but giving them their dues.” But beneficence is a service rendered for the sake of the person to whom it is rendered. For it these

rules are laid down. Our generosity must be really serviceable. It should hurt "neither those whom it is meant to assist, nor others." "It ought not to exceed our abilities; and it ought to be rendered to each in proportion to his worth, for that is "the foundation of justice, to which all these matters are to be referred." Thus there should be circumspection, a regard to worth. And such elements as the following are taken together: the examination of the character of the person to whom we are generous: the extent to which he may have promoted our interests: his disposition towards us; and what the general good of society requires. In fact there are gradations of beneficence. "Our country and parents bind us to them by the greatest services, next our children and our whole household, for they look to us alone and can have no other place of refuge; and next relatives with whom we get on well and with whom generally even our ill fortune is shared."

But beneficence is an art. It requires experience and practice. Precepts do not suffice. In other words, the duty to your neighbour in part consists of justice, in part of active beneficence. And in relation to it in thought at least, the people are conceived of as a whole, without any limitation of class. They are the community

bound together by common rights and mutual benefits (cf. i. 25). The field of neighbourliness is large.

Then as to the high and unconquerable soul. Cicero rejects Epicureanism at the outset as hateful. The question of life is not that of calculating pains and pleasures. It is judged by other standards: it depends not on sensation but on worth. "In truth in no wise can he be brave who thinks pain to be the greatest evil, and declares pleasure to be the greatest good." Setting this aside then he looks for his honourable man among the ranks of civil life. The glories of war and the ruthlessness of public ambition he sets aside. "The *honestum*," the state of being to which we should attain, and "which is nature's chief aim, consists in realities and not in mere glory, and rather chooses to be than to seem pre-eminent." It is to be sought for in the duties of the civil life. There is opportunity for it in all government, for government is a guardianship, a trusteeship, held on behalf of the whole people. The active life is better than the contemplative or studious life. In it is ample scope for men of high capacity. So he would dissuade man from the disordered life of ambition and he would bring him back to the antique spirit of State-service and patriotism.

But this *honestum*, the flower of the honourable existence, is also a kind of grace (*decorum*). There is a seemliness and beauty inherent in it. In relation to others it is justice, but justice refined to something more delicate, to a delicate appreciation of the feelings of others—(*verecundia*). Justice would not injure men. This *verecundia* or sympathetic modesty would not displease them; and in that most of all the power of a seemingly grace of manner lies.

So we pass to our fourth quality, in which this seemliness is found. It is found in the observation of order and measure in all that is done or said, for in that lies moderation and temperance. It represents a self-control which expresses itself in the fulfilment of one's best nature, that pleads, for instance, for energy as against luxury, straightforwardness against bribery, honesty as against foul play. Thus quoting Chrysippus, Cicero says that the young man should serve his own interest, only so far as this is possible without injustice to another. "He who runs a race should exert himself and strive as much as he can to be the winner, but he must not trip up his adversary or pull him back."

This same 'order and measure' indeed should pass into the whole man. It should give free play to his individual genius. No less should it

govern his whole manner. "We should follow nature and flee from everything that eyes or ears shrink to approve. Standing or moving, sitting or lying, the regard of our eyes, the movement of our hands, should all keep that seemingly grace." Thus justice passes into our very persons and transforms our being, and finds its expression in an individual charm, a kind of characteristic grace. It affects also our choice of time and place. We set things in convenient order; we do things at the right moment. We choose our profession well. Desirous of being just, we will not be tax-gatherers and usurers. Their gains are hateful to men. Nor will we be hired labourers, who sell their labour and not their skill; their hire is the consideration paid them for their enslavement. Nor will we be retail dealers; to make profit we shall have to tell lies. Nor will we be handicraftsmen. Their gains are sordid. Good breeding scorns the workshop. Nor will we be fishmongers, cooks, and the rest; these and others are trades that cater to our pleasures. We will be physicians or architects, or the teachers of 'honourable' things. These arts require more intelligence and have a large utility. They are honourable to those whose station in life they suit. So your merchant

who has made profits enough may make a harbour, or take an estate and become farmer. What is better or more delightful or more worthy of men of independent means?

Thus, guided by the dictates of justice, or (we must confess) in some measure moved by prejudice, or led by a recognition of the differences in capacity which generally follow differences in employment and upbringing, we pass to a classification of occupations. Some of them are honourable and consistent with our standard, with the state of life and thought, that we would wish to reach, and some, as it is judged, inconsistent with it. So Plato had his excluded professions; and so later the Church. Socially the old professional distinctions remain even now. Politically they have disappeared. Religiously they have disappeared in what is, or what should be, a common ecclesia or assembly of the faithful. But such statements hardly indicate the length and breadth of the change that has taken place in this regard. There is now a recognition of the honourable life, apart from the narrowness of individual occupations and their inferiority as sordid or less attractive. There is a greater unity of social spirit. There is a general care for those who are poor and in distress, apart from all

distinctions of labour or trade or craftsmanship. There is a general desire to raise the standard of life and independence among the people. We resent the enslavement of the labourer. We are not critical of trades and occupations by which men make an honest living. We do not believe that retail trade is a kind of cheating. We understand the economics of the question, and find the levels of price vary with demand and with district. So in itself not even is retail trade dishonourable in our eyes.

To turn to another point. The claims of a large generosity in promoting objects of public advantage are pressed home by Cicero (ii. 17, 60). In his second book he deals with the duties of young men; and by steps he passes to this question, and reverts to beneficence. Beneficence he says, may consist of helping the needy by our own exertions or by money. The former is the better. As for money—our private means—according to the old saying “bounty has no bottom” (ii. 15, 55), there’s no end of giving, and “what limit can there be, when those who have been accustomed to receive it, and others who have not yet become accustomed to do so, yearn for it both alike?” In these circumstances the limitation of one’s means is the only limitation of one’s bounty. The

whole method of public largesse is bad whatever form it take. There are occasions, however, when by usage it is considered necessary, but, even then, whatever form it take, it should be kept within limits out of regard both to the extent of our means and to our sense of proportion. Our liberality (*benignitas*) should rather be directed towards individuals in distress (*calamitosi*) unless perchance their distress is deserved. Those who ask our help in order that they may improve their position in life must be discreetly selected. "Bona facta male locata male facta arbitror." The benevolence of a man of the highest rank is for all men a kind of refuge. His liberality is of service even to the State—if he redeems captives from slavery or enriches the poor. It used to be the custom that men of senatorial rank should do such things as these. This customary liberality is of far greater value than the provision of public entertainments. It is worthy of serious and high-minded men. The other is to pander to the frivolity of the people. The same spirit of kindness should show itself in the transactions of life, buying and selling, hiring and letting. There must be a certain neighbourliness in these matters. But there is also great scope for a large and splendid munificence in the building of city walls, or dockyards, or

aqueducts, and in the advancement of many things that are to the advantage of the State. Thus what later (see p. 250) came under the head of "charity" here finds its place under the head of liberal giving (*largitio*)—coupled with the conclusion that "the motive for liberal giving is that it is either necessary or useful."

Of expediency Cicero says much, but his discussion of it is uncompromising. No expediency inconsistent with what is 'honourable,' the recognized standard of the good life, is to be tolerated. Thus he would leave behind him a Roman lesson. He would transfer the warfare against flesh and blood to a warfare against principalities and powers of darkness in high places: and like Virgil he hopes for the advent of a Roman youth endowed with a purer life, less greedy of power, more devoted to duty, staunch and truthful, and nobly mannered. Among these would spring up the true beneficence, the large charity of life.

St. Augustine, it should be added, used and praised Cicero's *de Republica*, and made it a stepping-stone to other thoughts in his *Civitas Dei*. Cicero's *de Officiis* has been of constant service in moulding the thought of the middle ages. Nor in these modern days has its usefulness passed away.

CHAPTER XIII.

A CENTURY LATER.

WE next pass to Seneca (3 B.C. to 65 A.D.), and then to Epictetus.

The main thoughts of Seneca's essay on Benefits should be set down. He is impressed with the obligation of doing good, and not less with the evil of faulty and inconsiderate giving. Among people who live heedlessly and without plan, nothing, he says, is more intolerable than their lack of the knowledge how to give and how to receive benefits. There is no more common fault than ingratitude; and the reason for it is that we do not choose worthy persons on whom to bestow our bounty. Were we lending money, we should inquire into the means of our debtor and his mode of life; but our benefits we scatter without any discrimination. True, a benefit is not a debt. We do not give in order to be repaid. It is a loan only in the sense that so much of it may be received by the donor as

may be voluntarily returned to him. The repayment of a benefit is a payment of thanks (*reddit enim beneficium qui libentur debet*). Another cause of ingratitude is the manner in which the benefit is conferred. There is ungraciousness or delay. A benefit is received in the mood in which it is given. It should not, therefore, be given carelessly, for a man thanks himself and not the donor for what he accepts from one who does not know the facts. Yet the ingratitude of men should not put us off. The sun shines on the just and on the unjust. It is the distinction of a great and good mind, that, in doing good, it seeks no profit at all, but only to do good deeds. The book-keeping of good deeds is simple: so much is laid out. If anything is paid back it is a profit; if nothing, there is no loss. Do not stop, do your work thoroughly, fulfil the duties of a good man. Help one man with money, another by your credit, another by your favour; help one with advice, another with sound injunctions (*de Beneficiis*, i. 102).

A good deed, a benefit, is not a material thing (i. 5). The act or the gift is the outward sign. The benefit itself one cannot touch: it exists only in the mind. The benefit is the very will of him who bestows it (*ipsa tribuentis voluntas*). Ignorant people only notice what is material,

and value only that; but what we see and touch—that to which our consciousness clings—is transitory. Those who receive a kindness may pass away. The kindness, and those material things, therefore, which assume the name of “benefit” improperly, represent, in fact, services through which the friendly will manifests itself. They are not the kindness, the goodwill, itself.

What then is a good deed (*beneficium*)? It is a friendly action which imparts a reasonable gladness, and in imparting it receives it, and what it does, it does with hearty readiness and of its own accord.

Next, what kind of benefits are to be given, and how? First (i. 11), let us give what is necessary; then what is useful; then what is pleasant, provided that it be of lasting service. What is necessary comes first. It represents things without which we cannot live, things without which we ought not to live, things without which we would not care to live. The preservation of life, of honour, of family; benefits that preserve such things as these provide us with what are necessities.

Then follow benefits that are useful. They are a wide and varied class. Money, or public office, or advancement in office: these are benefits

that are useful—for nothing can be of greater service to a man than to enable him to promote his own interest (*quam sibi utilem fieri*). To do more than this is to do what is superfluous, and it will spoil the recipient.¹

As to benefits that are done to cause pleasure, if we have a free choice, let us choose gifts that are lasting and will endure. They should be things that will be always before the eyes of those to whom they are given, and will keep alive their memory of you. So we should give rather a service of plate than a present of money.

The moral of all this is: a benefit bestowed on people just as it pleases you, will give pleasure to no one. What any one may get, no one will treasure. Use your discretion, for what is given casually and heedlessly can touch no one's heart.

The good of the recipient too must be considered (ii. 14). What does harm we may not give to those that ask it. We must think of what is useful to them rather than of what they wish. We ought to consider the outcome of what we do to help them as well as the beginning of it, to give not only what they are glad to receive, but what they will be glad to have received. Never let us bestow what will

¹ Cf. the argument of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 261.

recoil on us to our shame. Since the sum of friendship consists in making our friends equal to ourselves, we must consider the interest of both parties alike. I will give to a man who is in want, yet so that I do not want myself. I will help the perishing, yet so that I do not perish myself, unless by perishing I be the price paid for saving a great man or a great cause.

But of the receivers of benefits, how should they behave? Every function that is performed by two persons makes equal demands on both. So with father and son, husband and wife. Each gives and takes equally, and each requires a similar rule of life for the fulfilment of which each is answerable. Such a rule is hard to follow. For the giving and receiving of benefits is like a game at ball. If either the thrower or the catcher misses, the ball falls to a certainty. It only keeps up when it passes to and from their hands, deftly thrown and deftly caught. According to your partner's skill you send a long or a short throw. So it is with a benefit. Unless the ball is deftly thrown by each to each, it will neither pass from the one nor reach the other as it ought. To your skilled player you may throw a hard ball; to your novice you will throw it gently, guiding it into his hands, and running to meet it when he throws. This is

what we should do in confirming benefits. Let us teach a certain number to do so, and be satisfied if they make the attempt, and if they have the courage and the will (ii. 17, 18). For goodness (*honestum*) is ever on the steeps of life, and not sheer goodness only, but what is near to goodness—goodness-like. We have not only to do good, but to do good on principle (*ratione*). All through life this must be our guide. According to its dictates we must do all things, the least and the greatest: as it prompts us, we must give.

Two questions follow, and a moral. The first is; if there is, alike for the least and the greatest, equal responsibility to do good, do not class distinctions from this point of view disappear? The answer can only be in the affirmative. The member of one class may do a benefit to the member of another; the slave may help his master, no less than the master his slave. Thus the division between master and slave disappears in this spirit of mutual responsibility.

For "it is a mistake to think that slavery pervades the whole being of a man. His better part is exempt from it. Bodies are subject to masters and enrolled as their property. The mind is independent (*sui juris*). So free and

spontaneous is it, that not even by this prison house of the body, in which it is confined, can it be held back; but on its own impulse it acts, follows vast designs in thought, and passes out into the infinite, companion of the heavenly powers. Thus the body only does misfortune transfer to a master. This he buys and sells. That inner part cannot become another's property. Whatever comes of it is free; for we are not allowed to order our slaves to do any thing we please, nor are our slaves compelled to do it. What is bidden them contrary to the commonweal they will not do, nor will they put their hand to crime."

And then, what is independence? "Your pleasure," Seneca says to his opponent (iv. 12), "is to enjoy a kind of torpid sleepy æstheticism, to dream and eat and drink in the shade of your gardens. This you call tranquillity. Our pleasure is to bestow benefits, even those that cost much trouble, if only they lighten the hardships of others—even those that expose us to dangers, if only they save others from danger—even those that imperil our interests, if only they lessen the straits and necessities of others. What difference does it make to me if I receive benefits as well as bestow them. Even if I receive them, it is still my duty to bestow

them." We receive and we bestow, but what do we mean by possession? There is a possession by the act and use of the mind; and there is a possession that is by ownership. The wise man is a possessor of the former kind. He has rightly appraised the riches of life. "I know the kingdom of wisdom, its greatness and security (vii. 4: vii. 10). I possess all things, yet so that they still belong to all men." Independence lies in that manner of thought. "It makes a great difference whether we estimate what a man owns by the greatness of his mind, or by the public register." Thus two things are brought together: life as a doing of benefits and an acceptance of them; and life as a form of understanding. To give benefits is not to give a thing only, but a thought. To understand the world is to possess the world. Who understands the world best is the greatest benefactor. What he gives always carries the thought with it. What he possesses, he shares with all, for in the sphere of the understanding friends have all things in common. Independence thus is to be one's own master (*sui juris*), able to give and receive as for oneself, and to be a great possessor, by right, not of ownership, but of understanding.

The last words of Seneca's book sum up the

moral. "Suppose a man is not grateful, he does not injure me, but himself. I had the enjoyment of doing a kindness. Therefore I will not be more slow to do a kindness again, but more careful. What I have lost by this man I shall receive from others. But this very man I shall assist again, and like a good husbandman, by care and culture, I will overcome the barrenness of the soil. I may lose what my charity has cost me; but, if I do not succeed, he is lost, lost to all mankind. A man of spirit and intelligence would not spend his kindness and let the good of it be lost. He would admit the loss, but spend again."

It is said that the Stoics talked finely but did not care about the lot of the poor or the distress of the individual. We can hardly think that Seneca and many others who wrote upon this question of "benefits" wrote out of an assumption of knowledge, and not out of experience. On the contrary, may we not conclude that, though their lives may have been passed at a lower standard of endeavour than they propose to their readers, they wrote because the problem of giving and helping interested many of their own generation, and because many were actively engaged in the task of trying to assist people in distress.

The similarity of phrase in Seneca and St. Paul is very marked (see Lightfoot's *St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians*, p. 268, etc.). So it is in Epictetus. Why should we not in these authors find a point of fusion between Stoic philosophy and Christian or especially Pauline thought? After all is said, the arguments on the question seem to leave that as a still remaining solution of the undeniable similarity. It is good to remember that Seneca, the contemporary of St. Paul, continued to live with him side by side in the thought of the middle ages.

In relation to mediaeval thought one paragraph of Seneca's may be quoted (*de Beneficiis*, iv. 29). It is significant as a kind of justification of indiscriminate almsgiving.

"A benefit is a useful service, yet all useful service is not a benefit: for some are so trifling as not to claim the title of benefits. To produce a benefit two conditions must concur. First, the importance of the thing given: for some things fall short of the dignity of a benefit. Whoever called a hunch of bread a benefit, or a farthing dole tossed to a beggar, or the means of lighting a fire? Yet sometimes these are of more value than the most costly benefits: still their cheapness detracts from their value, even when, by

the exigency of time, they are rendered essential. The next condition, which is the most important of all, must necessarily be present, namely, that I should confer the benefit for the sake of him whom I wish to receive it, that I should judge him worthy of it, bestow it of my own free will, and receive pleasure from my gift. None of these conditions are present in the cases of which we have just now spoken. What we give in these cases we do not bestow upon people because they are worthy or deserving, but we give it carelessly as a trifle. We give it, not so much to a man as to humanity" (Seneca, *de Beneficiis*, iv. 29 : Stewart's trans.).

The argument would apply to much mediaeval and not a little present giving. There are two kinds of gift one might say. One kind is an alms. The recipient is anyone. The gift is impersonal; it is a casual transaction with one knows not who. It is too trifling to make a knowledge of facts or of the worthiness of the recipient an element in deciding whether and how it should be given. It is given to humanity. There is another kind of gift which involves personal considerations. Progress in thought lay in making this kind of gift and method the rule, the other the exception. Unfortunately the reverse has often taken place. The gift

and help that should be personal have often been made an impersonal alms, and the alms itself has degenerated into a purposeless bounty.

We pass to a contemporary of Seneca's, a much greater man than he, we venture to think. There were many Stoic teachers in Rome. Of the lectures of one, Epictetus, we possess notes, taken down by a pupil. Epictetus had been the slave of Epaminondas, a friend of Nero's (54 A.D.), and his lectures are full of references to his times, to slaves, to arbitrary imperial power, to unjust sentences of death and banishment, to the anxieties of the nervous Roman and his way of life, to the philosophical views of the day, to personal ambitions, and common vices. In the midst of all of this, he believes that there is a way of escape and of progress for the individual soul. His discourse is like a torrent of argument—a quick conversation with an imaginary objector, a sharp and absolute summing up, and a conclusion that is almost a scourging of the feeble-hearted and unrepentant. He will drive his hearers to take thought of nobler cares and would leave them no chance for evading the fulfilment of higher endeavour. But sometimes, too, he takes another tone. He most earnestly beseeches them and entreats them. The time

is critical—the state of things is like that of “an army placed in battle order” (Epictetus iii. 23; Long’s trans.), when the cynic, the apostle, the “man sent by God to show you what is possible” should “without distraction be employed only on the ministration of God, able to go about among men, not tied down to the common duties of mankind, not entangled in the ordinary relations of life.”

His tenets are simple. In large part they had been formulated by his predecessors in philosophy. Man is the offspring of God. There is in him some part of the divine nature. This is his justification, and suggests his standard of life. Nature lies in God and is ordered to his purposes. So does man, and so should man be ordered. In nature thus conceived man finds a measure for himself. What is the purpose of my life, he asks, considered as a part of this whole? He accepts the obligations of social life, the duty of taking part in its administration, the duty of marriage, the careful nurture of children, the duty of parents to children. There is in each case a pattern—what the mind conceives to be the ordered or natural fulfilment of the particular duty. The answer is ready, if the questions be truly asked. Thus, in the case of a parent, what goes to make a parent? What

is he for? What is his purpose? What then is his duty?

And for the method of discernment of duty he urges this. We have, he says, a reasoning spirit (*logikē psychē*) a property of self-leadership or a ‘ruling faculty,’ as formerly it would have been called. By this means the mind rules: and the mind is free. We have also in regard to all matters that come before the mind certain preconceptions (*prolēpseis*), ‘preconceived notions,’ as people say. When we would do or not do a thing or affirm or reject an opinion, we have to consider what comes before us. What come before us are the appearances of things or impressions (*phantasiai*). We view them in the light of these preconceptions, and we judge, check, and modify our preconceptions of them by the standard of nature and by the guidance of our master faculty. This process is selection or willing (*proairēsis*).

The condition of the good life thus considered is a power to choose, a kind of judgment or willing; and the choice or judgment is not superficial and a matter of words or argument only, it is real, and by its power to produce actions and habits transforms the choice or judgment into a way of acting and living. Philosophy is the training of this judgment into a right will

by education and discipline. One's life, rightly understood, depends thus on the will. "The being or existence of the good is in a certain will; the being of the bad is a certain kind of will" (i. 29). Equally it may be said that, as the will depends on the ruling 'faculty,' and is indeed the expression of it, so the state of this 'faculty' of the mind is no less an indication of moral health and sanity.

To sum up, Epictetus lays stress on three points of training for one who intends to be a good man (iii. 2). "The first concerns desires and avoidances, that he may not fail of his desire nor encounter what he avoids. The second is about desire of good and aversion to bad, and is a word about duty, that his action may be orderly, reasonable, careful. And the third has to do with security against deception, and with discretion, and with a right assent to his perceptions."

"Of these the most important and most pressing is the first—desire and avoidance. It affects our emotions: for we suffer from the perturbation of our emotions only when we fail in our desire or when we are upset by our avoidance of what we might have done. It is this that brings distractions, confusions, ill-fortunes, disasters, that produces jealous and

envious men—all of which things prevent us from even hearing the voice of reason."

"Next comes the second point, that about duty: for my freedom from perturbation must not be like that of a statue, but I must keep in view my states of being, both those which are mine by nature and those which I assume in the several capacities of a religious man, or as a son, as a brother, as a father, as a citizen."

"The third matter is one which begins to be incumbent on those who are in a degree of forwardness in philosophy. It refers to your state of security in these matters—your security against deception, your discretion, and the rightness of your assent to perceptions—to the end that not even in sleep should any uncriticised fancy pass your guard, nor in drink, nor in any morbid state of mind."

Lastly, some things are in our own power, some are not (*Encheiridion*, i.). Our opinion and our own acts—doing and avoiding to do anything—are in our power. Not in our power is the body, the avoidance of sickness or of the physical compulsion which may lead to imprisonment, banishment, or death. Not in our power is the gaining or losing of property by the confiscation of an authority such as the Emperor, or by the chances of life. Nor is the winning or the losing

of a reputation in our power: nor success nor failure in election or appointment to magisterial offices. Whichever way these things may go, as to them there should be neither fear nor disappointment. They are not in our power. With this gospel comes tranquillity. Fear is cast out. Death itself loses its torment. What one does or thinks in the presence of death, that alone is of consequence. Heroes and good men have set us the example of tranquillity. In Socrates we find an ideal. He cast out fear. He knew the true purpose of life (iv. 1). In prison he wrote a hymn to Apollo. He would not avoid death by escape; and by his death he served mankind, by the remembrance of what he did and said when he was alive.

Such a succinct system of dogma as this, easily stated and often repeated, gave a Roman firmness to those who accepted it, as Epictetus shows by examples. A kind of martyrdom is borne by them unflinchingly. The man compelled to go a mile goes twain (cf. iv. 1), the sick man must not murmur; the loss of wife or children must be taken as in the order of things. There is in his teaching the ascetic sternness of some of the sayings of Christ, and the words and phrases remind the reader of the phraseology of the Gospels. The tone is religious.

The will is enforced, on the side of right assent and action or on the side of right dissent and inaction, by the thought of God. "Your talk of God is to be renewed every day rather than your food"; and "You are to think of God more frequently than you breathe." So nature—the standard of nature—is within and may be habitually applied. And for the exertion of the will and its victory over desire (ii. 23) reliance is placed on the enforcement of the right decision by the dominance of the whole self on that side. "If a man put in one and the same place his interest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and parents and friends, all these are secured: but if he puts in one place his interest, in another his friends, and his country and his kinsmen and justice itself, all these give way, being borne down by the weight of interest. For where the I and the Mine are placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines; if it be in the flesh, there is the ruling power; if it be in the will, it is there; and if it be in externals, it is there. If I am there where my will is, then and then only shall I be a friend such as I ought to be, and son, and father; for this will be my interest, to maintain the character of fidelity, of modesty, of patience, of abstinence, of active co-operation, of observing

my relations (towards all)." The plea is a plea for the stringency of social claims, for the fundamental conditions of social life and charity, without which no administration can be effectual and no relief adequate.

Two examples may be given. Of friendship he has the hard saying: "To love is only in the power of the wise." Between men who seem to be closest friends may come many causes of difference, a Helen and war, the question of an estate or some such ground for alienation. But love is not love till it reaches a higher plane. At the lower plane it is misled by appearances. The Helen or the estate are misvalued. The man who judges wisely will avoid the tortures of jealousy or avarice. He will be to "another who is like himself" "altogether and completely a friend." "But he will bear with the man who is unlike himself; he will be kind to him, gentle, ready to pardon on account of ignorance, on account of his being mistaken in things of the greatest importance; but he will be harsh to no man, being well convinced of Plato's doctrine that every mind is deprived of truth unwillingly." Thus we come to the mood of charity.

Then as to "those who fear want" (iii. 26). Slaves run away from their masters. How do

they fare? You run away from doing wrong, will you fare worse? "Do not the slaves, after stealing a little which is enough for the first days, then afterwards move on through land or sea, contriving one method after another for maintaining their lives? And what fugitive slave ever died of hunger?" Can't you get some situation, take care of children, or be a watchman at another person's door? There is no shame in that. Don't mind plain fare and a hard bed. The righteous are never forsaken. It is better to have a free mind than heaps of food with cowardice.

• There is no practical solution of the social question here, some would say. No: there is none, but there is more. Life is understood. The will that has the force to decide rightly will support a life which is consistent with the decision. The future will justify the past. It is 'in the nature of things' that it should do so.

For the rest, social life—and it is always from the social life Epictetus argues—demands cleanliness, not finery in dress (iii. 1). Purity is (iv. 9) of the soul. "The purification of the soul is the planting in it of proper opinions." There is no doctrine of an after-world (iii. 13). In death you go to "nothing terrible, but to the place from which you came, to your friends

and kinsmen, to elements. What there was in you of fire goes to fire; of earth to earth; of spirit to air; of water to water; no Hades, no Acheron, no Cocytus, no Pyriphlegethon, but all is full of Gods and Demons"—the spiritual existences of an elemental life. The exit is Ariel's. "To the elements be free; and fare thou well."

Our psychology is different now. A knowledge of development and evolution has altered our standpoint.¹ We recognise the more sufficient genesis of 'preconceptions' by primary instincts and emotions, and the commingling of instincts with instincts and their adaptation, and their modification by sentiments and disposition (cf. McDougall, *Social Psychology*). It is enough for us that we recognise the will only. By itself it serves for 'ruling faculty' or reasoning spirit. But the tussle of will with desire remains, and the explanation of its victory, when it is victorious, is not very differently explained.

But Stoicism failed, it may be said. Hardly so, it served and serves its purpose. It was in religious worship conservative and tolerant,

¹ Perhaps not so much as is frequently thought. Cf. Professor Bosanquet's *Companion to Plato's Republic* (x. 597), p. 384.

not inclined to innovation. It did not concern itself with a judgment day and a revision of life according to a yet diviner justice than prevailed upon the earth. It could not therefore be popular among the worshippers, whose language was largely the language of symbol and ritual, and whose hopes rested in a personal after-life. It quarrelled (ii. 20) with Epicurus, and may be in part misunderstood him. In its eyes he seemed to make enjoyment the end of life and would destroy "the natural fellowship of mankind" by the gratification of individual tastes and desires. But on the other hand it ran a risk of becoming too introspective, and thus unsympathetic, and almost fatalist in the abandonment of things "not in our power," or assumed to be "not in our power." It sometimes lacked discernment. All grief is not alike and equally to be disciplined away. We can neither love a wife nor grieve over her loss as we would love or grieve over the loss of an "earthen vessel," as if they could be in the same category (*Encheir.* iii.). Nature would have it otherwise. The sorrow must be according to the true loss. Yet, after all, we think of Stoicism and of its place in a vast literature, philosophic and poetic, as the source of help to men who were finding their way in a great crisis, when the

old religions were being transformed and social life had to be rebuilt. Are not, indeed, the thoughts of Stoicism, its staunch self-discipline and its glowing sense of duty part of the gospel according to St. Paul, Epictetus' contemporary?

CHAPTER XIV.

PRECHRISTIAN RELIGION.

By 'prechristian' here we mean before the official recognition of Christianity as the religion of the State. Two religions competed with Christianity, the worship of Isis and the worship of Mithra. Plutarch (about 50 to 117 A.D.) tells us of both. He is a kindly, learned, inquisitive, tolerant soul. He does not approve of atheism, a term which he applies to the Christians (*Isis*, 33), and by which he means "insensibility to what is Divine" (*On Superstition*, 2). He would say that many more or less unintelligible rites and customs have a kind of reason in them, though the reason might be obscure and the truth about them forgotten. In religious thought, as his own essays show, there was a confusion of disordered observation and ill-understood introspection. Analogies were applied without any conception of the logical unity that should underlie them. Thoughts were illustrated by numbers and geometrical forms, as

though the numbers and forms had a spiritual nature or implied some kind of logical sequence. Symbolism and cyphers ran wild. As we have seen, religion, as it has developed, has tended to satisfy several deeply-felt desires or longings of the human heart. It must, we have found, be cosmic: in some way it must explain the Universe to man. It must recognise man's sense of some paramount divine authority. It must bring the individual into relation with the Universe, and with the God that seems to stand over against him. By reason of the nature of this God it must be able to appeal to sympathy with individual suffering and distress. It must be the guardian and promoter of some kind of moral code, though only slowly does the life of 'true marriage' and of chastity assert itself as an indispensable condition of true religion.¹ As the appreciation of justice and morality advances, it must create for itself an after-world, in which its moral standards are reflected and wickedness is punished or purged away.

¹ Animalism and impurity accompanied the ritual of much pagan religion. (Cf. e.g. St. Augustine, *Civitas Dei*, ii. 5.) But it would be wrong to judge religion in its earlier stages by that only. The lofty is found in strange proximity to the low. The purging of social life is a long process. Christianity itself is evidence of this.

The contradictions of thought and of observation are the puzzle of religion; the antithesis between the individual and the universe, the self and the object; and the endeavour to find a unity in which these apparent opposites become harmonized in some way. 'Principles' or transcendent formative intelligences, it is felt, must make the world of our thought. These Principles are conceived as opposite, and yet the opposition, it is argued, must be subject to some kind of unity. Plato, Plutarch says, calls them "the one" and "the other," which to him is simply puzzling. When Plato wrote the *Laws*, he says, he dropped these terms and was more easy to understand. (*Isis*, 48, King's trans.) He then wrote: "Not by one soul was the universe set in motion, but by several perhaps, at all events by not less than two, whereof the one is beneficial, and the other antagonistic to this, and the creator of opposite effects; and there is room for a third Principle to exist, one intermediate between the two which is neither destitute of soul, nor of reason, nor of impulse from within (as some suppose), but subordinate to these two principles, ever seeking after the better one, and desiring and following after it." In this Plutarch seems to find the key to the worship of Osiris and Isis.

But Plato's "the one" and "the other" represented a substantial issue. They touched the question of identity and difference—what became ultimately the Nicæan question, the resolution of the idea of God into an identity of being (*ousia*), "the same," and yet also into a difference of function or purpose, into "the other," into a difference of persons.

The worship of Isis and Osiris is founded, it appears, upon the great antithesis of nature, like the worship of Demeter—the antithesis of winter and summer, of darkness and light, of death and resurrection, of the obstruction of good and the promotion of good, of sorrow and joy. In the myth of Demeter, there is Demeter the mother, and Persephone the maid, rapt into the underworld to Hades, the concealer; and Demeter travails to find her daughter. In the myth of Osiris, Isis is the companion sister and mate of Osiris the Sun. Typhon the mangler, hider and destroyer, coffins him, tears him in pieces, and scatters him in pieces the world over; and Isis goes in sorrow in search of him, and ever brings together the scattered life of the God. Osiris is first a God of the under-world (Wallis Budge, *The Book of the Dead*, p. lxxx), but he becomes also the Sun, whose generative beams are scattered to fertilize the earth, and, as the Sun (*Isis*,

51), he is also "the body of the good Principle," the visible form of the Intelligible Being. He is the 'word' (54) who exists by himself free from admixture and from passion. He is "eternal and incorruptible." He is the civilizer. As the Sun, and more than the Sun, he has travelled over the whole earth, civilizing it. He has "made the Egyptians reform their destitute and bestial mode of living, taught them the art of cultivation, given them laws and learned them to worship the Gods." He has tamed mankind by persuasion and reasoning and by song of all kinds and by music. As the eternal word he is scattered and hidden in the minds of man, and from this springs the divine knowledge. Typhon obstructs both, would prevent the Sun by slaying it, and the word by seizing it.

As Mediator between the world and the Osiris, the Intelligible and the God, there is Horus the son of Isis (Origen's name came from Horus; he was named the Horus-born) who is the Word, with the admixture of matter, "bearing witness and proving how that nature changing her form after the model of the Intelligible, produces the World." The Great Osiris requires some mediating agent between himself, so remote, and the world, as alien to him as matter is to spirit. But the thought in which the feeling of the

worshipper, finds its centre and satisfaction is that of Isis, the sorrowing, and Osiris the supreme, the kindly and wise. Osiris the good and supreme, the eternal and incorruptible, is ever scattering himself in seedlike words to give life and peace. Typhon is ever furious, and confounds and obstructs. "But the avenger of Osiris, his sister and wife, who extinguished and put a stop to the madness and fury of Typhon, did not forget the contests and struggles she had gone through, nor yet her own wanderings, nor did she suffer oblivion and silence to envelop her many deeds of wisdom, many feats of courage, but by intermingling with the most sacred ceremonies, images, hints and representations of her sufferings of yore, she consecrated at one and the same time both lessons of piety and consolation in suffering for men and women overtaken by misfortune. And she, together with Osiris, having been translated from the rank of good demons up to Gods by means of their virtue . . . receive not inappropriately the united honours of Gods and demons everywhere" (27).

Hence mysteries to show the inner meaning of the religion, hymns, a priesthood, and a discipline. "'Typhon' the enemy of Isis, for he is 'puffed up' by want of knowledge and falsehood, tears to pieces and puts out of sight the sacred word

that the Goddess again gathers up and puts together and gives into the charge of those initiated into the religion; whilst by means of a perpetually sober life, by abstinence from many kinds of food and from unchastity, she checks intemperance and love of pleasure, accustoming people to endure her service with bowels not enervated by luxury, but hardy and vigorous—the object of all which is knowledge of the First, the Supreme, the Intelligible, whom the Goddess exhorts you to seek after, for he is both by her side, and united with you" (2).

Thus, like great Cosmic personages, Isis and Osiris loom before the believer. They are the givers of the knowledge of eternal life. Their history of eternal warfare with destruction and darkness is holy warfare: and the brave perplexed Goddess who has borne her task, out of veneration for her husband God, ever seeking him who is divine knowledge, and by her love keeping him who is all knowledge one and complete, becomes a heavenly guide to those who like herself have had trouble and misfortune. And she appeals to the best: requires self-restraint and discipline; would make a vigorous people, would ask of her worshippers a life consistent with their aspirations for purity and the knowledge that explains and consoles. Viewed, as Plutarch

viewed it, this religion is not enervating. But it would touch a chord of pity and sympathy which seekers after religion might wish to find in some new belief. Thus it too would lead the way to reform. It was not an imposed or official religion. It was popular and was welcomed by masses of the people. It was evidence of their thought and their effort in regard to their individual needs and the progress of social life.

Thus the religion of Osiris and Isis in spite of its strange and deterrent overgrowth of fantastic symbol and imagination, met many of the cravings of religious feeling. In a manner it seemed to explain the world to man, to give him a moral standard, to touch his heart, and to lead the way to an after-world.

The dominant key of the religion indeed was this belief in a resurrection, a judgment, and an after-world. "The ancient Egyptian believed (Wallis Budge, p. lxxxii) that there was some very definite connexion between the resurrection of Osiris and of himself and also that "the god was able to raise him up and to give him everlasting life, because he himself had conquered death and risen, and had become the master of everlasting life." The conception of the after-world varied according to the age and generation. The rudest conception of it was one of Elysian

fields, where the land was flat, fertile and Egypt-like, where the food was plentiful and the old farming life of Egypt could be followed once more, or the combative life of the huntsman or warrior. The land of the after-world was thought to be not a very long ladder's length above this. But as life and thought matured, there was the same desire, as in the Orphic thought, for purity (p. cxxxvii); and purity opens the gates of heaven: and the purity is moral purity (p. 190), in which charity has a large place.

The following is one of the confessions of the faithful: The deceased and his wife are represented as standing with both hands raised in adoration. He is the overseer of the palace, the chancellor in chief. He comes into the hall of double Maäti—twin sisters, who live as warders of sinners and who feed upon their blood on the day when the lives of men are taken into account. And he says, "Homage to thee, O great God (Osiris), thou Lord of the double Maäti. I have come to thee, O my Lord, and I have brought myself hither, that I may behold thy beauties. . . . In truth I have come to thee and I have brought Maäti (*i.e.* right and truth) to thee, and I have destroyed wickedness for thee. [I have not done evil to] mankind.

I have not oppressed the members of my family. I have not wrought evil in the place of right and truth. I have had no knowledge of worthless men. I have not wrought evil. I have not made to be the first [consideration] of each day that excessive labour should be performed for me. [I have] not brought forward my name for [exaltation to] honours. I have not ill-treated my servants. [I have not thought scorn of God.] I have not defrauded the oppressed one of his property. I have not done that which is an abomination to the Lord. I have not caused harm to be done to the servant by his chief. I have not caused pain. I have made no man to suffer hunger. I have made no one to weep. I have done no murder. I have not given the order for murder to be done for me. I have not inflicted pain upon mankind. I have not defrauded the temples of their oblations. I have not purloined the cakes of the gods. I have not carried off the cakes offered to the *khus* (the shining forms). I have not committed fornication. I have not polluted myself [in the holy places of the God of my city] nor diminished from the Bushel. I have neither added to nor filched away land. I have not encroached upon the fields [of others]. I have not added to the weights of the scales [to

cheat the seller]. I have not misread the points of the scales [to cheat the buyer]. I have not carried away the milk from the mouths of children. I have not driven away the cattle which were upon their pastures. I have not speared the feathered fowl that were upon the preserves of the Gods. I have not caught fish [with bait made of] fish of their kind. I have not turned back the water at the time [when it should flow]. I have not cut a cutting in a canal of running water. I have not extinguished a fire (or light) when it should burn. I have not violated the times [of offering] the chosen meat offerings. I have not driven off the cattle from the property of the Gods. I have not repulsed God in his manifestations. I am pure, I am pure, I am pure." . . .

Thus the religion of Osiris and Isis, which won for itself very many worshippers in Rome, brought with it much to leaven the general thought and to add duty and charity to social life.

Mithraism insists on the same antithesis as that of Osiris and Typhon—two Gods, as it were, "of opposite trades" (Plutarch, *Isis*, 46), Oromazes and Arimanios, one the creator of good, the other of bad things, one resembling Light, one Darkness and Ignorance; they wage war

with one another and Mithras is the mediator. The warfare is life. It lasts for ages on ages. Eventually there will be one life and government of man, all happy and of one language. The sacred sacrifice of the bull reappears in this religion; and there is an elaborate after-world with many heavens, as it seems to us, fantastically named, according to types of character, named from animals.¹

So the record closes. Christianity is affecting other religions. They too probably affect Christianity. This obviously would seem to be the case in the religion of Osiris and Isis; and the Orphic or Pythagorean element also finds affinity with Christianity. Eusebius (iv. 13), who sought for evidence of the religious thought which was a "preparation for the Gospel," quotes the following statement of the views of that school as set forth by Apollonius (d. about 98 A.D.):

"If a man wishes to pay fitting service to the Deity, and by that means to be singled out as an object of divine grace and goodness, he must offer to that God whom we called the first, who is One and above all, after whom only can the other deities be recognized, no sacrifice at all; he must kindle no fire, nor promise any earthly thing.

¹ An idea of the spread of Mithraism and its character may be obtained from *Die Mysterien des Mithra*, by Prof. Cumont (1903).

For God needs nothing, not even from beings that are higher than we; nor is there any plant, any creature, produced or nourished (earth or air) which is free from pollution. To him man must offer only the better word, I mean that which is not uttered by the lips, and ask good things from the most beautiful of all, by the most beautiful faculty that we possess, the faculty of intelligence, which needs no organ. Therefore to the great and supreme God no sacrifices at all must be offered."¹

So great an advance has been made in the purification of worship; so great an advance in the simplification and clearness of the religious thought, on which depended the larger conception of charity that had already come into the world, but had not yet been accepted.

¹ Quoted from the late Prof. Brigg's *Origins of Christianity*, 307. The quotation is taken from a work "On Sacrifices," said to be written by Apollonius, but of doubtful authenticity. *Apollonius' Life*, which "can only be regarded as a romance," "has a high interest as a semi-official religious manifesto, and explains, better than any other book, that neo-paganism which was supplanting the barren old popular beliefs." (Cf. *Apollonius de Tyane*: A. Chassang, 1862; and *Apollonius of Tyana*: F. W. Groves Campbell, 1908.)

CHAPTER XV.

CHANGES OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND
ORGANIZATION.

To make clear the changes that took place in regard to charity somewhat more should be said. Christianity fulfilled the conditions of thought and feeling required by religion, as we have noted them, but with a difference.

First there stands before the worshipper the figure or memory of Christ. He by his parables tells how thought works in the world. He explains the world of the human kind in relation to thought, as a perpetual sowing and harvesting, a silent unseen leavening, a seeking and a finding; and with a sower's hand he scatters around short sayings, thoughts contained in fewest words. Thus, without the parley of discussion and without preliminary, he marks out the lines of a morality freshly conceived and stated and gives the meaning of a new religion. What is life, he asks, and gives the answer. He

measures it by a new standard, or at least by a standard applied in a new way: "Be ye therefore perfect as your father which is in Heaven is perfect." "Father in heaven" takes the place of "nature." Nature is not made the norm or standard of life. The standard is a certain kind of fatherhood-mind, realized in thought, in the supremacy and eternity of thought, "in heaven." The godlikeness of man is according to this a kind of sonhood. The sonship of one, who would be perfect, is realized also in a kind of thought. Within him, as a corresponding element, is the kingdom of heaven. So may he strive, without futility, for perfection. A kind of supremacy, of eternity, is his—within his reach. Thus the relation of man to the Universe, or to nature, or to the thought of the Universe or of nature is revised, reasserted, simplified, and made very evident and real.

The multiplicity of Gods, and of friendly spirits such as demons and heroes, passes out of sight; though saints with their shrines in due course take their place. The Gods belong to another age of thought. One supreme God only is left, as the thinkers so long have thought; and his nature is now expressed by an old word, even in its religious application, as the Father. And there is Christ, and the Spirit.

In Christ, eventually, for the great mass of the people, centre all the associations of religious thought, all its yearnings for pardon and peace. His crucifixion touches all sympathy. He is offered up for sin. He is the Mediator. He is the perfect man. His courage of self-sacrifice enlarges the imagination. He gives of life and thought in full overrunning measure, and what he gives he counsels others to give in a like absoluteness of spirit. He gives new currency to the old saying—to love one's neighbour as oneself. He cares for children, for the weak, the fallen, and the unhappy. He is the fulfiller of the promise of the ages, the "servant" of the prophets, who is led to the slaughter, that the people may find a new freedom under a new spiritual rule of righteousness and mercy. He instituted baptism, a mystic birth, the uprising of a purified spirit within the man, the ceremony of admission to the assembly. As a perpetual remembrance of him, he instituted the thanksgiving feast of the last supper, in which many thoughts come together, thoughts of the shared sacrifice, of a brotherhood, of a perpetual presence, and of the refreshment of the soul. In him is solved the mystery of the relation of man to God, man made perfect, God now more clearly understood as Father. He is of the same being

(*ousia*), the same ideal reality, with God. He is the Son. He dominates religious thought, as the holy babe, pure and born of the pure, as the Messiah, as the Mediator, as the sacrifice, as the counsellor, as the ideal, as "the Lord."

All this he became, as religious thought and feeling grew round him, as the central figure, and found in him a new unity and an enlarged sympathy.

There is also another conception, which is formative and administrative, and is vital to Christian thought. The Spirit (*pneuma*) proceeding from Father and Son and of their being is the mover of souls, and thus the spiritual architect of the Church. The "baptism of the Holy Spirit (*pneuma*)" (*Acts* i. 5, ii. 2) fires the apostolate. This is felt as a new power. Christ leaves behind Him assemblies larger or smaller, as may be. "Where two or three are gathered together there am I in the midst of you." There indeed is the church or assembly, a part of the greater assembly which is conceived as a general or universal church. The analogies, especially in Pauline thought, are many. Christ is the head: the Church is the body. Where the assembly is there Christ presides. He is not present to the eye, but 'in the spirit.' Some one actually presides, sits in his seat, and

physically takes his place. The assembly has no laws. It has members and they have functions. The function is shown again 'in the spirit'—to teach, to minister, to exhort, to have faith, to prophesy, to give, to heal and to work wonders. These and other functions are gifts, gifts of goodwill or graciousness (*charismata*), or functions of service, or aptitudes forthcoming according to the needs of the times; and the assembly of Christ is 'in the spirit,' a spiritual body operating through the use of 'gifts.' The progressiveness and adaptability of such an association is obvious. The apostles, the prophets, and teachers have sustenance out of the contributions of the members of the assembly. Teaching according to their several gifts is their 'sole vocation.' The president teacher who excels by his gifts and presides at the assembly becomes the bishop. As the earlier order changes he takes the place of the apostles and prophets. He represents the Christ. Afterwards, by degrees, the elder men, as presbyters or priests, become president teachers of yet other assemblies, but under the bishop. They subsequently take over the duties of the stewardship of the means of the assembly, which with the duties of management and teaching were the bishop's duties before. The gifts of the assembly are made to

Christ. In his place he receives them for his body, the assembly, the Church. All is for use. Property in these earlier days is sold for immediate purposes. The assembly meets in private houses, from which the form of the later church edifice is taken; it has no specially built churches or places of assembly (cf. *The Church and its Organisation in Primitive and Catholic Times, an Interpretation of Rudolph Sohm's Kirchenrecht*, by Walter Lowrie, p. 147, etc.).

The Church or Assembly is regulated by apostolic settlement, by a heritage of custom, by the practice prevailing in other assemblies, and by practices that are admissible in the humility or subjection which underlies the whole principle of order and the necessary tolerance of conscientious membership.

Thus Christianity implies, or should imply, a power of growth and adaptation 'in the spirit.' On the one hand use and customary forms, on the other hand freshness and spontaneity of thought, the gifts (*charismata*) which are possessed by members who can fulfil functions. But above the *charismata*, the spiritual gifts, there is "the more excellent way" of love or charity (*agapē, caritas*), the compound mood of goodness, complete in the largeness of its

sympathy, in the insight of its discernment, and the infinity of its nature. This is the disciplined and habitual mood of charity as experienced and preached by St. Paul.

In another way Christianity touched the heart of the people. The old more widely spread religions were all or many of them centred round the thought of a resurrection, from darkness to light, from winter to spring, from a dying or sleeping to an awakening. Christ in Christianity suffers both death and resurrection. The resurrection is cosmic. The Christ passes into hell to release the souls of the dead; and he passes from earth to heaven. All the universe is thus in thought brought under one spiritual rule and purgation. But individually the same thought has its inward working. A sharp, too sharp, distinction is made between body and soul. The body is treated as being relatively a kind of grave of the soul. Out of it in goodness of life rises the soul within, which awaits, in goodness and sober living, a yet further resurrection to heaven, to a world of souls.

The language in which the religion is preached is Greek, the world language of the day. There is at the service of the more educated who study Christianity or become Christians a great reli-

gious and philosophic literature. Christ may have spoken Greek. The Greek and then the Latin words pass into religious thought. *Sötër* Saviour or Preserver, in earlier pre-Christian prayers, becomes Salvator and Saviour in the Christian service. Salvation is a state of well-being, of safety or security of the soul; the state of being *salvus*. The virtues of Plato become the cardinal virtues of the Christian moral theory. When at the end of the Confession the worshippers say that they would lead a "godly, righteous and sober life," they would perhaps better understand the history of the words which they used, if instead they said the words "godlike, just and temperate life," words not so satisfying to the ear as to the mind, but more suggestive of the origin from which have sprung the thoughts that lie within them.

In the struggle for a better kind of life the change is great. The moral demand of religion is newly met. The God of the Christians is the "Jehovah," the Jahveh of the Jews. The substantial and well-established morality of the Jews stands behind and strengthens the whole movement. The credo does not impose it; but the commandments are repeated, or some vow is made—if we may judge from the passage

in Pliny's letter to Trajan (xevi). In Bithynia and Pontica, where Pliny was propractor (103-5 A.D.), it would seem that the Christians met before daybreak, and in turn one with another, in a set form of words, said a chant to Christ, just as to God, and by solemn affirmation bound themselves, not for any criminal purpose, but in order that they might not commit theft or robbery, or adultery, or break their word, or when called upon deny what had been entrusted to them. And later in the day they met again to take food, simple food taken by all without distinction. How far the solemn obligation (*sacramentum*) went we may, as thought developed, judge perhaps from the *Didaskalia* (ch. iii.).¹ In that book there is a kind of conversation, as of Apostles sitting in council, and each of them takes up the word in turn.

"Matthew said: All those things that thou dost not wish to happen to thee, do thou not also to others. That therefore which thou hatest, that shalt thou not do to others. O our brother Peter, tell thou the doctrine of these words.

"Peter said: Thou shalt not kill. Thou

¹ *Didaskalia Apostolorum*: Gibson, trans. from Syriac, probably in its present form the first half of the third century A.D.

shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not commit fornication. Thou shalt not corrupt boys. Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not be a soothsayer. Thou shalt not use enchantments. Thou shalt not kill a child at its birth, not after he is born shalt thou kill him. Thou shalt not covet what belongs to thy neighbour. Thou shalt not transgress oaths. Thou shalt not bear false witness. Thou shalt not say anything wickedly. Thou shalt not keep anger in thy heart. Thou shalt not be double-minded, nor double-tongued, for doubleness of tongue is the snare of death. Thy word shall not be vain nor false. Thou shalt not be avaricious or rapacious. Thou shalt not be a respecter of persons, nor shalt thou receive evil about thy neighbour; neither shalt thou hate anyone, but thou shalt reprove some, and have compassion on others, pray for some, and love others more than thyself."

So the religious demand for a higher morality was met with a discipline not yet turned to professional asceticism, and a charismatic unity not yet turned to legality and institutionalism. Legalism is a protection when faith tends to fail. Yet like heavy armour it impedes and may incapacitate the life it protects.

In practice by degrees a great change came.

The judgment day of St. Matthew's Gospel is a judgment day in which the tests of life are charity and almsdeeds. With these are associated the horror of eternal fire or the hope of eternal life. Like other religions, but with at the outset a greater simplicity, Christianity would use an after-world to weight the balances left amiss in this. But it is noteworthy that in this religion too the right and the wrong of life are tested by acts of individual charity.

The suggestion indeed goes further. Religious thought finds the Christ in the poor man who is in want or distress. The conception of Christ as poor is associated with the conception of human suffering at large. All poverty, in which help is sought, becomes Christly. In the fervent idealism of religion a spiritual transformation takes place. The Christ is materialized into the claimant petitioner for help. The petitioner is spiritualized into a claimant Christ. The process is not reasoned: it is felt. In the ardour of the thought, the heart is set on fire; and so the first step is gained—to feel it as a paramount duty, as a hot and inspiring affection, to love one's neighbour. The ways and the means may still remain to be sought. The promptings and a heightened motive have been given. But, as in

St. Francis's Canticle (iii.), something, it may be shown, may yet be wanting—the “order” which gives to all things their purpose and value. So to him the Christ says:

Ordina questo amore tu che m'ami:

Non è vertu senz' ordine trovata. . . .

A me amore voglio che tu chiami

La caritate, quale sia ordinata.

But doctrinally the conception went further still. Everywhere are there rudiments of charity (*caritas*: St. Augustine, *Homilies on the First Epistle of St. John*, trans. Parker, 1849: v. 7; vi. 1; ix. 1). It is in the dumb and irrational animals, and in the love we owe to our brother, a love that is not weak and morbid, but strong, and if need be disciplinary. “More accepted is the blow of charity than the almsgiving of pride” (viii. 9). “Here then hath this charity its beginning: to give of one's superfluities to him that hath need, to him that is in any distress; of one's temporal abundance to deliver his brother from temporal tribulation. Here is the first rise of charity.” This is the test of the religious life. Participation in service and ceremonial of itself is no sufficient test. Only “they that have charity are born of God; they that have it not, are not born of God.” “God prepareth us to be inhabited by charity” (ii. 8).

And "charity is God," St. Augustine writes, converting the sentence "God is love" (viri. 4, 6); and he pleads for the acceptance of the Trinity, as a Trinity whose being is Love. It is as though the sequence of thought from the first step of the ladder—"Love their neighbour," led by a process of religious analogy to the highest step, where the being, the *ousia*, of God was found to be not merely unqualified existence, but being quite absolutely qualified and conceived as "perfect love."

This thought may indeed be considered to be the saving element in Christianity. When intellectual degradation and coldness of feeling have crept into religion, and formalism has mastered it, this thought has again and again suggested the way of escape. "Let them all sign themselves with the cross of Christ; let them all respond Amen; let them all sing Alleluia" (v. 7), ultimately the question is: Whom do we serve? And the answer is "Love. Where that leads, we follow."

So in the same spirit as that of St. Augustine, St. Bernard (Epistle xi., *Opera omnia*, 1719) said that the persons of the Trinity were one and united by the unstained (immaculate) law of God—charity (*caritas*). Deus caritas est. Dicitur ergo recte caritas, et Deus et Dei donum.

Itaque caritas dat caritatem, substantia accidentalem. 'God is charity. Therefore rightly is He called charity, both God and God's gift. So charity gives charity: the 'substance' produces the 'accident,' the being the act.

On the material side there is the same continuity of thought. What am I bound to give? "My superfluity." And what is superfluity? This became a problem of casuistry. St. Thomas Aquinas explains his view (p. 257). It implies the use of large funds held privately, but for the general good. It implies that charity is our adjuster of social needs, that it may have large aims, and, besides meeting individual claims, may assume the characteristics of what in Roman thought was called liberality; and we find indeed in "charity" in mediaeval times this larger construction (p. 250).

The administrative basis of Christianity was the assembly, the gifts of grace (*charismata*), a fellowship (*koinōnia*), gifts made for the aid of the assemblies or churches, and love (*agapē*, *caritas*). In this is the beginning of that change which for a long time made the provision of the poor the object of religion, so far as social and political institutions, the tribe, for instance, or the manor did not meet the need. Though the task in detail and somewhat

in purpose be different now, love or charity in fact remains an essential part of Christianity. It cannot be alienated from Christianity and leave Christianity Christian. Christianity no doubt has by accretion assumed very many growths of human feeling and knowledge within that wide range which stretches from folklore to philosophy; and in every complex of thought each one takes his share and simplifies what is complex according to his own mind and capacity. But to omit from religion love or charity, which both in consciousness and in action is the master thought of the whole, is to make void, in a most real sense, Christianity itself.

Not only within Christianity, however, but also outside it, there is, as the development of human thought makes clear, a like charity, the mood of an enlightened and illuminated goodness, moved by sympathy with sorrow and distress, seeking ever to express itself in the fulfilment of duty and the endeavours of love. To use the Pauline phrase, "God shewed it unto" others also.

CHAPTER XVI.

JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN CHARITY AND THEIR FUSION.

WITH Christianity, as we have seen, two elements come into fusion, the Jewish and the Greco-Roman. To trace this fusion and its results it is necessary to describe the Jewish system of charity, and to compare it with that of the early Christian church, to note the theory of love or friendship in Aristotle as representing Greek thought, and of charity in St. Paul as representing Christian thought, and to mark the Roman influences which moulded the administration of Ambrose and Gregory and Western Christianity generally.

In the early history of the Hebrews we find the family, clan-family, and tribe. With the Exodus (probably about 1390 B.C.) comes the law of Moses (cf. Kittle, *Hist. of the Hebrews*, Eng. trans. i. 244), the central and permanent element of Jewish thought. We may compare

it to the 'commandments' of Hesiod. There is the recognition of the family and its obligations: "Honour thy father and mother"; and honour included help and support. There is also the law essential to family unity: "Thou shalt not commit adultery"; and as to property there is imposed the regulation of desire: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house." Maimonides (A.D. 1135), true to the old conception of the family (x. 16), calls the support of adult children, "after one is exempt from supporting them," and the support of a father or mother by a child, "great acts of charity; since kindred are entitled to the first consideration." To relief of the stranger the Decalogue makes no reference, but in the Hebraic laws it is constantly pressed; and the Levitical law (xix. 18) goes further. It first applies a new standard to social life: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." This thought is the outcome of a deep ethical fervour—the element which the Jews brought into the good life. In Judges and Joshua, the 'Homeric' books of the Old Testament, the Hebrews appear as a passionately fierce and cruel people. Subsequently against their oppression of the poor the prophets protested with a vehemence as great as the evil was intense; and their denun-

ciations remained part of the national literature, a standing argument that life without charity is nothing worth. Thus schooled, and afterwards tutored into discipline by the tribulation of the exile (587 B.C.), they turned their fierceness into a zeal which, as their literature shows, was as fervent in ethics as it was in religion and ceremonial. In the services at the synagogues, which supplemented and afterwards took the place of the Temple, the Commandments were constantly repeated, and the Law and the Prophets read; and as the Jews of the Dispersion increased in number, and especially after the destruction of Jerusalem, the synagogues became centres of social and charitable co-operation. Thus rightly would a Jewish Rabbi say, "On three things the world is stayed: on the Torah (or the law), and on worship, and on the bestowal of kindness." Also there was on the charitable side an indefinite power of expansion. Rigid in its ceremonial, there it was free. Within the nation, as the Prophets, and after the exile, as the Psalms show, there was the hope of a universal religion, and with it of a universally recognized charity. St. Paul accentuated the prohibitive side of the law and protested against it; but, even while he was so doing, stimulated by the Jewish

discipline, he was moving unfettered towards new conceptions of charity and life—charity as the central word of the Christian life, and life as a participation in a higher existence—the ‘body of Christ.’

To mark the line of development, we would compare the family among the Jews and in the early Christian Church; and then note the sources of relief and the tithe, the treatment of the poor and their aid, and the assistance of special classes of poor; the care of strangers; and, lastly, we would consider the theory of alms-giving; friendship or love, and charity.

As elsewhere, property is the basis of the family. Wife and children are the property of the father. But the wife is held in high respect. In the post-exilian period the virtuous wife is represented as laborious as a Roman matron, a ‘lady bountiful’ to the poor, and to her husband wife and friend alike. Monogamy without concubinage is now the rule—is taken for granted as right. There is no ‘exposure of children.’ The slaves are kindly treated, as servants rather than slaves—though in Roman times the Jews were great slave-traders. The household is not allowed to eat the bread of idleness. “Six days,” it was said, “*must* [not *mayest*] thou work.” “Labour, if poor;

but find work, if rich.” “Whoever does not teach his son business or work, teaches him robbery.” In Job xxxi., a chapter which has been called “an inventory of late Old Testament morality,” we find the family life developed side by side with the life of charity. In turn are mentioned the relief of the widow, the fatherless, and the stranger—the classification of dependents in the Christian Church; and the whole chapter is a justification of the homely charities of a good family. “The Jewish religion, more especially in the old and orthodox form, is essentially a family religion” (C. G. Montefiore, *Religion of Ancient Hebrews*).

In the early documents of the Church the fifth commandment is made the basis of family life (cf. Eph. vi. 1; *Apostolical Constitutions*, ii. 32, iv. 11—if we take the first six books of the *Apost. Const.* as a composite production before A.D. 300, representing Judæo-Christian or Eastern Church thought). But two points are prominent. Duties are insisted on as reciprocal (cf. especially St. Paul’s Epistles), as, for instance, between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant. Charity is mutual; the family is a circle of reciprocal duties and charities. This implies a principle of the greatest importance in relation to the social utility of charity.

Further reference will be made to it later. Next the "thou shalt love thy neighbour" is translated from its position as one amongst many sayings to the chief place as a rule of life. In the *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* (Jewish-Christian, early first century A.D.) the first commandment in 'the way of life' is adapted from St. Matthew's Gospel thus: "First, thou shalt love God who made thee; secondly, thy neighbour as thyself; and all things whatsoever thou wouldst not have done to thee, neither do thou to another." A principle is thus applied which touches all social relations in which the 'self' can be made the standard of judgment. Of this also later. To touch on other points of comparison: the earlier documents seem to ring with a reiterated cry for a purer family life (cf. the second, the negative, group of commandments in the *Teaching*, and the judgment of the apocalyptic writings, such as the Revelations of Peter, etc.); and sharing the Jewish feeling, the riper conscience of the Christian community formulates and accepts the injunction to preserve infant life at every stage. It advocates, indeed, the Jewish purity of family life with a missionary fervour, and it makes of it a condition of church membership. The Jewish rule of labour is enforced (*Ap.*

Const. ii. 63). If a stranger settle (*Teaching*, xii. 3) among the brotherhood, "let him work and eat." And the father (*Constit.* iv. 11) is to teach the children "such trades as are agreeable and suitable to their need." And the charities to the widow and the fatherless, are organized on Jewish lines.

The sources of relief among the Jews were the three gifts of corn: (1) the corners of the field (cf. Lev. xix. etc.), amounting to a sixtieth part of it; (2) the gleanings, a definite minimum dropped in the process of reaping (Maimonides, *Laws of the Hebrews relating to the Poor*, iv. 1); (3) corn overlooked and left behind. So it was with the grapes and with all crops that were harvested, as opposed, *e.g.* to figs, that were gathered from time to time. These gifts were divisible three times in the day, so as to suit the convenience of the poor (Maim. ii. 17), and the poor had a right to them. They are indeed a poor-rate paid in kind such as in early times would naturally spring up among an agricultural people.

Another gift 'out of the seed of the earth' is the tithe. In the post-exilian period the septenniad was in force. Each year a fiftieth part of the produce (Maim. vi. 2, and Deut. xviii. 4) was given to the priests, the class

which in the Jewish state was supported by the community. Of the remainder one-tenth went to the Levite, and one-tenth in three years of the septennium was retained for pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and in two of it was given to the poor. In the seventh year 'all things were in common.'

Supplementing these gifts were alms to all who asked: "and he who gave less than a tenth of his means was a man of evil eye" (Maim. vii. 5). All were to give alms, even the poor themselves who were in receipt of relief. Refusal might be punished with stripes at the hand of the Sanhedrim. At the Temple alms for distribution to the worthy poor were placed by worshippers in the cell of silence; and it is said that in Palestine at meal times the table was open to all comers.

As the synagogues extended, and possibly after the fall of Jerusalem (A.D. 70), the collection of alms was further systematized. There were two collections. In each city alms of the box or chest (*kupha*) were collected for the poor of the city on each Sabbath eve (later, monthly or thrice a year) and distributed in money or food for seven days. Two collected, three distributed. Three others gathered and distributed daily alms of the basket (*tamchui*). These were for strangers and wayfarers—casual

relief 'for the poor of the whole world.' In the Jewish synagogue community from early times the president (*parnass*) and treasurer were elected annually with seven heads of the congregation (see Abraham's *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, p. 54), and sometimes special officers for the care of the poor. A staff of almoners was thus forthcoming. In addition to these collections were the *pruta* given to the poor before prayers (Maim. x. 15), and moneys gathered to help particular cases (cf. *Jewish Life*, p. 322) by circular letter. There were also gifts at marriages and funerals; and fines imposed for breach of the communal ordinances were reserved for the poor. The distinctive feature of the Jewish charity was the belief that 'the poor would not cease out of the land,' and that therefore on charitable grounds a permanent provision should be made for them—a poor-rate, in fact, subject to stripes and distraint, if necessary. (Maim. vii. 10, and generally articles on 'Alms' and 'Charity' in the *Jewish Encyclopaedia*.)

If we compare this system with that of the early Church we find the following sources of relief: (1) The Eucharistic offerings, some consumed at the time, some carried home, some reserved for the absent (see Hatch, *Early Church*,

p. 40). The ministration, like the Eucharist, was connected with the love feast, and was at first daily (Acts ii. 42, vi. 1, and the *Teaching*). (2) Freewill offerings and first fruits and voluntary tithes (*Ap. Con.* ii. 25) brought to the bishop and used for the poor—orphans, widows, the afflicted and strangers in distress, and for the clergy, deaconesses, etc. (3) Collections in churches on Sundays and week-days, alms-boxes, and gifts to the poor by worshippers as they entered church; also collections for special purposes, as, for instance, for Christians at Jerusalem. Apart from 'the corners,' etc., the sources of relief in the Christian and Jewish Churches are the same. The separate Jewish tithe for the poor, which (*Maim.* vi. 11, 13) might be used in part by the donor as personal charity, disappears. A voluntary tithe remains, in part used for the poor. We do not hear of stripes and distraint, but in both bodies there is a penitential system and excommunication (cf. *Jewish Life*, p. 52), and in both a settlement of disputes within the body (*Clem. Hom.* iii. 67). In both, too, there is the abundant alms provided in the belief of the permanence of poverty and the duty of giving to all who ask. As to administration in the early Church (Acts vi. 3), we find seven deacons, the number of

the local Jewish council; and later there were in Rome seven ecclesiastical relief districts, each in charge of a deacon. The deacon acted as the minister of the bishop (*Ep. Clem. to Jam.* xii.), reporting to him and giving as he dictated (*Ap. Con.* ii. 30, 31). He at first combined disciplinary powers with charitable. The presbyters also (Polycarp *Ad Phil.* 6 (A.D. 69-155)), forming (Hatch, p. 69) a kind of bishop's council, visited the sick, etc. The bishop was president and treasurer. The bishop was thus the trustee of the poor. By reason of the churches' care of orphans responsibilities of trusteeship also devolved on him. The temples were in pagan times depositories of money. Probably the churches were also.

There must have been many variations in detail. The bishop was the responsible head. He thus himself distributed to everyone who was in want, personally or by the instrumentality of others. All gifts passed through his hands; he was accountable for them; and had to distribute them like a good steward. "God knoweth him that giveth, even when he is not present"; and when the bishop distributed he was to tell the recipients the name of the giver, that they might pray for him by his name (*Didaskalia Apostolorum*, III., xiv).

Great stress is laid by the Jews on the duty of gentleness to the poor (Maim. x. 5). The woman was to have first attention (Maim. vi. 13). If the applicant was hungry he was to be fed, and then examined to learn whether he was a deceiver (Maim. vii. 6). Assistance was to be given according to the want—clothes, household things, even a wife, or a husband—and according to the poor man's station in life. For widows and orphans the 'gleanings' were left. Both are the recognized objects of charity (Maim. x. 16, 17). "The poor and the orphan were to be employed in domestic affairs in preference to servants." The dower was a constant form of help. The ransoming of slaves took precedence of relief to the poor. The highest degree of alms deed (Maim. x. 7) was "to yield support to him who is cast down, either by means of gifts, or by loan, or by commerce, or by procuring for him traffic with others. Thus his hand becometh strengthened, exempt from the necessity of soliciting succour from any created being."

If we compare the Christian methods we find but slight difference. The absoluteness of "Give to him that asketh" is in the *Teaching* checked by the "Woe to him that receives: for if any receives having need, he shall be guiltless, but

he that has no need shall give account, . . . and coming into distress . . . he shall not come out thence till he hath paid the last farthing." It is the duty of the bishop to know who is most worthy of assistance (*Ap. Con.* ii. 3, 4); and "if any one is in want by gluttony, drunkenness, or idleness, he does not deserve assistance, nor is to be esteemed a member of the church." The widow assumes the position not only of a recipient of alms, but a church worker. Some were a private charge, some were maintained by the church. The recognized 'widow' was maintained: she was to be sixty years of age (cf. 1 Tim. v. 9 and *Ap. Con.* iii. 1), and was sometimes tempted to become a bedeswoman and gossiping pauper, if one may judge from the texts. Remarriage was not approved. Orphans were provided for by members of the churches. The virgins formed another class, as, contrary to the earlier feeling, marriage came to be held a state of lesser sanctity. They too seem to have been also, in part at least, church workers. Thus round the churches grew up new groups of recognized dependents; but the older theory of charity was broad and practical—akin to that of Maimonides. "Love all your brethren, performing to orphans the part of parents, to widows that of husbands, affording them sus-

tenance with all kindliness, arranging marriages for those who are in their prime, and for those who are without a profession the means of necessary support through employment: giving work to the artificer and alms to the incapable" (*Ep. Clem. to James*, viii.).

The Jews in pre-Christian and Talmudic times supported the stranger or wayfarer by the distribution of food (*tamchui*), and strangers were lodged in private houses; and there were inns provided at which no money was taken (cf. *Jewish Life*, p. 314). Subsequently, besides these methods, special societies were formed "for the entertainment of the resident poor and of strangers." There were commendatory letters also. These conditions prevailed in the Christian Church also. The *Xenodocheion*, coming by direct succession alike from Jewish and Greek precedents, was the first form of Christian hospital both for strangers and for members of the Christian Churches. In the Christian community the endowed charity comes into existence in the fourth century, among the Jews not till the thirteenth. The charities of the synagogue without separate societies sufficed.

CHAPTER XVII.

GREEK THOUGHT ON CHARITY COMPARED WITH JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN.

WE may now compare the conceptions of Jews and Christians on charity with those of the Greeks. There are two chief exponents of the diverse views—Aristotle and St. Paul; for to simplify the issues we refer to them only. Thoughts such as Aristotle's recast by the Stoic Panaetius (185-112 B.C.), and used by Cicero in his *de Officiis*, became in the hands of St. Ambrose arguments for the direction of the clergy in the founding of the mediaeval Church; and in the thirteenth century Aristotle reasserts his influence through such leaders of mediaeval thought as St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Paul's chapters on charity, though not fully appreciated and understood, one is inclined to think, have perhaps, more than any other words, prevented an absolute lapse into the materialism of almsgiving. After him we think of St. Francis, the greatest

of a group of men who, seeking reality in life, revived charity; but to the theory of charity it might almost be said that since Aristotle and St. Paul nothing has been added until we come to the economic and moral issues which Dr. Chalmers explained and illustrated.

The problem turns on the conception (1) of purpose, (2) of the self, and (3) of charity, love, or friendship as an active force in social life. To the Greek, or at least to Greek philosophic thought, purpose was the measure of goodness. To have no purpose was, so far as the particular act was concerned, to be simply irrational; and the less definite the purpose the more irrational the act. This conception of purpose was the touchstone of family and social life, and of the civic life also. In no sphere could goodness be irrational. To say that it was without purpose was to say that it was without reality. So far as the actor was concerned, the main purpose of right action was the good of the soul (*psychê*); and by the soul was meant the better self, 'the ruling part' acting in harmony with every faculty and function of the man. With faculties constantly trained and developed, a higher life was gradually developed in the soul. We are thus, it might be said, what we become. The gates of the higher life are within

us. The issue is whether we will open them and pass in.

Consistent with this is the social purpose. Love or friendship is not conceived by Aristotle except in relation to social life. Society is based on an interchange of services. This interchange in one series of acts we call justice; in another friendship or love. A man cannot be just unless he has acquired a certain character or habit of mind; and hence no just man will act without knowledge, previous deliberation, and definite purpose. So also will a friend fulfil these conditions in his acts of love or friendship. In the love existing between good men there is continuance and equality of service; but in the case of benefactor and benefited, in deeds of charity, in fact, there is no such equality. The satisfaction is on one side, the donor's; but often not on the other, the recipient's. The dilemma is one that is pressed, though not satisfactorily; in Cicero and Seneca. The reason for this will be found, Aristotle suggests, in the feeling of satisfaction which men experience in action. We realize ourselves in our deeds—throw ourselves into them, as people say; and this is happiness. What we make we like: it is part of us. On the other hand, in the person benefited there may be

no corresponding action, and in so far as there is not, there is no exchange of service or the contentment that arises from it. The 'self' of the recipient is not drawn out. On the contrary, he may be made worse, and feel the uneasiness and discontent that result from this. In truth, to complete Aristotle's argument, the good deed on one side, as it represents the best self of the benefactor, should on the other side draw out the best self of the person benefited. And where there is not ultimately this result, there is no effective friendship or charity, and consequently there is no personal or social satisfaction.

The point may be pushed somewhat further. In recent developments of charitable work the term 'friendly visitor' is applied to persons who endeavour to help families in distress on the lines of associated charity. It represents the work of charity in one definite light. So far as the relation is mutual, it cannot at the outset be said to exist. The charitable friend wishes to befriend another; but at first there may be no reciprocal feeling of friendship on the other's part—indeed, such a feeling may never be created. The effort to reciprocate kindness by becoming what the friend desires may be too painful to make. Or the two may be on

different planes, one not really befriending, but giving without intelligence, the other not really endeavouring to change his nature, but receiving help solely with a view to immediate advantage. The would-be befriender may begin 'despairing of no man,' expecting nothing in return; but if, in fact, there is never any kind of return, the friendship actually fails of its purpose, and the 'friend's' satisfaction is lost, except in that he may 'have loved much.' In any case, according to this theory, friendship, love, and charity represent the mood from which spring social acts, the value of which will depend on the knowledge, deliberation, and purpose with which they are done; and only as they acquire value on this account will they give lasting satisfaction to both parties.

St. Paul's position is different. He seems at first sight to ignore the state and social life. He lays stress on motive rather than on purpose. He speaks as an outsider to the state, though technically a citizen. His mind assumes towards it the external Judaic position, as though he belonged to a society of settlers (*paroikoi*). Also, as he expects the millennium, social life and its needs are not uppermost in his thoughts. He considers charity in relation to a community of fellow-believers—drawn together

in congregations. His theory springs from this social base, though it over-arches life itself. He is intent on creating a spiritual association. He conceives of the spirit (*pneuma*) as 'an immaterial personality.' It transcends the soul (*psychē*), and is the Christ life, the ideal and spiritual life. Christians participate in it, and they thus become part of 'the body of Christ,' which exists by virtue of love—love akin to the ideal life, *agapē*. The word represents the love that is instinct with reverence, and not love (*philia*) which may have in it some quality of passion. This love is the life of 'the body of Christ.' Therefore no act done without it is a living act—but, on the contrary, must be dead—an act in which no part of the ideal life is blended. On the individual act or the purpose no stress is laid. It is assumed that love, because it is of this intense and exalted type, will find the true purpose in the particular act. And, when the expectation of the millennium passed away, the theory of this ideal charity remained as a motive force available for whatever new conditions, spiritual or social, might arise.

Nevertheless, no sooner does this charity touch social conditions, than the necessity asserts itself of submitting to the limitations which

knowledge, deliberation, and purpose impose. This view has been depreciated or ignored by Christians, who have been content to rely upon the strength of their motives, or perhaps have not realized what the Greeks understood, that society was a natural organism (Arist. *Pol.* 1253A), which develops, fails, or prospers in accordance with definite laws. Hence endless failure in spite of some success. For love, whether we idealize it as *agapē* or consider it a social instinct as *philia*, cannot be love at all, unless it quickens the intelligence as much as it animates the will. It cannot, except by some confusion of thought, be held to justify the indulgence of emotion irrespective of moral and social results. Yet though this fatal error may have dominated thought for a long time, it is hardly possible to attribute it to St. Paul's theory of charity, when the very practical nature of Judaism and early Christianity is considered. In his view the misunderstanding could not arise. And to create a world or 'body' of men and women linked together by love, even though it be outside the normal life of the community, was to create a new form of religious organization, and to achieve for it (so far as it was achieved) what, *mutatis mutandis*, Aristotle held to be the indispensable condition of social

life, friendship (*philia*), "the greatest good of states," for "Socrates and all the world declare," he wrote, that "the unity of the state" is "created by friendship" (Arist. *Pol.* ii. 1262 B).

It should, however, be considered to what extent charity in the Christian Church was devoid of social purpose. The Jewish conceptions of charity passed, one might almost say, in their completeness into the Christian Church. Prayer, the petition and the purging of the mind, fasting, the humiliation of the body, and alms, as part of the same discipline, the submissive renunciation of possessions—all these formed part of the discipline that was to create the religious mood. Alms henceforth become a definite part of the religious discipline and service. Humility and poverty hereafter appear as yoked virtues, and many problems of charity are raised in regard to them. The non-Christian no less than the Christian world appreciated more and more the need of self-discipline (*askēsis*); and it seems as though in the first two centuries A.D. those who may have thought of reinvigorating society searched for the remedy, rather in the preaching and practice of temperance, than in the application of ideas that were the outcome of the observation of social or economic conditions. Having no object of this

kind as its mark, almsgiving took the place of charity; and, as Christianity triumphed, family life, instead of taking the first rank in religious social thought, fell into the background, while the virtues of the discipline of the body, considered apart from social life, became an end in themselves, and it was desired rather to annihilate instinct than to control it. Possibly this was a necessary phase in a movement of progress, but however that be, charity, as St. Paul understood it, had in it no part.

But the evil went farther. Jewish religious philosophy is not elaborated as a consistent whole by any one writer. It is rather a miscellany of maxims; and again and again, as in much religious thought, side issues assume the principal place. The direct effect of the charitable act, or almsgiving, is ignored. Many thoughts and motives are blended. The Jews spoke of the poor as the means of the rich man's salvation. St. Chrysostom emphasizes this: "If there were no poor, the greater part of your sins would not be removed: they are the healers of your wounds" (*Hom.* xiv., Timothy, etc.: St. Cyprian on Works and Alms). Alms are the medicine of sin. And the same thought is worked into the penitential system. Augustine speaks of "penance such as fasting, alms-

giving, and prayer for breaches of the Decalogue" (Reichel, *Manual of Canon Law*, ii. p. 23); and many other references might be cited. "Pecuniary penances (*Ib.* 154), . . . in so far as they were relaxations of or substitutes for bodily penances, were permitted because of the greater good thereby accruing to others—and in this case they were—A.D. 1284—legally enforceable under English statute law." The penitential system takes for granted that the almsgiving is good for others, associates with it advantage or reward in assisting others, and puts a premium on it, even though in fact it were done, not with any definite charitable object, but only for the good of the penitent himself. Thus almsgiving becomes detached from charity on the one side and from social good on the other. Still further is it vulgarized by another confusion of thought. It is considered that the alms are paid to the credit of the giver, and are realized as such by him in the after world; or even that by alms present prosperity may be obtained, or at least evil accident avoided. Thus motives were blended, as indeed they now are, with the result that the gift assumed a greater importance than the charity, by which alone the gift should have been sanctified, and its actual effect was habitually overlooked or treated as only partially relevant.

The Christian maxim of "loving (*agapē*) one's neighbour as one's self" sets a standard of charity. Its relations are idealized according as the 'self' is understood; and thus the good self becomes the measure of charity. In this sense, the nobler the self the completer the charity; and the charity of the best men, men who love and understand their neighbours best, having regard to their chief good, is the best, the most effectual charity. Further, if in what we consider 'best' we give but a lesser place to social purpose, or even allow it no place at all, our 'self' will have no sufficient social aim and our charity little or no social result. For this 'self,' however, religion has substituted, not St. Paul's conception of the spirit (*pneuma*), but a soul, conceived as endowed with a substantial nature, able to enjoy and suffer quasi-material rewards and punishments in the after-life; and in so far as the safeguard of this soul by good deeds or almsgiving has become a paramount object, the purpose of charitable action has been translated from the actual world to another sphere. Thus, as we have seen, the aid of the poor has been considered not an object in itself, but as a means by which the almsgiver effects his own ulterior purpose and 'makes God his debtor.'

The problem thus handled raises the question of reward and also of punishment. Properly, from the point of view of charity, both are excluded. We may indeed act from a complexity of motives and expect a complexity of rewards, and undoubtedly a good act does refresh the 'self,' and may as a result, though not as a reward, win approval. But in reality reward, if the word be used at all, is according to purpose; and the only reward of a deed lies in the fulfilment of its purpose. In the theory of almsgiving which we are discussing, however, act and reward are on different planes. The reward is on that of a future life; the act relates to a distressed person here and now. The interest in the act on the doer's part lies in its post-mortal consequences to himself, and not either wholly or chiefly in the act itself. Nor, as the interest ends with the act—the giving—can the intelligence be quickened by it. The questions "How? by whom? with what object? on what plan? with what result?" receive no detailed consideration at all. Two consequences follow. In so far as it is thus practised, almsgiving is out of sympathy with social progress. It is indeed alien to it. Next also the self-contained, self-sustained poverty that will have no relief and does without it, is

outside the range of its thought and understanding. On the other hand, this almsgiving is equally incapable of influencing the weak and the vicious; and those who are suffering from illness or trouble it has not the width of vision to understand nor the moral energy to assist, so that they shall not fall out of the ranks of the self-supporting. It believes that 'the poor' will not cease out of the land. And, indeed, however great might be the economic progress of the people, it is not likely that the poor will cease, if the alms given in this spirit be large enough in amount to affect social conditions seriously one way or the other. When we measure the effects of charity, this inheritance of divided thought and inconsistent counsels must be given its full weight.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PARISH.

THE sub-apostolic church was a congregation like a synagogue, the centre of a system of voluntary and personal relief, connected with the congregational meals (or *agapai*) and the Eucharist, and under the supervision of a presiding officer, apostle, prophet, or teacher, who presided at the assembly in the place of the Christ. Out of this was developed a system of relief controlled by a bishop, who was assisted chiefly by deacons or presbyters, while the *agapai*, consisting of offerings laid before the altar, still remained in force. Subsequently the meal was separated from the sacrament, and became a dole of food, or poor people's meal—for instance, in St. Augustine's time in Western Africa—and it was not allowed to be served in churches (A.D. 391). As religious asceticism became dominant, the sacrament was taken fasting; it appeared unseemly that men and women should meet together for such

purposes, and the *agapai* fell out of repute. Simultaneously it would seem that the parish (*paroichia*) became from a congregational settlement a geographical area.

The organization of relief at Rome illustrates both a type of administration and a transition. St. Gregory's reforms (A.D. 590) largely developed it. The first factor in the transition was the church fund of the second period of Christianity (Tertullian, about 150 to after 208 A.D., *Apol.* 39). It served as a friendly fund, was supported by voluntary gifts, and was used to succour and to bury the poor, to help destitute and orphaned children, old household slaves, and those who suffered for the faith. This fund is quite different from the *collegia tenuiorum* or *funeraticæ* of the Romans, which were societies to which the members paid stipulated sums at stated periods for funeral benefits or for common meals (Waltzing, *Corps. Professionelles chez les Romains*, i. 313). It represents the charitable centre round which the parochial system developed. That system was adopted probably about the middle of the third century, but in Rome the diaconate probably remained centralized. At the end of the fourth century Pope Anastasius had founded deaconries in Rome, and endowed

them largely "to meet the frequent demands of the diaconate." Gregory two hundred years later reorganized the system. He divided the fourteen old 'regions' into seven ecclesiastical districts and thirty 'titles' (or parishes). The parishes were under the charge of sixty-six priests; the districts were eleemosynary divisions. Each was placed under the charge of a deacon, not (Greg. *Ep.* xi. and xxviii.) under the priests (*presbyteri titularii*). Over the deacons was an archdeacon. It was the duty of the deacons to care for the poor, widows, orphans, wards, and old people of their several districts. They inquired in regard to those who were relieved, and drew up, under the guidance of the bishop, the register of poor (*matricula*). Only these received regular relief. In each district was an hospital or office for alms, of which the deacon had charge, assisted by a steward (or *æconomus*). Here food was given and meals were taken, the sick and poor were maintained, and orphan or foundling children lodged. The churches of Rome and of other large towns possessed considerable estates, "the patrimony of the patron saints," and to Rome belonged estates in Sicily which had not been ravaged by the invaders, and they continued to pay to it their tenth

of corn, as they had done since Sicily was conquered. Four times a year (Milman, *Lat. Christ.* ii. 117) the shares of the (1) clergy and papal officers, (2) churches and monasteries, and (3) "hospitals, deaconries, and ecclesiastical wards for the poor," were calculated in money and distributed; and the first day in every month St. Gregory distributed to the poor in kind corn, wine, cheese, vegetables, bacon, meal, fish, and oil. The sick and infirm were superintended by persons appointed to inspect every street. Before the pope sat down to his own meal a portion was separated and sent out to the hungry at his door. The Roman *plebs* had thus become the poor of Christ (*pauperes Christi*), and under that title were being fed by *civica annona* and *sportula* as their ancestors had been; and the deaconries had superseded the 'regions' and the 'steps' from which the corn had been distributed. The *hospitium* was now part of a common organization of relief, and the sick were visited according to Jewish and early Christian precedent. How far kindly Romans visited the sick of their day we do not know. Alms and the *annona* were now, it would seem, administered concurrently; and there was a system of poor relief independent of

the churches and their alms, unless these, organized, as in Scottish towns, on the ancient ecclesiastical lines, were paid wholly or in part to a central diaconate fund. Much had changed, but in much Roman thought still prevailed.

On lines similar to these the organization of poor relief in the Middle Ages was developed. In the provinces in the later empire the Senate or *ordo decuriorum* were responsible for the public provisioning of the towns (Fustel de Coulanges, *La Gaule romaine*, p. 251), and no doubt the care of the poor would thus in some measure devolve on them in times of scarcity or distress. On the religious side, on the other hand, the churches would probably be constant centres of almsgiving and relief—and then, further, when the Roman municipal system had decayed, each citizen (as in Charlemagne's time (742-814)) was required to support his own dependents—a step suggestive of much after-history.

The change in sentiment and method in the earlier, as contrasted with the later Christianity, could hardly be more stronger marked than by a comparison of "the *Teaching*" with St. Ambrose's (334-397) "Duties of the Clergy" (*de Officiis Ministrorum*). For the old in-

stinctive obedience to a command there is now an endeavour to find a reasoned basis for charitable action. Pauperism is recognized. "Never was the greed of beggars greater than it is now. . . . They want to empty the purses of the poor, to deprive them of the means of support. Not content with a little, they ask for more. . . . With lies about their lives they ask for further sums of money." "A method in giving is necessary." But in the suggestions made there is little consistency. Liberality is urged as a means of gaining the love of the people; a new and a false issue is thus raised. The relief is neither to be "too freely given to those who are unsuitable, nor too sparingly bestowed upon the needy." Everywhere there is a doctrine of the mean reflected through Cicero's *de Officiis*, the doctrine insufficiently stated, as though it were a mean of quantity, and not that rightly tempered mean which is the harmony of opposing moods. The poor are not to be sent empty away. Those rejected by the Church are not to be left to the 'outer darkness' of an earlier Christianity. They must be supplied if they are in want. The methodic giver is "hard towards none, but is free towards all." Consequently none are refused; and no

account is taken of the regeneration that may spring up in a man from the effort towards self-help which refusal may originate. Thus after all it appears that method means no more than this—to give sometimes more, sometimes less, to all needy people. In the small congregational church of early Christianity, each member of which was admitted on the conditions of strictest discipline, the common alms of the faithful could hardly have done much harm within the body, even though outside they created and kept alive a horde of vagrant alms-seekers and pretenders. Now in this department at least the Church had become the state, and discipline and a close knowledge of one's fellow-Christians no longer safeguarded the alms. From Cicero is borrowed the thought of 'active help,' which "is often grander and more noble than the gift," but the thought is not worked out. On the social side the problem is not understood or even stated; and hence no principle of charity or of charitable administration is brought to light in the investigation. Still there are rudiments of the economics of charity in the praise of Joseph, who made the people *buy* the corn, for otherwise "they would have given up cultivating the soil; for he who has the use of what is

another's often neglects his own." Perhaps, as St. Augustine inspired the theology of the Middle Ages, we may say that St. Ambrose, in the mingled motives, indefiniteness, and kindness of this book, stands for the charity of the Middle Ages, except in so far as the movement which culminated in the brotherhood of St. Francis awakened the intelligence of the world to wider issues.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE INSTITUTION OF THE ENDOWED CHARITY.

IN Constantinople the pauperism of the people seems to have been extreme. The corn supplies of Africa were diverted there in great part when it became the capital of the empire. This must have left to Rome a larger scope for the development of the civic-religious administration of relief. St. Chrysostom's sermons give no impression of the rise of any new administrative force, alike sagacious and dominant. The appeal to give alms is constant, but the positive counsel on charitable work is *nil*. The people had the *annona civica*, and imperial gifts, corn, allowances (*salaria*) from the treasury granted for the poor and needy, and an annual gift of 50 gold pounds (rather more than £1400) for funerals. Besides these there were many institutions, and the begging and the almsgiving at the church doors. "The land could not support the lazy and valiant beggars." There

were public works provided for them; if they refused to work on them they were to be driven away. The sick might visit the capital, but must be registered and sent back (A.D. 382); the sturdy beggar was condemned to slavery. So little did alms effect. And in the East monasticism seems to have produced no firmness of purpose such as led to the organization of the Church and of charitable relief under St. Gregory.

There were, it is said, 50,000 poor in Constantinople, and it was urged by St. Chrysostom that they should become a public charge; and for the economy of means and organization he would have had all claimants fed at some central place. So entirely was Christian thought, just when the 'annona civica' was passing away, reviving that system in another form, that of public alms. It was a counsel of despair, naturally adopted when the standard of social duty had been lowered and society seemed oppressed alike by injustice and by destitution. Though alms had proved to be no remedy there seemed to be no resource but to give more alms, alms taken from the larger funds of the public exchequer and given in larger amounts to larger numbers. For when faith is lost in the natural force and the self-supporting and recuperative

powers of the people living according to the laws of social life, there seems no alternative but relief and ever more relief. That the voluntary aid is called 'alms' and the public relief poor or poor law relief makes no difference.

Apart, however, from the general 'poor' there were some 3,000 women—widows and virgins—some poor and, according to the traditional requirement, over 60—"widows indeed," some workers for the church—and some who had a more questionable right to relief—who were fed from the church funds; and besides these, portions were secured to the prisoners (the prisons were usually under the rule of the Bishop), to the sick, to the people in the hospitia, strangers, casuals, needy infirm poor, the leprous—probably a general term for the diseased and all the unfortunate (*calamatosi*). The 3,000 were entered in a register as in receipt of permanent allowances of food (cf. the *Matricula*: and the 'registered' poor of the eighteenth century in England and Scotland); and the duty of selecting the applicants for admission to this register, St. Chrysostom found a troublesome business (*molestissima occupatio*), for which there was need of the most careful scrutiny, "for it was equally heinous to enter undeserving (*indignas*) women, as to keep off (*expugnare*) deserving ones." These

were considered to have a clear and honourable claim on the Church funds.

The differences between this ecclesiastical almsgiving and the personal charities of the earlier Church are obvious. The system that worked well in the small self-governing 'assemblies' of Jews or Christians, could not be rightly expanded without the adoption of some new principles of administration. An effort was made, and considered in relation to an evidently large administration, it is the sign of a marked advance, to use inquiry and to restrict relief to the 'deserving'; but this by itself, as experience has shown, is not enough. We do not hear of any parochial decentralization. No reference is made, as we moderns would say, to adequate relief.

Another movement of the Byzantine period was the establishment of the endowed charity. The Jewish synagogue long served as a place for the reception of strangers—a religious *xenodocheion*. Probably the strangers referred to in "the *Teaching*" were so entertained. The table of the bishop and a room in his house served as the guest chamber, for which afterwards a separate building was substituted. In the East the Jewish charitable inn first appears, and there took place the earliest extension of institutions. There was probably

a demand for an elaboration of institutions as social changes made themselves felt in the churches. We have seen this in the case of the *agapē*. Similar changes would affect other branches of charitable work. The hospital (*hospitalium*, *xenodocheion*) is defined as a "house of God in which strangers who lack hospitality are received" (*Suicer: Thesaur.*), a house separated from the church; and round the church, out of the primitive *xenodocheion* of early Christian times and the entertainment of strangers at the houses of members of the community, would grow up other similar charities.

In theory the Church held no property. All gifts were made to the Christ, and the Bishop received them on behalf of Christ for the purposes of the Church, and applied them to those purposes. With the establishment of institutions and the building of churches new conditions arose. But nevertheless these buildings were not held by the Church in any corporate capacity, but as the property of Christ. Only slowly in the fourth century was this non-legal tenure superseded by legal enactments (*Löwrie-Sohm, The Church and its Organisation*, p. 317, etc.). In A.D. 321 license was given by Constantine to leave property to the Church. The churches were thus placed in the same

position as pagan temples, and though subsequently Valentinian (A.D. 379) withdrew the permission on account of the shameless legacy-hunting of the clergy, in that period much must have been done to endow Church and charitable institutions.

In the same period grew to its height the passion for monasticism. This affected the parish and the endowed charity alike. Under its influence the deacon as an almoner tends to disappear, except where, as in Rome, there is an elaborate system of relief. Nor does it seem that deaconesses, widows, and virgins continued to occupy their old position as church workers and alms-receivers. Naturally when marriage was considered "in itself an evil, perhaps to be tolerated, but still degrading to human nature," and (A.D. 385) the marriage of the clergy was prohibited, men, except those in charge of parishes, and women would join regular monastic bodies; the deacon, as almoner, would disappear, and the 'widows' and virgins would become nuns. Thus there would grow up a large body of men and women living segregated in institutions, and forming a leisured class able to superintend institutional charities. And now two new officers appear, the *elemosynarius*

or almoner and the *æconomus* or steward (already an assistant treasurer to the bishop), who superintend and distribute the alms and manage the property of the institution. (In the first six books of the *Apostolical Constitutions* A.D. 300 these officers are not mentioned.) In these circumstances the *hospitium* or hospital (*xenön*, *katagögion*) assumes a new character. It becomes in St. Basil's hands (A.D. 330-379) a resort not only for those who "visit it from time to time as they pass by, but also for those who need some treatment in illness." And round St. Basil at Caesarea there springs up a colony of institutions. Four kinds principally are mentioned in the Theodosian code: (1) the guest houses (*xenodocheia*); (2) the poor-houses (*ptöcheia*), where the poor (*mendici*) were housed and maintained. The *ptöcheion* was a general term also applied to all houses for the poor, the aged, orphans, and sick. (3) There were orphanages (*orphanotropheia*) for orphans and wards; and (4) there were houses for infant children (*brephotropheia*). Thus a large number of endowed charities had grown up.

This new movement it is necessary to consider in connexion with the law relating to religious property and bequests, in its bearing on the rule of the monasteries, and in its effect on

the family. The gradual development of this elaborate system of endowments out of the stringency of Roman law may be noted.

The sacred property (*res sacra*) of Roman law consisted of things dedicated to the gods by the pontiff with the approval of the civil authority, in turn, the people, the senate, and the emperor. Things so consecrated were inalienable. Apart from this in the empire, the municipalities as they grew up were considered 'juristic persons' who were entitled to receive and hold property. In a similar position were authorized *collegia*, amongst which were the mutual aid societies referred to above. Christians associated in these societies would leave legacies to them. Thus (W. M. Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, I. i. 119), an inscription mentions a bequest (possibly by a Christian) to the council (*synedrion*) of the presidents of the dyers in purple for a ceremonial, on the condition that, if the ceremony be neglected, the legacy shall become the property of the guild for the care of nurslings; and in the same way a bequest is left in Rome (*Orelli*, 4420) for a memorial sacrifice, on the condition that, if it be not performed, double the cost be paid to the treasury of the corn-supply (*fisco stationis annonae*). No unauthorized *collegia* could re-

ceive a legacy. "The law recognized no freedom of association." Nor could any private individual create a foundation with separate property of its own. Property could only be left to an authorized juristic person, being a municipality or a *collegium*. But as the problem of poverty was considered from a broader standpoint, there was a desire to deal with it in a more permanent manner than by the *annona civica*.

The *pueri alimentarii* (see above) were considered to hold their property as part of the *fiscus* or property of the state. Pliny (*Ep.* vii. 18), seeking a method of endowment, transferred property in land to the steward of public property, and then took it back again subject to a permanent charge for the aid of children of freemen. By the law of Constantine and subsequent laws no such devices were necessary. Widows or deaconesses, or virgins dedicated to God, or nuns (A.D. 455), could leave bequests to a church or memorial church (*martyrum*), or to a priest or a monk, or to the poor in any shape or form, in writing or without it. Later (A.D. 475) donations of every kind, "to the person of any martyr, or apostle, or prophet, or the holy angels," for building an oratory were made valid, even if the building were

promised only and not begun; and the same rule applied to infirmaries (*noscomia*) and poor-houses (*ptōcheia*). The bishop or steward was competent to appear as plaintiff in such cases. Later, again (A.D. 528), contributions of 50 solidi (say about £19 10s.) to a church, hostel (*xenodocheion*), etc., were made legal, though not registered; while larger sums, if registered, were also legalized. So (A.D. 529) property might be given for "churches, hostels, poor-houses, infant and orphan homes, and homes for the aged, or any such community" (*consortium*), even though not registered, and such property was free from taxation.

The next year (A.D. 530) it was enacted that prescription even for 100 years did not alienate Church and charitable property. The broadest interpretation was allowed. If by will a share of an estate was left "to Christ our Lord," the church of the city or other locality might receive it as heir; "let these, the law says, belong to the holy churches, so that they may become the alimony of the poor." It was sufficient to leave property to the poor (*Corpus Juris Civilis*, ed. Krueger, 1877, ii. 25). The bequest was legal. It went to the legal representative of the poor—the Church. Charitable property was thus Church property. The word

'alms' covered both. It was given to pious uses, and as a kind of public institution "shared that corporate capacity which belonged to all ecclesiastical institutions by virtue of a general rule of law." On a *pia causa* it was not necessary to confer a juristic personality. Other laws preserved or regulated alienation (A.D. 477, A.D. 530), and checked negligence or fraud in management. The clergy had thus become the owners of large properties, with the *coloni* and slaves upon the estates and the allowances of civic corn (*annona civica*); and (A.D. 357) it was stipulated that whatever they acquired by thrift or trading should be used for the service of the poor and needy, though what they acquired from the labour of their slaves in the labour houses (*ergastula*) or from inns (*tabernae*) might be considered a profit of religion (*religionis lucrum*).

Thus grew up the system of endowed charities, which with certain modifications continued throughout the Middle Ages, and, though it assumed different forms in connexion with guilds and municipalities, in England it still retains, partially at least, its relation to the Church. It remained the system of institutional relief parallel to the more personal almsgiving of the parish.

Here perhaps, to mark a certain progress, we may add a word as to the state of Constantinople in the "Iconoclast period" (A.D. 716-867). (George Finlay: *A History of Greece*, B.C. 146-A.D. 1864; II. 216). "Among the people at large," Finlay writes, "though the curial system of castes (cf. p. 106), had broken down, still the trader was fettered to his corporation, and often to his quarter or his street, where he exercised his calling amidst men of the same profession. The education of the child, and the tendencies of society, both prevented the individual from acquiring more than the confined knowledge requisite for his position in the empire. Great progress was made towards the extinction of slavery during the eighth and ninth centuries." Free labour was being found to be more profitable. Many hospitals and charitable institutions had been founded. "That the moral conditions of the great mass of the people of the Byzantine empire under the Iconoclast emperors was superior to that of any equal number of the human race in any preceding period, can hardly be doubted. The bulk of society occupied a higher social position in the time of Copronymus than of Pericles; the masses had gained more by the decrease of slavery and the extension of free labour than the privileged citizens had lost."

CHAPTER XX.

EARLY MONASTICISM AND CHARITY.

MONASTICISM, in acting on men of strong character, endowed them with a double strength of will, and to men like St. Gregory it seemed to give back with administrative power the relentless firmness of the Roman. In the East it produced the turbulent soldiery of the Church, in the West its missionaries; and each mission-monastery was a centre of relief. But whatever the services monasticism rendered, it can hardly be said to have furthered true charity from the social standpoint, though out of regard to some of its institutional work, we may to a certain degree qualify this judgment (see below "Charity and Social Conditions in England").

The movement was almost of necessity in large measure anti-parochial, and thus out of sympathy with the charities of the parish, where personal relations with the poor at their

homes count for most. The good and evil of it may be weighed. Monasticism working through St. Augustine helped the world to realize the mood of love as the real or eternal life. Of the natural life of the world and its responsibilities, through which that mood would have borne its completest fruit, it took but little heed, except in so far as, by creating a class possessed of leisure, it created able scholars, lawyers, and administrators, and disciplined the will of strong men. It had no power to stay the social evils of the day. Unlike the friars, at their best the monks were a class apart, not a class mixed up with the people. So were their charities. The belief in poverty as a fixed condition—irretrievable and ever to be alleviated without any regard to science or observation, subjected charity to a perpetual stagnation. Charity requires belief in growth, in the sharing of life, in the utility and nobility of what is done here and now for the hereafter of this present world. Monasticism had no thought of this. It was based on a belief in the evil of matter; and from that root social charity could hardly spring.

Economic difficulties also fostered monasticism. Gold was appreciated in value, and necessities were expensive, and the cost of maintaining a

family was great. It was an economy to force a son or a brother into the Church. The population was decreasing; and in spite of Church feeling Marjorian (A.D. 461) had to forbid women from taking the veil before forty, and to require the remarriage of widows, subject to a large forfeit of property (Hodgkin, *Italy and her Invaders*, ii. 420). Monasticism was inconsistent with the social good. As to the family—like the moderns who depreciate thrift and are careless of the life of the family, the monks, believing that marriage was a lower form of morality, if not indeed, as would at times appear, hardly moral at all, could feel but little enthusiasm for what is socially a chief source of health to the community and a well-spring of spontaneous charitable feeling. By the sacerdotal-monastic movement the moralizing force of Christianity was denaturalized. Among the secular clergy the falsity of the position as between men and women revealed itself in relations which, being unhallowed and unrecognized, became also degrading. But, worse than all, it pushed charity from its pivot. For this no monasteries or institutions, no domination of religious belief, could atone. The Church that with so fine an intensity of purpose had fostered chastity and marriage was

betraying its trust. It was out of touch with the primal unit of social life, the child-school of dawning habits and the loving economy of the home. It produced no treatise on economy in the older Greek sense of the word. The home and its associations no longer retained their pre-eminence. In the extreme advocacy of the celibate state the honourable development of the married life and its duties were depreciated, and sometimes one would think quite forgotten.

We may ask, then, What were the results of charity at the close of the period which ends with St. Gregory and the founding of the mediæval Church?—for if the charity is reflected in the social good, the results should be manifest. Economic and social conditions were adverse. With lessened trade the middle class was decaying (Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, p. 204) and a selfish aristocracy rising up. Municipal responsibility had been taxed to extinction. The public service was corrupt. The rich evaded taxation, the poor were oppressed by it. There were laws upon laws, endeavours to underpin the framework of a decaying society. Society was bankrupt of skill—and the skill of

a generation has a close bearing on its charitable administration. While hospitals increased, medicine was improgressive. There were miserable years of famine and pestilence, and constant wars. The care of the poorer classes, and ultimately of the people, was the charge of the Church. The Church strengthened the feeling of kindness for those in want, widows, orphans, and the sick. It lessened the degradation of the 'actresses,' and, co-operating with Stoic opinion, abolished the slaughter of the gladiatorial shows. It created a popular "dogmatic system and moral discipline," which paganism failed to do; but it produced no prophet of charity, such as enlarged the moral imagination of the Jews. It ransomed slaves, as did paganism also, but it did not abolish slavery. Large economic causes produced that great reform. The serf attached to the soil took the place of the slave. The almsgiving of the Church by degrees took the place of *annona* and *sportula*, and it may have created pauperism. But dependence on almsgiving was at least an advance on dependence founded on a civic and hereditary right to relief. The pauper stood higher than the slave, socially at any rate: he was free to support himself. Bad economic conditions and traditions, and a bad

system of almsgiving, might enthrall him. But the way, at least, was open; and thus ultimately it became possible that charity, working in alliance with good economic traditions, should in the end accomplish the self-support of society, the independence of the whole people.

CHAPTER XXI.

CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY.

MEANWHILE changes were taking place in the structure of society; and these show how personal slavery tended to disappear in a system of organized social dependence, and how it in some measure reappeared in the status of the lowest class of serfs, before the freedom of the modern world was reached.

In Western Europe the tribe and tribal custom form the basis of the new structure. They are strong and not yet overlaid by conditions which would assert themselves in the passage from a tribal community to the community of a nascent city-state. They are at a formative stage; and lend themselves to a series of adaptations which take the names of the manorial system and of feudalism. These are the product of a long and complex period of fusion, racial and social. Tribal custom is brought into conflict with Roman law, and paganism with Christianity

among Burgundians and Franks and the mass of Scandinavian peoples. The period of the invasion of France lasts from 406 A.D. to 800. Feudalism develops from the ninth to the eleventh century. The tribe consisted, according to the Cymric custom, of protective and co-operative communities or hamlets of the same kindred, ruled over by a chief. The manor was a settlement formed on the basis of private rights held in association with common rights, controlled by a lord of the manor and a manor court. Feudalism represents an agrarian and social movement on the one side, and on the other the establishment of a new chieftainate on a territorial basis and under new conditions of graded dependence.

In the tribe (Seebohm, *Tribal Custom in Anglo-Saxon Law*, pp. 21, 50) the family of four generations forms the kin. Each boy born in the kin has a tribesman's right of maintenance, and at the age of fourteen an allotment of cattle and a right of co-ploughing in the waste. The cattle are provided out of the flocks of the chieftain. Each girl born in the kin remains "at the father's platter" till fourteen, and then the father ceases to be responsible for her. When she is married a portion goes with her out of the kin. Thus all are settled. The *tref*

or *trefgordd* is a co-operative hamlet, "nine houses, and one plough, and one oven, and one churn, and one cat, and one bull, and one herdsman." The chief receives from the *trefs* food-rents, in the form of nightly entertainments in his progress through the district (or *villata*), or a fixed commutation. The necessitous man "does not forfeit life" for a theft of food, if he has traversed three *trevs* and nine houses in each *trev* "without obtaining a gift, though asked for." Non-members of the tribe in the fourth generation (Seebohm, pp. 51 and 499) become settled, *adscripti glebae*, and acquire a status as founders of a kindred. This state is not looked upon as a degradation, but "on the contrary, as a step in advance towards the recognition of tribal rights." There is also a semi-servile class, permanent *nativi*, in later developments of the tribal system called bondsmen, born non-tribesmen without recognized family rights; but they too in the fourth generation may reach recognition of family or kin rights, like the stranger who settles. They after the fourth generation form kindreds of non-tribesmen. There are also bought slaves. These may gain freedom from their master. With the exception of these slaves, the tribal society consists of a self-supporting society with

dependents who may by the mere process of time become recognized members of the community. Their dependence is not slavery, but a dependence of different kinds and qualified by the prospect of admission to the state of tribesmanship. In such a population there is a large freedom of movement (Seebohm, p. 34). The groups of kindreds carry their hearthstones and move from one district or *villata* to another: and the *villata* becomes "the fixed unit for tribal food-rents to the chieftain and for taxation after the English conquest."

To the manor as a social and self-supporting unit we refer later on. But we would here show the connexion of feudalism with the protection and maintenance of the people, and illustrate it by the account of the estate of the Abbey of St. Germain-des-Près in the ninth century (Levasseur, *La Population Française* (ed. 1889), i. 125).

Feudalism represents an agrarian and social movement for the protection and maintenance of the settled labourers or *coloni* in the turbulent period of the break-up and ending of the Roman Empire (406-800, the year in which Charlemagne was crowned King of the Romans), culminating in the eleventh century. This is one side of the question. It represents, on the other hand,

the parcelling out of the sovereignty of the Roman Empire. That sovereignty was taken over piecemeal by the great proprietors. The proprietors administered justice to their people, had retainers for their own defence and their people's protection, and kept the cultivators on the soil. The small cultivators, the *coloni*, from the end of the Merovingian period (752 A.D.), out of fear or on account of their poverty, by submission, gave themselves up in a crowd to masters, and freemen to become serfs or *coloni*, holding their lands subject to the payment of dues (*cens*, or *cens et rente*). A formula for the renunciation of their liberty was: "As is well known to all that I have not the means to clothe myself or to support myself." . . . There is thus owing to the disquiet of the times a loss of freedom, but it takes the form not of slavery but of a qualified dependence, the provision of land and a livelihood by the one party, the provision of protection, subject to dues, by the other.

The domain of the Abbey of St. Germain-des-Près in the ninth century consisted of about a million and 75,000 acres—say about two-thirds of a French department of the present day. The land was still, as in Charlemagne's time, divided into *mansi*, or estates of land.

The account given in the *Polyptique* of the Abbot Irminion refers to only 552,500 acres, which lie in the departments of the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and five other neighbouring departments. Some of these estates are signorial, held by lords under the abbey. They number twenty-four, and on an average consist of some 627 acres of arable, besides meadows and woods. They represent the Roman *villas*, with all the buildings necessary for the farm of a landed proprietor. They are worked by the labour of the classes dependent on the lord.

The other estates (*mansi*), 1646 in number, are held subject to the levy of dues (*tributaires*) payable in labour and in kind and money. The average size of these estates, including woods, is thirty acres, but they vary according to the status of the dependent. Some are ranked as free estates (*ingénuiles*), having been probably the estates of freemen originally. These number 1430, and consist of 25 acres on an average, and they pay in money or in kind 116 francs and in personal services 67 francs. Others of the estates or *mansi* liable for dues are classed as 'servile.' They number 191, and consist of plots of 17½ acres, and they pay 48 francs in money or kind, and 114 francs in personal service. The *mansi* are worked by two and

sometimes by many households which live in a kind of community. Thus, in the 1430 tributary *mansi* of the first class (*ingénuiles*) there are households (*ménages*) of *coloni* (1957), households of *barbari* or *nativi* (*lides*), 29 in number; some 43 households of serfs, and only eight households of freemen. The remaining households are (160) those in which the man and the wife are of different conditions of life, or (199) where their standing is undetermined.

Besides tributary *mansi* of the free type (*ingénuiles*) and of the serf type (*serviles*), there were 25 estates or *mansi* held by *nativi* (*lides*); and there was yet another class of estate lower than the 'servile' called *hospitia*, or, apparently, holdings granted to strangers. They were cultivated by 71 households, and consisted of patches of land of very small size. The population of the whole estate of the abbey was 10,282 in an area of 552,500 acres. The *coloni* paid a war tribute.

The *Polyptique* thus gives us the picture of a scattered community in a sparsely populated country, associated for mutual protection, containing differences in rank and status, subject to fixed taxes, and for the most part to the payment of war tribute. It also indicates a past revolution in which the freeholders of a previous

generation have become dependents, subjected to the payment of dues, and approximating to the condition of those who paid a relatively larger amount in personal service and a relatively lesser amount in money or kind. By degrees the individual right—which gave a distinctive quality to the person and to his estate (*mansus*) disappeared before the territorial right of the lord. "Individual liberty and small proprietorship were almost everywhere sacrificed or subordinated to the settlement of the feudal domains" (Levasseur, i. 141). The classes of nobles, freemen, and serfs were being formed, to the general exclusion of minor differences. At the end of the thirteenth century the serfs had become very numerous (p. 145); some became practically the property of the lord. "Between the lord and the villein there was no judge except God." Others who paid their dues were only subject to the lord if they committed some offence; but if they died without issue their property passed to the lord, as it did also if they married a free woman whose children would otherwise have escaped his claim (*mainmorte*). Thus for many of the peasants protection tended to pass from an ordered dependence to an actual slavery.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHARITABLE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PARISH.

It remains to trace the history of thought and administration in relation to (1) the development of charitable responsibility in the parish, and the use of tithe and Church property for poor relief; and (2) the revision of the theory of charity, with which are associated the names of St. Augustine (354-430), St. Benedict (480-542), St. Bernard (1091-1153), St. Francis (1182-1226), and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). (3) There follows, in reference chiefly to England, a sketch of the dependence of the poor under feudalism, the charities of the parish, the monastery, and the hospital—the mediaeval system of endowed charity; the rise of guild and municipal charities; the decadence at the close of the fifteenth century, and the statutory endeavours to cope with economic difficulties which, in the

sixteenth century, led to the establishment of statutory serfdom and the poor laws. New elements affect the problem of charity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; but it is not too much to say that almost all these headings represent phases of thought or institutions which in later forms are interwoven with the charitable thought and endeavours of the present day.

Naturally, two methods of relief have usually been prominent: relief administered locally, chiefly to residents in their own homes, and relief administered in an institution. At the time of Charlemagne (742-814) the system of relief was parochial, consisting principally of assistance at the home. After that time, except probably in England, the institutional method appears to have predominated, and the monastery or hospital in one form or another gradually encroached on the parish.

The system of parochial charity was the outcome, apparently, of three conditions: the position and influence of the bishop, the eleemosynary nature of the church funds, and the need of some responsible organization of relief. It resulted in what might almost be called an ecclesiastical poor-law. The affairs of a local church or congregation were superin-

tended by a bishop. To deal with outlying districts he detached priests for religious work and, as in Rome and (774) Strasburg, deacons also for the administration of relief. Originally all the income of the church or congregation was paid into one fund only, of which the bishop had charge, and this fund was available primarily for charitable purposes. Church property was the patrimony of the poor. In the fourth century (IV. Council of Carthage, 398) the names of the clergy were entered on a list (*matricula* or *canon*), as were also the names of the poor, and both received from the church their daily portion (cf. Ratzinger, *Geschichte des Kirchlichen Armenpflege*, p. 117). There were no expenses for building. Before the reign of Constantine (306) very few churches were built (Ratzinger, p. 120). Thus the early Church, as has been said, was chiefly a charitable society.

By degrees the property of the Church was very largely increased by gifts and bequests, and in the West before St. Gregory's time the division of it for four separate purposes—the support of the bishop, of the clergy, and of the poor, and for church buildings—still further promoted decentralization. Apart from any special gifts, there was thus created a separate fund for almsgiving, supervised by the bishop,

consisting of a fourth of the church property, the oblations (mostly used for the poor), and the tithe, which at first was used for the poor solely.

The organization of the church was gradually extended. The church once established in the chief city of a district would become in turn, the mother church of other neighbour churches, and the bishop or priest of the mother church would come to exercise supervision over them and their parishes. In France, which may serve as a good illustration in the fourth century (Ratzinger, p. 181) the civic organization was utilized for a further change. The Roman provinces were divided into large areas (*civitates*), and these were adopted by the Church as bishops' parishes, or, as we should call them, dioceses; and the chief city became the cathedral city. The bishop thus became responsible in Charlemagne's time both for his own parish (that of the mother church), and for the supervision of the parishes in the *civitas*, and so for the sick and needy of the diocese generally. He had to take charge of the poor in his own parish personally, keep the list of the poor, and provide houses for the homeless. The other parishes were at first, or in some measure, supported from his funds, but they acquired by

degrees tithe and property of their own and were endowed by Charlemagne, who gave one or more manse or lots of land (cf. Fustel de Coulanges, *Hist. des Institutions Politiques de l'ancienne France*, p. 360), for the support of each parish priest. The priests were required to relieve their own poor, so that they should not stray into other cities (II. Counc. Tours, 567), and to provide food and lodging for strangers. The method was indeed elaborated, and became, like the Jewish, that contradiction in terms—a compulsory system of charitable relief. The payment of tithe was enforced by Charlemagne, and it became a legal due (Counc. Frankfort, 794; Arelat. 794). At the same time two other conditions were enforced. Each person (*unusquisque fidelium nostrorum* or *omnes cives*) was to keep his own family, i.e., all dependent on him—upon his freehold estate (*allodium*); and no one was to presume to give relief to able-bodied beggars unless they were set to work. Thus we find here the germ of a poor-law system. As in the times, whether of the *annona civica*, slavery, feudalism, or statutory serfdom, the burthen of the maintenance of the poor fell only in part on charity. Only those who could not be maintained as members of some 'family' were properly

entitled to relief—and in these circumstances the officially recognized clients of the Church consisted of the gradually decreasing number of free poor and those who were tenants of Church lands.

Since 817 there has been no universally binding decision of the Church respecting the care of the poor (Ratzinger, p. 236). So long ago did laicization commence in charity. In the wars and confusion of the ninth and tenth centuries the poorer freemen lapsed still further into slavery, or became *coloni* or bond servants; and later they passed under the feudal rule. Thus the Church's duty to relieve them became the masters' obligation to maintain them. Simultaneously the activity of the clergy, regular and secular alike, dwindled. They were exhorted to increase their alms. The revenues and property of 'the poor' were largely turned to private or partly ecclesiastical purposes, or secularized. Legacies went wholly to the clergy, but only the tithe of the produce of their own lands was used for relief; and of the general tithe, only a third or fourth part was so applied. Eventually to a large extent, but more elsewhere than in England (Ratzinger, pp. 246, 269) the tithe itself was appropriated by nobles or even by the monasteries; and thus

during and after the tenth century, a new organization of charity was created on non-parochial methods of relief. Alms, with prayer and fasting, had always been connected with penance. But the character of the penitential system had altered. By the seventh century private penance had superseded the public and congregational penance of the earlier Church (*Dict. Christian Antiquities*, art. Penitence). To the penalties of exclusion from the sacraments or from the services of the Church, or from its communion was coupled, with other penitential discipline, an elaborate penitential system, in which about the seventh century the redemption of sin by the 'sacrifice' of property, payments of money fines, etc., was introduced. (Cf. for instance Conc. Elberti:—Labbeus, i. 969 (A.D. 305), with Conc. Berghamstedense, Wilkins, Conc. p. 60 (A.D. 696), and the Penitential (p. 115) and Canons (A.D. 960), p. 236). The same sin committed by an overseer (*praepositus paganus*) was compensated by a fine of 100 *solidi*; in the case of a *colonus* by a fine of 50. So amongst the ways of penitence were entered in the above-mentioned Canons, to erect a church, and if means allowed, add to it land . . . to repair the public roads . . . 'to distribute,' to help poor widows, orphans, and

strangers, redeem slaves, fast, etc.—a combination of 'good deeds' which suggests a line of thought such as ultimately found expression in the definition of charities in the Charitable Uses Act of Queen Elizabeth. The confessor, too, was 'spiritualis medicus,' and much that from the point of view of counsel would now be the work of charity would in his hands be dealt with in that capacity. For lesser sins (cf. Bede (673-735), *Hom.* 34, quoted by Ratzinger) the penalty was prayer, fasting, and alms; for the greater sins—murder, adultery, and idolatry—to give up all. Thus while half-converted barbarians were kept in moral subjection by material penances, the Church was enriched by their gifts; and these tended to support the monastic and institutional methods which were in favour, and to which, on the revival of religious earnestness in the eleventh century, the world looked for the reform of social life.

CHAPTER XXIII.

MEDIAEVAL REVISION OF THE THEORY OF CHARITY.

To understand mediaeval charity it is necessary to return to St. Augustine. According to him, the motive of man in his legitimate effort to assert himself in life was love or desire (*amor* or *cupido*). "All impulses were only evolutions of this typical characteristic" (Harnack, *History of Dogma* (trans.), v. iii.); and this was so alike in the spiritual and the sensuous life. Happiness thus depended on desire; and desire in turn depended on the regulation of the will; but the will was regulated only by grace. God was the *spiritualis substantia*; and freedom was the identity of the will with the omnipotent unchanging nature. This highest Being was "holiness working on the will in the form of omnipotent love." This love was grace—"grace imparting itself in love." Love (*caritas*—charity) is identified with justice; and the will,

the goodwill, is love. The identity of the will with the will of God was attained by communion with Him. The after-life consummated by sight this communion, which was here reached only by faith. Such a method of thought was entirely introspective, and it turned the mind "wholly to hope, asceticism, and the contemplation of God in worship." "Where St. Augustine indulges in the exposition of practical piety he has no theory at all of Christ's work." To charity on that side he added nothing. In the eleventh century there was a revival of piety, which had amongst its objects the restoration of discipline in the monasteries and a monastic training for the secular clergy. To this Augustinian thought led the way. "Christianity was asceticism and the city of God" (Harnack, vi. 6). A new religious feeling took possession of the general mind, a regard and adoration of the actual, the historic Christ. Of this St. Bernard was the expositor. "Beside the sacramental Christ the image of the historical took its place—majesty in humility, innocence in penal suffering, life in death." The spiritual and the sensuous were intermingled. Dogmatic formulae fell into the background. The picture of the historic Christ led to the realization of the Christ

according to the spirit (*kata pneuma*). Thus St. Bernard carried forward Augustinian thought; and the historic Christ became the "sinless man, approved by suffering, to whom the divine grace, by which He lives, has lent such power that His image takes shape in other men and incites them to corresponding humility and love."

Humility and poverty represented the conditions under which alone this spirit could be realized; and the poverty must be spiritual, and therefore self-imposed ('wilful,' as it was afterwards called). This led to practical results. Poverty was not a social state, but a spiritual; and consequently the poor generally were not the *pauperes Christi*, but those who, like the monks, had taken vows of poverty. From these premisses followed later the doctrine that gifts to the Church were not gifts to the poor, as once they had been, but to the religious bodies. The Church was not the Church of the poor, but of the poor in spirit. But the immediate effect was the belief, for a time apparently almost universal, that the salvation of society would come from the monastic orders. By their aid, backed by the general opinion, the secular clergy were brought back to celibacy and the monasteries newly disciplined. But charity could not thus regain its touch of life

and become the means of raising the standard of social duty.

Next, one amongst many who were stirred by a kindred inspiration, St. Francis, turned back to actual life and gave a new reality to religious idealism. For him the poor were once again the *pauperes Christi*. To follow Christ was to adopt the life of 'evangelical poverty,' and this was to live among the poor the life of a poor man. The follower was to work with his hands (as the poor clergy of the early Church had done and the clergy of the early English Church were exhorted to do); he was to receive no money; he was to earn the actual necessities of life, though what he could not earn he might beg. To ask for this was a right, so long as he was bringing a better life into the world. All in excess of this he gave to the poor. He would possess no property, buildings, or endowments, nor was his order to do so. The fulness of his life was in the complete realization of it now, without the cares of property and without any fear of the future. Having a definite aim and mission, he was ready to accept the want that might come upon him, and his life was a discipline to enable him to suffer it if it came. To him humility was the soul making itself fit

to love; and poverty was humility expanded from a mood to a life, a life not guarded by seclusion, but spent amongst those who were actually poor. The object of life was to console the poor—those outside all monasteries and institutions—the poor as they lived and worked. The movement was practically a lay movement, and its force consisted in its simplicity and directness. Book learning was disparaged: life was to be the teacher. The brothers thus became observant and practical, and afterwards indeed learned, and their learning had the same characteristics. Their power lay in their practical sagacity, in their treatment of life, outside the cloister and the hospital, at first hand. They knew the people because they settled amongst them, living just as they did. This was their method of charity.

The inspiration that drew St. Francis to this method was the contemplation of the life of Christ. But it was more than this. The Christ was to him, as to St. Bernard, an ideal, whose nature passed into that of the contemplating and adoring beholder, so that, as he said, "having lost its individuality, of itself the creature could no longer act." He had no impulse but the Christ impulse. He was changed. His identity was merged in that of

Christ. And with this came the conception of a gracious and finely ordered charity, moving like the natural world in a constant harmonious development towards a definite end. The mysticism was intense, but it was practical because it was intense. In that lay the strength of the movement of the true Franciscans, and in those orders that, whether called heretical or not, followed them—Lollards and others. Religion thus became a personal and original possession. It became individual. It was inspired by a social endeavour, and for the world at large it made of charity a new thing.

St. Thomas Aquinas took up St. Bernard's position. Renunciation of property, voluntary poverty, was in his view also a necessary means of reaching the perfect life; and the feeling that was akin to this renunciation and prompted it was charity. "All perfection of the Christian life was to be attained according to charity," and charity united us to God.

In the system elaborated by St. Thomas Aquinas two lines of thought are wrought into a kind of harmony. The one stands for Aristotle and nature, the other for Christian tradition and theology. We have thus a duplicate theory of thought and action throughout,

both rational and theologic virtues, and a duplicate beatitude or state of happiness correspondent to each. On the one hand it is argued that the good act is an act which, in relation to its object, wholly serves its purpose; and thus the measure of goodness (*Prima Secundae Summae Theolog.* Q. xviii. 2) is the proportion between action and effect. On the other hand, the act has to satisfy the twofold law, human reason and eternal reason. From the point of view of the former the cardinal factor is desire, which, made proportionate to an end, is love (*amor*); and, seeking the good of others, it loses its quality of concupiscence and becomes friendly love (*amor amicitiae*). But this rational love (*amor*) and charity (*caritas*), the theologic virtue, may meet. All virtue or goodness is a degree of love (*amor*), if by virtue we mean the cardinal virtues and refer to the rule of reason only.

But there are also theologic virtues, which are on one side 'essential,' on the other side participative. As wood ignited participates in the natural fire, so does the individual in these virtues (II. II.^{ae} lxii. 1). Charity is a kind of friendship towards God. It is received *per infusionem spiritus sancti*, and is the chief and root of the theologic virtues of faith and hope,

and on it the rational virtues depend. They are not degrees of charity as they are of (*amor*) love, but charity gives purpose, order, and quality to them all. In this sense the word is applied to the rational virtues—as, for instance, to beneficence. The counterpart of charity in social life is pity (*miser cordia*), the compassion that moves us to supply another's want (*summa religionis Christianae in misericordia consistit quantum ad exteriora opera*). It is, however, an emotion, not a virtue, and must be regulated like any other emotion (. . . *passio est et non virtus. Hic autem motus potest esse secundum rationem regulatus*, II. II.^{ae} xxx. 3).

Thus we pass to alms, which are the instrument of pity—an act of charity done through the intervention of pity. The act is not done in order to purchase spiritual good by a corporal means, but to merit a spiritual good (*per effectum caritatis*) through being in a state of charity; and from that point of view its effect is tested by the recipient being moved to pray for his benefactor. The claim of others on our beneficence is relative according to consanguinity and other bonds (II. II.^{ae} xxxi. 3), subject to the condition that the common good of many is a holier obligation (*divinius*) than that of one. Obedience and obligation to parents may be

crossed by other obligations, as, for instance, duty to the Church. To give alms is a command. Alms should consist of the superfluous—that is, of all that the individual possesses after he has reserved what is necessary. What is necessary the donor should fix in due relation to the claims of his family and dependents, his position in life (*dignitas*), and the sustenance of his body. On the other hand, his gift should meet the actual necessities of the recipient and no more. More than this will lead to excess on the recipient's part (*ut inde luxurietur*) or to want of spirit and apathy (*ut aliis remissio et refrigerium sit*), though allowance must be made for different requirements in different conditions of life. It were better to distribute alms to many persons than to give more than is necessary to one. In individual cases there remains the further question of correction—the removing of some evil or sin from another; and this, too, is an act of charity.

It will be seen that though St. Thomas bases his argument on a duplicate theory of thought, action, and happiness, part natural, part theologic, and states fully the conditions of good action, he does not bring the two into unison. Logically the argument should follow that alms that fail in social benefit (that produce

remissionem et refrigerium, for instance, want of spirit and apathy) fail also in spiritual good, for the two cannot be inconsistent. But in regard to the former he does not press the importance of purpose, and, in spite of his Aristotle, he misses the point on which Aristotle, as a close observer of social conditions, insists, that gifts without purpose and reciprocity foster the dependence they are designed to meet. The proverb of the 'pierced cask' is as applicable to ecclesiastical as to political almsgiving, as has often been proved by the event. The distribution of all 'superfluous' income in the form of alms would have the effect of a huge endowment, and would stereotype 'the poor' as a permanent and unprogressive class. The proposal suggests that St. Thomas contemplated the adoption of a method of relief which would be like a voluntary poor-law; and it is noteworthy that his phrase 'necessary relief' forms the defining words of one chief part of the Elizabethan poor-law, while he also lays stress on the importance of 'correction,' which, on the decline and disappearance of the penitential system, assumed at the Reformation a prominent position in administration, in relation not only to 'sin,' but also to offences against society, such as idleness, etc.

On this foundation was built up the classification of acts of charity which in one shape or another had a long social tradition, and which St. Thomas quotes in an elaborated form—the seven spiritual acts (*consule, carpe, doce, solare, remitte, fer, ora*), counsel, sustain, teach, console, save, pardon, pray; and the seven corporal (*vestio, poto, cibo, redimo, tego, colligo, condo*), I clothe, I give drink to, I feed, I free from prison, I shelter, I assist in sickness, I bury (II. II.^{ae} xxxii. 2). These in subsequent thought became ‘good works,’ and availed for the after-life, bringing with them definite boons. Thus charity was linked to the system of indulgences. The bias of the act of charity is made to favour the actor. Primarily the benefit reverts to him. He becomes conscious of an ultimate award accruing to himself. The simplicity of the deed, the spontaneity from which, as in a well-practised art, its freshness springs and its good effects result, is falsified at the outset. The thought that should be wholly concerned in the fulfilment of a definite purpose is diverted from it. The deed itself, apart from the outcome of the deed, is highly considered. An extrême inducement is placed on giving, counselling, and the like, but none on the personal or social utility of the gift or counsel.

Yet the value of these lies in their end. No policy or science of charity can grow out of such a system. It can produce innumerable isolated acts, which may or may not be beneficent, but it cannot enkindle the ‘ordered charity.’ This charity is, strictly speaking, by its very nature alike intellectual and emotional. Otherwise it would inevitably fail of its purpose, for though emotion might stimulate it, intelligence would not guide it.

There are, then, these three lines of thought. That of St. Bernard, who invigorated the monastic movement, and helped to make the monastery or hospital the centre of charitable relief. That of St. Francis, who, passing by regular and secular clergy alike, revived and reinvigorated the conception of charity and gave it once more the reality of a social force, knowing that it would find a freer scope and larger usefulness in the life of the people than in the religious aristocracy of monasteries. And that of St. Thomas Aquinas, who, analysing the problem of charity and almsgiving, and associating it with definite groups of works, led to its taking, in the common thought, certain stereotyped forms, so that its social aim and purpose were ignored and its power for good was neutralized.

CHAPTER XXIV.

MEDIAEVAL CHARITY AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS
IN ENGLAND.

WE have now to turn to the conditions of social life in which these thoughts fermented and took practical shape. The population of England from the Conquest to the fourteenth century is estimated at between $1\frac{1}{2}$ and $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions. London, it is believed, had a population of about 40,000. Other towns were small. Two or three of the larger had 4000 or 5000 inhabitants. The only substantial building in a village, apart perhaps from the manor-house, was the church, used for many secular as well as religious purposes. In the towns the mud or wood-paved huts sheltered a people who, accepting a common poverty, traded in little more than the necessities of life (Green, *Town Life in the Fifteenth Century*, i. 13). The population was stationary. Famine and pestilence were of frequent occurrence (Creighton, *Epidemics in Britain*, p. 19),

and for the careless there was waste at harvest time and want in winter. Hunger was the drill-sergeant of society. Owing to the hardship and penury of life infant mortality was probably very great. (Blashill, *Sutton in Holderness*, p. 123). The fifteenth century was, however, 'the golden age of the labourer.'¹ Our problem is to ascertain what was the service of charity to this people till the end of the century. In order to estimate this we will have to apply tests similar to those we applied before to Greece and Rome and the pre-mediaeval Church.

THE FAMILY.

Largely Germanic in its origin, we may perhaps set down as elemental in the English race what Tacitus said of the Germans. They had the home virtues. They had a high regard for chastity, and respected and enforced the family tie. The wife was honoured. The men were poor, but when the actual pressure of their

¹This view, that of Thorold Rogers, as to the fifteenth century is too absolute. Cf. Dr. Cunningham's *English Industry and Commerce*, fourth ed., p. 439. His summing up (p. 441) is: "For many of the rural population the fifteenth century was a time of abundance; not because agriculture was flourishing, but because they were being set to work at domestic manufactures by enterprising employers."

work—fighting—was removed, they were idle. They were born gamblers. Much toil fell upon the wife; but slavery was rather a form of tenure than a Roman bondage.¹ As elsewhere, there was in England “the joint family or household” (Pollock and Maitland, *English Law before Edward I.* i. 31). Each member of the community was, or should be, under some lord; for the lordless man was, like the wanderer in Homer, who belonged to no phratry, suspected and dangerous, and his kinsfolk might be required to find a lord for him. There was personal servitude, but it was not of one complexion; there were grades amongst the unfree, and the general advance to freedom was continuous. By the ninth century the larger amount of the slavery was bondage by tenure. In the reign of Edward I., though “the larger half of the

¹ On the other hand under Scandinavian tribal custom (Anglo-Saxon Custom: Seebohm 264) if the thrall became a freedman, his children inherited from him, for he had gained family rights. He “married and would make his own bargains and keep what property he and his wife could accumulate.” But if the freed parents could not keep their children and fell into extreme want, they were *grafgangsmenn*; and a “grave shall be dug in the churchyard, and they shall be put into it and left to die there. The master shall take out the one who lives the longest and feed that one thereafter.” Freedom was thus given at the freedman’s peril. The self-support of the family was an indispensable condition of it.

rural population was unfree,” yet the serf, notwithstanding the fact that he was his lord’s chattel, was free against all save his lord. A century later (1381) villeinage—that is payment for tenancy by service, instead of by quit-rent—was practically extinguished. So steady was the progress towards the freedom and self-maintenance of the individual and his family.

THE MANOR.

In social importance, next to the family, comes the manor, the organization of which affected charity greatly on one side. It was “an economic unit,” the estate of a lord, on which there were associated the lord with his demesne, tenants free of service, and villeins and others, tenants by service. All had the use of land, even the serf. The estate was regulated by a manor court, consisting of the lord of the manor or his representative and the free tenants, and entrusted with wide quasi-domestic jurisdiction. The value of the estate depended on the labour available for its cultivation, and the cultivators were the unfree tenants. Hence the lord, through the manor-court, required an indemnity or fine if a child, for instance, left the manor; and similarly, if a villein died, his widow might have to remarry

or pay a fine. Thus the lord reacquired a servant and the widow and her family were maintained. The court, too, fixed prices, and thus in local and limited conditions of supply and demand was able to equalize them in a measure and to neutralize some of the effects of scarcity. In this way, till the reign of Edward I., and, where the manor courts remained active, till much later, a self-supporting social organization made any systematic public or charitable relief unnecessary.¹

¹ Mr. Arthur H. Johnson in *The Disappearance of the Small Landowner* (1909), describes the manor before the great plague, and incidentally sums up the position of the villein very ably; and the latter question so closely affects the social issues of mediaeval English life which we have to consider, that we venture to quote his description:

"A typical manor, then, in the middle of the thirteenth century, was a complete social and juridical unit. The arable land is still cultivated in common, generally on the three-field system, each field being left fallow every third year. On these open fields the freeholders and the villeins, who enormously preponderate, except in a few North-Eastern counties such as Norfolk and in Kent, hold their strips and in return pay rents or owe labour service to their lord. The lord's demesne itself either lies in strips on the open fields, or has become consolidated, and is cultivated by all those who owe him service, such as ploughing, carting, herding cows, and dairy work, sometimes partly by hired labour.

"If the lord is a small man he lives on the manor and manages it himself. If he is the king or some great lord, ecclesiastical or lay, with many manors, his demesne is managed or let out in farm to his bailiff. Outside the arable land lies the waste.

THE PARISH AND THE TITHE.

The conversion of England in the seventh century was effected by bishops, accompanied by itinerant priests, who made use of conventual houses as the centres of their work. The parochial system was not firmly established till the tenth century (970). Then, by a law of Edgar, a man who had a church on his own land was allowed to pay a third of his tithe

This, according to the statute of Merton of the reign of Henry III., the lord could enclose or dispose of at will, provided that he left sufficient whereon the freeholders might pasture their cattle, cut turf, timber, and so forth, privileges which by custom were usually shared by the villeins and for which a small annual payment was made.

"By law there is a great difference between the villein or bondsman by blood and the freeman, and also between the villeinage by tenure and the freehold. The freeman, whether he holds some land on villein tenure or not, is free to come and go; he cannot be forced to act as reeve; he can sell all the lands he holds in freehold, and above all, if his tenure is free, he can sue for a writ of right in the King's Courts against his lord who dispossesses him. The villein by blood or status is bound to the land: he cannot leave it without the lord's licence; he is liable to pay merchet for leave to marry his daughter and leyrwrite for her incontinency, and fines for leave to send his boy to school, or to have him ordained; he can be tallaged at the lord's will. The lord can seize his lands and his chattels, except perhaps his waynage or implements of industry,¹ although land or goods which he has himself acquired do not lapse unless the lord has actually taken them in hand.² The

¹ Vinogradoff, *Villeinage*, p. 75.

² *Ibid.*, p. 67.

to his own church, instead of giving the whole of it to the minster or conventual church. Theodore, archbishop of Canterbury (667), had introduced the Carolingian system into England; and, accordingly, the parish priest was required

lord can move him from one holding to another and increase his labour services. He can sell his labour, or even his person and his family, away from the manor altogether. The bondsman by blood is indeed protected in life and limb against his lord, and as against all others he is free and can enforce any engagements made with them, but he must first get his lord's leave and pay a fine (*gersumma*).

"So again the difference between villeinage and free tenure is considerable. If it is free, the services—other than the military service, which was forty days whenever called upon—and the dues are fixed and immutable, whereas the characteristic feature of villein tenure lies in the uncertainty of the services. 'He knoweth not to-night what he may have to do to-morrow.' He must grind his corn at the lord's mill and pay dues; he must pen his sheep on the lord's fold to manure it; he must keep his buildings in repair, and his ditches clean; he pays numerous little dues in kind or money. Lastly, villein tenure, unless it was on ancient demesne (a manor which had been in the king's hand 'when Edward the Confessor was alive and dead,' that is in the first year of Will. I.) is not protected by the king's court, while on his death his lord can admit whom he likes, and if his son is admitted he must pay a heriot.

"Such was the legal position of the villein whether by status (blood) or by tenure. Yet we must remember that the manor was a juridical unit and had its court. Here no doubt the lord or his steward presided. We might therefore expect that in and by this court the chains of villeinage would be all the more strongly rivetted. The fact was otherwise. Just as the existence of a good system of control on the arbitrariness of a despot, the manor.

to provide for strangers and to keep a room in his house for them. Of the tithe, a third and not a fourth was to go to the poor with any surplus; and in order to have larger means of helping them, the priests were urged to work

In this court all tenants, free and villein, were suitors, and though villeins alone could be forced to serve on the juries, freemen also did. It was under the protection of the court that those *customs* grew, which served as an effective check on the will of the lord. Custom is the very life of the manor; the court is the protector of that custom, and the suitors were the interpreters of that custom. 'To fix,' says Professor Maitland, 'in precise terms the degree of binding force that the lords in their thoughts and deeds ascribed to manorial custom would be impossible. Generalizations about the moral sentiments of a great and heterogenous class of men are apt to be fallacious, and when a lord pays respect to a custom that cannot be enforced against him by any compulsory legal process, it will be hard to choose between the many possible motives by which he may have been urged; provident self interest, a desire for a quiet life, human fellow feeling for his dependents, besides his respect for the custom as a custom, may all have pulled one way.'¹ But whatever were their motives, custom grew, and the position of the villein no longer 'depended on the caprice of the lord though it depended theoretically on his will,'² and if the villein forfeited his land for non-performance of his duties, the question whether he had so failed was decided by the court where the villeins, and not the lord, were the judges.

"Thus, although all that the villeins by blood possessed belonged by law to the lord, in practice we find them enjoying property, and buying and selling at will.³ Further, the dis-

¹ Pollock and Maitland, i. 359.

² Vinogradoff, *Villeinage*, p. 176.

³ Page, *End of Villeinage*, p. 15.

themselves, according to the ancient canons of the Church (cf. Labbeus, IV. Conc. Carthag. A.D. 398). The importance of the tithe to the poor is shown by Acts of Richard II. and Henry IV., by which it was enacted that, if parochial tithes were appropriated to a monastery, a portion of them should be assigned to the poor of the parish.

At a very early date (1287) quasi-compulsory charges in the nature of a rate were imposed on parishioners for various church purposes (Pollock and Maitland, i. 604), though in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a compulsory church rate was seldom made. Collections were made by paid collectors, especially for Hoke money—money gathered for church purposes (Brand's *Antiquities*, p. 112). But there must have been many varieties in practice. In Somersetshire the churchwarden's accounts (1349 to 1560) show that the parish contributed nothing to the relief of the poor, and it seems probable

inction between villein status and villein tenure, though it still existed, was becoming obscured, because many villeins by status held lands on free tenure and many freemen held lands on villein tenure. The freeholder often worked by the side of the bondsman on the lord's demesne. They often served on the juries of the court, and in some cases paid the merchet which was considered the especial mark of bondage by blood."¹

¹ Vinogradoff, *Villeinage*, p. 154.

that the personal charities of the parishioners, and the charities of the guild fellowships and of the parsonage house sufficed. (Bishop Hobhouse, *Churchwardens' Accounts*, 1349-1560. Somerset Record Soc.). Many parishes possessed land, houses, and cattle, and received gifts and legacies of all kinds. The proceeds of this property, if given for the use of the parish generally, might, if necessary, be available for the relief of the poor, but if given definitely for their use would provide doles or stock cattle or 'poor's lands,' etc. (cf. Augustus Jessop, *Before the Great Pillage*, p. 40, and many instances in the reports of the Charity Commissioners, 1818-1835). Of the endowments for parish doles, very many may have disappeared in the break-up of the sixteenth century. There were also 'Parish Ales,' the proceeds of which would be used for parish purposes or for relief. Further, all the greater festivals were days of feasting and the distribution of food; at funerals also there were often large distributions, and also at marriages. The faithful generally, subject to penance, were required to relieve the poor and the stranger. In the larger part of England the parish and the vill were usually coterminous. In the north a parish contained several vills. There were thus side by side the charitable

hospitularius attended to their needs, and novices waited on them. Guests who were laymen might stay on, working in return for board and lodging (Smith's *Dict. Christian Antiq., Benedictine*). The monasteries often established hospitals; they served also as schools for the gentry and for the poor; and they were pioneers of agriculture. In the twelfth century, in which many monastic orders were constituted, there were many lavish endowments. In the fourteenth century their usefulness had begun to wane. At the end of that century the larger estates were generally held in entail, with the result that younger sons were put into religious houses. This worldliness had its natural consequences. In the fifteenth century, owing to mismanagement, waste, and subsequently to the decline of rural prosperity, their resources were greatly crippled.

In their relation to charity one or two points may be noted: (1) Of the small population of England the professed monks and nuns with the parish priests (Rogers, *Hist. Agric. and Prices*, i. 58) numbered at least 30,000 or 40,000. This number of celibates was a standing protest against the moral sufficiency of the family life. On the other hand, amongst them were the brothers and sisters who visited the poor and

nursed the sick in hospitals; and many who now succumb physically or mentally to the pressure of life, and are cared for in institutions, may then have found maintenance and a retreat in the monasteries. (2) Bound together by no common controlling organization, the monasteries were but so many miscellaneous centres of relief, chiefly casual relief. They were mostly "magnificent hostelries." (3) They stood outside the parish, and they weakened its organization and hampered its development.

THE HOSPITALS.

The revival of piety in the eleventh century led to a large increase in the number of hospitals and hospital orders. To show how far they covered the field in England two instances may be quoted. At Canterbury (Creighton, *Epidemics*, p. 87) there were four for different purposes, two endowed by Lanfranc (1084), one for poor, infirm, lame, and blind men and women, and one outside the town for lepers. These hospitals were put under the charge of a priory, and endowed out of tithes payable to the secular clergy. Later (Henry II.) a hospital for leprous sisters was established, and afterwards a hospital for leprous monks and

poor relations of the monks of St. Augustine's. In a less populous parish, Luton (Cobbe, *Luton Church*), there were a hospital for the poor, an almshouse, and two hospitals, one for the sick and one for the leprous. The word 'leper,' it is evident, was used very loosely, and was, applied to many diseases other than leprosy. There were hospitals for the infirm and the leprous; the disease was not considered contagious. The hospital in its modern sense was but slowly created. Thus St. Bartholomew's in London was founded (1123) for a master, brethren, and sisters, and for the entertainment of poor diseased persons till they got well; of distressed women big with child till they were able to go abroad; and for the maintenance, until the age of seven, of all such children whose mothers died in the house. St. Thomas's (rebuilt 1228) had a master and brethren and three lay sisters, and 40 beds for poor, infirm, and impotent people, who had also victual and firing. There were hospitals for many special purposes—as for the blind, for instance. There were also many hospital orders in England and on the Continent. They sprang up beside the monastic orders, and for a time were very popular: brothers and sisters of the Holy Ghost (1198), sisters of St. Elizabeth (1207-1231)

Beguins and Beghards (about 1175), knights of St. John, and others.

THE MENDICANT ORDERS.

The Franciscans tended the sick and poor in the slums of the towns with great devotion—indeed, the whole movement tells of a splendid self-abandonment and an intensity of effort in the early spring of its enthusiasm—and with the aid of reform councils and reformations it lengthened out its usefulness for two centuries.

large number of charitable trusts are created and held by lay corporations; and 'alms' include gifts for social as well as religious or eleemosynary purposes.

CHAPTER XXV.

MEDIAEVAL ENDOWED CHARITIES AND GUILD CHARITIES.

As in the pre-mediaeval Church, the system of relief is that of charitable endowments—a marked contrast to the modern method of voluntary associations or rate-supported institutions.

THE CHURCH AS LEGATEE.

The church building among the Teutonic races was not held by the bishop as part of what was originally the charitable property of the Church. It was assigned to the patron saint of the church by the donor, who retained the right of administration, of which his own patronage or right of presentation is a relic. Subsequently, with the study of Roman law, the conception of the Church as a *persona ficta* prevailed; and till the larger growth of the guilds and corporations it was the only general legatee for charitable gifts. As these arise a

FREEDOM FROM TAXATION AND SERVICE.

Gifts to the Church for charitable or other purposes, were made in free, pure, and perpetual alms ("ad tenendum in puram et perpetuam eleemosynam sine omni temporali servicio et consuetudine"). Land held under this *frankalmoine* was given "in perpetual alms," therefore the donor could not retract it; in free alms, therefore he could exact no services in regard to it; and in pure alms as being free from secular jurisdiction (cf. Pollock and Maitland).

ALIENATION AND MORTMAIN.

To prevent alienation of property to religious houses, with the consequent loss of service to the superior or chief lords, a license from the chief lord was required to legalize the alienation (Magna Carta and Edw. I., *De viris religiosis*). Other statutes (Edw. I. and Rich. II.) enacted that this license should be issued out of Chancery after investigation; and the principle was applied to civil corporations. The necessity

of this license was one lay check on injurious alienation.

IRRESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATION.

Until after the thirteenth century, when the lay courts had asserted their right to settle disputes as to lands held in alms, the administration of charity was from the lay point of view entirely irresponsible. It was outside the secular jurisdiction; and civilly the professed clergy, who were the administrators, were 'dead.' They could not sue or be sued except through their sovereign—their chief, the abbot. They formed a large body of non-civic inhabitants free from the pressure and the responsibilities of civil life.

CONTROL.

Apart from the control of the abbot, friar, master, or other head, the bishop was visitor, or, as we should say, inspector; and abuses might be remedied by the visit of the bishop or his ordinary. The bishop's ordinary (2 Henry V. i. 1) was the recognized visitor of all hospitals apart from the founder. The founder and his family retained a right of intervention. Sometimes thus an institution was reorganized, or even dissolved, the property

reverting to the founder (Dugdale, *Monasticon Anglicanum*, vi. 2. 715).

CY-PRES.

Charities were, especially after Henry V.'s reign, appropriated to other uses, either because their original purpose failed or because some new object had become important. Thus, for instance, a college or hospital for lepers (1363) is re-established by the founder's family with a master and priest, *quod nulli leprosi reperiebantur*; and a similar hospital founded in Henry I.'s time near Oxford has decayed, and is given by Edward III. to Oriel College, Oxford, to maintain a chaplain and poor brethren. Thus, apart from alienation pure and simple, the principle of adaptation to new uses was put in force at an early date, and supplied many precedents to Wolsey, Edward VI., and the post-Reformation bishops. The system of endowments was indeed far more adaptable than it would at first sight seem to have been.

THE SOURCES OF INCOME.

The hospitals were chiefly supported by rents or the produce of land; or, if attached to monasteries, out of the tithe of their monastic

lands or other sources of revenue, or out of the appropriated tithes of the secular clergy; or they might be in part maintained by collections made, for instance, by a commissioner duly authorized by a formal attested document, in which were recounted the indulgences by popes, archbishops, and bishops to those who become its benefactors (Cobbe, p. 75); or, in the case of leper hospitals, by a leper with a 'clapdish,' who begged in the markets; or by a proctor, in the case of more important institutions in towns, who "came with his box one day in every month to the churches and other religious houses, at times of service, and there received the voluntary gifts of the congregation"; or they might receive inmates on payment, and thus, apparently a frequent abuse, decayed servants of the court and others, were 'farmed out.'

THE MODE OF ADMISSION.

The admission was usually, no doubt, regulated by the prior or master. At York, at the hospital of St. Nicholas for the leprous, the conditions of admission were: promise or vow of continence, participation in prayer, the abandonment of all business, the inmate's property at death to go to the house. This

may serve as an example. The master was usually one of the regular clergy.

THE DECLINE OF THE HOSPITALS.

It is said that, in addition to 645 monasteries and 90 'colleges' and many chantries, Henry VIII. suppressed 110 hospitals (Speed's *Chronicle*, p. 778). The numbers seem small. In the economic decline at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries many hospitals may have lapsed.

THE GUILD CHARITIES.

In the fifteenth century the towns grew in importance. First the wool trade and then the cloth trade flourished, and the English developed a large shipping trade. The towns grew up like 'little principalities'; and for the advancement of trade, guilds, consisting alike of masters and workmen, were formed, which endeavoured to regulate and then to monopolize the market. By degrees the corporations of the towns were worked in their interests, and the whole commercial system became restrictive and inadaptably. Meanwhile the town attracted newcomers; freedom from feudal obligations was gained with comparative ease; and a new *plebs* was congregating, a

population of inhabitants not qualified as burghers or guild members, women, sons living with their fathers, menial servants, and apprentices. There was thus an increasing restriction imposed on trade, coupled with a growing *plebs*. Naturally, then, lay charities sprang up for members of guilds, and for burghers and for the commonalty. Men left estates to their guilds to maintain decayed members in hospitals, almshouses, or otherwise, to educate their children, portion their daughters, and to assist their widows. The middle-class trader was thus in great measure insured against the risks of life. The guilds were one sign of the new temper and wants of burghers freed from feudalism.

Another sign was a new standard of manners. Rules and saws, Hesiodic in their tone, became popular,—in regard, for instance, to such a question as “how to enable a man to live on his means, and to keep himself and those belonging to him.” The boroughs established other charities also, hospitals and almshouses for the people, a movement which, like that of the guilds, began very early—in Italy as early as the ninth century. They sometimes gave outdoor relief also to registered poor (*Town Life in the Fifteenth Century*: Green, i. 41), and they

had in large towns courts of orphans presided over by the mayor and aldermen, thus taking over a duty that previously had been one of conspicuous importance in the Church. As early as 1257 in Westphalian towns there was a rough-and-ready system of Easter relief of the poor; and in Frankfort in 1437 there was a town council of almoners with a systematic programme of relief (Ratzinger, p. 352). Thus at the close of the Middle Ages the towns were gradually assuming what had been charitable functions of the Church.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE RISE OF STATUTORY AND POOR-LAW SERFDOM.

WHILE a new freedom was being attained by the labourer in the country and the burgher in the town, the difficulty of obtaining a sufficient supply of labour for agriculture must have been constant, especially at every visitation of plague and famine. In accordance with a general policy of State regulation which was to control and supervise industry, agriculture and poor relief, and to repress vagrancy by gaols and houses of correction, the State accordingly stepped in as arbiter and organizer. By Statutes of Labourers beginning in 1351 (25 E. 3. 1351) it aimed at enforcing a settled wage and restraining migration. From 1351 it endeavoured to suppress mendicity, and in part to systematize it in the interest of infirm and aged mendicants. Each series of enactments is the natural complement of the other. In the main their signification, from the point of view of charity,

lies in the fact that they represent a persistent endeavour to prevent social unsettlement and in part the distress, which unsettlement causes, and which vagrancy in some measure indicates, by keeping the people within the ranks of recognized dependence, the settled industry of the crafts and of agriculture, or forcing them back into it by fear of the gaol or the stocks. The extreme point of this policy was reached when by the laws of Edward VI. and Elizabeth, possibly founded on Byzantine edicts, the despairing legislator offered to give the mendicant as a slave or bondman for a period to any one who would take him. On the other hand, it was desired that relief should be a means of preventing migration.

In any time of general pressure there is a desire to organize mendicity, to prevent the wandering of beggars, to create a kind of settled poor, distinguished from the rest as infirm and not able-bodied, and to keep these at least at home sufficiently supported by local and parochial relief; and this, in its simpler form all the world over, has in the past been effected by response to public begging. The argument may be summed up thus: We cannot have begging, which implies that the beggar is cared for by no one, and belongs to no one, and there-

fore throws himself on the world at large. Therefore, if he is able-bodied he must be punished as unsocial, for it is his fault that he belongs to no one; or we must make him some one's dependent, and so keep him; or if he is infirm, and therefore of no service to any one—if no one will keep him—we must organize his mendicity, for such mendicity is justified. If he cannot dig for the man to whom he does or should belong, he must beg. Then out of the failure to organize mendicity—for relief of itself is no remedy, least of all casual relief—a poor-law springs up, which, afterwards associated with the provision of employment, will, it is hoped, make relief in some measure remedial by increasing its quantity by means of compulsory levies. This argument, which combined statutory wage control and statutory poor relief, seems to have been firmly bedded in the English legislative mind for more than two centuries, from 1351 till after 1600; and, until the close of the eighteenth century, these two series of laws effectually reduced the English labourer to a new industrial dependence. To people imbued with ideas of feudalism the way of escape from villeinage seemed to be not independence, but a new reversion to it.

Many elements produced the social and economic catastrophe of the sixteenth century, for the condition into which the country fell can hardly be considered less than a catastrophe. With the growing independence of the people there was created after the thirteenth century an unsettled 'masterless' class, a residue of failure resulting from social changes, which was large and important enough to call for legislation. In the fifteenth century, 'the golden age of the English labourer,' the towns increased and flourished. Both town and country did well. At the end of the century came the decadence. The measure of the strain, when perhaps it had reached its lowest level, is indicated by the following comparison: "The cost of a peasant's family of four in the early part of the fourteenth century was £3 4s. 9d.; after 1540 it was £8" (Rogers, *Hist of Agric. and Prices*, iv. 756).

The cause of this has now been fairly investigated. The value of land in the thirteenth century generally depended chiefly 'on the head of labour' retained upon it. Its fertility depended on main-oeuvre (manure). To keep labour upon it was therefore the aim of the lord or owner. The enclosing of lands for sheep began early, and in the time of Edward III., in the great days of the wool staple, must have been exten-

sive. So long as the demand for the exportation of wool, and then for its consumption at home in the cloth trade, continued, the towns prospered, and the enclosures did not become a grievance. But in the fifteenth century itself, in many ways prosperous, changes were taking place that affected the towns greatly. "Competition was beginning to have freer play. Domestic industry, especially that of weaving of cloth in the rural districts, was taking the place of the old guild system, and causing dislocation of manufacture in many towns. Out of the wreck of the mediaeval system the capitalist was arising, who found in this new world a field for enterprise and business capacity" (Johnson, *The Disappearance of the Small Landowner*, p. 29). Before the reign of Henry VII., with the decay of trade, the towns decayed, and their population in some cases diminished extraordinarily. This reacted on the country, where the great families had already become impoverished and were hardly able to support their retainers. In Henry VIII.'s time the lands of the religious houses were confiscated. Worked on old lines, the custom of tillage remained in force on them. Accordingly, when these estates fell into private hands they were transferred subject to the condition that

they should be tilled as heretofore. The condition was evaded by the new owners, and the disbandment of farm labourers went on apace. Enclosures were very profitable. Their actual extent in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it is difficult to gauge. But it can hardly be doubted that it was a phenomenon large and conspicuous enough to represent a change of national importance. It affected not only the "waste" of the manor, but the open field in which each member of the manor had his share and interest. It was to remain a force for the industrialization of agriculture till the end of the eighteenth century. An industrial revolution indeed was in progress, and, especially in its earlier stages, the people could hardly adapt themselves to the new conditions without suffering great penury and distress. With towns decaying the effect of this must have been terrible. What were really 'latifundia' were created, 'great landes,' "enclosures of a mile or two or thereabouts . . . destroying thereby not only the farms and cottages within the same circuits, but also towns and villages adjoining." A herdsman and his wife took the place of eighteen to twenty-four farm hands. The people thus set wandering could only join the wanderers from the decaying

towns. At the same time the economic difficulty was aggravated by a new patrician or commercial greed. Owing to the confiscation of monastic property a great amount of land was thrown upon the market. It was bought up as an investment with but little regard to the claims of the labourers upon it. It passed into comparatively few hands, few by comparison with the number of all those members of the old manors, who had made their subsistence out of it. Thus once more the absorption of the land by a few, regardless of the legal and equitable claims of all those whose interests were involved, led to long continued social demoralization.

A few years after the alienation of the monasteries the coinage (1543) was debased. By this means prices were arbitrarily raised, and wages were increased nominally; but nevertheless the price of necessaries was 'so enhanced' that neither "the poor labourers can live with their wages that is limited by your grace's laws, nor the artificers can make, much less sell, their wares at any reasonable price" (Lamond, *The Commonwealth of this Realm of England*, p. xlvi). No social reformation, such as the charitable instincts of Wycliffe, More, Hales, Latimer, and other men suggested, was

attempted, or at least persistently carried out. In towns the organization of labour had become restrictive, exclusive, and inadapted, or, judged from the moral standpoint, uncharitable. There had been a time of plenty and extravagance, of which in high quarters the famous 'field of the cloth of gold' was typical; and probably, in accordance with the frequently observed law of social economics, as the advance in wages and their purchasing power in the earlier part of the fifteenth century had not been accompanied by a simultaneous advance in self-discipline and intelligent expenditure, it resulted in part in lessened competence and industrial ability on the part of the workmen, and thus in the end produced pauperism.

The poverty of the country was very great in the reigns of Edward VI. and Elizabeth. Adversity then taught the people new manners, and households became more simple and thrifty. In the reign of James I., with enforced economy and thrift, a "slow but substantial improvement in agriculture" took place, and a new growth of commercial enterprise. The vigour of the municipalities had abated, so that in Henry VIII.'s time they had become the very humble servants of the Government; and the Government, on the other hand, had become strongly

centralized—in itself a sign of the general withdrawal of self-sustaining activity in all administration, in the administration of charitable relief no less than in other departments. A system of endowed charities had been built up, supported chiefly by rents from landed property. To a very large extent these had now passed into other hands, and thus the means of relief, which Edward VI. and Queen Elizabeth might have utilized at a time of general distress, had been dissipated by the acts of their predecessors. The civil independence of the monasteries and religious houses might have been justified, possibly, when they were engaged in missionary work and were instilling into the people the precepts of a higher moral law than that which was in force around them. But afterwards, as the ability and intelligence of the community increased, their privileges became more and more antagonistic to charity, and tended to create a non-social, and even anti-social, ecclesiastical democracy actuated by aims and interests in which the general good of the people had little or no place. There was a growing alienation between religious tradition and secular opinion, as Lollardism slowly permeated the thought of the people and led the way to the Reformation.

While this alienation existed no national system of charity, civic and yet religious, could be created. But worse than all, the ideal of charity had been degraded. A self-regarding system of relief had superseded charity, and it was productive of nothing but alms, large or small, isolated and unmethodic, given with a wrong bias, and thus almost inevitably with evil results. Out of this could spring no vigorous co-operative charity. Charity—not relief—indeed seemed to have left the world. The larger issues were overlooked. The property of the hospitals and the guilds was wantonly confiscated, though the poor had already lost that share in the revenues of the Church to which at one time they were admitted to have a just claim. A new beginning had to be made. The obligations of charity had to be revived. A new organization of charitable relief had to be created, and that with an empty exchequer and after a vast waste of charitable resources. There were signs of a new congregational and parochial energy; yet the task could not be entrusted to the religious bodies, divided and disunited as they were. In their stead it could only be imposed on some authority which represented the general community, such as municipalities; and in spite of the centralization

of the Government there seemed some hope of creating a system of relief in connexion with them. They were tried, and, very naturally, failed. In the poverty of the time it seemed that the poor could be relieved only by a compulsory rate, and the administration of statutory relief naturally devolved on the central Government—the only vigorous administrative body left in the country. The Government might indeed have adopted the alternative of letting the industrial difficulties of the country work themselves out, but they had inherited a policy of minute legislative control, and they continued it. Revising previous statutes, they enacted the Poor Law, which still remains on our statute book. It could be no remedy for social offences against charity and the community. But in part at least it was successful. It helped to conceal the failure to find a remedy.

CHAPTER XXVII.


CHARITY AND THE REFORMATION.

DURING the Reformation, which extended, it should be understood, from the middle of the fourteenth century to the reign of James I., the groundwork of the theory of charity was being recast. The old system and the narrow theory on which it had come to depend were discredited. The recoil is startling. To a very large extent charitable administration had been in the hands of men and women who, as an indispensable condition to their participation in it, took the vows of obedience, chastity, and 'wilful' poverty. Now this was all entirely set aside. It was felt (see *Homilies on Faith and Good Works*, etc., A.D. 1547) that socially and morally the method had been a failure. The vow of obedience, it was argued, led to a general disregard of the duties of civic and family life. Those who bound themselves by it were outside the state and did not serve it.

In regard to chastity the *Homily* states a widespread opinion: "How the profession of chastity was kept, it is more honesty to pass over in silence and let the world judge of what is well known." As to wilful poverty, the regular clergy, it is urged, were not poor, but rich, for they were in possession of much wealth. Their property, it is true, was held *in communi*, and not personally, but nevertheless it was practically theirs, and they used it for their personal enjoyment; "and for all their riches they might never help father nor mother, nor others that were indeed very needy and poor, without the license of their father abbot" or other head. This was the negative position. The positive was found in the doctrine of justification—the central point in the discussions of the time, a plant from the garden of St. Augustine. Justification was the personal conviction of a lively (or living) faith, and was defined as "a true trust and confidence of the mercy of God through our Lord Jesus Christ, and a steadfast hope of all good things to be received at His hands." Without this justification there could be no good works. They were the signs of a lively faith and grew out of it. Apart from it, what seemed to be 'good works' were of the nature of sin, phantom acts pro-

ductive of nothing, "birds that were lost, unreal." So were the works of pagans and heretics. The relation of almsgiving to religion was thus entirely altered. The personal reward here or hereafter to the actor was eliminated. The deed was good only in the same sense in which the doer was good; it had in itself no merit. This was a great gain, quite apart from any question as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the Protestant scheme of salvation. The deed, it was realized, was only the outcome of the doer, the expression of himself, what he was as a whole, neither better nor worse. Logically this led to the discipline of the intelligence and the emotions, and undoubtedly 'justification' to very many was only consistent with such discipline and implied it. Thus under a new guise the old position of charity reasserted itself. But there were other differences.

The relation of charity to prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and penance was altered. The prayerful contemplation of the Christ was preserved in the mysticism of Protestantism; but it was dissociated from the 'historic Christ,' from the fervent idealization of whom St. Francis drew his inspiration and his active charitable impulse. The tradition did not die out, however. It remained with many, notably



with George Herbert, of whom it made, not unlike St. Francis, a poet as well as a practical parish priest; but the absence of it indicated in much post-Reformation endeavour a want, if not of devotion, yet of intensity of feeling, which may in part account for the fact that sectarianism in relief has since proved itself stronger than charity, instead of yielding to charity as its superior and its organizer. Fasting was parted from prayer and almsgiving. It was "a thing not of its own proper nature good as the love of father or mother or neighbour, but according to its end." Almsgiving also as a 'work' disappeared, and with it a whole series of inducements that from the standpoint of the pecuniary and material supply of relief had long been active. It was no wonder that the preachers advocated it in vain, and reproached their hearers with their diminished bounty to the poor; the old personal incentive had gone, and could only gradually be superseded by the spontaneous activity of personal religion very slowly wedding itself to true views of social duty and purpose. Penance, once so closely related to almsgiving, passed out of sight. Charity, the love of God and our neighbour, had two offices, it was said "to cherish good and harmless men," and "to correct

and punish vice without regard to persons." Correction as a means of discipline takes the place of penance, and it becomes judicial, regulating and controlling church membership by the authority of the church, a congregation, minister, or elder; or dealing with laziness or ill-doing through the municipality or state, in connexion with what now first appear, not prisons, but houses of correction.

The religious life was to be democratic—not in religious bodies, but in the whole people; and in a new sense—in relation to family and social life—it was to be moral. That was the significance of the Reformation for charity.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE ORGANIZATION OF MUNICIPAL RELIEF.

CONSISTENTLY with this movement of religious activity towards a complete fulfilment of the duties of civic life, the older classical social theory, fostered by the Renaissance, assumed a new influence—the great conception of the state as a community bound together by love and friendship. “We be not born to ourselves,” it was said, “but partly to the use of our country, of our parents, of our kinsfolk, and partly of our friends and neighbours; and therefore all good virtues are grafted on us naturally, whose effects be to do good to others, when it showeth forth the image of God in man, whose property is ever to do good to others” (Lamond, p. 14). Economic theory also changed. Instead of the mediaeval opinion of the “theologian or social preacher,” that “trade could only be defended on the ground that honestly conducted it made no profit” (Green, ii. 71),

we have a recognition of the advantages resulting from exchange, and individual interests, it is argued, are not necessarily inconsistent with those of the state, but are, on the contrary, a source of solid good to the whole community.

Municipal laws for the suppression of the mendicity of the able-bodied and the organization of relief on behalf of the infirm were common in England and on the Continent (Colmar, 1362; Nuremberg, 1478; Strasburg, 1523; London, 1514). Vives (Ehrle, *Beiträge zur Geschichte und Reform der Armenpflege*, p. 26), a Spaniard, who had been at the court of Henry VIII., in a book translated into several languages and widely read, seems to have summed up the thought of the time in regard to the management of the poor. He divided them into three classes: those in hospitals and poor-houses, the public homeless beggars, and the poor at home. He would have a census taken of the number of each class in the town, and information obtained as to the causes of their distress. Then he would establish a central organization of relief under the magistrates. Work was to be supplied for all, while begging was strictly forbidden. Non-settled poor who were able-bodied were to be sent to their homes. Able-bodied settled poor

who knew no craft were to be put on some public work and the undeserving set to hard labour. For others work was to be found, or they were to be assisted to become self-supporting. The hospitals provided with medical advice and necessities were to be classified to meet the needs of the sick, the blind, and lunatics. The poor living at home were to work with a view to their self-support. What they earned, if insufficient, might be supplemented. If a citizen found a case of distress he was not to help it, but to send it for inquiry to the magistrate. Children were to be taught. Private relief was to be obtained from the rich. The funds of endowed charities were to be the chief source of income; if more was wanted, bequests and church collections would suffice.

The scheme was put in force in Ypres in 1524. The Sorbonne approved it, and similar plans were adopted in Paris and elsewhere. It is in outline the scheme of London municipal charity promoted by Edward VI., by which the poor were classified, St. Bartholomew's and St. Thomas's hospitals appropriated for the sick, Christ's hospital for the children of the poor, and Bridewell for the correction of the able-bodied. Less the institutional arrangements

and plus the compulsory rate, the methods are those of the Poor Relief Act of Queen Elizabeth of 1601. At first the attempt had been made to introduce state relief in reliance on voluntary alms (1 Mary 13, 5 Eliz. 3, 1562-63), subject to the right of assessment, if alms were refused. But the position was anomalous. Charity is voluntary, and spontaneously meets the demands of distress. Such demands have always a tendency to increase with the supply. Hence the very limitations of charitable finance are in the nature of a safeguard.

At the utmost, economic trouble can only be assuaged by relief: it can be met or prevented only by economic and social reforms. If a compulsory rate be not enforced, as in Scotland and formerly in some parishes in England, a voluntary rate may be made in supplementation of the local charities. In Scotland, where the compulsory clauses of the Poor Relief Act of James I. were not put in force, the country weathered the storm without them, and the compulsory rate, which was extended throughout the country by the Poor Act of 1845, came in very slowly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In France (1566) a similar Act was passed and set aside. If a compulsory rate be enforced, it is inevitable

that the resources of charity, unless kept apart from the poor-law and administered on different lines from it, will diminish, and at the same time, as has happened often in the case of endowed charities, the interest in charitable administration will lapse, while the charges for poor-law relief, drawn without much scruple from the taxation of the community, will mount to millions either to meet increasing demands or to provide more elaborate institutional accommodation. The principle once adopted, it was enacted (1572-73) that the aged and infirm should be cared for by the overseers of the poor, a new authority; and in 1601 two Acts were passed, that for the relief of the poor (43 Eliz. 2), and that for the furtherance and protection of endowed charities. Thus the poor were brought into the dependence of a legally recognized class, endowed with a claim for relief, on the fulfilment of which, after a time, they could without difficulty insist, if they were so minded. The civic authority had indeed taken over the alms of the parish, and an *eleemosyna civica* had taken the place of the *annona civica*. It was a similar system under a different name.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE ORGANIZATION OF STATUTORY POOR RELIEF.

A PHRASE of Cecil's indicates the minute domestic character of the Elizabethan legislation (D'Ewes, 674). The question (1601) was the repeal of a statute of tillage. Cecil says: "If in Edward I.'s time a law was made for the maintenance of the fry and fish, and in Henry VII.'s for the preservation of the eggs of wild fowl, shall we now throw away a law of more consequence and import? If we debar tillage, we give scope to the depopulating. And then, if the poor being thrust out of their houses go to dwell with others, straight we catch them with the statute of inmates; if they wander abroad, they are within the danger of the statute of the poor to be whipt. So by this undo this statute, and you endanger many thousands." A strong central Government, a local authority appointed directly by the

Government, and a network of legislation controlled the whole movement of economic life. On this reliance was placed to meet economic difficulties. The local authority were the Justices of the Peace, and they had to carry out the statutes for this purpose, to assess the wages of artisans and labourers, and to enforce the payment of the wages they had fixed; to ensure that suitable provision was made for the relief of the poor at the expense of rates, which they also fixed, and to suppress vagabondage. Since 23 Edw. III. there had been labour statutes; and in 1562 a new statute was passed, an "Act containing divers orders for Artificers, Labourers, Servants of Husbandry, and Apprentices" (5 Eliz. c. 4).

It recognized and upheld a social classification. On the one hand there was the gentleman or owner of property to which the Act was not to apply; and on the other the artisan and labouring class. This class in turn was subdivided, and the Justices were to assess their wages annually according to "the plenty and scarcity of the time and other circumstances." Persons between the ages of 12 and 60 who were not apprentices or engaged in certain specified employments were compelled to serve in husbandry by the year "with any

person that keepeth husbandry." The length of the day's work and the conditions of apprenticeship were fixed. The assessed rate of wages was enforceable by fine and imprisonment, and refusal to be apprenticed by imprisonment. Thus there was created a life control over labour with an industrial settlement and a wage fixed by the Justices annually.

There are differences of opinion with regard to the extent to which this Act was enforced; and the evidence on the point is comparatively scanty. It was enforced throughout the century in which it was passed, and it probably continued in force generally until the Restoration, while subsequently it was put in operation to meet special emergencies, such as times of distress when some settlement of wages seemed desirable (cf. Rogers, v. 611; Hewins, *English Trade and Finance*, 82; Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce: Modern Times*, i. 168). It was not repealed till 1814. From 1585 to 1622 there was, it is said, a slight increase in labourers' wages, which stood at about 5s. a week, with a declining standard of comfort and at times great distress. Then there was a marked increase of wage till 1662, "a very marked improvement, the rate of increase being nearly double that of the earlier periods," and

reaching 9s. "as the highest weekly rate for the whole period." Then from 1662 to 1702 there was "a slight improvement" (Hewins, p. 89).

It would seem, indeed, that the stir of the times between 1622 and 1662 may have caused a great demand for labour. But with the Restoration, when the assessment system was falling into desuetude, came the Poor Relief Act of 1662 (13 and 14 Car. ii. cap. 62), which brought in the Law of Settlement; and a settlement for relief of a very strict nature was added to the industrial settlement of the Artificers and Labourers Act. Thus, if the influence of that Act, which had so long controlled labour, was waning, its place was now taken by an Act which, though it had nothing to do with the assessment of wage, yet so settled the labourer within the bounds of his parish that he had practically to rely, if not upon a wage fixed by the Justices, yet upon a customary wage limited and restricted as a result of the law of settlement. And the assessment by the Justices, in so far as it may have continued, would therefore be of little or no consequence. Settlement also, like the Artificers and Labourers Act, would prevent the country labourer from passing to the towns, or the townsman passing to other towns. At

least they would do so at the risk of forfeiting their right to relief if they lost their settlement without acquiring a new one. Hence the industrial control, though under another name and other conditions, remained in force and to a large extent in practice.

By the Artificers and Labourers Act, then, in conjunction with other measures, the labouring classes were finally committed to a new bondage when they had freed themselves from the serfdom of feudalism, and when the control exercised over them by the guild and municipality was relaxed. The statute was so enforced that to earn a year's livelihood would have taken a labourer not 52 weeks, but sometimes two years, or 58 weeks, or 80 weeks, or 72 weeks; sometimes, however, less—48 or 35 (cf. Rogers, above). It followed that on such a system the country could only with the utmost good fortune free itself from the economic difficulties of the century, and that the need of a poor-law was felt the more as these difficulties persisted. A voluntary or a municipal system could not suffice, even as a palliative, while such statutes as these were in force to render labour immobile and improgressive. Also, while wages were fixed by statute or order, whether chiefly in the interest of the employers or not,

obviously any shortage on the wages had to be made good by the community. The community, by fixing the wages to be earned in a livelihood, made itself responsible for their sufficiency. And it is suggestive to find that in the year in which the Artificers and Labourers Act (1563) was passed, that for the enforcement of assessments of poor-rate (5 Eliz. cap. iii.) was also enacted. The Law of Settlement to which we have referred, passed in the reign of Charles II., was due, it is said, to a migration of labourers southward from counties where less favourable statutory wages prevailed; but it was, in fact, only a corollary of the Artificers and Labourers Act of 1563 and the Poor Relief Act of 1601. These laws, it may be said, were the means of making the English labourer, until the poor-law reform of 1834, a settled but landless serf, supported by a fixed wage and a state bounty. By the poor-law it was possible to continue this state of things till, in consequence of an absolute economic breakdown, there was no alternative but reform.

The philanthropic nature of the poor-law is indicated by its antecedents: once enacted, its bounties became a right; its philanthropy disappeared in a quasi-legal claim. Its objects were to relieve the poor by home industries,

to apprentice children, and to provide necessary relief to the poor unable to work. The Act was commonly interpreted so as to include the whole of that indefinite class, the 'poor'; but according to a better and more rigid interpretation it was held by the Poor Law Commissioners of 1834, so far as those able to work were concerned, to apply in the words of the Act only to "such persons, married and unmarried, [as] having no means to maintain them, use no ordinary or daily trade to get their living by," that is, to the 'destitute,' as the Commissioners called them. For those unable to work "competent sums of money for or towards their necessary relief were to be provided." The economic fallacy of home industries founded on rate-supplied capital early declared itself, and the method could only have continued as long as it did because it formed part of a general system of industrial control. When in the eighteenth century workhouses were established, the same industrial fallacy, as records show, repeated itself under new conditions. Within the parish, in many parts of England, it resulted in the farmer paying the labourer as small a wage as possible, and leaving the parish to provide whatever he might require in addition during his working

life and in his old age. Thus, indeed, a gigantic experiment in civic employment was made for at least two centuries on a vast scale throughout the country—and failed. As was natural, the lack of economic independence reacted on the morals of the people. With pauperism came want of energy, idleness, and a disregard for chastity and the obligations of marriage. The law, it is true, recognized the mutual obligations of parents and grandparents, children and grandchildren; but in the general poverty which it was itself a means of perpetuating such obligations became practically obsolete, while at all times they are difficult to enforce. Still, the fact that they were recognized implies a great advance in charitable thought. The Act, passed at first from year to year, was very slowly put in force. Even before it was passed the poor-rate first assessed under the Act of 1563 was felt to be “a greater tax than some subsidies,” and in the time of Charles II. it amounted to a third of the revenue of England and Wales (Rogers, v. 81).

The service of villein and cottar was thus, as we have seen, in part superseded by what we have called a statutory wage control, founded on a basis of wage supplemented by relief, which

was provided by a rate-supported poor-law. It follows that with the decay of this wage system the poor-law itself should have disappeared, or should have taken some new and very limited form. Unfortunately, as in Roman times, state relief proved to be a popular and vigorous parasite that outlived the tree on which it was rooted. Assessments of wage under the Statute of Labourers fell into disuse after the Restoration, and the statute was finally repealed in 1814, and sixty years later was repealed the Act against illegal combinations of working men. But the serfdom of the poor-law, the *elemosyna civica*, remained, to work the gravest evil to the labouring classes, and, even after the reform of 1834, it impeded greatly the recovery of their independence. Nevertheless, by new laws for the grant of state alms or pensions for the aged, and for the official regulation of wages, in certain trades in which poor labour is employed, it is now proposed to bring the people once again under a political dependence similar to that from which they have so slowly emancipated themselves. The new servitude like the old is supported on philanthropic grounds.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE ORGANIZATION OF ENDOWED CHARITIES.

THE policy adopted by Queen Elizabeth for the relief of the poor (1601) included a scheme for the reorganization of voluntary endowed charity as well as plans for the extension of rate-aided relief. The "Charitable Uses" Act of 43 Eliz. c. 4 (1601), was an Act "to redress the mis-employment of lands, goods, and stocks, heretofore given to certain charitable uses." During the previous century, as we have seen, endeavours had been made to create a responsible system of voluntary charity. This it was now proposed to safeguard and promote concurrently with the extension of the poor-rate. Accordingly, in the poor-law it was arranged that the overseers, the new parochial authority, and the churchwardens, the old parochial and charitable authority, should act in conjunction, and, subject to magisterial approval, together raise "by taxation of every inhabitant," weekly or otherwise,

money for a convenient stock to set to work the able bodied poor who had "no means to support them," and also competent sums of money for or towards the necessary relief of those unable to work. The old charitable organization was based on endowment, and the churchwarden was responsible for the administration of many such endowments. The aim of the two new Acts taken together was to utilize charitable gifts, and to encourage donors to bequeath them. What was not available from voluntary sources was to be raised 'by taxation.'

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, when the administration of poor relief fell into confusion, many charities were lost, or were in danger of being lost, and many were mismanaged. In 1786 and 1788 a committee of the House of Commons reported on the subject. In 1818, chiefly through the instrumentality of Lord Brougham, a commission of inquiry on educational charities was appointed, and in 1819 another commission to investigate (with some exceptions) all the charities for the poor in England and Wales. These and subsequent commissions continued their inquiries till 1835, when a select committee of the House of Commons made a strong report,

advocating the establishment of a permanent and independent board, to inquire, to compel the production of accounts, to secure the safe custody of charity property, to adapt it to new uses on *cy-près* lines, etc. A commission followed in 1849, and eventually in 1853 the first Charitable Trusts Act was passed, under which 'the Charity Commissioners of England and Wales' were appointed.

The following are details of importance:¹

DEFINITION.

The definition of the Act of 1601 (Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. 4) still holds good. It enumerates as charitable objects all that was once called 'alms': (a) "The relief of aged, impotent, and poor people"—the normal poor; "the maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners"—the poor chiefly by reason of war, sometimes a class of privileged mendicants; (b) education, "schools of learning, free schools, and scholars in universities"; and then (c) a group of objects which include general civic and religious purposes, and the charities of

¹In regard to this section and the development of the administration of charity the reader may be referred to "Charities and the Relief of Distress," Section VII. of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress (1909).

guilds and corporations; "the repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks, and highways; the education and preferment of orphans; the relief, stock, or maintenance for houses of correction; marriages of poor maids, supportation, aid, and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed"; and there follows (d) "the relief or redemption of prisoners or captives"; and, lastly, (e) "the aid and ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payment of fifteens" (the property-tax of Tudor times), setting out of soldiers, and other taxes. The definition might be illustrated by the charitable bequests of the next 60, or indeed 225, years. It is for the most part a fair summary of them.

CHARITABLE GIFTS.

A public trust and a charitable trust are, as this definition shows, synonymous. Such a trust is not held for the benefit of private persons, *e.g.* relations, but for the common good, and, subject to the instructions of the founder, by trustees responsible to the community. Gifts for charitable purposes, other than those affected by the law of mortmain, have always been viewed with favour. "Where a charitable bequest is capable of two constructions, one of which

would make it void and the other would make it effectual, the latter will be adopted by the court" (Tudor's *Charitable Trusts*, ed. 1906, by Messrs. Bristowe Hunt and Burdett, p. 167). Gifts to the poor, or widows, or orphans, indefinitely, or in a particular parish, have been considered valid under the Act, or for any purpose or institution for the aid of the 'poor.' Thus practically the Act covered the same field as the poor-law, though afterwards it was decided that, "as a rule, persons receiving parochial relief were not entitled to the benefit of a charity intended for the poor" (Tudor, p. 167). In the administration of charities which are for the poor the broadest view is taken of religious differences.

SUPERSTITIOUS USES.

The superstitious use is one that has for its object the propagation of the rights of a religion not tolerated by the law (Tudor, p. 4). Consequently, so far as charities were held or left subject to such rights, they were illegal, or became legal only as toleration was extended. Thus by degrees, since the Toleration Act of 1688, all charities to dissenters have become legal—that is, trusts for schools, places for religious instruction, education, and charitable purposes generally. But bequests for masses for

the soul of the donor, or for monastic orders, are still void.

ADMINISTRATION.

The duty of administering charitable trusts falls upon trustees or corporations, and under the term 'eleemosynary corporations' are included endowed hospitals and colleges. Under schemes of the Charity Commissioners, where charities have been remodelled, besides trustees elected by corporations, there are now usually appointed *ex officio* trustees who represent some office or institution of importance which it is considered desirable to bring into some connexion with the charity.

The Court of Chancery has jurisdiction over charities, under the old principle that "charities are trusts of a public nature, in regard to which no one is entitled by an immediate and peculiar interest to prefer a complaint for compelling the performance by the trustees of their obligations." The court, accordingly, represents the Crown as *parens patriae*. Now, by the Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, and subsequent Acts, a charity commission has been formed which is entrusted with large powers, formerly enforced only by the Court of Chancery.

A further jurisdiction is by the 'visitor.' Visitation is a right inherent in the founder of

any eleemosynary corporation, and his heirs, or in those whom he appoints, or on their default, in the king. The object of the visitor is "to prevent all perverting of the charity, or to compose differences among members of the corporation." Formerly the bishop's ordinary was the recognized visitor (2 Henry V. i. 1, 1414) of hospitals, apart from the founder. Subsequently his power was limited (14 Eliz. c. 5, 1572) to hospitals for which the founders had appointed no visitors. Then (1601) by the Charitable Uses Act commissions were issued for inquiry by county juries. Now, apart from the duty of visitors, inquiries are conducted by the charity commissioners. By subsequent Acts (see below) ecclesiastical and eleemosynary charities have been still further separated and defined.

"Trustees, or other persons concerned in the management of a charity, may apply to the charity commissioners for their opinion, advice, or direction; and any person acting under such advice is indemnified, unless he has been guilty of misrepresentation in obtaining it."

THE CHARITY COMMISSIONERS.

The commissioners cannot, however, make any order with respect to any charity of which the

gross annual income amounts to £50 or upwards, except on the application (in writing) of the trustees or a majority of them. Their powers are thus very limited, except when put in motion by the trustees. If a parish is divided they can apportion the charities, if the gross income does not exceed £20.

Subject to the limitation of £50, etc., the charity commissioners have power (Charitable Trusts Act, 1860) to make orders for the appointment or removal of trustees, or of any officer, and for the transfer, payment, and vesting of any real or personal estate, or "for the establishment of any scheme for the administration" of the charity.

Under this power charities are remodelled, and small and miscellaneous charities put into one fund and applied to new purposes. The *cy-près* doctrine is applied, by which if a testator leaves directions that are only indefinite, or if the objects for which a charity was founded are obsolete, the charity is applied to some purpose, as far as possible in accordance with the charitable intention of the founder. This doctrine probably received its widest application in the City of London Parochial Charities Act of 1883. Under other Acts doles have been applied to education and to allotments.

About 380 schemes are issued by the charity commissioners in the course of a year.

In the remodelling of charities for the general benefit of the poor some one or more of thirteen objects are usually included in the scheme. These are subscriptions to a medical charity, to a provident club or coal or clothing society, to a friendly society; for nurses, for annuities, for outfit for service, etc.; for emigration; for recreation grounds, clubs, reading-rooms, museums, lectures; for temporary relief to a limited amount in each year; for clothes, fuel, tools, medical aid, food, etc., or in money "in cases of unexpected loss or sudden destitution"; for pensions.

By the Local Government Act of 1892, local ecclesiastical charities, *i.e.* endowments for "any spiritual purpose that is a legal purpose" (for spiritual persons, church and other buildings, for spiritual uses, etc.) are separated from parochial charities, "the benefits of which are, or the separate distribution of the benefits of which is, confined to inhabitants of a single parish, or of a single ancient ecclesiastical parish, or not more than five neighbouring parishes." These charities are further dealt with under the Local Government Act, 1894.

There is "an official trustee of charity lands,"

who as "bare trustee" may hold the land or stock of the charity managed by the trustees or administrators. At the end of 1908 the stock transferred to the official trustees amounted to £27,142,228.

The charity commissioners have no power of audit, but the trustees of every charity have to prepare a statement of accounts annually, and transmit it to the commission. The accounts have to be "certified under the hand of one or more of the trustees and by the auditor of the charity."

In the case of rents and profits of lands, etc., belonging to hospitals or alms-houses, or vested in trustees for charitable purposes, allowances are made in diminution of income-tax (56 Vict. 35, § 61). From the inhabited house duty any hospital, charity school, or house provided for the reception or relief of poor persons, is exempted (House-tax Act, 1808). Also there is an exemption from the land-tax in regard to land rents, etc., in possession of hospitals before 1693.

A digest of endowed charities in England and Wales was compiled in the years 1861 to 1876. A new digest of reports and financial particulars has been set on foot, but it has not yet been completed. The income of endowed charities

at that time was returned at £2,198,463. It is now, no doubt, considerably larger than it was in 1876. Partial returns show that at least a million a year is now available in England and Wales for the assistance of the aged poor and for doles.

THE POOR-LAW AND ENDOWED CHARITIES.

Between the poor-law, which, as it is at present administered, is a permanent endowment provided from the rates for the support of a class of permanent 'poor,' and endowed charities, which are funds available for the poor of successive generations, there might seem to be no great difference. But in their resources and administration the difference is marked. Local endowed charities were constantly founded after Queen Elizabeth's time till about 1830, and the poor-rate was at first supplementary of the local charities. When corn and fuel were dear and clothes very expensive, what now seem trivial endowments for food, fuel, coal, and clothes were important assets in the thrifty management of a parish. But when the poor were recognized as a class of dependents entitled by law to relief from the community, the rate increased out of all proportion to the charities. A distinction then made itself felt,

and was recognized by the Court of Chancery, between the 'parish' poor and the 'second' poor, or the poor who were not relieved from the rates; and relief from the rates altogether overshadowed the charitable aid. Charitable endowments were ignored, ill-administered, and often were lost. After 1834 the poor-law was brought under the control of the central Government. Poor relief was placed in the hands of boards of guardians in unions of parishes. The method of co-operation between poor-law and charity suggested by the Acts of Queen Elizabeth was set aside, and, as a responsible partner in the public work of relief, charity was disestablished. In the parishes the endowed charities remained in general a disorganized medley of separate trusts, jealously guarded by incompetent administrators. To give unity to this mass of units, so long as the principles of charity are misunderstood or ignored, has proved an almost impossible and certainly an unpopular task. So far as it has been achieved, it has been accomplished by the piecemeal legislation of schemes cautiously elaborated to meet local prejudices. Active reform has been resented, and politicians have often accentuated this resentment. In 1894 a Select Committee was appointed to inquire whether it was desirable

to take measures to bring the action of the Charity Commission more directly under the control of Parliament, but no serious grievances were substantiated. The committee's reports are of interest, however, as an indication of the initial difficulties of all charitable work, the general ignorance that prevails in regard to the elementary conditions that govern it, the common disregard of these principles, and the absence of any accepted theory or constructive policy that should regulate its development and its administration.

The Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress (1909) has made new proposals, however, that would add greatly to the utility of the Charity Commission, and meet some of their difficulties. They suggest that all charities should have a status, similar to that which is obtained by Friendly Societies by registration under the Friendly Societies Act. They would be enabled to register at the Commission, whether endowed or voluntary. The Commission would become the Charities Commission, and would, to some extent, be reorganized to fulfil its new purpose. It would also be attached to the Local Government, and represented by the President of the Board in the House of Commons. For the better utilization of dole-endowments, it is

suggested, that by a general statute the conditions that prevent the beneficial use of these endowments should be set aside, so that the sums which they represent may be made serviceable for voluntary aid. Recognized voluntary Aid Councils and Committees would be formed with a view to systematic co-operation with the Public Assistance Authorities (see Appendix I.).

CHAPTER XXXI.

CHARITY IN THE PARISH AFTER 1601.

AFTER the Poor-Law Act of 1601 the history of the voluntary parochial charities in a town parish is marked by their decreasing amount and utility, as poor-law relief and pauperism increased. The Act, it would seem, was not adopted with much alacrity by the local authorities. From 1625 to 1646 there were many years of plague and sickness, but in St. Giles's, London, as late as 1649, the amount raised by the 'collectors' (or overseers) was only £176. They disbursed this to "the visited poor" as 'pensions.' In 1665 an extra levy of £600 is mentioned. In the accounts of St. Martin's-in-the-Fields, where, as in St. Giles's, gifts were received, the change wrought by another half-century (1714) is apparent.

The sources of charitable relief were similar to those in all the Protestant churches—English,

Scottish, or Continental: church collections and offertories; correctional fines, such as composition for bastards and conviction money for swearers; and besides these, income from annuities and legacies, the parish estate, the royal bounty, and "petitions to persons of quality." In all £2041 was collected, but, so far as relief was concerned, the parish relied not on it, but on the poor-rate, which produced £3765. All this was collected and disbursed on their own authority by collectors, to orphans, 'pensioners' or the 'known or standing' poor, or to casual poor (£1818), including nurse children and bastards. The begging poor were numerous and the infant death-rate enormous, and each year three-fourths of those christened were "inhumanly suffered to die by the barbarity of nurses." The whole administration was uncharitable, injurious to the community and the family, and inhuman to the child. If one may judge from later accounts of other parishes even up to 1834, usually it remained the same, purposeless and unintelligent; and it can hardly be denied that, generally speaking, only since the middle of the nineteenth century has any serious attention been paid to the charitable side of parochial work. Parallel to the parochial movement of the poor-law in England, in France

(about 1617) were established the *bureaux de bienfaisance*, at first entirely voluntary institutions, then recognized by the state, and during the Revolution made the central administration for relief in the communes.

CHAPTER XXXII.

CHARITABLE MOVEMENTS AFTER 1601.

IN the seventeenth century in England, as in France, opinion favoured the establishment of large hospitals or *maisons Dieu* for the reception of the poor of different classes. In France throughout the century there was a continuous struggle with mendicancy, and the hospitals were used as places into which offenders were summarily driven. A new humanity was, however, beginning its protest. The pitiful condition of abandoned children attracted sympathy in both countries. St. Vincent de Paul established homes for the *enfants trouvés*, followed in England by the establishment of the Foundling Hospital (1739). In both countries the method was applied inconsiderately and pushed to excess, and it affected family life most injuriously. Grants from Parliament supported the foundling movement in England, and homes were opened in many parts of the country. The demand soon became

overwhelming; the mortality was enormous, and the cost so large that it outstripped all financial expedients. The lesson of the experiment is the same as that of the poor-law catastrophe before 1834; only, instead of the able-bodied poor of another age, infants were made the object of a compassionate but un-discerning philanthropy. With widespread relief there came widespread abandonment of duty and economic bankruptcy. Had the poor-rates instead of charitable relief been used in the same way, the moral injury would have been as great, but the annual draft from the rates would have concealed the moral and postponed the economic disaster. To amend the evil changes were made by which the relation between child and mother was kept alive, and a personal application on her part was required; the character of the mother and her circumstances were investigated, and assistance was only given when it would be "the means of replacing the mother in the course of virtue and the way of an honest livelihood." General reforms were also made, especially through the instrumentality of Jonas Hanway, to check infant mortality, and metropolitan parishes were required to provide for their children outside London. A kindred movement led to the

establishment of penitentiaries (1758), of lock hospitals and lying-in hospitals (1749-1752).

In Queen Anne's reign there was a new educational movement—"the charity school"—"to teach poor children the alphabet and the principles of religion," followed by the Sunday-school movement (1780), and about the same time (1788) by "the school of industry"—to employ children and teach them to be industrious. In 1844 the Ragged School Union was established, and until the Education Act of 1870 continued its voluntary educational work. As an outcome of these movements, through the efforts of Miss Mary Carpenter and many others, in 1854-55 industrial and reformatory schools were established, to prevent crime and reform child criminals. The orphanage movement, beginning in 1758, when the Orphan Working Home was established, has been continued to the present day on a vastly extended scale. In 1772 a society for the discharge of persons imprisoned for small debts was established, and in 1773 Howard began his prison reforms. This raised the standard of work in institutional charities generally. After the civil wars the old hospital foundations of St. Bartholomew and St. Thomas, municipalized by Edward VI., became endowed charities partly supported by voluntary

contributions. The same fate befell Christ's Hospital, in connexion with which the voting system, the admission of candidates by the vote of the whole body of subscribers—that peculiarly English invention—first made its appearance.

A new interest in hospitals sprang up at the end of the seventeenth century. St. Thomas's was rebuilt (1693) and St. Bartholomew's (1739); Guy's was founded in 1724, and on the system of free 'letters' obtainable in exchange for donations, voluntary hospitals and infirmaries were established in London (1733 and later) and in most of the large towns. Towards the end of the century the dispensary movement was developed,—a system of local dispensaries with fairly definite districts and home visiting, a substitute for attendance at a hospital, where 'hospital fever' was dreaded, and an alternative to what was then a very ill-administered system of poor-law medical relief. After 1840 the provident dispensary was introduced, in order that the patients by small contributions in the time of health might provide for illness without having to meet large doctors' bills, and the doctor might receive some sufficient remuneration for his attendance on poor patients. This movement was largely extended after 1860. Three Hospital Funds for collecting contributions for

hospitals, and making them grants, a movement that originated in Birmingham in 1859, were established in London in 1873 and 1897. In 1897 was established for London medical charities—King Edward's Hospital Fund—by which a useful system of voluntary visitation of hospitals has been instituted. From the extended activity of this Fund many measures in support of Hospitals and for their co-ordination are anticipated. Since 1868 the poor-law medical system of Great Britain has been immensely improved and extended, while at the same time the number of persons in receipt of free medical relief, public and voluntary, in most of the large towns has greatly increased. The following figures refer to London: at hospitals, 97 in number, in-patients (1905) during the year, 119,099; out-patients and casualty cases, 1,859,800. The total expenditure was £1,175,512. Patients at free or part-pay dispensaries, about 230,200; and at provident dispensaries about 116,650. In Poor Law Infirmaries the number of inmates at the commencement of the year and admitted during the year 1905-6, was 104,105. The cost £925,614. (Appendix No. XIII. (B), Vol. II., Minutes of Evidence, R. Commission on Poor Laws.) There are in London 12 general hospitals with, 18 without, medical schools,

and 67 special hospitals. Thus the population in receipt of public and voluntary medical relief is very large, indeed altogether excessive.

Each religious movement has brought with it its several charities. The Society of Friends, the Wesleyans, the Baptists have large charities. With the extension of the High Church movement there have been established many sisterhoods which support penitentiaries, convalescent homes and hospitals, schools, missions, etc.

The magnitude of this accumulating provision of charitable relief is evident, though it cannot be summed up in any single total.¹

At the beginning of the nineteenth century anti-mendicity societies were established; and later, about 1869, in England and Scotland a movement began for the organization of charitable relief, in connexion with which there are now societies and committees in most of the larger towns in Great Britain, in the Colonies, and in the United States of America.

More recently (1884) the movement for the establishment of settlements in poor districts, initiated by Canon Barnett at Toynbee Hall—"to educate citizens in the knowledge of one another, and to provide them with teaching and recreation"—has spread to many towns in England and America.

¹ In regard to London charities generally, see the Appendix.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

PROGRESS OF THOUGHT IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES.

THESE notes of charitable movements suggest an altogether new development of thought. On behalf of the charity school of Queen Anne's time were preached very formal sermons, which showed but little sympathy with child life. After the first half of the century a new humanism, with which we connect the name of Rousseau, slowly superseded this formal beneficence. Rousseau made the world open its eyes and see nature in the child, the family, and the community. He analyzed social life, intent on explaining it and discovering on what its well-being depended; and he stimulated that desire to meet definite social needs which is apparent in the charities of the century. Little as it may appear to be so at first sight, that century was a period of charitable reformation. Law revised the religious conception of charity, though

he was himself so strangely devoid of social instinct that, like some of his successors, he linked the utmost earnestness in belief to that form of almsgiving which most effectually fosters beggary. Howard introduced the era of inspection, the ardent apostle of a new social sagacity; and Bentham, no less sagacious, propounded opinions, plans, and suggestions which, perhaps it may be said, in due course moulded the principles and methods of the poor-law of 1834. In the broader sense the turn of thought is religious, for while usually stress is laid on the religious scepticism of the century, the deeper, fervent, conscientious, and evangelical charity in which Nonconformists, and especially 'the Friends,' took so large a part, is often forgotten. Sometimes, indeed, as often happens now, the feeling of charity passed into the merest sentimentality. This is evident, for instance, from so ill-considered a measure as Pitt's Bill for the relief of the poor. On the other hand, during the eighteenth century the poor-law was the object of constant criticism, though, so long as the labour statutes and the old law of settlement were in force, and the relief of the labouring population as state 'poor' prevailed, it was impossible to reform it. Indeed, the criticism of the time was generally vitiated by a tacit

acceptance of 'the poor' as a class, a permanent and irrevocable charge on the funds of the community; and a class the poor had become. At the end of the eighteenth century, in the times of dearth and difficulty that prevailed during the Napoleonic war, when the labour statutes had become inoperative, but the poor-law was unreformed, serfdom in its later stage, the serfdom of the poor-law, asserted itself in its extremest form. In 1802-03 it was calculated (Marshall's *Digest*) that 28 per cent. of the population were in receipt of permanent or occasional relief. Those in receipt of the former numbered 734,817, including children—so real had this serfdom of the poor become. The establishment of mendicity societies in some of the larger towns, in the early years of the nineteenth century, is a sign of the general discontent with existing methods of administration. The Society for Bettering the Condition of the Poor—representing a group of men such as Patrick Colquhoun, Sir T. Bernard, Dr. Lettsom, Dr. Haygarth, James Neald, Count Rumford, and others—took a more positive line and issued many useful publications (1796).

After 1833 the very atmosphere of thought seems changed. There was a general desire to be quit of the serfdom of pauperism. The Poor-

Law Amendment Act was passed in 1834, and since then the actual registered pauperism of male able-bodied persons in health has well-nigh dwindled to a minimum.

The bad years of 1860-70 revived the problem in England and Scotland, and the old spirit of reform for a time prevailed. Improved administration working with economic progress effected still further reductions of pauperism, till on January 1, 1905 (exclusive of lunatics in county asylums and casual paupers), the mean number of paupers stood at 764,589, or 22.6 per thousand of the population, instead of at 41.8 per thousand as in 1859. Charity organization societies were formed after 1869, with the object of "improving the condition of the poor," or, in other words, to promote independence by an ordered and co-operative charity; and the Association for Befriending Young Servants, and workhouse aid committees, in order to prevent relapse into pauperism on the part of those who as children or young women received relief from the poor-law. The Local Government Board adopted a restrictive out-door relief policy, and a new interest was felt in all the chief problems of local administration. The movement was general. The results of the Elberfeld system of municipal relief adminis-

tered by unpaid almoners, each dealing with but one or two cases, influenced thought both in England and America. The experience gained by Mr. Joseph Puckerman of New York of the utility of registering applications for relief, and the teaching of Miss Octavia Hill, led to the foundation of the system of friendly visiting and associated charity at Boston (1880) and elsewhere. Since that time the influence of Arnold Toynbee and the investigations of Mr. Charles Booth have led to a better appreciation of the conditions of labour of which it may be said that the Labour Department of the Board of Trade is in great measure the outcome. In co-operation with the Poor-Law and other authorities, in Health Visiting, and in Children's Care Committees, it may be said that the spirit of charity has assumed the form of a new devotion to the duties of citizenship.

But perhaps, in regard to charity in Great Britain, the most important change has been the revival of the teaching of Dr. Chalmers (1780-1847), who (1819) introduced a system of parochial charity at St. John's, Glasgow, on independent lines, consistent with the best traditions of the Scottish Church. In the development of the theory of charitable relief on the economic side this has been a main

factor. His view, which he tested by experience, may be summed up as follows. Society is a growing, self-supporting organism. It has within it, as between family and family, neighbour and neighbour, master and employee, endless links of sympathy and self-support. Poverty is not an absolute, but a relative term. Naturally the members of one class help one another; the poor help the poor. There is thus a large invisible fund available and constantly used by those who, by their proximity to one another, know best how to help. The philanthropist is an alien to this life around him. Moved by a sense of contrast between his own lot, as he understands it, and the lot of those about him, whom he but little understands, he concludes that he should relieve them. But his gift, unless it be given in such a way as to promote this sympathy and this self-support, instead of weakening them, is really injurious. In the first place, by his interference he puts a check on the charitable resources of another class and lessens their social energy. What he gives they do not give, though they might do so. But next, he does more harm than this. He stimulates expectation, so that by a false arithmetic his gift of a few shillings seems to those who receive it and to those who hear of it a possible source

of help in any difficulty. To them it represents a large command of means; and where one has received what, though it be little, is yet, relative to wage, a large sum acquired without labour, many will seek for other such gifts, and with that object they will waste their time and be put off their work, or be tempted to lie and cheat. In this way social energy is diverted from its proper use. Alms thus given weakens social ties, diminishes the natural relief funds of mutual help, and beggars a neighbour instead of benefiting him. It follows from this argument that a clear and well-defined purpose lies before charity. Charity becomes a science based on social principles and observation. Not to give alms, but to keep alive the saving health of the family, becomes its problem: relief becomes altogether subordinate to this, and institutions or societies are serviceable or the reverse according as they serve or fail to serve this purpose. Not poverty, but distress is the plea for help; not almsgiving, but charity the means. To charity is given a definite social aim, and a desire to use consistently with this aim every method that increasing knowledge and trained ability can devise. Under such influences as these, joined with better economic conditions, a great reform has been introduced.

The poor-law, however, remains—our modern *eleemosyna civica*. It now, indeed, absorbs a proportionately lesser amount of the largely increased national income, but excluding the maintenance of lunatics, it costs England and Wales more than twelve millions a year; and among the lower classes of the poor, directly or indirectly, it serves as a bounty on dependence, and is a permanent obstacle to thrift and self-reliance. The number of those who are within the circle of its more immediate attraction is now perhaps, in different parts of the country, or different districts in a town, not more than, say, 20 per cent. of the population. Upon that population the statistics of a day census would show a pauperism not of 2·63, the percentage of the mean day pauperism on population at the present time, but of 13·15 per cent.; and the percentage would be much greater—twice as large perhaps—if the total number of those who in some way received poor relief in the course of a year were taken into account.¹

Thus the poor-law is among the lower classes, those most tempted to dependence—say some six or seven millions of the people—a very potent influence antagonistic to the good development of family life, unless it be limited to

¹ Cf. the figures on p. 441.

very narrow proportions, or so organized as to lead definitely to self-support. As ample experience shows, only on these conditions can poor-law relief be justified from the point of view of charity and the common good. In marked contrast to this opinion is the agitation for pensions. These, it was at first proposed, should be given out of the national exchequer to all persons over 65, at the rate of five shillings a week; and, were the plan adopted in spite of its great cost, a system of state alms for the aged would be set on foot, unlike the *annona civica*, since it would be available not for citizens only, a comparatively small part of the population, but for the whole population, yet like the *annona*, since it would be claimed as a right—a huge charity endowed with unlimited funds, funds which ultimately may largely exceed the normal cost of the army or the navy. Schemes of the kind have been adopted in the Australasian colonies with limitations and safeguards; and they seem likely to develop into a new type of poor relief organization for the aged and infirm (Reports, Royal Commission on Old Age Pensions, Commonwealth of Australia, 1906). Now (1909) the Old Age Pensions Act (1908) has been carried, and is in operation. By it, free pensions of 5s. a week are made available for

persons over 70 years of age whose yearly income does not exceed £21; and proportional sums are payable, according to a schedule, to those whose income does not exceed £31 10s. Already there is agitation that the age should be reduced to 65 or 60. On the other hand, there is some hope that instead of these free pensions, a contributory system may be established instead for "invalidity" on lines similar to those adopted in Germany. There is, indeed, great scope for preventive thrift organized on the basis of actuarial science.

History has proved that demoralization results from the wholesale relief whether of the mass of the citizens, or of the able-bodied, or of the children, and the fact that endowment is now limited to the aged makes no substantial difference. The social results must be similar; but social forces work slowly, and usually only the unanswerable argument of financial bankruptcy suffices to convince a people habituated to dependence of the evils of the largess which they have received, though the inward decay of vitality and character may long before have been manifest. Ultimately the distribution of pensions and allowances for maintenance by way of a disguised outdoor relief, corrupting a people far more independent than the Roman

plebs, would work a far greater injury than the *annona civica*. The endowment of old age might indeed be justified as part of a system of regulated labour, which, as in earlier times, could not be enforced without some such extraneous help, but it cannot be justified otherwise. It is naturally associated, therefore, with socialistic proposals for the regulation of wage by authority, and may even be considered an indispensable step towards the adoption of that method.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE ECONOMICS OF CHARITY.

IN the light of the principles of charity, which we have considered historically, we have now to turn to two questions: charity and economics, and charity and socialism.

The object of charity is to render to our neighbour the services and duties of goodwill, friendship, and love. To prevent distress charity has for its further object to preserve and develop the manhood and womanhood of individuals and their self-maintenance in and through the family; and any form of state intervention is approved or disapproved by the same standard. By self-maintenance is meant self-support throughout life in its ordinary contingencies—sickness, widowhood, old age, etc. Political economy we would define as the science of exchange and exchange value. Here it has to be considered in relation to the purposes of charity. By way of illustration we take, accordingly, two points:

distribution and use, and the standard of well-being in relation to wage.

Economy in the Greek sense begins at this point—the administration, the use, of means and resources. Political economy generally ignores this part of the problem. Yet from the point of view of charity it is cardinal to the whole issue. The distribution of wage may or may not be largely influenced by trades unions; but the variation of wage by, as is generally the case, the increase or decrease of a few pence is of less importance than its use. Comparing a careful and an unthrifty family, the difference in use may amount to as much as a third on the total wage. Mere abstention from alcohol may make, in a normal family, a difference of 6s. in a wage of 25s. On the other hand, membership of a friendly society is at a time of sickness equivalent to the command of a large sum of money, for the common stock of capital is by that means placed at the disposal of each individual who has a share in it. Further, even a small amount saved may place the holder in a position to get a better market for his labour; he can wait when another man cannot. Rent may be high, but by co-operation that too may be reduced. Other points are obvious and need not be mentioned. It is evident that while the

amount of wage is important, still more important is its use. In use it has a large expansive value.¹

SUPPLEMENTATION OF WAGE.

The exchange between skill and wage must be free if it is to be valid. The less the skill the greater is the temptation to philanthropists to supplement the lesser wage; and the more important is non-supplementation on such a large scale as may affect wages; for the skilled can usually look after their own interests in the market, while the less skilled, because their labour is less marketable, have to make the greater effort to avoid dependence. But under certain conditions the dole of endowed charities in a small parish, outdoor relief, and any constant giving, may tend to reduce wage or to keep it down. The employer is pressed by competition himself, and in return he presses for

¹Professor Chittenden, in his *Physiological Economy in Nutrition*, and others, have shown what great economies can be made in the use of food—consistent with a wise parsimony such as has enabled many people, earning low agricultural wages, to bring up healthy families. Townspeople now, with food purchasable at extraordinary low prices, could do as much. To urge, as some do, that people in receipt of low wages cannot usually make any provision for the future, nor even feed their children properly, is rather a plea for their social incompetence than for their actual lack of resources.

profit by using more labour-saving machinery, a smaller and more skilled staff of workers, and by reduction of wage, when such a reduction can be made without a corresponding loss of the skill that may be indispensable for his business. The reduction of wage due to supplementation, if it take effect, can arise, however, only on certain conditions. There must be some direct association between the employers and the providers of the supplementation, or between the employees and those who supplement their wages. There must be supplementation of an amount sufficient to affect the wage sheets of the section of labour as a whole. There must be a market area sufficiently confined to make the supplementation effective in relation to the amount of the wage. Two or three examples will illustrate this.

Before 1834 the overseers gave parochial outdoor relief. They, by arrangement, associated themselves with the farmers in the parish, who paid a large part of the rates. The farmers undertook to employ the able-bodied men at a certain wage. The wage was supplemented by the overseers from the rates. The conjunction of the givers of the outdoor relief and the providers of the employment made the supplementation effective for the reduction of wages. Further,

the market area for employment, the parish, was small. The law of Settlement prevented migration. Economically the parish was a "close borough." Here were all the conditions for an effective supplementation and reduction of wages. Next, in the case of women's work generally, it is admitted that the fact that women are to a large extent supported at home reduces their wage. In this case the wage-earner, not the employer, is associated with the provider of "charity" or of maintenance, not paid for by wage, but furnished at home in the form of food and shelter and the rest; and it becomes necessary to earn only such a wage as will supplement this provision. The same results follow. The market area of the wage is in that case not geographical, as it is in the case of the parish, but industrial. It lies within a certain class or classes of persons who are prepared to do a certain class of work. The amount of the supplementation by the home provision is also in this case sufficient to affect the amount of wage.

Again, if the age of pensioners who receive the state alms or pension of five shillings a week was reduced from 70 to 65 or 60, it is likely that that amount would be a sum sufficiently large to affect the amount of wage that men

over 60 or 55 could earn. This would be likely to be the more effective to that end, if, as at present, the Workmen's Compensation Act excluded the elder men from employment more and more. In that case employers, who needed the services of such men, might compute the wage so as to include all or a great part of the pension; and if the men (and women) over 60 or 65 wanted the work greatly, if, for instance, they were unable to live, according to their standard of life, without it, the wage would fall to be regulated in part by the supplementation of it afforded by the pension. Already where a man has an army or any other similar pension, it is constantly taken into account in fixing his wage. In this case, to make the supplementation effective, there would be a conjunction of the interests of the employers and the employees; and the market area of the wage would be limited by the group of old age pensioners able to work to the satisfaction of employers.

It has been thought that outdoor relief given here and there or alms given in a town from endowed charities or from societies or from private donors reduced wage by supplementing it. But this is not the case unless the conditions that we have mentioned prevail. The employer as a rule does not know whether

such and such a hand is in receipt of, outdoor relief; and accordingly he or she receives a wage on the same basis as other employees. The relief is not taken into account. The sums are relatively small and scattered; and there is no conjunction of donors with the employers, as in the case of outdoor relief before 1834, or of donors or home-pensioners with the employees, as in the case of women.

But there is another aspect of the question to be considered. Much is said of the 'sweated' industries. Two factors affect this. The supply of women's labour, more particularly, may be large. A notice put up at a workshop may at any moment bring a far larger number of applicants forward than can obtain employment. The work may be, and often is, comparatively unskilled work. The market area of competition for it is accordingly comparatively large. In these circumstances the labour is cheap, and, according to the employers' standard, sufficiently effective: otherwise he would not employ it. Wages which are low on account of mere competition can hardly be called 'sweated.' So far as 'sweated' has a meaning, it implies that another element influences the contract, namely, that the employer, finding that he has an overwhelming advantage in contracting, and has practically a limited

market area in which he can dominate, obliges the employee to take less than that to which he or she would be entitled if there were approximate equivalence of bargaining power on both sides. The limited market area, in this case, is the class of persons so hardly driven by fear of immediate hunger and distress that they must on any terms accept work of some kind.

THE REGULATION OF WAGE.

In fact, however, it would seem that the regulating power—the selection of a higher or of a lower grade of persons suitable for comparatively unskilled work, turns on other issues. It turns largely on the class of management in the factory or workshop. Some employers take only better or more respectable workers. In their factories there may be slight differences in the method of payment, or in fines, or on some other point. There is probably a closer discipline and, in point of standing, the factory may be recognized locally as of a higher grade. In these factories, to a great extent, not the possible industrial capacity of a worker merely is taken into account, but those important but relatively subordinate qualities, of cleanliness, trustworthiness, and respectability, which have also their industrial value. Other factories take

a lower class. Their standard of selection is low, or non-existent, if only the work can be done. In these circumstances the wage is lowest, and the conditions of work and its continuance or discontinuance most uncertain. In one sense, these are conditions that must imply 'sweating'; but the sweating, the 'sweated' work, so called, is usually done at the home, and it depends, it must be noted, on the terms of a contract from which all economic considerations are abstracted, except the single one—performance of a task of great simplicity at a wage settled on the basis of there being a certain number of persons who must take that work on the employers' terms or be famished. This is then the lowest stage. In it economic qualities, above those that are merely mechanic, disappear or disappear almost entirely. But in the higher stages of poorly skilled work the qualification of the economic contract is found in the terms of a contract that lies largely outside this economic issue pure and simple—in respectability and other qualities, that have a social and indirectly also an economic value, which tends to betterment and self-respect.

This must be so in the lower grades of labour at all times. In those grades there is no alternative but to qualify the conditions of the

labour contract by social considerations. To some extent Factory Acts tend to introduce these social considerations, but primarily they depend on the employer. We have no slave or even industrial villein class, if one may use such a phrase. There is, as yet, at least, no order of society which is required to furnish cheap labour on the condition that the necessities of life are provided for it. We have to consider the state of things otherwise, as of a number of economic groups socially affected for good or ill by the conditions on which they are employed. On this plan there is an endless variety of conditions in factory or other employment, and much possibility of change. On the other plan—that of creating a new industrial villein class—a privileged 'sweated' class, dependent on wages fixed by statutory committees, the conditions are reduced to a common level with no scope for change. A breach of rules may amount almost to a breach of social order. Accordingly, the alternative before us, if we wish to intervene, is to legislate on lines that will tend to create and make permanent a new industrial class, considered as a class, and so provided for in the eye of the law; or to foster such social conditions as will tend to qualify more and more effectually the economic conditions of the market of the lower

grades of unskilled labour. Of progress in the latter direction there is no question. The economic conditions of relatively unskilled work in many directions tend to be qualified by improvement and by social considerations that affect it very largely.

But to revert to the alternative method, that of legislation. We do not here refer to the legislation that may prevent distress on the lines of mutual insurance and labour exchanges. To it we allude later (p. 460). The question of legislation here under consideration is solely that of a regulation of wage in lieu of the settlement of wage for unskilled labour on the terms of supply and demand, qualified by social considerations.

Trades Unions, by the convenience they afford in settling wages where large numbers of men are concerned, and in view of the great difficulties that arise if the terms of wage contracts in regard to large masses of workers are upset—if they do not raise wages materially, tend at least to maintain wages, and to a certain extent to keep up the number of men employed. That is a form of what may be called negative co-operation. They co-operate with employers to provide them with labour. They stand aloof from employers as to any results of the non-

provision of labour by strikes or otherwise. This is inconsistent. Logically Trades Unionism should be a step to positive co-operative methods of production. Perhaps it is tending in that direction. So far as it does so, the difficulties of relatively unskilled labour, if it finds a place in such a co-operative organization, are largely met. It receives a kind of protection and stability that it does not now possess. But apart from co-operation, in the case of the poorly skilled there is no protection, such as that which a Trades Union supplies for its own members. In so far then as Trades Unionism is tending to co-operation there is no reason for legislation; and in such matters it is better to trust to economic solutions than legislative interference.¹

In the Sweated Industries Act (1909), however, an attempt is made to provide this industrial protection by the imposition of a state organization. In certain trades wages are to be settled by boards consisting of employing and other members of the trade and of repre-

¹ Cf. the evidence given before the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress by the late Sir George Livesey, Mr. Vivian, M.P.; also the views of employers and workmen on the question of masters and men; also the co-partnery scheme introduced by Sir Christopher Furness into his shipbuilding works (*Times*, 30 Dec., 1909).

sentatives of the Board of Trade. The Local Industries Board thus takes the place of a Trades Union, and, associating the parties concerned, is to fix the wage. Then, if on the employers' part there is a sufficient margin of profit on the 'sweated' wage, the wage of the employees may be raised by the action of the Board. But if there is not this margin, the employees would to that extent have to be dismissed from their work, and would have to be supported by the community. At present many who receive a 'sweated' wage, are, as inquiry shows, known to their employers, and receive their work out of good will, in spite of age and increasing incapacity. In view of the new law this social protection will be abandoned. The result of the measure, therefore, can hardly be otherwise than this. A class of unskilled industry will become economically a regulated body required to receive work at a fixed 'Board' wage, and deprived of work if they cannot do so. That wage, as Australian experience shows, whether it be called a minimum wage or not, will become the ruling wage; and the unskilled class will thus tend to become an economic caste. In fact we return to a fixture of wage by Boards instead of by magistrates, as it prevailed under Elizabethan law. As before, the management of the poor by

the Poor Law was an adjunct to the management of the industrial classes by the fixture of their wage, so, logically, a poor law, organized to make good the deficiencies of industry and the difficulties of regulating the 'national demand for labour' must be established on Elizabethan lines brought up to date and furnished with new theoretic, restrictive or concessive, contrivances.

There is no evidence to show that the community of the present day is capable of undertaking such a task, without great disaster, even if, for purposes of social advancement, it were the right task to undertake. The danger of the new Act lies in the responsibilities that it is creating for the future. If it fail, it is quite possible that it will be extended, both to screen its own failure and to prevent it. Step by step, as the Act itself suggests, it may extend its sphere. As it does so, it will create a fixed industrial class, a new proletariat of industry, for the economic regulation of which it will have made itself responsible. Despite many drawbacks, the social advance of labour has been great. Would it not have been better to have promoted it, on the lines upon which experience shows that it could most successfully be promoted?

Always it has to be remembered that the

mere increase of wage is not the sole, possibly not even the principal issue. With an increase of income there has to be an increase in the power to use income intelligently. Whatever is not so used reacts on the family to its undoing. Constantly when the wife can earn a few shillings a week, the husband will every week idle for two or three days. So also, if the husband finds that in a few days he can earn enough to meet what he considers to be his requirements for the week. In these circumstances the standard of well-being falls below the standard of wage; the wage is in excess of the energy and intelligence necessary to its economic use, and in these cases ultimately pauperism often ensues. The family is demoralized. Thus, with a view to the prevention of distress in good times, when there is the less poverty there is the more need of charity, rightly understood; for charity would strive to promote the right use of wage, as the best means of preventing distress and preserving the economic well-being of the family.

CHARITY AND SOCIALISM.

The theory of charity separates it entirely from socialism, as that word is commonly used.

Strictly socialism means, in questions affecting the community, a dominant regard for the common or social good in so far as it is contrary to private or individual advantage. But even so the antithesis is misleading, for the two need not be inconsistent. On the contrary, the common good is really and ultimately only individual good (not advantage) harmonized to a common end. The issue, indeed, is that of old Greek days, and the conditions of a settlement of it are not substantially different. Using modern terms one may say that charity is 'interventionist.' It has sought to transform the world by the transformation of the will and the inward life in the individual and in society. It would intensify the spirit and feeling of membership in society, and would aim at improving social conditions, as science makes clear what the lines of reform should be. So it has constantly intervened in all kinds of ways, and, in the last century, for instance, it has initiated many movements afterwards taken up by public authorities—such as prison reform, industrial schools, child protection, housing, food reform, etc.—and it has been a friendly ally in many reforms that affect industry very closely, as for instance in the introduction of the Factory Acts. But it has never aimed at recasting society

itself on a new non-economic plan, as does socialism.

Socialism, indeed, offers the people a new state of social security. It recognizes that the *annona civica* and the old poor law may have been bad, but it would meet the objection made against them by insisting on the gradual creation of a new industrial society, in which wage would be regulated and all would be supported, some by wage in adult life, some by allowance in old age, and others by maintenance in childhood. Accordingly for it all schemes for the state maintenance of school children, old age pensions, and state provision for the unemployed are, like municipal trading, steps towards a final stage, in which none shall want because all shall be supported by society, or be dependent on it industrially. To charity this position seems to exclude the ethical element in life, and to treat the people, primarily or chiefly, as social animals. It seems also to exclude the motives for energy and endeavour that come from self-maintenance. - Against this, on the other hand, socialism would urge that only by close regulation and by the provision of special opportunities and by the imposition of corresponding penalties will the lowest classes be improved, and that only the society that maintains them can control them.

Charity from its experience is assured of the impossibility of such control without a fatal loss of initiative on the part of those controlled, and it believes both that there is constant improvement on the present conditions of society and that there will be constantly more, as science grows and its conclusions are put in force. Its appeal to the individual is different, an appeal to personal duty and to thought. Thus charity and socialism, in the usual meaning of the word, imply ultimately two quite different theories of social life. The one would recast industrial society, and place it on a new basis, the other would develop society and allow it to develop on the lines of constant and progressive self-support.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND SOCIOLOGY.

WE should perhaps consider the relation of social progress and charity in the larger sense in which we have used the latter word to social science. Laws and customs mark so many attempts to understand society and to suggest methods for preserving and improving it. They are evidence in the main of a conscious regard for the development of society as a whole, and not merely of casual modes of thought and regulation which are the outcome of passing and particular needs. The folk-lore—the less conscious—stage passes slowly away, rather indeed clothed upon by other thought that gradually takes its place than cast out and exiled. And at later stages of social growth, probably owing to some uneasy conviction that social life is not achieving the good that seems to be within its reach, men are drawn to scrutinize it and so pass to analysis, comparison, inference, and suggestion.

“The conscious regard for the development of society as a whole” thus necessitates limitation and definition.

We may make our attempt to understand society from the ethical side, from the religious side, from the side of political science, from the economic side, or from that of social science and of sociology. But no study of society as a whole can dispense with some consideration of all these and, if special considerations require it, of other sciences also; and the right judgment that may result from this study will take account of them all. Thus, in point of fact, we cannot proceed without some ideal, some conception of society in which these various views of life, as indicated by the several sciences, are, not neutralized, but associated and adjusted.

In the statement which we have made in regard to past thought, two main positions appear. According to one theory, progress in social life, as a whole, depends on justice leavening the community in alliance with courage and temperance; for these must be considered not as words merely, but as active and, possibly, preponderant moods, in the general mind—effective states of being.

Next there is the Christian theory of society. It accepts the structure of social life as it finds

it, and takes for its representative word Charity. In justice the stress is laid on the claim or right of membership with its consequent duty, just dealing—social obligation. In charity, the stress is laid on the inherent interdependence of membership, on the function of each member, and his consequent service, on friendly dealing—social solidarity; and this is linked to the Christ ideal.

These two views are not passed and gone. Each lives now. Each is sociological, for though we take different routes we come at last to the primary thoughts out of which society is built, which make for the progress of society and of its membership. For the conception of a living whole, and living parts or members, we may in these days use the word 'organism,' and explain that we do not mean an organism in which, as in the animal, part and part are visibly united, but an organism the members of which find their common unity in thoughts and words—in the invisible. But the idea that we have formed of society and express in the metaphor remains strangely unaltered. Practically it remains the same.

MODERN ECONOMICS AND THE GENERAL WILL.

So it is, we might almost say, till the eighteenth century. Then is harvested the after-

math of the Reformation. Once again the presence of a practical social dilemma gives the impulse to scientific investigation and defines the problem. Modern economics may be said to have resulted from the discussion of the question why the inhabitants of a rich and fertile country like France suffered continually from want and misery. Should there not be some science of exchange and economic management by which plenty (*euphoria*) may be attained? In general the answer was in the affirmative. Free methods of exchange produced plenty: and plenty was cheapness; and cheapness was general wealth. Very naturally, as it affected far-reaching interests, the science of economics became in itself almost *the* social science, assuming an overwhelming position in the minds of thoughtful people; and, as we shall see, social science, when again it asserts itself, appears as an appendage to political economy, crouching in a kind of dissent under its wing.

Parallel to this comes the doctrine of Rousseau (1712-1788)—the doctrine of the general will. Society considered as a working organization represents, he argues, a tacitly accepted understanding between its members individually and its members acting together or collectively. As individuals "each of us puts to the common use

his person and all his powers under the supreme direction of the general will; and, on the other hand, we recognize each member as an indivisible part of the whole." The words represented a reaction and a reformation. All parts of the social whole were taken as equally indispensable to the whole; the principle of membership was restated. In this sense the words represented a reaction; but they also represented a reformation. Instead of Justice as the master-thought of society, and instead of Charity and the Christ ideal, the general will of the community was accepted as the master-force. The community thus became self-sufficient and self-explanatory; and the problem, How does the community grow—or what is social growth? became a burning question.

Two developments we must follow. One is represented by this argument. The general will makes society. Only as it came into being and by degrees found its fuller expression, did society, strictly speaking, come into existence and grow. It is inalienable—that is to say, it is a condition of social life; and if we abstract it from life, society disappears. So the sovereignty of the people expressed by the general will represents a transference of the whole conception of the State to a new point of view. The external construc-

tion—which we may call the 'constitution' of the State—is nothing, if it ceases to express the general will, and to be consistent with it. Only vitalized by its breath does it acquire and retain effective social reality. We have thus on the political side a doctrine of *laissez faire: laissez faire la volonté générale*.

But further, naturally a country hampered by antiquated restrictions and seeking to free itself found salvation in an economic *laissez faire*—the counterpart of this. In this relation it meant that the external structure of the mercantile system had lost its touch of life; that its purpose and the purpose of commerce—the outcome of economic experiences—were no longer consistent; that its purpose had been found to be wrong, to be based on a misconception. And so, instead of the endless restrictions to which Gournay (1712-1759) so successfully objected, in commerce one could rely, it was argued, on the general will of groups of consumers who demand or are ready to demand, and groups of producers who supply or are ready to supply their wants.

'Let *do*'; this does not mean seek your own ends only regardless of all moral considerations; it means in the science or the department of life to which the science (in this case the science of

economics) refers, "Do not bind the mind that does." The appeal is from regulation to self-adjustment, from letter to spirit. If the mind is lacking, or in so far as it is lacking, it has not liberty; and so, we of a later age may say—to reach liberty and prepare for it, to create a sufficient mind—let regulation come in. But in the main, on the view of self-adjusted expansion, one may expect the mind of the group more and more to grasp not merely, for instance, the economic conditions, but the whole of the conditions of the question or issue that lies before it, and so to live by a rule as broad as its grasp. But it may fail to do this. Then we may say '*Laissez faire*' fails, which in a sense is true; but it is only another way of saying the 'mind' is not up to the 'doing.'

This view of social development, it will be seen, accentuated the importance of the study of social conditions. Every part of the problem became vital; a positive philosophy in some form could not but be its outcome on this side. Thus, as a result, on the one hand, history under Saint Simon (1760-1825), Comte (1798-1857) and others was recast into stages of development, more or less real. On the other hand the method of observation was evoked. For instance, once again a social difficulty challenged analysis. In

a small country like England, where there is frequent want coupled with widespread poor relief, what is the relation of population to the supply of food? This brought Malthus into the field; and of these and other investigations such sciences as demography and statistics are the outcome, as are also the methods of observation which in the course of time were elaborated by Le Play (*d.* 1888) and his special form of "Science Sociale."

At the same time, at first the scope of social observation was limited. In spite of some protests, the merely economic interest in social life was dominant. Some departments, the ethical, for instance, and the religious fell out of sight. The biological and the psychological, as modern sciences of observation, were yet unborn. The philosophy of the useful was made the basis of economic thought, and dealing with material wealth it was naturally applicable to it. It was also applied to ethics, and it practically desocialized them, and obscured the nature and importance of social habit. It overlooked the finer elements of thought that stimulate social action and give unity of feeling to society, and train its responsiveness to higher appeals. Thus, in ethics it tended to give predominance to material ends, social and individual, as though

men could live on bread alone, and the idealism of Justice as a chief element in social advance was well-nigh forgotten.

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

The reaction came from under the very wing of economics. The phrase 'social economics' is evidence of it; and, incongruous as the expression really is, the term suggested the actual state of thought. The substantive was economics; it was the actual and effective movement. The question was how to socialise it: the adjective was 'social.' Sismondi (1773-1842) was the introducer of this change, the representative of the movement, the opponent of *laissez faire* as he understood it, at a time when *laissez faire* was an economic dictum elevated to a social principle.

Social science Sismondi deals with as a sister that an errant and aggressive economic has forgotten. He says: "La science économique sera toujours courte par quelque endroit et aura besoin d'être rehaussée par la charité!" "Economics will always fall short at some place, and must be made good by charity." In effect, he argues that "Economic science does not supply the key to the social problem; it has been pre-occupied with things rather than with men; it has sought only how to increase wealth; it has become

merely chrematistic. It must add a piece to its raiment and become social. It is the art of social economy to make men happy, materially and morally." On this understanding Sismondi proceeds to deal with our modern questions, adopting, as his successors have done, the theory of wages, as it was then and till recently accepted, by which wage was conceived as perpetually hovering about the line of minimum subsistence, and tending constantly to that minimum. So, to quote one or two instances, property, he argues, is rightly private; but when it assumes large proportions held in one ownership, if it becomes an instrument of oppression, the State should interfere. So competition unbridled favours *la grande industrie*, and the workman becomes mere social dust, *la poussière sociale*. Social equality does not exist. Such an evil he would remedy in part by a revision of taxation. It should be made progressive from that point at which the individual cannot pay a tax at all up to the maximum income, and there should be a trade guarantee (*garantie professionnelle*) to assure to the labourer subsistence when he cannot work or is ill or old. There would thus be in industry as in politics a Constitution. In political life the constitution produces public liberty. In industrial life the guarantee would

cover all industrial conditions, and in one form or another would be incidental to contracts of labour between employer and employee. Here, clearly, we have the germ of so-called 'pension' and 'insurance' schemes.

These and other points which might be quoted illustrate what may be called the first position in the modern development of social science. At this stage it is not separate from economics and independent of it. It is economics rather crudely socialized. It is socialist rather social-scientific; it is socialism and not social science. It represents no sufficient study of social habit, no co-ordinated principles in science, but a policy of more or less interference on the lines of compensation and reconstruction in view of the pressure of economic laws. It occupies the place which socialism has generally occupied even up to the present time of being a modifying force in economic theory and practice, not as being a science in itself, but a factor of intervention, a skid put on the quick-rolling wheels of competition. Slowly since then social science has set itself free from economics, and is now assuming a new position, and incidentally at the same time social science properly speaking does, and should, take the place of socialism.

SOCIOLOGY AND 'SOCIAL FACTS.'

In what follows some may think, perhaps, that more stress should be laid on the work of Comte and Herbert Spencer. In justification of the line we have adopted, however, we would quote the words of M. Durkheim in the introduction to his *Règles de la Méthode Sociologique*.¹

"Up to the present time the sociologists have been little interested in describing or defining the method which they apply to the study of social facts. Thus the problem of the science of method has no place in the works of Herbert Spencer. The *Introduction to Social Science* might by its title seem to indicate that it would deal with a study of method, but it is devoted to demonstrating the difficulties of sociology and its possibilities, not to setting forth the procedure which it should adopt." Mill, he adds, passes the conclusions of Comte through the sieve of his dialectic, but adds to them nothing of his own; and he concludes that "Comte's single chapter in his *Cours de philosophie positive* is

¹Sociology may be taken as meaning more than social science. Ethics, economics, etc., may be considered social sciences, and sociology may be considered the science of society in which the conclusions of the several sciences are brought together and adjusted.

nearly the only original and important study we possess on the subject"—now, a far too sweeping conclusion.

Two processes follow, observation, the ascertainment of the universal—the constant underlying laws which observation suggests and induction establishes; and in the case of society the reference of such laws to some ideal, as the standard of their measurement and value in relation to life. In regard to these processes very much remains to be done, but a beginning has been made.

To submit first a short note about Le Play in regard to his method of observation and social habit.

Le Play, noticing the anomaly of increasing wealth and weakened manners, and the variety of conditions that prevailed in the lives of families, investigated the actual circumstances of people in different countries, not from the side of their wage or remuneration only and their ability to earn wages and produce goods, but also from the point of view of their life as members of society and of the groups into which society divides itself. Thus, for him, the place with its geographical characteristics, the home, the family and its relationships, the earnings of its members, their means of social preservation, industry,

thrift, property, habits, manners, education, religion, their relations to the village or town or state—all that was actual and formative in their lives was brought under one survey; and matters economic, in fact or by inference, came to be treated as but a part of the whole, as the part that was concerned with exchange and exchange value in relation to the supply and demand of goods and labour. This method of observation led the way to classification—to a definition of groups of people by type, and drew into juxtaposition the formative elements of social life. To questions respecting the anomalies of competition and the conflict between wealth and desire, it gave the answer, "What are the facts of social habit? That is right which strengthens social habit consistently with the strengthening of the structure of society—the individual, the family, the group, in relation to themselves and the general good." According to this view, on the results obtained and submitted by social science, judgment might be given, that what is desired by way of reform or improvement should, on the ground of the formation of social habit, be dealt with either by law or by the influence of custom or by the influence of religion, as a kind of authoritative ethic; or, on the other hand, by the processes of well-considered social change

adjusting itself to economic movements—on lines which are suggested by the nature of the social habits in question and the method of their growth. Thus, instead of merely empiric socialism we have the beginnings of science.

But social science has now gone further. By observation and statistic what M. Durkheim calls 'social facts' are being gradually collected and grouped on lines outlying the province of observation which Le Play chose as his own; and they supplement it in various ways. These social facts are inductions from observation in many collateral departments of life. They represent a further stage in the working of the mind in relation to facts. So M. Durkheim, in his own phraseology, argues that the mere incidents of life are not social facts; also that personal habits and the like, considered by themselves, are not necessarily social facts; that the social fact has in its nature something of a force exterior to the individual and tends to control him; and that, finally, the social fact is "a fact which is general throughout any given society and retains its own characteristic independently of its manifestations in individual instances." And so, arguing his way to the conception of the 'form' or the 'idea,' but hardly perhaps realizing who is his master in that craft, M. Durkheim rightly con-

cludes that it is with this group of phenomena that sociology concerns itself.

Of such 'social facts' some instances may be given. The rates of mortality on which assurances are based are a social fact according to the latter definition. The rate is general, and under the conditions of the particular place and population, normal at different ages. Accepting it, the members of some classes of society submit to the conditions of constraint that its conclusions impose upon them, and settle a large department of their social life, in regard to which they desire to have security, by saving and investments, the amount and nature of which are also largely dependent on these conclusions. The decrease of birth-rates in the case of people of marriageable age, as it appears in recent papers read on that subject at the Statistical Society, is another social fact, which appears to satisfy these definitions. Other social facts—very many—remain for analysis and verification. Such are the variation in social habit in particular trades in relation to the amount of the wage of the head of the family and members of the family, for instance, or variation in migration in relation to trade conditions in a country, variation in the actual purchase rates in poor or rich neighbourhoods,

and so on. And there is now scope for a statistic of details in regard to social habit, which should demonstrate with great clearness its relation to conditions of health and social progress.

This 'social habit' is indeed a 'social fact' that requires more detailed investigation. The remarkable and well-known investigations of Mr. Charles Booth and Mr. Seebohm Rowntree, which have stirred public thought in many circles, were in our judgment faulty from this point of view.¹ They were not analytical of social habit, but of relative poverty and riches. They graded the population according as they were 'poor' or 'very poor,' or above a poverty line. Their authors aimed at marking out such a line of poverty, forgetful, as it seems to us, of the fact that poverty is so entirely relative to use and habit and potential ability of all kinds, that it can never serve as a satisfactory basis of social investigation or social reconstruction. It is not the greater or lesser command of means that makes the material difference in the contentment and efficiency of social life, but the use of means relative to station in life and its possibilities. Nevertheless, in these investiga-

¹ See "Some Recent Investigations as to the Number of the Poor in the Community" (Appendix III., Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration, 1904).

tions it was on the possession of means that stress was laid. Hence the suggestion that the issue to be settled by the country—the line of social reform—was the endowment of the class or classes whose resources were considered relatively insufficient.

But to transfer the wealth of one class to another by taxation or otherwise is no solution of social difficulty. The transfer is, and must be, in the nature of an alms, an *annona*; and it cannot but weaken effort instead of strengthening it. The evidence that it can have an opposite effect, it is not too much to say, is *nil*. Everywhere one may see people of similar means living under similar conditions, some successfully and usefully, some with failure and social inutility. The difference, it is clear, lies not in the difference of resources, but in social habit. Hence, not the relative riches or poverty of the classes, or of the individuals that compose them, are primarily of material importance, but their social habit.

Drink in the case of a richer man is concealed; in the case of a poorer man it is quickly revealed in disastrous want. But socially it is not less harmful in the former. To society it is the habit that matters; and for it the fall of the richer man, who is charged with larger responsi-

bilities, may involve a greater evil. The results of misdoing and misjudgment come on a poorer man quickly and surely. His financial position cannot parry them or hide them. He walks in dangerous places without a parapet. He may thus be educated and stimulated to greater efforts, may be saved, socially speaking, and made a man.

Here again is the difference between social science and socialism. Social science works from 'social facts' and social habits, towards a higher and completer standard, consistent with the extension of competent and self-developing habit. Socialism rests its faith on the financial and economic reorganisation of society, by which the poorer classes shall be endowed, the stringency and stimulation of competition removed by a state-controlled labour market, and relief provided to all, subject to their resources falling below some more or less definite poverty line. That is the policy of the Report of the Minority of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law and Relief of Distress. It is, as we have said, the policy of creating a large dependent class, a huge industrial villeinage.

Thus has social investigation, divorced from social science, led the people astray.

THE STANDARD OF THE GOOD SOCIAL LIFE.

Another element in the development of social science or sociology is the correlation of our inductions and their reference to some standard, which we may call the good social life. For, as we have seen, it is characteristic of social science that it should accumulate the facts in relation to the structure of society from social observation and from other cognate sciences with a view to the comparison of data, for the purposes of induction, and thus ultimately for the formation of society on lines consistent with knowledge. There lies before us then the ideal of the good social life, which, if our science be sound, should be built up consistently with the conclusions and conceptions of social science.

This we may illustrate. It is made abundantly clear by social science, as we have shown, that unless the individual and the family be strong and self-progressive, society cannot be strong. The good social life depends on this. The individual and the family are continually educated by an imitative and also by a reasoned give-and-take of thought and suggestion between other individuals and families and themselves. Individuals have a dramatic instinct. Each, especially in childhood and youth, thinks out what he

observes, by associating it with a kind of other or 'acting' self. What others do he embodies in an 'actor' self, and so he rejects or he assimilates it. And then in turn what he has assimilated, he uses for a kind of propaganda, that underlies his statements and his actions. What he believes, he disseminates, possibly, overtly and consciously, but often in greatest measure incidentally and unconsciously. "What we do is always a function of what we think." Thus social vitality is preserved and strengthened, and social growth takes place at the formative stages of life. Thus, too, the common education of the members of society is enforced, and what Professor Baldwin calls the social judgment is acquired. (James M. Baldwin: *Social and Ethical Interpretation in Mental Development*, pp. 93, 80, 36): "The eligible candidate for social life," he says, "must have a good judgment, as represented by the common standards of judgment of his people." "The socially unfit person is the person of poor judgment."

And so equally of the family considered as a group of mutually related members. "The interests of the family group are reflected in the wants of each member of the group. . . . Nothing but an upheaval of the foundations of personality can eradicate the sense of social

solidarity in every child in a family. And the sanction for family life and its permanent safeguard is here." "To eradicate the family instinct in the animal is to destroy his private chance of survival."

Here we have the elements of a kind of standard which may be considered in its completeness in relation to the *data* of the several social sciences, economics, ethics, and so on. Whatever proposal we may make, it must be considered primarily in the light of completing the social ability of the family and the individual as self-adjustive, self-expansive parts of the social organism. That in one chief relation sets our standard of the good social life according to social science. And, further, the good social judgment consists in a large degree in the ability to make a kind of correlation of the several scientific factors in any particular issue, and in giving to each its due place in decision and conduct. We say 'scientific factors,' but to the normal mind the factors will hardly seem connected each with its particular science. The judgment is of a more elemental nature, partly deliberative, partly, if one may so use the word, instinctive. Throughout, however, the judgment is steadied by a regard for the good social life, conceived as a definite and attainable whole,

according to the standing or outlook of the individual.

But the view which socialism adopts, coupled with the promises which it makes to the people, is the opposite of all this. It ignores the standard that social science would suggest. To it practically the question is one of more or less want, more or less poverty, more or less riches. If the gaps be filled up the evils will be met. In this sense it may be promised, as the supporters of the Minority Report of the Commission promise, that there shall be no more destitution. For everybody whose means are less than a certain amount becomes qualified for a subsidy, be it medical relief, an aliment, or a pension, coupled with whatever conditions a liberal state may impose. This ignores all the self-acting elements of society, all its springs of growth. The liberal supply of relief (for after all it is that) which is to smother destitution so that it shall appear no longer, will of itself destroy the structure of society. The pressure of life makes for the strength of life. No conditions attached to relief given to all who seek it or to all who are to be sought out in order that they may accept it, can be vital, as the conditions which social life itself imposes are vital, for the reinforcement of character and the prevention of decadence.

That, again, so far as our knowledge goes, may be said to be proven. We want, therefore, not an enormous and much enlarged institutionalism, and a yet larger system of allowances, but, what leads us to quite other methods, the reinforcement of social habit, as far as may be, without relief, and, when assistance is necessary, still to keep that end clearly in view. Destitution cannot disappear. Every group of competing men is continually producing it. The man who fails passes down along the road to destitution, whether he can stop himself or be stopped before he reaches it or not.

Quite akin to these promises for the "abolition" of destitution is the proposal that those in distress should be treated by several authorities according to the age of the claimant instead of according to his condition individually and in relation to the family of which he is a member. Social experience has shown that the treatment of the family as a whole is productive of the best results, and that this should be the rule, and any other method the exception. This method is consistent with the structure and purposes of the family, and it leads to the strengthening of social judgment and capacity. But there seems to be a kind of completeness in setting out, for children one authority, be they in want or not in want ;

for the able-bodied one authority, be they unemployed, or vagrant, or criminally idle; for the aged one authority, and for the sick and infirm one authority. Yet socially no scheme could be less complete. In accordance with it the child is treated without regard to the father or mother, the grandmother without regard to either, and the family, on the mutual relations of which each alike rests, is ignored. Here, indeed, we have a wrong standard. The method affords no basis for social advance or reconstruction. It sets aside a main condition of the good social life by running counter to the lines of social structure, and promoting individual relief apart from the stimulation of the social judgment. This, again, is socialism.

We have referred to the general will and its identification with justice. There is always fear lest the general will itself be brought down to injustice. It may be warped by the pressure of the counsellors of the nation. They may appeal to the weakness of the people, and may carry by vote an enfeebling policy—a policy that consists of a distribution of goods to the people under new forms and new disguises, but which is not just. It is not just because it contravenes the ordered structure and the growth of society itself. For justice lies not in the distribution

or non-distribution of means with a view to equality, but in the development and enforcement of function with a view to the fulfilment of duty.

If this sketch of the growth of sociology be correct, sociology, as it becomes more complete, is pointing out with ever more emphatic clearness the conditions of social progress. It is, for those who will seek it, drawing together the several social sciences and co-ordinating their conclusions as the science of the structure and development of society and of the groups that compose it and of social well-being.

For Charity a new position is gained. It finds in the social sciences and sociology new allies and counsellors. To them it now becomes definitely related.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE ORGANIZATION OF CHARITY.

THE springs of charity lie in sympathy and religion, and, one would now add, in science. To organize it is to give to it the 'ordered nature' of an organic whole, to give it a definite social purpose, and to associate the members of the community with it for the fulfilment of that purpose. This in turn depends on the recognition of common principles, the adoption of a common method, self-discipline and training, and co-operation. In a mass of people there may be a large variation in motives coincident with much unity in action. Thus in charity there may be an acceptance of a common social purpose, though one may be stirred to fulfil it by impulses such as moved St. Francis or George Herbert, and others by motives such as influenced Howard or Dr. Chalmers, a modern poor-law reformer like Sir George Nicholls, or a pioneer of modern charitable thought such as Edward Denison. The method of charity as now

understood may be judged by its fruits. So tested, it does best. Socially this is the plain and actual justification of it as right. Accepting, then, the principles of charity, we pass to its method in relation to assistance and relief. Details may vary, but on the following points there is general agreement among students and workers :

THE COMMITTEE OR CONFERENCE.

There are usually three kinds of local relief: the public or poor-law relief, and relief connected with religious agencies; and besides these, there is the relief of endowments, societies, and charitable persons. Therefore, as a condition precedent to all organization, there must be some local centre of association for information and common help. A town should be divided for this purpose into manageable areas coincident with parishes or poor-law divisions, or other districts. Subject to an acceptance of general principles, those engaged in charity should be members of a local conference or committee, or allied to it. The committee would thus be the rallying-point of a large and somewhat loosely knit association of friends and workers.

For the discussion of large general questions a larger and somewhat representative body or council of social welfare may be of service. It

may canvass new projects and consider measures for the assistance of particular classes or the suppression of particular evils. This method, so far as it has gone, has proved useful.

INQUIRY, AID, AND REGISTRATION.

The object of inquiry is to ascertain the actual causes of distress or dependence; and to carry on the work there must usually be a staff of several honorary and one or two paid workers. Two methods may be adopted: to inquire in regard to applications for help with a view to forming some plan of material help or friendly aid, or both, which will lead to the ultimate self-support of the family and its members, and, under certain conditions, in the case of the aged or sick, to their continuous or their sufficient help; or to ascertain the facts partly at once, partly by degrees, and then to form and carry out some plan of help, or to continue to befriend the family in need of help, in the hope of bringing them to conditions of self-support, leaving the work of relief entirely to other agencies. The committee in neither case should be a relief committee—itsself a direct source of relief. On the former method it has usually no relief fund, but it raises from relations, employers, charities, and

charitable persons the relief required, according to the plan of help agreed upon, unless, indeed, it is better not to relieve the case, or to leave it to the poor-law. The committee thus makes itself responsible for endeavouring to the best of its ability to raise the necessary relief, and acts as trustee for those who co-operate with it from the outside, in such a way as to keep all the natural obligations that lie within the inner circles of a self-supporting community intact and to give them full scope. On the latter method the work of relief is left to general charity, or to private persons, or to the poor-law; and the effort is made to help the family to self-support by a friendly visitor. This procedure is that adopted by the associated charities in Boston, Mass., and other similar societies in America and elsewhere. It is akin also to that adopted in the municipal system of relief in Elberfeld—which has become, with many variations in detail, the standard method of poor relief in Germany. The method of associated help, combined with personal work, represents the usual practice of charity organization societies. *Mutatis mutandis*, the plan can be adopted on the simplest scale in parochial or other relief committees, subject to the safeguards of sufficient training and settled method.

In general the inquiry should cover the following points: names and address, the nature and causes of the distress, slight or serious, affecting the family as a whole or any member of the family, the ages of the family, previous addresses, past employment and wages, present income, rent and liabilities, membership of friendly or other society, and savings, relations, relief (if any) from any source. These points should be verified, and reference should be made to the clergy, the poor-law authorities, and others, to ascertain if they know the applicant. The result should be to show how the applicant has been living, and what are the sources of possible help, and also what is his character. The problem, however, is not whether the person is 'deserving' or 'undeserving,' but whether, granted the facts, the distress can be stayed and self-support attained. If the help can be given privately from within the circle of the family, so much the better. Sometimes it may be best to advise, but not to interfere. In some cases but little help may be necessary; in others again the friendly relation between applicant and friend may last for months and even years. Usually in charitable work the question of the kind of relief available—money, tickets, clothes, etc.—governs the decision how

the case should be assisted. But this is quite wrong: the opposite is the true rule. The wants of the case, rightly understood, should govern the decision as to what charity should do and what it should provide.

Cases at some centres are overwhelming in number, as at the out-patient and casualty departments of a hospital or at a 'shelter,' where the admissions are made without inquiry, and subject practically to no restrictions; but when there is inquiry, and each case is seriously considered and aided with a view to self-support, the numbers will seldom be overwhelming. On this plan appeal is made to the strength of the applicant, and requires an effort on his part. Indiscriminate relief, on the other hand, attracts the applicant by an appeal to his weakness, and it requires of him no effort. Hence, apart even from the differentiating effect of inquiry, one method makes applicants, the other limits their number, although on the latter plan much more strenuous endeavours be made to assist the lesser number of claimants.

For the routine work of the office an extremely simple system of records with card index, etc., has been devised. In some cities, particularly in the United States of America, there is a

central registration of cases,¹ notified by individual charities, poor-relief authorities, and private persons. This should be adopted generally. The system of charity organization or associated charity, it will be seen, allows of the utmost variety of treatment, according to the difficulties in each instance and the remedies available, and gives the utmost scope for personal work.

TRAINING.

If charitable work is an art, those who undertake it must needs be trained both in practice and method and in judgment. It requires, too, that self-discipline which blends intelligence with emotion, and so endows emotion with strength and purpose. In times of distress a reserve of trained workers is of the utmost service. At all times they do more than others and produce, socially, better results; and when there is general distress of any kind they do not lose their heads like new recruits, but prevent at least some of the mischief that comes of the panic which often takes possession of a community, when distress is apprehended, and leads to wild distributions of relief. Also

¹The system is now growing apace in London in connexion with the London Charity Organization Society.

trained workers make the most useful poor-law guardians, health visitors, school visitors, trustees of charities, secretaries of charitable societies, and district visitors. All clergy and ministers, and all medical men who have to be engaged in the administration of medical relief, should learn the art of charity. Poor-law guardians are usually elected on political or general grounds, and, generally speaking, have no special knowledge of good methods of charity; and trustees are seldom appointed on the score of their qualifications on this head. To provide the necessary education in charity there should be competent helpers and teachers at charity organization committees and elsewhere, and an alliance for this purpose should be formed between them and professors and teachers of moral science and economics and the 'Settlements.' This is now being done in London and Liverpool, Boston and New York, and elsewhere. Those who study social problems in connexion with what a doctor would call 'cases' or 'practice' see the limits and the falsity of schemes that on paper seem logical enough. This puts a check on the influence of scheme-building and that literary sensationalism which makes capital out of social conditions.

CO-OPERATION.

Organization in charity depends on extensive co-operation, and ultimately on the acceptance of common views. This comes but slowly. But with much tribulation the goal may be reached, if in case after case the effort is made to provide friendly help through charities and private persons, unless, as may well be, it should seem best not to interfere, but to leave the applicant to apply to the administrators of public relief. Experience of what is right and wrong in charity is thus gained on both sides. Many sources may have to be utilized for aid of different kinds even in a single case, and for the prevention of distress co-operation with municipal authorities, poor-law authorities, with members of friendly societies and with provident and thrift agencies is indispensable. But the whole question has now been stated and discussed anew in the Majority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress.

One point, however, may be overlooked, and should be definitely stated. Charities are judged of in the gross—so much money—what number relieved? Or so many societies—should they not be recast and many of them combined? This criticism, as a rule, is superficial and mis-

leading. Charities represent so many social endeavours made to meet social needs; and they concentrate a certain definite amount of force. They draw together groups of friends and fellow-workers. They are not mere material units that can be cut and divided and glued together. The number of the charities is not in itself necessarily an evil. They are, as a rule, economically managed, and they fulfil different functions. They naturally group themselves, and out of this grouping there naturally arises organization. This movement in this direction is now constant. But the most valuable organization is that which grows out of case work. In this way new relations are continually created between charity and charity, and there is a growing unity of endeavour and an increased usefulness, of which most people are usually quite ignorant. To force amalgamation or amplification is merely to create difficulties and to fail to organize. Each society naturally claims to be the master of its own existence. If, however, there is association in work a far more valuable unity arises, a unity that is founded on friendship and a dominant common interest. The advance in this kind of organization in London during the past thirty years has been very marked.

CHAPTER XXXVII

PARTICULAR QUESTIONS OF CHARITABLE
ADMINISTRATION.

CHARITY AND THE POOR-LAW.

WHERE there is accord between charity and the poor-law pauperism, unnecessary and injurious dependence, may be largely reduced. The poor-law in most countries has at its disposal certain institutional relief and out-door allowances, but it has no means of devising plans of help which may prevent application to the rates or 'take' people 'off' the rates. Thus a widow in the first days of widowhood applies and receives an allowance according to the number of her children. Helped at the outset by charity on some definite plan, she may become self-supporting; and if her family be large one or two of her children may be placed in schools by the guardians, while she maintains the remaining children and herself. As far as possible there should be a division

of labour between the poor-law and charity. Except where some plan such as that just mentioned is adopted, one or the other should take whole charge of the case relieved. There should be no supplementation of poor-law relief by charity. This will weaken the strength and dissipate the resources of charity without adding to the efficiency of the poor-law. Unless the guardians adopt an out-door relief policy, rightly restrictive and yet directed to the proper and sufficient treatment of the individual case, there is no scope for any useful division of labour between them and charity; for the many cases which, taken in time, charity might save from pauperism, they will draw into chronic dependence by mere allowances a very much larger number. But if there is a restrictive out-door policy, so far as relief is necessary, charity may undertake to meet on its own lines distress which the poor-law would otherwise have met by allowances, and, subject to the assistance of urgent cases, poor-law relief may thus by degrees become institutional only. Then, in the main, natural social forces would come into play, and dependence on any form of *annona civica* would cease.

MEDICAL RELIEF.

Hospitals are of the greatest service to the poor and to those who want to help them thoroughly. Yet their unrestricted admission of all-comers cannot but have injurious results. Open-handed hospitality always creates mendicants. This is what the hospitals and free dispensaries offer in the out-patient and casualty departments, and they have created a class of hospital mendicants. The cases are quickly dealt with, without inquiry and without regard to home conditions. The medical man in the hospital does not co-operate with any fellow-workers outside the hospital. Where his physic or advice ceases to operate his usefulness ceases. He regards no conditions of morality. In a large number of cases drink or vice is the cause of application, and the cure of the patient is dependent on moral conditions; but he returns home, drinks, and may beat his wife, and then on another visit to the hospital he will again be physicked, and so on. The man is not even referred to the poor-law infirmary for relief. Nor are conditions of home sanitation regarded. One cause of constant sickness is thus entirely overlooked, while drugs, otherwise unnecessary, are constantly given at the

hospital. The hospitals are thus large isolated relief stations which are creating a new kind of pauperism. So far as the patients can pay—and many can do so—the general practitioners, to whom they would otherwise go, are deprived of their gains. Still worse is it when the hospital itself charges a fee in its out-patient department. The relief is then claimed even more absolutely as a right, and the general practitioners are still further injured. The doctors, as a medical staff, are not only medical men, but, whether they recognize the fact or not, they are also almsgivers or almoners; what they give is relief. Yet few or none of them have ever been trained for that work, and consequently they do not realize how very advantageous, even for the cure of their own patients, would be a thorough treatment of each case both at the hospital and outside it. Nor can they understand how their methods at present protract sickness and promote habitual dependence. Were this side of their work studied by them in any way they would be the first, probably, to press upon the governors of their hospitals the necessity for a change. Unfortunately, at present the governors are themselves untrained, and to finance the hospital and to make it a good institution is

their sole object. Hospitals, however, are, after all, only a part of the general administration of charity, though as they are now managed they have seldom any systematic connexion with that administration. Nor is there any co-ordination between the several hospitals and dispensaries. If one rightly refuses further treatment to certain applicants, they have only to wander to some other hospital, there to be admitted with little or no scrutiny. For usually out-patients and casualty patients are not even registered, nor can they be identified if they apply again. Practically they come and go at will. The definite limitation of cases, according to some standard of effectual work, association with general charity, the employment of a sufficient number of trained almoners¹ for attending to the out-patients and casualty patients at the Hospital, inquiry, and a just regard for the interests of general practitioners, are stepping-stones to reform. In towns where medical charities are numerous a representative board would promote mutual help and organization.

The Poor Law Commission (1909) has in its

¹For details as to the aims and work of Hospital Almoners see papers published by the London Charity Organization Society.

Majority. Report proposed very useful measures for the co-ordination of medical assistance, public, voluntary, and provident, which, if adopted, should put an end to many pressing evils in this branch of work.¹

ENDOWED CHARITIES.

Like the poor-law, endowed charities may be permanent institutions established to meet what should be passing and decreasing needs. Administered as they usually are in isolation—apart from the living voluntary charities of the generation, and consisting often of small trusts difficult to utilize satisfactorily, they tend to create a permanent demand which they meet by fixed quantities of relief. Also, as a rule, they make no systematic inquiries with a view to the verification of the statements of the applicants, for they have no staff for these purposes; nor have they the assistance of almoners or friendly visitors. Nor does the relief which they give form part of any plan of help in conjunction with other aid from without; nor is the administration subject to frequent inspection, as in the case of the poor-law. All these conditions have led to a want of progress in the actual admini-

¹See below, p. 450.

stration of endowed charities, in regard to which it is often very difficult to prevent the exercise of an undue patronage. But there is no reason why these charities should not become a responsible but voluntary colleague in the country's administration. It was never intended that the poor-law should extinguish the endowed charities, still less, as statistics now prove, that where endowments abound the rate of pauperism should often be considerably above the average of the rest of the country. This shows that these charities often foster pauperism instead of preventing it. As a step to reform, the publication of an annual register of endowed charities in England and Wales is greatly needed. The consolidating schemes of the charity commissioners have done much good; still more may be done in some counties by extending to the county the benefits of the charities of well-endowed towns, as has been accomplished by the extension of the eleemosynary endowments of the City of London to the metropolitan police area. Nor, again, until quite lately, and that as yet only in a few schemes, has the principle been adopted that pensions or other relief should be given only in supplementation of the relief ^{se.} relations, former employers, and friends, and ^{Soc.}

not in substitution of it. This, coupled with good methods of inquiry and supervision, has proved very beneficial. Hitherto, however, to a large extent endowed charities, it must be admitted, have tended to weaken the family and to pauperize.

THE RELIEF OF SCHOOL CHILDREN.

In many places funds used to be raised for the relief of school children by the supply of meals during the winter and spring, subject to the authorization of the Board of Education, the Elementary Education (Provision of Meals) Act, 1906, now enables the Education Authorities to supply meals out of the rates; and what was formerly a voluntary charge has now become a charge on the rates. Frequently a very large number of the children at a school are said to be underfed, but inquiry shows that such statements may be taken as altogether excessive. They are sometimes based on information drawn from the children at school, or sometimes on general deductions; they are seldom founded on any systematic and competent inquiry at the homes. When this has been made, the numbers dwindle to comparatively small proportions. Teachers of experience have noted the effect of the meals in weakening the independence

of the family. While they are forthcoming, women sometimes give up cooking meals at home, use their money for other things, and tell the child he can get his meal at school. Great temptations are put before a parent to neglect her family, and very much distress is due to this. The meals stimulate this neglect—just at a time when, owing to the age of her children, the mother's care is most needed, and just in those families where the temptation is greatest, and where the family instinct should be strengthened. Considered from the point of view of meeting, by eleemosynary provision, a normal economic demand for food, intervention can only have one result. The demand must continue to outstrip the supply, so long as there are resources available on the one side, and until, on the other side, the desire of the social class, that is chiefly exposed to the temptations of dependence in relation to such relief, has been satisfied. If the provision be made from the resources of local or general taxation, the largeness of the fund available will allow practically of an unlimited expansion of the supply of food. If the provision be made from voluntary sources, in some measure limited, therefore, and less certain, this very fact will tend to circumscribe

demand and limit the offer of relief. It is indeed the problem of poor-law relief in 1832 over again. The relief provided by local taxation practically unlimited will create a mass of constant claimants, with a kind of assumed right to aid based on the payment of rates; while voluntary relief, whatever its shortcomings, will be less injurious, because it is less amply endowed. In Paris the municipal subvention for meals rose from 545,900 francs in 1892 to 1,000,000 in 1904. Between 1894 and 1904 there was an increase of nine per cent. in the school population; and an increase of twenty-eight per cent. in the municipal grant. In that period the contributions from the local school funds (*caisses des écoles*) decreased thirty-six per cent.; while the voluntary contributions otherwise received were insignificant, and the payments for meals increased two per cent.¹

But the subject has been lately considered from a somewhat different standpoint (cf. the Reports of the Scottish Royal Commission on Physical Education, 1903; of the Interdepart-

¹ London experience confirms this. In 1909-10 (March 31), as against the previous year, the meals provided under the Elementary Education (Supply of Meals) Act rose seventy per cent.—to 7,702,526, and cost £62,260 *plus* establishment expenses.

mental Committees on Physical Deterioration, 1905; and on Medical Inspection and the Feeding of School Children, 1905; also the report of the Special Committee of the Charity Organization Society on "the Assistance of School Children," 1893). After careful investigations, medical officers especially have drawn attention to the low physical condition of children in schools in the poorer parts of our large towns, their low stature, their physical defects, the improper food supplied to them at home, their uncleanness, their want of decent bringing up, and sometimes their want of food. Other inquiries have shown that, as women more usually became breadwinners, their children received less attention, and the home and its duties were neglected, while in the lowest sections of the poorer classes social irresponsibility reached its maximum. Cheap, but often quite improper food, is provided, and infant mortality, which is largely preventible, remains as high as ever, though adult life is longer. This, with a marked decrease in the birth-rate in recent years has, it may be said, opened out a new field for charitable effort and social work. Science is, at each revision of the problem, making its task more definite. Actually the mere demand for meals stands for less;

the reform of the conditions of the home for more. So it was hoped that instead of making school meals a charge on the rates, as Parliament has done, it would be content to leave it a voluntary charge, while the medical inspection of elementary schools would be made universal; that representative relief committees would be formed for schools or groups of schools; that cases of want or distress among the school children would be dealt with individually in connexion with their families, and that where necessary day schools should be established on the lines of day industrial schools. There is a hope that in London the Children's Care Committees working in these lines and co-operating closely with general and personal charity, and, when necessary, with the Poor Law, may save the situation.¹

EXCEPTIONAL DISTRESS.

At a time of exceptional distress the following suggestions, founded on much English experience, may be of service. (Cf. Report of Special Committee of the Charity Organization Society on the best means of dealing with exceptional distress, 1886.) Usually at such

¹The present difficulties would probably disappear, if school relief were included in the system of Public Assistance recommended by the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws.

a time proposals are made to establish special funds, and to provide employment to men and women out of work. But it is best, if possible, and as long as possible, to rely on existing agencies and to strengthen them. Round them there are usually workers more or less trained. A new fund usually draws to it new people, many of whom may not have had any special experience at all. If a new fund is inevitable, it is best that it should make its grants to existing agencies after consultation with them. In any case a clear policy should be adopted, and people should keep their heads. The exaggeration of feeling at a time of apprehended or actual distress is sometimes extraordinary, and the unwise action which it prompts is often a cause of continuing pauperism afterwards.

Where there is public or poor-law relief the following plan may be adopted: In any large town there are usually different recognized poor-law, charitable, or other areas. The local people already at work in these areas should be formed into local committees. In each case a quick inquiry should be made, and the relieving officer communicated with, some central facts verified, and the home visited. Roughly, cases may be divided into three classes: the irresponsible casual labouring class; a middle

class of men with decent homes, who have made no provision for the future, and are not members of either friendly society or trades union; and a third class, who have made some provision. These usually are affected last of all; at all hazards they should be kept from receiving public relief, and should be helped, as far as possible, privately and personally. If there are public works, the second class might be referred to them; if there are not, probably some should be left to the poor-law, some assisted in the same way as members of class three. Much would turn upon the family and the home. The first class should be left to the poor-law.

Working men of independent position, who, as members of a friendly society or are otherwise well qualified for the task, should be called into consultation. The relief should be settled according to the requirements of each case, but, if the pressure is great, at first at least it may be necessary to make grants according to some generally sufficient scale. There should be as constant a revision of cases as time permits. Great care should be taken to stop the relief as soon as possible, and to do nothing to make it the stepping-stone to permanent dependence.

If employment be provided it should be work within the skill of all; it should be fairly remunerated, so that at least the scantiness of the pay may not be an excuse for neglect; and it should be paid for according to measured or piece work. The discipline should be strict, though due regard should be paid at first to those unaccustomed to digging or earthwork. In England and Wales the guardians have power to open labour yards. These, like charities which provide work, tend to attract and keep in employment a low class of labourer or workman, who finds it pays him to use the institution as a convenience. It is best, therefore, to avoid the opening of a labour yard if possible. If it is opened, the discipline should be very strict, and when there is laziness or insubordination, relief in the workhouse should at once be offered. The relief furnished to men employed in a labour yard, of which in England at least half has to be given in kind, should, it has been said, be dealt out from day to day. This leads to the men giving up the work sooner than they otherwise would. They have less to spend at a time.¹

¹This paragraph represents a practice found useful in the past in emergencies. Important changes in regard to the kind and variety of offer available for able-bodied persons in con-

EMPLOYMENT RELIEF.

In the last few years in Great Britain a great change has taken place in regard to the provision of employment in connexion with the state. Since about 1890 there has been a feeling that men in distress from want of employment should not be dealt with by the poor-law. A circular letter issued by the Local Government Board in 1886, and subsequently in 1895, coincided with this feeling. It was addressed to town councils and other local authorities, asking them to provide work (1) which will not involve the stigma of pauperism; (2) which all can perform, whatever may have been their previous avocations; and (3) which does not compete with that of other labourers at present in employment. This circular led to the vestries, and subsequently the borough councils, in many districts becoming partially recognized relief authorities for the unemployed, concurrently with the poor-law. It was a fatal step. If there was difficulty, it should have been met by a revision of the Poor Law,

nexion with the Poor Law are recommended by the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress in the Majority Report. The adoption of these would alter the conditions of such relief materially in some directions. (See p. 452.)

in relation to the kind of offer which it made to persons in distress, through want of employment, not by the establishment of what were practically new relief authorities outside the Poor Law. Much confusion resulted. The local authorities had seldom any suitable organization for the investigation of applications. It was difficult to supply work on the terms required; and the work was often ill done and costly. Also it was found that the same set of people would apply year after year, unskilled labourers usually out of work part of the winter or men habitually 'unemployed.' As on other occasions when public work was provided, very few of the applicants were found to be artisans, or members of trades unions or of friendly societies.

In 1904 Mr. Long, then President of the Local Government Board, proposed that local voluntary distress committees should be established in London, consisting of poor-law guardians and members of town councils and others, supervised more or less by a central committee and ultimately by the Local Government Board. This organization was set on foot, and large sums were subscribed for its work. The report on the results of the movement was somewhat doubtful (Report, London Unemployed

Fund, 1904-5, p. 101, etc.), but in 1905 the Unemployed Workmen's Act was passed, and in London and elsewhere distress committees, like the voluntary committees of the previous year, were established by statute. It was enacted that for establishment expenses, emigration and removal, labour exchanges, and the acquisition of land a halfpenny rate might be levied, but that the rate would not be available for the remuneration of men employed. For this purpose (1905-6) a large charitable fund was raised. The Act has been passed for three years. A training farm at Hollesley Bay has been acquired, and it has been hoped to train Londoners there to become fit for agricultural work. The evidence upon which the whole experiment may be judged is perhaps hardly complete. The experiment has been subjected to several changes of policy; and partly perhaps on that ground it cannot be said to be satisfactory, judged by results. But one or two points are important: (1) Something very like the 'right to labour' has been granted by the legislature; (2) this has been done apart from the conditions required by the poor-laws and orders of the Local Government Board on poor relief and without imposing disfranchisement on the men em-

ployed; (3) a labour rate has not been levied, but a rate has been levied in aid of the provision of employment; (4) if the line of development that the Act suggests be followed, it will tend to create a class of 'unemployed,' unskilled labourers of varying grades of industry who may become the dependent and state-supported proletarians of modern urban life. Thus, unless the administration be extremely rigorous, once more will a kind of serfdom be established, to be, as some would say, taken over hereafter by the socialist state.

The Royal Commission on the Poor Laws in its Majority Report recommend several important changes in Poor Law administration to meet the needs of our modern society. To this reference is made in the next chapter. They have altogether discountenanced the policy of opening new relief departments outside 'Public Assistance,' the policy initiated by Mr. Chamberlain. Its inutility and unsatisfactory results have become self-evident. (Report: Comm., Part VI.) The establishment of 'Colonies,' managed on the lines of industrial employment and prison discipline, for the reception of vagrants and various classes of offenders, such, for instance, as those who keep going in and out of the workhouses, is almost universally admitted to be necessary.

(Report: Comm. on Poor Laws (1909), and Report of the Labour Colonies Committee of the Commission.)

VAGRANCY.

In some of the English colonies Homeric hospitality still prevails, but by degrees the station-house or some refuge for wayfarers and vagrants is established in the towns as they grow more populous. Finally, some system of labour in exchange for relief is evolved. At first this is voluntary, afterwards it is officially recognized, and finally it may become part of the system of public relief. As bad years come, these changes are made step by step. In England the vagrant or wayfarer is tolerated and discouraged, but not kept employed. He should be under greater pressure to maintain himself, it is thought. The provision made for him in different parts of the country is far from uniform, but now, usually, at least in the larger towns, after he has had a bath and food, he is admitted to a separate room or cell in a casual ward. Before he leaves he has to do a task of work, and, subject to the discretion of the master, he is detained two nights. This plan has reduced local vagrancy, and, if it were universally adopted, clean accom-

modation would everywhere be provided for the vagrant without the attractions of a common or 'associate' ward; and probably vagrancy would diminish still further.¹ It seems almost needless to say that in these circumstances, at any rate, casual alms should not be given to vagrants. They know much better how to provide for themselves than the almsgiver imagines, for vagrancy is in the main a mode of life, not the result of any casual difficulty. Vagrancy and criminality are also nearly allied. The magistrate, therefore, rather than the almsgiver, should usually interfere; and, as a rule, where the magistrates are strict, vagrancy in a county diminishes. An interdepartmental committee (1906), taking generally this line, has reported in favour of vagrants being placed entirely under police control, and it has recommended a system of wayfarers' tickets for men on the roads who are not habitual vagrants and the committal of men likely to become habitual vagrants to certified labour colonies for not less than six months. Still undoubtedly

¹Since 1894 the figures of vagrancy have been higher; and the increase has held good to the present day. A night count, the best test, was introduced in 1897. The count of January 1 in that year was 6922. In 1908 it was 9747. This count refers only to vagrants relieved by the poor-law. There are no doubt other vagrants, but of them it is not possible to do more than make rough estimates.

vagrancy has its economic side. In a bad year the number of tramps is increased by the addition of unskilled labourers, who are soonest discharged when work is slack. As a part-voluntary system under official recognition the German *Arbeiter-Kolonien* are of interest. This in a measure has led to the introduction of labour homes in England, the justification of which should be that they recruit the energy of the men who find their way to them, and enable them to earn a living which they could not do otherwise. In a small percentage of cases this result may be achieved. Charitable refuges or philanthropic common lodging-houses, usually established in districts where this class already congregate, only aggravate the difficulty. They give additional attractions to a vagrant and casual life, and make it more endurable. They also make it comparatively easy to avoid the responsibilities of family life, and, in so far as they do this, they are clearly injurious to the community.

There are thus two ways of treating vagrants. One is to tolerate them. To assume, rightly or wrongly, that the vagrant cannot be bettered by treatment, and to let him have the facilities of the road and necessary relief and a task of work. If he comes under the law to punish

him, and so far to deter him. This method takes no count of the voluntary provision for the vagrant, which on a large scale is of comparatively recent growth. Its success preceded this significant development.

The other way is that of treatment with employment and with or without detention. This is the modern method, and it has yet to be more fully tried to justify itself. This method in a limited form—that of labour colonies with detention, the Departmental Committee has advocated. Without detention it is the method of the *Arbeiter-Kolonien*, the labour homes of the Church Army, and the shelters and other institutions of the Salvation Army. These societies have now been active for many years, but they have made no impression on the vagrancy of the country, which has increased since 1897. In London and in some cities the state of vagrancy, nightly wandering, and homelessness calls for some decision. The number of casual paupers relieved in the casual wards of the Metropolis has hardly increased, but the voluntary provision made for vagrants and casuals is very large, and seems ever to increase in order to meet an increasing demand. In these circumstances it may be well to treat the vagrant and homeless of the Metropolis by the method

of labour colonies, experimentally at least, as suggested by the Departmental Committee, even if provision were not at once made with that object for the country generally. Certainly in the Metropolis a strong and unified administration is necessary, and thorough interchange of information and regular co-operation between the administrators of casual wards and the managers of voluntary homes and refuges. Every case should be dealt with, as it arises, in connexion with some single central office, or a few with organized local centres; and according to the circumstances penal labour colonies, voluntary refuges and colonies, and the poor-law, should each be turned to account. A positive policy of this kind might lead us back to realities and prove whether the extension of voluntary interference has been a disservice or not. The perpetual circulation of the vagrant in London would be stopped. Any that could be helped properly would be helped.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE
POOR LAWS AND RELIEF OF DISTRESS.

SINCE the above paragraphs were written, almost in their present form, the report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws has been published, and it has been thought well to conclude these notes with a statement of our subject as it stands in the light of that report.

Our notes have touched on various phases of a movement of thought which at different times has had to cope with what in these days we call the problem of city life. Among many questions this one stands conspicuous: and the report of the Commission is to a large extent a report on the means of dealing with want and distress in cities. It is in regard to this that some policy, some solution, is desired.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST.

It may be argued that the past has no suggestions for us: human nature has altered:

economic and other conditions have changed: we call the problem by the same name, but in reality it is a different problem concealed under mere similarity in the use of terms. But such a view is superficial and hardly tenable. The meaning of history depends upon an actual continuity in human thought and understanding. We could not repeat the words or appreciate the value of the thought of past generations if it were not so. In a sense human nature has indeed changed. A Greek is not an Englishman. But the change is as between members of the same stock, and in spite of differences it is but a variation within the lines of common kinship. Nor is economic government so different as at first sight it appears. The general methods of trade and commerce remain very similar. Slavery, it is true, has now given way to freedom, and the conditions of industry and domestic life are altered. But life in large cities has many common characteristics, whether in ancient or modern times. There is always the problem of the prevention of dependence, social weakness, and degradation in certain classes of the population, or, if prevention and reform are impossible, there remains the problem of the maintenance of the less fit, and their preservation with the least harm to the community at large. Thus, with

many differences, there is an underlying unity of experience.

At Athens the care of the large population of slaves devolved on their masters. In old age and sickness they were not a public charge, though the masters may in their ailments have taken advantage of free medical relief. The great industrial concerns of the day were mostly worked by slave labour, but in so far as this was the case, industry bore its own burthens and provided for its own workmen. For the freemen the State provided by allowances which enabled them to serve on juries, to attend the assemblies, and to take part in the great festivals. If they had property of less than £12 in value, and were unable to support themselves owing to bodily defects or infirmity, they might receive an allowance sufficient for their maintenance, and there were distributions of corn.

At Rome also the care of the large population of slaves rested with their masters. They were not a public charge. For the citizens there was corn at half price, and subsequently free corn, amounting practically to a maintenance. Clients too received the sportula from their patrons. The methods of slave labour, it would seem, eventually ousted and ruined the free industrial corporations, and these in

their final development became rigidly managed industrial castes. But no doubt in general the demands of a large city required a large supply of labour and induced much trading. A philanthropic care of the poor individually did not exist.

At Constantinople there were allowances of corn, imperial gifts and allowances, and many institutions: and there would appear to have been an advance; but we lack information sadly. With a decrease of slavery, unless coupled with a growing independence, the maintenance of the poor would become an additional charge on the public and on the almsgiver.

At Athens and Rome there was found no way of escape. The people drifted to the city became unfit for work, were by degrees incurably demoralized, and in the process very many of them had simply to be maintained. There was no immediate and far-reaching reform: there were only degrees of decay. Of course these changes worked slowly: and probably nothing better than a more or less contented dependence was expected of the poor.¹

In all these great cities a large part of the

¹ The picture of Greece after the Roman spoliations is that of a country reduced to a disastrous poverty by depopulation. Rome after the creation of Constantinople became a kind of majestic provincial town.

people became pauperized. They lost their sense of independence, their energy, and their vitality. Prosperity brought changes, the effect of which they were not strong enough to bear. The community did not make one city. Rich and poor did not come together. Neither could heal or help the other. Our modern problem is urban, and the question before the Royal Commission was chiefly this: granted an urban population with certain strata of weak and impoverished members, how can their ruin be prevented, so that they may rather advance than degenerate as the generations succeed one another? The question affects most of our large towns, but especially London—the English Rome. Like our predecessors, we who might help may go through the phases of pity, relief, and indifference, and then turning away from the problem, some of us may pass to pleasure and extravagance, and some may withdraw from the responsibilities of life, a withdrawal which may take many forms and may perhaps lead to a reactionary asceticism. All these pathways may lead away from the fulfilment and enforcement of social obligation, may lead through indifference down to mere social nullity and annihilation.

What, then, are the strata of the weak and impoverished? Mr. Charles Booth in 1889 classi-

fied the London population. Class A, the lowest class, he defined as consisting of "some occasional labourers, street sellers, loafers, criminals, and semi-criminals." This class, he said, is recruited with adult men (and women) from all the other classes. Class B he notes "Casual earnings—very poor." "This class, and especially the labour part of it," he says, "is not one in which men are born and live and die, so much as a deposit of those who from mental, moral, and physical reasons are incapable of better work." Class C he marks as "Intermittent earnings"—"Labourers who usually work by the job or who are in and out of work according to the season or nature of their employment"—"with a large contingent from the poorer artisans, street sellers, and the smaller shops." Class D contains those who receive "small regular earnings." "The earnings are constant enough to be treated as a regular income, which is not the case with the earnings of C." "Of the whole section none can be said to rise above poverty, unless by the earnings of the children, nor are many to be classed as very poor." The other classes, E and F, are classed as in comfortable circumstances. These classes, E and F, are returned as 69·3 of the population. The classes "in poverty" at 30·7. Classes A (37,545) and B (316,838)—the

residual classes—make 8·4 per cent. of the population. This leaves classes C and D, 938,050 persons, or 22·3 per cent. of the population. These two classes were enumerated separately from East London and Hackney. In the count of London as a whole they were merged. In East London and Hackney class C (74,247 persons) stood at 8·33 per cent. This percentage would obviously be in excess of the population of this class in London as a whole. Roughly perhaps we may say that at least three-fourths of the total of C and D may be entered under D; a fourth or, say, 234,512 people under C. This gives us a general measure of the classes A, B, and C, consisting of about 588,895 persons, or 13·9 per cent. of the population, who may be considered impoverished or specially exposed to impoverishment in sickness or slackness of work.

Accepting these figures as generalizations which have largely affected the estimate of the social problem in this generation, we would illustrate them by two pieces of evidence:

At the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor in 1893 Miss Octavia Hill said: "One thing bearing on thrift always strikes me very much—the immense difference between the country and London in the accumulation of 'things.' I do not mean in regard to money in the savings

bank, but in the things that make a person's wealth. I go down into the country and I find the people with half of the wages of the Londoners have linen, they have crockery, they have furniture, they have tools—they have many of them almost everything for domestic comfort. I come straight up to London where the wages are double, and I may go from end to end of a poor street, and I hardly find an atom of furniture; there is no linen. If people die there is nothing to wrap them in; there is no crockery, you could not get a hammer, hardly a thimble, from end to end of the street. I attribute it very much to the chance charities of London. These people are never sure that they must depend on themselves. Somebody dies suddenly. I had a tailor living in a house under my charge, earning £3 a week, and his wife was working, and their mother died; they had nothing—clean sheets or anything—in the place; but they went straight round to the church, or to the charitable ladies, or somebody, and they said, 'poor things; they have nothing.' Everything was supplied within an hour of that woman's death. These people never feel that they should rely on themselves; and the more miserable they look the more they get help.

"The houses are very different, if the people

take care of them. One street I have specially in my mind, where one notices it very much indeed. There is money and money and money being spent on the houses, and meantime everything destroyed by the people, and where a countryman would nail up his things and take care of them, everything is broken and destroyed. And the same house inhabited by different tenants looks quite a different place. No doubt bad accommodation is a drag on them, and it has a tendency to make them drink. Then of course that brings the misery.

"I suppose there are bad people and neglectful people in the country too, but I think they are worse in London; many have lost all character and feel they have none to keep up. There is a large class of people they can appeal to without the risk that they have known them before, and the great curse of the people is the uncertainty of the help that is coming to them. They never know who will come in and help them or how; and the worse condition they get themselves into the more chance they have of help."

Asked how she would set about an enquiry that she thought might be desirable, she said: "Well if you could get evidence from people who have lived among them; but a very good plan is to take a few people and watch them for

a few years, just see whether they are using their powers as much as they can. You can tell very well by then what the result of it must be; if you find people who lose their places because they will not get up in the morning and go to them, well, you know what that must lead to." Asked: "Of course in an enquiry of this kind you have to depend upon persons who have made themselves familiar with the lives of the people"; she said: "Yes, but that is a different thing, of course, from going to the poor themselves. I think it is a very difficult thing to do, but I think you can do a good deal more by common-sense than by any accumulation of statistics. You can see the tendencies of the people at work now, how many of their chances they are losing all round."

Next, Dr. Lewis Hawkes at the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration in 1894, speaking of families of the low class, said: "Might I emphasize one point, the question of control—the teaching of self-control and self-restraint. There is a great lack of training children in this direction. A child by the time he comes to school is often a most unruly and intractable person. That is due more or less to injudicious correction. There is coercion and very injudicious correction. You find that the

children of the poor from their earliest years are a great deal more spoiled than children of the better class. The home is largely dependent upon what the woman has been before marriage. If she has been a domestic servant in a decent house she makes a good wife. Those who have been general servants in small houses or shops are often dirty and slatternly. Then the factory girls, some of them make good wives, others are ignorant and go from bad to worse. You have an awful feeling of the want of thought and the want of common-sense among them. It is the acting on the impulse of the moment which is the serious thing. If you live among them you find that the love of excitement is the one thing that keeps them going. There is so much said about the kindness of the poor to one another. Well, there is a great deal of kindness, but, of course, that kindness does not last. It exists for the time. When they are sympathetic, they will do anything. They will all come in and help and do anything, but if the illness extends and you want something done, it will not be done. I remember one case where the people had to come to me at the dispensary about the condition of a patient; I used to find that someone else was sent, but that someone had to be paid 2d. to come down. The kindness is only

due to impulse and sympathy which is created on the spur of the moment, but it passes away. There is no parental control which is of any value. And within certain limits the children practically shift for themselves."

This is essentially the pauper life and temper, and it represents the problem before us, or at least the most difficult part of it.

THE PAUPERISM OF LONDON.

The mean number of paupers relieved in London on 1st January, 1907, and 1st July, 1907, was 121,496, or 25·5 per thousand on the population. In the *year* 1906-7 it was 71·3 per thousand, and the number of persons relieved was 339,256. In the country at large, excluding London, the corresponding ratios per thousand are 22·3 and 45·4. There is a constant migration to London (Royal Commission on the Poor Laws. Evidence, cf. *e.g.* Bury, vol. ix. p. 316). The proportion of paupers (31st March, 1906) over 60 years of age in the population of that age in London is 187·1 against 157·7 in the rest of the country. The *corrected* rate of pauperism on population in London on that date was 29·83 per thousand, as against 25·11 in the rest of the country. "London is maintaining 15,800 more paupers than in the eighties": the

larger number consist chiefly of men relieved indoors, and relief in this form is relatively greater in London than elsewhere. In the last decade, 1895-6 to 1905-6, the number of able-bodied men in health who received indoor relief has increased 38·4 per cent.; and the number who received outdoor relief 137·9 per cent. This is largely due to the policy of one or two particular Unions. "Notwithstanding the large number of medical charities in London the proportion of paupers under medical relief in London very largely exceeds the proportion of such paupers in extra-Metropolitan Unions."

TREATMENT AND MAINTENANCE.

The wages of men in the building trade, coal mining, engineering, textile and agricultural industries, have risen, and the cost of living has decreased. For comparative wages past and present in casual unskilled trades there are no trustworthy *data*. But there is reason for thinking that they are larger than they were. In England and Wales pauperism has decreased. Before 1872 it was always over 41 per thousand of the population. Since 1881 it has never exceeded 31·3.¹ It now stands at 23·6 per

¹This is according to the count on the last day of the last week of January. It includes all forms of pauperism. The

thousand. Yet in London, amongst the classes exposed to pauperism, higher wages, it would seem, have made but little difference, and neither better sanitation, nor more widespread education have reduced pauperism. To other cities also this criticism would apply. There is thus a clear disconnexion between the Poor Law and ameliorative agencies, educational, sanitary and other, and that social dependence of pauperism, which may be taken as the final manifestation of a process of decline. It shows that there are before us evil effects of which we do not know or do not touch the causes, or to which none of our remedies, educational and the rest, at present apply. In fact, especially of late, apparently there has been a growth of a population, dependent and pauper in spirit, which we have not been able to prevent.

The question then is one of administrative revision and reorganization on preventive lines. We have shown (p. 348) how pauperism connects itself with, not the community at large, but a comparatively small section of it. Our methods then if they are to be remedial must be such as

"mean number" of paupers on January 1 and July 1 was in 1885 28·6, exclusive of casual paupers and insane. It has never reached that figure since. It is now 26·1 per thousand. The London figures, however, have risen. In 1885 they were 25·4, they are now 30·3.

to affect the lower and lowest classes. Pauperism is also geographical in many districts. There are streets out of which a great part of the pauperism comes. Our remedies, therefore, must be such as to affect those streets. This means that comparing the old cities with our modern cities, treatment in some form must take the place of maintenance or be allied with it; and this treatment must cover the critical periods of life in the class exposed to pauperism, those who are relieved in the course of the year—some 339,256 persons. Treatment and not mere maintenance is the key-note of the report of the majority of the Commissioners.

THE CRITICAL PERIODS OF LIFE.

The critical periods of life are childhood and adolescence, and periods of sickness especially in earlier life. At these periods the method of treatment requires that cases of distress—applications for assistance—should be dealt with individually and thoroughly. Only in this way is a nexus made between remedy and disease. Only in this way can that course of action be adopted which will take character into account and not weaken it. The evidence of the past, all the evidence, shows that relief without regard to this is ultimately demoralizing. It tampers with

the will and may eventually for all purposes of self-reliance destroy it.

The Commission thus, very rightly in our view, require that the conditions necessary for this treatment should be observed—thorough inquiry, adequate aid, supervision, which should include the supervision of moral and sanitary conditions, and the use of voluntary personal care in the individual case. So far as may be necessary the family as a whole would be supervised. Children would not be left possibly ill-cared for and sickly while their parents were receiving relief. Treatment would take the place of mere relief. The class 'applicant' would become a supervised class, treated in connexion with their home. The family would not be forgotten in the applicant. A new duty would devolve upon Public Assistance Committees, which the Commission propose should take the place of Boards of Guardians.

But further the Voluntary Aid Committees, which they propose should also be established, would follow the same line of thorough treatment in the individual case; and if, as may be quite practicable, this rule cannot prevail generally, the partial relief from parochial agencies, societies, 'Armies,' Hospitals, and Dispensaries which now is often so ineffectual, and, from the

point of view of co-operation, so elusive, might be drawn into relation with a common centre. Thoroughness of treatment might then become to a far greater extent than at present, a means of regeneration.

Thus—that at least is the hope—a large number of those who are in danger of falling into pauperism may be brought round to better ways of life in the home. The relief of children would become a part of Public Assistance instead of being attached to education, as a thing apart. Assistance, education, sanitary and medical aid, instead of having little or no influence on pauperism and dependence would be definitely used to prevent it. A new relation between them would be created.

There comes next adolescence. Professor Michael Sadler put the question of a preventive use of education very well before the Commission. He showed that a large proportion of the men who applied for work through the Distress Committees were under thirty years of age. Some of the percentages were, Camberwell, 28·6; Poplar, 37·8; Hornsey, 35·6; Manchester, 29·9; Liverpool, 35·5; Warrington, 66; Sheffield, 32·9; Derby, 46·1; Sunderland, 44·2, and so on. The cause of this was ascribed to “un-

educative labour during adolescence” which was believed to be on the increase. And the argument was that first the elementary education, and then the after-school education, might to a much larger extent than heretofore affect the causes that produce dependence. There was indeed, it was urged, a real relation between the two. A ‘more humane’ elementary education would help to solve the problem “not only by increasing technical dexterity and adaptiveness, but by giving a certain alertness of mind and a sense of social responsibility and a new ideal of life.” But after school age there should be graded continuation classes. In support of this, it was stated that in an investigation made at Manchester replies from persons well acquainted with continuation schools in industrial and commercial centres drew attention to cheap mechanical factory work, service as messenger boys, casual street employment, half-time in textile factories, as occupations “socially deteriorating and physically deteriorating.” These occupations led neither to better wage in the future nor to steadier work; but later in life they left the worker stranded, in the receipt only of the pay of a casual unskilled labourer. In these circumstances the Commission recommended:

That boys should be kept at school until the age of fifteen, instead of fourteen; that exemption below this age should be granted only for boys leaving to learn a skilled trade; that there should be school supervision till sixteen and the replacing in school of boys not properly employed.

The next critical period is that of sickness. Here again we will refer principally to London. The supply of medical, institutional and home relief is without unity or organization. There is a large and increasing demand for relief in Poor Law Infirmaries and Sick Asylums. They are many of them built according to the latest standards of completeness, are well provided with nurses, and are under the single management of the Medical Superintendent. Unlike the Voluntary Hospitals they suffer from no lack of funds, and taken altogether they accommodated in London 15,912 patients on the single day, and in the course of the year (1905-6) 88,193 (vol. ii. *Royal Commission on the Poor Laws*, Evidence, Appendix XIII. (B)); while the Voluntary Hospitals, 97 in number, have 10,691 available beds, and deal with 119,099 patients in the course of a year (vol. iii. Evidence, *Royal Commission on the Poor Laws*, p. 720). These Hospitals also deal with about a million and a

half out-patients in the year. There is no co-ordination between their out-patient relief and that of the Poor Law authorities; and none between the out-patient relief of the Free Dispensaries, of which there are several that are important, and the same authorities. Some 38 per cent. of those who attend Hospitals as out-patients are of the same class as those who receive the Poor Law medical relief. Conditions such as these prevail not only in London but in many large towns. In some instances the Poor Law Infirmary, large and rate-supported, receives the larger number of cases, and ranks as an Hospital. Usually the Hospitals have the pre-eminence. For infectious cases the Sanitary authorities make separate provision, more or less complete, supported by the rates. In London this provision is made by a special Board—the Metropolitan Asylums Board. The annual expenditure on voluntary medical relief at Hospitals in London amounts to £1,175,512. That of the rate-supported Poor Law Infirmaries and Sick Asylums is £925,614. And with all this there is the constant and well-supported complaint of medical practitioners that these institutions—come between them and their patients, and prevent a remuneration reaching them which

would otherwise come to them in the ordinary course of their work. Thus a process of concealed and unscrutinized pauperization is in progress.

THE ORGANIZATION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE.

To meet these difficulties the Commission makes practically two suggestions. The first is that there should be in every County and County Borough a County Medical Assistance Committee appointed by the Public Assistance Authority, to bring into co-ordination this variety of agencies, and to supplement in any way that may seem desirable the medical requirements of the County. And the second is that the principle should by degrees be adopted that medical outdoor relief should for the most part be placed on provident lines remunerative to the medical practitioner, and should by arrangement be supplemented in suitable cases by assistance in Voluntary Hospitals, as the authorities may arrange. Local Medical Assistance Committees would carry out the scheme in detail.

Thus new forces would be brought into the field. There would be an official authority whose business it would be to co-ordinate and to organize and to supplement. Failing this there would seem to be no alternative but to

adopt a scheme of medical insurance, and through it to come to terms with the Friendly Societies, the Hospitals, Infirmarys and Dispensaries, as far as may be. It is true that a scheme for a separate public health and medical department has been suggested, but in that case the chief problem, the co-ordination and expansion of medical agencies, would remain the same. Its evolution would only be transferred to another body. The public health and sanitary organization of the country is at present too weak to be the centre of this co-ordination. It serves another purpose, and is preventive not curative; and its reorganization as a department of public health and medical relief apart from the general treatment of cases of distress would not remove our present difficulties, but would add to them. The County Medical Assistance Committee would give a unity to the whole group of medical institutions more effectively than any separate medical department.

Thus, for the time of sickness, another of the times of difficulty in life, a provision would be made on new lines that would aid those in sickness without the removal of personal obligation where it can be rightly imposed.

UNEMPLOYMENT.

Yet another time of difficulty—another critical period—is unemployment. The word naturally covers many different things; and the differences are obvious. Some are out of work only at periods of trade depression which come in somewhat irregular cycles. Some are out of work casually, especially in trades the demand in which is very variable, as in the building trade. Some are out of work more or less regularly for a part of the year. Some are engaged in casual or job labour; and their work depends on the piecing up of many comparatively short or day by day engagements. Some are insufficiently employed habitually and live in part on their families.

It is clear that for these several classes the treatment in great measure should be different. On the other hand, there is a great difference in number between those who will apply to the present Poor Law Guardians and those who would register their names for employment under some other authority—such as the Distress Committees which have been formed under the Unemployed Workmen's Act. Thus in England and Wales, the year ending 31st March,

1909, out of 196,757 persons who entered their names as unemployed in the Distress Committee's registers, work was found for only 26,320. But the increase of able-bodied pauperism due to inability to find work would appear to be very small. The difference between 1901 (before the Boer war) and 1907 is on the day count only 2882.

The Royal Commissioners, who reported in 1834, reviewed the position of the able-bodied especially. They recommended that an offer of useful work under conditions less eligible than those of the life of an ordinary labourer should be placed within the reach of any destitute able-bodied man who desired to accept it; and "that, except as to medical attendance, and, subject to the exception respecting apprenticeship hereinafter stated, all relief whatever to able-bodied persons or to their families, otherwise than in well-regulated Workhouses (*i.e.* places where they may be set to work according to the spirit and intention of the Act of Elizabeth) shall be declared unlawful, and shall cease in manner and at periods hereafter specified." They believed that below the rank of the ordinary self-supporting labourer able-bodied men could support themselves under institutional conditions; and they were prepared

for that emergency. And undoubtedly the experience of the Industrial Colony at Merx Plas confirms this view. The Commissioners also proposed that there should be, not one Workhouse in the Union, but Workhouses as might be needed for the various requirements of the administration. Classification and special management would thus become possible.

The Commissioners that have just reported adopt this view of their predecessors: but for Workhouses they propose for the treatment of the able-bodied several institutions, which would afford what may be called a graduated system of intervention, a discriminative test, and more real and varied employment. According to the character and circumstances of the applicant, for some there would be work, under conditions, merely as for unemployed persons, who might return home each night. For others there would be definite industrial work and training in an institution. For some a Farm Colony, and for some detention in a Labour Colony instituted for that purpose. There would not be payment by wage, but the applicant could earn a *peculium* as they often do in institutions abroad, which would act as an incentive to his working, and would provide him with a sum for use when he leaves.

Two questions arise: one is whether this plan is better than a frank acceptance of the right to work and, instead of relief, a payment of wages to the worker by the State at the ordinary rates: the other is whether there is evidence to show that the institutional or colony system, diversified, as is suggested, will produce satisfactory results.

In regard to the first a matter of vital importance is at stake. An open offer of work to unemployed persons will create a very large demand. It will not matter whether inquiry is made, as under the Distress Committees in London, or whether the engagements for employment are made under conditions which would allow of the contractor turning away all unsuitable men. The inquiry will lead to results similar to those that have taken place in London. If it sifts it will exclude. But in these circumstances all the excluded will have a right to work. Thus a populace might make the demand, a demand that no State provision could meet without as a result the transference to State agencies of a large control over the labour market. In these circumstances, as the numbers would be so great, the bias of responsibility for supplying work and obtaining work would to a very large extent be moved from the

members of the community, who employ others and are themselves employed in the course of their daily transactions, to a department directly dependent on the Exchequer. Industry would not bear its own burthens but would transfer them to the State. The result would be an industrial revolution, but a revolution that tended to weakness of will and the destruction of self-support. It could hardly be otherwise. And the financial burthen would be excessive. It is true that work at ordinary wages would not have to be supplied for all, that other means might be used for the less capable, special colonies, training homes, and places of detention. But these institutions would be overwhelmed by the mere mass of applicants, and discrimination and treatment would alike become impossible. On the other hand, work provided on what are called commercial lines would tend inevitably to become 'relief works.' Started at a time of pressure, or in expectation of pressure, public sentiment would tend to weaken the management; and the claimants attracted from all quarters it would seem hard to repel and send away; and indulgence would prevail. These are the general conclusions of experience.

Only those can desire the overt or veiled acceptance of the right to work who wish to

place industry on a new footing, dependent on the State and adjusted by it, or who do not fear a relapse under modern and urban conditions into evident economic and social derangements, such as the old Poor Law introduced into the old parishes. The limitations in the Unemployed Workmen's Act and in its administration, insufficient as they have proved to be, have at least saved us from such a catastrophe. But it might well have been otherwise.

The other question—what are the results of the Colony system—is one of evidence. The desire that that system should be adopted received overwhelming support. Of results one or two references may be given from witnesses. In England the evidence of the Lingfield Colony in Surrey was very favourable; and so far as it went that respecting Mayland in Essex—a permanent allotment colony. To turn to foreign evidence: at Schäferhof, near Hamburg, the free farm colony "is distinguished from the majority of the German Labour Colonies by the earnest efforts which it makes to induce its inmates to stay there long enough to make it possible to effect a substantial change in their moral and industrial character": and "reclamation is effected," the Director states, in the case of about ten

per cent. of the inmates.¹ At another free Colony, that at Tannenhof, near Berne, it was said that many men there improved so much that they became self-supporting. Of the forced labour farms at Witzwyl and St. Johannsen, near Berne, it was said that speaking generally every year, from one or other of these two colonies, about 35 men came from there to a 'Shelter' at Berne, and about eight or ten of these were "reformed, made a decent living and did not get into trouble: the others turned out badly and ultimately fell again into the hands of the police." At Merx Plas in Belgium the numbers reclaimed were said to be very few, but on discharge very little was done in the way of placing them in situations. On the other hand, the work to which the men were put was most diverse and the influence of it upon the men was good. "While in the establishment the men did well, but many were recidivists." Dr. Muensterberg of Berlin said that the utility of the free colonies in Germany was, he thought, considerable in promoting reclamation. Yet, when all is said, it is clear we can expect no large or general transformation of character from

¹ See Reports on visits paid by the Labour Colonies Commission to certain institutions in Holland, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland: Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, 1909.

the adoption of the Colony system, and that if it is to become really serviceable it must be most carefully worked. Able-bodied applicants are of different classes, industrially and otherwise, and if the single Workhouse is to be given up, as the Commissioners recommend, it is necessary that institutions such as the farm colony, the industrial workshop, and the labour colony should take its place. Public assistance is a broader term than 'Poor Law' and should carry with it a new meaning—a meaning that has not attached to the Poor Law hitherto—the discriminative treatment of the individual case. On this method all municipal and other relief works should become unnecessary. Necessitous men who are unemployed and cannot support themselves and their families should be able, through it, to find under the condition "less of eligibility," the general principle propounded by the Commissioners of 1832, such treatment as is right and fair in their difficulty.

PREVENTION.

But chiefly reliance should be placed on prevention. Methods of relief, especially relief works, have their inherent disadvantages, by whatever name we call them. Methods of prevention, which now or soon after further

experiment are likely to be available, are that of the Labour Exchange and of Insurance. The Labour Exchange if it becomes the resort of both masters and men in the search for purposes of employment should prevent much irregularity of work, consolidate the demand for labour, and save much waste of effort in seeking work. Unemployed insurance might be introduced in connexion with groups of men of similar trades, even in part unskilled trades. The future all depends on foresight and saving. The free pensions now paid to persons over 70, under the Old Age Pensions Act of 1908, have created a new status of dependence for the aged. This is a deplorable departure from the principle of treatment and help as against that of State almsgiving. The effects of the Act cannot yet be stated, and under our present system of administration it will be very difficult to ascertain them. In many cases, as far as one can now judge, the Act touches the very heart of family obligation and weakens it. Many who could have gone on well, as they have done hitherto, are now made dependent. The relations—sometimes quite well off, will do less, and others will do less. So much of the supply of friendly energy and thoughtfulness has been cut off. This is

not to say that in many instances the pensions have not reached people who have been living on the verge of destitution. Undoubtedly that has been the case. But it indicates a great lack of administrative ability on the part of the State to make close and well-defined adjustments, that, in order to help persons who may really be in need of pensions, it has to include in the class of pensioners a large number of persons who are able to keep themselves in one way or another and could do without the assistance.

In these circumstances there is the more reason now for contributory, and, if necessary, compulsory insurance. The people should provide for themselves, 'C and D' as well as the other classes; and by insurance money that now often goes amiss may perhaps be diverted to self-support.

If the report of the Commission in its main features passes into a Statute there will be a strong Central Public Assistance 'Division,' organized in connexion with Public Assistance Authorities in Counties and County Boroughs, and so locally in districts. But there would be also a further change. Voluntary aid, which we saw had fallen apart from the Poor Law, would be brought into line with Public Assistance. On

the lines of the Friendly Societies Act, which would give them a kind of *status* and require of them proper accountancy, charities would have the option of registering under the Charities Commission, as the Charity Commission would be then called. The Commission would be in part reorganized, and would have a Voluntary Societies Department; and it would be attached to the Local Government Board. Registered charities would be able to be of service in the administration of Public Assistance by receiving and helping cases for which voluntary institutions could better provide than the institutions of an official body. Under schemes passed by the Commission there would be Voluntary Aid Councils in the Counties and County Boroughs and Voluntary Aid Committees. It is also recommended that by a general clause in a statute the trustees of doles for the poor should be authorized to use them for the relief of distress, irrespective of obsolete and now purposeless conditions. The doles would thus come once more into the active operations of charity and, associated with other aid and help, would serve a new purpose.

If the principle of future administration be treatment, not gifts and maintenance, new forces must come into the field. The trained volunteer

must intervene. Something like an Elberfeld system modified to meet English conditions must be introduced as a friendly partner of the Public Assistance Authorities. This is a vital change; and it is well to consider the conditions on which its success depends.

CONDITIONS OF FRIENDLY VISITING IN A LARGE CITY.

Its success depends mainly on two conditions: the possibility of giving to voluntary work a coherent organic existence, and thus making it a responsible instrument in the bettering of the individual and his family; and, next, the simplification of the duties which the voluntary worker may undertake, so that it may not exceed the time which he has at his disposal or his ability.

Hitherto the Poor Law system and differences of religion and class distinctions have held people apart; and no central rallying point for voluntary administration has been created by the State or under Statutory approval. The Poor Law has become a self-contained and more or less isolated body. It has taken little or no heed of means or methods which lie outside its own organization. In general its relief has been the indoor relief provided within the walls of its Workhouses and Workhouse institutions; its outdoor

relief has consisted mainly of mere allowances given through the Relieving Officers. Differences in religion have in great measure made void the utility of the parish as a recognized centre for common work. And till lately many may have despaired of any such fusion of thought in charity as would bring together as fellow-helpers in that work people who differ greatly in their views about creeds and dogmata. But religion has a social faith which no doubt cannot be cut away from its theologic faith, isolated and treated apart from it, but which nevertheless is grounded largely on the facts of life, on its obvious needs and deficiencies, and on the claims of humanity. There are many things about which there can be no righteous quarrel of dissident religions. The quarrel, if there be one, cannot be righteous. To help the weak, to make the intemperate sober, to clean the room, to help the sick and to prevent sickness—to do all these, and many other things, is to act on the promptings of a humanity that underlies the social faith of all religions. This our survey of the past has clearly shown. And now, in view, not, we think, of the unequal conditions of life, the greater wealth of some, the lesser means of others, but at the sight of those who are dirty in home and person, careless of themselves and their children,

and unequipped, for the demands that duty may rightly impose on them, there has arisen in many classes a new or enlarged sense of responsibility. And this is broad as society itself is broad. It sets minor questions aside, and it demands of the individual who gives his thought to these matters at all the realization of a social faith at least as wide as the extent of the evils with which he has to deal. There is a freedom of charity—a great liberty of endeavour, which, though religious in conviction and feeling, is not bound down by religious exclusiveness, and which is characteristic of those courageous spirits who would fain contend with the evils of their time, and, if it may be, conquer them.

There is no danger to a man that knows
 What life and death is ; there's not any law
 Exceeds his knowledge ; neither is it lawful
 That he should stoop to any other law :
 He goes before them and commands them all,
 That to himself is a law rational.

And the other difficulty is the difference of class. We have seen how the rural slave became the colonus, how the serf long halted in a position half-way between servility and freedom, how the dependence of feudalism gave way to freedom and contract, and then again how in England the later dependence upon the Poor

Law and upon wages assessed by the Magistrates passed once more into industrial freedom and a minimized or at least a greatly reduced pauperism. In all these stages there has been a large class of unfranchised people living in a society in which, rightly or wrongly, they had no political participation. But now a further step is reached. With social freedom comes the franchise. Not the middle classes only, but the poor are brought into the body politic. And if there is to be a reform of charitable method on such a scale as will, where needful, necessitate the supervision as well as the relief of those who are assisted, the army of helpers must be recruited at least from the tradesman and the artisan class, as well as from the class of those who can serve their country with their leisure. Social and political freedom brings with it new social duties.

The other condition to which reference has been made is the simplification of the responsibilities imposed on the voluntary worker. The report of the Royal Commission shows by its analysis of the system of relief at Hamburg that, for any widespread and yet personal assistance, two things are necessary—a reduction of personal duties, of supervision and visiting, to their simplest form, and a strong centralization of control, especially in regard to all those other

duties—petty accounts, letter writing, etc.—which accompany personal work, but do not necessarily form part of it. The two positions are correlated. The policy of dealing with distress by treatment necessitates both. The friendly visitor must be set free for the particular task which he has to accomplish in the limited time of his available leisure. To free him for this task there must be a corresponding local centralization. All correspondence, accounts, and all, or at least all preliminary, investigation, must be taken off his hands; and the supervising authority must do all that he cannot do well, reserving also to itself power to intervene at any point where there is danger of misjudgment and consequent wreckage. With all visiting, whether in connexion with health and sanitary matters, or with general assistance, this is equally indispensable. Further, supervision rightly used will lead to the training of the worker.

But though the right treatment of the individual case in all its aspects is a method most preventive of distress, there are other measures besides those mentioned above which should be considered.

INSURANCE.

The contingencies with which we have to deal are of two kinds. Some are general and cal-

culable: some are personal, and fall within the range of no sufficient statistic. The natural way of dealing with all general and calculable contingencies is by association. Our Clubs, and the elaborate insurances which cover so large a part of the risks we incur in civilized countries, are evidence of this. To extend the circle of those who are in some way insured is to improve the position of a larger number of the population; and if its methods are brought into relation with the class that is most exposed to dependence, to reduce largely the chances of such people falling on the community for maintenance. In fact, insurance may be pushed as far as it will go. Sickness, old age, death, accidents, recurrent unemployment, indeed a large number of the critical periods which we have been discussing from the point of view of assistance, may be equally well discussed from that of insurance. And insurance should reduce the need of public relief to a minimum. But there are drawbacks. The first may be stated as a question. Can the necessary premiums be paid by the parties concerned? To this the answer is alike, in the case of skilled or unskilled labour: Yes, or Yes in great part. The question is largely one of machinery. Next, Can the means of making his payment be brought to the doors of the insurer?

The answer again is, Yes or Yes in great part. The enormous organization of the Prudential Insurance Company shows that it can be done, and can be done to a profit. In 1907 that Company had in its ordinary life insurance business funds amounting to £34,103,669; and in its industrial branch £26,366,235. If it is possible, why, we ask, cannot this method be applied in other directions? The answer is that there is no efficient effort made to do it. A man aged twenty-one, in good health and employed in a healthy occupation, could insure for the receipt of 10s. 6d. a week during the first twenty-six weeks of illness, and 7s. 6d. during the remainder of illness up to the age of sixty-five, on a payment of little more than 3d. a week. Most working men could meet this charge in normal times. But if such an offer is to reach the great mass of the people, it must be organized on a very broad basis, brought to their houses, and somehow be quickened by a deeply felt demand, such, for instance, as the popular demand for "burial money."

Next, it may be demurred that this is but one contingency, whereas in fact there are several; and to meet these it may be said no sufficient premiums will be forthcoming from the artisan and labouring class. These contingencies are

accidents, old age, death, unemployment. Two of these, accidents and unemployment, are connected with the industrial life; and industry should bear its own burthens. On that principle already accident insurance falls on employers, and unemployment insurance might fairly be met by premiums paid by employers and employed. What would be the effect of this on wages? If the wage of the employee and the profits of the employer remained the same, each would continue to bear his share of the premium. If wages rose, the employer, it might be said, would pay the workman's share. If profits rose, and the employer sold his goods at higher prices, the customer would pay. And if the wages rose and profits rose the whole charge would fall on the customer.

'The premiums for old age and life insurance may be considered personal rather than industrial. Old age is now largely met by the State. Life insurance reduces itself to payments for funeral benefit and payments for a sum payable at death to the widow. Insurance for funeral benefit is so widespread that it might be left to the people to continue it on the present lines. A system of optional extra premiums for the widow might be on foot to meet the contingency of widowhood.

There would thus be an insurance system parallel to the contingencies of life; and if it were a convenience that the various risks should be met by the same premium however distributed, that too might be arranged. Probably the insurance against unemployment should be kept apart from others: the conditions of the risk are very different, the decision as to who is unemployed and who is not would depend on the skilled supervision of managers and men, while the insurance pay was given on some test sufficiently exact to prevent malfeasance. Such a test might be like that at Strassburg, where, to verify the fact that an alleged unemployed person is really unemployed, he is required to report himself at the Labour Exchange daily at a time frequently varied and not necessarily during the usual working hours. But indeed this development of insurance is still in the experimental stage; and only experiments will show how far and under what conditions it may be applied. Employment by way of relief is open to so much criticism that any method by which it can be avoided should be put in operation and tested.

But objection may be made that, though it be true that only on the lines of self-support can progress be made, the less skilled wage-earners

have not means to pay towards insurance. Certainly the pictures of industrial life which are drawn by witnesses are miserable enough, in those districts in which work is irregular and largely of an unskilled kind, where the head of the family learns to depend on the wife, and the household becomes the mere room-hold, and life becomes not life, but a day to day, even hour to hour, existence, with little or no property, and for furniture mere 'sticks.' Yet this, it must be remembered, is the lowest rung of the ladder. By degrees higher rungs may be reached. A reserve of some small amount collected weekly and paid to a Post Office or other account on the part of the individual, and, as a first step, made available, for instance, for the off-season of the winter would be of the utmost service. It might provide a good part at least of what would meet the need of that time—after all usually only a short period, from the end of January till the middle of March.

A plan would be to associate the skilled and Unionist with the unskilled and non-Unionist in one scheme, grading the advantages according to the payments which the men made to any unemployment fund. But this would entail State grants, or grants from somewhere, from some large endowed fund perhaps, such as that

of the City Parochial Charities, if they were applied, as they might be applied most usefully, to limited and well-considered experimental work of social utility. And there are no doubt many other possible plans. But the first step is to form the nuclei of organization for social advance. These nuclei exist in the case of the unemployed funds of Trade Unions, or, for other purposes, in the case of Friendly Societies. If they could take root in a lower social grade a new social growth within the lower ranks of industry might spring up.

But it may be said that it is best to leave people to spend their money as they will, and to let them suffer if they misuse it, or that these suggestions will not touch the lowest ranks of industry. The former argument, however, will hardly carry if, to put it commercially, we are dealing with human material of value to the country. The argument is that of factory interference over again. The interference is justified by the prevention of sickness or premature weakness and death among those who would not otherwise be strong and self-maintaining. The community on many grounds is interested in the preservation of its own members in health and fitness; and so long as its action tends to strengthen effort and ability and independence

it may well make enactments to effect such a purpose. At present the irregularity and uncertainty of life in class C would seem to impoverish them unnecessarily. So far as this is due to economic causes a remedy may be found in some form of insurance or saving.

But, again, the lowest ranks of industry, it may be said, would remain unaffected—those classed A and B, to use Mr. Booth's classification. In their class, and in the case of all those who come within the line of 'treatment,' resort may be had to many means—varying with the case, means in part placed at the disposal of the community by the institutions of Public Assistance. For one great difference between past urban conditions and our own is that we have a large organization and staff for public aid, which should to a large extent be used remedially. Some of this class may be withdrawn from society—drunkards and vicious men and women, the real and inevitable paupers of society, for pauperism or dependence is only in part economic. If we subtract all those whose trouble is due to economic causes wholly or chiefly, we have a large preponderant mass, as the inquiries made during the last twenty years show us, in which the difficulty is not economic but, in the larger sense of the word, moral. It is the fashion to

ignore this, and to say that the drink and the vice are due to environment. Of course in a degree that is true; but not less is it true that it is due to want of central-ment—to want of the good will, the central preservative force of the individual soul. And one plea for the application of methods of helping and treatment by friendly visiting is that they may touch this inner heart of the trouble.¹ Pauperism in its final state is indeed a residue, and so far possibly to be prevented, hardly to be cured. It has been stated that no teetotallers become paupers, because their lives are 'good lives' (as the Temperance Insurance Societies prove), and their health is better and their money goes further. That is at least an indication of the bearing of the argument for prevention. It shows where the stress of conflict lies.

THE MAIN ISSUE.

The consideration of industrial questions, such as the effect of municipal action or municipalization on industry and invention, and, on the other hand, the growth and importance of co-partnership in industry—a solution of many

¹ Cf. the line suggested by the recent studies in heredity, made in connexion with the Galton Laboratory for National Eugenics. They point to the outstanding importance of heredity as against environment. (Cf. p. 40 above.)

difficulties which is only now receiving more general attention and a wide application, lies beyond the scope of this book.

The report of the Majority of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress consists practically of two arguments. One argument is that, by the treatment of the individual case with the means and appliances which are at the disposal of the community, or may be placed at its disposal, those who are in distress may be assisted without an increase of their dependence upon the community; the other argument is that there is a large scope for general methods of prevention, to which at this stage of society it is necessary to resort to prevent decadence and to raise the standard of foresight and self-support among the poorer classes.

Both of these arguments are, in the sense in which we have used the word, distinctively 'charitable.' Charity represents a mood which is very constant in social life and which expresses itself in many ways. We have tried to show the compass of its thought, how there meet in it religion and reverence and sympathy and many-sided social endeavour; how it has prompted the thought of the best minds in many states and stages of society; and how it

ever stands as an advocate for the social good and as a protestant against the social evil of the day.

Charity is the very life of religion, above all of Christianity. The great revolution of thought in the fourth century yielded to Christianity the amplest victory. Since then Christianity has had the mastery. No other religion has competed with it. It has had its divisions and sects and its reformations. But whatever the differences of individuals may have been the world at large has been encircled by it. The religious ceremonies of birth and death have been in its hands, and the preaching of the spiritual life. Religions change slowly in thought, though they may not in formula. The change is constantly progressive in conception and in endeavour; and the appeal of charity to the passing generation is always more insistent, as science shows the ever greater results that it can produce. Is it not possible, then, for those who, by their religious faith are believers in charity, to unite, as they have never yet done, for the true and honourable fulfilment of the task which their faith imposes on them—Levite, priest, and Samaritan—conforming, non-conforming, cleric and lay, men and women? The future in this great branch of work depends

on them. All rests—as in science, so in charity—on the right handling and helping of those who are, or may fall, into distress. Good citizenship, no less than faithfulness to religious ideals, demands this. Cannot all, putting aside lesser matters of difference, try to find an orthodoxy in charity and charitable method? In the hope that now or some day this may be possible, and that there may be a new unity in this vital social faith, this book has been written.

APPENDIX I.

CHARITY AND VOLUNTARY AID.

NOTE.—The Roman figures at the end of each recommendation refer to the parts of the report, the Arabic figures to the paragraphs in those parts.

THE following statement is taken from the Majority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law and relief of distress.

Our recommendations in regard to the organization of Voluntary Aid are as follows (Part VII. 237):

ESTABLISHMENT OF VOLUNTARY AID COUNCILS AND COMMITTEES.

(173) That in the area of each Public Assistance Authority, that is, in each County or County Borough, there be formed a Voluntary Aid Council, consisting in part of trustees of endowed charities, of members of registered voluntary charities, as defined below, of some members of the Public Assistance Authority, and

of such persons as members of friendly societies and trade associations, of clergy and ministers, and of other persons being co-opted members, as may be settled in schemes approved by the Charities Commission.¹

(174) That a statutory obligation be imposed upon the Lords Lieutenants, the Chairmen of County Councils, the Lord Mayors, and Mayors of County Boroughs to take steps, within a given period, and after consultation with the managers of charitable societies, trustees of endowed charities, and members of the Public Assistance Authority, for drawing up schemes in accordance with the preceding recommendation, which schemes must be submitted to the Charities Commission for approval.

(175) That the Voluntary Aid Council submit to the Charities Commission proposals for the formation of Voluntary Aid Committees to be drawn up in the form of schemes to be approved by the Commission, and that the Voluntary Aid Council under such schemes appoint as members of the Voluntary Aid Committees persons such as those mentioned in Recommendation 173.

(176) That Voluntary Societies and Charities, as defined in Recommendation 189, be entitled

¹ See p. 273 as to the proposed change in name of the Charity Commission.

to register at the Charities Commission on lines similar to those of the registration of Friendly Societies under the Friendly Societies' Act.

(177) That a registered Voluntary Society be entitled to nominate members of its own body for appointment to the Voluntary Aid Council and to the Voluntary Aid Committee of the district in which either its institution or any branch of its institution has an office.

(178) That it is desirable that the Voluntary Aid Committee have its offices in the same building as the Committee of Public Assistance.

FUNCTIONS OF THE VOLUNTARY AID COUNCIL.

(179) The duties of the Voluntary Aid Councils would be for the most part not executive, but supervisory. The executive work would be assigned to the Voluntary Aid Committees. The Voluntary Aid Council would supervise the operations of these Committees generally, and would, as far as possible, maintain the same principles of help and relief throughout County or County Boroughs. They would collect funds for distribution to Voluntary Aid Committees, and they would allocate funds to poor districts. The County is already the accepted area for many benevolent and philanthropic purposes. The local Infirmary or Hospital is frequently a

County institution. There are County Nursing Associations, and the County is the recognised centre in connection with various naval and military charitable associations. We propose that the Voluntary Aid Council, acting for the County, should promote any voluntary institutions, associations, or societies for which the County, as a whole, has need. Its duties would thus be important and distinctive.

FUNCTIONS OF THE VOLUNTARY AID COMMITTEE.

(180) That the Voluntary Aid Committee aid (1) persons in distress, whose cases do not appear to be suitable for treatment by the Public Assistance Committee, and (2) applicants for Public Assistance, whose cases have been referred to the Committee by the Public Assistance Committee.

(181) That, with a view to the thorough treatment of individual cases, the Voluntary Aid Committee make such arrangements for the investigation of the applications made to them as the Charities Commission may deem necessary and sufficient.

(182) That, in dealing with persons in distress for whom it is desired to provide aid by way of monetary relief, it shall be the duty of the Voluntary Aid Committee to obtain such sums

as may be possible from relations of the applicant, from friends, and from charitable sources generally, for the aid of individual cases.

(183) That, with the administration of aid on the part of the Voluntary Aid Committee, there should be associated such a system of voluntary visitation as the Committee may deem advisable in view of the responsibilities of their work in providing effectual aid, and in view of the physical needs and the habits of those whom they decide to assist.

(184) That the Voluntary Aid Committee be empowered to appoint such Local Committees as it may deem necessary, subject to the approval of the Voluntary Aid Council.

(185) That a Voluntary Aid Committee shall, as far as possible, register the cases dealt with by the Public Assistance Committee and by the charitable societies and institutions in the district.

(186) That Voluntary Aid Committees receive the support of the Public Assistance Committee, and of the Inspectors of the Local Government Board, with a view to systematizing the relations between the Public Assistance and Voluntary Aid Committees and promoting co-operation between them.

(187) That Voluntary Aid Councils or Committees be eligible for subscriptions from the

Public Assistance Authority, on the lines of 42 and 43 Vict., cap. 54, section 10.

THE CHARITIES COMMISSION.

(188) That the Charity Commission be attached to the Local Government Board, and that the Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners, permanent or temporary, be appointed by the Local Government Board, whose President should represent it in the House of Commons.

(189) That the Charity Commission be enlarged, and that there be assigned to it two departments of work, the supervision of endowed charities on the lines of the Charitable Trusts Acts, and the registration of Voluntary Charities or Societies which hold any property in land or houses by purchase, or by leasehold, or are the tenants of any property under yearly or other agreements.

(190) That the name of the Charity Commission be the Charities Commission.

(191) That the staff of the Commission be strengthened so as to fulfil all the various additional duties that may devolve upon them :

- (1) As a centre for the registration of voluntary charities.
- (2) In assisting in the preparation of schemes for the establishment of Voluntary Aid

Councils and for registering such schemes.

- (3) In assisting in the preparation of schemes for the establishment of Voluntary Aid Committees, and for registering and supervising their administration.
- (4) In the scrutiny of accounts and statements relating to Voluntary Aid Councils and Committees.
- (5) In the supervision of other schemes ; and
- (6) In the scrutiny of the accounts of endowed and registered charities.

(192) That section 30 of the Endowed Schools Act, 1869, by which certain charities founded for purposes of relief may be applied to purposes of education, be repealed.

(193) That it be provided in a Statute amending the Charitable Trusts Acts that, by Order of the Charities Commission, any charities, as defined in section 30 of the Endowed Schools Act, 1869, exclusive of Loan Charities, Apprenticeship Charities, and Charities for Advancement in Life, may be used for the relief of distress, subject to such conditions respecting enquiry and other matters as the Commissioners may determine under a general order.

APPENDIX II.

THE CHARITABLE EXPENDITURE OF THE
METROPOLIS.

LONDON has, within what is known as the Metropolitan area, a population of 4,833,938. The Larger London, consisting of a circle of 15 miles from Charing Cross, contains a population of 7,233,563. Outside this circle, but not far from it, are towns and populated districts. The charities of London thus serve a very large population.

In addition to this, to London institutions, hospitals, and homes are admitted persons from all parts of the country, and in general charitable work, societies and committees, in the central part of London especially, deal continually with non-Londoners who are in distress. If therefore the total income of London charities has to be considered, it must be considered in relation to the large population of which London is the centre, and in relation to these large claims.


But there are further considerations. London is the centre of many societies which have branches throughout the country, *e.g.* the Church of England Homes for Waifs and Strays, Dr. Barnardo's Homes, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution. Consequently the receipts of those societies, though credited to London, are but banked in London, and are in fact to a very large extent applicable to the country at large, or to the places where these decentralized societies have their branch agencies.

It has been said that the income of the charities of London is ten millions. This is a serious mistake—especially when it is stated without regard to the limitations to which reference has been made.

The following statement in regard to the year 1908 represents the facts as far as they can be ascertained :

The voluntary contributions of London charities, which would represent in general terms what is called "income," amount to about £3,430,000. Nearly £900,000 represents income from invested funds, the possession of which is desirable in many, and essential in some, institutions, as, for instance, pension societies. A sum of £1,060,000, equivalent to almost one-third of the voluntary income, is due to payments made

by or on behalf of beneficiaries, and such payments, while charitable in intention, are obviously dependent upon the existence of agencies which form convenient channels for the assistance of particular individuals. Legacies amount to nearly £1,090,000, and the receipts from this source, a fluctuating one at the best, are in many cases treated as far as possible as capital. Nearly £543,000 represents the outcome of industrial work done by inmates of Homes, or of trading operations undertaken by charitable agencies. A sum of £25,000 is not classifiable under any of the foregoing heads. It will be seen, therefore, that the total "turnover" is under £7,000,000, of which as nearly as possible one-half is represented by voluntary contributions. This figure has to be considered in relation to the circumstances stated above, which affect the conditions of London voluntary administration.



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
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