

Raja Dasing of Gingee



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Raja Desing of Gingee¹

(An episode in the History of the Moghal Carnatic)

BY

RAO BAHADUR

DR. S. KRISHNASWAMI AYYANGAR, M.A., HON. PH. D.

THE following extract is taken from the section bearing on the history of Gingee from a manuscript folio book in the Mackenzie collection. The book as a whole purports to be a history of the Rajas of the lunar line and other Hindu rulers. It was written by one Narayana Pillai, son of Kallaha Rama Ranga Pillai and a descendant of the shepherd, Ananda Koil Kovalan, the founder and ruler of Gingee and Padaividu. Narayanan composed this history from what he had learnt either from books or by hearsay from the members of his family and other elders of the place. He says that he compared his account with large books on history (Tavārik), such as Firishṭa and other works. He submitted his account for verification to Muhammadan amirs of age and others well learned in Tamil. Having collected his information in this way, he has made an effort to compile an account which appeared to be acceptable to his historical sense.

¹ Presented in the first instance to the Indian Historical Records Commission—Gwalior Session. Reprinted by permission with additional notes, etc.

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In order that it may be acceptable to those high placed in Government service, he took the trouble to carry it to Arcot, where there were Muhammadan gentlemen living, with records and books, who could enlighten him. It is there that he came into contact with the Collector of the Subha, 'Col.' William Macleod, as he calls him. He got the account compared through Amir-ud-din Ali, son of Muhammad Murad, the Company's Sadar at Vellore. This Ali introduced him to 'Col.' William Macleod, and, after cautioning him as to the importance of compiling a correct account, Col. Macleod asked the said Ali to hear his account in full and bring him over to him afterwards for his own hearing.

The manuscript consists of four sections: Section 1 contains the history of the Rajas of the lunar line; Section 2 gives the history of the Muhammadan rulers of Delhi; the third section contains a history of the Dekhan comprising the Mahratta and Tulu countries; and the fourth consists of the history of Gingee and the Karnāṭak (known in British Indian History as Carnatic Payeen ghat). The extract that follows is taken from Section 4, which is much more historical than the previous sections.

The date of the actual composition of the work is fixed by the reference to 'Col.' Macleod. The manuscript writes the name variously, partly due to the blunder of the copyist and partly due to other exigencies. Sometimes it is written *Makvot*, the *la* and the *va* being written sometimes very like each other, and the mistake therefore becoming possible. In the poetical passages the name gets to be written Macleod William instead of William Macleod as in the prose passages, the former being due entirely to the exigencies of verse. Soon after the annexation of Arcot, the British Government at Madras, particularly the Board of Revenue, had to make arrangements for carrying on the revenue administration. They appointed one man and then another to initiate an administration by a new settlement of the revenues, etc. Being a difficult affair, the first Collectors did not prove as great a success as the Board of Revenue wished and they had to be changed rapidly. The officers at the head-quarters were anxious for a large revenue. The men on the spot had a more clear conception of the actualities and struck out for a fairer assessment. So the first Collector had to go and the second Collector had to be changed soon, also through blunders of his own. The third one

PENUGONDA

Its place in South Indian History generally and the Empire of Vijayanagar in Particular

BY DR. S. KRISHNASWAMI AIYANGAR, M. A., PH. D.

Penugonda, as it is at the present that must have supplied the various needs of a vast population. If such a time, is a townlet of about 6,000 population, and is couped up in the hollow of a one cast his glance across the plain, he basin surrounded by hills so closely that will find the plain in the hollow there is little room for cultivation to surrounded by a cluster of hills lying




BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF PENUGONDA

meet the needs of the expanding population of a growing town. It has however, potentialities of expansion even now, which, with sufficient enterprise, could be made to provide what is wanted for the needs of a royal city, such as it was for a number of centuries under Hindu rule. If one gets up to the top of the highest of the peaks in the group close to the town and takes a bird's eye view of it, he will find vestiges of human handiwork in serried ranks of various heights one behind the other, as if each were set there specially to prevent access to the plain from outside. One great road cuts across the middle of the plain leading southwards to Pangalore and northwards through Guntakal to Raichur and ultimately to Hyderabad, almost in a straight line. That seems the only feasible way across the plain. This roadway and the plain which it cuts in two are shut in by high hills on

the west, rising sheer from a vast stretch of plain country, comparatively barren and uncultivated. The biggest hill is in three peaks, with another hill of a slightly inferior height standing close, the four together constituting a natural buttress commanding the extensive plain outside. The natural strength of these is improved by artificial fortifications which make up for the defects that Nature had left. The highest knoll is surmounted by a fortified bastion affording room for the movement of a few guns, which could be used with deadly effect upon an approaching army from any side. The top is reached by a bridle-path, which may be about $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 miles in length. Half way up the hill along this path lies a saddle at the distance of a mile between two hills. This is surmounted by a temple dedicated to Lakshmi-Narasimhasvami (the Man-Lion Avatar of Vishnu) which has adjoining it a tank providing the necessary water-supply for the normal requirements of the Temple, and the periodical concourse of people congregating there for festivals. These hills offer effective protection against attacks or hostile entry on the western side, and under the shadows of these high walls of nature lay the royal part of the city with its palace, temples and tanks, all enclosed in a circuit of stone walls of an inner fort with its four main gates and a number of posterns. The bridle-path up the hill, and another, a much shorter and well-guarded pathway up the hill, both lie within the walls of the fort in the town. This bridle path is probably a more modern one, and was perhaps made for facilitating visits to the Temple of Narasimha, already referred to. The other path is well-guarded at the narrower gorges, of which there are three before reaching the middle terrace, and two more before one reaches the top. The total number is counted as seven, and this number is likely to be correct as we cut across portions of the path-way. Each one of these "passes" is fortified and provided with a guard-house, a store for the contingent keeping guard, and an unfailing supply of water in a hill cleft containing springs. These are built up with stone-steps so that men may go down to the water, and they seem generally to have been kept in good condition for use. It is said that these stages are connected with each other by secret passages; one such is pointed out at the topmost "Killá" (fort). This is a passage for one man to creep through, while it is certain death for any second man to enter at the same time. The town itself is now confined to one part of the plain which might have been occupied fully with it, but the number of stone-built wells in various parts of it and the large Temples now in ruins or in the occupation of Muslim Mosques, are clear enough indications of the vaster extent of the town area. Two villages, one west and the other east, seem to mark the outermost limit of the capital city of those days. These are Somandahalli, about 3 miles west, where the Emperors of Vijayanagar kept their cows in herds and got their milk supply from. The other is Erramanchi, about 6 or 7 miles to the north, which seems to have given an alternative name to the Province itself, called Penugondārājya or Erramantirājya, in the more popular form in which Bukkapatna is described to have been situated in records of the reign of Krishnaraya and his brother Achyutaraya. One of the gates of the fort takes its name after this. The remaining part of the plain is almost unoccupied at present, and the trunk road to Bangalore passes right across it north and south. The part of the plain on the farther side of the road slowly rises up to the cluster of low hills lying in semi-circles one behind the other. Across this cluster there seems

to be a feasible pass for a road. This is, however, barricaded by piling up stone boulders, big and small, in such a fashion as to make it infeasible for cavalry. Hence the present-day name for this obstruction "Gurrapurallu" (Horse-boulders). This defence makes the eastern side secure against attacks by Muhammadan Cavalry. The west is inaccessible by nature; the south and the north are open to entry, but could be easily defended. Such are the natural features of the plain in which is situated what is now the town, and of a number of Temples in various stages of ruins. The most noteworthy among these happen to be the Narasimhasvami Temple turned into the Jumma Musjid, and another Viṣṇu Temple, as it seems, transformed into the Jain Shrine of Parsvanatha. Penugonda was early famous as one of the eighteen Jain centres of reputation; but the present shrine did not belong to Parsva. There is a standing Dvārapāla figure with the disc and the conch, the unmistakable signs of Vaishnava persuasion. Another peculiarity of this was that the Figure



KILLÁ AND GURRAPURALLU

which should have held what was the royal capital for more than a century, and a first class Provincial Headquarters for nearly three centuries before. carries these two weapons in the inner two hands, the outer two carrying each a lotus—a characteristic of Chalukyan and, later, Hoysala iconography. The Musjid referred to above shows clear signs of transformation, as the outer entrance still has all the decorative panels, pillars and pilasters intact. The inner portion, or the Mosque proper, is now so well plastered that it seems entirely a Muhammadan structure. This should not necessarily be the case, as

The existing walls and gates of the Fort with its moat, still visible in certain parts, seem to mark the citadel in which was situated the royal palace, and the temples and buildings appurtenant thereto. The greater part of the city seems to have lain outside these walls. Inside the fort are now shown the vestiges

there are other instances in the locality of this complete transformation of Hindu temples into Muhammadan structures by plastering over and otherwise giving them such other outside touches as would make them seem wholly Islâmic in character. This feature is illustrated in the remains of the palace called "Gahan Mahal" in the immediate vicinity. This building is apparently a part of the inner palace intended for the occupation of the royal ladies, and the part of the structure must have occupied one end of a spacious enclosure. The upper part of this structure must have served originally the double purpose of serving as a vantage ground from which to view various kinds of entertainments taking place in the great yard, and, at the same time, as the confidential reception-room for the Ruler who received his ministers and ambassadors for confidential discussions. On the pinnacle of this building are two turrets, one larger than the other. The larger is in the Hindu style. The smaller, of the same style, is given a parapet of the Islâmic pattern. This and the same style of parapet round the whole shows the effort, very clumsy as it proves on closer examination, to transfer the building into a Muhammadan palace.


Set diagonally over against this is the shapely minar of the Sher Khan's Mosque, as it is called—a structure said to have been constructed in the thirties of the eighteenth century. The well just outside and the flagstone pavement give clear indications of the Hindu character of the structure. One of the stones on the pavement carries an inscription of a date ten years earlier than the Battle of Talikota, which event transferred the capital of the Empire of Vijayanagar to Penugonda. What is much more of a tell-tale character in the structure is the niche constituting the Shrine. The Muhammadan attendant some-

what officiously exhibits two rotating pillars by the side of the door jams with all the gusto of a miracle. On closer examination the rotating pillars turn out to be door ornaments intended by the Chalukyan architect to show various panels of Devas and Devis supplemental to those in the door jams. These are now covered up with thin slabs of polished stone, showing niches for holding lights. This is carried out only so far as the uprights are concerned. The archway above is left over as in the original and shows the characteristic lotus ornament. It is possible to remove the thin slabs now; and it may be quite worth while to have these removed temporarily and a few photographic views taken of the original doorway as it was intended to be. These photographs will give unmistakable evidence of the transformation of what was the sanctum of an early Chalukyan Temple into the "Kaaba" of a Muhammadan Mosque. There is much more direct evidence of the vast structure of a Chalukyan Temple in what is now called Baba Fakrudin's Mosque close by.

These vestiges give clear evidence of the palace having been a town of considerable importance in Chalukyan times from the tenth to the twelfth centuries A. D. It maintained that position under the Hoysalas and under the earlier dynasties of Vijayanagar. It had grown to be of great importance under the great Krishna and his immediate successors. When the Empire suffered a defeat at Talikota, Penugonda became the royal capital, and, in consequence, the centre of attack by the forces of Golkonda generally, sometimes in co-operation with the forces of Bijapur, the two southern Kingdoms of the Bahmani Sultans. Penugonda in its turn fell as the result of repeated attacks, and with its fall may be dated the fall of the Empire of Vijayanagar.

We shall now proceed to narrate briefly the story of Penugonda from her days of royal splendor to those of ruin and decay.

The District of Anantapur always constituted an important salient to be guarded against attack by the rulers of Dekkan Power. This was the function that devolved upon Penugonda when it rose into importance. Very few Chalukya inscriptions in Penugonda have survived the onslaught of the Muhammadans; but the vestiges of Chalukyan temples, images and various other items



NORTHERN GATE

the tableland, which now constitutes the State of Mysore. Places like Nidugal and Hemavati (Henjeru) were headquarters of chieftaincies which came into notice with the rise of the later Chalukyas of Kalyani. Before their rise to power, the District seems to have constituted a part of the Pallava and Chola territories, and the chieftains of Nidugal claimed descent from the Cholas and took Chola titles. With the rise of the Western Chalukyas of Kalyani this became a frontier Viceroyalty, set over against the Kingdom of Vengi, the territory of the Eastern Chalukyas rapidly passing under Chola influence. Henjeru (Hemavati) is generally described in the inscriptions of this period as "the bolt of the South". This was intended to mean that it barred the way of advance to the South for any northern or

of temple architecture show unmistakably that it was a place of considerable importance under that dynasty. Under the last great Hoysala, Vira Ballala III., it was the headquarters of an important Governorship, which office was held in A. D. 1328 by one Machayya Dandanâyak, who seems to have been a close relative of the Ruler himself. It is found maintaining that position during the troubled times that followed the invasions of the South under Muhammad, the Tughlak (A. D. 1325-1351). In the last year of the reign we have mention of Bukka, the third of the five brothers associated with the foundation of the Empire of Vijayanagar, as the Governor of Penugonda and "upraiser of the Hoysala dynasty". His elder brother, Harihara I., is heard of already in A. D. 1333 as

the Southern Mahratta foundation of the Empire.

country under the last great Hoysala, and exercised authority as overlord of the Muhammadan Sultan Jamaluddin of Honavar on the West Coast. Some ancient Tamil chronicles refer to Bukka's son Kampana or Kumara Kampana, as the "door-keeper" (Gentleman-in-Waiting) upon the Hoysala Monarch. We are thus justified in regarding these brothers, and even their grown-up sons, as officers of the Hoysalas.

In the early years of the fourteenth century Muhammadan raids had been carried successfully as far south as Ramesvaram and Madura; and soon after, the Muhammadan garrisons left behind were turned out by a Kerala or Travancore Ruler, Ravivarman Kulasekhara. In the years following the death of Alauddin Khilji, his son Mubarak constituted the Muhammadan Province of the Dekkan with the capital at Devagiri, the modern Dawlatabad. When, after a revolution, Muhammad Tughlak ascended the throne, a conquest of the South was attempted with so much success that a Muhammadan Governorship of Ma'abar (the Coromandel Coast) was formed, with Madura for its headquarters. This distant Governorship was among the earliest to revolt, and set up independently. When Muhammad had involved himself in the hopeless muddle of subduing the ever-recurring revolt of his Provinces, the Hoysala Ruler began gradually consolidating his power by planting a series of garrisons along the Krishna as a first line of defence, with a second and a third line behind it. Penugonda was the main fortress in the second line covering the whole of the south country below the Ghats, Carnatic Payin Ghat as the Muhammadans called it. It was this movement on the part of the last great Hoysala monarch that culminated in the Empire of Vijayanagar, and the foundation of the fortress preceded by a few years the

The village of Hampi, on the banks of the Tungabhadra with its shrine sacred to Virūpāksha, has probably had a long anterior reputation as a holy place, and, set over against Anegondi on the other side of the river, offered advantages considerably superior to the fortress of Kampli, two miles and a half down the river, which had suffered badly during the recent wars. The destruction of Kampli, the foundation of the fortress which afterwards became Vijayanagar and the shifting of the Hoysala royal residence, all came so close together about A. D. 1328 that they seem to have had some kind of organic connection as the outward acts of an accepted course of policy, followed, as it was, by a more vigorous effort of Muhammad to conquer the South. This resulted in success, but so short-lived as to lead on to the declaration of independence of Ma'abar in A.D. 1335, and the establishment of the Sultanate of Madura, which lasted with a break of about twelve years (A.D. 1345-1358) till A.D. 1378 or thereabouts. This posture of affairs explains the importance of Penugonda as a strongly fortified place in the direct line of communication between the Provinces of Devagiri and Ma'abar. Hence this was made the headquarters of the Province and made over to the charge, first, of General Machayya, and transferred subsequently to Bukka, who placed one of his brothers and then one of his sons in charge of it. After the wars of the Hoysalas against the Sultans of Madura, Penugonda became a place of comparatively minor importance, and continued as the headquarters of a Province. With the rise of the usurper Saluva Narasinga and the aggressive activity of Muhammad, the last Bahmani Sultan, and the Gajapati of Orissa, Penugonda again became important as the key of the South. Under the usurpation, it marked

PENUGONDA

ITS PLACE IN SOUTH INDIAN HISTORY GENERALLY AND THE EMPIRE OF
VIJAYANAGAR IN PARTICULAR

BY

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appointed was Macleod. He was Major Macleod at the time and 'the Colonel' of the manuscript may be merely a courtesy rank popularly given. The Government of Fort St. George felt the need for arranging for the proper government of the new acquisition, and divided the territory of the Nawab of Arcot that they annexed into a northern and a southern Arcot, Palar being the dividing line. Arcot was annexed in 1801, and Macleod, the third Collector who succeeded about the end of the year 1802, remained in office till March 1804, when, owing to the inexorable character of the Board of Revenue, he was compelled to take leave 'on grounds of ill-health.' The manuscript therefore must have been composed during the fourteen months of the administration of 'Col.' Macleod. We may therefore take it that the work was compiled in 1803.

The story of Raja Deśing, as we find it in this manuscript, is very sober and bears on the face of it the impress of an account of a contemporary character. Probably Narayana Pillai heard the account from those that were actually living in the vicinity when Raja Deśing and his father Surup Singh were conducting the administration of Gingee, that is, the period 1699 to A.D. 1714. The account starts with the fall of Gingee to Zulfikar Khan, the Mogul general under Aurangzeb who was deputed to take possession of Gingee after the fall of Bijapur and Golkonda. The story of the wars round Gingee and its ultimate fall are well known, though the details are not quite so well established. The first fact that lends itself to investigation as a test is the date of the fall of Gingee and what took place immediately after. Even Sir Jadunath Sarkar in his voluminous work on Aurangzeb leaves the question open. He quotes the *Ma'asir-i-Alamgiri* which gives a discrepant date, and the correction that the learned author suggests is also of an uncertain character. The next authority that he quotes is one in which he has full confidence, that is, *Nushak-i Dilkusha* of Bhimasen, the Agent of Dalpat Rao Bundela, the officer of Aurangzeb. According to him, the fort fell on a *Sankarānti*, which he tries to interpret as the 2nd of January or the 31st, as either of them marks the entry of the sun into one of the signs of the zodiac, such entry being termed *Sankaramana* or *Sankarānti*. He also quotes the further authority of the *Diary and Consultation of Fort St. George*, where there is an entry that on the 2nd of January, 1698, that all but one of the fortresses

at Gingee had fallen to Zulfikar Khan.¹ Now our authority here gives a precise date, namely, the Fasli year 1107, the year Îsvara, the month of Tai, day two, equivalent to Saturday, the 31st December, 1697, in modern computation. The entry in the *Fort St. George Diary* has reference to the 2nd of January. It would be three days from the date actually given here. The *Masir-i-Alamgiri* is certainly wrong, though perhaps it is the official account. Bhimsen comes rather near to correctness if his datum that the fort fell on a *Sankarānti* should be properly interpreted. According to this account, the fort actually fell on the second of *Tai*. The first of *Tai* is generally known as *Sankarānti* in these parts and is an agricultural festival for all people who celebrate it as *Sankarānti* not only the orthodox Brahman marking the entry of the sun into a new house of the zodiac. It happens to be the tenth house here. Bhimsen's reference to a *Sankarānti* therefore is not the monthly entry of the sun, but the special *Sankarānti* which usually comes about the middle of January now. It happened to be for that year on the 30th of December. On the 31st also the *Pongal* continues, which is sometimes spoken of also as *Sankarānti* loosely, and Bhimsen might have so heard it. That this was so can be inferred from the Fort St. George records in a letter to William Hatsell, Governor of Fort St. David. The Council of Fort St. George communicated: 'there is a report here that Zulphaker Cawn had got up his flag upon one of the hills of Gingee, and makes a show as if he had really intended to take the place; a little time will show the truth,' on the 28th of December. Then, Gingee had not fallen. Another entry, dated the 11th of January, 1698, in a letter to the same party states: 'It is certain that Zulphaker Cawn had taken Gingee' and wants Fort St. David to be careful and be prepared for an attack. The letter refers to a communication from Fort St. David, dated the

¹ 'M.A. 391 explicitly says that Gingee was captured on 6th Shaban forty-first year of Aurangzeb (7th February, 1698). The *Madras Diary* of 2nd January, 1698, records: 'A letter from Amir Jahan from the Mughal camp received to-day advises that the Nawab has taken the Gingee forts all but one which also offers to capitulate.' If we read *Rajab* instead of Shaban in M.A., we get 8th January. Bhimsen (135a) says that the fort fell on a *Sankarānti*, which would give 2nd or 31st January. Chitnis (ii. 58) as usual is grossly incorrect, giving *Chaitra pratipad Sudi* 1618 = 23rd March, 1696, as the date of the capture'. Sarkar's *Aurangzeb* v., p. 108 n.

5th January, giving the news to them, and the letter in reply agrees with the view expressed by Mr. Hatsell. Therefore, then, Gingee must have fallen before the 5th of January, and the actual date of the fall must be between the 28th of December, 1697, and the 5th of January, 1698. Having regard to the general statement, that Gingee fell on a *Sankarānti*, that is, the 30th of December, 1697, our record comes as close to a precisely correct date as it is possible in the circumstances, in whatever manner the author had acquired the date. The actual difference between the 30th *Sankarānti* and the 31st of the chronicle may be one of looseness of language regarding *Sankarānti* of Bhimsen, or of the fort having actually fallen or taken to have, before sunrise.

The next point in which this account differs materially from those of the others is the circumstances and the character of the retirement of Rajaram from Gingee. As Professor Sarkar's account has it, Rajaram was just able to take himself away leaving behind even his wives and children,¹ and that, while the Nawab offered them escort and arranged to send them away, one of them declined to accept the hospitality of the Nawab, and, dropping herself down a sheer precipice, lost her life.² To begin with, this seems to be rather against the complaint of collusiveness, which, on all hands, has been ascribed to Zulfikar Khan's prosecution of the siege of Gingee, and his unwillingness to take the fortress, lest the fall of the fortress should free the army and make it available for Aurangzeb to send it out on a distant expedition to the North-Western Frontier, which the general and the army alike disliked. The account of Narayana Pillai here is that all the while the Nawab was feigning an attack, and whenever it was proposed to make an attack, Rajaram had previous intimation,

¹ 'The Maratha royal family begged for safety, which was promised to them, and *palkis* were sent for their conveyance. Four wives, three sons and two daughters of Rajaram now came out of the citadel and were kept in honourable captivity. Another wife of the Rajah avoided surrender; she flung herself down from the summit of the fort into the sheer depths below. Her head struck a projecting rock and she was killed instantly, but her mangled corpse was caught in the branches of a tree on the hillside at an inaccessible place and there it lay without funeral. Nearly 4,000 men, women and children were found in the fort, but very few combatants. (*Dil.* 124)'. *Ibid.*, p. 108.

² *Letters from Fort St. George, 1698: letter, dated 1st March.*—'There are Credible reports that the Morattas who lately came to Vellore have carried away Ramaraja with them and that the Nabob three dayes since out from Wandewas for Vellore with the Army onely, leaving the Baggage att Wandewas.'

as the Company's records bear out.* As on this occasion, the Nawab was compelled to make a serious attack, on the representation of Yāchamanāyaka at Venkatagiri, the attack was made after the said Nāyaka had been killed by Zulfikhar Khan. It is difficult to believe that Rajaram had no intimation of it. Whether Zulfikhar Khan gave intimation or no, Rajaram apparently had intimation of what was taking place in the Nawab's camp and planned his retreat accordingly. He seems to have taken a somewhat sequestered way out of the fort with all his family and entourage, and got out of the fort in the night safely unknown to the besiegers. From various references in the records of Fort St. George, he loitered about the Karnātak and remained in Vellore till a contingent of 3,000 Mahratta horse came from Poona and took him safely from Vellore in the month of March following¹. In the light of these, therefore, the account of Bhimsen may not be exactly correct in details.

Practically all the year 1698 Zulfikar Khan was making his own arrangements and Daud Khan was ultimately put in charge when Zulfikar left for the imperial camp. The Fort St. David correspondence gives us clear indication of it. It was in the year following that the imperial rescript was sent ordering the appointment of a Bundela chieftain, Surup Singh, as Killadhar of Gingee and superseded the temporary arrangements made by Zulfikar Khan. Surup Singh is said

¹ *Letters from Fort St. George, 1698, letter, dated 4th March.*—'But it hath happened in this juncture 4 or 5,000 Morāttas came to Vellore, whither Ramaraja had escaped from Chingee which obliged the Nabob to carry his Army thither. Ramraja upon that news is gone from Vellore with the said Morattas, and the Nabob follows them, but probably no further then the extent of his Counrey, and his returne is expected suddainly after which itt will appear whether he do's really design to trouble us. Att present wee can make no judgment having yet received no answer to the Letters sent him so that wee find reason to confirme the caution given you in the inclosed, and the rather because the last letters received from Fort St. David yesterday give an account of their advices, that Seillm Cawn doth threaten and prepair for another assult of Cuddaloor.'

Letters from Fort St. George, 1698, letter, dated 8th March.—'Spye Bramines from the Camp advise that the Nabob hath followed after Ramraja as far as Gurram (c) unda and that from thence the Nabob will returne to Sautgur and from thence to Arcott to keep the Ramzan. Amerjeahan is gone with the Camp, but there is no Letter from him since he sett out from Wandevass, so soon as wee heare anything from him shall communicate itt to you'.

Letters from Fort St. George, 1698, letter, dated 28th March.—'Last night our peons came from the camp who advise that the camp was 8 days agoe beyond Gurrungunda, and that the Nabob designed to go (after hee had finished some business with Polligars) against Vellore.'

to have been a man in personal attendance upon 'the Bundela chief'. The account leaves it open whether he was dependent, on Dalpat Ray Bundela, or another Bundelkhand chieftain. He was appointed Killadhar and succeeded to the responsibilities of the Nawab of the Karnātak over all the territory appertaining to the province of Gingee. We need not go through all the details of the administration of Surup Singh, which is not exactly our concern, nor does the account publish many details regarding these. Apparently Surup Singh conducted himself as an efficient administrator and carried on the administration to the satisfaction of the *Foujdar* of Arcot, Daud Khan. Daud Khan retired from Arcot in 1704 and Surup Singh continued, perhaps with more power, under his successor Sadat-ullah Khan and the Dewan Dakhni Roy. There was apparently no trouble during Bahadur Shah's reign except perhaps that Surup Singh took advantage of the change in headquarters to be slack in the payment of the monies due. It is the accession of Faruksiyar who took the throne, and the assumption of power by the Sayyad brothers, that brought to the notice this remissness of Surup Singh. A demand was accordingly made, and perhaps Surup Singh found it impossible to get out of the bargain; he managed to pay up the arrears and put himself fair and square with respect to his imperial master. But the accession of Faruksiyar and the changes that followed in quick succession upset much, and perhaps it was the new order of things in regard to the governorships that made the position of Surup Singh somewhat delicate. But he managed to live it down and died without having settled the question. In these circumstances, his son Dēśing happened to be, at the time of the last illness of his father, in Bundelkhand. He naturally marched at the head of an escort, and his taking possession of Gingee in succession to his father was the beginning of the trouble. The matter in dispute between Dēśing and Nawab Sadat-ullah Khan was one almost exactly the same as that between the British at Fort St. David and the Nawabs of the Karnātak and the Killedhars of Gingee. The question of the right of possession by grant of a *firman* in this particular case, the imperial *firman* of Aurangzeb, and whether a subsequent *firman* of Faruksiyar could overthrow a title established through a period of more than twelve years. Dēśing took the line of Aurangzeb's *firman* to his father giving them absolute right of the Killadhari, while the Nawab held, in behalf of Faruksiyar, that

a succession was not valid unless the emperor for the time being approved of it. The ten months' rule of Raja Dēśing was one, on this account, of opposition and ended in a campaign conducted by Nawab Sadat-ullah Khan against Gingee. Raja Dēśing fought heroically against tremendous odds and fell fighting.

The simple story of Dēśing's succession and history has been magnified into a romance, and all that was known hitherto was an almost fabulous account of Dēśing incorporated in a popular ballad that is being sung ordinarily by people of all classes in the Tamil country. The account of the ballad begins with a very highly coloured, and absolutely mythical, account of the character of the horse, which he rode. He is said to have got it from the Sultan of Delhi, who, in admiration of his success in taming the beast, gave his daughter in marriage with a *jaghir*. In the ballad, the name of the father is wrongly given, and he is provided even with an uncle, which does not appear in the other account. The account of Narayana Pillai, however, makes it intelligibly historical. Dēśing, on his way from Bundelkhand up to his father's head-quarters, passed through Beḍnur, and obtained from the Raja of Beḍnur, in return for the assistance that he rendered, a particularly spirited horse, which he rode through all his battle. The story is something like Alexander and Beucephalus and no more. His own guard was 350 horse. He had a body of 500 *killadhari* soldiers. This is of course a slender force in comparison with the resources of the Nawab, and he fought like a hero. He succeeded in killing Dowlat Khan, the general of the Nawab, on the back of his elephant, and almost succeeded in taking the life of the Nawab himself by means of his splendid horse. There being no way of escape from the field of battle with his slender force, the Nawab made every attempt to capture him alive. He had, however, to be shot down at the critical moment to save the Nawab being killed. There is a representation of the last battle on a stone slab preserved in the Museum. Recently a writer in the *Madras Mail* gave this illustration and his own account of Raja Dēśing. There are also Tamil books written upon the story of Raja Dēśing, which young boys read in schools claiming to be historical expositions though they show but slender knowledge of history.

The Tamil name Dēśing stands for Tej Singh in Sanskrit. He was the son not of Thēraṇi Singh but of Surup Singh of Bundelkhand.

He had a personal friend in the son of the *killadhar* of Valudāvūr, a young Muhammadan by name Mohabat Khan who, with two of his own intimate friends, stood staunchly loyal to his friend and fought like Leonidas' 300 in the fight. Toḍar Mall occupied a position of something like a Foreign Secretary to the Nawab of Arcot, a high caste Hindu, a man of culture and of capacity. He tried by peaceful means to bring Dēśing to reason and failed, and reported to his master that if Dēśing is to be tamed, it should only be by fight and not by arguments. Nawab Sadat-ullah Khan began life as a clever Secretary, and was a capable and well-meaning administrator who wanted no war in particular, till it was forced upon him. The account of Narayana Pillai in regard to this is quite sober and narrates the events in a manner to carry conviction as a true account, in whatever manner he came by his knowledge. He was a native of Gingee apparently, and could write but indifferent Tamil. His account is written in a brogue, a sort of hybrid between bazaar-Tamil and the official Hindustani written Tamil. He could, however, state the incidents clearly and observe the sequence. As he claims in the preface, he seems to have had some little critical power and applied it usefully. He sometimes offers opinions, perhaps without adequate knowledge, and does not show himself a partisan of Dēśing. He shows himself rather the other way. The narrative presented of Dēśing probably conveys all the correct history of the hero and his short ten months' rule of Gingee.

The date of the death of Dēśing is precisely given in the narrative, and the details given are found to be correct according to the *Indian Ephemeris* of the late Dewan Bahadur L. D. Swamikannu Pillai, corresponding to Sunday, 3rd October, 1714.¹

¹ Wheeler, *Madras in Olden Times*, p. 337.—'Saturday, October 9, 1714.—General Letter from the Deputy Governor and Council of Fort St. David, dated the 6th instant, advising that our Nabob Sadat-ulla Khan had drawn all his forces round Ginjee, and summoned Serope Singh's son to surrender, upon pretence of an order from Court to take possession of that place; which he refused to do, and making a desperate sally with about 300 Rajpoots, was very near killing the Nabob, having cut the harness of his elephant with his own hands. But timely succour coming in to the Nabob's rescue, Tejah Singh, Serope Singh's son, with Mohabut Khan and several others of the principal men belonging to Ginjee, were overpowered and cut off, so that it is believed Ginjee will surrender in a few days.' On the 15th of November the news arrived that Ginjee was captured by Sadatulla Khan.

(TRANSLATION OF NARAYANA PILLAI'S ACCOUNT)

(In the wars of Aurangzeb in the south, the operations round Gingee constitute an important episode, and the siege itself is said to have lasted for a period of twelve years till ultimately it fell. Since the episode of Raja Dēśing arises directly out of the fall of Gingee, we may well begin the story with the fall of the fortress.)

The Nawab¹ having in this manner pretended to be operating seriously carried on the siege of the fortress to the year Fasli 1106 (A.D. 1696). The Nawab so operated in the belief that, if the Padusha had no trouble in Hindustan, the Dakhan or the Karnāṭak, the sepoys would have no work. This was generally known to all. In these circumstances and at this time, Bangāru Yāchamanāyaka wrote a petition to the Padusha that the Nawab Amir-ul-Umara Bahadur was actually helping Rajaram. The Padusha having seen the letter showed it to Nawab Asafud Dowlah Asad Khan, Vazir. The Nawab replied, 'I have been your Vazir for the past fifty years. Never will disloyalty be shown by any of kin to me to the Padusha.' On this the Padusha sent the petition of Yāchamanāyaka enclosed in a *firman* to Amir-ul-Umara. Even Nawab Asad Khan Bahadur wrote to his son, Nawab Amir-ul-Umara, indicating that disloyalty would become ascribable to him through the son's conduct. The Amir-ul-Umara having seen the *firman* of the Padusha and the letter from his father, cut off the head of Yāchamanāyaka.

While this was the condition of affairs in camp, there arrived from the Padusha to the Nawab money and reinforcements under the command of Nawab Daud Khan, Muhammad Syed Kevud, Venkatapati and others. On the arrival of these, the siege of Gingee was pushed on vigorously. Rajaram considered it was no more safe to remain in Gingee. Taking with him from among the Mēlachēri Killedhars, Kandē Rao and others with all the things, and *taking with him his wives and attendants, he was getting ready to quit the fort.* The Nawab was not aware of this. He actually thought that, as the siege had been going on for twelve years, and as even the Padusha's resources were getting almost exhausted, the fortress was actually going to fall. He therefore ordered that the siege might be pressed and efforts made to take it without further delay. Nawab Daud Khan and his contingent

attacked Sēnaghaḍi, Kevud and his contingent similarly attacked Krishnaghaḍi, while the Nawab (Amir-ul-Umara) with all the remaining forces sat down in front of the principal entrance to the fortress. In this stage of the siege, Rajaram opened the Tiruvannāmalai gate and, with all his impedimenta, got out of the fort and set forward marching westwards. The army of the Nawab, however, continued the siege, and the fort fell in the year of Fasli 1107, the year *Īśvara* month *Tai*, day 2 (Saturday, 31st December 1697). The fortress gate by which the Nawab entered it was called *Fatḥ Dārūdāja* (victory gate). Hearing that the enemy had escaped, the Nawab's army left the fort and surrounded Rajaram's forces. Rajaram's army fought its way successfully and arrived at Pennāttūr. Attacked again there, they reached Tiruvannāmalai the next day, and breaking camp again there, the army of Rajaram marched through the pass of Chengama to Tirupattur, thence to Kolar and ultimately reached Poona. The Nawab's army pursued them, till they passed the ghats and returned. The Amir Umara, taking possession of Gingee, made arrangements for securing it by making Kakad Khan Killadhar. Khasbur Khan (Gussafur Khan of the *Fort St. George Records*) was made *Faujdar*. Further he made Daud Khan *Faujdar* of the Karnāṭak in accordance with the orders of the headquarters (Huzur) in the year of Fasli 1108¹ (A.D. 1698). Muhammad Sayyed Khan was made Dewan, Lala Dākni Ray was made Dewan Peishkar, Lala Toḍarmal was made Sheristadar of the Karnāṭak. The Amir-ul-Umara gave to Gingee the name Nazrat Ghaḍ².

With a view to taking Tanjore in the Chola country, he marched forward and encamped at Tiruvāḍi (Tiruvaiyār). The Bhosla or Bhonsla king³ of Tanjore, *Ekoji-Tukaji*, sent his wakil and, by paying *Nazar* and contributions for the expenses of the troops, he came to an agreement by undertaking to pay tribute. Similarly the Nayak-Raja of Trichinopoly and the Rajas of Ramnad and Sivaganga were put under tribute. While the Nawab Amir-ul-Umara was making these arrangements, information reached the Padusha that Yāchamanāyaka

¹ In the account, the figure for 100 is inadvertently omitted.

² The full name of the Nawab is Amir-ul-Umara Zulfikar Khan Bahadur Nazarath Jung. The name Nazarath apparently was taken from a part of his full title.

³ Written by an error Kosala.

¹ Zulfikar Khan, the son of the minister Asad Khan,

had been killed. The Padusha sent forward orders that the late Nayak's son, Kumâra Yâchamanâyaka, be installed in his place with a suitable *Mansab* and *Jaghir*. The Amir sent for Kumâra Yâchamanâyaka, communicated to him the orders of the Padusha and gave him the *Jaghir* of Venkaṭagirikoṭah. To the contingent sent forward by the Raja of Jeypore under Sirdar Śivanath Singh, the Nawab presented *Jaghirs* both to the Commander and to the Sepoys in the districts of Gingee, Tiruvannâmalai and Tiruvâḍi and in the places under the irrigation districts of the anicut at Tiruvannainallûr. Śivanath Singh was under the same orders given the *killedhari* of Chengi, Madanmust and Dēśur. In addition to a *Mansab*, Śivanath Singh came into possession of these *Killedharis* in Fasli 1107, year Isvara. In these circumstances, Padusha Alamghir sent Surup Singh with a *Mansab* of 2,000, a *jaghir* of twelve lakhs and the *killedhari* of Gingee. Surup Singh was a man in immediate attendance on the Raja of Bundelkhand, Surup Singh by name. He took the man from the Raja, and, giving him the title of Surup Singh, sent him on to the Nawab Amir-ul-Umara with the *firman* above mentioned. Under this *firman*, the Nawab, Amir-ul-Umara gave him the *killedhari* of Gingee and sent him with the order to Kisafar Khan (the Gussafar Khan of the *Company's Records*) and Kakadkhan. Surup Singh entered office as *Killedhar* of Gingee in the year of Fasli 1110, year *Vikrama*, (or A. D. 1700) and took possession of the fortress of Gingee. Killedhar Kisfar Khan and Foujdar Kakad Khan retired and joined the army of the Nawab. Payya Rāmakrishna was appointed *Vak Navis* (Secretary). Shaik Nur was appointed head of the guard. Shikar Udaya Ram became *Jupya Navis*. Chalchiram became *Tahavildar*. Śrī Ram became *Hazar Amani*. Other officials like *Hazar Mendi*, *Hazar Thopachi* and others of the Padushayi service numbering 5,000 remained as khilla *dhaināth* under the orders of the Nawab. Surup Singh kept with him this *dhaināth* 5,000 along with his own three hundred horse, took possession of his own *Jaghir* of the *eight veli parganah* in Gingee, Valudāvûr, Tinḍivanam, Tiruvāmāttûr, Aśapûr, Tirukkôvilûr, Vēṭṭaivanam and places like that. Nawab Amir-ul-Umara Zulfikar Khan Bahadur Nazrath Jung, in accordance with the orders of the Padusha, made over the *foujdari* of the Karnatak to Daud Khan as *Foujdar*, Muhammad Sayyad Khan as Dewan, Todar Mall as Sheristadar, and reached Aurangabad in the same year *Vikrama*. Nawab Daud Khan, taking his

army with him, encamped himself on the south bank of the Palar as usual and remained there in camp. That place has since become the town of Arcot. Remaining there he conducted the work of the *Foujdari* of the Karnatak on the lines laid down by his predecessors, particularly by Nawab Amir-ul-Umara, collecting the *nazar* and *peishkush* arranged for him from the *Killedhars*, *Jaghirdars*, *Mansabdars*, the *Poligars* who were established from the time of the Rajas and others. He also sent out *Amildars* for collecting the *amani* dues from the *khalsa* lands, the revenues from the *koṭi* at Bhandar (Masulipatam) and remitted to the Huzur the 15 lakhs, the *Irsal* amount according to the *Ijari*. He built for himself a bungalow in Mylapore and fortified the town. He conducted the administration with justice and remained in Arcot till the fasli year 1114 (A. D. 1704).

In these circumstances and, in accordance with the orders of the Padusha Alamghir (Aurangzeb), he appointed Muhammad Sayyad Khan Dewan to carry on the administration officiating in his place (*Kathiyāri*) and left for the imperial head-quarters leaving instructions that Sayyad Khan should write to him regular reports and arrange for sending out an agent to him also. In accordance with these instructions, Sayyad Khan carried on his administration appointing Roy Dakhiniray as his Dewan. He got for his elder brother, Ghulam Ali Khan, the *Killedhari* of Velur by recommending to the head-quarters and obtaining their *firman* and *tasvisnāma*, Ghulam Ali Khan thus got the *Killedhari* of Velur with a *mansab* of one thousand. He also wrote his reports and obtained the necessary *firman* and *tasvisnāma* in favour of the *Killedhars* of his own choice for the Karnatakghaḍi, Kailâsghaḍi, Wandivash, Timir and other places in the Karnatak already. The Padusha accordingly sent to Sayyad Khan a *mansab* of 3,000 and the title Sadat-ullah Khan. Nawab Sadat-ullah Khan proved a good administrator of the Karnatak keeping himself on good terms with the *Jaghirdars* of the Karnatak and the Rajas of Trichinopoly, Tanjore, Madura and Venkaṭagiri, collecting from them the due *peishkush* as well as the other revenues from the *Sircar* taluks according to the established arrangements. He collected the dues with justice and remitted the dues to the head-quarters along with the accounts at the fixed time. He also managed to be on good terms with the officials of the Dewan's Office (*mutسادis*) by means of gifts, *takhrir* and *paridana*. While everybody concerned spoke well of him, the Padusha

was greatly pleased with him as a very efficient administrator, fully justifying the expectations of his youth as a very intelligent young man. About this time, Padusha Alamghir died and was succeeded by his son who let the administration of the Karnatak go on as before. The Nawab conducted himself in his days by remitting regularly the *Izara* due to the *Sircar*, the tribute due from the Karnatak by way of *nazar* and the usual durbar expenditure. When afterwards Faruksiyar succeeded as Padusha, the *Killedhar* of Gingee Surup Singh had become a regular defaulter for ten years without sending even the *peishcush* or *Nazar*, and otherwise taking forcible possession of the *Sircar Khalsa* villages and disregarding the order of the *Foujdar* in regard to these matters. Sadat-ullah Khan therefore intimated the matter in his report to the Padusha and made a separate report that Surup Singh owed to the *Foujdari* 70 lakhs of rupees, filing accounts to prove it. Having examined the accounts and reports, the Padusha in anger threw Surup Singh's Vakil into prison and ordered that he might write to Surup Singh to pay up the seventy lakhs of rupees to the *Foujdar* of the Karnatak. In this state of affairs certain of the Amirs in the court spoke in favour of Surup Singh and presented his case favourably to court. The agent of Sadat-ullah Khan, on the contrary, by name Tipudas, worked through the agency of the court Daroga Kutbudin undertaking to pay two lakhs of rupees to the durbar for expenditure through the Bukansi Kasidas' business house (*Khoti*). He also filed a *darkhast* in these terms at the Muzur office. Having seen these, the Padusha sent out a *firman* informing Sadat-ullah Khan of this and issued orders on these terms to Surup Singh.¹ Having learnt

¹ Wheeler, *Madras in Olden Times*, p. 323.

² Zulfikar Khan being cut off, there came immediate orders from Court to re-assume all the lands and villages that were granted him in these parts by Aurungzebe, in consideration of his good services in the conquest of the Gingee country. Accordingly the Dewan Sadat-ulla Khan sent us a summons to deliver up Egmore, etc., villages granted us by Zulfikar Khan on account of the assistance we gave him with ammunition, and what else he wanted to carry on his designs. We have hitherto staved this business off with good words and pleading our rights; and when the new Nabob (Nizam) comes nearer, we will endeavour to get our grant confirmed. In the meantime, if any force is used to take them from us, we resolve to defend them as well as we can. We are in daily expectation that our Dewan Sadat-ulla Khan will be turned out, as having been a creature and vassal of Zulfikar Khan. For which reason, we avoid purchasing his friendship in this matter by presents.

from news letters of all that had taken place, Surup Singh was sorrow-stricken and, falling ill, died sometime after.¹ News of this illness reached the house of Surup Singh in Bundelkhand.

Dēśing (Tej Singh), the son of Surup Singh, immediately started with his wife and fifty horse and attendants, and arrived at Bidanur (Bednur) in the Karnatak. At that time the Raja of Bidanur was much troubled by the Mahratta Sardars between whom and himself frequent skirmishes were taking place. Having heard of Raja Dēśing's arrival, the Raja of Bidanur urged the friendship of Dēśing's father, Surup Singh, the *Killedhar* of Gingee and persuaded Dēśing to render him assistance, by showing him letters received from Surup Singh. After due consideration of the proposal, and, on the representation of the chief officials of Bidanur who carried the letter, Raja Dēśing agreed to assist the Raja of Bidanur and attacked his enemies with his own forces. His contingent distinguished itself and succeeded in turning back the assailants. The Raja of Bidanur in return paid one lakh of rupees and made him a present, with great pleasure, of an extraordinarily good horse in his stables, which nobody had been able to ride before. The animal actually cost him twelve thousand rupees. Having heard the description of the horse, Dēśing proceeded to the stables and found the animal tame at his approach. Dēśing was able to ride the animal without trouble and thus secured the present for himself in addition to the money, the dress and jewels. With all these, he arrived at Gingee. Surup Singh had died in the meanwhile, while Dēśing was still on the way from Bundelkhand to Bidanur.² Reaching Gingee, Dēśing performed the funeral ceremonies of his father and assumed authority as *Killedhar*. The *Killedhari* officials of Surup Singh paid the *nazar* and acknowledged him as his

¹ A day or two before 20th December, 1713, Fort. St. George, Consultation, dated 24th December 1713.

² from Thoms Frederick Esqr, Deputy Governr. of Fort St. David, dated 20th. inst. advising the death of Serope Sing Rajah of Chingee.

* There is an apparent discrepancy here. The narrative seems to imply that Dēśing started on hearing of the death of Surup Singh. But what actually seems to have taken place, according to the narrative as a whole, is that the information of Surup Singh's illness reached his house in Bundelkhand. Raja Dēśing left with his wife and a slender guard. While he was still on the way south, Surup Singh took ill and died when the son reached Gingee. Information of death reached Bundelkhand only then.

successor, while the Padushayi officials, such as the *Dhainath Vaknavis* and others did not pay the usual *nazar*. Knowing that Dēśing was a man of quick temper, nobody dared to intimate to him that he should not assume office without the orders of the *Sircar*. Payya Ramakrishna, the *Vaknavis*, however, found a suitable opportunity some time after to point out that he should assume office with the knowledge of the *Sircar* and with the orders of the Padusha where necessary. Failing this, he urged that he ought to obtain orders from Nawab Sadat-ullah Khan.¹

Dēśing replied that his father Surup Singh got the *meras* of Gingee from his Padusha Alamgir, and therefore he was not bound to apply to anybody else, and nobody's orders were therefore required. Payya Ramakrishna kept quiet and six months passed.

Sadat-ullah Khan had information of the death of Surup Singh. But he did not send anybody to take possession of the government of Gingee. He wrote to Raja Dēśing, however, a letter of condolence about the death of his father. Dēśing was exercising his authority over all the taluks of Surup Singh's *Jaghir*. In the meanwhile, there arrived from the Padusha two *harkars* to Arcot (the head-quarters of the Karnatak since the days of Daud Khan) carrying a *firman* to Sadat-ullah Khan, and orders to Surup Singh (the orders that Faruksiya issued in regard to the seventy lakhs of revenue due). Having read the *firman* from the Padusha, the Nawab Sadat-ullah Khan called the Sheristadar of the Padushayi, Lala Todar Mall (Tamil Tondar Mull), and told him that Raja Dēśing was an irritable young man and therefore to proceed personally to Gingee and show him the *takhid firman* and the letter from himself and take quiet possession of the fortress peacefully as well as the *Jaghir* lands attached thereto, and to send down Raja Dēśing. Todar Mall left Arcot at the head of fifty horse and the necessary equipage and, reaching Gingee, encamped himself near the temple of Venkatarāya Swāmi constructed by Muthiyal Nāyakan. The Padushayi officials of the fort, Payya Ramakrishna and others, came and visited him in camp. Todar Mall intimated to them that he was the bearer of the imperial *firman* to Nawab Sadat-ullah Khan and the *takhid firman* to Killedhar Surup Singh. They examined the *Ināyatnāma* and copies of the *firman* and conveyed the information

¹ See note above.

to Raja Dēśing¹. Raja Dēśing gave them the reply that the fort as well as the *Jaghir* attached thereto were given to his father by Alamgir Padusha, and that he was not prepared to give up the fort. Payya Ramakrishna in reply said that the *firman* from the Padusha and the *Ināyatnāma* of the *Foujdar* were both of them brought to him by the *Mutsadi* who is encamped in Gingee. Whatever Raja Dēśing may have to say in this matter, he ought to speak to him. He pointed out that Todar Mall was a good man as also was the *Foujdar* Sadat-ullah Khan. They assured him that they would not take away the *miras* from him, but that, if he saw Todar Mall and the *Foujdar* afterwards, they would confirm him in the *killedhari*. Payya Ramakrishna therefore impressed it upon him that he ought to go and see Todar Mall. Agreeing to this, Raja Dēśing at the head of his horses and all the necessary equipage of his father went out riding towards the cremation ground of the Rajas near Mēlachēri. Turning round from there to the temple of Chakraperumāl on the banks of the river and turning towards the fort from there, the Raja came to the tent of Todar Mall. Todar Mall, seeing that the *Killedhar* was coming, went forward to meet him. Dēśing made his salutation without getting down from his horse. Todar Mall felt chagrined and returned to his tent. Dēśing proceeded on his way to the fort. The next morning Todar Mall in his turn came on horseback and reached the court of Dēśing. Being a mild man, Todar Mall felt that he should not make much of the 'characteristic stupidity of the *Bundela*'. He approached Dēśing in due form and presented him the imperial *firman* and the *Foujdar's Ināyatnāma*. When Dēśing got them read out to him, his eyes turned red and, becoming angry, he said that he would not allow the *Jaghir* to be taken possession of by Todar Mall. But, if he persisted, it would result in the rolling of many heads. So saying, he threw down the *firman* of the Padusha and the *Ināyatnāma* of the *Foujdar* towards Todar Mall. Todar Mall took up the documents and returned to the camp. The *Foujdari* officials followed him to the camp

¹ *Madras in Olden Times*, p. 327.

² *Thursday, October 8, 1713*. The present Nabob Sadat-ulla Khan, having received a firman from the new King Feroxsere, confirming him in the Government of these parts; upon which the French and Dutch have presented him each to the amount of a thousand pagodas or thereabouts; and having lately received a message by a horseman from him, that if we do not forthwith deliver up the villages, he intends to come and take possession of them'.

and wanted orders as to how they should conduct themselves.¹ Todar Mall instructed them to go on as ever before in the discharge of their various duties and sent them back.

Todar Mall reported to Nawab Sadat-ullah Khan, the *Foujdar* of the Karnatak, that, if an attempt be made to take forcible possession of the fort, there is likely to be a fight for possession, and pointed out that Raja Dēśing's confidence in the line of conduct that he has adopted was due to the possession of 350 horse of his own and 500 soldiers belonging to his *Killa*. On receipt of this letter the *Foujdar* set his army in motion and a skirmish took place in the plains of Timiri. In the course of a month, the *Foujdar's* forces rose to 5,000 horse and ten thousand foot, besides contingents from Bangāru Yāchamanāyaka of Venkatagiri, from the Nāyak of Kālahasti, from the Poligars, Bommaraja and other *Killadhars*, the whole army totalling thirty thousand. The *Foujdar* having collected all the necessary material for carrying the campaign to the uttermost, arrived in Arni. He was met there by the *Killedhar* of Arni, Venkat Rao. Presenting the usual *nazar* and paying the peishcush, he joined the Nawab with his contingent. After fifteen days' stay, the Nawab broke up his camp and reached Chetput, the *Killa* of Salabat Khan, who met him and made the payments due. He was in camp there for about ten days when Todar Mall joined him. In Gingee, however, Payya Ramakrishna, *Vaknavis*, and the other officials of the *Foujdari* pointed out to Raja Dēśing that the *Foujdar* was in full march with his own army and auxiliary contingents upon Gingee, that the *Foujdar* was authorised to exercise control over all the *Killedhars*, *Jaghirdars* and *Rajas* of the whole Karnatak and is authorized to receive tribute from them. 'Your father was given a *tākhid firman*

¹ On the matter under dispute the following extract from *Diary and Consultations at Fort St. George* for 1714 is illuminating: p. 143.

'I hope your Excellency will not disturb our quiet possession of Wt. w- formerly purchas'd wth. our money of the Lawfull Owner & has since' been confirm'd to us by the Vizier Assid Cawn and his son in the name of the great King Aurg Zeb, & for wch. as well as for all our Antient Rights and privileges we have lately been hon'd. with. his present Majesty king Farruckseer's Husbulhookum as a token of his princely grace and favour for the small unworthy services our people at Patna were able to do for him before he left that place to go for Agra. I have sent an attested Copy of this Royal grant to Latchmarow to lay before your excellency. not doubting but as we are always ready to do our utmost for his Majesty's Service, Yor. Excellency will continue Yor. favr. and friends to us as usual, & command me in particular when anythg. offers for your Service, w^t can I say more.'

for possession of Gingee. It would not do, therefore, in disregard of all these, to persist in the course of hostility adopted by you. Even now if you would visit the *Foujdar* and pay your respects to him, he would recommend to the head-quarters and obtain the *Killedhari* for you. The *Foujdar* is actually seen at the head of a large force. It is for you to judge on the basis of these facts and adopt a line of action conducive to your interests.' Raja Dēśing gave no answer to this remonstrance. The Nawab's forces encamped at Kadalimalai and entered the territory dependent on Gingee and set about plundering. The army gradually entered Gingee. The forces of the *Killedhāri* did not oppose the *Foujdar's* forces. Seeing this, Raja Dēśing sent to his friend the *Killedhar* of Valudāvūr, which belonged to the estate of his father, and obtained from him the assistance of his son Mohabat Khan and two of his friends at the head of fifty horse. On the arrival of these, Dēśing got ready and mounted his horse. Those that were well inclined towards him pointed out to him that the omens were bad and that it was not proper that he should advance against the *Foujdar's* forces. Declining the advice given, Dēśing went to his wife and telling her that, in case he should not return, she ought to find means to protect her honour. He sent word to all concerned that the army of the Muhammadans was approaching, and, telling those dependent upon him not to follow if they did not care, he set forward at the head of his guard on the road to Arcot. He was followed by 200 horse and Mohabat Khan. Without taking notice of any of the Nawab's forces that met them, they reached the banks of Varāhanadi, which was in full flood, as it was the month of October-November. After waiting there for just a short while, he spurred his horse into the flood, followed by Mohabat Khan and about a hundred horse, and reached the other bank of the river. The remainder of the force stood on the other bank alone. The river was not big and, even when it was in floods, it would be possible for them to cross it by waiting a few hours. But Dēśing had no consideration for these and marched forward at the head of a hundred horse against the Nawab's forces. Information of this having reached the *Foujdar*, he sent forward Dowlat Khan at the head of a contingent with instruction to fight him and capture him alive, and himself got ready and mounted his elephant. Dowlat Khan, seeing Dēśing approach at the head of a slender force of about a hundred horse, ordered his forces

to spread out and surround the small force coming against him, himself approaching with a view to capture Dēśing. Dēśing and Mohabat Khan attacked Dowlat Khan's forces, fought for some time vigorously till each of the forces lost fifty men. Of the followers of Dēśing a few fled. Mohabat Khan and his two friends stuck close to Dēśing and stood with him. They fought hard killing a number of the enemy, till they themselves were killed in their turn. Dēśing left alone was in terrible anger and wished to kill Dowlat Khan on the back of his elephant. Leaving therefore the Khan's main army, Dēśing rode up to his elephant. Dowlat Khan cried out to his forces not to kill Dēśing, but to capture him alive as that was the order of the *Foujdar*. So saying, he urged forward his elephant and made an effort to capture Raja Dēśing. Finding an opportunity in the course of manœuvring, Dēśing urged his horse, which got on to the side of Dowlat Khan's elephant and rearing on its hind-legs, set its fore-legs on the side of the elephant. Dēśing simultaneously pierced Dowlat Khan with his lance and turning round quickly galloped to Gingee. Even after the death of Dowlat Khan, the Nawab *Foujdar* still urged the soldiers to capture Dēśing alive and not to kill him, and moved forward with his own elephant. Dēśing, in his turn, urged his horse, charging the Nawab's elephant. One of the men on the side of the elephant cut off the fore-legs of the horse charging. The horse fell and Dēśing became a footman. Even after this the Nawab still would not permit his men to kill him and wanted that he should be captured alive. He urged his elephant forward and brought it near Dēśing. He was followed closely by Bangāru Yāchamanāyaka on his own elephant similarly urging his men to capture Dēśing. One of the Jamadars of this Nāyak, holding his shield in front as a protection, approached Dēśing with a view to capture him. Dēśing transfixed him with his spear when Yāchamanāyaka ordered that he be struck. One of the sepoys that was ready with his gun loaded and the wick burning, lighted the fuse and shot him dead. The Nawab entered the fort carrying the dead body of Dēśing with him in the year Jaya, month Arpiśi, date 2, corresponding to Fasli 1123, about an hour after sunrise (Sunday, 3rd October, 1714).¹

¹ Saturday the 9th.—'General Letter from the Depty. Governr. and Council of fort St. David, dated the 6th instant read inclosing their Accot. of Cash for last month, and advising that our Nabob had drawn all his forces Round Chingie

The Nawab entered Gingee and proceeding to the fort of Nazaratghaḍi in Padushabagh, and, having seated himself in the Kalyānamahal of the late Surup Singh, saw that the treasury and other places were secured and put under seal. All the officials of the Padushai, the officers of the army that followed him, other Amirs and Rajas and the officials of the Nawab saluted the Nawab and presented him *nazar*. In the fort itself, the Nawab secured the Baratkḥāna, the Chowkipāra and other places, and sent word to the wife of Raja Dēśing and others in the palace of his assumption of government of the fort. Dēśing's wife sent back word that the Nawab was her father, and that she had no wish to continue life after the death of her husband, and requested permission to become *Sati* by ascending his funeral pyre. Finding her immovable from her resolution, the Nawab ordered everything being provided for carrying out her wishes, and gave her the permission she sought. The cremation of the body of Dēśing and the immolation of his wife took place the next morning on the bank of the tank dug by Ram Shetty in the days of Rajaram. The funeral ceremonies were performed by the son of Alup Singh, a nephew of Raja Dēśing, at the expense of the Nawab's treasury. The followers of Dēśing, the Nawab ordered, should continue to hold their places and remain as before. They, however, obtained the permission of the Nawab to raise a new town at the spot near Kadalimalai, where Dēśing fell, and, given a cowle therefor, they built a temple to Dēśing. They also built tombs for Mohabat Khan and the other Muhammadans who fell as well as to the horse of Dēśing. They recovered the corpses of Mohabat Khan and his two friends, and after burying them in the outskirts of Gingee, built tombs over them on the bank of the Setty's tank. They built a flower garden where Dēśing was burnt and planted in the place a pipal and margosa. The *Bundelas* that were in the service of Dēśing obtained permission and returned to Bundelkhand. The Nawab took from Dēśing's Dewan Hanumaji

& Summond Seroop Sings Son to surrender upon pretence of an order from Court to take possession of that place, which he refus'd to do & making a desperate Salley with about 300 Rashboots was very near killing the Nabob having cut the harness of his Elephant with his own hands, but timely Succours coming in to the Nabobs Rescue, Teja Sing Seroop Sings Son with Mohabat Cawn and Several others of the principal Men belonging to Chingie overpower'd & cut off so that it is beleiv'd Chingie will surrender in a few days.'

Pandit, Tiruvengada Pillai and others, charge of their offices and accounts, and sent them out as *Amils of Parganas*. He also settled the rents and the taxes after measurements, and granted *kavilnâma* to those of the *petta* (heart of the town). He appointed as the *naib killadhar*, Sadat Tiyyar Khan, his wife's sister's husband along with a suitable *mansab* and *jaghir*. The *Foujdari* was given to Padanda Rao. To the new town that was built where Dēśing fell, they gave the name *Fateh Pett*. Faiyya Ramakrishna and other Padushai officials were allowed to continue in their usual offices. He also appointed *killadhars* and *mutsadis* as well as *sardars* over Rajaghaḍi, Krishnaghaḍi and Śēndarāyan Durga. He gave over Krishnaghaḍi to Kevutam Venkatapati, and, as usual, gave the *jagir* of Pennāttūr with it. For Bhūmikotta he appointed as his Foujdar, Azam Ushān, and the office of *navis* was given to Alkhayār. All were placed under the orders of Sadat Tiyyar Khan, and in addition to the already existing *dhayināti* officials, he appointed Siyad Sultan, Abdul Karim, Hayāt Khan and others as *Jamadhars*. The *Killedhari* was assumed temporarily by Sadat Tiyyar Khan. The office of *Khazi* was given to Muhammad Ali, the son-in-law of the Padushayi *Khazi*, Shaik Abdul Khadar. They also built a Jamah Musjid within the fort and an *Idga* right in front of the Śēttipallam tank. It was such a splendid structure, the like of which 'is not likely to be seen elsewhere.' Dewan Lala Roy Dakhan Ray built a single storied ~~palace~~ for himself with a garden round it. They also got the ~~stone~~ of the capture of Gingee cut out in a stone and had it built in on the steps of the Fātēh Darwāja. In this manner, Nawab Sadat-ullah Khan carried on the administration of the Karnāṭak for four years residing in the fort of Gingee. Under the orders of the head-quarters, he exercised authority over the governments of Śrīrangapaṭam, Madura, Trichinopoly, Ramnad, Tanjore, Venkaṭagiri, each under its own ruler. Besides the fifty-four *Killedharis* of the Karnāṭak, he had also authority over the factories of Channapaṭanam (Madras) and Bhandar (Masulipatam). From all these he took the settled *Peiskush* and collected the revenues of the *Khalsa* (state-owned lands). Finding at the end of the four years that the water of Gingee did not agree with him, he made over his authority to the *Naib* (his deputy) and returned to Arcot.

The Rise of the Mahratta Power in the South

BY

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It was Akbar's vision of empire that has to be regarded as perhaps the root cause of the rise of the Mahrattas to political power, and it may equally well be considered that the collapse of the Hindu empire of Vijayanagar was as much of a contributory, as the Mughal advance in the Dekhan, to the rise of the Mahrattas as a nation and as a political power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Akbar conceived his empire not exactly as an empire of the Mughals in India, but as an Indian empire, in which the Mughals, Afghans and the Hindus alike were citizens on an equal footing politically, and entitled to be regarded as the subjects of an Indian empire. The conception of such an empire seems to have come early to Akbar, and there is evidence in the earliest acts of even young Akbar as emperor when he was moved towards the accomplishment of this ideal. He almost began after the dismissal of Bairâm Khân from his position of authority and the overthrow of Adham Khân, getting rid thereby of sinister influences in the way of this ideal. The first practical steps that he took were to accept the Hindus as his own subjects, as much entitled to privileges of position and power as his own Mughals, and, needless to say, as the Afghans. In the course of carrying this idea into practice, he experienced the difficulties of antagonism in religion as prejudicial to the bringing about of that complete unity among his subjects, which for some little time perhaps exercised its opiate influence upon his imperial mind. That is what induced him, after elaborate preparation by way of open discussions and arguments between the best votaries of the prevalent religions of the land, to formulate a common religion for all. That religion was matter not capable of being thus ordered even by imperial authority was borne in upon him, when perhaps the most intimate among his courtiers plainly told him, after all his travail, that this was a hopeless feat. Bhagavândâs



WATER TOWER

This division of the Empire in 1575 or the one side, and the activities 1576 made Penugonda the objective of Golkonda on the north, and those upon which Golkonda concentrated of Bijapur against the Viceroyalty attacks. These were so frequent and of Seringapatam. Venkata provided persistent that as a result of a siege against the last by appointing Jagadeva following a repulse in 1577, the Emperor Raza for the Government of Channah himself became a prisoner. Ibrahim patna and the Baramahals, as a barrier Kuth Shah on this occasion received against the advance of Bijapur. He the active assistance of the Handé managed to keep Madura in allegiance Nayak of Anantapur. He was released, by sending an army to co-operate with continued to maintain himself against the Nayak of Tanjore, who had already Golkonda, mostly by diplomacy but not given evidence of unswerving loyalty on altogether without war. When sriranga a previous occasion. This Imperial died in 1585, Golkonda had advanced its contingent was sent in charge of his possessions almost to the Pennar. Rama nephew, who showed himself ready to make common cause with his

is said to have made the remark: 'Islam I understand, Hinduism I know, but this new religion, I protest, I do not understand,' thus putting the whole position in a nutshell. Religion is not made to order, except for agnostics and plain atheists. It is something more secretive and has an appeal to much beyond reason. That was a truth that was recognized in India ages ago; and the religion of each one was left entirely to himself alone. That was the cardinal principle that contributed to the success of Hindu administration during the best of its days. Rulers regarded themselves as the preservers of the *Dharma*, not the propounders and the promulgators thereof. In a country of the vastness and variety of India, even admitting that it never was under an empire as a whole before the establishment of the British Empire, any other principle would have been impossible as an operative principle of action. This truth Akbar learned when his Dîn Ilâhî failed, and, like a statesman of distinct vision, he learned the truth and laid it to heart and did not go into sackcloth and ashes, like a fanatic, to mourn the sad fate that had overtaken his pet scheme. The empire of India that he wanted to form fell short, to this extent, of the unity that he wanted to impart to it; but short of this, his liberal policy had knitted it as closely as may be, and had put it on a footing on which it showed promise of permanence.

On this basis, having firmly established himself in the Indian empire of Hindûstân, the next natural effort would be to make the attempt, which failed before under Muḥammad bin Tughlaq, of extending the empire to take into it peninsular India as well. The first effort at expansion was the successful advance across the Vindhya and the establishment, without much ado, of a viceroyalty of the Dekhan at Burhânpur. To the Dekhan states, which were Islamic in character though of another form, the expansion of imperial authority meant their incorporation in the imperial rule and therefore political extinction. The states fought as hard as they could, but succumbed to the imperial forces when the time came. Akbar's policy of expansion was pursued by his successors. Jahângîr in his own way tried to go a step further and employed in the enterprise the most promising among his sons, who ultimately succeeded to the throne and carried out the policy of his father still further; so that at the unexpected termination of Shâh Jahân's rule, the two Musalmân States, Bijâpur and Golkonda, were alone left in the Dekhan. The three States that had been

overthrown successfully had been incorporated in the viceroyalty of the Dekhan, which gave the surest indication of what the states could expect by submission to imperial authority. The two States therefore felt that they must fight to the bitter end and be extinguished fighting, rather than undergo the political extinction, which, as they might well imagine, submission to the Mughal Empire meant. In this fight naturally they utilized all their resources, and the Mahrattas as such emerged into view as auxiliaries rendering valiant services in this cause of Dekhani independence of the Indian empire of the Great Mughal.

Ever since the overthrow of Yâdava Râmdev by 'Alâu'd-dîn and the flaying alive of his son-in-law Harapâla, the Mahrattas lost their independence. The planting of military colonies, as it were, of the 'Amirs of 100' by Mubârak Khaljî drove another nail into the coffin of their independence. Politically therefore they had become extinct as a nation; but in practical life they played a very considerable part in the administration of the Islamic states of the Bahmani kingdom as a whole, and rose to rank and importance even in some of the separate states into which this kingdom broke up. They were found largely employed even in the State of Bîdar under the Bahmani Sultâns themselves. It was a quarrel between the Mahratta Controller of the finances and Yûsuf 'Âdil Shâh, the general, that brought about the rebellion which ultimately dismembered the Bahmani kingdom. They found scope for further service in the States of Bijâpur and Ahmadnagar particularly, and it is common knowledge that Shâhjî began his career as a petty military commander and Jâgîrdâr in the State of Ahmadnagar. A valiant man in comparatively humble circumstances, he naturally looked up to those high in position and through the agency of another Mahratta chieftain, who had influence at court, he found opportunity for honourable entry into service and for achieving distinction in the wars that Ahmadnagar had to wage against the Mughals. Unfortunately for him, Ahmadnagar was too far gone to appreciate even the valiant services of a loyal officer of their own. Shâhjî's achievements only provoked jealousy and, instead of meeting rewards for services rendered, he found that he had the counteracting machinations of court intriguers against him. He tried his fortunes with the other rival State, Bijâpur. There again, he achieved the same distinction, and he met with almost the same kind of a reward.

After trying his fortunes with Ahmadnagar, once again chastened after defeat, he found he was in no better position to prosecute his ambition for a career and changed again to Bijâpur. There was the possibility of service in the empire. He might have elected to enter imperial service and risen to a certain degree of importance. Had he done that, as in fact he attempted to do in A.D. 1637, Shâhji might have ended his days as the holder of a big *mansab* in the empire at the very best, not without the possibility of an inglorious end to a brilliant career, having regard to his character and high ambition. Fortune had willed it otherwise. Shâhji finally threw in his lot with Bijâpur, which first gave him an opportunity to round off his small estate by further accretions of territory, so that in Mahârâshtra he could count himself a Sardâr of a fairly high rank. It was then that the territory south of the two Musalmân kingdoms opened out vistas for accomplishing his ambition, and Shâhji found an opportunity to take the tide at the full flood.

The empire of Vijayanagar, which had suffered a shattering blow at the hands of the united Muhammadan states of the dismembered Bahmani kingdom in the battle of Talikota so-called, was able soon to rehabilitate her resources and restore herself, in the course of a score of years, to something of the position that she had held before as arbiter of the fortunes of the Islamic states. Tirumala, who fled from Vijayanagar soon after the battle of Râkshasatânga, ordinarily called Talikota, regained his power so far that, from Penugonda as his capital, he began to exercise the same commanding authority for intervention in the affairs of the Bahmani kingdoms. At the end of the sixteenth century therefore Vijayanagar still was an important power capable of using and willing to use her power as before in regard to the Muhammadan kingdoms. On the contrary, the two Muhammadan states in the immediate neighbourhood had pursued a policy, with the advantage that they acquired after the great battle, of not playing into the hands of the Hindu power. They came to an understanding in the course of the years that followed the battle that in their career of expansion they ought to follow a policy of respecting each other's spheres of activity. Bijâpur was allowed for its share of expansion the plateau region covering the greater half of the Mysore plateau on the eastern side and leading into the middle country of Tamil India, the South Arcot District of to-day. Golkonda had for

its sphere the whole of the Karnâtak below the Ghâts leading southwards towards Madras and terminating with perhaps the borders of the Chingleput District. Each of them therefore laid itself out to pursue a policy of aggression along the lines thus indicated and ultimately to bring the Hindu state to extinction. They were prosecuting this policy with vigour, and, if not with immediate success, at least with chances of assured ultimate success. Tirumala passed away and was succeeded by his son Śrîraṅga sometime about A.D. 1575. Śrîraṅga had hard work to do against Golkonda. He had to fight and win many battles to keep the power of Golkonda within limits. He had also reverses of a very serious character.¹ He fell into the hands of the Muhammadans and was taken prisoner. He was rescued by the efforts of a loyal chieftain, a feudatory of the empire. Occupied as he was in this fashion, he provided for the administration of the empire by creating two viceroyalties, one at Śrîraṅgaṭam, which controlled all the territory on the plateau extending northwards to the frontiers of the Southern Mahratta country. The other viceroyalty had its head-quarters at Chandragiri. This viceroyalty had for its sphere of authority all the territory extending southwards along the plains down to the extreme south.² When Śrîraṅga died, Golkonda's expansion did not go very much beyond the Krishnâ, which marked the boundary on this side. Even Bijâpur was kept more or less within her bounds. The exposed parts however were under the direct rule of the empire including as they did the viceroyalties of Udayagiri, Penugonda and Vijayanagar itself or Halabid, as it used to be called before that, and the plateau part at any rate Muḥbâgal. These were earlier provincial governments, and it is because of the warlike operations that were necessary in this region that the south was otherwise provided for.³ When Śrîraṅga died, the empire was left more or less intact. The next brother Râma, who was viceroy at Śrîraṅgaṭam, had died before him, leaving the viceroyalty to his eldest son, Tirumala. The next brother was Venkaṭapati, who was viceroy at Chandragiri. He had with him his younger nephew, the brother of Tirumala, and being the eldest member of the family and the only surviving brother of four, he succeeded to the empire at the death of Śrîraṅga.

¹ Sources of Vijayanagar History, p. 232.

² Ibid., p. 302.

is so, why
high
capital

Venkaṭapati died in the year A. D. 1614. During the score of years and more of his reign, he managed to keep the empire intact, and there is a record of his having stood a siege in Penugonda which he ultimately managed to beat off with great success with the assistance of Rāṇa Jagadēva Rāya, the viceroy of Channapaṭṇa and the Bāramahāls and Raghunātha Nāyaka, the heir-apparent of Tanjore. The empire, however, suffered a dismemberment in that the vicerealty of Śrīraṅgaṭaṃ underwent an extinction, as it were, and a new family of rulers, the Uḍayārs of Mysore set themselves up instead with the countenance, as it seems, of the emperor himself. Beyond these and the successful aggressions of the Golkonda rulers in the north-eastern corner of the territory, the empire remained intact. His death brought about a disputed succession which rent the empire in twain and left it permanently damaged. Venkaṭapati married four queens, but apparently had no children by any of them. One of them who belonged to the family of Gobburī chiefs, claimed to have brought forth a son and was bringing him up as their child. Venkaṭapati himself seems to have shared the general unbelief in regard to the matter and continued to bring up his nephew, Raṅga, the brother of the Śrīraṅgaṭaṃ viceroy and son of his elder brother Rāma, almost as his adopted son, and had even raised him to the dignity of 'Chikkarāya' (Yuvarāja), meaning either prince or perhaps the prince heir-apparent. According to contemporary accounts, Venkaṭapati on his death-bed declared this Chikkarāya as his successor and handed over to him the imperial seal. For the moment the other party led by Gobburī Jagga, the brother of the queen concerned, was silenced. The discontented powers in the empire rallied round the infant son and were only waiting for an opportunity to overthrow the reigning ruler. Jagga managed to work himself into the confidence of the new ruler and found a suitable opportunity to put an end to the emperor and all his children and secure the throne for his own nephew. Practically all the governors of provinces, big and small, joined in this disloyal enterprise excepting one chief, Yāchamanāyaka, who was in touch with the court and had heard of the plot. He managed, through the good offices of the imperial washerman, to smuggle one of the boys, the second of the three sons of the emperor, out of the palace in which the royal family was held in prison by Jagga. The only ruler of importance on whose loyalty Yāchamanāyaka depended was, as mentioned

already, the ruler of Tanjore, Achyutappaṇāyaka, and his son Raghunātha, who played an important part in his father's administration.¹ Yāchamanāyaka therefore wanted to carry the prince off for safety to Tanjore. Getting wind of this, Jagga attacked and defeated him in the field, but Yāchama dodged his pursuers successfully and reached Kumbhakonam in safety, wherefrom an escort sent from Tanjore met them and took the prince and Yāchamanāyaka into Tanjore. This led naturally to Jagga's organizing his party, and a great battle was fought just two miles above the Grand Anicut of to-day, where the confederated enemies were defeated in behalf of Rāma, the prince. Among the enemies, the principal were the Gobburī chiefs, who were the leaders, along with the other petty chiefs excepting perhaps those of Venkaṭagiri and Kālahasti in the territory dependent on the empire. The newly-founded family of Mysore stood aloof. We do not hear of the viceroy of Channapaṭṇa taking any part. The Nāyak of Gingee took a very prominent part and ultimately fell in the battle. So did the Nāyaka of Madura; and, if the Tanjore account is correct, there was even a Portuguese contingent on the side of the malcontents. This movement and its result damaged the empire much more than anything else and threw the gate open for the entry of the Muhammadan neighbours more effectively into the imperial territory. This Rāmarāja succeeded, however, in tiding over his difficulties through the assistance of Tanjore so long as Tanjore maintained itself in full power. But Tanjore itself was at constant war with the Madura chiefs, and this intermittent warfare ultimately weakened both States. This weakness of Tanjore diminished the power of resistance of the empire and paved the way to its downfall.

The breakdown of the vicerealty of Channapaṭṇa prevented the newly-founded kingdom of Mysore, obviously occupied by Bijāpur movements on the northern side, from taking any part in the general mêlée in the empire. Whatever it was, we may take it that the Bijāpur movements began to be more active and disconcerting. The empire being involved in its own struggle for existence, the distant chiefs were thrown upon their own resources for defending themselves against the enemies on the north. This gave an opportunity at once for distinction, which would lead on ultimately to independence. It was

¹ Extracts 86, 90 and 94, *Journal of Indian History*, vol. v, pp. 164 ff.

about this period that the chiefship of Ikkêri, Keladi or Bednore was coming into prominence. The Channapaṭṇa viceroyalty was the first to suffer by the Bijâpur invasions. Invaders from Bijâpur seem to have begun their attacks on the territories under the Government of Bednore. Gradually absorbing the territory that constituted afterwards the Nawâbship of Śîra, they marched southwards against the territory dependent upon Channapaṭṇa and Bangalore, and they were able to overthrow that by a series of invasions first under Ranadullâh Khân and then under Mustafa Khân, the general-agents of Bijâpur. The Bijâpur armies were able to march farther south-east to the end of Bâramahâl and Salem districts, which constituted a part of the government of the viceroy at Channapaṭṇa and advanced from there into the province of Gingee, destined to play a very important part in the history of the Mahrattas. This process took a considerable number of years and was not complete before A.D. 1649, when Gingee actually fell into the hands of the invaders.

In the meanwhile, Golkonda activities began to receive a fresh stimulus through the genius of a new minister, well-known to history later on as Mîr Jumla; Golkonda made gradual advance till it took possession of the territory round Pulicat, the Dutch settlement not far off, and absorbed all the territory right down to the province of Kâlahastî and Conjeevaram in the immediate neighbourhood of Madras. It was this double pressure, one from the eastern, and the other from the western half of the northern frontier of the empire, that occupied all the available time and energy of the imperial headquarters and left the larger viceroyalties of the south to pursue their own particular plans of self-aggrandizement without much fear of active intervention on the imperial side. This general aspect of the forces in operation must be borne in mind in any discussion of the activities of any of these individual provincial governors, or of even the interloping activities of States like Bijâpur. Râma was succeeded by another Venkaṭa about A.D. 1635, and it was he who was responsible for granting the charter to the two factors of the English East India Company, Cogan and Day, for erecting the factory at Fort St. George, which more than a century and a half later blossomed into the Madras Presidency of to-day.

The accession of this second Venkaṭapati to power was almost coincident with important changes in the frontiers of the Dekhan.

The kingdom of Ahmadnagar passed out of existence in A.D. 1633, and just three or four years later, the war for the division of Ahmadnagar spoils between the Mughals on the one side and the Sultâns of Bijâpur and the Mahrattas on the other came to an end by the definitive treaty entered into between the parties arranged by the emperor Shâh Jahân. It was this treaty and the specific obligations it imposed upon the powers concerned that set Bijâpur free from the entanglements of the Mughals, as it did Golkonda to some extent, though Golkonda was not directly concerned. It was after this arrangement that Shâhji the Mahratta cast in his lot with the state of Bijâpur and entered its service with the influential support of the commander-in-chief Ranadullâh Khân and his chief adviser Morar Pant. Shâhji's entry into Bijâpur service was followed almost immediately by Bijâpur activities in the territory of what at present constitutes the state of Mysore.

To understand what brought about this Bijâpur intervention, a short retrospect of the history of Mysore is required. The state of Mysore came into being with the capture of Śrîraṅgaṭam by Râja Wodeyar in A.D. 1610. The possession of Śrîraṅgaṭam was ratified by a charter issued by the emperor Venkaṭapati Râya just at a time when his position at Penugonda was actively threatened by a vigorous Golkonda attack. Whether there was any connection between the one and the other or no, Venkaṭapati Râya accepted the accomplished fact and allowed Râja Wodeyar to rule the territory that hitherto was under the viceroy at Śrîraṅgaṭam in A. D. 1612. This charge comprised at least two governments, possibly three, viz.,—(1) that under Śrîraṅgaṭam itself; and (2) the territory with its headquarters at Channapaṭṇa, which happened to be under a governor, Jagadêva Râyâl, who gradually extended the little province by the accession of the so-called Bâramahâl districts of Salem. On the north, this territory seems to have taken in the area ruled over by the Nâyak of Ikkêri, not to mention the petty chieftains and Poligars between Ikkêri and the frontiers of Śrîraṅgaṭam. But Râja Wodeyar's claims to all these were not acknowledged without question. He was able to take actual possession of Śrîraṅgaṭam; and unless he took similar possession of the others also, he could not well establish his title. But Râja Wodeyar, active man that he was, was not able to accomplish all these things in his life-time. It was left to his successor, his grandson, Chamarâja Wodeyar by name, to achieve gradually the conquest of the

territory immediately adjoining his own, that is, the Channapaṭṇa viceroyalty without the Bāramahāls, and having acquired this, he made an attempt upon the territory of Ikkêri. But Ikkêri was able to defend herself so long as the northern frontier was safe. Chamarāja was not able to accomplish much in that direction before he died. What he failed to do, his successor tried to effect. In order to divert the attention of his Ikkêri contemporary he brought about a Bijāpur invasion, from which he had himself to suffer. Among the petty Poligars that surrounded the territory of Ikkêri was one ruler by name Kengê Hanuma of Basavapaṭṇa. This general and other discontented Poligars in the neighbourhood were set up against Vīrabhadra Nāyaka of Ikkêri by Kanṭhīravanarasa. Vīrabhadra quelled the rebellion and dispossessed Kengê Hanuma, referred to in Persian authorities as Kengê Nāyaka, of his own Pālayam. The latter went to Bijāpur to solicit the aid of the Pādshāh there. He found there another Poligar, Channaya of Nāgamaṅgala, similarly dispossessed by Chamarāja Wodeyar himself. The one invitation and the other prevailed against such doubts as the Bijāpur court entertained as to the wisdom of this intervention, as about this time, A. D. 1638-39, the definitive treaty dictated by Shāh Jahān had established peace on the northern frontiers of Bijāpur. The invitation was accepted, and the first invasion of Mysore was undertaken. The commander-in-chief of Bijāpur, Ranadullāh Khān, was despatched at the head of 40,000 men for the purpose of reinstating Kengê Hanuma. Having succeeded easily in doing this, the Bijāpur army marched onward, taking possession of the three provinces of Ikkêri, Śīra and Bangalore, the last being under the viceroyalty of the great Jagadêva Rāyal, lately conquered by the rulers of Mysore. Having succeeded in taking possession of these, as it is claimed, the army laid siege to Mysore and Śrīraṅgapaṭam simultaneously. The siege was prosecuted with great vigour, but the defence was equally vigorous. Ultimately the whole campaign ended in a treaty, which left the Mysore ruler all the territory south of the Kāvêri, that on the north of the river being taken over by Bijāpur; that is, Mysore lost her new conquests in the province of Jagadêva Rāyal. This invasion is said to have taken place in the year of Kanṭhīravanarasa's accession, that is A. D. 1638-39. Though Kanṭhīravanarasa agreed to the humiliating treaty in his distress, he seems never to have thought of fulfilling it, as his subsequent attitude

would clearly show. Ranadullāh Khān, on the contrary, considering the arrangement satisfactory, left Kengê Hanuma in charge of the newly-acquired territory and returned to Bijāpur. It was now the turn for Vīrabhadra Nāyaka of Ikkêri to appeal to headquarters. He sent an ambassador to Bijāpur and pointed out the unsatisfactory character of the arrangements and the unreliability of Kengê Hanuma, the agent left by Ranadullāh Khān. A Commission of which Nāgamaṅgala Channayya was a member was appointed to conduct an enquiry. Hanuma was none too ready to facilitate the enquiry, and Kanṭhīravanarasa showed as little inclination to act up to the treaty. Kengê Hanuma managed to get rid of the only member of the Commission who had knowledge of the locality and was likely to be troublesome. This management seems to have brought Ranadullāh Khān into disgrace, and another general was sent in his stead. This commander-in-chief and his successor Mustafa Khān were both alike unable to do much against Śrīraṅgapaṭam, which had been completely repaired and put into condition for standing a much longer siege than the previous one. A subsequent invasion by Abdullāh Khān and Hemaji Paṇḍit did nothing more than occupy the post of Turuvêkere, north-east of the Mysore district of to-day for a short time. The turn had now come for Kanṭhīravanarasa to break out of the boundary by which he was confined. He marched eastwards, took back the territory of the Channapaṭṇa viceroyalty, and entering the territory of Koṅgu, he defeated the guardian of the passes and took possession of Satyamaṅgalam, Sāmbaḷli, and Bombaḷli, all on the south and west of the Kāvêri, thus coming into hostility with the ruler of Madura. He incorporated territory to the extent of bringing his frontiers into direct touch with those of Ikkêri, Śīra and Chittaldurg on the north, Coorg on the west and the Koṅgu country on the south. This was the position during the reign of Kanṭhīravanarasa of Mysore, that is, through the twenty years¹ A. D. 1639-59, so far as this area is concerned.

This period of Kanṭhīravanarasa's activity was almost coeval with the rule of Tirumal Nāyak, in many respects perhaps the greatest of the Nāyaks of Madura. Tirumal Nāyak apparently came to the throne about ten years earlier and had borne an influential part in the

¹ *Ancient India*, S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, pp. 292-5.

administration of Madura some years before that. The great civil war of Vijayanagar consequent on the massacre of the royal family after the death of Venkaṭa I threw all the great Nâyaks excepting the Nâyak of Tanjore into opposition to the empire. During the rule, therefore, of the emperor Râma and his successor Venkaṭapati II extending from A.D. 1616 to 1642, the position was one of comparative inactivity resulting in no harm to the empire, as the two Mussalmân powers in the neighbourhood were occupied in their own struggles against the advancing tide of the Mughals. Venkaṭapati during his life-time pursued a policy of non-intervention, letting his feudatories fight it out among themselves, if need be, unmolested from the imperial headquarters. This is how we can explain the aggressions of Râja Wodeyar, and particularly his successor Chamarâja Wodeyar against the province of Channapaṭṇa and the Bâramahâls. Chamarâja advanced as far east as Hoskote which he besieged, but did not capture. In the meanwhile, a change seems also to have come over the southern viceroyalties, namely, those of Gingee, Tanjore and Madura. It will be remembered that Tanjore remained thoroughly loyal and was primarily instrumental in setting up Râmarâja on the throne. After the death of Raghunâtha Nâyaka and under his successor, Vijayarâghava, the same relations seem to have continued substantially, Tanjore and Madura fighting out their wars between themselves whenever occasion offered. Throughout the reign of Venkaṭapati, the administration seems to have been carried on for him by his brothers-in-law, the Velugoṭi chiefs of Kâlahasti. Among these two names figure prominently, Damarla Venkaṭa and Damarla Ayya. It is the administration of the brothers-in-law, as the Company's correspondence¹ describes their

¹ *The Dagb-Register, 1640-41*, p. 185 gives an account in some detail, which Sir Wm. Foster describes in the following words:—

'The name of this Nayak appears to have been Damarla Venkatadra or Damarla Venkatappa. The Dutch records use the latter form, which seems the more correct; and they add that he was lord of from twelve to fifteen thousand soldiers; his chief abode, they say, was at "Wandawas" (i.e., Wandiwash, about sixty miles south-west of Madras), but he spent most of his time at court, leaving his brother, Ayappa Nayak, who resided at Poonamallee (thirteen miles west of Madras), to administer his territories for him. We infer that Damarla Venkatappa was the chief supporter of the then Raja of Chandragiri, who, as the representative of the ancient dynasty of Vijayanagar, claimed dominion over all the Nayaks of the south; and this inference is borne out by an entry in a list compiled at Fort St. George in 1750 of the old Madras farmans and grants, noted the grant obtained by Day, which is stated to have been given by "Damarla Moodu

relationship to Venkaṭa, that seems to have brought Venkaṭapati's administration into some little contempt, as the viceroys seemed to have pursued their own policies unmolested by the Emperor. It is in these circumstances that the chief factors of the East India Company, with its chief factory at Armagam at the time, obtained a charter which gave them Fort St. George and laid the foundations of the southern Presidency. The Viceroy Damarla Venkaṭa, with his headquarters at Wandiwash, was ruler of a big province with a very large revenue. He remained, however, at headquarters and directed the administration for the emperor. His province was actually managed by his brother Ayyappa, who seems to have held the government of Poonamallee, thirteen miles west of Madras. It was from these two that was obtained the grant of Fort St. George, which, in the Company's correspondence, is ascribed to the great Nâyaka Damarla Venkaṭa. Naturally, therefore, when king Venkaṭa died childless, the brothers-in-law were not anxious that his nephew Śrîraṅga should succeed. They seem to have ingratiated themselves with the other governors and brought about a possibility of united action in opposition to this succession. Venkaṭa died in October, 1642, and after a delay of about a month or two, Śrîraṅga succeeded to the throne.¹ The discontent among the viceroys in regard to this

Venkatapa (*sic*) Naick, son of Damarla Chenama Naick, the Grand Vizier of the foresaid sovereign (i.e. the Chandragiri Raja and Lord General of Carnatica" (*Treaties*, vol. vi). . . . It is clear that Damarla Venkatappa was a person of great influence whom neither the Dutch nor the Portuguese could hope to intimidate, and whose support would be of great value to the proposed English settlement.'

¹ In a later volume (*The Dagb-Register, 1643-44*, p. 244) the yearly value of the Nayak's district is put at about 6,00,000 *pardaos*. Ayappa Nayak is described in the 1641-42 volume of the same series (pp. 272, 289), as brother-in-law of the then "King of Carnatica," i.e. the Raja Venkaṭapati.' (See note 2, p. xxxvii, *The English Factories in India, 1637-41*).

² 'The Golconda army had overrun part of his territory, and the rest (including Armagon itself) had been occupied by a neighbouring Nayak, to whom apparently the defence of the frontier had been entrusted by his uncle, Venkaṭapati, the King of Vijayanagar. At the beginning of October the King died, and after a short delay this nephew was elevated to the throne as Sri Ranga Rayalu, though many of the other Nayaks were opposed to his succession, and gave him a great deal of trouble.'

'The Naique of Armagon is absolutely beaten out of all his country, it being possess part by the King of Golquondah[s] people and the major part by Rayalwar. The Moors have encamped themselves, or rather seated themselves for the warr, at a place called Cowle Geldancke, the chiefest place in all that country; and Rayalwar hath a strong garrison Vinquatagery and Armagon. Indeed, wee

succession showed itself immediately. The reason seems to have been that Śrīraṅga somehow already showed himself to be a man who disapproved strongly of the policy of the *roi fainéant*, his predecessor, and wanted to pursue a more vigorous policy by bringing about the active union of all the provinces of the empire under the lead of the emperor himself.¹ This was not exactly a mere personal predilection of the emperor. The circumstances of 1642 actually demanded the pursuit of a more vigorous policy than that of the score of years previous. The definitive treaty between the Muhammadan states of the Dekhan and the Mughals set free the states of Bījāpur and Golkonda on the northern side, and their intervention was sought no doubt against the Nāyak of Ikkēri by Kanthiravanarasa of Mysore. Bījāpur showed itself quite ready to intervene in the affairs of the south. Either about that time or a little later, it seems to have been more or less as a direct result of the accession of Śrīraṅga, that Tirumal Nāyak made a similar appeal to Golkonda for intervention. Tirumal Nāyak's policy must have been directed by the movements of Mysore which, under Chamarāja, the predecessor of Kanthirava, had, as already stated, been active in the direction of Channapaṭṇa. The next advance of Mysore would be into the Koṅgu, directly menacing the northern frontier of Madura. Whether this led Tirumala to bring about the invasion of Mysore soon after the succession of Kanthiravanarasa does not appear clear in our authorities. But that he pursued the policy of his predecessor, namely, of hostility towards the empire, and sought the intervention of Golkonda soon after the accession of Śrīraṅga is fairly on record. Tirumal Nāyak's effort to bring about the alliance of Gingee, Tanjore and Madura, failed through Tanjore betraying the secret to the empire, and Tirumala turned for assistance to Golkonda, and contrived that an attack should be made therefrom upon Vellore.² It was probably

are of opinion that the Moores will have all this country ere many years; for what with the Kinge of Viçapōre [Bījāpur] on one side and the Kinge of Gonquondah on the other, the Gentues themselves being divided among themselves, it is even impossible their country cann continue.'

O. C. 1792 contains substantially the same information in a slightly different version. See note 2 on p. 44. (See *The English Factories in India, 1642-45*, p. xxviii and p. 44 respectively.)

¹ See paper on Śrī-Raṅga by R. Satyanatha Aiyar, *Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference*, Madras, pp. 365-75.

² See *The Nāyaks of Madura*, by R. Satyanatha Aiyar, pp. 126-35.

during this attack that Śivappa Nāyaka marched from Ikkēri to the assistance of the emperor and caused the Golkonda army to raise the siege. It was then that Śrīraṅga realized that he must somehow or other instil into the southern feudatories a policy of loyalty to the empire. The accession of Śrīraṅga naturally brought about the dismissal of the most powerful of the two brothers, Dāmarla Venkaṭa, from his position of authority. Dāmarla Venkaṭa, as early as December 1612¹ hardly two months after the succession of Śrīraṅga, intrigued with Golkonda and was put under arrest by Śrīraṅga's orders; but his powerful brother Ayyappa brought pressure to bear from both the northern and southern provinces in 1643, and the Company's records mention that Venkaṭa was likely to be released on account of this pressure.² It was then that Śrīraṅga sought the

¹ 'The warrs and broyls increasing in this country, and now (by reason of our Great Naiques imprisonment (*) drawing nere to us, wee latelie raised a third bulwark of turfe; and wanting gunns to mount thereon, have resolved that the *Advice* shall spare us foure minion for that purpose, because there is noe danger of enemies in her way to Bantam, and when shee comes there shee may be againe supplied.

² 'If this cannot be supplied, the surplus should be returned in gold; for as for other commodities, they will not of (f) of our handes, this countrie being all in broiles, the old Kinge of Karnatt being dead. Soe is the Naique of Armagon, whose countrie is all in the handes of the Moores, and (*sic*) whoe will ere long by all likelihood bee maisters of all this countrie; for our Naique, not findeing the respect from the new Kinge as he expected, did make profer to assist the Moores; but ere he could bringe his treason about, 'twas discovered d(and) he apprehended by the Kinge, who hath seaz'd greate parte of his countrie. But wee beleve hee will be forc'd suddainely to restore it againe and relaease him, for our Naiques brother and kindsmen are levying an armie for his rescue; whoe, with the helpe of the Moores on the other side (whoe are within halfe a dayesi a journey of each other) will force his libertie or ruine the whole kingdome.'

(*The English Factories in India, 1642-45*, p. 80.)

'And from Pullicat about a moneth since a piscash was sent by the hand of their merchant Moileya (alias Chinana Chitty) unto the present King of Karnatt, estimated to be worth 4,000 (pagodas). The Portugauls from St. Thoma have likewise been with their piscash with the Kinge; but it comes far shorte of the former, for all that they carried could not amount to full 200 pagodas. Somewhat is expected from us; but until our Naique and the Kinge bee eyther reconcyled or absolutely outed, wee intend to stand upon our guard and keepe what wee have' (*The English Factories in India, 1642-1645*, p. 81.)

* Damarla Venkatappa had been detected in intrigues with Golkonda and had thereupon been imprisoned by the new King and deprived of all his territory, with the exception of Punamallee and the surrounding districts (see p. 80); also *The Dagh-Register, 1643-44*, p. 244 (*The English Factories in India, 1642-45*, p. 70).

† Soms particulars of the advance of the Golkonda invaders will be found at p. 244 of the *Dagh-Register* for 1643-44. They had just occupied Venkatagiri. The release and reinstatement of Damarla are mentioned on p. 259 of the same volume.

assistance, probably of Mysore, but certainly of Bijāpur. Bijāpur agreed and marched to his relief for a consideration of 1,50,000 pagodas and twenty-four elephants.¹

It was about this time that the Company made the first move to get from Śrīraṅga a confirmation of their charters, after this initial success against Golkonda and the machinations of Dāmarla Venkaṭa.²

Śrīraṅga found the time to undertake active operations against the rebel vassals of the south. There is a note in a letter of the Company's servants, dated October 1645, that Śrīraṅga had

¹ 'This countrey hath byn, and still is at present, all in broyles, one Nague against another, and most against the King; which makes all trade at a stand. But the King, by means of the King of Vizapore, whose for 15 lacke of pagothaes and 24 elephants hath sente some thousands of horse for his assistance, is like to have the better.'—(*The English Factories in India, 1642-45*, pp. 115-6.)

² 'The wars in these parts made them glad to entertain some of these men as soldiers; for the Moores but five weekes past had advanced with there armes within three myles of Pullicatt, and sent unto the Dutch Governor to surrender up these castle; and we did suddenly expect the same. But shortly after the Jentues came down with a greate power, gave the Moores battle, rowted there armie and put the Moores to flight beyond Armagon* where they are now agathering a head againe;

* The Dutch Governor of Pulicat, writing to Batavia some months later, reported that on reaching that fortress from Masulipatam on July 15 (N.S.), he found that the forces of the King of Golkonda, under 'Casy Aly' (? Kasim Ali), had subdued the whole of the neighbouring towns without opposition and were demanding the submission of Pulicat itself, promising at the same time that the Dutch should retain all their privileges. Of this demand no notice was taken and the invaders, finding the fortress amply equipped, contended themselves with a demonstration at a safe distance. The Nayak of Gingi, who was then in rebellion against Sriranga, advanced with the intention of joining the Golkonda army; whereupon the King recalled Kistappa Nayak, who was operating against the Gingi chief, and restored Chinnana to favour. Kistappa fell unexpectedly on the Moors and completely routed them, killing their commander and several other men of importance. (*Hague Transcripts*, series i, vol. xiv., No. 431; *The Dagb-Register, 1644-45*, p. 325, September 8, 1644.)

'Nay, such a storme is prepareing for us that tis to bee feared will even whorle us from this coast. Our neighbours the Dutch have bine longe a projecting and now they have wrought it that Mollay, their merchant, is like to bee as powerfull with this King as the Serkayle is att Gulcundah; and, to ingratiate him thoroughly into his favour, they have assisted Mollay with men and guns for the subdueing of castles of our Nague for the king, or rather their owne use; by which means our Nague is cashered and hee substituted, and is allso made his Treasurer and dus even in a manner command all.'

(*The English Factories in India, 1642-45*, pp. 193-4 and note, September 8, 1644; also *Ibid.*, p. 154.)

brought the enemies under control and had restored himself to his original position.¹

It was then that Greenhill's mission went to Vellore and obtained a charter for the grant of Fort St. George. Mīr Jumla nominally in behalf of Golkonda, was not likely to take his defeat quietly. We

¹ 'Wee have bin often tymes sollicit by this Kinge to give him a vissitt, which never was yett done to him or his predecessours since our first arivall heere, which is now seven yeares almost; soe, if wee any longer deny his reasonable request, wee may suddainely expect his just displeasure and peradventure have a seidge about us, as our neighbours the Hollanders of one syde and Portugalls of the other, which are seldome free, notwithstanding their great power and defenc, who hath twenty for one more then wee; soe that, if the like should happen unto us, what can you expect of 50 well and sicke men to defend your estate and fort against the kings power, when one of his merchants hath queld the Hollanders soe, that they dare not stirr out of their fort or putt their feete ashoare in this kings dominion? And now the King himselfe hath taken it to hart, in the behalfe of Mollay, his cheife counsellor, to commence warrs against the Hollanders. Tyme will produce the event thereof; for it is growne to that height that the Hollander must leave this Kings country, or Mollay fall into utter distruction. Soe that wee have nothing more to trust unto then our civil comportment and respect to the Kinge and great ones, which hath hetherto prevayled before the Hollanders potencie; and at present are in such esteeme with the King and great ones that the whole trade of this kingdome is proffered unto the Honourable English East India Company. And for the mayntenance of the same and the Kings favour, wee are . . . resolved within this few dayes to send upp Mr. Henry Greenhill, with foure other English souldiers for his attendance, for the reconfirmation of what was graunted unto Mr. Cogan by the Great Nague, under whose protection formerly wee liv'd, but now the Kinge hath taken his power and this cuntry from him; soe that his power and protection is of noe longer vallue. Soe now, findeing a fitting oppertunity, wee doubt not but to have our old priviledges reconfirm'd, with the addition of a great many more, by this now reigning King, which hath brought all his great lords unto his comand, which hath not bin this 40 yeares before. This by Mollayes assistance wee make noe question to obtayne. And another reason for the sending of Mr. Greenhill to the King is because that our powerfull friends the Governur etc., of Pullicatt would make us beleive that Mollay is a villiane and a heighway robber and that wee, in receiveing those goods of our merchants which Mollay hath stollen and sould to them, are as bad as hee, and therefore will take those goods out of our shippes where soever they meete them, and to this effect hath given their commissions to all their commanders to search out shippes wheresoever they meete them thinkeing thus to buncke us out of 400 bales of goods which our merchants hath in Fort St. George and at our washers in possession; soe should we disapoint our Surratt President of his Mocho shippes ladinge of goods (and better goods wee know hee cannot have for that place). Therefore, untill wee have his approbation, wee are resolved to our power to maynetayne our merchants in that just cause that wee well know they are in, in regard wee finde they doe truely indeavour your proffitt and their owne credditts; and for these goods, wee well know they have paid to the uttermost vallue of them, and soe must wee likewise. Therefore, because the Hollanders shall not say that wee are the receivers of stollen goods, wee doe send Mr. Greenhill and four other English men unto the Kinge, to beseech his hand and signett to testifie to the whole world that Mollay is noe

find him working with Bijâpur as against Śrīraṅga. He also made proposals to Kanthirava Narasa of Mysore for assistance. We find a record again, dated January 1646, that Śrīraṅga was attacked by Golkonda and Bijâpur.¹

villiane nor theife, and what warr is commenced against the Hollanders is by His Majesties command, as well as the goods taken from his subjects belonging to the Hollanders, sould by his officers with the same command. Soe that when wee have this from the King under his owne hand and signett, and that by his owne hand is delivered when wee shall have sent the coppie thereof to the Governour of Pullecatt, hee will no longer threaten us for the receiveinge of stolen goods.'

The King of Vijayanager at 'Arlour' to the Agent at Fort St. George, September 25, 1645 (O. C. 1948)

'Zree Sringo Raylo, King of Kings, a God in his kingdome, in armes invincible, etc., unto the Captain of the English, these. The Hollanders, who have their residence in Pallacatt, not valuing my letters, hath constrained mee to commence awarre against them, the charge whereof is committed unto Chenana Chetty [Malaya: see p. 50], whom you are to assist therein with artillery, powder, shott, fireworks; and in soe doing you shall pleasure us. Whatever goods appertained unto the Hollanders in my kingdome I accompt it as my peculiar and proper wealth which, being all come to Madraspatam, wee will that you buy and pay monies for the same, proceeding therein as Chenana Chetty and Seradra shall prescribe, not failing at all in its performance. And whereas I am given to understand by Chenana Chetty that you intend to send up a man of quality unto us (I am very well pleased, for that you have allwaies esteemed my ordinances; and as Chenana Chetty will advize, soe shall you bee sure to receive content; nor bee you induced to beleive the contrary, but confide upon our word and along with him; for whose secure repayre unto our court this our firman shall suffice. As for the other matters, Chinana Chetty will advise you.'

'Then comes a long silence, but from the Dutch records we learn that Sri Ranga, after suffering a severe defeat under the walls of Vellore, was forced to pay a heavy indemnity to the leader of the Bijapur army, and that the Nayaks, sobered by the successes of the Muhammadans, returned to their allegiance and promised to assist the King in maintaining the independence of his country.'

The English Factories in India, 1642-45, pp. 289-91 October 1, 1645, and p. 285, Sri Ranga's letter; also p. xxv, Volume for 1646-50 of the same series.)

¹ 'How the warres stand betwixt the King and Vinagar [Vijayanagar] and the Hollanders.' 'Ever since the seige of Pullacatt, which was begune the 12th August last, the King hath bine in warres with the King of Vizapore [Bijâpur] and in civell wares with three of his great Nagues; soe that he to this tyme never had opportunitie to send a considerable foorse against Pullacatt, more then 4,000 souldiers that lay before it to stopp the wayes that no goods should goe in or out. And now the King of Gulcondak hath sent his generall, Meir Gumlack [Mîr Jumla], with a great armie to appose this King; who is advance [d] to the Jentues cuntry, where the King hath sent Mallay, who hath got together 50,000 souldiers (as reporte saith), whereof 3,000 souldiers he sent for from Pullacatt, to keepe the Mores from intrenching upon this Kings country.'

'Among the *Hague Transcripts* at the India Office (Series I, vol. xv, No. 484) is an interesting diary kept at Pulicat at this time. According to this the three rebellious Nayaks were those of Tanjore, Madura, and 'Sinsier [Gingi?], who inflicted a severe defeat on the royal forces in December, 1645. It also says

It was then that Mîr Jumla was able to take possession of Udayagiri, which was the capital of the eastern viceroyalty from Mallaiya, the successor in command in these parts of Dâmarla Venkaṭa.¹

The surrender of Udayagiri threw Mallaiya into disgrace and the change of command in the face of the enemy gave them the advantage. Golkonda and Bijâpur now laid siege to Vellore together and defeated Śrīraṅga Râya.² Mîr Jumla, in consequence, conquered all the districts and was within two days' march of Madras on his way to Ginjee.³

that the English had sent a mission to court with a present of about 1,000 *pardaos* in spices, looking-glasses, etc., and had promised at the King's request to buy the goods taken from the Dutch. In return they had asked for the confirmation of their *previous gaul* and this had been granted.'

¹ 'This country is at present full of warrs and troubles, for the King and three of his Nagues are at variance, and the King of Vizapoore's armie is come into this country on the one side and the King of Gulcondah upon the other, both against this King. The Meir Jumla is Generall for the King of Gulcondah, whose hath allreadie taken three of the Kings castles, whereof one of them is reported to bee the strongest hould in this kinkdome; where Molay was sent to keepe it, but in a short tyme surrendered it unto the Meir Jumla, upon composition for himselfe and all his people to goe away free; but how hee will be received by the King we shall advise you by the next, for this newes came unto us but yesterday.'

'In the Dutch document already quoted this fort is called "Oudegiere" (Udayagiri?). Its situation is not known. (It is Udayagiri in the Nellore Dt., always known one of the strongest of Vijayanagar Forts and the stronghold at the Eastern Viceroyalty.) It could hardly be the place of that name in Nellore District, as this would be too far north.'

(E. P. 25, January 21, 1646, and note 1; p. 26, February 10, 1646 and note 2, *The English Factories in India, 1646-50*).

² 'Then comes a long silence, but from the Dutch records we learn that Śrīraṅga, after suffering a severe defeat under the walls of Vellore, was forced to pay a heavy indemnity to the leader of the Bijâpur army, and that the Nayaks, sobered by the successes of the Muhammadans, returned to their allegiance, and promised to assist the King in maintaining the independence of his country. The siege of Pulicat ceased with the fall of Malaya from power; and in May a fresh lease of the town and district was obtained from Sri Ranga.'

The English Factories in India 1646-50, p. xxv.

³ The warres and famine doth still furiously rage in these parts, and wee thinke that there wilbe a period sett unto the former before the latter; for the Anna Bobb * Meir Jumla hath taken the government of Pullicatte and St. Thome, settinge the country all in order as hee goeth along, and is now within two dayes march of the Kings court and noe body commeth to oppose him, the famine havinge almost destroyed all the kingdome; for out of our little towne there hath dyed noe less than 3,000 people since September last; in Pullicatte as reporte saith, 15,000; and in St. Thome no less.

The English Factories in India, 1646-50 (January), p. 70.

* Al-Nawab.

There is a note in October 1647 that the Company obtained a renewal of the grant from Mîr Jumla and that the Râyalu had fled the country.¹ 6

Mîr Jumla marched upon Gingee, having strengthened himself by an alliance with Bijâpur. In front of the walls of Gingee, the Bijâpur contingent went over to the side of Golkonda, and Golkonda allowed the Bijâpur troops to occupy Gingee. The Bijâpur army assumed possession of Gingee and Tegnapatam near Cuddalore. It was then that the Râja of Karnâṭak, that is, Śrīraṅga, found his position untenable and fled to Mysore, which was then at war with Bijâpur.²

¹ 'Wee had almost forgotten to advise you that the 16,000 rials of eight President Baker left us indebted at the coast at his going to Bantam was lent us by the King of Gulcondah(s) Generall, who hath almost conquer'd this kingdom and reigneth as King under the title of Annabob (see p. 70). This 16,000 rials hee lent us for one twelve months gratis; which debt wee discharged at the arrivall of the *Fagwell*: So, in requitall of the Annabobs curtezie, wee gave him one of the two brass guns you sent out by the *Mary*, which hee would not have denied of, whither hee had lent us this money or no; otherwise he would not have confirmed our old priviledges formerlye graunted us by the now fledd Jentue King. So upon the deliveringe of this gunn hee gave it us here under his hand that hee received the gunn in full and contentable satisfaction for the loan of 16,000 rials of eight to the Company the whole space of one twelve month, and never hereafter would desire any thing elce for the same; and withall confirme'd under the King of Gulcondah(s) great seale all our former priviledges in ample manner, as it was graunteed unto us by the aforesaid fledd Jentue King. Soe by this means the gun hath saved you three tymes the vallue of it, by accomplishing too good acts at once.'

A letter he carried declared that food was dear and cotton goods were difficult to obtain, as the country was being harried by fresh incursions of the Golkonda and Bijâpur armies, with the result that Porto Novo and Pondicherri were 'in a manner ruin'd,' while Tegnapatam, the other chief centre of the piece-goods trade in that region, had to buy immunity from a like fate by 'continueall presents.'

(*The English Factories in India, 1646-50*, pp. 166-7, October 9, 1647, and also Letter by Ivy to Bantam same vol. p. xxx August 19, 1648.)

² 'On the eastern side of India, at the beginning of the period under review, the Carnatic was still being harassed by the incursions of its Muhammadan foes, and by their constant dissensions and conflicts. The forces of the King of Bijapur had conquered the whole of the district centring in the famous fortress of Gingi, including the seaboard round Tegnapatam, of which Malaya was made Governor; and the Dutch promptly took advantage of this to obtain (August, 1651) a grant of trade at that and the neighbouring ports (*Hague Transcripts*, series i, vol. xvii, No. 532 p. vol. xviii, No. 539). The unhappy Raja of the Carnatic had taken refuge with the Nayak of Mysore, who was at war with Bijapur (*Ibid.*, vol. xvii, No. 518). Meanwhile, to the northwards, the Nawab Mir Jumla, as general of the Golkonda forces, was busy consolidating his position.'

(*The English Factories in India, 1651-54*, pp. xxiv-xxv.)

It was about this time that the activities of Mîr Jumla brought him into hostilities with Bijâpur, and war broke out soon after the fall of Gingee, possibly in the year 1651.¹

The contest between the two lasted for some time and ultimately Mîr Jumla was able to enter into a treaty with Bijâpur, paying six hundred thousand pagodas for the retention of his conquests made in the territories of Śrīraṅga.²

The war was apparently waged for the division of the spoil. Bijâpur, in her turn, now became very active, marched across and captured Penukonda and wanted permission to march on to Gingee through the territory belonging to Mîr Jumla. Mîr Jumla declined to grant them free passage through his territory and sought the assistance of Mysore, and made direct overtures to the emperor Śrīraṅga. This was in 1652. The Bijâpur army marched up to Vellore, took possession of it, and left the emperor with Chandragiri for his capital and a few districts dependent thereon. This was soon after March A.D. 1653.³

¹ 'Warrs being commenced betweene the Moors of Gulcondah and Vizapore, who, haveing shared this afflicted kingdom, are now bandying against each other, whilst the poore Jentue, hoping their mutuall destruction, watches opportunity to breake of his present miserable yoke. In the interim many bickerings have bin within two daies journey of this place, and tis reported that the Nabob with his whole army is besieged among the hills of Gulcondah, whither hee retired for the more safty, by the Vizaporians; which hath soe distracted this country that wee could not adventure your monies abroad without to much Hazard.'

(*The English Factories in India, 1651-54*, p. 99, January 14, 1652.)

² 'Have already advised the troubles, ariseing from the quarrell betweene the Vizapore and Golcondah Moores; but lately peace is concluded betweene the two Kings, being bought by the last for 600,000 (some say 900,000) pagodas; for which sume hee is againe restore'd to possession of his late conquests, part whereof had in this bickering beene surprized by the Vizaporeans, whose King for these many months was reported dead, though now resuscitated and said to bee in better health then for diverse passed yeares.'

(*The English Factories in India, 1651-54*, p. 111, January 27, 1652.)

³ 'The war in the Carnatic was continued as strenuously as ever. According to the Dutch records, the Bijâpur commander-in-chief, having mastered the important fortress of Penukonda in March, 1653, thereupon requested permission to pass through the districts held by the Golkonda troops on his way to Gingi; but this was refused by Mir Jumla, who, alarmed at the success of the Bijâpur troops, was animating the Nayak of Mysore against them and also making overtures to the Carnatic Raja. The latter, relying on Mir Jumla's promises, returned to Vellore and raised a large army, hoping to drive the Bijâpuris out of the country (*Hague Transcripts*, series i, vol. xix, No. 550 (i)). The issue of all this is told in a letter from Batavia of November 7, 1654 (N.S.), which states that the Bijapur general had, after a long siege, captured Vellore and concluded a treaty with the Raja, by which Chandragiri was left to the latter, with the revenues of certain districts (*Ibid.*, No. 551). Meanwhile the Dutch were endeavouring to live

Soon after followed the attempt of Mîr Jumla at independence, which Abdullâh Qutb Shâh had long suspected. His efforts to bring his powerful lieutenant to heel threw him first into the hands of Bijâpur and then into the hands of the Mughal Prince, Aurangzeb, actively operating in behalf of his father in the Dekhan at the time.¹

as peaceably as possible with both contending powers. This was not easy in the case of Mîr Jumla, who (as we have seen) was much irritated by their refusal to grant passes to Indian ships desirous of trading with Ceylon, Achin, and all districts in which the Dutch were striving to establish a monopoly.¹

(*The English Factories in India, 1651-54*, p. xxxiii.)

¹ It is interesting to note that the Dutch at this time were negotiating with the Danes for the purchase of Tranquebar, mainly in order to prevent its falling into the hands of the Portuguese or the English. The Danes, however, though in a somewhat critical position, decided to hold out in hope of relief from Europe, though they promised to give the Dutch the first offer, should they be compelled to give up their settlement.

In September 1654, the English factors reported a fresh development in the unstable politics of the Coast. The King of Golconda, Abdullâh Qutb Shâh, had long been jealous of the power wielded by his servant, Mîr Jumla, and an open breach had now occurred between them. (p. 290). The latter was suspected of an intention of making himself an independent sovereign of the territory he had conquered in the Carnatic; but he was well aware of the difficulty of standing alone, and after making overtures to the King of Bijapur, he finally succumbed to the intrigues of Aurangzeb, who, as Viceroy of the Deccan, was eagerly watching for an opportunity to interfere. Mîr Jumla agreed to enter the service of the Mughal Emperor; but rumours of his intention so alarmed Abdullâh Qutb Shâh that he sought to win back the friendship of his former minister, and the latter hesitated until the imprisonment of his family at Golconda towards the end of 1655—an act provoked by the haughty behaviour of his son—precipitated the crisis and drove Mîr Jumla into the arms of Aurangzeb, with disastrous results to the Golkonda kingdom.¹

¹ It hath been no small miserie that this poore heathen country hath suffered any tyme these ten years almost, since the Moores of Vizapore on one side and those of Gulcondah on the other side first made inroads upon it. And now, when wee hoped all would have beene put in some good posture of government, to continue still those miseries (or rather to adde a greater burthen to it) our Nabob is lately up in armes against the King of Gulcondah his master, whose commands he slighteth, intending (soe farre as is conceived) to keepe what part of the country hee hath conquered to himselfe; which if hee can accomplish, hee will soone bee as great a king as his master, and his yearly renew little inferiour to it. What the issue to those things wilbee, the Almighty only knoweth; in the meane tyme wee that live here amongst them shalbee sure never to want troubles on every side.²

In the booke (1) of transactions with the Nabob [you will] read how hee hath intrenched on our privileges [in Madras]—patam; which was begunn by the Braminees mentioned in Mr. Bakers tyme, who would take no notice of their [actions, but] supported them. . . . In the meane tyme wee strive to keep what we have, until better tymes. The said Nabob is [in opposition] to the King his master; nor can wee divine the issue of this un| certaine warr from such varrious reports as pass in [these parts; but] suppose, if the King

Mîr Jumla got confirmation of his possession of the Karnâtak from Shâh Jahân, and continued his trading activities in the region up to July 1656.¹

In November 1656, Śrîranga had recovered a good deal and was laying siege to Pulicat as against Mîr Jumla.²

oremaster him, heele fly to the [Mogull for] shelter, who already begins to take his part.³

(*The English Factories in India, 1650-55*, p. xxxiv, also p. 290, September 18, 1654; and p. 46, February 4, 1656, *ibid.* vol. for 1655-60.)

¹ The report runs that this King will send an army against Golconda and Decan [i.e. Bijapur] in favour of Miere Jimla, lately generall of the King of Gulcondah[s] forces, who, haveing subdued the large territory of Ram Rajah, (1) is reported now to bee in rebellion, proffering Sha Jehan to doe his best to subject the whole country of Gulcondah to his more absolute command. If this warr goe forwards, it may perhaps bee as dangerous to send the saltpeeter by the way of Brampore [Burhanpur] as Ahmedabad, for if the prince Oran Zaeb have occasion for any, noe doubt but hee will stop it, and then it may bee a businesse very troublesome to gett mony for it.²

(*The English Factories in India, 1655-60*, pp. 62-3, February 6, 1656.)

² This long imprisoned King at last returned to his city, after (by reporte) the receipt of good news from the Mogull, who they say keepe the Nobob by him and will not permit him to returne to these countreys againe, and hath given him all the Curnatt [Carnatic] country to his disposall and yeares tribitt free. This is reported for truth; whither soe or noe, [I] knowe not. But for certaine hee [i.e. Mîr Jumla] hath lately sent an army of neare 10,000 horse to take possession of Curnatt, and at his coming into the city had not lesse then 50,000 horse and foote, richly acoutred, which are all in pay, that marched before him.³

³ The story regarding the disposal of the Carnatic was, in effect, true. Abdullâh Qutb Shâh had done his best to retain that rich province, which had been conquered on his behalf by the Nawab; but Shah Jahan decided that it must be treated as Mîr Jumla's *jagir*, held directly from the Emperor, and the Golconda monarch was ordered to recall his officers from the province.* As a Madras letter of July 7, 1656 (written, it is true, before the decision was known there), says:

'As for this country about us, tis indifferent quiett; continueing yett under the Nabobs government, whose officers still remaine in their places of command, though the army bee much lessened by his departure.'

In which respect wee have not as yett broake their seales, but deferre their opening until wee bee better informed to whome they belong, or the country settled in the Gentue Kings possession, which would not only secure us from future trouble but much advance your affaires in these parts, for some good service wee have done him in assisting Conar Cittee [Koneri Chetta], his generall for these quarters; which business, if the success bee sutable to the beginning, this place will bee better worth your owning then ever.

Alsoe it was reported that the king of Gulcondah had lett the countrey of Carnaticum again to the Roylaes; uppon which the Kinge of the Jentues father-in-law, called Vengum Rajah, with a partye of souldiers tooke parte of the

* See Professor Sarkar's *Aurangzib*, vol. i, p. 245.

According to the Dutch records of January 1657, Koneri Chetti who was entrusted with the operations in behalf of Śīraṅga betrayed him and made overtures to Tupāki Krishnappa, Mīr Jumla's lieutenant.¹

country, and came to Peddapollum; * which newes when Sidelee heard, not raising sieg nor comeing hither, returned to Pullecat.

'And all the country hereabouts (Punnamalee castle excepted) rendered to the Jentue Kings obedience, who, now, in the nabobs absence, is up in arms for the recovering of his kingdome, and hath already recovered a large part.'

'Nor are our Dutch neighbours in Pullecat altogether secure, for all their strength, should the Gentue King overcome, who yet is able to counterpoize the Nabobs party and may happily get the day at last, if the Nabob come not in person to conserve his conquest; which is much to bee doubted, though his party report that hee is on the way from Agra as farre as Brampore with a formidable army; but tis supposed Vizapore (Bijapur) will take him up by the way. As for Conarcittee, hee rendered himselfe up to the Moores as a prisoner, but was received in state by the comandars with more then accustomed honour in such cases; which, considered with his alliance, and neere relation to Topa Kistnapa, the Nabobs generall together with other circumstances, and observations in his present deport and continued respect from ditto Kistnapa, are sufficient to ground the generall suspicion of his betraying the kings army.'

(*The English Factories in India, 1655-60*, pp. 91, 94, 95, 97 and 98.)

'And all the country hereabouts (Punnamalee castle excepted) rendered to the Jentu King's obedience, who now, in the Nabobs absence, is up in armes for the recovering of his kingdome, and hath already recovered a large part.'

'Next from a letter sent by the Madras factors to Bantam, dated, November 5, we learn that—

'All these countries that were formerly conquered by the Nabob are now of late (in his absence at the Moghulls court) upon the revolt, the Jentue King with diverse Nagues being in arms; some of whose forces are now at the seidge of Paleacatt, where tis said most of the Nabobs riches are stowed. Here is nothing but takeing and retakeing of places, with parties of both sides, in all places; soe that tis very dangerous giving out monies for goods in these tymes. But wee hope ere long 'twill be settled, especially for us, if the King recovers his countrey.

'And finally we have the report made to the Company by Greenhill and Chamber on January 28, 1657.

'The warres in these parts have been an exceeding hinderance to the progress of your business in this place; and the more through the treachery of Conarcity, whom the Jentue King made his generall in these parts about Punnomalee; which castle might have been easily brought in subjection, but hee delayed the time until the Nabobs party had united their forces and formed a body to overpower him; whereupon hee basely fledd to this towne with his army.'

'Nor are our Dutch neighbours in Pullecat altogether secure, for all their strength, should the Gentue King overcome, who yet is able to counterpoize the Nabobs party and may happily get the day at last, if the Nabob come not in person to conserve his conquest; which is much to bee doubted, though his party report that hee is on the way from Agra as farre as Brahmpore with a formidable army; but tis supposed Vizapore [Bijapur] will take him up by the way. As for Conarcittee, he rendered himselfe up to the Moores as a prisoner, but was

* Possibly Peddanaikpetta (a ward of Madras) is meant.

This latter is said to have inflicted a defeat upon Śīraṅga in September of that year.¹

This brought about the siege of Madras in behalf of Mīr Jumla.²

received in state by the comandars with more than accustomed honour in such cases; which, considered with his alliance and neere relation to Topa Kistnapa, the Nabobs generall, together with other circumstances and observations in his present deport and continued respect from ditto Kistnapa, are sufficient to ground the generall suspicion of his betraying the king's army.'

'A letter from Batavia, written towards the end of January, 1657 (*Hague Transcripts*, ser. i, vol. xxi, No. 612), gives some additional particulars. It says that the Chandragiri Raja with an army of 8,000 men captured the pagoda of Tirupati, and then designed the conquest of the districts of Conjeeveram, Chingleput, 'Carmigaelpatam', and Pulicat. He wrote secretly to the Dutch chief at the last-named place, asking him to secure for him the Nawab's treasure (which had presumably been hurried thither for safety), or at least to prevent its being carried away by sea. Reply was made that the Dutch had no jurisdiction in the town of Pulicat, which was guarded by the Nawab's troops. The Raja then besought the Dutch to remain neutral in the event of his attacking the place; but to this they answered that they were under a contract with the Nawab to assist him in such a case.'

(*The English Factories in India, 1655-60*, pp. 97, 98 and 99.)


'Since when the nuse heare touching the Nabobs proceeding in Decan differs littell from your relations, only the takeing of Colburge,* reported by that party, is contradicted; but tis said he is now at the siege of another strong place, called Callinarra [Kalyani], where many bloody conflicts hath passed on both sides, which hath much retarded the expectation of his speedy conquest, and detained him from succoring his party in these quarters; who were lately so invironed by the Gentues that they could not have long subsisted, had not the gennerrall, Topa Kistnapa, an old souldier, layed an ambuscada for a greate party of the Kings horse that hath bene plundering, and returning confidently (or rather carelesly) fell thereinto; where though they lost not 100 men killed, yet fled so amazedley that thay put all the company in such a feare as most of them disbanded and fled, leaving the King and [his?] adjutant shangee [Shanji] only with 1000 horse [and] foote; who staid behind two dayes and then retreated two miles to Arni, a strong castell on the borders of Chinge [Gingi]; whar thay are recruiteing the army with the Vizaporians [i.e. Bijapurs'] assistance and intended er long to be in the field with greater force then before. In the meane time Topa Kistna strengthens himselfe by all possible menes and Leiknrely [Leisurly] follows them, to see if he can get another advantage before thare whole powers be united. This unexpected defeate was about forty miles from the place; which is now so well provided as [we] do dot much feare the worst [what] can happen, especially [as] our cause is soe just.

(*The English Factories in India, 1655-60*, pp. 135-6.)

'Since when the nuse heare touching the Nabobs proceeding in Decan differs littell from your relations, only the takeing of Colburge† reported by

* (Kulbarga or Gulbarga, now in the Hyderabad State, about seventy-five miles north-east of Bijapur. It does not seem to have been attacked in this campaign, the course of which has been described on p. 118.)

† Kulbarga or Gulbarga, now in Hyderabad State, about seventy-five miles north-east of Bijapur. It does not seem to have been attacked in this campaign, the course of which has been described on p. 118.)



Now that Mîr Jumla was in Agra, Golkonda began to take a strong line to assert its claims to what had become Mîr Jumla's territory. In August 1658, there was fighting between Tupakki Krishnappa and the Golkonda forces round Poonamallee. Tupakki Krishnappa came to terms with Fort St. George in order to be free for this.¹

In the December of that year, Mîr Jumla's son Tapa Tapa demands the restoration of Mîr Jumla's Junk.²

that party, is contradicted; but tis said he is now at the siege of another strong place, called Callinara [Kalyani], where many bloody conflicts hath passed on both sides, which hath much retarded the expectation of his speedy conquest, and detained him from succoring his party in these quarters; who were lately so invironed by the Gentues that they could not have long subsisted, had not the gennerall, Topa Kitsnappa, an old souldier, layed an ambuscada for a greate party of the Kings horse that hath bene plundering, and returning confidently (or rather carelessly) fell thereinto; where though they lost not 100 men killed, yet fled so amazedley that they put all the company in such a feare as most of them disbanded and fled, leaving the King and [his?] adjutant Shangee [Shanji] only with 1000 horse [and] foote; who staid behind two dayes and then retreated two miles to Arni, a strong castell on the borders of Chinge [Gingi]; whar they are recruiteing the army with the Vizaporians [i.e. Bijâpuris'] assistance, and intended er long to be in the field with greater force then before. In the meane time Topa Kisna strengthens himselfe by all possible menes and Leiknrely [leisurely?] follows them, to see if he can get another advantage before thare whole powers be united. This unexpected defeate was about forty miles from this place; which is now so well provided as [we] do not much feare the worst [that] can happen, espetially [as] our cause is soe just.'

(*The English Factories in India, 1655-60*, p. 135-36.)

'We for our parts hitherto enjoy all freedome and quietnesse, though the noyse of warre and thundering of ordinance are day and night within our hearing. The castle of Pulomolee, about ten miles off, having revolted to the King of Gulcondah, is beleagred by Topa Kisna's forces, that formerly besieged us and Pulicatt; to whom it had been rendered ere this time, but that they expect help from the Gulcondah forces, which are said to be marching this wayes. So as you may easily gusse at the misery these countryes suffer, being covered with many severall armyes, and is very destructive to the trade thereof and consequently to our present affaires; so as we are forced for the most part to fetch our goods thirty leagues on each side from this place.

(1) From the Dutch records we learn that in October Kuli Beg, commanding the Golconda forces, inflicted a serious defeat on Tupaki Krishnappa, who was wounded and taken prisoner. The victor subdued all the district round Madras, and the Dutch at Pulicat found themselves obliged to come to terms with him, while San Thome also submitted (*Hague Transcripts*, ser. i, vol. xxiii, no. 639).

(*The English Factories in India, 1655-60*, p. 176.)

'Tapa Tapa came to this towne with Orange Zebes firmaund, demanding of Mr. Winter the Nabobs juncke; which he denying, secondarily required her of us, as also the Persia[n] comonly called Cajee [Kaji], who Mr. Winter conveyed to your port, to whome the Nabob, upon his leaveing Carnatt, left him Cheife Salaskaree [sar-lashkar, head of the troops] in those parts, on whome is pretended

In December 1659, Revington writing from Dandarajapur on the West Coast refers to Rustam-i-zamân as a friend of Shâhî and Shivajî, and among the Umras who declined to recognize Ibrâhîm 'Âdil Shâh's succession are mentioned Rustam-i-zamân Bahlol Khân, Shâhî and Shivajî, as though all the four of them were Amîrs of similar rank.¹

It is also stated in the course of the letter that Shâhî was expected to march up from his government extending to Gingee with 17,000 troops in a month and overthrow the government of 'Alî 'Âdil Shâh who could put into the field only 10,000.²

very large somes to be in his hands of the Nabobs; of whome, as well as the juncke, if there be not a surrender made, the Company, as well as their servants, are like to be sufferers in these parts.

(1) Bernier (1670 ed., vol. ii, p. 180) says that Mir Jumla's son had so much influence at Masulipatam that "le tap-tapa, son commis, en est quasi le maistre". He seems thus to use "Taptapa" as a title; but, as Sir Charles Lyall has pointed out to me, it is really a personal name, Tapa Tapa, implying descent from the great-grandson of Ali of that designation. In the Dutch Records at the India Office (*Hague Transcripts*, ser. i, vol. xxiii, No. 651) he is called "Miermameth Hosseyn Tafia Tappa."

(*The English Factories in India, 1655-60*, p. 187, December 22, 1658.)

'The person that is cald King of this country is knowne to bee the bastard of this Queenes husband,* and she, notwithstanding that, would have the crowne settled on him; but some of the Umbraves of this country, knowing to bee spuriously begotten, will not give him homadge and refuses to goe to court; and these are Rustum Jemah, Bull Ckaune,† Shawgee [Shahji Bhonsla], and Sevagy; which latter lyes with an army to the no[rth] ward and commands all alongst the coast from the upper Choul† unto Dabull; against whom the Queene this yeare sent Abdle Ckaune§ with an army of 10,000 horss and foote; and because shee knew with that strength hee was not able to resist Sevagy, shee counceild him to pretend friendship with his enemy; which hee did.'

(*The English Factories in India, 1655-60*, pp. 249-50.)

'One months tyme more will, wee beleive, put an end to this trouble; for Sevagyes father, Shawjee, that lyes to the southward, is expected within eight dayes with his army, consisting of 17,000 men, and then thay intend for Vizapore [Bijapur], the King and Queenes residence, whose streng(t)h consists onely in

* The question of the legitimacy of Ali Adil Shah II is examined by Professor Jadunath Sarkar at p. 285 of the first volume of his *History of Aurangzeb*. He accepts Grant Duff's view that the boy was really the son of the late king, and suggests that his mother was a slave-girl in the harem. Bernier and Tavernier say that he was simply an adopted son, and Aurangzeb made the same assertion as an excuse for his invasion of Bijapur. Manucci and Fryer stigmatize him as an illegitimate son of the Queen herself.'

† The general Bahlol Khan. Fryer calls him "Bullul Caun". See also Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, vol. i, p. 256.

‡ Chaul (near Alibag, in Kolaba District) is divided into Upper and Lower Chaul, the latter (also called Revadanda) being the Portuguese settlement.

§ Afzal Khan. Fryer speaks of him as "Abdul Caun." The name appears to have been Abdullah, "Afzal Khan" (the pre-eminent lord) being merely a title.'

In a letter, dated October 1661, Shâhji is referred to as the Bijâpur general and his having taken Porto Novo from the English is stated in clear terms.¹ e

Shâhji's imprisonment and the treaty between Shivaji and Bijâpur are under reference in a letter dated January 1663.²

men, and they are not above 10,000 souldyers; so that in all probability the kingdome will bee lost. and if it proves so, all that Rustum Jemah hath promised us, of a tancestall, or remitting you part of the saltpeeter costomes, and of assisting you in taking Danda Rajapore Castle, which are three things wee doe desire to bee instrumentall in, will as certainly bee performed. Wee onely want power and means, and a good head at Suratt.³

(*The English Factories in India, 1655-60*, p. 251.)

¹ If this bee indured by these governours, they will presume further; and wee have the like complaint to present concerning Xaigee* (whoe is father to him that is the Visapore [Bijapur] generall and hath Mr. Revington in durance); for hee came in July last to Porto Nova and robbed and pillaged the towne; whereof the Companies merchants were the greatest losers, having taken from in ellephants, callicoes, broad cloth, copper, benjamin [benzoin], etc., goodes to the value of 3,000 pardawes, and are utterly unable to pay the Company their remaynes in their hands, being about 4,000 pa[godas], unless our masters will licence us to vindicate them by their shipping at sea, for this Xaigee hath now Porto Nova in possession.

² By the mediation of Shahji Bhonsla (his father), Sivaji had come to terms with his nominal overlord, the King of Bijapur, with the result that Bijapur, amongst other districts, had been recognized as part of his territories.[†]

³ But he told us what was past must be forgotten, and that for the future never any such thing should happen again, nor should wee ever suffer by his master to the value of a corn of rice loose; giving in severall reasons for what had happened . . . as, his master then having warr with the King of Deccan (which since is ended and they now certainly at amity), and therefore he robd his countrey; as also the great necessity that then were upon him, occasioned by his warring with two potent Kings and Oran Shaw having spoiled him of great parts of his dominions, etc., but now his master had no such great necessity depending; but although any such should happen again, yet he now was fully resolved never hereafter to commit the like outrages as formerly, and would give us his inviolable oath wee should never be any wayes injured againe; shewing us with all a

* Shâhji, the father of Sivaji. His depredations in the Carnatic, nominally on behalf of the King of Bijapur, have been alluded in the preceding volume.

† It was declared that there was now no reason for ships to call at Porto Novo, since the towne is wholly destroyed and the merchants totally ruined by Xaigee, the Visapore King's Generall.

(*The English Factories in India, 1661-64*, p. 50, October 19, 1661; also p. 51.)

† "The Bijapur Government granted all Shivaji's demands (A.D. 1662). He was left in possession of his conquests from Kalyan in the north to Phonda in the south and from Dabhol in the west to Indapur in the east, and his complete independence was acknowledged. Both parties undertook to defend the other from foreign aggression. And Shivaji took a solemn oath not to molest Bijapur during Shâhji's lifetime." (*A History of the Maratha People*, by Kincaid and Panthan, vol. 1, p. 175.)

In letters, dated the 19th and 20th July 1663, Shâhji's position of influence with Bijâpur is referred to. Bahlol Khân was summoned to court, but would not go unless Shâhji accompanied him. There is also a reference to a Bijâpur invasion against Snep-Nayak (obviously standing for Śivappa Nâyaka of Ikkêri), the Karnâtak Râja, and his being forced to 'a composition of 7,000,000 Pagodas,'¹

In the accounts so far given there is no reference to Shâhji in our sources relating to the history of Mysore. There is clear reference to Shâhji in the Company's records from the year 1657 onwards, that is, more or less after the disappearance of Mîr Jumla from the scene of his activities in the Golkonda Karnâtak. One may therefore fairly argue that Shâhji was playing but a very subordinate part all through,

writing from his master with his own chop [i.e., seal] and others accustomed to it; also the print of the Rajah's hand on the top of the paper, done with sandall, declaring his resolve to tend as permentioned. To all which wee answered that, in confidence of the truth of what he had allegged, wee did believe our masters would be perswaded to trade againe to these ports, that are now in the Rajah's possession, provided reparation be made to their former losses; which wee hoped would be done, and assured him his master would not be a looser thereby.

(*The English Factories in India, 1661-64*, p. 230 and note, and p. 231.)

¹ Rustum Jeamah, returning from whence the King had placed him to Hookery, his owne towne, by the Kings order is denied entrance. This jessud sweares before he came out of Bunckapore, he saw irons put on Bussall Ckan* and Shagee [Shahji] (Shevgys father), but taken off of the latter in two dayes; who is now with the King without any command. Bussall Ckans mother denying the King entrance into Bunckapore, the King wrote to Shagee to perswade Bussall Ckan to come and stand to his mercy, for the King, being denied entrance, was so incenced that, if he stood out any longer, would never have pardoned him, and now he could not hope to be able to withstand him, the kingdome being at peace since the King conquered Snep-Nayck, a Carnattick Rajah, and brought him to a composition of 7,000,000 pagodas.† The rebelling of this Rajah was the cause of the Kings going for Bunckapore. At last Shagee perswaded Bussall Ckan to goe to the King, upon condition that he would accompany him; which he did, and so the King trappann'd them both. The King hath likewise wrote Syddy Mussad (Sidi Mas'ud), Syddy Zoars sonne in law, and to Syddy Zoars eldest sonne ‡ (the former of which hath 14,000 horse, the latter 10,000) to come to him; but they returned him answer that they dare not trust him that had murdered their father; § upon which the King wrote them againe, that they had no reason to mistrust him, he having now imprisoned Bussall Ckan, who was the only cause of their fathers death.

* An error for Bahlol Khan.

† The Batavia Dagh-Register, 1664 (p. 323) says 1,500,000.

‡ Sidi Aziz.

§ For the murder of Sidi Johar, see Grant Duff (ed. Edwardes), vol. 1, p. 146.

(*The English Factories in India, 1661-64*, pp. 242-3.)

although the position that he is said in the Company's records, to have occupied after A.D. 1657 would give the clearest possible indication that he must have been occupying a position of some importance before that.

In this connection we shall have to consider the new light that is brought to bear upon the subject by Sir Jadunath Sarkar in the *Modern Review* for July 1929. Sir Jadunath claims to have acquired two manuscripts relating to the reigns of the Bijâpur Sultâns, Muhammad 'Âdil Shâh (A.D. 1627-56) and 'Alî 'Âdil Shâh (A.D. 1627-72). These are described by him as contemporary official histories, the first by Zâhîr bin Zâhîrî and the second by Nûrullâh. He also notes that these two sources were not available to the author of the *Basâtinu's-salâtin* written in 1824, and which 'hitherto was our source of information for Bijâpur history.' 'In the light of these first-rate materials and the annual Jesuit letters from Madura, it is now possible to trace step by step and in clear detail the story of how the Muhammadans seized the heritage of the recently shattered empire of Vijayanagar and crushed its numberless, disunited, mutually jealous and warring Hindu feudatories, across the entire Indian peninsula from Goa to Madras. The Adil Shah of Bijâpur conquered what are called in his Persian history "Malnad and Karnatak", i.e. first the Kanara country of Bednur, then Mysore, starting from the Ikeri or Nagar district in the west, on to Sera and Bangalore in the centre and the north Salem district in the south east corner, and finally descending the Eastern Ghats the Madras plains up to Vellore, Jinji and Waligandapuram within sight of Tanjore. The Qutb Shah of Golkonda seized the Hindu principalities due south and south-east of his capital, i.e. the country beyond the Krishna, lying north-east of these new Bijapur acquisitions.'

'Between these two streams of invasion, Sir Ranga Rayal, the last representative of Vijayanagar royalty, was completely crushed out. He offered a long and desperate resistance. But his worst enemies were his own people. The insane pride, blind selfishness, disloyalty and mutual dissensions of his Hindu feudatories rendered all his efforts futile and the Muslims conquered Hindu Deccan piecemeal with the greatest ease and rapidity. As the Jesuit missionary Antoine de Proenza wrote from Trichinipoly (1659): "The old kings of this country appear, by their jealousies and imprudent action, to invite

the conquest of entire India by the Muslims"' (*Mission de Madure*, iii, 42.)

Before proceeding to exhibit his material, Professor Sarkar indulges in a comparison of the overthrow of the Hindu kingdoms of the south and the Muslim conquests of Hindûstân, and draws the conclusion that in the course of the years 1637-64 the extinction of Hindu rule in the south was brought about, and this period corresponds exactly to the life of Shâhji as a servant of Bijâpur. He lays himself out to indicate that 'the popular Maratha tradition that he was the leading general or conqueror of Mysore finds a complete refutation in the authentic historical sources described above. These sources prove that Shahji was not the supreme army chief, nor even the commander of an independent division, but only one of the many Bijâpuri generals serving under the eyes and orders of the Muslim, generalissimo, throughout the conquest of Mysore; and it was only very late in his life, in the invasion of Tanjore in 1660-62 (which was, however, followed not by an annexation, but by withdrawal), that he rose to be second in command.' Then he proceeds to state categorically under six heads the invasions of this country and the results achieved by these invasions.

The campaigns of the years 1638-39 ended in the capture of all the territory up to Bangalore according to this account. Shâhji was placed in the fortress of Bangalore to carry on the government of the conquered parts. Rustam-i-zamân himself proceeded to lay siege to Śrī-raṅgapaṭam, which under Kanṭhirava Narasa Râja Wodeyar, according to this account, submitted after a month's fight, paying five lakhs of gold pieces. The learned historian next proceeds to state 'when Rustam-i-zamân returned from Mysore at the approach of the rainy season, Kenge Nayaka rebelled, and there was a general rising of the Hindu Rajas throughout the Kanarese country against Bijâpur. So, the war was renewed.' Rustam-i-zamân returned, and Basavapaṭana, belonging to Kenge Nayaka, was taken after an elaborate siege, in which Shâhji played a part with Afzal Khân and other generals. While Rustam stayed in Basavapaṭana, Afzal Khân was ordered forward. He took Chik-Nayakan-halli and Bellur belonging to Venkaṭapati, and Tamkur. Rustam is next stated to have taken possession of Balapur (Ballapur) and Kulihal (Kunigal). That closes section I.

So in this official account, no cause is given for the war, and the Bijâpur invasion is begun as if it came upon Mysore like a bolt from the blue. Historical events did not take place in that fashion, even where the Sultâns of Bijâpur and Golkonda were concerned. The Hindu accounts give it that the intervention of Bijâpur was sought, and the invasion was launched accordingly; nor can this court account be regarded as thoroughly historical. It was not such a beautifully unopposed march down to the walls of Gingee, nor so satisfactory a settlement. The fatal weakness of the account is that it gives no explanation of the part that Kenge Nayaka, as he is called, played. He figures in the second campaign, without any mention of his name in the first. It is he who was the author of all the mischief; and the person concerned was not Kenge Nayaka, but Kenge Hanuma, the son of Kenge Nayaka. He invited the Bijâpur army and brought about Bijâpur intervention. The renewal of the Bijâpur invasion again was caused, according to the Hindu accounts, because Kenge Hanuma, who was placed in charge of the territory on the northern bank of the Kâvêri, as against Kanthirava Narasa holding the territory south of the Kâvêri, played false and brought on the invasion, this time perhaps by the incitement of Nâga-maṅgala Chansaayya, who had to go from his territory to Bijâpur as a combined result of Mysore expansion and Hanuma's administration. The treaty that Kanthirava Narasa entered into was only to gain time, so that Śrīraṅgapataṁ might be fortified and put in a position to withstand a siege. In this campaign, Shâhji is stated by this court historian to have been placed in the fort of Bangalore, and to have been charged with the administration and garrisoning of the district dependent on it, which would perhaps constitute a somewhat important position, subordinate, of course, to that of the commander-in-chief Ranadhoora Khân, as he is called in Hindu histories, sometimes also described as Khân-i-Zamân.

The next section, division IV of Sir Jadunath's article, simply says that the war was renewed in A.D. 1644. No reason for this renewal of the war seems called for so far, at any rate, as Sir Jadunath is concerned. The fort of Tikri, as it is called, is supposed to have been taken, and Sivappa Nâyaka is stated to have wrested it from the Bijâpur commander. The fort was not Tikri, but Ikkêri, the capital of the Nâyaks of Beḍnur. The next commander that was despatched, Khân

Muhammad, is said to have taken both Tikri and Sagar, four miles from it. The names ought to be Ikkêri and Sâgar, which latter is actually situated between Ikkêri and Keladi, the two capitals of the Nâyaks of the place. The following year Khân Muhammad is supposed to have marched into the Karnâṭak and gained a succession of victories, until, in A.D. 1646, he is said to have captured Nandyal and eight other forts in the Kurnool district. It is pointed out that in this campaign Shâhji played no part, and did not deserve to be 'mentioned' in the despatches. The campaign, beginning in 1644 and ending in 1646, is described as a mere rhodomontade by this official historian. Apart from what we find in the Hindu accounts, we see in the Company's records that a great change was taking place. Early in the year 1643, the chief Governor of the Vijayanagar empire, Damarla Venkaṭa, was found intriguing with the Wazîr of Golkonda, Mîr Jumla. He was promptly placed under arrest. His influential brother Ayyappa was raising forces against the emperor Śrīraṅga with a view to compel him to release Venkaṭa. In the course of the year 1643, Śrīraṅga obtained the assistance of Bijâpur, and Bijâpur undertook an invasion to assist him for a consideration of 15 lakhs of gold pieces and twenty-four elephants. The campaign of 1644 began as a result of this agreement between the Vijayanagar emperor Śrīraṅga and the Bijâpur Sultan, and naturally, therefore, the sphere of the campaign would extend to the region indicated in the official account. It shows the Bijâpur activity not only in the Shimoga district, but along the whole frontier eastwards into the Kurnool district, undoubtedly the territory of Golkonda, under Mîr Jumla's actual administration. This would be inexplicable, notwithstanding the first-rate importance of the court historian, unless it was a war undertaken by Bijâpur against Golkonda as well. Golkonda's intervention was naturally sought by Venkaṭa's brother Ayyappa. In 1644 under pressure of this joint effort, Śrīraṅga was compelled to restore Damarla Venkaṭa to his freedom, but apparently not to his former position, Mallaiya taking his place. Mallaiya, in his turn, captured Dutch goods and pressed them hard at Pulicat, but fell into disgrace by surrendering Udayagiri to Mîr Jumla. It was during this period of the restoration of Śrīraṅga that the East India Company's factors in Madras obtained a renewal of the grant from him.

The next campaign, according to this account is that of 1646. When the Prime Minister of Bijāpur, Mustafa Khān led the expedition. He is taken again in glorious career across the whole territory. But unfortunately the details given of the campaign give the lie direct to this glorious success. Āsaf Khān and Shāhji had been ordered ahead, it is said, 'for the defence of the Karnatak frontier.' Why? No explanation is given. The next march was to Śākṛēpaṭana. Śivappa Nāyaka and a number of others are supposed to have joined the expedition. He marched as far as Śivagaṅgā in the Tumkur district, where he is said to have received the envoy of Śrīraṅga Rāyulu of Vellore. There is a note in the Company's records that before January 21, 1646, Śrīraṅga Rāyulu was attacked by the combined armies of Bijāpur and Golkonda, which would mean that after the previous campaign, in which Bijāpur assisted Śrīraṅga, they changed front and joined Mīr Jumla. It is in the course of the operations connected with this joint attack that Mallaiya surrendered Udayagiri, as it was thought, too readily, and fell into disgrace. That was in February, 1646. The combined armies succeeded in inflicting a defeat upon Śrīraṅga Rāyulu in Vellore. This is apparently what is referred to in the official account, where the ambassadors of Śrīraṅga Rāyulu are said to have waited upon Mushtafa Khān. The Rāyulu apparently made an effort to detach Bijāpur from its alliance with Golkonda. The three rebel Nāyaks of the south, viz. those of Gingee, Tanjore and Madura, who were apparently opposed to the succession of Śrīraṅga, and were consequently ill-affected towards him, if not positively disaffected, countenanced the rebellion of the influential brothers, Dāmarla Venkaṭa and Ayyappa. Śrīraṅga Rāyulu's efforts all along were to bring them to reason and to loyalty. He had not as yet succeeded. It is likely that ambassadors from them also met Mustafa Khān at Shivagaṅgā. What is said in this court history is inexplicable unless these details from other sources are put in their setting. Mustafa Khān refused to be dissuaded from his enterprise on account of these three officers and would not stop till he heard that the Rāyulu's projected invasion was given up. There is a note in the Company's records, dated October 1, 1645, that Śrīraṅga Rāyulu had obtained a distinct success against the southern rebels, who were coerced into some kind of submission. It was subsequently to that, that the mission to Mustafa Khān must have taken place. The Rāyulu's ambassador was sent

back with Mulla Ahmed to get the Rāyulu to agree. Mustafa waited at the head of a pass 28 miles from Vellore. The information is added here that Mustafa's original idea was to detain the Hindu ambassador and send Mullā Ahmad alone. Shāhji is said to have persuaded him in the belief that he had obtained a promise of loyalty from the Brahman envoy. The pass here referred to must have been the Nāyakanēri pass, which leads from the present-day Chittoor district into Gudiyātam. The ambassador is said to have gone and advised Śrīraṅga Rāyal to attack Mustafa and his army at the pass. Mustafa wanted to make a détour into the territory of Jagadēva Rāyal, that is, the Bāramahāls of the Salem district by what is called 'Kanvi Pass'. There is no Kanvi Pass. *Kanvi* means 'pass'. Instead of descending into the basin of the Pālār, which apparently was guarded in force by Śrīraṅga Rāyal, Mustafa wanted to make a détour into the Salem district, perhaps with a view to take the Rāyulu in the rear. There again he was attacked by Śrīraṅga's armies. The Rāyulu himself advanced against the main line and attacked the division left there under Shāhji and Asad Khān. Asad Khān is said to have been absent from his command, leaving it to his Dīwān, so that Shāhji was in sole command. After a bloody fight, the Rāyulu's troops were hurled back and a victory won by Shāhji. All the same, the army is said to have marched through the Bāramahāl by way of Ankuṣagiri to Krishnagur, which must be the present-day Krishnagiri, sometimes called Krishnagiri Durga. Then taking Vīrabhadra Durga, the capital of that region, the army is said to have marched across and descended into the Pālār basin. From this account it is clear that, Shāhji's victory notwithstanding, the army was not able to take the direct line to Gudiyātam, but had to make a détour, which discounts the victory considerably.

The next section of Sir Jadūnath's historians' account speaks of the Bijāpur army marching by way of Ānandābād, Amarāvati, and Gudiyātam and reaching what is called *Uranjpur*. This is not *Daran-chur*, as stated, but *Vrinchipuram*, the capital, in the days of the Hindus, of the Bāṇa country in the Pālār valley. After giving his army some little rest, Mustafa Khān arrived ultimately in front of the walls of Vellore. In the battle that followed, the Rāyulu's general was defeated. Vellore was invested, and ultimately the Rāyulu submitted and agreed to pay 50 lakhs of gold pieces and 150 elephants

as indemnity. After a month's halt at Vellore, Mustafa is said to have returned with his army by the same route by which he had approached Vellore. In this decisive battle of the war, Shâhji is said to have commanded, along with a certain number of other Hindu officers, the right wing of the Bijâpur army; and when Mustafa returned to Bijâpur, Asad Khân and Shâhji, with many other officers, were left behind to hold the conquered country. Here again there is a very significant omission, without which it is difficult to appreciate the position. The part that was taken in this campaign by the Golkonda troops is conspicuous by its omission, notwithstanding the fact that these are official historians, who had access presumably to the despatches and other official documents. There is a note in the Company's records bearing the date January 21, 1646, that Srîraṅga was attacked by Golkonda and Bijâpur. Mallaiya played the craven and surrendered Udayagiri on February 9, 1646. The Râyulu's defeat at Vellore is mentioned, and, significantly enough, it is added that the rebel Nâyaks returned to their allegiance. This looks rather unlike the complete conquest of Vellore and the territory dependent thereon by Mustafa Khân, the general of Bijâpur. We have another dated January 1647, that Mîr Jumla's agents were active on the eastern side, had taken the Dutch settlement at Pulicat and were marching towards St. Thomé reaching within two days' march of the Râyulu's forces. It was this march of the Golkonda troops that demoralized the Râyulu's Dîwân and made his position untenable in Vellore. He had to fly for the time being for safety and spent some time on forest frontiers of the Tanjore Nâyak's territories, the regions of Ariyalûr, Udayarpâlayam, etc., on the banks of the Coleroon. In October 1647, the East India Company's factors at Fort St. George felt that the territory had become so far Mîr Jumla's that they obtained from him a renewal of the charter that was first granted by Venkatapati in 1639, and was renewed by Srîraṅga in 1645///

The next section deals with the last of the great campaigns of Mustafa Khân when he marched towards Gingee, the invasion starting in January 1648. Why they should have marched against Gingee or undertaken this invasion is not explained as usual. Tirumal Nâyak of Madura, finding his schemes not prospering by themselves, seems to have striven to effect a combination, as before, between the three Nâyaks of the south, making an effort this time to bespeak the

sympathy and good offices of Mîr Jumla in their cause. The Tanjore Nâyak betrayed the scheme by divulging it to the emperor. Thus balked, he succeeded in bringing about an invasion of the Râyulu's territory by Golkonda.¹ Having achieved considerable success, as indicated by the Company's record already quoted, Mîr Jumla marched south and laid siege to Gingee. He sought the good offices of Bijâpur and obtained its co-operation. When Gingee was thus attacked by the victorious Golkonda troops, whom Tirumal Nâyak regarded as his allies, Tirumal changed front and came in force to the assistance of the Nâyak of Gingee. The siege by the combined Muhammadan troops seemed not to prosper particularly, and Tirumal Nâyak nearly succeeded in getting the siege raised, when the Golkonda troops left. Seeing that it would require a lengthy investment, Mîr Jumla left the siege to be conducted by the Bijâpur troops. These succeeded in putting a garrison into the fort. Mustafa Khân, according to this official account, is brought up to the walls of Gingee, which offered to surrender, 'except, of course, for the disobedience of his chief subordinates like Siddi Raihan and Shâhji.' Shâhji was put into fetters and brought back to Bijâpur. Mustafa Khân died on the way, and the command passed on to Khân Muhammad. Shâhji is said to have been brought in fetters to Bijâpur, where the Sultân set him free after negotiating with him for the surrender of the fortress of Kondana, a fortress in the Mahratta country, Bangalore, and a place called Kandarpi in the Bellary district,² restoring him to all his honours and offices. According to the court historian, the Sultân summoned Shâhji to his presence, 'giving him the robe of minister, and settled his former lands to him again.' In these authentic sources, there is no other mention of Shâhji, and Sir Jadunath concludes the section with the remark that the gap in our knowledge from A.D. 1649 onwards in regard to Shâhji's doings can be but inadequately filled by references to Jesuit letters.

The section which relates to the other sources of authority, namely, the letters of Abdullâh Quṭb Shâh, really gives some valuable information as to the character of the changes that took place in the kaleidoscopic arrangements and re-arrangements of the forces in the Karnâtak. It refers to the agreement between the two Muhammadan

¹ *The History of the Nâyaks of Madura* quoted above.

² Kandarpi was then a fortified place, now in the Anantapur district.

Sultâns in regard to the division of the territory of the Râyâl, Bijâpur being given two-thirds and Golkonda retaining a third. The Qutb Shâh complained that the 'Âdil Shâh had broken the agreement and had attempted to retain more than his share, whereas the *Muhammad nâma*, one of the court chronicles, already referred to, states 'that the ungrateful Abdullâh—whose forces had been defeated by the Râyâl, and who could not have won an inch of the Karnâtak without Bijâpur support—had formed a secret alliance with the infidel, i.e. the Râyâl, and sent his general Mîr Jumla to destroy the Hindus in defence of Gingee, but that Mîr Jumla arrived too late. He was subsequently defeated by another courtier.....of.....the Bijâpur general, Bâjî Ghorpare.' On the authority of a letter written by Abdullâh Qutb Shâh to his Agent in Bijâpur of a date corresponding to December 23, A.D. 1647, according to Sir Jadunath, reference is made to a petition from Shâhji Bhonsle begging to be taken into the Qutb Shâh's service. The Qutb Shâh is said therein to have repeatedly rejected Shâhji's prayer, and advised him to serve the 'Âdil Shâh. Another Hindu Râja is supposed to have done so, whose name could not, however, be made out clearly. Shâhji's arrest by Bijâpur is generally ascribed to this attempt on his part to prove traitor to Bijâpur. The story of this arrest is given entirely differently in Mahratta sources of history, but the cause may have been perhaps to some extent what it is stated to be here. But even so, it would be rather difficult to accept it altogether as correct without confirmation in the face of the contradiction in Mahratta sources. The fact that Shâhji was let off so easily by the Bijâpur monarch and his court, according to the court chroniclers, would go a long way to show that perhaps this statement is not exactly the truth.

The account of these Muhammadan historians, which is by no means friendly to Shâhji, makes it abundantly clear, Sir Jadunath's verdict notwithstanding, that from the commencement of his career in the Karnâtak, Shâhji had occupied a position of importance. The first general under whom he had to serve, Ranadhoola Khân, or as he is called, Khân-i-zamân seems to have been particularly friendly to him, and this very chronicle itself admits that he was appointed to the charge of Bangalore when it was first conquered. It is nowhere stated in the chronicle itself, or anywhere else, that it was taken away from him, even after his treason so-called. As a matter of fact, he

seems to have continued to govern those parts of the conquered Chanapaṭṇa viceroyalty, but shifted his government from Bangalore to Chikbalapur, with Kolar as his headquarters and Nandi as his summer residence. There are vestiges of his own work in the fortifications and other structures which bear witness to his occupation of the place. The fact that the Mysore ruler, Chikkadeva Râja Wodeyar ultimately effected the purchase of Bangalore from Ekoji, Shâhji's son in A.D. 1684 would go to show that the family retained possession of Bangalore, notwithstanding the statement in the chronicles that Bangalore was one of the three forts that Shâhji was to surrender as a price for his release by the Sultân of Bijâpur. His treason with Golkonda and his arrest consequent thereon are not mentioned in the correspondence of the Company's servants, who were likely to have heard about it, as, in their own particular interest, they kept their eyes and ears open for all possibilities of changes in fortune of the important personalities concerned in the administration of the territory. The fact that Shâhji occupied the position of the leader of the campaign against Tanjore and the southern viceroyalties, Mullâ Ahmad, called 'Mula' in Jesuit letters, going as only second in command, would go to show that he retained the important position with which he was entrusted at the very commencement of the Bijâpur invasions of the south. That important position he occupied is vouched for by letters of the factors of the East India Company in Madras and the letter of Revington in connection with Danḍarajâpuri on the Bijâpur coast. But the Maharatta tradition, which Sir Jadunath lays aside almost with contempt, claims absolutely nothing more than that he occupied a position of confidence under the commander-in-chief. It was the latter who entrusted him with the charge of administering the great territory, which was ultimately confirmed by the Sultân himself; and it was retained by Shâhji even when his patron Rustam-i-zamân had fallen into disgrace and lived away from court. The *Śiva Bhârata*, which is a work compiled, perhaps in Tanjore, tells in a summary fashion much the same story as that recorded by the court chroniclers, to which Sir Jadunath attaches such high value: 'Afterwards along with the commander-in-chief, this great man, the strong-armed, mighty one, reached the Karnâṭaka Maṇḍala; he conquered successfully the ruler of Bindupur (Beḍunur) by name Vîrabhadra, the strong one; he also

conquered the well-known Kenge Nâyaka, the ruler of Vrishapattana (Basavâpatna); the ruler of Kâvêripattinam, the strong armed Jagadêva, he likewise conquered, as also the cruel Kanthîrava, ruler of Śrîraṅgapaṭṇa. Then he overthrew the brave Vijayarâghava, the lord of Tanjore, as also the master of Gingee, the great Venkaṭa Nâyaka. He followed with the overthrow of Tirumala Nâyaka, the lord of Madura; then the ruler of Piluganda (Penugonda?), by name Venkaṭa Nâyaka, then the brave Śrîraṅga Râja, ruler of Vidyânagara (Vijayanagara), and then the well-known Tammé Gauḍa of Hamsakûṭapura. In this manner bringing under his control these and other kings, Râja Shâhî made the commander-in-chief Ranadhoola delighted with his achievements.' Then follows the statement, in two *sloka*s, that after a continuous fight for days and nights, 'he took the delightful place, Bangalore from Kempe Gauḍa, who delighted in war, which was presented to him for his own maintenance by the delighted Ranadhoola Khân. He the victorious one (Shâhî) resided in the city called Bangalore.' This is a literal rendering of *sloka*s 37 to 44 of *adhyâya* IX of *Śiva Bhârata*, a work composed poetically, of course, in the lifetime of Shivajî himself, probably in Tanjore, far away from the Mahratta country proper. This is confirmed by an account compiled in Tanjore in the days of Râja Sarfojî by his *Chitnis* in the Śaka year 1725, Rudrodgâri, month Chitra, corresponding, as it is given there, to March 25, A. D. 1803. The account begins with a chronological discrepancy in this particular context, where it says that he was despatched on this mission by 'Alî 'Âdil Shâh, whereas the invasion actually started under Muhammad 'Âdil Shâh, years earlier. The object of the invasion is given as an effort to bring under Bijâpur control those feudatories and states of the south which were likely to become friendly with Aurangzib, who was operating in the Dekhan, and whose attitude towards the southern states of Bijâpur and Golkonda was anything but friendly. Here again the account says that 'Shâhî went on the southern invasion with Ranadhoola Khân sent by 'Âdil Shâh. The rulers that he conquered in the south are given as the Râja of Bedanûr, Vîrabadra Nâyaka; Kōṅgē Nâyaka, ruler of Kōṅgu [which may be an error—a copyist's error—for Kengē Nâyaka of the territory of Kengē, Kengē being the place of birth of the ruler]; Jagadêva Râja of Kâvêripattinam Kanthîrava of Śrîraṅgapaṭṇam, Vijayarâghava

of Tanjore, Venkaṭa Nâyaka of Gingee, Rangâsâyi Nâyaka of Vidyânagar [another form of the name Raṅga Râyal]; Tirumala Nâyak of Madura, Harikâra Venkaṭa Nâyaka of Valikondapuram, Danakoṭi Nâyaka of Hosakota.' Pleased with all these conquests, 'Alî 'Âdil Shâh is stated to have given to Shâhî the territory of Bangalore for his personal expenses. 'Being pleased with the sight of Bangalore, the security of its fortress, and the salubrity of its climate,' Shâhî made up his mind to fix his headquarters there. This is one of the Mackenzie manuscripts noted by Wilson in volume ii, page xliv, which purports to be a genealogical account of the Bhonsle Râjas of Tanjore. The claim advanced in favour of Shâhî here may be over-pitched to some extent. The account leaves many details to be filled in, and, in that particular respect, is not much worse than the court chronicles so much valued by Sir Jadunath. In this case as in the other, historical research consists in exploiting all possible sources of information for obtaining details of a reliable character to fill in the gaps, and work out a reasonably trustworthy account of the facts. The mere issue of a testimonial that a certain record or set of records is authentic and genuine, because of some features of its character, viz., that it was an official account, that it was compiled in court, or that it is in a particular language will hardly constitute research work; nor will such contribute to the discovery of historical truth. The first account given above is substantially the same as that given in my *Ancient India*, published in 1911; but the particular thesis, actually published so long ago as 1900, contains the material taken from the works of a writer who was contemporary with the Chickkadêva Râja Wodeyar, who followed not many years (a little over ten years) after the death of Kanthîrava Narasa, who figures in these campaigns. The author was a play-fellow and companion at school of the ruler, Chickkadêva Râja, and ultimately became his minister. He composed a work in poetry, *Chickkadêva Râja Vijayam*, in epic form, as also a prose work, *Chickkadêva Râja Vamsâvali*, cast more in the form of history. Along with that is compared such information as is contained in the late compilation issued by the palace and referred to as the Palace History. It is mainly based on the second of the works above referred to, and such other historical manuscripts as were available at the time before the whole library was accidentally burnt. The third source of information utilized is Wilks, who had access to sources

such as Grant Duff had for his *History of the Mahrattas*; but, as in the other case, all of his sources are not at present available. The account was actually compiled for Wilks by a Hindu Brâhman, by name Nagar Puttaiya Paṇḍit, who occupied a high place in the Secretariat, and who exploited all the records in the archives at Śrīraṅgaṇaṭam to compile an account therefrom. Since then certain other Kanarese and Sanskrit sources have become available, and Mr. N. Subba Rao, a research student working on the subject at the Mysore University, utilizes these, particularly the Kanarese sources. As far as I am able to see these, as exhibited by him in the columns of the *Modern Review*, they go merely to confirm the details already given in *Ancient India*, involving perhaps modification of a detail here and a detail there. Historical research consists really in the study of these various sources, estimating their historical value, each by its own worth, and combining the result of genuine historical criticism of all the sources with a view to compiling a reasonable account of what actually took place.

We have unrivalled means for doing this in the details that lie scattered in the correspondence of the Company's servants, written from all over the Dekhan to their masters at home, English, Dutch and even Portuguese to some extent. The English records have been made available in ten volumes by the indefatigable energy of Sir William Foster, but the details contained therein are not history by design. They are incidental references to the state of affairs in the territories surrounding the factories where their commercial operations were carried on. Their commercial interests required that they should note carefully the smallest changes in the rapidly changing conditions in order to safeguard their interests and their money and promote their trade and profit. They were not particularly concerned with commending one party or condemning another. They had their own personal preferences and predilections, which sometimes showed themselves; but generally they were mainly concerned with noting these political changes accurately—as accurately as was humanly possible—with a view to plying their trade safely and profiting by their business.

Judged by the combined evidence of all these sources of history, Shâhji the Mahratta appears to have been a man of ability, both as a soldier and as an administrator. He first played an important part in

the conquests of the various petty states of the Karnâṭak for Bijâpur. Slowly, but surely, he was able to build up from out of these conquests a pretty big Government for himself, certainly under the authority of his masters at Bijâpur to begin with, but gradually to become more or less entirely his own, as a result of the inefficiency and dissension that were the ultimate bane of the Bijâpur kingdom, with the threat of Mughal conquest hanging, like the sword of Damocles, over its head. It is just possible, although it is not yet satisfactorily established, that he showed himself friendly to the interests of Śrīraṅga Râyal once and that he tried to enter the service of the Quṭb Shâh another time. Shâhji was not the only man that was guilty of such changes. It seems to have been quite common at the time. The supreme example of Mîr Jumla in the same region offers an illuminating comparison. The attitude of Rustam-i-zamân and of Bahlol Khân of Bijâpur presents a close parallel. Nonetheless, it would constitute treason, notwithstanding the fact that such treason was in the air. The officers to whom Śrīraṅga Râyal entrusted his affairs behaved no less badly in regard to this matter, but that would not justify an act of treason morally. Moral justification or denunciation is not, however, the function of the historian. When Bijâpur fell, Shâhji's work was visible in the existence of the Mahratta state in the south nominally called Tanjore, but extending far into the plateau and comprising a comparatively large portion of the Karnâṭak. Shivaji had been only a feudatory of Bijâpur so far as the territory in the Mahratta country was concerned, in spite of the fact that he made himself quite as independent as his father in the south. The southern portion of his father's territory seemed to him more justifiably independent and could perhaps enable him to set himself up as a successor to the now vanished empire of Vijayanagar, with Śrīraṅga Râyal as the last of its rulers. Shâhji, therefore, is entitled to be regarded as the founder of the Mahratta dominion in the south, which survived a number of generations after him before it reached complete extinction.

Before concluding this essay on Shâhji, it would perhaps be just as well to advert briefly to such memorials as we have of Shâhji's position in the south. It is commonly known in Mysore that Shâhji's tomb is still pointed out in a village in the Channagiri Taluq, of the Shimoga District not very far from the headquarters of the jâgîr of the Kengé Nâyakas. It was Kenge Hanuma, the contemporary of

Shâhji who was primarily responsible for, at least, one invasion by the Bijâpur Sultâns. His headquarters, Basavâpatna, is not very far from the famous Sâlagere Tank, one of the most important irrigation tanks in the territory of Mysore. We have already referred to the fortress of Nandidrug, and some vestiges that used to be pointed out in the fort at Kolar. It may perhaps be that there are much more living memorials of Shâhji's rule in the south in the administration of Mysore territory, particularly in the Survey and Settlement departments. Till recently a large number of the officials belonging to the department were men from the neighbouring southern Mahratta country, holding their positions almost by hereditary succession. Farther south, at Gingee, we have not come across anything connected with Shâhji, but farther south again, in the Tanjore District and quite close to the town of Kumbhakonam, is the village now called Sakkottai, which is about a mile to the south of the railway station. The name Sakkottai applied to the fort is a derivative from Shâhji, the full name having been Shâhjikot. The village Sakkottai used to consist fifty years ago of the village itself on the banks of the river Araśâlâr at the southern end of the bridge, and the fort about six furlongs off, containing an old Śiva temple, tanks and other appurtenances of a little fortified town. This Śiva temple is as old as the Têvâram hymnographers, who sang of the place under the name Tirukkalaiyattânkuḍi, the village of the prosperous vessel. The Sanskrit name for the Śiva image installed in the temple, is Amirthagaṭêśvara, Amirthagaṭa being translated into Tamil as Tirukkalaiyam. It seems to have been fortified only under the Mahrattas, and the forts were dismantled and the stones were used for building the Small Causes Court in Kumbhakonam. I can recollect prisoners being put to this work, and have seen them dismantling the fortress and carrying the stones. It is only within the last twenty-five years that the place has been dismantled of all its fortifications and reduced to an ordinary village. The village itself is associated with another name. The Brâhman street is called Raghunâthapura Agrahâram in honour of the Nâyak, Raghunâtha of Tanjore, the father of Vijayarâghava, from whom Ekoji conquered the Tanjore District. This Raghunâtha it was that met the Vijayanagar prince, Râma, at Kumbhakonam before the battle against the rebels and took him safety at Tanjore. When the victory was won, he celebrated the installation ceremony of the Mahârâja in the newly-constructed

Râmaswâmi Temple at Kumbhakonam. In memory of this Raghunâtha, the son Vijayarâghava, built this Agrahâram and made it over to Brâhman, and it is said that thirty families were established in the Agrahâram. Born in that village and in that Agrahâram, I can recollect that the Brâhman houses were my father's, his maternal uncle's, and that of two families of Telugu Brâhman, and one house which was actually intended to be a Dharmaśâla. Recently there has been an addition to the Dharmaśâla by the construction of a new choultry. Otherwise the Agrahâram consists only of one or two households—a fate which is not unusual with Brâhman villages nowadays. The name Shâhjikot still survives in the Tamilized form Sakkottai, which forms a part of my own name.

In the village itself there is a considerable Mahratta settlement from Tanjore. The Mahrattas settled there and in the village Tiruvaḍamaruthûr about four miles to the East, claiming to be of better blood than the great bulk of those in Tanjore. In the confusion that arose in Tanjore time and again, several respectable families left the city, and these are found settled in both the villages, thus providing another memento of Mahratta rule.