

186

INDIAN HISTORICAL RECORD
COMMISSION

PROCEEDINGS VOL-XXX

PART-II



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INDIAN HISTORICAL RECORDS
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PROCEEDINGS VOLUME XXX


PART II



HYDERABAD

FEBRUARY 1954

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Thirdly, after the death of Ranjit Singh the British had increased their interference in the affairs of the Lahore Durbar which was naturally not liked by its rulers. Consequently they wanted to counteract the designs of the British in the Punjab by establishing direct relations with Nepal through Rohtak and Joomia across the Himalayas. Nepal Government had always been anti-British and the efforts on the part of the rulers of Nepal to establish friendly relations with Maharaja Ranjit Singh had failed because in between the territories of Nepal and those of the Lahore Durbar, lay the dominion of the British⁴.

Fourthly, it may also be pointed out that amongst all the Sikh nobles at the court of Lahore, the Jammu brothers, Raja Gulab Singh and Raja Dhyani Singh, were most interested in the extension of the Sikh rule towards Tibet because any acquisition of territory in that quarter was sure to add to their power.

All these circumstances, therefore, led the successors of Ranjit Singh to extend their rule towards Iskardo and Lhasa. During the one year rule of Maharaja Kharak Singh, the imbecile successor of Ranjit Singh, real power had passed into the hands of his promising son, Kunwar Naunihal Singh. The Kunwar along with the Jammu brothers formed a strong anti-British block at the Lahore Durbar and consequently they lost no time in the implementation of a policy which they considered to be unavoidable in the best interests of their kingdom. The Kunwar sent Sardar Ajit Singh Sadhanwalia and General Ventura to conquer the states of Mandi and Kulu while on the other side he permitted Zorawar Singh, the Vazir of Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu, to annex Iskardo from its ruler Ahmad Shah. Even the temporary convulsions at Lahore which followed the death of Maharaja Kharak Singh and the accidental death of Kunwar Naunihal Singh, in November 1840, did not materially change the foreign policy of the Lahore Durbar. Maharaja Sher Singh who succeeded Naunihal Singh, did not prevent Zorawar Singh from conquering the kingdom of Lhasa which lay next to Iskardo.

In April 1841, Zorawar Singh wrote to the Chinese Gorpon or Governor of Garo, for the surrender of Rohtak to the Sikhs as according to him it was an old dependency of Iskardo which was then a part of the kingdom of Lahore. He also wanted the Lhasa rulers to send all the shawl wool of their region to Ladakh and to pay their tribute to him and not to China. It seems that the Governor of Garo was caught unprepared and in order to avoid a clash with the Sikhs he sent a present of 5 horses and 5 mules to Zorawar Singh. These presents Zorawar Singh refused to accept.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 13 September 1841, no. 20.

because according to him it was in no way a satisfactory answer to his claims upon Lhasa⁵. Hostilities thus commenced between the two states and Zorawar Singh proceeded against Garo from three sides. He sent a force of nearly 300 soldiers under the command of Gholam Khan of Ladakh who easily captured the forts of Chooret, Chuprung and Tholing, thus encircling to the north the British province of Kumaon in order to prevent any help being sent to Lhasa from that quarter. Another force of nearly 300 soldiers was sent under the command of Nunoo Sunum, the brother of the Raja of Ladakh, who conquered Tasheegung. Zorawar Singh with the main force proceeded straight towards Garo where he reached in June, only to find the place evacuated by its Governor. On reaching Garo, Zorawar Singh wrote a letter dated 1 Assarh 1898 (5 June 1841) to the Raja of Bushair intimating him about his conquests in the Chinese Tartary. The letter was friendly in tone and most probably Zorawar Singh wanted to remove from the mind of the ruler of Bushair any apprehensions about the policy of the Sikhs regarding the conquest of Tibet⁶. From Garo, Zorawar Singh moved towards Tuklakote which was a town of considerable importance. On their way to Tuklakote, the Sikh forces were opposed by the Lhasa army at the place of Dogpoo Barmah. On 29 August 1841 an action took place between the two forces in which the Lhasa soldiers were completely routed and only one officer named Deva Peshee could escape to inform the Lhasa authorities about the disaster which had befallen their army. Ten days after the battle of Dogpoo Barmah, Zorawar Singh occupied Tuklakote. The conquest of Tuklakote extended the territories of the Lahore Durbar as far as the Marghil Pass up to the source of the river Indus. Zorawar Singh had a mind to stay at Tuklakote during the coming winter before proceeding to Lhasa. In order to strengthen the defences of Tuklakote, Zorawar Singh built a new fort in that town and garrisoned it with nearly 50 soldiers. He also fortified the villages of Numee, Khoeheer and Joongha⁷.

In the meantime the startling successes achieved by the Sikh armies in Lhasa very much alarmed the British in India. Firstly, they did not like that Nepal and Lahore should establish closer relations across the Himalayas and secondly, they did not want that the policy of the Lahore rulers to conquer Lhasa should further embarrass their position with the Chinese with whom they were already at war. Also they did not like the stoppage of trade between Tibet and India, which had resulted because of the occupation of Iskardo and Rohtak by the Sikhs⁸.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 21 June 1841, no. 15.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 25 October 1841, no. 22.

Ibid., 13 December 1841, no. 62; 29 November 1841, no. 28; 20 December 1841, no. 40

⁷ *Ibid.*, 27 December 1841, no. 37.

The British therefore took up an attitude of open hostility to the extension of the Sikh rule in Tibet. On 28 September 1841, Mr. Clerk, the British Political Agent at Ludhiana, wrote to Maharaja Sher Singh, "You yourself are the responsible party in any misunderstanding arising with the British Government out of proceedings of this nature towards Tibet or China or Nepal⁹". On 19 October 1841, Mr. Clerk again conveyed to the Maharaja of Lahore the decision of his Government that the Sikh forces should withdraw to Ladakh by 10 December 1841 and that they should abandon their newly acquired possessions in Lhasa¹⁰. But before Zorawar Singh could retrace his steps from an untenable position he found himself surrounded by an overwhelming force of nearly 10,000 Lhasa soldiers who were sent against him under the command of Kulsir Kwang or Zorkong. Another force of 2,000 Chinese soldiers was ready to march against him from the Chinese province of Yarkand. While an equally strong army was arriving via Garo or Gartoke to oppose the Sikh advance towards Lhasa¹¹. It was the month of November and the Sikh camp at a height of nearly 12,000 ft. was already running short of food and fuel. To add to their difficulties snow began to fall heavily. Hard pressed by these circumstances Zorawar Singh offered to make peace with the Chinese on the conditions that he should be allowed to withdraw safely to the west of Garo, and that he should be permitted to retain the territories to the west of Garo for which he would pay tribute to the Lhasa Government¹². To this the Chinese replied, "You seized Ladakh and we remained silent. You became bold in consequence and took possession of Gartoke and Tuklakote. If you desire peace, give up Ladakh and go down to your own country"¹³. It is also believed that at that critical juncture Zorawar Singh had received from Raja Gulab Singh a message to the effect that if he came back having lost his Tibetan conquests, he would also lose his nose¹⁴. Zorawar Singh had therefore been left with no alternative but to defend his position to the last. He stationed Col. Bustee Ram with nearly 150 men and two guns in the fort of Tuklakote. Another contingent of nearly 100 men was sent to Kurdumkote, while Zorawar Singh with the remaining force of nearly 2,000 soldiers moved to defend Missur, a place near the Mansrowar Lake.

The Lhasa forces occupied Kurdumkote and Garo in quick succession. Nearly 1,500 soldiers besieged the Sikh forces at Tuklakote and an army of 7,000 surrounded Zorawar Singh, who

⁹ *Ibid.*, 18 October 1841, no. 71.
¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 22 November 1841, no. 16.
¹¹ *Ibid.*, 29 November 1841, no. 28.
¹² *Ibid.*, 6 December 1841, no. 59.
¹³ *Ibid.*
¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 20 December 1841, no. 17.

died fighting on 12 December 1841. With the fall of their leader the morale of the Sikh soldiers declined. Sardar Rai Singh upon whom the command of the army devolved after the death of Zorawar Singh, was induced by the Lhasa authorities to give up fighting on the condition that he and his army would be allowed to retreat safely, a promise which was never fulfilled by the Chinese¹⁵. Col. Bustee Ram abandoned Tuklakote after strong resistance. By April 1842 the Lhasa forces had not only reconquered their lost territories, but they had also practically occupied Leh. Ahmad Shah the ruler of Iskardo and the young Raja of Ladakh joined the Chinese¹⁶. The only semblance of Sikh rule left at Leh was the presence of Munga Ram, the brother-in-law of Zorawar Singh, who with nearly 400 soldiers continued to defy the Lhasa authorities. On 27 May 1842, the Raja of Ladakh, who was practically a prisoner in the hands of the Chinese, wrote to Maharaja Sher Singh that he should remove his forces from Ladakh as their rightful lords, the Chinese, had come¹⁷.

When the news of the appalling disaster which had befallen the Sikhs in Tibet reached Jammu and Lahore, Raja Gulab Singh at once sent reinforcements to Ladakh under the command of Dewan Hari Chand and Rutnoo Vazir. Help was also sent via Kulu under the commands of Baba Lachman Singh and Sardar Mehtabar Singh. Raja Gulab Singh even requested the British to send to Ladakh a British regiment or even a British officer along with the Sikh army¹⁸. The British authorities did not accept the proposal because they did not want to become a party to the designs of the Sikhs for the conquest of Lhasa. However, they wanted that settlement should be reached between the two kingdoms on the basis of *status quo*. Lord Ellenborough, the British Governor-General in India, wrote to the Court of Directors that "it might appear at the first view that the taking up of this false position on the north side of the Himalayas by the most powerful of the Sikh chiefs in fact wielding the supreme authority at the court of Lahore, would be a circumstance advantageous to the British Government, but this government is, and must probably continue to be so connected with that of Lahore having with that state the common object of keeping foreigners out of India, that it cannot regard a misfortune to the Sikh state as a benefit to itself, nor can it view with indifference the commencement of a plan of invasion of countries beyond the Himalayas which may have the result of bringing armies from beyond those mountains into India"¹⁹.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 7 February 1842, no. 7.
¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 21 March 1842, no. 84.
¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 3 August 1842, no. 27.
¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 14 September 1842, nos. 26, 40.
¹⁹ G. G.'s Secret Despatch to Secretary of State, no. 14, 17 May 1842.

By the end of May 1842, the Sikh reinforcements reached Leh and without much opposition imprisoned the ruler of Ladakh and his Vazir named Gumbo. The Chinese commander at Leh also retreated towards Tasheegung near Garo, thus leaving Dewan Hari Chand and Rutnoo Vazir as the masters of Ladakh. After the conquest of Leh the Sikh forces marched towards Garo from all the sides. The Lhasa forces became so much demoralised that their commander at Roopshoo also broke his camp and fled towards Garo without fighting. By 5 August 1842, a party of the Sikh soldiers had reached Pitti and wanted to cross into Garo, but they were prevented from doing so by Lt. Cunningham, a British officer in that quarter, who asserted that it was then a question of the Sikh authority being established up to Ladakh only as agreed to by Maharaja Sher Singh in October last²⁰. In the meantime the Sikh force under Hari Chund and Rutnoo Vazir encircled between Leh and Rohtak the almost inactive Lhasa forces of Kulsir Kwang or Vazir Zorkong. The Sikhs dammed up a narrow portion of a ravine and flooded the camp of the Chinese below in the valley, which ultimately compelled their commander to agree to come to terms with them. Accordingly Kulsir Kwang with a few other officers and soldiers went to the camp of the Sikhs for a settlement. The Sikh soldiers, however, made a treacherous assault on the party killing several of them and making the Chinese commander a prisoner. This was the last action fought between the Sikhs and the Lhasa forces. It seemed that there was nothing to check the Sikh forces from their onward march over to Lhasa, but in view of the attitude adopted by the British the Lahore Durbar thought it advisable to conclude peace with the rulers of Lhasa on whatever suitable terms they could get. Consequently a treaty of peace was signed between the Lahore Durbar and the Chinese of Lhasa on 28 Assooj 1899, corresponding to 17 October 1842. The treaty was signed by Kaloon Zoorkund or Zorkong and Dewan Jessy on the part of the Chinese, and Shah Gholam on the part of the ruler of Lahore and Rutnoo Vazir and Hari Chund on the part of Raja Gulab Singh. Silechu Pessy and the Lama Vazir were also present at that time as confidential advisers of the Viceroy of Lhasa. The following were the main provisions of the treaty:

1. That the boundaries of Ladakh and Lhasa shall be constituted as formerly, the contracting parties engaging to confine themselves within their respective boundaries—the one to refrain from any act of aggression on the other.
2. That in conformity with ancient usage, tea and Pasham and shawl wool shall be transmitted by the Ladakh road.

²⁰ Foreign Secret Cons., 26 October 1842, nos. 90, 91.

3. Such persons as may in future proceed from China to Ladakh or from Ladakh to China not to be obstructed on the road.
4. That no renewal of the war between the Chiefs of the Raja (Gulab Singh) and those of the Viceroy of Lhasa shall take place.

Clauses 5 and 6 of the treaty bound the contracting parties to remain faithful to the above agreement²¹.

The British Government in India, however, did not relish the incorporation of clause 2 in the above treaty, by which the Chinese promised to send all their shawl wool to Ladakh. This provision surely hit hard the commercial interests of the British in Tibet²². Consequently when the sovereignty of the British over the newly created State of Jammu and Kashmir was established by the treaty of Lahore signed in 1846, between Maharaja Gulab Singh and the British, immediate steps were taken to change the provisions of the treaty of 1842. Mr. H. M. Lawrence, the Agent to the Governor-General, N. W. Frontier, Simla, instructed Captain A. Cunningham, the Assistant Agent at Simla, who was at that time fixing the boundary line between the kingdom of Maharaja Gulab Singh and Lhasa, to quietly inform the Chinese and Tibetan traders that no duty would be charged from them if they brought their shawl wool and other commodities for disposal in the British territory. Such a step was taken with a view to encouraging the traders of Tibet to bring their goods to the British territory, which they could not legally do according to the provisions of the Sikh-Chinese treaty of 1842²³.

At the same time Lord Hardinge, the Governor-General of India, wrote to the Vazir of Lhasa, informing him of the establishment of British control over the State of Jammu and Kashmir and therefore suggesting to him to delete clause 2 of the Sikh-Chinese treaty of 1842 and to change the wording of the clause 3 of the same to run as follows, "Such persons as may in future proceed from China to Ladakh or to the British territory and its dependencies to China are not to be obstructed on the road". The Lhasa Vazir was also informed that the British did not levy duty on any products which might be exported by China into their territories²⁴. The treaty was thereafter changed as desired by the British and in August 1846,

²¹ *Ibid.*, 24 May 1843, no. 62.

²² Foreign Dept. Secret Despatch to the Secretary of State, no. 38, dated 17 September 1842.

²³ Foreign Secret Cons., 26 December 1846, no. 1332.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 1336.

the Governor-General informed the British Ambassador at Hongkong about the changes made in that respect. Thus came the drop scene of the drama which had been started by the Lahore Durbar in Tibet in the year 1841.

AN OLD SURVEY REPORT OF HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE

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IN the course of examining the old Persian records in the Commissioner's Office, Patna, I came across some papers about the early settlements of land in the Patna Division. Among them was a Survey Report, written in Persian, of about 100 *bighas* of "Erazi English" in Mouza Pirajhal, Pargana Arrah, District Shahabad. The report, dated 20 September 1825, was copied by Darshan Lal, Sadar Mohurir of Sayer villages and was prepared by the order and under the supervision of George Burton Bayley, the Collector of Shahabad.

These 100 *bighas* of land were originally granted to Udant Singh Naik of the East India Company's Army according to a *sanad* dated 1790 and signed by Mr. Brooke, the then Collector. There were various references to lands thus granted by the Company to its soldiers or to those who rendered different services to the Company, in many other settlement papers, and these lands were called "Erazi English" and their recipients were designated as "Englishdars". The grant not being hereditary, the Collector gave notice for the settlement of the said area, following the death of the Englishdar in 1800. The application of the successors of the grantee for the settlement of the Erazi English being made with them was accepted and the land given to them in permanent settlement with effect from 1233 *Fasli* Year or 1825 A.D.

Before the finalisation of the settlement a survey of the area was ordered for and thus the present report was prepared. It covered 10 pages of 12"×10" size and comprised an introduction, five chapters, a conclusion and an appendix consisting of two tabular statements. Some translated extracts from the relevant portions of the various chapters, given below, will indicate the importance of this document from the administrative and economic points of view. It contains significant references relating to both these aspects during a transitional period in our country's history.

INTRODUCTION

Genesis of settlement

It may be recalled that the said Erazi English (to be referred to, henceforth, as E.E.) belonged to Udant Singh Naik and was granted according to the *sanad* of Mr. Brooke in 1790. It expressly laid down that the land was to be settled with the successors of the original grantee, after his death, on a suitable "Jumna" proposed by the Collector. The grantee died in 1800. But owing to the quick transfers of the previous Collectors and their preoccupation with other important works the question of the settlement of this land could not be taken up and for 25 years the successors of the grantee remained in unlawful possession of the land. In 1825, however, the question of the settlement of this land was taken up and Rang Lal, the Government Amin, was sent for the measurement of the land.

CHAPTER I

Verification of the claims of the heirs

The heirs of the Englishdar were asked to produce a death certificate as well as a certificate of succession, and they submitted them duly signed by the Patwari of the village and the Qanungo of the Pargana. The genealogical table is given below:

Udant Singh, the original Englishdar: share Re. 1.

1st son	2nd son	3rd son
Lala Rai (deceased), share - 5/4	Hemu Rai, share - 5/4	Share - 5/4 Harakh Rai, (deceased); his wife Musstt. Kanku is in possession of his properties.
Achraj Rai share - 2/8	Bhikha Rai share - 2/8	

CHAPTER II

Area and category of land

	B	K	D
Area mentioned in the original sanad of grant ¹	103	0	0
Area as measured by Gauri Shankar Qanungo in 1825 A.D.	83	2	12

There were two broad categories of lands in the area. The first was called *Karial* (hard soil). The colour of it's soil was black and it produced only the *Rabi* Crop. It was subdivided into two classes: one was situated in the lower and sloping regions and had a bigger crop yield, while the other was situated on a more elevated level and was less productive. The second category was called *Doras*

1 = 1/4; K=Katha; D=Dhur

and it was subdivided into three classes. The first had more of earth than sand in it, the second had more of sand than earth in it and the third was situated on comparatively higher levels. These lands produced both the *Rabi* and *Bhadai* crops. The total land area was thus divided into two categories which were again subdivided into five classes.

CHAPTER III

Basis of assessment

The process adopted for the fixation of rent on each class of land was this. The average produce as well as the crops produced in each class of land were determined. Then the prices of these crops were ascertained from a certified Table of Prices of Grains as current in the neighbouring markets of Kondi and Siria. The total prices of the crops produced in each class of land were divided by the number of *bighas* comprising that class and the rent fixed accordingly. The details can be had from Table No. 2. As the Khalsa lands (as distinguished from E.E. area) of the said Mouza Pirajhal were settled on a cash rent (*naqdi*) basis, enquiries were made regarding the rates of rent prevailing in it. A comparative table is given below:

Category of land	Class of land	Rates of rent for E.E. fixed on basis of the average produce	Rates of rent for Khalsa land bordering the E.E. in Mouza Pirajhal	Rates of rent in adjoining villages.
		Rs. As. Ps.	Rs. As. Ps.	Rs. As. Ps.
Karial	I	2 4 0	3 0 0	3 1 0
"	II	1 6 0	2 12 0	2 8 0
Doras	III	1 13 5	2 8 0	2 15 0
"	IV	0 14 0	1 8 0	1 5 0
"	V	0 10 0	1 4 0	Nil

The rent for the Khalsa land and the adjoining villages was higher than that for the E.E. but in the former case the Zamindars remained present on the spot and made suitable reduction in the rent from year to year in cases of crop failure and other natural calamities; whereas the E.E. was given in permanent settlement and no such reductions could be made. Hence the average produce was made the basis of rent.

CHAPTER IV

Rights of tenants

The area was a non-residential one. Some land was cultivated by a few non-residential tenants (*Asaamiyan Pahi Kasht*) and the rest was cultivated by the successors of the grantee themselves. The tenants did not have a permanent right of cultivation in the land.

The period of the lease was specified in the Patta given to them. However, the successors of the grantee could not levy rent on their tenants at a rate higher than the one fixed by the Government.

CHAPTER V

Patwaris and other employees of the village

The custom regarding the remuneration of Patwari in the whole of this pargana was this. In cash rent (*naqdi*) tenures he received one pie per rupee from the cultivators (this was called *Neeg*) and in produce rent (*Bhaoli*) tenures he received one seer per maund (this was called *Serhi*). No other remuneration was fixed. There was no mention of the appointment of other village employees like the Brahmin and Gorait, or their jagirs in the village.

CONCLUSION

Fixation of the share of each heir and the Government Jumma on it²

	Hemu Rai	Mosstt. Kanku	Achraj Rai	Bhikha Rai
	R. A. P.	R. A. P.	R. A. P.	R. A. P.
Share	0 5 4	0 5 4	0 2 8	0 2 8
Share of	R. A. G.	R. A. G.	R. A. G.	R. A. G.
Jumma	23 10 13	23 10 13	6 13 6	6 13 6
Share of	B. K. D.	B. K. D.	B. K. D.	B. K. D.
Land	27 14 4	27 14 4	13 17 2	13 17 2
Total Government Jumma (yearly) Rs. 41/-.				

APPENDIX

Table No. 1: units of measurement

The basis of measurement in the whole of the Pargana was the "Bigha Jaribi" (Chain measurement) and not the "Bigha Qadmi" (step measurement). The following three tables were given:

- 6 jao (barley) laid breadthwise one after another = 1 finger
24 fingers (Angusht) = 1 hand (dast)
5½ hands = 1 lagha
400 sq. lagha = 1 bigha
- According to Ilahi yard
1 Ilahi yard = 10 fists (musht)
1 fist = 4 fingers
3 Ilahi yards = 1 lagha
20 lagha = 1 rassi
3,600 sq. Ilahi yards = 1 bigha
- According to the English yard
1 hand = 1' 6"
1 lagha = 8' 3"

² R = Rupee
A = Anna
P = Pic

R = Rupee
A = Anna
G = Ganda

(20 Gandas = 1 Anna)

B = Bigha
K = Katha
D = Dhur

Coinage and rates of interest on loans

The E.E. was a non-residential area and no mosques or temples were situated in it. The prevailing currency was the Sicca Rupee. No discount (*batta*) was charged on the exchange of Rupee. Anyone who gave loans charged interest on it at 1½ per cent. and 2 per cent. according to the needs of the debtor. The creditor who advanced a loan of 1 Md. of grains before the harvest, received back 1 Md. 10 seers after the harvest was over.

No grazing ground was expressly set aside for the plough cattle. They used to graze on the cultivable plots of land after the harvest was over.

Table No. 2

No Laka or jungle was situated in the E.E. Tobacco and opium were not cultivated.

Rates of assessment

Category of land	Class of land	No. of bighas in each class	Rent fixed per bigha	Total
		B. K. D.	R. A. P.	R. A. P.
Karial	I	15 7 13	2 4 0	35 4 0
"	II	8 0 0	1 0 0	8 0 0
Doras	III	8 6 0	1 0 0	8 0 0
"	IV	38 6 13	0 12 0	28 14 0
"	V	13 8 0	0 8 0	6 14 0

Although the total Jumma fixed according to this rate came up to Rs. 87, a further concession was made for the benefit of the successors of the Englishdar and the final Jumma fixed at Rs. 41 yearly.

Average prices of grains

According to a Table of Prices of Grains for the period 1820-24 A.D. (Rate per Rupee)³.

Wheat	Gram	Barley	Moong	Masur	Arhar	Kodrum
M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.
1 10 0	1 13 0	1 17 0	1 20 0	1 38 0	2 10 0	1 38 0
46 Sicca Rupees equal in weight to 1 Seer						
276	"	"	"	1 Paseri		
1 Paseri comprised				6 Seers		

46 Gorakhpore Pice equal in weight to the old Kaldar Sicca which was in current use before the introduction of Act XIV of 1818.

Remuneration of labourers

The area being non-residential one, not much could be written about the right of the professional classes. The custom regarding

³ M = Maund

S = Seer

C = Chattak

the payment of ploughmen (called Halwaha in this area) was this. They were given a specified area of land to plough and sow and got three seers of grain per day for ploughing. They were also allotted some land which they cultivated and they received some percentage of its produce. They used to get three bundles of grains (amount unspecified) out of every stack during harvesting. The same procedure was adopted for the payment of labourers (they were called Noneehars in this area).

Each cultivator kept out a little grain (amount unspecified) out of his own stock of grain and the total amount thus collected was divided into three parts—two parts going to the village Brahmin and one going to the village Gorait.

CHAIT SINGH AND HASTINGS FROM PERSIAN SOURCES

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CHAIT SINGH'S relations with the East India Company were highly complicated. Much has been already said on the subject on the basis of the English sources. We know that the Raja preferred the patronage of the English to the goodwill of the Nawab Vazir of Oudh and the English also sought to protect and strengthen him and secured his confirmation in all the rights and privileges enjoyed by his father¹. Hastings "advocated a policy of improving the Raja's rather deteriorating position by making him as far as possible an independent though a tributary prince"². He evinced almost a paternal interest in his affairs in return for many services rendered by the Raja not only in public affairs of trade and war such as the grant of a virtual monopoly for the purchase of opium in Bihar and Ghazipur³ and assistance in the expedition against the Bengal Sannayasis⁴, but also in his private affairs such as the purchase of diamonds for himself⁵. But a few years later the reluctance of the Raja to pay extraordinary demands for the expenses of the wars in the Carnatic, year after year and over and above his annual contributions which he always regularly paid, his pleas for exemption from extra payments, and his requests for indulgence to pay the amount levied by instalments, were considered as offences amounting to contumacy. His procrastination and excuses were magnified into heinous crimes. Payment was enforced under threat of military actions against him. His status was belittled and his rights and privileges were questioned and even denied⁶. It was resolved to exact a severe vengeance on one who had been called 'farzand' (son) for what was declared to be his premeditated and⁷

¹In September 1773 Hastings reported to the Council at Calcutta that he had concluded a new treaty with the Vazir, and had obtained from him a Coulnama confirming to Raja Chait Singh and his posterity the stipulation formerly made on behalf of his father.

²Beveridge, *History of India II*, 532. Davies writes in his book, "It is true that Hastings proposed on March 3, 1775 that Chait Singh should exercise a free and independent authority in his dominions, subject only to a payment of his tribute, and that it should be made a condition of the treaty with Asaf-ud-dowla".

³*Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. IV, 692, 826.

⁴*Ibid.* 703, 1674.

⁵*Ibid.* 700, 756.

⁶See Davies, "Warren Hastings and Oudh", Chapter V.

⁷It was an after thought when Hastings accused the Raja of having entertained an ambition to revolt. Beveridge exonerates the Raja of the charge of any premeditated treason and says that "Hastings' own conduct refutes the charge. He moved into the heart of the Raja's capital and arrested him in his own palace(?) under the very eyes of an attached and most excitable population without providing himself with any stronger protection than a small escort".

treasonable designs to overthrow the authority of the Company. The explanation of this change in Hastings' attitude⁸ is not wanting in English records including his own writings. Indeed there is no dearth of material regarding this subject and the insurrection, truly speaking affray, took place due to circumstances for which the Raja was not responsible. But such contemporary Persian sources as *Balwant Nama*⁹ of Ghulam Husain Khan Kamboh and *Tuhfa-i-Taza*¹⁰ of Khairuddin Muhammad have not been properly utilized and *Miftah-i-Khazain*¹¹ of Shambhunath, whose name has been mentioned by Hastings¹² is too rare to have been noticed by scholars interested in the subject.

Many of the interesting and important details contained in these three works have not been recorded anywhere else. The writers were intimately associated with the affairs of Benares and Oudh and they were not only in the know of things about the Chait Singh incidents, but were eye-witnesses of, and not un-important actors in, some of the transactions they have chronicled¹³. Their narratives

⁸ See Mill, *op. cit.*, II. 536. Thornton, Beveridge, etc.

⁹ Also called *Tarikh-i-Benares*, Oriental Public Library, Patna, Ms. Another complete copy consulted by the author is dated 1880.

¹⁰ Oriental Public Library Ms. Davies has referred to it on p. 120.

The author's better known works are *Ibrat-nama*, *History of Shah Alam* and *Tarikh-i-Jaunpur*.
¹¹ Rieu notices it. Complete copy available in Raj Library, Benares. The present writer utilized it for his paper read at the Aligarh Session of I. H. R. C., 1943.

¹² Forrest's *State Papers*, II. See also *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, V. 854 1067 & 1338 for extracts from letters of and reference to Shambhunath. He appears to have mismanaged the situation. In one of his letters he writes "Munshi Sadruddin who exercised a great influence with the Governor General is a staunch partisan of the Raja". Ghulam Husain Khan the author of *Balwant-nama* refers to the "futile negotiations of Shambhunath Pandit" with Munshi Sadruddin (founder of the Buhar Library) and the latter's attempts to fleece the foolish Raja of Benares.

¹³ (1) Ghulam Husain Khan, well versed in literature and music had been a trusted courtier of Balwant Singh and was a constant companion and confidential counsellor of his son, Raja Chait Singh, whom he did not desert even during the period of his exile and misfortunes. He was one of those for whose arrest rewards had been advertised. Nevertheless, he did not hesitate to answer the last call of duty and undertook the futile task of approaching the newly arrived Governor General, Lord Cornwallis, through Col. Harper and his friend, Mr. Cherry, for securing permission to his master to return to the sacred city of Kashi. He has frequently referred to the historian, Khairuddin, and also to Shambhunath. (2) Khairuddin was born at Allahabad in 1165 A. H. and educated at Jaunpur. The house occupied by his family at Ramnagar and his boats were plundered by the riotous people of the Raja. He was for some time a companion and courtier of Shah Alam and Asaf-ud-dowla, and he enjoyed the friendship and patronage of some high civil and military officials of the Company such as Henry Vansittart, James Anderson, Col. Dow and Abraham Wayland and it was at the instance of Wayland that he wrote his work containing, in the third chapter, an account of Chait Singh's affairs. (3) Shambhunath of Bhuili parganah of Chunar Tehsil (Mirzapur) who wrote his work, which is a collection of letters and other compositions in prose in 1197 A. H. when he was 40 years old. He had a chequered career ever since the 18th year of his age. He served successively under Mir Qasim and Shuja-ud-dowla and acted as the emissary of the latter to Major Munro after the battle of Buxar and was twice put under arrest and threatened with death by Nazir Manzur Ali, a minister of Shah Alam, at Sultanpur (near Chunar) due to an action of Sumru. He at last entered the service of Mr. Joseph Fowke and his son Francis, the friends and nominees of General Clavering. A clever man who claims to have outshone the Bengali Diwans in ability and in dealings with the English, he was selected by Raja Chait Singh, on the advice of Bhai Ram, to accompany Naha Pandit on a secret mission to Calcutta. Notwithstanding the report received at Murshidabad of the change in situation, he proceeded to Calcutta and resumed his duty as Munshi to Mr. Fowke.

are in agreement on all essential points about Chait Singh's affairs such as the origin of Hastings' hatred and malicious spirit of revenge in the belief of Raja's alleged complicity with the hostile majority in the Council and because of the compliments paid to Clavering by his Vakil, and also the repeated demands, extensive exactions, unjust and arbitrary arrest and overthrow of the Raja, despite the latter's innocence of the charges brought against him, his most submissive and even servile attitude, and his constant endeavours to avoid all the supposed causes of offence to the Governor-General. Khairuddin's and Ghulam Husain's accounts are fuller and more comprehensive, but Shambhunath gives greater details regarding the events leading to, and resulting in the flight of the Raja and capture of his various strongholds. All the writers had a remarkable understanding of the ways and methods of the English and while they expose the ignoble transactions in which the Company's officers then could enter for private monetary gains, some of them are conscious of the higher ethical standard and sympathetic attitude of men like Vansittart, and while emphasizing the innocence of the Raja and his unjust victimisation at the hands of Hastings and his hirelings like Graham, Markham, Ausan Singh and the Maulavis, they have not abstained from delineating the weak character of Chait Singh as an inexperienced, wavering, foolish, extravagant person who was also very timid and cowardly. The narratives being too long it is neither possible nor the object of this paper to analyse and comment on their contents. An attempt has been made to draw attention of scholars to them by referring to such points as have not been previously noticed and which throw new light on some aspects of this episode.

Maharaj Misr, the new Vakil of the Raja of Benares, though not so able and experienced as Ali Naqi, was instructed by his master not to follow others in complimenting Clavering, but he did so on the stoppage of the usual annual *Khilat* to the Raja¹⁴. Francis Fowke, the Resident appointed by the majority, pressed the Raja hard, but in vain, to disclose all the *Nazranas* and *Salamis* which had been paid to the Governor-General¹⁵. Persuasions and even veiled threats proved ineffective. Hastings admitted in private to Maharaj Misr that his honour lay in the hands of his master¹⁶. But the Vakil fell from favour and was dismissed from the presence on Hastings getting some information about the deputation of Naha Pandit and his companion, Shambhunath, although the agents had

¹⁴ B. N. ; M.K. Ghulam Husain says that it was done with the knowledge of Hastings. Shambhunath says that Misr was misled by the prevailing atmosphere and the Raja had no information of his action.

¹⁵ We are told that it was done at the instance of Clavering. We know that the General had been busy collecting information regarding money paid by the Raja to the Vazir. Davies, *op. cit.*, 114.

¹⁶ B. N., 17.

been instructed not to convey the Raja's letters to the opposite party, till Hastings had actually boarded the ship for his journey home-wards¹⁷. This was the beginning of the trouble for Chait Singh. Francis Fowke was replaced by Thomas Graham who was "an expert in mixing water with milk" and artful and adept enough in spoiling the affairs of others¹⁸. As directed by Hastings, the new Resident compelled the Raja much against his wishes to banish the faithful Bhai Ram and grant a Jagir in Syedpur Perganah worth 54,000 rupees annually to the family and dependents of the dismissed Diwan and the enemy of the Raja, B. Ausan Singh, who had already received from Hastings¹⁹ a *Doshala* and assurances and encouragement to go to Benares. The Raja was called upon to pay a contribution of five lacs in excess of the annual tribute and also to provide a contingent of 500 horse and 1,000 foot for service in the Doab. The Raja raised the corps led by Haji Najaf Ali and Kabulimal Sardar but they were sent back to Benares after some months for the real object was to create confusion in the affairs of the Raja²⁰. Graham also encouraged the enemies of the Raja and forwarded the letters of Rani Gulab Kaur and her grand-son, Mahipal Narain, to Calcutta²¹. The notorious Maulavis²² were also greatly favoured and the Raja had to fix monthly salaries for them. Graham also employed Chait Ram Chobdar²³ who had been dismissed by the Raja to carry his messages to Chait Singh. The Resident sent exaggerated reports about the Raja's riches and the wealth stored in his forts. He used to depute exacting agents to harass the Raja on the plea of delay in the payment of his dues. Although it was not difficult for the Raja to pay off the extraordinary demands yet he apprehended the danger of their continuation and neither wished to pay nor had the power to refuse the same. He procrastinated²⁴. The arrival, at Ramnagar, of two platoons of the Company's army, then on their way from Dinapur to Cawnpore, was also taken advantage of to intimidate the Raja. Guards were placed at the gate of his palace and some citizens were fleeced by soldiers. Notwithstanding his

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ T. T. & M.K. ; & B. N. also C. P. C., V., 825. Ausan Singh in his letter mentions annual Jama to be 65,000 out of which he was to pay Rs. 15,000. C.P.C.V., 834 and 854.

²⁰ Compare Hastings' 2nd direct charge with what the Raja says in C. P. C. V., No. 207

²¹ B.N. Shambhunath claims to have influenced Francis and Wheeler to recover the 'Arzi' of Rani Gulab Kaur and return it (M.F.). See also the reference to it in C. P. C. V., 854.

²² Both B. N. & T. T. contain detailed accounts of the careers, character and activities of these unscrupulous adventurers, Ali-ud-din Kubra named Asghar Ali of Nagina in *Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad*, and Zainul Abadin, a converted Hindu. The latter was the first to be killed at Shivala Ghat along with the vile Chobdar.

²³ All the three writers fix the responsibility upon this vile wretch for precipitating the affray at Shivala Ghat. But the reference to his audacity in grappling with the innocent Raja in T. T. & M.K. cannot be taken seriously for Ghulam Husain who was all along present with the Raja does not mention it.

²⁴ B. N. ; T. T.

innate cowardice, the Raja offered resistance for which Graham was not prepared. He came to the Raja and wanted to have a definite acceptance of the Government's demands. The Raja pleaded that being a mere Zamindar, it was beyond his competence to share the expenses of wars and campaigns fought by the sovereign power. He, however, managed the Resident who agreed to wait till the reply was received to the Raja's letter addressed to the Governor-General which was couched in most submissive language. The reply came reprimanding the Raja for his evasive attitude and threatening him with a heavy fine on failure of punctual payment of the dues. There being no alternative, the amounts demanded were paid off²⁵.

The affair of the pretender, Bhaw, who had gathered some persons around him and was visited by many including Raja's men and some bankers who had their business in the Deccan also gave a handle to Graham to malign the Raja and his men. Graham directed the Raja to execute the orders for seizing Bhaw, hoping that if in the ensuing scuffle the pretender was killed the reputation of the Raja would suffer. Being disappointed in this, for Sadanand Buxi and Ghulam Husain Khan presented him alive to be sent as a captive to Chunar, the Khan was accused of having misappropriated his money. The Khan boldly called upon Graham, swore his innocence, and had an interesting talk with him during the course of which he was told by the Resident that considering what had happened to Shuja-ud-dowla with such extensive resources it was impossible that Chait Singh could be saved, and that the day was coming soon when the whole of India would pass into the hands of the British. The Khan failing to get a reply as to what the fault of his master was, went straight to the palace and advised the Raja to proceed to Calcutta to plead his case and resign his power and authority in case he found Hastings to be adamant in his attitude. The Raja was too timid to accept this advice and his mother also discountenanced the proposal²⁶.

General Coote's journey to Benares also provided an opportunity to intimidate, harass and fleece the Raja. The latter was told that one of the objects of Coote's tour was to punish him. The timid and terrified Raja sent his family and goods to his forts and paid Rs. 10,000 as fine for the expenses of the platoons referred to above. There was a talk of paying 20 lacs to avert the calamity²⁷. But Ghulam Husain Khan assured his master that it was not the practice with the English to allow military men to interfere with civil matters. On his advice the Raja sent his brother and Buxi, and

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ All the writers refer to these affairs but the account in T. T. is more detailed and first-hand.

Mir Abdullah, to wait on the General on his way to Oudh. Graham had already poisoned his mind against the Raja, and, therefore, the agents were turned back at Buxar. Khairuddin, however, persuaded the fair-minded and upright Persian interpreter of the General, the young H. Vansittart, to plead for the Raja. He was called at Ghazipur. Being foolish enough to listen to the interested advice of some 'Sahebs' then out for a stroll at Zamania, the Raja tried to proceed with a fleet of boats to see the General there. The General's apprehension of a night attack and resentment were allayed by Vansittart and the interview was granted next day at Ghazipur. Despite the advice of Richard Johnson and even Lady Coote, the General paid a visit to Ramnagar and was accorded a fitting reception. But he felt disgusted in the midst of festivities when Graham told him in English that the Raja professed ignorance of his father's transaction with H. Munro on whose behalf one lakh was being demanded. Eventually the Raja had to pay not only this amount to the General but also many other sums to others including 30,000 rupees to Mr. Purling who promised to secure a receipt from the General and his acceptance of the amount for himself and not on account of Munro²⁸. This was not done.

Barwell and Francis managed to secure the recall of Graham and his replacement by F. Fowke. The latter impressed upon the Raja the gravity of the situation and advised his personal visit to Calcutta or the despatch of a trustworthy person²⁹. Vansittart had suggested the despatch of Sujan Singh, but the Raja would not trust his brother³⁰. He sent the phlegmatic but faithful Sadanand Buxi with a letter professing loyalty, obedience, and compliance with the Governor-General's orders. The deputation involved a total expense of three lakhs³¹ without producing the desired results. The agent was told that Hastings would do the needful on his arrival at Benares. To add to the Raja's apprehensions, Fowke was replaced soon by William Markham who was as hostile to Chait Singh as Graham and even more dangerous than the latter as he would not like Graham soften his attitude at times by accepting something³². Vansittart was good enough to intimate to the Raja through Khairuddin of Hastings'

²⁸ See H. C. Wyllie's *Life of Coote* for this exaction, p. 173. In T. T. we get an interesting reference to Balwant Singh's treachery to his suzerain Shuja-ud-Doula and to his offer of 10 lacs to the then Governor and 2 lacs to H. Munro. C. Purling was a Resident in Awadh. The Raja merely refers to something "respecting General Munro" (C. P. C., V., 1771), but Wyllie tells us not only about the demand for, and the payment of one lac "after considerable demur and much pressure" but also regarding "Cheyte's personal gifts to Coote" which "consisted of 21 trays of cloth, one of Jewellery, 10 horses and an elephant". P. Francis wrote "I never heard of so abandoned a scoundrel who even here (Bengal) excites execration and contempt".

²⁹ B. N.

³⁰ T. T.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² B. N.

impending journey and to suggest the need for clearing the dues punctual payment of the excess contribution till the duration of Deccan affairs, avoidance of expenditure on luxuries and on buildings, and the despatch to the Governor-General of an agent, preferably the brother of the Raja. Vansittart was magnanimous enough to refuse the rich presents including 15,000 in cash and a note for two and a half lacs³³. It was unfortunate that he was not allowed to accompany Hastings in his journey westward by the river.

Much of what happened afterwards is already known, at least in outline. I would, however, invite attention to the minute detail and some apparently little things such as the sly look of Hastings at Digbijay Singh, father of Mahipal Narain, who had come from Danapur and was present at the joint meeting at Buxar and his introduction in English by Markham³⁴ and also the movements and activities of Ausan Singh, Rani Gulab Kuer, her daughter, Padan Kuer etc. During the second and private interview on the river the Raja's abject humility, tears and entreaties and offer of the surrender of Bijaygarh—alleged to be stored with fabulous wealth—failed to move the relentless Governor-General. Other references to the nefarious activities of the vile ex-Diwan, Ausan Singh, who had followed Hastings, and of the unscrupulous Maulavis, the refusal to grant another personal interview at Benares, the transmission of a letter recapitulating the offences supposed to have been committed by the Raja in regard to the annual payment of the excess contribution and the contingent required, the sale of utensils and gold and silver plates despite extravagant expenditure on other things, the alleged banishment of the "well-wishing B. Ausan Singh", theft and murders said to have been committed within the city and territory, and the Raja's desire for a full enquiry into the truths of the various allegations are also well worth our attention³⁵.

No less important is the detailed account of all that happened in the Shivala of B. Baijnath Singh where the Raja having received Hastings' rebuff had chosen to stay awaiting his doom. Markham's hypocritical expressions of regret and of personal helplessness over the sad plight of the Raja and his suggestion of having received and conveying a letter to Hastings to mend matters after he had communicated the orders of arrest to which no resistance was made, the Raja compelling those few present to give up their arms, were followed by dramatic events with accelerated rapidity³⁶. In the morning of the next day, guards were placed, all access to the Raja was

³³ T. T.

³⁴ B. N.

³⁵ B. N., T. T., M. K.

³⁶ M. K. Khairuddin refers to the Raja's offer of 50 lakhs to the Government in cash and 2 lakhs every year to Markham.

blocked, and some Englishmen, swords in hand, took their stand beside him³⁷. According to Khairuddin, after a talk with Hastings, Markham wrote to the Raja that if he offered seventy lakhs in cash, accepted an increase of seven lakhs to his annual tribute, and gave security of punctual payment through bankers, there would be no trouble in future³⁸. He promised to see the Raja after lunch and settle everything. Captain Stalker induced the Raja to perform his ablution and do the usual Puja³⁹. Already the Raja had sent strict orders to his men and some of the populace assembled outside not to mind even provocations and desist from interference with the Company's men. When B. Manyar Singh came with 200 men and wanted to join the Raja, Ghulam Husain was sent to pacify him by showing the newly arrived letters of assurances. But he insisted on sharing the fate of his cousin and master. The Captain did not mind three or more persons coming of their own accord to share the Raja's captivity. They were not disarmed⁴⁰. In the meanwhile, Markham on being misinformed by some mischievous persons that Sujan Singh had crossed the river and was on the way to Shivala Ghat for rescuing the Raja sent the villainous mace-bearer, Chait Ram, to warn the Raja. The vile wretch perhaps exceeded the limits of the order and insolently threatened the Raja that he and his females would be dragged in the bazars if any harm was done to any of the Company's men. The 'Babus' writhed with anger and Manyar Singh's young son spoke a few words to receive only an insulting reply. The Raja intervened, even extended his legs towards the Chobdar, and pacified the 'Babus'⁴¹. Quite unknown to the Raja, some of his musketeers had assembled in an orchard to the west of Shivala and there was an altercation between them and the Captain of two newly arrived Companies of Tillingas who carried two cannons. The reckless Captain (Egerton or Eeton?) ordered the discharge of one of the cannons which misfired. The affray, miscalled insurrection or rebellion, had begun without the Raja's knowing anything about it⁴².

In fact when the musketeers and the men hidden in the Sangit and others who had managed to conceal their weapons in the kitchen rushed towards the courtyard, some jumping down from trees and through the windows, Ghulam Husain and Sadanand Buxi ran to control them but they could not⁴³. The Raja rose from his

³⁷ B. N. wherein there is a reference to the advice given to the Raja at night to escape to Ramnagar by boats, which were kept ready but the Raja did not accept it saying that he was innocent and his flight would be construed as a crime.

³⁸ T. T.

³⁹ 2,000 was given to Stalker, 500 to Egerton and 1,000 to soldiers. T. T.

⁴⁰ B. N., T. T., M. K.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ B. N.

Puja to see what was happening, and if possible, to quell the disturbances. Chait Ram tried to grapple with him⁴⁴, crying aloud for help from the soldiers in the Baradari. When some came and the Raja's life appeared to be in danger, the Chobdar and the younger Moulvi were cut down by either Nankhoo Singh or Shankardatt. Captain Stalker and others were taken aback but rushed to face the crowd, sword in hand, for there was not enough ammunition. They fell fighting bravely against heavy odds. It was at this time when the men and officers of the two Companies had all been killed that Ghulam Husain advised the Raja to proceed to the garden of Madhudas, take Hastings under his protection, carry him to the fort of Bijaygarh, show him all that it contained, bring home to him his innocence not only of the previous allegations but also, and particularly, of the recent bloodshed and massacre and obtain his pardon, and through him, that of the other people at Calcutta. Manyar Singh agreed with the suggestion. The Raja was at his wits' end and only wanted to be taken out to the river and across it to Ramnagar. This was done with difficulty⁴⁵. The same day he escaped to Latifpur, Rani Gulab Kuer and others refusing to accompany him, and from there he sent an 'Arzi' through Beni Ram Pandit, the Vakil of Mudhoji Bhonsla, to Hastings professing his loyalty and devotion and expressing his sincere regrets and apology for the recent happenings on which he had no control. No notice was taken of this letter⁴⁶. In the meanwhile, the Proclamation had been issued appointing Ausan Singh as Naib. The latter's attempt to cross over to Ramnagar was repulsed. Hastings was calmly and coolly taking stock of the English forces at Chunar and Mirzapur in consultation with Popham. Blair Mayaffre and Dockson who tried to capture Ramnagar lost their lives with 30 officers and 80 other European soldiers⁴⁷. Sujan Singh's plan of a night attack on Bagh Madhudas, still occupied by Hastings, was prevented, or at least postponed, by Ghulam Husain showing the Raja's letter that Ausan Singh should be resisted but no harm or insult be offered to the Governor-General⁴⁸. Sujan Singh, however, did not appreciate this and had he not been let down by some of his men, he might perhaps have disregarded his brother's behests and fallen upon and captured Hastings during the latter's flight to Chunar⁴⁹.

⁴⁴ B. N., T. T.

⁴⁵ B. N. The Raja's statement that "being wounded by a sword he retired to a corner (C. P. C., V, 219) is contradicted by Khairuddin (T. T.) who says that the Raja was hit by a stone while being let down through the window by means of a rope made of turbans tied together.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ M. M.

⁴⁸ B. N., M. K.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Even Ghulam Husain was dissatisfied and cynically remarked after a talk with the Rajas, "I saw that despite so much bloodshed he still hoped for the redress of his grievances at the hands of the Councillors (at Calcutta). It was no use regretting the event after it had happened"⁵⁰.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE ANNEXATION OF JAYANTA (1835)

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I N 1824, when the Burmese were hammering at the gates of the North-East Frontier, David Scott, the Agent to the Governor-General made an 'alliance of friendship and amity' with the ruler of Jayanta. Scott had an exaggerated notion of the potentialities of this petty state. In the war against Ava it was soon found that the Raja could not substantially aid the British troops nor his assistance against refractory hills tribes in the neighbourhood (namely the Khasis) was up to his expectations. Considering this to be a very unsatisfactory bargain, eight years later, when Captain Jenkins was engaged on the survey of the Eastern Frontier, Lieutenant Lister, Officer in-charge of the Khasi Hills, wrote to him in a private letter¹:

"While the subject of our Eastern Frontier is under consideration, the following observation on our general policy towards the protected States in this quarter will perhaps be found to contain something not altogether uninteresting. Our arrangements with all these countries being made in 1824 during the Burmese war were necessarily concluded in a hurried manner and without a close enquiry into their power and resources the immediate object being to prevent their falling into the hands of their enemy or rather (in some instances) to establish a right to interfere in their favour and thereby keep the Burmese from our own neighbourhood. Our knowledge of Cachar and Manipoor was sufficient to enable us to attain this object without compromising any other feasible advantage, which at the time we might have hoped to acquire. But it was far otherwise with respect to Jyntea and smaller Cosseya States of which we were extremely ignorant and indeed misinformed. Under the impression that people of Jyntea were very warlike and that their lands were all held by a military tenure it was stipulated by the treaty of 1824 that in place of tribute the Raja should assist us with his forces in all our wars to the East of the Brahmaputra, a condition which he notoriously failed to fulfil. During the Burmese war the Raja gave us no assistance beyond supplying a few coolies for a month and that (at) a high price.....worse still

¹ Bengal Political Consultations, 14 May 1832, no. 117 : Lister to Jenkins, 16 April 1832.

he allowed a party of Burmese to remain concealed at Nungthung during the second invasion of Cachar and thence to maintain a communication with their countrymen in that country and in Assam. During the last disturbances in the Cosseya Hills he has given us no kind of assistance but confined his exertions to retaining those parts which we have first conquered and then granted to him."

"Now when the extent, wealth and population of Jyntea is considered, when it is remembered that it is the only one of the petty states which in this quarter has enjoyed an uninterrupted tranquility for the last sixty years, it must be admitted that we have made a very unsatisfactory bargain in accepting a military service in place of tribute and the sooner we amend that part of the treaty, the better."

In September 1832, an opportunity to revise the treaty presented itself. Raja Ram Sing, the ruler of Jayanta died leaving his brother Rajendra Sing then a boy of fifteen, as his successor². An attempt was made by Mr. Robertson, the Agent to the Governor-General, to impose a tribute of Rs. 10,000 on the new ruler in recognition of his title by the British Government. After justifying the right of the Government to the tribute, the Agent pressed hard for amending the terms of the existing treaty³. The young prince got perplexed, he was afraid of conceding to any of these terms against the wishes of his Council of Ministers, who were opposed to all innovations. When all arguments failed to bring him to a decision, Rajendra Sing was informed that he would be treated by the British as "Jamadar" and not the Raja of Jayantees⁴.

In these circumstances, Rajendra Sing made a frantic appeal to the Supreme Government. Narrating the past relations with the British he wrote:

"On the demise of my elder brother the late Maharaja Ram Sing, I succeeded to the Raj in accordance with the family practices. On which occasion I had the honour of writing a letter to Robertson, your Lordship's Agent, North East Frontier of Bengal, forwarding a Nazzar to him apprising him at the same time of my intention of addressing a letter and sending a Nazzar to Your Lordship. In reply that officer wrote a letter to me acknowledging as the Raja and informing me that on a personal interview between him and myself he would forward my letter and Nazzar to Your Lordship. Accordingly on the 9th Jyete (Bengali month) 1755 S.E. I called on Mr. Robertson at Sylhet upon which he did not receive any Nazzar for Your Lordship, but stated that the engagement which was

² Bengal Political Consultation, 6 November 1832, no. 56.

³ Bengal Political Consultation, 13 June 1832, no. 83.

⁴ *Ibid.*

entered into between the late Mr. Scott, the former Agent, and my elder brother under the orders of the Supreme Government should be renewed and he demanded from me an amount of tribute of 10,000 rupees, adding at the same time that in the event of non-payment of the sum I should not be recognised as the Raja but as one incharge of the territory of Jyntea and accordingly himself and other gentlemen at Sylhet at his suggestion addressed me as a person incharge of the territory to my great degradation."

"With reference to the terms of the engagement above alluded to my elder brother despatched his troops to assist the British army in Assam and furnished it with necessary supplies of articles, coolies etc. I am also in the same way obedient to the orders of the British Government. Now the demand of a tribute from me appears to be in direct opposition to the aforesaid engagement as well as to the established Regulations of the Hon'ble Company and it cannot but be considered injurious to myself as the country is very small and most part of the population according to former usage only render their personal services when required and attend when war occurs with their own victuals. They never give their revenue to me. This being the case, it is impossible for me to give a tribute to the Hon'ble Company. I have therefore thought it necessary to depute a person on my part to submit my case to Your Lordship. I most confidently hope that Your Lordship will be graciously pleased to take my representation to Your indulgent consideration and that in order to protect me you will kindly instruct Your Lordship's Agent, North East Frontier, to manifest his kindness towards me as formerly"⁵.

In the meantime, an unfortunate incident occurred. Four British subjects were captured at Gobha, a principality under Jayanta; of them one escaped and the three others were sacrificed before the Goddess "Kali"⁶. The attention of the Government was drawn by Robertson, who had the presumption that Rajendra Sing, a 'promoter of this inhuman rite', had committed this atrocity in collaboration with the Chief of Gobha⁷. He urged the Government to call upon the ruler of Jayanta to deliver up immediately that Chief and other perpetrators of the crime under penalty of losing his throne. The Government of Bengal instructed the Agent to repeat the demand of surrendering the culprits and in the event of Raja's non-compliance or indifference to arrest and punish the criminals and he was to be deemed guilty of the crime and to be dealt with accordingly⁸.

⁵ Bengal Political Consultation, 6 February 1834, no. 141. Rajendra Sing to the Governor-General, letter delivered on 11 January, 1834.

⁶ Bengal Political Consultation, 12 December 1833, no. 70.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 72.

A few months after Robertson left Assam. On the arrival of Jenkins as the Agent to the Governor-General, a deputation of several leading men of Jayanta waited upon him. They represented⁹ the willingness of the Raja to apprehend the persons concerned in the sacrifice but added that they were unable to do so at present on account of party strife that was rife in the country of Jayanta and particularly owing to the resistance of the Chief of Nurtung. Imploring for justice, the Raja also wrote to Jenkins¹⁰:

"My country is very small. No ryot pays revenue in cash and I cannot alter the old customs. By the former treaty my grand-father was to have some lands in Assam when that country should be conquered. This has not yet been given. On the contrary my quiet country is put in trouble and my subjects in agitation. My hope is in your justice".

Jenkins fully realised the difficulties of the Raja in face of the enmity of Nurtung in handing over the "perpetrators". "It is almost certain to my mind" he reported "that the Raja had not the power to enforce them (the demands of Government) on the Gobha Raja, the person apparently most implicated having sided with the Nurtung people, who have notoriously set at naught the Raja's authority"¹¹. As to Raja's complicity, the evidence he found was extremely meagre and unreliable. All that he could procure was:—

"During the life time of the late Raja Ram Sing one of the family (?) of the present Raja, the suspicion being that he was the person, according to the custom of his family and country gave orders to offer up human sacrifices to the Raja or other headman of Gobha, which district appears to have been an estate of the heir-apparent. In compliance with these orders four individuals were seized in passing through Gobha (to) Nowgong, who were British subjects. Three of whom were sacrificed and one escaped by which circumstances the atrocity became known....."¹².

Without committing himself to anything for final decision, Jenkins submitted the proceedings to the Government of Bengal. 'Should the Government consider the fact of sacrifice established and that the privity to the crime by the present Raja as sufficiently proved to justify his deposition' the Agent recommended 'instead of setting up another Chief, the country should be dismembered' and the low tracts on both sides of the hills should be attached¹³.

⁹ Bengal Political Consultation, 10 April 1834, no. 135.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 136. Rajendra Sing to the Agent. ■

¹¹ Bengal Political Consultation, 10 April 1834, no. 135.

¹² Bengal Political Consultation, 23 February 1835, no. 3.

¹³ *Ibid.*

The Government of Bengal considered the case as 'sufficiently proved' to justify the deposition of the Raja. Feeling, however, inexpedient to have recourse to such an extreme measure, on the suggestion of the Agent, it was decided to confiscate all his possessions in the lowlands. On 15 March 1835, when the order was delivered by Captain Lister, Officer in-charge of the Khasi Hills, Rajendra Sing resigned expressing his reluctance to exercise any rule over the barren possessions of his hills left to him¹⁴. The whole of Jayanta in consequence passed under the direct control of the British Government.

¹⁴ Bengal Political Consultation, 30 March 1835, no. 17.

A FORGOTTEN OFFICIAL INQUIRY ON THE HINDI-URDU CONTROVERSY

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AMONG the District Records of Lucknow, I recently discovered a file of correspondence of 1875-6, regarding the adoption of Hindi as the court language of Oudh and North-West Provinces. These letters bring to light the first and now totally forgotten official inquiry on the Hindi-Urdu controversy in the post-Mutiny period. A perusal of these records would show how the problem of court language in North India was viewed by the authorities. The arguments put forward in these letters throw a flood of light on the outlook and policy of the British bureaucracy in India.

Curiously enough, the question whether Hindi could be recognised as the court language of Oudh came up for consideration in the wake of a public agitation¹ at Patna for the introduction of Hindi in the Courts and Offices of Bihar². The Government of India forwarded a copy of a petition of certain citizens of Patna, entitled, "Why should Nagri be introduced in the Courts and Offices of Bihar", to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh for his opinion³. This Patna petition occasioned an interesting discussion among officials in Bihar and Oudh, and eventually the petition was rejected. The Government of Bengal held that Hindi and Urdu could not⁴ be regarded as two distinct languages. Concurring in this view, the India Government further stated that "an artificial, Sanskritized language" could not be fostered under the name of Hindi. The authorities in Oudh also rejected the claims of Hindi as against Urdu⁵.

While expressing their strong opposition to making Hindi the court language, the official experts advanced arguments which could

¹ Letter from C. S. Bayley, Commissioner of Patna, 20 May 1875.

² Letter from Government of Bengal, no. 17, 9 July 1875.

³ Letter from Government of India, no. 2/208, 17 November 1875.

⁴ Letter from Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Commissioner of Patna, 9 July 1875.

⁵ Circular from Government of India, Home Department, no. 17, 1875.

interest the students of Indian history at the present day. These may be thus summed up in the words of the authors themselves:

1. "To call Hindi and Urdu two languages is to perpetuate a vicious error." "They are simply the city and rustic forms of one and the same language"⁶.

2. It would be "very hazardous" for the Government to support Hindi against Urdu, for there was "political danger" involved in the disaffection of a class of men, about whom the "complaint already was that their means of living were too scanty". "The Mahomedans in fact would be ousted from public employ"⁷.

3. Among the Hindus, "the facile Kayasth" who had "almost a monopoly of the court language" was strongly opposed to the change from Urdu to Hindi⁸.

4. The agitation for Hindi was ascribed to "the desire of Bengalis to be more extensively employed than at present in the Urdu-speaking provinces of India". "The Bengalis imagine they could learn Hindi easily", for "the Hindi characters and the Sanskrit technicalities are similar to those of Bengali"⁹.

5. "The Hindi language is extinct". "Some persons doubt whether it was ever spoken at all by the masses". The Director of Public Instruction, Oudh, stated "There can be no question now that what is known as Hindi, such, for instance, as that used in the Bihar petition, is not the kind of speech used at the present day by the people of Oudh. During my five years' service in Bengal, I heard so much about the claims of the neglected Hindi language, that I came into Oudh with a mind imbued with the belief that the Urdu language was foreign to the masses. But, since I have had time to become better acquainted with the vernacular of the province, I have found out my mistake"¹⁰.

6. "When it is remembered that all the vernacular newspapers and all the vernacular periodicals published in Oudh are in Urdu, and none in Hindi, there cannot be much doubt as to what the vernacular of this country really is"¹¹. "There is no class in the community, not even Brahmins, who transact matters of business in the Nagri character". The Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow

⁶ Note by A. W. Croft, Inspector of Schools, 16 July 1875.

⁷ Letter from Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Oudh, no. 24, 1875.

⁸ Letter from the Commissioner of Patna, no. 397, 8 October 1873.

⁹ Letter from A. Thomson, Inspector of Schools, 27 January 1876.

¹⁰ Letter from Director of Public Instruction, Oudh, Lucknow, 28 March 1876.

¹¹ Letter from Inspector of Schools, Western Circle, Oudh, 25 February 1876.

stated emphatically, "Hindi is not the vernacular of the Province and Urdu is"¹².

7. "The Nagri character has no advantage over the Persian"¹³. "The Nagri character is one which scarcely admits of being written in a running hand, and this fact alone is a decisive proof of its unfitness for being used as the court language"¹⁴.

It is highly interesting to note that one official (S. C. Bayley) agreed with the opposite view that Hindi could be and "should be gradually introduced into the courts and offices" on the following grounds¹⁵:—

1. Hindi is not a rude language. It is a branch of Sanskrit which is the best language in the world.
2. Hindi can be written quickly.
3. Hindi can be learnt more easily than Urdu. "Nagri can be mastered in three or four months, while Urdu cannot be learnt so easily."
4. Hindi is better adapted for transliteration than Persian.
5. "The Persian characters can be altered with much greater facility than Nagri, and hence it affords greater temptation to fraudulent tampering with documents".
6. "Nagri is used in the transaction of all kinds of business in Nepal, Nagpur, and the Commissioner's Office at Almora,—a fact which proves that there is no defect in it."
7. Hindi is the vernacular of the Province.
8. "True, the Nagri takes a little more space in writing than Hindustani, but this defect cannot weigh against the many considerations in favour of the use of Nagri".

But, a vast majority of officials reported in favour of Urdu, and they maintained that Hindi should not be substituted for Urdu as the court language. The Chief Commissioner of Oudh notified all Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners in Oudh as follows:—

"The opinions of officers are unanimous that Urdu should remain the language of our courts; but that the use of difficult Perso-Arabic words should be discouraged as

much as possible, and that writers generally should be made to write more legibly than they do at present"¹⁶.

In short, the claims of Hindi were set aside in 1875-76 on grounds which were apparently more political and administrative than purely academic. One high official even asserted with an air of bravado, "There seems in fact as little reason for introducing Hindi as for introducing Chinese"¹⁷. The Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow went to the extent of saying—"Why not make the Court language English to suit that increasing class—the Eurasians?"¹⁸. Another official recommended the use of the Roman character in these words: "Were the Roman character used, neither the Sanskrit element nor the Perso-Arabic would be at a disadvantage; and the Hindustani language would be formed, as it should be, by the survival of the fittest words"¹⁹.

¹² General Circular no. 30-3303 of 1876, 24 July 1876.

¹³ Letter from Director of Public Instruction, Oudh, to Chief Commissioner Oudh Lucknow, no. 3704 of 1875-76, 28 March 1876.

¹⁴ Letter from Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, no. 1812, 24 April 1876.

¹⁵ Letter from A. Thomson to Director of Public Instruction, Oudh, no. 841, 27 January 1876.

¹⁶ Dir of Arch.

¹² Letter from Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, 26 April 1876.

¹³ Letter from A. Thomson, 27 January 1876.

¹⁴ Letter from Director of Public Instruction, 28 March 1876.

¹⁵ Letter from S. C. Bayley, 20 May 1875.

SOME ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE INDIAN MOVEMENT OF 1857-59

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THE Indian Movement of 1857-59 was a gigantic and widespread challenge to British authority in India. Its first manifestation was naturally in the more inflammable quarters of the Sepoy Army of the Company's government in India. But it is not correct to describe it as a mere military rising. Referring to the areas covered by U.P. and Bihar, a contemporary British military officer observes as follows in part two of his Narrative¹, dated December 1857: "The crisis came. At first, apparently a mere military mutiny, it speedily changed its character, and became a national insurrection. The Rajpoot villages in Bihar, those in the districts of Benares, Azimgarh, Gorukhpore, in the entire Doab comprising the divisions of Allahabad, Cawnpore, Meerut and Agra, in the provinces of Rohilkhand and Oudh, shook off our rule and declared war against us". Lord Cromer significantly remarked, "I wish the younger generation of Englishmen would read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest the history of the Indian Mutiny; it abounds in lessons and warnings." The Hon'ble Mr. Disraeli at Aylesbury, spoke as follows at a meeting held on 30 September 1857. "One of the greatest calamities that ever befell this empire, has fallen upon us Day by day, we have seen that which was at first characterised as a slight and accidental occurrence, is in fact one of those great events which form epochs in the history of mankind, and which can only be accounted for by considerations demanding the deepest attention from statesmen and nations. I think that what has happened in India is a great Providential lesson, by which we may profit....."²

While engaged in the study of this important subject and particularly in the preparation of an authoritative history of Freedom Movement in Bihar, I have been able to discover some highly in-

¹ *The Mutiny of the Bengal Army : An Historical Narrative.*

² Quoted in Charles Ball, *History of the Indian Mutiny, Vol. II, pp. 418-420.*

teresting original records which contain plenty of new information regarding it. I am mentioning here a few of these:

(1) Message of April 1858, from the Commissioner of Patna, Mr. E. A. Samuells, who had succeeded Mr. William Tayler on 5 August 1857:

"First Message.—Letter just received from the Magistrate of Arrah of 22nd April. Expedition did not go out last night, fearful lest rebels might come another road and attack Arrah. Koer Singh (Kunwar Singh) is at Jugdespore with men. Lost his arm and wounded in thigh. Report that European force had come up with the rebels at the river yesterday. Killed a considerable number and took their guns and Treasure, proposed plan to march to Jugdespore in the evening of the 22nd and attacked the enemy the following morning, no further news from Chuppra. Patna Steamer after landing ladies and treasure has returned.

Second Message.—I have information received from Buxar. Douglas appears to have attacked the rebels at Bunsdee on the 20th and killed a number of them. He was pursuing them most energetically. 150 of the 54th were to be sent from Ghazeepore to Bulloh on 20th on board Agra but the Steamer seems to have been detained. Cumberleges force at Gamaree on 20th. I am sorry. *Lugard*³ has not waited for Douglas⁴ before attacking Jugdespore, but he is a prudent officer and he has good men under him. Boyle⁵ tells me that Cutcherry is quite safe if nothing heavier than fieldpieces are brought against it. Message ends."

(2) In a letter from the Officer Commanding at Benares to Colonel Birch, Military Secretary to the Government of India, dated 25 April 1858, we get the following information about Kunwar Singh's victory over a party of British troops:

"I have just received by express a copy of a letter from Mr. Bowring from Mr. Madock, Dy. Collector, Buxar, stating that a force which had been sent from Arrah to meet Kooer Singh in the direction of Jugdispore, had been totally defeated, 2 of our guns being captured by the enemy. The Arrah detachment, it is said, consisted of 250 or 300 men, and the spies report that only 25 or 35 Europeans, 30 or 35 Sikhs and 7 Officers were seen by them returning to Arrah. If this is true our loss has been very heavy. Kooer Singh is entrenching himself in the Jungles and is burning all villages the inhabitants of which won't join him. He has 1,500 Sepoys, and rabble up to 4 or 5,000."

³ Sir Edward Lugard, who had been ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to press unwar Singh in April 1858.

⁴ Brigadier Douglas.

⁵ Railway Civil Engineer at Arrah.

(3) In one of his letters addressed to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal on 14 June 1858, Mr. Samuells wrote as follows regarding the successful movements of the followers of Kunwar Singh under the leadership of his brother Amar Singh, even after the death of that brave Rajput chief:

"I regret to have to report that a body of the rebels under Umur Sing said to be altogether about 1,500 in number has returned to the Jugdispore Jungle, and were by the latest accounts at Ruja on the west side of the Jungle. They must have crossed the Kurumnassa near Soupa and gone off to the East, while Brigr. Douglas was crossing it lower down in an opposite direction. They made their appearance at Mudnarpore about 4 miles south of Captain Rattray's at Roop Saugor on the 12th, they fired a few shots into his camp but did not attempt to molest him otherwise, and following pretty nearly the same tract by which they had advanced, re-entered the Jungle as I have above stated at Ruja. General Lugard is at Dalupoor about 5 miles North of Ruja with the 10 Foot and I believe the Madras Rifles and some Guns and Cavalry. He was to be joined by Captain Rattray with his detachment of Sikhs now numbering about 400 yesterday. Extensive clearances have been made in the Jungle under the superintendence of Messrs Barrows and Mylne of the firm of Burn & Co. since the rebels left it, and I trust that this may facilitate the General's movements and that the enemy may be so vigorously attacked as to compel them to abandon the Jungle for good.

A body of 3 or 400 rebels appears to have got across the Ganges, and to be doing great damage in the Ghazeepore district. They recently burnt down the Deputy Magistracy of Bulleah and will very probably seek to re-enter Shahabad after their mission of destruction in Ghazeepore is completed.

The object of the enemy as avowed by one of their number whom Captain Rattray captured a few days ago is to do as much damage as possible in order to compel the people whether from fear or the prospect of starvation to join them and to harass our troops by leading them up and down the country and avoiding fighting whenever it is possible to do so. They count much it appears on the rainy season when they think our troops will be compelled to go into quarters and to leave the interior of the country to them.

These are no doubt ingenious tactics and are probably the best which the enemy can now adopt, but it seems to me that they may easily be defeated by a judicious distribution of troops by rapid movements and by vigorous and determined attack, whenever an opportunity of striking a blow presents itself. The heat of the weather it is true is terribly against the European soldiers at the

present moment, but this in all probability will soon be mitigated. Elephants which are now available in considerable numbers may be used to afford relief to the soldiers on their march and it has been found I think throughout this campaign that inaction is much more injurious to the health of the troops than exposure when accompanied with the prospect of action.

We must make a very vigorous effort to drive the enemy out of those districts. I allude particularly to Shahabad and Ghazeepore before the rains set in: otherwise the rebels will employ themselves during the rains in thoroughly disorganising those districts and in conducting expeditions into the neighbouring districts of Gaya, Patna and Saran. The natives will see with astonishment and it is to be feared with a diminution of respect for our power which is much to be deprecated that we are actually receding in this quarter instead of advancing, that districts hitherto quiet are being invaded and overrun, and this not by formidable armies but by half armed gangs of men so contemptible that in the various actions they have had with our troops they have never succeeded in killing above two or three of our men in fair fight.

I trust the Lieutenant Governor will press very strongly on the attention of the Military authorities the serious consequences which will most assuredly result if these miserable bands of rebels are allowed to remain in the Jugdispore Jungle and the Ghazeepore Doab during the approaching rainy season."

(4) In another letter to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated 30 July 1858, Mr. Samuells thus narrated the activities of the followers of Amar Singh:

"The main body of the rebels still continue in the neighbourhood of Jugdishpore (Jagdishpur near Arrah), and ape our Government in the appointment of Commissioners, Judges, and Magistrates. They even copy our revenue system (which some people tell us produced this rebellion) to the letter, and sell all the estates of our friends for arrears of revenue with as much punctuality as the Collector himself could evince. Umur Sing hung a sepoy the other day for the murder of a Bunneeah (*bania*), which shows that the rebels are compelled to conciliate the people occasionally by giving them justice even when the offending party is one of themselves."⁶

(5) An interesting and a very important correspondence relating to this topic has come to my notice in an old bound register in the Record Office of the Commissioner of Patna.⁷ It is a long letter of

⁶ Copies of documents no. 1-4, studied here, were obtained by me a few years back from the National Archives of India.

⁷ I am obliged to the Commissioner of Patna for kindly permitting me to study it.

the Commissioner of Patna, Mr. Samuells, addressed by him to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, on the 4 December 1858, containing various observations from him on the two letters from his predecessor, Mr. William Tayler, dated 3 and 5 April 1858, which again had been written "by way of rejoinder to the communication" which Mr. Samuells sent to the Government on 29 January 1858, "commenting on certain statements which had appeared in a pamphlet published by Mr. W. Tayler." Making allowance for personal recriminations* of the two officers, one of whom had replaced the other, I find that this document is full of relevant references to many important events of Bihar connected with the trial of the local leaders of the Wahabi movement and the movement of 1857-59. In consideration of time and space at my disposal here, I reproduce only some highly significant paragraphs of it.

(a) *Insurrection at Patna on 3 July 1857.*

"Of the extent to which W. Tayler placed himself in the hands of Moula Buksh in this matter it is impossible however to judge without a short analysis of the proceedings of this Officer and of the evidence which he submitted to the Commr. It may be convenient that I should first state the facts of the case. The rioters from 50 to 100 in number appear to have assembled about 7 o'clock in the evening of the 3rd July at the house of Peer Ali Khan a bookseller who resided in a lane which leads off from the main street of the city of Patna. They issued from the lane into the main street with drums beating, colour flying and shouts of 'Ali' 'Ali'. Their heads and faces were bound up with cloths, fashion common to dacoits and latteewallas and they were armed with guns, which they occasionally discharged, swords, spears. They first plundered the Catholic chapel which stands near the entrance of the lane and then proceeded eastward towards the opium godown plundering the shops and disarming the Police. They were encountered at different times by the patrol Darogah Syed-oo-deen and sowar of the name of Peer Beg. The Darogah shot one of the rioters dead but was himself so severely wounded that he subsequently died. The sowar wounded another and the rebels then fled west but shortly afterwards returned. Dr. Lyell* who had started on horseback from the godown on hearing of the disturbance with a small party of Sikhs and Nujeebs but had unfortunately cantered (sic) on alone was encountered by them on their return and shot dead. The Sikhs came up immediately afterwards and found only three men on the spot who fled on being fired at. The rest had previously dispersed. The whole affair appears to have been over in about $\frac{3}{4}$ of an hour" (para. 125).

* British officers of the Civil Service in India were not above these.
 * The principal Assistant to the Opium Agent in Bihar.

(b) *Tayler's tyranny at Patna in June and July 1857.*

"The words which Mr. Tayler quotes were not applied, it will be observed, to him at all. The 7th and 8th paras referred expressly to my own policy. I challenged Mr. Tayler to prove that I had shown any tenderness for rebels or disaffected people and that challenge he passes by in silence. I repudiated on the other hand the policy of rigour towards the people of this country which Mr. Tayler had advocated at the 20th page of his pamphlet and pointed to the inevitable consequence of that policy. The 8th para refers to the same subject but, when I spoke of needless violence and petty annoyance I very probably had in my mind the accounts which I had received on all hands of the terror in which the people of Patna, lived during the months of June and July in consequence of the frequent arrests of respectable persons, the oppression of Gondas and the summary executions which took place as also the annoyance to which they were subjected by being confined to their houses after 8 o'clock. "The state of affairs at Patna is as follows. Some respectable parties of the City are in prison and the subjects are all weary and disgusted with the tyranny and oppression exercised by Government whom they all curse." This is a confidential communication found in the house of one of the conspirators. He does not refer it will be seen to the conspirators themselves but to the people at large. The writer was interested in conveying to his friends a true account of the state of affairs at Patna and there is no reason to doubt that he describes correctly the effect on the general body of the people of Mr. Tayler's proceedings" (para. 15).

"I may leave Mr. Tayler's ideas that the daily sight of the gallows was likely to produce a good effect and that English ladies are fond of such spectacles to speak for themselves. As to matters of fact I will merely observe that the race course at Patna is, as I stated, 4 miles from the city, that it is a small confined place and that the houses of the residents enclose it on two sides. Mr. Tayler's proceeding in putting up a gallows there is precisely the same as if the Sheriff were to erect a gallows in Hyde Park, for the purpose of overawing the inhabitants of Wapping or Rotherhithe" (para. 47).

"Mr. Tayler is quite mistaken about the gallows at Mozufferpore. The place of execution, it is true, is on the race course because the Jail was originally in that neighbourhood but the gallows has never been permitted to remain there after the purpose for which it was erected has been secured and as the race course is not in the station it is not likely that any lady can ever have seen the gallows unless she went for the express purpose" (para. 48).

"I have said in my January letter that there was a very general belief that the majority of the men hung by Mr. Tayler were innocent.

Reports to this effect were current in Calcutta before I came up here and had, I believe, reached the ears of the Lieut. Governor. In the course of the first month or two after my arrival at Patna I noted the names of 14 men who were believed by different people who spoke to me on the subject to have been the victims of false evidence. This memorandum has been lost or mislaid for I cannot now find it. Of the fact that this report was prevalent, however, both here and in Calcutta there can be no doubt" (para. 123).

(c) *Case of Lutf Ali, one of those imprisoned by Mr. Tayler but released by Mr. Samuells.*

"I challenged Mr. Tayler to produce one fact in support of his charges against Lootfally and he gives us 15 paras about his own opinions instead. The fact is now, however, admitted that in the arbitration originated Mr. Tayler's bad opinion of Lootfally. Mr. Tayler had for several years been judge of an adjoining district in which Lootfally had many business transactions but he had never heard anything against him. When he became Commissioner he found Lootfally here acting as a member of the Education Committee and in frequent association with all the gentlemen of the station. Mr. Tayler became arbitrator in the suit between Lootfally and his nephew. Still not a whisper against Lootfally reached him. Even in the arbitration Mr. Tayler discovered nothing against his previous character. All that he wrote to the Magistrate on the subject was in a letter open in some respects to the same objections as those afterwards addressed to Mr. Farquharson¹⁰ that he had found Vilayut Ally's statements in this case to be true and Lootfally's to be false, not a word was said against the general character of the latter. Up to the time of his committing him for trial in fact we hear nothing of his notorious bad character and considering the deep offence which Lootfally had given Mr. Tayler by getting his arbitration set aside and opposing him in the matter of the Industrial School it is certain that Mr. Tayler would not have allowed Lootfally to continue on the Education Committee if he had any good grounds, such as the notoriety of his character for removing him. I stated in my former letter that Mr. Tayler's assertion of Lootf Ally being a man of notoriously bad character was "wholly untrue" and I submit that Mr. Tayler's entire failure to support the assertion together with the strong presumptive evidence I have adduced on the other side fully bears out my statement" (para. 27).

"Mr. Tayler's 70th para affords a good exemplification of the morbid feeling which bears him to regard every question as a personal one. I had seen the papers in Lootf Ally's case before I left Calcutta. I made further enquiries into it on my arrival and came

¹⁰ R. N. Farquharson, Judge of Patna.

to the conclusion at which every one who considers it impartially must arrive that Lootf Ally had been scandalously ill treated and that there was no reason whatever why he should not be received by the gentlemen of the station on the same terms as before his commitment. A decision on the point was absolutely necessary because he was a member of the Local Committee of Public Instruction and had sent to beg he might be permitted to pay his respects. It never for a moment occurred to me that by acting on my own convictions in this matter I could offend Mr. Tayler. In the court in which I had the honor to sit last year it was not usual in deciding an appeal to consider whether our decision would please the Judge whose orders we were reviewing. Mr. Tayler, however, considers that you ought to think only of the Judge's feelings and to disregard those of the suitors, nay, that if a suitor has already suffered injustice you should rather add to that injustice than run the risk of wounding the self love of the Judge who first took up the case. This appears to be a fair statement of his argument. I should rather have added to the indignities which had already been heaped on Lootf Ally though I believed him to have done nothing to deserve them, than have ruffled Mr. Tayler's susceptibility by treating the injured man with common civility. I can truly say that none of my public acts since I have been in this office have had any personal reference to Mr. Tayler nor have been dictated by any spirit of opposition to him. So far too have I been from wishing to apply technical rules of evidence to cases arising out of the mutinies that the Lieutenant Governor will remember I declined to recommend the interference of Government in a case of Mr. Tayler's which formed the subject of a memorial to Government when the parties had been convicted without legal evidence because it seemed to me that there was moral evidence of their guilt and that Mr. Tayler was justified under the circumstances of the country in acting upon such evidence" (para. 35).

(d) *About Kunwar Singh.*

"In the same way the whole of the facts which constitute the charges are imaginary. The Board's order was not ill timed, for it was issued before the mutiny. The communication of the Board's message was not received by Kooer Sing in such a way as to justify Mr. Tayler's description of the probable effect of the measure threatened. Mr. Tayler did not exhibit the energy and promptitude he boasts of. On the contrary it was solely owing to his own carelessness and procrastination that the matter was not settled a month before the mutiny. The Lieutenant Governor did not show any want either of promptitude or decision. Mr. Tayler's assertions that the Lieutenant Governor's dilatory mode of dealing with his recommendation either caused Kooer Sing's rebellion or added one inducement thereto falls entirely to the ground. Mr. Tayler may depend

upon it, it will take much more fencing than he is master of to make any impression on these facts" (para. 74).

"That Kooer Sing sent round a circular to his villages in which he professed his belief that Mr. Tayler had summoned him to Patna for the purpose of hanging him and called upon his tenantry to save him, is a fact which the Magistrate and others in Major Eyre's¹¹ force learnt at Jugdeespore and which is very generally known. A letter which I received from a gentleman in Shahabad who had excellent opportunities for getting at the truth and which without any reference to Mr. Tayler contains among other remarks on the state of the district and the causes of the rebellion the following passage.

"The general opinion and belief is that Kooer Sing's defection was forced on him 1st, by Mr. Tayler's improper treatment of the Wahabees in Patna and 2nd, by the indiscreet language used by Mr. (.....). Could Kooer Sing have relied on Mr. Tayler's justice and impartiality he would have appeared at once notwithstanding Mr. (.....) derogatory threat; but seeing the whole system of hanging going on at Patna at the time and the breach of all honorable engagements indulged in by the head of the district, Kooer Sing in a moment of exasperation and despair of being more honorably treated than others threw off his allegiance to the British government". "Another letter which has been mislaid in giving an account of the share which the different members of Kooer Sing's family took in the rebellion mentions particularly that while Umur Sing and other persons counselled Kooer Sing to obey the Commissioner's summons Hurkissoon Sing who had from the first advocated rebellion, argued the arrest of the Wahabees and the executions at Patna as reasons why he should not trust himself there. The opinion that Kooer Sing did not obey Mr. Tayler's summons for fear of being seized on his arrival so far from being my supposition is very widely spread and certainly has probability on its side" (para. 75).

¹¹ Vincent Eyre who, on his way to Allahabad, relieved the besieged English garrison at Arrah.

A STUDY OF THE LAND REVENUE RECORDS OF TIRHUT* (1783-1838)

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IN the record room of the Muzaffarpur Collectorate there are on the receipt side numerous volumes of English correspondence relating to the land revenue affairs of Tirhut during the Company's period. A study of these records from 1783 to 1838, which is the subject matter of the present paper, reveals very many important and interesting details in connection with the land revenue history not only of Tirhut but of Bengal and Bihar as a whole. Indeed it is possible to re-write the whole land revenue history of these provinces in the light of these records. The various difficulties which faced the Company's Government in collecting information on the existing and former positions of the *mahals*, and in conducting and carrying through the settlement of estates, the extreme recusancy of the zemindars or farmers of revenue in coming to terms with the Government, the great delay in conferring on numerous estates the benefits of a permanent settlement, the extensive system of *khas* management of estates prevailing in the district, the ruthless resumption of jagirs and rent-free tenures for assessment, the irregularities and mistakes often committed by the revenue officers in conducting revenue proceedings and the consequent harassment of the parties concerned, the various kinds of peculiar tenures prevailing in the district, the complications arising out of the formation of alluvial tracts, and the way the Company's Government dealt with the zemindars are all discussed in detail in the letters which the collectors of Tirhut received from various authorities, particularly from the Revenue Board in Calcutta. Gists of and extracts from some of the interesting documents are given below by way of illustrations and will speak for themselves.

It will be worth while to notice at the outset some of the important peculiarities characterizing the history and administration of Tirhut during the period under review. In the first place, the Company's Government had hardly ever to experience any financial deficit in the district. On the contrary, it had almost always a surplus. And it was no mean credit to the district that besides furnishing regular supplies of money to the Commercial Resident of Patna for the Company's annual investment, the Tirhut treasury

* The district of Tirhut then included the present Muzaffarpur and Darbhanga districts.

sent supplies to various other districts of Bengal and Bihar to meet deficiencies. In the records there are numerous references to this. The reasons are obvious. The extreme fertility of the soil, the abundance of rainfall, the floating of large capital by the European indigo planters, and by the Company for opium and saltpetre, were some of the important causes. But added to those there was this important fact that the Government took long to introduce fully the Permanent Settlement into this district, and consequently the revenue was still liable to increase even long after 1793. That itself was a peculiar feature of the revenue history of Tirhut. The fact that Tirhut was a long way off from the headquarters station of the Bengal Presidency, and the peculiar conditions prevailing in the district, were the reasons why the Permanent Settlement was introduced very slowly there. Another important point worthy of note is that there were in Tirhut an unusually large number of revenue-free estates, most of which dated from Mughal times. And the revenue officers were very often hard put to it in finding out the genuineness of the numerous grants alleged to have existed from such times.

A letter of the Revenue Committee to G. F. Grand, Collector of Tirhut, of 25 September 1783, complains of "a very heavy and unusual balance which has fallen in the collections" of the province of Bihar, and states that John Shore has been deputed to Patna, "for the purpose of making a new settlement of the province" and for realizing the heavy arrears. Though Shore succeeded in realizing a part of the arrears, the six years following the settlement of 1783 did not show any considerable improvement in collections. This was partly due to refractoriness of some of the zemindars, who refused to enter into annual *kabuliats* as stipulated in the settlement of 1783.¹

The next important document is the copy of a circular letter from the Governor-General in Council to the Board of Revenue, dated 20 May 1789, containing resolutions on and detailed instructions regarding the ten-yearly settlement of Bihar ordered by the Court of Directors. It is stated in the letter that the settlements be concluded in the first instance with the "actual proprietors of the soil, whether zemindars, chowdrees (*chaudhuris*) or independent talookdars and whether at present paying their revenues to Government through other zemindars or not", and, where there were no proprietors, with the farmers of revenue. This document is particularly important because it draws a distinction between the several classes of persons paying revenue to Government, viz. (i) proprietors of the soil not being zemindars; (ii) proprietors of the soil having the status of zemindars; and (iii) farmers of revenue.

Extract of a letter from Rev. Board, 1 February 1789

The Decennial Settlement of Bihar concluded in 1789-90 was in many cases made permanent in or immediately after 1793. But an immense number of estates, as mentioned above, continued as before. It is very striking that even as late as 1799 no permanent settlement was concluded with the Raja of Darbhanga, the biggest zemindar of Bihar. In the Collectorate records of the years 1789-1799 there are numerous documents relating to Raja Madhu Singh of Darbhanga and his lands. At the formation of the Decennial Settlement in 1790 Raja Madhu Singh having declined to agree to the *jamma* assessed upon his zamindari, it was let in farm to one Burkutullah Khan². On the death of Burkutullah in 1792 his heir declined to continue the lease, whereupon the zamindari was reformed to a number of *thikadars*³ for the remaining period of the Decennial Settlement.⁴ But 1,328 *bighas* of lands denominated *Kamut* remained in possession of the Raja, because the farmers declined to engage for the revenue of these.⁵ The remaining *Kamut* lands, for the revenue of which the farmers engaged in 1792, were assessed by the Collector's Assistant at the rate of Rs. 2-8-0 per *bigha*.⁶ Then in 1793, agreeably to Regulation VIII of that year, the Collector of Tirhut issued a *perwannah* to Raja Madhu Singh desiring him to state whether he would enter into engagements for his lands in Tirhut.⁷ It should be noted that no fixed *jamma* was proposed by the Collector in the *perwannah* and the Raja specified the *jamma* to which he would agree. Subsequently another *perwannah* was issued to the Raja; but this time too no fixed *jamma* was proposed. The Raja made further petitions stating that his *Kamut* lands were over-assessed and finally proposing in 1799 a total *jamma* of his lands in Tirhut which was stated to be Rs. 1,49,227-2-0⁸. In 1800, the Revenue Board accepted the Raja's offer with some modification on the ground that actually no settlement had ever been offered to him at any specific *jamma*, though by Section 82 of Regulation VIII, 1793, the Collector was in the first instance to determine the amount of the assessment. This was indeed a case of gross negligence and irregularity on the part of the Collector and of Government.

Similar and other irregularities occurred from time to time later on not only in Tirhut but also in other districts of the Bengal Presidency. A letter from the Additional Secretary, Sadar Board of Revenue to Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division, of 30 May 1837, states: "Numerous instances having lately been brought to the

² Rev. Board's Consultations, 25 January 1800.

³ Contractors.

⁴ Rev. Board's Consultations, 25 January 1800.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Petition of Raja Madhu Singh, 1899.

⁸ *Ibid.*

notice of the Board, in which estates have been advertized for sale before the expiration of the prescribed period of one month from the date of the arrear falling due, I am directed to request that you will caution the collectors subordinate to you to avoid so great an injustice." A miscellaneous circular from the same to the same, dated 1 August 1837, complains of a "difference of practice having found to exist notwithstanding previous orders on the subject as to the mode of effecting sales of estates under butwara"⁹, in some cases the whole estate with its entire *jamma* being advertized for sale, while in others portions only of the estate being advertized. Similarly a letter from the Commissioner of Bhagalpur to the Collector of Tirhut of 18 April 1838, draws the particular attention of the Collector to the fact that "in some instances advertizements for the sale of lands for arrears of revenue have been issued at the expiration of 30 days after the expiration of the Fusslee or Bengali month in which the kist¹⁰ fell due, instead of on the first day of the succeeding English month," as prescribed by the rules.

There can be no doubt that such irregularities caused great hardship and injustice to the parties concerned. A similar injustice was caused by the extraordinary misconception of the orders of Government, under which the collectors rejected bids at the auction sales on the ground of inadequacy of prices¹¹. But a much greater source of hardship was the ruthless resumption of rent-free tenures for assessment by over-zealous revenue officers without proper and thorough enquiries as to the validity of such tenures. Moreover, a letter from the Special Deputy Collector of Tirhut to the Commissioner of Saran of 6 December 1833, reports that "the Board (Sadar Board) are deeply sensible of the injustice and breach of public faith involved in the extreme delay that has taken place throughout your division in bestowing where Jagheers have been lapsed or rent-free tenures have been resumed the benefits of a permanent settlement upon those proprietors of the soil who are unquestionably entitled to that immunity under the law of 1793". Likewise in a circular letter to the Collector of Tirhut, dated 18 December 1833, the Commissioner of Saran refers among other things to "the continued injustice sustained by the landholders by the present extensive system of khas management or temporary engagements" with farmers of revenue. According to the Commissioner of Patna, the khas management of estates was responsible for "abuses and speculations and the deterioration of the estates."¹²

⁹ Partition.

¹⁰ Instalment.

¹¹ From Secretary, Sadar Board, to Commissioner of Bhagalpur, 4 September 1838.

¹² Letter to Collector of Saran, 10 April 1834

The extent of the resumption of the lapsed jagirs and other revenue-free tenures was indeed very considerable in Tirhut between 1820 and 1838. In 1833-34, for example, as many as sixty-four estates were resumed; and in the following year ninety-one were proposed to be resumed¹³. The over-zealousness on the part of the revenue officers sometimes led the Government to restrain the action of such officers in the interests of justice and equity. In a circular letter to the Sadar Board of Revenue of 2 May 1837, the Secretary, Revenue Department, writes that "His Lordship is very anxious that no unnecessary alarm should be given to landholders by the institution of suits on insufficient grounds to establish the liability to assessment of lands attached to permanently settled mahals."

The difficulties of effecting settlements with the proprietors or revenue farmers in Tirhut are set forth in several letters of the Special Deputy Collector to the Commissioner of Bhagalpur and the Collector of Tirhut. These were the excessive time taken in travelling from village to village, the great expenses attending settlement proceedings, the different modes of land measurement prevailing in different parganas, the extreme recusancy on the part of the zemindars to come to a settlement with Government, the absence of reliable records of rights, the officers generally having to depend on the "vague and uncertain records" in the possession of *kanungoes* and *patwaris*, the "habitual dishonesty" of these people, and the habit of sometimes producing forged documents before the officers in order to establish the right to exemption from the payment of rents. In the midst of these difficulties the settlement proceedings had to be carried on. And it frequently happened that the parties suffered grave injustice in the hands of the revenue officers. One example of injustice remains to be noticed, and that is that the revenue officers of Tirhut at their own discretion and contrary to law sometimes reduced the *malikanah*¹⁴ payable to recusant proprietors of estates to 5 per cent. The attention of Government was drawn to this irregularity, and it was pointed out that the revenue officers had no right to act thus in contravention of the law.

Lastly, it is worthy of note that before the introduction of the Permanent Settlement the term "proprietors of the soil" was frequently used in Bihar to designate a class of zemindars, and it continued to be used throughout the period under review. In view of this it may be doubted whether the Permanent Settlement for the first time created hereditary proprietors of the soil, as is commonly believed.

¹³ From Special Deputy Collector of Tirhut to Commissioner of Monghyr, 4 August 1834.

¹⁴ Allowance paid to proprietors of estates for temporarily dispossessing them of their estates.

AMAR SING LETTERS

S. GOPALAN

Honorary Secretary, Saraswathy Mahal Library, Tanjore

EKOJI, alias Venkaji, the brother of the Great Shivaji, founded the Maratha kingdom of Tanjore by seizing it from the hands of the Naiks in 1676. Raja Amar Sing was one of his descendants and he ruled from 1786 to 1798.

Before he became king, he was regent for the infant King Serfoji, who was adopted as son by Raja Thulaja, the previous ruler. Both Thulaja and Amar Sing were the sons of Raja Pratap, but Amar Sing was said to be the son by a 'sword-wife'. As regent, Amar Sing plotted to become the king himself. He questioned the validity of Serfoji's adoption and induced the East India Company to set up a commission to go into the question. The commission headed by Sir Archibald Campbell came to Tanjore and, after examining some Pundits, produced by Amar Sing, declared the adoption void. So the boy was unseated and Amar Sing became the king.

Schwartz, the Danish missionary, then at Tanjore, who was an intimate friend of Serfoji's adoptive father Thulaja, espoused the cause of the unfortunate boy especially as Amar Sing was subjecting him to ill-treatment. Finally he succeeded in inducing the East India Company to reverse its verdict and declare the adoption valid. Serfoji was again placed on the throne in 1798 and Amar Sing had to retire into obscurity.

Except for his cruelty to Serfoji, Amar Sing seems to have been a good ruler and liked by the people. Although he ascended the throne with the help of the East India Company, he fought against their influence as long as he was the ruler. Naturally this brought him into clash with the English and their revised opinion about the validity of the adoption, though a just one, was not wholly a judicial matter.

Almost from the commencement of his reign, Amar Sing was intriguing with the Maratha powers to eliminate the British from the country. His chief trouble was the periodical demand by the Nawab of the Carnatic for exorbitant amounts as arrears of tributes due from Tanjore. When Raja Thulaja was reigning, the Nawab put forth a claim for a fabulous amount. The East India Company at Madras supported him. The Raja was unable to pay and the

combined forces of the Company and the Nawab invaded Tanjore in 1773, imprisoned the King and ruled over Tanjore for three years till 1776 when the Court of Directors in England disapproved the transaction and sent Lord Pigot as Governor to restore Thulaja to the throne. (This incident is referred to in one of the letters). But this did not prevent the Nawab from reviving his claims and the British at Madras from backing him, in later years, especially during the reign of Amar Sing.

So Amar Sing conceived the idea of raising a big army to drive the British out of Tanjore, if not India.

He negotiated, chiefly with Nana Farnavis, Madhava Rao, Ahalya Bai, Mahadji Sindhia, Chatrapati Shivaji and Tukkoji Holkar. His ambassadors were Taponidhi Kasi Vasi Kumaragurupara Goswami and Narasinga Rao Bhonsle, who are referred to in these letters¹. It is needless to say that the plot was exposed and this culminated in Amar Sing's deposition in 1798.

A word has to be said about the Taponidhi Kasi Vasi Kumaragurupara Goswami. He belonged to the famous Saivite institution, famous in South India as the Kasi Mutt at Tiruppanandal. Its founder was a great saint called Kumaragurupara whose learning, piety, and miraculous powers won universal admiration throughout our country, and whose poetical compositions of a didactic character are among the great Tamil classics. The present Madathipathi Srilasri Kasivasi Arulnandi Thambiram Swamigal is equally renowned for his piety, erudition, linguistic attainments and generous contributions for every worthy cause.

The Heads of the Mutt were good friends and counsellors of the Tanjore kings and it is no wonder that in the days of Amar Sing's troubles the Taponidhi came forward to help him and fight out the British and the Muslims.

There is internal evidence in some of the letters that they relate to the year 1789. There must have been other letters lost to us. It is also unfortunate that the replies from the great Maratha powers have been lost, except for one reply from Savai Sadashiva Rao.

The letters do not throw up any startling fact. Their main theme consists in importunities for urgent action to liberate Tanjore. Indirectly they reveal the desperate straits to which Amar Sing was reduced in his feeble fight for liberty.

¹ The correspondence which forms the subject of this paper is at present available in the Saraswathy Mahal Library, Tanjore.

At the end of the letters, we find office instructions to indite them on gilded papers, put them in ornamental envelopes and cover them up in a velvet packet.

The gist of some of the letters is given below:—

Amar Sing to Nana Farnavis (n.d.)

Refers to earlier letters in this connection. Importunes Nana Farnavis to liberate Tanjore from the British. Narasinga Rao and Taponidhi Goswami would personally meet him and give further information.

Amar Sing to Madhava Rao, Poona, (n.d.)

The family of the Peshwas is famous from Kailas to Kanyakumari. He alone could save Tanjore. Narasinga Rao and Taponidhi are mentioned.

Amar Sing to Ahalya Bai, (1789)

Her family had helped Tanjore previously. She should help to liberate Tanjore. The same messengers are mentioned.

Narasinga Rao Bhonsle and Lingoji Rao Bhonsle to Mahadji Sindia

The Maharaja has written a brief letter to you. You have helped Tanjore on prior occasions. When we were last in Poona you defeated at Thalgaon your foe Raghoba Rao who attacked you with the aid of the English and you took him prisoner. In the treaty that followed, Madhava Rao Sadashiva Rao put in a clause that Tanjore should not be molested any more. Now Tanjore is under trouble. You must not be indifferent now. Kasi Vasi Taponidhi Kumaragurupara Goswamigal has come to see you. He will tell you everything. Please make secret arrangements.

Amar Sing to Mahadji Sindia (1789)

You have helped my kingdom already. Now it is being plagued by the British. Taponidhi Goswami is being sent to you. Narasinga Rao Bhonsle is writing to you. Please help us and win glory.

Narasinga Rao Bhonsle to Nana Farnavis (Margasirsha Sudha, no year)

When Lord Pigot restored Tulaja to the throne, he stationed four regiments at Tanjore, at an annual cost of Rs. 14,00,000 payable by the king. Later the British insisted on the king paying large amounts demanded by the Nawab of the Carnatic. King Tulaja protested and told Pigot that the Nawab when he invaded Tanjore had carried away large booty worth several lakhs. So Pigot released the Raja from the obligation to pay the Nawab. When Amar Sing succeeded, the English told him that on orders from Bengal they had to insist on payment to the Nawab of annual tribute of Rs. 24,50,000. We were unable to pay so much and there was an unpaid balance of

Rs. 12,25,000. The English asked us to pay the amount or surrender the kingdom to them. The Raja handed over all his properties and those of his subordinates and dependents and even then a balance of Rs. 3,50,000 was found due. This he agreed to pay up in three annual instalments. We do not know what will happen this year. The English threaten to annex the country. So the Raja has asked me to write to you. He has himself addressed you in writing for help. When I met you last you promised to help. Taponidhi Goswami will tell you everything.

Chhatrapati Shivaji of Satara to Raja Amar Sing (Sravana Sudha Pratham, no year)

You have said in your letter that Europeans (Nivata Kavachars) are growing from strength to strength and that you are praying day and night for their overthrow. I had written to you to send accredited officers to discuss plans with me. But none came. I hear that Sastri and Karkoon have proceeded to Poona for discussion. You will discover in a few days that I am planning to overthrow the British. Rajesri Ghantke Jhunjar Rao will give you particulars as ordered by me. (The letter bears the seal of Satara with the words: "Mariyadeyam Virajate").

To Tukkoji Holkar (month of Jilhej, Bhudhwar, no year)

We are surprised to have had no letters from you. The Toppiars (Toppiwalas) are giving increasing trouble. Lord Hobart at Madras is using coercive methods which I am unable to describe. So liberate us from the Toppiwalas.

To Nana Farnavis (month of Jilhej, Bhudhwar, no year)

We are sorry not to have heard from you for a long time. Please write. You made yourself famous by putting Savai Baji Rao, on the throne. Your attachment to Tanjore is well-known. Liberate us from Toppiwalas. Lord Hobart is causing trouble. He arrested our Cirkheel Sivarayar. The Governor of Bengal intervened and had him released. Lord Hobart is therefore very angry. Please inform Savai Baji Rao about all this and take steps to liberate us. You will get further particulars from Vasudeva Dikshit and the letter of Cirkheel Siva Rao.

SIKH-NEPAL RELATIONS, 1839-40

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IN THE thirties of the last century Nepal was trying to seek opportunities of courting an alliance with the Lahore Darbar, the only other independent State in India. The British Government did not favour these transactions and Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who was determined to maintain friendly relations with the British, positively discouraged these overtures.

In 1834 the Court of Nepal sent an intelligent officer named Karbir Singh, a Nepalese Khatri, to tour different states in India. He also visited Lahore. Ranjit Singh immediately consulted Wade, British Political Agent at Ludhiana, and at his suggestion the Maharaja abruptly dismissed him.

This did not deter the court of Nepal from pursuing the object of its wishes. In 1835 another mission consisting of Karbir Singh and Kalu Singh arrived at Lahore. The Maharaja again showed no warmth which was so characteristic of him, and the mission left in disappointment.

In 1838 the Government of Nepal sent to Lahore an emissary of high standing in the person of General Matabar Singh who appeared in the neighbourhood of Amritsar. His arrival coincided with Lord Auckland's visit to the Panjab. Ranjit Singh displayed his usual deference to the views and wishes of the British Government, and on receiving intimation he assured the Governor-General that he would not admit the Gorkha General to an interview. The Maharaja strictly fulfilled his pledge in spite of the fact that many attempts were made to divert him from his purpose.

The person who was chiefly responsible for the direct interchange of letters and presents between the two courts was Devi Singh who had taken up service with Raja Dhyan Singh. He was formerly a broker in horses and elephants. He accompanied Sardar Gujar Singh who was bound for Calcutta. On their arrival at Banaras he persuaded the Sardar to send a couple of horses as a present to the Maharaja of Nepal. When he arrived at Khatmandu he passed them off as gifts from the ruler of the Panjab, and prevailed on the Nepal Maharaja to send some elephants in return. With these he passed through the British territory until the elephants were

detained at Ludhiana. In compliance with solicitations of Ranjit Singh's wakil they were allowed to proceed to Lahore. On receiving the elephants the Maharaja observed to Wade that "Devi Singh was habitually given to cheating and lived by his wits in that way".

Ranjit Singh died in June 1839, and was succeeded by his eldest son Maharaja Kharak Singh. During his regime most of the important state affairs were managed by his youthful and promising son Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh. Being rather bold and daring the Kanwar saw no objection to receive General Matabar Singh who had been living in the Panjab since his arrival.

The Court of Nepal sent to Lahore an emissary named Surat Singh with letters of condolence. He was accompanied by Basant Gir Gosain, Hari Gir and Kishan Gir. The Gosain opened communications with Nau Nihal Singh through Bhai Ram Singh. On being introduced to the Kanwar the Gosain presented him a letter along with a rich dress made of fur and valued at Rs. 5,000. He also presented a piece of Chinese brocade to Bhai Ram Singh. Maharaja Kharak Singh was kept ignorant of the Gosain's presence in the capital.

The Nepal Darbar continued to send letters and messengers regularly to Lahore via Doti, Pilibhit, Hardwar and Kangra. In October 1839, a party consisting of four persons named Albel Singh, Ganga Singh, Buddhu Singh and Nathu Singh reached Khatmandu from Lahore. They declared themselves dealers in horses, but they were suspected to be political emissaries.

It was supposed that Sardar Lahna Singh Majithia favoured alliance with Nepal. A report stated that the Sardar among various scientific pursuits was fond of the study of astrology. For this he was indebted to a Brahmin named Balkishan, the domestic priest of Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh. Balkishan had a patron at Banaras named Durga Shankar Pathak. Durga Shankar was also the patron of the spiritual adviser of the Maharaja of Nepal. At Lahna Singh's advice Balkishan persuaded Nau Nihal Singh to invite Durga Shankar to Lahore and a sum of Rs. 1,500 was remitted to him for his travelling expenses. Durga Shankar was stated to have taken the horoscope of Nepal's ruler and he was to cast one of Nau Nihal Singh.

Hodgson, the British Resident in Nepal, reported in January 1840, that a letter had been received from General Matabar Singh by the Nepal Court. It said that the purpose for which he had been deputed to Lahore was likely to be accomplished owing to the ascendancy of Nau Nihal Singh and his "supposed disposition to favour the English alliance less than his grandfather". Hodgson was of opinion that "Nau Nihal Singh may pretend friendship for the

Company's Government, but he does not feel it. The Bara Sahib may be assured that Nepal is bent upon a union with Lahore and that Lahore is bent on a union with Nepal".

Matabar Singh's statement was accepted by the Nepal Court, but they suspected the General's sincerity and honesty. In their opinion the General wished to remove his family from Nepal. His confidant Kalu Jamadar was there to effect escape of his own family as well as of Matabar Singh. The reason for this was that in the absence of the General a change had taken place in the Government of Nepal. The Thapas had fallen out of power and were succeeded by the Kala Pandays. The latter were neither known nor esteemed outside Nepal, while the Thapas enjoyed both the privileges. They were therefore obliged to use Thapas for establishing an alliance with the Sikhs.

The British Resident in Nepal remarked that this eagerness has "blinded the Darbar to the folly of trusting the Thapas and their friends". He further stated that General Matabar Singh was playing his cards consummately "with no other purpose than to betray it".

Another person who was suspected by the British to be instrumental in bringing about friendship between the courts of Lahore and Khatmandu was Bhupal Singh Thapa. He was a son of the late celebrated Amar Singh Thapa and was employed as a captain in the French Legion of the Sikhs. He had proceeded on leave towards the end of 1837 and taken service with the Government of Nepal. He had a brother named Arjun Singh Thapa in the Sikh service through whom he maintained his communication with Lahore. The British Resident in Nepal reported that in February 1840, letters had been received at Khatmandu through Arjun Singh and Bhupal Singh from Lahore. As a result the turban and sword of the Maharaja of Nepal for Nau Nihal Singh were kept ready for transmission. In April 1840, Hodgson came to know that Bhupal Singh Thapa who was in command of Nepalese troops at Doti was ordered by the Nepal Court to proceed to Lahore on a political mission. Bhupal Singh wrote to Ranjor Singh Thapa in July 1840, saying that sufficient progress had been made for the projected exchange of turbans and swords between the two courts.

Harprashad, a Brahmin of Shamli in Muzaffarnagar district, and an old spy of the Nepal Court, reached Khatmandu from Lahore, early in July 1840. He was alleged to have brought two letters, one from Nau Nihal Singh to the Maharaja, and the other from his mother to the senior Maharani. Haridas, a saint much in the confidence of the Maharani, was sent to Lahore through Rajputana. Hast Bir Khawas, the Governor of Jumla, and in the Maharaja's confi-

dence, also conducted correspondence with the Sikhs. No exchange of turbans and swords took place owing to British vigilance.

At this time Sardar Atar Singh went on a pilgrimage to the Gangetic provinces for the good of the late Maharaja's soul. On reaching Banaras he informed the Court of Nepal that he had some important communications to make. As he feared to come to Khatmandu he requested the Darbar to send some confidential agent to him. The Nepalese Court ordered Captain Karbir Singh to go. As Karbir Singh delayed, Atar Singh was requested to come to Khatmandu.

Sardar Atar Singh declined to visit Khatmandu and resolved to proceed to Gaya. The Nepal Court therefore decided to send its emissaries to meet Atar Singh either at Banaras or at Gaya. A party of secret agents was furnished with five *Kharitas*, two letters, a draft of the proposed treaty between Lahore and Nepal, a quantity of valuable jewels and 1,300 tolas of silver. The party left Khatmandu on 6 September 1840, for Palpa where it was expected to reach about 18 September. From there it was to proceed to Gorakhpur which was 6 to 8 marches distant. The party consisted of ten persons headed by Captain Karbir Singh and Har Prashad. In an armlet (*bazooband*) which Har Prashad always wore on his arm was enclosed the draft of the treaty. The five *kharitas* were addressed to Maharaja Kharak Singh, Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh, Maharani Chand Kanwar, Raja Dhyan Singh and Sardar Atar Singh. The two letters were written to Govind Ram and Matabar Singh.

The subject matter of the treaty as proposed by the Court of Nepal reads as follows:

"The interests of the Khalsa Sarkar and of the Gorkha Sarkar have become one. On this account if any trouble or attack (Bhir) falls upon the Khalsa Sarkar from the English or others (*Malechh Adi*) the Gorkha Sarkar will aid the Khalsa with all its means of money and troops. So if any trouble or attack by English or others (*Malechh Adi*) falls on the Gorkha Sarkar, the Khalsa Sarkar will come to its aid with all its means of money and troops.

"Both Sarkars have agreed to the above terms and ratified them by this solemn treaty (Dharm Patra). Whichever party violates this treaty, may the gods (Pasupati and Gajeswari) punish them in this world and the next; and if they keep the treaty, the gods will advance their welfare here and hereafter.

"This treaty shall hold and have effect from generation to generation".

The following ornaments were supplied to the party as presents:
 For Maharaja Kharak Singh: One pair of diamond bangles,
 One necklace of 66 pearls.
 For Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh: do. do.
 For Maharani Chand Kanwar: One dukduki of diamonds and
 (from the Maharani of punnahs,
 Nepal). One necklace of 49 pearls and
 4 drops.

The secret service of the British was functioning very efficiently, and the British authorities were in the know of all that was happening. No longer did this party leave Khatmandu than the British Resident in Nepal issued immediate instructions to R. Reade, Magistrate, Gorakhpur, to arrest the whole party on their entering the British territory. The draft of the treaty and the presents never reached Lahore, and all these secret attempts failed to bear any fruit.

Sources

Foreign Department, Secret Consultations, dated 5 February, 1840, Nos. 58, 116; 23 March, 1840, Nos. 115, 116; 27 April, 1840, No. 119; 11 May, 1840, No. 91; 20 July, 1840, No. 61; 17 August, 1840, No. 79; 21 September, 1840, Nos. 138, 142 (available at National Archives of India, New Delhi).

CHINESE "FRONTIER GATES"

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ON January 1, 1886, Lord Dufferin proclaimed the annexation of Upper Burma to the British Empire and the whole of the north-eastern frontier of Burma became conterminous with the Chinese province of Yunnan. In July 1886, the Burma-China Convention was signed by which, Britain agreed to abandon Tibetan mission and China waived her claims of suzerainty over Burma,¹ recognized the annexation of the country by Great Britain and agreed to settle the frontier between Burma and Yunnan by amicable negotiations².

In the frontier negotiations that followed, the Chinese claimed all territory lying to the east of the Upper Irrawaddy³. Great Britain found difficulty in accepting the Chinese demands. Lord Kimberley, the Secretary of State for India, recorded "his strong conviction that on political, strategical, commercial and administrative grounds, it is not possible.....to admit any of the Chinese demands in this quarter"⁴. He was willing to make large concessions of territory to the east of Salween, and his whole object was to find out a scientific frontier, which would settle the question for all time to come⁵.

The quest of a suitable frontier led to the discovery of the Chinese "Frontier Gates" on the Burma-Yunnan border, marking the western limits of the Chinese Empire⁶. It considerably helped in settling a suitable frontier between the two Empires. The story of the Chinese

¹ Extracts from *Chinese Annals* translated by E. H. Parker. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, March 1893, nos. 531-542. Burma had recognized Chinese supremacy for a long time past. After the final failure of the Chinese in the campaign of 1769, Burma refused to send tributes to China, which was again continued since 1790 by King Meng Yun. He sent decennial tribute missions to China indicating only formal recognition of Chinese supremacy, the real motive being to obtain trade facilities.

² *Moral & Material Progress & Condition of India* (1886-87). 162; Article III of Burma-China Convention of 24 July 1886.

³ India Office to Foreign Office, London. Letter dated 17 December 1892. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, February 1893, no. 23.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*; N. R. O'Connor, British Ambassador in China to Lord Rosebery, British Foreign Secretary, dated 4 May 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, October 1893 no. 224. Contains a report of the British intentions regarding the frontier question as conveyed to China.

⁶ Extracts relating to the Yunnan-Bhamo "Frontier Gates" translated from the *Annals of Momein* by E. H. Parker, dated 14 March 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, September 1893, no. 27.

frontier "Gates" (forts or military posts), "Kwans" as the Chinese called them, is very fascinating⁷.

The whole of the Burma-China frontier is situated among high mountains covered with wild and dense forests almost impenetrable; besides the various rivers flowing in the region, many streams, streamlets and rivulets can be found within every few miles. From time immemorial neither the Chinese nor the Burmese had dared to explore this region and regarded their frontiers to be where these high mountains became visible. Only navigable rivers and roads passing through mountain gorges were known to the people and the two Governments satisfied themselves by exercising some authority in these parts. In the last decade of the 19th century, during the Burma-China frontier negotiations, Mr. E. H. Parker's bold and enterprising work translating *Momein Annals* (official Chinese records) into English revealed the existence of eight Chinese ancient frontier "gates"⁸. They provided a good evidence of the existing frontier conditions and it only remained to locate the exact position of the "gates" to conclusively prove their existence. In 1893, after the translation of the *Momein Annals* into English, three of the gates were identified by joint parties of the British and the Chinese, because their position was doubtful, the rest being clear. They were considerably to the east of the upper Irrawaddy valley. The search parties also described the structures of the three gates. Thus, on the basis of Chinese records and local enquiry, the origin, situation, identification, structure and objects of these "gates" are described below:—

In the province of Yunnan, Momein "Sub-Prefecture" or division lies adjacent to the north-east Burmese frontier. Before 1594 A.D., the frontier gates or military posts of China were close to the city of Momein⁹. But in that year, Governor Ch'ên Yung-pin established "the eight gates" marking the west frontier of Momein as a precaution against Burma. These Chinese precautionary measures displeased Burma. But she could not do anything against the great and powerful Chinese Empire and such was the origin of the "gates". In the *Momein Annals* published in 1888, there is a full description of

⁷ Diary of W. Warry, Adviser on Chinese Affairs in Burma, dated 19 September 1893. For. & Pol. Progs., A, Sec. E, November 1893, no. 593. Refers to Huchu Kwan as "ancient fort or gateway". Evidently, the Chinese Frontier "Gates" or "Kwans" were similar to British small forts or posts. They were erected on important roads and contained small garrisons for the purpose of defining the frontier and checking any possible Burmese invasion.

⁸ Extracts relating to the Yunnan—Bhamo Frontier Gates translated from the *Annals of Momein* by E. H. Parker, dated 14 March 1893, For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, September 1893, no. 27.

⁹ E. H. Parker's letter to British Foreign Office, dated 20 April 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, October 1893, no. 212. Burma Confidential Print Section 37.

the eight gates, interior gates and narrows, roads leading to Burma and the tribes residing in the neighbourhood of the gates¹⁰.

The situation of the gates arranged in order from South to North is as follows:—

1. The Hanlung Gate
2. The T'ien-ma Gate
3. The Hukü Gate
4. The T'ieh-pih Gate
5. The T'ung-pih Gate
6. The Kü-shih Gate
7. The Wan-jên Gate
8. The Shên-hu Gate¹¹.

1. *The Hanlung Gate*.—The *Momein Annals* of 1888 admit that it had fallen into the hands of Theinni (Burma) by 1770 and since then remained in Burmese hands. The gate is on the left bank of the Shweli river near the junction of that river with the Namwan river and west of the town of Namkham.

2. *The T'ien-ma Gate*.—According to *Momein Annals*, it had also fallen into Burmese hands by 1770 and since then has remained under Burmese control. It is situated in the Pang K'an Hills. It is 6½ miles north-west of Hanlung Gate and is described in the *Momein Annals* as the western frontier of the Chinese town of Mong Mao.

3. *The Hukü Gate*.—In the *Momein Annals*, it is described 500 li¹² south of Momein in the Pang-Hang Hills. It is nearly 16 miles north of T'ien-ma Gate. River Taping runs nearly 33½ miles north of it, and the river Namwan 16½ miles east of it. The precise situation of these three gates was not then clear from the available records.

4. *The T'ieh-pih Gate*.—According to *Momein Annals*, it is situated 480 li south of Momein in the Tenglien Hills. It can be conveniently placed south of the river Taping and nearly 23½ miles north of the Hukü Gate. This gate is mentioned in the accounts of the Burmese embassies sent to China in 1790, 1823, 1833, 1853, 1874 etc. These accounts identify the gate with Lewèlàing chokey or guard —5 or 6

¹⁰ Extracts relating to the Yunnan—Bhamo Frontier Gates translated from the *Annals of Momein* by E. H. Parker, dated 14 March 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, September 1893, no. 27.

¹¹ Confidential Report on the Frontier Gates by H. T. White. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, September 1893 no. 104. White's report is based on Parker's account of Chinese "Frontier Gates" and "Mountain & Rivers" from *Momein Annals*; Diaries of W. Warry—Adviser on Chinese Affairs in Burma, E.H. Parker—off. Adviser on Chinese Affairs in Burma, H.F. Hertz A.S.P., Bhamo, Records from Chinese Imperial Archives, Account of Momein *Sawbwas* or headmen and local information gathered by British officers.

¹² Diary of W. Warry, Adviser on Chinese Affairs in Burma, dated 19 September 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, November 1893, no. 593. The (Momein) *Annals* place Huchu (Huku) Gate 500 li or 100 Miles South west of "Momein". The Chinese 5 li is equal to 1 British mile.

miles east of Lwelon and of the Kachin village of Matin. It is well known as the "Iron Wall Gate" (Lat. 24°19' North and Long. 97°47' East).

5. *The Tung-pih Gate*—Described in the *Momein Annals* 320 li south of Momein in Nantien territory at Puling Hills. It is placed 33½ miles north-west of the Taping river and 6½ miles from Kadu (Lat. 24°36' North and Long. 97°40' East).

6. *The Kü-shih Gate*—Described in the *Momein Annals* 330 li south of Momein in the Hukiang Sih-ma Hills. It is the west boundary of Chinese Sanda, 63½ miles south-west of Wan-jên Gate. Local information supplied to Parker and Hertz places it at 6 miles east of the Chinese Soma Pa or Sima plains also called Ta Sima or Greater Sima. It is a very long day's walk south-east of British Sima post (Fort Morton) known as lesser Sima (Lat. 24°45' North and Long. 97°45' East).

7. *The Wan-jên Gate*—Described in the *Momein Annals* 300 li south of Momein on the top of the Mengling Hills marking the northern limits of Sanda. It is to the south-west of Shên-hu Gate. According to local information obtained by Parker, it is at Meungtien or 6½ miles north-east of it. According to Hertz it is 2½ miles south-west of Seden. It is certainly near Meungtien. It is a long day's walk north-east of Sima post (Fort Morton) (Lat. 25°1' North and Long. 98°7' East).

8. *The Shên-hu Gate*—Described in the *Momein Annals* 180 li south-west of Momein in the Meung Kah Hills. It is near the source of the Taping. Local information places it 6½ miles from Seden and to the north of Sansi. It is about a day's easy walk east of British Sadon post (Fort Harrison) (Lat. 25°7' North and Long. 98°7' East)¹³.

Having described the situation of the eight gates, it will now be proper to narrate the circumstances leading to the identification of the three doubtful gates—Hukü, T'ien-ma and Hanlung, and then describe their structures as revealed by the investigation.

Erected in 1594 A.D., these ancient forts for more than a century and a half effectively guarded Chinese frontier. After the failure of the Chinese in the campaign of 1769, the two gates—T'ien-ma and Hanlung fell permanently into Burmese hands¹⁴. In 1790, Burmese King Méng Yun sent customary tributes to China and only formally

¹³ The account of the above gates is based on Parker's translation of the *Momein Annals*, his letter to British foreign office and White's report on the Frontier Gates—all referred above.

¹⁴ Extracts relating to Yunnan—Bhamo "Frontier Gates" translated from the *Annals of Momein* by E. H. Parker dated 14 March 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, September 1893, no. 27.

recognized Chinese supremacy¹⁵. There was no more possibility of any Burmese invasion or encroachment on China and so the Chinese took no care of these "Kwans". They were practically abandoned and with the passage of time decayed and ruined¹⁶. In the Burma-China frontier negotiations conducted in London, in 1893, China pleaded for the retention of all of them—the unidentified gates to be restored to her after their location¹⁷—on "national and sentimental" grounds¹⁸. This could not be agreed upon by the British Government, as the "Kwans" may lie within their important administrative area and it was decided to ascertain the position of the gates and decide the issue permanently¹⁹. As a result, the Chinese Ambassador in London, telegraphed to the Yunnan Viceroy to instruct Momein authorities to send a Chinese Officer to Bhamo to show the exact position of the doubtful "Kwans" to any British Officer²⁰.

The Chinese Deputies P'eng and Yeh with their party arrived at Bhamo on the 2nd November 1893²¹, the former being the Officer in-charge. From the British side W. Warry, Adviser on Chinese Affairs in Burma, and E. Martini, Dist. Superintendent of Police, Bhamo, and party accompanied the Deputies to locate the gates. It was decided to proceed to Ponkan Hills first to locate the Hukü, then proceed to Mawsi for the T'ien-ma, and last of all to Namkham for the Hanlung²².

The party left Bhamo on the 17th November 1893 and reached Pangtap—a distance of 25 miles on the 20th November²³. The place is generally spoken of as Ponkan Hill after the powerful Ponkan Kachin Sawbwa. It is 2 miles west of Karwan, the chief village and residence of the Ponkan Sawbwa²⁴. The remains of the Huchu

¹⁵ Extracts from Tung-Hwa-Lu or officially published records of Imperial Archives of China translated by E. H. Parker. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, February 1893, no. 38.

¹⁶ Diary of W. Warry, Adviser on Chinese Affairs in Burma dated 25 November 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, January 1894, no. 385.

¹⁷ Foreign Office to India Office, London. Report of the meeting of 8 August 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, November 1893, no. 19. Burma Confidential Print Sec. 47. Burma China negotiations were carried on in London between representatives of the Chinese Legation and British Foreign Office.

¹⁸ Foreign Office Memorandum regarding Burma—China Frontier dated 15 December 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, February 1894, no. 322.

¹⁹ Foreign Office to Indian Office. Report of the Meeting of 10 August 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, November 1893, no. 23. Burma Confidential Print Section 47.

²⁰ Letter from Foreign Office to India Office dated 23 August 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, November 1893, no. 46. Burma Confidential Print—Section 48.

²¹ Diary of W. Warry dated 2 November 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, December 1893, no. 12.

²² Diary of W. Warry dated 7 November 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, December 1893, no. 14.

²³ Letter of E. Martini D. S. P., Bhamo on deputation with the Chinese deputies, to Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, dated 16 January 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, June 1894, no. 273.

²⁴ Diary of W. Warry from 17 November to 23 November 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, January 1894, no. 384.

(so called in Chinese) Gate were found about $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile south of Pantap village on a disused road, which is said to have led at one time to Bhamo. The Hukü Gate, thus appears to be only at a distance of $25\frac{1}{2}$ miles by road from Bhamo²⁵. Warry wrote, "It may be mid-way between the T'ien-ma and T'ieh-pih gates being 18 miles distant from either and 100 miles from Momein"²⁶. (Lat. $24^{\circ} 4'$ North and Long. $97^{\circ} 33'$ East)²⁷.

Regarding the structure of the Hukü Gate, Martini writes, "The remains consist of a breastwork of stone in semi-circular shape, built across a gorge through which the road ran (to Bhamo),—a fallen archway, two Chinese tombs,—(and) near the gate to the right are also two brick kilns in a perfect state of preservation..... The place must at one time have been of some importance and that the structure must have been erected by skilled workmen—"²⁸. Later, the Commissioner, North Division, Burma, visited the Hukü Gate and finding the "Stone work rough and unfinished" and relying on Kachin version "the hill where the army encamped" declared the gate as a "fortified camp" during the last war between Burma and China²⁹. The Commissioner's version does not appear to be tenable in view of large documentary evidence and local examination conducted by the Chinese Deputies, Warry and Martini.

The T'ien-ma Gate was located on 25 November 1893³⁰ about 2 miles south of Mawsui³¹. Warry says that it is $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Mawsui, which is 50 miles from Bhamo by road³². It may be added that Mawsui is on Pangkan Hills. Thus T'ien-ma gate is nearly 52 miles from Bhamo. (Lat. $23^{\circ} 48'$ North and Long. $97^{\circ} 20'$ East).

²⁵ Letter of E. Martini, D. S. P., Bhamo, on deputation with the Chinese deputies, to Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, dated 16 January 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, June 1894, no. 273.

²⁸ Warry's letter to Chief Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Burma, no. 38, dated 24 November 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, January 1894, no. 386.

²⁷ Chief Commissioner, Burma, to India Government. Telegram dated 5 November 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, January 1894, no. 359.

²⁸ Letter of E. Martini, D. S. P., Bhamo, on deputation with the Chinese deputies, to Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, dated 16 January 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, June 1894, no. 273.

²⁹ Viceroy's Secret External despatch to Secretary of State for India, no. 36 dated 7 March 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, June 1894, no. 279. Letter of Commissioner, North Division, Burma, no. 927-16, dated 1 February 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, June 1894, no. 277.

³⁰ Letter of E. Martini D. S. P., Bhamo, on deputation with the Chinese deputies to Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner Burma, dated 16 January 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, June 1894, no. 273.

³¹ Diary of E. Martini dated 25 November 1893, For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, January 1894, no. 400. Also spelt as Mawsi or Mawusi.

³² Diary of W. Warry from 2 December 1893 to 9 December 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, January 1894, no. 399. After locating the Hukü Gate on 20 November, Warry went to Bhamo and Martini along with Deputies located T'ien-ma gate on the 25 November 1893. Warry again left Bhamo on the 2 December 1893 for Namkham to identify Hanlung gate and on way examined the T'ien-ma gate.

Regarding the structure of the T'ien-ma Gate, Warry writes, it is an "enormous structure, still standing crumbling away little by little"³³. He adds, "—identification is correct. The locality agrees fairly well with the accounts in the Chinese books and the structure itself would seem to have been erected not for any temporary purpose, but rather as a permanent symbol of authority in that region. The remains of the stone horse supply additional evidence, the meaning of the T'ien-ma being 'heavenly horse' "³⁴. Martini states that, this gate built in the style of Huchu gate, but of brick, and in a similar spot (at the foot of a hill, across a gorge, on a road) on what was at one time the high road to Sikaw (and Momeik) is in a better state of preservation³⁵. "One arch being almost intact, it is built of stone and brick;—The arch is about 8 ft. high with an aperture of about 8 ft.—The second arch has entirely fallen out and the stones are lying—the stone breastwork on the sides has almost entirely fallen out—"³⁶.

On the 6th January 1894, the Hanlung Gate was located³⁷. Even the Chinese Deputy P'eng had no clear idea about its position. The search parties wandered for a month and a half. Warry writes that the Kangai Sawbwa proved of great help in this work. Having found in an old essay written by the emperor Chien Lung a statement that, the Shweli 'flowed past the Hanlung into Burma', he sent a few men to make a thorough examination of the country on the left bank of that river below Namkham. On this occasion they were most fortunate, and the gate was found $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles in a direct line south-west of Namkham and $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant from the Shweli. Its identification was placed beyond doubt by the discovery of fragments of a stone slab on which a part of the characters Hanglung Kwan was cut in relief"³⁸.

Regarding the structure of the Hanlung Gate, Martini writes, "Although this is called a gate, it appears to have never been anything more than a small fort to command the road to Meng Tu and Theinni.—little remains of the gate—", (only) remains of two walls

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Confidential Letter of W. Warry to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner Burma dated 8 January 1894. For. & Pol. Progs., A, Sec. E, June 1894, no. 270.

³⁵ Diary of E. Martini, 25 Nov. 1893 For. and Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, Jan. 1894, no. 400.

³⁶ Letter of E. Martini, D.S.P., Bhamo, on deputation with the Chinese deputies to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner Burma, dated 16 January 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, June 1894, no. 273.

³⁷ Viceroy's Secret External despatch to Secretary of State for India, no. 25 dated 14 February 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, June 1894, no. 275. Warry's confidential letter to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner Burma, dated 8 Jan. 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, June 1894, no. 270. Letter of E. Martini, Distt. Supdt. of Police Bhamo, on deputation with the Chinese deputies, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, dated 16 January 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, June 1894, no. 273.

³⁸ *Ibid.* A slab was unearthed bearing Chinese characters end of "Hanlung" and beginning of "Kwan".

25 ft. apart with bricks and stones strewn about. These remains give the impression that the structure is less important than Huchu and T'ien-ma"³⁹.

A few words about administration and control of these forts will not be out of place. According to Chinese Deputy P'eng, "The eight gates were first garrisoned by troops, and when they were withdrawn, some influential local men, sometimes a Chinese, sometimes a Shan, was placed in charge as a Protector"⁴⁰. P'eng further said that when a Shan failed, it was even placed under a powerful Kachin Sawbwa only on the condition of his accepting Chinese fealty. As for example, Hukü was placed under Ponkan Kachin Sawbwa. Warry also concurs with P'eng and observes, "Each gate was placed under a 'Protector of Barbarians' whose duties were to assist the Chinese Shan Sawbwas in maintaining order on the frontier"⁴¹. It is certain that, the Chinese kept a vigilant control over and maintained sufficient troops in these ancient frontier forts so long as there was danger of invasion or hostility from Burma. After 1790, when this danger passed away by Burmese formal submission, the control was relaxed, and gradually the gates were left under nominal control.

From the foregoing description of the "gates", it may be said that the structure of all the eight gates was more or less on the same plan and design. Each was built at the foot of a hill, across a mountain gorge, through which some important road ran to Burma. The breastwork of stone was usually in semi-circular shape on both the sides and two arches (gates and hence the name gate for the fort) were built over them. Adjoining it, there were living houses for the garrison. Built in mediaeval times, it exhibits constructive imagination of the Chinese Governor, who erected them on the western frontier of Momein sub-prefecture mainly for guarding the great Chinese empire from foreign invasion and marking the limits of Chinese political control.

The objects of erecting the "Kwans" were multifarious. From the *Momein Annals* of 1888, it appears that the eight frontier gates were primarily established to mark the western frontier of Momein, to protect Chinese empire from any possible Burmese encroachment or invasion, to bring under nominal jurisdiction the wild tribes, and to control all possible roads leading to Burma.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Diary of W. Warry dated 25 Nov. 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, January 1894, no. 385.

⁴¹ Letter of W. Warry to Chief Secretary, to Chief Commissioner, Burma, no. 38 dated 24 November 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, January 1894, no. 386.

The last two points are very clearly elucidated in Parker's letter to British Foreign Office⁴². Regarding control over the tribes, he writes, "—the idea evidently being to include the semi-independent Shan States subordinate to the Momein Sub-Prefecture, within the gates instead of leaving them outside and having the gates on the borders of 'Regulation' China. Outside of each gate the population is Kachin, and the Chinese have thus never at any time possessed Kachin subjects. Kachins bear the same political relation to Burma as the Shans within the frontier gates to China"⁴³. As regards control over the roads, "there is a method in the arrangement of these gates, which command all the roads into Burma. The first commands the Sadon road to Myitkyina, our northernmost post on the Irrawaddy, to which merchant steamers now successfully run. The second and third gates command the two Chinese roads which converge at our Sima, passing on thence through Karu to Myitkyina and Talaw. The above three roads all lead to Jade Mines, a nest of Chinese filibusters in the heart of our territory. The fourth gate commands a now little used road from Momein to Talaw a branch of which turns south to Bhamo. The fifth commands the 'Embassy route' via Matin to Bhamo. The sixth commands the southernmost road to the Irrawaddy from Lung Ch'wan to Kaungton. The seventh and eighth command roads round the debatable triangle"^{44,45}.

Some further light on the objects of the "gates" is thrown by Chinese Deputy P'eng, who came to Bhamo to point out the sites of the Hukü and T'ien-ma gates and spoke to Warry while showing the gates. "The eight gates were created to overawe the Burmese, whereas the posts at the "nine narrows" were to control the wild tribes inside the Chinese frontier". Warry writes that P'eng's account appears to be based on local enquiry⁴⁶. After seeing the ruins of the Hukü gate, Warry observes that, the "gate was not merely erected as defence or as part of an ordinary fort or encampment. The stone structure and the arch or gateway gives impression that it was built as a symbol of authority and a large number of people lived in the neighbourhood"⁴⁷. He held the same view regarding the

⁴² E.H. Parker's letter to British Foreign Office, dated 20 April, 1893, For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, October 1893, no. 212. Burma Confidential Print Section 37.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* The "Gates" in this article have been mentioned from south to north according to White's report. Parker here describes them from north to south beginning from the Shen-hu gate.

⁴⁵ Map showing the Namkhan triangle: For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, October 1893, no. 17. It is described as "Debatable triangle" due to tussle between Britain and China or its possession. It refers to the territory surrounded on the east by river Namwan, on the west by river Nammak and south by river Namkham and Shweli.

⁴⁶ Viceroy's Secret External despatch to Secretary of State no. 3, dated 3 January 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, January 1894, no. 401; Diary of W. Warry, Adviser on Chinese Affairs in Burma, dated 25 November 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, January, 1894, no. 385.

⁴⁷ Letter of W. Warry, Adviser on Chinese Affairs in Burma, to Chief Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Burma no. 38, dated 24 November 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, January 1894, no. 386.

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objects of the T'ien-ma gate⁴⁸. He was also impressed by the Hanlung structure⁴⁹. Thus, Warry's statement can be said to be applicable as well to all the other gates. These "Kwans" were by no means any temporary structure, but permanent symbols of authority indicating the extent of Chinese political control.

It now remains to tell what happened to the "gates" under the Burma-China frontier negotiations. By the Burma-China Convention of 1894, Hukü and Hanlung gates remained under Burmese territory by virtue of a century's occupation⁵⁰. Later when this Convention was revised by the Agreement of 1897, two more gates—T'ieh-pih and T'ien-ma were given to Burma by China⁵¹. Thus, out of the eight Chinese "frontier gates", four remained in Chinese possession and four under Burmese occupation.

⁴⁸ Confidential letter of W. Warry, Adviser on Chinese Affairs in Burma to Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, dated 8 January 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, June 1894, no. 270.

⁴⁹ Diary of W. Warry, dated 6 January 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, February 1894, no. 379.

⁵⁰ Report of the meeting held at British Legation Office on 22 December 1893. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, February 1894, no. 326. Report of the meeting of 20 January 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, March 1894, no. 275; Telegram from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy dated 22 January 1894. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, May 1894, no. 137.

⁵¹ Burma China Agreement of 4 February 1897. For. & Pol. Progs. A, Sec. E, May 1897, no. 39.

SOME VIEWS ON MORAL EDUCATION CULLED FROM THE RECORDS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

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THE importance of imparting moral education in schools has never been questioned. Opinions, however, have varied as to the best method of attaining this end. Conflicting views have been put forward on two fundamental points—whether moral education is possible without the sanction of religion and whether direct moral instruction with the help of text books and through regular classes should be introduced to supplement indirect moral education.

Regarding the first question again the point at dispute is not so much whether moral education based on religion is desirable—few will deny that it would have more effect on the boy's mind than one divorced from it where religion is a live force—but whether moral education without religious sanction would have any value. There are on the one hand persons who say,

"For Creeds and forms let senseless bigots fight
He can't be wrong whose life is in the right".

On the other hand eminent educationists like Cyril Norwood say that those who believed that moral education can be dissociated from religion were "living on unearned capital", a capital earned by religion, and that when religion ceases to exert its influence, "their moral beliefs will grow attenuated and shrivel"¹.

The conflict of views is noticeable in the records of the Government of India also. A circular addressed by the Government of India in 1911 to the various local governments on the question of moral and religious education in schools was the occasion for the recording of their views on this question². The provincial governments generally agreed that moral instruction divorced from religious sanction would be of no permanent value. The N.W.F.P. Government said that "any effort to introduce secular moral teaching, divorced from the Koran would be regarded as an insidious attempt to undermine the religion of Islam." The view of the U.P. Government was that

¹ Cyril Norwood, *The English Tradition of Education*, 1929.

² National Archives of India, Education Proceedings, May 1919, no. 35.

"Moral instruction divorced from a religious context is destitute of all real value." Similarly C. P. Government held that "no moral instruction not directly sanctioned by religion will be of permanent value". In the Punjab "Hindus favour theoretical instruction in morals while Moslems strongly object to it. Similarly Christians object to abstract moral instruction severed from religious sanction". "The most effective moral teaching" continued the Punjab Government, was "that based on religious doctrine." There was hardly any contrary opinion on this point. Inayatullah Khan, the future Khaksar leader, then Assistant Secretary in the Education Department, Government of India, also wanted some sort of sanction. "The religious or let me say 'moral' instinct of man is, to my mind, a weak and mostly 'utilitarian' influence and cannot be kept going by external stimulative agents." "How many of the world's people", he asked, "will remain 'instinctively moral' if there were no fear of police or fear of God?"

It should be noticed, however, that all the above-quoted views refer to the uselessness of direct moral instruction only when divorced from religious sanction. As regards moral education i.e. the gradual inculcation of the principles of right conduct through indirect means—no hostile opinion had been expressed. As a matter of fact the overwhelming majority of the opinions held that such indirect moral education without the backing of religion was not only possible but desirable.

S. M. Fraser, Resident in Mysore, said, "For India generally it is neither wise nor necessary in the true interest of morality to link ethical with religious teaching. For Christians they are inseparable, for Hindus they are not." Referring to Gokhale's opinion that "the younger generation was becoming too advanced for the ancient forms of religion", Lord Minto in a note dated 9 February, 1910 admitted the possibility of imparting moral training in place of the old religious education³. H. Butler, the Hon'ble Member for Education, pointed out that so far as the Hindus are concerned "the connection between religion and morality is not always apparent"⁴. H. Sharp, Educational Commissioner with the Government of India, while noting the diversity of opinion of the local governments on the question whether moral instruction can be effectively imparted without a religious sanction, wrote, "I should certainly say, however, that moral education can be imparted without a religious sanction, and this is probably the case with moral instruction too. For morality can be made to stand on an ethical basis. Doubtless the boy, if rightly brought up, will, perhaps unconsciously, be swayed by the

³ Education Procdgs. A, September 1911, nos. 74-76.

⁴ *Ibid.*

motive which appeals to him most. Of course this motive is enormously strengthened if the sanction of religion is added. But I maintain that direct moral education can stand by itself and. . . can and should be given through every means."⁵

The question has lost all practical interest after the constitution of India has definitely set its face against imparting any religious instruction in schools. But since moral education is considered of value, the best way of imparting it without the sanction of religion has to be thought out. This brings us to a discussion of the second question, whether direct moral instruction should be useful, or emphasis should be given only on moral education by indirect means.

Those who favour direct moral instruction say that "Direct moral instruction aims at furnishing ideas and suggestions that help in giving a right direction to conduct. It formulates the general principles of right conduct and gathers up into something like a system the fragmentary teaching indirectly derived from the teaching of all the school subjects. Just as a knowledge of English can be indirectly given by the teaching of any subject in the school, and yet general lessons in Grammar, Translation and Composition are necessary for imparting a correct and scientific knowledge of the language, so direct moral instruction is necessary for summing up the indirect instructions derived from other sources, and such instruction is all the more necessary when indirect moral influences are weak or absent in a day school.

"Moral training will always remain as the principal and most powerful means of forming and strengthening character of pupils. But in day schools where children meet together only for a few hours a day, direct moral instruction should not be neglected. Its value is now recognised in all civilized countries, especially in America, where the diversity of races, religions and social positions among the pupils renders uniform religious teaching and ethical instruction based on such teaching very difficult or impossible."⁶

H. W. Orange, Director General of Education, Government of India, advocated direct systematic moral instruction. In England, he pointed out, the code of 1906 adopted the policy of direct moral instruction in public elementary schools on the plea that "the good moral training which a school should give cannot be left to chance. On this side no less than on the intellectual side the purpose of the teacher must be clearly conceived and intelligently carried out. It is therefore desirable that where systematic teaching of this subject

⁵ Note dated 25 January 1918. Education Procdgs., May 1919, no. 36.

⁶ Extract from the Report on Public Instruction in Mysore for 1908-09, Education Procdgs., August 1910, no. 1-3.

is practicable, such teaching should be direct, systematic and graduated...."⁷

H. Sharp, Educational Commissioner, Government of India, also supported direct moral instruction though he admitted that moral instruction "is quite useless unless supported on moral education i.e. unless it squares with the unconscious lessons imparted by the daily life of the school..... I think it has its uses, especially in a country like India where boys are impressionable and emotional. . . . The mistake is to make moral instruction a routine to be gone through by all teachers at stated times. Moral instruction should await the occasion—an event in the history of the world or of the school, and should be given by those only who feel themselves competent to deal impressively with the subject."⁸

Opinion against imparting direct moral instruction in schools appears however to be general. The Government of India in their resolution of March 1904 said that "the remedy for the evil tendencies unfavourable to discipline in schools has to be sought not so much in any formal methods of teaching conduct by means of moral text books or primers of personal ethics as in the influence of carefully selected and trained teachers, the maintenance of a high standard of discipline, the institution of well-managed hostels, the proper selection of text books, such as biographies, which teach by example, and above all, in the association of teachers and pupils in the common interests of their daily life."

Almost all the local governments, as has already been pointed out, expressed themselves against direct moral instruction, particularly when divorced from a religious context. It was pointed out by the Commissioner of Education, Baroda State, that "one will never make a boy moral through text-books."⁹ A better class of teachers is a desideratum if moral instruction is to be given. And "the provision of teachers with the necessary qualifications constitutes the first great difficulty..... It is a truism that in moral as well as in religious instruction it is the personality which counts; the man is more than the word."¹⁰

While the utility of direct moral instruction was questioned, no objection was raised against moral education. Even those who were in favour of religious instruction recognized that "Moral training will always remain as the principal and most powerful means of forming and strengthening the character of pupils."¹¹

⁷ Education Procdgs., September 1911, nos. 74-76.

⁸ Education Procdgs., May 1919, no. 36.

⁹ Education Procdgs., August 1910, nos. 1-3. Note by S.M. Fraser, Resident in Mysore.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Report on Public Instruction in Mysore for 1908-09.

The Government of India also were conscious of the great importance of moral education as distinguished from direct moral instruction. Their resolution of March 1904 above referred to, and its proposed resolution of 1920 leave no doubts on this point.

In Bengal stress was laid on the important place which the general work and life of the schools must take in the formation of character. "Stories from religious books, biographies of great men, teaching practical harm resulting from immoral practices" were recommended. The C. P. Government held that "the only method practicable is the indirect teaching of morality through ordinary studies and tone of school and general discipline." They advocated "provision of good teachers, concentration of more individual attention by inspectors, compulsory games" etc. as practical steps. Assam laid stress on "the strengthening of discipline and the creation of a wholesome atmosphere in schools." Similarly opinion in Bihar and Orissa was that "general influences surrounding a boy at School are a most important factor in the formation of character." The Commissioner of Education, Baroda State, stated, "Given a good and honest teacher he will himself be an incentive to the moral life, but an unconscious incentive." Referring to the importance of games he goes on to say "a boy who has been taught on playing fields to keep his temper, to respect an umpire's decision, the utter importance of honest and sustained endeavour, in a word, true sportsmanship, has unconsciously imbibed draughts of manliness which will inevitably lead to the highest morality."¹²

H. Sharp in reviewing these views held that "indirect moral education is of vital importance and depends chiefly on the character of the staff and the general tone created by the school. Such education is a matter of daily routine and to be effective, must be incessant and so to speak sub-conscious." He therefore stressed the importance of the raising of the status of the teachers' profession. "We know too well the atmosphere of many educational institutions in Bengal. Where teachers mark as present students who are absent, sign their acquittance of pay which is not paid and utilise a leakage of examination papers for coaching their pupils, it is not expected that boys will grow up moral. Better pay and the attraction of better men are required to rehabilitate the teacher's position."¹³ Finally E. D. Maclagan, Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Education while in agreement with the above suggestions advocated greater use of the class master or tutor system and "careful instruction of the teachers themselves in the best methods direct and indirect of influencing conduct."¹⁴

¹² Education Procdgs, July 1920, nos. 27-53.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Ibid.

The consensus of opinion was thus overwhelmingly in favour of indirect moral education. Indeed, this accorded with the traditional Indian method which depended a great deal on the impalpable influences of discipline, the teacher's example and moral lessons of allegories and fables like those of the *Hitopadesa*, *Panchatantra* and of the epic poems, for inculcation of morality.

NANDURBAR DESAI DAFTAR

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NANDURBAR is an industrial town, situated 100 miles east of Surat and 110 miles west of Bhusawal on the Tapti Valley Railway, now merged in the Western Railway. It has been the headquarters of the political division 'Nandurbar Sircar' for well over 300 years. It was in pursuance of my contention¹ that the patron, named Shambhu, of Hari Kavi the author of *Shambhuraj Charita* and the hero of this work, was a person from the Desai family of Nandurbar and not Chhatrapati Sambhaji as suggested by Mr. P. K. Gode,² that I tried to see if there were family records available in that family, to support the inscription at Patna. Luckily I was able to contact Mr. S. B. Desai, the present head of the family, who gave me free access to the family archives. The record was a vast mass of several thousand papers, some placed in bundles and others lying scattered all over an attic room above the first storey of his house.

On their examination lasting several days and with the intelligent co-operation of Mr. Desai nearly 500 documents were selected and sent to Rajwade Sanshodhan Mandal, Dhulia, for preparing their copies. Out of these nearly 200 papers were copied and 100 Persian papers were perused and their descriptive list was made.

These papers date from Akbar's reign and present a very interesting, instructive and varied reading. The bulk of them are in Modi and belong to the Maratha and the early British period. Here I mention five of the selected documents with the gist of their subject matter. The numbers of the documents indicate the order in which their copies have been kept at the Mandal. The late Mr. B. W. Bhat contributed two articles to the *Proceedings of the I.H.R.C.*, which are based on the records from this Daftar.

No. 72

This document is a schedule giving the cultivable and non-cultivable areas in *bighas* of 36 villages under Tape Shindkheda. It also mentions the revenue fixed for each village in terms of Dam. The schedule purports to be a part of the system enforced by Todar Mal in the year 984 A.H.

¹ A note of Shri Gode's article on the History of the Jata Shankar temple of Nandurbar; *Journal of the Bombay University*, Vol. XVI, Part I.

² *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. XVI, Parts III and IV.

Hakikat (list of) Foudars and Jagirdars of Pargana Nandurbar. It starts from *San* 994 (*Fasli*) and ends in 1164. It gives nearly 75 entries, each mentioning the names of the Suba, the Foudar, the Amin and the Karodi; and the periods during which they held office. The officials mentioned include Aurangzeb (3 years: 1049 to 1051); Shahzada Muradbux (one year: 1056); Shaista Khan (3 years: 1057 to 1059); Raja Makaranda (1½ years: 1081 to 1082); Shahzada Rafiush-Shan (3½ years: 1118 to 1121); Padshah Jahandar Shah (one year: 1122).

The paper mentions that in 1151 Balaji Bajirao tried to snatch this Pargana from Nizam-ul-Mulk, but the disaster at Panipat and the presence of the Nizam at Burhanpur averted it.

No. 73

A list enumerating and describing 35 occasions on which the town and the Pargana of Nandurbar were ransacked, plundered or taxed heavily twice during a period of twenty years, from 1207 to 1227 A.H.

No. 28

Notification of the East India Company dated 6 April 1828. It allows people to use all sorts of arms for self-protection; encourages repairs of village fortifications, arbitration and Panchayats for disputes and practice of asking the village officers and Kamgars to make good the loss caused by thieves and robbers in their jurisdiction if not detected.

Nos. 1-4

A list giving the names of the then living Heads of the 12½ Rajput Raval families—the hereditary Zamindars in Khandesh in Samvat 1749, i.e. 1693 A.D. when Aurangzeb was staying in the Deccan. One of the Ravals is named as Chand Khan. This list also contains the area of land granted to them as Inam and the amount they were required to pay to the sovereign as 'Salami'.

The family of the Desais of Nandurbar was holding the hereditary office of Kanungo and Desai of the Division for a long continuous period and on account of this their records are found accumulated in one place.

RECORDS OF INDIAN INTEREST IN THE DANISH ARCHIVES

AXEL LINVALD

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THANKING you for your kind invitation to write a paper on the records in the Danish archives that might be of interest to India, I am glad to be able to send you a brief survey of the material found here, and I hope that this will give you some idea about the extent of the archives-fonds and of their value to your history and thus form the basis for later correspondence about those items that might be of greater interest to you.

As little or nothing has been published in English or French about the small Danish possessions in India, I think it will be useful to give a short survey of the Danish activities in your country.

The first Danish East India Company was founded in 1618 during the reign of King Christian IV, and in 1619-20 the first ships from Copenhagen reached Ceylon, where the foundation of a factory was tried, but in vain. The Danes therefore had to find other possibilities, and in 1620 the little fishing-village, whose name was written as Tranquebar by the Danes, was purchased from the Rajah of Tanjore. From that time to the year of the sale of this possession in 1845 Tranquebar was the main settlement of the Danes in India.

During the first half century after the foundation of the factory the trade between Copenhagen and India was of very small dimensions. When Denmark entered on a series of wars the country had not sufficient capital for investments in the Indian trade, and for the period 1643-69 the Company's voyages from Europe completely ceased. Nevertheless, the little Danish garrison was able to maintain the factory at Tranquebar, drawing its living from trade between the Indian continent and the East Indian islands.

In 1668 a new Company was founded in Copenhagen, and from this time and until 1704, the Danish trade to the East had its first great period of prosperity, but then again, Denmark was engaged in wars resulting in poverty and lack of capital. The Company had not the necessary funds to overcome these difficulties and was dissolved in the year 1729.

After a short interval another Company was founded in 1732, called the Danish Asiatic Company, as it was the intention to extend

the trade to China. This Company, which continued to exist until 1840, was up to 1777 the master of Tranquebar and the small but important possession of Serampore (or Frederiksnagore) in Bengal (acquired in 1754-55) and of a few other factories.

In 1777, however, the State bought the factories from the Company and until their sale in 1845 they remained under "Royal rule". From 1777 and till the outbreak of our war with England in 1807 the Danish trade with India had its greatest period. Its extent was then so great that it was not only of the highest importance for Denmark, but it must also have been of some value for India. On the other hand, after the peace of 1814 the Danish trade and the Danish possessions in India were of little importance.

A fairly important number of records of the Companies as well as of the State's rule have come down to us; most of them, of course, belong to the later periods. The European records of the Companies, those of their governors and other functionaries in India as well as those of the royal governors and other officers have been kept at the Royal Archives as one fond (wrongly called the records of the Asiatic Company) from the time they were handed over to us about a hundred years ago. The records are arranged in such a way that it is sufficient to quote one number to indicate each volume or bundle.

The Copenhagen Government's "Indian documents" are found among the records of the Board of Commerce, under whose control the Danish possessions in India were placed after 1777. As during the whole period until 1845 a separate "kontor" (i.e. section or branch) of the Board of Commerce dealt with them the records are relatively easy to use.

The Records of the First Company

Of the records of the first Company that existed during 1618-68, nothing has been left but a few treaties, namely 6 for the period 1618-20, concluded between King Christian IV and the "emperor" of Ceylon or rather his European representative¹.

The sources of the rest of its history must be traced in the government records, in this case in those of the Danish and German Chanceries. Fortunately, the greater part of records relating to the Company are to be found collected in some special bundles². Most of these contain papers from Copenhagen, parts of accounts and the

¹ Egeskabssamlingen E, Ostindien.

² Danske kancelli B 144, B 169, B 244-49. Tyske kancelli indenlandske afdeling A 171.

like, but two groups³ contain reports of the leader of the first Danish expedition to India and the records of one of the governors of Tranquebar, Willum Leyel (1643-48), among which there are the copy-books of his official letters to Copenhagen.

A manuscript in which a Danish soldier of the ranks gives a description of his stay at Tranquebar is in the Royal Library at Copenhagen⁴.

Records of the Second Company

For the history of the second Company (1669-1730) a greater amount of sources are extant. In the Danish Chancery again there are special volumes and bundles of the East-Indian records⁵, most of them concerning the Company's administration, but some of them may give glimpses of the situation in India. Furthermore, in the books of the series of law-suits appeals from India to the Supreme Court of Denmark at Copenhagen⁶ several cases are treated rather thoroughly. Of course most of these cases have relation to the Danes in India.

From this period parts of the Company's own records have also been preserved. From 1690 seqq. there exist the so-called "sekret-protokoller"⁷ (secret or confidential registers) which contain the reports of the negotiations and deliberations of the "Secret Council", the highest Danish authority in India, consisting of the Governor and some of the Company's highest functionaries in Tranquebar. These registers were kept during the whole period of the Company's rule and are—at least from our point of view—one of the most important sources of the history of the Danish possessions as all resolutions of greater importance were recorded here, whether they concerned operations of trade or political matters.

From 1695 and, with some gaps, until 1749 is preserved a series from Tranquebar, called "rapportboger"⁸ (report-books). These are a sort of journals or diaries which contain records of all events of greater importance in the colony's life. For some years they contain copies of letters that have not been preserved elsewhere.

From 1690 are also preserved the "justitsprokoller"⁹ (i.e. the registers) of the courts of law at Tranquebar and from the same

³ B 169 and B 246-49.

⁴ Rostgards samling 40, folio.

⁵ Dkc C 22-23, D 34-35, D 55.

⁶ Hojesterets domprotokoller.

⁷ Asiatisk kompagni nr. 1252^a seqq.

⁸ Ask. nr. 1267 seqq.

⁹ Ask. nr. 1454 seqq.

time some copy-books of letters to the Board of Directors at Copenhagen (1704—11, 1712—15, and 1715—32) and copy-books of letters received at Tranquebar (1705—36)¹⁰.

The more important of these two series is the one containing the Governor's letters to the Company's Board of Directors. The usual name for it is "the general letters". In the earlier periods these as a rule were sent only once a year, namely when the ship (or the ships) in the autumn left Tranquebar for Copenhagen. In the letters a report was given of all significant events in the year that had elapsed since the last letter. These included matters of economical, political and personal interest. Like the series of "sekretprotokoller" mentioned above, this series was continued in the later periods of the history of the colony, and in fact it existed as long as Tranquebar was a Danish possession, although the possibilities of dispatching mail to Europe had become easier and more numerous and though the Governor in later periods sent several official letters every year.

Unfortunately, all these older books and documents from Tranquebar are in a very poor state of preservation. As far as it is possible to see they had remained in India until 1845 and as a consequence the papers were spoilt by insects, moisture and heat, often to such an extent that it is very difficult, and in many cases quite impossible, to read them. To make photocopies of them will be impossible.

Records of the Danish Asiatic Company, 1732—1845

As mentioned above the second Company was followed in 1732 by a third, bearing the name of the Danish Asiatic Company existing till about 1840, although it had very little importance after our war with England of 1807—14. A large number of its documents and volumes have been preserved, and especially from its Copenhagen office almost all items of importance can still be found.

From its headquarters here are preserved all the registers of the General Assemblies¹¹ and of the meetings of the Board of Directors¹². Both the series are invaluable as source materials for the understanding of the general policy of the Company; but as sources of Indian history they are only of secondary importance as most of their references about Indian political and economic conditions are taken from the letters from Tranquebar, the greater part of which is available.

Next, there are copy-books for the whole period of the Company including correspondence with institutions, firms or private persons

¹⁰ Ask. nr. 1351 seqq. and 1397-98.

¹¹ Ask. nr. 8 seqq.

¹² Ask. nr. 28 seqq.

in Europe;¹³ and from 1757 is preserved a series of copy-books of letters to India and China¹⁴. But it must be said that this material is of greater value for the study of the general policy of the Company than for Indian history. The same holds true about another series, the copy-books of instructions for the Company's servants and functionaries of all classes¹⁵.

The most interesting item in this part of the records, we should presume, is the letters ("general letters") from the factories¹⁶. Their character and contents are mainly the same as in the previous period, and they continue until 1777, when the colonies were transferred to the Crown. After that time, letters to the Company were sent from its factors at Tranquebar (until 1797), but the news about their trade was given in more elaborate form than about political affairs.

The letters of the Company's establishment at Serampore¹⁷ are also preserved. From 1773 to 1820 their contents are of almost the same character as the letters from Tranquebar. A small number of letters for the period 1773—82 are preserved from Patna in Bihar, where the Company had a factory for its trade in saltpetre¹⁸.

A lot of accounts material has been left too. We shall limit ourselves to mention the ledgers of the Company (1732—1840) with the cash-books and journals belonging to them¹⁹. Through these books it is possible to get valuable information as to the cargoes sent to and from India, but it is rather seldom that we find detailed price-lists of the Indian goods.

As regards the Tranquebar records of the Asiatic Company they fall into two different groups: those before and those after 1777, when the colonies were transferred to the Crown. Before this date they comprise records regarding both the administration of the territories and trade; after 1777 they are only concerned with trade.

The best sources for this period are the "sekretprotokoller"²⁰, the registers of the deliberations of the Council at Tranquebar, and the report-books²¹. It seems, however, that the latter series has not been kept as carefully as the first, but it is of great advantage that

¹³ Ask. nr. 93 seqq., 98 seqq. and 155 seqq.

¹⁴ Ask. nr. 159 seqq.

¹⁵ Ask. nr. 173 seqq.

¹⁶ Ask. nr. 196 seqq.

¹⁷ Ask. nr. 219 seqq.

¹⁸ Ask. nr. 233.

¹⁹ Ask. nr. 514 seqq.

²⁰ Ask. nr. 1256 seqq.

²¹ Ask. nr. 1269 seqq.

copies of the report-books as well as of the "sekretprotokoller" were despatched every year to Copenhagen, as they because of our colder climate are in a better state of preservation than those which remained in India until 1845.

Further we have different series of letters to the Governor and Council²². Many of these are interesting as sources of political and economic history, while others are only of interest for the study of the Danish administration. Copy-books of letters from the Governor are preserved for the whole period of 1733—79²³. Their contents are of a character similar to that of the letters received. It may be mentioned that these also contain some correspondence between the Danes at Tranquebar and Dupleix, the famous French general. Unfortunately, many of these letters are in a very poor state of preservation.

From among the records of the law-courts of Tranquebar are preserved several registers, both from the "town-court" and the so-called "black-court"²⁴. The function of the first was to decide cases between the Danes or between the Danes and other Europeans or Indians as well as disputes between members of the native population, if the matter was of great monetary value, whereas the function of the "black court" was to settle cases involving small sums of money and cases of heritage, caste and family law among the native population. Out of the records of this court are preserved a register from 1762—67 and one, without date, written in Tamil language²⁵.

Finally it is to be mentioned that ledgers and journals are preserved for 1733—1801²⁶. Until 1777 this series comprises both the accounts of the colony's administration and of the trade; after 1777 only those of the trade.

From Serampore in Bengal only report-books for a short period (1753—64) are left²⁷, from the factory at Calicut a few report-books and ledgers, and from the other factories, Patna, Porto-Novo etc., a few books and documents have found their way to the archives at Copenhagen²⁸.

²² Ask. nr. 1319^a seqq., 1321^a seqq., 1352 seqq., and 1371^a seqq.

²³ Ask. nr. 1412^b seqq.

²⁴ Ask. nr. 1459^a seqq., 1461 seqq.

²⁵ Ask. nr. 1495^a and b.

²⁶ Ask. nr. 1800 seqq.

²⁷ Ask. nr. 2020.

²⁸ Ask. nr. 2160-61 and 2168-69.

Records of the State's Administration of the Colonies

The Danish establishments in India were under the Crown's administration from 1777 to 1845. As mentioned before, they were administered in Copenhagen through the Board of Commerce. As there was a special section ("kontor") of the Board for the East-Indian matters these records are grouped in one fond²⁹. The most important item among them is the royal resolutions regarding the administration of these overseas possessions. Important news about trade may be found in them as also something about the policy of the great powers in India; but much of the material in this group will hardly be of any interest to Indian students.

Next, there are copy-books of letters to India, the contents of which, however, to a great extent are only a repetition of those in the series of resolutions.

The most interesting and valuable item for Indian studies will no doubt be the letters received, of which no less than 109 bundles are available³⁰. The letters are numbered in chronological order according to their day of entry into the diary of the office, but it is easy to find the letters one may want to see, as good indexes were kept. Among these letters are to be found not only the reports from the Governors ("general letters" and others) but also correspondence with other officers and private persons and letters from Indians. But again a great part of the letters are from private persons or firms at Copenhagen.

In addition to this chronological series some bundles about special matters were formed in the Board of Commerce, e.g. "the custom-farm-case of Mr. Bie 1785", a case which throws an interesting light on the *customs-praxis* in Bengal at that time, "Extracts of the reports on the political events in East-India 1783-91", "Documents on the Indian or black-court at Tranquebar 1788-1818" and "Documents on the loan of the Rajah of Tanjore, 1788-1802".

Further there are some books and documents concerning the Danish efforts to found a colony on the Nicobar Islands and finally some collections of private notes, written by Danish civil officers that had served in India. I think that these things will be of some interest to students of Indian history.

Among the records of Tranquebar and Serampore, the most illustrative series no doubt is the register of the deliberations of the Council, now called the "gouvernement"³¹. This is a continuation

²⁹ Kommercekollegiets ostindiske sager (V.A.II, p. 330 seqq.).

³⁰ Kommercekollegiets ostindiske kontors journalsager (V.A.II, p. 331).

³¹ Ask. nr. 1328 seqq.

³² Dir of Arch.

of the older "sekretprotokol" and is kept in the same way as the latter, so that it is of the greatest value because it often gives a fresher and more accurate picture of the events than the letters to Copenhagen which were generally written later and after ripe deliberations.

As in the time of the Company, the royal government kept copy-books of letters received and despatched. Unfortunately, most of these seem to have disappeared, and for the interesting time up to 1808, when the Danish possessions were occupied by British troops, none are left (but copies of letters may be found in the reports to Copenhagen). Those available for the period after 1814 are generally without the same interest as those of the period before 1777³².

Of the court-registers of this period only a few have been transferred to Copenhagen, whereas the account-books of the colony³³ are almost completely preserved, but they will no doubt be of small use to you. It may be mentioned here that for the years 1789-1819 is preserved a series of lists illustrating the value of different Indian coins in relation to each other and to the Danish rixdollar³⁴.

From the settlement of Serampore relatively few documents have survived, those of the Company in greater numbers than those of the Crown. The Company's register of deliberations and its accounts are available, till the dissolution of the factory in 1825³⁵, and considering the great importance of the Bengal trade, it is possible that they may contain interesting material for its detailed study.

Before ending this survey it may be proper to make a brief mention of some other archive-fonds that contain records concerning the Danish possessions in India. The records of the Department of Foreign Affairs contain some but most interesting bundles about the settlements and later about their sale to the British Company³⁶.

In the 18th century there was at Copenhagen a special "Board of Missions" whose aim was the propagation of Christian faith in the non-Christian parts of the world. This board had the supervision of the Lutheran Mission that was established in and about Tranquebar, and although parts of its records were destroyed by fire in 1795, 8 bundles of letters from the missionaries (1738-1808) have escaped the flames³⁷.

³² Ask. nr. 1381 seqq., 1401 seqq. 1434 seqq. and 1440 seqq.

³³ Ask. nr. 1526 seqq.

³⁴ Ask. nr. 1708.

³⁵ Ask. nr. 2031 seqq. and 2067 seqq.

³⁶ D.f.u.A., alm. korr. sager, litra O. og udenrigsministeriets journal A, nr. 2193-

³⁷ Missionskollegiet, nr. 9.

I might have wished to give further details on a number of the records mentioned above, as well as translations of samples of the more important series, but space will not permit it. Nevertheless I hope to have given you an idea about the material here, and I hope that at least part of it may be of use to the future writing of Indian history.

ORIGIN OF THE ILBERT BILL.

L. P. MATHUR

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THE amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872) carried out in 1884, which is popularly known as Ilbert Bill, did not owe its origin to any opinion given by Sir C. P. Ilbert with whose name it has since been associated. The Bill was far less a part of Ripon's reforming policy than a normal outcome of certain necessities, by no means urgent to the administrative evolution of India¹. Only about one year and a half before the introduction of the Bill in the Legislative Council, Lord Ripon had decided that it was not the opportune moment to alter the existing law for investing the Indian civilians with powers of trying European British subjects in the mofussil, although he had no doubt that the change was only a question of time and that it will have to be made and ought to be made². He also declared afterwards that if he had known that it will cause so much uproar, he would not have brought forward the bill³. It is therefore generally believed that the Bill was the outcome of a letter dated 20 March 1882, from Sir Ashley Eden, the then Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, to the Government of India. Sir C. P. Ilbert himself explained in the Council that the above letter was received and circulated to local governments for opinion before he took his seat in the Council on 1 May 1882, and that he never heard anything of the subject until after the replies of the local governments had been received⁴. As the Bill, when it was first issued, was accompanied by a statement of objects and reasons with which Ilbert's name was associated, it has since been known as Ilbert Bill.

It is true that the Government of India introduced the so-called Ilbert Bill in the Council on receipt of the above mentioned letter from Sir Ashley Eden, but he, in fact, was not the real author of the Bill. It was only when Behari Lal Gupta, I.C.S., had submitted a note on 30 January 1882, to the Bengal Government after consulting Sir Ashley Eden and others⁵ that the Government of India was moved to remove the restrictions placed on the Indian Magistrates

¹ Wolfe Lucian, *Life of Lord Ripon*, Vol. II, p. 120.

² National Archives of India, Home Dept. Est. A. Progs., June 1881, no. 69.

³ Wolfe Lucian, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 120.

⁴ Buckland C.E., *Bengal under the Lieutenant Governors*, Vol. II, p. 768.

⁵ *Calcutta Review*, Vol. LXXVI, 1883, p. 394.

for trying European British subjects. Mr. Gupta, therefore, can rightly be called the real author of the Ilbert Bill. In his official capacity he was the first Indian civilian to give expression to the feelings of humiliation caused by the above restriction. He had joined the Indian Civil Service in 1871 along with R. C. Dutta and Surendra Nath Banerjee. The only other Indian to become a member of the Indian Civil Service before them was Satyendra Nath Tagore. Mr. Gupta was the Officiating Presidency Magistrate of North Calcutta before he was promoted to the rank of District Magistrate in the interior. He must have realised his anomalous position in respect of his restricted jurisdiction over European British subjects. Before him Mr. Satyendra Nath Tagore, who was serving in Bombay, had also faced a similar situation when on having reverted for a time to an appointment at Tanna (Thana) he could not investigate a charge of simple hurt against a European though he had given entire satisfaction as a District and Sessions Judge⁶. It, however, fell to the lot of Mr. Gupta to raise the issue and point out the anomaly to the Bengal Government. The Government of India while recommending the introduction of the Bill in the Legislative Council wrote to the Secretary of State, "That the anomalous nature of the present arrangement was forcefully brought out in Mr. Gupta's case. While officiating as Presidency Magistrate, he had under the law, as it stands, full power over European British subjects even in comparatively serious cases, and exercised these with satisfaction to the local Government and the Public. On his removal to a more responsible appointment in the interior he ceased to be qualified to deal with even the most trivial cases affecting Europeans"⁷.

Mr. B. L. Gupta in his memorable note dated 30 January 1882, had pointed out that under Act IV of 1877 in Presidency towns, a Presidency Magistrate, whether himself a European or not, had the same jurisdiction over Europeans as over natives of that country, but an Indian Magistrate or Sessions Judge had no authority to enquire into a complaint affecting an European British subject or to try a charge against him unless he was a Justice of Peace. Mr. Gupta forcefully brought out the fact that under the existing law, invidious distinctions would be created between Europeans and Indians and that many practical inconveniences would arise in the case of Indians who in the course of time expect to attain the position of a District Magistrate or that of a Sessions Judge. He anticipated strong objections against any proposal to extend generally the criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects to all members of the Covenanted Civil Service and therefore suggested that this extension should only be limited to Indians holding the office of a Magis-

⁶ Home Establishment 'A' Progs., August 1880, nos. 43-44.

⁷ Para 3 of Government of India Legislative Department Despatch No. 33 dated 9 September 1882, to the Secretary of State, Legislative Proceedings, 9 May 1884, no. 2.

trate of a District or that of a Sessions Judge. He also desired that the amendment might be carried out in the Bill of Criminal Procedure Code which was at that time under consideration in the Council. Sir Ashley Eden, however, postponed the submission of Mr. Gupta's note to the Government of India until the new Criminal Procedure Code had become law, as the Bill had then reached its final stage in the Council, and it was obvious that the question—which was of such importance and difficulty and about which it was impossible to take action without consulting local governments and the Secretary of State—could not with propriety be raised at so late a stage of the discussion of the Bill. But at the time of submission of the above note to the Government of India the Bengal Government strongly expressed its opinion that the law should be expeditiously amended in the direction indicated by Mr. Gupta. Sir Ashley Eden wrote to the Government of India, "The time had arrived when all native members of the Covenanted Services should be relieved of such restrictions on their powers as are imposed on them by Chapter XXXIII of the New Code of Criminal Procedure, or when at least Native Covenanted Civilians, who have attained the position of District Magistrate or Sessions Judge, should have entrusted to them full powers over all classes, whether Europeans or natives, within their jurisdiction."⁸ It may, however, be mentioned that after retiring from the Governorship of Bengal, Sir Ashley Eden did not support Lord Ripon's proposals in the Secretary of State's Council of which he had become a member.

The above anomaly was also pointed out by Raja Jotindra Mohan Tagore, a member of the Council of the Viceroy during this period, at about the same time when Sir Ashley Eden was considering the matter on receipt of the note from Mr. Gupta. Lord Ripon in his speech in the Legislative Council on 9 March 1883, at the time of the introduction of the Bill stated, "When the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code was before my Council last year, one of my Honourable Colleagues—I cannot exactly remember which—who was a member of the Select Committee on the Bill, came to me and said that Maharajah Jotindra Mohan Tagore had told the Select Committee that he intended to raise the question of powers of Native Magistrates to exercise jurisdiction over European subjects."⁹ After consultations with his colleagues Ripon had told the Maharajah that the subject in which he was interested would receive full consideration of the Government. But, before any steps were taken to fulfill the above promise the letter from Sir Ashley Eden forwarding the note of Mr. B. L. Gupta and his proposals, was received.

⁸ Note of Mr. B. L. Gupta, dated 30 January 1882 and letter of Sir Ashley Eden, dated 20 March 1882, to the Government of India; published in C. E. Buckland, *Bengal under the Lieutenant Governors*, Vol. II, p. 773. See also Appendix A to Legislative Proceedings, May 1884, no. 3.

⁹ *Speeches of Lord Ripon*, Vol. II, p. 50.

FARMANS OF EMPEROR SHAH ALAM II ADDRESSED TO NAWAB MIR NIZAM ALI KHAN, ASAF JAH II

SYED MOHIUDDIN

Central Records Office, Hyderabad State

A FEW Farmans of Emperor Shah Alam II are available in the *Daftare Darul Insha*, which now forms a part of the Central Records Office of Hyderabad State. In the regime of Nawab Mir Nizam Ali Khan, however, this *Daftar* constituted the state correspondence office and as such it was entrusted with the correspondence which took place between the Nizam on the one side and the Emperors of Delhi, the Governors-General and the princes of India etc., on the other. It also received *Akhbars* or the court bulletins of the court of the Emperor.

Apart from correspondence the *Daftar* was also charged with grant and issue of *Sanads* for Jagirs and Inams which further heightened its importance and made its records of inestimable value to the students of history.

In this paper, I shall just introduce two of the Farmans of Emperor Shah Alam II addressed to Nawab Mir Nizam Ali Khan. Both of them are written on large sheets of paper, in good hand and enclosed in covers, one bearing the seal of the Emperor and the other only the words "Allah-o-Akbar".

Students of Indian history know how Ghulam Qadir deprived the Emperor Shah Alam II of his eyes and how Madhoji Sindia hastened to his help. It is in this context that both the Farmans have been written.

The first Farman pays a glowing tribute to the loyalty of the Nizam and appreciates the measures he took to inform Madhoji Sindia Alijah Bahadur of the sad event and the steps both of them took jointly to punish the evil-doer. It also expresses the deep gratitude of the Emperor to Madhoji Sindia for his devoted service and ends with the intimation that he has graciously accepted the *Nazrana* sent by the Nizam.

Historians have no doubt narrated these events in detail but the emotion of deep gratitude vibrating in the heart of the Emperor as expressed in this letter is, I claim, something entirely new and not to be found in any history written so far.

The second Farman again is replete with fulsome praise for both the Nizam and Madhoji Sindia Alijah Bahadur. It informs of the despatch of a trustworthy nobleman, Babu Rao, to deliver a confidential message and requires the Nizam to work in co-operation with Madhoji Sindia for the restoration of the empire.

The tenor and terms employed in both the Farmans reveal the love and affection which the Emperor had for the two great leaders of men of his time and the absolute trust he had placed in them.

The translation of both the Farmans is as follows:—

(I)

To the Amarat-o-Ayalat Martibat, Shoukat-o-Shahamat Manzilat, Atezad-e-Khilafat, Atemad-e-Sultanat, Hishbur-e Marika-e-Dilawari-o-Dileri, Fidwi-e-Khas, Rasikhul-Ikhlās, Khulasa-e-Maarik Aryan-e-Ze shan, Zubda-e-Umrayan, Buland Makan, Farzand-e-Arjumand, Saadat-Nishan.

Know you, the receiver and benefiter of high royal favours, that the petition submitted by you, has reached us. You have written therein that the dreadful happening and the deeds of disloyalty perpetrated by the cursed Ghulam Qadir, had impelled your noble self to make preparations for the journey in order to present yourself before us accompanied by one of your sons.

The demands of loyalty, and the impulse of devotion to us, and the honour of the ever lasting empire did call from you for this self-same service and performance of duty.

You have also written that, although you were far away you took good care to concert all the necessary measures required in this connection, and these could not escape our notice. Our conscience which unravels the knots of mysteries has inferred from the contents of your petition that your noble self is very friendly with our illustrious and dear son, Alijah Bahadur and that much intimacy subsists between you two. We sincerely hope that your devotion and love to us has prompted you to devise ingenious plans and methods unheard of before, and to have written them to our dear Alijah Bahadur, to punish and take revenge on the cursed and faithless one. The aforesaid dear one is our old and devoted well-wisher and has been sincerely attached to us. Incurring expenses running up to crores, he has performed conspicuous deeds to punish the cursed and devilish one. This has, as you know, become the talk of the people and widely known. It requires no mentioning. A noble deed of devotion it is, and will shine throughout the world. Nothing likewise was previously done by any noble sons or the rulers.

The Nazr of one hundred and one Ashrafs sent by you as a token of rejoicing over the punishment of the cursed and faithless one, has been graciously accepted by us.

(2)

To Rafat-o-Awali Martabat, Atezad-e-Khilafat-o-Sultanat, my dear worthy brother, Asafjah, Nizamul Mulk, Nizamud-Doula, Mir Nizam Ali Khan Bahadur, Fateh Jang, Sipah Salar, Faithful Ally, Rustume-Dauran.

Several events and the vicissitudes of the time have quite clearly exposed the weakness which has overtaken the empire. The little of the power which remains now, is due entirely to the extreme diligence and statesmanship of the Maharaja Alijah Sindia Bahadur. Of the high nobles who were closely associated with the Emperor, none served him faithfully. We shall leave them aside. For the present, as chief of the Imperial servants and worthy friend possessed of enthusiasm and zeal I expect you will apply your gracious mind and bestir yourself with whatever you deem necessary for the administration of the realm and progress of the empire. If you and the Maharaja Bahadur work together for a common cause and take up the reins of the Government in your hands, God will be pleased and the people benefited. By so doing, you will earn your reward in both the worlds, the present and the future, and obtain fame throughout the whole human race. You will know the details from the noble, strong in faith, and worthy of favour, Rai Babu Rao, who is known for his orthodoxy, wisdom, and loyalty to your worthy self, and to the Emperors, and from the verbal message sent through Baji Ram Pandit, whose ancestral devotion and trustworthiness are unquestionable. We firmly believe that you will be actuated by a sense of ancestral loyalty and devotion. In the past, the high nobles used to search for wise and learned men and present them before the Emperor, so that there should be no breakdown in the affairs of the state or lack of devotion or trust on their part. The above mentioned Rai is one of such men, wise and loyal and available with difficulty, specially in these days when men, in the true sense of the word, are scarce.

(Received 4th Ramzan 1205 A.H.)

TRIAL OF AN IMPOSTOR OF NANASAHIB PESHWA

V. P. PANDIT

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DURING the course of my search for unpublished papers and documents among the records of the former Gwalior State, forming at present part of the records of Madhya Bharat, I came across file No. 1404 of 1874 *Khatut Residency*¹, relating to the trial and conviction of an impostor, Jamnadas, who claimed himself to be Nanasahib Peshwa, the well known leader of the Mutiny of 1857, who had escaped from being captured by the British and was said to be missing.

Instances of such impostors posing themselves as prominent figures who had played a leading role on the stage of History are not rare, and the well known story of a Brahmin of Gujarat who had claimed that he was Sadashivrao Bhau, the Peshwa's brother, who had led the Maratha forces against Ahmed Shah Abdali in the famous battle of Panipat in 1761, and who was believed to have been killed in battle, may be recalled in this connection. Indeed this impostor had such a remarkable resemblance to the famous Bhau that even Parvatibai, the widow of Sadashivrao Bhau, had for some time believed that the impostor was her real husband and it took a considerable time and effort for truth to be ascertained.

Jamnadas, however, did not have even the initial good luck and was soon found out to be bogus and was immediately arrested. The facts of the case are as follows:—

Jamnadas accompanied by Premraj came to Gwalior and stayed at Chotishala, a *math*, in District Gird, Gwalior, with Mahant Ramdas. Jamnadas dictated the following letter² to Premraj on 11 September 1874 (Kunwar Sudi, Ekadashi, Samvat 1931) addressed to Maharaja Jayajirao Sindia:

"I am alright till now and I am somehow existing in this world. I am praying to Gangaji for your welfare. For a long time now, I am wandering as a Sadhu and by chance came to Gwalior. I have no strength left in me now to move about and I, therefore, thought that since your ancestors had always been loyal and true to my

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ancestors and had always exerted for their welfare, I could rely on you, as you are one of us. I am placing myself and my life in your hands and I request you to do as you think best. I am quite helpless and friendless."

Premraj and Mahant Ramdas were then despatched by Jamnadas, who had signed the letter as Nanasahib Peshwa, and had also proclaimed himself as such, to deliver the letter to His Highness. The Maharaja, immediately on receiving this letter hastened to the Chotishala, and got both Jamnadas and Premraj arrested. Jamnadas admitted to be the writer of the letter and reiterated that he was Nanasahib Peshwa. Premraj stated as follows:

"About 10 or 11 months back Jamnadas came to Bareilly and stayed at the Ramgangaji Ghat. Close to this Ghat, there is a temple of Jagannathji where about 15 or 16 Sadhus were living and were being fed at the temple's Bhandar. Jamnadas also used to get things from the Bhandar for his maintenance. I used to go to the Ghat everyday for a bath, where I met Jamnadas and in the course of my talk with him I apprised him of my poor circumstances and lack of employment. I also told Jamnadas that I was on the lookout for some means of livelihood. Jamnadas said that he was a Deccani Brahmin and that he was going to Gwalior, where he was known to many people. He promised to get some employment for me at Gwalior and so I accompanied him here and am staying here at the Chotishala for the last 20 days. Yesterday, at about 2 o'clock Jamnadas asked me to write a letter to Maharaja Sahib of Gwalior, which I wrote for him. He signed the letter in Marathi and told me that he was Nanasahib Peshwa".

The Acting Resident at Gwalior was immediately put in possession of this information and he immediately called at the palace where, during the inquiry, Jamnadas again claimed himself to be Nanasahib Peshwa and admitted having caused that letter to be written to the Maharaja.

Both Jamnadas and Premraj were surrendered the next day to the Residency from where they were sent to Kanpur for further investigation. By letter No. 938 dated 4 November 1874 the Darbar Vakil, Gwalior, inquired for more details about the inquiry at Kanpur and was informed by letter, dated 11 January 1874, that after a careful inquiry by the authorities at Kanpur the person who had claimed to be Nanasahib Peshwa was found to have been quite bogus and was, therefore, to be handed over to the Darbar for being

¹ Residency Correspondence.

² It is most unfortunate that this most important letter has not been traced so far.

tried for cheating and forgery in accordance with the laws obtaining in the State so that others also may be deterred from committing such offences.

Mahant Ramdas was also later on arrested for his complicity in this case so far as it related to his permitting Jamnadas and Premraj to stay at the *Math*, and also for helping Jamnadas in delivering that letter to His Highness.

Ramdas stated as follows:

"Jamnadas had stayed at my *Math*. Some time before the Mutiny, I had met a Sadhu of the same name and complexion at Dholpur and I thought that he was the same Sadhu. Later on I found that Jamnadas had pen and ink with him and was getting something written. He handed to me a letter without any cover for being delivered to H.H. the Maharaja Sindia. When I asked him what the letter was about, he told me that it related to meritorious deeds. Without objecting to anything and without asking for more details, I submitted the letter to His Highness. This indeed was my mistake and I plead guilty".

On 25 February 1875 Jamnadas, accused No. 1, was handed over to the Darbar by the Resident and was then kept in the state jail. The papers relating to the inquiry at Kanpur had also been received at Gwalior in the meantime, a perusal of which disclosed that there was a lot of discrepancy in the statements of the two accused, viz. Jamnadas and Premraj, and contradictions in their statements at various places.

In his letter, dated 15 December 1874, Mr. Fitz Patrick, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, reported to the Government that after a thorough and careful inquiry, the Kanpur authorities concluded on the basis of the statements made by Jamnadas and Premraj that Jamnadas was not Nanasahib Peshwa and had impersonated as such and thus cheated His Highness the Maharaja Sindia. Mr. Fitz Patrick did not consider it necessary to waste time in giving a detailed report, as the statements being full of inconsistencies and contradictions, were of no worth and could hardly be given any credence. He, therefore, recommended that the two accused may be handed over to the Gwalior Darbar for such action as the Darbar may deem fit to take. Jamnadas and Mahant Ramdas were then tried together for forgery and cheating etc. Premraj, accused No. 2, had not been delivered back.

The trial took place in the Court of Criminal Session of the Huzur Darbar under the Presiding Officer, Major Michael Filose, Naib

Dewan (Case No. 4, dated 1 June 1874). Jamnadas was sentenced to four years rigorous imprisonment and was kept in the fort at Narwar in chains and fetters. Mahant Ramdas, accused No. 3, was similarly sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment and was kept in the state jail at Lashkar. The Daroga of the state jail was informed accordingly. A report of the proceedings was also sent immediately to the Residency.

The Daroga of the jail reported on 31 May 1875 that accused Jamnadas was suffering from fever and had become very weak. Jawala, guard and Hakim Fazl-i-Haq, who was treating him, reported by letter No. 39 dated 25 October 1876, that convict Jamnadas who had been suffering from fever and cough for the last six months had died on that day, and that he had made no will before his death. A report of the death of the convict Jamnadas was sent to the Residency and the proceedings were brought to a close.

Letters, dated 26 October 1874, 4 November 1874 and 28 December 1874, the first from Ranchi and the other two from Government House, Calcutta, written by His Excellency Lord Northbrook, the Governor-General of India, and addressed to H. H. Maharaja Sindia bearing on the above case have also been found elsewhere. These letters after having referred to the relations of friendship and goodwill subsisting between the British and the Maharaja, congratulated His Highness on the prompt action taken by him in getting the impostor arrested, which had given fresh proof of his friendship and loyalty to the British Crown. Lord Northbrook had made particular mention of the fact that Her Majesty Queen Victoria, Empress of India, had also expressed her great pleasure at the capture of the impostor Nanasahib Peshwa.

A PROBLEM ABOUT REVENUE ACCOUNTS IN THE 18TH CENTURY

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WHEN editing the *Fort William—India House Correspondence*, Vol. VII (1773-1776), I came across several places where certain sums were given in four denominations instead of in the usual three (Rupees, annas, and pies). In several cases the number in the third place exceeded 12, and that in the fourth never exceeded 3. Certain additions and subtractions also made it clear that the third denomination was 1/20th part of the second, i.e., an anna, and that four of the fourth denomination made one of the third.

The following are the passages to which the above description refers:—

- (1) 'In the Dewanee Treasury Curr. (i.e. Current) Rs. 28,28,285-10-12' (Letter to Court 15-1-1773, para 40).
- (2) 'Balance in Khalsa Treasury Ct. Rs. 25,14,708-3-15' (L. to C. 1-3-1773, para 105).
- (3) 'Balance in Khalsa Treasury is Rs. 20,68,309-5-15' (L. to C. 31-3-1773, para 47).
- (4) 'In the Dewanny Treasury Sa (i.e. Sicca) Rs. 3,89,143-1-17-2 (L. to C. 22-8-1774, para 9).
- (5) 'The Balance in the General Treasury this Day is Ct. Rs. 14,79,832.....1.....in the Khalsa Treasury Sicca Rupees 18,78,064...13...15' (L. to C. 24-2-1775, para 50).
- (6) 'The Balance of Cash now in the Khalsa Treasury is Current Rupees 5,28,556...5...19...2' (L. to C. 16-5-1775, para 46).
- (7) 'In the Khalsa Treasury Sa Rs. 20,14,091...11...14...2' (L. to C. 3-8-1775, para 54).
- (8) 'Memorandum of Cash in the Treasuries at the Presidency the 2nd August 1775. Khalsa Treasury 2nd August 1775 Sa Rs. 6,19,217...11...14...2' (Encl. No. 6 with Warren Hastings' letter of 31-7-1775).

(9) 'Balances in the Treasuries of the Provincial Councils, Khalsa Treasury, General Treasury, and in the Mint.

Dinapore Division	8,85,709-7-15
Dacca Division	6,58,527-14-0
Burdwan Division	1,38,809-0-0
Calcutta Division	2,56,233-11-19-3
Moorshedabad Division	72,598-6-1-1
Durbar Division	40,323-13-1-2
Rajamahar Province	1,11,779-13-14-0
Boglepore Division	1,77,612-1-3
Subah Behar Division	7,02,550-9-0

	Sa Rs.	30,44,144-11-14-2
Khalsa Treasury		8,73,095-2-14-2
		39,17,239-14-9-0
Batta 16 per cent		6,26,758-6-3-0
	C.Rs.	45,43,998-4-7-0
Balance in General Treasury		13,30,041-11-9-0
Other balances		15,29,553-0-0-0
	C.Rs.	74,03,593-0-4-0

(Enclosure No. 2 with ditto.)

(10) 'The amount of cash in the Calcutta Treasury on the 31st August was :

	Rs.	42,38,618-6-19
The Provincial Treasuries	"	28,93,639-15-2
		71,32,258-6-1

Deduct for Bonds to be discharged	26,33,240-4-8
Deduct for Deposits	3,21,870-6-6
	29,54 ² ,110-11-2

The remains in cash free of all Demands 41,78,147-10-19
(L. to C., 12-9-1776, para 89)

The question before us is, what are these figures of the third and fourth denominations?

Firminger seems to have taken them to be pies and gandas respectively. This is clear from his use of the abbreviations Rs. A. P. G. at the top of the figures in the comparative statement of the revenues of the four years—1768-69, 1769-70, 1770-71 and 1771-72.¹ Firminger's view, however, is impossible, because side by side with the passages quoted above we have many others in our documents where the

¹ Sic., it should be 12.

² Sic., it should be 5.

³ *The Fifth Report*, Introduction, p. CCX. The statement, together with some extracts from the letter dated 3 November 1772 in which it occurs, is also printed by Monckton-Jones: *Warren Hastings in Bengal*, pp 296-7, without, however, the use of any symbols to denote 'rupees', 'annas' etc.

usual three units only—Rupees, annas, pies—12 pies making 1 anna—are used, and it is impossible to suppose that the pie was in some cases 1/12 of an anna and in others 1/20. We have also more direct evidence that the third unit is the *Ganda* and not the *Pie*. This consists of the extracts relating to Chait Singh's lease of the Zamindari of Banaras, which are printed by Forrest on pages 511, 514 and 515 of his *Selections from the State Papers preserved in the Foreign Department*.

(1) On page 511 there is a letter from Fowke, the Company's Resident at Banaras, to the Governor-General and Council, detailing the instalments by which Chait Singh is to pay his tribute. The tribute amounts to Calcutta Sicca Rupees 22,66,180. A premium of 2 per cent being deducted (for the expense of remitting the amount to Calcutta), 'leaves the sum of Rs. 22,21,745-1-9, the nett amount to be annually remitted by the Raja to Calcutta.' There follows 'an equal division of the above sum into monthly Kists, commencing from the 1st of July':—

Calcutta Sicca.

1st Monthly Kist due on 4th August 1775,

Rs. 1,85,145-6-16-1

2nd Monthly Kist due on 4th September 1775,

Rs. 1,85,145-6-16-1

12th Monthly Kist due on 4th July 1776,

Rs. 1,85,145-6-16-1

Rs. 22,21,745-1-15

(2) On page 514 there is the Potta granted by the Company to Chait Singh: "You are to pay it in Calcutta in Sicca rupees of Calcutta, amounting in which specie to 22,66,180 Sicca rupees, the amount of the hoondyan, or exchange, allowed you at the rate of 2 per cent is Rs. 44,434-14-5, which being deducted the nett sum will be 22,21,745-1-15 Sicca rupees of Calcutta."

(3) Lastly, on page 515, is the 'Cuboolyet or Agreement executed by Raja Cheyt Sing.' Chait Singh agrees to "pay it at Calcutta annually, by monthly payments according to Kistbundy,—the sum being Calcutta Sicca Rs. 22,66,180—, but deducting on account of hoondyan or exchange a premium of 2 per cent which premium of 2 per cent upon the whole sum being Sicca Rs. 44,434-14 annas 5

GUNDAS,⁴ I will accordingly deduct for remitting the remainder to the Company's Treasury at Calcutta, so that I shall pay nett the sum of Calcutta Sicca Rs. 22,21,745-1-15 at the end of each year."

The conclusion, then, must be that the third denomination in the passages which form the subject of this paper is the *Ganda*; it seems that usually the accounts were kept in Rupees, annas and pies, but that for purposes of land revenue the accounts were in Rupees, annas, and gandas. When necessary gandas were readily converted into pies and *vice versa*, 12 pies being equal to 20 gandas. Thus, in the first letter from Forrest referred to above, Fowke calculates Chait Singh's tribute first in Rupees, annas and pies (Rs. 22,21,745-1-9), but in fixing the monthly instalments calculates them in terms of Rupees, annas, and gandas, (Rs. 22,21,745-1-15, 9 pies being the equivalent of 15 gandas). Similarly in passage No. 9 above, the sum

of

39,17,239-14-9

and 6,26,758-6-3

is made up as

45,43,998-4-7

because 12 gandas is equal to 7 pies. It is true that a similar adjustment has not been made in passage No. 10, but that may have been an oversight, or the difference may have been considered unimportant.

If the third denomination in our passages is the *ganda*, what may the fourth be? This can only be a matter of guess-work, because there is no conclusive evidence, as in the case of the *ganda*, to show what it is. A possible answer is that it is the *Cowrie*. Cowries were money in many parts of India almost up to the end of the 19th century. According to *Hobson-Jobson*, up to 1801 the whole revenue of the Sylhet District, amounting then to Rs. 2,50,000, was collected in cowries. Four cowries also made a *ganda*.

The difficulty in this view, however, is that it gives too high a value to the cowrie. If 4 cowries made a *ganda*, and 20 gandas an anna, 80 cowries would make an anna, and this seems to give much too high a value to the cowrie. *Hobson-Jobson* mentions a cowrie table given by Mr. Lindsay at Silhet Circa 1778, according to which, while 4 cowries made a *ganda*, 20 gandas made a *pan*, and 4 *pans* made an anna. This gives 320 cowries to the anna. In Maharashtra too, the traditional table gave 256 cowries to the anna, 4 cowries making a *ganda*, 4 gandas a *damdi*, 4 *damdis* a *paisa*, and 4 *paisas* an anna.

In the absence of conclusive evidence, therefore, the determination of the fourth denomination must for the present be considered uncertain.

⁴ Capitals mine.

MIRAT—UL—AUZA

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HERE is a wealth of contemporary literature relating to the history of the Nawabs of Awadh in Persian, Urdu and English. There is still larger and unexplored material available in the National Archives of India. Some of the contemporary Persian works have not been studied with the care they deserve. I recently came across a manuscript of *Mirat-ul-Auza* by one Lalji, son of Munshi Shital Prasad, son of Shiv Kumar, resident of Karrah. This book, as the author states in his Introduction, is a supplement to his larger work *Sultan-ul-Hikayat*. The latter is an illustrated history of the rulers of Awadh and contains a detailed account of their kingdom. The supplement, *Mirat-ul-Auza*, is mainly devoted to an account of the civil and military administration, revenue organization, organization of the judiciary and an interesting description of the capital of the kingdom, Lucknow, with its magnificent buildings, arts and crafts.

Lalji belonged to a respectable family of Karrah. He had a big jagir there and owned a number of houses and gardens. The jagir was granted by the rulers of Awadh. When the rule of the Company was extended to Allahabad, the nature of his jagir also changed. The Company converted the rent-free jagir (*Muafi Jagir*) into zamindari. Lalji's status consequently changed from that of a jagirdar to that of zamindar.

Lalji's grandfather Munshi Shiv Kumar came to Lucknow in the beginning of the reign of Nawab Asaf-ud-daulah (1776-1796). John Bristow was then the Resident at Lucknow. Shiva Kumar was appointed *Waqai Nigar* with the English Resident and *Sarishtadar* of English correspondence. In those days all the affairs of the native princes of India were regulated by the Resident at Lucknow. John Bristow and his successor asked Munshi Shiv Kumar to appoint efficient *Waqai Nigar* in all the native states. Shiv Kumar's nominees undertook the work of *Waqai Nigari* in the courts of the princes of Lahore, Jodhpur, Jaipur, Kotah, Gwalior, Nagpur, Kalpi, Bharatpur, as well as the court of Baji Rao Peshwa and Nawab Amin Khan. Even the *Waqai Nigar* of Shahjahanabad was appointed by Munshi Shiv Kumar. Thus Munshi Shiv Kumar's position and influence considerably increased. In almost all states of the South

and the West his nominees were appointed at the request of the Company.

Munshi Shiv Kumar continued in the service of the Residents till his death. His devotion and loyalty were appreciated and his son Munshi Shital was appointed *Waqai Nigar* in his place. Later, when the Residency of Shahjahanabad was created and the control of the affairs of the Indian Princes was assigned to the English Resident at Delhi, Munshi Shital Prasad could not retain his pre-eminent position. All states except Awadh and Rampur were taken away from him. His salary was also reduced. Col. John Baillie, the Resident, recommended his case to the Governor-General in view of his long and loyal services to the Company. The Governor-General granted him a life-pension of Rs. 100 per mensem. This was not by way of remuneration for his work, but as reward for his past services. Later, when the Resident came to know about the indifferent health of Munshi Shital Prasad, he gave him an assistant on Rs. 50 per mensem and appointed his brother to this post. In 1823 Munshi Shital Prasad died. The author was then only 15 years old. He wandered about for five or six years in search of employment but ultimately returned to Lucknow. Abraham Locket, the Resident, showed kindness to him and considering the record of his family, appointed him *Waqai Nigar* in 1829.

In his Introduction to *Mirat-ul-Auza* the author states that he intended to write a brief account of the revenue system of the kingdom of Awadh, details of the treatment meted out to the peasants by the revenue officers, the dealings of the high placed officers of the kingdom with the servants attached to the king's household, causes of the disturbances which occurred in the land and finally the mode of life of the *taluqdars* and the sources of their income. Besides this, he has given a brief but careful account of the judicial administration, the administrative machinery, the number and equipment of the army of Awadh and the manners and customs of the people. This account, as he himself says, is based on personal observations and on what he heard from reliable sources. Lalji was, no doubt, eminently fitted to write an account of Awadh. His family had long associations with the English Residency as *Waqai Nigars* and had close personal knowledge of the conditions of the people. In his pages one cannot fail to discern a feeling of personal resentment against the old authorities, but on the whole his account is objective and truthful. He says in the Introduction that this general information about life in Awadh was incorporated by him in a separate treatise *Mirat-ul-Auza* because according to an old saying "Truth was bitter" and the account of the causes of ruination of the country as a result of mal-administration would not have been liked by those in authority in Awadh.

Mirat-ul-Auza is divided into eight chapters subdivided into several sections as detailed below:—

- Chapter I An account of the kingdom of Awadh and the mode of life of the *amils* and *taluqdars* of that kingdom, subdivided into 5 sections as follows :
- Section 1 Total revenues of the kingdom and the method of revenue collection.
- Section 2 A description of the cultivated and uncultivated areas of this country and the cause of the wealth of *taluqdars* and an account of their income.
- Section 3 An account of the causes of lawlessness and bloodshed as a result of mal-administration, arrogance and incivility of the *amils* appointed by the *Mustajirs* and the indifference of the government officers to duty and the welfare of the people.
- Section 4 An account of the *amani* settlement.
- Section 5 An account of the wealth of *taluqdars* and the illegal taxes levied by them.
- Chapter II An account of the judiciary subdivided into three sections.
- Section 1 An account of the cases coming before the High Court and the court of *Mujtahid-ul-Asr* (the Shia Divine) and the method of disposal of such cases and the court for settlement of debts.
- Section 2 An account of the court of *Sadar Amin*.
- Section 3 An account of the criminal court.
- Chapter III An account of the English department relating to royal household and the rural and urban areas.
- Chapter IV An account of the perquisites of the Bakhshi's court subdivided into two sections.
- Section 1 Perquisites of the Bakhshi court.
- Section 2 An account of the *Bakhshi's court*, and the disbursement of the salaries of *Chobdars*, *Darbans*, *Servants* attached to the elephant stable, and *Farash Khana*.
- Chapter V An account of the Treasury court.
- Chapter VI An account of the duties of officials and other distinguished officers of the staff attached to the courts subdivided into two sections.
- Section 1 An account of the duties of high ranking officers.
- Section 2 An account of *Khwaja Saras* (eunuchs), royal companions and officers on special duty and *amins*.
- Chapter VII An account of the mode of life of the people of Awadh subdivided into two sections.
- Section 1 An account of the life of the people of Awadh.
- Section 2 An account of the duties assigned to those attached to the royal family and a description of the habits and manners of amirs and other notables, male and female, living in Lucknow.
- Chapter VIII An account of the magnificent buildings of the capital with a description of the principal arts and crafts of the city divided into two sections.
- Section 1 An account of the magnificent buildings of the period.
- Section 2 An account of the arts and crafts for which Lucknow was then famous.

A free translation of Chapter I is given below in order to give an idea as to the sort of information this remarkable book contains.

CHAPTER I

Section I—Pertaining to the Revenues of Awadh and the method of their collection.

Be it known that after the partition of the kingdom of Awadh, the partition having taken place in the year 1216 A. H. during the reign of Saadat Ali Khan Bahadur, the revenues of the remaining territory amounted to one crore thirty-five lakhs and a few thousands. Afterwards, in some years the assessment came to one crore and fifty lakhs. From the time of Ghaziuddin Haidar to that of Nasiruddin Haidar full revenue (according to assessment) was never realised. During the reign of Muhammad Ali, as a result of wise administration of Sharafuddaulah Muzaffarul Mulk Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, Mustaqim Jang the actual realisation of the revenue for the current year and that of the arrears (which were deposited in the state treasury) came to one crore and fifty lakhs. From that time onward the (actual) realisation declined day by day (till) so much so that at present only one crore and twelve lakhs are realised in cash and these include the charges for collection of revenue for a whole year.

The reason for the heavy expenses (of collection) is that the *Amils*, in collusion with officers in power, appropriate lakhs of rupees under different heads of expenditure, proper or improper. If the assessment papers with the expenses of collection were discontinued and the *Amils* who put obstacles in the way of the salaried officers in the matter of collecting revenue, and who oppress and maltreat the ryots, are dismissed, it is certain that even one crore will not be realised for the treasury.

Section II—An account of oppression practised and the lack of cultivation in this country, the cause of the wealth of the *taluqdars* and details of their income.

The land of this country is very fertile and is well suited for the cultivation of cereals and other crops.

If it is carefully observed it will be found that more than one half of the land in this country is uncultivated and is lying waste. The reason for this simply is the carelessness and indifference of the officers of the government who do not strive for the extension of cultivation or for the suppression of lawlessness. The wealth of the *taluqdars* is due to the fact that villages and lands worth thousands and capable of revenue assessment at a lakh or two, have measuring many miles, capable of yielding unlimited profits, have been appropriated by them. They have assigned to themselves for their expenses more than their needs, rent-free villages in lieu of *nankar*. Consequently those who had armies, forts and guns paid revenue as they liked. They realised the cash value of their grant

out of the revenue of the lands (assigned to them) so that they were not dependent on the assistance or favour of the *amils* and other officials, with the result that some of the *taluqdars* appropriated about half of the assessed revenue in lieu of *nankar* and other perquisites without inquiry, measurement or fixing of *Jama Kamil* (circle rates). The *amils* in view of the strength and influence (of these *taluqdars*) and their lack of power (to enforce laws) without any objection, credited such expenses to their accounts in the revenue registers. If the officers of the government were to attend to the administration of the kingdom leaving aside the question of cultivation and improvement of new uncultivated lands, and of cutting down forests which are for the purpose of increasing cultivation and adding to the income of the state, and should undertake measurement of cultivated land in the possession of the *taluqdars*, and having ascertained and assessed the land revenue payable by them and leaving to them income befitting their position and sufficient for their maintenance should make a determined effort for settlement and assessment of revenue, within a short time, that is two or three years, the revenue of this kingdom would rise to two or three crores. What better proof in support of this statement can there be for men of discernment than the fact that the revenues of Gorakhpore and Batul at the time of partition of the kingdom of assigning that block of territory to the Company were approximately five lakhs and fifty thousand rupees, while now as a result of the good administration of the officers of the Company it has risen to such an extent that the income from excise duty alone exceeds three lakhs annually from Gorakhpore. The income from land revenue may be estimated from this.

Section III.—*An account of the lawlessness and murders committed in this kingdom as a result of mismanagement, arrogance and highhandedness of the amils and mustajirs and the general indifference of the government officers.*

The strongest reason for the maladministration and lawlessness such as dacoities and plundering by the *taluqdars* which result in depopulation of the country and violent deaths of the subjects, is that the settlement and assessment of revenue in this country is not customary on the basis of proprietary right in land. The officers of state pay no attention to this. If in a rare case some of the payers of revenue have ever divided up the holdings in different shares by mutual consent, the *amils* and *mustajirs* do not like it and do not desire that arrangement to continue. On the other hand, in order to increase the share of revenue, out of greed, they assess the revenue pertaining to different shareholders on one person and this results in various evils and devastation of the country and the death of many persons. It has happened very often that one of the two real or step brothers from amongst *zamindars* have signed a written

agreement with the *amil* and deprived (his brother) the *shareholder* from his rights, and the brother so deprived of his share as taken to highway robbery and dacoity. At the time of this dispute between the brother who had taken possession and the *amil*, and the flight out of resentment of his brother the latter would appear before the *amil* and sign an agreement about the *taluqa*. The first *taluqdar* would leave that *taluqa* and other (adjoining) villages. If the *amil* at the time of the rebelliousness of the first *malguzar* had obtained an agreement for payment of revenue in respect of half (share of his brother) and taken over for temporary collection of revenue his share and left to him his perquisites about *nankar* and *sir* or had by persuasion or advice told him that if he could not undertake the payment of the full revenue of the entire *taluqa* he should undertake to pay his own share, and if even that was not possible for him then his share would also be assigned to his brother and he should take his own perquisites as *zamindar* and had with his consent assigned his share to his brother, then he would have saved that *taluqa* from ruination. But such arrangements are not customary in this kingdom nor have the *amils* ever paid any attention to it. On the contrary, rather than asserting the right to the *taluqa* of the rebellious *taluqdar* in spite of the existence of his brothers and co-sharers, the *amil* would assign to some other bigger *taluqdar*, who has no connection with or claim on that family, and that rebellious *taluqdar* owing to his being deprived of his *taluqa* would take to dacoity, murder, robbery, destruction of property, setting fire to granaries, and thus lay waste that *taluqa*. There was no kind of cruelty which was not practised on the *ryots*. For example, he would capture the peasants of that *taluqa* and charge them with the crime that after his flight why did they remain in that village and engage themselves in cultivation and (as a punishment) would cut off their heads. In case of some well-to-do *ryots*, he would take them as captives and ask them to pay for his necessary expenses. In case of refusal he would torture his captives with hot irons or fill the ears with gunpowder and set fire to the same. Either that wretched person would die after this torture or if he survived he would pay the money demanded. The *amil* and the *taluqdar* would not redress the grievance or listen to the complaints preferred by his survivors.

The second reason is the bad character of the *taluqdars* and the *zamindars* and their committing such heinous acts that proper punishment of these *zamindars* such as may serve as an example to others is not meted out by the government. As is evident, the result is that the *taluqdar* who rebels in one *ilaga* under an *amil* commits robbery and bloodshed in another *ilaga*, and the *amil* of that *ilaga* makes no effort to arrest him. On the other hand if the *amil* intends to pursue and arrest the culprit, he proceeds to prevent

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15.12.2

depredation by himself devastating his own *ilqa* to prevent it from being destroyed by the rebellious *taludkar*. The officers of state with an eye to their own profit do not make any effort to inquire into the highhandedness of the *amil* or the *taludkar* and do not admonish or restrain them. Most of the *amils* of the *mustajirs* of this kingdom, enhance, out of greed, the valuation of the lands held by *zamindars* and *taludkars* and assign them to *mustajirs* and this results in many (untoward) incidents. Bloodshed and devastation of the ryots is the result, as the hard-hearted *mustajirs* do not give up exactions and severity. If the settlement of land is effected on the basis of proprietary right in lands of *zamindars* and villages are not assigned to *mustajirs*, and the highhandedness of *amils* who put the ryots to great hardships by appointing *dastaks* and realising *talibana* and *sazawalana* ends, hardship will decrease, and the removal of these evils within a short time may be expected.

It is related that during the reign of Amjad Ali Shah one day Mir Ali Londoni, who was appointed as the King's agent to the Resident, complained to the King about the maladministration of the kingdom. Nawab Aminuddaulah Bahadur, the Chief Wazir at that time, replied "If this is your allegation what is there to prevent you from taking over the administration of some *ilqa* of your own choice?" He replied that any small *ilqa* may be assigned to him on trial and then it may be seen how well he would administer it, provided the Wazir and his officials did not interfere in administrative affairs. Nawab Aminuddaulah accepted his request and assigned to him the *ilqa* of Bijnor (Lucknow) valued nearly at an annual revenue of one lakh of rupees but which (then) did not yield even 50 thousand yearly to the treasury. Mir Hasan did not depute any person from amongst the ministerial staff or collection agents. He himself went there one day and summoning the *Qanungoes* and *Zamindars* told them publicly that he would not assign to *mustajirs* any *ilqa* belonging to the *zamindars*. Any *zamindar* whose *ilqa* is held by a *mustajir* should come in person and write a *qabuliyat* and restore the villages and *talukas* to the original *zamindars* who had fled away as a result of the highhandedness of the *amil* and who, now hearing his announcement, presented themselves before him. He appointed one of his men as *mutasaddi* for the collection of the revenue. In the presence of the revenue payers of that *ilqa* he warned the said *mutasaddi* that on the expiry of one month from the date when first instalment fell due he should send one sepoy to give notice to the *zamindar* without charging him for food and daily wages for the same. If the *zamindar* ignored the first warning and did not pay the amount of first instalment a sepoy should be sent a second time to demand the revenue and he should be warned not to ask for anything other than the daily food as *talibana* from the *zamindar*. If even after this the

zamindar delayed in paying the instalment, *dastak* consisting of one sepoy with a daily allowance of -/1/- and food, should be posted there. The *zamindar* should not be burdened with more *talibana* than this. In view of this most of the *zamindars* paid up the instalments without demand. The result was that in the same year the said Mir remitted to the treasury about seventy thousand rupees after deducting the collection charges which were very small, and the *ilqa* so flourished that one saw green fields all round and no incidents of murder or robbery were reported throughout the year from that *ilqa*. When the Mir saw that this was not to the liking of the government officers he resigned in the following year, and the said *ilqa* was handed over to another *amil* and was ruined owing to excessive exactions.

The flight of *zamindars* and *taludkars* (from their *ilaqas*) and their internecine fights and the risings against the *amils* are not to be ascribed entirely to their rebellious spirit but are equally due to the arrogance, selfishness and greed of the *amils*. Some of the *taludkars* due to arrogance and (habitual) non-payment of the revenues desire reduction of revenue at first agreed to by them on improper pleas. The *amils* knowing the profits accruing from the *ilqa* and its resources ask for enhancement of revenue for their own benefit. The *taludkars* refuse to agree to it on the strength of their retainers and their fortified villages which they possess because of their wealth. The result is that armed conflicts ensue between them. In such conflicts for the slight benefit accruing to the *amil* and *mustajir* the state suffers heavy loss. The details of this brief statement are as under: The *amil* in the month of *kunwar* which is the beginning of the *fasli* year takes over the *ilqa* as *mustajir* and goes there and realises revenue for the *kharif* crop at the rate of -/4/- or -/5/-, in some places, at -/6/- per rupee till the month of *poh* and from the month of *magh* proceeds to assess the revenue for the whole year. If at the time of assessment, agreement is not reached between the *taludkar* and the *amil* because of the latter's demand for enhanced rates or *nazrana* beyond the means of the *taludkar*, or due to any other reason, the *taludkar* returns to his *taluka* and over and above the usual levy of ten or twelve annas per rupee he realises additional rent to the maximum amount from the ryots and then rebels against the *amil* and retires to his fortified village. When the *amil* besieges his fort armed conflict ensues between them. In the end after this bloodshed, flying from his *taluka*, he establishes himself in the *ilqa* of some other *amil* and ruins his peasantry by plunder and burning of their crops. After his flight if the *amil* assigns his *taluka* to his co-sharers or to another *taludkar* the latter assesses the entire revenue for the whole year on the ryots and realises the same from them. The

revenue realised by the absconding zamindar at the time of his flight is not credited to their account and this results in double loss to the ryots. If the *amil* does not assign the *taluka* to any one and the management of the same is made on the basis of *tahsil-e-Khan*, without crediting the amount realised by the absconding *taluqdar*, the revenue is realised by sale of their property, crops, household goods, agricultural implements etc. The tyrannical *amils* and *tehsildars* not finding enough property to satisfy their demands arrest the money lenders having dealings with the ryots and exact the revenue due from the ryots from them. At the end of the year they charge the government the expenses incurred on these armed conflicts. Under these circumstances the arrogance and selfishness of the *amils* for petty personal gains in the form of enhanced assessment results in armed conflicts, bloodshed, ruination of the peasantry and devastation of the country and heavy loss to state revenues because firstly the *amils* charge thousands of rupees against the expenditure incurred on the conflict, and the *taluka* as is evident remains uncultivated during the following year.

Section IV.—*Regarding Amani Settlement during the reign of Saadat Ali Khan and Ghaziuddin Hyder*

The method of *amani* settlement was as follows: At the beginning of the year the *amil* with the entire staff of clerks and collection staff was appointed on the recommendation of the officers of the government. The *amil* on reaching the *ilaqa* proceeded to realise the revenue relating to *kharif* crop at the rate of 0-6-0 or 0-8-0 per rupee from *malguzars* till the month of *poh*. The paper for the total annual realisation which is called *dowl*, after proper inquiry from the clerks concerned, was prepared and sent to the government.

He then realised the revenue according to the assessment of annual revenue from the villages in that *ilaqa* on the basis of that *dowl* or less than that in the presence of the *tehsil* staff without concealing from them the net revenue or the additional cesses. The amount realised till the end of the year was remitted to the state treasury. The arrears were debited to the account of the *malguzars* and this was not concealed from the staff appointed by the government. And *nazar*, the perquisites of the *amil* and his staff which had been fixed by the government, were realised.

At this time when most of the *ilaqas* are under *amani* settlement the conditions are worse than those under *ijara* system. This is because at the time of assigning an *ilaqa* to an *amil* on *amani* basis instead of *mustajiri* arrangement, the following agreement is entered into by the *amil*: "I will remit to the treasury such and such amount

in respect of the total annual revenue and if there is any decrease in the stipulated amount I hold myself responsible for the same," and the government appoints in name only his staff. But the *amil* in his arrogance and pride asserts that he had entered into an agreement for the realisation of the revenue for a whole year like the agreement which *mustajirs* execute, or at the end of the year the arrears will be demanded from him. The staff appointed by the government have no business to interfere with his arrangements. They (*amils*) conceal from their staff their arrangements with the *malguzars*, and make them agree to pay them an additional sum as *nazrana* over and above the amount stipulated in the *qabuliyat* and thus they derive an income of lakhs of rupees. The *amils* remit to the treasury only that amount which was agreed to in the contract after deducting a large amount against expenses incurred for the realisation of revenue after armed conflicts with the *taluqdars* and themselves. They also would charge other bogus expenses. Under these circumstances the amount remitted is not equal to that which used to be remitted by *mustajirs* of that *ilaqa*. The highhandedness and cruel treatment meted out to the ryots by these *amils* exceeds that practised by the *amils* appointed by *mustajirs*.

Section V.—*An account of the taluqdars and the excessive revenue realised by them.*

A very large number of the *taluqdars* have forcibly taken possession of the villages belonging to poor and helpless ryots without (proper) sale or mortgage deeds. Most of them induce the petty *zamindars* who have suffered on account of the highhandedness of the *amils* (to part with their holdings).

If they join them in their agreement to pay revenue to the government in respect of their own villages, then they would escape the severity and over exactions of the *amils*. Having included them in their personal contracts for payment of revenue after one or two years they tell the petty *zamindars* that as the *amil* has assessed excessive revenue in respect of their earlier contract and such and such amount proportionate to the increase in the number of villages shall have to be paid by them (*zamindars*). Since it was beyond the capacity of the *zamindars* to pay the additional demand they ask them to write down a *tamasuk* for the payment of the revenue in respect of their (*zamindars*') villages. After some time interest having accumulated on the principal and unpaid interest they have a sale deed (of villages) executed against the amount of interest and principal and take possession of the same. In case of some villages or *talukas* they take over some villages as farmers (*mustajirs*) on assignment by the *amil*. After the dismissal of the

amil and the appointment of a new one, if the newly appointed *amil* wants to restore those villages or *taluqa* to the original *zamin-dar*, then the *taluqdar* in possession of the same would not give up possession of the said *taluqa* on the plea of bogus expenses (incurred by them as *mustajirs*). If the original owner files a petition he would never receive redress through the machinations of the *taluqdars* and the said villages remain in the possession of *taluqdars*. For example, Beni Madhu Bakhsh *taluqdar* Shankarpore, Raghunath Singh *taluqdar* Khjargaon of Beswara, Harpal Singh *taluqdar* of Sehipur in the district of Sultanpore and Ram Datt Pandey of Gond etc. have secured villages yielding lakhs of revenue in this manner. The late Raja Darshan Singh and his brothers and sons in his *ilaga* having shown very excessive revenue demands and (consequent) unpaid arrears against the *zamindars* compelled them (*zamindars*) to transfer by sale hundreds of villages against those bogus claims. Darshan Singh who was notorious for his cruelty obtained in similar manner *talugas* of petty *zamindars*. If the real proprietorship of the *taluqa* of such persons is inquired into, their original ancestral property would come to a fraction of what they hold. A few *taluqdars*, for example, *taluqdars* of Julsipur and Balrampur and Debi Bakhsh of Gonda etc. are *taluqdars* in this kingdom who have had *zamindari* worth lakhs since the time of their ancestors.

DELHI DIARY OF 1828

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IN the National Archives of India, there are some bound volumes of *Jam-i-Jahan Numa*, a Persian weekly, beginning from December 1824. The newspaper was issued from Calcutta, and was printed at the Mission Press. The Urdu news supplement, which had been published along with the Persian issues of this paper, was stopped on 11 January 1826. In its place the Urdu supplement of the year 1826 was utilized for the purpose of publishing very detailed and interesting accounts of (1) the war of succession between the sons of Shahjahan and (2) the Napoleonic wars. This Urdu supplement ceased to be published completely in 1827. The issues of the paper for the year 1828 contained news about Indian states and foreign countries.

News about Delhi were published under two headings: (1) news about the Emperor Akbar Shah II, and (2) news about the various activities of the Resident. In fact there were two courts at Delhi at that time, one of the Mughal Emperor within the precincts of the Red Fort and the other of the British Resident. The latter was responsible for the administration of the extensive Delhi province. At both the courts the nobles offered *nazars* and paid their humble respects. Though the Mughal Emperor had lost all political power, he tried to imitate his namesake, the Great Akbar, by conferring titles and *khillats* and by maintaining the court etiquette. The Emperor still received *nazars* from the British Government. The *nazar* of one hundred and one *ashrafs* was offered to the Emperor on behalf of the Governor-General on all important festivals. The Commanders-in-Chief too offered him *nazars* and in return titles were conferred upon them by the Emperor. The minute guns were fired on the Emperor's departure from and on arrival at the Fort. The Resident attended the *durbars* on the occasions of all festivals and offered him *nazar*. The Emperor and the Residents of Delhi were free from communal prejudices. Both Hindus and Muslims participated in the festivals of each other. The Resident had to perform multifarious duties. His political duties consisted of regulating the relations of East India Company with the Emperor of Delhi, the rulers of Kishengarh, Ballabgarh, Jhajjar, Firozpur and the Rajput states.

Below are mentioned some of the important happenings of the year.

Emperor's visit to the Qutub.—On 2, January Kiran Sahib, the Commandant of the Palace, presented himself in the court. The Emperor came out of his apartment and with all his followers started from Lahori Gate of the Fort. Guns were fired on his departure and a salute was given to him by the foot soldiers. After reaching the house of Ghazi-ud-din, the heir apparent (Zafar, later on Bahadur Shah II), the Emperor returned to the palace. Kiran Sahib also returned from Jeysinghpura (the observatory). The rest of the procession reached Dargah of Kutub Sahib. They offered their respects and prayers at the tombs in the Dargah.

Mrs. Resident visits Hussani Begum.—On 13 January Mrs. Resident visited Hussani Begum and presented her a *nazar*. She presented some clothes for the bridegroom and the bride.

Colonel Skinner's arrival.—Colonel Skinner came from Hansee. He had an interview with the Resident and then went to his residence.

The Commander-in-Chief's arrival.—On 23 January Moonshi Pran Kishan communicated the news of the expected arrival of Lord Combermere to the various chiefs and thus gave them an opportunity of meeting the Lord. On 26 January he reached the vicinity of Delhi province. On 31 January Mirza Selim paid his respects to the Commander-in-Chief in the outskirts of the city. He again saw Lord Combermere on 1 February near Safdurjung. On 2 February the Lord entered Delhi and inspected the cantonment at Rajpura. Two battalions were posted at his residence. English and Indian bands also played at his residence. On 3 February Raja Kalyan Singh, Balwant Singh and Madho Singh met the Commander-in-Chief. On the same day Mirza Selim proceeded from the Fort and met the Commander-in-Chief on the way. The Commander-in-Chief came and attended the *darbar* in the *Diwan-i-Khas*. He offered 51 gold mohurs, three trays of clothes, one tray of jewels, two elephant chains and five horses as *nazar* to the Emperor. He also presented twenty-one *ashrafis*, one tray of clothes, and one horse to the heir apparent. Other officers accompanying him also presented *nazars*. The Emperor gave turbans and other dresses embroidered with gold to all those who had presented him *nazars*. A *Mansab* of *Haft Hazari* was conferred on the Commander-in-Chief and the title of "Ghazanfarul-Daula, Saiful-Mulk, Sipah-salar, Khan-i-Jahan, Khan Bahadur, Rustam-i-Jang" was conferred upon him. On the fourth day the Commander-in-Chief visited the Qutub and Nizam-ud-din. Mirza Selim again visited Lord Combermere. He was invited at a dinner

and various English fruits were presented to him. On the fifth day Nawab Shams-ud-din (of Ferozepur) received a visit from Lord Combermere. The Nawab offered a *nazar* of two hundred rupees to the Lord. He was entertained by an English band and took his dinner there. On the sixth day he departed from Delhi.

King's Birthday.—On 23 February the Resident and the nobles presented their *nazars* on the occasion of the Emperor's birthday.

Shab-i-Barat.—On 27 February fireworks for *Shab-i-Barat* were received from the British Resident, and were distributed among the Princes on the following day.

Holi.—On 3 March Raja Sohan Lal and other nobles presented *nazars* to the Emperor on the day of Holi. The Emperor gave him permission to go in *palkee* (in procession) to his house as a special favour.

Presents from Begum Samru.—On 5 March Begum Samru's presents were received which included two English made silken clothes for Nawab Mumtaz Mahal Begum (the most favourite Begum of the Emperor) and two for Mirza Selim (the most favourite living son).

Poisoning of the Husband.—In Subzi Mandi, an evil natured woman, who had bad intentions, gave poison with meals to her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law. She was apprehended. The physician, Gholam Nasir, got the poison vomited out.

Nowroz (New Year's Day).—On 21 March His Majesty gave one *dopata* to each of his women followers. After this he went to *Diwan-i-Khas*. His nobles, the English officers and the followers of the Emperor paid their respects to him. The Resident gave one hundred and one *ashrafis* on behalf of the Governor-General and also delivered a letter from the Governor-General to His Majesty. The Resident presented 21 *ashrafis* on his own behalf, five to the heir apparent and two to Begum Mumtaz Mahal. After this Mr. Burke and other English officers, Raja of Kishangarh, nobles and servants of the Emperor presented their *nazars*. As usual a turban and a dress were given to the Agent by the king. Raja of Kishangarh was given a *dopata* and a *kulgee*. His son was also given a *dopata*.

Distribution of Money on behalf of the King at Hardwar.—On 29 March Raja Kidar Nath presented a bag containing five hundred rupees. The Emperor with the shadow of his hand sanctified the bag. The Raja informed the Emperor that he was going to distribute that money on behalf of the Emperor at Hardwar. Then he sought his permission to leave for Hardwar. The Emperor gave him a *doshala* on his departure.

Prohibition of preparation of fireworks.—On 8 April a letter was received from Mr. Thomas Metcalfe in which he had informed the Resident that an order prohibiting the preparation of fireworks for the use of marriage processions had been promulgated by the beat of drums in the city.

Raja Sohan Lal.—On 11 April the Emperor informed the Resident that Raja Sohan Lal had been given the highest rank among his nobles.

Id-ul-fitr.—On 12 April the Emperor went to Jama Masjid. After the prayers he gave a dress and sword to the *Pesh-i-Imam* (a person who leads the prayer). Three clothes were also bestowed upon the Darogha-i-Masjid. The followers of the Emperor were presented with flowers. The minute guns were fired on the departure and arrival of the Emperor at the Fort. On 15 April the Emperor was weighed against cereals and then these were distributed among the poor. On the 16th owing to dusty sky, the moon could not be seen. Just at about 2 A.M. an application of the Qazi of the Dargah at Qutub Sahib was received declaring that he had seen the moon. Immediately the Emperor ordered firing of guns expressing joy on this auspicious occasion. At dawn, after the performance of the usual duties, the Emperor started for the Idgah. A *khillat* of four clothes and a sword were presented to the Imam of the Idgah. After this the Emperor returned to the Fort and a *darbar* was held in the *Diwan-i-Khas*. Congratulatory guns were fired by the battalions of the Emperor and the East India Company. The Resident presented 121 *ashrafis* (one hundred and one on behalf of the Governor-General and twenty on his own behalf) and other nobles and officers also gave their offerings.

Urs of Mirza Jehangir.—On 21 April Nawab Mumtaz Mahal Begum issued orders that the Urs of Mirza Jehangir would take place on the 10th (Mohammadan month); therefore, preparations should be made for that. On 4 May Nawab Mumtaz Mahal Begum went for Urs of Mirza Jehangir to Dargah-i-Nizam-ud-din.

Accession Anniversary (Jashan-i-Jalus).—On 6 May the Emperor graced the *Diwan-i-Khas* with his presence. He took his seat on the throne. Mirza Selim, the heir apparent, and Mirza Babur presented their *nazars*. Dresses and jewels were given by the Emperor to all of them. After this the Resident Mr. Thomas Metcalf Brown Sahib, Dr. Ludlow and the court nobles presented their *nazars*. Four hundred and twenty-three *ashrafis* on the 23rd year of accession (new coins specially prepared for the occasion) were presented by the Agent to His Majesty. Five *ashrafis* of the new year were presented to the heir apparent. All these persons were given dresses embroidered with gold by the Emperor. Raja of Ballabgarh, Munshi Altaf Husain,

Mohammad Reza Khan, Munshi Sadar-ud-din, Munshi Pran Kishan, Munshi Sultan Singh, Mohammad Husain, Kunwar Raj Singh, Mirza Abbas, Maulvee Fazl Haq, Mirza Kharati, Mirza Shujait Ali. Hanu Mal treasurer and Munsha Ram were given dresses in return for their presents. Garlands of flowers were also given to some of the nobles.

Sketches of Historic Buildings.—On 4 June two painters were sent to the Palace by Thomas Metcalfe. They wanted to draw sketches of the Red Fort and the Jama Masjid. The Emperor sent a *chobdar* to help them and show them properly those buildings.

Non-Payment of Salary.—In the month of June the Emperor addressed a letter to Raja Sohan Lal, the *Mukhtiar*, in which he informed him that residents of the Fort were very angry over non-payment of their salary. He ordered him to make immediate payment of the salary to the people.

Id-uz-Zuha.—Raja Sohan Lal was also ordered to get the goats ready for sacrifice for the Id.

Ghusil-i-Sehat (bathing after recovery from sickness).—On 15 August Mirza Selim, who had been suffering from smallpox recovered completely from the disease. He took a bath. A *khillat* was conferred upon him by the Emperor. The Resident and other officers also offered *nazars* to the Emperor and the prince. The prince gave a feast to the Resident and other English officers.

Repairs in the Red Fort.—On 27 August the Emperor was informed that the canal in the Fort, which had been filled with mud, was now cleared and water had begun to flow through it. The Emperor ordered fifteen rupees to be paid to the labourers. The Emperor was also informed that roof of Chhatta Lahore Gate of the Fort was leaking. After his reaching the Fort on 8 September the Emperor ordered Mirza Selim to send two hundred rupees to Kiran Sahib, the commandant of the Red Fort, for the repairs of Chhatta Lahore Gate.

Raksha Bandhan.—A *khillat* was bestowed by the Emperor on Raja Kidar Nath on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan (Salona).

Seir-i-Gulfroshan (visit to the fair of flower sellers).—Money was ordered to be distributed among the followers of the Emperor according to the wishes of Mumtaz Mahal Begum. On 20 August the Emperor (Akbar Shah II) arrived at Qutub Sahib. On 5 September the flower sellers decorated a *pankha* very well and brought it to the Dargah. A large crowd of people had come from far and near to see the fair. On 6 September, before his departure for the city, the Emperor gave money to the *chowdhari* of the flower sellers for the preparation of a covering of flowers for the saint's tomb and a fan of flowers.

Akhree Chhar Chamba.—On 10 September the Emperor took his seat in the *Diwan-i-Khas*. The heir apparent and followers of the Emperor attended the *darbar*. The Resident and other British officers also presented themselves. Darogha-i-Jawahar Khana brought many golden rings from his store. The Emperor wore five rings of each kind on his fingers and four rings were given to each of his followers. Seven rings were given for the Governor-General by the Emperor. Five rings were given to the Agent and four were given to the other English officers.

Pulling down of Dams.—On 7 October a complaint was made to the Resident that Nawab Faiz Taleb Khan had constructed a bund on a rivulet. He was ordered to pull down the dam and not to check the normal flow of water.

Dussera.—On 15 October Mirza Selim with 50 riders and two battalions of soldiers went to see Ramlila in Rajpura cantonment. Raja Kidar Nath wore a new turban on *Dussera* day and offered his *nazars* to the Emperor.

Urs of Nizam-ud-din.—On 28 October all the nobles presented themselves before the Emperor and paid their respects to him. Then all of them started for Nizam-ud-din. *Nazars* and flowers were placed at the tomb of Amir Khusru, Nizam-ud-din and Mirza Jehangir. After this the Emperor attended a meeting of *Mushaikh*s (elders and holy persons). He then amused himself with *Quwalis* (singing of dervishes). Then the Emperor gave prizes to good singers and came back to the Palace.

Diwali.—On 6 November the Resident distributed sweets among his servants, which he had received from the bankers of the city on the occasion of Diwali. The Emperor also had a look at the sweets sent by Kishan Chand, a banker of the city.

A MISSION TO THE WESTERN STATES OF RAJASTHAN, 1831

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EARLY in the 19th century the tranquillity of Rajputana was disturbed by the havoc caused by certain local predatory associations. Former proceedings against them had failed entirely¹. So, on 2 February 1831, Mr. R. Cavendish, the Superintendent and Political Agent at Ajmer, reported to the Resident at Delhi about these distracted affairs, urging appropriate action. "The Larkhanees", he stated, "have done us and our subjects a greater injury than was ever suffered by us at the hands of the Meers and Cheetoos." These mercenaries were nominally employed by the Rajputana Chiefs for mutual safety and their "marauding system" was "a disgrace to these Governments". Mr. Cavendish therefore desired to appoint an *Amin* to adjust "the past and prevention of future differences and retaliation". Mr. W. B. Martin, the Resident at Delhi, doubted if the subjugation of these bands could be effected until the differences in Jaipur had ended. A dispatch, dated 13 March 1831, contains the Governor-General's observations on the subject. The issue raised by Mr. Cavendish involved "considerations of the first importance". Punishment of the bands and their supporters, the Chiefs of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Shekhawati, was quite distinct from "the sources of the present commotion in Jyepoor". However, sufferance of the marauders being a breach of the Treaty of Alliance of 1818, which bound their feudal overlords to the British Government, active punitive measures were necessary for their suppression. Summer had advanced and proper information was lacking. The interim period was therefore to be utilised in these preliminary inquiries which would enable the supreme Government to undertake military operations eventually. As these duties were "too important to be entrusted to an *Amin*," the Governor-General appointed instead Col.

¹ A.G.G. Captain Stewart induced Jaipur in 1822 to send an expedition to Tuarawati Battisi under Thakur Kishen Singh. G.R. Clerk and later R. Cavendish were also entrusted with the operations. But they were busy with other matters. Marwar, Kishengarh and Bikaner were ravaged by the plunderers. In 1829 Jaisalmer suffered. It was alleged that the internecine trouble at Jaipur, begun early in 1831, was due to them.

A. Lockett of the Bharatpur Agency². Voluminous correspondence relating to this mission of Lockett has been preserved in the Foreign Department records of the Indian National Archives.

Lockett's commission was to collect intelligence about the following:—Names of the chiefs of the several associations; connections of each with the chiefs of Rajwara, principal or subordinate; tenure of their lands and forts, how obtained and from whom; ascertainment with proof of specific cases of depredations committed by each association; country of the plunderers, its approach, and a plan of measures for being proposed to different chiefs who would help in the liquidation of the oppressors. The Governor-General also hoped that when these details were being collected during the summer and monsoon, Col. Lockett may also exert the necessary 'political influence, supported by military display' for discouraging the expected Shekhawati rising in the ensuing winter. These duties were to be undertaken immediately³.

Reliable information was not forthcoming at Bharatpur. Lockett expected to obtain it in Jaipur territory by personal contacts. To collect data of military importance, the services of Lt. A.H.F. Boileau, surveying at Bharatpur, were lent to him. Then, anticipating the Governor-General's sanction to his visiting the Jaipur territory for a short while, Lockett moved in that direction intending not to cross the frontier till he received formal permission. He further requested the Resident at Delhi to acquaint the Jaipur Court with his visit⁴. With these preliminaries, Lockett left Bharatpur on 28 March 1831 and reached Bassawar (4 coss from Newa Ramgarh in Jaipur State) on the 30th morning. Boileau joined him on 1 April. It was soon revealed that correct information at Jaipur or its dependencies would not be available to him without espionage. Coupled with this, the Jaipur *akhbars* systematically misrepresented that he was deputed to interfere in the existing court disputes. Thereupon Lockett decided against communicating with Jaipur. Instead he drew up an itinerary, so as to skirt the Shekhawati country on three sides bordering on foreign states, following the route of Alwar, Koteputli, Narnoul, Kanound, Dadri, Loharu, Churu, Ratangarh, Didwana, Kuchawan and Ajmer. In this circuit, through Alwar, Beraitch, Bikaner and Jodhpur States, all of which endured the aggressions of the Shekhawatis, Lockett was to obtain all the desired information⁵. This programme was approved by the Governor-General and Lockett was left free to obtain the details⁶.

² National Archives of India, Political Consultation., 2 April 1931, no. 44, Cf. Pol. Cons., 27 May 1831, no. 13.

³ Pol. Cons., 2 April 1831, no. 44.

⁴ Pol. Cons., 22 April 1831, no. 812.

⁵ Pol. Cons., 6 May 1831, no. 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 9.

The entourage of Lockett numbered 500 men, including one Rissala of irregular Cavalry, half a Company of Sepoys of the 46th Native Infantry with a compliment of officers, Boileau's establishment, servants, etc. Banya Lokman, a travelling pedlar, was hired as Boileau's guide.

Lockett started on his mission from Akheygarh on 12 April and reached Ajmer about 6 A.M. on 24 May. He encamped at Ajmer for 10 days "to consult the books of correspondence in the office of the Political Agent". Leaving it on 4 June, he concluded the tour arriving at the Bharatpur Agency, during the morning gunfire, on 17 June 1831.

Lockett derived his information from local inhabitants, important officials and even family records. The long Persian *Naqshu* (statement) containing an account of the predatory associations of Shekhawati and the thieving Minas of Tuarawati was given by Nawab Fyaz Muhammad Khan of Beraitch. With this, supplemented by the information of Dhabae Kanya Ram of Khetri, Lockett prepared "*A Geographical and Topographical Sketch of the Shekhawati Country*." The geographical portion of it was drawn up by Boileau, while the historical notice of the origin and descent of Shekhawats was based on an old Rajasthani genealogical record belonging to the Dhabae. The account of Minas etc. was obtained from the Beraitch Dewan Kishen Lal and other citizens of Narnoul. A well-informed individual provided Boileau with facts for his '*Geographical description of the Tract called Patun Tuarawati or Battisi*.' Materials for Sikar and Fatehpur history were got from 'a variety of unexceptional sources', and the sketches of the Keeam Khani, Sikar, Jaipur and Bikaner history were related either by Rao Raja Lachman Singh of Sikar or his agents. Besides, much reliable information on the cavalry, strongholds, habitats of Silhadis, Larkhanis, Bedawats etc. and their leaders, was gleaned by Lockett on interviewing the Dhabae, Shekhawati Chiefs (e.g. Hammir Singh, Sheo Singh etc.), Dewan Lacchmi Chand of Churu and others.

The diaries of Lockett and Boileau constitute the most valuable raw materials for the military, geographical, economic, social and political history of Rajputana during this period. They contain innumerable facts appertaining to the climatic conditions, nature of the country, flora and fauna, origins of defensive works, detached redoubts and forts in important towns, mines, minerals, industries, habitations, population, customs, social organisation etc. Copious information is available on the rise of the Chiefs of Alwar, Khetri, Sikar. Shekhawati and a host of other subjects like sieges of Baggar (1808) and Mandawa (1829), Khetri, Bikaner relations etc.⁷.

⁷ Foreign Miscellaneous records, nos. 270 and 272. These are now being edited by me

Lockett's inquiries showed that the disturbances in Rajputana were due to Minas and Rangars of Tuarawati, the Larkhanis and Silhadis of Shekhawati and the Bidawats of Bikaner.

In the company of Tuarawati Rajputs, the Minas devastated the Beraitch country. They had been settled at Koteputli, Jodhpur border, Shekhawati, Kukres, Bajuwah, Tumkor and Jaipur.

The Shekhawats were descendants of Shekha, a disciple of Sheikh Burhan Aulia. Rae Sal's seven families comprehended all the Shekhawats of any note subject to the Jaipur Raja. Larkhanis, a branch of the Shekhawats, derived their name from the Delhi Mansabdar Larkhan, the fourth son of Rae Sal. Their home was in Kacharia on the Jodhpur and Bikaner frontiers. They were dispersed in 174 villages under 15 chiefs. The Silhadis were descendants of Salheqdi Singh, the youngest brother of Sardul Singh. Their headquarters were at Kheror and Jakal. Khetri supported Silhadis and Larkhanis, placing them at Kotepulti and Babae. 2,000 Minas, 1,200 Rajputs, 200 Silhadis and 200 Larkhanis were stationed in Khetri town under Surat Singh and Bagh Singh, the friends of Dhabae Kanya Ram. The Silhadis of Bassao, Bachawa, Kukres and Tumkor were led by Hammir Singh and Chayn Singh, the sons of Sham Singh of Jhunju. Others were serving at Jaipur. The jagirs of the seven sons of Zorawar Singh of Taen, were nests of Silhadi horse, which plundered the Bikaner territory. Fourteen villages from Mandawah to Churu contained Silhadi horse which daily raided the same region. Robbers from Malsisar, Alsisar, Gangsisar, Kheoli, Kukres, Tumkor and Sikar encroached on Parganah Rajgarh. In Sikar levies of Silhadis were also maintained. The Bidawats of Bidasur, originally connected with Jodhpur, occupied 100 villages, from where they foraged into Jodhpur territory, occasionally near Sikar and in other parts of Shekhawati towards Churu.

The strength of these marauders was due to two important facts. In the first place they were friendly with the Thakurs and Zamindars. Prior to the Treaty of Alliance of 1818, the Larkhanis and Silhadis served under Surajmal, Meer Khan and others. Thereafter the Shekhawati Thakurs employed them while fighting with each other or resisting the payment of tribute to Jaipur. When Rajputana came under the control of the British, their profession received a setback and they turned to plunder travellers and merchants passing through their states. They compromised with the Thakurs and Jagirdars, shared the booty, or paid *Chouth* or half on condition that they did not complain. To screen them from blame, the Thakurs even nominally employed them, but not on payment. Secondly, they found support from the Jaipur Court. The Silhadis and Thakur Sham Singh acted in concert. Important Silhadi Chieftains were employed by

the Minister Sangi Jotha Ram and Sham Singh and posted near their mansions at Jaipur for mutual defence. Mistrusting each other and without any real friends, Jotha Ram and Sham Singh remained united through fear, and were inseparable. At Bassao a body of 500 infantry, with 4 guns, was kept under the Keeam Khani Toru Khan. Out of this, 200 were with Sham Singh at Jaipur during 1831. About this time the latter raised at Bassao new levies under two Eurasians. 2,000 men were also sent to Jaipur. Though recruited in Sham Singh's name, yet the fresh levies were actually in the service of the Jaipur Raja—Jotha Ram paying them through his friend.

Sham Singh's influence in Jaipur Court was due to many reasons. In 1820 the Maji (Queen Regent) had adopted him as her father. Seven years later, together with Rao Raja Lachman Singh of Sikar, he reinstated Sangi Jotha Ram as Minister. In 1829, when Jaipur sent Bakshi Munna Lal, the brother-in-law of Jotha Ram, against Fort Kheror, the Silhadis carried off with Sham Singh's connivance the niece and two nephews of the Minister. To obtain their release the Minister, among other things, agreed to call off the expedition and entertain 200 Silhadis at Jaipur. From now the Silhadis depended upon Sham Singh for support, rising or falling at his word. The Jaipur Government were thus not inclined or able "to introduce reform in these disorderly tracts".

The Beraitch Dewan proposed a plan for suppression of the Battisi plunderers. If Jaipur was unwilling to interfere, the British should assume 'direct management' of the tract, deposing the Rao. In the alternative, he was willing to superintend the proceedings with some facilities. Rao Raja Lachman Singh of Sikar suggested that both Sham Singh and the Minister be "called upon and made responsible" for the conduct of the marauders. During an informal talk with Mr. R. Cavendish in June 1831, Lockett attributed the existing evils to Jotha Ram and the Maji and advocated her deposition and the establishment of British or some other Regency. But Cavendish maintained that the habits of the people and the weakness of the Chiefs were responsible for the chaos, which existed even before British rule⁸. Lockett submitted his views much later.

On 2 June 1831, while referring to Lockett's arrival at Ajmer, Cavendish wrote that his inquiries on the Shekhawati frontier "have for the present proved highly beneficial on the frontiers generally for I do not now hear of any aggressions". Military measures for their suppression were however still necessary⁹.

⁸ Pol. Cons., 16 September 1831, no. 1613.

⁹ Pol. Cons., 22 July 1831, no. 57.

THE MARATHI RECORDS OF KOTAH

GOVIND S. SARDESAI

Kamshet

A VERY large body of historical records of primary importance to scholars and unique in respect of certain events and personalities, still remains unpublished and almost unknown except to a few men. It is the *Gulgule Daftar*, or the papers of the Gulgule family, the sardars of the Sarola House in Kotah. Fortunately for Indian history the collection is complete and undamaged, and still more fortunately the cream of the papers, that is what a historian requires, has been transcribed from the Modi script of the original into Nagari and typed in triplicate, thanks to the tireless historical zeal and noble liberality of Maharaj-kumar Raghuvir Sinh of Sitamau. Through his courtesy I have been supplied with one set, which I have studied, dated, rearranged and furnished it with English summaries on the lines of the *Selections from the Peshwas' Daftar*, edited by me for the Bombay Government. They are thus ready for publication, if only money is provided for purchasing them from their owner, Pandit Chandrakant Gulgule, Sardar of Kotah, and for printing them.

Importance of this Daftar

I am giving here a description of these records, with translations of two letters as samples, so that the public may realise the great value of the *Gulgule Daftar* and some State Government or generous patron of learning may be induced to buy these from their present owner and publish the press copies prepared by me, for the benefit of scholars all over the world.

Let us understand clearly in what points the *Gulgule Daftar* is of unique importance to Indian history. This is the only source where we get authentic and full details of (1) the doings of the sons of Ranoji Sindhia, (2) the early struggles of Mahadji Sindhia during the period of his obscurity (and persecution by Raghunath Dada) from 1761 to 1768, (3) the entire history of Daulat Rao Sindhia after Mahadji's death in 1794, and (4) the rise of Yashwant Rao Holkar. These documents also throw new light on the Anglo-Maratha War of 1803 and Monson's retreat (1804) and are of unique importance for the studies of the social and economic condition of Central and North India in that age, and for illustrating the fascinating but hitherto neglected

subject of the interaction between Hindusthan and the Deccan in culture and social life, in consequence of the Maratha penetration into the Delhi empire north of the Narmada.

Kotah is geographically so situated as to be a very convenient half-way house between Delhi and Maharashtra. When the great Peshwa Baji Rao I invaded Malwa and Bundelkhand, and established Maratha spheres of influence there, he worked through his generals Holkar and Sindhia. Ranoji Sindhia placed at Kotah an agent of his own for the collection of tribute for diplomatic transactions, purchase of war materials, recruitment of men, and supplying the needs of army chiefs. This general manager of his affairs was a Sarasvat Brahman named Balaji Yashwant Gulgule, whose original home was Achre, a village in Goa. He served the Sindhias from 1733 (or even earlier, because the letters before 1733 may have been lost) and died at the end of 1759, when he was succeeded by his son Lalaji Ballal, who seems to have died about the year 1820 as his last letter is found written in November 1817, and the first letter by his son Ramchandra Lalji is dated June 1822. Thus two generations of this family covered nearly 90 eventful years in Maratha service, or even longer, if we take into account Balaji's father, because Lalaji rightly boasts in a letter of 23 August 1794, that he represented "three generations of service to the State for 60 to 70 years".

Analysis of Contents

I examined the *Gulgule Daftar* at Kotah (along with V. S. Wakas-kar) in 1927 and again in 1929 along with Dr. Jadunath Sarkar, who copied the Persian letters mostly written by the munshis of Sindhia's French generals.

The typed transcripts supplied to me by Maharaj-kumar Raghuvir Sinh number 4,372 documents, chronologically arranged thus:—

Years	:	1733—1760	...	...	...	121 letters.
"	:	1761—1770	...	...	...	223 "
"	:	1771—1775	...	...	...	396 "
"	:	1776—1780	...	...	...	592 "
"	:	1781—1785	...	...	...	310 "
"	:	1786—1790	...	...	...	243 "
"	:	1791—1795	...	...	...	699 "
"	:	1796—1800	...	...	...	540 "
"	:	1801—1805	...	...	...	739 "
"	:	1806—1824	...	...	...	192 "

and only one letter of 1857, besides 317 letters which cannot be correctly dated.

Need of Publication

Three volumes of selections from the *Gulgule Daftar* were published by their editor Sardar Anandrao Bhau Phalke of Gwalior; Vol. I (296 letters) in 1929, Vol. II (188 letters) in 1930 and Vol. III (460 letters) in 1937. The total number of letters thus published was 944. But all of them are not of equal historical importance, many being mere commonplace correspondence or notes of minor business transactions. My own opinion is that not more than one-half, or it may be only one-third, of the 4,372 letters classified by me deserves to be printed. The useful letters already published by Phalke should also be incorporated in the new publication in order to ensure its completeness. It is also necessary for the very preservation of these priceless records that the State or some great public institution like a University should acquire them, for their future. In the hands of private owners they will become more and more uncertain from generation to generation. No private individual can handle them in a scientific manner, or make them available to scholars, as a well organized archives repository can do.

I think that quite a substantial addition can be made to our knowledge of North Indian affairs,—the Delhi empire and its provinces,—if the vast *Gulgule Daftar* is patiently studied. Many incidents hitherto unknown, many new personalities and even statements of policy and diplomatic *pour-parlers*, are here revealed for the first time, so that a revision of our judgment on many matters may become necessary. No history of the young Mahadji and no study of Daulat Rao Sindhia's regime is possible without exploring these first-rate original sources. But, to my mind, this corpus of records has a value unparalleled by other known sources like news-letters and political reports. I mean that this *Daftar* illuminates the social and economic intercourse between Northern India and Maharashtra as no other archives do; we are heirs to all the changes in our life and thought that took place thus. History is not merely, or even mainly, a record of war and diplomacy, intrigue and court splendour; the life of the people must be studied particularly in regard to the changes in their thoughts, beliefs and culture. For the second purpose, probably half a dozen young research students must devote themselves, and the *Gulgule Daftar* invites them most temptingly.

Social Intercourse between North and South India

These papers bring out in bold relief what the Maratha contact between the South and the North effected during that long period, such as trade, banking, exchange, discount on drafts, the intrinsic value of the various local coins throughout the country. By far the largest number of papers refer to orders and demands by

Mahadji and his subordinates to Lalaji Ballal at Kotah for supplying guns, muskets, ammunition, horses, camels, saddles and all kinds of military equipment. Along with these there is a constant demand as much by Mahadji Sindhia in the North as by the various Maratha Chiefs and agents in the South, for all kinds of articles as for instance, gold and silver ornaments, pictures, fans, jugs, statues, vases of artistic workmanship, and even dancing girls and army recruits. Along with these, well written copies of sacred works like the *Mahabharat* and the *Bhagwat* are constantly requisitioned. To supply guards and escorts to officials and travellers on pilgrimage was one main task imposed upon Lalaji Bawa, who occupied a responsible position in the country at Kotah.

Two Specimen Letters

(1) From Lakba Lad (at Khusalgad) to Lalaji Ballal in Kotah, written on 6 May 1795.

Tai Sathe the young Peshwa Madhavrao II's grandmother (mother of Gangabai, the murdered Peshwa's wife) was on pilgrimage from Poona. Having finished the three holy places, she came to Mathura Brindavan. The Nawab of Lucknow and the British authorities of Calcutta had received intimation in advance to show every mark of respect to the revered lady, by giving a proper escort for the journeys of footmen and horsemen, offering her fitting honours at the places she visited and the accommodation and supplies she would need for her comfort. After having received the best treatment both from the British and the Nawab of Oudh during her visits to the sacred places she thereupon arrived at the places controlled by General De Boigne. He himself proceeded several miles to receive her and carried out the lady's pilgrimage to places in his jurisdiction, having offered her his most humble obeisance throughout. Yesterday she arrived in my camp. I went a long way to receive her and she is comfortably lodged along with the large following of Poona people who had been in her company, numbering about two to three thousand. She now wishes to proceed to Poona in a day or two by the route of Ujjain *via* Bundi and Kotah. I am providing for her an escort of Deccani troops and a regiment of Firangis. I therefore request you to arrange with Zalim Singh of Kotah for her proper reception at those places. From Khushalgad she will be escorted by Hari Narayan Halde up to the border of Bundi; you must see to it that her stay along the route becomes entirely successful. She must be properly received by the Kamavisdars of the places on the way, and the party be supplied with all their needs. Please issue strict instructions in this matter and see that no shortcoming takes place. You must send a responsible officer from Kotah to Bundi. He must accompany the party all the way. Ordinarily she does not take any

obligation gratis, but you must arrange everything freely in advance. From Kotah she must receive a fresh escort to Ujjain consisting of good trustworthy officers, with proper instructions about the party's comfort on the way. The escort should return only if the lady of her own free will allows them to do so. Please let me know that you have properly grasped what is needed on this account. Kindly do proceed yourself to Bundi to receive her. This will look well. Thakur Zalim Singh too should meet her in advance. As you are well aware of all proprieties, I need not write more in detail. The lady is in a hurry to return to Poona and no delay should be caused on any account. I hope you realize that the lady bears a high rank and deserves fitting treatment.

(2) "From Mahadji's secretary Jagannath Vishvanath (Poona) to Lalaji Ballal at Kotah, written on 10 February 1793 (when Mahadji was engaged in a serious contest with the Peshwa's ministers).

"Here the Government affairs are proceeding as usual. Tipu is confining his attention to his own territory and is collecting ammunition. Out of his second instalment due to the Peshwa he has paid twenty-three lacs. He talks of peace with the Poona Government, so does the Nawab of Hyderabad. His ambassadors are here negotiating payments of tribute to the Peshwa. The Poona Government has agreed to pay 25 lacs to Patil Bawa on account of his Delhi expenses. Govindrao Gaikwad has received his investiture for the State of Baroda. He has pitched camp outside, but no one has yet been nominated to act as his Diwan. Nawab Ali Bahadur has arrived at Kuchwadhar.

Looking to the present trend of events at this court of Poona, there is a severe contrast visible. There was a time when the Maratha Government had the reputation of a model to be copied. To-day there is complete darkness. Justice is at a discount all over the country. Every soul is unhappy. Apart from there being no justice, there is wanton harassment of the people. Every officer behaves according to his own free will. There is none to whom one can appeal for redress. Every day complaints are pouring before the rulers. Patil Bawa also receives innumerable complaints, but he is inclined to hold his tongue for the present. He is anxious for his own grievances being redressed. Once this is accomplished, he will see his way towards improvement. Not much love is lost between the two (Nana Phadnis and Mahadji). No one cares for results. The subjects of the Deccan intensely desire success for Mahadji's efforts. They anxiously hope that his powerful voice should prevail in bringing about the necessary reform before he goes back to the north. God's will be done! If things don't improve, then the devil take this government. All people intensely wish that the Patil Bawa's

voice should prevail. Your good fortune, the good stars of the Peshwa, and the good wishes of the people as a whole are alone the main support under the present circumstances. It is evident that Patil Bawa will fully succeed before he returns to the north. That is the only relief for these poor suffering people of the Deccan. Such is the general talk one easily notices in all quarters. Beyond this is God's will."

PRIVATE PROPERTY OF RAGHUJI ANGRIA

UPENDRA NATH SARKAR

Archivist, National Archives of India

ON the death of Kanhoji II, the infant ruler of Kolaba, on 9 April 1840, the legitimate line of Raghuji Angria became extinct and the Kolaba State was annexed to the British territories in 1843¹. Immediately after the death of the infant Kanhoji, the Bombay Government deputed on 23 April 1840, J. M. Davies on special duty to Kolaba to look after 'Government interest'². He was instructed to send a detailed statement showing the private property of the late Raghuji Angria, which fell into the possession of Government and the mode in which it was distributed. Davies accordingly sent an interesting account of what he received from Venayak Parshuram Dewanji (Minister) as the private property of Raghuji Angria and gave his comments on it and also suggested the best method of its disposal in his letter of 26 July 1843 addressed to L.R. Ried, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay³.

Davies sent 'a statement (accompanying) of all the moveable property surrendered by the Dewan upon the demise of the Chief, which comprises every article which was given into my charge and from which Government will perceive that of strictly private property there was none. The statement exhibits what was originally made over, that which has been disposed of or expended since and that which still remains'. As there was no mention of the state jewels belonging to Raghuji Angria, Venayak Parshuram Dewanji was called upon 'to explain the cause of this'. From the Dewanji's explanations 'it appears that all kinds of personal property belonging to the Chief was in the custody of the Ranees'. But Davies was not the person so easily to be convinced. In his report to his Government he made it plain that 'in fact *nothing of the nature of the Chief's private property* ever came into my charge; unless the elephants and horses and the dairy farm might have been at the time, so termed and also some copper vessels used at Native feasts. But strictly

¹ National Archives of India, Pol. Cons., 31 August 1840, no. 11.

² *Ibid.*

³ Pol. Cons., 23 November 1844, no. 160. It is also not included in B. K. Srivastava's *Angreys of Kolaba in British Records*.

speaking, these are public property having originally purchased and from time to time replenished by the Dewan and debited to the expenses of the State'.

From the stud (Pagha), the Ranis selected as many horses, other animals and carriages as they desired to have. To 'do away with the enormous cost of maintaining the "Pagha" as given in by the Dewan', Davies suggested that the 'remaining carriages and bullock "gharees" valued 'at Rupees 550 for all' might be offered to the Ranis or to the other members of the family. There were 'also 8 horses left used by native horsemen of the Establishment'.

The 'cattle dairy farm' was also 'placed at the service of the Ranees.' The cattle were 'of a very inferior description and the whole Tuthee or farm' were valued 'at no more than rupees five hundred (500)' and 'properly speaking these cattle' were 'the public property of the State'.

The copper and brass vessels 'used at native feasts by the Ranees, Tye Sahib and other members of the family' were given 'to the Ranees as they required them' and were 'valued at Rupees 1,560.' These were 'purchased and from time to time added to, from the State's own money'.

Of the remaining articles of moveable property belonging to the State were 'the ships or boats', which were 'certainly not of the nature of Private property left by the Chief'. These included 'the two hulls of Grabs' which were 'of comparatively little value if sold by auction'. Davies recommended 'that the six (6) serviceable ones be kept for occasional use instead of being sold for perhaps little or nothing'. The remaining vessels 'including the Hulls' were 'so valueless' that 'no purchasers came forward for the old "grabs", although the latter have been frequently advertised for sale in the Bombay Government Gazette'.

Of the saleable articles, there only remained some 'sundry bales of cloths, a few unserviceable Tents and Rowties, some Shawls of a very inferior description and some articles of Native dress, which were left by the Dewan and were in fact the refuse of former purchasers'. The Dewanji valued them 'at a most absurdly Extravagant price' but in reality these were 'the most worthless trumpery'. Davies valued them 'at Rupees 1,500 at the utmost' and doubted if they would 'fetch even half that sum'.

In forwarding the statements Davies wanted 'to show that nothing of the nature of the Private Property of the chief further than what may be assumed to have been contained therein, has come into the possession of Government'. The statements are reproduced below for the interesting details:—

STATEMENT EXHIBITING THE MOVEABLE PROPERTY OF THE COLABA STATE SURRENDERED BY THE DEWAN IN A.D. 1840/41.

Head under which divided	Things given in charge by Dewan		Things disposed of since 1840/41			Things remaining		General Remarks
	No.	Value of— fixed by him	No.	Value expended by Dewan's estimate	Debited to Govts. Account	No.	Value per Dewan's estimate	
I	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Vessels Vizt. Grabs 2 Hulls of	2	Rs. A. P.	..	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	2	..	These were repeatedly offered for sale in the Government Gazette, but no purchasers offered. They might fetch at most Rs. 500 @ 1,000.
Vessels (afloat)	6	..	..	..	..	6	..	These are very ordinary vessels and might fetch if sold Rs. 1,000. I have recommended that these should be kept for occasional use.
Vessels (unservicable)	8	..	1	..	41 0 0	7	..	One boat was wrecked at Caranjah and sold for Rs. 41. The rest might realize Rs. 500 and I recommend that they be sold.
Boats (afloat)	16	..	..	..	..	16	..	Four of these are used as Ferry boats; one is used by the Carcoon of Customs; one is an old Bunder boat now unserviceable. They may be worth altogether Rs. 500. They are not worth selling.

Boats (unservicable)	40	..	3	..	..	37	..	These are perfectly valueless; they would not fetch Rs. 300. Three were broken up.
Boats' stores	Articles 3135	..	721½	..	45 4 6	241½	..	The sum of Rs. 45-4-6 was brought to account by the Dewan before giving over charge. The other expenditure has been that of wear and tear. The residue might be worth Rs. 500. I should recommend their being kept such as they are.
2. Pagha or stud vizt. Elephants Their bullocks	3 6		3 6		5,200 0 0	..	..	The elephants were sent to Baroda and disposed of by the Resident on account of the state by order of Govt. No. 116 of 1841 dated 5th March. The proceeds were paid into the General Treasury on account of the State.
Horses Camels Bullocks	188 14 12	..	100 14 12	Value lost by Messrs. B. & Co. 2,779 9 10	Do paid by them. 1,740 2 8	8 ..	..	Fifteen horses, four camels and six bullocks were claimed and given over to the Ranee, as per instructions contained in Govt. letter No. 2689 of 1840, dated 15th December; one horse was claimed by the Dewan; eight were retained for service and are forthcoming. The remaining seventy-seven horses (deducting 7 dead), nine camels (1 dead) and six bullocks were sold on account of the state by Messrs. Blackwell & Co. for Rs. 4,519-12-6 for which amount they failed paying in 2 dividends Rs. 1,740-2-8.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Carriages & Buggies	15	Rs. A. P. ..	2	Rs. A. P. ..	Rs. A. P. ..	13	Rs. A. P. ..	Two carriages have been made over to the Ranees at their request. The remaining ones would not realise more than Rs. 500. I recommend their being again tendered to the Ranees and others of the family and if not taken, sold for Government.
Bullock Gharies	8	..	3	..	..	5	..	These were made over to the Ranees, the rest are worth about Rs. 50 altogether.
Harness	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	The Dewan gave nothing in change of the least value. These are worth nothing.
Shikar Khana or Menagerie of a few deers, parrots & monkeys.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Some of these animals were taken by Tye Sahib; the others have been given away being quite useless to reduce the expense of keeping them.
3. Fras Khanna Store Room of Tents, carpets &ca. Vizt. Misc. articles such as carpets and valued by Dewan.	..	1,304 12 9	..	612 6 11	..	692	..	The nominal value here given was put by the Dewan the total value never exceeded Rs. 200 and the residue is now valued at Rupees 100. They are worth nothing.
Tents & Routies	28	..	..	..	..	28	..	They would not realize Rs. 200 if sold. I beg to recommend that they be tendered to the Ranees and if not taken by them sold on account of Government.

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4. Jandar Khana Viz an Assort of clothes, cloths shawls &ca. &ca. valued by Dewan.	..	@ 3,309 11 3	..	231 14 9	..	..	3,077 12 7	The value of these articles was most absurdly exaggerated by the Dewan. They were mostly the refuse of former purchases. The residue is now valued at Rs. 1,500 but it is doubtful if half that would be realized, I recommend however that the whole be put up for sale on account of Government.
5. Hoozoor Forts & Bunder, moveable property at vizt. lead, powder, old iron, cannonballs &ca. &ca. set down by the Dewan.	..	@ 2,558 10 9	..	1,133 0 3	..	..	1,385 10 6	These things were valued at an extravagant rate by the Dewan. The powder for instance of the commonest description was put down at Rs. 700 but was not worth a quarter of that sum. It has been expended in Salutes at the request of the Ranees at Native festivals, the Chandrat &ca., the remaining articles are useless and would not fetch Rs. 100; they might however be put up to sale.
Copper } Utensils . Brass } Iron }	629 693 2,031½		17 26 69		46 13 0	612 667 1,962		The sum of Rupees 46-13-0 brought to Acct. is the value of some articles which were stolen and which was reimbursed from the person who had charge of them. These utensils are used by the Ranees Tye Sahib and others of the family at native feasts; the remaining articles are valued at Rs. 1,560. I beg to recommend that they be given over to the Ranees.
Fire Arms (Native) Fire Arms (English)	41 134					41 134		Valued at Rs. 700.

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Swords &c.	202	Rs. A. P.	5	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	197	Rs. A. P.	Valued at Rs. 200.
Miscellaneous Articles	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Valued at Rs. 200.
Do. Iron, Copper / Brass in the Districts.	669	..	25	..	..	644	..	Valued at Rs. 200.
6. Tuttee or Dairy Farm	Cattle 320	..	Have died 170	..	21 0 0	150	..	The Ramees and Tye Sahib have some of the cattle which are now valued at only Rs. 500. I beg to recommend that they be fairly distributed amongst them.

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Political Superintendents' Office
Alibaugh, 26th July 1843

(Signed) J. M. Davies
Political Superintendent

Colaba

THE BRITISH AND COCHIN CHINA A HUNDRED AND FIFTY YEARS AGO

S. K. SAXENA

Assistant Archivist, National Archives of India

At a time when the Franco-Viet Minh War is attracting international attention, it may not be uninteresting to recall British aspirations of a hundred and fifty years ago to forestall French influence in Cochin-China¹. With the renewal of Anglo-French hostilities on 18 May 1803, the threat of interruption of British commerce in the Far East, especially trade with China,² was likely to become acute due to the French occupation of Dutch bases³ in the eastern seas.

The only advantageous bases in that region then free from European occupation lay in Cochin-China. But there was the fear of the French renewing their influence over the kingdom of Cochin-China for it was once the close preserve of monarchist France. The circumstances which enabled the monarchy to introduce itself into that country were as follows:

There was a revolution in Cochin-China in the last quarter of the eighteenth century as a result of which the reigning kings were killed one after the other and the throne was occupied by the rebel leader, Nguyen Van-Nhac. From that time till the re-establishment of rightful royal authority over the kingdom of Cochin-China in 1802 by Nguyen-Anh, the sole legitimate pretender, the rival contestants,⁴ as had often been the practice among the Asian potentates

¹ The name "Cochin-China" was given by the Portuguese to distinguish it from Cochin on the Malabar Coast, and is probably taken from Kuchi, the name by which the Malays designate the country. The term was formerly used for the old kingdom of Annam which under Gia-Long, extended over "almost all the littoral of Indo-China, comprising Tongking, Cochin-China, part of Cambodia," and certain islands off the coast, including the well-known Paracels.

² The China trade "employs from England 20,000 tons of shipping and nearly three thousand seamen; it takes off our woollen manufactures and other productions to a very considerable extent, and it brings into the Exchequer an annual revenue of about three million sterling. It is the grand prop of the East India Company's credit." *A Voyage to Cochin China*, John Barrow (London, 1806).

³ From 1795 until 1810 the Netherlands were practically a vassal state of France with very little freedom of action.

⁴ Charles Chapman, who visited Cochin-China in 1778, records in his narrative that Nguyen Van-Nhac, the rebel King "disclosed some of his future designs to me; they were no less to subdue the kingdom of Cambodia, with the whole peninsula as far as Siam, and the provinces belonging to Cochin China, to the north, now in the hands of the Tonquinese. To effect these, he wished for the assistance of some English vessels, in recompense for which he would make them such grants of land for settlements as they might think proper." *The Asiatic Annual Register for 1801* (London, 1802), Miscellaneous Tracts, p. 74.

of those times, courted foreign aid against each other. The rightful heir was no exception to this unwise practice of bartering the country's interest in exchange for foreign assistance. He entered into a most impolitic political engagement with France against the rebels who had driven him to flight. As the fugitive titular king could be in no position to bargain, France could extract what political recompense she chose for her assistance.

This is evident from the treaty concluded at Versailles on 28 November 1787 between the little Prince Canh-Dzue who had been taken to France by his French guardian, the Bishop of Adran, to represent his father Nguyen-Anh, and the Comtes de Vergennes and de Montmarin representing Louis XVI of France. By this treaty the French king was to furnish aid to the fugitive Cochin-Chinese king a squadron of twenty French ships of war and five regiments of European and two regiments of colonial non-European troops and to in saltpetre, cannons, muskets and military stores. The moment the French forces entered Cochin-Chinese territory, they and their generals were to be under the command of the king of Cochin-China. On the other hand, the latter, in return for their assistance, undertook to furnish, as soon as tranquillity had been restored in his State, all the material necessary for the construction of fourteen ships of the line; and to admit, whenever the French chose, consuls who should be allowed to build ships wherever they chose, and to fell timber for the purpose from any forest in the kingdom. A corps of French naval officers was to be sent out, in furtherance of the design, who should form a permanent establishment in Cochin-China. The bay and the peninsula of Turan, with two neighbouring islands were to be ceded to France, the king of Cochin-China was to furnish an army of sixty thousand men if the French were attacked in their possessions by any foreign power and France was to have the right of levying and drilling fourteen thousand Cochin-Chinese soldiers for use in their Indian wars. Terms favourable to the commerce of France were also to be conceded. Circumstances prevented the complete execution, or even the ratification of the remarkable agreement.

When the Bishop of Adran arrived at Pondicherry to secure a vanguard of the expeditionary force for assisting the King of Cochin China, he found the Governor, M.de Conway, under the influence of his mistress, Madame de Vienne, the wife of his Aid-de-camp. This lady had been insulted by the Bishop. The Governor, therefore, hesitated and delayed till the French residents of Pondicherry themselves took up the project and equipped two ships, besides providing arms and ammunition. Certain volunteers accompanied the expedition and the Governor consented, some months later, to place a frigate

and several officers at the bishop's disposal. The revolution⁵, in the meantime, breaking out in France, put a final stop to all their projects in Cochin-China.

England, who, it may be remarked, was already in possession of as many colonies as she could conveniently manage and as much territory as she could profitably use, seldom took keen interest in this part of the country except in time of national stress and emergency. Such a one arose in 1803 endangering her line of communication with China. The moment seemed to be propitious. The king of Cochin-China had lately extended very cordial treatment to a British firm trading in "repairable muskets" discarded from the Company's arsenals. This cordiality was a measure of political necessity brought about by the king's need of arms to enable him to re-establish legitimate royal authority over the kingdom which he did by 1802. But the English East India Company mistook it as evidence of goodwill towards the English and were tempted to come to an understanding with the king almost on the same terms as those of the Versailles treaty concluded in 1787 between Louis XVI and the king, then a fugitive. Their chief object was to acquire bases on the coast of Cochin-China or at least to obtain the appointment of a permanent British Resident at the court either of which could bind the Cochin-Chinese to their apron strings and keep the French away from that country.

With this object in view, the English East India Company deputed David Lance, a retired servant of their Canton factory, on a mission to the king of Cochin-China but he failed to discharge his commission "owing to the advance period of the season and the removal of the king from Saygon to Hui." Lance's health became so impaired as to prohibit his returning to hot latitudes, and he, therefore, nominated John William Roberts, one of the supercargoes at Canton, to execute the commission in his place. On his arrival in Turan Bay, Roberts was informed that the King of Annam had left Hue, his capital, and was then in the northern part of his dominions, completing the re-conquest of Tongking. It seemed useless for him to remain at Turan Bay, and he left it on 16 December, Penang on 7 January, arriving at Calcutta on 1 February 1804, with the intention of returning the next season.

Receiving his credentials and instructions from the Governor General, Roberts left Calcutta in the first week of June on his second

⁵ "Had this event not taken place, it is difficult to say what the consequences of such a treaty might have been to our (English) possessions in India, and to the trade of the East India Company with China, but it is sufficiently evident that it had for its object the destruction of both". *A Voyage to Cochin China*, John Barrow, pp. 266-67.

visit to Cochin-China. On reaching Penang on 25 June, the envoy "was informed that a French privateer had been lately fitted out at Manilla, to intercept our (English) trade on the coasts of Cochin-China and China"⁶. At the request of the envoy, the Lieutenant Governor of that settlement lent to him the armed brig *Amboyne* to escort him on his onward voyage.

Roberts went ahead with his mission and opened negotiations with the king who had by then gradually recovered authority over Saigon and Annam, conquered Tongking and ascended the throne of his ancestors under the title of *Gai-Long*. This prince had in fact too much prudence and foresight to risk the safety of his own states by embroiling himself in the quarrels of European nations. This mission, therefore, proved to be a complete failure as was predicted by Farquhar⁷.

Among the papers connected with this unsuccessful effort of the British to develop closer contacts with Cochin-China is an interesting memorandum by Lieutenant Governor Farquhar on the government of Cochin-China which throws a flood of light on the history and politics of the country of that period. The information supplied, he did not consider to be exhaustive. He himself admits in his letter of 28 June 1804 that he could only "collect a few desultory remarks relative" to the Cochin-Chinese Government as only "a partial intercourse with Cochin-China is kept up at Prince of Wales Island through the channel of Siam"⁸.

Memorandum relative to Cochin China.

In order to understand the present situation of Cochin-China, and the Share France has had in the restoration of the Royal Family after a lapse of about 20 years, it may be necessary to go back to the Revolution effected in the year 1780 by three Brothers called Tysons.—The one Brother was Minister, the other General, and the other Admiral so that the cutting off of the whole Royal Family and giving the capital to be plundered was a Work of little difficulty.

But in the hurry and confusion of the troubles, a French Missionary⁹ saved a Nephew of the King and this Boy's father escaped to Siam.

The Missionary and charge went to Quedah, and embarked for Pondicherry, and Subsequently for Paris about the year 1781-2.

⁶ National Archives of India Secret O.C. 9 August 1804, no. 6.

⁷ Sir Robert Townsend Farquhar (1776-1830), politician; son of Sir Walter Farquhar; lieutenant-governor of Penang; commissioner for transference of Moluccas to Batavian Republic, 1802; governor and commander-in-chief of Mauritius, suppressing slave trade there, 1812-23; created baronet 1821; M.P., Newton, 1825; Hythe 1826-30.

⁸ Secret O.C. 9 August 1804, no. 6.

⁹ Georges Pierre Joseph Pigneaux de Behaim, Bishop of Adran.

While at Siam in command of the lower Choky on the River Menam, the present King¹⁰ of Cochin-China, Father to the Boy¹¹ who went to Pondicherry and Paris, heard that, from the oppressions of the Tysons, the People of Cochin China, in the province of Donai, were ripe for revolt, on which intelligence he escaped from Siam, reached Donai, was well received, and had time to strengthen the Port and Province, which was undervalued by the Tysons, at that time involved in War with Tonquin.—

The King's Son and the French Bishop arrived at Donai at this period, and brought presents of Arms, Ammunition and about 60 Europeans and promised great aid from France. The circumstances attending their Mission to Paris, return, subsequent Treaty, Stipulating for the cession of the Ports of Donai and Cuington to the French on condition of that Nation's furnishing a subsidiary force, the preparing and sailing of two French Armaments from Pondicherry, in order to secure the advantages of the Treaty, and their failure for two years successively in consequence of getting to leeward of the River St. Jacques both going and coming, are fully known to Government.—

The King giving up all hopes of the promised reinforcement and Aid, began to fortify himself, collected Arms, built a Fleet (by the assistance of the few Frenchmen who arrived with his son) and by degree became formidable to the usurpers of his Brother's Throne, tho' this impression was made more in consequence of their dissensions, than his actual strength.—

The war continued with various fortune for nearly 20 years, and was closed by the surrender of the Fort of Cuington to the King, about two, or three years ago.

On this event the King liberated the province of Donai from all Taxes for a number of years, laid up his Fleet to rot in Turon and its Creeks, retired inland, and began establishing his Capital, situated a considerable way up the River Turon. He has since dismantled all the Forts, and that of Cuington among the rest, tho' considered impregnable, collected all his Artillery, said to amount to 8000 pieces, chiefly brass, and has nearly finished a Fort ten leagues in Circuit on which this Artillery is to be planted. It has accommodation for his Court, and lodging for a Garrison of 80,000 Men, with every requisite for offensive or defensive operations.

¹⁰ Gia-Long (1802-19).

¹¹ Cand-Dzuc.

Since the reduction of Cuington, he has subdued the Kingdom of Tonquin, and made a demand of the province of Canton or Quintong from the Emperor of China, as belonging to his progenitors.—

It is necessary to remark in this place that as soon as the King found he could succeed without the French, he maltreated them, and obliged most of them to leave¹² his dominions poor as they arrived.

The Boy who went to Paris, and another son together with the French Bishop¹³ are dead—The Heir apparent¹⁴ is a child of four or five years old.

The King is a Man of enterprize, ability and decision, aged about 50 or 55. but in mind Young and Active as ever: He learns every thing, and governs without any Ministers, and tho' inclined to restore the Country to its former opulence, he never will be successful while the Mania for War continues to operate, and it is supposed he will attack China the ensuing year, if no compromise be offered.

This brief account of the past and present state of Cochin China leads to the following reflections.—

That Factories at Cochin China established solely for Trade cannot hope for immediate success, and must be attended with risk from the advanced age of the king¹⁵, his being engaged in Hostilities, and the infancy of his successor; all untoward circumstances in a Country for these 20 years past the Seat of active warfare, where opinion has little stability, and hereditary right is scarcely recognised—The prevalence to revolt and the difficulty of getting Governors to be relied on, are said to have induced the King to destroy all his Forts, excepting the Capital, and to be the only Governor in the only Fort in his Dominions. If this be the case, it is apparent that internal tranquility is dependent on his Life, and therefore commercial arrangements, which require peace and quiet, promise little benefit, and must involve great risk.

The produce of Donai consists chiefly of Rice, Beetlenut, and Teak-wood; the Country is low and flat. The produce of Cuington was formerly Pepper, Sugar, Cassia, Gold, Agala Wood, Cardemums, Pineapple, Thread, etc., etc., the Country variegated with Hill and Dale.—Both provinces produce Cotton and Silk equal to their consumption.—

¹² A number of French officers and men, conspicuous among whom were Colonels Olivier, Vannier, J.M. Dayot and J.B. Chaigneau, helped Gia-Long to reconquer his throne. Chaigneau and Vannier remained more than thirty years in Gia-Long's service and were the last to quit Cochin China. Crawford had the pleasure of seeing them in Singapore on their way to France in 1825.

¹³ Georges Pierre Joseph Pigneaux de Behaim, Bishop of Adran, fell ill early in August and died on 9 October 1799, in his fifty-eighth year and was buried on 16 December at Saigon.

¹⁴ Minh-Mang (1820-40).

¹⁵ Gia-Long died in 1819

Should Great Britain determine on aiding the Emperor of China so far as to defend the province of Canton, little attention may be paid to the King of Cochin China—But if Great Britain be determined not to interfere, and there should be any probability of the King of Cochin China's reducing the province of Canton, he must be managed with great address unless arrangements are made with the Emperor of China, to trade at another Port in his Dominions. Should he make the attack, and such an arrangement can be effected, it may perhaps be wise to allow of his Success.—

But setting all this Argument on one side, and admitting that for some one or other great political or commercial reason, a Station on the Coast of Cochin China is an object of importance to the British Ministers or Court of Directors, the next consideration is the station most convenient.

Pulo Condore¹⁶ was formerly occupied by us, and the objects of the Settlement then, may be, probably, what are now aimed at, but being situated nearly off the South West point of the Country, being a Jungle in which every thing is to be done, its advantages must be distant and expenses immediate and great.

Turon is more central, is favored with a good anchorage, and may be defended, but it is as much a Jungle as Pulo Condore.—Being more in the vicinity of the Capital, its advantages might be less distant and uncertain, but its expenses would be much greater.

Suppose then that by a Coup de Main, we were so to arrange matters, as to seize and on the instant fortify, garrison and store the Old Fort of Cuington, which may be made in ten days impregnable against Chinese Assailants.—We should have a secure station, commanding a large City in the center of a valuable Cultivation, with a noble and safe Port, equal to all our wants.—

Such a capture it is true would not be altogether correct, unless made as the Ally of the Emperor of China, or on the grounds of National Security against the designs of the French in that quarter— Could the acquisition be made by other means, it would certainly be of great moment. But what hope of such an Arrangement can be reasonably entertained.—

¹⁶ An island off the South-East Coast of Cochin China. The British factory at Pulo Condore was established in 1702 by those who had been forced to abandon the factory of Chusan in China. The Governor of the Settlement, according to the practice of those times, engaged some natives of Celebes as soldiers, stipulating to discharge them in three years—an engagement which he failed to fulfil, and the breach of which provoked them in 1704 to rise upon the English and murder all who were within the Fort. The remnant abandoned the factory and afterwards formed the settlement of Banjarmasin in Borneo. John Crawford visited the island on 22 August 1822, spoke very highly about the hospitality of the islanders. Crawford's *Embassy to Siam and Cochin China* (London 1828), p. 196; F.C. Danvers, *Report on the Records of the India Office* (London, 1887) pp. 101-102.

It may be remarked that a knowledge of what Cochin China formerly was, and ignorance of what it now is, is likely to lead into error.—From a quiet and commercial it has been changed into a turbulent, ambitious, and warlike Empire.

There is very little risk therefore, in my opinion of the French, or any European power's being allowed peaceably to settle on that Coast, unless upon conditions something similar to those imposed upon the Dutch at Japan.—They would be considered as Slaves, and treated as such. But, as with the French, national expediency appears to be the sole rule of conduct, and to supercede all public or private justice, they would no doubt eagerly embrace an opportunity of commencing the second part of the Egyptian campaign, by the unjust seizure of Cuingnon, and if successful, they would acquire very important advantages in India"¹⁷.

In conclusion, Farquhar's observation that "There is very little risk therefore, in my opinion of the French or any other European power's being allowed peaceably to settle on that coast" except "by a Coup de Main" proved prophetic as half a century later the foundation of the French Empire was laid in Indo-China through the agency of a "Coup de Main" as predicted by the British Lieutenant Governor of Penang.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND HYDERABAD 1785—1793

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HERE are some letters preserved in the Pondicherry Archives which throw an interesting light on the relations between the French and Hyderabad from 1785 to 1793. It is well-known how French connection with Hyderabad started from the time of Dupleix, when Bussy marched with a small force and established French ascendancy there. After the failure of the policy of Dupleix and the recall of Bussy by Lally, Hyderabad passed under English influence, the beginning being made by the treaty of 1766. But for many years the crafty Prince, Nizam Ali, tried to maintain his independence of English control and sought to promote his interests by continuing diplomatic relations with the French and employing a large number of French troops in his service. During the next phase of Anglo-French hostilities in India, 1778-1783, Nizam Ali, piqued by the English occupation of Guntoor, tried to break away from the English connection and to set up a coalition of the three southern Powers. Although he was quickly won over by the English and abandoned the projected coalition, he kept up diplomatic relations with the French and corresponded with Bussy and Montigny, the French agent accredited to the *Darbars* of Poona and Hyderabad. His correspondence did not mean much except only to show that he wanted to keep the door open. After the end of the war and the re-establishment of the French in India in 1785 Nizam Ali not only continued his diplomatic relations with the French but even made repeated overtures to the Pondicherry Government for assistance in the shape of troops and artillery in order to strengthen his army and to free himself from dependence on the English. The overtures were made both directly and also through three French officers in his service, Aumont, Raymond and Piron. The French Government, standing on the verge of the collapse of the *Ancien Régime*, showed no interest in Indian politics and made no move to draw Nizam Ali into a closer alliance, ignoring the repeated representations of the Pondicherry Government. Nevertheless, these overtures from the side of Nizam Ali, made at a time when he was fighting against Tipu as an ally of the English, are of deep interest to a student of modern Indian history.

After the re-establishment of the French in India in 1785 Aumont, one of the French officers in the service of Nizam Ali, gained the con-

¹⁷ Secret O.C. 9 August 1804, no. 8

fidence of Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, and was appointed by him special diplomatic agent at the *Darbar* of Hyderabad. He retained his post as an officer in the service of Nizam Ali, but received nonetheless a regular allowance from the Pondicherry Government for working as a French agent at Hyderabad. Aumont seems to have gained some influence over Nizam Ali and Mushir-ul-Mulk, his *Diwan*. In 1787 he was sent to Pondicherry with the ostensible purpose of repairing the Nizam's jewels, but perhaps it covered some political object. Anyway, in October we find Aumont writing from Pondicherry to Nizam Ali and to Mushir-ul-Mulk that he would return to Hyderabad as soon as repairs to the jewels had been completed and Conway, the new Governor of Pondicherry, had received news from Europe¹. It may be recalled that in 1787 there were rumours of a renewal of Anglo-French hostilities in Europe over the sudden turn of developments in Holland. We also find Aumont praying to the new Governor, Conway, for retention in the post of French resident at the Court of Hyderabad and begging him to pay the charges for repairs to the Nizam's jewels as a friendly gesture².

Conway, who succeeded Cossigny as Governor of Pondicherry in September 1787, wrote to Nizam Ali in October, assuring him of the continuance of "the closest friendship that had always existed between France and the House of Nizam-ul-Mulk"³. It is not known definitely how Conway received Aumont's professions of loyalty and service to the nation, but from a letter written by Nizam Ali to Conway sometime later it appears that the latter had a positive dislike and suspicion against Aumont and had written to Nizam Ali to keep strict watch on him. Conway had further expressed his intention to send somebody else shortly to work as the French representative at Hyderabad⁴. There is no means of knowing why Aumont fell into the bad grace of Conway, nor does it appear that the Pondicherry Government actually appointed somebody else as their official representative at Hyderabad. On the other hand, later contact between Pondicherry and Hyderabad was maintained through two other officers in the service of Nizam Ali, Raymond and Firon.

In spite of the dislike of Conway, Aumont, who went back to Hyderabad early in 1788, still continued to work for some time as intermediary between the Pondicherry Government and the *Darbar* of Nizam Ali. In September 1788 while forwarding a letter from Nizam Ali to the French Governor, Aumont wrote that he still

¹ Pond. Arch. mss. 1008, 1019.

² *Ibid.*, ms. 1017 (letter dated 20 October 1787).

³ *Ibid.*, mss. 1015, 1019.

⁴ Martineau—*Lettres et Conventions des Gouverneurs de Pondichery etc.* pp. 339-340.

remained a good patriot and was always ready to place himself at the disposal of Conway to supply him news of everything that happened at the Court of Hyderabad. He then gave an account of the arrival sometime back of an English agent from Calcutta and of the grand reception accorded to him⁵. Although the object of the visit was kept a close secret, Aumont could learn from reliable sources that it was to procure the cession of the province of Guntoor and to persuade Nizam Ali to join the English in a coalition against Tipu. Aumont thought that the mission had little chance of success. "The English would not succeed here as easily as among the Marathas. The real reason is that Mughal indolence has no liking for the risks and fatigues of war in contrast to the love for pillage among the Marathas, a nation of born brigands"⁶. Aumont's prediction was, however, totally falsified. Nizam Ali did cede Guntoor under English pressure and did join the war against Tipu two years later.

Aumont was mortified at French inactivity to prevent Nizam Ali from entering into a close alliance with the English in 1790, which seemed to presage the loss of what little influence the French still had in Hyderabad. He gave expression to his feelings in a letter to de Fresne, Governor of Pondicherry, in September 1790, after getting news of the Revolution in France and the effect it had produced at Pondicherry. He wrote that he had received de Fresne's letter sent through one Bellevue, who had come to Hyderabad in search of employment. He doubted very much whether Bellevue would get any appointment, since the situation in Hyderabad had changed completely for the French, and the Government was not anxious to increase the number of Frenchmen in its service. Indeed, if the *Diwan* had had his own way, all the existing Frenchmen would have been dismissed, but he was held in restraint only by Nizam Ali who had still some liking for the French. Aumont continued that the English were trying to exploit the news of the revolution in France to discredit that country in the eyes of the Indian Princes, but he hoped that the National Assembly would pay more attention to India than the ministers of the old regime, who had lost for France the high esteem which India originally had for her. Hoping for a revival of the French influence in India as a result of the Revolution, he wrote: "I am too old to see France come back to this brilliant theatre, but I am nevertheless always optimistic. I console myself with the belief that a change of system will give France her original lustre"⁷.

⁵ It referred to the mission of Captain Kennaway. Forrest—*Selections from the State Papers of the Governor-General of India, Cornwallis, I*, pp. 35-36.

⁶ *Ibid.*, mss. 5252 (Aumont's account of the reception given to the English embassy by the Nizam), 5253 (Aumont to Conway, 3 September 1788).

⁷ *Ibid.*, ms. 5254 (letter dated 18 September 1790).

About the time that the English were trying to secure Guntoor from Nizam Ali there was an informal overture from the latter to cede the province to the French in exchange for a guarantee of protection against the English and Tipu. In May 1788 Montigny, the French agent at the Court of Poona, was recalled by the Ministry, and on his way to Pondicherry he made a brief halt at Hyderabad. It was through Montigny that Nizam Ali made an informal and verbal proposal about the cession of Guntoor. Montigny reported it to Conway on his arrival at Pondicherry, and the matter was referred to the Advisory Committee, set up in 1787 to assist the Governor. In view of the existing situation of the French, however, the Advisory Committee recommended in September 1788 the adoption of a non-committal policy, and asked Conway to write a simple letter of compliments to Nizam Ali in reply to his proposal without undertaking any definite engagement⁸. No wonder that soon after Nizam Ali, in order to secure his territories from Tipu's aggression, ceded Guntoor to the English and entered into a close understanding with them.

Baffled in his attempt to gain French protection or to secure the alliance of Tipu, for which overtures were made in 1788⁹, Nizam Ali finally turned to the English and entered into an offensive and defensive alliance in July 1790. But although he joined the war against Tipu, he was not very happy about his connection with the English. During the progress of the war he realised that the destruction of Tipu would merely increase the power of the English and enable them to subdue the other states, including their allies. Thus towards the end of 1791 he turned once more to the French and tried to get from them European troops and arms in order to be independent of English military assistance for the protection of his territories which had forced him into the war. He had in his service a number of French officers, and it was through them that he opened overtures to Pondicherry. One of them was Raymond, who later acquired great reputation and influence in Hyderabad, somewhat recalling the days of Bussy in the Deccan. Another notable person was Piron, who later succeeded Raymond in command of his contingent after the latter's death in 1795.

Raymond, who had joined the service of Nizam Ali in 1785, opened his first political contact with the Pondicherry Government towards the end of 1787. In a letter dated 1 December he introduced himself to Conway, then Governor of Pondicherry, giving an account of his earlier career and the strength of the contingent he had under

his command. He pledged his loyalty to France and expressed his readiness to supply to the Pondicherry Government all news about Hyderabad¹⁰. For a time this did not lead to any important development. But from the end of 1791 the two French officers, Raymond and Piron, became actively engaged in negotiations with the Pondicherry Government for procuring troops and arms. It was at the instance of Nizam Ali, who was anxious to draw away from the English alliance, that Raymond entered into correspondence with the Governor of Pondicherry. Writing to de Fresne on 29 December 1791, Raymond gave an account of the state of war against Tipu and the unwillingness of the Marathas and Nizam Ali to continue the war any longer. They had become conscious of the dangers that eventually threatened them from the side of the English if Tipu was completely crushed, and they were thus anxious to conclude an early peace. Raymond stated that he was sending the letter through Piron, who was going to Pondicherry on a special mission¹¹. Piron's departure for Pondicherry was delayed for a few days, and taking advantage of it Raymond wrote a second letter to de Fresne on 3 January 1792, giving further news of the war and particularly of the defeat of the Nizam's army before Goorumconda in which several French officers were taken prisoners¹².

It was on 12 January 1792 that Raymond made his definite proposal to de Fresne¹³. He wrote that Nizam Ali had asked him to increase the number of troops under his command to a strength sufficient to enable him to dispense with the contingent placed at his disposal by the English and to seek the help of the Pondicherry Government for the purpose. Raymond urged de Fresne to consider the proposal as a great opportunity to the French nation, assuring him that "Nizam Ali has been attached to the French since his boyhood and that he will never be their enemy to help a Power whose ambition has given him just ground for distrust". At the moment he had allied himself with the English against Tipu, but that was only for taking revenge on the ruler of Mysore for the capture and destruction of Adoni in 1786. Raymond then continued that if by supplying troops and guns France helped the formation of a contingent of 10,000 men in the service of Nizam Ali, it would be as good as being at her own disposal. At the first signal from Pondicherry it would move to any quarter indicated, possibly strengthened by additional troops lent by Nizam Ali. Raymond explained that by his contract with Nizam Ali he was the master of the troops under his command together with their arms and baggages, and was at liberty to dispose of them

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, ms. 5251.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, ms. 1563. Both Raymond and Piron had taken part in the war and fragments of the Journal of their campaigns are preserved in the Pondicherry Archives,—ms. 1569.

¹² *Ibid.*, ms. 5255.

¹³ *Ibid.*, ms. 5256.

⁸ *Ibid.*, mss. 1006 (Proceedings of the Advisory Committee).

⁹ Wilks—*History of Mysore*, II, pp. 334-335.

in any way he liked in case of a European war. He then outlined a plan of campaign for the next war with the English. His troops would move immediately on the outbreak of war and occupy the Northern Sarkars, which would greatly facilitate French operations on the Coromandel coast. Nizam Ali could be drawn over to the side of the French by assuring him of protection from Tipu's aggression, and Tipu being an ally, such a guarantee would not create any difficulty. The only condition that Nizam Ali would require for an alliance with the French was the restoration of the Northern Sarkars. Raymond concluded that considering the existing political situation the French Government would do well in helping him to augment his corps, as desired by Nizam Ali. It would not cost the French any money; all that was required was to supply guns and enterprising officers of whom there were many in the different settlements in India.

De Fresne was favourably disposed towards the proposal of Raymond. While forwarding his letter to the Minister of the Marine on 5 March 1792, he expressed his high appreciation of the integrity and military qualities of Raymond. He emphasised the assurance given by Raymond to leave the service of Nizam Ali and place his contingent at the disposal of the French Government immediately on the outbreak of a war with the English. He also confirmed the view of Raymond that Nizam Ali was well disposed towards the French, and stated that the tremendous growth of English power after the victory over Tipu had made him all the more inclined towards the French. While recommending the acceptance of Raymond's proposal, de Fresne pointed out that it would not cause any embarrassment to the French Government and would not disturb peace with the English, since there was to be no direct negotiation with Nizam Ali. Outwardly the French Government would be merely permitting the sale of arms to Raymond and allowing army officers to join his contingent. There were both plenty of arms at Pondicherry and a large number of men in the various settlements anxious to seek good careers in the service of Indian Princes¹⁴.

Raymond repeated his prayer for arms and officers in two letters to de Fresne, written from Seringapatam on 6 March. Hoping for a successful outcome of Piron's mission, he wrote that after the latter's return he himself would go to Pondicherry to negotiate about more important affairs on behalf of Nizam Ali. Raymond informed de Fresne of the conclusion of peace and expressed great admiration for the courage and tenacity of the Mysore army. He defended himself against the charge of disloyalty for fighting against Tipu, an ally

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, ms. 1657.

of France, and for taking deserters from the French contingent in Tipu's service commanded by de Vigie after the latter's defeat and capture before Seringapatam on 8 February. Regarding the second charge, he contended that deserters had left Vigie's contingent because of low salary and bad treatment; and regarding the first he stated that the honour of a soldier and gratitude towards an employer had compelled him to take part in the war, but that he had seized every opportunity to urge upon Nizam Ali the necessity of concluding peace and to impress upon him the danger that threatened his own power after the total destruction of Tipu¹⁵.

On 13 March Raymond wrote to de Fresne again, informing him about an interview he had with Nizam Ali. The latter was anxious to know the result of Piron's mission. He proposed to Raymond to raise a second contingent and to procure additional arms for the purpose from Pondicherry. Raymond once more urged de Fresne to seize the great opportunity for promoting national interests¹⁶.

There is a gap in the correspondence of Raymond preserved in the Pondicherry Archives, and it is not known definitely what reply de Fresne gave to his prayer for men and arms. It appears, however, from some later correspondence that de Fresne was quite willing to accommodate Raymond in an indirect way. Desertions became suddenly frequent among the men of the Pondicherry garrison, and in a letter written in June 1792 to the Governor-General in the Isle of France, Cossigny, de Fresne stated that the desertions at Pondicherry were connected with the recruitment started by Raymond¹⁷. Piron returned to Hyderabad in July after having made an arrangement with de Fresne about the supply of arms and other equipments through Mercier, a wealthy private merchant, formerly a Government officer. In July 1792 Raymond informed de Fresne about the panic created in the Deccan by the sudden appearance of the powerful Maratha chief, Sindhia, with a formidable army, as a result of which Nizam Ali had pressed his demand on Raymond to increase his corps immediately. Raymond stated that he had already recruited 3,000 sepoys and had sent 20,000 rupees to Mercier for arms and uniforms. He had authorised Mercier to procure them, if necessary, from Negapatam or Madras¹⁸. In a letter dated 1 October Raymond informed de Fresne that at the demand of Nizam Ali he was raising another sepoy force of 5,000 men and had sent 50,000 rupees through his adjutant, Chemith, to Mercier for procuring additional arms and

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, mss. 5302, 5303.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, ms. 5304.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, ms. 1775.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, ms. 5257.

uniforms. He further stated that he was sending a letter from Nizam Ali relating to a long-cherished political project, about which he would write in details later¹⁹. Unfortunately, the letter of Nizam Ali is not preserved in the Pondicherry Archives. Perhaps, it might have referred to the old project of an alliance. Raymond added that he had been authorised to go to Pondicherry and enter into negotiations as soon as Sindhia returned to north India.

About this time Raymond received news from his agent at Pondicherry, Chemith, that de Fresne had changed his mind and was unwilling to supply arms according to the previous arrangement out of suspicion about his real intentions. In a letter dated 4 October Raymond regretted that de Fresne's ears had been poisoned by some persons and declared that he was prepared to go to Pondicherry and answer any charge that might have been brought against him. He wrote: "Would I have addressed you, my General, with so much confidence if I had wanted to deceive you?" Raymond added that his enemies had done him a great injury not so much by stopping the supply of arms as by depriving him of the good opinion of de Fresne²⁰. Shortly after Raymond received a letter from de Fresne, explaining the reason which prevented the latter from keeping his promise. It referred to the changed situation at Pondicherry after the Revolution and the coming of two Civil Commissioners from France²¹. Anyway, Raymond was satisfied with the explanation.

The matter was allowed to rest there for the time being, but was taken up once more in June 1793. Before that de Fresne had been succeeded by Chermont as Governor of Pondicherry. The latter had written to Nizam Ali and Raymond, informing them of his assumption of office. In reply to that letter Nizam Ali wrote on 1 June 1793, assuring Chermont of the continuance of his friendship for France, and expressing a fervent hope that his old request for arms and other military equipments made to the previous Governor would receive more favourable consideration from him. He added that he had entrusted Raymond to write in details about the things needed and hoped that it would be possible for Chermont to send them at the earliest opportunity²². On the same date Raymond also wrote to Chermont, renewing his request for arms and other equipments and assuring him that in case of need his contingent would be entirely at the disposal of France²³. By the time that these letters reached Chermont the condition of Pondicherry itself had become desperate

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, ms. 5258.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, ms. 5259.

²¹ *Ibid.*, ms. 5260.

²² Martineau—*Lettres et Conventions des Gouverneurs de Pondicherry etc.* p. 398.

²³ *Ibid.*, ms. 5262.

on account of the outbreak of war with the English, and there could be no question of supplying arms to Hyderabad. On 25 June Chermont wrote to Nizam Ali, informing him of the sudden change in the situation which prevented him from keeping his request for arms, having need of all the available resources for the defence of Pondicherry itself. He, however, assured Nizam Ali that he was expecting strong reinforcements from France, and on their arrival he would be in a position to give a more tangible proof of his friendship for the Nizam²⁴. It was in fact just a pious wish, and shortly after Pondicherry capitulated to the English.

MINTO AND EAST INDIA COMPANY'S TURKISH ARABIA AFFAIRS¹

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WHILE studying the history of the various diplomatic missions sent by Lord Minto to the Courts of the Punjab, Afghanistan, Sind and Persia etc. in order to form a solid block of resistance against the Napoleonic menace one is inevitably faced with the story of British affairs in the regions of Turkish Arabia. This story has a special significance for the student of Minto's diplomacy for two express reasons:—

1. It helps to demonstrate vividly how all the events in any region, in Europe, the Middle East or India, were being interpreted by the British statesmen and diplomats of the period, in the context of the omnipresent French menace. Also we can see that this attitude of mind had been whipped up by what then seemed to be the conscious French attempts in all possible quarters to further their interests, and an attack on India was the foremost aim of their policy in Asia.

2. It helps also to show how when the opinions of the 'man-on-the-spot' and the 'metropolitan statesman' clashed the correspondence grew cumbersome, decisions became difficult to be taken and steps had sometimes to be retraced—a process which was not always very easy.

An important nerve centre of the Middle East was the region known as Turkish Arabia—the Bagdad—Bussora area. It was a Pashalick of Constantinople about which the tradition of confirming the dead Pasha's personal heir as the new Pasha was in that difficult stage when some consider the tradition to have ripened to a degree where a challenge to it tantamounts to sacrilege, while others think that if a wrong practice has been incidentally repeated once or twice it does not establish a principle which must be followed. Persia thought she had claims on this area¹. The British statesmen realised the commercial and strategical importance of the area and so kept Residents both at Bussora and at Bagdad. As it happened, the Residents not only reported the political occurrences in these areas but also meddled in them².

¹ Driault: *La Politique Orientale de Napoleon*, p. 173.

² Says Kays, "these are two side gates in the East to the great Park of English Diplomacy. The one is Commerce. The other is Medicine. We owe indeed, our Indian Empire to them". *Life & Correspondence of General Sir John Malcolm*, Vol. I, p. 106. This seems to explain the extreme care which was taken that in most of these Middle Eastern Residencies the First or the Second Assistants should be medical men.

About the time Minto took charge of affairs of the Supreme Government at Fort William in Bengal the whole of his world seemed to be rocking with rumours of Napoleon coming to the East³. Of these not the least important was a rumour about his using Bussora and Bagdad as safety valves which he would keep tight under his fiat, links in the chain of communications his advancing army would maintain with his islands in the Indian Ocean, Mauritius and Bombon etc.⁴. Naturally the minds of the British Residents at Bussora and Bagdad were upset.

The Bagdad Residency was temporarily under charge of Dr. Hine pending a new permanent appointment after the retirement of the last incumbent, Sir Harford Jones⁵. The Bussora charge was with Mr. Samuel Manesty, a man senior in point of service even to Sir Harford, and in general as easily excitable as he was passionately patriotic. Manesty had the duty pending the new permanent appointment, of supervising the affairs of Bagdad Residency as well⁶.

It was about this time that Ali Pasha, the Lord of Bagdad, died. Soliman, the nephew of the late Pasha, as his direct heir, hoped to succeed his uncle. He had a staunch supporter in Selim Aga, the Musaleem of Bussora. The latter completely won over Manesty to Soliman's side. At this stage it was rumoured that the Porte proposed not to care for what was generally considered to be the tradition under which Soliman was expected to get the nomination to the Pashalick almost automatically. It was supposed to be the intention of the Porte to appoint Eusuf Pasha to the Pashalick of Bagdad. This man had remained at some earlier date the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire. There were some considerations of continental politics that played their part in the matter of this choice of a new Pasha for Bagdad. Manesty was irretrievably committed to support Soliman's candidature and was prepared to go to the limits of armed opposition in case Eusuf advanced towards Bagdad to take charge, along with his French supporters, and Manesty was convinced that he would not come without his French henchmen⁷.

The Bombay Government as well as the Supreme Government felt that Manesty was going too far. They also thought they knew more about Eusuf Pasha than Manesty did; and they did not consider

³ N.A.I. Bengal Sec. & Sept. Cons., 15 February 1808, no. 13.

⁴ Bengal Sec. & Sept. Cons., 29 January 1808, no. 6; *Ibid.*, 8 February 1808, no. 14; *Ibid.*, 28 June 1809, no. 9.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 15 February 1808, no. 15.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 5.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 29 January 1808, no. 6; *Ibid.*, 15 February 1808, nos. 6, 7, and 12.

Eusuf such an undesirable character as he did. Moreover the question of successor to the Bagdad Pashalick was a purely domestic issue of the Ottoman Empire and they felt British interference would be unwarrantable⁸.

In the meanwhile, it seems, Soliman had been playing his cards cleverly. He tackled the French ambassador at Constantinople⁹, as well as prepared the background for getting help from the Wahabies¹⁰, at the same time as he had secured the commitment of Manesty to support him. It seems that the Porte was very thoroughly under French influence (Sebatiani's) at that time and Soliman was appointed to the Pashalick. It was after this news came through that Manesty learnt that the French had helped Soliman to get the appointment. (The French incidentally collected their *douceur* from Soliman for the help rendered to him)¹¹.

Manesty could neither swallow the whole thing nor spill it. He tried as well as was possible under the circumstances to get along with Soliman and Selim Aga reminding them of his staunchness in their support, in the hour of their need. He went on cautioning his Government against the danger to which India was exposed in case of a French attack via Bagdad¹².

The Supreme Government, particularly the Governor-General Lord Minto, and the Bombay Government put the whole incident to the debit of Mr. Samuel Manesty. Mr. Rich, the son-in-law of the influential and well-known Sir James Mackintosh, was appointed to be the permanent Resident at Bagdad¹³.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 29 January 1808, no. 7 ; *Ibid.*, 15 February 1808, nos. 5, 9, and 14.

⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 10.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, no. 11 ; *Ibid.*, 2 May 1808, no. 6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, no. 6, paras 6-8.

¹² *Ibid.*, no. 5.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 15 February 1808, no. 14.

KANDY RAJAS OF PUDUKKOTTAI

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THE influence of India on the culture, language and religion of the people of Ceylon is as old as the beginnings of the history of the island. The migration of the Tamils, the Chola conquest, the Pandya-Sinhalese political entente, trade relations and the development of the island's economy by South Indian capital and labour are leading themes of Ceylonese history, amidst the width and range of the scope of which, one comparatively minor event of Indo-Ceylonese relations is apt to be lost sight of. It is of interest as an illustration of the quaint ways in which castes and sub-castes continued to be formed till so late as the nineteenth century. The origin of the "Kandy Rajas" sub-caste will be quite obscure but for the evidence furnished by a document in the collection of the Pudukkottai¹ Palace letters.

The royal line of Kandy became extinct in 1739 with the death of Narendra Simha (1707—39). The queen's brother, a native of South India, ascended the throne under the name of Sri Vijaya Raja Simha (1739—47). The queen and her brother, the new king, were descendants² of the Nayak ruling house of Madurai which had become extinct in 1737. The next three sovereigns Kirti Sri (1747—82), his predecessor's brother-in-law, Rajadhiraja Simha (1782—98) and Sri Vikrama Raja Simha (1798—1815) were also 'Malabar'³ princes.

Sri Vikrama Raja Simha, who was a nephew of the queen of Rajadhiraja Simha, was placed on the throne by the First Adigar⁴ Pilama Talaive. His reign was marked by intrigues in which figured prominently his Adigars (Pilama Talaive, and after his death, his nephew and successor Eheylapola, and Muttusvami, a member of the royal family), and devastating wars with the English Government of Colombo, which laid waste extensive territories where villages and

¹ A State now merged in the Madras State; it now constitutes a division of the district of Tiruchinapalli (Trichinopoly).

² The descendants of the Madurai Nayak house settled down mostly in the villages of Pudukkottai and the Sivaganga Zamindary, Ramnad District.

³ Sir James Emerson Tennent is careful to say that 'although the new dynasty are spoken of under the generic name of Malabars, it is necessary to observe that they were not of the Tamil race, but *Telugus*, of the royal family of Madura, with whom the Singhalese kings had intermarried' — *Ceylon*, II, p. 61, *Fn.* 3.

⁴ An office corresponding to that of Prime Minister.

temples were burnt and fields and gardens were destroyed. Frustration and the sordid consciousness of his inability to root out opposition to his exercising unfettered authority turned the king into a tyrant revelling in orgies of massacre. The final British engagement of January 1815 resulted in the fall of the city of Kandy and the deportation of the king to India and his imprisonment in the fort of Vellore where he died in January 1832.

In January 1816, Major Blackburne⁵, the British Resident for the States of Tanjore and Pudukkottai, requested Raja Vijaya Raghunatha Raya Tondaiman, Ruler of Pudukkottai, to permit the settlement in his State of thirteen Kandyan robles who were prisoners of war. In his letter⁶ to the Raja on this subject the Resident expressed his particular desire that these political prisoners 'were not to be under any other restraint than their parole not to quit without the permission of the Raja the villages in which they might reside', and that it was 'the desire of the (Madras) Government that they should be treated with respect and kindness'. In April 1834, however, the next ruler, Raja Raghunatha Tondaiman, permitted some of these state prisoners to re-visit Ceylon. The Kandyan exiles were soon absorbed in some of the Nayak families in the Pudukkottai State previously related to them⁷, and formed a new sub-caste called *Kandy Rajas*⁸, whose homes lie scattered in the town of Pudukkottai and a few villages such as Karuppapatti and Vellaikurichi. Though now reduced to indigence, they still cling to some of the emblems of princely birth; their women, to cite an instance, wear toe rings of gold, a privilege which is denied in South India to all women not of princely rank, whose leg ornaments are generally of silver or brass. This 'caste' is now divided into a number of exogamous sects⁹, and they speak a corrupt form of Telugu.

⁵ Afterwards Colonel Sir William Blackburne.

⁶ Letter dated 31 January 1816 from the Resident to the Raja Tondaiman.

⁷ A genealogical tree furnished to the Madras Government by the 'Nayaks' of Karukakurichi in Pudukkottai State traces the close relationship of their families to Raja Vikrama Simha of Kandy who is alleged to have been born in Karukkapulampatti (*Karuppapatti* for short) a village in the Tirumayam taluk of the State.

⁸ The census and other reports of the State enumerate them as a separate caste.

⁹ Venkata Raman K.R., *A Manual of the Pudukkottai State*, Vol. I, p. 132.

FORGOTTEN GUJARATI BRAHMAN BANKER (18th CENTURY)

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THE early records of the East India Company, particularly those of the Surat factory, contain many references to the part played by the Gujarati bankers of Surat. We have, for instance, the names of Tapi Das Parekh, Tulsi Das Parekh, Chota Das Thakur, Somaji Chitta, Somaji Nathaji, Valji, Virji Vora, Vaghji and others figuring in records ranging from 1634 till 1677¹. From their names all except one appear to have been Gujarati Banyas. In the absence of the surname, we cannot make out whether Somaji Nathaji was a Brahman or a Banya.

But this is not the case when we come across the name of Arjunji Nathaji Trivedi, who was undoubtedly a Gujarati Brahman. He figures in the records of the Fort William Government at Calcutta, which are now preserved in the National Archives of India, and which range from 1770 till 1798. Before we proceed we may note that this name is variously spelt in the records, thus: Turvady Urzoonji Nathjee; Hurjunjee Nathjee Tarwadee; Harjundee Natjee Tarwadee; Turvaddy Urjonji Nathjee; Turvaddy Urjenjee Nathjee; Arjunjee Nathjee; Arzonjee Nathjee; and Arjenjee Nautjee Tewarry. In a letter dated 24th September 1770 from the Surat factors addressed to the Fort William Government, we are informed that they had granted bills in favour of Arjunji Nathaji Trivedi for Muxadavad (Murshidabad) Sicca Rupees 7,500 payable at the Calcutta Treasury. Evidently Ramnath Ramdut, who delivered the amount to the Surat factors, was one of the agents of Trivedi².

In a letter dated 22nd April 1773, and addressed to Samuel Middleton, Chief of Kassimbazar, the "humble servants" (i.e., the Governor-General in Council) sent a copy of the petition addressed to the Board at Calcutta from Arjunji Nathaji Trivedi in which there was a complaint against Mr. Pattle. Middleton was to make proper inquiry into the case. The nature of the complaint is not revealed in the letter

¹ Foster, William, *The English Factories in India, 1634-36*, pp. 85, 103, 218; 1651-54 pp. 107, 150, 281; 1661-64, pp. 85, 90, 98, 100, 107, 113, 203, 207, *et passim*; 1670-77 pp. 192, 238, 328, 335; Fawcett, Sir Charles, *The English Factories in India Vol. I (N.S.) 1670-77*, pp. 78, 190, 192, 288, 328, 335.

² Home Department, Public "C" Consultations, No. 10, dated 9th January 1771.

which merely seeks that redress may be granted to Trivedi as the nature of the circumstances may require³. Middleton reported on 4th May 1773 that the complaint was groundless, and that it needed no further consideration⁴.

Notwithstanding the above complaint, the relations between Trivedi and the Company's factors at Surat remained cordial. On 22nd September 1773 they drew bills to the value of Murshidabad Sicca Rupees 50,000 in favour of Trivedi payable at the Calcutta Treasury. The exchange rate is given at Surat Rupees 96 being equal to Muxadavad (Murshidabad) Sicca Rupees 100⁵. The same Surat factors, as revealed in their letter dated 24th December 1773, drew bills in favour of the same banker to the extent of Murshidabad Sicca Rupees 15,000 payable at Calcutta, and being equal to Surat Rupees 14,100⁶. Another agent of Trivedi, by name Vir Vallabdas Vir Bhoosundas is mentioned in another letter from the same factors, dated 30th November 1776, in which we are informed that bills to the extent of Murshidabad Sicca Rupees 5,000 equal to Surat Rupees 4,750, were drawn in favour of Trivedi but to be paid at Calcutta⁷. A third agent of Trivedi, called Taldas Loldas, is mentioned in another letter of the Surat factors dated 15th December 1775, in which they drew bills to the extent of Murshidabad Sicca Rupees 5,260 and "two quarters", equal to Surat Rupees 5,000⁸.

How careful the English factors were in calculating the interest on the capital borrowed from Trivedi is shown in a letter dated 25th May 1780 from Claud Alexander, Military Paymaster General, and addressed to Willaim Bruere, who was acting Secretary to the Supreme Council. The difference between Trivedi's interest account and that of Alexander is put down by the latter at Sicca Rupees 322-2-1.

³ Home Dept., Public "B" Cons. No. 6, dated 22nd April 1773.

⁴ Home Dept., "B" Cons. No. 11, dated 7th June 1773. Five persons bearing the name Pattle appear in the records ranging from 1778-1800. These are R. W. Pattle, who was Registrar, *Diwani Adalat*, Birbhum, and who was Collector of Purnea (Press List to Public Dept. Records, Vol. XIV, p. 424; XVI, p. 412); T. Pattle, who was Secretary to Murshidabad Controlling Council of Revenue, who held various high posts, and who became Judge of the Court of Appeal, Murshidabad and Paymaster of the Nizamat stipends (*Ibid.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 180, 240, 260; Vol. IX, pp. 130, 143, 536; XV, pp. 132, 134, 243, 401, 462; XV, pp. 367, 376, 394-5, etc.); R. Pattle (*Ibid.*, XV, 442); J. Pattle (*Ibid.*, 473, 482-83); and W. Pattle (*Ibid.*, XVII, 559). It cannot be made out to whom the reference in the letter under review is meant.

⁵ Home Dept., Public "C" Cons., No. 3, dated 7th March 1774.

⁶ *Ibid.*, "C" Cons., No. 2, dated 15th February 1774. This letter is dated earlier than the previous one.

⁷ *Ibid.*, "C" Cons., No. 29, dated 25th January 1776.

⁸ *Ibid.*, "C" Cons., No. 11, dated 14th February 1776.

This difference was due to Trivedi's not having reckoned the days of Grace. In the second paragraph of the same letter, Alexander attributes this difference, which was also noticeable in the accounts of other bankers like Gopal Das and Hari Krishna Das, to the "calculations by the Moons", adopted by the indigenous bankers which resulted in a difference of four or five days⁹. The details of Trivedi's interest account are given in the Home Department Public "C" Consultations, dated 29th May. So far as we are concerned, we may merely note two points concerning them—First, that bills were payable either within 10 days or 16 days after sight; and secondly, that the rate of interest was 9 per cent per annum.

While the English were careful in calculating the difference in the amount of interest payable by them, they were not equally careful in repaying the amounts borrowed. This does not mean, however, that they defrauded those who lent them vast sums of money. On the other hand, the reverse is the truth. But there was an unavoidable delay in repaying the borrowed amounts which necessitated in 1780 a petition written in Hindi from Mulchand Dubey, the *gomastah* of Arjunji Nathaji Trivedi, to Governor-General Warren Hastings. The petitioner prayed that, whereas the banker's agents promptly paid the amounts at Surat and Bombay, the Fort William Government did not repay the capital with equal promptness at Calcutta, thereby compelling them to incur loss. The petitioner requested that that loss may be compensated for by the Calcutta Government¹⁰. That this was not an altogether unjust request is proved by Claud Alexander's letter dated 6th April 1781 in which the Military Paymaster General admits that he was sometimes three months in arrears in matters of payment, and that the complaints of the *gomastah* of Arjunji Nathaji Trivedi were as much justifiable as those of another banker called Kushal Chand¹¹.

The great delay which the banker's agents had experienced at Calcutta was taken up by Arjunji Nathaji Trivedi himself, who in an undated letter received at Calcutta on 7th May 1788 but recorded in the Public Consultations on 21st May 1788, requested that the amounts due to his firm might be paid more regularly. This letter is important from two points of view—Firstly, it adds to the proof available elsewhere that the Company's officials were intent on maintaining law and order in the country. Trivedi eulogizes the services of Jonathan Duncan, Resident at Banaras, thus:—"Your Lordship's Justice is published from East to West, and Tyranny of Oppressors is buried in everlasting Darkness. Mankind apply themselves to

⁹ *Ibid.*, "C" Cons., No. 16, dated 19th May 1780.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, "C" Cons., No. 16, dated 29th May 1780.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Original "C" Cons., No. 39, dated 21st May 1781.

their concerns with Comfort and Ease, so that they have no other wish than Prosperity and success to Your Lordship. In these Zillahs that Mr. Duncan applies himself with such zeal to the arrangement of the Company's affairs and has fixed them in a manner that never was known before, has raised his name all over Hindostan for his Protection of the Ryotts of all Denomination and published the fame of the Company in a Degree that exceeds the power of Description". And secondly, the letter informs us that by 1788, Trivedi's firm had for long time been performing the business of bankers to the Company, that it was unconnected with any other banking concern, and that, while other bankers had sometimes failed to stand by their pledges to the Company, Trivedi's firm had never failed to perform their duty. But the tardiness of the Company in the matter of payment was to be rectified, and amounts due to Trivedi to be repaid at once, if his banking house was to continue its business.¹²

There was some truth in the statement of Trivedi that his firm could always come to the rescue of the Company when other bankers had failed to do so. The events in 1790 proved this. The centre of gravity had now shifted from Surat to Bombay. On 15th December 1790 the Governor in Council at Bombay wrote to Mr. Duncan at Banaras the following—That Nagin Das, agent of the bankers of Banaras, had refused to pay, as stipulated, his monthly quota of Rs. 2½ Lakhs until November 1790, since he had already paid Rs. 40 Lakhs till that time; and that Mr. Duncan was to remind Bhavani Das and Dwarka Das, Bankers of Banaras, of the latter's breach of agreement¹³. Mr. Duncan at once wrote to the firm concerned on 23rd October 1790 that it should stand by its agreement and pay off the balance at the rate of Rs. 2½ Lakhs for three months from September 1790. But the bankers of Banaras declined to pay on the plea that Bombay was showing favour to other bankers, and had refused to honour bills from the firm of Bhavani Das and Dwarka Das. On this Duncan wrote back to Bombay saying that no reliance could be placed on that firm, and that he recommended the house of Babu Manohar Das assisted by that of Arjunji Nathaji; that Manohar Das had sent his agent Suja Shankar to Bombay, and that arrangements had been made by Duncan through the firm of Manohar Das and that of Arjunji Nathaji Trivedi for the immediate payment of Rs. 2½ Lakhs to Bombay. The details of the invoice of remittance to Bombay make interesting reading. Whereas the house of Manohar Das was to pay through its agents Chandesser Janney (Chander-shwar Jani?) at 91 and 81 days sight, two bills of Banaras Rupees

¹² Home Dept. Public Cons., No. 19, dated 21st May 1788.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Public "C" Cons., No. 7, dated 10 November 1790.

66,960 and Rs. 69,040 (equal to Bombay Sicca 82,000 and 63,000) respectively, the house of Arjunji was to pay through Pitambor Das and Chaturbhuj Das within the same time, two bills each of Banaras Rupees 41,040 and 39,960 (equal to Bombay Sicca Rupees, 38,000 and 37,000) respectively. Receipts for the above amounts were duly given by Mr. Duncan at Banaras¹⁴.

The conclusion deducible from the above transactions are the following: Firstly, the house of Arjunji Nathaji Trivedi now stood forth as equal to the famous banking concern of Manohar Das of Banaras. Secondly, it could meet the Company's liabilities in the same prompt manner and almost to the same extent as the house of Manohar Das. Thirdly, by 1790 Trivedi's firm had established itself also at Banaras. And, finally, the Company agreed to pay the interest on the amount borrowed at the rate of 8 per cent per annum.


By 1798 the house of Arjunji Nathaji Trivedi had become a source of strength to the Bombay Government. John Morris from Bombay Castle wrote on 8th January 1798 to Daniel Seton, Chief of Surat, that the Board authorized the latter to conclude, if possible, "the negotiations which you communicated to Sir Charles Malet of raising a monthly supply of one Lac of Rupees for this Government". Daniel Seton wrote on the 15th January 1798 to Jonathan Duncan of Banaras that he had arranged with Arjunji Nathaji Trivedi to grant him bills on the Resident or Collector of Murshidabad, for one Lakh of Rupees every month for January, February, and March 1798, payable at 31 days sight for Surat Rupees One Lakh. Trivedi agreed to pay the amount monthly but requested that the Company's Government might allow him a more favourable rate of exchange than that given to other shroffs. This letter was endorsed by John Morris of Bombay and passed on to Henry Fawcett, Accountant General, on 19th January 1798. Fawcett agreed on 26th January with the Bombay Chief that the transaction was very favourable to the Company, and that it would mean a corresponding reduction on the draft on Bengal from Bombay¹⁵.

Certain considerations present themselves to us from the foregoing sketch of the liquid assets of one of the many indigenous bankers of India in the 18th century. Removed as we are from Arjunji Nathaji Trivedi by just over one hundred and fifty years, the first question that presents itself to us is this: What was the total wealth of Arjunji Nathaji Trivedi, who could give one lakh of rupees a month to the East India Company? Since he was only one of the many

¹⁴ Home Department, Public "C" Cons., No. 7, dated 10th November 1790.

¹⁵ Home Department, Public Cons., No. 2, dated 16th February 1798.

great indigenous bankers, the next question is—What was the cumulative wealth of all these indigenous bankers? These bankers lent money at rather high interest, and hence the next question—How could the English borrow at 8 per cent and 9 per cent per annum, and yet manage to pay off both interest and capital to their various creditors? The indigenous bankers mentioned above lived in the second half of the 18th century, and, therefore, in the context of their political environment, another question that may be asked is the following: Why did these bankers show preference to the English as against either their own countrymen the Marathas, the Nizam, Mahadji Sindhia, the Sultans of Mysore, the Nawabs of Bengal, or foreigners like the French and the Dutch? These are some of the many vital issues which deserve to be studied in any reorientation of the modern period of Indian history that may be undertaken at the present time.



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